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In partialfulfilment ofthe

MILITANT DEMOCRACY Supervisor: Professo Department ofLegalStudies Central EuropeanUniversity Doctor of Juridical Science Doctor ofJuridicalScience Budapest, Hungary Svetlana Tyulkina Submitted to 2011 requirements for thedegreeof By

r RenátaUitz CEU eTD Collection acknowledged. materials previously writtenand/orpublishedbyanotherpersonunlessotherwise

s/Svetlana Tyulkina This dissertationcontains nomaterials

ii accepted foranyotherinstitutions andno CEU eTD Collection safeguard democracyfrom itsenemies. democracy arsenal todemonstrate whichlegal relation topolitical partiesandbeyondisdelin Furthermore, itelaboratesonthemajor theoretica detailed accountofthecurrent stateoflitera democracy: itsorigin and developmentintheconstitutional theoryaswellproviding a democracy logic. religious movements andthethreat of terrorism couldbeaddressedbyapplying militant democracies might facenowadays. Theprojec interpretation, i.e.extension of militant democracy toaddress newtypes of threats which as wellcoveringthemostrecent developments addition, thecase-study element includestraditio possible solutionsandmeasures provide adetailed account of considered tobeanoriginalcontribution to threatened tobepotentiallyharmed orde considerate applicationitcould become anim although militantdemocracyisadmittedly aspects ofthepracticein variousjurisdictions.Thewholeprojectcenters onthepremise that concept ofmilitant democracywithasubstant In thesecond chapter an overviewof the The first chapter outlines some of thetheo This projectaims topresent the analysis of major theoretical considerations onthe the potentialdangersofmili tooutweighorneutralizesuchdangersandconcerns.In ABSTRACT stroyed byundemocratic actors.Theprojectis

ture onmilitant democracy andrelatedmatters. iii the militant democracy debateasitaims to ive practicalcomponent investigating diverse a somewhatproblematic concept, through eated. Thisincludesanoverviewofmilitant portant safeguardofdemocracywhenitis practice of militant democracy worldwidein measures and institutions could be usedto l andpractical justification of theconcept. nal cases ofmilitant democracyapplication intheunderstanding of theconcept andits

t investigates in detailshowdangerous retical insights intothenotionof militant

tant democracy andsuggest CEU eTD Collection anti-terrorism policieson theexamples militant democracy might be relevant for theth democracy beyonditstraditionalsc coercive religions.Inthefifth chapter anot to abuseinstitutions andprivilegesgivenby thedemocracy toestablish fundamentalist hypothesis thatmilitant democracy canbeutilized democracy. chapterpresentsacase-studyofthreejurisdictionstotestthe Thefourth the prohibition of political parties. Reich PartyandtheAustralianCommunist from militant democracy jurisprudence, begi jurisprudence in relation totheprohibition of po The fourth and fifth chapters represent the major contribution tothe debateonmilitant Thereafter, thethird chapter presents a case-study of militant democracy ope ofapplicationisexamine ofSpain,Russia,andAustralia. iv nning withthefoundationalGerman Socialist her example of thepotentialuseof militant eoretical debate andpractical application of to themost recently decidedcasesregarding toneutralizemovements thatallegedlyaim litical parties. Itincl d. Thischapteranalyseshow udes arangeofcases

CEU eTD Collection and encouragement helpedme alotwhileworkingonthisdissertation. years. Iespeciallythankmy always feel. throughout theprocessofco appreciated andIbenefitedalot guiding me throughoutwritingthisdissertati I alsowanttothankallmyfriendsandco I thankmy wonderfulmotherandallthefa I am alsovery grateful toall thepeople I wouldlike toexpress my gratitude toProfessor RenátaUitzfor supervising and mpleting thisproject. dear friendsGeert,Katyaand from herknowledgeandexperience. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS on. Heradvice,commentsandsupportarehighly v lleagues whosupportedme inthelastfour

and research institutions that helped me mily fortheirendlesssupportandloveI Nevena whosefriendship,support

CEU eTD Collection AND BEYOND INPRACTICE: MILITANT DEMOCRACY 2: CHAPTER PRACTICE IN ONMILITANTDEMOCRACY PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS OFTHEDOCTRINE,THEORETICALUNDERPINNIGSAND THE ORIGIN 1: CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 1.2. MilitantDemocracy’s Justificati 1.1. TheOriginoftheDoctrine Introduction Democracies 2.2. MeasuresofMilitantDemocracy Arse 2.1 OverviewofMilitant Democracy Introduction Conclusion 2.2.2. ContemporaryDebate onMilitant Movement 2.2.1. KarlLowenstein’sMilitantDemocracy a Preliminary Observations 1.2.4. MilitantDemocracy’s Justification Argument in Favorof MilitantDemocracy Justification? 1.2.3. MilitantDemocracy: DistinctObjecta Treaties: Additional Grounds forMilitant Democracy Justification? 1.2.2. TheMilitantCharacterofDemocracyas 1.2.1. MilitantDemocracy: Standa Democracy usedfortheCurrentProject 1.1.3. TheCurrentUnderstandingofMilita 1.1.2. ContemporaryTheoreticalDebateonMilitantDemocracy of ToleranceandDemocracy 1.1.1. TheOriginoftheDoctri Methodology ...... 10 Summary oftheResearch Timeliness andRelevanceoftheResearch ...... 58 ...... 63 ...... 11 ...... 11 ...... 63 ...... 69 ...... 69 ...... 63 ...... 1 ...... 56 ...... 6 ...... 13 and TheoreticalUnderpinnings ne: theNeedofMilitating TABLE on: TheoreticalDebateandPractice StatesintheModernWorld rd TheoreticalJustification ...... 34 ......

nal: from KarlLowensteintoModern

Democracy MeasuresClassification vi OF and MajorConcernsChallenges: ...... 4 ...... nt Democracy:TheNotionofMilitant PROHIBITION OFPOLITICALPARTIES PROHIBITION nd PurposeoftheProtection asAdditional

CONTENTS anObligationImposed byInternational nd ListofMeasuresAgainsttheFascist ...... 50 Democracy andtheParadoxes

...... 13 ...... 36 ...... 64 ...... 18 ...... 44 ...... 36 ...... 72 ...... 11 ......

CEU eTD Collection EARLY CASE-LAW TOTHEMODE ANDPROHIBITION MILITANT DEMOCRACY Chapter 3: 2.3. MilitantDemocracy andothe Jurisprudence andtheLegislati 3.3. MilitantDemocracy andtheProhibition of PoliticalPartie 3.2. MilitantDemocracy Employe the Standards,andIdentifyingMajorChallenges 3.1. EarlyMilitantDemocracy ApplicationCases: Introduction Conclusion 2.5. MilitantDemocracy andTransitionalConstitutionalism 2.4. ExtensionoftheDoctrinebeyond Germany Case 3.3.2. MilitantDemocracy inth 3.3.1. MilitantDemocracy inYoungEuropeanDemocracies 3.2.2. Germany’sMilitantDemocracy Interpretation andApplication 3.2.1. The Democracy 3.1.2. TheAustralianCommunistPartyCase Case ...... 96 3.1.1. Germany:Testing Constitutio ...... 116 Parties The CouncilofEurope’sGeneralApproach Settingth The ECHRJurisprudence: Foundations: TheEarlyCase-Law Militant DemocracyinEarlyECHRJu Loyalty of Public(Civil) Servants Democracy The Dissolution/Ban of PoliticalParties Measures RestrictingFreedom ofPolitical Accorded to PoliticalParties ...... 94 ...... 89 ...... 140 ...... 94 ...... Communist PartyofGermanyCase ...... 103 andtheSubsequentDevelopments ...... 127 on ofYoungEuropeanDemocracies of MilitantDemocracy Notions ...... 131 ...... r Regimes of RightsLimitations e JurisprudenceoftheECHR d byParanoidDemocrats: The RN CONSTITUTIONALPRACTICE nal MilitancyinPractice: the Prohibition ofPoliticalParties ...... 129 ...... 132 intheAftermath ofthe e StandardsfortheEuropean Space vii risprudence: AnEx as theMain Instrument of Militant Parties othersthan PartyDissolution : Australia’s Experience of Militant ...... 95 ...... towardstheProceduretoBanPolitical anditsImpact ontheFurther OF POLITICAL PARTIES: FROM THE OF POLITICALPARTIES:FROMTHE ...... 109 TestingtheConceptinPractice,Setting ...... 83 ...... s inEurope:ECHR ...... 122 ...... 130 tensive Protection The Socialist ReichParty Communist PartyCase ...... 111 Communist Partyof ...... 75 ...... 122 ...... 80 ...... 94 ...... 133 .... 125

CEU eTD Collection EXTREMISM ANDRELIGIOUS MILITANT DEMOCRACY 4: CHAPTER India andIsrael 4.1. Russia:GuardingthePerimeter from Introduction Conclusion 3.5. ‘Softer’MilitantDemocracy 4.2. MilitantSecularism inTurkey Tool toSuppressanyPoliticalDissent(theExampleofRussia) 3.4. MilitantDemocracy inthePracticeofStat Headscarf Ban:ReasonsandConcerns 4.2.2. ProtectingSecularism inTurkey:The 4.2.1. MilitantDemocracy inTurkey: GeneralObservations Democracy asaTooltoWipe out 4.1.3. AnalysisoftheFreedom Re ofReligion of theRegulatoryRegime a 4.1.2. ForeignReligiousMovements andtheFear ...... 184 4.1.1. Freedom ofReligioninRussia:AnOver 3.5.2. TheBanningofPoliticalPartiesfrom Elections: The Example ofIsrael 3.5.1. ContentRestrictionsonElector Democracy RationaleusedinOrde 3.4.2. ImpactoftheExistingRegulatoryRegi General Overview 3.4.1. Constitutional andLegislativeRegula The HeadscarfBan:Background oftheDebateandTurkishApproach The RefahPartyDissolution: The RefahPartisi(theWelfareParty) ...... 199 The ThreatofReligiousExtremism: Add Interference? Banning ofReligiousAssociations asaTool 192 Equality ofReligions: Is EverybodyWelcome? ...... Religious Demography inRussia Registration ofReligiousGroups:Problems andConcerns ...... 177 ...... 182 ...... 182 ...... 165 ...... 196 ...... 144 nd Practiceonnon-OrthodoxReligions Measures:TheExample of ...... 208 Problems andConsequences allNon-TraditionalReligions? r toPerpetuatetheStatusQuo?...... 151 ...... 191 ...... al Speech:TheCaseofIndia ...... 216 ...... any ForeignReligiousInterference? Dissolution:BackgroundoftheCase viii itional GroundforUnjus tion ofPoliticalParties’Activities:A es withAllegedlyAut Dissolution ofPoliticalPartiesandthe me andits Purpose: IsaMilitant gulatory Regime inRussia:Militant view oftheExistingRegulatoryRegime toGuardthePerimeter fromanyForeign ofReligiousExtremism: TheImpact Alternative Solutionsfrom ...... 182 ...... 210 ...... 142 ...... 189 ...... 221 ...... 203 horitarian Agendas:A ...... 166 ...... 191 tified Interference? ...... 184 ...... 224 ...... 171 ...... 217 ......

CEU eTD Collection WARONTERROR ANDTHE MILITANT DEMOCRACY 5: CHAPTER ...... 260 5.1. TheWar onTerrorandMilitantDemocracy: TheExtensionoftheConceptIntroduced Introduction Conclusion Secularism inthePractice of theECHR 4.3. Mohamedcomes toStrasbourg: OnM Approach to Anti-Terrorism Policies. 5.3. Russia’sWar onTerror:MilitantDemocracy Lessons fromSpain TheBanning5.2. SettinganExample? ofPolitic 5.3.1. OverviewoftheExisting Anti-Terrorism Regime 5.2.3. SpanishMilitantDemocracy Model-Wise 5.2.2. Spain:TowardsMilitantDemocracy 5.2.1. Terrorism andPoliticsinSpain: HistoricalBackgroundandContext ...... 266 5.1.2. MilitantDemocracy: Improved Constitu 5.1.1. Anti-Terrorism Policies:TypologyandConcerns Particular LegalOrder? 4.3.3. MilitantDemocracy inStrasbourgJurisp 4.3.2. Headscarves,ReligiousExtremism, andMilitantDemocracy Importance ofDialogueonPoliticalIssues Court’s AttitudetotheIssues 4.3.1. Mohamed comesStrasbourg,orHo to 4.2.3. MilitantSecularisminTurkey:BusinessasUsual Grand ChamberDecision Muslim Society Militant DemocracyinTurkey,orHow Militant DemocracyinTurkey:Business asUsual Spain: APlausibleModeltoFollow? The CasetoOutlawBatasuna a The BatasunaPartyDissolution towards aSewParadigm? The newLawonPolitical Parties: Extending Militant Democracy Application ...... 253 ...... 258 ...... 258 ...... 270 ...... 230 ...... 247 ...... 240 ...... 278 ofPoliticalPluralism, Di nd theValidityofStatute ...... 280 ...... 290 ...... 236 ...... 286

ilitant Democracy andthePrinciple of ix Islam DangerousforaPredominantly is ...... 237 ...... 276 w theRefahPartisiCasechanged al PartiesasResponsetoTerrorism: tional Framework fortheWar onTerror? asatooltoIntroduceSystemized rudence: AnInstrument toMaintain ...... 283 ...... 228 ...... versity ofOpinionsandthe ...... 260 ...... 291 ...... 228 ...... 258 ...... 281 ...... 243 ...... 272 ......

CEU eTD Collection BIBLIOGRAPHY CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 5.4 MilitantDemocracy andtheWar Conclusion Conclusion New Threats Democracy anditsNewEnemies: TheExtensi Legitimacy v.Effectiveness Revisited and Who aretheEnemies? The Militant Democracy Principle: Democr Communist PartyCase 5.4.3. MilitantDemocracy andAustralia’sWar onTerror:From theAustralian 5.4.1. OverviewofAustralia’sAnti-Terrorism Regime andMajor Concerns 5.3.3. Anti-Terrorism PoliciesinRussia: The NeedforaSystemized Approach Regime 5.3.2. RussianWar onTerror:Problems andCo Control Orders Pre-Emptive Policy:Preventive DetentionandControl Orders Australian Security Intelligence Organization and itsNewPowers...... 313 Non-Criminal Anti-Terrorism Legislation Crimes ofTerrorism Anti-Terrorism PoliciesintotheRegime of ConstitutionalNormalcy 5.4.3.3. MilitantDemocracy inAustralia’sWar onTerror:UsefulGuidancetobring 5.4.3.2. War onTerrorreachesthe and LessonWorthRemembering 5.4.3.1. AustralianCommunistPartyCase:Rele Terrorist Organizations Preventive Detention Great Hopes Thomas vMowbray:Implicationsfor Terrorist Organization: Definition ...... 298 ...... 343 ...... 358 ...... 353 ...... 360 ...... 316 ...... 334 ...... 292 ...... to Thomas vMowbray ...... 319 ...... 322 ...... 346 ...... 346 ...... on Terror:TheCaseofAustralia ...... 327 ...... High CourtofAustralia ...... 349 ...... 323 x the War onTerrorandDisappointment of acy onitsGuardagainsttoomuchOptimism ...... 295 ......

...... 327 on oftheMilitantDemocracy Principleto ncerns oftheExistingLegislative vance fortheWaronTerrorDebate ...... 332 ...... 315 ...... 311 ...... 339 ...... 312 ...... 306

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that itgaveitsdeadly enemies th “This willalwaysremain oneofthebestjokesdemocracy, xi e meansbywhichitwasdestroyed.” Paul JosephGoebbels .

CEU eTD Collection Historical Perspective Democracy 47 Militant (2004). militant democracy,heis,probably, theone While Loewensteinwasnotthefirstoronly 6 5 4 3 2 1 of militating democracy wasnotelaborated only fascists techniquesemployed indifferentEuropean confront itwhiletheseconde essay Loewensteinelaborates onthe featuresof invade Europe.Heintroducedthisexpressioninaseriesoftwo Theterm ‘militant democracy’was introducedinthe1930s byKarlLoewenstein, a prominent German legalscholarwho immigrated between thetwoworldwars. posed bythe enemies of democracy anditsnature issue ofstabilizing a transitions of411and403BC. denying civilandpoliticalrightstowrongdoers difficulty ofstabilizinggovernments. in very beginningofdemo The problemofdefendingdemocracy againstits 417-432, 638-658 (1937). (1937). 638-658 417-432, For seePfersmann, details Loewenstein, Karl O. Pfersmann refers to Forancient antecedents discusse Ibid. Stability, Democratic Limitsto Democracy: Legal Militant Pfersmann, Shaping Otto The Republic , the reasons for transition from one form ofgovernment toanotherandthe , thereasonsfortransitionfromoneform Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights I, II I, Rights Fundamental and Democracy Militant 3-24 (2004). (2004). 3-24 L’Esprit des lois L’Esprit des moderate government. supra cratic theory itself. note 1, at48.

d in details seeJon. Elster, ssays representacomprehensiv anti- e case-studyofdifferent 3 Later, Montesquieu alsoproduced extensive writings onthe , Book 8 (1748). INTRODUCTION 2 InAncientGreece,theAthenians werepracticing 1 whointroduced thisparticular term. Forexample, alreadyPl

4 1

However,theissueof author whostatedapo fascism aworldmovement as andneedto in theminds of legaland political scholars, potential enemies canbetracedbacktothe , asitisperceived to theUnites StateswhenNazisstartedto states.There isstrong proofthattheneed from previousregimes, i.e.duringthe Closing the Books. Transitional Justice in Justice Books. Transitional the Closing

, 31 American Political Science Review Review Science AmericanPolitical , 31 essays publishedin1937. ato discussedatlength, these days,wasshaped addressingthethreat sition ontheneedfor in Andras Sajo (Ed.), (Ed.), Sajo Andras in 6 Inhisfirst 5

CEU eTD Collection Unlimited toleranceshouldnotbeextendedto 10 9 8 7 Loewenstein’s argument: “unlimited tolerance must tolerance’ andthe‘paradoxofdemocracy.’ Karl Popperandhis works ofotherscholarsduringthesame period.On be redefinedtoequippedstandfo game whodenytheveryexiste on freedom ofspeechandopinioninordertoha also thenecessitytointroducevarioustechniqu destabilize democracy (atleastinthe caseofimmense successoftheFascistmovement) but Loewenstein means notonlytheacceptanceofth purpose of power.Democracy yet fulfilleditsdestination,it situation istoturndemocracy into amilitant one: “if democracy isconceived that ithasnot principles oflegalityandfr anti-parliamentarian andanti-democratic partie result inasituationwherede preserving democracy. but many states alsorealizedtheneedtoc Karl R.Popper, Fora detailed account of militant democracy anti-fa SeeLoewenstein, Ibid., at 546. As wasmentioned above,ideassimilar toLo According toLoewenstein,democratic fundamentalism andlegalis The Open Society anditsEnemies supra note 5, at 423. at423. 5, note The OpenSocietyandItsEnemies ee playofpublicopinion.Theonlyremedy to thisunfortunate mocracies are legallyboundtoallo

must fightonitsownplanea nce andmeaning ofitsrule. must become militant.” r democracy anditsabsolutevalues (1950). (1950). scist measures see Loewenstein Id.,at 638.

onfront subversivemoveme 2 Theparadoxoftole es including butnotlimited toimposing limits s aslongtheyconform formally tothe e factthatdemocratic fundamentalism may ve toolsto excludethose playersfrom the those whoareintolerant,otherwise “the leadtothe disappearance oftolerance.” e of the authors worthmentioninge oftheauthors hereis ewenstein’s wereformulated alsointhe 9 whereheexplainsthe‘paradoxof 8 technique which Inthissense,democracy hasto 7 Bymilitating democracy w theemergence andriseof rance echoessomehow nts forthesakeof . tic blindnesscould serves onlythe 10

CEU eTD Collection (1971). (1971). 13 12 11 his arguments and claims arestillvalid no changed since Loewenstein’s While democracy isnotastaticconstructi realize andacceptthisstateof opportunities grantedbythedemocratic regime remain silentaboutattempts todamage itfr institutionalized means toprotectitself agains states inthe1930sleddemocracy accountable to,thepublic. egalitarianism andprotectionism, andtolerateal can beavoided ifwedemand ourgovernments should notbeonlyaboutprocedure, but alsoaboutsubstanceaswell. all thedifferent forms ofthetheory of sovereig that atyrantshouldrule.While Poppermentions contradictions. Thepotentialprobl paradox of democracy means thattheprincipl in thesame manner asincitement tomurder, or intolerance placesitselfoutsidethelaw”; intolerant” shouldbereservedinthename oftoleranceas“anymovement preaching tolerant willbedestroye For further debate on the paradoxes of of the paradoxes on debate further For Ibid. Ibid. Thus, theunfortunateexperienceofvi d andtolerancewiththem.”

Militant DemocracyandFundamentalRights affairs anditisdefinitelyalessonofworthremembering. ’s adherentstoreal em of majorityrule isthat democracy see, forexample, JohnRawls, 12 on anditsunderstandingan incitement tointolerance should becriminalized

3 t attacks ofitsenemies. Democracyshould not om insidebyabusingprivileges,rights,and wadays, and“toneglec . Unfortunatelyittooktime andmany livesto nty, heneverthelessis l whoaretolerant;thatiscontrolledby,and totherevival oftheslavetrade, etc.The that asimilar critique canberaisedagainst ctorious Naziconquestofmany European e ofmajority rulemay leadtoself- ize thatdemocracy ca to ruleaccording totheprinciples of 11 “Therightnottotolerate the onedaymajority maydecide correct thatdemocracy 13 d interpretationhave Alllistedparadoxes t theexperienceof A Theory ofJustice nnot strivewithout essays, much of 216 CEU eTD Collection Democracies 4(2009). preserve thepossibilitytoresort thesemeasures. to militant democracy measures, duetolocal While itwasexpectedthatthe 19 18 17 16 15 14 fundamentalism ofanewgeneration. democratic worldbecame moreawareof rights onauniversalbasis. discussed asbeingpotentiallyus non-conventional asymmetric warfare”. coming from“obviouslyamorphous groupsinvolved democracy backinto the center ofpolitical previous rulers. Further, theterrorist attacksof11September 2001broughtissuesofmilitant it wouldhelptoprotectthefrag democracies inserted militant democracy provisions democracy measures werewidely utilizedto time in1949 as aresponsetothetragiceven Militant democracy measures were incorporated intoademocratic constitution for thefirst Timeliness Propaganda. the famous sarcasticcomment end, democratic experiencesandpracticesshouldbeacontinuingc democracies deceased wouldbetantamount MarkusThiel, Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Avineri, Shlomo Lowenstein, and supra noteat 658. 5, Introduction, Introduction Relevance in Markus Thiel (Ed.), The ‘Militant Democracy’ Principle in Modern Democracy’ inModern ‘Militant Principle Thiel (Ed.), The inMarkus in A. Sajo (Ed.), Militant Democracy 2 (2004). Democracy2(2004). inA.Sajo Militant (Ed.), 18 of

Furtherinterestwas alsoboos fall ofcommunism woulddecrea ile democratic regime from the theResearch ed inamuch widerscopeto of PaulJosephGoebbels,the 19 Therefore, militant democracy isnotaconcept thatis 17 Asaresult,defensivemechanisms startedtobe

discourse; withtheperceiveddangerseemingly tosurrenderfordemocracies living.” 4 thenovelthreatsposedbyreligious curbthefunctioningofcommunistparties. ts causedbytheNaziregime. Later,militant

conditions some Europeanstatesdecidedto into their constitutions withtheidea that inwhatbecome knownasanewkindof 16 Moreover,many youngEuropean possibility ofbeingharmed by target and curtailsome basic se thefrequency ofreference ted duetothefactthat former NaziMinistryof onsistent responseto 14 Inthe 15

CEU eTD Collection of threatsdemocraciesmayfacenowadays.The pr concept and itsinterpretation,i.e.extension of democracy applicationaswell and concerns.Inaddition,thecase-study element includestraditional casesof militant practical applicationan debate asitaims toprovide a actors. Theproject isconsidered to bean democracy whenitisthreatenedtobepoten concept, throughconsiderateapplicationit around the premise thatalthoughmilitant democr practice invariousjurisdictions,ondiverseaspe concept ofmilitant democracywithasubsta traditional andnovelareasofthemilitant democracy application. jurisprudence ofvariousstatesfrom theearly militant democracy measures, whilsttracking theirdevelopment intheconstitutional However, thereisnoscholarlyworkthatcove 21 20 includes an extensive case-study of militant democracy from thirteen jurisdictions. militant democracyapplication.Oneofthemo Militantdemocracyhasbeenstudied articles. we havewitnessedthatitisbeingemployed ‘withering away’,butalivelyandpractical t Markus Thiel (Ed.), Thiel Markus at 18. 1.1., inChapter state isincluded the ofliterature of account A detailed This projectaims topresent the analysis of major theoretical considerations onthe 20 However,most of them refer toeither aparticular jurisdiction ormatter of the The ‘Militant Democracy’ Princi Democracy’ The ‘Militant d suggestpossiblesolutionsandmeas

detailed accountofthepotentia as coveringrecentdevelopments also beyondits traditional scope ofapplication. original contribution tothemilitant democracy

ool, usefulforprotectingdemocracy. Recently 5 ple in Modern Democracies in Modern ple themilitant democracy toaddressnewtypes tially harmed ordestroyedbyundemocratic st recent publicationsonmilitant democracy could becomeanimportant safeguardof ntive practicalcomponent investigating its and discussedinvariousmonographs and rs boththeoretical andpractical aspects of cts of issues. The whole projectiscentered cts ofissues.Thewhole yearsofitsexistence,andinvestigating acy isadmittedly asomewhat problematic oject investigates indetailshowdangerous l dangersofmilitant democracy ures toovercome suchdangers intheunderstandingof (2009). (2009). 21

CEU eTD Collection Lowenstein andisfurther compared withcontemporary constitutional practices. In order to from itsenemies. demonstrate whichlegal measures andinstituti powers. Thissurvey is followed bythepresentation of militant democracy arsenalto feature ofademocratic regime, suchas ins democracies aremore orless militant, andthat militating ademocracy becomes anatural militant democracy practice indifferent jurisdiction inthelightof theargument thatall worldwide inrelation topolitic on militant democracy justifications major concernsandchallenges. obligation imposedbyinternational treaties. Ch militant democracy, including the debate over th matters. The first chapter alsoelaborates onthe majortheoretical andpractical justification of providing adetailedaccountofthestate contemporary theoretical debateon militant de sarcastic comment ofPaulJosephGoebbe experience andpracticesshouldbeacontinui democracy notionwasintroducedasaresponsetotr democracy, its origin and development inconst Chapter one beginsbyoutlining some ofthetheoretical insights into thenotionof militant Summary democracy logic. religious movements andthethreat of terrorism couldbeaddressed by applying militant The latter analysis beginswiththe militant democracy arsenal as introduced byKarl The second chapterprovides anoverview

of theResearch

al partiesandbeyond. Thestartingpoint isaconcise outline of

6 titutions of representation andseparationoftitutions ofrepresentation literature onmilitant democracyandrelated apter oneendswithpreliminary observations mocracy isintroduced withthepurpose of ons couldbeusedtosafeguarddemocracy ng and consistent response to the famous ng andconsistentresponsetothefamous e militant character of the democracy as an ls, mentioned above.Furthermore, the itutional theory. It argues that the militant of thepractice of militant democracy agic historicaleventsandthatdemocratic CEU eTD Collection for mature liberal democracies.” See Ruti Tietel, be appropriate itmay not institutions; democratic fragile often and fledgling presence of the in vigilance judicial closer demand often transformation that periods ofpolitical with associated constitutionalism, transitional to only. some scholarseven argue that militant democr 24 23 22 the prohibitionofpoliticalpart appropriate solutionfor democracy givesmore chances fortransitional demo was fully incorporated intomany constitutions of post-CommunistEuropean countries democracy mustincorporate militant features intheirdemocratic system. The ‘foundingfather’ofmilitant democracyadvocat constitutionalism isof great relevance for ath threats coming from growingreligiousf is invokedtoaddressproblems beyondunconstitutional and dangerous politicalparties,i.e. many states andinternational judicial instituti the argument that the arsenal of militant democracy measures isbeingextended: Practice of therefore deservescarefulanal supports the argument thatmilitant democracy isauniqueconstitutionalsolution and distinction notonlydistinguishesmilitant democracy measures from otherregimes, butalso distinction betweenother regimes of rights’ limitation andmilitant democracy itself. This get betterunderstanding of thearsenal of militant democracy measures, itisuseful tomake a Democracy must become milita become must Democracy power. of only the purpose serves its fight which on atechnique itmust own plane itsdestination, fulfilled http://students.law.umich.edu/mjil/uploads/articles/v29n1-teitel.pdf 29 Michigan Journal ofInternational Law 49 (2008). Available online at Ruti Teitel argues, for example that “Militant constitutional democracy” ought to be understood as belonging as belonging tobe understood democracy” ought constitutional “Militant that Teitelargues, for example Ruti at Formore120. 3.3, seeChapter details Karl Lowenstein in the first volume ofhis essays argu 24 Thedebate willbe analyzed indepth Chapter threepresents acase-study ofmilitant The issue of therelationship betweenmilitant democracy and transitional stable democracies. nt”. See K. Loewenstein,

ysis andresearch.Moreover,thesecondchapterwillintroduce ies. Thechapter starts with undamentalist movementsundamentalist and terrorism. Militant Democracy: Comparative Constitutional Perspectives Constitutional Comparative Democracy: Militant

eoretical debate onmilitant democracy practice. 7 ons demonstrate thatmilitant democracy logic acy isasign of transitional constitutionalism supra order toanswer the question whether militant es that“If democracy isconvinced that ithas notyet note 5, a 423. a 423. 5, note ed thatcountriesundergoing transition to cracies tosurvive, andifthis isnotan democracyjurisprudence in relation to . party prohibitioncaseswhichare 22 Thisargument 23 and , CEU eTD Collection chapter argues thatmilitant democracy rationale democracy, andifmilitant democracy canguide these policies more successfully. The policies inaddressing threats of religious extremism areconsistent withtherulesof militant democracy.Thepurposeofthiscase-st Turkey andtheEuropeanCourtofHuman Right allegedly dangerousmovements withareligiousagendafrom thejurisprudenceofRussia, establish totalitarian that militant democracy canbeutilized toneut electoral speech(India). Human Rights andyoungEuropeandemocracies. also includes a case-study of militant democracy jurisprudence of theEuropeanCourt of practical applicationwhichoccurr democracy cases, demonstratingthemajor poten constitutionalism intimes of crisis.Furthermore, thethird chapter refers toother militant could beconsideredas successful applications of militant democracy logictoguard opportunity totest Loewenstein’sarguments Reich PartyandtheAustralianCo considered tobethefoundation of militant democracy jurisprudence: the German Socialist electoral listsfrom theupcoming elections can beendorsedalsothroughalte ‘other(s)’ than theruling party.Thechapter ends withthesuggestion that militant democracy as atoolto suppresspolitical dissentand Russia, thestate withanallegedly authoritarian agenda where militant democracyis(ab)used The fourthchapterpresents ideology, i.e.fundamentalist coerci rnatives topartydi ed fromtheverybeginningofitsexistence.Chapterthree mmunist Party.These judicial a case-studyofthreejurisdic

guard politicalspacefrom intrusionby those 8 ralize movements thatusedemocratic means to onmilitant democracy inpracticeandboth (Israel) andcontent-re isofrelevanceforthe states’policies to udy isto investigatetheextenttowhich s willbeassessed tial controversiesandconcernsforthe ssolution measures, i.e. Subsequent tothis ve religions.Politicstowards decisions werean excellent tions totestmyhypothesis strictions imposed on through thelensesof is acase-studyof banningparties’ CEU eTD Collection jurisdictions, and to check the validity ofmy hypothesis thevalidity check to and jurisdictions, policies anti-terrorism argument, their 25 whether democracy canresort to militant meas effective manifestation andapplica the effectiveness vs.legitimacy of militantde purpose of thepractical application of militant to answerthe questionof whoarethe enemies provide answers tothe questionsposed atvarious valuable exampletotestmyhypothesis. and in theirexperienceof thefightagainstterro Australia and Russia. separation of powersbalance.Thisargument rights, extended powers anddiscretion of the ex remedy someseriousflawsofanti-terrorism policies, i.e.excessive curtails offundamental that militant democracy might bea usefulgui cooperation inthefight democracy perspective atthe national level only andwillnotapply tothe international chapter contentisfocused uponananalysisof relevant for the theoretical debate and practical beyond its traditionalscopeofapplication a more consideratelimitations imposed on address suchthreatsand,whereitisappliedpr While the United States and the United Kingdom are also potentially interesting jurisdictions to test my tomy test jurisdictions interesting potentially Kingdomarealso the United Statesand the United While Chapter five focuses onanotherexample of The concludingobservationswillprovideth 25 Alljurisdictions differ substantiallyintheiranti-terrorism policies against terrorism. Thema

are over-analyzed to date.Itis tion oftheconcept. Itisalso fundamental rightsandfreedoms. fundamental

nd analyses how militant democracy might be 9 on little-discussed anti-te on little-discussed mocracy dichotomy inorder to seek the most will betested uponthreecase-studies: Spain, ding principletoleadthe‘War onTerror’to democracy. Furthermore, itwillelaborate on of democracy andhowto rism. Nevertheless, each ofthem represents a operly, itmight leadtobetter solutions with ecutive, inaddition to ageneral shift inthe counter-terrorism policiesfrom amilitant application of anti-terrorism policies.The in purposeofthischap points of theproject. Firstof all,itwillaim ures in ordertoprotectitselfwithout e summary oftheresearch outcomes and thepotential use of militant democracy more challenging to analyze other crucial torevisit thedebateof rrorism national policies. policies. national rrorism ter istodemonstrate definethemforthe CEU eTD Collection conceptual comparisons. throughout theproject Iwillrefermainly to Without going into detail onconcerns and 27 26 will begiven ineachchapter. in constitutional jurisprudence. More detailed development oftheconceptove picture ofvariousapproaches tothesame bringing more examples ofconstitutionalprac was basedaroundmajor issuesofmilitant demo approach anditisimportant no Contemporary comparative legalstudiespresen Methodology potential useforpoliticalpurposes. compromising itsdemocraticnature,especia Legal Studies Fora detailed account of th See for example, Oliver Brand, As tothe choice ofjurisdictions fortheco , 32 Brooklyn, 32 Journalof International Law, 405 (2007). e latter see Brand,see Ibid. e latter 27 Ibelievethataproject of Conceptual Comparisons: Towards a Coherent Methodology of Comparative Comparative of Methodology Coherent a Towards Comparisons: Conceptual

t toover-estimate thevalues r time toseehowits

10 problem. Moreover,ithelpstotrackthe lly takingintoaccountthehighriskofits t avarietyofmethodologies tochoosefrom. justification for theselection of case-studies tice to present aclearerandmore complete benefits of each method, Iwillnotethat functionalism, critica cracy practice. This approach allowed for cracy practice.Thisapproachallowedfor mparative analysis, th understandingandinterpretationchange this typerequiresamulti-pronged of oneapproachoveranother. l legalstudies and e selectionofcases 26

