Sociological Paradigms and Organisational AIlalysis Elements of the SocioloRY of Corporate L({e

Gibson BUlT'H'eBm lecturer in the Department of Behaviour in Organisations, University of lancaster, England Gareth Morgalm Associate Professor of Organisational Behaviour and Industrial Relations, York University. Toronto

ASHGATE © Gibson Burrell and Gareth Morgan 1979 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without Contents the prior permission of the publisher

First published in 1979 by Heinemann Educational Books Reprinted 1980, 1982 page Ust of figures v Reprinted 1985, 1987, 1988 by Gower Publishing Company Limited List of Tables v Reprinted 1992 by Ashgate Publishing Limited Acknowledgements VI Introduction viii Reprinted 1993, 1994 by Arena PART I: IN SEARCH Of A FRAMEWORK Reprinted 1998, 2000, 200I, 2003, 2005 by n AssumptiOHlls lllbout the NllltlUlre oa' Social Sciellllce n Ashgate Publishing Limited The Strands of Debate 4 Gower House Analy'sing Assumptions about the Nature of Social Cron Road Sci.ence 7 Aldershot 2 Assumptiolllls aboot the Nature off Soddy no Bants GU 11 311R The Order-Conflict Debate 10 England 'Regulation' and 'Radical Change' 16 J Two Dimelllsioll1lS: ]four !Paradigms 2ll Ashgale Publishing Company The Nature and Uses of the Four Paradigms 23 Suile420 The Functionalist Paradigm 25 101 Cherry Streel The Interpretive Paradigm 28 Burlington, VT0540 1-4405 The Radical Humanist Paradigm 32 USA The Radical Structuralist Paradigm 33 Exploring Social Theory 35 IAshgatc website:http://www.ashgate.com PART II: THE PARADIGMS EXPLORED British Library Cataloguing in Publication D:nta ~ Functiollllalist Sociology <1 n Burrell, Gibson Origins and Intellectual Tradition 4\ Sociological paradigms and organisational The Structure of the Paradigm 48 analysis: elements of the sociology ofcorporate Social System Theory 49 lite. Interactionism and Social Action Theory 68 I. Organization Integrative Theory 87 I. Title II. Morgan, Gareth Objectivism 102 302.3'5 HMl31 The Underlying Unity of the Paradigm 106 :5 FIJlll1lctiomnRist Orglllrusllltiolll nlleory nn8 ISBN 0 566 05148 6 Hbk Theories of Organisation within the Functionalist 185742 1140 Pbk Paradigm 121 Social System Theory and Objectivism 123 Printed and bound in Great Britain by Athenaeum Press Ltd, Theories of Bureaucratic Dysfunctions 184 Gateshead, Tyne & Wear Introduction ix proportion of theory and research is located within the bounds of Introduction just one of the four paradigms to be considered here. Indeed, the bulk of it is located within the context of a relatively narrow range of theoretical possibilities which define that one paradigm. it is no exaggeration, therefore, to suggest that the social-scientific enter­ prise in general is built upon an extremely narrow set of This boole, which has devoured the last two years of our lives, is metatheoretical assumptions. This concentration of effort in a the product ofa friendship and intellectual partnership. It began as relatively narrow area defines what is usually regarded as the an innocuous idea which grew with such strength that itdeveloped domimmt orthodoxy within a subject. Because this orthodoxy is so into a 'way of seeing'. It has changed the ways in which we think dominant and strong, its adherents often take it for granted as right about social theory, and we hope that it will do the same for others. and self-evident. Rival perspectives within the same paradigm or The book is intended to clarify and help overcome what seem to outside its bounds appear as satellites defining alternative points of be some of the major sources of confusion within the social view. Their impact upon the orthodoxy, however, is rarely very sciences at the present time. Initially it had a fairly specific objec­ significant. They are seldom strong enough toestablish themselves tive: to attempt to relate theories of organisation to their wider as anything more than a somewhat deviant set ofapproaches. As a sociological conteJlt. In the course ofdevelopment, however, this result the possibilities which they offer are rarely explored, let endeavour widened in scope and evolved into an enterprise alone understood. embracing many aspects of philosophy and social theory in gen­ Yn order to understand alternative points of view it is important eral. As such it now stands as a discourse in social theory of that a theorist be fully aware of the assumptions upon which his relevance to many social science disciplines, ofwhich those in the own perspective is based. Such an appreciation involves an intel­ general area oforganisationstudies - industrial sociology, organ­ lectual journey which takes him outside the realm of his own isation theory, organisational psychology and industrial relations familiar domain. It requires that he become aware of the bound­ - are but special cases by which we illustrate our general themes. aries which define his perspective. h requires that hejourney into Our proposition is that social theory can usefully be conceived in the une"plored. h requires that he become familiar with paradigms terms of four key paradigms based upon different sets of which are not his own. Only then can he look back and appreciate metatheoretical assumptions about the nature ofsocial science and in full measure the precise nature of his starting point. the nature of society. The four paradigms are founded upon mutlll­ The work presented here is an attempt to take the student of ally exclusive views of the social world. lEach stands in its own organisations into realms which he has probably not explored right and generates its own distinctive analyses ofsocial life. With before. It is a journey upon which we, the authors, unwittingly regard to the study of organisations, for example, each paradigm embarked as a result of certain nagging doubts and uncertainties generates theories and perspectives which are in fundamental about the utility and validity of much contemporary theory and opposition to those generated in other paradigms. research in our subject. We were concerned about the way in Such an analysis of social theory brings us face to face with the which studies oforganisational activities had generated mountains nature of the assumptions which underwrite different approaches of theory and research which seemed to have no obvious links to social science. It cuts through the surface detail which dresses outside narrow discipline areas. We were concerned about the many social theories to what is fundamental in determining the essentially ephemeral nature of our subject. We were concerned way in which we see the world which we are purporting to analyse. about the academic sectarianism reflected at various times in open It stresses the crucial role played by the scientist's frame ofreJfer­ hostility, ostrich-like indifference and generally poor-quality ence in the generation of social theory and research. dialogue and debate between essentially related schools of The situation with regard to the field of organisation studies at thought. Yn short, we felt that our subject area called for a close the present time, as in other social science disciplines, is that a vast e1tamination ofthe assumptions upon which it is based with a view to seeing it in a new, and hopefully refreshing, light. Our book in essence presents an account of our journey and a record of the J( Introduction Introduction xi conclusions and insights which have emerged. Marxist social theorists appeared content to work in isolation, We began our enterprise by considering how we could dis­ ignoring the contradictory persp.ectives w~lich they. presented, it tinguish between different approaches to the study of seemed that any adequate analySIS of theones of society must take organisations. The view that 'all theories oforganisation are based these rival perspectives into account. . upon a philosophy of science and a theory of society' seemed to Ourjourney into Marxist literature took us mto yet another new recur time and again in our conversations and we soon found it realm as far as our initial interests were concerned. We were defining two major dimensions of analysis. Although organisation surprised to find striking parallels betwe.en i~tellectual theorists are not always very explicit about the basic assumptions developments within Mandsttheory and academiC soc~olog~. We which inform their point of view, it is clear that they all take a stand found that the assumptions about the nature of SOCial sCience on each of these issues. Whetller they are aware of it or not, they which had divided academic sociologists into different schools of bring to their subject of study a frame of reference which reflects a thought also divided Mantist theorists. In that realm, too, t~e whole series of assumptions about the nature of the social world dominant theoretical framework was surrounded by satellite and the way in which it might be investigated. schools of thought offering rival explanations. Pursuing thes~ tra­ Our attempt to explore these assumptions led us into the realm ditions to their source, we found that they emerged from prec~sely of social philosophy. We were confranted wi th problems of ontol­ the same bounds of social philosophy which had underWritten ogy and epistemology and other issues which rarely receive con­ divergent elements within