What is clear from these statistics is that even within 's borders conscripts are being called on to kill and give their lives in order to carry out the government's aims.

Conscripts have no choice in this matter. They do not even have the option of refusing to enter the black townships or of being non-combatants ( unless they are accepted by the Board for Beligious Objection as religious pacifists).

The ECC believes this situation cannot be defended on religious or moral grounds. We believe that no-one should be forced to kill or die for a cause they do not believe in. We therefore believe that, as interim measures, the definition of objectors should be extended to those who are unwilling to do military service on moral, political or non-pacifist religious grounds, and that conscripts should be given the right not to enter the black townships.

i\f 'The psychological effects of military service and of militarisation have caused the deaths and scores of conscripts and have left permanent mental scars with many others.

The ECC believes that militarisation and compulsory conscription have raised the level of violence in society as a whole.

In 1981 a number of behavioral psychologists showed how "violence, drunk­ enness and sexual frustration in returning national servicemen are inevit­ able consequences of a border war which is growing in intensity" (these conclusions were drawn on the basis of research conducted at four universities, Weekend Argus, 28/3/81).

A clinical psychologist at Potchefstroom University pointed out in a court case that soldiers "who cannot handle stress are potential murderers" (Dr Dap Louw, quoted in Weekend Argus, 28/3/81). Numerous incidents of national servicemen and former national servicemen being arrested and tried for a wide range of violent crimes have appered in the press recently. Many of these arrests have involved seemingly random attacks on innocent black people (see appendixes).

According to the Human Awareness Programme some of the effects of the war in the townships and on the Namibian border are moodiness, aggression and withdrawal, redirection of trained aggression into violent crime, guilt, sleeplessness, nightmares, an extension of "us-against-them" attitude to the civilian situation and an inability to re-adapt to civilian 1 i f e.

The frequent allegations of assault, torture and rape committed by nation­ al servicemen while on duty on the Namibian border and in the townships are, we believe, closely linked to the dehumanising effect military service is having on young conscripts.

The alarming numbers of suicides and suicide attempts of national service­ men is also, we believe, an indication of the negative psychological effects of military service. The Minister of Defence said that between September 1983 and March this year a total of 74 people serving in the SADF committed suicide( Weekly Mail, 14/3/86). Between July and December 1984 ten nation­ al servicemen committed suicide and a further 67 attempted suicide, according to Mai an. (Rand Daily Mail March 6, 1985). In the first two weeks of the 1985 call-up there were 60 attempted suicides (Human Awareness Programme, March 1986).

The growing militarisation of "civilian" life also contributes to a milit­ aristic ethos in our society and effects the level of violence in every day life. Sales of guns to whites have rocketed, businesses specialising in security systems are flourishing, everything from children's toys and picture stories to television and radio programmes have taken on a militaristic flavour and an increasing number of products are marketed specially for the growing section of the white population who are in the SADF. The result, we believe, is often a survival mentality which is not condusive to peaceful persuits. In the course of ECC's work a considerable number of ex-national servicemen have described the psychological pressure they were subjected to in the SADF and their difficulty in coping with life in civilian society subsequently. The ECC believes that while the primary victims of conscription are the black people? who are killed, injured or detained by SADF personel, the national servicemen who suffer emotional or physical scars as a result of their experiences are also victims of an unjust system.

The role of the SADF outside South Africa

In 1971 the International Court of Justice declared South Africa's occup­ ation of Namibia illegal. Yet 14 years later the SADF maintains its pres­ ence in that country, against the will of its people.

Three endorsers of the ECC Declaration have clearly stated positions on South Africa's occupation of Namibia - the Southern African Catholic Biship's Conference, the Anglican bishoDS and the South African Council of Churches have all called for the withdrawal of South African troops, the speedy implementation of United Nations Resolution 435, and the hold­ ing of free and fair elections so that the people of Namibia can determine their own future.

South Africa's occupation of Namibia has caused enormous suffering on the part of the Namibian people. Wei 1-documented allegations of attrocities by the South African troops point to the callous disregard the colonising force has for the lives and well-being of the colonised people.

As Pastor Kameeta of the Namibian Council of Churches put it: "The people speak about the SADF as "terrorists" while they refer to SWAPO guerillas as "our boys"". (See appendixes).

It is estimated that between 1966 and 1984 over 10 000 Namibians died in the war (nearly 1 percent of the population). But it costs about R 1 million to kill one SWAPO guerilla, according to the South African Broadcasting Corporation (Human Awareness Programme, 1986), so the cost of the was has been astronomical for South Africa as well as for Namibia. In 1980 PW Botha announced that R 3 billion had been spent on the "infra­ structure and defence" of Namibia. Today the war costs South Africa over R 2 million every day.

The cost in lives on the South African side has also been high. Between 1961 and 1985 1399 South African soldiers lost their lives "in the exec­ ution of their military duties (Citizen 12/8/85), and a total of 123 members of the SADF were killed in military or training operations during 1984 according to the Minister of Defence (Star 27/2/85). It is not known how many of these were killed in the course of the Namibian war. SWAPO said its forces killed 120 South African soldiers in 1985 (Weekly Mail, March 7). The Minister of Defence said that the SADF killed 916 "terrorists" in the operational area during 1984. He said that in 1985 104 members of the SADF were killed in operations and training (Citizen 14/3/86). These are official figures. Real totals may well be far higher and no official figures are available on the number of injured and crippled.

South African conscripts are being forced to occupy a country against the wish of its people and to fight a war which cannot be won against a guerilla army which clearly has overwhelming support among the people of Namibia.