CEU eTD Collection 1930s (whentheterm wasintroduced byKarl development oftheprinciplemilitant democr the moment, wasshapedbetweenthetwowo addressing thethreatposedbyenemies ofde traced back totheverybegi militating a democracy. Theproblem of defend conscious of them andattempt toatleastclarifythesepoints. concerning thetheoretical andpractical aspects represent the very foundations ofthemilitant that ariseanytime someone elaborates upon might impose uponindividualrights does militant democracy protect, and howitis different from otherrights limitations astate obligation to incorporate militant democracy meas democracy measures bejustifiedinademocra understanding ofmilitant democrac democracy look,andwhatarethemajor issuesdisc systems of different jurisdictions? How doesthe contemporary theoretical debate onmilitant Why,was itdevelopedthroughouttheyears? a What ismilitant democracy, whendid the idea Introduction THE PRELIMINARY This chapter starts withoverview of theoriginof thedoctrine and theidea of

ORIGIN

OF

THE

OBSERVATIONS

DOCTRINE, nning ofdemocratic y intheory andpractice, and liberties? Theseareso andliberties? CHAPTER PRACTICE

THEORETICAL

11

ofself-protectivedemocracy appear,andhow

ON democracy debate,and thereforeanywork rld wars.This chapterwillreflectuponthe militant democracyissues. Thesequestions acy inconstitutionaltheory starting from the of themilitant democracy principle mustbe mocracy, anditsnature,asitisperceivedat Loewenstein). Examples oftheparadox of nd how,wasitincorporatedintothelegal ing democracy against itsenemies canbe tic state? Dostateshave aninternational ures intotheir legalsystems?What exactly ussed intheliterature

1: MILITANT

theory itself. However,the issueof

UNDERPINNIGS how can resorting to militant me ofthecrucialquestions

DEMOCRACY ? What isthecurrent IN AND

CEU eTD Collection protection aspossibleadditional groundsform possess somemilitant democracy measuresinitslegalsystems. Theobjectandpurpose of international law.Thelatterservestoinve and others) willbeexamined toascert inorder the standard theoreticaljus in theoryandinvokedpracti state’. and outlineif thereare any difference betw follows willtrytodevise anacceptable defi most of themrefer tothesame qualitiesof democracyaddedbytheterm ‘militant.’ What debate andrelatedissues.While everyauthorw universal definitionofmilitant democracyagr crucial one,andisincludedinthestructureof domestic constitutional legislationand jurisprudence. including KarlLoewenstein’s essays, wasinre groups. Itis important tokeepinmind that various militant democracy issues.Allscholarlywo militant democracy and willintroduce anovervie tolerance forthesakeofde support oftheargument thatLoewensteinwasno tolerance and theparadox form ofdemocracy Additionally, thischapter willfocus onmilita The question oftheunderstanding of militant democracy forthepresentresearchisa Furthermore, this chapter willelaborate mocracy’s self-preservation. tification (asemployed byLoewenstein,Schmitt, Popper,Rawls ce. Inordertoidentifythema een ‘militant democracy’ and‘militant democracy stigate ifastatemight

12 nition of‘militant democracy’ forthis project, everything writtenabout militant democracy, eed uponbyallofthescholarsinvolved inthe ain thestatus ofmilita ould trytocome upwiththeirowndefinition, action tocertaineventsanddevelopments in ulated byKarlPopperwillbediscussed in the first chapter. Atthemoment thereisno ilitant democracyjustification will alsobe on thecontemporary theoreticaldebateon w of theexistingliterature andopinions on t aloneelaboratingontheideastolimit the rk inthisfieldwillbedividedintothree nt democracy justification asdiscussed jor groundsforthejustification befoundduty-boundto nt democracy inpublic CEU eTD Collection 32 31 30 29 28 on theneed tomilitate democracy; howeverhe isprobably theone whointroduced this essays publishedin1937. started toinvadetheEuropeancontinent.He introduced thisexpressi Theterm ‘militant democracy’was coined inthe1930s byKarlLoewenstein, a prominent German legalscholarwhoimmigrated was shapedbetweenthetwoworldw threat posedbytheenemies anditsnature,asitisperceivedinthepresentday, ofdemocracy on the issue of stabilizi the transitions,i.e.of411and403BC. practicing denialofciviland of stabilizinggovernments. Republic theory itself. constitutional theoryand practice.Itcanbe democracyagains The problemofdefending 1.1.1. 1.1. The Origin ofthe Doctrine effectiveness andlegitimacy. observations onmajor concernsandchallenge analyzed. The discussion onmilitant democracy Paradoxes Loewenstein, Loewenstein, O. Pfersmann refers to L’Esprit des Lois, Book 8 (1748). Forancient antecedents discussed in details seeElster, Ibid. Pfersmann,

The , thereasonsfortransitionfrom oneform supra

of 28 Origin supra OttoPfersmann mentions, forexample, Tolerance note 1, at47. note 5. 5. note

of

ng amoderate government. the 32 and 29 Loewensteinisnotthefirstoronlyauthorto stateaposition AsearlyasinthetimeGreece,Athenianswere ofAncient political rightstowrongdoersfrom

Doctrine: Democracy andTheoretical Underpinnings ars. 30

the Furthermore,Montesquieualsowroteextensively traced backtotheverybeginningofdemocratic

13 Need supra note 3. t itspotential enemies isnotnewfor s oftheconceptwhichmight affectits to the Unites States when the Nazis regime of government toanotherandthedifficulty 31 justification will end withpreliminary

of However,theissueofaddressing Plato,whodiscussedatlengthin

Militating thepreviousregimes during Democracy on inaseriesoftwo

and

The The the CEU eTD Collection it was an ideology. ideology. it wasan horse bywhichtheen democratic institutions. In Loewenstein’swords of thetechniquescombini Loewenstein observesthe secretofthesuccess rather apolitical technique for graspingpowerwiththe simple intentiontorule. His workstartswithdescribingfascism asa of thecollapse of theWeimar Republicwhichco In practice, thefirst(theoretical)partof second essayrepresents anextremely valuab need toconfrontsubversivemovements forth not elaboratedonlyinminds oflegalandpoliti The secondpartofhisproject is compelling pr case-study ofdifferentanti-fasciststechniques world movement andtheneedtoconfrontitwh 35 34 33 those clearlyrecognizedassuch).Moreover, Republic failed duetothelackof militancy against subversive movements (evenagainst with theGerman exampleand argues thatatte itself through unlimited tolerance towards itsen particular term. Loewenstein, Loewenstein, tec apolitical Fascismisonly factthat the Allegedly, For seePfersmann, details Militant DemocracyandFundamentalRights,I supra 33 Inhis first essay Loewenstein elaborat note 5, at 424. emy enters the city.” supra note 1, at48.

ng emotionalismwithextrao hisworkisofgreaterrelevance. 35

Democracyfailedtota 14 world movement whichisnotanideology,but hnique makes it easier for governments to resist it than if resist itthan to makes forgovernments iteasier hnique thepurposeofgetting le summaryoftheearlymilitant democracy oof thattheneedofmilitating democracy was ile the second essay presents acomprehensive cal scholarsandthatma mpts toestablish democracy inthe Weimar employed invariousEuropeanjurisdictions. e sakeofpreservingdemocracy.Whilethe emies. Loewensteinillustrates this argument uld be equated with the defeat of democracy. uld beequatedwiththedefeatofdemocracy. “the mechanism of democracy istheTrojan thefascist movement sawinitsmastering es on thefeatures offascism asa , Loewensteinexplainsthecauses rdinary conditionsofferedby ke actionanddestroyed access tonationaland ny states realized the 34

CEU eTD Collection In thissense,democracy hastoberedefined customary complacency oftraditional liberalism towarddanger from extremism haslargely (in thestyleof1900)slowlygiveswaytoa“d Control ofPoliticalExtremisminEuropeanDemocracies , hearguesthatliberaldemocracy Laterworks ofLoewenstein echothemain ideasformulated inhis essays Democracy andFundamentalRights and itsabsolutevalues. 38 37 36 exclude thoseplayersfrom thegame whodeny movements andimposing limits offreedom ofspeechandopinioninordertohavetools measures from criminal prohibition toform para-military bands toproscribing ofsubversive immense successof theFascistmovement). He the factthatdemocratic fundamentalism may become militant.” fight onitsownplaneatechniquewhichserves statement reads “Ifdemocracy isconceived that unfortunate situationisturningdemocracy in principles of legalityand thefreeplayofpublicopinion.Theonlypossibilitytocurethis parliamentarian andanti-democra AccordingtoLoewenstein,democratic fundamentalism blindnessledto andlegalistic a situationthatdemocracies werelegallybound democratic ideology,proportionalrepresentation.” communal representativebodies Fora detailed account of militant democr Ibid., at 423. Ibid. 37 Bymilitating democracyLoewensteinmeans notonly theacceptance of

waseasilyfacilitatedby“thatgravestmistake ofthe tic partiesaslongthelatterconform formally tothe acy anti-Fascistmeasures see Ibid. . Forexample,inaseriesoftwoessays,

15 to amilitant stand.AsLoewenstein’s strong beequippedandable only the purpose of power. Democracy must must onlythepurposeofpower.Democracy the very existence andmeaning ofitsrules. it has notyet fulfilled itsdestination, itmust isciplined” oreven“authoritarian”one,the destabilize democracy (atleastincaseof discerns alsotheneedtointroducevarious toallowtheemergence andriseofanti- 36

to standfordemocracy Legislative Militant Militant 38

CEU eTD Collection Law Review 5 (1938). (1938). 5 Review Law 40 39 In thenotetoquestion“doesnotexcess[o where theparadoxoftolerance KarlPopper’sbookisofrelevanceforthe militant democracy atleastfor its notefour to chapter seven, labeled byhim asoneofthemost powerfulofthesephilosophies). the widespreadprejudiceagainst thepossibilitie problems ofopensociety,partially attempts toexamine theapplicationofcrit totalitarianism, andofthesigni The purposeofthebook according toitsauthor movements whichtry to return us back to trib experiencing becauseofthistransitionisone transition from thetribal, or‘closed society’ which setsfreethecriticalpow Prophecy two volumes: Volume One, of Austria;mostthebookwaswrittenduring decision towritethisbookwasmade inMarch mentioning hereisKarlPopperandhis Aswasmentioned above, ideassimilar toLoewenstein’s wereformulated in the works ofotherscholarsduring fire. disappeared anditisbeingacceptedmore andmo Popper, Popper, KarlLoewenstein, 39

supra note 9. . Themain idea ofthisbookisthatoneda Legislative Control of Political Extremism in European Democracies, I,II Democracies, European Extremismin Political of Control Legislative

The SpellofPlato and theparadoxofdemocracy we ficance of the perennial fightag ficance oftheperennial the same period oftime. One ers ofman. Popperclaims that viacriticism ofthosesocial The OpenSocietyandItsEnemies

16 , toanopenone.Theshockourcivilizationis ical andrationalmethods alism anddestroytheidea of thefactorsfacilitating 1938 whenPopperheardnewsoftheinvasion f liberty] bringmen tosuchastate thatthey the graveyearsof istocontribute toourunderstandingof , andVolume Two, s of democraticreforms (historicism is re thatdemocracy hastofightfirewith debate ontheoriginofdoctrine y we should arrivetoan‘opensociety’ y weshould The PrinciplesofLeadership of theauthorsnoteworth philosophiesresponsiblefor ainst it.Furthermore, Popper re introducedandexplained. civilization isstillinits war. Thebookisin ofanopensociety. the rise ofdifferent ofsciencetothe The HighTideof . 40 , 38 Columbia Columbia , 38 The final Thefinal , CEU eTD Collection lead to a restraint, since it makes the bully free to enslave themeek. arestraint, since to enslave itmakeslead freeto the bully substance aswell. nevertheless iscorrectthatdemocracy should critique can beraised against allthediffere day amajority may decidethatatyrantshouldrule.While Poppermentions thatsimilar majority rulemay leadtoself-contradictions.Th criticism ofdemocracy andatleasttoLeona of democracy wasnotspelledoutforthefirst “as incitement tomurder, orkidnapping,totherevivalof argument: “unlimited tolerance must lead 50 49 48 47 46 45 44 43 42 41 tolerant, or rather,controlled by,andaccountable rule according tothe principles outside thelaw”; reserved in thename of tolerance as“any destroyed andtolerancewiththem.” tolerance should not beextended“to thosewhoareintolerant, otherwise thetolerant willbe paradoxes: the‘paradoxoftoleranc time agobyPlato. herefersto badly wantatyranny?” For further debate on the paradox of democracy see, for example, also Rawls, Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Popper, Italics added. Theparadox of toleranceis the argum Italicsin original. The paradoxoftoleranceasexplaine supra note546. 9,at 47 42 50 “incitement tointolerance” Inthesame lineofarguments, Popperbringstwofurtherbutlessknown Alllistedparadoxescanbeavoide

of egalitarianism andprotectio ent thatfreedomin thesense ofabse e’ andthe‘paradoxofdemocracy.’ theso-called‘p 45 “Theright notto tolerate the intolerant” tothe disappearan

17 movement preaching intolerance places itself d byPopperechoessomehow Loewenstein’s 48 nt forms ofthe‘theor rd Nelson’ssuggestionthattheprincipleof not beonlyaboutprocedure,butalso time byPopper.Hehimself referstoPlato’s e biggestproblem ofmajo shouldbecriminalized to, thepublic. KarlPopper’s paradoxes are aradox offreedom’, d ifwedemand ourgovernments to theslave trade.” ce oftolerance.” nce of any restraining controlmight nism; totolerateallwhoare supra 43 y ofsovereignty,’he note 13. 13. note

in thesame manner 41 rity ruleis thatone expressedalong 49 Theparadox 44 46 Unlimited shouldbe CEU eTD Collection 51 constitutional legislation andjurisprudence. Loewenstein’s essays, isaresponse tocert important to articulate here thateverythingwr divided intothreegroups.Yet,be on militant democracy related issues. In general, all scholarly workinthis filed canbe The purposeofthissectionistoprovideade 1.1.2. means bywhichitwasdestroyed. Goebbels, theformer NaziMinistryofPropa continuing andconsistentresponsetothefamoussarcasticcomment ofPaulJoseph democracies living.” “to neglect theexperience ofde Fundamental Rights understanding andinterpretationha lesson worthremembering. While democracy time andmany lives torealize and privileges, rightsandopportuni Democracy shouldnotremain silentaboutatte institutionalized means toprotectitselfagai thatdemocracycannotstrivewithout the 1930sleddemocracy’s adherentstorealize right tointerfere inthename of tolerance andself-preservation. unlimited tolerance arenotsomething democracy another step towardsamilitant democracy state: Loewenstein, Loewenstein, Contemporary Thus, theunfortunateexperienceofvict supra note 5, at 658. essays, many of hisargumentsandclaims arestillvalidnowadaysand 51

Intheend, democratic experiences andpracticesshould bea Theoretical

ties grantedbyademocratic regime. Unfortunatelyittook mocracies deceasedwouldbe fore placingacademic worksin accept thisstate ofaffairs. Nevertheless, itwas definitely a ve changedsinceLoewenstein’s Debate

18 on tailed accountofthecurre Thereisno scholarly articleon militant itten aboutmilitant democracy, including Karl ganda thatdemocracy gaveitsenemies the ain eventsanddevelopments indomestic nst theattacksofits potentialenemies. mpts todamage itfrominsidebyabusing Militant first, itre-states that canafford;andsecond,itshouldhavea is notastaticconstructionandits orious Nazitake-ove

Democracy tantamount tosurrenderfor one oranother Militant Democracyand pure majority rule and

nt theoreticaldebate r ofmanystatesin category it is category itis CEU eTD Collection available at Democracy in Spain (2003 European Law Review 3 (2004); Miguel Revenga Sanchez, 53 52 not widelydiscussedangles.Fo be compiled from scholarlyworks whichdiscuss militant democracy butfrom differentand valuable contribution to thedebateonmilitant democracy practice. includes case-studies from thirteen different jurisdictions andrepresents anextremely democracy practiceindifferentjurisdictions Turkey, Spain,Germany, Israel,India,etc. publications onmilitant democracy legislation isintroduced orappliedinpractice particular jurisdictions. Suchpublications appear most often oncethemilitant democracy comments andanalysiswritten constitutional practice from democracy issuesand is applicabletothedebate militant democracytheoryandpractice.’This concept. that militant democracy isnot a mere theoretical democracy written inabstractterms, without http://germanlawjournal.com/i Court Constitutional Federal Thilo Rensmann, Kremnitzer, Rights Human Court of theEuropean and Court Constitutional Ergun, Ozbudun (1998); 25(2) Studies Eastern RefahDemise ofParty Turkey's Riseand The Possibilities: Populist and Politics Turkey in Parties Political DicleKogacioglu, (2004); Militant (Ed.), Sajo, Democracy47 FerreresComella, Victor (2003); Law 4 Constitutional Turano, Thiel, Thiel, Seeforexample, PaulHarvey, supra Spain: Banning a Political Parties as a Response to Basque Terrorism, Basque to a Response as Parties a Political Banning Spain: The firstgroup Disqualifying Parties:Case, the of Israeli Disqualifying Lists and note 21. 21. note http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/events/generalco Procedural Fairnessina Militant ), Paper delivered at the ECPR Conference, Marburg, 18-21, September 2003, also , 38Lawand Society Review 3(2004); Mehran Kamrava, Iwouldcall‘Generaltheoretic ndex.php?pageID=11&artID=332 differentjurisdictions.Thesecond group includes articles,

, 4 German Law Journal (2003), also available at Militant Democracy and the European Convention on Human Rights Human on Convention European the and Democracy Militant r example, governmental attacks and publishedinresponsetoc practicecanbefoundinrela Party prohibition cases: different approach the Turkish by approach cases: different Party prohibition Democracy:the “Uprisingof 52

19 isabookeditedbyMa strongreferencetothepracticewhichmeans Oneofthemost recentprojects onmilitant The New Regulation of Political Parties in Spain in Parties Political of NewRegulation The by thenational courts.Examples ofacademic group consistsofworks onclassical militant ingeneral while based ontheanalysis of the construction andthatitisa context-sensitive The Move Towards (And the Struggle For) Militant nference/marburg/papers/10/7/Sanchez.pdf , etc. in A. Sajo, (Ed.), Militant Democracy (Ed.),Militant inA.Sajo, (2004); Progress, Unity, and Democracy: Dissolving Dissolving Democracy: and Unity, Progress, , 17Democratisation1 (2010);Mordechai al observationsandcommentson onstitutional developmentin on politicalpart 53 , 25 British Journal of Middle Journal ofMiddle , British 25 tion toeventsinatleast the Decent” Fa

The thirdgroupcould 1 International Journal of of Journal International 1 rkus Thiel.Thebook Pseudo-Democratic Pseudo-Democratic ies withan ils Before theils Before ; Leslie ; Leslie , inA. , CEU eTD Collection http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewc at alsoavailable Law (2011), International Peter G.Dancin, I Religious Freedom in Europe Militant Democracy 171 (2004). (2004). Democracy 171 Militant Kent Roach, 56 55 redir=1#search=%22Islam%20Secular%20Nomos%20European%20Court%20Human%20Rights%22 54 when itisnecessary for liberty itself, topreven they arenot “derived frompracticalnecessities the intolerant’ underthe framework thatprincipl of thefeatures of militant democracy. traditions arguedinsupportofsubstantiveview ofdemocracy whichcanberegarded asone other relatedmatters. For example, itisargued practice, however, much wassaidbyacademia notexactly aboutmilitant democracy buton of militant democracy application willbethesubjectof thissection. detail infurtherchapters(mainly incase-st While scholarlyworksfrom andthe thesecond course notstrictasthesame workcandiscuss application of militant democracy toguidestates anti-terrorism policies. terrorism occurred indifferent parts of theworld initiated atheoretical debate over the secularism. debate ontheexpansion of militant democracy asbeingutilizedtoguard theprinciple of judgments ofthe StrasbourgCourtonthehead Court ofHuman Rightswhichgeneratedmanifo Islamist agenda(i.e.theWelfare PartyinTu Gregory H. Fox & George Nolte, Seee.g. Andras Sajo, See for example, Teitel, After KarlLoewenstein’s essayswecanobservetheimplementation ofhisideasin Anti-Terrorism and Militant Democracy: Militant and Anti-Terrorism 54 Theterrorist attacksofSeptember slam in the Secular Nomos of the European Court of Human Right From Militant Democracy to the PreventiveState?, supra (2010) available athttp://papers.ssrn. available (2010) note 24; Patrick Macklem, Macklem, Patrick 24; note

Intolerant Democracies Intolerant 56 JohnRawlsexamines theproblemof‘toleration ontent.cgi?article=1980&context=fac_pubs&sei- udy elements), thepublicationsongeneralissues

20 Some Western and Eastern Responces Eastern Some Western and rkey) anditsfurtherapprovalbytheEuropean orreasonsofstate”andcanonlybe“justified scarf ban,itledsome commentatorstoopena different issuesandfit t aninvasionoffreedom that theorists from a variety of philosophic that theoristsfrom ofphilosophic avariety , 36 Harvard International Law Journal 17 (1995). es ofliberty“carrytheir ownimperative”; ld debateanddiscus third groups willbeaddressedingreater Guarding the Perimeter: Militant Democracy and theand Democracy Perimeter: Militant Guarding 11 andmanyotherunfortunateactsof com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1660649; com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1660649; 27 Cardozo Law Review (2006); (2006); LawReview Cardozo 27 sion. Followedbythe into othergroupstoo. , 32 Michigan Journal of 55 thatwouldbestill Thedivisionisof , in A. Sajo (Ed.), , inA. Sajo (Ed.), . CEU eTD Collection 23. considerable risksatour popular support. Inaddition, intolerance the rules ofthegame andaim at 60 59 58 57 constitution anditssubstantive principles (Legality and Legitimacy) wherehe arguesfor th Fox andNoltereferintheir known legaldefenderoftheNaziregime once somehow surprisingly befoundin theworks of natures. United Statesconstitutionalsystem whichprovedto speaks aboutdemocracies during democracy debate. The model offeredbyJohnRawlshasasignifican of theprinciples of justiceagreed to evenbythe intolerant inhisfamous ‘original position.’ of theintolerant onlywhenitisurgently needed constitution; altogetheritgive natural strength of free institutio “person’s righttocomplain islimited toviolationsofprinciplesheacknowledgeshimself.” intolerant groupsdonothaveanyentitlement to worse.” More details on the notions of procedural and substantive democracy will be provided later in this section at this section laterin provided willbe democracy substantive and procedural of the notions on More details Ibid. at18. Ibid, Ibid, From John Rawls, supra note 13. This conclusioncanbeeasilyprojectedtopol Arguments similar toRawls, insupport of 57 Inexamining theproblemof 60 However,itmight havesome difficulties inapplicationwhensomeone own legitimateinterests.”

s confidence tothe members ofthesocietyto limit thefreedom article toSchmitt’s 1932article violating them claiming justification for such actions intheir ns andheavily relies on theinherent stability of ajust their stillyetunstableandfr toleration of theintolerant Rawls concludes that

. Schmitt claims thatthere are some basic 21 is permitted onlywherethere are“some Hitler gained powerintheWeimar Republic. anditisconsidered byhim asanapplication CarlSchmitt, wholaterbecame thebest- e distinction betweenprocedural rules ina 59 complain if it isnottoleratedbecausea t positioninthepro thesubstantiveview beabletoresistsma Rawls,however,strongly believesinthe itical partiesintheeventtheydisregard agile stageasopposedtothe Legalität undLegitimität cedural v.substantive ny crisesofdifferent ofdemocracycan 58

CEU eTD Collection http://articles.cnn.com/2011-02-22/world/algeria. example Algerialifts 1992emergency decree. February See for early2011. lasted until which was 1992 emergency in and February a stateof declared cancelled resigned and control of the country was taken over by the Algerian army. The second round of elections was Algeria intoanIslamicstate, turn to intend would FIS awarefactthat the of being process, legislative inthe principle 79(3) of government. form republican the on the provision of character non-amendable the established Constitution French the when insurgency?_s=PM:WORLD 64 63 62 61 arriving atpoliticaldecisionsin adopted JosephSchumpeter’s formulation ofde Nolte, definesdemocracy onlyasasetofpro tolerance: procedural andsubstantivedemo Salvation Front(FIS). by theeventsinAlgeriaof1991whenfi which coversanimpressive numbe in the1990s;whenFoxandNoltepublishedtheirfamous article principles came backintoconstitutional theory under the slogan of ‘militant democracy’ only the legislativedecision-making processin constitutions ofmany statespr collapse ofcommunisminEurope,Schmitt’s view received widespread supportand current the procedural rules areobserved. substantive principleswhich cannotbesimply a character ofthemost fundamental principles. Driven bythe fearthatapartyw &Nolte, Fox Themost famous example would the eternitycl 1884 atleastsince practice in constitutional coreisknown unalterable an containing constitutions idea of The : Amendments to this Basic Law affecting the division of the Federation into into ofthe the BasicLawaffecting Federation division this : Amendments to The main arguments ofthispaperarebasedaroundtwotheoriesdemocratic The ‘toleration of theintolerant’ debate aswell theissueof limitations imposed on supra note 56. note 56. 64

. or the principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20 shall be inadmissible. inadmissible. 20 shall be laiddownin Articles and 1 the principles or

ill ensure two-thirds majority in th in majority two-thirds ensure ill whichindividualsacquirethepowertodecidebymeans ofa ovide explicitreference to r of issuesand jurisdictions. 61 Intheaftermath oftheSecondWorldWar andthe emergency_1_islamist-party-emergency-decree- ause provision from the 1949 German Basic Law, Article

62 cracy. Thefirst model, accordingtoFoxand 22 theform ofnon-amendable constitutional rst roundofelectionswaswonbytheIslamic

bolished bytheelectedrepresentativesevenif cedures. Todescribethismodel theauthors , 22, 2011 available at C mocracy asan“institutionalarrangement for e Parliament afterthesecondroundand the ideaofnon-amendable 63 Theauthorswereinspired Länder Intolerant Democracies NN Worldnewsarchive at the President of the country thecountry of President the , their participation on on , their participation

CEU eTD Collection Communist Control Act of 1954). meaningful. is substantive modelofdemocracy making and isinfactnothingmore thanpure 73 72 71 70 69 68 67 66 65 authors includedonlystablede democracy; divided intofourcategories: which majority ruleismade meaningful. a processof ascertaining thepreferencesofpolit themselves. providing aframework fordecision-making particular legalsystem. Aproceduraldemocr democratic institutions. these twosystems iswhetherthe national constitution canbeamended toalteror eliminate into account reactionstowards anti-democraticactors. Oneclearline ofdemarcation between and Nolteaddthenotion oftolerant(passive) as other rights. whereas noneoftheserightsisabsolute,which to create suchasociety wherecitizens enjoyavariety of rights,including therighttovote, competitive struggleforthepeople’s vote.” E.g. Germany, Israel,and CostaRica. E.g. France, Canada, and India. because E.g.UnitedStates(mainly E.g. United Kingdom, Botswana, and Japan. at16. Ibid, at 14. Ibid., Ibid., at 24. at 16. Ibid., &Nolte, Fox In additiontoclassifyingalldemocratic systems intoproceduralorsubstantive,Fox 71 68 66 supra tolerant substantive democracy; cracy assumes Incontrast,substantiveviewofdemo thatdemocracyisnotonly Inthisview, thedemocratic process is note 56, at 14. note 56, at 67 Furtherdivisionisbasedonthevi

of the Smith Actof1940, the Intern mocratic systems intheiranalysis andthearticlewas tolerant proceduraldemocracy; characterizedasasocietyin 69 65

Asaresult,state cons Thismodelprovidesa 23 governance byamajority rule.Incontrast,the 72 acy isdescribedbythe and, militant and, substantivedemocracy means itcannotbeusedtoabolishitselfor opposedtomilitant (active)states totake ical majorities, butratherasasociety in but withoutprescribingthedecisions notanendinitselfbutratherameans sions ofdemocracy endorsedina which majority ruleismade al Security Act of1950 and the 70 framework fordecision- titutional practice was militant procedural authors asa system 73 . The CEU eTD Collection Andras Sajo, 74 jurisprudence decidedinthelate-1990sandea parties. Whiletheauthorsdidnothaveach their summary onthestateofin would supportthisargument. it canbe utilizedatany stageof constitutiona Self-protection isa natural andlogical feature refer totheweaponsofmilitant democracy democracy couldbe,andshouldadynamic con the past. This argument leadsus toanothe the airandisbroughtintopr of itsdrafters. democracy fitsperfectly totheclaim thatanationalconstitution veryoften mirrors thefears important forthegeneral understandingof on theimportance of past experiences inthe elections oftenposechalle imposes limitationonethnicallyba constitutional militant democracy model;in th experience. Without anydoubts,thememories of differences inthetreatment of extremist parties whichisexplainedtoa largeextentbypast excluded fromtheiranalysis. published in1995;therefore,most oftheyoung For example, Andras Sajo argues that often constitutions constitutions often that argues Sajo example, Andras For The final point from theFoxandNoltearti In conclusion,theauthors’summarizedthat Limiting Government:Intr an 74 Theideatoimpose limits onactivitiesof nges tothe territorial integrity a

ocess ofconstitution-making asaresponseto ternational lawonthequestion oduction to Constitutionalism sed politicalpartiesaspart

24 beyond theinitialconstitution-making process. r important conclusion, namely thatmilitant way militant democracy is practiced is utterly ance toinclude many casesfrom theECHR of democracy, andtherefore whenitis needed l development. Thefurther example of Spain militant democracy.Constitutional militant e same wayIndia, as a multi-national state, rly-2000s, theirfindings European democracieswere, unfortunately, are written out of fearofear are written out of theNaziregime influencedtheGerman cept. Statesshouldnotbetoohesitantto cle worthofmentioni democratic stateshavesubstantial politicalparties nd causeviolence.Thisobservation 13(1999). of anti-democratic political icipation ofsub-groupsin lier despotic power. See See power. lier despotic does notcome from arestillvalidand ng herebrieflyis tragiceventsof CEU eTD Collection 130. 76 75 democracy hasastable meaning andexpression ‘militant democracy’ onlyadds specific militant democracy measures make adifference incontent rather than instructure; and3) underlying assumptions: 1)militant democracy diffe Pfersmann arguesthattheformulation ofsuch be effectivelyappliedincertain situations? Andfinally,howshouldthey be legallyapplied? democracy? Whatisthepreciselegalmeaning oftheprovisions compatible withthevery natureof democracy debate isbuilt aroundthefollowing questions menaces. that democratic attitudemay becontext-sens points whichappearasuncontrovers democracy provisionsgenerate.Furthermore, O international crisis.Thethirdandfinalstra the debatefocusesonquestionofhowdemocr trigger thepurported effect and measures. Democratic Stability democracy. treaties couldbeinterpretedinawayaspr divided ontheproblemofanti- applicable tothecurrent stateofaffairs: Pfersmann, at 3.3.2 Section issuesin these to Iwillcomeback and chapter asubsequent for asubject is,however, This Moreover, Pfersmann denotesthat themajo Otto Pfersmann inhisessay 76 75 Thefirst oneisnormative: itisquesti supra

note 1, at 51-52. at51-52. note 1, underlines three main strands of thedebate over militant democracy

how tobest utilizethe means they provide. Thesecond tierof democratic actors. Most of theinternational humanrights ial, i.e.thatthereisno Shaping MilitantDemocracy:LegalLimitsto nd is formed aroundthelegalproblems militant itive, dependinguponthepresenceofthreatsand omoting andsupportingasubstantivetheoryof the internationalcommunityisnothopelessly

25 and if yes, whether such provisions promote andifyes,whethersuchprovisionspromote questions isbasedontheacceptanceofafew : whethermilitant democracy provisions are tto Pfersmann indicates thatthere are some acies respondtoasitua oned whethersuchmeasures areableto r controversy of themilitant democracy rs from simpledemocracy inquality;2) democracy withoutdemocrats and and inwhatwayshouldthey tion ofinternaland CEU eTD Collection 80 79 78 77 precision, butonthewaytheyare important missionsistoalarg why alldemocraciesare more orlessmilitant. few examples wherethe majority decision-making of rule-making canbe characterized as militant structures containingrulesonpr democratic rule-making inacertaindomain.” voting for certainmatters whichresults in“a ruleonrule-making thatexcludes pure concerning decision-making. Anexample ofth promote pro-democratic beliefsandattitudes,whereasindirectobstaclesmodify rules democracy orimpose obligationstoidentifyt order whichcouldbedirector democracy. Legalstrategiesconsistoflegally appeal tobeliefs andpolitical habits of thecitizen to demonstrate theadvantages of offers twospeciesofdevices:legalandnon-lega constitutional democracy.” extension oftheareaprotec making democracy more militant modifies thestructure from whichitstarts andexcessive he argues that “democracies arealways features. Pfersmann disagreewiththese assumpti as “strict militant democracies”as “strictmilitant (as infor Democracies in which no absolute majority is entitled entitled majority is absolute no which Democraciesin Pfersmann, at 56. & with Fox Nolte, he disagrees regard this In Ibid. Pfersmann, As aresponse totheabove discussedparadoxofdemocr supra note at53 note 1, 78

e extentnotonlyaboutthequal eventing departurefrom open-dem indirect.Directobstaclespr tion couldleadtoa“decrease stance in stance in Germany, Italy,and France). interpreted andappliedbycomp more note 56. 56. supra note

26 orlessmilitant.” hose actionsin apreventive wayaswellto . Pfersmann concludesthat there are onlyvery to modifyto Pfersmann certain democratic settings names imposed obstaclestoab l strategies.Bynon-legalstrategieshemeans 79 is would be introducing qualified majority is wouldbeintroducingqualifiedmajority ons andclaims theircharacter false.Instead Asaresult,anydemocracywithlegal 80 rule isnot limited in anywayand thatis Thesuccessof militant democracy’s ity of the provisions and their ity oftheprovisionsandtheir ohibit certainactionsagainst 77 acy (Section1.1) Pfersmann However,hewarnsusthat of theliberalheritage etent constitutionalcourts. ocracy asthe generalrule olishing democratic CEU eTD Collection http://www.germanlawjournal.co II Parties, I, http://www.germanlawjournal.co 84 83 82 81 attempt “to doawaywithdemocraticinstitutions.” Niesen claims therearenodemocratic contradic the right and left. Enemies aredefined asthose rejecting political institutions and values. democracy) thedefensive mechanism isdirected offer for limitingpolitical liberty, but alsointhedangers they attempt toavert. opponents andtheconceptionofde pragmatic understandingsofpa restrictions ofpolitical speechinthesame provisions tooutlawpolitical partiesinGerm negative republicanism andcivic society. practices ofbanning political successful practiceofbanningpoliti party dissolutions,systemize statespractices elaborating onpartyprohibitionrulesandproced openly aimstodestroythem. Therefore,le political parties whichprograms andactivities analytical constitutional jurisprudence. even hypermajoritarian parliaments, anditleadsusto thenecessitytodevelop strong Constitutional courts are the “final guardians of liberal democracy”, Ibid. Ibid. at45. Ibid, Peter Niesen, Pfersmann, In theanti-extremism paradigm (which Traditionally, militant democracy isunders supra Anti-Extremism, Negative Republicanism, Civic Republicanism, Negative Anti-Extremism, note 1, at 68. at68. note 1, , 3 German Law Journal (2002), also available at m/index.php?pageID=11&artID=169 m/index.php?pageID=11&artID=164

parties might beplaced in thr rty banswhichdiffer notonly intheidentification of their mocracy theytendtorely cal parties. Forexample, Pe 82 Hisarticle isbased onex