sociology itself. It became clear that the sideration within the field of organisation studies. As we rival traditions emphasising 'order' as opposed to 'conflict' shared investigated these issues we found that they underpinned the great the same pedigree as far as their roots in social philosophy were philosophical debates between social theorists from rival concerned. Deriving from similar assumptions about the intellectual traditions. We realised that the orthodoxy in our sub­ ontological and epistemological status of social science, they h.ad ject was based in essence uponjust one of these traditions, and that been wedded to fundamentally different frames of reference With the satellite perspectives which we had observed as surrounding regard to the nature of society. ., .. the orthodoxy were, in fact, derived from quite a separate Given these cross linkages between nvalmtellectual traditions, intellectual source. We realised that they were attempting to it became clear to us that our two sets of assumptions could be articulate points of view which derived from diametrically counter-posed to produce an analytical sch~me for studying soci~1 opposed assumptions about the basic nature of the social world; theories in general: the two sets of assu.mpllons de~ned fo~r baSIC accordingly they subscribed to quite different assumptions about paradigms reflecting quite separate vlew.s of .soclal. reahty. On the very nature of the social-scientific enterprise itself. attempting to relate this scheme to the SOCial sCience hteratu~e :ve In investigating assumptions with regard to the nature ofsociety found that we possessed an eKtremely powerful tool.for negottatmg we were, at first, able to operate on firmer ground. The sociology our way through different subject areas, and one which made sense of the 1960s had focused upon the 'order-conflict debate' ­ of a great deal of the confusion which characterises much con­ whether sociology emphasises the 'problem of order' or the temporary debate within the social scienc.es. Th~ schem~ offered 'problem of conflict and change'. By the late 1960s the debate had itselfas a form of intellectual map upon which SOCial theones could been pronounced dead, and these two views of society were seen be located according to their source and tradition. Theories rarely merely as two aspects of the same problematic. In reviewing the if ever appear out of thin air; they usually have a well established literature relevant to this debate we became increasingly con­ history behind them. We found that our i~tellectual map all.owed vinced that it had met a premature death. Whilst it was clear that us to trace their evolution. Theories fell mto place accordmg to academic sociologists had convinced themselves that the 'problem their origins. Where rival intellectual traditions had been fused, of conflict' could be subsumed under the 'problem of order', distinctive hybrid versions seemed to appear. What had first theorists outside this tradition, particularly those interested in offered itself as a simple classificatory device for organising the Marxist theory, were actively engaged in the development of literature now presented itself as an analytical tool. It pointed us social theories which placed the problems ofconflict and change at towards new areas of investigation. It allowed us 10 appraise and the forefront of their analysis. Although academic sociologists and evaluate theories against the backcloth of the intellectual tradition xii lfllroductioll which they sought to emulate. It allowed us to identify embryonic PART I: IN SEARCH OF A FRAMEWORK theories and anticipate potential lines of development. it allowed us to write this boole. in the following chapters we seek to present our analytical scheme and to use it to negotiate a way through the literature on soci~1 theory and org~nisational analysis. We have aimed to pre­ sentlt as clearly and directly as we can whilst avoiding the pitfalls 10 Assumptions about the of oversimplification. But the concepts of one paradigm cannot easily be interpreted in terms of those of another. To understand Nature of Social Science a new paradigm one has to explore it from the inside in terms of its own distinctive problematic. Thus, whilst we have'made every Central to our thesis is the idea that 'all theories oforganisation are efforlto present our account as plainly as possible as far as the use based upon a philosophy ofscience and a theory ofsociety'.in this of the English language is concerned, we have necessarily had to chapter we wish to address ourselves to the first aspect of this draw upon concepts which may at times be unfamiliar. thesis and to examine some of the philosophical assumptions . The r,emaining chaJ;>ters in Part i define the nature ofour two key which underwrite different approaches to social science. We shall dimenSIOns of analysIs and the paradigms which arise within their argue that it is convenient to conceptualise social science in terms bounds. In this analysis we polarise a number of issues and mance of four sets of assumptions related to ontology, epistemology, much use of rough dichotomisations as a means of presenting OUf human nature and methodology. case. We do so not merely for the purposes ofclassification but to All social scientists approach their subject via eJ\plicit or implicit forge a working tool. We advocate our schemeas a heuristicdevice assumptions about the nature of the social world and the way in rather than as a set of rigid definitions. which it may be investigated. First, there are assumptions of an in Part II we put our analytical framework into operation. For ontological nature - assumptions which concern the very essence each of our four paradigms we conduct an analysis of relevant of the phenomena under investigation. Social scientists, for so.cial .theory and then proceed to relate theories oforganisation to eJ\ample, are faced with a basic ontological question: whether the tillS wider background. lEach of the paradigms is treated in terms 'reality' to be investigated is eJ\ternal to the individual - imposing ~onsistent wit.h. it,S own distinctive frame of reference. No attempt itself on individual consciousness from without - or the product of IS made to cnticise and evaluate from a perspective outside the individual consciousness; whether 'reality' is of an 'objective' paradigm. S.uch criticism is all too easy but self-defeating, since it nature, or the product ofindividual cognition; whether 'reality' is a IS usually directed at the foundations of the paradigm itself. Ail given 'out there' in the world, or the product of one's mind. four paradigms can successfUlly be demolished in these terms. Associated with this ontological issue, is a second set of What we seek to do is to develop the perspective characteristic off assumptions ofan epistemological nature. These are assumptions the paradigm and draw out some of its 'implications for social about the grounds of knowledge - about how one might begin to analysis. in so doing we have found that we are frequently able to understand the world and communicate this as knowledge to strengthen the conceptualisations which each paradigm generates fellow human beings. These assumptions entail ideas, for eJ\ample, as far as the study of organisations is concerned. Our guiding rule about what forms of knowledge can be obtained, and how one can has been to seek to offer something to each paradigm within the sort out what is to be regarded as 'true' from what is to be regarded terms of its own problematic. The chapters in Part II therefore as 'false'. Indeed, this dichotomy of 'true' and 'false' itself pre­ are ~ssentially eJ\pository i~ nature. They seek to' provide ~ supposes a certain epistemological stance. It is predicated upon a detailed framework upon which future debate might fruitfully be view of the nature of knowledge itself: whether, for example, it is based. possible to identify and communicate the nature of knowledge as Part. m. pre~ents a slJ(~rt conclusion which focuses upon some of being hard, real and capable of being transmitted in tangible form, the prinCipal Issues which emerge from our analysis. or whether 'knowledge' is ofa softer, more subjective, spiritual or even transcendental kind, based on eJ\perience and insight of a 2 SocioloRical Paradi/?ms and OrRanisational Analysis Assumptions about the Nature oj Social Science 3 unique ~nd .essenti~lIy personal nature. The epistemological social world as ifit were a hard, external, objective reality. then the ~ssumptlOnsIn these Instances determine extreme positions on the scientific endeavour is likely to focus upon an analysis of relation­ Issue ofwhether knowledge is something which can be acquired on ships and regularities between the various elements which it com­ ~he one hand. or is something which has to be personally exper­ prises. The concern. therefore. is with the identification and defini­ Ienced on the other. tion of these elements and with the discovery of ways in which Associated with the ontological and epistemological issues. but these relationships can be expressed. The methodological issues of concept~ally separate from them. is a third set of assumptions importance are thus the concepts themselves. their measurement concermng human. nature an? in .particular. the relationship and the