In the second World War there was no conscription and South African troops had the right to refuse to serve outside South Africa's borders. Today South African troops have no such option.

In the course of its work the ECC has given backing to the demands for the unconditional implementation of resolution 435. We believe the continued presence of South African troops is the major obstacle to peace in Namibia.

P W Botha favours the implementation of Resolution 435 only "provided a firm and satisfactory agreement can be reached ... on the withdrawal of the Cubans" (The Namibian, 7/3/86).

The ECC rejects this condition. We believe it to be a "red Herring" to delay the independence of Namibia and to try and force the Angolan govern­ ment into a istuation where it removes one of its main defences against South African/Unita aggression. We believe the "linkage" may be a means to the end of installing a friendly government in Luanda.

South Africa's policy to its neighbours is aimed at destabilising these countries in order to install friendly governments, or, where that is not possible, to wrech their.'economies alnd to undermine the political stability of their governments.

As The Economist put it: "The new South Africa refuses to apologise for anything, let alone . It spurns the "coctail diplomacy" of past and present foreign ministers, It is built on the reality of South Africa's economic and military power" (The Economist 16/9/83).

The goal of this policy appears not only to be to ensure that the govern­ ments of these countries are in no position allow the ANC to have bases or even offices in their territories, but also to ensure that these countries remain economically dependent on South Africa.

The policy of destabilisation began in earnest in the mid-1970s, after Angola and Mozambique became independent. Its methods vary from covert support for dissident forces, through "pre-emptive strikes" and other commando operations to full-scale invasions..

In 1975 South Africa invaded Angola in an attempt to set up a puppet government before the present MPLA government took power. Although driven out by the combined MPLA and Cuban forces, the SADF inflicted great damage on Angola's economy.

South Africa has often invaded Angola on the pretext of "hot persuit" raids against SWAPO, but it is clear that for several years they have occupied much of the territory of southern Angola. Despite South Africa's promises to withdraw it has continued to maintain a significant presence in the territory. In May last year, when South Africa's "withdrawal" was supposed to have been completed a small commando of SADF Reconaissance Battalion troops were captured in Cabinda province, allegedly on a mission to blow up a key oil depot. Two SADF personel were killed and one captured.

South Africa's most recent major raid was in September last year when SADF troops penetrated 250 kilometers into Angola in support of Unita who were being bombed by a FAPLA column advancing on Unita's headquarters it Jamba (The Star =8/9/85 , Business Day 19/9/85).

The whole Angolan army and some 15 000 Cuban troops and advisers are involved in rebutting South Africa's invasions and the activities of the - sponsored Unita - at great cost to the Angolan economy.

ECC opposes the use of South African troops to invade or raid other southern African countries and opposes South Africa's support for dissident movements like Unita.

We are concerned that national servicemen are not only being used to uphold apartheid at home, they are also being used to export it to other countries. In this respect we believe South Africa is clearly a threat to the peace of the southern African region. *

We are also concerned about reports that the United States government is planning to provide military and other forms of aid to Unita. We believe that this will not only help to bolster the South African government’s regional policy of destabilisation, but it will also help to free SADF troops and resources to suporess "unrest" and to enforce aoartheid at home. We believe that the effect of United State's decision could be to increase the misery of both the people of Angola and the people of South Africa. Also, by forcing Angola to maintain or even increase its contingent of Cuban troops American support for Unita could help to prolong South Africa's occupation of Namibia. We believe that Unita is still little more than a surrogate force of the SADF. Without the support of South Africa, as was provided in September last year, they would probably be unable to survive FAPLA offensives.

As Corporal Trevor Edwards, a former member of SADF 32 batallion who was involved with frequent raids into Angola and in support for Unita, put it in an article in the Observer in 1973: "The point is that Unita is a load of crap. They hang around in the South-east where their tribe can probably defend themselves. But they can't go out and take somewhere like Savate (an Angolan base). We do it for them because it improves their bargaining position, gives them more talking power".

And he went on to say: "Our main job is to take an area and clear it. We sweep through it and kill everything in front of us, cattle, goats, people - everything".

ECC believes that if the United States government goes ahead with its nlans to provide assistance to Unita they will in effect be assisting the South African government carry out its dubious goals of regional supremacy.

In Mozambique the SADF has also played a major destabilising role both through its direct raids on Mozambican territory and through ifs support for the MNR (Mozambique National Resistance).

The MNR was set up in Rhodesia by Ian Smith's Central Intelligence Organisation to fight against Mozambique's Frelimo government. It engaged mainly in small scale acts of banditry and economic sabotage. After Zimbabwe's independence, the MNR moved its bases to the North Eastern Transvaal where they were supplied with training camps and and broadcasting facilities.

By 1980 the MNR was beginning to have a devestating effect on the Mozambican economy. By 1984 MNR had destroyed 840 schools, over 200 clinics, numerous roads, railways, oil pipelines, convoys of food carrying trucks and had been responsible for the deaths of thousands of peasants and Mozambican soldiers.

In March 1984 President Samora Machel agreed to prevent the ANC from using its territory and signed the Nkomati Accord with South Africa. South Africa in turn agreed to prevent the MNR from using its territory and agreed to stop providing support for the MNR. Machel said he had gone to Nkomati to "turn off the tap" on which the MNR depended.

Shortly after the signing of the agreement South Africa's Foreign Affairs Minister, , admitted that the South African government had in the past supported the MNR, after having previously denied it for several years.

