INDEX TAB TITLE PIT Military value BRAC Impact concerns Economic Impact 1995 BRAC Commission Recommendations Aircraft Parking Plans Memorandum of Agreement Show Stoppers Military Entry Processing Station (MEPS) Firing Range National Medical Disaster System (NMDS) Commuting Distance DOD Estimated Payback Figures Regional Joint Readiness Center A Joint Readiness Study The Dupuy Institute Contact Information alue Recognize DoD use of selection criteria - Focus of 91 lthand potential impact on entire military value of Pittsburgh region to include 99thRegional Readiness Command Charles E. Kelly Support Facility Implications on joint aspect of national defense and homeland security MILITARY AFFAIRS COUNCIL OF WESTERN PENNSYLVANIA * PIT* BRAC TASK FORCE Concerns The BRAC Task Force has grave concerns about the nation maintaining an effective strategic reserve that are trained and ready to defend the nation. Proposed changes will: - Impact retention and future recruiting of Reserve Forces - Result in a loss of expert skills and experience that DoD and USAF need to fight the global war on terrorism MILITARY AFFAIRS COUNCIL OF WESTERN PENNSYLVANIA * PIT. BRAC TASK FORCE Date: June 18, 2005 To: Bob Cook, Deputy Director Mike Flinn, Senior Analyst, Air Force Timothy B. McGregor, Senior Air Force Analyst From: Charles L. Holsworth, Western Pennsylvania BRAC Task Force Director RE: Point Paper, Specific BRAC Impact Concerns- Air Force I have attached the POINT PAPER you requested during our discussion on June 9, 2005 there at the BRAC offices. I hope that this paper explains in much more detail what we discussed at that meeting. Charles L. "Chip" Holsworth BRAC Task Force Headquarters 1550 Coraopolis Heights Road Coraopolis, PA 15 108 412-490-5092 P)r' 4 12-490-5048 (fax) SPECIFIC BRAC IMPACT CONCERNS - AIR FORCE BRAC TASK FORCE OF WESTERN PENNSYLVANIA We of the Military Affairs Council of Western Pennsylvania BRAC Task Force have serious concerns about the nation maintaining an effective strategic reserve that are trained and ready to defend the nation in time of war or contingency. The impact to the Reserve Forces from proposals in the BRAC 2005 Report includes closing four C-130 Air Force Reserve (AFRC) Wings, five Air National Guard (ANG) C- 130 Wings, two C-135 AFRC Wings and five C- 135 ANG Wings and one AFRC A-10 Wing and two ANG A-10 Wings. All Air Force Reserve proposed changes in the Report are shown by unit and state in Appendix A, this White Paper, "DoD BRAC Announcement 13 May 05 - Impact on AFRC." This list excludes Wings that are remaining in place with new tasking. Military policies for the United States must fairly support the long-term defense capability requirements of our Nation. The basic motivation of soldiers, sailors and airman is to continue their careers and make a contribution to U.S. national defense in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). MAC of western Pennsylvania and the ROA do not believe that the BRAC 2005 proposals will not allow a majority of citizen soldiers of the AF Reserve and Air National Guard to continue to support the GWOT and in fact, works contrary to those motivations. Specific concerns about the BRAC 2005 Report follow. 1. The proposed changes will impact Reserve Forces retention and future recruiting of 'IIW reserve forces. By changing the demographics of Reserve Component bases, at current count, over 5,000 Air Force Reservists alone will be required to "commute" hundreds of miles to Unit Training Assembly (UTA) every month (and even more reservists from the Air National Guard.) If these changes are enacted, these servicemen and women will very likely not be able to afford the monthly travel expense/ travel time and many will leave the military. Appendix By"AFRC Groups Moving - Distance Impact", shows that a total of over seventy million miles (70,000,000) per year un-reimbursed travel would be required for monthly UTA by Operation Maintenance Groups (page I) and Expeditionary Combat Support units (page 2). The current DoD definition of reasonable commuting distance is 100 mile radius from the drill site and none of the proposed locations comply with this DoD policy. Also, there is a lack of personnel to recruit and very likely also a lack of trained personnel that are required for the tasking at many of the new bases for "realigned" units. If these changes and "realignments" were directed for active duty units, personnel would be paid to move to the new base location. This does not occur for traditional reservists whose choice is "commute" a long distance usually at their own expense, find another Reserve or Guard position in another nearby unit, retire (only if they have 20 good years of service) or transfer to the Not Affiliated Reserve Section (NARS) of the Air Reserve Personnel Center. 