identification of underlying themes. This perspective between human beings and their environment. All social science. e){presses itself most forcefully in a search for universal laws clearly•.mu.st be predicated upon this type of assumption. since which explain and govern the reality which is being observed. human ~Ife IS. essentially the subject and object of enquiry. Thus, Ifone subscribes to the alternative view of social reality. which we can Identify perspectives in social science which entail a view stresses the importance of the subjective experience of individuals ofhuman beings responding in a mechanistic or even deterministic in the creation of the social world. then the search for understand­ fashion to the situations encountered in their external world. This ing focuses upon different issues and approaches t?em in differe~t view tends to be one in which human beings and their experiences ways. The principal concern is with an understanding of the way In are regarded as products ofthe environment; one in which humans which the individual creates. modifies and interprets the world in are conditioned by their external circumstances. This extreme which he or she finds himself. The emphasis in extreme cases tends perspecti~ecan be contrasted with one which attributes to human to be placed upon the explanation and understanding of what ~s b~i~gs a m~ch more creative role: with a perspective where 'free unique and particular to the individual rather than of what IS will OCCUPI~S the ~entre ofthe stage; where man is regarded as the general and universal. This approach questions whet~er there creator of hiS environment. the controller as opposed to the con­ exists an external reality worthy of study. In methodological terms trolled, the master rather than the marionette. In these two it is an approach which emphasises the relativistic nature of the ext~eme views ofthe relationship between human beings and their social world to such an extent that it may be perceived as 'anti­ environment we are identifying a great philosophical debate scientific' by reference to the ground rules commonly applied in between the advocates of determinism on the one hand and the natural sciences. voluntarism on the other. Whilst there are social theories which adhere to eac~ of t~ese.extremes,as we shall see, the assumptions Th0 subjective-objective dimension of many SOCial SCientists are pitched somewhere in the range The subjectivist The objectivist between. approach to !IIpproach to social sci0nce social science The three sets of assumptions outlined above have direct implications of a metJlOdoloRical nature. Each one has important cons.eq~encesfor t~e way in Which. one attemp~s to investigate and ob~aln kn0':'Vledge about the social world. Different ontologies. epl~temo.logl~s and models of human nature are likely to incline SOCial sClent!sts. t?wards different methodologies. The possible range of ch?l.ce IS Indeed so large that what is regarded as science by ~he tradl~lOnal '.natural scientist' covers but a small range of optIOns. nt. IS p~sslbl~, for, example, to identify methodologies ~mployed In social sCience research which treat the social world ~Ik~ ~he natural world. as being hard. real and external to the individual, and others which view it as being of a much softer personal and more subjective quality. ' If one subscribes to a view of the former kind. which treats the !Figure 1.1 A scheme for analysing assumptions about the nature ofsocial science 4 Sociological Paradigms and OrKaflisational Analysis Assumptions about the Nature ofSodal Science 5 Hn this brief sketch of various ontological, epistemological, Anti-positivism-positivism: the human and methodological standpoints which characterise 4 approaches to social sciences, we have sought to illustrate two epistemological delbate broad and somewhat polarised perspectives. !Figure 1.1 seeks to depict these in a more rigorous fashion in terms of what we shall Hi has been maintained that 'tille word "positivist" like the word describe as the subjective-objective dimension. Hi identifies the "bourgeois" has become more of a derogatory epithet than a four sets of assumptions relevant to our understanding of social useful descriptive concept'.S We intend to use it here in the latter science, characterising each by the descriptive labels under which sense, as a descriptive concept which can be used tocharacterise a they have been debated in the literature on social philosophy. Hn particular type of epistemology. Most of the descriptions of the following section ofthis chapter we will review each oftile four H)ositivism in current usage refer to one or more off the ontological, debates in necessarily brief but more systematic terms. epistemological and methodological dimensions ofour scheme for analysing assumptions with regard to social science. It is also sometimes mistakenly equated with empiricism. Such confiatiollls cloud basic issues and contribute to the use of the term in at The Strands of Debate derogatory sense. Nominalism-realism: the ontological delbateR We use 'positivist' here to characterise epistemologies which sede to explain and predict what happens in the social world by These terms have been the subject of much discussion in the searching for regularities and causal relationships between its con­ literature and there are great areas of controversy surrounding stituent dements. Positivist epistemology is in essence based uporll them. The nominalist position revolves around the assumption the traditional approaches which dominate the natural sciences. that the social world external to individual cognition is made up off Positivists may differ in terms of detailed approach. Some would nothing more than names, concepts and labels which are used to claim, for eRailllple, that hYlPothesised regularities can be verified structure reality. The nominalist does not admit to there being any by an adequate experimental research programme. Others would 'real' structure to the world which these concepts are used to maintain that hypotheses can only be falsified and neVer demon­ describe. The 'names' used are regarded as artificial creations strated to be 'true'.6 However. both 'verilficationists' and 'fal­ whose utility is based upon their convenience as tools for describ­ silficatioll1lists' would accept that the growth ofImowledge is essen­ ing, making sense of and negotiating the external world. Nominal­ tially a cumulative pmcess in which new insights are added to the ism is often equated with conventionalism, and we will make no e,dsting stock of Imowledge and false hypotheses eliminated. distinction between them. 2 The epistemology ofanti-positivism may talee various forms but Realism. on the other hand. postulates that the social world is formly set against the utility of a search for laws or umderlyill1lg external to individual cognition is a real world made up of hard, regularities in the world ofsocial affairs.lFor the anti-positivist. the tangible and relatively immutable structures. Whether or not we social world is essentially relativistic and can only be understood label and perceive these structures, the realists maintain, they stili ffmm the point ofview ofthe individuals who IlIre directly ill1lvolved exist as empirical entities. We may not even be aware of the in the activities which are to be studied. Anti-positivists reject th(\'; existence of certain crucial structures and therefore have no st~ndPoiDlt off the 'observer'. whidu charactenises positivist 'names' or concepts to articulate them. 1F0r the realist, the social en>nstemology, as a valid vantage poillllt for understlllndinll1l RmmaB1l world e)(ists independently of an individual's appreciation of it. activiti~s. They maintain that one can only 'understand' by The individual is seen as being born into and living within a social occupymg the frame olfreferelfllce olfthe Pllllrticipall1t ilfll action. One world which has a reality of its own. It is not something which the lInllls ao Ulll1lderstamll from the inside rather than the olUtside. lFrom indivi~ual creates-it ex~sts 'out there'; ontologically it is prior to this point olf view social scielOlce is seenn as beillbg essertlltiatny all the eXistence and conscIOusness of any single human being. 1F0r subjective rather tnUaln llUIll objectiVidealism thus define the objective and in the natural sciences, which focus upon the process of testing subjective extremes of our model. hypotheses in accordance with the canons of scientific rigour. It is Ma~y ~ociologists ~~d organisati~n theorists have been brought preoccupied with the construction ofscientific tests and the use of up wlthm the tradition of SOCiological positivism, without 8 Sodolo~kal Paradigms and Organisational Analysis Assumptions about the Nature of Social Science 9 exposure to the basic tenets ofGerman idealisr~. Social scienc~ for 3. For a comprehensive review of 'realism', see Keat and Urry them is seen as consonant with the configuration of assumptions (1975), pp. 27-45. They make much of the distinction which characterise the objective e"treme ofour model. ~owev~r, between 'positivism' and 'realism' but, as they admit, these over the last seventy years or so there has been an mcreasl,ng terms are used in a somewhat unconventional way. interaction between these two traditions, particularly at a SOCIO­ 4. For a further discussiol1l of the positivism-anti-positivism philosophical level. As a result intermediate points of viey-r have debate, see, for e"ample, Giddens (1974) and Walsh (1972). emerged, each with its own distinctive configurafion of 5. Giddens (1974), p. l. assumptions about the nature of social science. T~ey have 31.11 6. See, for e){ample, Popper (1963). spawned theories, ideas and approaches cha~actenstlc of their 7. For a good illustration of 31111 anti-positivist view of science, intermediate position. As we shall argue m later chapters, see Douglas (l970b), PI'. 