Semiotica 2016; 208: 49–77

Dinda L. Gorlée* Wittgenstein’s persuasive rhetoric

DOI 10.1515/sem-2015-0121

Abstract: Wittgenstein surprised with the rhetorical inversion of his style of writing, often at the expense of thought. In his works, he skillfully constructed the fragmentary paragraphs to solve the “confusions” of language. The result of Wittgenstein’s conscious endeavor is the persuasive effect of new reasoning in the “ornamental” type of the philosophical writings about language. Wittgenstein’s verbal genres are the interplay of deduction, induction, and abduction, formed consciously and subconsciously, following the three categories of Peirce’s semio-logical reasoning. Wittgenstein’s rhetoric changed the first certainty of philosophy into the abductive uncertainty of his later works, keeping the story of Wittgenstein’s reasoning in suspense.

Keywords: Wittgenstein, stylistics, linguïculture, Peirce, speculative rhetoric, deduction-induction-abduction, Barthes

If I do not quite know how to begin a book that is because something is still unclear. For I should like to begin with the original data of philosophy, written & spoken sentences, with books as it were. And here we encounter the difficulty of “Everything is in flux.” And perhaps that is the very point at which to begin. (Wittgenstein 1930, CV 1998: 11)

1 Persuasive and ornamental speech

Ludwig Wittgenstein’s (1889–1951) “new” philosophy, as he envisaged it, was to be the idea of writing books and writings in conflicting rhetoric to question the readers. Wittgenstein’s philosophy has become so diversified and specialized in the secondary literature, that we would need a number of examples to show that the first form of systematic knowledge developed into Wittgenstein’s creative philosophy of language. Perhaps he could derive his twentieth-century moder- nity from the difference between his present knowledge and the knowledge of our ancestors. Instead of talking in monologue for himself, Wittgenstein’s life also decided to feature the dialogue as didactic tool of persuasion. Regardless of

*Corresponding author: Dinda L. Gorlée, University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway, E-mail: [email protected] 50 Dinda L. Gorlée fame or adversity, Wittgenstein in his later years kept true to his first vocation of finding the social dialogue with the readers. Perhaps Wittgenstein’s personal development could make sense of the world in which he lived by following the footsteps of the orator of Athens, Demosthenes (c. 384–322, BCE). So the legendary story goes that the lawyer Demosthenes was a stutterer (Ostwald 1973: 356–366; Gray 2012: 34). After years of practicing law in the courts of Athens, Demosthenes wanted to overcome his weak voice to become a famous orator with passionate orations to persuade the Greek audience. Standing on the beach of Athens, Demosthenes put a mouthful of pebbles in his mouth to improve the tone of his voice. This handicap practiced his vocal appropriateness or political adequacy to train the acoustics of his eloquent voice against the noise of the sea. The Greek statesman won his own battles, composing and delivering his series of political speeches, and reaching his success in public policy as the great orator of the golden age of Greek oratory. Demosthenes and young Wittgenstein stuttered for words in the articulation in public, inhibiting their power to speak straightforwardly (McGuinness 1988: 52). When writing the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein’s first speech dis- fluency was clearly observed by his friend Paul Engelmann, when he listened to his explanation of the work. Nervously, Wittgenstein stammered the paragraphs of the incomprehensible and controversial manuscript, while Engelmann, as he said, with a “sensitive understanding for what he wanted to say” helped him find the “right words by stating myself the proposition he had in mind” (qtd. in CPE: 94). Perhaps the blocking of sounds and articulation of words remained after the disappearance of the stammer as the desire of Wittgenstein’s fragmentariness in narrative speech. Wittgenstein also seemed to fulfill the biblical story of Ezekiel’s prophetic vision (c. 600 BCE). During the hard times of the Jewish exile in Babylon, the prophet Ezekiel pronounced divine speeches promising to the banished Israelite people the “garden of Eden” (Ezek. 36: 35 Authorized King James Version). The vision of the future fixed on the future in the Promised Land. Following the exile, the Jews would restore the ruins of the Temple at Jerusalem (Ezek. 40–48). Ezekiel’s spiritual images explained the process of restoration in the volumes of the outer wall, the dimensions of the inner courtyard and the sanctuary of the Hebrew Temple. The complex dimensionality of Jerusalem’s sacred temple was measured exactly by Ezekiel. His gift of prediction was full of detailed information about the numerical and algebraic dimensions of the breadth and length, the height and depth of the parts of the Temple. Metaphorically, the deduction of the outer wall, the induction of the inner courtyard, and the abduction of the sanctuary gave the three dimensions of Ezekiel’s building tools to draw an analogy between the shape or form of the architectural framework and Wittgenstein’s narrative style and genre. Wittgenstein’s persuasive rhetoric 51

The domain of Wittgenstein’s life started with the philosophical “oratory” of his early work, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. The basic thoughts of this book were about solving the questions of grammar and logic. The effectiveness of this academic volume was in the paragraphs measured in the numbered and subnumbered items. Tractatus is the only work of Wittgenstein that was published during Wittgenstein’s lifetime. The other writings, from the 1930s onwards, The Blue and Brown Book and his masterwork Philosophical Investigations right up to his last pages in On Certainty (OC) feature his mature philosophy. These and other “new” works (articles, lectures, andnotebooks)werewrittenandrewrittenbyWittgensteintoachievethefinal formulation of his world view. However, Wittgenstein’sworksandwritingswere circulated in the provisional form of stencils produced to be read by interested colleagues and students suitable for early dialogue in academia. The dimensionality of the contemporary scientific rules shaped Wittgenstein’s early linguistics of the Tractatus. Wittgenstein focused on true or false proposi- tions, which he judged not only by appearances but from the facts of logic and mathematics. In the series of propositions, he revealed the list of free vari- ables used in the “confusions” of language in order to clear up the doubtful points. According to Lunsford, the “subversive” difficulties indicate the relativism of the “vitality, the sense of excitement and playful purpose” (1992: 77) regarding the production of words with a new meaning. As a creative philosopher, Wittgenstein’s new ideas solved the “good” and “false” meaning of linguistic problems through the cultural background of the community. The novelty of Wittgenstein’s language philosophy animates and inspires the fact that language is not a fixed collection of words and sentences, but a shared instrument for all speakers and readers. Language shows the linguistic-and-cultural mannerisms of linguïculture (Anderson and Gorlée 2011: 222–226). Wittgenstein did not write only logical “books” but composed his “albums” written in daily language (PI 2009 [1953]: 4; see Pichler 2002, 2004, 2009; Gorlée 2012: 68–69, 187, 228). Like Barthes, Wittgenstein transformed the ordinary state- ments of language into literature, creating for the author “akindofsocial,theolo- gical, mythic, aesthetic, moral end” (Barthes 1983 [1979]: 492). The literary speeches and conversations signify that the traditional type of the “architectural and preme- ditated” book existed to “reproduce an order of the world” as opposed to chaos; but the relative order led Wittgenstein to transfigure it into “a kind of written word according to a special code” (Barthes 1983 [1979]: 491–492). After publishing the coded form of the Tractatus, Wittgenstein wrote that he was, as Barthes, not able to:

… achieve the status of the Book (of the Work); it is only an Album … The Album is a collection of leaflets not only interchangeable (even this would be nothing), but above all infinitely suppressible … to the complete annihilation of the Album, with 52 Dinda L. Gorlée

theexcusethat“Idon’t like this one”: this is the method of Groucho and Chico Marx, reading aloud and tearing up each clause of the contract which is meant to bind them. (Barthes 1983 [1979]: 492)