However, Mozambique continued to make allegations of support being channeled through South Africa to the MNR. Responding to these allegations General Magnus Mai an said in parliament that there was "no evidence of any direct or indirect support" for the MNR by South Africa (Hansard 14/5/85).

Yet later that year the Mozambican government released the diary of an MNR leader which gave a detailed account of cointinued support for the MNR by the SADF, conducted at the highest levels of the military command.

The documents released by the Mozambican government included a message from General Constand Viljoen, Head of the SADF, assuring the MNR that South African troops would not operate against them (Cape Times 1/10/&5). The message was delivered tweve days after the General's statement.

After the release of the "Vaz diary" the South African government was forced to admit that it had continued to provide military and "hum­ anitarian" aid for the MNR. The Mozambican government continues to allege that MNR is being supported by South Africa.

The SADF has also been responsible for at least three major raids on Mozambican territory. In January 1981 the SADF riaded Matola killing 12 people including several ANC members and a Portuguese civilian. In May 1983 SADF Impala jets bombed and strafed targets in the Mozambican capital of Maputo killing at least 6 people including 2 women and 2 chil­ dren. In October 1983 SADF troops attacked the ANC offices in Maputo, injuring five people. The former Lesotho government of Chief Leabua Jonathan, frequently alleged that South Africa was providing active support for the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA). Many LLA attacks occurred withing 3 kilometers of the Lesotho - South African border.

Lesotho has also been the target of SADF raids in the past. In December 1982 SADF commandos struck at ANC houses in Maputo. Lesotho said 42 people were killed. In December 1985 9 people were killed, including at least 3 civilians, in a raid on Maseru. The Lesotho government accused the SADF of being responsible for the raid. The SADF denied responsibility and the LLA claimed responsibility, but according to eye witnesses the attackers were white and spoke Afrikaans. (Human Awareness Programme, March 1986,.The Argus 21/12/85).

Shortly after that the South African government implemented a blocade of Lesotho, depriving the country of all its food and fuel. While this was happening the South African government was engaged in talks with Lesotho opposition leaders and members of the Lesotho government. SADF officers played a prominant role in these talks.

The outcome was that there was a coup in Lesotho and a new government was installed who agreed to expel the ANC from the country.

The SADF has also raided Botswana. In June last year the SADF raided Gabarone, attacking 12 houses and killing 13 people including several Botswana citizens and other civilians. The South Africa government claimed the raid was directed at an ANC base.

At the time President Quett Masire of Botswana said: "When we receive refugees we do nto distinguish whether they are black or white, nationalist or progressive, ANC or PAC ... we receive them as a duty and as an international obligation" (Star 19/6/85).

However, nine months later the Botswana government was forced to make these distinctions after being pressurised to come to a security agreement with South Africa. It is widely believed that a threat of a blocade was used to force Botswana to come to an agreement suitable to the South African government. The result was that the ANC and groups believed by the South African government to be sympathetic to the ANC were asked to leave Botswana.

Prior to the establishment of Zimbabwe, South Africa was involved directly on a military level in Rhodesia.

Zimbabwe alleges that since independence, the SADF has engaged in an actve policy of destabilisation, making use of former Rhodesian army and intelligence personel to engage in acts of sabotage. Four years ago two former Rhodesian Airforce officers were detained after allegedly blowing up several airforce planes. According to the Zimbabwe government South Africa was behind the attack.

The Zimbabwe government also alleges that South Africa has been been assl isting dissidents in Matabeleland. President Robert Mugabe alleged that South Africa was training 5000 troops loyal to Bishop Muzorewa as part of a wider attempt to destabilise the country. In 1983 allegations in the British press charged that the SADF was training and arming former ZAPU troops, fuelling the conflicts in Matabeleland. In 1982 it was discovered that an anti-Mugabe radio station was broadcasting from the Transvaal. Shortly before that three SADF troops were killed in Southern Zimbabwe (Human Awareness Programme, March 1986). “r

In Febuary this year General Magnus Malan warned Zimbabwe that some members of the Zimbabwean government were seeking a confrontation with South Africa and that the ANC was using Zimbabwean territory for its actions against the South African government. He warned that action would be taken against Zimbabwe if this continued. Both the Zimbagwean government and the ANC denied that Zimbabwean territory was being used (Sunday Star 9/2/86, Citizen 2/12/85, , 18/12/85, Weekly Mail 20/12/85).

There have also been numerous allegations of SADF involvement in other parts of the region. After the aborted Seychelles coup of November 1981, the South African Ministry of Defence tried to suppress evidence in the trial of the mercenaries responsible (Star 16/6/83), who received strangley short sentences for potentially capital crimes (the leader of the coup, Major Mike Hoare) served one year in prison.

A similar coup in the Comoro Islands in May 1978 produced a regime reportdly willing to channel arms to the MNR. In both these cases there have been allegations of SADF involvement.

Numerous other acts of sabotage and assassinations in the southern African region have been linked to the SADF.

Although P W Botha is presenting himself as a peacemaker today, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that South Africa has in fact acted as the aggressor in the region. Its actions have attempted to undermine the independence of neighbouring territories, in order to prevent them assisting ANC guerillas and refugees, and to force them to accept economic cooperation with South Africa.

The effects on the southern Africa region have been devestating. The est­ imated cost of South Africa's political and military destabilisation reached a figure of over R,2,l billion by 1985 according to the governments of these regions (Human Awareness Programme, March 1986).