3-44. developments il1l phenomenology, ethnomethod.ology and the 8. The human nature debate in its widest sense involves many action frame of reference are to be understood In these terms. other issues which we have l1Iot referred to here. The precise These perspectives, whilst offering their ?wn special brand of model of man to be employed in any analytical scheme, insight, have also often been used as launchlOg pa~s for attacks on however, is underwritten by assumptions which relflect the sociological positivism and have generated a c~nslderable a~ou~t voluntarism-determinism issue in one way or another. We of debate between rival schools of thought. fhe nature of thiS have isolated this element of the debate here as a way of debate can only be fully understood by grasping and aprrecia~ing treating at its most basic level a necessary assumption of all the different assumptions which underwrite the competing pomts social-scientific theories which purport to account for human of view. activities. Detailed propositions with regard to the precise It is our contention that the analytical scheme offered here e){planation of human activities elaborate in one way or enables one to do precisely this. It is offered not as a ,m~re another this basic theme. classificatory device, but as an important tool for negotiating 9. For an excellent discussion of the nature of the ideographic social theory. It draws attention to key assumrtions. I~ alloy-rs ~ne approach to social science, see Blumer (1969), ch. I. to focus on precise issues which differentiate soclo-sclentlfic 10. It is important to emphasise here that both nomothetic and approaches. It draws attention to the degre~ of ,congrue~cy ideographic methodologies can be employed in a deductive between the four sets of assumptions about SOCial sCience which and inductive sense. Whilst the inductivc>--deductive debate characterise any given theorist's point of view. We offer it here as in science is a subject of considerable interest and the first principal dimension of ~ur ,theoretical .sche~e for importance, we do not see it as being central to the fOUir analysing theory in general and orgamsatlOnaltheory m pa~tlcular. dimensions suggested here as a means of distinguishing For the sake of convenience we shall normally refer to It as the between the nature of social science theories. That notwith­ 'subjectivc>--objective' dimension, two descriptive labels which standing, it remains an important methodological issue, of perhaps capture the points of commonality between the four relevance to both sociology and organisational analysis, analytical strands. within the conte". of the assumptions e){plored here. Notes and! References For a further discussion of the nominalism-realism debate, see Kolakowski (1972), pp. 15-16. 2. Kolakowski (1972), PI'. 158-9. In its most extreme form nominalism does not recognise the e"istence of any world outside the realm of individual consciousness. This is the solipsist position, which we discuss in more detail in Chapter 6. Assumptions about the Nature ofSociety II primarily geared towards an explanation of social order. The approach advocated by Cohen, for example, clearly illustrates this. ]He takes his point of departure from the work of DahrendOif 20 Assumptions about the Nature and elaborates some olf the central ideas in the order-cordlict debate to present two models olf society, which are characterised of Society in terms ofcompeting sets olf assumptions which attribute to social systems the characteristics of commitment, cohesion, solidarity, cons.ensus, reciprocity, co-operation, integration, stability and persIstence on the one hand, and the characteristics olf coercion division. hostility. dissensus, conflict, malintegration and chang; All approaches to the study of society are located in a frame of on the other (Cohen, 1968, Pl'. 166-7). reference of one Idnd or another. Different theories tend to reflect Cohen's central criticism is that Dahrendorf is mistaken in treat­ different perspectives, issues and problems worthy of study, and ing the order and conflict models as being entirely separate. He in are generally based upon a whole set of assumptions which reflect effect suggests that it is possible for theories to involve elements of a particular view of the nature of the subject under investigation. both models and that one need not necessarily incline to one or the The last twenty years or so have witnessed a number of attempts other. From this point of view, the order and conflict views of on the part olf sociologists to delineate the differences which societ~ are but two sides of the same coin; they are not mutually separate various schools of thought and the meta-sociological exclUSive and thus do not need to be reconciled. The force of this assumptions which they reflect. sort of argument has been very powerful in diverting attention away from the order-conflict debate. In the wake ohhe so-called counter-culture movement of the late I%Os and the failure of the The Order-Conflict Debate 1968 revolution in France, orthodox sociologists have become much more interested in and concerned with the problems of the Dahrendorf (1959) and Lockwood (1956), for example, have 'individual' as opposed to those of the 'structure' of society in sought to distinguish between those approaches to sociology general. The influence of 'subjectivist' movements such as which concentrated upon e)(plaining the nature of social order and phenomenology, ethnomethodology and action theory, which we equilibrium on the one hand, and those which were more con­ referred to in passing in the previous chapter, have tended to cerned with problems of change, conflict and coercion in social become much more attractive and more worthy ofattention. As a structures on the other. This distinction has received a great deal of result, interest in continuing the conflict-order debate has sub­ attention and has come to be known as the 'order-conflict sided under the iQfluence olf issues relating to the philosophy and debate'. The 'order theorists' have greatly outnumbered the 'con­ methods of social science. flict theorists', and as Dawe has observed, 'the thesis that socio­ Our contention here is that ilf one reviews the intellectual source logy is centrally concerned with the problem of social order has and foundations of the order-conflict debate, one is forced to become one of the discipline's few orthodo)(ies. It is common as a conclude that it has met a premature death. Dahrendorf and basic premise to many accounts of sociological theory which lo.c~(wood sought to revitalise the work of Marx through their otherwise differ considerably in purpose and perspective' (Dawe, wntmgs and to restore it to a central place in sociological theory. 1970, p. 207).1 For. the. most p~rt Marx had been largely ignored by leading Many sociologists now regard this debate as dead or as having SOCIOlogIsts, the mfluence of theorists such as Durltheim, Weber been a somewhat spurious non-debate in the first place (Cohen, and Pareto having been paramount. Interestingly enough, these 1%8; Silverman, 1970; van den Berghe, 1969). Influenced by the laHer three sociologists are all very much cOlClcemed with tDu~ work of writers such as Coser (1956), who pointed to the functional problem ofsocial order; it is Marx who is preoccupied with the role aspects of social conflict, sociologists have been able to incorpor­ off conflict as the driving force behind social change. Stated in this ate conflict as a variable within the bounds of theories which are way, therefore, the order-conflict debate is underwritten by a H2 SociologicallParadigms and Organisational Analysis Assumptions about the Nature ofSociety B3 differell1lce between tRne persl>ectives alIId concerns ofleading social 'ftlllb>HIe 2.11 URneorists of the nineteell1lth and early twentieth centuries. Modem socioBogy has done Biule more than articulateand develop the basic themes initiated Iby these pioneers of social analysis. To state that rhe 'order' or 'inte/?rationis,' rhe 'conflict' or 'coercion' the order-con1f1ict debate is 'dead' or a 'non-debate' is thus to I'iew of society emphasises: I-iew of society empJwJises: IImderpBay, if not ignore, substantial differences between the work Siabilily Change of Marx and, for example, Durkheim, Weber and Pareto. Anyone Inlegralion Conflict familiar with the work of these theorists and aware of the deep lFunclional co-ordinalion Disintegration division which exists between Mandsm and sociology is forced to Consensus Coercion admit that there are fundamental differences, which are far from being reconciled. 