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Home , New religious movement, Shoko Asahara, Steven Hassan

REFRAMING THE ISLAMIC STATE 1

The Islamic State of Doom Reframing the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant as a

Lizzie Orr

California State University Maritime Academy

REFRAMING THE ISLAMIC STATE 2

“Every man he has his own good reason.”

C.G.B. Spender

Abstract

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has been analyzed extensively as a religious extremist group. Yet today, it is still hard to understand how individuals are compelled to join an

REFRAMING THE ISLAMIC STATE 3 organization which demonstrates such disregard for human life and reason. This paper explores the structure of New Religious Movements in attempt to see if this framework is applicable to the Islamic State. Specific areas of analysis are recruitment, retention, and thought control utilizing the BITE Model. The successful reframing of the Islamic State as a New Religious

Movement offers the potential to better understand recruitment metrics for the organization, implications which may lead to more effective counter-recruitment and counter-terrorism strategies.

Keywords: Islamic State, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, , New Religious

Movement, thought reform, terrorism, counter-terrorism,

The Islamic State of Doom

Reframing the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant as a New Religious Movement

Introduction

REFRAMING THE ISLAMIC STATE 4

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)1 creeps into the global psyche near daily, as media reports detail the latest in horrific imagery created by the hands of this jihadist militant group. Progress in the international war on terror waged against this self-proclaimed caliphate has proved difficult because of the group’s widespread recruitment strategies and its path of destruction. Recruitment tactics which play off the isolationist feelings of Muslims worldwide have proven successful in bolstering the ranks of the organization. The use of inventive, but inhumane methods of attack in cities around the world requires universal vigilance to combat.

With no contained geographical area in which to expect and counter attacks, it is difficult to target attackers before they inflict damage. Recent military success against ISIL may have pushed the organization out of its territorial strongholds, but does not diminish their ability to mobilize supporters and admirers worldwide. U.S. coalition and Middle Eastern forces and governmental entities alike are at a loss with how to combat the psychological power of an organization with an ever-growing following in endless locations. What is needed is a framework to decipher how and why the Islamic State, more commonly known as ISIL, is so successful at recruitment and international terror. Recently, religious psychologists have postulated that ISIL would be better understood through the lens of a New Religious Movement— the politically correct terminology for a . An unusual and almost comical concept at first glance, this organizational structure is surprisingly apt. Such a framework offers insight on recruitment, training techniques, and objectives in a way which makes analyzing ISIL as a religious movement not only more manageable but also more insightful. And indeed, the association of

1 The Islamic State is known by many names: Islamic State (IS), Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Daesh, etc. For the purposes of this paper the term used will be Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) because this is the generally accepted nomenclature for this group for governmental institutions.

REFRAMING THE ISLAMIC STATE 5

ISIL with religious is not terribly far-fetched, particularly when considering dramatic examples of the propensity of cults, both historically and recently, to engage in violence.

Stories involving cult and crimes continue to mesmerize contemporary audiences as the popular media stimulates and capitalizes on morbid fascination to gain greater viewership.

News reports of , financial ruin, and mass murder- convey to the public at large the tragic consequences of involvement with elusive and secretive cult societies. Fantasy and sci-fi fictional accounts of occult activity create lead characters that are exaggerated tropes.

Lead characters the like of X-Files’ Special Agents Scully and Mulder, or Jos Whedon’s vampire hunter Buffy Summers, battle zealots and demons for the safety of mankind. Meanwhile more traditional crime-based television shows--while their storylines pull from true events and often employ retired criminal investigators as research experts to present more accurate representations--also delve into the realm of cult crime. The perverse fascination with the sensational has even invaded our modern lexicon. Such phrases as “drinking the kool-aid” represent the normalization of multiple incidents of when organizations used poison diluted in the sugary drink for suicide .

While widely familiar, these shock-and-awe incidents are portrayed as examples of the downfall of otherness: this is what happens when one joins a fringe organization with fanatical beliefs. However, many organizations classified as New Religious Movements, known colloquially as cults, have a wider impact than simply on those who “choose” to join their ranks.

In reality, New Religious Movements have often posed a threat to outsiders. These threats range from local crimes in the communities where they reside to larger international incidents. Much more than an intriguing and inconsequential facet of fantasy and fiction, these groups can and do pose very real and very serious security threats to members of the international community.

REFRAMING THE ISLAMIC STATE 6

In fact, the international impact of New Religious Movements (NRMs) has played out in many theaters across the globe. For Americans the iconic cult is the of the

Disciples of Christ, the cult of personality centered around which met infamous ends at in 1978. The story of this NRM began in Indiana, crossing state lines to California and eventually national borders to South America’s Guyana. It was in their self-named

Jonestown, Guyana that over 900 members of the ‘church’ ingested poison spiked kool-aid, many against their will.

A further religious movement that makes regular news headlines is The Church of

Scientology, its congregation including many celebrity practitioners. Ex-members often speak out about the negative impact the organization has had on their lives. Accusations detail mental health and physical safety issues, including the brainwashing of younger church members who are forced to live on ships as a part of ’s Sea Org (Goodstein, 2010). On a larger scale was Operation Snow White that coordinated espionage efforts and the alteration of

Scientology-centered documents in government databases worldwide. This infiltration is still considered one of the largest ever committed against the Government, one of the

17 government agencies targeted (Owen, 1998).

Peoples Temple and Scientology are the two obvious examples of “cult” activity well- known by members of the American public, but there are many global examples that are essential to an understanding of the international role of New Religious Movements. In Mexico, a new folk called has garnered millions of followers. This “Saint of Death,” depicted as a female skeleton wearing a robe, has become the unofficial face of Dia de Los

Muertos celebrations and integral part of everyday for Mexican citizens (Tucker, 2017).

In this case, instead of a particular criminal organization centered around one deity, many

REFRAMING THE ISLAMIC STATE 7 organizations have had ties to Santa Muerte; nefariously, the most well-known followers of

Santa Muerte are the gangs and cartels who employee her imagery. As seen with other popular cults, the commercialization of the saint makes it a useful tool for economic exploitation. These gangs and cartels often utilize the religious imagery to enforce obedience within their ranks.

Kidnapping, money laundering, drug trafficking and human are all alleged crimes of proponents of the Saint of Death (Grillo, 2011).

A more traditional instance of New Religious Movements abroad is Aum Shinrikyo, the

Japanese . Aum Shinrikyo reached international notoriety following two chemical weapon attacks in the 1990s. These are perhaps the only non-governmental sponsored use of chemical weapons (Ahuja, 2013). Chemical weapons are universally agreed upon to be taboo, and their use in an act of terrorism by the NRM is particularly frightening; it is possible for signatory nations to monitor and deplete their own stockpiles, but similar monitoring of radical groups is near impossible. The United States Air Force intelligence indicates that Aum Shinrikyo was also actively pursuing nuclear weapon capabilities, though they were ultimately unsuccessful (Daly, 2005). Obviously, these instances carry significant security implications for the containment of weapons of mass destruction on the international stage.

These cases illustrate an array of international security threats stemming from human rights violations to the threat of use of weapons of mass destruction by rogue entities. The list includes the international movement and trafficking of people and drugs, espionage, cyber attacks, acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, and the violent terrorizing of civilian populations by non-state actors. While vastly different examples of international crime, these events and many of the organizations that perpetrate them most frequently have common ties within the scope of New Religious Movements. To better understand the role these groups play

REFRAMING THE ISLAMIC STATE 8 in the international sphere, we must analyze the commonalities seen within them. By delving into

NRM related terminology, typology, , examples, and international policy, we can begin to make connections about how these organizations form and operate, and ultimately impact global security.

Ultimately, following the recognized components of the New Religious Movements lead us to the examination the jihadist militant group the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant as a

“cult.” With a hand in terrorist acts perpetrated throughout the global system, the Islamic State of

Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) itself is a security-threatening behemoth. Mass graves located in liberated ISIL territory hold over 15,000 bodies, indicators of genocide carried out by the group

(“Iraq: ISIL Dumped Hundreds in Mass Grave”, 2017). Threatening international law and attacking human rights through the fist of , ISIL itself is the contemporary epitome of a New Religious Movement and the ability of such groups to disrupt the world order.

By contextualizing the recruitment, training, and violent acts of ISIL, we might be able to better understand the organization and design strategies to counteract their terrorist measures.

Framework of Terminology

When attempting to understand New Religious Movements, the first step to is to build a solid framework of terminology and typology. What exactly are the groups involved, and what crimes and security threats are being perpetrated? What sets these organizations apart from other religious and nonreligious groups?