At present 10 000 Zimbabwean soldiers are involved in helping Frelimo soldiers fight the SA_sponsored MNR and South Africa's neighbours are being forced to spens billions of rands on military equipment to counter South Africa's attempts at destabi1ision.

For conscripts into the SADF this situation creates an acute dilema.They are being put in a position where they are playing a direct role in undermining the sovereignty of independent states and in contributing to the hardships faced by the people of these states. The ECC believes that these acts of destabilisation have in all cases been unjustified violations of the independence of these countries. This belief is not limited to fringe groupings, but is widespread in South Africa and is shared by the vast majority of governments internationally.

The ECC also finds the South African government's frequent but dishonest denials of its involvements in these activities equally disturbing. Its initial denials of support for the MNR and for responsibly for attempting to blow up the Cabinda oil refinery,which were followed by irrefutable evidence contradicting the South African government's accounts of these actions, place the word of the South African authorities in doubt.

The ECC backs the statement made by one of its endorsers, the South African Council of Churvhes, in responce to the SADF raid into Botswana:

"For the SADF to act as judge and executioner against any South African is reprehensible in the extreme. That it should do so in any neigh­ bouring territory with whom we are not at war is an act not only of agg­ ression and violence but of utter folly, destabilising to the entire sub-continent" (Cape Times 15/6/85).

GROWING RESISTANCE TO CONSCRIPTION s

All these examples of the role played by the SADF reinforces the ECC’s call for an end to conscription. The civil nature of the conflict within South Africa, the psychological effects of conscription, the increasing death toll which is emerging from the South African government's conflicts with its neighbours and its own people, the SADF's aggressive operations outside South Africa, have all put many conscripts in an inviduous position.

Within South Africa they are forced to co-operate with apartheid against their will. This alienates them from the people they may wish to be close to. Outside South Africa they have no choice but to assist in the illegal occupation of Namibia and they may be compelled to participate in acts of aggression against neighbouring states. There is also an increasing chance they will have to kill or die while carrying out these actions.

Furthermore, they are being asked to spend a total of more than six years in the service of a cause they may not agree with.

The result of this situation has been a considerable growth the numbers of people draft dodging, conscientiously objecting or leaving the country because of their call-ups.

At the moment national service involves an initial period of two years followed by 720 days of camps over the next 12 years, in six two-year cycles of 120 days each. This is followed by service in the Active Citizen Force Reserve for five years, followed by service in the Commando Force until the age of 55. After that the conscript is placed on the National Reserve until the age of 55. By the end of this process the conscript will have served a total of up to four years and nine months in the SADF.

Aside from any moral, religious or political dilemas the conscript may face, for many the period of service is simply far too long.

Between January and November last year 26 895 people emigrated from South Africa (including over 1 700 doctors and other professionals), compared with 16 421 in the same period in the previous year .'(Weekly Mail, 7/3/86).

In the whole of 1984 1 596 conscripts failed to report for duty. In t the January 1985 intake alone 7 589 conscripts failed to report for duty (this figure includes those who applied for exemption on the grounds of study). This year the Minister of Defence, General Magnus Mai an, refused to disclose how many conscripts failed to report, implying that in the past ECC had misused the figures. (Weekly Mail, 20/12/85).

The number of applications for religious objector classification with the Board for Religious Objection has also increased considerably. Between July 1984 and November 1985 758 people had applied to the board. So far 12 applicants have been refused full objector status, most because the board found that they were not "religious pacifists" (some said they could, for example, fight against a Nazi-type government). All 12 who refused were offered non-combatant status within the SADF but refused to accept it.

According to figures released in trials of conscripts who failed to report for SADF camps, about 25 nercent of conscriDts who are called up for camps do not turn up.

According to the Committee of South African War Resisters there are over 7 000 war resisters living in Britain, Europe and the United States at the moment.

The ECC believes there are thousands of conscripts who are prolonging their university studies in order to avoid going to the army.

These figures reveal a growing opposition to conscription from a wide section of the white community.

The effects of conscription on the economy has also contributed to the growing disquiet in the white community about the SADF. A large percentage of tax revenues (over 20 percent) goes to the military, and this increases the burden individuals and companies have to face in a period of severe recession.

Furthermore, many compainies are forced to pay the bulk of the •Salaries of employees who are in the SADF (by law businesses are obliged to pay the difference between their employees' salaries and what they receive in the SADF even if this means paying for over two years). Very often businesses lose skilled employees for SADF camps of up to three months.

As a result many employers are reluctant to take on employees who have national service or camps to complete. The officer commanding the SADF’s orientation service, Commandant Garry Whyte, said that out of 400 servicemen polled recently, about 26 percent had no employment waiting for them (Star 11/12/85). This contributes to the pressures on conscripts to leave the country or dodge the draft.

Partly as a result of the effects of conscription on the economy the official parliamentary opposition, the Progressive Federal Party, last year called for the rapid phasing out of conscription and the replacement of the current SADF with a non-racial force made up volunteers and Drofessionals. (The youth wing of the PFP, the Young Progressives have called for the immediate end to conscription and are an ECC member organisation).At the moment only 25,52 percent of the SADF are permanent force members (professionals), and only 3995 SADF members are "non-white" (Race Relations Survey, 1984, Defence White Paper 1984).

However, many ECC member organisations argue that even a professional and non-racial SADF in a South Africa ruled by a minority government would serve to uphold apartheid.

What all ECC members and member organisations aree on is that conscripts should be given the choice in South Africa today.

South Africa managed to fight two world wars without conscription. One must surely adknowledge, without necessarily agreeing with their reasons, that some conscripts have a legitimate basis for not wanting to serve in the SADF? It would be consistent with the international principles outlined earlier to recognise this right of individual conscience.