2 nn this chapter therefore, we wish to re-evaluate the order-conflict issue with a view to identifying a key dimen­ As Dahrendorfadmits, this conceptuaiisatimll is something off an sion for analysing the assumptions about the nature of society oversimplification. and whilst providing a very useful tool fOB' reflected in different social theories. In order to do so, let us return coming to grips with the differences between the two standpoints, to the work of Dahrendorf, who seeks to set out the opposing it is open to the possibility ofmisintelfJPretatioffll, in that the different issaJIes in the following terms: adjectives mean different things to differet]t peo[ple. Nowhere is this more evident than in the way in which tine notion of cml/licd The integration theory ofsociety, as displayed by the work of Parsons has been tn':ated in the sociological literature. Since Coser's and other structural-functionalists, is founded on a number ofassump­ demonstration of the functions of social conflict, for e"ample, the tions of tine following type: role of conflict as an integrating mechanism has received a great (I) IEvery society is a relatively persistent, stable structure of ele­ deal ofattention, nn effeCt, the whole notion off 'conflica' llDas oftefi1l ments. been incorporated within the notion of integration. Dahrendorfs (2) IEvery society is a well integrated structure of elements. integration/confllict dimension has been conveniently telescoped (3) IEvery element in a society has a function, i.e., renders a con­ tribution to its maintenance as a system. so that it is brought within the bm.ll1lllds off sociology's traditiona8 (4) IEvery lfulJlctiornng social structure is based on a consensus of concel'll1l for the eRplanation of order. TIne fallacy off this [position values among its members .... becomes dear if one considers certain e,(treme forms of conflict, , ..What Hhave called the coercion theory of society can also be such as class conflict, revolution aUlld war, which can only be D"4;ducedl to a small number of basic tenets, although here again these incorporated in the integrationist model by the wildest stretch oft· assumptions oversimplify and overstate the case: one's imagination. ]Examples such as these suggest tID at it is mis~ (I) IEvery society is at every point subject to !processes of change; leading to equate this type of macrostmcturnl collll.flict with the social change is ubiquitous. functional conflict identified lby Coser. There is an importalIl\t (2) IEvery society displays at every point dissenslls and conflict; questioll1l olf degree involved here, which emphasises the dalIl\gers olf social conflict is ubiquitous, the dichotomisation of integrntion and con1f1ict; realistically the (3) IEvery element in a society renders a contribution to its disin­ tegratiolJl and change. distinction between the two is much more off a conailfmum tIDarrn ahe (4) IEvery society is based on the coercion ofsome orits members by majority olf writers have recognised. others. (Dahrendorf, 1959, IPn>. 160-2) Another strand of the Dalhllrendorlf scheme which caun lbe regarded as somewhat problematic lies ilIl\ the distinctioUll lbetweelll1 The opposing adjectives which Dahrendorfs schema suggests for conumU$ all1ld coercion. At first sight the distincti0ll1l appears disuinguisinilllg approaches to the study olf society can be conve­ obvio,us and clear-cut, focusing UpOIIl\ shared va811.11es 01Il\ the orrne unielIl\u8y brought together ill'll the fform olf a table, as follows: Inall1ld and tine impositiolIl\ off some sort of Iforce on the other. OU1I closer iUllspectioUll there is at certain ambiguity. Where do the shared values come lfrom? Are they acquired all.lltoR1Iomousiy or imposed on some members ofl'socnety by ot8u~rs?ThisI[]luestiolfn identifies the Assumptions about dine Nature ofSociedy DS D4 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis ugration can be seen as constituting one of the most P?werful t~e ~f possibility that consensus may be the product of use some strands of thought which distinguish tt~e order and ~~nfllct per­ form of coercive force. for example, as C. Wnght Mills has spectives. Here again, however, there IS room Ifor mlsn~terpreta­ pointed out, 'What Parsons and other grand theorists call "value tion. The concept ofintegration in Dahrendorfs work denves from orientations" and "normative structure" has mainly to do with the functionalists' concern with the contribution which cOllistituelf1lt master symbols of legitimation' (1959, p. 46). elements ofa system make to the whole. In many respects this is an A normative structure here - what Dahrendorf would view as oversimplification. Merton (1948) introduced the idea of manifest COIllSei1lSUS - is treated as a system legitimising the power and latent functions, some of which may be dysfunctional for the structure. from Mills's point of view, it reflects the fact of integration olf society.4 Again, Gouldner (1959), writing shortly domination. Hn other words, shared values may be regarded not so after the publication of the German edition of Dahrendonf's work, much as an index ohhe degree ofintegration which characterises a suggests that various parts olf a syste!" may have a ~igh deg~ee of society as one which reflects the success of the forces of autonomy and may contribute very Intle by way olf mtegratlon to domination illl a society prone to disintegration. from one point of the system as a whole. The term 'functional co-ordination' is thus view, extant shared ideas, values and norms are something to be something of an oversimplification and, given the existence of the dominat~on preserved; Ifrom another, they represent a mode olf points of view el\pressed above within t~e. ~mnction.ali~t camp Ifrom which man needs to be released. The consensus/coercion itself, it is not surprising that the concept of dlsmtegratlon s~ould dimension cam thus be seen as focusing upon the issue of social be seen as relevant and capable of being used from a functIOnal control. Consensus - however it may arise - is identified in standpoint. 'Disintegration' can be very easily viewed as an inte­ Dahrendorf's scheme as something independent of coercion. This grationist concept and, as with other aspects of Dahrendorfs we believe to be· a mistaken view since, as suggested above, it scheme this dimension has often been telescoped and brought ignores the possibility olf a form of coercion which arises through within the bounds olf the theories of order. for this reason it may tllhe control olf value systems. well have been clearer if the position of conflict theory on this Hn distinguishing between stability and change as respective dimension had been presented in more radical and distinctive features olf the order and conflict models Dahrendorfis again open terms. There is much in Mandan theory, for example, which refers to misinterpretation, even though he explicitly states that he.dfaith or at least a and seek to explain, the process and nature olf deep-seated considerable leap of imagination. . structural change in society as opposed to change olf III more Dahrendorf's work has clearly served a very useful purpose m that~!1 theo~es superfBcial and ephemeral Reind. The.fact functi

I\!@Qeg I. Among the numerous theorists primarily concerned with the problem of order, Dawe cites Parsons (1949), Nisbet (1967), lit By 'consensus' we mean voluntary and 'spontaneous' agree­ ment of opinion. Bramson (1%1), Cohen (1968), and Aron (1968). t The term 'need satisfaction' is used to refer to the focus upon 2. For a discussion of the Mar"ism versus social science satisfaction of individual or system 'needs'. The sociology of debate, see Shaw (1975). The division between Mantist regulation tends to presume that various social characteristics can theorists and orthodm( sociologists is now so deep that they be explained in relation to these needs. It presumes that it is either ignore each othelf completely, or indulge in an possible to identify and satisfy human needs within the conte"t of exchange of abuse and accusation regarding the politicall e,dsting social systems, and that society reflects these needs. The conservatism or subversiveness commonly associated wiili concept of 'deprivation', on the other hand, is rooted in the notion their respective points ofview. Debate about the intellectual that the social 'system' prevents human fulfilment; indeed that strengths and weaknesses of their opposing standpoints is 'deprivation' is created as the result of the status quo. The social conspicuous by its absence. 'system' is not seen as satisfying needs but as eroding the 3. lLater in this chapter we sllIlggest that the descriptions of possibilities for human fulfilment. It is rooted in the notion that 'concern with the status quo' and 'concern for radical society has resulted in deprivation rather than in gain. change' provide more accurate views of the issues involved here. :W Sociological Paradigms and Organisatimwl Analysis 4. Dahrendonf acknowledges Merton's distinction between latent and manifest functions but does not pursue the con~ sequence of 'dysfunctions' for the concept of integration 30 Tvvo Dimensions: (Dahrendorf, 1959, pp. 173-9). 5. Other 'order' theorists who have addressed themselves to Dahrendorf's model tend to follow a similar path in the Four Paradigms attempt to embrace conflict theory within their perspective. See, for e1\ample, vall1l den lBerghe (1%9).