Religion

Religion forms the foundation of the discussion on New Religious Movements. There is a discussion in the academic community about the effectiveness of definitions dealing with religion, which show that even seemingly straightforward aspects of understanding this topic are

REFRAMING THE ISLAMIC STATE 9 bristling with controversy (Schaffalitzky de Muckadell, 2014). Symbolic Anthropologist Clifford

Geertz is a proponent of the most popular way of thinking about religion as a cultural system. He suggests:

Sacred symbols function to synthesize a people’s ethos– the tone, character, and quality of their life, its moral and aesthetic style and mood– and their world-view– the picture they have of the way things in sheer actuality are, their most comprehensive ideas of order… In religious and practice a group’s ethos is rendered intellectually reasonable by being shown to represent a way of life ideally adapted to the actual state of affairs the world-view describes, while the world-view is rendered emotionally convincing by being presented as an image of an actual state of affairs peculiarly well arranged to accommodate such a way of life. (p. 64)

To Geertz and other anthropologists and ethnographers, religion is an all-encompassing network of worldviews, sacred texts and places, ethics and behaviors, which relate to the .

Unfortunately, not all religious systems are equal in their inclusions of each of the aforementioned aspects. Today, the approach of Geertz and his professional colleagues remains the most sensible and useful in understanding and contextualizing religion.

Religious Groups and the Church- Continuum

When people gather together to practice the same religion, these groups fall into certain levels of a sociological classification of religious movements known as church-sect typology

REFRAMING THE ISLAMIC STATE 10

(Figure 1). Devised by sociologist Max Weber, this ranking lists religious groups on a spectrum determined by how membership was gained. On one end of the spectrum are organizations which have reached equilibrium and often obtain new members through “birth," such as churches; the far end of the spectrum are , which gain members through “decision” (Swatos,

1998. p. 90). Segregated on the “decision” (or “protest”) side of the spectrum, are cults/New

Religious Movements. These groups can form without breaking away from the larger religion.

This model offers a way to compare completely different organizations by comparing their membership. Understanding the role of an NRM as a “protest” group helps initiate dialogue about the foundational tenets of one of these organizations, compared to another group on the spectrum.

Church. Churches make up the most established religious groups. These organizations have stood the test of time and have a considerable following. They preach their universality as the one “true” religion, taking precedence over all other belief systems. These groups frequently have a monopoly on religious practice in a society and work strenuously to maintain religious dominance. Churches employ hierarchical bureaucratic structures and procedures to strengthen their organization by separation of labor, keeping power in specific places (usually at the top).

Reproduction/internal generation is the basic mode of increasing membership. A classic example was the at its height of its temporal and secular power as the uniting force

Figure 1. Church-Sect Continuum. This scale shows how religious groups obtain their membership for contrast of groups with differing ideology (Cragun, 2005).

REFRAMING THE ISLAMIC STATE 11 across Europe (Johnstone, 2007). In the Middle Eastern countries where the powers of church and state are not separated, is a church. As one may see, this terminology has its nuances and does not claim to give an organization one concrete classification; however, this system attempts to generalize usefully the multiple complexities of religion in vastly different societies.

Sect. On the opposite side of the spectrum of the relative internal organization of religious institutions are sects: new formed by individuals who protest aspects of a preexisting religion (Swatos, 1998). This can happen for many reasons. Some sects begin as disenfranchised members of larger groups; they attempt to practice the religion in a way that better meets their needs, for example, those in a lower socioeconomic bracket. Other sects develop as members of a denomination want to return to a more conservative practice of their religion — this is particularly poignant in the discussion of extremist groups. An iconic

American example of a sect is the , practitioners of which generally reside in rural

Pennsylvania.

The term “sect" generally has a negative connotation today and is sometimes used interchangeably with “cult.” Consequently today, proponents of religious tolerance recommend refraining from using the term when discussing a particular group unless a full definition is given, as above (Robinson, 2015).

Denomination. As membership in sects grow, they either become institutionalized or reach denomination status. A denomination is a voluntary association which carries many of the traditions and beliefs of larger churches, but without the barriers to entry traditional churches have: ethnicity, nationality, etc. (Wilson, 1959). Denominations function within societies that have other religions or non-church states, so the American Catholic Church fits this classification in modern times. These organizations must co-exist in many “free-market” pluralist religious

REFRAMING THE ISLAMIC STATE 12 societies. In the United States, for example, the largest religious organizations are denominations because of this cohabitation within the secular state (Swatos, 1998, p. 135).

Institutionalized Sects. Sects that gain membership, but not to the extent of denominations, eventually stabilize into institutionalized sects. A common thread between sects that become institutionalized is societal protest; sects that protest individual sin are more likely to become denominations because it is easier to make the case for changing yourself than entire aspects of society—especially in pluralist societies. Like most sects, these groups do not have a formally educated , and continue to promote spontaneous worship (Swidler & Mojzes,

2000). A contemporary example of an institutionalized sect is the Religious Society of Friends, better known as .

New Religious Movements. The most difficult to define on the spectrum of religious typology is the New Religious Movement. In plain terms, these are organizations which form around the of new spiritual thought. This can be the re-emergence of lost scripture, focus on a new aspect of established doctrine, or a completely new realm of theological thought.

New Religious Movements may form out of an existing religion or can materialize out of unique sets of practices or thought (Swatos, 1998). The societal norm is to interpret these groups as the social “other,” or societal outsiders, and therefore dismiss their legitimacy as a new religious school. Most frequently, what is seen as different or unknown is feared and labeled as dangerous. This has led to many new or divergent groups being deemed cults, or pseudo- religious.

The word cult summons up imagery of esoteric or demonic symbolism, psychological torment, and/or violent rituals, thus giving the term its derogatory implications. The use of this terminology in an academic paper might, therefore, be misconstrued. Thus the term will be used

REFRAMING THE ISLAMIC STATE 13 sparingly throughout this thesis. What will be developed is an analysis based on the examination of detrimental New Religious Movement practices, those typically associated with stereotypical cult behavioral patterns.

Particularly tragic events during the last four decades involving violent New Religious

Movements, some of which are highlighted in this discussion, stigmatize all newly emergent religious groups. In reality, these high-casualty incidences are an exception to the rule and not typical of the numerous alternative religions that have sprung up. Known for its , the United States has been a conducive starting environment for new religious groups since its founding (Stein, 2003). As such, it would be both academically and socially irresponsible to paint New Religious Movements as necessary instigators of social unrest in

America or in other societies. But the exceptions provide chilling testimony regarding the potential for NRMs to turn dark and dangerous.

This thesis attempts to provide a framework for understanding ISIL in terms of New

Religious Movement activity as a way to understand various aspects of recruitment, training, and countermeasures to terrorism and crimes against humanity. This thesis is not an indictment of religious freedom or a proponent of discrimination against New Religious Movements; indeed it is quite the opposite. This paper attempts to understand and disarm a group which threatens the freedom of speech, religion, and life around the world.

A cult is a cult is a cult. That being said, some organizations fall within the scope of cult status in an inescapable way. “Doomsday cult,” for example is the term that defines a particular type of organization which postulates the end of times. Aum Shinrikyo falls within this purview, so it would be nonsensical to reinvent terminology in this discussion for existent and perfectly

REFRAMING THE ISLAMIC STATE 14 justifiable labeling. Cults of personality, satanic cults, commercial cults and political/terrorist cults will all be elaborated upon in later applicable sections.

Table 1 on the following page delves deeper into the easily quantifiable differences between churches, denominations, institutionalized sects, sects, and new religious movements.

Table 1: Church-Sect Continuum Comparison Church Denomination Institutionalized Sect New Religious Sect Movement/Cult

Membership • By birth • By birth • Voluntary • Voluntary • Voluntary • Voluntary • Voluntary • Recruitment • Recruitment • Recruitment • Recruitment • Recruitment

Membership • Lower Class • Middle Class ✵ • Lower Class • Disenfranchised Demographics • Middle Class • Upper Class • Disenfranchised from all classes • Upper Class Membership Largest Medium Small Small Smallest Size (comparative within a state)

Conversion • Open to all • Open to all • Requires • Requires • Requires conversion conversion conversion experience experience experience

Religious • Universal doctrine • Reestablish • Reestablish • Reestablish • Religious Interests original doctrine original original doctrine revolution/revela about individual doctrine about tion sins and salvation social injustices

In Society • Religious • Amiable • Tends away • Tends away • Aversion to monopoly relationship with from/protests from/protests mainstream • Allied with state; state aspects of aspects of society shared • Ability to be mainstream mainstream responsibilities critical of state society society

REFRAMING THE ISLAMIC STATE 15

Table 1: Church-Sect Continuum Comparison Church Denomination Institutionalized Sect New Religious Sect Movement/Cult

Who Can Be • Everyone can be ✵ ✵ • Only members • Only members “saved” saved can be saved can be saved

Clergy • Professional • Professional ✵ • Not professional • Cult of • Educated • Educated • Not educated Personality around a charismatic leader

Worship • Formal • Formal ✵ • Spontaneous ✵ Practices

Issues/Concerns • This world • This world • This world • Otherworldly • Individual • Otherworldly • Otherworldly • Otherworldly • Otherwordly

Leaving • Least Difficult • Less Difficult • Less Difficult • More Difficult • Most Difficult

Examples • Medieval • Major religions in • Quakers • Pennsylvania • Peoples Temple Catholicism the United States Dutch Amish • Scientology and other pluralist • Islam in present • • Aum Shinrikyo societies day • Jehovah’s • Contemporary Witnesses Catholicism • Methodist

✵ = More data needed.