The ECC Declaration begins and ends with the call for a "just peace in our land". The ECC is committed to working for genuine peace and justice in South Africa and has adopted non-violent methods towards this end.

Although peace can only be achieved if the root cause of the conflict - the system of apartheid - is removed, ending conscription would be a significant step towards this goal. E C C ’s INTERIM PROPOSALS

VOLUNTARY ARMY

This submission has asserted that the issue of conscription in South Africa cannot be divorced from the role of the SADF and the nature of the society which it defends. Thus ending conscription without other fundamental political and social changes will not in itself guarantee that the SADF plays a conscructive role in building a peaceful society.

The ECC has consequently not specifically called for the setting up of a volunteer army within the context of the current political dispensation.

At the same time, however, the End Conscription Campaign essentially revolves around the issue of choice. In this sense , the setting up of a volunteer army would be consistent with the demand that individuals be free to choose whether they participate in the SADF. The ECC would therefore regard the establishment of a volunteer army as preferable to the existing system of compulsory conscription.

CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION *

If conscription were ended, there would be no need to consider the rights of conscientious objectors. However for as long as the system of conscription exists, three issues with regard to the status of conscientious objectors need to be addressed.

1) Recognition of all Objectors

Large numbers of conscripts have chosen to leave South Africa (as has been mentioned above). Many of them are people who believe they cannot in good conscience, participate in the SADF. At the same time they are not prepared to face the hardship of up to six years in prison for refusing to serve.

As stated earlier this situation has caused a drain on South Africa's resources. Many of those who have chosen to leave are university graduates and others with much-needed skills.

ECC's particular stand is against conscription into the SADF. None of those involved in ECC organisations have opposed the concept of non-military national service. Those involved in the campaign regard themselves as patriotic South Africans, prepared to serve the country and its people.

The ECC believes that the option of c mmunity service, as an alternative to military service should not be limited to religious pacifists, but should be available to all those who in good conscience cannot serve in the SADF.

ECC proposes that in section 72 B (1) of the Defence Act, the definition of "religious objector" be changed to "conscientious objector". This should be defined as "a person for whom - for reasons of conscience or profound conviction arising from religious, ethical, moral, humanitarian! or similar motives - it is in conflict to perform all or part of their military service".

ii) The length of community service

This should be of an equivalent length of time to that served by soldiers. It is illogical that someone recognised and classified as a bona fide conscientious objector should be punished for his beliefs by serving one-and-a-half times the length of military service.

From the Defence Force point of view, a maximum four years continuous service would be a sufficient deterrent to possible mala fide objectors, bearing in mind that few soldiers complete a full 720 days after their initial service, and never in one continuous stretch. iii) The nature of community service

Community service should be available in non-state organisations as well. One of the ECC member organisations, the Civil Rights League, has already given a lead on this issue. Their proposal for the setting up of a Movement ad Pacem" is that the concent of community service should be broadened to include "community related work, oerhaps under the direction of welfare and religious bodies, but independent of government control."

THE RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL CONSCRIPT

Ecc has no fixed policy on the question of participation in the SADF. ECC recognises that with few acceptable alternatives, the individual conscript faces an extremely difficult decision with regard to participating in the SADF.

Many conscripts do their service only because the alternatives are too heavy to face.

At the same time, ECC is cogniscant of Section 121 C of the Defence Acr, and in the course of its work has always ensured that this act

(which makes it a criminal offence to encourage people not * to serve in the SADF) is not contravened.

Accepting, then, that many conscripts are doing their military service under duress, ECC proposes that individual conscripts be given a greater say over the nature of their service.

In the previous section particularly controversial areas of SADF act­ ivity were highlighted: its role in South Africa's townships and beyond its borders. ECC believes that, for as long as conscription exists, conscripts should be given the freedom, in conscience, to choose not to enter South Africa's townships. (On August 13 last year, Alan Dodson, a former Pietermaritzburg University law student doing a one month camp in the SADF, was found guilty at a Natal military martial of having disobeyed his order to go on a vehicle patrol in the townships and was fined R600). ECC also believes conscripts should be be given the right to choose not to enter other neighbouring countries including Namibia.

The importance of the right not to enter townships is reinforced by the declaration of the state of emergency and a recent ammendment to the Internal Security Act which gives members of the SADF (including conscripts) the right to search, detain or arrest township residents.

Implementation of this proposal would again be consistent with ECC1s fundemental and frequently stated demand: that all individuals retain their freedom of choice. ECCs REQUESTS TO THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMITTEE AGAINST APARTHEID

* ON APARTHEID ECC calls on all United Nations member countries to do everything in their Dower to end apartheid and see to the SDeedy implementation of a non-racial and democratic society in which the government is elected on a one-person-one-vote franchise in a united South Africa.

* ON CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION

ECC calls on all United Nations member countries to provide support for those who in conscience refuse to serve in the South African Defence Force.

We call on all members to do everything in their power to accept people into their countries who, for whatever reason, are unwilling to do military service in South Africa. We call on them to give all forms of supDort including political assylum, and refugee status on application, to South African conscientious objectors.

* ON DEALINGS WITH THE SADF

ECC calls on all member nations to carefully consider the implications of having any dealings with the SADF.

We believe that by permitting the buying and selling of arms or equippment useful to the SADF, the governments of certain member nations may be playing a direct role in nrolonging the life of apartheid and prolonging the misery faced by the SADF's power.

