Household Responsibility System Jiātíng Chéngbāo Zérènzhì 家庭承包责任制

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Household Responsibility System Jiātíng chéngbāo zérènzhì 家庭承包责任制

The household responsibility system is an es- collective retained the ownership of the land. Under the sential component of the agricultural reform form of contracting output to the household, land was initiated by China in the late 1970s. Under the divided equally and then leased to individual peasant system, land or certain tasks are contracted households on a per capita basis for the return of a certain kind or amount of yield as specified by the contract to to individual households for a period of time. the state. Peasant households had the autonomy to decide After fulfilling the procurement quota obliga- what and how much to produce. Any surplus beyond the tions to the state, farmers are free to keep their fixed quota would be kept by peasant households either surplus for their use or sell it on the market. for their own consumption or for sale in the newly liber- alized rural markets. Under the form of contracting everything to the aving transformed China’s countryside into household certain plots of land were assigned to indi- a system of agricultural cooperatives by 1957 vidual households in return for fixed payments to the (the process called collectivization), the Chi- collective as procurement quotas, taxes, welfare funds, nese leadership moved on in 1958 to more ambitious pro- and collective investments. The household would keep grams of the Great Leap Forward. Existing collectives anything else for its own use or for sale. were soon organized into people’s communes, much The terms of household contracts varied in differ- larger units with an average of about 20,000 to 30,000 ent areas. Initially some areas used annually renewed members. Communes as a basic organization of the Chi- contracts that reallocated land to allow for changes in nese countryside remained until late 1970s when reform a household’s size or situation. In other areas the dura- impulses began to pop up in various places. The house- tion of the contract was not clearly stipulated but was as- hold responsibility system (jiating chengbao zeren zhi) was sumed to be long term. In the latter, land allocations were one of the agricultural reforms that emerged at the time. to remain unchanged regardless of household situations Although forbidden by the central government until the such as births or deaths. Over time the system gradually autumn of 1980, the household responsibility system was evolved into explicit long-term leases of land under col- introduced experimentally in rural China, most famously lective ownership. The government even began to grant in Anhui Province. land-use certificates through county offices that would be The household responsibility system had two major good for fifteen to twenty years. Eventually the govern- forms. The first involved contracting output to the house- ment extended leases to fifty years on land that could be hold (baochan daohu); the second involved contracting inherited and sublet. everything to the household, or contracting tasks to The essential feature of various forms of the respon- the household (baogan daohu). Under both forms the sibility system was the establishment of a direct and 1066 H © 2009 by Berkshire Publishing Group LLC Household Responsibility System n Jiātíng chéngbāo zérènzhì n 家庭承包责任制 1067

effective link between work and rewards. The system did 1977 the provincial government began to liberalize the not change the nature of collective ownership of land and rural economy with the passage of a policy known as the property, but it did change the way the land and property “Six Articles,” which called on officials at various levels were used and the way agricultural production was man- to respect local units’ autonomy. In 1978, when a severe aged. Thework- point system that had been in place since drought hit Anhui, with the endorsement of the provin- collectivization was gradually replaced by various forms cial government Shannan District in Feixi County began of the responsibility system. the practice of “lending” pieces of land that were not used Early forms of the household responsibility system by the collectives to peasant households. were introduced in response to excesses of the crash col- With the benign neglect and implicit support of some lectivization movement in the mid-1950s. But this en- reform-oriented regional and local leaders such as Wan deavor was quickly reversed with Chinese Communist Li, other localities in Anhui began experimenting with Party leader Mao Zedong’s intervention. Accused as various forms of the responsibility system. These experi- “rightist opportunism,” these nascent experiments were ments included contracting output to groups (baochan soon submerged in the waves of “agrarian radicalism” daozu), contracting tasks to groups (baogan daozu), during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revo- contracting output to the household, and contracting lution (1966–1976). Their revival came in the late 1970s tasks to the household. These forms of the responsibil- in response to initiatives taken by the farmers and local ity system calculated rewards based on yields and dis- governments. tributed bonuses for output over quotas (lianchan jichou Experiments with various responsibility systems in and chaobao jiangli). For example, in 1978 Xinjie Com- the late 1970s started in Anhui Province when Wan Li mune in Tianchang County adopted a limited version was appointed provincial party secretary. In November of household contracting by fixing output responsibility

Farmers cart their produce to sell at market. Because farmers are now allowed to sell their surplus crops after government quotas are fulfilled, incentive is a factor in China’s reformed agricultural system. Photo by Joan Lebold Cohen.