Compiled by the author. Sources: Stein 2003; Swatos, 1998; Swidler & Mojzes, 2000.

Terrorism

The concept of terrorism is particularly important to the understanding of New Religious

Movements and the international security threats they pose. Terrorist acts will be discussed at length later, so clarification of this term is necessary for effective analysis. Unfortunately for clarity’s sake, terrorism has no internationally agreed upon definition; as the idiom goes, one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter. Not everyone can agree on which attacks are undertaken for what reasons. For the purpose of this discussion, the Institute for Economics &

Peace offers an internationally focused definition: the threatened or actual use of illegal force and

REFRAMING THE ISLAMIC STATE 16 violence by a non‐state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2017, p. 6). This think-tank maintains the Global Terrorism Index (GTI), an annually published quantitative report of terrorist activities and important related metrics based on the Global Terrorism Database. Their definition looks at not only the physical damage inflicted on victims, but the psychological societal impact which follows. The GTI is an analysis of acts of intentional terrorism in and their impacts in 163 countries, covering 99.7 of the world’s population. To be included:

“[an] act has to be 'an intentional act of violence or threat of violence by a non-state actor.’ This means an incident has to meet three criteria in order for it to be counted as a terrorist act:

1. The incident must be intentional - the result of a conscious calculation on the part of a

perpetrator.

2. The incident must entail some level of violence or threat of violence - including

property damage as well as violence against people.

3. The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors. (6)

In addition to the Global Terrorism Database, The GTI also looks at definitions from the

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). This organization offers extra criteria for inclusion into their START database:

1. The violent act was aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious or social goal.

2. The violent act included evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate or convey some

other message to a larger audience beyond the immediate victims.

3. The violent act was outside the precepts of international humanitarian law. (6)

Here we see that the basic idea of terrorism is the implementation of acts dangerous to human life with the intent to intimidate or coerce the citizens of a country or state, or to influence

REFRAMING THE ISLAMIC STATE 17 governmental policy. ISIL is a known perpetrator of dozens of terrorists acts against multiple states and is commonly referred to as a militant terrorist group.

Building Blocks of a Violent New Religious Movement

An essential part of the discussion of New Religious Movements and ISIL relates to what sets NRMs apart as an organization type. These are the building blocks for an analysis of

ISIL activity as New Religious Movement activity. As previously explained, New Religious

Movement is a broad term which describes countless groups with as many divergent ideologies and practices. Even within known violent or abusive NRM environments, no two organizations are alike in doctrine or practice. Studies involving ex-members of NRMs who had overwhelmingly negative experiences help illustrate common factors in structure, recruitment, retention, and training.

Common Threads in Negative New Religious Movement Experiences

Leadership The founder and singular leader of the New Religious Movement is often a charismatic male figure. Their spoken reasons for creating the group may vary, but the true purpose is to dominate group members via manipulation (Rousselet, Duretete, Hardouin, &

Grall-Bronnec, 2017). This type of leader attempts to build a relationship “in which a person intentionally induces others to become totally or nearly totally dependent on him or her for almost all major life decisions, and inculcates in these followers a belief that he or she has some special talent, gift, or knowledge” (Singer, 1998, p. 270). This is known as a cult of personality, where the true purpose of the religion is to revere the leader as or as God’s messenger.

REFRAMING THE ISLAMIC STATE 18

One of the most famous NRM leader is Jim Jones, founder of the Peoples Temple of the

Disciples of Christ. What started as a foray into for the charismatic Jones turned into arguably the most iconic cult imagery to the Western world. A child of a poor household,

Jones was always less well off than his peers and often felt ostracized. When he was older, he had an interaction with a communist which changed his outlook on life completely.He recalledfeeling more accepted by that man than any other person he had met before. What followed was a deep desire to learn about communism and the aspects of shared community life and values. Jones’ infatuation with the ideals of Marxism lead him to devise a way to infiltrate the church in an attempt to draw membership to his own ideals (Jones, n.d.).

In a matter of three decades, Jones was able to garner a following of up to 20,000 members in many cities throughout California. His professed faith healing abilities brought audiences to his shows from throughout the United States. He gained financial support through these events and members of his People’s Temple. Ostracized by a wider national community, which denounced communism, and by local communities, which feared the group as abusive towards its own members, Jim Jones eventually resettled his group in Guyana.

At their commune, named Jonestown after their leader, many members of the group became unhappy. When Congressman Leo Ryan and a group of reporters came to Jonestown to investigate members’ family’s complaints about the commune, many asked Ryan if they could return home with them. Jones was rightfully worried that Ryan would leave and contact the authorities and ruin the utopia he had created for himself, surrounded by those who idolized him.

Instead of letting the truth about the internal working of the group be known and face the consequences, Jones sent an attack group to ambush Ryan and his attach and ordered everyone at the commune to ingest poisoned kool-aid. The majority of that NRM ultimately met their end at

REFRAMING THE ISLAMIC STATE 19 the hands of their charming, but disingenuous leader, who founded the group in order to use

Communism and religion to feel his own acceptance.

Jim Jones is an example of Max Weber’s concept of . Weber contests that there are three models of leadership within human groups: traditional, rational-legal, and charismatic. The leadership in newly founded NRMs is increasingly charismatic, based on the perception that “a particular individual possesses extraordinary qualities” (Robbins, 1998, p.

78). These organizations are more usually volatile, because it lacks both institutional restraint and institutional support. In other words, there is no foundation for the religion to find consistency in doctrine or practices as the leadership changes their desires on a whim. Because leaders are not held accountable, corruption, abuse and even extreme violence are allowed to take place. Because these charismatic leaders are essentially deified, their followers see them as doing no wrong. Often leaders are allowed to indulge their sexual and violent deviant tendencies, which are rationalized as eccentric parts of the leader’s personality. In order to keep this power, leaders constantly create crises within the group allowing them to maintain control.

It is important to note that, as groups move away from a single leader and towards a broader church structure with more meaningful accountability of power, an NRM has the ability to move into sect territory. Examples such as Ellen White’s Seventh-day Adventists or Joseph

Smith’s Mormonism illustrating such successful transition (Ross, 2009).

Offerings The most common thread of all New Religious Movements, not only those which are abusive, is the promise that membership and doctrine will provide for basic spiritual needs: personal meaning, acceptance, belonging, and commitment to a higher cause. The leader rejects the tenets of existing religions and claims to offer new , occult , or spiritual transcendence.

REFRAMING THE ISLAMIC STATE 20

Isolation Such groups often separate themselves from mainstream society, and this isolation is largely considered as an appealing aspect of the group. This separation is done physically, socially, and psychologically. Physically, groups remove themselves by choosing to live in one house or on one property together, sometimes participating in a commune like

Jonestown. This isolates members from outsiders, reducing their interactions with those who might find aspects of the NRM concerning. Group members are encouraged (or pressured) to cut ties with non-members (family members, friends, co-workers), who might likewise have concerns and influence members to question the philosophy and ethics of the new organization.

It is easy for groups to separate themselves psychologically from society by maintaining that they are actually outcasts with different/deviant ideas about behavioral norms (MacHovec,

1992).

Dispensing of Existence. On the Church-Sect spectrum is the concept of ‘salvation,’ or specifically who the religious group decides can be saved from the eternal damnation that their doctrine preaches. As shown on in Table 1, churches believe that everyone can be saved while

NRMs and Sects uphold that only initiated or converted members of their religious group can be saved. Destructive NRMs can take this to the extreme, believing that it is their prerogative to decide who does and does not have the right to exist (Intentional Cultish Studies Association, n.d.).

New Religious Movements which report to know that the end of the world is coming soon are known as Doomsday cults. The organization which quickly comes to with the discussion of apocalyptic tendencies is the Heaven’s Gate UFO religious group. This organization gained media attention in March of 1997 when 39 members committed mass suicide via poison in order to catch a ride on a spaceship believed to be trailing the Hale-Bopp

REFRAMING THE ISLAMIC STATE 21

Comet. Their belief structure was centered around the impending doom of the planet, with the only way to achieve salvation was by getting off Earth as quickly as possible by leaving their corporeal bodies, which they called “vehicles.” This passive view about their part in the end of times is in stark contrast to other Doomsday prophesying groups which were intent on being the ones to actually bring about the .