27 jurisdictions. Nielsenclaims therearethree gal scholarshipproducednumerous articles , andformulate some sortofaguide for tions toeliminate those political players who any andItaly withsome illustrationsfrom ures, introducingdifferentmodels toclassify against extremist politicalparties bothfrom guidestheGerman model of militant disregard major democr Society: Three Paradigms for Banning Political Political Banning for Paradigms Three Society: tood assetofprocedurestooutlaw 84 ; Thesecondmodel, negative ee paradigms: anti-extremism, on andthejustificationthey ter Niesenclaims thatall 81 amples ofconstitutional notthemajoritarian or atic principlesor 83

CEU eTD Collection 85 considerations surrounded byrest analysis of whatmay betermed democraticintolerance based onasurveyof institutional moment andcouldbeafforded,probably,onl Moreover, civicsocietyapproaches unique understandingofhow find severalexamples whenCEE classifications seems tobethefactthat divi serious advantages compare tothe twoothermodels. Themajor concernwith Niesen’s approach isbasedonadistinctlymoralconcep considered asitselfprotect as amoral dutytoguaranteethereproductionof civic society viewchallenges, bothother mode compared tonegativerepublicanism,butwithoutfallingbackintoanti-extremism. more capableofaddressingnewemergingdang society’ isnot thatclearhowever.Hecallsita example ofthis logic appliedinpractice. prohibited notonlyinItalybutsome ot democratic processes. Political parties with certain politicalideologyormovement is coming from politicalactors identified asen evenwhenthereisnoapparentdangerforthedemocracy this paradigmcanbejustified identity with thoseresponsible for past tragic republicanism whichwecanfindinItaly,iden Ibid, at 41. at41. Ibid, Samuel Issacharoffinhisarticle ed butratherasprotect

party prohibitionshouldbeorganizedandfunctioning. party rictions onpoliticalparticipat countries combineddifferent for whichthe author admits tobea pricy solution atthe Fragile Democracies

The thirdparadigm byNielsen,‘civic offered y byhighlystabledemocratic systems. enough toeliminate theirinvolvement inthe 28 fascist and communist regimes of injustice. Pa her European democracies wouldbeaclear emies of democracy.Their affiliation witha new abstractionandarguesthatthisregime is ls, andviewsmilitant democracy restrictions tion ofdemocracy whichisclaimed tohave sion isnotasstrict tifies enemies basedontheir ofdemocracy ers andbroadeningthefocusofprotection ive democracy. Inaddition, democracy isnot ofminorities andlatergenerations.This givesadetailedandprofound approached todeveloptheir ion invariousjurisdictions, rty dissolutiondrivenby he seesitand wecan political agendas are 85 The CEU eTD Collection 88 87 86 most interestinginhisworkisanattempt Toaddressthesefourfundamental que jurisprudence from statesconfronted democratic scores?” implement exclusionortoavoidthe temptati define theboundariesofdemocratic particip define legislativelytheouterbounds danger they present? (3) Ifsuch the ideological positions of th fall onthewrong sideoftheboundary?(2)Ifso participation inthedemocraticprocess, exclud parameters ondemocratic participation: posed fourquestionsthelegisl European approach torestrictions onpoliticalac picture jurisdictions outside Europe, thebi important contributionof Issacharo preserving fundamental democratic principles democratic governments: howtorespondtheactionsofintolerantgroupsinname of cartoon publications. This wasanoccasionto re intolerance.” ensure thattheirstateapparatus not becapture is “underwhat circumstances [a]democraticgove including Germany, India,Israel,Tu Ibid., at 1415 Ibid., Ibid. Samuel Issacharoff, 88

87 Thepublicationwasinspiredbythe2006controversysu Fragile Democracies Fragile

e excludedactors,ormust it ators andcourtshadtodeal determinations are tobe made, isthere an obligation to ff inthemilitant democracy deba , 120 HarvardLaw Review 1405(2007). oftherightpar rley, UkraineandtheUnitedStates. “(1)Mayastatedrawboundaryaround to introducetypologiesofpartyprohibitionbased

29 on towardpoliticalself-d ation, must therebeanindependentbodyto withoutcompromising democracyitself.The rthplace oftheconcept, andexaminesthe ing from therightof d wholesaleforsociallydestructive forms of , wheredoesthatboundary withinternalantidemocratic challenges. The tivities against theUSexample. Issacharoff rnment may act(or,perhaps,must act)to stions, Issacharoff looks to the actual stions, Issacharofflookstotheactual visit oneofthemost ticipation? (4)ifthelegislatordoesso ticipation? with while trying tomark the turn ontheimmediacy ofthe te isthathebrings tothe participation those who ealing orsettlingthe 86 seriousissuesfor Hismajor concern lie? Isitbasedon lie? rrounding Danish CEU eTD Collection 90 89 many establisheddemocratic states and thisf Moreover, political parties are define thetypeofthreatthatwouldjustif will ofthemajority butalsobecause ofth parties byprohibitionareill-advised.” applied inawaytosuppressthedissentandth Issacharoff concludes thatmilitant democracy us warning usexactlyabout danger of emotionalism inpolitics). Towardstheendof hisarticle, underestimate themobilizing powerofthepoliti power. Probably,weshouldnotbesooptimis on assumption thatthefirst twotypes of political considered conceptuallyasthe antidemocratic majoritarian parties (i.e. thefam separatist parties (theBatast parties (forexample, theSocialistReichPa type ofpartiesbeingtraditionalobjectsparty dissolution procedures: insurrectionary the typeofthreatcoming from allegedlyunde Israel). Theprohibitionof politi speech (i.e. inIndia), party prohibition, andpartyexclusionfrom three typeof restrictions imposed onpolitical on anapproachemployed toaddressantidem Ibid., at 1418. at 1418. Ibid., Ibid., at 1442.

una Partyfrom SpainandKurdishpartiesfrom Turkey), greatest challengeforademocracy. cal partiescan be backed by three distinct rationales basedon accorded specialanduniquerole 90 Thiscouldhappennotonlybecause ofthepolitical

act onlycomplicates theenforcement of militant e difficultiesnaturallysurrounding thetaskto y suchdrasticmeasures aspartydissolution. rty and the Communist Party from Germany), rty andtheCommunistPartyfromGermany), 30 participation: content restrictions onelectoral ocratic mobilization. Thus,hedistinguishes mocratic partieswhic ous RefahPartyfrom Turkey).Thelatteris at “in most circumstances effortsto silence parties donothavereal ed asasafeguard might beinterpreted and cs ofemotionalism (KarlLowensteinwas tic aboutitandmight beriskyto theelectoralarena(i.e.in 89 indemocratic process in Thisconclusionisbased h correspondstothree istic chancestoseize CEU eTD Collection and also mentions that there could be examples of examples of therebe could that alsomentions and 97 96 95 94 93 92 91 grouped insevenclusters. offers inthe concluding chapterof his typology ofdemocracies inrelationtotheirar reveals thatitrather represents a classification of militant democracy measure butnot model ofclustersforthepur as beingimpractical andbearingsubstantial mode oflimitationsimposed onrights.Neverthe Pfersmann alsomentions directand indirect attempt toclassify alldemocracies democracies arealwaysmoreorless militant procedural democracies and militant v.tolerant of classificationwerementioned above,i.e.Fo the form of democracy itconsiders correct, fitting ortolerable”. terms of‘militancy’, notwocount systemizing theapproaches tomilitant democracy couldbe explained bythefact that“in numerous attempts atclassificationor guarantees, “atolerant democratic society mu democracy provisions. However,onthec 21, at 382-408. at 21, 382-408. Thiel reveals example of non-amendable constitutional provisions from Germany, France, Italy, and Turkey fromGermany, Italy,andTurkey France, provisions constitutional non-amendable example of reveals Thiel Ibid., at 398 onwards. Ibid., at 396. Ibid. Ibid., at 398. Foradetailedaccountofmodels ofclassification seeMarkus Thiel, Ibid., at 1466. The diversityofarrangements regardingthe 1. TheConstitutional protection of an‘inviolable andunalienable ‘democratic core’. pose ofcomparative analysis.

ries are‘like typificationofdemocratic countries. under the‘graduals sub-constitutional law provisions of a similar character. asimilarcharacter. lawof provisions sub-constitutional book summaryofmilitant democracymeasures disadvantages andsuggest

st beabletopoli 31 militant democracy measures in relation tothe (which wasinterpreted byMarkusThielasan ondition ofpresencestrongprocedural rangements inbusinessof self-defense.Thiel x andNolte’sclassificat peas inapod’” less, Thiel rejects onebyallthe models as well as Otto Pfersmann’s thesis that issue ofdemocratic 96 Comparative Aspects cale ofmilitancy’). Acloserlook atThiel’s clusters ce itsfragileborders.” 93 94 and every society “opts for Forexample,afewmodels s instead developing a s insteaddevelopinga ion ofsubstantivev. self-defense caused 92 The difficulty of Thedifficulty in Thiel, Thiel, in 95 Moreover, 91 note supra note

97

CEU eTD Collection element’ ofmilitancy. war’. 103 102 101 100 99 98 democracy measures, butformed intosmaller groups.Theauthorofthisscheme attempts to constitution. ‘militancy’ issue,but contribute totheprot other clustersorform anowncluster,or violating fundamental constitutional law. extirpation oftheprev government andthejudiciary,whic principles. fundamental rightsandfreedoms toabolishthe members. the acceptance of theconstitutional orde but nevertheless they secure the functionality of of the functionality secure they nevertheless but internal threat. against the constitution of the inprotection services of in charge general, intelligence or, authorities special Basic (Article61 the of Law). constitution infringement ofthe resist’ inArticle20 of the BasicLawaswell as possibility incitement to sedition or violence. or violence. sedition to incitement Thielmentions here Germany’s prov as‘core author the by is considered and other organizations parties ofpolitical dissolution The ban or For example, the requirement of a qualified majority aqualified requirement example, of the For Theauthoraccepts thatthese provi of activities the regarding provisions means legal the authors constitution the of protection Byadministrative specific to and Germany ‘right loyalty only cluster in civil this dutyof servants core would The provision 102 6. Legalprovisionsregardinga‘s 7. Allotherregulationsandprovisionsthatcannotbeclassifiedasbelongingtothe 5. Regulationsontheadministrativ 3. Provisionsandmeasures takenagainst Thiel’s system of clusters isbased ontheLoewenstein’s fourteen groups of militant 4. Regulationsandmeasures taken against institutions of thestate, especially the 2. Thetreatment ofextremist politicalpart

98 99

103

ailing democratic structures or whichareobviously and considerably

sions mayberegardedmarginal asa r asan educational objective. ision of forfeiture of rights, as we rights, ision offorfeiture h arepreparingorconductinga the system even in extraordinary situations. situations. inextraordinary systemeven the 100 tate ofemergency’, a‘stateof siege’ or the ‘state of e protectionoftheconstitution.

that actuallyhavenodirectconnectiontothe 32 to amend the constitution or constitution the amend to tofilea motion of impeach ection of the democratic system andthe democratic system oritscorevaluesand organizations andpersonsmisusing their ies andotherorganizations,oftheir ll asbroader notion of hatespeech, for the militant democracy debate, militant democracy the debate, for regulations thatenumerate ment incases of deliberate 101 coup d’etat

by the bythe CEU eTD Collection sketch ofmajor concernstobea understanding ofmilitant democracy issuesfor constitutional theory an debate and numerous issuesarising from thepresence of militant democracy notionin Theaboveanalysis coversfew,yetre democracy theory.Thepurposeof application. most recent practical developments inthear militant democracy measures and other regimes of could begivenfrom thefollowingsections.Theirpurposeisto help toaddress butnot measure. Further clarif decade. The extension affects, however,rather the German modelwasmodifiedandsome more el constitutional militancy, itisimportant tostudy excellent startingpoint.Nevertheless,tohave the German model of amilitant democracy state andlist of measures wecould find there isan could qualify as manifestation of amilitant state. democracy Forthepurpose of this project, excluding atleastclusters6and7astheyapp is understoodandappliedinpr against at least the contemporary constitutiona widen thelistofmilitant democracy measures back to the originalunderstanding, whichgoes d practice.Thesubsequentsections ddressed inthefollowingchapters. actice inadifferentmode now thisoverview wastodemonstrate theintensity of the

33 ear tobemisleading indefiningwhichmeasures senal ofmilitant democr l practices.The domain of militant democracy amore updatedpictur ication of whatis amilitant democracy state the currentpractice ofmoderndemocracies as the type ofthreats militant democracy could presentative scholarly works onmilitant this particular researchandprovidebrief rightslimitations as wellastocapture the ements wereadded, especially inthelast of thischapter willintroduce the provideaborderlinebetween . Thereislittleproblem e ofwhatamountsto acy andareas ofits CEU eTD Collection the population. want todestroyitfrom outside preserving democracy againstthosewhowantto given byOttoPfersmann: militant democracy isapolitical andlegal structure aimed at ideas ofthe foundingfathersof added bythe term ‘militant.’ Oneof themost comprehensive definitions reflecting the major try tocome upwithhisowndefinition,most ofthem refertothesame qualitiesofdemocracy involved inthedebateon militant democracy militant democracy wouldbe used inthisproject. current theoreticalandpracticalinterpretati a strategyto addressthose chal applied bymoderndemocracies,what arethemajo The verypurposeofthisproject Democracy 106 105 104 institutions toresistcaptur Issacharoff inhisarticle defined militant a state’sown democratic character bytheelectionofanti-democratic parties. Georg Nolte narrowsdown militant democracy toaset of measures to prevent the change of order toguard thedemocratic character of aconstitutional order”. authorized toprotectcivil and 1.1.3. Fox & Nolte, &Nolte, Fox Macklem, in Pfersmann,

The There isnouniversaldefinition ofmilitantdemocracy ag Macklem defines militant democracy as“a form of constitutional democracy

Current supra used supra noteat 54, 1. supra 104 note 1, at 47. at47. note 1,

note 56, at 6. note 56,at forthe

Understanding Current e byantidemocratic forces.Theaim istoresisthavingthe

political freedoms bypre-emptively lenges andcritiques.However, byutilizingdemocraticinstitu militant democracy andcurrentconstitutional practiceswas istoinvestigate howthecon Project

of

Militant

on ofthedoctrineandwhatunderstanding 34 democracy as “mobilization of democratic and relatedissues. While everyauthor would overturnitfrom withinorthosewhoopenly r challenges ofthedoctrine, andifthereis

Democracy: it isimportant toemphasize the tions aswellsupportwithin cept of militantdemocracy is reed uponbyall

restricting theirexercise in The 105 GregoryH.Foxand

Notion

of the scholars 106

Militant Samuel Samuel

CEU eTD Collection anti-democratic actors whousethedemocr Harvey refers to militant democracy asa system “capable of defendingconstitutionagainst 109 108 107 or procedures.As‘militant democracy’ wa against those whowanttooverturn ordestro structure possessinglegalopportuni public safety. which innarrowinterpretationdifferssubstantially from nationalsecu society. Finally,militant democracy isaimed topreservethe democratic natureof thestate, to harm structuresbyabusingri democratic individuals aiming thede toharm pre-emptive measures areaimed againstasp represents aconstitutionally represents a prescribed mechanism totakepre-emptive actions,i.e. militant democracy overturn the system haverealopportunities todoso.Moreover, militant democracy preventive characterand statesarenotexpect to delineate itfrom atolerantconstitutional demo opportunities todoso,presentinanopensociety. confront theactionsofthosewhoattempt to article where militant democracy isdefined astheonewhichhasappropriate means to distinct features of militant democracy couldbe derived from MiguelRevengaSanchez’s institutions ofdemocracy harnessedtowh Sanchez, in Harvey, insupra Issacharoff , Therefore, thereare atleastafew distinct features of thenotionof militant democracy For thepurpose of this project militant democracy isdefined asalegal and political supra note 86, at 1409. 1409. supraat 86, note note 52, at 408. at408. 52, note note note 52. authorized departurefrom majo

mocratic structuresofthestat ties topreservedemocracy bytakingpreventiveactions at maybetermed “illiberaldemocracy.”

ghts giventothembythedemocracy andopen y democracy byutilizing democratic institutions atic processinordertosubvertit.” 35 destroy them bytakingadvantageofthemany ed towaitoncethosewhoaimdestroyor s turnedmany years ago into apractical ecific ‘enemy’:individualsorgroup(s)of cracy. First ofall,militant democracy isofa 109

ritarian democracy. Second, such ritarian democracy. Second,such e. Thirdly, enemies areaiming rity, publicorderand 108 Similar 107 Paul CEU eTD Collection 110 important tosee whatconstitutional theory o survive and overcome thecriticism onlyif itisproved tobejustified. Therefore, itis considered ascontradictorytotheverynatureof aliberaldemocracy a ratherproblematic concept.Thecourseof it isimpossible todenythatmilitant democracy The ideatoprotectdemocracyfromitspotenti 1.2.1. TheoreticalDebateandPractice 1.2. MilitantDemocracy’sJustification: worth beingutilizedinmodern the militancy oftheirconstitutional system andanswerthequestionif militant democracy is different jurisdictions,whatitisusedfor,how address most ofthem withthepurposeofde concerns, andchallengesremain unresolved.Inwhatfollows Iwouldmake anattempt to one and,despite the substantial constitutiona the constitutional practice of democratic states. used notasamere theoreticalconceptbutrather project are based onpractical observations, therefore theterm ‘militant democracy’ wouldbe democracy andamilitant democracy state.Most of theexamples, cases andanalysis inthis constitutional phenomenon itdoes notmake se in concrete instances. See, Pfersmann, bele they should as which well asthe way in provisions and in what manner such provisions effectively promote democracy; 3)The precise legalmeaning of the Whether or not suchmeasures arecompa O. Pfersmann summarized the controversies of milita of controversies the Pfersmann O. summarized Militant Nevertheless, itisimportant tonote thatth Democracy:

Standard Theoretical constitutionaldemocracies. supra tible with the very nature of the democracy andif so2) Whether or not note52. 1,at actionsproposedbymilitant democracy canbe

monstrating how theconcept isimplemented in 36 al enemies soundsniceandplausible;however, states manage toaddresscriticalremarks about gallyapplied; and, 4)How ffers asa standard justification for militant l practiceon this matter, many questions, by itspreventive andopen-textured natureis nt democracy as centered around four questions: 1) 1) fourquestions: around centered democracy as nt asmanifestation ofitsmajor principlesin e term ‘militant democracy’ isstillajarring nse tomake distinctionbetween militant Justification

110 they areeffectivelyapplied andtheconceptcan CEU eTD Collection 113 112 111 tool tofightthiswar.Furtherarguments from Loewenstein’s workarebuiltaround specific that “during warlegality takesvacations” therefore, emergency measures wereneededto grasping powersinmany Europeanstatesamount words: panic writing theircommentaries andrecommen twentieth century,legalandpoliticalscholarswere underserious emotional pressureifnot fascism asaworldmovement.” accompanied bythestrongassumptionthat“no Fundamental Rights arguments of othersdevelopedataroundthesame time. and legalisticblindness.Howeve beginning ofthischapter,especiallyinrelati sense tobeginwithhisarguments. Abriefsu offered asystemized accountofmilitant democr employed inpractice. democracy measures andcompare itlater against the militant democracy justification as http://www.telospress.com/ Loewenstein, Loewenstein, at available Bendersky Joseph by W. and War Democracy," Horkheimer, "Militant in Cited Loewenstein, Apparently, forLoewenstein,theeventsof precaution.” emergency solutions. [It is] arisk and a gamble but wehave no choice. The best defence is and decent people to permanent dictatorship war demands atwar, are We hooligans. by and rogues “I prefer to be hysterical now instead of being melancholy later. . . . Iprefer dictatorship by democrats As KarlLoewensteinwastheone whointroduced term ‘militant democracy’ and supra supra 112 note 5, at 432. at432. note 5, note 5, at 658.

waswrittenatthetime whenthegrowingpopularityoffascism was main/index.php?main_page=news_article&article_id=303

r, areservationshouldbemade aboutLoewenstein’sandthe 111 Ontheeveofonemost tragic eventsofthe 113 on tohiscriticismofde andsuggestsamilitant standofdemocracy asa

37 mmary workwasgivenatthe ofLoewenstein betaken.HecitesLeonBlum’s observation dations. ConsiderforexampleLoewenstein’s acy measures and theirjustification,itmakes toawardeclaredag country whatsoeverisimmunized from fascistmovements andtheirsuccess in Militant Democracyand mocratic fundamentalism mocratic fundamentalism . ainst democracy and, CEU eTD Collection 117 116 115 114 “every possible effort” absolute values” preservation isjustified. Hecontinues that“if democracy believes inthesuperiority of its and beingtakenseriously,theirtemporarysu light oftheseconsiderationsthesolutionis the secondhalfofnineteenthcentury.Democracyprovedtobeadeathlessidea.In spiritual movement thatsurviveddifferentha outcomes onfundamental rights to democratic th Therefore, democracy candefenditselfonlyth ready todieforlibertypassedand‘democratic attack as democraticgovernme deemed democraciesasincapable threat andtakeanyactionsto threats todemocracy andinthe1930s;most seek formore supporters.Emotionalism isper points ofdemocraticfundamentalism andadapt power atany cost. Thetechnique was successful Accordingly, fascism isnotanideologybutpur features offascism asapolitical techniqu Ibid. Ibid. Loewenstein, at 432. be suppressed”. idea an of“can the question investigates firstessayhe the Forexample, in Loewenstein, Loewenstein was,however,awareofthepossi supra 116 eory andpractice, note 5, at 428. overthe politicsof emotions, itmust meet thedemands of realityand take 117 torescueit,“evenattherisk

addresstheweaknessofde nts couldappeal of meeting of anemotional at and freedoms.Loewensteinbelievedthatliberalism isa 115 butheofferedajustifi easy: oncefundamental ri

rdships, butneverthele 38 rough politicalandlegislativemeans. democracies werenotr e andthepoliticsofemotion ingeneral. ceived byLoewensteinasoneofthebiggest onlytoreason. spension inthename ofdemocratic self- perfectly emotionalism asauniting force to romanticism’ turnedin ely apoliticaltechniqueaimed atretaining mainly because itmanaged todetectweak ble critiqueofthesolutionhesuggested and cost of violating fundamental and costofviolatingfundamental mocratic regime. However,he tack byanemotional counter- 114 cation for possible negative negative possible for cation Times whenpeople were ss conqueredtheworldin ghts areinstitutionalized eady toacceptsucha to self-contradiction. CEU eTD Collection 121 120 119 118 structures seems tobesufficientintroducesome preventivemeasures. Unfortunately,later order canbesuspendedthrough due totheexistenceofpara measures. So,theSchmittian justification of th unalterable corecouldserveasaperfectgroundtolegitimi ignored orabolishedevenwhentheprescribedprocedureisfullyfollowed. in favorofcertainsubstantiv such ascommunistsornational socialists.It certain substantive norms democracy becomes de democratic statesintheiradhe otherworldliness tiedtothepa totalitarian etatism, anotherworldliness tiedto antidemocratic sentiment, and envisaged hisviewof apoliticalcommunity Legitimacy attention totheso-cal this particularmoment ishisclaim thatc of thestategovernedby theemergency rule,Ca legality could be sentontemporary vacationin rights.” http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/lpbr/subpages/reviews/schmitt804.htm P. McCormick(2004). Fox & Nolte, &Nolte, Fox SeeReview by Benjamin Gregg, Department of Government, University of Texasat Austin at CarlSchmitt, Ibid. The possibilitythatproceduremight assist We canfindsimilar groundsofjustificati 118 Theultimate end ofaliberalgovernment ishuman dignityandfreedom; therefore, 119 waspublishedjustayearbeforethe supra supra Legality and Legitimacy, Translated Legitimacy, andedited and Legality byJeffreySe note 56,19. at led unalterablecoreof theconstitution.Hisbook

e principlesinthedemocratic constitutionswhichcannotbe rence totherobustregime ofpr dox ofmajority rulewhenthefoundationsofconstitutional a prescribedprocedure. rticular notionofsovereignty. onstitutional theoryandpracticeshouldpaymore wasalreadyoutlinedabovethatSchmitt argued

39 order toensure themove towardsthisend. e militant character of democracy isjustified rl Schmitt. Oneofhisarguments relevantfor on in the works of the well-known defender on intheworksofwell-knowndefender basedonfourfeatures:antirationalism, fenseless against organized politicalforces in overthrowingdemocratic principlesand collapse oftheWeimar Republic.It . ze democracy’s self-protective oceduralism: intheabsenceof 120 itzer with an introduction by John byJohn anintroduction itzer with Hesawtheproblem of 121 Theideaofthe Legality and CEU eTD Collection of theverybasicdemocratic features incorporate some guaranteesofitsself-preserv justified bytragiceventsinthepast. followed intheaftermath of nevertheless hisargument infavor While thelatterargument hasnotbeenwelcome 125 124 123 122 sense ofthisword,i.e.includi democracy comes fromthedebateontoleration be understood aspermitting their alienation. democratic principlesencouragingdissentand be drawnwith anindividual majority and therefore in times ofemerge Schmitt argued that theexecutiveofficer captures government whenruleoflawwassuspended emergency in favor of the executive ruli than Loewenstein.Schmitt arguedforthereplacement ofparliamentary governanceduringan Schmitt interpreted Blum’s observationthatlega & Nolte, & Nolte, himself from argument freedom]. his Mill Humboldt. borrows freedom cannotrequirethat he should own case,the very purpose which is the justification ofallowing himdispose to of himself .Theprinciple of slave, heabdicates his liberty; he forgoes any future use of it beyond that single act. Hetherefore defeats, in his P.McCormick, Liberalism of Critique Schmitt’s The Dilemmas ofDictatorship: CarlSchmitt andConstitutionalEmergency Powersin For details on debate over skepticism about all viewpoints as saving the value of freedom seeFN 64 in Fox, Fox& Nolte cite thefollowing piece from JohnStuart Mill, This could also be referred to asthe ‘paradox of democracy’ explained earlier in this Chapter. Fora detailed account of Carl Schmitt’s theory of In otherwords,ademocratic constitution Another setof argumentsrelated toth supra note 56, at 16. at16. 56, note Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Schmitt’sof Liberalism Carl Critique 217-251 (1998) John P. McCormick, P.McCormick, John (1998) 217-251 the SecondWorld War,andtheneedforsuchphenomenonis

selling himself intoslavery. ng allvotersandkind be free not to be free. It is not freedom, to be allowed to alienate his oftheunalterablecore of of thecurrent constitutional structures. ncies democracies shouldbehaveaccordingly. (1999). (1999). 125

40 emergency powers see forexample John P. McCormick, ng (theideaimplemented fully byHitler’s

arguments overimportant publicissuescannot ation topreventthesuspensionandalteration and replaced bytheexecutiveorders). Carl lity takesvacation duringthewardifferently in constitutionaltheory the people’s will better than parliamentary of intolerantpolitical e possiblejustification of themilitant should notbeasuicidepactand s oftheirassociati On Liberty 124 Inthesame lineofarguments, theconstitutionwaswidely (1962): By selling himself for a for By himself selling (1962): Emergency Powers foralongtime now, players(inabroad ons). The intolerant ons). Theintolerant LawasPolitics.Carl 123 Aparallelcan , in John John , in 122

CEU eTD Collection 129 128 127 126 reasons dictate soandleaddemocracy towardsaprecautionary character. Moreover, democracy isoften otherwise doesnotmake sensean instinct of democratic self-preservation isinherent tothe natureof thedemocracy which opportunity todeform democracy a andestabl can bejustifiedonasimilar stand. who claims thatthe state’smost natural charact matters ofsocialandpolitic or democracies facinginternalstrugglebetw there isnotmuchconfidence thatthe same shouldhappeneasilyintransitional democracies liberty of conscience. While thisargument might Rawls believesthatinmostcasesintolerant citizens, ingeneral, should rely on thepow considerable risks toour legitimate interests.” position onthismatter, Rawlsargues thatintolerance ispermitted butonlyif thereare “some toleration of the intolerant from theperspectiv invoked forthesakeofpreservationtolera “unlimited tolerance must lead tothe disappearance of tolerance.” players. Aswasalreadymentioned earlierinthischapter,KarlPopper claimedthat reaction from thesideof democracy isjustified bythemere presence of intolerant political democracy 213 (2004). (2004). 213 democracy Ibid., at 215. Andras Sajo, &Nolte, Fox Popper, The finalargument from themost recent work supra note546. 9,at supra Militant democracy and Transition Towards Democracy Towards Transition and democracy Militant note 56, at 18. note 56, at al life(i.e.religious,et

less self-sensitive wherespecific historical experience and d issubjected tothe threat of 128 Democracy basedonmajority rulemight givean

groups willlose theirintolerance andacceptthe 41 er of theirdemocratic institutions. Moreover, een differentgroupsofcitizensovervarious e ofjustice.As FoxandNolte summarize his 127 eristic is self-defense and militant democracy ish aregime thatdissolvesdemocracy. The nce. JohnRawlsexamines theproblem of Unlessthereareanythreatsofthiskind, hnic, nationalgroups,etc). bevalidforstabledemocratic regimes, s tobe mentioned hereisAndrasSajo beingoverthrownfrom inside. , in Andras Sajo (Ed.), Militant (Ed.),Militant AndrasSajo , in 126 Intolerancecouldbe 129

CEU eTD Collection 130 freedoms underthe militant democracy rational. Thisreaction of democracy is explained by democracy, citizensandtheirassociationsaresa democratic rules. So,unless someone intends tousedemocratic instit majority decisions. Militant democracy meas developments isthatdemocracybecomes substa be abolished andreplacedwithanotherregime. Theonlypossibility toprevent such that amajority willnotdecide tovoteonedaythatatyrant shouldruleanddemocracy should democratic states. in KarlLoewenstein’sessays,politicalpopulis major namely ofdemocracy, enemy thepolitics democracy shouldoverstepitslegalisticblindne for thepurposetodestroydemocraticorder. fundamentalism might develop poli such buthascertainproblems andweakpoints. democracy cantaketowards itspotential enemies. were interpreted intheconstitutional jurisprudence of various democracies. part ofthisprojectinordertoreconcile for analysisofthefollowingcase-studychapters case. Thejustification of militant democracy meas Democracyin Central and EasternEurope Eastern Europe seeGrigorij Meseznikov, Olga Gyarfasova and Daniel Smilov, Andras Sajo, 71-74Militant Democracy (2004).Foradetailedaccountof example, ChantalMouffe, For example, right-wing populism is present in the political environment of some European states.See, for some of European environment the political in ispresent example, right-wing For populism Therefore, a militant democracy justification iscontext-dependant ineach particular To sum up, constitutional theory offers 130 Furthermore, apurelyprocedural The Limits of Liberal Pluralism: Towards an Agonistic Multipolar World Order, in

tical technologiesadjustedtosuchphenomenon anduseit (2008). (2008). theory andpracticeseehowabovearguments

42 ures areinvokedonly m isstillatroublingfeatureofmany modern of emotions. While thisenemy wasidentified fe from beingsuppressedandlimited intheir Thosebeingawareofideasdemocratic ss andbepreparedto Inordertoavoidsuchunfortunateevents, ntive andtakesintoaccountthecontentof andwillbesummarized intheconcluding ures invoked inpracticewouldbeanissue few justifications for the militant stand First of all,democracy isagreatideaas view ofdemocracy cannotguarantee populist politicsin Centraland Populist Politics and Liberal and Politics Populist towards disrespecting utions toabolish the neutralize oneofthe CEU eTD Collection Democracy 130-132 (2004); Thiel, (2004); 130-132 Democracy 132 131 Communism orFascismwillhittheworldand existence of democracy in the foreseeable proved bythetragic events of thepast.While itisvery unlikelythatsomething like the necessity tohavecertainself-preservati realistic especially foryoung andtransitional democracies. the electoral and measures of a‘militant’ provenance and(mainly or is endangered.Theideathat“democracy should alternatives tomilitant democracy inthebusiness of rescuing democracy whenitsexistence both dictatedbythepractice.Thefirstobservation damage orevenabolishademocracy. and stopthem beforeanintolerantminority empow structures andtheultimategoa preventive natureof themilitant democracy democracy withoutthesupportor structureand weaknesses ofthedemocratic minority.’ Therewereexamples inthepast majority decisions, but alsoprevent thesituat could bedetrimental fordemocracy. paradox oftolerancewhich m Niesen, Forexample,Peter Niesenargues that‘Civic Society’ Thiel, supra There aretwo final pointsrelevant to thedebateonmilitant democracy’s justification, However, militantdemocracy canimpose so supra note 82. See also Gunter Frankenberg, Sovereign the Learning note 92, at 417. at417. 92, note political processes” supra

l ofprotectingrightsanddignitycan‘filter’suchmovements eans thatunlimited tolerancetowardsdemocracy’s enemies note 92, at 417-421. at note92, 417-421. consentofthemajority (i.e.theWeimar Republic).The 131 isofcourseverydesi

43 on measures indemocratic constitutions was managed tograspthepowerandabolish should be a new desirable paradigm forparty ban. See ion ofthe‘majority capturedbyintolerant refrainfromproviding whenintolerant minorities utilized the aimed atpreservation of thedemocratic is thatatthemoment therearenorealistic me limits notonlyonthesubstanceof ers itselftothedegree solely) rely onself-regulative powers of 132 Thesecondobservationisthat rable, butdoesnotsound in Andras Sajo (Ed.), Militant (Ed.), Militant Sajo Andras in legal regulationsand where itisableto CEU eTD Collection 134 133 International 1.2.2. opportunities forrestrictingrights.” concept aslongitis“capableofexcluding past, andabsence of any realistic alternatives physical attacksfrom withinandoutside.Theref only structure ofthestate,eventhough itisnot yetcompletely the lastcouple ofdecades havedemonstrated future andnodeclarationofrightsriskstoda the question of militant democracy wasgivenby FoxandNolteintheir famous article on often, butthefirstcomprehens states duetotheirpar militant character of ademocracy beconsidered a positiveobligation imposed ondemocratic on whetherdemocracy shouldresorttomilitant well withinalegitimate curiosity toaskif this domain ofhuman rightsprotectio more prominent role in theconstitutional deve concerned thejustificationforse practical justification for militant democracy measures todate. However, both parts Previous sectionshadthepurposeof summing up andanalyzingthestandardtheoretical domestic legalsystems. Asitisawell-knownfact Sajo, Sanchez,

supra at211. note 128, The same questionisbeingraisedanddisc The supra noteat 52,6.