© 2009 by Berkshire Publishing Group LLC 1068 Berkshire Encyclopedia of China 宝库山中华全书 for certain crops such as cotton to individuals (in real- ity, households). In the spring of 1978 Mahu Commune in Fengyang County and Weiying Production Team in Lai’an County began linking production and reward via contracting output to groups or contacting everything to groups (da baogan daozu). At about the same time in Xi- aogang, Fengyang County, eighteen peasant households secretly began practicing the household responsibility system. Given the political uncertainty at the time, they signed a pledge in the spring of 1978 to take care of the dependents of team cadres in case they were arrested for allowing such a practice.

Contracting Spreads Although Fengyang County later reversed its decision to permit the household responsibility system when other areas demanded the same right, its initial endorsement emboldened residents in other localities, and household contracting began to spread even though this practice was often concealed from higher authorities. By the time of the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Commit- tee in December 1978, over one thousand production teams had already adopted the household responsibility system. A farmer displays the head of a sunflower, the Although the Third Plenum reaffirmed the Dazhai seeds of which will be dried for food. After ful- model, a brigade widely heralded during the Cultural filling their quotas owed to the state, farmers are Revolution for its spirit of hard struggle and self-reliance, free to keep the surplus for their use or sell it at it also encouraged experimentation with various forms of market. Photo by Joan Lebold Cohen. the responsibility system that linked work with pay under unified accounting and distribution by the collective. More important, while the Third Plenum still forbade the adoption of the household responsibility system, the fact But the household responsibility system continued to that it tolerated the development of different forms of the face strong opposition, and in most provinces the respon- responsibility system was a sign of relaxation. In such an sibility system was still limited to contracting to small atmosphere responsibility systems in the form of con- groups, not households. Even Xiaogang was among the tracting output to small groups and even contracting out- first to adopt the household responsibility system, it was put to households were soon adopted in various places, forced by county authorities to switch to small-group re- especially in remote and poor areas. Although not all of sponsibility in 1979 because of complaints from neighbor- the practices were sanctioned, none was really punished ing brigades and communes. or banned. Therefore, well before the central government While the general atmosphere during this period permitted the practice of group and, later, household re- was favorable to various experiments of agricultural sponsibility in agriculture, various localities had already reforms, it was not until 25–28 September 1979 at the adopted them secretly. Fourth Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee did