Wittgenstein’s fragmentary albums unite the unbroken and broken signs in his stream of discourse (Gorlée 2007). In the theory of logic in the literary frame- work, Wittgenstein attempted to operate the simple and complex signs of language to create a permanent fixture between the official form of published book and the intimacy of the album. One could argue that Wittgenstein followed the Peircean categories of sense, meaning, and significance (NEM 3: 844), expressing in his reasoning the three stages of thought. Wittgenstein created the pragmatic stages formulated in words, paraphrases, and arguments. Although the three stages of thought would suggest Wittgenstein’s reading of Peirce’s work, the inescapable truth is that Wittgenstein did not read Peirce, although he could have discussed the semiotic themes, and particularly Peirce’s semiotics, with his English friend, mathematician Frank Ramsey (Gorlée 2012: 27–30). This means that Wittgenstein’s thoughts and its overlaps with Peirce’s organization of work institute a semiotic connection between them (Gorlée forthcoming). Peirce’s categories form the basis for Wittgenstein’s demonstrative and fallible thought- signs in the use of language, while language is suffused with the undemonstra- tive and unfallible signs of non-thought. Wittgenstein’s philosophical confronta- tion and linguistic negotiation regarding the use of alternative and creative forces in ordinary vocabulary, phraseology, and textology (Gorlée 2004: 197– 198) was to be understood in a general sense, reaching the understanding of general readers. The complex interplay between the domestic accommodation of linguistic forms with the cultural pressures of Wittgenstein’s hard times – consider the political background of the Habsburg monarchy, the impact of both World Wars, and the Cold War – gave Wittgenstein the threatening challenge of transacting the globalized, but still fragmented, world view implying the conflict and war around. The political puzzle of Wittgenstein’s survival dealt with a constantly changeable and manipulable situation of world politics. The political uncer- tainty has become transplanted in the fragmentariness of Wittgenstein’s short paragraphs or aphorisms (Gorlée 2007). He spoke not in the general voice of universal scholar, but as individual person facing the world around. Instead of dealing with the immediate situation of the danger in his environment, he tended to escape from “reality” to build his version of “pseudo-reality” in composing the persuasive rhetoric. Wittgenstein wanted to tell the truth in fragmentary albums. The albums had an emotional reference to Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s persuasive rhetoric 53 as a person and scholar, but also maintained the historical tension of being inspired by the genres of Plato’s Dialogues and the influence of Saint Augustine (Gorlée 2012: 107–128). Plato benefitted for Wittgenstein’s eyes the pedagogical argumentation in teaching pure logic, while Augustine added the sacred writ- ings of biblical writings, hymns, and sermons. In Wittgenstein’s intellectual company, the archaic teaching of philosophy and religion of Plato and Augustine gave the special form and unorthodox shape to the philosophical “pseudo-reality” of Wittgenstein’s personal “reality”:

As recognized faithful patrons, their mission and persuasiveness taught Wittgenstein the way that passive words can turn into active deeds. On reading the sources, Wittgenstein underwent a change of heart: Plato’s evidence alerted him to the hazards of interpretation, whereas Augustine taught him interpretative translation. The supportive forces of Plato’s socio-political thought – the utopian ideal of the good life and good society of the Laws – and Augustine’s personal – or perhaps egotistic – notebooks of Confessions inspired Wittgenstein to pursue his scientific learning, aiming to resolve the social “confusions” of language today with his authoritative answers and to confide his own philosophical schemes in his lectures and publications. (Gorlée 2012: 138–139)

As a teacher, Wittgenstein’s style emphasized the degree of experimental learn- ing and the value of scientific method in his lectures. This new style is trans- planted into Wittgenstein’s new reasoning of humanities. The literary effect of the emergence of linguistics was for the readers or students the wide exposure to the grammatical, logical, and rhetorical “otherness,” including fragmentary reading, writing, and speaking. Analytic philosophy addressed the new and contemporary interests of the twentieth century audience. Against the ancient sources of the genres in the traditional drama, epic, and lyric, Northrop Frye’s division of poetic rhetoric refers to two kinds of rhetoric: persuasive speech for “applied literature” and ornamental speech meaning the “lexis or verbal texture of poetry” (1973 [1957]: 245). At first sight, both kinds of rhetoric seem:

… psychologically opposed to each other, as the desire to ornament is essentially disin- terested, and the desire to persuade essentially the reverse. In fact ornamental rhetoric is inseparable from literature itself, or what we have called the hypothetical verbal structure which exists for its own sake. Persuasive literature is applied literature, or the use of literary art to reinforce the power of argument. Ornamental rhetoric acts on its hearers statistically, leading them to admire its own beauty or wit; persuasive rhetorics tries to lead them kinetically towards a course of action. One articulates emotion; the other manipu- lates it. (Frye 1973 [1957]: 245)

The rhetorical sides of Wittgenstein’s philosophical works appear in the long and mostly unedited narratives as they seem to be in the first version or the 54 Dinda L. Gorlée variety of different re-versions, written by Wittgenstein’s hand; or else the rhetorical sides can shrink back to smaller units of the edited titles or appear in editorial volumes. After Wittgenstein’s death (1951), Wittgenstein’s rhetoric became a mixed genre for the readers of his edited volumes. These are com- posed out of Wittgenstein’s own materials, but include the alien (radical, even mythical) imagery of all kinds of textual editors, revisers, and translators of his work. The ethical criticism of these reviewers can refer back to Frye’s “assertive, descriptive, or factual” reorganization (1973 [1957]: 245) of the “realism” of Wittgenstein’s own writings into the critical rearrangement of his total frame- work of language philosophy. Returning to the linguistic ornaments and schemes to plan the logical truth of language, Wittgenstein’s volumes concentrate on the rhetorical inversion of the persuasive (meaning non-logical and emotional) forms of style, discourse, passage, phrase, and words, often at the expense of logical thought. Focusing on emotional aspects of the persuasive style, ornamented with scientific argu- mentation, Wittgenstein’s treatment of language reached forward by decades into the contemporary mistreatment of social media of the twenty-first century. As language philosopher, he was constantly aware of the philosophical certainty of his work, but often sharply contrasted with the uncertainty of the fragmentary albums. Wittgenstein created in natural language the groundless manuscripts of interweaved paragraphs and aphorisms, which must be read not directly but indirectly to be rightly understood as critical remarks. This paradox has created the puzzle of reading Wittgenstein’s writings.

2 Speculative rhetoric

Practical creativity as the linguistic and psychological engagement with every- day life was the subject of Wittgenstein’s lectures about aesthetics delivered at the University of Cambridge in 1938. The published lectures about the “confu- sions” of the term of aesthetics were not written by Wittgenstein himself, but compiled and taken down by the students (including Yorick Smythies and Rush Rhees) in their notes, which were edited in that provisional form after Wittgenstein’s death (LA). This happened, of course, without his agreement on this procedure, since Wittgenstein actually wanted the students to stop making notes at his lectures (Monk 1990: 403; see Klagge and Nordmann 2003: 331–332). During the dialogue of Wittgenstein’s lectures, he gave practical examples from architecture, music, the art of hairdressing, costume, and other cultural examples. To define the objective meaning of aesthetics, he answered to Rhees’ question that: Wittgenstein’s persuasive rhetoric 55

I may join up with the things I like; you with the things you dislike. But the word [of aesthetics] may be used without any affective element; you use it to describe a particular kind of thing that happened. It was more like using a technical term – possibly, though not at all necessarily, with a derogatory element in it. (LA: 10-11, see Drury 1984: 141)

The solution of the philosophy concerned with personal art was that one must “get clear about aesthetic words you have to describe ways of living” (LA: 11). To determine what is portrayed as “beautiful” or “ugly” objects of art, looking like good or bad artifacts, one needs to go back to the basic social patterns – in Wittgensteinian cultural “forms of life” (Lebensformen). The forms of life mix aesthetics with the cultural remarks about modern life to integrate into the mechanism of science (LA: 11–17). As underlying forms of life, including the theories of art and science, the cultural forms build the speech-act of the “language-game” (Gorlée 2012, forthcoming). The language-games have removed the traditional rules, but are not un-ruled, since they must function within a shared culture to be rightly understood in a particular society. The efforts to creativity in language reaffirms the constantly fluctuating activity of cultural beliefs, practices, commitments, joined with the strength of scientific theories to perform the “pervasive” force of Wittgenstein’s “ornamental” language-games. In the attempts to solve the “vagueness” of the creative play-acts in Wittgenstein’s language-games, the deliberate effort to reasoning is the use of the logical method to grasp the meaning of the subject. Wittgenstein appeared to follow the semio-logical method of the formal logician and active scientist Charles S. Peirce. As argued in my book Wittgenstein and Translation: Exploring Semiotic Signatures (Gorlée 2012), the method of semiotics can define Wittgenstein’s logical methodology. Peirce’s “laboratory” inquiry serves here as the method of threeway reasoning for Wittgenstein. While semiotics, as a methology, remains neutral (and here undiscussed), the scientific inquiry is orthodox reasoning, linked to the classical logical rules. Nevertheless, it is, in Peirce’s doctrine of semiotics, trans- posed in other working forms of semio-reasoning and can become unorthodox thought. These forms of reasoning are usual to grasp and drive the flux and flow of ruled thought of the creative and non-ruled imagination in Wittgenstein’s mind and heart. Peirce’s article “Ideas, Stray or Stolen, About Scientific Writing,” discussed the abstract forms and concrete shapes of scholarly writing between logical (and illogical) problems. Scientific communication must be “trained to the scientific life” in which the “coupling of the ideas of rhetoric and science would hitherto equally have been regarded as a typical example of incongruity” (EP 2: 325), something Wittgenstein would certainly agree with. Peirce’s general idea of rhetoric will include the “rules of expression as stringent as any of those by 56 Dinda L. Gorlée which the excellence of composition in Chinese or in Urdu is judged” (EP 2: 326, see EP 2: 329) in order to become a cross-cultural tool. Peirce stressed:

