Religion and the Populist Radical Right in Western Europe
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Religion and the Populist Radical Right in Western Europe Submitted by Nicholas George Morieson, BA(Hons), Master of International Relations A thesis submitted in total fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) Institute of Religion, Politics, and Society Faculty of Education and Arts Australian Catholic University 24 March 2019 i Declaration of Authorship and Sources This thesis contains no material that has been extracted in whole or in part from a thesis that I have submitted towards the award of any other degree or diploma in any other tertiary institution. No other person’s work has been used without due acknowledgment in the main text of the thesis. Nicholas George Morieson 24 March 2019 ii Acknowledgments I wish to first thank my supervisors, Associate Professor Mark Chou and Dr Benjamin Moffitt, for their crucial advice and guidance. I wish also to thank Dr Dina Afrianty and Professor Irfan Ahmad, who supervised my work earlier in my candidacy. Without my supervisors this thesis would not have been possible. The advice provided by Professor José Casanova and Professor Jack Barbalet proved to be vital to this project, and for this I thank them. I also wish to thank Dr Joshua Roose and Professor Bryan Turner for their support and advice during this period, my friends and colleagues at the Institute for Religion, Politics, and Society at Australian Catholic University, and – for her unfailing support and understanding throughout my candidacy – Christine Lan. iii Abstract This thesis seeks to understand the role of religion in the discourse of Western Europe’s populist radical right parties. Populist radical right parties have made extraordinary electoral gains in a number of Western European nations. Many of these parties call for a return to Christian and/or Judeo-Christian values, and for the Christian and/or Judeo-Christian identity of their respective nations to be respected and preserved. Muslims, in particular, are singled out by the populist radical right as a threat to Western Christian values and identity. Yet these populist radical right parties do not appear to be advocates of a religious doctrine or way of life; rather, they most often frame themselves as defenders of secularism. This is curious: if populist radical right parties in Western Europe are secular, when then has Christian or Judeo-Christian identity become such an important aspect of their discourse? Building on sociologist Rogers Brubaker’s observation that populist radical right parties in Western Europe are not genuinely religious, but rather Christian identitarian in orientation, this thesis contends that populist radical right parties use religion in their discourse in order to exclude Muslims from European society, and to protect their respective secular nationalisms. Therefore the primary question asked in this thesis is: why is religion used as a tool to differentiate ‘the people’ from ‘the other’ in the discourse of the populist radical right in Western Europe? The thesis proposes a hypothesis: Western Europeans’ encounter with Islam in Europe has (1) revealed the non-universal nature of Western European secularism to Europeans, and (2) demonstrated the secularisation of Christianity into Western European ‘culture.’ This recognition that Christianity has been secularised into ‘culture’ has allowed secular Europeans to identify themselves – and their nation and ultimately Western civilisation – as Christian or Judeo-Christian. These effects have precipitated the formation of Christianist secularism, a type of Christian identitarian politics which perceives contemporary European culture to be ‘Christianity secularised.’ A group of populist radical right parties in Western Europe, then, have embraced Christianist secularism, which they use to define their respective national identities in religio-civilisational terms, i.e. as (Judeo-)Christian. In doing so, they are able to exclude Muslims from their society, on the grounds that Islam is an alien religion which – unlike Christianity and possibly Judaism – has not and cannot be secularised into ‘culture.’ iv To test this hypothesis, the thesis analyses the discourse of two populist radical right parties in Western Europe: The National Front (now known as National Rally) of France, and the Party for Freedom of the Netherlands. This analysis has two parts: The first tests part of my hypothesis: that Europeans’ encounter with Islam in Europe has (1) revealed the non- universal nature of European secularism to Europeans, and (2) demonstrated the secularisation of Christianity into ‘culture.’ The second consists of Critical Discourse Analysis of three selected texts produced by the respective leaders of the National Front and Party for Freedom, Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders, produced during the 2012-2017 period. The Critical Discourse Analysis seeks answers in the selected to the following questions: (1) does the discourse display the key elements of Christianist secularism? (2) How is Islam constructed in the discourse? (3) How is Christian identity used to exclude Muslims from European society? v Table of Contents 1. Religion and the Populist Radical Right in Western Europe: An Introduction......................2 2. The Populist Radical Right in Western Europe....................................................................31 3. Understanding Populist Radical Right Parties’ use of Religion..........................................51 4. Methods................................................................................................................................80 5. The Party for Freedom and Religion...................................................................................99 6. Discourse Analysis of the Party for Freedom: 2012-2017.................................................127 7. The National Front and Religion........................................................................................158 8. Discourse Analysis of the National Front: 2012-2017.......................................................184 9. Comparing Case Studies....................................................................................................217 10. Conclusions......................................................................................................................256 11. Bibliography.....................................................................................................................253 vi Religion and the Populist Radical Right in Western Europe: An Introduction Has religion returned to Western European politics?1 Throughout the continent, populist radical right politicians are calling for a return to Christian or Judeo-Christian values, and for the Christian identity of their respective nations to be respected and preserved.2 Muslims, in particular, are singled out by the populist radical right as a threat to Western Christian values and identity.3 And populist radical right parties are, increasingly, winning a greater share of the vote while spreading this message. At first glance it may appear the rise of the populist radical right indicates that, after decades of secularisation, Western Europeans are returning to the religion of their parents and grandparents. Yet this does not appear to be occurring. There are no indications that Europeans are, by and large, becoming more religious. Fewer and fewer Western Europeans are attending church, and disbelief in the Christian God and traditional Christian sexual morality is growing year by year. Western Europeans, rather, appear to be increasingly irreligious.4 Moreover, the parties of the Western European populist radical right do not tell their supporters to go to church, believe in God, or practice traditional Christian values. Instead, they do something rather strange: they claim that their respective national identities and cultures are the product of a Christian or Judeo-Christian tradition which either encompasses – or has produced – secularism. For example, in an interview conducted by Cecile Alduy, French National Front leader Marine Le Pen remarked upon the challenge posed to French culture by Muslim immigrants.5 Having lauded Laïcité as a necessary form of protection for homosexuals, women, and secular Muslims against religious law, Le Pen opined that Muslim immigrants had been making “increasing demands that collide with the mores, the codes, the ways of life, the 1 Elements of this thesis were previously published in Nicholas Morieson, “Are contemporary populist movements hijacking religion?” Journal of Religious and Political Practice, 3(1-2), pp.88-95, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1080/20566093.2017.1292171. 2 Nadia Marzouki and Duncan McDonnell, “Populism and Religion,” in Saving the People: How Populists Hijack Religion, , McDonnell, Roy (eds), C. Hurst and Co: London, 8, 2016. 3 Ibid, 5-6. 4 A Pew survey indicates that Europeans are remarkably irreligious. See “How Religious commitment varies by country among people of all ages,” Pew Research Centre, June 13, 2018. http://www.pewforum.org/2018/06/13/how-religious-commitment-varies-by-country-among-people-of-all- ages/. Church attendance remains very low in most Western European countries. See “Being Christian in Western Europe,” Pew Research Centre, May 29, 2018. http://www.pewforum.org/2018/05/29/being-christian- in-western-europe/. 5 Throughout this thesis I refer to the French political party now known as National Rally by their previous name, National Front (Front National). I do this because