the official policy regarding the household responsibil- From Permitted to Popular ity system began to relax. Although contracting output to households was still prohibited, it was allowed with During the next two years the first tentative endorse- the exception of certain sideline productions with spe- ment of the household responsibility system was gradu- cial needs and isolated households living in remote poor ally extended, and the corresponding increases in grain areas. production helped alter attitudes toward the system. The Even this limited opening to allow households in poor subsequent policy changes evolved from permitting the remote areas to contract land in certain sideline produc- household responsibility system to recognizing and then tions became a window of opportunity for those looking popularizing it. This change was due largely to Chinese for change. By late 1979 contracting output to house- Communist Party leader Deng Xiaoping’s endorsement holds quickly spread. According to the economist D. L. and Wang Li’s open support after he became vice premier Yang (1996), 25 percent of rural households were already in charge of agricultural affairs and head of the State Ag- engaged in output contracting in the spring of 1980. By ricultural Commission. July–August of the same year the number increased to Even in 1980 at a meeting of provincial party secretar- 30 percent. In Anhui production teams practicing house- ies most provinces still opposed the household responsi- hold contracting grew from less than 1 percent in 1978 bility system. However, a major breakthrough occurred at to 16 percent in 1979 and 90 percent in 1980. The rapid a meeting of provincial party secretaries on 14–22 Septem- expansion of the household responsibility system was ber. With strong support from Wan Li, the meeting issued due largely to the permissive attitude and even support a resolution on “Certain Problems with Respect to Further from reform-minded regional and local leaders such as Strengthening and Improving Responsibility System for Wan Li in Anhui and Zhao Ziyang in Sichuan. Wan Li Agricultural Production,” known as “Document No. 75.” openly defended the practice of the household responsi- Despite continued opposition from some provinces at the bility system as simply one form of responsibility system meeting, this document endorsed the experiment of vari- and it was socialist because the land still belonged to the ous forms of responsibility system, including the contin- collective. ued practice of the household responsibility system even Despite the much-improved political atmosphere, ru- in some prosperous areas that had already adopted it. ral reform, and especially the household responsibility At the time of this meeting an estimated 20 to 30 system, still faced strong opposition. Even in Anhui, the percent of all production teams had already adopted most radical of China’s provinces, the household respon- the household responsibility system despite continued sibility system was still not widely accepted. Although opposition. In the aftermath of the release of the docu- Feixi County had adopted the system from the begin- ment most provinces and autonomous regions responded ning, most of Anhui had adopted the alternative system of promptly and positively, and subsequently various forms contracting to small groups. In Fengyang County, which of the responsibility system developed quickly. Apart became famous for pioneering the system of contract- from contracting output to small groups and contracting ing to small groups, the party leader gave his support output to households, many places began dividing labor only to contracting output to small groups but opposed according to specialization and linking rewards to yields the adoption of the household responsibility system. As (zhuanye chengbao, lianchan jichou). At the same time re- noted earlier, the county authorities who had originally strictions on rural markets and fairs were further eased, allowed Xiaogang to adopt the household responsibility and measures were also taken to encourage crop diver- system reversed their decision when Xiaogang’s example sification, specialization, and production for expanding came into conflict with the policy of contracting to small internal and external markets. Most important, by July groups in nearby areas. Although the leadership at the 1981 many basic accounting units in rural China had ad- prefecture level in Chuxian supported the more radical opted some form of the household responsibility system household responsibility system, resistance from local even though the document stipulated that “average areas cadres, especially at the county level, persisted. should not adopt” this system.

A variety of responsibility systems was used in dif- This reaffirmation led to further acceleration in the pace ferent regions. More-developed regions along the coast of decollectivization. Rural households engaged in the preferred some form of specialized contracting. The poor- household responsibility system jumped to 98 percent of est and least-commercialized areas in the interior would the total in 1983 and 99 percent in 1984. find the household responsibility system most appropri- ate. Regions in the middle would tend to adopt a hybrid system of the two. By this time most people still viewed Litmus Test contracting output to individual households as an effective way to raise rural income levels because it could alter After the central authorities accepted the household re- the incentive structures in the “backward” areas where sponsibility system, implementation of the system soon the collective economy was weak and ineffective. But sus- became the litmus test in many areas of a cadre’s support picion and even opposition to its adoption in more pros- for reform despite government calls for selective adoption perous regions persisted. of the system where the collective had failed. Most cad- By the time of the National Rural Work Conference res, skilled at sniffing shifts in the political wind, quickly on 5–21 October 1981 about half of the production teams jumped on the bandwagon of reform. Those that did not had already adopted the household responsibility system were subjected to political pressure by 1982. Although and divided up team property. The household responsi- adoption of the household responsibility system was to be bility system gained legitimacy at the conference when it originally voluntary and based on peasants’ “democratic was formally recognized as a form of socialist collective decisions” in regions where it was suitable, primarily in economy. This policy shift was reaffirmed by the CCP the poorer and remote rural areas where collectivized Secretariat the next month. farming had failed, the system soon became mandatory The Chinese political system has an inherent ten- throughout China. dency to swing between extremes. Although there was Implementation of the household responsibility sys- still some resistance to adoption of the household respon- tem was further facilitated by the dismantling of the sibility system, resistance soon collapsed after the system commune system in 1984. In accordance with a state was endorsed and pushed from above. Like the socialist constitution adopted in December 1982, the political and high tide during the collectivization movement, party ap- administrative authority of the people’s communes was paratus at various levels again lapsed into rigidity after transferred to township (xiang) governments. The central an initial flirtation with experimental innovations and government required that separation of the government local flexibility. administration from economic management be competed With the promulgation of Document No. 1 of 1982, ru- throughout China by the end of 1984. The separation of the ral reform became unstoppable. Despite the government government administration from economic management, intention for a period to slow down the new system and along with the establishment of xiang governments, was a reflect, stabilize, and improve on it, the momentum to- major institutional reform in rural areas in the early 1980s, ward household contracting was so strong that the house- and these changes made the individual peasant household hold responsibility system was accelerated. Within a year the main unit of production and management. production teams that had already adopted some form Thus, the initial changes in the form of production of the household responsibility system increased from since 1978 in rural China soon turned into a new high tide about 50 percent of the total in 1981 to about 80 percent of decollectivization. In this sweeping process of change in 1982. the old commune system was replaced by the new house- The effect of the adoption of the household respon- hold responsibility system based on individual family sibility system was remarkable. By the time of the Rural farming. By 1984 most villages divided their land and col- Work Conference in November 1982, there were dra- lective properties; even villages that never divided their matic increases in the production of grain, cotton, and land and collective properties were pressured to adopt oil crops. Consequently the household responsibility sys- various forms of the responsibility system and make nec- tem was reaffirmed in January 1983 by Document No. 1. essary adjustments.