… as an ens in posse, a universal art of rhetoric, which shall be the general secret of rendering signs effective, including under the term “sign” every picture, diagram, natural cry, pointing finger, wink, knot in one’s handkerchief, memory, dream, fancy, concept, indication, token, symptom, letter, numeral, word, sentence, chapter, book, library, and in short whatever, be it in the physical universe, be in in the world of thought. (EP 2: 326)

The “universal art” (EP 2: 326) of the signs of language can be broadened and enlarged by Peirce with “just contempt of ‘mere’ words” to transfigure into the “literary culture” (EP 2: 325) of figures of non-verbal speech. The outcome will be Peirce’s “speculative rhetoric” (EP 2: 326–330; see Liszka 1996; Freadman 2004: 93–94, 103), concerned with “the methods that ought to be pursued in the investigation, in the exposition, and in the application of truth” (CP 1.191). Instead of speculative rhetoric, Peirce’s other name of speculative rhetoric was “pure rhetoric’ or the “methodeutic” of rhetoric. Methodeutic shows “how it [rhetoric] differs from critic: how, although it considers, not of what is admis- sible, but what is advantageous, it is nevertheless a purely theoretical study, and not [just] an art” (NEM 4: 26). The new, but formal, science of speculative rhetorics serves as the “objective logic” of the “utility (meaning, generally, the scientific utility)” (NEM 4: 27). Speculative rhetoric applies persuasively, eco- nomically, and mathematically to the “practical” questions of knowledge of education, learning, and erudition. Continuing the Roman trivium of grammar, logic, and rhetoric, Peirce’s speculative rhetoric is divided into speculative grammar, speculative critic, and speculative rhetoric (EP 2: 327). Speculative grammar and speculative criti- cism have been argued, as Peirce proposed, but the details remain unclear. Peirce added that “speculative rhetoric has been comparatively neglected” (EP 2: 327). In the oratory of speech and language, the image of the “rhetoric of fine arts” stands to provide the activity of “practical persuasion” to direct the form and shape of the text, according to the individual and collective “knowledge” (EP 2: 329) of the author. Speculative rhetorics is inspired by the formalistic treatment of the relationship of perfection to execute the truth of content. Wittgenstein’s strategy contains a good deal of practical philosophy. He wrote and rewrote his temporary and fragmented versions, but after his Tractatus he never wrote a final or definitive version to be made public. Instead of Peirce’s ideal of semiosis, Wittgenstein’s pseudo-semiosis (discussed in Gorlée 2012) did not improve on the speculative expression of Peirce’s “Ideas, Stray or Stolen, About Scientific Writing.” Unusual words, sentences, or fragments needed for Wittgenstein’s persuasive rhetoric 57

Wittgenstein the “dry-cleaning” process of recovering the unusualities and restoring them to working order (CV 1984: 39; CV 1998: 44; see Gorlée 2012: 61). Wittgenstein’s grammatical (terminological) puzzle in the article “Some Remarks on Logical Form” (1929) started with:

Every proposition has a content and a form. We get the picture of the pure form if we abstract from the meaning of the single words, or symbols (so far as they have independent meanings). That is to say, if we substitute variables for the consonants of the proposition. The rules of syntax which applied to the consonants must apply to the variables also. By syntax in this general sense of the word I mean the rules which tell us in which connec- tions only a word gives sense, thus excluding nonsensical structures. The syntax of ordinary language, as is well known, is not quite adequate for this purpose. It does not in all cases prevent the construction of nonsensical pseudopropositions … (RLF: 162)

The vagueness of content and the form of the writings expressed Wittgenstein’s struggle. In 1930, he suggested a more positive tone:

But it seems to me too that there is a way of capturing the world sub specie aeterni other than through the work of the artist. Thought has such a way – so I believe – it is as though it flies above the world and leaves it the way it is – observing it from above, in flight. (CV 1980: 5; retranslated in CV 1998: 7)

Wittgenstein’s flight of thought avoided the “confusions” of the earlier philosophy of language. Instead, he formalized the scientific value and the utility of the methods of reasoning, the conclusion(s) are regarded as Peirce’s interpretants. The series of Peirce’s three interpretants that follow and interact with each other are the immedi- ate and dynamical interpretants, as well as the final interpretant, also called the emotional, energetic, and logical interpretants. The interpretants are building-signs of earlier signs, actively involved with the constructive and deconstructive inter- pretation to give special content and form to the signs of communication. The exhaustive analysis of interpretants does not always reach the final analysis of semiosis, but the reasoning of the sign system gives in informal logic the temporary (Peirce’s pseudo-semiosic) style of communication (Gorlée forthcoming). Wittgenstein’s reasoning minimized the risk of subjectivity and provided maximum objectivity. To achieve this ideal of seeking rational truth through persuasive “untruth,” he observed his own writing style and grounded his own demonstrative and fallible data by a variety of inferential reasonings, in accor- dance with Peirce’s semiotics and the three categories. The three-step methods of reasoning are expected to eventually yield true conclusions. Logical reasoning was traditionally either deductive or inductive reasoning. Peirce revolutionized the traditional dichotomy which he expanded and redefined as a trichotomy by including his discovery of abduction (from 1867). The decision-making 58 Dinda L. Gorlée distinguished between explicatory (or analytic) reasoning in deduction and ampliative (or synthetic) reasoning for induction; together with Peirce’sdis- covery of abductive reasoning, Peirce’s steps of logic were three-dimensional. Explicatory (or analytic) reasoning corresponds to deductive inference, as in this example taken from Peirce’s metaphor of the beanbag:

Rule All the beans from this bag are white. Case These beans are from this bag. • Result These beans are white. (CP .)

Deduction simply substitutes for the facts presented in the premise, what is implicit in them. Since all of the beans in the sample are white, the sample from the known whole to the parts of the bag means that the deductive argumenta- tion stays as it is (whiteness) and does not draw upon the unknown or the partially unknown. This makes deduction the only form of “necessary” (that is, explicatory) reasoning to reach truth in itself. Deduction as such forecloses critical examination or evaluation of its premises and does not engage in the introduction of new insights, nor in the rejection of hypotheses already adopted. While deduction makes no error, non-deductive reasoning does not lead to necessary conclusions but to other conclusions which can be probable or merely plausible. While deduction “proves that something must be” and induction “shows that something actually is operative,” Peirce suggested that abduction” “merely suggests that something may be” (CP 5.171). Apart from the traditional reasoning about the clear signs seen in reality (deduction and induction), the new abduction (also called hypothesis or retroduction) is the hidden logic of the real impulse of the intuitive sensing of the known parts to the unknown whole and come to the conclusion. Abduction is Peirce’s talent for guesswork. As temporary guidepost to logic, induction and abduction are the “statistical inference” to logic, since “Out of a bag of black and white beans I take a few handfuls, and from this sample I can judge approximately the proportions of black and white in the whole” (CP 5.349). While induction and abduction are similar viewpoints, they point to different approaches (as shall be argued further). Instead of the ampliative or synthetic arguments of deductive reasoning, the inductivist character rests on what “actually is” (CP 5.171) in the reality of propositions. Peirce’s signs of inductive reality are:

Rule These beans are from this bag. Case These beans are white. • Result All the beans from this bag are white. (CP .) Wittgenstein’s persuasive rhetoric 59

