Land and Power: Theory and Evidence from Chile Jean-Marie Balandy James A. Robinsonz October 2004 We are grateful to Mauricio Benitez-Iturbe and SebastianMazzuca for their outstanding research assistance. Our greatest debt is to Jonathan Conning who persevered through at least three previous versions, pointing out all the mistakes and confusions. He enormously improved the paper. We have also bene tted from the suggestions and advice of Siwan Anderson, Arnold Bauer, Michael Carter, Eduardo Fajnzylberg, Je Frieden, Tu Jarvis, Francois Maniquet, Dina Mesbah, Sripad Motiram, Andrew Newman, Thomas Piketty, Timothy Scully, Bill Summerhill, Werner Troesken, and seminar participants at APSA, Yale, Boston University, the Universi- dad de Los Andes, LSE, MIT, Montreal CIRPEE 2004 conference, and Stanford, particularly Timothy Besley, Alberto Diaz-Cayeros, Esther Du o, Jim Fearon, Dilip Mookherjee, Je Nu- gent, T.N. Srinivasan and Barry Weingast. We also thank S. Laurent for his econometric advice, Jean-Marie Baland would like to thank the MacArthur network on Inequality and Economic Per- formance, the CRED for nancial support and the Belgian Program on Inter-University Poles of Attraction initiated by the Belgian State, Prime Minister's oce, Science Policy Programming. yC.R.E.D., Facultes Universitaires Notre-Dame de la Paix, 8 Rempart de la Vierge, B-5000 Namur, Belgium. e-mail:
[email protected]. zHarvard University, Department of Government, Littauer, 1875 Cambridge St., Cambridge MA02138; e-mail:
[email protected]. Land and Power: Theory and Evidence from Chile Abstract: In this paper we investigate the e ect of the absence of a secret ballot on electoral outcomes and resource allocation.