Militant Treaties: ticipation invarious international treaties?

Character Additional

ive contemporary accountofthe lf-defensive democracyfromthe n andadherence todemocratic principles in general), itis 134

of

Grounds

Democracy

44 y tobetransformed intoa‘suicidepact’; fieldoflawoffersanyguidelineorsuggestions thatdemocracy isacceptedworldwideasthe , militant democracy appears tobe ajustified conceptually andinstitu democracy measures. Inother words, canthe lopment ofmoderndemo forMilitant ore, keepinginmind thetragediesof thatpublicinternat ussed recently inlegal scholarship quite

as

an Democracy securedfrom ideologicaland

state ofinternationallawon Obligation point of view of national or point ofviewnationalor ional lawisplayinga tionally the abuseof cracies (i.e.inthe Justification?

Imposed 133

as by

CEU eTD Collection 140 guiLanguage=en 139 138 137 136 135 Copenhagen criteria) additional supportofthisargum of rightsestablishedbythehuman rights “democracy” used bythe ICCPRdescribesatr other similar limitation clausesandadopttheconc may berestrictedwhen“necessary indemocratic society.” Political Rights international law.Forexample, Article22(2) of the argument that asubstantive standofdemocracy at thesame time itdoesnotentire authors claim thatinternational lawingenera international communitytomaintain democratic government. Astothefirstquery, the substantiveorproceduralview ofdemo intolerant democracies. http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?refer at Available ofminorities.” protection and respectfor and rights human law, of rule democracy, the guaranteeing institutions of stability achieved has country the candidate requires that “Membership that in The Ronald. St. J. MacDonald & John .P. Humphry (Eds.), Practice of Freedom 137, 147 (1979). Humphry, Hu of Declaration the Universal by enunciated rights Humphry suggeststhat“the General Assemblymeant bydemocratic societythekind International Law: Essays in Honour (Thomas Buergent Rights Instruments:ClauseThe a “In Democratic L.Societyin Sohn, B., 23ContemporaryIssuesin than thosewhichareprescribed by Europe must acceptthe principles ofthe rule oflaw and of on members of the armed forces and of the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This article national security orpublic safety, public order ( Statute ofthe Council ofEurope adopted on the 5 Conc 1993. June 21-22 Copenhagen, in Council European &Nolte, Fox at 38. Ibid., Fox &Nolte, supra noteat 56, 38-59, 59-68. Article 22(2) There arefewexamples from internationaltr The Just Requirements of Morality, Public Order and The General Welfare in a Democratic Society inaDemocratic Welfare General The and Order Public Morality, of Just Requirements The supra oftheICCPRreadsasfollow:“No restrictions ma . (ICCPR)isconsidered asproviding atypical example thatcertainkey rights note 56, at 39. Authors refer to Oscar M. Garibaldi, 139 135 andtheCouncilofEuropemembership requirement. Theydiscuss,atlength,ifc

law andwhichare necessary inademo ent canbefoundintheEU ly rejecttheproceduralview. police in their exercise their exercise of this right.” in police ordre public instruments isrespected inpractice. ence=DOC/93/3&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN& th

of May, 1949. May, 1949. of 45 l favors thesubstantive aditional Western societyinwhich thepanoply man Rightsarerecognized cracy andif there isan obligation tothe hal ed., 1984) andalso mention that similarly. John theenjoyment byallperson is more welcomed thanprocedural in public shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions restrictions of lawful imposition the prevent not shall lusion ofOscarGaribaldithatthenotion ), the protection of public health ormorals orthe lusion of the Presidency. Article 7(A) (iii) states (iii)states Article7(A) the Presidency. of lusion eaties that can be cited in support of the eaties thatcanbecitedinsupportofthe International CovenantonCiviland ontemporary international lawfavors y beplacedontheexercise ofthis right other Article 3 137 accession criteria(knownasthe On the Ideological Content of Human 136 Further,the authorsrefer to

: Everymember of cratic society in the interests of of interests the in cratic society view ofdemocracy, but s within itsjurisdiction of and respected.” JohnP. of society in which the the which in ofsociety 140 138 the Council of of Council the Thisview, Moreover, , CEU eTD Collection Covenant. for in thepresent is provided a than to greater extent limitation at their or herein recognized freedoms and rights group or person any right to engage in any activity orperform any act aimed at the destruction of any ofthe ICCPR. political parties andgroups combined withthe 144 143 142 141 to fulfil the provisions of Articlemay 3 beinvited to becomemember a ofthe Council ofEurope of the Council as specified in Chapter I. human rightsand fundamental freedoms, rights’ limitations. However, itstilldoesnotanswerth legitimacy oftheconcept democracy issupportedtosome extendbypublic international human rightsstanda speech. Rights (ECHR) doesnotseeasaproblem in hate speechanddangerousreligiousmovements. protection legislation. anti-democratic partiesandstatescandoit states ofemergency,theconclusi 5 provisionsthroughthenotionsof question ofwhetherdemocracycan legitimately limit rightsof anti-democratic actors. however, ledtotheconclusionthathuman rights instruments donotdirectlyanswerthe as frommay suchdateastheCommittee determine. does not comply withthis request, the Committeemay d of representation and requested by the Committee ofMinisters to withdraw under Article 7.Ifsuchmember Any member ofthe Council ofEurope which hasseriously violated Articlemay 3 besuspended from its rights protection of Article 10 by Article 17.” established historical facts – such asthe Holocaust -whose negation or revision would beremoved from the could not beallowed toenjoy the protection afforded un any other remark directed against the Convention's underlying values, the justification of apro-Nazi policy of Human Rights reminded that freedom ofexpression has limits anddeclared that “there is nodoubt that, like For example, in Garaudy v. France Admissibility D Admissibility France v. Garaudy example, in For &Nolte, Fox &Nolte, Fox Article 5(1 Therefore, Fox andNolteseekforthe answer 144 142 Therefore, militant democracy measures at AfterananalysisoftheUNandregional ) reads as follows:Nothingin the present Covenant supra note 56 supra note 56, at 59. note 56, at 143 Aparallelcanbemade herewith , at 39. , at as longitispracticed on isthat public international law allows for actions against rds anditmight beconcluded Article 4 andcollaboratesincerely and effec abuseclause,standardsof : Any European State which is deemed to be able and willing andwilling able isbe to deemed Statewhich European : Any

46 ecision (Application No. 65831/01) the European Court Court European the No. 65831/01) (Application ecision pre-emptively byenactingdemocracy’s self- der Article 10” andthatthere is “a category [of] clearly ecide thatit has ceasedtobe a member ofthe Council ‘abuse clause’providedinArticle5(1)ofthe the prohibitionofpr Forexample, theEuropean Courtof Human international law.This findingaddstothe withinthegeneralru practices inconjunction with theArticle intheevaluationof least donotfall into contradiction with e questionifdemocrat may be interpreted as implying for any State, anyState, for asimplying interpreted may be widelyacceptedprohibitionof reasonableness, necessity,and tively in the realisation of the aim of aim the realisation the in tively that asubstantiveviewof ovocative and offensive les andprinciplesof practiceofbanning ic states havean . Article8 141

:

CEU eTD Collection measures as maybe necessary togive effect to of theprovisions with and processes itsconstitutional with 147 146 145 range ofresponsestoauthor arrive tothe conclusion that much helpastheydescribestateobligationat parties toadoptlegislativeandothermeas enact appropriate preventivemeasures tocomp under publicinternationallaw,it to elections. However,evenif weestablish that dutynot toabolish democratic ruleexists to protecttheir democracies in this rule.Thisargument might bedevelopedfurthe protect their democratic systems from potentia to “holdgenuineperiodicelections.” slavery). things arenotallowedeveniftheyapprov provisions ininternationalhuman rightstreatiessendaverystrong want tolive inademocracy formed bytheconstitutional ’suicide pact.’ However, some adopt. Thegeneralobservationisthat citizensof the peopleof aparticularnationonwhatkindof to enact self-protection obligation topreservedemocracies intheirhomelands, andifastatepartymight berequested othermeasures, eachStatePartytothepresent Covenant Fox &Nolte, supra noteat 56, 69. I.e.Article 2(2) I.e. Article 25(b) In thislineofargumentation, FoxandNolte Fox andNoltealsotriedtoanswerwhether of the ICCPR which requires that “Where not already provided for by existing legislative or of the ICCPR or Article 3 of the Protocol 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights. Rights. on Human Convention tothe European 1 Protocol the 3of theor ICCPR Article of legislative measures. itarian movements itshouldnot

“while theinternational commun generalfrom overthrowingitse does notautomatically followthatstatescanberequiredto 145 the rights recognized inthe presentCovenant.” Therefore,itmeans thatst ures togiveeffectthelistedrights

47 a verygenerallevel.Intheend,FoxandNolte l rulerswhowouldbeattempting toabolish ly withthisduty.Provisionsrequiringstate undertakes totakethen constitution andsocialcontracttheyshould ed bythepolitical majority (i.e. torture or eachstateshoulddecidethemselves ifthey the present Covenant, to adopt such laws or other other lawsor such adopt to present Covenant, the r totheextent thatst the international community candictate to bring anexample ofaninternationalduty dictateachoiceamong them.” lf andnotonlywhenitcomes ity may defineapermissible ates are obliged atleast to ecessary steps,inaccordance ate parties are obliged message that certain 146 donotoffer 147

CEU eTD Collection State.” fundamental freedoms, andtheruleoflaw, “Union isfoundedontheprinciplesofliberty Treaty oftheEuropeanUnion subjected tocertainsanctions.Theissuecame Union wherewecanfinddutytotakedemocracy- acceptance ofsuchpractices isanadditional ar duty imposed oncontractingparties to enact militant democracy measures, themere political paritiesendorsedinc approved andallowedthepracticeofadefensivedemocracy, The major lessonfrom thispiece of jurispr forfeiture offundamental rightsconcept fam this section.MarkusThielisof stormed political and legal debate butalsooffered some solutionstothe questionat stakein 149 148 did haveseveralpartybandecisionsbeforetheRefah and controversialjudgment onthe freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which ar which law, principles of andthe rule freedoms, The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental and the Treaty establishing theEurop between women and men prevail. non-dis pluralism, which in asociety States in Member the to to Thesevaluesarecommon minorities. including rights persons for human rights, of belonging the fre respectfor dignity, human of values the on founded provision can befound in Article 2ofthe current version ofthe Treaty onEuropean Union: TheUnion is Former To be discussed in details in Chapter 3.3, at 122. 149 A more rewarding move toanswerourques Fox andNoltepublishedtheirarticlesome Incasetheprinciplesarebreached th Article 6(1) (before the adoption of theTreaty of Li

onstitutional legislati wasdrafted.MarkusThielcites ean Community, signedat theopinionthatcasewasd RefahPartisi(Welfare Party) case(however,theECHR e commontothe Member Stat

48 iliar totheGerman militant democracy model. udence according toThielisthattheECHR principles whicharecommon totheMember gument formilitantde edom, democracy, equality, the rule of lawandrespect of rule the edom, equality, democracy, crimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality equality and solidarity justice, tolerance, crimination, , democracy, respectforhuman rightsand to the stage as early as in 1992 when the to thestageasearlyin1992when e Member Statemight besuspended from protecting measures and time beforethe ECHRadopteditsfamous on. While itdoes notprovethatthereisa tion istotakea Lisbon, 13December 2007) read asfollows:1. sbon amending the Treaty on European Union

case, too). including thepossibilitytoban ecided inthesame stanceasa Article 6(1)whichstatesthat 148 mocracy justification. Thejudgment notonly look attheEuropean es. Similar but modified failure todosois CEU eTD Collection 155 154 153 152 151 150 However, asO’Connelclaims, theCourt “alsowentontoindicatethatsuchaconclusionwas to outlawtheBatasunaPartydue obligation tobancertainparties. argues that theCourt’s judgment seems toe recently decided case from Spainon theprohibition ofthe Batasuna Party. in general withinthesame veinof argument as EvaBrems’ comparison. by aracistpoliticalagendaandmotives. Rory expected tobeextended tothe prohibition of politi requires statestoproscriberacistorganizations. that Article 4 of the in democracy’s survival inamember state. indirectly oblige themember states toreactan not onlyawareofpossiblethreatstothefu some ofitsrights. in aDemocracy in by law”. punishable asan offence oractivities organizations such incite racial promote and which activities, propaganda other (2006). 131 Europe Century in 21st Under Stress Rights Political (Ed.), Treaties shallin any casecontinue to be binding on that State. rights andobligations ofnatural andlegal persons. Th account take into shall the Council so, In doing Council. the repres rightsof voting the including question, State in certainoftherights de to suspend maydecide majority, observations. (3): adeterminationWhere under paragraph 2hasbeen made, the Council, acting by aqualified theto valuesreferred in MemberArticle 2, Stateof may the determine Parliament, European the of consent unanimity on a proposal by one third of the Member States or by the Commission and after obtaining the establishing theEuropean Community O’Connell, 25817/04. No. 25803/04, Applications Batasunav Spain (2009), Herri O’Connel, Rory the Closures Eva and of Question Party Brems, Association of Political Freedom Article 7(2) Articles 4(b) Another interestingaccount oftheproblem isgivenbyEvaBrems supra as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty onEuropean Union and the Treaty , 61 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 3 (2010). (2010). 3 Quarterly Legal Ireland Northern 61 , impose obligation to “declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and also organized and all and organized also and organizations, prohibit and illegal “declare to obligation impose Realising Political Equality: the European Court of Human Rights and Positive Obligations Obligations Positive and Rights Human of Court European the Equality: Political Realising note 153, at 277. at277. note 153, 150 Therefore,thepossibilityofsuchsa Convention on theElimination of al

, signedatLisbon, 13 December 2007 155 tothepresenceofevidence TheStrasbourgCourtaccepted

after inviting the Member State in question to submit its to its submit question Statein the Member after inviting 49 e obligations of the Member State in question under the the under question in State oftheMember e obligations riving from the application of the Treaties to the the oftheMember Treatiesto riving from application the d provide defensivelegal O’Connelprovidesanotherexample whichis the possible consequences ofsuch a suspension on the nvisage the possibilitytoimpose positive a ndamental principles ofdemocracy butcan entative ofthe government of existence of a serious and persistent breach by a discrimination, and shall recognize participation in participation recognize shall and discrimination, 152 cal parties, atleast incase theyare driven Thisrequirement canlegitimately be nctions demonstrates thattheEU is l FormofRacialDiscrimination supportforpoliticalviolence. : The European Council acting by thegovernmental actions that Member State in the thatMember Stateinthe mechanisms toassist , in Wojciech Sadurski Sadurski Wojciech in , 151 153 who emphasizes whoemphasizes Hebringsthe 154 O’Connel

CEU eTD Collection structure crucialforthe veryexistence of militant democracyaims toprotectthe‘core of theconstitution,’or thebasicconstitutional further examined inordertoseeifitaddsanyt Therefore, theissueofobjectprotecti One ofthegrounds formilitant democracyjustifica Additional 157 156 1.2.3. protect democracy. be assessedonacase-by-casebasisbutingenera international obligations.Theconsistencywith rules toconclude thatmilitant democracy measur international lawpromotes ara measure otherhuman rightstreaties’provisi the European Unionisaspecific international or least in certain cases and incertain internationa However, therearesome signsofmovingtoward measures canbeperceivedas the statemay haveadutyto legitimacy to the national authorities actions),bu positive obligationtobantheparty (andmost though thatparagraph82oftheju in accordance withthe state’spositive obligations.” Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., at 278.

To sum up,scholars seemtobecautiousand Militant Argument

Democracy:

in Favorof ban certainpoliticalparties.”

ther substantiveviewofdemo

positiveobligations Distinct dgment should notbereadasan Militant

on and purposeofmilitant democracyshouldbe Object

the state,andfunctioningasademocracy. To 50 Democracy hing tothe justification internationalhuman rightsstandardsshould ons from stand).Nevertheless,public this l institutions (while itmust be accepted that s the development of such an obligation, at s thedevelopment anobligation,at ofsuch t “leaves open thepossibility toargue that probably theCourtsaidsoto addthe ganization; thereforeit

l statesareallowedto utilizemeasures to es assuch are contradictory to thestates tion isthespecialobj and skeptical tostatethatmilitant democracy imposed bypublicinternationallaw. 156

Thereaderisimmediately warned 157 Purpose

Justification? cracy anddoes notcontainany explicitdeclarationofthe

of debate. In vague terms debate. Invagueterms

the ect ofitsprotection. isnotdesirableto

Protection

as

CEU eTD Collection 159 158 defined thenotionof‘freedemocratic basic ‘eternity clause’ of Article79(3). Moreover, the textofconstitution(i.e.Article18,21(2) and91(1)iscongruentwiththeso-called so-called ‘freedemocratic basicorder.’ Thisex Law alsoclarifies whatmilitant democracystands the constitutionandlocalconditi defines andunderstandsthe‘coreof elaborate on thisissuefrom thepoint of view of constitutional theory isnot easy aseach state own: theBasicLawismore‘militant’ thatthesum of itsmilitant elements.” emblematic character. Ratherit“isaconstituti militant democracystate. In Germany, militanc constitution (BasicLaw)of1949andthedocument Theeasiestandthemost logicalanswertothequestionposedabovecanbefoundin Germany. Thedoctrineofmilitant democracywas incorporated inthedemocratic here. democratic regimes. Therefore, some reference totheconstitutional practices isinevitable Jurisprudencethe ofFederal RepublicGermany of Thiel, Thiel, Forelaborated account see e.g. Thiel, powers; responsibilityofgovernment; lawfulnessofad of separation free development; lifeand to aperson right BasicLaw,in forthe particular of the in fundamental principles of this order include at least: respect forthe human rights given concrete form The equality. a freedomand majorityupon and the existing willof the by asexpressed the people of arbitrariness and represents a governmental system und The free democratic basic order can be defined asan order which excludes any form oftyranny or multi party principle; and equality of opportunities for all political parties. forallpolitical opportunities equalityof and principle; multi party supra note 158, at 116. at 116. 158, note

ons, includingpastexperience theconstitution’initsown supra note 158, at 115; Donald P. Kommers, 217 (1997). (1997). 217 order’ asearly1952inthefollowingway:

51 theFederal Constitutional Courtof Germany onal principlewithasu pression isdirectlymentioned afewtimes in for, andwhatitisintended topreserve; the y does nothaveasolelydescriptive or spells outpreciselywhat itmeans tobea ministration; independence er a rule of law, based upon self oflaw,based upon determination er arule way influencedbythetextof of totalitarianandothernon- 159 bstantive content of its

158 of the judiciary;the The Constitutional Constitutional The German Basic CEU eTD Collection 161 160 democracy measures andtheobjectofprotec state’ andtherefore, their constitutions doe Unlike Germany, notmanymodern democracies declare themselves asa‘militant democracy to overthrowthedemocraticorder. democracy ingeneralsincethefunctioningof political participation. to create and preservea politicalspace where democracy istoensurethatdemocratic proce power onfairandappropriateterms.” and sustaingroundrules ofpoliticalcompetition th participation. the majority andfor thattheymust enjoyaco Substantivedemocracy wheremajority rule that majorities arefluid.Followingthisassumpti participation ina way compatible withthe‘free democratic basic order.’ rightsascitizens on fundamental where ultimate endishuman dignityandfreedom individual rightsdirect Therefore,from thisexplanationitis conclusions. First, militant democracy protectscer Theory Working Papers (2010). Richard Pildes, &Nolte, Fox To identify the‘core of theconstitution’in 160 supra supra Attheend, acentral task for modern constitutionalism is“toseektopreserve Political PartiesandConstitutionalism note 56,16. at This taskextendsfurthertothe ly (notingthatatth

and theirgroupsareexpected 161 Therefore, themoreprecise taskof militant e endprotectionofdemo

52 dures arenotanendinthemselves butameans s notcontain adirect reference to militant democratic procedures citizens enjoy essentialrightsformeaningful possibletodrawatleast two important re ofpoliticalrightsthat ensureseffective on, citizensshouldbeabletojoinorrejoin tion. Some constitutionscontainseparate , 179 New York University Public Law and Legal LawandLegal Public , University 179 New York ). Secondly,itimposes certainlimitations ismeaningfulbasedontheassumption tain qualities of the at enablepartiesto otherjurisdictionsisnotaneasytask. more generalmission ofpreservinga to behaveintheirpolitical would preventattempts cracy isaboutrights, compete forpolitical state rather thanan CEU eTD Collection Force of the Constitution . the Constitution Force of order’. 165 nationale.fr/english/8ab.asp 164 163 162 Amendment might qualify somehow asamilitant democracy measure protecting the secular not unusualandeveninthe religion tobe presentin public.While theprin minorities. Theprinciple of secularism wasinterpreted inawaytodenyanypossibilityof the 1929 Turkey endedupdenyingtheexistenceofany and thestate’s territorial integrity. Constitution andoverallpoliticalproject isparticularly keen ontheprincipleof secularism militant democracy measures.For example, Turkeyisaninteresting example asits differences inwhatdemocraciesperceiveas Constitutional Courtreferred toas‘free democra many other principles,thelistofwhichwouldbeclose towhattheGerman Federal amendable characterof the ‘republicanform ofgovernment’ probablyassumes toinclude abolishing therepublicanform ofgovernment. for thedemocraticorder. Forexample, the norms invarious jurisdictions exactly through th parts ofthe text.Nevertheless, themilitant chapters orpartscalle arrangement. IX Function Powerand VIII. Executive IV. Irrevocable Provisions V. Fundamental Aims and Duties of the State VI. Sovereignty VII. Legislative Power the Stat of III. the Republic Integrity of Characteristics Full text of the Constitution available at the National Assembly website:http://www.assemblee- National atthe available Constitution of the text Full For details see Chapter 4.2, at 208. 4.2, For seeChapter details ofsuch illustration Articles isa valid 16 of consists which Constitution Russian ofthe 1 Chapter Forexamplein Turkey.Part 1‘General Principles co Article 89 163 Insuchcasesthe coreoftheconstituti Treaty ofLausanne reads as follows: The republican form of govern

d ‘generalprinciples’

andimposing seriouslimitations onreligiousandethnic . Before Power Judicial X. Equality United Statesthenon-establis 165 Underthesloganofprotec core principleswhichshouldbeguardedthrough democracy logic can betracedin constitutional

53 e, Official Language, Flag, National Anthem, and Capital Capital Anthem, and Flag, National e, Official Language, 1958 constitutionofFran 162 ciple ofseparationpoliticsandreligionis minorities apartfrom theonesmentioned in e accentuating ofcertainprinciples ascrucial nsists of eleven articles’:I.Form eleven nsists of oftheStateII. tic basic order’. There arealso substantial on could,probably,bederivedfromsuch or ‘fundamentals of the constitutional or‘fundamentalsofthe 164 ment shall not be the obj the notbe ment shall While Article89isbrief,thenon- the Law XI. Supremacy and Binding Law Binding the XI. Supremacy and hment clauseoftheFirst ting thestate’sintegrity ce preciselyforbids ect ofanyamendment. CEU eTD Collection (2006). The Constitution of Poland is a good illustration of such a policy: such of illustration isagood of Poland Constitution The (2006). secrecy oftheir own structure or application of violence for the purpose of obtaining power or to influence the State policy, or provide for the programme whose well asthose as communism, fascism and organizations whoseprogrammesare 168 167 166 violent riots, natural disasters, open callstoviolence, formation of paramilitary forces, etc. some concreteactionsoccur.Militantdemo prevent possibleharm todemocracy throughpreven Militant democracy aims toprotect the cons different from publicorder andnationalsecurit and/or ethnic affiliation. the typeofpoliticalpartiesprohibitedfrom pol became aseriousconcernformany western-type protection of thesecular character previously knownenemies tohaveanother militant democracywouldveryoftenattempt to democracy frombeingoccupiedbythe incorporated militant democracy measures intheirnew constitutionstoprotecttheir of enemies it wishestoeliminate. Forexam also worthmentioning here,mainly forits allowing seriouslimitations ofrightswithoutpr character of the state. Nevertheless, some jurisdictions interpret thecore of theconstitution as available at state powe of usurpation violent the seek which parties democracies. social structure, butprobab preserving peace and democratic order in a country like India should be extremely difficult dueto its diverse Article 356 of the Indian constitution in powersconstitutionalized example, emergency For in itscontent. be could constitution’ the ‘coreof different Seeforexample For seeSajo, details militant emergencyfrom astate isdifferent of While Additionally, the object of militant democracy http://www.online.bg/law/const/const1.htm Article 11(4) Article supra note 128; WojciechSadurski, ly the State interprets the the es of‘core principl Stateinterprets democracy’ly the broader than many other 168

membership, shall be prohibited. prohibited. be shall membership, : There shall be no political parties on ethnic, racial or religious lines, nor lines, religious nor racialor ethnic, on parties political no be shall : There

were invoked in peace times about 100times already. While thetaskof based upontotalitarianmethods and ofthestateandstrictsepa previous rulers,i.e.communists. emergenc

54 . cracy cannot helpto protect society against y. Themilitant standof democracy isaimed to chance toharm thesystem. Moreover,the ple, many post-communist Europeanstates democracy, in the case of India it demonstrates how how itdemonstrates thecaseofIndia democracy, in r in Bulgaria. Constitution of Bulgaria in English is is in English of Bulgaria Constitution Bulgaria. r in itics, i.e.political partiesbasedonreligious protect the status quoinordertopreventthe oper justification.Theexample ofIndiais democracies. Thiscan beconcluded from s or activities sanction racial or national hatred, the the hatred, national racialor sanction activities or s Political Under Stress in the 21st Century Europe the Century in 21st UnderStress Political tive actions,i.e.takenbeforethethreator y situationprovisionsandpractice. titutional security of thestate,which is measurescanbetraced from thetypes Article 13 ration ofpoliticsandreligion the modes ofactivityNazism, : Political parties and and : other parties Political 167 Inotherwords, 166

CEU eTD Collection since ancient times. the fundamental questions ofpoliticaltheory, democratic state,also due tothe factthatth scope of militant democracy protection woul (as wellasmany otherconcernsand puzzlesre expressions. Therefore,theanswerto thisqu Tosum up,constitutionaltheorydoesnot exactly militant democracy protects andwhatit would provoketheattention of allowing them toleave freely pre-established speech, association,religion,etc. Therefore, anymovement thatintendstoesta 170 169 practices fromvariousstates. protection should beinvestigated more car protection of newqualitiesof thestate.Therefore, theissueof militant democracy’s object of new typesofthreatsand therefore,anewcircle democracy practiceinrecentyearssentthe further the taskof defining whatmilitant could offer variousjustifications tointroduce ensure allindividualsareabletomake choices democracy’s major concern istotake careof the possible abuse of political process whileto participation ina society’slife initsbroadse Militant democracy is calledtosecure cons Fox & Nolte, &Nolte, Fox Sajo, supra at210. note 128, supra supra note 56,2. at 170 Thefactthatmilitant democracy iscontext-sensitive andeachstate

militant democracy measures. ) aregime whereindividualswouldbedeniedexitrights democracy exactly protects. Moreover,militant estion shouldbesoughtinconstitutional practice

e definitionof‘democracy’ stillremains oneof blish throughdemocratic means(i.e.freedomof message ofbeingpotentiallyextended towards 55 militant democracy measures complicates even engaging statesmen andphilosophersindebate efully through case-study ofconstitutional lated tothemilitant democracy concept).The and coercive forms of nse, i.e.notonlytheright tovote.Militant titutional comfort inthefield of political ofenemies ofdemocracy might leadtothe protects from, apartfrom vaguephrasesand instructuring their forms of sociallife. d be,most probably, different inevery offer much clarificati social representation, on interms ofwhat 169

CEU eTD Collection 211 Fox &Nolte, 173 172 171 m Second,thejustificationof its effectiveness.Inpractice, theformer group onlyandtheformerenjoyssa primary processofdecision-making. who disagreewithsome democratic policies contradiction vanishesfurtherifweconsider enjoyment of alldemocraticprivileges desp contradiction if itallows thiscourse of acti being attackedandcouldbepossiblyabolishe the argument thatdemocracy cannot affordtoremain inactivewhenits basicstructuresare can behave inamilitant wayandremain trueto been vehementlycriticizedsinceits establishment. Firstof all, militant democracy seems to extent, namely itlimits rightsandlibertiesinorder tosecure theirexistence. analyzing the practice of militant de chapters. In other words, itis us solutions orresponseto those not tointroduce adetailedaccount ofallthe critique ofthedoctrinefrom th In whatfollowsIwillintroducetheprelim Preliminary Observations 1.2.4. Sajo, Thiel, Seeforexample, Loewenstein,

supra at211. note 128, Militant supra note 92, at 417. at417. 92, note supra note 56

Democracy’s , at 6; , supra

e perspective of itsjustification. Thepurposeof thissection is critical remarks, butrather eful topreparealistofissues note 5, at 431; Pfersmann, Justification mocracy invariousjurisdictions. ilitant democracy intheoryshould notbeconfused with 173 me levelofprotectionasalways. Altogether, militant democracy targets the latter does notpresupposethelatter.OttoPfersmann on from itsenemies andcontinuestoallow the

and thosewhodenyrelianceondemocracy asa 56 that thereisacleardifferencebetweenthose inary observationsonmajor challengesand

challenges the conceptfacesinpracticeand ite theirabusive exercise.Moreover, the itself. This critique couldbeoutweighed by and d. Inotherwords,democracyisinself- beaself-contradicting concept tosome 172

Itisquestionablewhetherdemocracy Major supra to outlinearoadmap further for worthpayingattentiontowhile

note 1,at 52; Sajo, supra noteat 128, Concerns

and 171

Theideahas Challenges:

CEU eTD Collection supra the overallpractice ofmilitant democracy proves repression [...],breadshate.” Furthermore, causeseriousprob preventiveoppressioncanpotentially supported bysubstantialnumber ofvoters(i.e. parties the statemight faceanembarrassing 177 176 175 174 rights areatstake. as oneofthedemocracy’s foundationalprinciplespresupposesjudicialinterferencewhere democracy measures maycome dangerouslyclose account local conditionsandthedegr matter isthatthejudiciaryshouldexamine caref can decideonitandwhoshouldinitiatethepr direct orindirectattackon Third,itishardtodefine an easytask todrawaclearlinebetweenaccep their associational rights willbefollowed bymoreviolence anddisobedience. aggressive tendenciesin (behaviorandreactions), political partiestodevelopaso-called‘spare-party’system. militant democracyledtotheveryunpleasan be surroundedbyvariousdifficultiesaffecting politically and legally. It is important to adm outlined the problem asoneof themajor d measures in 13 jurisdictions, so appears to be somehow reliable and logical. SeeThiel, Suchaconclusion is made in the final chapter ofthe book complied from case-stud This,forexample, co wasaserious at note 128, 214. in Sajo, supra at (1927).Cited US 357, 375 274 v.California, Whitney Kogacioglu, in note note 52. supra note 52, at 435. at 435. 52, note it. Howtodefinethepointwhendemocracy isendangered,who

ncern inrecentNDP part dissolution therightmoment toinvokemilitant democracy. Itisnever ee ofthethreat.Judicialcont 175 Inthecaseofsuppressionpoliticalgroupswith

it thatthe application of militant democracy can 57 ilemmas of militant democracy: how it works and difficultsituationifabannedparty was ul thearguments ofthegovernment, takeinto table critiques ofademocratic regime anda itasaworkableandplausible solution. t politicalclimate andforcedunwelcome ocedure? Apreliminaryocedure? conclusiononthis its effectiveness.Forexample, inTurkey in theinstanceofRefahPartycase). to limiting fundamental there isajustifiedfearthatlimitations of 174 Incaseofbanningpolitical case. For details see Rensmann, in case. Fordetails in seeRensmann, rol isimperative asmilitant ies of militant democracy democracy ies ofmilitant supra lems as“fearbreeds rights. Ruleoflaw note 92, at 417. at417. 92, note 176 However, However, 177

CEU eTD Collection democracy’s adherentstorealizethatdemocracy The unfortunateexperienceofthevictoriousNa Conclusion democracy practicefromvariousjurisdictionsa and practice. Thesearethequestions most scholar Thelistofconcerns is outlined criticalremarks shapethedebatearound themilitant democracy conceptin theory standards ofthepracticestolimit fundamental rightsforthesakeofprotectingademocracy. a roleof preventing political misuse of militant democracy measures and preserving legal motion toimposelimits onsomeone’s politicalpart complying withallproceduralrulesandre party prohibitionandsimilar cases that thepotentialtendencyofgovernments tofor concept isfarfrom beingwitheringaway.Inth addressed laterbythe ECHR;whosejurispr European space, the potential abuseof militant de unwelcomed groups,thejudiciaryshouldbeactiv democracy bytheleadingpoliticalgroupsth ultimate goal of theconstitutional regime. Inordertoprevent thepossible abuseof militant addressed indemocracies where argument againstthemilitant democracyjustific Fourth,militant democracy isaconceptof anextremely political nature; therefore it inevitably posesariskofbeingabusedfo not exhaustiveandcouldbe fundamental rightsareinstituti . Courtsshouldbecautiousin