Inductive inference gives the “course of experimental investigation” (CP 5.168). Induction assumes that “what is true for a whole collection is true of a number of instances taken from it at random” (CP 5.275). The conclusion of the fair sample taken from the bag is that we can judge that all the beans are, both now and in the future, white. Induction is a statistical proposition, since the sign points outside itself to the object referred to, giving “a fragment torn away from the object, the two in their Existence being one whole or a part of such whole” (CP 2.230). Induction establishes a clear cause-consequence relation between premise and conclusion (semiotically, between sign and interpretant). The conclusion requires the investigator to follow the judgment almost “blindly,” but there can be no absolute certainty in induction. The active inquirer (reader), spurred by his or her intellectual curiosity (CP 5.584), is in fact making predictions and thereby judging the unknown by the known. New knowledge is inferred by extrapolating it from actual fact toward the unknown of the future. Induction is therefore something like a “practical truth” (CP 6.527), bringing the inquirer halfway on the path of logic, leading closely from interrogation and doubt to certainty and truth. Every scientific inquiry and pseudo-scientific story (the case) needs to for- mulate and adopt certain beliefs or rough hypotheses on which to further build the argumentation. The belief uses instinctive reasoning to come to the abduc- tive hypothesis. In the abductive inference, we catch a new “case from a rule and result” (CP 2.623). Peirce explained: “On the table there is a handful of white beans; and, after some searching, I find one of the bags contains white beans only. I at once infer as probability, or as a fair guess, that this handful was taken out of that bag” (CP 2.623) or in the practical example of Peirce’s beanbag:

Rule All the beans from this bag are white. Case These beans are white. • Result These beans are from this bag. (CP .)

Abductive mannerisms are radically contrasted with the forward reasoning of deduction and induction, since they concern backward reasoning through new ideas. Abduction is based on hunches and guesses of the inquirer. The emo- tional or affective attitudes of the case is the intuitive feeling adopted through the case inside the result. The intuitive opportunities state the possibilities of “may” and “maybe not.” Through the abductive experiment, the experience is a surprising requirement to offer new information and new grounds for reasonable doubt of what seems to happen in reality. Of the three modes of reasoning, abduction is the only one to “open up new ground” (NEM 3: 206) and to introduce novelty into the intellectual (or pseudo- 60 Dinda L. Gorlée intellectual) observation of the case. Induction moves from ideas to things, whereas abduction is a reverse operation, moving from things to ideas, from outside to inside. Abduction seems to start with capturing the inquirer’s flavors, tastes, and expectancies, until it reaches the hypotheses on the story. Weak as the absolute truth value of abduction may be and in fact is (at least when compared to the probative force of its stronger counterparts of deduction and induction), abduction is nevertheless the creative force of logical reasoning, breathing the air of originality into what would otherwise be a “reasonable” (CP 5.174) but utterly rationalistic and, thereby, lifeless process of reasoning. Abduction must be defined as individual creativity bringing new ideas into the story. Peirce relabeled a mode of thought which, for all his conjectural tentative- ness of feeling, was often plausible in real cases. Abduction suggests more than gratuitous guesswork of the problems of the story, but introduces the lightning flash breaking through logical analysis to shed new light on the underlying instinctual feeling with a moral or ethical element. The tentative explanation is iconically prefigured in the premises. The first premise describes what the beans must be like to qualify as beans from Peirce’s bag. The interpretant (final conclusion) of the abduction is the iconic quality, here the whiteness of the beans. The rest is guesswork based on rational instinct, recreating feeling not from the mind but from the heart. It is believed that abduction looks somehow into the unseen universe of mind and heart in the attempts to form some hypothesis concerning the forms, shapes, and other features of the subject. The abductive overtones of logical reasoning are acritical feelings or psy- chological reflections, suited to Peirce’s “Ideas, Stray or Stolen, About Scientific Writing.” The judgment of abduction gives no certainty; the decisions have the emotional nature of some form of intuitive perceptions. The more or less intel- lectual feelings are expressed by the ejaculatory sentence “It seems to me that …” to explain the story of abduction. Abductive judgments offer personal values and rebuild the signs to acquire the feelings of the meaning (or meanings) of the case, at a distance from the moral control of self-control of data through the settling of doubts within, firstly, induction and subsequently, deduction. Abduction starts the evolution of the speculative reasoning, in which abductive beliefs are the first and essential steps of poetic unreasonableness to move further on the way toward final reasonableness – the truth of the conclusion. Abduction is not included in the purely cognitive laws and dispositions. Abductive forms are not (or not yet) regarded as intellectual inquiry but, rather, answer imaginary forms of inchoate questioning of new ideas, out of which rational discourses may possibly emerge to solve the case. Abduction speaks about the emotive, religious, and political values as implicit argument, integrated into explicit argument, remaining as the surprising phenomenon of feelings or Wittgenstein’s persuasive rhetoric 61 other acriticial reasonings of the story. Despite the hidden nature, abductive reasoning is adopted within deduction and induction, but, as the case may be, is often not discussed as meaningful element of illogic transformed into logic.

3 Narrative style and genre

Peirce’s logical reasoning seems to put in order Wittgenstein’s persuasive and ornamental genres of the primary works, as well as in the ongoing editing of the edited secondary works. Mastering the linguistic and cultural obstacles of the language-game, Wittgenstein has named, explained, and made understood (or perhaps misunderstood) the varieties of meaning (such as persuasive, econom- ical, and mathematical meanings) he used. The “ostensive definitions” went into what he called the collection of the general term “proposition” (for Satz; Glock 1996: 274, 315–319), also called “sentence” or “theorem.” Wittgenstein fostered a more realistic formation of the “definable” and “undefinables” of the logical elements in the expression of the contemporary speculative rhetoric. The prac- tical and theoretical questions of rhetoric seem to be split into three stories of deduction, induction, and abduction.

What I mean is not however giving up an old style a new trim. You don’t take the old forms & fix them up to suit today’s taste. No, you really speaking, maybe unconsciously, the old language, but speaking it in a manner that belongs to the newer world, though not on that account necessarily one that is to its taste. (Wittgenstein 1947, CV 1998: 69)

In one story, the first flow of thought is expressed in the catalog of definable and undefinable elements in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP 1933), the “Bible” of logical empirism. This slim but rich book was, miraculously, written by the young Wittgenstein as an Austrian soldier serving in the trenches of the First World War, but served, translated into English, at a later date as Wittgenstein’s doctoral thesis, submitted to the University of Cambridge. Under the professorial aegis of Bertrand Russell, the manuscript needed to comply to academic standards to qualify for a dissertation. Apart from the introduction written by Russell (TLP: 7–23), strongly criticized by Wittgenstein himself, the text of the Tractatus expresses the quasi-mathematical body of rules concerned with deductive reasoning whose formal decisions form logical precedents in respect of succeeding cases. Tractatus corresponds to statements of the facts of life in imperative propositions, like a legal document (Gorlée 2014 [2005]). The essentially rational argument was grounded in pure ratio and propor- tion, but the total design of the Tractatus was based on an open-and-closed 62 Dinda L. Gorlée syllabary in numbered and subnumbered materials, ordered together in a formal series (TLP: 83 [§ 4.1252]). The deductive nature of the Tractatus was clear from Wittgenstein’s counting of the separate paragraphs of the proverbial proposi- tions of the text. The quasi-mathematical technique of sign-counting in the diversity and variety of arrangements of Wittgenstein’s ideas showed that:

The decimal figures as numbers of the separate propositions indicate the logical impor- tance of the propositions, the emphasis laid upon them in my exposition. The propositions n.1, n. 2, n. 3, etc., are comments on proposition No. n; the propositions n.m1, n.m2, etc., are comments on the proposition No. n. m; and so on. (TLP: 1 fn.)