Un the previous two chapters we have focused upon some of the n,ey assumptions which characterise different approaches to social theory. We have argued that it is possible to analyse these approaches in terms of two I(ey dimensions of analysis, each of which subsumes a series of related themes. h has been suggested that assumptions about the nature of science can be thought of illl terms of what we call the subjective-objective dimension, and assumptions about the nature of society in terms ofa regulation­ rndical change dimension. Un this chapter we wish to discuss the relationships between the two dimensions and to develop a coher­ ent scheme for the analysis of social theory. We have already noted how sociological debate since the late 1960s has tended to ignore the distinctions between the two dimen­ sions - in particular,how there has been a tendency to focus upon issues concerned with the subjective-objective dimension and to ignore those concerned with the regulation-radical change dimension. Interestingly enough, this focus of attention has characterised sociological thought associated with both regulation and radical change. The subjective-objective debate has beelfi conducted independently within both sociological camps. Within the sociology of regulation it has assumed the form of a debate between interpretive sociology and functionalism. Un the wake ofBerger and Luckmann's treatise on the sociology ofImow­ ledge (1%6), Garfinkel's work on ethnomethodology (1967) and a general resurgence of interest in phenomenology, the questionable status of the ontological and epistemological assumptions of the functionalist perspective have become increasingly exposed. The debate has often led to a polarisation between the two schools of thought. Similarly. within the context of the sociology of radical chalfige there has been a division between theorists subscribing to 'subjec­ tive' and 'objective' views ofsociety. The debate in many respects taB'es its lead from the publication in france in 1966 and Britain in Two Dimensions: Four Paradif!.ms 23 22 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis twO independent dimensions which resurrect the sociological 1969 of Louis Althusser's work For Marx. This presented the issues of the early I960s and place them alongside those of t~e .Iate notion of an 'epistemological break' in Marx's work and emphas­ I%Os and early 1970s. Taken together, they define four d~stmct ised the polarisation of Marxist theorists into two camps: those sociological paradigms which can be utilised fo~ the analySIS of a emphasising the 'subjective' aspects of Marxism (Lukacs and the wide range of social theories. The relationship between these frankfurt School, for example) and those advocating more 'objec­ paradigms, which we label 'r.adic~1 ~u~~nist', 'radi.cal ~tructural­ tive' approaches, such as that associated with Althusserian struc­ ist', 'interpretive' and 'functIOnalIst, IS Illustrated In figure ~.I. turalism. It will be clear from the diagram that each of the paradigms Within the context of the sociologies both of regulation and shares a common set of features with its neighbours on the hori­ radical change, therefore, the middle to late 1960s witnessed a zontal and vertical axes in terms ofone ofthe two dimensions but is distinct switch in the focus ofattention. The debate between these differentiated on the other dimension. for this reason they should two sociologies which had characterised the early 1960s disap­ be viewed as contiguous but separate - contiguous because of the peared and was replaced by an introverted dialogue within the shared characteristics, but separate because the differentiation is, context of each of the separate schools of thought. Instead of as we shall demonstrate later, of sufficient importance to warrant 'speaking' to each other they turned inwards and addressed their treatment ofthe paradigms as four distinct entities. The four para­ remarks to themselves. The concern to sort out their position with digms define fundamentally different perspectives for the analysis regard to what we call the subjective-objective dimension, a of social phenomena. They approach this endeavour from con­ complicated process in view ofall the interrelated strands, led to a trasting standpoints and generate quite different concepts and neglect of the regulation-radical change dimension. analytical tools. As a consequence of these developments, recent debate has often been confused. Sociological thought has tended to be charac­ terised by a narrow sectarianism, from which an overall perspec­ tive and grasp ofbasic issues are conspicuously absent. The time is The Nature and Uses of the Four Paradigms ripe for consideration ofthe way ahead, and we submit that the two key dimensions ofanalysis which we have identified define critical Before going on to discuss the substantive nature of each of the parameters within which this can take place, We present them as paradigms, it will be as well to pay some attention to the way in which we intend the notion of 'paradigm' to be used.· We regard THE SOCIOLOGY OF RADICAL CHANGE r------1 our four paradig~s as being d.efined by very basic meta-theoretical assumptions which underwnte the frame of reference, mode of I I theorising and modus operandi of the social theorists who ~perate I within them. It is a term which is intended to emphaSise the 'Rllldical 'Radical I humlllnist' atructurlllli13t' commonality of perspective which binds the work of a group of I I theorists together in such a way that they can be usefully regarded I as approaching social theory within the bounds of the same SUBJECTIVE ;------+------~I OBJECTIVE problematic. . I This definition does not imply complete umty of thought. h I allows for the fact that within the context of any given paradigm 'Functionllllilllt' I there will be much debate between theorists who adopt different I I standpoints. The paradigm does, however, have an underlying I unity in terms of its basic and often 'taken for granted' assump­ L. JI tions, which separate a group of theorists in a very fundamental ~he '~nity' THE SOCIOLOGY OF REGULATION way from theorists located in other paradigms. of the paradigm thus derives from reference to alternative views of real- !Figure 3.1 Four paradigms for the analysis of social theory 24 Sociololfical Paradixms and Or/?anisational Analysis Two Dimensions: Four Paradif?ms 25 ity which lie outside its boundaries and which may not necessarily practice. As Keat and Urry put it, 'For individual scientists, the even be recognised as existing. change of allegiance from one paradigm to another is often a In identifying four paradigms in social theory we are in essence "conversion experience", akin to Gestalt-switches or changes of suggesting that it is meaningful to examine work in the subject area religious faith' (1975, p. 55). When a theorist does shift his position in terms of four sets of basic assumptions. Each set identifies a in this way, it stands out very clearly as a major break with his quite separate social-scientific reality. To be located in a particular intellectual tradition and is heralded as being so in the literature, in paradigm is to view the world in a particular way. The four para­ that the theorist is usually welcomed by those whom he has joined digms thus define four views of the social world based upon differ­ and often disowned by his former 'paradigm colleagues'. Thus we ent meta-theoretical assumptions with regard to the nature of witness what is known as the 'epistemological break' between the science and of society. work of the young Marx and the mature Man, - what we would It is our contention that all social theorists can be located within identify as a shift from the radical humanist paradigm to the radical the context of these four paradigms according to the meta­ structuralist paradigm. At the level of organisational analysis, a theoretical assumptions reflected in their work. The four para­ distinct paradigm shift can be detected in the work of Silverman ­ digms taken together provide a map for negotiating the subject a shift from the functionalist paradigm to the interpretive para­ area, which offers a convenient means of identifying the basic digm. We will analyse such intellectual journeys in more detail in similarities and differences between the work of various theorists later chapters. and, in particular, the underlying frame of reference which they Before we progress to a review of the four paradigms, one point adopt. It also provides a convenient way of locating one's own is worthy offurther emphasis. This relates to the fact that the four personal frame ofreference with regard to social theory, and thus a paradigms are mutually exclusive. They offer alternative views of means of understanding why certain theories and perspectives social reality, and to understand the nature of all four is to under­ may have more personal appeal than others. Like any other·map, it stand four different views of society. They offer different ways of provides a tool for establishing where you are, where you have seeing. A synthesis is not possible, since in their pure forms they been and where it is possible to go in the future. It provides a tool are contradictory, being based on at least one set of opposing for mapping intellectual journeys in social theory - one's own and meta-theoretical assumptions. They are alternatives, in the sense those of the theorists who have contributed to the subject area. that one can operate in different paradigms sequentially over time, nn this work we intend to make much use of the map-like qual­ but mutually exclusive. in the sense that one cannot operate in ities of the four paradigms. Each defines a range of intellectual more than one paradigm at any given point in time. since in accept­ territory. Given the overall meta-theoretical assumptions which ing the assumptions of one, we defy the assumptions of all the distinguish one paradigm from another, there is room for much others. variation within them. Within the context of the 'functionalist' We offer the four paradigms for consideration in these terms, in paradigm, for example, certain theorists adopt more extreme posi­ the hope that knowledge of the competing points of view will at tions in terms of one or both of the two dimensions than others. least make us aware of the boundaries within which we approach Such differences often account for the internal debate which goes our subject. on between theorists engaged in the activities of 'normal science' within the context of the same paradigm. 