58 r politicalpurposes.This quirements beforeapprovingagovernment’s nd implications forthetheoreticaldebate. rough silencingpoliticalopponentsorother e same lineofcriticism itcouldbementioned udence proves thatthe militant democracy zi occupationofmany st mocracy atthedomestic levelcouldalsobe ce thecourtstorelax s wouldaddress intheiranalysis of militant cannotstrivewithoutan institutionalized ation. Altogether, it couldbe effectively icipations rights.The judicial control play ely involvedintheprocedure.In prolonged. However,theabove onalized andperc such situationsandinsiston standards ofproofin couldbeaserious ates inthe1930sled eived asthe CEU eTD Collection democracy’ wasturnedmany year overturn or destroydemocracy byutilizingdemocrat opportunities topreservedemocracy bytakingprev project militant democracy wasdefined asalegal andpolitical structure possessing legal democracy todelineate itfrom tolerant consti term ‘militant.’ Therefore, there are atleast afew distinct features of thenotionof militant with their own definition, most of them refer tothesame qualities of democracy added bythe involved inthedebateuponitandrelatedissu concerns and challenges remain unresolved.The ideatoprotect democracy fromitspotential one anddespite thesubstantial constitutional practice on this matter many questions, make sensetomake distinctionbetween amilitant democracy andamilitant democracy state. constitutional theory and practice. debate andnumerous issues arising from the widely discussed angles. Theoverview of the literature demonstrates the intensityof the and, scholarlyworkswhichspeakaboutmilita written andpublishedinresponse and comments onmilitant democracy theorya scholarly workinthisfieldcanbedivided still validnowadays.Astothecontemporary Militant DemocracyandFundamentalRights construction anditsunderstandinginterp means itselfagainst theattacks toprotect of Nevertheless, itisimportant tonotethatth There isnouniversaldefinition ofmilitantdemocracy ag s agointoapracticalcons to constitutionaldevelopment

to threegroups:generaltheoreticalobservations 59 essays,many ofhisarguments andclaimsare presence of themilitant democracy notionin its enemies. While democracy isnotastatic es. While everyauthor theoretical debateonmilitantdemocracy, all tutional democracy.For nd practice;articles, comments andanalysis retation havechangedsinceLoewenstein’s nt democracy, butfromdifferentandnot e term ‘militant democracy’ isstillajarring entive actionsagainstthosewhowantto ic institutions orprocedures. As‘militant titutional phenomenon itdoesnot reed uponbyall in particular would trytocome up the purposeofthis jurisdictions; the scholars CEU eTD Collection 178 However, there aresomeperceivable signs of international law,scholars seem tobecautious abuse ofopportunitiesfo justified concept aslong asitis“capable of excludingconceptually and institutionally the tragedies and theabsence ofanyrealistic democratic constitutionswasprovedbythetragic is endangered.Furthermore,the alternatives tomilitant democracy inthebusiness of rescuing democracy whenitsexistence be abolishedandreplacedwith that amajority willnotdecide tovoteonedaythatatyrant shouldruleanddemocracy should politics ofemotions.Furthermore, apurelypr legalistic blindnessandbepreparedtoneutrali democratic order.Inordertoavoidsuchunf technologies adjustedtosuchphenomenon a points. Thosebeingawareofideasdemocr enemies. theory offers few justifications for themilitant standard justification for militant democracy measures. It wasestablished thatconstitutional practice. Therefore,chapter on was awareof thepossiblecritique of thesolutionhesuggested todemocratic theoryand by itspreventiveandopen-texturednatureisa enemies sounds niceand plausible; however, itis impossible to denythatmilitant democracy Sajo, supra at211. note 128, When itturns tothequestion of militant democracy as adutyimposed bypublic First of all, democracy isa great idea, r restrictingrights.”

another regime. However,atth e tried toinvestigate whatconstitutional theory offers asa necessity to havecertainse 178

60 ortunate events,democracy shouldoverstepits alternatives, militant democracy sounds asa stand democracy cantake towards itspotential ze oneofthemajor the enemies ofdemocracy: ocedural viewofdemocracy cannotguarantee

movingtowardsthedevelopment of suchan rather problematic concept. EvenLoewenstein atic fundamentalism might developpolitical as such,buthascertainproblems andweak nd useitforthepurposetodestroy and skeptical tostate that itactually exists. eventsofthepast.Keepinginmind those e moment therearenorealistic lf-preservation measures in CEU eTD Collection The contradictionvanishes furtherifweconsid abolished. remain inactivewhenits possibly basicstructuresarebeingattackedandcoul d be that thiscritiquecouldbeoutweighedbytheargument thatdemocracy cannotaffordto extent asitlimits rightsandliberties inorder follows. First of all,militantdemocracy appe of thestate. therefore, anewcircleof enemies ofdemocracy recent years sentthemessage ofbeingpotentiallyextendedtowardsnewtypesthreatsand defining whatmilitant democracy exactlyprotects. Moreover, militant democracy practicein justifications tointroduce militant democracy measures complicates even further the taskof The factthatmilitant democracy iscontext- militant democracy protection wouldbe,most pr case-study partwillbecomplete. Atthemoment, itispossibletoarguethatthescopeof democracy protects,thereforethisissueshouldbe constitutional theorydoes notoffer much cl considered asadditionalargument insupportof states areallowedtoutilizemeas international human rightsstandardswouldbe such arecontradictory tothe statesinternational obligations. The consistency with democracy anddoesnot containany rules to c possible toarguethatpublic obligation, atleastincer The major concernsand challengesatthis stage oftheprojectcanbe summarized as Distinct objectandpurpose of theprotection of militant democracy might be tain casesandincertaininternational institutions.Therefore,itis ures toprotectdemocracy. international lawpromotes arathersubstantiveviewof

61 to securetheir existence.However,itis argued assessed onacase-by-casebasisbutingeneral arification in terms of whatexactlymilitant sensitive and eachstate couldoffervarious er thatthere isaclea onclude thatmilitant democracy measures as ars asaself-contradictingconcepttosome might leadtotheprotectionofnewqualities militant democracy justif answeredattheendof theprojectwhen obably, different ineverydemocratic state. r differencebetweenwho ication. In general, CEU eTD Collection democracy practicefromvariousjurisdictionsa and practice. Thesearethequestions most scholar outlined criticalremarks shapethedebatearound themilitant democracy conceptin theory purposes. The listofconcernsis extremely political nature; therefore itinevitably posesariskof beingabusedfor political interference whererights are at stake.Fo The ruleoflawasonedemocracy’s militant democracymeasures may come danger into accountlocalconditionsandthedegreeofth matter isthat the judiciaryshouldexamine car to definethe right moment to invoke militant democracy. Apreliminary conclusion onthis practice ofmilitant democracy proves itaswork 179 problems as“fearbreedsrepressi former doesnotpresupposethelatter.Preven militant democracy intheoryshould notbeconf only andtheformer enjoysthesame levelofpr primary processofdecision-making. Altogether, militant democracytargetsthe lattergroup disagree withsome policiesa democratic From Whitney v. California, 274 US 357, at 375 (1927) as cited in Sajo,

notexhaustiveandcouldbeprolonged.However,theabove on [...],repressionbreadshate.” nd thosewhodenyrelianceondemocracy asa

urth, militant democracy isaconcept of an 62 foundational principles otection asalways.Second, thejustificationof tive oppressioncanpotentiallycauseserious nd implications forthetheoreticaldebate. efully thearguments ofthegovernment,take able andplausible solution.Thirdly,itishard ously closetolimiting fundamental rights. used withitseffectiveness. Inpractice, the s wouldaddress intheiranalysis of militant e threat.Judicialcontrolisimperative as supra note 128,214. at 179 However,theoverall presupposes judicial CEU eTD Collection movements andterrorism. dangerous politicalparties,i.e.threatscoming from religiousfundamentalist growing militant democracylogic is invoked toaddress problems beyondunconstitutionaland extended. The practiceofmany statesandinterna this chapter thatthere aresigns that thear deserves atleastcarefulanalysis and researc but also toarguethatmilitant democracy isaunique constitutional solution and therefore distinction ishelpfulnotonlytodistinguish m distinction betweenother regimes of rights’limitation andmilitant democracy itself. This gain betterunderstanding onthemeasures ofmilit Lowenstein anditwillbe compared against cont enemies. which legalmeasures andinstitutionscouldbeusedtosafeguarddemocracy from its overview willbefollowed bythepresentation of militant democracy arsenal todemonstrate democratic regime suchasin are more or less militant; andthat militating ademocracy becomes anatural feature of democracy practice indifferentjurisdictions in relationtopoliticalparties and beyond.Thest In whatfollows Iwillprovide an overview Introduction MILITANT The analysis hastobegin withthemilitant democracy arsenal asintroduced byKarl

DEMOCRACY stitutions ofrepresen PARTIES IN

PRACTICE: CHAPTER

AND of thepractice of militant democracy worldwide

senal of militant democracy measures isbeing h. Moreover,itseems reasonabletomention in 63 ilitant democracy measures from otherregimes, supportoftheargument thatalldemocracies emporary constitutional practices.In orderto arting point isaconcise overviewofmilitant tional judicialinstituti

ant democracy arsenal itisusefultomake a BEYOND

tation andthesepara 2:

PROHIBITION

ons demonstratesthat OF tion ofpowers. The

POLITICAL

CEU eTD Collection appropriate solutionforalre democracy givesmore chancesfortransitional 184 183 182 181 180 Korea and Chinawhich tooksome inspirationfrom theGerman model ofmilitant scale ofdegree withother forms ofdemocracy. democracies are always moreorless militant as norms andpreambles. reference to themilitant characterof astateit constitution completely lackingmilitant democrac The constitutional practice 2.1 OverviewofMilitantDemocrac only. some scholars even argue that militant democr was fullyincorporated inmany constitutions ofpost-communistEuropean countries to democracy must incorporate militant features intheir democraticsystem. practice. The ‘foundingfarther’ofmilitant demo constitutionalism isofgreatrelevance fo shall not be subject to amendment (Article 89). to amendment(Article89). subject not be shall for mature liberal democracies.” See be appropriate itmay not institutions; democratic fragile often and fledgling presence of the in vigilance judicial periods with associated constitutionalism, transitional Democracy must becomemilitant”. See Loewenstein, power. of only the purpose serves its fight which on atechnique itmust own plane itsdestination, fulfilled Pfersmann, form government republican of that the provides explicitly of 1958 Constitution French the Forexample, to as belonging to be understood ought democracy” constitutional “Militant Teitelargues, for example, that at Formore122. 3.3, seeChapter details Karl Lowenstein in the first part of his essays argu 182 The issue of therelationship betweenmilitant democracy and transitional Thedebatewillbeanalyzedindepth supra note 1, at53. 183 Inthisrespect itmakes sensetoaccept OttoPfersmann’s claimthat of many democratic states revealsth ady stable democracies.

supra note24 y StatesintheModernWorld , at 49. , at49. r anintroductorypieceon militant democracy

supra 64 es that “Ifdemocracy is convinced that it hasnot yet of political transformation that often demand closer closer demand often that transformation political of acy isasign of transitional constitutionalism can beimplied from textofitsconstitutional legalstructure of militant democracy isona 184 cracy advocatedthatcountriesin transition note423. 5,at y provisions andeven if there is no precise democracies tosurvive andif thisisan Herevealsexamples ofnationalistSouth order to answer thequestion if militant at itishardtofindamodern 180 The argument Theargument 181 and and CEU eTD Collection at 49. democracy startswiththeGerman BasicLawof 1949. will beprovided later,but atthisstageitis to theconstitutionallevel. Thedetailed anal essays. However,Germany became thefirstcoun Aswasalreadymentioned above,theidea potential enemies wasnotnewevenatthetim militant democracy inmodernconstitutional jurisprudence. jurisdictions). Itismore appropriate tofollo due tothepresence inthisproject of case-st wide acceptance ofmilitant democracy importance inorder toprotect democracy (especially these countriesandciteprovisions fromtheirconstitutional andstatutes todemonstrate the Thelistofcountrieswheremilitant democracy ispresentandcanbepotentially invoked topreservedemocracycouldbetool constitutional framewor is aboutrisk-aversion most natural characteristic isself-defense. 189 188 187 186 185 ensure fascism hadnochancetoreturn in particular enemy inmind: Nazism. abstract enemy,itisobviousth particular ideologytobebanne democracy. Peter Niessen article. See, Niessen,Peter Niessenarticle. Germany’s model qualifyas“anti-extremism Germany’swould para model Forasummary ofGerman BasicLawprovisions Ibid. Sajo, For see,Pfersmann,details supra at213. note 128, 185 Theargument isfurthersupportedbyAndr 187 k ofmany democracies. then itiseasytofind atleast some signs of militant democracy inthe supra noteat 50. 1, note 82. 82. supra note

d from German politicsandthe at thefamous Article 189 TheItalian constitution-m 186 important tounderlinethatconstitutional militant on militant democracy seee.g.inPfersmann, Ifwearetoaccept hisargument thatdemocracy

udies of militant democracy practiceinvarious 65 w thestagesofadopting ysis of theGerman militant democracy model e when Karl Loewenstein published his famous e whenKarlLoewensteinpublishedhisfamous ong, thereforeitdoesnotmake sensetolistall to the politicalmainstream, introducing a try wheremilitantdemocracy waselevated digm” for banning political parties as outlined in in as parties outlined digm” for political banning to limit the democratic tolerance towards to limit tolerancetowards thedemocratic s 18,21(2)and33wereadoptedwitha 188 While thereisnomentioning ofa as Sajowhoarguesthatthestate’s Basic Law identifiesonlyan akers choseanotherwayto the legalstructureof supra 1, note CEU eTD Collection 191 190 adherent tocertainideologies,orarequirement political parties. Theserestri of militant democracy intheirnewconstitutions, mo Central andEasternEuropefollowedtheGerm collapse ofthecommunist regime ontheEuro recognized legalstructuredesi had unpleasantmoments dealingwithstate principles forthesakeofprotectingtheirdemo stable systems ofgovernments we legislation againstthepossible democracies: thecommunistregime.Thefear use ittooverthrow it, andalso asaprev the tragicevents ofthepast wheredemocracy historically specificidentific political parties. Overall, the Italian model relies on an “anti-fascist particularism, a corresponding provisionsagainstconstitution dissolved Fascist party. constitutional provisiononthe democracy means from thisconfrontation.” leaders responsible forthe Fascist regime. the for eligibility thetovote and right to limitations temporary of Constitution, the from implementation the more years for five not than established, law has Fascistparty. Article 48, Notwithstanding the dissolved the Transitory and Final Provisions reads asfollow: It shall beforbidden to reorganize, under any form whatsoever, Fora detailed account of Italian Negativ TheConstitution of Italy adopted on 22 Dece In theearlyyearsofconstitu The nextphaseinthe development of militant democracy asaconstitutionally 190 TheItalianmodel differsfrom

ation ofitsopponent ctions came intheform of rise ofcommunism andevenc precise prohibition of the reorganization in any form of the ofthe inanyform precise prohibitionofthereorganization gned toassistindemocracy’s self-preserv re onthevergeoftr e Republicanism paradigm seeNiessen, tional militant democracy itwasadoptedas aresponseto mber, came intoforce policies againstthe 191

entive techniqueagainstanewenemyofall 66

gave achancetoitsenemies togainpower and cracy. AtleastAustraliaandtheUnitedStates al amendments andconstraintsimposed on of communism made ofcommunism manycountriesadopt pean continent.Many young democracies in an example andintroducedvariouselements tohavepartyprogram stly inrelationtorestrictions imposed on , anttakesitsunder ade off theirmost cherisheddemocratic a priori on 1 January 1948. theGerman one alsothrough onstitutional democracies with rise ofcommunism. prohibitionofparties’ note 82, at 10-18. supra at10-18. 82, note s andactivities tobe standing of what standing ofwhat Article XII ation was the ation wasthe ofthe CEU eTD Collection (Venice, 10-11December, 1 196 195 194 INF%282000%29001-e.asp 193 192 similar to militantdemocracy l response tothethreatofterrorism growi and brought issues ofmilitant democracy backinto September 11terroristattacksand undeclared warasextremist Islamstartedto attacks of2001. Manywestern-type democracies addressees arecontextdependentanddeterm later in this chapter. In mostof thecases the rationalebehindmilitant democracy measures beinginvoked.Thiswillbeintroduced political parties.” which wouldgenerallywarrantsuchserious of association.However,“itwas though partyactivitiesareguaranteedeverywhere are numerous legalmeans ofprohibiti request oftheSecretaryGeneralCouncilEurope. conduct asurvey onthe prohibitionofpolitical organizations, liketheCouncilof Europe. militating post-communist democracies became worryingeven for international compatible withmajor democratic principles. political parties and analogous measures. Adopted by the Venice Commission atits the measures. 41 by Commission Adopted Venice analogous and parties political in Sadurski, found Avineri, Avineri, Ibid. Ibid. EuropeanCommission for Democracy throughLaw (V Adetailedaccounton speech oflimitations and political parties from demomilitant The most recenttrendinthemilitant democracy supra note 15, at2. 15, note supra 195 Nevertheless,constitutional practices of various states allow systemizing note 167, at 196-238. at 167, 196-238. note . 999). Available online at 999). Availableonline

ogic, atleast inthereasonsbe concluded thatitisnearly the anti-terrorism policiesand ng theactivities of political parties” the set of militant democracy measures andtheir

ng religiousfundamentalism bearmany features 67 fight againsttheWest anditsvalues. Thus, in1999theVenice parties and analogousmeasures following the ined toalargeextendbythecountries’past. thecentreofconstitutionaldebate. States’ sanctions asprohibitionordissolutionof 192 andprotectedbytheprincipleoffreedom enice Commission). Guidelines on prohibition of on prohibition Guidelines Commission). enice conceived thatthey became targets ofan However,atsome stageactivism in debatetakes usbacktotheterrorist http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2000/CDL- 193 impossible todefinebehaviours Thesurveyshowedthat“there hind such policies, as wellas legislation thatfollowed it cracy perspectives can be Commission hadto st 194 Plenary session Plenarysession inEurope, 196 The CEU eTD Collection 199 198 197 was adopted. therefore Spain became amilitant democracy constitutional principlesandstandards,itam democracy inSpainisnot constitutionally authorized. Aslong asthe law iscompatible with ban political parties from certain activities. added in2002 whentheLawonPoliticalParties wasadoptedandintroduced aprocedure to for thestateinstitutionstorefer tomilitant it happenedincaseofSpain.TheSpanishC Nevertheless, militancy of theconstitutional regime couldbeaddedbyordinarylegislation as provisions donotmention anything which not only bylookingthrough thenationalconstitu modern democracies isthatmilitancy of apart of political parties with Islamist agenda. apply militant democracy torelatively newissues, suchasthe headscarf banandprohibition situations, but therearealsosignsthatthe ECHR tendstoextenditnewparadigmand principles of militant democracy. Thisisnot undermine democracy. questions andconcernsposedforliberaldemo onwards. moremilitant.militant orlessThe democracy stateinSpainistobediscu they accepttheargument thatth once cured be probably can politicians and judiciary Spanish the of concerns The concept. historical Spanish the in importance special very regimeis of political asacompletely tolerant democracy, militant system a callthe to Constitutiona Gross, Oren and (2004); Journal Law Yale Another distinguished feature oftheSpanish caseisthat To be discussed in detail in section 4.3, at 236. Seeforexample Rashad Hussain, The final observationimportantfor theoverview of militant democracy states in l, 112 Yale Law Journal (2003). l,(2003). Yale Law Journal 112 199

197 ThepracticeoftheECHRdemons e State’s moste State’s natural characteristicis

Security withTransparency:Judici Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent CrisisAlways toViolent be Responses Rules: Should Chaos and 198

democracy measures, however, suchafeaturewas onstitution of1978doesnotreserve anypowers

68 ounts totheoverall constitutional regime and icular constitutional system canbedetermined onlyinrelation tothesomehow traditional many yearsafteritspost-Franco constitution It does not, however,follow thatmilitant would remind usof militant democracy. tion. Thereareexamples whenconstitutional cracy: whethersuchinitiatives enhance or national judiciary is extremely reluctant and hesitant hesitant and reluctant isextremely judiciary national self-defence andthatalldemocraciesself-defence are al Reviewin“SpecialInterest trates precise adherence tothe ssed indetails inChapter5.2at269 ”, 113 ”, 113 CEU eTD Collection might soundaggressiveandcont they belong tothegroup ofstatesemploying theconcept ofmilitancy, maybe becauseit in order to see if itqualifies asmilitant democr The lessonfrom thisobservationisthatitimpor 201 200 measures adoptedindifferentstatesatthetim Karl Lowensteinwasapioneerin introducing theclassification ofmilitant democracy Fascist Movement 2.2.1. Democracies 2.2. MeasuresofMilitant militancy’ cannotbeanswered ingeneral a stronger legitimacy anduniquechar even though aconstitutional status of militant possibility of insertingmilitant democracy meas procedures ofconstitutionalamendments. Ther completely realisticifwetakeintoaccount thesometimes complicated andlengthy This optionsoundsplausibletosolvepotentialcontradi difficulty is, according toPfersmann, tointroduc are introducedthrough one toanswer.OttoPfersmann, forexample, constitutional principlesmight become veryproblematic. Thiel, Thiel, Pfersmann,

Karl The question of thelocationof legal provisions onmilitant democracy is notaneasy supra

supra note 92, at 416. at416. 92, note Lowenstein’s note 1, at63. ordinary legislation, Militant

Democracy Arsenal: radictory totheveryidea acter ofsuchmeasures. The Democracy nd answersdependonpart

69 e whenFascistsweremarching throughEurope. admits thatonce militant democracy elements acy state as for various reasons states candeny democracy measures is more desirable forthe therelation between this legislation and efore, itdoesnotlookreasonableto denythe e suchmeasures directly intheconstitution. ures through theregularlegislative process tant tolook insideth

and from KarlLowens ctions, butthisso ofaliberaldemocracy.

200 List The only waytoovercomethis

of question ofthe‘domicile of

Measures e constitutional system e constitutionalsystem icular legalsystem. lution doesnotlook tein toModern

Against the 201

CEU eTD Collection 204 203 202 measures listed byLoewensteinmigrated, forexample,tothedomain ofcriminal lawandare broad bythecurrentstandards historical factsandlegislativeac Europe”. movements; measures employedinselectedjurisdicti general. this subject;therefore,legislationwas direct that most ofthejurisdictions attempted toach he analyses wasdirected against fascists,or Sweden, Norway,Denmark,Finland, Switzerland movements incountrieslikeFrance,Belgium, the His essayspublishedin1937representsasurv party organizations within the border. theforeign newspapers, offoreign activities wearing fascist visitors and of residents the or bysymbols foreign missionaries on alien or foreigners of activities political pr movements (administrative and activities constitutional to discover specialauthorities on rights); Provisions 13. public servants (forexample, the du role of thespecial regarding members of activities th 12. ofthearmedProvisions and e police; political forces the regarding Provisions 11. martyrs heroes’; and ‘symbolism of the and criminals political abetting and morality aiding practice of the against Provisions regime; 10. existing of personalities leading or its institutions thedemocratic stateitself, ridiculing defaming,and slandering for example, vilifying, propaganda, subversive curtail the freedoms of speech, expressions, public opinion and press in order to prevent revolutionary and wrec or in disturbance tacticsof the to curb Provisions violence, agitation or hatred against other sections of the population andagainst violent campaigning; 8. adherents of subversive parties from representation in political bodies); 7. Provisions against the incitement to extremis political by institutions of abuse parliamentary wearing, possession and use of firearms or of the other offensive weapons of any kind; 6. Provisions against the or as troops assault bodygua asstewards, forces, serving constituti the against 4.Provisions in public; person the of opinion political to the denote serve which symbols other and thereof, wearing parts or uniforms political of private of paramilitary armies,the the formation against parties; Legislation of3. extremistdissolution political the state ofsiege; 2. Provisions allowing for the prohibition of ‘subversive movements’, especially theban or treason or rebellion and additional regulations regarding ma Loewenstein, at 638. 1.Provisions in the countries’ criminal codesagainst acts bordering on or falling in the category of high Lowenstein, Loewenstein’s listofmilitant democracy measures might beconsidered too longand 202 204 TowardstheendofhisessayLowenstein Theclassification oflegislativemeas

203 supra noteat 644. 5, theauthorcallsitasa“more systema

ty of allegiance, loyalty oaths or th or oaths loyalty allegiance, ty of and understandingof ts from different jurisdictions. ed againstsubversivemovements andgroupsin

National Socialists,KarlLowensteinmentioned ons tofightFascism andotherdangerous 70 , repress, supervise and control anti-democratic and anti- and anti-democratic , control repress, and supervise the national territory, the importation ofanti-democratic importation territory,the the national m (for example, regulations permitting the exclusion of exclusion the permitting m (forexample, regulations of the state’s armed ofthe own competitors intolerable ons of rds; 5. Legislation against illicit manufacture, transport, transport, manufacture, illicit against Legislation rds; 5. king meetings by militarized parties; 9. Provisions to to Provisions 9. militarized parties; by meetings king ieve facially neutral la otection of the constitution); 14. Provisions against against Provisions 14. constitution); of the otection rtial law and conferment of rtial lawand , andCzechoslovakia. Netherlands, England,theIrishFreeState, ures isaccompanied byreferencetothe ey ofmeasurestofightmainly fascist introduces fourteengr the militantdemocracy concept.Many tic accountofanti-fasc e curtailmentof certain fundamental ws andregulationson extraordinary powers for for powers extraordinary While thelegislation oups oflegislative ist legislationin CEU eTD Collection completely different from thepresent.” which makes ithardertostudy,justify, andapply. 207 206 205 Loewenstein hadinmind. Thisonly provesthat measures areputinconstitutions andapplied inpractice areverydifferent from what a militant stand of democracyare stillvalid of liberaldemocracyand placed developments made theconceptmore controvers topic. Asaconsequence, themilitant democracy helpful forself-protectionofdemocracy andth ruining democracy withoutbreach qualify asa crime. Thegraspof powerbyHitler demonstrates that itispossible tostart the burdenofproof,and,most importantly, not criminal lawis applicable onlyonce a crime is extend ashedirectlyreferstocriminal la violence anddangerousideasdirect would betooeasytoclaim thatmilitant demo behavior, includingopencalltovi Lowenstein’s longlistcapturesalllegalprovisionsdirected wearing firearms andformation of paramilitary armies and other similar rules. In fact, Karl by nomeans controversialfrom theliberalde book, therefore I book, will referto workhere. his Ibid., at 401. Thiel, Markus Thiel produced agood summaryof Loewenstein’s classification in the concluding chapter ofhis Loewenstein’s “account naturallyisdated Karl Loewenstein’saccountofdemocracy’s supra note 92, at 382. at382. 92, note

it attheintersectionoflegal, olence, rebellion,hightreason,formation ofarmies,etc.It ing anylegalnorms, therefore,criminal lawisnotalways ed against thestate’sstructures. 207 While thefoundingfather’sarguments infavorof w provisions,butitisawell-knownfactthat

71 nowadays,thewaythatmilitant democracy e focusshouldbeshiftedtowardsaprevention committed or plannedtobecommit, requires arsenalof measures became narrower.These allactionsdangerousfordemocracy could ial andopentocritiquefrom theperspective mocracy pointofview,i.e.prohibition cracy isaboutdealingwithanyform of militant democracyinpractice,aswell and rootedinahistorical situation self-defense iscontradictorytosome against any kindofextremist social,and political science 205

206

CEU eTD Collection Basic Lawprovidesthepreventivemechanis non-amendable characterofthemost fundame militant democracy related debate. democracy state,thelist ofmeasures listedth arrangements. mistakes inthepastmight andpreventedthrough becured innovative constitutional originated there, but also becauseitrepresents model of militantdemocracy isimportant to example whichcomes tomind whensomeone is adding anovelfeaturetoit,elevating ittoth life totheconcept of militantdemocracy measures shouldstartfrom ofaclassicmilitant anexample democracy statewhichgave new attempts toclassifythem indifferentgr practices. This isfully applicable tothelist As mentioned above,militantdemocracy debate 2.2.2. to militant democracy. democracy manifestation andpracticetoguide exercise, itprobablymakes sensetolookfo militant democracy measures so alldemocracies application. Therefore,probably many other constitutionalarrangem Contemporary As German BasicLawwasthefirst case of aconstitutionallyendorsed militant

Debate on it isnotfeasible tofile th Militant ents, iscontext-sensitive, espe The firstelement oups. However,thelist ofmilitant democracy by not only following it in the scholarship, but by notonlyfollowingitinthescholarship,but of militant democracy measures andtheoretical

Democracy 72 abalanced and careful begin withnot onlybecause theNazi regime the readerthroughstat ere isconsidered asastartingpointforany ntal provisions oftheConstitution. German m for changingtheConstitution evenby discussing militant democracy.TheGerman e constitutional level.Germany isthefirst can refer toit.Instead of doing this hopeless r themost commonfeaturesofmilitant is basedprimarily ontheanalysisofstates’ of themilitant democracy stateisthe Measures e exhaustive list of universal cially inthefashion of their es’ practicesamounting approach onhow tragic Classification

CEU eTD Collection Constitutions, i.e. Turkey (Article 4). (Article 4). i.e.Turkey Constitutions, 92, at401).Similar provisioncanbe of suchrightsbytheFede certain rights inorder to eliminate the free demo of basicrights(howeveritwasneverinvoked). 212 211 210 209 208 to giveastatuspoliticalparties,which is indispensable element ofdemocracy. Article21 the Federal Constitutional Court. envisages theproceduretooutla understanding. of whichare directed against the constituti envisaged in the Article 9(II) wh Law. intolerance towardstheenemies ofdemocracy Basic Lawtoprevent itinthe future andmake and dismissed duringtheNaziregime anditexplai unanimity. The Federal Constitutional Court decides on the question of unconstitutionality. of unconstitutionality. question the on Court decides Constitutional Federal The the of existence to endanger or order democratic basic (II) Parties, which, by reason of their aims orthe behavior of their adherents, seek to impair orabolish the free have to publicly account for their sources people. They may befreelyestablished. Their internal organization must confirmto democratic principles. They bere can also This Articles 1and areinadmissible. 20 (Lander), the participation on principle of the States (Lander) in legislation, or the basic principles laid down in extent thereof are determined by the Federal Constitutional Court. Court. Federal Constitutional the thereof are by determined extent (Article 16a)in order tocombat thefree democratic basi of lettersandsecrecypostte freedom ofteaching(Article5III),fre in For seeKommers, details atpp. 40-41. above discussion the Seealso Article 18: Whoever abuses freedom of expression of opinion, in particular freedom ofpress (Article 5I), Article 21reads asfollows: (I)thepoliticalparties particip Article 79(III 209 Third The 208 second element Mostofthevaluesand , thepossibilitytolimit thebasicright The fourth ): Amendments to this Constitution affecting the division of the Federation into States States into Federation ofthe division the affecting Constitution this ): Amendments to ral Constitutional Court. supra note 158 in ; Thiel, and andthecentralmilitant democrac , established byArticle18of theBasicLawallowsforfeiture

lecommunication (Article 10), property (A property (Article10), lecommunication edom 8), ofassemblyfreedom (Article w apoliticalpartyandtodecl ich prohibitstheassociations, foundinItalianConstitutionof1 212 and use their funds as fortheir assets. Underthisprovisi principles protected from amendment weredisregarded different from kinds other

ferred to as the ‘Clause of Eternity’ (see Thiel, (seeThiel, Eternity’ of ‘Clause toasthe ferred 73 the Federal Republic of Germany are unconstitutional. Germany of areunconstitutional. Republic Federal the s order s forfeits thesebasicrights. Such forfeiture and the a democracy abletoprotect itself. Theideaof onal order orthe concept of international of theBasicLawisevidence ofthe intention cratic basicordercanbe 210 211 is clearlyexpressedfurther inthe Basic ns thestrongintention supra note 158. Theideaisthatindividualswhoabuse

on politicalpartiesar ate intheforming ofth s such as freedom of associationis y provision is Article 21 which y provisionisArticle21which are apartyunconstitutionalby with the purpose andactivities 948 (Article139)andmore recent ofassociation (Article9),privacy rticle 14), or the right to asylum toasylum right the or rticle 14), of socialorganizations deniedthe exercise of thewriters e recognized asan e politicalwillofthe supra note note CEU eTD Collection 214 213 democracy arsenalwereneverapplied(i.e.forfeitu law, as such. Aswasmentioned above, some of thelegalprovisions from Germany’s militant can befoundinotherlegaldomains andmilitant rebellion, paramilitary armies, manufacturing and wearing firearms, butthatthese provisions measures. ThedifferenceisnotthatGerma militancy differs substantially from Loewenstein’s suggestions interms of thelist of protect itselffrombeingdestroyedinside.However,thefirstexampleofconstitutional Aswecansee,German BasicLawfollowe that democracies shouldnotremain inactive the applicationandimplementation ofthisprovision. discussionandcase-lawrelatedto known as‘adutyofloyalty’,whichproducedsubstantial public servantsactivities.Artic the FederalRepublicofGermany, bebanned. can seeking toimpairorabolishthefreedemocratic basicorder,ortoendangertheexistenceof the politicalpartiesandassoci destruct thedemocratic government. Afterthe freedom guaranteedforpolitical 21 imposes certain limitations onthe internal stru positive recognition ofpoliticalpa anymore. TheBasicLawgranteda specialstatus protected by Article9.Politicalparties are not an“extra-constitutional” German Basic Law Present and Future. AGerman-American Symposium Law Constitutional of Association the of International Congress Seefor example Paul Kirchhof & Donald P. Kommers (Eds.), ChristianStarck, Fifth , theGerman interpretation of themilitant democracy includestheregulation of , 10 The Western Political Law Quarterly 527-528 (1997). Law (1997). Political Quarterly 527-528 , The Western 10 New Challenges to the German Basic Law: the German contribution to the Third World

ations withoutanycontrol,a le 33(5) establishesconditions partieswillnotbeusedfo rties ever in German history. 155 (1993), or Carl. J. Schneider, Schneider, J. Carl. or (1993), 155

74 ny doesnothaveanylegalprovisionsagainst and shouldtakesome preventivemeasures to Weimar experiencethe democracy hasnothing todowithcriminal d thecoreofLoewenstein’s arguments cture oftheparty,its aims toensurethat re ofrights),butsomeotherswerewidely topolitical parties, whichwasthefirst 122(1991). Germany and its Basic Law. Volume Volume 14. Past, Law. itsBasic Germany and nd since 1949 political parties nd since1949politicalparties r thepurposetodisruptand 214 ofaccesstocivil service, Atthesame time,Article state couldnotleave Political Parties and the and Parties Political 213 phenomenon CEU eTD Collection 217 216 215 the possibilitytodenyrightsthosewhoabuse useful hintonhowtodistingui Convention onHuman Rights(ECHR) regular rights’limitation clauses democracy measures. Thefurther questionwouldbeif militant democracy isdifferent from clauses. Thisclarificationwillgain abett interesting toseeif andhowmilitant democracy therefore, militantdemocracy measures inevitably clashwith civilliberties. However,itis Militant democracywasdesignedtofightth 2.3. MilitantDemocracyandother influenced itscurrentpractices. militant democracypractices.Thenecessitytobe was leftforconstitutionaltheo did notwarnusmuch aboutthepossibledangersanddisadvantagesofsuchpractices, to sacrificesome fundamental Loewenstein’s arguments onthepreventivecharact narrowed downmainly tothepr presence of militant democracy intheconstitutional practice of different states itwas used notonlyinGermany butinotherdemocratic statesaswell.Aftermany yearsofthe radical movements, especially parties, and their parties, and movements, especially radical activities.” freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the Convention the Convention in for isprovided than extent toa greater limitation orattheir freedoms setforth herein or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction on any of the rights and See for example sectionin Loewenstein’s essay on“Can an Idea be Suppressed?” Sajo, Article 17 The startingpointforthisdelineationcanbe note 128, at 210: “Today, militant democracy is most commonly understood as the fight against against fight asthe understood most commonly is democracy militant at210: “Today, supra 128, note reads as follows: Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, group State, forany group asimplying may interpreted be Convention this in Nothing asfollows: reads

rists toelaboratea sh variouslimitations ofrigh rights forthesakeofdemocracy and statesofemergency. ohibition ofpoliticalparties. theso-called‘abuseclause.’ Regimes ofRightsLimitations

er understanding ofwhatconstitutes militant 75 e possible abuse of the political process; e possibleabuseofthepoliticalprocess; them withthepurposeof them nd suggestsome safegu is different from ordinaryrights’limitation cautiousaboutdangersoftheconceptalso er ofmilitant democracy andthenecessity referenced toArticle 17of theEuropean ts. TheConventionprovidesfor 215 Suchpracticesfullyendorse ’s survival.AsLoewenstein 217 This provisiongivesa ards againstabusive theirdestruction.It 216 it CEU eTD Collection jurisprudence on the scope and manner of application of this provision. application ofthisnormbytheEuro clauses. Moreover,theconstructionandlang first important distinctionsbetweenamilita It might beexplainedbyanothercrucialpoint: 220 219 218 applied mainly inacase-by-casemanner andcouldneverbeinvokedinrelationtothewhole emergency situationsandordinaryrightslimitations cases).Militant democracymeasures are democracy measures usuallyaffect onlyalimited number ofcitizens directly (as compared to subject of itsattention: participation inpol democracy, amilitant democracy statefocuses on deal withcasesunderthe life andsocialeconomic rightscouldnotbe justified by militant democracy rationale. constitutional democracy. Thatiswhylimitatio rights ofpoliticalpar or areaofapplication.Militantdemocracy range ofhuman rights.Bothnotionsareapplied protected in theConventionwhilemilitant de clause ofArticle17theEu guaranteed inademocratic stat impose limitations onrightsoftheindividu seems thata militant democracy stateandArticle 17follow thesame logicas they both For more details seeP. Harvey, insupra note 52, at 407-420. democracy relatedcaseswereArticles10and 11 (free Seeat for 3.3, 122. Chapter details to thedeclar ECHRmore by often is Article17 used Iftoconsider theEuropean Convention ofHuman Ri While variouseventsandindividualbeha ticipation, rightsthatpotentiallya ordinary limitation clause.