The archetypical aggressor Doomsday cult is Aum Shinrikyo, the Japanese organization which is responsible for the only nongovernmental use of chemical weapons ever recorded in modern times. Aum Shinrikyo was founded in 1988 by as a Buddhist sect. While initially a positive New Religious Movement, which suggested salvation was possible for everyone, over the course of the next decade its teaching turned negative and apocalyptic. By the mid-1990s, Aum was a full cult of personality surrounding Asahara. He claimed to have superhuman powers, such as levitation, not needing a normal amount of air to breathe, and the gift of . In reality, ascetic practices left Aum members so malnourished and weak (not to mention heavily drugged), that they slipped into hallucinogenic states which made it seem like

Asahara had these abilities. He convinced his followers that the only way to achieve salvation was by being close to him and receiving superhuman powers from him. Eventually Aum doctrine stated that the world was largely evil and so corrupt that the only way to assure Aum member’s rebirth and ultimate salvation was for the world to be destroyed. Instead of taking a passive seat to the end of the world like Heaven’s Gate members, Aum taught its members to bring about this apocalypse themselves. Today, Aum Shinrikyo is best known for its attack on a Tokyo subway commuter train. There gas was released leading to the death of twelve people and over six thousand injuries (Metraux, 2000). This attacks demonstrated that, to Asahara and his Aum practitioners, the right of existence to any non-Aum members was nonexistent.

REFRAMING THE ISLAMIC STATE 22

Economic There is often a financial component to detrimental New Religious

Movements, as members are convinced to pay into the organization. Some organizations end up moving into communal living spaces, but not before the leadership asks them to donate their entire life savings to the organization. Members of the gain levels within the organization by paying for church courses. One member of their organization actually committed suicide because he fell into debt from taking the courses. subsequently a French court of law ruled that a Scientology official was culpable (Wright, 2011). These courses were advertised as ways to improve one's life, as a sort of therapy session. Scholars of the Aum

Shinrikyo incidents suggest that Aum’s bids for political power in were in reality motivated by the desire for money, notoriety and power, and not driven by actual religious beliefs or the desire to participate in government for the betterment of society (Metraux, 2000, p.

42). Aum’s initiation dues were upwards of $10,000 per person(Kaplan & Marshall, 1996, p.

203).

Recruitment

The Recruits There is a misconception that people who join New Religious Movements are stupid or somehow not normal. However the vast majority of cult recruits act within the confines of socially acceptable behaviors. Many of the ex-members studied purported to be “lost ” searching for meaning or simple answers to the complexities that surrounded them. Those who feel disenfranchised and/or powerless are looking for a way to take control of their own destiny. While searching for meaning or a sense of belonging was often given as a reason for commitment, it is important to note that in some studies, voluntary joiners reported having no investment in the NRM’s doctrine. They instead joined because of perceived social values that the New Religious Movement provided (Buxant & Saroglou, 2008).

REFRAMING THE ISLAMIC STATE 23

It is important to point out that in the majority of cases, people do not join New Religious

Movements, or any religious movement, for any specific “evil reason”— indeed, they are simply looking for stability, purpose, and for a place to belong (Vatican Report, 1986).

Targeted Groups This being said, certain populations are more susceptible to voluntarily joining or “committing” to New Religious Movements that have an abusive nature. The most recruited age range has typically been 18-25 (MacHovek, 1992) with recent trends ranging to the early 30’s (Rousselet et al., 2017). Gender studies show that women join religious groups at a higher rate than men do, and NRM rates are no different. Recruits are generally from a minority or low socioeconomic class standing. They feel disenfranchised because society looks down on them, or keeps them feeling like outsiders. Psychologically, low self-esteem and depression are factors, though recent surveys show that only about 5% of recruits show deep psychological issues before membership (Singer & Lalich, 1995). Troubles in family life or relationships are also an indicator for susceptibility to joining. Self-reported fragile pasts and separation/attachment insecurities were a common thread in those who sought membership.NRM membership research studies reveal that many ex-members in related studies joined in the wake of recent negative life events for which they needed closure (Buxant & Saroglou, 2008).

Indoctrination Tactics

As evident from the at-risk populations, destructive New Religious Movements seek out the disenfranchised, the troubled, and the emotionally vulnerable. Former members frequently report fraud or deception during their recruitment period, often stating that they were generally unaware of what they were getting themselves into (MacHovek, 1992).

Indoctrination itself takes many forms, and it is impossible to quantify all of it for the purposes

REFRAMING THE ISLAMIC STATE 24 of this discussion. However, the recurring theme is the general breakdown of a person’s sense of self via thought and behavior manipulation.

BITE Model. One system for explaining types of mind control used in NRM indoctrination is undue mind control: scholar ’s BITE model (2000): Behavioral

Control, Information Control, Thought Control, Emotional Control.

Behavioral Control is the installation of rigid rules and regulation of a member’s physical reality to affect their behavior: what a person is allowed to wear, eat, do, who they are allowed to interact with, or how much they can sleep. All aspects of an individual’s life are decided for them. They must report back on their feelings, thoughts and activities. Behavior modification techniques are used to reward obedience and punish disobedience.

Information Control is the control of information to and from an individual. Leaders withhold information or twist it to meet their needs or completely lie or fabricate information.

Information is on a “need to know” basis with little transparency. Outside information is controlled, and individuals are told what they may or may not read, listen to, or watch, or who they can communicate with. Amongst the available are group publications and : newsletters, magazines, videos, and quotes taken out of context from outside sources. The objective is to limit information and keep members busy so that there is no other information to challenge the leader’s worldview, or time to think about what is really going on beyond the NRM. Confessions are used to manipulate individuals, instead of as a method for gaining forgiveness. Other members are encouraged to report on another’s deviant behavior, which results in suspicion and punishment.

Thought Control requires that individuals internalize the doctrine of the NRM as the one truth. This truth is black and white, and all matters are seen in terms of good vs. evil, us vs. them.

REFRAMING THE ISLAMIC STATE 25

Only positive thoughts are allowed, negative thoughts or critical/analytical/constructive thinking are prohibited and silenced. A new lexicon is introduced based on the desired outcome of the leader as buzz words to simplify complex experiences. Verbal techniques such as chanting, , praying, singing, humming and speaking in tongues are used to control thought processes within the group.

Emotional Control determines the range of acceptable feelings an individual is allowed to have. Any negative feelings an individual may have about the group or leader are blamed exclusively on the Individual. Any issues that would cause a person to want to leave are illegitimate: the result of weakness of character. Guilt is used as a highly effective control mechanism. Unreached potential, past events, thoughts, and feelings are all held against the individual. Likewise, fear is used as another control mechanism. Through phobia indoctrination, members are taught to irrationally fear independence, outsiders and enemies (continued us vs. them mentality), and importantly damnation, disapproval, or rejection from within the group.

Individuals learn to fear that without the group, they will not experience salvation or a positive future. These control factors lead to extreme emotional highs and lows.

Out of these techniques, ex-members often recall highly structured daily schedule featuring indoctrinating lectures and moderated discussions. Little to no privacy is obtainable, decreasing opportunities for members to have private discussions or critical analysis about the organization’s teachings; and any overheard conversations relating to negative feelings towards the group would be readily outed by eavesdroppers. Poor diet, sleep and health care take the clarity of focus off of mental tasks. (MacHovek, 1992).

Thought Reform. The BITE Model offers classification for the techniques groups or individuals can employ to alter a person’s thoughts and behaviors, a process most commonly

REFRAMING THE ISLAMIC STATE 26 referred to as brainwashing. In psychology, brainwashing is referred to as thought reform. This type of ideological remolding has been applied by religious groups throughout , as churches attempted mass religious conversions and inquisitions. The process takes two basic steps: confession and re-education. In confession, an individual renounces their old beliefs, evils and sins. In re-education, the individual is recast? in the ideal image of the group. While not commonly associated with New Religious Movements, militaries are also known for their use of thought reform.2 Studies of Chinese Communist indoctrination techniques show victims of thought reform acting against their own deeply held ideologies, only to be utterly confused about what would cause them to do so (Lifton, 1989, p.7). Ex-members of NRMs have similar experiences, and feel disconnected to their actions in the organization and about their membership in general. The implementation of thought reform is a hallmark of New Religious Movements in media representations, and for good reason: it is this technique which keeps membership in abusive

NRMs.

As can be illustrated in numerous cases of corruption in religious organizations, not all organizations practice the same level of sincerity of doctrine; that is to say that some groups are not as religious as they claim to be, but use their “faith” as a means to control and take advantage of others. This is especially true in cults of personality. Aum Shinrikyo attempted to gain political power to further recruit and increase revenues. Similarly, the People’s Temple charged fees for bogus faith healing ceremonies performed by Jim Jones.