Wittgenstein’s own medley of punctuation, the words in italics, or sentences used in brackets are used as special parenthetical remarks of his logical style and propositional genre (TLP: 127 [§ 5.461–5.4611]; see also CV 1980: 13, 48, 68; CV 1998: 15, 55, 77). Steiner described the Tractatus thus:

The Tractatus is a graphic example of the kind of book, of the forms and motions of spirit, which I am trying to define. It is built of aphorisms and numbers, as if borrowing from another kind of certitude. It makes its own syntax and idiom an object of doubt and rigorous appraisal. Wittgenstein has a poet’s capacity to make every word seem new and full of untapped, possibly destructive vitality. At several points the Tractatus, with its economy of image and its typographical effects, reads like a poem. (Steiner 1969 [1967]: 114)

Despite the basic formality of the book, the Tractatus had, however, some informality in the poetic appendices which gave the personalized (that is, persuasive and ornamental) tone of Wittgenstein’s belief in abduction. Also, Wittgenstein began the account of the Tractatus by the epitaph “dedicated to the memory of my friend David H. Pinsent” followed by the quotation of a poetic line from the Austrian journalist, poet, and playwright Friedrich Kürnberger: “… und alles, was man weiss, nicht bloss rauschen und brausen gehört hat, lässt sich in drei Worten sagen” (“… and all that one knows, having heard only the raging and roaring, can be said in three words”). To illuminate the condensed matrix of the Tractatus, Wittgenstein’s Preface (TLP: 27–29) briefly expanded the pejora- tive implications of the epigraph in the abductive overtones of his self-belief:

The book deals with the problems of philosophy and shows, as I believe, that the method of formulating these problems rests on the misunderstanding of the logic of our language. Its whole meaning could be summed up somewhat as follows: What can be said at all can be said clearly; and whereof one cannot speak thereof one must be silent. (TLP: 27)

The alternation of the ego-directed phrasing of “as I believe” clearly formulates the break of the literal or figurative opinions to the definitive “silence” of Wittgenstein’s final judgment, ending the rational speech of the Tractatus. Wittgenstein’s persuasive rhetoric 63

The closure of the Tractatus seemed to metamorphose Ezekiel’s vision of building the temple into the framework of the right propositions at the right time and space. In Wittgenstein’s words:

My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed through them, on then, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.) He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly. (TLP: 189 [§ 6.54])

Philosophy can be compared to the biblical ladder of wisdom. In Jakob’s spiritual vision, the ladder reached from earth to heaven with angels climbing up and down the steps (Gen. 28: 12). Wittgenstein’s metaphor let it be known that philosophy works not in evolution, but in reality (Kishik 2008: 66–68). Philosophy shows gradually, by steps of logic, the translation from the naive “confusions” of language until the final steps of Jakob’s ladder, reaching the Holy Temple of God. Away from the abstract principles of reasoning, the concrete meaning of most propositions can be clearly formulated in the deductive strategy. Yet the rest, the so-called unclear propositions, has the obscure or oblique sense of Wittgenstein’s “confusions” made in the use of language. In the final sentence of the Tractatus, Wittgenstein famously declared: “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent” (TLP: 189 [§ 7]). The unclear propositions suppose the solution of Wittgenstein’s inexpressible (Unaussprechliche) problems of life (unsere Lebensprobleme). The solution is applied to the thoughts of “silence,” which can hardly be solved by logical reasoning, but rather by the speculative or hypothetical reasoning of Peirce’s abduction. Without the illogical consequence, the meaning of the non-verbal “silence” can become nonsensical, cryptic, or even mystical (TLP: 187 [§ 6.522]). In Wittgenstein’s terms, the mystical feeling can come alive in the personal “silence” (TLP: 187 [§ 6.44–6.45]). Wittgenstein’s skeptical interpretation of what the opaque or sterile silence is has remained a controversial refrain from scientific logic and religious mythol- ogy. The myth of Wittgenstein’s silence can be “demythologized” into the sense of emotive language. By any standard, we live in two worlds, interacting within our mind and soul. Apart from the known microcosm of the world around us, there must exist the unthinkable macrocosm of the unknown or unseen world (TLP: 151 [§ 5.621]). The limit between both worlds solves the problematic area between rational certainty and the uncertainty of emotive language in the bodily act of avoiding or rejecting Wittgenstein’s silence. To eliminate the uncertainty of verbal statements with obscure meaning, the non-verbal silence is clarified by the speculation of the figurative, optional, or necessary mysticism of what ought to be thought of as silent speech of Wittgenstein’s soul. The vague and 64 Dinda L. Gorlée allegorical sense of non-language is the abductive process structured by the speculation of Peirce’s unconscious feeling with an intellectual backing. The act of magic can be described as Wittgenstein’s logical end to the Tractatus,in which he moved the expressive form of logic into the meaning to the inexpres- sive areas of non-logic. The deductive precision of the inductive clarity of the illumination of facts foregrounds the possibility of sense-experience – by reach- ing the solution accepting the fair hints and guesses of abduction (Gorlée 2014 [2005]).

“Le style c’est l’homme.”“Le style c’est l’homme même.” The first expression has a cheap epigrammatic brevity. The second, correct, one opens up a quite different perspective. It says that style is the picture of the man. (Wittgenstein 1949, CV 1998: 89)

The second story bridges the “deducibility gap” between the paragraphs of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and the counterparts, The Blue and Brown Book (BBB 1969) and Philosophical Investigations (PI 1968, 2009). The latter albums show how the logical reasoning of deduction has been broken down to the inductive patterns of the narrations of human experience, giving neither true not false propositions. The narrative description on the literal level is almost a number of episodes, but the “novel” can grow from the episodic narration to the logical reasonableness (truth) in the future, despite the fact that in induction the view of the future remains an unruled – unknown or indeterminate – world. The rule of The Blue and Brown Book prepares the way for Philosophical Investigations, but these allusive, uncharacterized, or even self-contradictory sets of manuscripts does not obey real logic. The lack of rule in Wittgenstein’s albums signifies that the reader (inquirer) needs to ascertain what “actually is” (CP 5.171) going on in the variety of different propositions. The subject shows, as in a detective novel, how the events of paradigms and aphorisms can be regulated at all into the forms of a “real” story; but the story remains on the metaphorical level. The opinions of Wittgenstein’s sturdy tome of the Philosophical Investigations have been forwarded in many argumentations and explanations by analysts, read by scholarship, and judged by evidence; how- ever, the characterization of Wittgenstein’s Brown Book, first introducing the concept of language-game, might give other answers to the dramatic mode of narration (see Gorlée 2012: 221–230, 237–271). The line of the fin-de-siècle Viennese political author and moral playright Johann Nestroy (Janik and Toulmin 1973: 27, 85–87, 90–91) “Überhaupt hat der Fortschritt das an sich, dass er viel grösser ausschaut, als er wirklich ist” (“The trouble about progress is that it always looks much greater than it really is,” Wittgenstein’s persuasive rhetoric 65 see PI 2009 [1953]: 2) is noted for the witty engagement with Wittgenstein’s stylistic and technical achievement of the Philosophical Investigations. Can this volume in the edited form be approached from the general question: is bigger better? By measuring the dense complexity of the volume of the Philosophical Investigations, compared to the brief volume of the Tractatus and preparatory Blue and Brown Books, the question is: does the bigger size of the “new” philosophy advance the “progress” of Wittgenstein’s successes (or failures)?

The first edition of the substantial volume of Philosophical Investigations (1953) consisted of two parts of longer or shorter paragraphs, but without subtitles or thematic note to identify the nature of both materials, implying both related paragraphs and unrelated episodes. Was the limited degree of self-illumination in Wittgenstein’s narrative program necessary to under- stand accurately the vast collection of different “stories” in the Philosophical Investigations?