ropean ConventiononHuman Rights e tooverturnorharm democracy pean CourtofHuman Rights(ECHR)

itical andpublic discourse. Moreover,militant 76 dom of speech and freedom ofassociation respectively). affects onlyalimited ra nt democracy stateand ordinarylimitation e thecase inadmissible; theref mocracy provisionsdo notaffectthewhole the objectofprotection.This bringsustothe als and groups who wish touseliberties als andgroupswhowish ns imposed onrightslikefamily andprivate in asimilar logic butwithinadifferentscope uage oftheabuseclauseledtorare ghts, the mostghts, the frequent articlesinvoked inmilitant 220 one area of social and political life as a vior could be potentially harmful for vior couldbepotentiallyharmfulfor

ffects theoperation itself. However, the abuse itself.However,theabuse is applicable nge ofrights,namely ore thereis not much of 219 whichprefers to of astateas to allrights 218

CEU eTD Collection taking intoaccounttheobjectof consequences followingfrom it.Itmightmake iteasierforaStatetomake acase,especially 222 221 taking certain action inadvance is the main them of astateemergency, happening (orhashappened)with operation intime. Moreover,astateofemergenc time. Usuallyitcannothappenquickly,andtherefore itdoesnotmake sensetolimit its for averyshortperiod only,whiletheapplica should beadded.Instabledemocracies astateof militant democracy state and astate of emergency. application oftheordinaryrightslimitationclause. constitutional principle, militant democr purpose of thelimitations. However,wheremilit rights limitation clausesbythe than salvationofdemocracy. convincing reasons,asthecaseisbasedon or religiousgroup)toresistthis It isalwayshardfortheindivi involves theStateasaparty(itisneveran political community.Inaddition,theapplicat Ni Aolain, Ni Aolain, 328-349 (2003). (2003). 328-349 Michel Rosenfeld,Andras For details see Oren Gross & Fionnuala Ni Aolain, NiAolain, Gross & Fionnuala detailssee Oren For state For brief overviewof Most of thedifferences outlinedabove areapplicable tothe distinction betweena Therefore, militant democracy measures could in general beseparated from ordinary Law in Times Practice Law in in and Powers of Theory Crisis. Emergency Sajó, Susanna Baer (Eds.), 222 of emergency see Fox &Nolte, whilemilitant democracy isaconcept of preventivenature where

dual oragroupofindividuals kindofsituationwherethegove the protection:coreof scope ofprotection,address a traditionallystrictlyprescribed mechanism ofdeclaration acy willoftenbeaccommodatedwithinthe

77 individual vca Models of Accommodation of Models tion of militant democracy measures cantake Comparative Constitutionalism: Cases Materials and Constitutionalism: Comparative ion ofmilitant democracy measures always e. Theissue of distinction betweenamilitant emergency itisintroducedveryrarelyand assumption that nothingismore important ant democracy isnot conceptualized asa y isdeclaredwhenadisaster isalready supra note 56 221 However,onesi (like apolitical party, association the constitution,anddemocracy. ees ofthemeasures, andthe rnment isrelaxed inbringing 54 (2006). (2006). 54 , at 54-60; and Norman Dorsen, Dorsen, Norman and , at54-60; , in Oren Gross & Fionnuala & Fionnuala Gross Oren in , se) withallpossible gnificant element

CEU eTD Collection 223 of themilitant democracy casesaredecidedwith government, courts,andindividual other casesoflimitations ofright in thename of militant democracy canproveeasi burden ofproofontheState’sside.Doesitm limitations thestatemay impose onpoliticalright and notother regimes? It might bearguedthat there anypracticaldifference forgovernments threat. purpose. The latterisaimed tosecurethelife permanently) whileastateofemergency may goindifferentdirectionsdependinguponits militant democracy aims toeliminate certain play of limitations imposed onrightsa non-derogable rightswhichcannotbelimite democracy should alwaysremain withintheconstitutionalframework. Wh suspension of some constitutional norms andguaranteeswhiletheapplication ofmilitant militant democracyprobablycannot help. S declaration ofastateemergency isaresponsetoevents motivated riotsandviolence could besimilar, th of militant democracy measures of nationalemergency generated democracy andastateofemergency isnotasclearitmight appearifwebringanexample EuropeanConvention on HumanRights. See for example Article 4(2) of the International Co the Article4(2) See of for example International What followsfrom differencesforthemilitant theabove democracydebate?And,are

and statesofemergency declar s? Inotherwords,doesitmake s? by political unrest. While the motives behind the application s underwhichrationaletheirrigh nd libertiescouldbeofextr d evenduringastateofemergency,

78 ean thatstateimposi venant on Civil and Political Rights; Article 15 of the Article 15ofthe Rights; Political and onCivil venant econd, astateofemergency isaboutthe and courtsiftheyinvokemilitant democracy and healthof itscitizensfrom animmediate if militant democracyisdifferent from other anactiveintervention of thejudiciary,itis ers from thepolitical game (temporarily or e distinction isstill obvious. First of all, er thenecessity of suchmeasures thanin s, thenitmight cause adifference inthe which alreadytookplacewhen ed asaresponse to politically apracticaldifferenceforthe aordinary character.Third, ng limitationsuponrights ts were limited? As most ts werelimited? Asmost ile therearecertain 223 the range CEU eTD Collection between militant democracy andordinary right ECHR demonstratesalso thatthisjudicialbodydoesnotrefe r directly tothe distinction 224 and thepossible consequences forthe democratic courts accept this position taking into account th make acaseundermilitant democracy justificati different justificationwoul character but withdifferent rationale (militant democracy andordinary limitations) require the imposed limitations. groups thetestmight be,probabl participating inpublicpolitical discourse. However,eveninrelation tothesame typeof political parties. Thetest willbeprobably less role parties play inmodern democratic states). from theGovernment in instancesofbanningapo is imposed). For example, courts in many jurisd depends verymuch uponthecharacterof practices which wouldgobeyondthepurposeofthis limitation cases. government as justificationformilitant democracy measures compared toordinaryrights of particularinteresttoseewhethercourts and analogous measures, parties political of prohibition on Guidelines Commission). Law (Venice Democracy for through Commission is supported same the trend Moreover, (2001). Turkey v. others and Partisi) (Refah Party Welfare (2003), Turkey v. Turkey of Socialist Party (1998), v.Turkey Party for party ban practices and would scrutinize suchmeasures Thereare numerous cases from th The most likelyconclusiononthequesti The answer tothis question requires substantialanalysis of themilitant democracy note 193. 193. supra note d bethatatleastthegovernment assu

e ECHRjurisprudence where Courtcl y, differentinmany jurisdicti

79 imposed limitations (onwhom, when,andwhat by the SeeVenice for example Commission. European wanttohearsomething specialfrom the strict in relation toothe s limitation regimes; therefore theborderline 224 on. However, itisimportanton. However, toseewhether very strictly. For details see e.g. United Communist Communist United seee.g. strictly.For details very e typeofrightsaffectedbysuchmeasures politicalprocess. Th ictions strictlyrequire serious justification litical party (taking into account the special Thesame appliestonon-registrationof on of whether limitations of the same on ofwhetherlimitations ofthesame chapter.Myclaimsofaristhatit ons basedontherationaleof early expressed itsserious concern mes thatitisea r types of associations r typesofassociations e jurisprudenceofthe sier foritto CEU eTD Collection Legal andpoliticalsciencescholarsstartedto 228 227 226 225 constitutional debaterecently,i.e.thewaronterrorandthr of casesthan itwastraditionally utilized, especi not mean outlawingonlypolitic Loewenstein’s slogan“fireisfoughtwithfire” stillrelevantforthe current realityanddoes democracies shouldbeequippedtodothesame forms ofpolitical rule” was givenupinordertorescuedemocracyby democracy, “everygenerationgotitsowndisease.” domestic and international legal systems. Astothreats anddangersposed totheexistenceof should beable to accommodate new realitiesof political parties.However, itisawell-known abuse oftheelectoralprocess and to suppress As mentioned above,militant democracy istradit 2.4. Extension ofthe Doctrinebeyond case-study iscomplete andIwillcome backto thisissue intheconcluding part. out precisely intheconstitution. is gettingmoreblurred injurisdictions wher democracy. Sajo, in the practice ofyoungEa democracy Militant 3.3. further see section details Member the States.For of practice the in democracy militant Forexample, Andras Sajo claims Ibid., at 382. Thiel, of application the address to isenough clause limitations that ordinary considers Court the moment, Atthe Militant democracyanditslogicmightbeappliedjustified inamuch widerrange supra note 92, at 379. at379. 92, note supra note 128, at 210. at210. note 128, stern Europe democracies. 227 (whichwereseeninfascist and communist parties), then

al partiesandonlywithcomm 225 that protection of secularism is intimately interrelated with militant with secularism interrelated militant of protection isintimately that Thefinalanswerto the ProhibitionofPoliticalParties

e themilitant democracy conceptisnot spelled 80 the activitiesof fact that constitutional lawisnotstaticand social andpolitical li ionally understoodasatool tofightwith the ridding “societiesof ally inthe lightof events whichfilled the debateoverissuessuchasif Islam is againsttheenemies ofnewgenerations. 226 Iftheideaofconstitutionalpatriotism thisquestionshouldbegivenafterthe eat ofreligiousfundamentalism. unist andfascistagendas. politicalorganizations, mainly fe, happeningwithinthe unjust and oppressive oppressive and unjust 228

CEU eTD Collection Sahin v. Turkey (2005); Dogru v. France (2008). (2008). France v. Dogru (2005); v.Turkey Sahin History of The European Court of Human Rights guide thestates’ policies inrela structure and constitutional security, thenmilita are perceivedasathreatnoton more generalizedsphereofpart These arewithoutany doubtclearsymptoms of democracy, andthisconcept seems tobemore thanrelevant intheso-calledwaronterror. Moreover, thethreatofterrorism isalsobeing perceived throughthe lensesof militant 235 234 233 232 231 230 C6F1D4A90A0734155?sequence=1 229 of Islam andSharia militant democracy. freedom ofreligionwhichcoul jurisprudence oftheECHR canprovideampl coercive religions,becomes beingcontro can beextended beyondtheprohib there arelegitimate grounds toclaim thatthe Loewenstein’s essays in1937.Theconstitutional prac these topics didnotappear from nowhere,aswe new reality, compatible withdemocracy, 14 Party Politics 6 (2008); Turano, in in Turano, 6(2008); PartyPolitics 14 https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/12452/paper_bayat.pdf;jsessionid=65C6B3839EA8CD7 See for example, Sajo,in Renata Uitz, Seeforexample, Kalifatstaatv. Germany (2000);Refah See for example, Danchin, in Seeforexample, SuzieNavot, For example, seeDanchin, in Asef Bayat, For example oneofthelatestchallenges 230 Freedom of Religion in European Constitutional and International Case-Law International and Constitutional inEuropean Religion of Freedom Islam and Democracy:Islam and What andhowto fight terrorism inthepolitical arena. 233 issubstantially different from trad Therefore,jurisprudenceinvolving, supra supra supra supra supra 229 Fighting Terrorism in the Political Arena. The Banning of Political Parties Political of Banning The Arena. the Political in Terrorism Fighting note 55; Roach, in

. tion tothesenew‘diseases.’ howdemocratic principle of secularism isinterpreted inthe supra d bebetterrationalizedand icipation inpublicdiscourse.If note 54; Makclem, in supra in Makclem, note 54; note 54; Macklem, in supra 54; Macklem, in note ly tothelife of thecitizens ition ofpolitical note 52. is the Real Question Real is the 88 (2007). 88 (2007). lled throughmilitant democracy measures. supra supra

81 area oftheapplication militant democracy nt democracy might be for democracy,aswell e evidence thattherearecasesinvolving ll astheidea of militant democracy inKarl theextension ofmilitant democracy toa note 55 note Partisi (Welfare Party) and others v. Turkey (2001); parties. tice ofthelast decade note 54. itional religious association cases. , note 54; Michael D. Goldhaber,note 54;Michael ? ISIM? Paper 8 (2007), available online at at 171-208. at171-208. for example, Court’sanalysis the understood throughtheprism of political Islam andterrorism but tothe entiredemocratic 231 Thescholarlydebateon as fundamentalist and a relevant concept to demonstrates that 177 (2007). (2007). 177 A People’s 232 The 234 235 ,

CEU eTD Collection the target of extremist Islamic movement of politicalandlegaldiscourse The eventsof11September2001 237 236 is basedonpreventivemeasures whichin the criminal dimension of anti-terrorism policies there isatleastonefeature making parallelsbetweenanti-te argues for therelevance of militant democracy consideration for anti-terrorism policies. points outseveralsimilar feat participate inpoliticaldiscourse. many religious-relatedcasescourtsarenot States Supreme Court)ortoth religious issuesarebeingshiftedtothefreesp example, Turkish Constitutional Court). Moreover, inrecent years manycases related to or extensions of ‘core of theconstitution’ in groups arenot accepted aspossibleparticipants Militant democracycouldbehelpfulinexpl democratic means toestablis measures canbeusedbythestateinorderto of political processindemocracy basedonfree elections? I claim that militant democracy questions such asaremilitant democracy measur Avineri, Avineri, in Sajo, Therefore, thedebateover militant democr A similar lineofargumentscanbetracedin supra supra note 13, at2. 13, note note 55. which makes thesenotionscloselyconnected.Ifweleave aside

h totalitarianideologyorfundamentalist coercive religions. ures betweenpolitical e participatory rights arenaas asmany Western typedemocrac rrorism democracy andmilitant brought issues ofmilitant demo against the values ofWestern democracy.

82 clude notonlydetentionsandinterrogations aining, forexample, whyreligiousandethnic neutralizeotherkindsofmovements thatuse eech clause (asinthecase-lawof Unites talking aboutreligi of thepoliticalprocessinmany democracies order to diminish theroleof religion(for es designedtofightexclusivelywithabuses we canobservethat the fight withterrorism acy measures is beingentertained nowby theso-calledwaronterror.AndrasSajo radicalism andterrorism andtherefore in the case-law of theECHR. In ies believe that theybecame shouldbemade cautiously, cracy back into the center cracy backinto thecenter on, butaboutwhocan 237 While 236

CEU eTD Collection 238 not only if transitional democracies are more li The issue of therelationship between militant democracy and transitional constitutionalism is 2.5. MilitantDemocracyandTr the following chapters. chapter andtobediscussed inadetailedcase- latter applies principally tothe concept of a uncertainties andputthepracticeofStatein mixed character,e.g.the‘War onTerror’), framework of militant democracy (rather than attempting tobeplaced into newparadigms of militant democracy. Moreover, if some meas general risk-aversion,thenne elections anymore, butratherwhocanparticipat discourse. Militantdemocracyisnotonlyaboutwhichpolitic behavior of theStatein relationtolimitations potential relevanceforotherrightslimitations investigate moredetailsandsy measures wereappliedinthefightagainstterrorism. In addition,thereareexamples fromconstitutio democracies arejustified todeny the rights an of speech,associationandreligion.Moreover,bo conducted bytheintelligenceservices,butalso it seechapter 5.2, at270. and the law was applied not as aparty prohibition casebut rather as anti-terrorismmeasure. For more details on The Statute allowing prohibition of political parties in Spain was introduced as part of anti-terrorism policy policy anti-terrorism aspart of wasintroduced Spain in parties ofpolitical allowing Statute prohibition The The issueof theextension ofmilitant democracy deserves aspecialcase-study to

w challengestoitsstructur mptoms ofthisphenomenon. Militant democracylogicisof ansitional Constitutionalism

83 d freedoms tothosewhodisrespectdemocracy. War onTerror.Thisissuedeservesaseparate study, theresults ofwhic imposedonrightsofparticipationinpublic seriouslimitations imposed onthefreedoms it wouldprobablydecreasethenumberof e inpoliticaldiscourse.Ifdemocracy isabout nal practice whencla to alegalframe thatmight bejustified. The ures taken bythestate areput intothe and for explaining and justification of the and forexplainingjustificationofthe kely to take amilitant standtowards their th notions are based on the assumption that th notionsarebasedontheassumptionthat 238

es might beaccommodated by al parties can compete for al partiescancompete for ssic militant democracy h willberevealedin CEU eTD Collection additional radicalelements, This isexplainednotonlybythelackofdemo 244 243 242 241 240 239 formation of theconstitutional regime andtrans return ofcommunism, risks todemocracyinthetr rather defenselessagainstthepoliticsofemo there arealso severalexamples ofpr democracies incorporated militant democracy provisions into their new constitutions; and constitutions intheCEEregiongave‘asec democratic regimes. fallofthecommunist The practice also suggeststhattransitional democr reveals that Loewenstein’sargument wasfollowe purpose of power.Democracymust become militant.” fulfilled itsdestination, itmust fight onits transition, orweakenanemerging democratic transition. Inotherwords,doesm potential enemies, but alsoifmilitant democr not even disbanded in the first place. Rights in the Democratization of Central and Eastern Europe inearly 1990 extremismwing wasflourishing censorshipwasre abolition ofpolitical note 167 supra Sajo, The fear of re-emergence of communism isnevertheless at least problematic where communist parties were Priban & Sadurski mention in their chapter on ‘Democratisation of Central and Eastern Europe’ that the Sajo, militant Formoremeas account of democracy detailed Loewenstein, supra at217. note 128, supra at209. note 128, Andras Sajo argues that, forexample, ma Karl Loewensteinarguedthat“ifdemocracy , at219-230. supra nt ,a 2. note 5, at 423. 243 territorialdisintegration,andright-wingextremism. i.e. racism,andcorruption. ansition periodthat provokesmilita

sulted inthegrowth ofex political fragile democratic structure? fragile democraticstructure? actical application ofsuchmeasures. s. See JiriPribanSadurski,s. See &Wojciech ond birth’tothedoctrine.ManyyoungEuropean

tion, oneofthebiggestthreatstodemocracy. own planethetechniquewhich serves onlythe 84 cratic experienceandcult acies aremore opentomilitancy than stable regime and thewaveofadoptingdemocratic acy ismore legitimate inthe situation of ilitant democracy facilitatetheprocessof ny post-communist constitutionalstatesare ition the majortaskisto“rid societies of ures list and practice in CEE region see Sadurski, see Sadurski, CEEregion listand practice in ures d, atleast inItaly , in , in Sadurski, isnotconvincedthatithasyet 242 239 AccordingtoSajo,therearemajor Earlymilitant democracy practice supra note note 167 supra tremism andhatespeech right- nt democracybehavior:the and Germany. Further ure, butalsobyother 240 , at219. The Role of Political Political of Role The

244 Duringthe 241

CEU eTD Collection 249 248 247 246 245 overthrow ofthedemocraticgovernment “may arguments from theECHRjudgment thatpreventive measures againstexpectation ofan need theabilitytodisc to manage theuniquethreats that arise from thatdistinct political realm, fragile democracies authority bythosewhowouldsubvertdemocracy the UnitedStates. Thatporousnessrequiresanab more fragile,andhavepoliticalstructuresmo traditions in the United States,Issacharoff c After comparing militant democracy practicesinEurope(mainly) againsttheconstitutional similar tone wasmade earlierbySamuel Issa institutions; itmay notbeappropria demand closerjudicialvigilanceinthepres transitional constitutionalism, associated withperiods of political transformation that often argues that “militant constitutional democracy oughttobeunderstood asbelonging to democracy isonlyaphenomenon oftransitionalc national past. always context-dependantanditscontentta activities. the assumption ofbeingendangeredandtheref unjust andoppressiveforms rule.” ofpolitical Issacharoff, Teitel, Pieter Niesen calls thismodel of Sajo, Thiel, supra at229. note 128, Such constitutional practices ledmany commentators toconclude thatmilitant supra note 24, at 49. supra at49. 24, note 246 Thisconclusion reaffirms alsotheearlierclaim thatmilitant democracy is note 92, at 382. at 382. 92, note supra 247

note 86, at 1467. at note 86, 1467. ipline electoralactivity...”

behaviour ‘negative republicanism’. te formature liberaldemocracies.”

85 ence offledgingandoftenfragiledemocratic oncludes that “some democraticsocieties are re poroustoantidemocratic elements, thanin 245 charoff inhispaperonfragiledemocracies. rget are alwaysconnectedtothe particular be more easilyacceptedinthecontextof ility torestrictthe Therefore,thesedemocracies functionon altogether”, andhecontinuesthat“inorder ore react withmore suspicion to certain onstitutionalism. Forexample, RutiTeitel 249 Furthermore,Leto capture of governmental capture ofgovernmental 248 Carioloureveals Aclaim witha CEU eTD Collection http://www.partylaw.leidenuniv.nl/uploads/wp0711.pdf at on-line alsoavailable Parties6(2011), of Political Legal Regulation Series the on 254 253 252 251 250 political partieshavebeenimposed, otherthanforformal reasons. measures duringtheirtransition;thereareveryfewdemocracies communist statesdemonstrated a general hesitance to actively apply militant democracy matter. Theexample ofSouthAfricaisillustrativethisdebate party dissolution;evenatthelevelofadopting democracies,’ regime. Moreover,there arepractical examples ofwhenso-called‘incomplete be amore challenging taskfor thejudiciary than asimilar situation inastabledemocratic political libertiesinastillfr and thereforecancontribute measures duringtransitioncanassistincounter democracies, theanswer tothis question is commentators arguethat thesolution ismore plausible tobeutilizedbytransitional to militant democracy andbanpolitical parties in future politicalcareerofindividualinterms ofstandingfornationalelections.” fragile democracies,wherethepastsupportofvi Dissolution of Parties, Dissolution Political Constitution African intheSouth Ban Party established democracies”, Bourne, of –characteristics but fundamental somenot other – obtained ona reform, and of set out process democratic (2006). Secro Ltd vRedfearn in the Light of the European Convention of Human Rights Seeforexample Sadurski, For South Africa’s experience with party prohibition provisions see: Jorg K. Kemmerzell, Theterm ‘incomplete democracy’ adopted from Angela K.Bourne paper andis defined as“states that have Angela K.Bourne, Analysisof An Party: British National the of Members the by Offended be notto Right The Cariolou, Leto Therefore, thereisconsiderabledebate 252 withallthedifficultiestheymight face, Democratisation and the Illegalisation of Political Parties in Europe in Parties Political of theIllegalisation and Democratisation supra note 193 note 145, at 225; Venice Commission Guidelines on Prohibition and and Prohibition on Guidelines Commission Venice 225; at supra 145, note agile democraticsystem might l supra

to politicalstabilization. note 232, at 12. at 12. 232, note , 17 Democratization 4 (2010). (2010). 4 Democratization 17 , , at , 21.

86

not thisstraightforward. Militant democracy about whether newdemocracies shouldresort constitutional orlegisl ing there-emergence offormer rulingparties theearly years of its existence. While many olent actionsmay justif 251 Ontheotherhand,suppressionof consciously choose nottoresort ook more controversialandcould inwhichsanctionsagainst 254 253 , 35 Industrial Law Journal 4 Journal Law , Industrial 35

ative provisionsonthis whileEuropean post- y restrictionsinthe 7 Working Paper 250 Why There is no

CEU eTD Collection provision for partydissolution initsConstitution. 257 256 darmstadt.de/fileadmin/pg/arbe 255 militating of itsconstitutional structures. there arenotwodemocraciesw dependant. Thereisnouniversal militant democracy presenceandpractice(as wellasits absence)isabsolutely context- society withindifferentsettings.Again,thisconclusion bringsusbacktotheargumentthat able tointegrate spoilers. The SouthAfricanexperiment wassuccessfulmain recommendation and criticizecoun democracy measures. However,weshouldnot experience inrelationtotheabilitytrans state tothe presentday. Constitutional theory reference topartydissolutionmeasures, butunf character ofSouthAfricansociety,ethnican the societyin constituting assembly of1994. natural marginalization ofextr the democratic transitions.Thelatterinvolve memory (wherethenotionofpart peculiarities ofSouthAfrica’stransition,i.e.theactor Institutional Engineering: Ethnic Engineering: Party Bansin on-lineat Africa.’ Available Institutional through Conflict Ethnic Project‘Managing the on report seethe inAfrica bans of party overview the For (2010). Niesen, Ibid. Ibid. Kemmerzell, Party ban was applied in a very distinct manner in Rwanda for example. For detailed account see Peter Political Party Bans in Rwanda 1994-2003: Three Narratives Justification of Narratives Three Rwanda 1994-2003: in Bans Party Political South AfricaisoneofthefewAfricanc supra note 234,703. at 257 itsbereiche/theorie/africa.pdf Similar solutionsmight playout

emist forcescausedbythestrongunityofallmajor groupsof ith asimilar pastandfearsit y baniscloselyconnectedtoth solution tothe issueof democratic self-defence as wellas tries in transition whichdiditdifferently toSouth Africa.

87 d thepoliticalelitere it todemocracy withoutreferencetomilitant canlearn alessonfrom theSouthAfrican ortunately South Africaremains aoneparty d political tensions were solvedwithout d politicaltensions

ountries which abstained from including a ountries whichabstainedfromincludinga rushtodrawge ly becausethemain transition actorswere 256 255 Therefore, despite themultilayered Thisexceptionisexplainedbythe s beliefsinthecont differently ina deeplydivided wishes toaddressthroughthe http://www.politikwissenschaft.tu- e pastregime), andnatureof aching anagreement and neral conclusionand , 17 Democratization 4 ext of historical ext ofhistorical CEU eTD Collection 258 dangers andcontroversies of militant democracy. of partybansisagoodsignmore orless eyes of itscitizens, andtothe international which hadthepurposeofdemonstrating totaldisconnectionfromthepreviousregime inthe militant democracy inrelation topast rulers mature andstable democracies. Moreover, inpost-communist democracies the notion of reference to thehelpofmilitant democracy,ortheurgetointroduceapartybanevenin matter either, andthere areexamples ofsuccessf signs ofextremism thandemocracies intrans apply militant democracy measures. democracies might facethesituation whenthey was alleged for a longtime tohavelinkswithterrorism. In 2002alegislativeactwasadoptedandquickly However, Spainhadtoadoptamilitant democracy democracy, and theideathatconstitutionalin enemies. Thecountrywas unitedaroundtheideato democracy afterthe Francoregime withthe the moment itisworth mentioning thatSp application isthecaseof Spain.Thiscasewillbe For details on the Statute and case to outlaw Batasuna Party see Comella, in in PartyseeComella, Batasuna andcasetooutlaw Statute For on the details Another example whichalsodoesnot fit intothe general trend of militant democracy While itis hardto argue that stable demo

community. However,theinfrequentapplication balancedapproachto

88 had anextremelyimportant symbolic meaning tolerance wouldbeaccepted wasimplausible. ition, thereisnouniversal ain completed itssuccessful transition to widest possible tolerance towards itspast feel aneed(andhavereasons)toadopt and appliedtooutlawtheBatasunapartywhich discussedlaterinsome detail;howeverfor ul transitionsintroubled societieswithout cracies couldremainmore toleranttothe standmanyyearslaterafteritstransition. defeattheprevious 258 Therefore,even‘complete’ supra wards theunderstandingof note 52, 133-156. 133-156. 52, note regime and tobuilda approachtothis CEU eTD Collection 260 259 looking through thenationalconstitution: there agendas. new issues,suchastheheadscarf banandthe prohibitionof politicalpa relation tothesomehow traditional situations, ECHR demonstrates precise adherence toprinciples of militant democracy notonlyin which startedtofightagainsttheWest anditsvalues. democracies conceivedthattheybecame target militant democracy debate takesus backto the terrorist attacksof 2001. Manywestern-type elements of militant democracy in theirnew Continent. Manyyoungdemocracies inCentra democracy’s self-preservation wasthecollapse militant democracy as aconstitutionallyrecogni enemy ofalldemocracies: thecommunistregi to gainpower anduseittooverthrow response tothetragiceventsofpastwher defense. supported byAndrasSajo whoarguesthatthest more orless militant as legal structures of constitution completely lackingmilitant democr The constitutional practice Conclusion Avineri, Avineri, Sajo, supra at213. note 128, The militancy of aparticular constitutional systemcanbedetermined notonlyby 259 supra In the early years ofconstitutional militant democracy itwasadoptedasa note 15, at2. 15, note of many democratic states revealsth

e democracyaffordedoppor 89 militantdemocracy. Theargument is further but alsoapply militant democracytorelatively s ofanundeclaredwar also asapreventive technique againstanew constitutions. Themost recent trend inthe ofthecommunistregime ontheEuropean are examples whenconstitutional provisions me. Thenextphasein acy provisions, anddemocracies are always l andEasternEuropeintroducedvarious zed legal structure designed toassist in ate’s mostnaturalchar 260 Inaddition,juri at itishardtofindamodern against extremist Islam thedevelopment of tunity toitsenemies rties with Islamist acteristic isself- sprudence ofthe CEU eTD Collection 262 261 calls forviolence,rebellion,hightreason,th captures alllegalprovisions directed against formation ofparamilitary armies, and othersimila the liberaldemocracy pointofview,i.e.th migrated, forexample, tothedomain ofcrim understanding ofthemilitant democracycon of militant democracy measuresmight beconsid jurisdictions tofight Fascism essay whereheintroducedfourteengroupsof of militancy. for variousreasonsstatescandenytheybel inside the constitutional system inorder tosee if itqualifies asa militant democracy state, as particular legalsystem. ‘domicile ofmilitancy’ cannotbeanswered in complicated andlengthyproceduresofcons contradictions, butthissolutiondoesnotlookrea measures directlyinthec might become problematic. through ordinary legislation, therelationbetween Pfersmann, forexample, admits thatoncem of thelocationof legalprovisions onmilitant democracy isnotaneasyonetoanswer.Otto do notmention anything whichwouldresemble Thiel, Thiel, Pfersmannm supra noteat 63. 1, As tothelistof militant democracy meas supra note 92, at 416. at416. 92, note 262 Thelessonfrom thisobservationis 261 onstitution. Thisoptionsoundspl

Theonlywaytoovercome thisdifficultyistointroducesuch and otherdangerousmovements. ong tothegroupofstatesemploying theconcept

inal lawandarebynomeans controversialfrom 90 any kindofextremist behavior,includingopen generalterms andtheanswerdependson cept. Many measures listedbyLoewenstein titutional amendments. Thequestion of the e prohibitionofwear e formation ofarmies, etc.Loewenstein’s militant democracy. Inaddition, the question ered astoolongandbroadbythecurrent ilitant democracy elements areintroduced legislative measures employedinselected listic ifwetakeinto this legislationandconstitutional principles ures, thestarting pointwasLoewenstein’s r rules.In fact,Karl that itisimportant to look However, Loewenstein’s list ausible tosolvepotential accountthesometimes ing firearms andthe Lowenstein’s longlist CEU eTD Collection democracy stateandofemergency. Themost Most of thedifferences outlined above areapp will often be accommodated within theapplicati militant democracy isnotconceptualized asa of protection,addresseesthemeasures, a democracy measures couldbeseparatedfrom or understanding ofwhatconstitutemilitant other rights’limitation clauses.Iassumed this Loewenstein’s suggestionsin from inside. However,thefirst example of constitutional militancy differs substantially from inactive andshouldtakesome preventivemeasur followed thecoreofLoewenstein’sargu considered as astarting pointfor any militant constitutionally endorsed militant democracy st innovative constitutionalarrangements. As careful approachonhowtragicmistakes inthe only because theNaziregime originatedthere,butalsobecauseitrepresents abalancedand militant democracy. TheGerman modelof militant most importantly, notallactionsdangerous crime iscommitted, orplanned tocommit, requires higher standards of burdenof proof, and, criminal lawprovisions,butitisawell-knownfact account ofdemocracy’s self-defenseiscontradict The furtherenquiryofChapter2waswhet Germany isthe first jurisdictionwhich the list of measures. thelistof nd thepurposeoflimitations. However,where for democracy couldqualifyasacrime.