2. The proposed changes will likely result in a loss of Air Force skills and experience that DoD and USAF desperately need to fight GWOT. Many of these BRAC 2005 recommendations ignore the cost efficiencies of a trained and ready reserve which contrasts with the cost of hiring new personnel, without any prior military training. clw Inexperience, increased training costs, increased recruiting incentives, and loss of community support in the short term will outweigh long term savings that are projected in the BRAC 2005 Report. DoD is relying heavily on Reserve and Guard personnel for mission tasking where there currently is insufficient active duty manpower available. Obviously jets and turbo-prop aircraft can travel distances faster than a truck convoy, but air travel and transport both need fully trained aircrew and aircraft maintenance personnel to launch and fly the airplane in a short period of pre-flight time. If these critical personnel do not live near their base, great delays will occur in launchinglmaintaining large numbers of airlift aircraft for quickly emergmg tasking for GWOT. 3. Concerns relating to strategic issues that are stated in the DoD NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY (NDS), issued by SECDEF, 1 Mar 2005, follow. a. NDS states that a "layered approach" capacity is needed to defeat missiles1WMD from a distance and defeat threats from a distance. Closing AFWANG bases andlor moving units to a few AFBs close to oceans1Gulf of Mexico do not contribute to the NDS goals. It appears to us that dispersed locations, with some consolidations, would better support U.S. national defense and the homeland defense scenarios of the USNORTHCOM. b. A NDS goal is management of "Force management risks" for a ready force. We do not believe that the BRAC 2005 proposals help manage these personnel risks. c. NDS desires "greater flexibility" to contend with uncertainty by not overly concentrating forces in a few locations. How do BRAC 2005 proposals contribute to this goal where multiple AFRIANG units close or move to a few AFB's? How does this lower the operational vulnerability for DoD military forces? ROA's position is that strategic dispersal of aircraft is required for security of personnel, aircraft and facilities. d. Nationally, a local example of "readiness" is the "Fire Station" which has a specific territory to cover. Regarding USNORTHCOM and readiness requirements from the Governors of each state across the country, the local "Fire Station" can not be 500 to 1,000 miles away. 4. Where is the "strategy to capability" linkage for the next twenty years? Documents such as the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), to be released in 2006, and the Mobility Capability Study "XX" (MCS XX is to update MRSO5 in mid-2005) are crucial to effective, long-term "Transformation" of USAF and DoD. Without access to these documents, the BRAC 2005 Report is premature and cannot be viewed as a comprehensive review of current military structure versus future needs. The nation needs all the C-130 and C-135 aircraft capability from the current DoD inventory until replacement aircraft are produced and delivered to USAF. The BRAC 2005 Report states "documented imbalance in the activelreserve manning mix for C-130s." Where is it documented? Ths has not been briefed to the Congress and funding requested for the "shortfall". Therefore, the "shortfall" is not validated national policy and should be excluded ICW from all discussion of the BRAC 2005 Report. Qu' The Congress is concerned about potential USAF retirement of C-130 E and KC-135 aircraft and prohibited this action during ~~06by inclusion in the Senate Armed Services Committee FY 06 NDAA Mark in May 2005. USAF has requested the Congress to authorize and fund C-130J-30 aircraft under a multi-year contract beginning in FY06. h ROA's opinion, no action should be taken to reduce the number of C-130 aircraft, aircrews and aircraft maintenance personnel until the QDR and MCS XX studies are released and future C-130 J aircraft become available to deploy to field units, including the AFRC and ANG. The C-130J-30 will have a lower life cycle cost for the next 30 years due to its 3 aircrew positions which replaces 5 aircrew positions in the C- 130 Em. Further, with the large number of C-130s no longer based at Pope AFB, an AFRC Associate Wing of 16 aircraft can not fly enough daily Ft Bragg airborne training missions to meet Army requirements without aircraft flying in from other AFBs. By "Realigning" C130H aircraft assigned to AFRC to active duty bases, this allows active duty Air Force to "re-capitalize" AFRC assigned aircraft (and retire active C-130Es) that have been providing airlift support to the Air Force for decades to augment the heavy tasking by DoD for the over 40 year old fleet of 186 C- 130E's that are not assigned to the AFRC or ANG.