2 One might see connections between the description of detrimental New Religious Movements and current military training techniques. The accepted difference is that people that sign up for the military understand the risks associated with that organization and are (generally) interested in carrying out its objectives.

REFRAMING THE ISLAMIC STATE 27

Retention Members of these destructive organizations are retained via the same apparatus that initially indoctrinates them, as illustrated in the BITE model . Members’ overpowering fears of outsiders and of being worthless without the group are continuously reinforced by mind control techniques. Former members cite inter-personal relationships and social pressure as the reason for staying in destructive groups for so long. Upon leaving, many individuals had to divorce or separate from spouses and cease communication with friends and family that remained inside the group. Many reported harassment from group members after leaving, including attempts at making the members rejoin (Rousselet et al., 2017).3

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

The Islamic State is a Salafi jihadist militant group which holds ultraconservative religious and political beliefs. ISIL’s tenets call for the fundamental practice of

Sunni Islam, where the words of the Quran are to be taken very literally. Ultimately, their interest is in the creation of a permanent physical totalitarian state of Islam, instead of the unrecognized proto-state in which they currently exist. More romantically, this state is referred to as the caliphate, God’s Kingdom on Earth (Dyer, 2015, p. 4). The extent to which ISIL members have gone to achieve this end has been vast. After the 2014 capture of Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city, there were mass executions, even crucifixions (McCants, 2015, p. 1). Social media posts with terrorist rhetoric, videos of beheadings, and bombings in large cities around the world more wholly prove their radial intentions for those who disagree with their end goal. These actions are carried out against so-called infidels: in other words, those who see ISIL’s fundamentalist views as extreme and do not share their vision for society.

3 These tactics and components are not unique to New Religious Movements, or religions at all. These common threads run through any type of abusive relationship, which is inarguably a category which destructive cults fall into.

REFRAMING THE ISLAMIC STATE 28

Origins

The Islamic State is headed by jihad extremists who were once members of al-Qaeda and its allied forces. The goal of al-Qaeda and other Islamic fundamentalist organizations has been to establish laws derived from the Quran as the official laws of the land, known as sharia (Ali,

Appleby, 2011, p.22). Al-Qaeda, known for its part in the 2001 9/11 attacks on the World Trade

Center in New York City, was viewed as the most extreme of these groups. Lead by Osama Bin

Laden, al-Qaeda utilized terrorist attacks for their political gain but also understood that gaining their own sharia state would take time. However, within the ranks of this organization rose members who were impatient—they wanted a physical state under sharia rule, a revival of the ancient Caliphate. This desire was realized on October 15, 2006, when the Islamic State was officially declared and claimed its authority as political and religious ruler above all Muslims

(McCants, 2015, p. 15).

After the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, Sunni muslims were ousted from positions of power in favor of Shiite muslims who had formerly been persecuted by the Iraqi government. Sunni soldiers from the disbanded Iraqi army joined the insurgency, increasing the numbers and military proficiency of al-Qaeda's ranks. It is around this time that religious scholar Abu Bakr al-

Baghdadi became head of the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI), an ally of al-Qaeda, and general supervisor for the sharia committee therein. In 2011, during the Arab Spring, Syrian President

Bashar al-Assad cracked down on protesters which gave ISI the political opportunity to send officials there to start an al-Qaeda chapter in Syria. Assad was generally tolerant of the rise of the

Islamic State in Syria because it weakened and divided the enemies it faced within its borders, as well as drawing international focus off of Assad himself. Able to gain territory and psychological

REFRAMING THE ISLAMIC STATE 29 leverage during this period, in 2013 Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi announced his control over of all al-

Qaeda allied forces in Iraq and Syria—thus ISIS (ISIL) as we know it was born (Vox, 2015).

Objectives

ISIL differs from al-Qaeda in its objectives. Al-Qaeda itself was interested in changing

United States policy in regards to Middle East issues. In his speeches, Bin Laden spoke rarely about domestic issues or tenets of ideology, but rather about US involvement in Middle Eastern affairs in Israel, Palestine, Lebanon and Iraq. Bin Laden described the US (maybe rightfully so) as meddlesome, insisting that their support for abusive regimes and pattern of resource depletion violate the rights Middle Eastern citizens. Al-Qaeda’s sworn objective was to perpetrate acts which would persuade international Muslims to oppose the actions of their governments against

Muslim states (Wade, 2017). In contrast, ISIL has particular objectives for political and ideological gains. The group intent is to impose ideological on all people, starting with domination over all Muslims and eventually leading to a global Islamic State. ISIL wants to have ultimate control over the Levant region, including Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, hence the name Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.

End Times In addition to its political and ideological views, ISIL holds more occult ideals— specifically, the belief in an end of days prophecy. According to Sunni scripture, God tells the Muhammad of a final battle between Muslims and infidels. attributed to Muhammad name al-Sham as the location of the final battle which starts the apocalypse. While al-Sham generally means the whole region to the east of the Mediterranean, jihadists equivocate with Syria because of other cities mentioned within that are featured in recent events: “The Muslims’ place of assembly on the day of the Great Battle will be in Ghouta near a city called Damascus, one of the cities in al-Sham,” Ghouta being the site of the 2013

REFRAMING THE ISLAMIC STATE 30

Syrian sarin gas attacks (McCants, 2015, p. 100). ISIL goes to great lengths to bring about these prophecies, including the military capture of Dabiq, Syria, because is was prophesied as the final battle location. There is literally no other reason for ISIL to have captured this town, which offered no military or economic gains. It is their intention to usher in the end of days by continuing to fulfill this prophecy. Or is it? This will be questioned later.

Generally speaking, the shift was made from al-Qaeda’s being a globalized cell structured force fighting against Western ideals to the Islamic State wanting physical territory and political legitimacy (Wade, 2017). This regression further into and literal interpretation of religious scripture are the same which takes place when any sect, and some New

Religious Movements, are born. By claiming to believe that their revival of the ancient Caliphate is the precursor for the end of days, ISIL employs fanatical doomsday rhetoric more akin to New

Religious Movements.

ISIL, the New Religious Movement

The same references used to discuss and define New Religious Movements are employable while discussing the Islamic State. These are the terms which help us to understand how ISIL embodies an NRM in teachings and utilizes the same thought control tactics.

Common Threads

Leadership One of the key differences between defending a religion and defining a New

Religious Movement is the status of the leader as living or dead. While ISIL retains that there is only one true God, they follow the teachings of the prophet Muhammad and leadership of living men. Finding its roots in the decades old al-Qaeda, the future of ISIL looked to jihadist leader

Abu Musab Zarqawi, a contemporary to Bin Laden but with opposing ideological views. It was

Zarqawi who lead the way for the founding of the Islamic State. As a leader, Zarqawi was

REFRAMING THE ISLAMIC STATE 31 described as an extraordinarily seductive, “as religious scholar and preacher of considerable gifts, capable of infecting and twisting like a Muslim Rasputin” (Warrick, 2015, p. 17).

The 2006 death of their charismatic leader during a bomb raid almost spelled doom for the group. Interest in the realization of a -Arab Islamic state waned; because its followers were primarily interested in the group only due to the leadership qualities of Zarqawi. The declining interest of the Islamic State followers after Zarqawi’s death show similarities between the early Islamic State and New Religious Movements. As previously mentioned, NRMs are founded almost exclusively by charismatic men interested in using scripture for their own goals, such as The People’s Temple’s Jim Jones or Aum Shinrikyo’s Shoko Asahara.

To save the momentum of the Islamic State, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was pronounced as the caliph, though at that point many Muslims had never heard of him. Where Zarqawi spoke from a platform of celebrity and charisma which made him easily spotted, Baghdadi has remained elusive to avoid the same fate. Baghdadi has not been seen in public since 2014, when he spoke as the caliph at Mosul’s Grand Mosque of al-Nuri. Before this speech, only two photos of him were ever confirmed. In July of 2017 The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights claimed that Baghdadi was dead. This was one in a line of Baghdadi death claims unconfirmed by Amaq,

ISIL’s media branch (Aljazeera, 2017). For someone that wishes to remain illusive, going as far as wearing a mask when he speaks to other ISIL members, this uncertainty is a good thing.

Recent Victories against ISIL, namely the reclaiming of Raqqa, Syria, the de facto capital of the caliphate, could be a nod to the death of Baghdadi, one of the group’s most important strategists.

That being said, without knowing who pulls the strings (and who, by fact of death, does not),

ISIL can begin to move away from the perils of charisma and build a level of legitimacy.