According to the Editors’ Note of the third edition with some modifications of the English translation (PI 2001 [1953]), the editors (Elizabeth Anscombe and Rush Rhees) remarked after Wittgenstein’s death (1951), that their task was certainly not a radical revision of Wittgenstein’s writings:

What appears as Part I of this volume was complete by 1945. Part II was written between 1947 and 1949 Part II was written between 1947 and 1949. If Wittgenstein had published his work himself, he would have suppressed a good deal of what is in the last thirty pages or so of Part I and worked what is in Part II, with further material, into its places. (PI 2001 [1953]: Editor’s note)

In fact, the “good deal” of Wittgenstein’s editorial revision concerned the practical problems of the “variant readings for words and phrases … written on slips which Wittgenstein had cut from other writings and inserted at these pages,” while the words “standing between double brackets are Wittgenstein’s references to remarks either in this work or in other writings” needed the editorial “choice [that] never affected the sense” (PI 2001[1953]: Editor’s note). The thematical note to Part II (PI [1953] 2001: 147–197) has remained more or less unclear, but became christened during the work of the following team of editors (Elizabeth Anscombe, P.M.S. Hacker, and Joachim Schulte), preparing the 4th edition (PI 2009 [1953]). Part II was given the subtitle “Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment” (PI 2009 [1953]: I–XIV) after the “re-arranged set of remarks written between 1946 and 1949 dealing chiefly with questions in what Wittgenstein called the new ‘philosophy of psychology’” (Hacker and Schulte in (PI 2009 [1953]: XXIII). Wittgenstein’s new science was, as he said himself in the Preface to the Philosophical Investigations (written in 1945 in Cambridge), still characterized by the fragmentariness of the old and new manuscripts of the Philosophical Investigations. These manuscripts were, for the various editors, 66 Dinda L. Gorlée both “old” manuscripits and “new” typescripts, which were “re-worked, cut up, and re-arranged” (PI 2009 [1953]: XIX) from rereadings, drafts, and revisions of early manuscripts. In the Preface, Wittgenstein’s conception of writing and reading explored the inventory of ideas within some fragments of:

… all these thoughts as remarks, shorts paragraphs, sometimes in longer chains about the same subject, sometimes jumping, in a sudden change, from one area to another. – Originally it was my intention at first to bring all this together in a book whose form I thought of differently at different times. But it seemed to me essential that in the book the thoughts should proceed from one subject to another in a natural, smooth sequence. (PI 2009 [1953]: 3)

Wittgenstein’s poetic style was based on words and punctuation, on clues of “remarks” and “short paragraphs” and “longer chains,”“jumping” together in thoughts. Far away from composing the traditional book, Philosophical Investigations shows a vacuum of words for meaning and emphasis. The con- clusion was, technically speaking, that deduction offered the general concepts of mental laws conceived in the traditional book of the Tractatus. Wittgenstein stressed that deduction was, at least for Philosophical Investigations, an impos- sibility. In the next paragraph, Wittgenstein continued the negative conclusion as follows:

After several unsuccessful attempts to weld my results together into such a whole, I realized that I should never succeed. The best that I could write would never be more than philosophical remarks; my thoughts soon grew feeble if I tried to force them along a single track against their natural inclination. – And this was, of course, connected with the very nature in the investigation. For it compels us to travel criss-cross in every direction over a wide field of thought. – The philosophical remarks in this book are, as it were, a number of sketches of landscapes which were made in the course of these long and meandering journeys. (PI 2009 [1953]: 3)

Importantly, there are the clues for understanding the “criss-cross” of the “whole” of Wittgenstein’s “thoughts,” which are weakened into the “number of sketches of landscapes” in the Philosophical Investigations. Technically, Wittgenstein’s biased narrativity in the inductive episodes gave as examples some fairly selected topics (such as the paradigm of pain or tooth-ache, men- tioned throughout PI 2009 [1953]) to argue further the “whole” trajectory of the general “investigation.” For the new functional generalization of the inductive manuscript, the logical imagination of the scenery seems to require “new sketches” from other perspectives. These were in turn, in Wittgenstein’s words, “badly drawn or lacking in character, marked by all the defects of a weak draughtsman” Wittgenstein’s persuasive rhetoric 67

(PI 2009 [1953]: 3). Instead of verbal speech, some artificial (scientific) illustra- tions were needed to pictorially envisage Wittgenstein’s inductive principles in practice. The illustrations, such as the duck-rabbit and the picture-face (PI 2009 [1953]: 204), were Wittgenstein’s own drawings. The meaning of these nonverbal images (diagrams) enables the reader to see the illogical view of the abstract symbolism. Yet the drawings find or make an unrepresentative ground for objects in reality, and even turn into degrees of irreality. Wittgenstein “apol- ogized” in the Preface of Philosophical Investigations, saying that “in order to give the viewer an idea of the landscape … this book is really just an album” (PI 2009 [1953]: 4). In the lengthy survey of the Preface, Wittgenstein struggled historically with choosing verbal genres for the speculative rhetoric in the Philosophical Investigations. In the unfinished formulas of fragmentary formulas, he gave the readers the equivocal statements about the false “tautologies” (RLF: 167, in particular TB) presented in the text of the Philosophical Investigations. See, for example, these two examples of “experimental testing” (CP 4.155):

Point at a piece of paper. – And now point at its shape – now at its colour – now at its number (that sounds odd). – Well, how did you do it? – You’ll say that you “meant” something different each time you pointed. And if I ask how that it is done, you’ll say you concentrated your attention on the colour, the shape, and so on. But now I ask again: how is that done? Suppose someone points to a vase and says “Look at that marvellous blue – forget about the shape.” Or: “Look at the marvellous shape – the colour doesn’t matter.” No doubt you’ll do something different in each case, when you do what he asks you. But do you always do the same thing when you direct your attention to the colour? Imagine various different cases! (PI 2009 [1953]: 33).

These things can hardly be fully understood. On closer look, the blue color can probably be indigo or another color; the experiences of seeing the shape, color, and even number can give inductive remarks about the “unrevealed” but practical appearances of the object. Under different eventualities of life, the deductive rules of logical appearances can be transformed into other rules. In ordinary language, the inquirer (reader) meets with “colours, sounds, etc., etc., with their gradations, continuous gradations, and combinations in various proportions, all of which we cannot seize by our ordinary means of expression” (RLF: 165). This means that slight variations in the colors can deal with “properties which admit of gradations, i.e., properties as the length of an interval, the pitch of a tone, the brightness or redness of a shade of colour, etc.” (RLF: 166–167). The linguistic tautologies play with the “same indefiniteness [that] sur- rounds the emotional physiognomy of abstract colors” (Blocker 1979: 139). The 68 Dinda L. Gorlée concrete material is not the formal or conventional color, but presents “an attractive conceptual picture” (Blocker 1979: 179) with many different kinds of meaning. Observing the complex physiognomy of defining the colors, they represent the cultural variables of the language-game, indeed embracing the game-with-language-and-culture. The emotional sense shows how one plays a game of chess with form and content, which “doesn’t consist only in pushing a piece from, here to there on the board – not yet in the thoughts and feelings that accompany the move; but in the circumstances that we call ‘playing a game of chess,’‘solving a chess problem,’ and the like” (PI 2009 [1953]: 33). The circum- stances of the game are a cultural story (Anderson and Gorlée 2011: 222–226). Induction is the practical interpretation of rule and case, moving from a person’s doubt and interrogation to the result of the individual decision to solve the cultural story, as observed. The cause-consequence story of induction differs from the previous, deductive authority of cases and precedents, which leads to the unquestioned rules of certainty and truth. Wittgenstein provided mixed text types together, calibrating the proximity of real or fictional narration with the chronological order of events of episodes. Wittgenstein’s narration is closely connected to maintaining the dialogue of events with the readers, whose interest or effort is the didactic ideal to understand the inductive stories of the Philosophical Investigations. The conflicting tests of the actual facts in the two colors or the shape of the vase can puzzle the scientific activity of reasoning, leading to the “confusion” in everyday living. Within other cultural contexts, particularly exotic environ- ments, the shade of the colors and the forms or shapes of Wittgenstein’s vase can be observed differently. Analytic reasoning did not solve Wittgenstein’s fragmentariness into a whole. Wittgenstein points out that “To piece together the landscape of these conceptual relationships out of their individual fragments is too difficult for me. I can make only a very imperfect job of it” (CV 1998: 90; CV 1980: 78). Moving from deduction to induction, Wittgenstein pursued the experience further from formal logic into informal logic. For Peirce, this movement was on the surface “one of the worst of these confusions, as well as one of the commonest, [it] consists in regarding abduction and induction taken together … as a simple argument” (CP 7.218). The reasoning to justify the confirmable predictions in deduction and induction was based on “seeing” the phenomenon in experience. Thereby, in the reasoning of the pure “seeing-as,” one neglects the inconsistent but pervasive force of introducing new ideas beyond what is given in the experimental observation of the world of phenomena. Wittgenstein suggests the possible hypothesis of abductive guesses to solve the actual cases (Merrell 2004: 256). Wittgenstein’s persuasive rhetoric 69

It’s possible to write in a style that is unoriginal in form – like mine – but with well chosen words; or on the other hand in one that is original in form, freshly grown from within oneself. (And also of course in one which is botched together just anyhow out of old furnishings.1) (Wittgenstein 1946, CV 1998: 60)