2 The remaining chapters ofthis work examine each ofthe four paradigms in some detail and attempt to locate their principal theorists in these terms. The FunctionaHist Paradigm Our research suggests that whilst the activity within the context of each paradigm is often considerable, inter-paradigmatic This paradigm has provided the dominant framework for the con­ 'journeys' are much rarer. This is in keeping with Kuhn's (1970) duct of academic sociology and the study of organisations. lIt notion of 'revolutionary science'. For a theorist to switch para­ represents a perspective which is firmly rooted in the sociology of digms calls for a change in meta-theoretical assumptions, some­ regulation and approaches its subject matter from an objectivist thing which, although manifestly possible, is not often achieved in point of view. Functionalist theorists have been at the forefront of 26 Sociological Paradif?ms and Orf?anisational Analysis Two Dimensions: Four Paradigms 27 the order-conflict debate, and the concepts which we have used to categorise the sociology of regulation apply in varying degrees ing the world of human affairs. for Durkheim, the task of to all schools of thought within the paradigm. It is characterised by sociology was to understand the nature of this regulated ordcu:. a concern for providing explanations of the status quo, social Since the early decades of the twentieth century, however, the order. consensus. social intef?ration, solidarity, need satisfaction functionalist paradigm has been increasingly influenced by ele­ and actuality. It approaches these general sociological concerns ments from the German idealist tradition of socialthoughl. As will from a standpoint which tends to be realist, positivist, determinist be recalled from our discussion in Chapter I, this approach reflects and nomothetic. assumptions about the nature of social science which stand in The functionalist paradigm generates regulative sociology in its opposition to those of sociological positivism. As a result of the most fully developed form. In its overall approach it seeks to work of such theorists as Max Weber, George Simmel and George provide essentially rational explanations of social affairs. It is a Herbert Mead, elements of this idealist approach have been util­ is~d perspective which is highly pragmatic in orientation, concerned to within the conte"t of social theories which have attempted to understand society in a way which generates knowledge which can bndge the gulf between the two traditions. In so doing they have be put to use. It is often problem-orientated in approach, con­ forged theoretical perspectives characteristic of the least objectiv­ cerned to provide practical solutions to practical problems. It is ist region of the paradigm, at its junction with the interpretive usu~lIy firmly committed to a philosophy ofsocial engineering as a paradigm. Such theories have rejected the use of mechanical and baSIS .of social cha~ge and emphasises the importance of under­ biological analogies for studying the social world and have sta~dlng order, eqUilibrium and stability in society and the way in introduced ideas which place emphasis upon the importance of which these can be maintained. It is concerned with the effective understanding society from the point ofview ofthe actors who are 'regulation' and control of social affairs. actually engaged in the performance of social activities. Since the I940s there has been also an infusion ofcertain Manist As will be apparent from our discussion in Chapter I the influences characteristic of the sociology of radical change. These appro~ch to soci.al science characteristic of the functionalist para­ have been incorporated within the paradigm in an attempt to digm IS rooted In the tradition of sociological positivism. This 'radicalise' functionalist theory and rebuff the general charge that reflects the attempt, par excellence, to apply the models and methods of the natural sciences to the study of human affairs. Originating in france in the early decades of the nineteenth f------THIE SOCIOlOGV OF ------1RADICAL CHANGE century, its majo~ influen~e upon the paradigm has been through I i the work of social theonsts such as Auguste Comte, Herbert I I Spencer, Emile Durkheim and Vilfredo Pareto. The functionalist I IVllJlntis~ , approach to social science tends to assume that the social world is : th~or\l : composed of relatively concrete empirical artefacts and relation­ I I ships which c~n be identified, studied and measured through I I I approaches denved from the natural sciences. The use of mechan­ SUIlllJIECTIVIE OBJECTIVE ical a~d biological. analogies as a means of modelling and under­ I I stand!ng !he socl.al world is particularly favoured in many I I functIOnalist theones. By way of illustration consider, for exam­ G0rmlllll pie, ~he work of Durkheim. Central to his position was the idea that id00lism 'social facts' exist outside of men's consciousness and restrain men in their everyday activities. The aim was to understand the relationships between these 'objective' social facts and to articu­ ~ate the,soci.ology whi~h e~plained the types of 'solidarity' provid­ tl1lIEGULATION SOCi?~o~icllll Ing the SOCial cement which holds society together. The stability PO!lI~IVI$m and ordered nature ofthe natural world was viewed as characteris- !Figure 3.2 Intellectual influences upon the functionaiisl paradigm 28 Sociolo/:ical Paradi/:ms alld Or/:allisatiollal Allalysis

ill functionalism is essentially conservative and unable to provide > explanations for social change. These attempts underwrite the f­ U debate examined in the previous chapter as to whether a theory of ill-, ro 'contlict' can be incorporated within the bounds of a theory of a 'order' to provide adequate explanations of social affairs. Put very crudely, therefore, the formation of the functionalist paradigm can be understood in terms of the interaction of three sets of intellectual forces, as illustrated in Figure 3.2. Of these, sociological positivism has been the most influential. The compet­ ing traditions have been sucked in and used within the context of the functionalist problematic, which emphasises the essentially objectivist nature of the social world and a concern for explana­ tions which emphasise 'regulation' in social affairs. These cross­ currents of thought have given rise to a number of distinctive schools of thought within the paradigm, which is characterised by a wide range of theory and internal debate. By way of overview, again somewhat crudely, Figures 3.3 and 3.4 illustrate the four paradigms in terms of the constituent schools of sociological and organisational theory which we shall be exploring later on. As will be apparent, most organisation theorists, industrial sociologists, psychologists and industrial relations theorists approach their sub­ ject from within the bounds of the functionalist paradigm.

The li nterpretive Paradigm

Theorists located within the context of the interpretive paradigm adopt an approach consonant with the tenets of what we have described as the sociology of re/:ulation, though its subjectivist approach to the analysis of the social world makes its links with this sociology often implicit rather than explicit. The interpretive paradigm is informed by a concern to understand the world as it is, to understand the fundamental nature of the social world at the level of subjective experience. It seeks explanation within the (f) 0 a. VJ_ &II E realm of individual consciousness and subjectivity, within the frame of reference of the participant as opposed to the observer of ~~~..,""",--JI-_----'-""='';''';''''i action. > f- In its approach to social science it tends to be Iluminalist, anti­ U ill-, pO.l'itil'iJf, volulltarist and idl'ographic. It sees the social world as OJ :::> an emergent social process which is created by the individuals lfl concerned. Social reality, insofar as it is recognised to have any existence outside the consciousness of any single individual, is regarded as being lillie more than a network of assumptions and Two Dimensions: Four Paradigms 31 intersubjectively shared meanings. The ontological status of the social world is viewed as extremely questionable and problematic as far as theorists located within the interpretive paradigm are concerned. Everyday life is accorded the status of a miraculous achievement. interpretive philosophers and sociologists seek to understand the very basis and source of social reality. They often delve into the depths of human consciousness and subjectivity in their quest for the fundamental meanings which underlie social life. Given this view of social reality, it is hardly surprising that the commitment of the interpretive sociologists to the sociology of regulation is implicit rather than explicit. Their ontological assumptions rule out a direct interest in the issues involved in the order-conflict debate as such. However, their standpoint is underwritten by the assumption that the world of human affairs is cohesive, ordered and integrated. The problems of conflict, domination, contradiction, potentiality and change play no part in their theoretical framework. They are much more orientated towards obtaining an understanding of the subjectively created social world 'as it is' in terms of an ongoing process. interpretive sociology is concerned with understanding the essence ofthe everyday world. in terms ofouranalytical schema it is underwritten by an involvement with issues relating to the nature 9f the status quo, social order, consensus, social integra­ tion and cohesion, solidarity and actuality. 