REFRAMING THE ISLAMIC STATE 32

Alternately, the group could fall apart as internal power struggles surrounding succession rise, leading to greater loss of life.

Offerings ISIL offers various things to those it recruits. Firstly and most readily obvious is the promise of a true Islamic State, where Muslims are free to practice their religion in adherence with state law. In this caliphate, all people would be able to live their best Muslim lives without harassment or interaction with infidels. This will eventually lead to a greater, world-wide Muslim empire. Secondly, ISIL offers respite from the feeling of otherness. General intolerance, but also past terrorists activities, have made being a Muslim ostracizing in many parts of the world. ISIL, through various recruitment channels, offers an escape from this feeling of being an outsider. It also promises the opportunity to make an impact (though often it is not in the way in which the person being recruited is aware of or intends). Along the same line, ISIL offers a place to focus frustrations from feeling like an outsider. Male recruits get to be freedom fighters, put on the front line of the war that is characterized as seeking oppression of Islamic peoples simply because of their religion, and put on the front lines facing those who are actively seeking to limit their freedom to practice the Muslim religion. Women recruits get to become brides of freedom fighters and propagate the Islamic State in the same way churches propagate their members. Suicide bombers are able to become martyrs for the cause, while wreaking havoc on Westernized oppressors (citation).

Isolation Al-Qaeda functioned as a large number of small cells throughout the world, constantly attempting to undermine Western influences. ISIL instead has focused its strategic efforts on obtaining actual land in Syria and Iraq and attempts to persuade people throughout the world to physically move to their caliphate. Once there, ISIL members are able to control the recruit’s movements throughout its territory, similarly control access to information, and monitor

REFRAMING THE ISLAMIC STATE 33 communication with the outside world. This is especially true for women who, under the strictness of fundamentalist doctrine, are not allowed to leave their homes without a male escort.

Those who challenge these restrictions and wish to leave, are threatened by death if they are found out (Shackle, 2016). Recent losses of territory have caused ISIL to shift its strategy to have recruits remain in their home country and undertake attacks there and from there. This does not change the isolationist nature of those who are already living in Iraq and Syria or the fact that some recruits are still making the move to join ISIL (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2017).

Another interesting note underscoring the relative isolation of ISIL recruits is the fact that in many countries any attempt to help family members move to Syria or Draw to join the cause is itself considered an act of treason. At the same time, sending money to a family member in an attempt to bring them home is seen as financially contributing to a terrorist or terrorist organization. These laws make it difficult for friends and family members to reach out to their lost loved ones, further creating a void and feelings of social isolation within the borders to the caliphate (Vice News, 2015).

Economics The Islamic State is the most well funded terrorist organization to date.

Revenue is made in taxes placed on their six million ‘citizens.’ Oil has also been a major source of funds, as has antiquities smuggling. Other tactics employed to accumulate financial assets include seizing assets from captured territories (ie. banks), donations, trafficking, kidnapping, and extortion (Wade, 2017). Recent territorial losses has reduced revenue streams: an estimated, yet extreme, drop from $81 million USD per month in 2015 to just $16 millions USD per month in 2016. This change in funding seems dramatic, and consequently the land loss has created a shift towards simpler and less expensive attacks outside of the caliphate. These more attacks

(suicide bombings, shootings, truck rentals, etc.) cost less than $10,000 USDA in total and can

REFRAMING THE ISLAMIC STATE 34 be self-funded by groups and ISIL inspired lone wolves around the globe (Institute for

Economics & Peace, 2017).

Dispensing of Existence Since the late 1980s, terrorism has been a tool used increasingly by Islamic fundamentalist movements. Recent numbers show the extreme impact of terrorism, which caused 25,673 deaths in 2016 alone. The Islamic State itself is responsible for 1,132 incidents of terror, leading to 9,132 deaths and 7,723 injuries. Above half of ISIL targets are private citizens and property, and likewise, make up more than half of the death toll. Bombs are the most utilized method of attack, accounting for 66.5% of all attacks in 2016; 24% of the attacks were suicide bombers--the most effective method with a rate of 14.2 deaths per attack

(the average rate per attack being 8.1 deaths). This data shows the Islamic State extremists consider themselves to have the authority to decide the fate and ultimate existence of others.

Indeed, ISIL has a disregard for even the humans within their organization, as recruits are strapped to explosive devices to increase casualty rates (Institute for Economics and Peace,

2017).

Recruitment

True recruitment numbers for ISIL are hard to determine, due to the isolationist nature of the organization. That being said, the Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP) places low-range estimates for recruitment the past two years at 28,000 individuals, joining from over 50 different countries worldwide (2017, p. 67). IEP references a report examining over 500 former extremist organizations in that finds that of those who join, over half of the 500 ex-members joined partially because of the perceived threats to their religion from their government or other sources. Meanwhile 71% said that the final catalyst to joining was a response to some government action against their religion. Generally speaking, studies found that individuals who

REFRAMING THE ISLAMIC STATE 35 feel that their economic or social status is relatively lower than others are inclined to join terrorist organizations. A perceived lack of social mobility and economic well-being , even within nations with higher economic standing , made many more inclined to radicalization (65).

On the other hand, these reports also show that many individuals were motivated to join

ISIL because they were are looking for the same benefits sought in joining other groups: companionship and belonging, a sense of security among a group of like-minded individuals, power and status, control and achievement. It is the group dynamic and environment itself that leads members to acts of violence, not necessarily their own personal nature.4 Some cases picked up by the media show the extent to which this is true, such as Samuel Wendt’s story of joining and escaping ISIL in 2014. In a 2016 the BBC interview, Wendt told reporter James Longman how he was interested in going to Syria. He was drawn by the appeal of an Islamic State where he could practice his newfound religion freely. Disinterested in killing, he had been interested in doing humanitarian work once he arrived. When he got there, however, he and the rest of the recruits were given three options: become a normal fighter, a front-line fighter, or a suicide bomber. Unhappy with the realities of living in the Islamic State, Wendt was eventually able to get home by escaping through Turkey. However, many do not buy the story of how he was able to escape, particularly because Europeans are highly prized freedom fighters for ISIL (BBC,

2016).

Ultimately, it was more alienation than anything which leads to radicalization. Factors such as discrimination against religious ideals and practices are common regardless of education level, economic standing, or political knowledge. However, there was no one single path to

4 This result was famously concluded in the 1971 Stanford Prison Experiment conducted by Philip Zimbardo to better understand the psychological effects of perceived power and social status. It is astonishing to consider, but relatively accepted psychological phenomena.

REFRAMING THE ISLAMIC STATE 36 radicalization. The perceived or real us vs. them mentality is driven by feelings of relative deprivation in society and leads to a desire to join a cause which will give a sense of belonging and meaning. This feeling of social otherness drives deep seated internal unrest , and such torment can make radicalization easier(Institute for Economics & Peace, 2017, p. 67).

Recruitment Tools ISIL feeds off of the concept of us vs. them, and uses various recruitment tools to not only further this feeling, but to strengthen through exploiting it. Their branding in propaganda and on social media not only excites and motivates individuals to join the cause, but reinforces the Islamic State’s perception as a strong and MANLY? ruthless organization (Koerner, 2016).

Propaganda. The Islamic State religiously utilizes propaganda, or compiled information with skewed or misleading content to publicize their political views or goals. While it comes in many forms, the three most commonly associated with ISIL are Propaganda by the deed, videos and magazines. Propaganda by the deed is the utilization of terrorism as the ultimate form of communication between those committing the act and those it wishes to sway politically.ssentially, the act of doing terrorism itself is propaganda for a cause. By perpetrating terrorist acts, ISIL is showing its ability to exploit weaknesses in societal and political structures, including the very freedom and openness of Western secular societies. At the same time ISIL shows the ideals for which it attacks(Schmid, 2011, p. 7). The anti-Muslim discrimination terrorism breeds in Western society also does it part to entice individuals to join extremist movements, by further ostracizing diverse cultures and creating the outsider persona.

Videos showing beheadings or opportunities of martyrdom aimed at already disgruntled and alienated individuals are not the only recruitment tools. ISIL creates videos targeted to specific groups to increase recruitment in various areas, from country-specific videos to

REFRAMING THE ISLAMIC STATE 37 recruitment of doctors. Media specialists for the Islamic State are paid at triple the rate of the organization’s fighters, and each province has their own media offices, and their work is prolific

(Koerner, 2016). Over 100 pieces of content are produced each week, with over 2,000 videos released by the group all together (Booth, 2017). Recruitment videos go live directly following bombings or mass shootings to capitalize on terror reactions in Islamic individuals. Table 2 shows example storylines used to further the ISIL recruitment efforts.