Adoption of the household responsibility system— behavior. Critics were also concerned that the household together with rising procurement prices, increased sup- responsibility system seriously depleted public assets such plies, use of farm inputs such as chemical fertilizer, and as draft animals, farming tools, and machinery. A more revival of rural markets—produced spectacular growth serious consequence of decollectivization is that many of in agricultural output and in peasant standards of living. the collectives’ functions began to lapse. This lapse could With growth in the agricultural sector exceeding that be seen in the deteriorating conditions of flood control, ir- of the industrial sector, the urban-rural income gap de- rigation projects, and the provision of basic public goods. clined for the first time. Consequently peasant demand More important, as stimulus effects from institutional for consumer goods mushroomed, providing strong mar- change began to taper off after 1984, growth of agriculture ket support for increased production in the light indus- became sluggish. trial sector. In response the government introduced long-term leases of collective land to peasant households. These long-term leases were expected to provide a means of re- Peasants Lose Confidence establishing all the incentives of family farming without turning all the land over to direct private ownership. But the limitation of the household responsibility system The rapid growth in productivity resulting from all soon began to manifest itself. Lack of explicit ownership these institutional changes has ushered in a period of rights of land and the initial short-term lease undermined great transformation in rural China. The surplus labor peasant confidence in the durability of the contracts and created by increased productivity, together with the eas- prompted peasants to engage in short-term economic ing of travel and residence restrictions, has led to massive

Farmers take a break from threshing. In the household responsibility system, local managers are in charge of, and therefore can account for, the success or failure of a business or farm. Photo by Joan Lebold Cohen.

© 2009 by Berkshire Publishing Group LLC 1072 Berkshire Encyclopedia of China 宝库山中华全书 rural migration. Many have abandoned tilling the land and Lin, Justin Yifu. (1987, May). The household responsibil- found employment in village and township enterprises. ity system reform in China: A peasant’s institutional More have become migrant workers, seeking jobs and even choice. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, permanent residence in cities and, in the process, fueling 69(2), 410–415. rapid urbanization in China. Lin, Justin Yifu. (1988, April). The household responsibility system in China’s agricultural reform: A theo- Qunjian TIAN retical and empirical study. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 36(Suppl.), S199–S224. Further Reading Naughton, B. (1996). Growing out of the plan: Chinese eco- Chen Wenxing. (1999). The political economy of rural devel- nomic reform, 1978–1993. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge opment in China, 1978–1999. Westport, CT: Praeger. University Press. Fewsmith, J. (1994). Dilemmas of reform in China: Politi- Putterman, L. (1985). The restoration of the peasant house- cal conflict and economic debate. Armonk, NY: M. E. hold as farm production unit in China: Some incen- Sharpe. tive theoretic analysis. In E. Perry & C. Wong (Eds.), Hartford, K. (1985). Socialist agriculture is dead; long live The political economy of reform inpost- Mao China (pp. socialist agriculture! Organizational transformation 63–82). Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Stud- in rural China. In E. Perry & C. Wong (Eds.), The po- ies, Harvard University Press. litical economy of reform in post-Mao China (pp. 31–61). Unger, J. (2002). The transformation of rural China. Ar- Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Har- monk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. vard University Press. Yang, Dali L. (1996). Calamity and reform in China: Kelliher, D. (1992). Peasant power in China: The era of rural State, rural society, and institutional change since reform, 1979–1989. New Haven, CT: Yale University the Great Leap famine. Stanford, CA: Stanford Uni- Press. versity Press.

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