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Drivers and Barriers Between change and continuity How has the Norwegian Police Security Service responded to a new security environment? Kristian Larsen Master’s Thesis in Peace and Conflict Studies Department of Political Science UNIVERSITY OF OSLO October 31, 2013 © Kristian Larsen 2013 Between change and continuity How has the Norwegian Police Security Service responded to a new security environment? Kristian Larsen http://www.duo.uio.no/ Trykk: Reprosentralen, Universitetet i Oslo II Acknowledgements This thesis marks the end of my Master’s Degree in Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Oslo. The choice of research topic stems from a combination of my own academic and professional interest in intelligence. While recognizing that writing a thesis on intelligence would be a challenging undertaking, the choice has never been doubted. I wish to direct a special thanks to my outstanding thesis supervisor, Jacob Aasland Ravndal, for rendering helpful comments and advice throughout the process. Jacob’s ability to bring timely and comprehensible guidance to my project has been highly valuable and motivating for my effort. Thanks also to my girlfriend, Agnieszka Cybulska, for proofreading my English and sharing her guidance. The responsibility for any mistakes or misunderstandings is entirely my own. III IV Glossary and Abbreviations 22/7 Terrorist attacks in Norway on July 22, 2011 9/11 Terrorist attacks in the US on September 11, 2001 DSB Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning / Direktoratet for samfunnssikkerhet og beredskap EOS Committee Norwegian Parliamentary Intelligence Oversight Committee / Stortingets kontrollutvalg for etterretnings-, overvåkings- og sikkerhetstjenestene FAE Unit for Common Analysis / Felles Analyseenhet HRD Human Resource Development IR International Relations IT Information Technology JCTC Joint Counter-Terrorism Center / Felles kontraterrorsenter KRU The Committee for Coordination and Advice / Koordinerings- og rådgivningsutvalget for etterretningstjenestene MoD Ministry of Defense / Forsvarsdepartementet MoFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs / Utenriksdepartementet MoJ Ministry of Justice / Justisdepartementet NDSA Norwegian Defense Security Agency / Forsvarets Sikkerhetsavdeling NIS Norwegian Intelligence Service / Etterretningstjenesten NPSS Norwegian Police Security Service / Politiets Sikkerhetstjeneste NSA National Security Authority / Nasjonal Sikkerhetsmyndighet RSU Norwegian Government’s Security Council / Regjeringens sikkerhetsutvalg Stortinget Norwegian Parliament WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction V Table of Contents Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................... III Glossary and Abbreviations .............................................................................................. V Table of Contents ............................................................................................................. VI Chapter I: Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 1.1.Questions and objectives ............................................................................................... 1 1.2.Key findings ..................................................................................................................... 1 1.3.Background ..................................................................................................................... 2 1.4.Relevance ........................................................................................................................ 6 1.5.Limitations ...................................................................................................................... 8 1.6.Thesis outline .................................................................................................................. 9 1.7.Concepts ........................................................................................................................ 10 1.7.1.Organizational change ........................................................................................... 10 1.7.2.Intelligence ............................................................................................................. 11 1.7.3.The Norwegian Police Security Service ............................................................... 13 Chapter II: Theory ..............................................................................................................................................16 2.1.The theoretical field of intelligence ............................................................................. 16 2.2.New perspectives and new requirements .................................................................. 18 2.2.1.Multidisciplinary .................................................................................................... 20 2.2.2.Proactive ................................................................................................................. 22 2.2.3.Open and transparent ........................................................................................... 23 2.2.4.Close dialogue with decision-makers .................................................................. 25 2.2.5.Cooperative ............................................................................................................ 27 Chapter III: Methodology ...............................................................................................................................29 3.1.Exploratory design ....................................................................................................... 29 3.2.Case study ...................................................................................................................... 30 3.3.Sources and data ........................................................................................................... 31 3.4.Validity and Reliability .................................................................................................. 33 Chapter IV: Developments - drivers and barriers ............................................................................36 4.1.Multidisciplinary ........................................................................................................... 36 4.2.Proactive ........................................................................................................................ 44 4.3.Open and transparent .................................................................................................. 60 VI 4.4.Close dialogue with decision-makers ......................................................................... 67 4.5.Cooperative ................................................................................................................... 75 Chapter V: Conclusions ....................................................................................................................................89 5.1.Developments ............................................................................................................... 89 5.2.Identified drivers and barriers .................................................................................... 91 5.3.Suggestions for further research ................................................................................. 93 Bibliography ............................................................................................................................................................97 VII VIII Chapter I: Introduction Over the last decades, and especially in the wake of the dramatic events of September 11, 2001 (9/11), the role and requirements for western intelligence services has undergone a revolution. The terrorist attacks in the US, Madrid, London, as well as some fifty other planned but averted attacks triggered a massive political response in the western world and clearly demonstrated the need to focus on intelligence (Holme, 2009:172). Intelligence does not operate in a vacuum. It is shaped by the nature of the threats and the environment in which it operates (Campbell, 2013: 45). Accordingly, the intelligence services received increased resources and powers in order to effectively cope with an increasingly complex security environment. In general terms, these developments have been similar across many western countries, Norway including (Whelan, 2012: Hammerlin, 2010:14). 1.1.Questions and objectives This thesis sets out to identify the requirements for modern intelligence organizations in a new security environment, and the ability of the Norwegian Police Security Service (NPSS) to adapt accordingly. The study raises two interrelated questions with the objective to describe organizational developments and explore possible explanations for change or continuity within the NPSS. (1) How has the NPSS responded to the changes in the security environment? (2) What key mechanisms can explain change or continuity within the NPSS? 1.2.Key findings Through a close examination of relevant primary and secondary sources, the study finds that the NPSS has responded to the new security environment with mixed achievements. The service has over the last decade taken considerable steps to attain broader, multidisciplinary expertize and to become more open and transparent toward the society. Meanwhile, it is indicated that the service is not sufficiently proactive, and that the level of communication with
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