Table 2: Example ISIL Media Storylines

Genre Example Description

Immigrant Testimonials Those Who Have Believed Fighters from every corner of the world tell their stories and Emigrated in their native languages, usually while sitting in bucolic settings. Many speak of how they were not permitted to practice “true Islam” in their home countries. Their children are shown attending schools, playing in gardens, and eating delectable meals.

REFRAMING THE ISLAMIC STATE 38

Table 2: Example ISIL Media Storylines

Economic News Food Security: Aspects From Blue-collar workers go about their daily business in a the Work of the Agriculture suspiciously cheerful manner: Farmers till crops, bakers Administration in the roll dough for bread, shopkeepers make change for Province satisfied customers. Battle Porn Explosives of the Thrones #2 Islamic State soldiers fire mortar rounds and rockets toward unseen enemy positions, as lilting nasheeds (a cappella holy songs) fill the soundtrack. Suicide bombers drive trucks into buildings, and the camera lingers on the resulting plumes of black smoke. Valentines to the State And They Gave Zakah Merchants and other businessmen interact with the Islamic State’s government employees, like tax collectors and religious police. Everyone pronounces themselves grateful for the order that the Islamic State has instilled. Mergers and Bay’ah to the Caliph of the Members of terrorist groups from far-flung locales, Acquisitions Muslims Abu Bakr al- such as the Philippines or Somalia, pledge their Baghdadi allegiance by reciting an oath to the camera, then giving each other hugs. Source: (Koerner, 2016)

Another well known aspect of ISIL’s propaganda campaign is its magazines Dabiq

(2014-2016) and Rumiyah (2016-present).5 These glossy magazines filled with pictures and utopian ideals are aimed at recruiting Westerners to the ISIL cause. Each magazine is printed in high quality, and produced in multiple languages. Images within the pages show everything from the happy, well adjusted lives of Islamic State citizens to gruesome beheadings. Each issue has selected virtuous themes working their way through the pages, with the very same issues justifying murder and praising terrorist attackers. These magazines are readily available online, offering ever accessible propaganda (Clarion Project, 2014).

Social Media. ISIL is notoriously adept at using social media to recruit followers.

Messages are sent out over the Telegram messaging app where it finds its way to Twitter,

5 Dabiq and Rumiyah are printed and available online for many audiences. Country-specific magazines also exist, Russian Istok, Turkish Konstantiniyye and French Dar al-Islam.

REFRAMING THE ISLAMIC STATE 39

Facebook, Youtube and other social media sites. Videos and the like are passed around via social media; a majority of the posts are casually written anti-Western messages aimed to fuel the fire of hatred. And these messages never stop— even after being banned from posting, members of ISIL media teams find a way to return to the media outlet, and these suspensions just give legitimacy to their words. One of the ways in which this is made possible is that ISIL opts for outsourcing and crowdsourcing distribution techniques instead of secured, password protected channels.

But the most significant way in which the Islamic State has exhibited its media savviness

has been through its embrace of openness. Unlike al-Qaeda, which has generally been

methodical about organizing and controlling its terror cells, the more opportunistic

Islamic State is content to crowdsource its social media activity—and its violence—out to

individuals with whom it has no concrete ties. GREAT! And the organization does not

make this happen in the shadows; it does so openly in the West’s most beloved precincts

of the , co-opting the digital services that have become woven into our daily lives.

As a result, the Islamic State’s brand has permeated our cultural atmosphere to an

outsized degree (Koerner, 2016).

This increases risk to the individual by opening post originators up to being more easily discovered but maximizes the group’s viewership potential.

Offline Recruitment. As effective as the online recruitment has been, in-person recruitment remains at the heart of radicalization. Sociologically speaking, groups are easier to radicalize together, as they discuss and feed off the us vs. them mentality in conversation.

Therefore, radicalization hubs are found in mosques, prisons, criminal networks, even schools

(Institute for Economics & Peace, 2017). Interpersonal relationships increased radicalization

REFRAMING THE ISLAMIC STATE 40 chances, including kin relationships, romantic relationships, friend groups and peer-to-peer networks (Osman, 2010). On such example is the three teenage girls from London who traveled to Syria to become freedom fighter brides in February, 2015. Kadiza Sultana, 16, Amira Abase and Shamima Begum, both 15, were recruited for the ISIL by a former classmate Sharmeena

Begum, who had joined its ranks two months before. All students of Bethnal Green Academy in

London, the girls showed no outward signs to their parents about eerie intentions to leave or any form of radicalization (Vice News, 2015).

The recruitment of young people for extremist causes is similar to grooming, "when someone builds an emotional connection with a child to gain their trust for the purposes of sexual abuse, sexual exploitation or trafficking" (National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to

Children, n.d.). This is especially true for girls who are recruited, because of the nature of how women are treated in the Islamic State and their role as jihadist brides at such a young age. The entire process of radicalization and recruitment can take as little as one or two weeks. During this time period, youths are being contacted continuously with propaganda about how the Islamic

State is akin to an Islamic Disneyland, to sway behavior and thought processes. Those being radicalized are told to keep up with school work and other plans as to not draw suspicion from parents and teachers (Vice News, 2015).

Indoctrination Tactics

Indoctrination techniques are used both during recruitment and after arriving in Islamic

State territory. These tactics align with the aspects of the BITE model. Because of the controlled nature of communication from within the Islamic State, it is hard to find concrete, verifiable examples of indoctrination. Most of the examples are from pieces fit together by law enforcement authorities after individuals have gone missing, or people who have miraculously

REFRAMING THE ISLAMIC STATE 41 escaped (members of the general public are often critical of this type of narrative).

Unfortunately, this means that there is still much more to learn about the techniques used once new members are radicalized. The following examples are generalized from readily available news depictions, but by no means offers a complete view of the techniques used.

Behavioral Control Once they have entered the Islamic State territory, recruits are given options for their roles in service. For many of the boys and men, it can go one of three ways: regular fighter, front lines fighter, or suicide bomber. For the women under the fundamentalist regime, the options are typically limited to domestic services, marriage, and reproduction.

Physically speaking, recruits have monitored movement within ISIL territory, and are not allowed to move in and out of the areas of control. This is to prevent those who become disillusioned with ISIL life from returning home. Those who are caught trying to escape are executed.

Information Control During the grooming process for young people, recruiters are in constant contact with potential radicals. They use social media and texting to overload individuals with lies about what life as a member will be like. Recruitment focuses on opportunities for humanitarian roles or positive service and the ability to practice their religion free of oppression. This fantasy is vastly different from the reality of life in Syria and Iraq, where personal freedom is severely restricted and many recruits are used mainly for fighting, reproduction, or carrying out terrorism. The organization’s strategies and true end goals are hidden from normal members. “A lot of foot soldiers haven't the slightest idea what the strategy is, or any interest in learning about it,” writes Gwynne Dyer in her book, Don’t Panic. “All that the men with the box-cutters on the hijacked flights of 9/11 needed to know was that they were going to be 'martyred' and go straight to paradise” (2005, p. 3)

REFRAMING THE ISLAMIC STATE 42

Within its territory, ISIL fighters and citizens have limited connectivity with friends and family back home. This includes limited internet access, a successful way of controlling what information its lower level members have. Access to information that members do have is biased heavily towards extreme and fundamental ideas. Leadership offers narratives which continue to paint ISIL and its Islamic tenets as doing Allah’s work, though, in reality, these practices are inhumane.

A unique aspect of information control is the extremists’ attitude toward ancient artifacts and monuments. In its acquisition of territory, ISIL frequently destroys these culturally and historically significant works as a way of controlling the narrative for future generations. By destroying material cultural of those groups which do not agree with your worldview, an organization is able to silence even ancient civilizations which stand against them.

Thought Control Us vs. them mentality is fostered through propaganda. Those who do not adhere to the beliefs of fundamental Islam are the others: infidels and the enemy. The final apocalyptic battle will be fought against these others, and all discussions of Western life must revolve around its evil. Religious practices are used to form thought patterns, including from frequent praying to Allah and upholding extremist doctrine. Questioning leadership is forbidden, and is considered a punishable offense.

Emotional Control Grooming uses emotional control to give potential recruits a sense of belonging. Specially trained recruiters using the al-Qaeda’s A Course in the Art of Recruiting manual spark friendships with individuals and offer emotional support in times of need. Those going through difficult times are easier to recruit, so fostering an emotional tie with them at this juncture makes them more likely to radicalize. Recruiters also feed off of the loneliness or fear an individual has, offering their religious tenets as comfort. These tenets foster aggression

REFRAMING THE ISLAMIC STATE 43 towards Western influences and fear of those from different backgrounds. By pitting the individual’s ethnicity, religion or beliefs against aspects or members of Western society, recruiters use fear to gain the potential recruit’s loyalty. ISIL’s fundamentalist teachings also play up the salvation model wherein those who do not join ISIL and its cause will not be saved at the End of Days. The fear of eternal damnation or the fear of not experiencing salvation breeds a fear which many will seek to expel by enlisting.