We are concerned by reports that certain United Nations member countries are openly or covertly purchasing arms and military equipment from , and that others are inadvertently or otherwise allowing transnational corporations based on their soil to sell technology and equipment useful to the SADF to South Africa. (See appendixes).

* ON SUPPORT FOR SOUTHERN AFRICAN DISSJDENT MOVEMENTS

ECC calls on all United Nations member countries to do everything in their cower to ensure that UNITA, the MNR and other southern African dissident groups are isolated from supprt.

ECC is extremely concerned about reports that the United States government intends providing financial and military supDort for Unita.

We believe that this will only se^ve to strengthen the hand of the South African Defence Force in the region. We believe that by sunnorting Unita. the United States government will be playing into the hands of the South African government's apartheid policies.

Such support will force the Angolan government to rely more heavily on foreign assistance from Cuba and will therefore allow South Africa to hide behind its sourious condition of the "Cuban linkage" in delaying Namibia's independence.

We believe it will also allow South Africa to concentrate its efforts on crushing internal resistance to apartheid by releasing SADF resources for the home front.

Support for Unita will also be direct support for the South African government's Dolicy of ensuring its own hegemony in the southern African region by destabilising its neighbours. * ON NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE

ECC calls on all United Nations member countries to do everything in their power to ensure the speedy and unconditional independence for Namibia through the implementation of United Nations Resolution 435.

We believe that any "conditions" set for the implementation of resolution 435, such as the condition of "Cuban linkage" are merely attempts at stalling independence. We believe these conditions are having the effect of indefinitely prolonging South Africa's subjugation of the Namibian peoole. SADF LINKS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES (Appendix 1)

One of ECC's requests to the United Nations Special Committee Against Apartheid is that member nations carefully consider the implications of having any dealings with the SADF, We therefore felt it necessary to provide a cursory list of some of the areas where the SADF has managed to get around the international arms embargo.

Transnational corporations are probably the most significant conduit for the supply of strategic and mi 1itarily-useful technology to South Africa.

The 1977 arms embargo imposed by the United Nations Security Council had stopped the flow of most official government to government arms transfers to South Africa, but trade in arms with a number of transnational corporations has continued.

This has helped South Africa to build un the largest arms industry in the southern hemisphere and one of the ten largest in the world. By gaining access to high-tech building blocks of modern weaponry - computers, microorocessors, instrumentation, equipment, electronic components and sub-assemblies for use in larger systems, the SADF ( through Armscor) has been able to provide for most of its own armaments needs. *

According to the American Friends Service Committee this has been done with the tacit approval of the governments in which the trading comp­ anies are based (Citizen, 19/9/85).

For example of the more than 400 united States compainies doing business in South Africa, 33 are ranked among the top 100 United States Department of Defence contractors during 1984. This provides a structural context for evading the arms embargo which is difficult to monitor. (Citizen, 19/9/85).

Loopholes used to beat the arms embargo include the following:

Overseas production by United States Corporations: US corporations can supply South Africa through subsidiaries in other countries. * Diversion and use of Front Organisations: Where goods are supposedly meant for "non-embargoed agen ies", they can be diverted for use by the SADF. Front organisatijns include the CSIR (Council for Scientific and Industrial Research) and its subsidiaries. These agencies are not embargoed and are able to act as intermediaries for the SADF. * Training: Corporations selling equipment to South Africa for non­ military purposes often offer training which is open to government staff, including the SADF. * Transfer of know-how: There is an informal flow of strategically useful information to South Africa. * Discretion in Licensing Procedures: "Dual-Use" equipment with military and civilian applications are exported to South Africa from the United States (but not, for example, to the USSR).

Comments from the United States government stressing the importance of close ties with the South African government are of concern in this respct.

For example, President Ronald Reagan said: "Can we abandon the country that has stood by us in every war we have fought, a country that strategically is essential to the free world?" (CBS News, March 3, 1981).

Since the Reagan administration took office in 1981 more than $28 million in American military-related equipment is alleged to have been sold in South Africa (Race Relations Survey, 1984).

According to the British anti-apartheid movement in the 22 years since the then Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, imposed and arms embargo on South Africa, and in the nine years since the United Nations embargo was imposed, South Africa has continued to receive nuclear technology and personnel, radar equipment and computers, codified NATO information, aircraft, and arms from British sources (Star, 11/7/85).

This supply of military equipment is often "laundered" through third countries or smuggled out of Britain (by South African agents like the "Coventry Four" of 1984).

South Africa has also conducted a vigorous trade in arms with Israel. Increased military cooperation became evident in 1979 when a series of top level military visits between Israel and South Africa occurred.

In 1979 the BBC reported that 50 South African Navy personnel were being trained near Haifa to operate Reshet missile-carrying boats.

Many Israeli designed weapons are produced under license by Armscor. Of special importance here is the R4 assault rifle which is a copy of the Galil assault rifle, the Gabriel surface to surface missile and the Reshev class boats now being built under license in .

The disgraced former head of intelligence in the (one of South Africa's "independent homelands") spoke at a seminar on security in Isreal three years ago. Following his detention in the Ciskei, it was announced that the Ciskei had secured a contract with Israel to supply and train a Ciskeian airforce. The Ciskei agreed to buy "about six" aircraft from Israel and Israeli Air Force instructors were to come to the "homeland" to run "phase one" of the pilot training scheme (Human Awareness Programme dossier on militarisation, March 1986).