91 democracy relateddebate. German BasicLaw German BasicLawwasthefirstcaseofa licable tothedistinct democracy measures. Ingeneral, militant past might beprevented ments thatdemocracies shouldnotremain clarification wouldassi dinary rights’ limitati constitutional principle, militant democracy on ofthe ordinary rights limitation clause. ory tosome extendashedirectlyrefersto comes tomind whensomeone discusses ate, the listofmeasures listed thereis thatcriminal lawisapplicableonlyoncea democracy isimportant tobegin with,not likely consequences of thesedifferencesis es toprotectitselffrom beingdestroyed her militant democracy isdifferentfrom ion betweenthemilitant on clausesbythescope st ingainingabetter in thefuturethrough CEU eTD Collection Moreover, therearepractical examples ofwhen challenging taskforthe judiciarythanasim a yetfragiledemocratic system might look can contributetopoliticalstab during transitioncanassisttocounterthere-e democracies, ananswertothis commentators arguethat thesolution ismore plausible tobeutilizedbytransitional militant democracy and banpoliticalparties in justified. the number ofuncertaintiesandput new paradigms ofmixedcharacter,e.g.asin militant democracy. Moreover, itwas argued that militant democracy framework (ratherthan general risk-aversion then newchallengestoitsstructures might beaccommodated by imposed ontherightofparticipationinpublic and forexplaining and justification ofthebeha was arguedthatmilitant democracy logicisof potential relevance for otherrights limitations investigate moredetailsandsymptoms ofthis complete. position. Thefinalanswer militant democracy justification). However,itis justification from thegovernment (probablyit that thelimitations ofthesame character,but There isconsiderabledebate The issueof theextension ofmilitant democracy deserves aspecialcase-study to to thisquestionisleftuntilthe ilization. Ontheotherhand,suppre questionisnoteasytogive.Militantdemocracy measures thepracticeofstateinto aboutwhetherornotnewde

92 mergence offormer ruli phenomenon. Forthepurposeofthischapterit wouldbeeasierforittomake underthe acase theWar onTerror),w with differentrationale,might requiredifferent ilar situation inastable democratic regime. the early yearsof itsexistence.While many so-called‘incomplete democracies’ withall important tosee whether courtsaccept this more controversialandcouldbeamore discourse.Further, if democracy isabout vior of the State in relation to limitations case-study partifthisprojectis alegalframe thatmightbe ssion of politicallibertiesin mocracies shouldresortto ng parties and therefore ng partiesandtherefore ould probablydecrease CEU eTD Collection have reasons toadoptand applymilitant democracy measures. Therefore, even‘complete’ democracies might face thesituationwhentheyfeelaneedand the level of adopting constitutional orlegislativeprovisions onthismatter (i.e. Spain). the difficultiestheymight faceconsciously choose

93 nottoresortparty dissolution, evenat

CEU eTD Collection with anallegedlyauthoritarian agendain provide anexample ofhowmilitant democr Europe (includingthejurisprudenceofECHR). general framework inrelationtoprohibitionof cover thecommon trendsinthelegislationand democracy principleinEurope,especially Germany. developments inthejurisprudence of thefi the UnitedStatesduring theColdWar) aswellfollowinguponthemost recent to themilitant democracy principle bysomewhat the constitutionalism intimes ofcrisis.Furtherm Loewenstein’s arguments weretried inpracti German SocialistReichPartyandtheAustra political parties. Thechapter starts withea and interpretinglegislativeprovisionsregula follows I willintroduce the constitutional practices principle inrelation tothelimitations imposed on The major purpose of this chapteris toinves Introduction

MILITANT FROM Furthermore, thischapter willreveal the A substantialpart of thechapter willbe

THE

DEMOCRACY

EARLY CASE­ AND LAW Chapter PRACTICE

PROHIBITION

TO order tosafeguardthe political spacefrom any acy logicmight beinvokedbythegovernments

rly militant democracy application cases –the youngEuropeandemocracies. Thesurveywill 94 tigate theapplication of themilitant democracy ce andappliedbythejudi rst constitutional militant democracy state– THE ting issuesofformation andfunctioningof lian Communist Party–todemonstrate how politicalpartiesprovidedbytheCouncil of ore, this chapter will case-study from Russiawiththe purposeto jurisprudence oftheC political parties andthei

paranoid democrats (i.e.inGermanyand devoted to the application of themilitant 3: from different jurisd

MODERN

OF

POLITICAL

CONSTITUTIONAL elaborate onreferences ciary whileguarding EE statesaswell r activities.Inwhat ictions inapplying

PARTIES:

CEU eTD Collection application cases.Thefirst part of this secti This section aims topresent abrief summary Practice, SettingtheStandards, 3.1. EarlyMilitantDemocracyApplication Cases: theConceptin Testing protection against potential enemies. democracy solutions when democracy resortsto examples ofIndiaandIsraelwillbeintroduced unwanted intrusionthroughtheprocedureofpo beginning of itsexistence. controversies andconcernsforthe practiceof thedoctrine cases of the application of militant democracy protecting constitutional security.The secondpartofthissectionwillrefer to other early see howthejudiciarycanpreventadherencetoaSchmittian accountinmattersof chapter asboth casesclearlydemonstrate basic times ofcrisis.Ibelievethis considered as successful application of militant democracy logic to guard constitutionalism in opportunity totestLowenstein’sarguments on decided shortlyaftertheSec considerate andcarefulapplic Socialist Reich Partyand theAustralian Comm can beconsidered as foundationalformilita ond WorldWar). Thesejudicial case-study isappropria ation andinterpretation of thedoctrine (bothcases were and IdentifyingMajorChallenges on willincludetwoparty

95 and analysis of theearly militant democracy measures to demonstrate the major potential challenges doctrine canfaceinpractice,and inordertodemonstrate alternativemilitant nt democracy jurisprudence. TheGerman militant democracyinpracticeand canbe softermeasures in thebusiness ofself- litical partyregistration.Attheend, unist Partycasesrepresentexamplesof te tointroduceatth which occurred from the very which occurredfrom thevery decisions wereanexcellent prohibition caseswhich e beginningofthis CEU eTD Collection 265 264 263 Party, a “negative majority” wasorganized in democratic representation.Af power andtheydiditthroughth the strongestpartyatthatmoment). Thisfact appointed Chancellor,hispartywasoccupying Parliament; however,itneverhad a real majo legislature ( constitutional policy. described bysome scholarsevenashavi party’s clearlyantidemocraticmeans andaims.” door totheelectoralassumption Germany’s firstconstitutionalstatebasedonth establish abrutaldictatorship.” movement, whichavaileditselfofthedemocratic criticized andcharacterizedashavingbeen“d the Weimar regime whichleadtothe destructi militant democracy state.Constitutional militanc andtherefore constitution (BasicLawof1949) Germany was thefirst toincorporate a militant democracy arsenal into itsnational Party Case 3.1.1. Weimar Constitution of Practice and Theory Seeforexample PeterC.Caldwell, Dorsen, Rosenfeld, Sajo &Baer, Rensmann, in

Germany: The Weimar Constitution provided forasystem ofproportionate representationin the

Reichstag supra

note 52, at 1117. 1117. at 52, note Testing 265 ). Intheearly1930sNazipart

Constitutional

ter theelectionofsummer 1932,togetherwiththeCommunist supra Popular Sovereignty and the Crisis of German Constitutional Law. The The Law. Constitutional Crisisof German the and Sovereignty Popular 263 of power by the National Socialists, or Nazis, despite the of powerbytheNationalSocialists,orNazis,despite note 221, at 1286. at 221, 1286. note Some commentators note thattheWeimar Republic, e establisheddemocratic pro 1 (1997). (1997). 1

ng played“akeynegative role”inGerman 96 didnotpreventtheNazipartyfrom achieving Militancy e principleofpopularso on ofthestate.TheWeimar regime iswidely the Reichstag whichallowed these partiesto rity. Forexample, in1933 whenHitler was less thanonethirdofseats(althoughitwas y wasintroducedtoaddressmajor flawsof it istraditionallymentioned asaclassical efenseless againstthe riseof totalitarian 264 process asaTrojanhorseinitseffortto Moreover,theWeimar Constitutionis

in y begantogainmore seatsinthe

Practice: cedure, usinginstitutesof vereignty “openedthe The

Socialist

Reich

CEU eTD Collection 267 266 destroy thedemocratic order.Nodoubt,Loew participated inelectionsandvotedfortheextr lack ofpoliticalandmoral cultu democracy ifthereareno democrats.” be aneducational and cultural project tothesame the Weimar Republicledtoits culture, andintheabsenceof was noconsensusonwhether to Constitution wasconsidered asillegitimate by a legal point of view.TheWeimar Republic wa democratic electoralprocess. Therefore, atotalitarianregime wasestabl liberties) wereeffectively dismissed andall democratic state(likethesepa power tothegovernment tolegi act), whichtemporarily suspendedmajor provi powerful enoughtoconvincethe 1933 elections didnotbringamajority tohis used hispowerinordertosuppressallpossi as theheadofacoalition government andthrough themajor ministers heldbyhisfellows dictate theformation oftheGovernment. Afte Ibid., at 51. Pfersmann, The legitimacyof theWeimar Republicitself isnotasettled issuefrom political and supra note 1, at 52. at52. note 1,

ration ofpowers,andtheguaranteefundamental rightsand a strongdemocratic tr collapse withtragicconsequences.Indeed,democracy should call itarepublic or not. re oftheGerman societyat slate bydecree.Asaresult, the veryprinciplesof deputies tovoteforthe‘ 267 Hitler’s project of risingtopowerowesalotthe ble opponentsforfurtherelections.However,the

97 ished withoutanyvisibleviolationsofthe powers weretransferre r severalfailedattempts Hitlerwasappointed enstein’s argument onthepoliticsofemotion emists togainpowerinorder whosought sions of theWeimar Constitution andgave party again, butatthatmoment Hitlerwas wide sector of Germany’s society andthere extent asa constituti s established after a military defeat, its adition, theimperfections andflawsof 266 Ermächtigungsgesetz Combined withalack of legal that stage.Attheend,people d totheGovernment. onal one:“thereisno ’ (enabling CEU eTD Collection bind the legislature, the executive, and th and executive, the legislature, the bind rights asthebasis ofevery community, ofpeaceand of justice intheworld.(3)The following basic rights shall th (2) The people German allstateauthority. of duty democracy whichis able toprotect itself. fascist moods among thedraftersofBasi to protectfounding principlesagainstthepoten However, themost distinguishedfeatureforth 272 271 270 269 268 institutions, andthefoundingprinciplesof protection; form. Forexample, citizensweregrantedbasicrightswithastrongmechanism fortheir previous provisionsandrulestheGerman which theNazi regime hasbeenbased.” never beneutral inthe faceofitsmortal enemies.” recalled theconditionsthatledto experience. Manyofthem foundareflection impressive bodyoflegalthought.Manylessonshavebeendrawnfrom theWeimar based onrealeventsandunfortunately and thenecessity toconfine itinorder to of theirinternal structure which must confir as well them declare unconstitutional and parties political constitutional order or theconcept of rights (Article 18), prohibition of associations, the purpose and activities ofwhich are directed against the character given to the most fundamenta justice. lawand by judiciary the and executive the order, constitutional through specific legislative, executive, and judicial bodies. (3) The legislature shall be bound by the authority is derived from the people. It shall beexercised by the people through elections and other votes and The elements of Germany’s militant democracy were outlined above at p.72 and it includes a non-amendable anon-amendable itincludes and atp.72 above wereoutlined democracy Germany’s of elements militant The Forexample, Article1 Elmar M.Hucko (Ed.), in Kommers, Article 20 The BasicLawof1949presentsthe“count However, Germany’s greatexperiment withliberaldemocracy generatedan 270 states: (1) The Federal Republic of Germany of Republic isade Federal The states:(1) Germany wasdeclaredtobefederal supra note 158,218. at The Democratic Traditions. Four Four Constitutions German Traditions. The Democratic states: (1) Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the the be itshall and protect respect To beinviolable. shall states:(1) dignity Human

international understanding (Artic theNazistateand l provisions of theBasicLaw (Artic l provisions e judiciary as directly applicablelaw. m the democratic principles (Article 21). (Article21). m democratic principles the isvalidtosome extendnowadays. 269 Thedocument radically turned away from some prevent manipulating thepeople’semotions was 272

98 erefore acknowledge inviolable and inalienable human in theGerman BasicLawof1949whichhad e militant democracydebateisthemechanism Thecentral element ofGermany’s militant state aretheruleoflawandsocialjustice. political system wasgivenacompletely new as an obligation imposed on political parties in terms terms in parties onpolitical imposed asan obligation c Lawledtothecreationofamodel of tial enemies ofthest 268 resolved that“the Federal Republiccould er-constitution to theprevious oneupon

mocratic andsocial federal state.(2)Allstate state withparliamentary-democratic le 9 (II)) and mechanismle 9(II))and tooutlaw le 79 (III), forfeiture of the le 79(III), ofthe basic forfeiture 68 (1989). (1989). 68 ate. Thestronganti- 271

CEU eTD Collection 277 276 275 274 273 Court’s decisionwasstructured procedure tooutlawpolitical unconstitutional andthebandid unconstitutional underArticle21(II).Unsu liberal democratic order andasked theFederal ConstitutionalCourt its Neo-Nazicharacter.TheFederalGovernme publications, campaign appeals,and leader’sspeechestheparty wasinforming peopleabout neo-Nazi Organizationfoundedin1949asa Constitutional Courtoutlawedthe for themilitant democracy debate. different sectionsastheydiffer both cases parties were declared unconstitutional. However,thetwocases willbe discussed in adopted, theFederalConstitutional Courtwasaske activity iscarried outwithinthelimits of thatland. by theCabinet.States’governments caninitia Theconstitutionality of politicalparty can be challenged before the Constitutional Court bythemotion ofanychambe unconstitutional. democracy to bediscussedindetailshere (‘National List’), asmall(‘National in1989. right-wing party Constitution of The Federal Republic of of Germany Republic Federal of The Constitution sub-chapter. in next the loyalty jurisprudence duty of servants civil with together Thiel, Thiel, Commentators observe that the banning of the party was surely no surprise. Seee.g. David P. Currie, PartyCase. Reich 2 BVerfGE Socialist 1 (1952). isincluded Article21 under firstcasedecided The in seeThiel, E.g. The firstcaseunderArticle21(II)wasdecidedin1952. supra note 158, at 158, 121. note

supra note 158, at 121 for details onthe Hamburg Senate attempt to banthe

parties wasintroduced to in themanner they weredecided; around threemajor themes: poli 274 Sozialistische Reichspartei(SocialistReichParty,SRP)a not causeasensationasit r ofthenationalparliament (

216 (1994). (1994). 216

successor totheGerman Party. Imperial 99 is aprocedure todeclareapoliticalparty in this part while the second case will be discussed casewillbediscussed second this part the in while nt foundthattheSRPsoughttodestroy rprisingly, theCourtdeclaredSRP te suchactiononlyag d twicetooutlawpoliticalpartiesandin 273 prevent neo-N Shortlyafter the Basic Lawwas 275 and alsointheirimplications Bundestag was evident thattheentire tical partiesanddemocratic ThedecisionoftheFederal azi activities. to declaretheparty ainst apartywhose , orBundesrat National Liste National 276 277 Inits The The The ) or

CEU eTD Collection the freedemocratic orderwhichareembodiedintheBasicLaw.” parties fromthepoliticalstruggleonly“ifthey political parties for ademocratic state dictates th provides to prevent the activityof unconstitutional parties. However,thespecial roleof However, Article21doesnotonl that theestablishment of political parties(aswell astheir activity) must notberestrained. characterized bytheCourtasth found thatitwasnecessarytoexamine thefirs electorate, and atthesame time their depe antidemocratic orientation),andth whichpermitsthe principleofdemocracy, tomani The Courtidentified twomajor issues tobe reso 279 278 stated innouncertainterms thatapartyw Basic Law,theyarealsoentitledtoadditi general executiveauthority.However,duetospec they might beprohibitedunderconditionsestab political partieswerefoundasbe defined as“agents–evenif notthesoleone a newConstitution and theirspecial status within behavior. order; theSRP’s leadershipandinternalorga Ibid., at 220. in Kommers, The Courtinitsjudgments alsoexamined therelationshipsbetweenArticles9and21; The Courtstartedwithcontempl supra note 158,219. at

e onlymeans toemerge the ing associationswith y guaranteethefreeformation of e statusofaparliamentarian ating theissueofrecognition ofpoliticalpartiesin onal guarantees provided in Article 21. The Court onal guaranteesprovidedinArticle21.TheCourt ndence onaparticularpa 100

s –forming thepoliticalwillof thepeople.” ith internalorganiza nization; and,SRP’sprogram anditsleaders’ seektotopplesupreme fundamental valuesof e rulethatitispossibletoexcludedangerous lved inthis regard: the relationship between lished byArticle9andbeasubjectofthe ial statusaccordedto t problem indetail.Political partieswere the political system. Political parties were fest anypoliticalviews (eveniftheyareof in themeaning ofArticle9.Ingeneral, popular willanditwasconcluded as freerepresentatives ofhis 279 tion notcorrespondingto

politicalpar rty program. TheCourt political parties bythe ties butalso 278

CEU eTD Collection 280 the intentiontoreviveidea and itsleaders’behavior. TheCourtreachedthe internal structurewhichmustbe interpreted Article 21(1) of theBasicLawasimposing requirements onpoliticalparties’ the goal of eliminating thefree democratic ba State intheeventthatitach the CourttoconcludethatSRPsought followed theNaziparty’s example byestablishing affiliated organizations. Allthesefacts led procedure correspondedexactlytotheoneprac some categoriesofcitizensweredenied beco but fromthetoptodown.Thefreedomjointh guarantee tojoinorleav its members inthedecision-making process, stated thatapartyisrequiredtobestructur resemblewas foundto verymuch organizati the positions in suchorganizations asSS andSA. basis ofwhichitwasestablishedthatmost ofpa especially Hitler’sNaziparty,andtested the State if itweretoac democratic principleswill most probablyseek Ibid., at 222. Further in thejudgment theCourtanalyzed history ofGerman politicalparties, The lastpartoftheCourt’sjudgment presen The CourtfoundthatintheSRPauthorit hieve some politicalpower. e thepartyanytime. ieved politicalpower.Asaresult,theSRPwasfoundaspursuing

oftheStrongReichands organized inaccordancewithmajor democraticprinciples. correspondence anddocuments oftheSRP onthe ed from thebottom up,withtheinvolvementofall 101

to imposeitsantidemocratic structureuponthe ming amember oftheparty)andexpulsion Moreover, theinternal organization of the SRP sic order. Therefore, to impose the same structuralprinciples upon rty’s leaderswereformer on of Nazi party. In light of Article 21 it was on ofNaziparty.InlightArticle21itwas e partywasnotalsoguaranteed(forexample, ticed bytheNaziparty.Moreover,SRP conclusion that the party’s program reflected the basic equality of its members, anda 280 ts adetailedanalysisoftheSRPprogram y flowednotfrom members toitsleaders

uperiority oftheGermanrace. the ConstitutionalCourt Nazis with previous Naziswithprevious CEU eTD Collection 282 281 State’s structures from attackofitsenemie the Court ofGermany occupiedasteadfast position in example ofthoroughandcarefulinterpretationthisnotion.TheFederalConstitutional democracy throughordinarylegislation,asLowens (meaning constitutional militancy as therewereotherlegislative attempts tointroduce militant German BasicLaw.This caserepresentsthe based state,butmainly tosupportthe princi democratic system atthattime, anddamage Germany’s internationalreputation. democratic principles.Thefascistideasstil popular will,andlegitimizes oppositionparties confers aspecialstatusonpoliti state.The interpretation oftheparty-based a legislative ruleof automatic lossof s among constitutional lawyers.” Court andatthattime itappearedas“wholly members representedabannedpartyandlosttheirplaces.This‘penalty’wasorderedbythe government, statebodies,andeagera The speeches andactivitiesofthe party’ unconstitutional. is member isa the deputy which of section party or party political the BasicLawthat the (2) Article 21 of Bundestagmembership if the or (5) his lose her of Federal Electoral Law Enacted on 7 May 1956 (Federal Law Gazette I, p. 383). p. I, Law 383). Gazette (Federal 7May1956 on LawEnacted Electoral Federal SeeSchneider, in The SocialistReichPartycasegavetheC However, the casewasanoccasion notsimply tointerpret themeaning oftheparty- Thus, thepartywasdeclaredunconstitutional under theArticle21(II).The Bundestag supra note 195,539.at

281 However,shortlyafterthe cal parties,definespartiesas cceptance ofaFuhrerState. eats formembers ofunconstitutionalparty. the Federal Constitutional Court finds in accordance with accordance in Court finds Constitutional the Federal ple ofconstitutionalmilitancy established bythe 102

unexpectedandarousedconsiderable opposition Court found that Article 21 of the Basic Law Court foundthatArticle21oftheBasic s leadersexpressedtheiropposition tothe l seemed toposeserious threatto thenew s. TheCourtanalyzedth first attemptto bring theconcept into life relationtothenecessity ofprotecting the unless theyactinaccordance withthe ourt anopportunitytoexpressajudicial tein essay’s reveal). It appears to be an tein essay’sreveal).Itappearstobean decision, theBundestagadopted theprincipleorganforming Article 46(1): e party’sprogram, its Adeputyshall 282

CEU eTD Collection of all,itinvolves aclassical militant democr The AustralianCommunist Partycaseisofreleva Democracy 3.1.2. relation toadifferent aftermath oftheSecondWorldWar. TheAustralian The German FederalConstitutional Courtwasnottheonly onecapableof doingthisinthe example of judicial intervention tothebusinessof thepreservation of constitutional security. occasion toapplyArticle21providesconstituti implementation of theadmittedly problematic conceptof militant democracy. Thefirst judiciary tostandforconstitutional democracy, returning. Thus, thecaseofSocialistReich have beenemotionally influencedandcould memories of theprevious regime andthewo However, keepingin mind thecharacterof cautious asitwasthefirst occasion tore applied universallyinallpartyprohibitionca and principles.Moreover,thejudiciarydidnot that everything about this party was troubling interms of itsadherence todemocratic rules look more legitimate and justifiedin theeyesofpublic. The simultaneous assessment ofalltheseelem party’s unconstitutionality, but diditthroughthele internal structureand

The The judiciaryentrustedwiththetask todeci

Australian

enemy: Communism. activities asmeaningful

Communist

Party nder judgment onaparty’s unconstitutionality. 103

rld-wide tragedycaused elements inordertomake ajudgment onthe Case acy measure: theprohibition of anallegedly the partyinquestion(neo-Nazi)andfresh ses. Itmight bearguedthattheCourtwas ents assisted inmaki Party demonstrates thegeneralabilityof and preserve itthrough carefuland cautious have beendrivenby onal theoryandpracticewitharespectable want toestablish anyuncertain rulestobe nce forthissectionseveralreasons.First nses ofthe politicalparty’s specialstatus. : judiciaryfacedquiteasimilar task,butin de onparties’unconsti Australia’s

Experience ng theCourt’s decision by it,theCourtmight fears oftheregime tutionality asserted of

Militant

CEU eTD Collection general. Furthermore it isregarded asasignificant victory for constitutionalism, andtheruleof lawin 285 284 283 continued togrowthroughoutth war, thepartywasallowedto 1940 until1942 intermsofwartimeregulation. However, afterthe SovietUnionjoined the advocated banning thePartyearlier.Forexam close toovercoming thepopular nature of the democracy isnotrecognized assuch attheconstitutional level. demonstrates aclear example of militant democr PartyofAustralia.However,th the Communist political partywasbannedunder does notcontain anyexplicit provisions of amilitant democracy character. Moreover, the militant democracystateinthe same sense as Germany. TheAustralianFederalConstitution decision, and analyzeits implications forthemilitant democracy debate. statement abouttheimportance ofjudicial constitutionalism. Thirdly,theAustralianCommunist democracy waslifted totheconstitutional levelfor the first timeinthehistory of same time astheGerman FederalConstitutional C judiciary hadtodealwiththevalidityofth dangerous politicalmovement intheform 29 (2004). Scope of the Defence Power Throughout this section, Irely thissection, Dyzenhaus, on Throughout David Dyzenhaus, Pintos-Lopez &George Williams, Hernan The CommunistParty of Australia had existe First of all,itisimportant toclarify thatAustralia isnotconsidered anexample ofa 284 InwhatfollowsIwillsummarize briefl Constituting an Enemy: Schmitt Enemy: to A Response Carl an Constituting , 27 University of Tasmania Law Review 108 (2008). 108 (2008). TasmaniaReview of Law , University 27

resume itsactivitiesandevengainedsome support.Theparty e 1940s,wasincontrolof afewtradeunionsbutneverhad support fortheLaborParty. the federallawadoptedforthis Enemies Foreign and Domestic’ and Foreign Enemies supra 265. note e prohibitionoftheCommu 104

review inamodern of apolitical party. ple, thepartywasbannedtemporarily from e Australian caseisofrelevance here asit acy logic, evenincases wherethe militant y thebackgroundofcase,judicial ourt, i.e.shortlyafter theidea of militant d sincethe1920s,but Partycaseisconsidered tobe aniconic

285 , in Andras Sajo, Militant Democracy Democracy Militant Sajo, Andras , in TheFederalGovernmenthad particular reason: to outlaw particularreason:tooutlaw ThomasMowbray v Secondly, theAustralian Australian democracy. nist partyataroundthe it hadneverbeen and the New New the and 283

CEU eTD Collection note 265,at 19. 287 286 seven judgesanswered‘no’ court ofthefactsrecitedinAct’s asked todecideontwoimportantquestions:di prevent theenforcement oftheAct.Thein Australia tochallengethe constitutional validity Communist Party,tenunionsand performed overthispieceoflegislation. distinguished aspectoftheAustraliancaseisth the same time –orlaterafter thecollapse of question isnotmuch differentfromsimilar la organization (punishablebyfiveyearsofimpris employment anditwas declared anoffenceto The personswhowerecommunists declared to bedissolved and Communist Partyandotherassociationslikely the CommunistPartyDissolution Actwhich became law on 20October1950. Australian Communist Party.ThenewPrime Mini to power,anditdidnottake strikes andthereforetrying todestabilize theco Australia badlyandcommunists any serioussuccessin elections. Intheearly 1940sawave ofindustri preambular recitals areconsideredmost asstatute’s remarkable feature”. Seeforexample Dyznehaus, relation to the Communist Party (specifically powers to legislate in matters of national defence). “Lengthy The Act commenced with nine recitals, indicating fact recitals, indicating with nine Actcommenced The (Cth) 1950 Act Dissolution Party Communist The On thesamedayCommunist PartyDi their propertywasorde

to thefirstquestionbutanswered‘yes long toimplement oneofitspl were accusedofbeingresponsibleforcontrollingthese some unions’officialsapp preamble and,ifnot,wastheActinvalid? 105

junction was rejected, but the High Court was junction wasrejected,buttheHighCourt banned from Commonwealth public service banned fromCommonwealthpublicservice communistregime inEurope–however,the ws coming from otherjurisdictionsadoptedat d the validity of the Act depend upon proof in d thevalidityofActdependuponproofin untry. The1949elections to beundertheinfluenceofcommunistswere e judicialreview theHi s supporting the exercise of the legislative powers in powers thelegislative exercise of the s supporting of thestatuteandaske onment). Overall,the be an officeror amember ofanunlawful ster, RobertMenziesensuredthepassageof ssolution Actwas enacted,theAustralian red tobe forfeited totheCommonwealth. atform statements: tobanthe ealed to theHighCourtof gh CourtofAustralia d for aninjunction to content ofthelawin ’ tothesecondand led theLiberal Party al strikesaffected 287 Fiveofthe 286 The supra

CEU eTD Collection 289 288 the Constitution isanexplicit signof them ensure theexecutionand maintenance ofthe party waspromoted asbeingnecessary toprot espionage, sabotage,andtreas Thus, thepreamble statedthattheparty’smain deemed tobetrue andwerepresent bythe G in allpartsofsociety,economy, andgovernance. the UnitedStates andsome otherwesternstat majority ofAustralians,some suppo 80percent, doubt theCourtwasunderimmense pressured judicial review mainly due tothefact that th at theheart oftheConstitution.” watershed for civilliberties andtheroleof thec section itisimportant tokeep majority’s reasoning was notwi on theargument thatthe federal legislator excee militant democracy case. Indeed,the‘yes’answer tothesecond questionwasbasedprimarily for the established constitutional structure of the state,as itcouldbeexpectedfor aclassic invalidate theAct). the remaining judgeanswered therefore the statutewasinvalid H.Pintos-Lopez & Williams, H.Pintos-Lopez See for more details Dyzenhaus, The CommunistPartycasecanbeseenasan The judgment itselfwasnotthatmuch a supra supra

note 265. supra 265. note inmindtheoutcome ofthebatt on to achieve its goals. The ban imposed on the Communist on toachieveitsgoals.Thebanimposed ontheCommunist note 289 ated. TheChiefJusticeanswered ‘no’ tobothquestions and ‘yes’ toboth(sosi thout some serioustensions,

283, at 108. at108. 283, ilitant democracy logicinvokedbythegovernment e case wasextensively politically charged, andno 106

es wasobsessedwithexposingcommunist plots Constitution. Referencetothemaintenance of overnment thatthepartyposedagreatthreat. aim wastoseizepower bout how dangerousthe ourt as‘guardianoftheabidingvaluesthatlie ded itsauthority byenacting thisstatute. The ect Australia’sdefenseandsecurity, andto rted theban.AustraliatogetherwithBritain, Moreover,some factscitedinthepreamble eciding onvalidityoftheAct.Thus, iconicstatement abouttheimportanceof x judgesoftheseve 288 le which isrecognized as “a butforthepurposeofthis anditwasengagedin Communist Partywas n judgesvotedto CEU eTD Collection 290 government insustainingtheneed ofexceptiona known factthatintimes ofcris law withoutanyconstrainssimply because theyaresupported bythema the fearofCommunisminearly1950sprove model oftheseparation emergency areveryoftenseductive,butalsoof requiring governments to judiciary iscapablenotonlyof dissolution oftheCommunistPartyth the scopeofdefense powergrantedtoitbytheConstitution inordertoaccommodate the circumstances.” there aresome thingsthatgovernments arenot High CourtofAustraliainvalida the side ofthegovernmenton necessity to international pressandhasbeenhighlyc security and defense. Atthesame time, question wastoprotecttheConstitutioninge justification putadditional pressure onthe judi responsibilities the legislator andexecutivere of thisstatute and its execution waspresented asfulfillment oftheconstitutional compatible withtheFederalConstitutionbutin was toconvince the population andtheopposition thatthelawinquestion was notonly and the legislator to justify thebanof theComm Ibid., at109. Judicial decisionsliketheAustralianCommunistPartycasedemonstrate thatthe Despite pressurecoming from variouspolitical actorsandpowerfularguments from 290 ThehighestcourtofAust powersandtherule of law.The

recognizing thattheexecutive’sarguments intimes ofalleged ted thestatute.The judgment st is judges(ingeneral)might te rough aseparatelegislativeact. ontested inParliament bytheLaborParty. the Billhadstormed negative commentsfrom the 107

ralia rejected the legislator’s intentionto broaden quired tobeperformed bytheConstitution. This deed wasneededtoprotectit.Theenactment entitled todowithout neral, andnotonlyinthename ofnational unist Party.So,thevery protect the veryfoundati l measures. However,theAustralian caseis ciary as it was claimed that the statute in in statute the that wasclaimed asit ciary s thatgovernments cannotbreaktheruleof Australian example ands “forthepropositionthat nd to ease the work of the nd toeasetheworkof the most compelling of idea of the preamble on ofthestate, live up to theideal jority. Itisawell- of dealingwith CEU eTD Collection 291 party prohibition case) thejustification invoked Party DissolutionActwasnotbasedonthesame Australia does notconsider itself as milita manage todestroytheAustralianstate,orpose the institutions tobe protected. The Communi supervise such activities andprotect aform of defend theexistingsystem, butitalsoisaw Party casedemonstrates many tensionsthatmay national security (including th useful andapplicableguidance individual rightsandfreedoms in remembering asitisapplicable tothe curren and social).Thereisoneparagraphfrom thejudg version ofdemocracy evenintimes ofcrisis an honorableproofoftheopposite.Thejudiciary Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth, 83 CLR 1 (1951), at 187-188 (Judge Dixon) Dixon) (Judge at CLR187-188 83 1(1951), Commonwealth, v Party Communist Australian opposition orattempts todi su to resistor g power holdin assistthose to only adequately adequate, protection of an existing form ofgovernment ought not to be based on a conception, if otherwise the for powerto legislate the theory of constitutional In point to be protected. institutions power. Formsof government may needprotection from dangers likely toarise fromwithin the theexecutive holding those seldomby not done been ithas suppressed, unconstitutionally been History and not only ancient history, shows that in countries where democraticinstitutions have This isalesson worthremembering for theentire militant democracy debate.This is

splace them ortheform of government theydefend. e basisofconstitutionalorde for thepracticeoflimiting rights times ofcrisisandstress: nt democracy state (and the caseof Communist t constitutional practiceof many statesinlimiting 108

whilstbeingunderimmens government from dangerslikelytoarisewithin onderful example ofhowthejudiciarymight st Partywasnotbanned,andyetitdid by theAustralian government isofamilitant arise whengovernments seekextrapowers to a significant andreal ment thatis citedmost oftenanditisworth can standfortheruleoflawandanideal legislative premises asthefirstGerman r). The Australian Communist and freedoms inthename of ppress obstruction or threat todoso. While 291 e pressure(political

CEU eTD Collection political system. Someone familiar Union, andthereforedevelopedasetofmeasures relevance here.TheUnitedStateswasundeclared courts. setting andwhatwasaddedtothemeaning andunderstandingofthisprinciplebydifferent time, soitis fascinating tosee howtheidea all casesdiscussedaboveandto implemented anextensiveloyaltyprogram thesloganof under militant democracy.Moreover, to ruleontheconstitutionalityof theCommuni order. Thecase of Germanyisof particular relevance asitsFederalConstitutional Court had driven bythefearofCo and manner itisemployed inpractice. effectiveness ofthemilitant ch system ofa democratic state isingene democratic movements. Thepossibilityof Many othercountriesaroundtheworlddeveloped popularity ofacommunistpartyan Party ofGermanyCase 3.2. MilitantDemocracyEmploye experience of theapplication of militant democracy worldwide. democracy natureandthereforeitisofrele Australia was nottheonlywesterndemo The UnitedStatesexampleofprosecution In thissectionIwillpresentcase-studies ofsomewhat paranoidgovernments being mmunism sneakingtotheirstates’stru andthe SubsequentDevelopments aracter ofthe democracydepends be analyzedinthis with thepolitical system of theUnitedStates might claim d itsideologyshortlyafterth d byParanoidDemocrats:The 109

of militant democracy was adjusted to particular ral acceptable, however,thelegitimacy and invoking suchmeasures intheconstitutional vance forthecurrentchapter, andtheoverall st Partyandlaterthecountrydeveloped enemy ofthecommuniststateSoviet to resist the intrusion of communism intoits to resisttheintrusionofcommunism some techniques tosuppressallegedlyanti- sectionweredecidedataroundthesame cracy beingtroubledbythegrowing theCommunist Partycouldbealsoof ctures tosubverttheestablished to alargeextent ontheway e Naziregime wasdefeated. Communist CEU eTD Collection overall debate onmilitant democracy inearly years of itspractical application. However, theUnitedStatescouldbeaninteres Act is best known for itsapplicationagainstpoliticalfigures. Act isbestknownfor Party, andstateregistrationrequirement “radical” speech, including extensive loyalty post-World War IIera fearover 297 296 295 294 293 292 the standards ofthecriminal code,“andpros Communist Partytobesubjected tolegalrestraints thatshould nothavebeenpermitted under were criticizedonnumerous in occasions, communist ideology.Anti-communism campaignduringtheColdWar andthe government decidedto impose considerable lim far beyondtheSmith Act. Federal Government launchedanextensivecampaign againsttheCommunistPartythatwent represents but onefacetofanAmerican waroncommunism. adopted intheUnitedStatestocrimina to theearlypracticeofmilitant democracyit States isexceptionallyuniquefrom othe that this jurisdiction isutterly alien for themilitant democracy debate andthatthe United Supreme Court in v. in States.SeeCurrie, SupremeDenis Court United of the acts prohibited by the provisions of ...this title. title. ...this of the provisions by acts prohibited the of such government; Sec.3. It shall beunlawful for any person destroying any government inthe United States by force or violence, or by the assassination of any officer of the advise, orteach abet, n advocate, duty, wilfully (a)it as follows: Sec. 2 Actprovide Smith of the 3 and sectionwas Howard W. Sm ofthe anti-sedition author the For details see Stone, Ibid., at 1090. at 1090. ForseeStone, Ibid., details (1951) 494 States.341 U.S. v. United Dennis Smith the Act(as called ItU.S. Code Act (18 Registration § isusually Alien 2385). isThe The title official Geoffrey R. Stone (Ed.), ConstitutionalLaw Davidmentions P.Currie that earlycases from Germ Fora detailed account of American 297 Despitetheminor role of the

exceptionalism seeIssacharoff, national securitygeneratedwi : 5th ed. 1084 (2005). (2005). 1084 ed. : 5th lize advocatingtheovert for allcommunist-action organizations. supra note 276 110

r westerndemocraciesonmany accounts. cluding blaming the Court for allowing the cluding blamingtheCourtforallowing ecuting peoplefortheiradvocacyofMarxism- ecessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or or overthrowing of propriety or ecessity, desirability, is ofrelevancetolookatthe1940Smith Act programs, attemptstooutlawtheCommunist shall beunlawful forany person -(1) to knowingly or ting andvaluableexample tobeplacedinthe ith, representative ofthe State of Virginia). Section 2 any bearaclose familyre itations on thefreespeechofadherents to attempt to commit, or to conspire to commit, any to commit, conspire any to or commit, to attempt to , at 215,, 220-221. supra 296 Communist PartyintheUS, Duringthe‘ColdWar’ erathe noteat 86, 1415-1421. hrow ofgovernment. de-ranging restrictionson Dennis v.UnitedStates semblance tothatsemblance ofthe 293 294 Dennis case Duringthe Inrelation 295 The 292

CEU eTD Collection 299 298 for theCourttorenderjudgment. Thismove Government soughttochallenge proceeding againstKDPwasinitiatedin1951 (aga the Communist PartyofGermany ( decided bytheFederal Constitutional Courtof commitment ofthenewgovernment todemocratic principles.However,thefollowingcase majority ofthepopulationaccepted thismove happened mainlydue to thefact that thememories Socialist ReichPartyunconstitutionaloccasionedonlyveryfewprotestsinGermany. This interpretation of themilitantdemocracy pr from thefirstoccasion theFederal Constitutio this section. However,intheCommunistPart The contentofnormative principlesestablished Interpretation 3.2.1. democracy lenses. judiciary, politicians, andcommentators not democracy inGermany astheprohibitionof fears. However,thefollowing sectionwill militant democracy rationaleemployed bydemo Leninism.” to the War on Terrorism Communist Party of Germany Case (1956), 5 BVerfGE 8. See Kommers, in BVerfGE 5 Germany Case(1956), of Party Communist Seeforexample Geoffrey R.Stone,

The seconddecisionontheapplicationof The 298

Communist Therefore,theUSexamplecouldbea and 410 (2004). (2004). 410 Application

Party

the constitutionality Perilous Times: Free Speech in Wartim in Times: FreeSpeech Perilous of of

Militant Germany Kommunistischer ParteiDeutschlands focus on theanti-communism theme ofmilitant 111

ovisions. TheCourt’sdecisiontodeclarethe Germany wasdifferentbymany accounts. through criminal lawprovisions butmilitant Democracy y caseapplicationofthoseprinciplesdiffers theCommunistParty nal Courthad todecideonthemeaning and oftheAdenauerGovernment wasconsidered by German BasicLawwasrevealedearlierin crats driven byunreasonable andunjustified Case withoutquestioning toomuch thetrue Article 21(II)wasrenderedin1956toban of theNazi regime werestill fresh andthe in by theGovernment), thesame yearthe of theSRP.However,

ltogether considered asanexample of and

Notions its

Impact supra note158 e. From the Sedition Act of 1798 Actof1798 Sedition e. Fromthe

was assessedbythe

ittookalongtime on , KPD).