Retention As with many organizations, recruitment is a process which does not simply end because an individual has agreed to join a group. Recruitment continues well into the experience of membership. For ISIL, however, those who are no longer being courted by the fantasy of the Islamic State are not simply allowed to stop being members. Simply not being allowed to leave helps retention remains high amongst ISIL recruits. What is now being portrayed in the media are cases of individuals which have joined ISIL, but regret their decision.

The desire to reintegrate into society is met with barriers from the non-extremist side as well: those who join terrorist organizations are criminally liable if they opt to leave. The internal and external pressures create a retention quagmire, in which the individual that wants out is trapped.

Take-Aways

The techniques utilized by the Islamic State for the recruitment, retention and thought reform of members closely mirror that of detrimental New Religious Movements, but are elevated to an art form. The sheer efficiency with which ISIL recruits speaks to the potential threats that this organization poses. The ability to recruit young, bright, and talented individuals to an organization that is overwhelmingly viewed as an abomination is baffling when examined outside of the context of a New Religious Movement. With this structure, however, we can see

REFRAMING THE ISLAMIC STATE 44 those thought reform techniques used surreptitiously on individuals, often times those going through tough transitional periods, are extremely effective recruitment tactics.

Threat Potential

One of the most devastating courses of action during a conflict is to underestimate your enemy. Considering the previous actions of the Islamic State, it seems almost impossible that anyone would think that ISIL would stop their quest for a legitimate caliphate at any point.

Looking to other examples of destructive New Religious Movements, we see how high the threat potential is for religiously rationalized crime.

If we think of ISIL in the terms of a doomsday cult, we can compare it to those which have come before it. Aum Shinrikyo used their elite membership (scientists) to obtain sarin gas for instigating a chemical weapon attack on the Tokyo subway. They also took great steps to obtain nuclear weapons, though were ultimately foiled by the difficulties of and surprisingly efficient security at Russian nuclear facilities (Daly, Parachini, & Rosenau, 2005). Al-Qaeda made the same bid for nuclear weapons, most likely as a tactic for inciting terror. ISIL could follow in both organization’s footsteps, joining the desires to instigate the apocalypse and perform acts of terror together with nuclear arms. Obviously, the threat potential is limitless for an organization so hell-bent on destruction.

Leadership Motives

One more important concept to note is that which suggests that New Religious

Movement leadership does not actually believe in the doctrine which it pedals, but utilizes it as a tool to gain power and money. Steven Hassan, former NRM member turned mental health professional and leading expert on undue thought control, warns of the perils of thinking of organizations like ISIL in terms of their religious beliefs:

REFRAMING THE ISLAMIC STATE 45

To equate a destructive group with its beliefs — and some cults purport to venerate angels, a beneficent god, world peace or universal love — is to misunderstand the nature of a cult and could undermine the…goal of stopping the flow of [recruits]. (N.d)

Thinking about ISIL in terms of how its gains membership due to its religious practices will not help understand their motives, because their motives are not necessarily religiously backed.

Many examples of detrimental NRMs have religious doctrine which are wholly unsupported by the actual practice of their leaders, who simply use religion as a tool in the same way they use terrorism. Because of the segmented nature of NRM leadership structures, understanding the motives of those at the top is near impossible. In reality, NRMs are about control, not faith.

Understanding how these groups utilize control for nefarious ends is the only way to truly understand how these organizations function within the larger societal context.

Recommendations

So the overarching question regarding the Islamic State remains: what can ultimately be done to stop ISIL’s wanton destruction? Unfortunately, not many examples of governments interacting with New Religious Movements offer insight into how to resolve these conflicts. By the time the before mentioned NRM situations come to a head, it was too late for governments to do anything but damage control. We can, however, look at techniques for dealing with recruits in the same way we look at those who were recruited for New Religious Movements, namely counter-recruitment and ex-member resources.

Social Media

Counter Recruitment The Islamic State’s utilization of the internet and social media has skewed the perspective of ISIL towards that of a highly polished and competent organization

REFRAMING THE ISLAMIC STATE 46 which offers vast benefits to its recruits. This propaganda hides the truth about life in the Islamic

State and brutality of fundamentalist Islamic teachings. In this case, governments and international governmental organizations should join ISIL in its own game, producing media content which exposes what life is really like as a member of the Islamic State. This battle of narratives over social media can help balance the views of ISIL on the web, impacting its ability to recruit as effectively.

Hacktivism, the use of internet networks to promote political or social change, has typically been used by the likes of Anonymous to protest political dealings. On November 17th,

2017, the same techniques were utilized to hack into ISIL servers and release over 2,000 emails of their social media subscribers. Other attacks pushed ISIL back to the messenger app

Telegram, which is more impervious to infiltration (Clarion Project, 2017). Similar directed cyber maintenance could help more permanently weed out terrorist accounts and subscribers, especially when backed by governmental authority.

Government & Private Intervention Governments should work with private companies

(internet providers and social media platforms) to flush out terrorist musings before they are able to persuade anyone. It is estimated that terrorist posts content spreads furthest within 2 hours of publication (Booth, 2017). Twitter alone accounted for 40% of clicks onto terrorist posts and was home to over 300,000 (not disbanded) extremist accounts in the early half of 2017. As recent as

September 2017, governments around the world have been reaching out to companies in order to help censor these postings. British Prime Minister Theresa May and French President Emmanuel

Macron have considered fining social media companies who do not respond quickly enough

(Riley, 2017). To the credit of members of in the private sector, Twitter, Facebook and like social media platforms have already created a joint forum to help understand trends in hashtags

REFRAMING THE ISLAMIC STATE 47 and terrorist rhetoric (Booth, 2017). Increased emphasis on the necessity of this and similar algorithm The United States has begun its foray into counter-recruitment in 2014 with the founding of the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications, later named the Global

Engagement Center. This agency of the State Department works to counter the extremist narrative by leading the “coordination, integration, and synchronization of Government-wide communications activities directed at foreign audiences abroad in order to counter the messaging and diminish the influence of international terrorist organizations” (U.S. Department of State, n.d.). Hopefully, this organization will utilize the same techniques that ISIL employs to bring the disproportionately positive extremist narrative back to center.

Resources for Ex-Extremists

In addition to attempting to stop the possibility of recruitment in the first place, governments should offer resources and opportunities for individuals to return home when they realize joining ISIL was a mistake. This is especially true for young adults, those who were recruited when they were in their teens. Currently, the only people to be granted amnesty for joining ISIL are the three teenaged girls from London, since the police admitted to bundling the investigation into their classmate’s disappearance. The basis for this argument was that they were just children, most likely joining out of fear. The caveat was that they were not yet party to terrorist activity, a qualifier that likely would have wained the longer the girls were missing

(Vice News, 2015).

Terrorism laws and resulting prison sentences can scare an individual from returning home after joining a group, even if they have not necessarily committed violent attacks.

Providing some level of amnesty for those who wish to return could give insight into recruitment

REFRAMING THE ISLAMIC STATE 48 and indoctrination techniques. The ability for these individuals to tell their story and the negative aspects of life in the Islamic State could be a strong counter-narrative for joining the extremist group. This narrative and the decriminalization of some aspects of recruited members can keep individuals from joining a society like ISIL before it is too late.

People that are recruited to organizations like ISIL need to be examined in the same way psychologists examine members of New Religious Movements: as victims. Thought control techniques persuade the people to join fringe organizations on false pretenses and keep them in a cycle of abuse. By thinking of ISIL member in this construct, it is easy to see that providing some level of psychological care and a whilst rehabilitation is essential for reintroduction into society. Promoting psychological wellness and decriminalizing association with these groups can foster a new dialogue about extremist recruitment, and is ultimately the first step towards demystifying life under ISIL rule.

Conclusion

While some organizations genuinely recruit members as a way of letting them find salvation, others disingenuously recruit to further influence or economic gains. The latter type makes up detrimental New Religious Movements and that which the Islamic State should be analyzed under. Labeling ISIL as a New Religious Movement for the purposes of identifying commonalities with other NRMs to potentially aid in a deeper understanding of how ISIL recruits and operates. By drawings these lines between key factors of ISIL and NRM recruitment and indoctrination techniques, there is a more clear vision of how these organizations draw in bright, young, and often successful new members into their ranks. Assuming that people who join NRMs or ISIL are ignorant or dimwitted misplaces the blame on them when in reality they are victims of the symptoms of otherness and those people who wish to exploit these symptoms.

REFRAMING THE ISLAMIC STATE 49

With lowered recruitment quotas brought on by a reframed social media narrative and protection of innocent citizens against the influences of thought reform and extremism, ISIL will have less of a foothold in the International realm.

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