Finally, the third story is about the abductive style of Wittgensteinian new ideas – called by Wittgenstein “freshly grown” ideas – introduced into the “furniture” of pseudo-scientific reasoning. These ideas show the insight into Wittgenstein’s privacy in the titles of poems or sentences, and in the lectures, notebooks, letters, and conversations. In the reading of what happened in the “private occasions” (Klagge and Nordmann 2003), one gets a personal feel of Wittgenstein’s beliefs, opinions, and also the final judgments. The aphorisms have a relative isolation, but draw attention to a word, a phrase, or a para- graph. They structure Wittgenstein’s comments and commentaries, clearing up a manifold of interesting subjects – culture, politics, music, arts, cultural life, philosophy, the Bible, Jewishness, Shakespeare, and so forth. The form and content of Culture and Value (CV 1980, CV 1998) collects the separate and decomposed remarks together in a volume; but originally the remarks were interspersed or intertwined throughout the written pages of Wittgenstein’s scientific work. Despite the fragmentary meaning of the remarks, they give in its incompleteness a measure of plenitude about Wittgenstein’sprivatesensa- tion (Pitcher 1970 [1966]). Culture and Value gives the diaristic remarks “revived” in the context of this album or phrase-book. The remarks do not reflect the entire framework of Wittgenstein’s writing nor his rewriting as such: the remarks are “borrowed” from his writings to produce in themselves a contradictory and ambiguous effect of Wittgenstein’s poetic and thoughtful frame of mind and heart, thereby show- ing the workings of his abductive heart as opposed to the deductive and inductive mind. The first edition of Culture and Value (CV 1984 [1980]) consisted of extractions from the pages of the early writings, Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus (TLP), Philosophical Investigations (PI 2001 [1953]), and the Notebooks 1914–1916 (TB). Culture and Value followed the step-by-step “method” of Notebooks 1914–1916 of keeping a kind of diary in the habit of writing short aphorisms (see PR).

1 Wittgenstein’s original was “aus alten Stücken,” Winch‘s translation “old bits and pieces” (Wittgenstein 1984 [1980]: 53) was re-translated into “old furnishings” (Wittgenstein 1998: 60). 70 Dinda L. Gorlée

During the First World War, the abstract manuscript of the Tractatus was joined with the private diaries as a separate manuscript in a list of daily events and moods. This diary written in 1914–1916 seems to feature the autobiographical biscript of the Tractatus narrating how the inductive life of military battles around him influenced the philosopher’s private identity living the melancholy of physical and psychological anxieties of a world of horrors. Later, the remarks of Culture and Value (CV 1984 [1980]) were supplemented with other personal observations taken from Wittgenstein’s later course of lectures at Cambridge, private notebooks, and other forms of “diaries.” These further remarks were taken from Wittgenstein’s unpublished heritage on electronic deposit in the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen (from 1990) to publish the larger revised volume of Culture and Value (CV 1998; see Gorlée 2012: 187–212). These diaries, precisely because they were not intentionally created as raw material for “philosophizing,” seem to be the instinctive (abductive) rock of Wittgenstein’s language-game, on which his deductive and inductive creations and his version of himself were built. The worknotes about warfare were continued throughout Wittgenstein’s life. They were unexpected in the orthographical spelling as far as they affected the private cryptography in Wittgenstein’s coded diaries (Pichler 2005–2006: 143– 144; see GT: 75). The crucial step of Wittgenstein’s cryptography was the codi- fication of the words into a simple rule: the literal code of the alphabet returned from a → z, b → y, c → x, d → w, e → v, etc. This Geheimschrift suggests Wittgenstein’s secret code, when he wrote entries of the diary during difficult days. Wittgenstein’s abductive pensiveness or sad reflection comforted him during the uphill battles. For example, during the emotionally charged trip to Skjolden (Norway) in August 1937 to work in solitude on the Philosophical Investigations (Monk 1990: 361–384, esp. 373), Wittgenstein wrote on the ferry from England, in between the pages of his “ordinary” work in philosophy, he wrote in secret code that:

Been working a bit. And yet I cannot keep my mind wholeheartedly on the work. At the back [of my mind] lurks a vague sense of the problem of this life of mine. From the ship to Skjolden. (MS 118: page front cover [Mjømna 13.8.1939], my trans.; see Pichler 2005–2006: 141)

Three days afterwards, Wittgenstein continued:

Am writing more or less because I am bored. I feel: I am adrift. Vain, thoughtless, anxious. I wish now not at all to live alone. Fear that I will become depressed and unable to work. I would now like to live with someone. To see another’s human face in the morning. – Still, I have now become so pathetic that perhaps it would be good that I am alone by necessity. Am now utterly wretched. Writing it is of course the untruthfulness. – Unhinged. (MS 118: page front cover [16.8.1937], my trans.) Wittgenstein’s persuasive rhetoric 71

Arrived at his hut in the Norwegian fjords, he continued that:

In Skjolden. Feeling poorly. Unhappy, helpless, and thoughtless … But then I remembered again how unique Francis is, almost irreplaceable. And how little I am aware of this, when I am with him. Am completely entangled in pettiness. Am irritable, think about myself only, and feel that my life is miserable, but have no idea how miserable it really is. (MS 118: 1r [Skjolden 17.8.1937], my trans.)

As seen in the double translation from secret code to German and translated into English, Wittgenstein’s standard formal brain has now rejected the truth of the mental things and objects in accepting the “untruthfulness” (Unwahrkeit) of the feelings of the informal heart. In first-person repetition, he moved from the self- referentiality of his own monologue into a narcissistic kind of dialogue, embody- ing the fictional reality around him with the (ir)reality of being alone. The poetic repetition of singular words in the three-way series of adjectives (“vain, thought- less, anxious” and “unhappy, helpless, and thoughtless”) give the ups-and downs he “now” (jetzt) suffered in the space and time, but “then” (da) written in coded form to make the text not readily available when “found” by outsiders. The emphatic clues of the abductive activity of dreams (the vision of his friend Francis Skinner [Monk 1990: 331–342]) realize the sum total of Wittgenstein’s conflicting nervous temperaments of love and hostility. The aphorisms are essentially fragmentary remarks (Gorlée 2007) about Wittgenstein’s affective states or private moods, as he himself wrote it down in the diaries. Beyond the isolation of the separate remarks as such, here translated, the real volumes of Culture and Value offered a new collection of contextual materials. The dates of writing the private remarks in Culture and Value are not real diaries, written every day about daily events. The autobiographical notes happen sporadically, written at the same time as the main text (the philosophical writing) as the unformu- lated set of unstable biscript, whenever Wittgenstein’s psychological need arises to relieve his emotions to himself. In the ruled and many un-ruled observations, Wittgenstein balances the high mannerisms of life and the cultural background, together with his illogical (hardly logical) arguments about what tortured him in pain, despair, and stupidity in his environment. The common thread of the explana- tory hypothesis of Wittgenstein’s abductive belief, repeated throughout the pages of the volumes of Culture and Value, is place and time repeated again in the chronolo- gical analysis of Wittgenstein’sprivate“archive” of sensations in private moments. Wittgenstein echoed his ideas and phrases in analogies and similes. Throughout the pages of Culture and Value, the modelling of comparison con- nects the whole reasoning “loosely” together. Wittgenstein’s crucial paradigms may “seize,”“grasp,” or “envision” the “optical illusion” or are “similar to,” 72 Dinda L. Gorlée