In addition the SADF exports arms to many countries through Armscor. These countries include Paraguay, Chile, Taiwan, South Korea, Indonesia and Morocco (Human Awareness Programme, March 1986).

The SADF has also made "donations" of arms to several countries. It was recently announced in parliament that the SADF gave away gifts of "armaments, supplies and three giraffes" worth R4,8 million to "foreign countries and a university" in 1984/5 (Weekly Mail, 7/3/86). Transnational corporations with subsidiaries in South Africa could find themselves in a position where they have no option but to orovide assistance to the SADF. Several foreign companies are subject to the provisions of the National Key Points Act of 1980 which enables the Minister of Defence to declare aiy factory a "National Key Point", thereby demanding that prescribed security standards are complied with. The National Supplies Procurement Act of 1970 gives the Minister of Defence the power to commandeer industrial plants, including those owned by Transnational Coroorations, for military use in times of crisis.

The SADF makes extensive use of equipment and machinery available from Transnational Corporations for civilian use. Thus, for example, the SADF uses Mercedes engines from West Germany in their Bedford trucks, Alouette helicopters from France and Landrovers from Britain, while the South African oolice have recently bought a large fleet of Ford Granadas from the South African subsidiary of the Ford Motor company of the United States. CONSCRIPTION AND CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION - A CHRONOLOGY

1914: There is no conscription when the Botha-Smuts givernment decides to go to war against Germany. Boer generals like De Wet, De la Rey and Beyers lead an unsuccessful rebellion against the South African government.

1939: The Smuts government goes to war against Germany and Italy. There is no conscription and military service outside of South Africa during the war is voluntary. Those members of the forces who agreed to fight outside South Africa wore orange flashes. Most members of the current National Party (the government party), including several prominant members of the government today, were openly pro-Nazi. 40 years later those who stood on their democratic right to dissent from going to war with Hitler refuse a similar right to dissenters in the 1980s.

1961 - 1964: Conscription is introduced on a ballot basis in 1961. 7000 men are conscripted for nine months service. There was no allowance made for conscientious objection in law, but non-combatant status was granted to members of "peace" (pacifist) churches (Jehova's Witnesses, Seventh Day Adventists, Plymouth Bretheren, Quakers and Christadelphians). - Before the introduction of conscription the Defence budget was R44 mi 11i on.

1964 - 1967: In 1964 the number of conscripts increased to 16 500 and the Defence budget increased to R210 million. - A number of Jehova’s Witnesses go into military Detention Barracks for refusing to serve at all because they did not recognise state authority. At this stage sentences are for 3 months in DB and could be repeated. - Atrickle of politically motivated Conscientious Objectors (CO's) went into exile.

1967: Universal military conscription is introduced for all white males of 17 years old for 9 months service 1970: The maximum sentence for Conscientious Objectors is increased to 15 months, with limited accomodation for "Peace churc" COs (if their sentence was for 12 months or more then they could not be called up again and they were allowed to wear blue overalls instead of military uniform).

1972: National service is extended to 12 months, plus annual 19 day camps for five years. - Defence budget increases to R 300 million. - First serious recruitment of blacks into the SADF.

1974: The SADF takes over from the South African Police in Northern Namibia. - the non-"Peace churches" begin taking up the issue of conscientious objection. The South African Council of Churches makes the following policy statement:

"The National Conference of the SACC points out that the military forces of our society are being prepared to defend an unjust and dis­ criminatory society, and that the threat of military force is already used to defend the status quo ... The conference calls on its member churches to challenge all their members to consider whether CHrist's call to take up the cross and follow him in identifying with the oppressed does not in our situation, involve beinq a conscientious objectors".

- The government resoonds by introducing Section 121 C of the Defence Acr making it a crime to encourage anyone not to serve in the SADF.

1975: South Africa launches a "secret" invasion of Angola in support of Unita and the FNLA. The government denies its presence in Angola for several months before admitting it. The SADF troops are repulsed by the combined MPLA and Cuban forces. 1976: . Within a year between 600 and 1000 black people are killed and thousands more are injured - maily by the police. Thousands of black youth flee the country to join the ANC. Troops are mobilised throughout the country and according to some reports are used in the black townships. - Official Defence expenditure increases to R1,3 billion (over 20 percent of the budget and 5,5 percent of the Gross National Product). - Three month operational camps are introduced.

1977: Conscription is extended to two years plus annual thirty day camps for eight years. - The Southern African Catholic Bishops Conference makes the following policy statement:

"In this matter of conscientious objection we defend the right of every individual to follow their own conscience; the right therefore to conscientious objection on the grounds of universal pacifism and on the grounds that the person seriously believes the war to be unjust".

- The SACC and SACBC stands wer? followed by statement supporting the right to conscientiously object from the Anglican, Methodist, Presbytarian and Congregational churches.

- In December 1977 Anton Eberhard, a Presbytarian and a pacifist, becomes / the first non-peace church CO. !e is sentenced to 12 months in DB, with 10 months suspended for refusing a three month camp.

1978: The law is changed making peace church COs liable for up to 36 months in DB (with no further call-ups after the sentence is served). For other objectors it was two years or a fine of R2 000 or both. Non­ peace church COs could be called up again and were not granted CO status. Since then nearly 1000 COs a year from the peace churches (mainly Jehova's Witnesses) have been charged. - Since then about 1000 conscripts a year have gone into exile.