3 The interpretive paradigm is the direct product of the German idealist tradition of social thought. its foundations were laid in the work ofKant and reflect a social philosophy which emphasises the essentially spiritual nature of the social world. The idealist tradi­ tion was paramount in Germanic thought from the mid-eighteenth century onwards and was closely linked with the romantic move­ ment in literature and the arts. Outside this realm, however, it was oflimited interest, until revived in the late 1390s and early years of this century under the influence of the so-called neo-idealist movement. Theorists such as Dilthey, Weber, Husserl and Schutz have made a major contribution towards establishing it as a framework for social analysis, though with varying degrees of commitment to its underlying problematic. figures 3.3 and 3.4 illustrate the manner in which the paradigm has been explored as far as our present interest in social theory and the study of organisations is concerned. Whilst there have been a small number of attempts to' study organisational concepts anli situations from this point of view, the paradigm has not generated 32 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis Two Dimensions: Four Paradi/?ms 33 much organisation theory as such. As will become clear from our In keeping with its subjectivist approach to social science, the analysis, there are good reasons for this. The premises of the radical humanist perspective places central emphasis upon human interpretive paradigm question whether organisations exist in any~ consciousness. Its intellectual foundations can be traced to the thing but a conceptual sense. Its significance for the study of same source as that of the interpretive paradigm. It derives from organisations, therefore, is of the most fundamental kind. It the German idealist tradition, particularly as expressed in the work challenges the validity of the ontological assumptions which of Kant and Hegel (though as reinterpreted in the writings of the underwrite functionalist approaches to sociology in general and young Marx). It is through Marx that the idealist tradition was ~rst the study of organisations in particular. utilised as a basis for a radical social philosophy, and many radical humanists have derived their inspiration from this source. In essence Marx inverted the frame ofreference reflected in Hegeliai1l The Radical Humanist Paradigm idealism and thus forged the basis for radical humanism. The paradigm has also been much influenced by an infusion of the The radical humanist paradigm is defined by its concern to develop phenomenological perspective de:ivin~ from. Husser~. . a sociQlogy of radical change from a subjectivist standpoint. Its As we shall illustrate in our detailed diSCUSSIOn of thiS paradigm, approach to social science has much in common with that of the apart from the early work ofMant, interest remained dormant until interpretive paradigm, in that it views the social world from a the 1920s, when Lukacs and Gramsci revived interest in subjectiv­ perspective which tends to benominalist, anti-positivist, voluntar­ ist interpretations of Marxist theory. This interest was taken on by ist and ideographic. However, its frame of reference is committed members ofthe so-called JFrankfurt School, which has generated a to a view of society which emphasises the importance of over­ great deal ofdebate, particularly through the writings ofHabermas throwing or transcending the limitations of existing social and Marcuse. The existentialist philosophy of Same also belongs arrangements. to this paradigm, as do the writings ofa group ofsocial theorists as One of the most basic notions underlying the whole of this widely diverse as lIIich, Castaneda and Laing. All in their various paradigm is that the consciousness of man is dominated by the ways share a common concern for the release of consciousness ideological superstructures with which he interacts, and that these and experience from domination by various aspects ofthe ideolog­ drive a cognitive wedge between himself and his true conscious­ ical superstructure of the social world within which men live out ness. This wedge is the wedge of 'alienation' or 'false conscious­ their lives. They seek to change the social world through a change ness', which inhibits or prevents true human fulfilment. The major in modes of cognition and consciousness. concern for theorists approaching the human predicament in these JFigures 3.3 and 3.4 again provide a somewhat rough and ready terms is with release from the constraints which existing social summary of the manner in which this paradigm has been explored arrangements place upon human development. It is a brand of in terms ofsocial theory and the study oforganisations. As we shall socialthestructuralism is committed to radical change, emancipa­ schools of thoughllocated within the paradigm, which w~ ~hall be tion, and potentiality, in an analysis which emphasises structural examining in some detail in Chapters 10 ~nd 1.1. In Bntlsh .and conflict, modes ofdomination, contradiction and deprivation. It American sociology the radical structuralist vle~ has recelve.d approaches these general concerns from a standpoint which tends relatively little attention outside the r~alm .of conflict the.ory. ThiS to be realist, positivist, determinist and nomothetic. paradigm, located as i.t is ~ith!n a realist view of the socl~1 w?rld, Whereas the radical humanists forge their perspective by focus­ has many significant ImplicatIOns for the study of organisatIOns, ing upon 'consciousness' as the basis for a radical critique of but they have only been developed in the barest forms. In Chapt~r society, the radical structuralists concentrate upon structural rela­ II we review the work which has been done and the embrYOniC tionships within a realist social world. They emphasise the fact that radical organisation theory which it reflects. radical change is built into the very nature and structure of con­ temporary society, and they seek to provide explanations of the basic interrelationships within the context of total social forma­ tions. There is a wide range of debate within the paradigm, and Exploring Sodal Theory different theorists stress the role of different social forces as a means of explaining social change. Whilst some focus directly So much, then, for our overview of the four paradig.ms. Su~­ upon the deep-seated internal contradictions, others focus upon sequent chapters seek to place flesh upon t~e bones of thiS analyti­ the structure and analysis of power relationships. Common to all cal scheme and attempt to demonstrate ~ts po~er a.s a t~ol ~or theorists is the view that contemporary society is characterised by exploring social theory:1 Hopefully, our dlSc~sslon Will doJustice fundamental conflicts which generate radical change through to the essentially complex nature of the pa~adlgms ~nd the net~ork political and economic crises. It is through such conflict and of assumptions which they reflect, and will ~stabllsh.the.relatlO.n­ change that the emancipation of men from the social structures in ships and links between the various perspectJ.ves dommatmg SOCial which they live is seen as coming about. analysis at the present time. Whi.'st the focus m C~la~ters 5,7, ?and This paradigm owes its major intellectual debt to the work ofthe 11 is upon organisational analysIs, the general pll1nclples and Ideas mature Marx, after the so-called 'epistemological break' in his discussed in the work as a whole clearly ~ave ~e1evan~e .fo~ the work. It is the paradigm to which Marx turned after a decade of exploration of a wide variety of ot~er SOCial sCience diSCiplines. active political involvement and as a result of his increasing inter­ The scope for applying the analytical scheme to other fields of est in Darwinian theories of evolution and in political economy. study is enormous but unfortunately lies beyond ~he scop~ of our Man's basic ideas have been subject to a wide range ofinterpreta­ resent enquiry. However, readers interest~d m appl¥mg the tions in the hands of theorists who have sought to follow his lead. ~cheme in this way should find little difficulty m proceedmg from Among these Engels, J?lekhanov, Lenin and Bukharin have been the sociological analyses presented in Chapters 4,~, 8.. an~ 10 toan particularly influential. Among the leading exponents of the radi­ analysis ofthe Iiterature in their own sphere ofspeCialised mterest. cal structuralist position outside the realm of Russian social theory, the names of Althusser, Poulantzas, Colletti and various Marxist sociologists of the New Left come to mind. Whilst the influence of Marx upon the radical structuralist paradigm is Notes and! References undoubtedly dominant, it is also possible to identify a strong Weberian influence. As we shall argue in later chapters, in recent for a full discussion of the role of paradi~ms in s~iell1tjfic years a group of social theorists have sought to explore the inter­ development, see Kullm (I970). ~n his a~aly.sis, lPar~(bgms are face between the thought of Marx and Weber and have generated a defined as 'universally recogmsed SCientific adn~vements distinctive perspective which we describe as 'conflict theory'. Itis that for a time provide model problems and soh.!tlons to a to this radical structuralist perspective that the work of Dahren- 36 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis Two Dimensions: /Four Paradigms 37 community ofpractitioners' (p. viii). Paradigms are regarded number of works which have aimed ~o chara a jpaah througlln as governing the progress of what is called 'normal science', ahe social science literature by reducing the variables of in which 'the scientist's worlc is devoted to the articulation sociological analysis to a number off Icey dimensions. TIwse and wider application ofthe accepted paradigm, which is not of Dahrendorf (959), Wallace 09(9), Gouldner (1970), itself questioned or criticised. Scientific problems are Friedrichs (1970), D'realities', 'frames of reference', 'forms of life' and 'universe of discourse' are all related conceptualisations although ofcourse they are not synonymous. 2. Some inter-paradigm debate is also possible. Giddens main­ tains 'that all paradigms ... are mediated by others' and that within 'normal science' scientists are aware of other para­ digms. He posits that: 'The process of learning a para­ digm ... is also the process oflearning what that paradigm is not' (1976, pp. 142-4). nnterestingly, he confines his discussion to the mediation of one paradigm by another one. We believe that a model of four confllicting paradigms within sociology is more accurate and that academics' knowledge of 'scientists' within the other three paradigms is m,ely to be very sketchy in some cases. Relations between paradigms are perhaps better described in terms of 'disinterested hostility' rather than 'debate'. 3. The notion of need satisfaction derives from the use of a biological analogy of an organism and plays no part in interrpretive sociology. 4. The sociological concerns ofrecent years have resulted in a ~;·:l~i]\H·(,C 111111 JBlilblinogn.R/lpilll Y

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