“remarkable in,”“familiar with,”“nothing but,”“being-as,”“seeing-as,”“as if,” “as it were,” or “as you like” (see, for example, CV 1998: 61). The modelling may imply all kinds of poetic metaphors, such as: “Resting on your laurels is as dangerous as testing when hiking through snow. You doze off & die in your sleep” (CV 1998: 41) or “Religion is as it were the calm sea bottom as its deepest, remaining calm, however, high the waves rise on the surface” (CV 1998: 61). For example, in the years 1939–1940, following the Anschluss of Austria by Nazi Germany (1938), Wittgenstein’s survival as an alien citizen of Jewish extraction was to receive the British passport. The sense of living as a mean- ingful philosopher sought to express itself in a new cosmology. Considering the political affliction of the Second World War, he wanted to give up academic life in Cambridge, hoping to find elsewhere the “peace of mind and concentration he required to finish his book [Philosophical Investigations]” (Monk 1990: 401). At the same time, the friendship with his partner, Francis Skinner, had deteriorated to the degree that the logical, ethical, legal, and sexual troubles, as seen in a number of manuscripts (MSS) during these perilous years, were a moral battle. In these years 1939–1940, Wittgenstein wrote 67 long or short aphorisms (CV 1984 [1980]: 34–39, CV 1998: 40–45), which on different dates seem discon- nected but on analysis are connected phrases. The common thread of these private phrases written in the years 1939–1940 (MS 122) seems to embrace the cultural hypothesis of psychoanalysis (then fashionable in academic circles). Psychoanalysis displayed, in Wittgenstein’s words, the wild “courage” of the “passion” of active feelings reverted as tamed nature broken by death (CV 1998: 40, 43).2 MS 122 has become interlaced with MS 162 to describe the inventive character of “genius.” The particular genius moves away from the mediocrity of primitive or idle thoughts to con- centrate on the genuine truth. Wittgenstein’s example of “genius” mentioned his private “courage” to realize the deep “wish to fill a nice notebook with writing as soon as possible” (CV 1998: 41). Since creative “art” (including Wittgenstein’s idea of philosophy) serves to “arouse feelings” (CV 1998: 42), Wittgenstein then compared the genius of Freud’s psychoanalysis, the deep human passions of the art of Shakespeare’s work, and the “bottomless” interpretation of the persons in

2 Analyzing Wittgenstein’s short fragments is not an easy way to provide a conceptual attitude of precise meaning, particularly in their relation to Wittgenstein’s “fashionable” clues (key- words, catchwords). The specific guesses of clues create with the language-game the cognitive, linguistic, and cultural realities of what is called the possible worlds in language and culture (Gorlée 2012: 231–237). See the jargon of Wittgenstein’s terminology “aesthetic,”“art,”“cul- ture,”“creative,”“genius,”“myth,”“nature,”“originality,”“personality,” and many other terms – as defined in Williams (1983 [1976]). Wittgenstein’s persuasive rhetoric 73 the New Testament (CV 1998: 42). To resist the temptation of simplicity in Wittgenstein’s “untruthfulness” in the empirical reality, he created the outlook of multiplicity of the truth (CV 1998: 41). He originated artistic genius not as inspira- tion, not as cleverness, but as forms of “courage” (CV 1998: 44) to tell the truth. Wittgenstein fluctuated in variations between the heart and the mind in the notebooks of the fragmentary albums, adopting the explanatory hypothesis about his private form of reality. Beyond the remarks of Culture and Value, the hunting-ground of Wittgenstein’s abductive beliefs stand essentially in the quotable lines, lectures, notebooks, letters, and conversations. The diaristic forms and shapes express the intimacy of Barthes-like “Journals” (Barthes 1983 [1979]). The paradoxical fragments of Wittgenstein’s journals in the note- books give “a kind of narcissistic attachment” (Barthes 1983 [1979]: 480) within or without his scientific writings. Some of the journals were lectures reflecting stylized efforts for teaching, for the dialogue with students (as argued, only published from the students’ notes). Some were personal writings in correspon- dence to his family and friends (letters, postcards), some were his own mono- logue, but not meant “with a view to publication” since he asked and self-asked the question “Can I make the journal into a ‘work’?” (Barthes 1983 [1979]: 480).3 Wittgenstein’s journals act as a particularly dramatic pose, in the best sense of the word, as the dramatic performance of the alter ego. In the stylistic mannerisms and figures of his day, Wittgenstein attracted the attention as an instinctive writer, later encouraging and inspiring the fashionable style of other, alternative writers (or journalists). Seeking the argument of his abductive journals, Wittgenstein behaved from intellectual or emotional temperaments. His first argument was, according to Barthes’ self-analysis, “a text tinged with an individuality of writing, with a ‘style’ (as we used to say) with an idiolect proper to the author (as we said more recently); let us call this motive: poetic” (Barthes 1983 [1979]: 481). Wittgenstein’s poetic behavior is his personal style of writing mere fragments including the poetic figures of speech. Wittgenstein’s speech was daily language for the sake of persuasive clearness. Yet instead of philosophical clichés, Wittgenstein used as literary ornament the rhetorical devices of emphasis and bracketed words or sentences. The argument was general logic, including the “ordinary” strategies of deduction and induction, but the cryptography of the whole alphabet turned the text into the engineering manufacture of ego-directed artifacts. When found and deciphered, it gives way to the speculative interpretation of Wittgenstein’s “silent” field in “secret” abductive speech.

3 These preoccupations with personal communications are further argued in Klagge and Nordmann (2003). 74 Dinda L. Gorlée

The second argument of Wittgenstein’s journals was the historical background, in the sense of including the cultural “traces of a period, mixing all dimensions and proportions, from important information to details of behavior” (Barthes 1983 [1979]: 481). The archeological traces came in particular after the Tractatus from the cultural mundanity of Plato, Augustine, and other historical thinkers. Wittgenstein inte- grated the historical thinkers into the deductive creativity of twentieth-century modernity; see the long quotation of the Confessions of Saint Augustine starting Part I of the Philosophical Investigations. The lyrical-romantic visualization of Plato’s argumentation created the highly moralistic-educational purpose of Wittgenstein’s quasi-conventional deduction. The modern details of old knowledge equally evoked Wittgenstein’s feelings of nostalgia in the abductive beliefs. The third ground is Barthes’“object of desire” (1983 [1979]: 481). The journals implied Wittgenstein’s “intimacy, the small change of his time, his tastes, his moods, his scruples” in which he (Barthes, not Wittgenstein) “mayevengosofar as to prefer his person to his work, eagerly snatching up his Journal and neglect- ing his books” (Barthes 1983 [1979]: 481). The goal and purpose is “to seduce, by that swivel which shifts from writer to person … which is supposed to compensate the inadequacies of public writing” (Barthes 1983 [1979]: 481). Here, Wittgenstein preferred the abductive speech of his fragmentary lectures and notebooks, even his correspondence with friends and colleagues, over the fatigue of his scientific work, which is what he strongly comments on all the time. The fourth argument focuses on the subject of this article, concentrating on giving a “passionate” form to the content of his inner thoughts. The special impressions of the “amorous” or “idolatrous” writer (Barthes 1983 [1979]: 482) ornaments the “serious” work with the observations and details of the private journal. Barthes’ purely abductive journals are the depiction of Wittgenstein’s real “individuation, the seduction, the fetishism of language” (1983 [1979]: 482). Barthes illustrated this instruction (or self-instruction) by the biblical proverb “Yea, my reins shall rejoice, when thy lips speak right things” (Prov. 23: 16, qtd. in Barthes 1983 [1979]: 482). Wittgenstein probably hoped that the deductive- inductive knowledge of the philosophy of language could be abandoned to credit, without probative force, the abductive comfort of loneliness, anxiety, and melancholy in his autobiographical remarks written throughout his life.

4 Conclusion

To summarize Wittgenstein’s formidable multitask to give special style and form to the typescripts and manuscripts, the analysis of his universe of discourse suggests that he supported Peirce’s three logical leading principles of deductive, Wittgenstein’s persuasive rhetoric 75 inductive, and abductive reasoning.4 Wittgenstein’s “art” of speculative rhetoric in his philosophical writings used the logical rhetoric of deduction. Then, the deductive rhetoric was recalibrated into narratives of inductive episodes, creat- ing a kind of novel in the procedure of his manuscripts. Wittgenstein realized that the old verification principles of deduction and induction had become too narrow, so that in his secret journals he wrote his personal paragraphs by abductive beliefs, part coded and part uncoded. The shifting of his personal activities in the use of various modalities of reasoning to himself and to others echoed Wittgenstein’s forms of ego-directed truth, displaying the weak or mod- ified feature of his “new” philosophy. In Wittgenstein’s discourses, the narrative speeches are no mismatch with his authority as author-philosopher, but are emotionally involved with the “artistic” look of uncertainty of form. Uncertainty shows the mutually intertwined and interpenetrating meanings of Wittgenstein’s fragmentary form. Wittgenstein’s variety of forms restated in clear and intelligi- ble reasoning the interpretation of his writings, that is the product from the defective or incoherent untruth to illuminate the truth of logical analysis.

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