1979: The ANC begins to attack military and police targets and steps

u d its guerilla campaign in South Africa. - The SADF annual intake rises to 30 000. - The Defence budget passes the two billion rand mark. _ Peter Moll, a university academic and a Baptist, conscientiously objects on religious and political grounds using the argument that the SADF is engaged in an unjust war. He is sentenced to 18 months in DB, reduced to 12 months, for refusing a three month camp. - Conscientious Objector Support Groups are formed in Cane Town, Durban and Johannesburg. COSGs are later formed in Grahamstown, Pietermaritzburg and Port Elizabeth.

1980: Widespread uprisings herald the emergence of a broad-based non- racial movement of resistance. Troops are used in townships to assist the police. - The SADF begins establishing "homeland" armies. - Richard Steel, a Baptist and universal pacifist, objects on religious and nolitically-related grounds. He is sentenced to 18 months in DB, with six months suspended, for refusing to do his initial service.

]981_:In January the SADF launches a raid into Maputo, killing a soldier, a civilian and several ANC guerillas. - In May Charles Yeats, an Anglican and universal pacifist, is sentenced to a year in DB for refusing to do his initial service and then in December to a second year for refusing to wear a regulation uniform.

J_982: Conscription is extended to two years service plus 720 days camps over the next 12 years plus 12 days camps a year up to the age of 55, after which the conscript is placed on the national reserve - a possible total of four years and nine months military service. - The National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) begins taking up the issues of militarisation and conscientious objection as a major focus of their activity and on some campuses forms broad-based Conscription Action Groups. - In Febuary Mike Vivieros, a Baptist teacher and a universal pacifist, objects on religious and policical grounds. He is sentenced to 18 months imprisonment for refusing his initial national service. - In July, Neil Mitchell, a teacher and a Roman Catholic pacifist is sentenced to one year in DB for refusing to do his initial service and then to another six months for refusing to wear regulation uniform. In October 1982 Billy Paddock, an Anglican who is an engineer and a journalist, objects on political and religious grounds using the Just War argument. He is sentenced to one year in prison for refusing his initial service. In December the SADF launches the Maseru raid killing 42 people, mainly civilians.

1983: The United Democratic Front is formed uniting over 600 community organisations in a camnaign against apartheid laws. Among other things the UDF campaigns for an end to conscription. - The ANC carries out 56 guerilla attacks, according to the Institute of Strategic Studies in Pretoria. - In May the SADF again riads Mozambique, killing 17 people and injuring over 200 in Maputo. - In October 1983 the SADF again raids Maputo, injuring 4 people in the ANC offices. In January 1983 Ettiene Essory, a journalist, becomes the first person to object with no religious affiliations. He is sentenced to four months in jail for refusing to do his third camp. - In Febuary 1983 Adrian Paterson, a scientist and an Anglican pacifist, objects and is sentenced to four months imorisonment for refusing to do his initial service. - In March 1983 Peter Hathorr, objects on just war political grounds. He is sentenced to two years imorisonment reduced to one year for refusing to do his initial service. - In September 1983 Paul Dobson, a teacher, objects on political grounds. He is sentenced to one year in prison for refusing to continue with his initial service after having served for 14 months. - In November 1983 Brett Myrdal, a student and Nusas leader, objects on political grounds in a high profile campaign. On the morning of his trial a postponement is announced to allow for the introduction of a new law. - In November 1983 a new law is introduced providing for up to six years alternative service for religious pacifists and for up to six years in prison for all other objectors. - In December 1983 the first ECC branches are set up following a call from the calling for an end to conscription.

1984: The 1984/5 Defence budget increases by 21 percent from the previous year to R3,755 billion. - Coloured and Indian elections for the new tri-cameral parliament are boycotted by 83 percent of potential voters. The government's announcements that it intends to conscript coloureds and Indians contrbutes to the low poll and the UDF campaigns vigorously around the issue. Conscription is extended to all immigrant males over the age of 25 who have been in the country for more than three years. - In September 1984 high rents and corrupt black town councillor spark off the "Vaal uDrising". By the end of the year about 200 people had been killed by the police and army after the "unrest" spreads throughout the country. - In October 1984 7000 troops and Dolice occupy the township of Sebokeng and later other townships in the Transvaal. Among other things they carry out oass raids and conduct house-to-house searches. - The SADF concucts a major offensive into Angola ("Operation Askari"). - 1596 conscripts fail to report for national service. - 16 421 people emigrate from South Africa, many to avoid military servi ce. - The End Conscription Campaign experienced rapid growth and carries out several successful national campaigns.

2985: SADF troops occupy at least 30 townships throughout the country and assist police and other apartheid officials with forced removals, squatter camp demolitions, pass raids, road blocks and house-to-house searches as well as with suppressing "unrest". - Two SADF troops are killed and one captured in Cabinda in Angola at a time when South Africa said its troops had left this area. The captured soldier, Captain Du Toit, confirms the Angolan government's version that the troops were attempting to blow up the American-owned Cabinda oil refinery .

- In September SADF troops penetrate 250 kilometers into Angola in an attempt to protect Unita from the Angolan army, FAPLA. - In July SADF troops raid Gabarone in Botswana killing 13 people including several civilians. In December 9 people are killed in Maseru, in Lesotho - allegedly by SADF troops. - In May the SADF admits to having killed 6 people and injured 30 in the township conflict. - The official Defence budget rises to R4,274 billion with real defence spending^ including the mini Defence budget, military spending in Namibia, homelands Defence spending, SADF housing, secret Defence accounts) being over R5,5 billion.

- No Africans ("blacks" in government terminology) volunteered for military service in 1985.

Collection Number: AG1977

END CONSCRIPTION CAMPAIGN (ECC)

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