, at 222. the Further 299 The

CEU eTD Collection 301 300 speech (expression). Asintheearliercase,as the procedureunderArticle21ofBasicLaw couldposetofreedomofassociationand tried tosendamessage forthefuturecasesofreferencesto to present asreasonable ajudi Government’s motion tobantheKPD,despite imperfect andnotwell-groundedjudgment. Ho principles. Itisnot exactly truetostate that protect, as wellas more precise guidance on on potentialtensionsbetween militant democr the decisions onthese twocases, pages longopinion(thelongestin Germany.” the faceofrisingSoviet-American tensions as being“importantsymbolicallyinthebitter and establishedinWest Germany. Forexample, DonaldR.Kommers onthiscase commented unconstitutional hadagreat symbolic meaning fo had todealwiththiscase.Thereisno Government was notgoingtowithdraw itsap without theState’sinterference. Federal Constitutional Courtbelieved thatitwouldmake sensetolet the partyvanish itself as premature astheparty’select impact of West German economic booming) it almost lost any popular support. Kommers, in in Kommers, the (under by1956 and percent, 2.3 only by supported was party the elections national example, in 1953 For The KPDfacedthesamefateasSRPandwasdeclaredunconstitutionalina308 Apparently, the1956judgment reflectedmore 301

supra note 158,218. at

cial opinionaspossibleinthe oral supportwasdroppingconstantly. someone legitimately would expect However,aftersome yearsit theCourt’shistory).AsCourthadfewyearsbetween the Courtfailed inthis 112

ly coldwarbetweenEastandWest Germany in exacerbatedbythedivision andrearming of its droppingpopularity.In plication and the Federal Constitutional Court doubt thatdeclaring ubstantial part ofjudgment wasdevotedtoa the future application of militant democracy acy andthebasicvalues itwasdesignedto r thenewdemocratic polity being promoted wever, theCourtcouldnotresist sensitivity about thepossiblerisksthat Article 21procedure. given circumstances andalso became apparent thatthe task and handed down an taskandhandeddownan to see furtherelaboration 300 the Communist Party the Communist Some justices ofthe stead, theCourttried CEU eTD Collection 303 302 guard theinternalconsistencyofademocratic the possibility ofinvokingmilitant democracy to goals intheforeseeable future. that there is aprobablechancebyhuman sta state tobepresentinorder is that there isnoneed for anactual danger to meaning ofArticle21.Themost im of alllistedelements particular case,theFederalC activity, leaders’statements,offi identify thepresenceofsuch manifestation ofitspurpose“inpolitic purpose constantlyandresolutelytocombat undertakings” toabolishtheconst not requiredtofindthatitisengagedin Article 21oftheGerman BasicLaw. proletariat. Thejudgment, however,included clearly announced itsgoalsto all itsactivities against the existing constitu attitudes towardsotherpolitical structure,lead investigation oftheparty’s detailed analysisofMarxism-Leninism Niesen, Ibid., at 223. First of all,itwasestablished that in order supra note 82, at 12. note82, andfoundthattheKDP onstitutional Courtc

eliminate apoliticalpartyfrom a plan,theCourtshouldbelooki 303 players.Itwasestablished make a revolution andestabl cial declarations,educational itutional order.What isimportant isthepresenceofa“fixed Therefore,theCommunistPa portant lessontobederivedfrom thispartofthejudgment al action according toafixedplan.” and thehistoryofGe 113

ership, therelationbetweenitsmembers, and tional system: thepublic platform of theKPD “illegalactivity”or some other“concrete theexistence of thedemocraticconstitutional ndards torealizetheparty’sunconstitutional some points important system bywatchingtheintentionsofits thefreedemocratic basicorder”and avert not onlyempirical dangersbutalsoto onducted itsownindependentexaminations was anunconstitution to denyaparty’sconsti by theCourtthatKPDaimed electoralprocess;itisenough ng attheparty’sprogram, its materials, andsoon.Inthis rty caseopened the door for ish thedictatorshipof rman Communism, an of interpretation al partywithinthe tutional statusitis 302 Inorder to CEU eTD Collection 305 304 Westphalia in1961.Thelitigationtochallenge th League wasdeniedtobeputontheballot some yearsafterthe CommunistPartywasdi organizations. Thelatterstatemen seats infederalandlandparliaments –butal extends notonlytotheCommunist decision thatisbindingtoth limit placed ontheiractivities. Militant democracy wasdeclaredaconstitutional value democracy cannolongerremain ignoranttoward ‘founding fathers’wasbasedonthe the rightsandfreedoms ofthosewhowoulddest should beprotectedandpreserve Article 21(II) theframers intended toensure that constitutional values.Accord Constitution. foundnoconflictbe TheCourt to comment onhowitis possibletoreconcile Artic Article 21(II) whichwasformative of Germany’s militant democracy.TheCourt felt obliged dissolution ofaminor political participants. Kommers, in in Kommers, Ibid., at 12. Finally, the Constitutional Courtdeclared Second, inthisjudgment theCourtformulat 304 supra TheFederalConstitutional Courtfounditaconvincing argument tojustifythe note 158,223. at e Federal Constitutional Court.

ing totheCourt’sopinionframers oftheBasicLawin partywithoutanysubstantia d, anditcouldbedonethroughme t hadafar-reaching implication forsome organizations even Party itself –withforfeiture tragic historicalexperience 114

ssolved. Forexample, theCommunist Voters’ for theBundestagelectionsinNorthRhine- tween Article21andpresumably higher so toallitscurrent and future surrogate s politicalpartiesandthereshouldbesome the veryprinciples of thedemocratic state roy theexistingorder.Theintentionof e state’srefusaltoallowthem tocompete le 21(II)withotherba ed anunderstandingandinterpretationof that adeclaration of unconstitutionality 305 l supportfromtheelectorate.

ofitspropertyandloose whichconvincedthem that asures directedtoaffect sic principles ofthe CEU eTD Collection (1999). (1999). German order. democratic authors find it difficult toseehowthesmall 307 306 strong proceduralguarantees. measures overweightsuch risks,anditisadmi democracy. Theonlypossible respond tothem is views which isso important for thepolitical process. These are the main questions of militant Needless to say,theexclusionof certain politicalparties narrowsthe diversityof political people todecideontheirownwho 1950s. Moreover,bybanningpoliticalpartiesastate demonstratesthatitdoesnottrustits preventive character of militant democracy wi processes inGermany; thereforeitishardto was handedout,theCommunist Partybarelyhadanychance toinfluencethepolitical overthrow theexistingconstitutional orderinthe foreseeablefuture.Bythetime thejudgment about theintentionofCommunist Party even inthelightofthisinterpretationitdoe democracy notonlytoaddressa declare the Communistpartyunconstitution supplanted bythebannedKDPparty. for theseatsinparliament wasnotsuccessf Sabine Michalowski &Lorna Woods, German Constitutional Law. The in Kommers, The CommunistParty caseis, supra note 158, at 223-224. 223-224. at 158, note 307

Themajor argument of the Federal Constitutional Court to real threat butalsoamere will represent theirinterest 306

however, somewhatproblematic. First of all, some s notsoundveryconvincingwhenaCourtspeaks 115

ssible onlyifitiscarrie KPD couldhaveposedaseriousthreattothe al wasthe possibility toemploy militant to extinguishitspoliticalopponentsand ul astheLeaguewasfoundtobeeffectively reconcile theCourt’s interpretation of the th theposition of CommunistPartyinthe thatadvantages of militant democracy logically possibl in thedecision-making process. Protection of Civil Liberties d outinaccordance with e one.However, 19 19 CEU eTD Collection Review 1592 (2004). (2004). 1592 Review in Germany Value Preferred Constitutional asa the Dignity Primacy of and Democracy, Constitution (established in1950). activities and overallpolicies of theFederalandStateBureaus for theProtection of the On theotherhand,Court’sjudgment on 311 310 309 308 entering civil service. militant democracy notion wererevived andwide free democratic basicorderonpoliticalactors violation ofpubliclawwhenpo political advertisement onpublicbroadcasting Federal Constitutional Courtvindicatedtheright campaign broadcastingtime onradioandtelevisi Groups Partycasedecidedin1978. special status grantedto political parties. Th demonstrate amore cautious approach towards the constitutional obligation toguarantee first glance, courts started to take the pa democracy principleinorderto case hadaconsiderable impact uponthefuture 3.2.2. when itfinds itnecessary toguard 21(2) sincethe1970s;however,government st In general, theFederal Constitutional Courthas b Case Nielsen, see in this Kommers, of decision account For detailed 198. BVerfGE 47 Case(1978), Groups Radical Ronald J.Krotoszynski,

Germany’s supra note 82, at 30. at30. 82, note

Militant A Comparative Perspective on the First Amendment: Free Speech, Militant Militant FreeSpeech, FirstAmendment: the on Perspective A Comparative

Democracy litical partiesweredeniedai protect theconstituti 309 311 the existingconstitutionalorder. During1975and1976threeGe Theinterpretationoftherequirement imposed bythe

in 116

is couldbeevidentfrom famous Radical the

rty privilegeguaranteemore seriouslyand supra note 158 note supra the the CommunistPartycaseinfluencedalot stations andchannelsfounditasevere interpretation andapplicationofthemilitant and especiallytheprev een lessstrict initsenforcement of Article on tothreeradicalleft-wingparties.The ill retainsthepower of radical parties to havetime for their ly appliedlater inordertoscreen those Aftermath onal structuresofGerman At democracy. , at 224-227. at 224-227. , rtime withoutsufficientreason.

of

308 the rman statesweredenied The Communist Party TheCommunist

entive nature of the Communist to abolishanyparty , 78 Tulane Law

Party 310

CEU eTD Collection 314 313 312 to anti-constitutionalorganizations public servicepositions. and 1980around1.3million applicantswerescr civil servicesapplicantsto many otherdemocratic states).Between 1972an example, itwasappliednotonlytothemost important andsensitivecivi engaged insuchactivities.Thepolicywasqui barred from beingengaged inanti-constitutional activities and belongingtotheorganizations of civilservantsinor issued aLoyaltyDecreeonJanuary28,1972. institutions andafteranexte democracy. the contemporary German government maintains aweakened commitment tomilitant measures toprotect the existing constitutional or parties. However, theFederalGovernment didnotdropthe ideatouse militant democracy three days, itchanged its strategy and became more serious about the specialstatus ofpolitical not hesitatetosubmit twomotions todeclar of militant democracy inGermany. Germany’ Anti-Terrorism Legislation Anti-Terrorism Germany’ Servants). For details see e.g. Thiel, Thiel, e.g. see Fordetails Servants). however the duty of loyalty is imposed by the ordinary federal and states legislation (e.g. Laws on Public ShawnBoyne, Krotoszynski, Article 33(5) The dutyofloyaltyimposed onacivilservant The purposeofthedecreewastosetforthguidelinesonrecruitment anddismissal 313 Intheearly 1970sGermany facedafear ofthe Basic Law requires theobservance ofthe customary principles ofpublicservice, supra note note 308 supra Law, Terrorism and Social der to excludeenemies ofdemocracy 314 Sometimes thestatetargetedindi , at 1592. , at1592. a loyaltytest.PeterKatzenstei nded periodofradicalunrest,bot

supra note 158 supra , 12 Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law 57 (2004). (e.g.asintheinstanceofdismissal ofamen from civil 312 Whileintheearly1950sGerman government did Movements: TheTension BetweenPoliticsand Security in , at 130-131. , at130-131. 117

e apoliticalpartyunconstitutionalwithinonly der andevennowoneshouldnotassume that d 1987theGovernmentsubjectedmillions of te broadinitspurpose eened andabout1300 werebarred from is consideredtobeoneoftheelements ofradicalgroups invadingthe state n hasestimated thatbetween1973 from thecivil service; they were viduals withahardlyvisiblelink h federalandstategovernments l serviceposts(asdo and application;for CEU eTD Collection Protection of theConstitution and of political always satisfied thecriteria of anti-constituti been attackedforitsneo-Nazitendencies very beginning of Germandemocracy militancy. TheNational Democratic Party (NDP) has handle instates truly committedtomajor democratic principles whichwereapparent from the foundational militant democracy issues, itdemonstr to mention thelatestdevelopment inArticle excessive burdenplacedonindi traded for measuresrequiring lessjustification from theside of theGovernment butwithan scale oftheirapplication, itappearsthatstro closer lookatthenature employed topreservedemo bydemocrats whoaim case andloyalty decree canbe considered toso has beenactivelyapplied inlessradical militant democracy measures. TheCommunistParty 316 315 servants. the prohibition ofpoliticalpartiestolesscontro Red Army Faction). service ashewascohabitatingwithGudren parties’ within the meaning of Article 21. Article 21. of meaning within the parties’ as‘political qualify not did organizations soasthese rule to rejected Court Federal Constitutional the 1994 sim Hamburg’s filed and Senate party Democratic Workers and the federal government 1993: Party case in only The Federal Constitutional Court was asked to decide on a party ban for the first time since the Communist Communist forthe firsttime apartyban since the Court on was askedto decide Constitutional Federal The Ibid. To present a full picture of militant democracy Thus, itispossibletoobservethatGermany 316 Thepreventive characterof militant de 315

ofthealternatives,proceduralguaranteesaccordedtothem, andthe

viduals applyingfororbeing sinceitsincep nger protectionprovidedfo 118

onality bythe assessment oftheBureau forthe Ensslin, founderoftheGerman terroristgroup 21(II)jurisprudence. the Bundesrat asked to declare unconstitutional Free unconstitutional to declare asked the Bundesrat me extentas examples of militant democracy versial measures ofal ilar petition in relation to the National List party. In Listparty. to theNational relation in ilar petition mocracy wasgreetedwithenthusiasm and scientists committed toresearch into ates thatmilitant democracy isnot easy to opted forsome trade-offsbyshiftingfrom cracy atanycost.However,ifwetakea application in Germany itisimportant tion in1964andithadprobably employed aspublicservants. Although it is not about Although itisnotabout oyalty screenof public r political parties was CEU eTD Collection has considered suchstatement asaviolationof unconstitutional activity, an enem challenged theInterior Ministry’s report between thegovernment andthispoliticalplayer the question ofits unconstitutionality wasnotreferredto theCourtuntil 2003. Thetension 320 319 318 317 whether theproceeding couldbecontinued desp The respondentsaskedtheCourttostoppr as informers of intelligence services” more than15%ofthemembers ofthepartylead had tosuspendthehearing.Theapplicants be seriousastheapplicationto of theparty activists had beenan scheduled ahearing.However,fewdaysbefore population ofthecountry.TheCourtfoundth Germany. Moreover,theNDPatthattime foundagrowingsupportamongst theyoung foreigners, andaseriesofhatecrimesattrib the NDP. statements evenifthepartyisno the BasicLaw. TheCourtfoundthatgovernmental agencies arepermitted tomake such ‘extremism.’ far. National Democratic Part of Germany Case (2003), 2 BVB1/01, 2/01, 3/01. frommajor partie allthe support political gained initiative Working Paper N.9 12 (2007). (2007). 12 N.9 Paper Working Rensmann, Federal Government bythe and both Itwasaapplication chambersjoint of the Federal Parliament (this in Thiel, PeterNiesen, In 2002the FederalConstitutional Court wasas 319 supra note 158 Thereasonforsuchapplications wasthe supra 317 Thediscussionaboutbanningthe Banning Parties in Germany: Lessons from Europe note 52, at 1120. at note 52, 1120. , at 122.

banthepartywasheavilyrely t declaredasun informer for the intelligence services. The issue appeared to y offreedom, anddangertofreedemocratic order.TheNDP 320 (butrefusedtodisclose uted toneo-Nazigroupsholdingtheiractivityin 119

disclosed laterthatbetween1997and2002“no which describeditasapartyengagedin partyprivilegeguarant constitutional. wasnotnewandasearlyin1975theNDP s) and therefore appears to be unprecedented move so move so to appears be therefore unprecedented s) and ite therevelationthataconsiderablenumber thehearingCourt ership atthe Federaland Statelevelworked ocedure andthe“Courtthushadtodecide NDP revivedinthelate-1990s. e constitutionalcomplaint admissible and number ofraciallymotivatedattackson ked toruleontheconstitutionality of ing onhisstatements. TheCourt , Technische Universitat Darmstadt. , Universitat Technische the names of allinformers). eed byArticle21(I)of was informed thatone 318 However, CEU eTD Collection 325 324 323 322 321 substantive issueunsolvedrepresent,accord which wouldgiveitmorelegitimacy and hand, iftheCourtfailedtoapplysubstantialgr NDP wouldleadthemembers ofthepartytob of tryingtobantheNPD”. bowed tothedynamics ofthe“uprising decent”without havingfullysupportedtheidea relief byallpartiesconcerned”. procedure. Therefore, theminority ofthecourtplayedade the Courtdidnothavesixout for therespondent.” NDP todiscontinuetheproceedings constituted the politicalparties.The Courtassumed thatth guarantee of politicalparties’ rights andadditio members oftheSenate” party withnegativeconsequencesfortherespon to theFederal Constitutional Actanydecisionintheproceeding toprohibit anddissolve the found thatthepresenceofinformers inNDPpr proceedings.” of members oftheNPDactedasinformers for Ibid. Ibid. Rensmann, in Ibid. at 1122. Ibid., at 1121. Ibid., The solution offered bytheFederal Constitutio The casewasturned into adecisionon thepr 321 supra Intheend,fourjudgesvotedtocon note 52, at 1133. 1133. at 52, note 323 Thus,theCourtfoundthatproc 322 325 assigned todealwiththeappl

Therewaslegitimatef 324 ofeightrequiredvotestodenytherespondent’sapplication. Thepolitical bodies which initiatedthe procedure “had 120

popularity. TheCourt’sde ing totheThiloRensma evented theCourtform ounds theNDPwouldbefreefrom anycharge the intelligencethe servicesbeforeandduringthe ecome more radicalthan before.Ontheother such a“decisionwithnegative consequences nal legitimacy totheCourt decisions toban cisive role inthedeci e denial ofthe“implicit” application ofthe dent requires“atwo-thirdsmajority ofthe ocedural details of th ear thatthesuccessful outlawing ofthe nal Court “was greeted withasense of tinue theprocedurewhilethreeothers eeding couldnotbecontinuedsince ication. Thisisaprocedural furtherproceeding. sion to discontinue the sion todiscontinuethe nn, the most suitable nn, themost e process:according cision toleavethe CEU eTD Collection reference topartydissolutionprocedure Nowadays, Germany representsastate witha 327 326 the casewithsome leadingNDPfigures),the measures, liketheindividualprosecution of part democracy. Insteadof partyprohibition the however, that theGermanstateappears tobe unless thereareserious attempts todamage the signal tothe Government thatitwillnotbeeasytodeclarea politicalparty unconstitutional parties. democracy is withering awayasaneffectiv subject ofmorecoordinatedandorga democracy. Itispossible toassume thatafter such anoutcome theparties willbecome the responsible fortheincreasinguseofexecutivemeans tofightagainsttheenemies ofthe danger fordemocracy) aslongtheminority j possibility ofasuccessfulapplic solution inthissituation. Themain consequenc 1993, 3213). 3213). 1993, at 21-23; Another case decided by the Federal Administ For detailsorder). seeMichalowski, constitutional against established aredirected the activities which any group suppress to process political in pluralism of principle the (itisagainst activities illegal other acts violence of or through goals realizeanti-constitutional German attemptto most isan State.The essential the of order constitutional the tothreat goals unconstitutional realizetheir to want Basic Lawonlyifthey the of 9(II) Article under banned be could Associations its prohibition. justify to enough not is principles other factthat mere the Court, Federal Administrative the by hierarchy. militaryIt wasa sportgr ba was association The (1980)). 218 61, Case (BVerwGE Hoffmann the Wehrsportgruppe e.g. order, constitutional established the against itwasdirected that grounds Court in the system ofadministrative justice) had ruled several times onthe prohibition of associations on the (the Federal highest Administrative The Tribunal Court. the to appeal further of apossibility with executive the Sanchez, in Article 9(II) of the Basic Lawallows prohibition of association. The prohibition of such groups is held by 326 The NDPcaseledsome commentators toconclude that theconcept of militant Iwould not agreew supra note at note 52, 5. oup and its membersoup andits received paramilitary training. As was established later

ith this statement andtheNDPcaseshould be considered as a ation tooutlawtheparty(except incases ofclearandpresent nized interference bytheState. but only inextreme circumstances. 121

banning oforganizations,andothermeasures. the association rejects the constitutional order and it and with order constitutional the rejects association the rative Tribunal is Nationalist Front Case(BVerwG TribunalFront is rative Nationalist NJW government willneedto existing constitutionalorder. It doesnot mean, defenselessagainstthoseaiming todamage y members forcrimes theycommitted (aswas e safeguardagainstundemocratic political udges remain inoffice.Thosejudgeswillbe e from thisdecisionistheexclusionofany stable democratic system which can afford stable democratic system whichcanafford sed onauthoritarian leadership andused arigid optforalternative supra note 307, 307, note 327

CEU eTD Collection 328 ensure movement intherightdirection:democr demonstration of howmilitant democracy can be the concept of militant democracy. Thepost-co The collapseoftheCommunism regime inCent 3.3.1. democracy asinvokedinpractice. potentially problematic nationalconstitution states anditisusefultoprovi jurisprudence of theECHRmirrors toalarg substantive bodyofcase-law onmilitant democracy must followandabideby.Second,inlastcouple ofdecades thisinstitutionhasproduced a legal issues aregiven toaconsiderableamou binding judgments for47stateswhichmeans that included inthiscase-study for various reasons. First of all, it isaninternational Courtwith jurisprudence onpoli project, so thefocus willbeongeneral trends constitutional practices onmilitant democracy jurisprudence in Europe. It isnot feasible to do afull reviewof allEuropean states’ The following sectionwillintroduce anoverview andan analysis of militant democracy ECHR Jurisprudence and theLegislat 3.3. MilitantDemocracya on Human Rights European Convention on Human Rights Forabrief overview ofthe ECHR case-law on party prohibition seee.g. David John Harris (Ed.), Militant 463-467 (2010). (2010). 463-467 Democracy tical parties’ prohibition of theECHR. in

de anaccountofitscase-lawtotrackthe YoungEuropean nd theProhibitionofPolit 527-531 (2009) or Jacobs, White and Ovey, ion ofYoung European Democracies 122

e extend theconstitutional practice of European nt oftheEuropean democracies,whichthey al andlegislative provisions on militant atization andthelibera ral andEasternEurope mmunism spaceof Europeisanexcellent application within the framework of this common to most states,as wellasthe atleast thegeneral utilized during the transitional period to Democracies related issues andproblems. Third,the 328 The ECHR case-law willbe ical PartiesinEurope:

guidance onparticular tion of a society and a tion ofasocietyand The European Convention most challengingand gave secondbirthto Law of the the Law of CEU eTD Collection 331 330 329 ranging means toregulatepoliticalparties’activities andtakemeasures onceapartybecomes invoking militant democracy whenitisneeded. voters. Therefore,theprincipleofpolitical many extremist organizationswouldusethisoppor communist regime causedaseriousideologicalv proclaiming thisprinciple intheirconstitutions”. on parties’activities, and“celebratedthe pr after along experienceof one-party accompanied bytwospecificandsomehow contra they represent. totalitarian attempts are tobetreated equally,irrespective of theactualnature of thedanger reactions arenotframed inawa extremism. communists; 2)territor regimes inresponse toatleastthreemajor riskspr democracyreaction intransitional period countries in Centraland EasternEurope.A.Sajo,forexample,suggeststhatamilitant triggered wide support fortheconstitutional state’s structures. Thepast experience oftheoppressive regime thatexistedformany years Ii. t28 at 242, 225. supra ¬e Priban Sadurski, Ibid., at 218. Sajo, supra at217. note 128, In general, constitutional systems of post-communist European statesprovide awide- inthecountriesofCentralandEasternEuropewas The transitiontodemocracy 329 Sajofurther points out that the actual constitutional and jurisprudential 330

ial disintegrationbecauseofextr

y totreatthedifferentproblems rule, all states were hesitant were states all rule, was adopted bypost-communistconstitutional 123

pluralism wassupportedbythepossibilityof inciple ofpartypluralism (attimes, even and legislativemilitancy wefindinmany acuum anditwaslegitimately expected that 331 esent inthosesocieties: tunity tomobilize largenumbers of‘lost’ dictory circumstances. Ontheonehand, On the other hand, the collapse of the Ontheotherhand,collapseof eme nationalism;and3)right-wing toputanyseriousconstrains inadistinct manner but all 1) the return of the 1)thereturnof CEU eTD Collection putting militant democracy intopractice. 337 336 335 334 333 332 Democracy oftheThirdPolishRepublic’) was corrected bytheConstitutional Courts(like incase of political party‘Christian the unjustifiedattempts onthesideofgovernments todissolveorprohibitpoliticalparties as longtheydonotuseviolenceameans of the ECHRandinmost of thecases political some othermeasures limitations imposing onpart it isimportant tobear inmind thatmost of th constitutional practiceoftheCEEregionisw that theapplication of militant democracy meas exceptional cases.” European approach,underwhichpoliticalpa number ofpoliticalpartiesovertheyearscomes incontrastwith thecont hardly everinvokethem. political parties inTurkey whereitnotesth Venice CommissionontheConstitutionalandLegalProvisions been usedsparingly intheregion. commentators, provisions onmilitant democracy meas potentially dangerousfordemocracy. and Legal Provisions Relevant to the Prohibition of Political Parties in Turkey, PartiesinTurkey, of Political Prohibition the to Relevant Provisions Legal and supra Ibid. Priban & Sadurski, section 3. Ibid., Constitutional the on Opinion Commission). Law(Venice for Democracy through Commission European at Ibid., 225. &Sadurski, Priban militant ofthe most Forabrief distinct overview note 128, at 218-219; Priban & Sadurski,, &Sadurski,, Priban at218-219; note 128, Central and Eastern European note 242, at 228. at 228. 242, supra note 335

334 Inthisrespect the practice of

333 Thisconclusion alsofollows from the post-communist stateshavebe 332

note 242, at 225-230 . supra at 242, 225-230 note However,aswascorrec 336 337 However,itwouldbeanexaggerationtoclaim orbytheECHR. parties wereaccordedex 124

ithout problems andconcerns.Atthesame time, at instateshavingpr democracy provisions from the CEE countries see Sajo, seeSajo, from CEEcountries democracy provisions the e attempts tobanpoliti rties areprohibitedor y activitieswerebroughttotheattentionof achievingtheirgoals. ures inrelation topolitical parties inthe ures inrelation topolitical parties have Turkeywhichprohibited“ahigh relevant totheprohibitionof supra ovisions onpartyclosure tly pointedoutbysome en extremely reluctant in tremely wideprotection note 224, section notesection 22. 224, cal parties as wellas rast oftheprevailing dissolvedonlyin As aresult,most of Opinion ofthe CEU eTD Collection Usually theCourtwilltakeintoaccounthi 340 339 338 registration mustbenecessaryindemocratic standards incasesofrefusalapartyregist as, forexample,intheUnitedCommunistPartyvTurkeycase).TheECHRusessame provide thelimitation onpartyname,andsome how seriousrequirements imposed onpartieswish Convention. the requirement of registration forpoliticalparties, the refusal of theregistration inthe ECHR. a fewcasescoming from differentjurisdictions threshold, etc.Astotheregistrationprocedures, suspension ofpartyactivities,exclusionfr the name of the party,number ofitsmemb procedures (whichisusuallyameans ofensuri Among themeasures regulatingpoliticalpartie Measures and procedures atth ECHR; therefore therearereliable sourcesinEnglish onthe relevant legislative provisions militant democracyapplicationintheregion(a type oflimitations imposed. InwhatfollowsI other limitations imposed onpoliticalpartiescan (2005). (2005). Romania v. andUngureanu Comunisotolor Partidul changes; constitutional for advocating actively association PartidulCommunistilor (Nepeceristi) European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), SeeforexampleLinkovv.Czech The entirebodyofjurisprudencecoming fromtheCEEregiononpartyclosureand

Restricting 339 However, contracting partiesdonothaveunlimited discretionastowhichand However,contracting e nationallevel).

Freedom

of and Ungureanuv.Romania(200 Republic (2006);Zhechev v. Bulgar

Political 338

Parties 125

Asitwasinterpreted society,andmeet theproportionalitytest. om astate’sfinancialsubversion,electoral will introduce brieflythe storical andpolitical background ofthecase, when political parties successfully challenged ration asincasesofpartybans:refusal ng thecompliance with formal criteria asto ll cases were broughttotheattention ofthe these rulesarenot‘ade even allowforpartycl ers, listofdocuments,ers, etc.),temporarily bedividedintofewgroups,basedonthe s couldbelistedmandatory registration

others ing toregister(forexample some states per se

than 5), Tsonevv. Bu , isnotaviolationofthe

Party ia (2007)whichconcerns public supra by theCouncil ofEurope,

note 193, Section Section 1. 193, note Dissolution ad law’ and there are are andthere ad law’ most typicalcasesof osure onthisground lgaria (2006). 340

CEU eTD Collection Party vMoldova. on temporary suspensionofpartyactivitiesis party activitiesasitmight havea‘chilling communist Europeanstates,however theECHRta 343 342 341 in thecaseofminor partieswithmodest financ privileges maysubstantially limit the functioning states providegenerousfinancialsupportto democratic principles,or justify a ban onthe activities of apolitical negative reactionoftheStrasbour communist affiliationof thethenrulingparty in Moldovaprobablytriggeredtheextremely and itwasimposedontheeveofparliament unauthorized demonstrations organizedbyth political parties basedon religiousor ethnicaffiliation. registration topolitical parties based onthe Federation (2006),theECHRagreed denied state registration. Thus, in admissibi democratic principles. democratic means, orchanges of lawpropo where thereisevidencethatapartyhad but as a drastic measure asrefusal to register Christian Democratic People’s Party v. Moldova (2006). Moldova Party (2006). v. People’s Democratic Christian Formorecase this see the section on next details Linkov v. Czech The issueofatemporary banorclosureof As totheexclusionfrom eulc(06. Republic (2006). 343 Thetemporary closureoftheparty 341 politicalpluralism). However,theCourtwasnotalwayssupportive ofpoliticalparties

g Court,whichstatedthatonlyveryseriousbreachescould a state’ssubventionsandot withthenationalauthoritie effect’ onaparty’sfreedom. Thebestknowncase on militant democracy in Russia, Chapter 3.4at142. 126

lity decision inthecaseof Artymov vRussian not soughttopursueitsaims bylawfuland partycanbeappliedonl e partyagainstsome governmental proposals ial resources.Moreover, the caseofChristian Democratic People’s sed werenotcompatible withfundamental legislative provision party(suchasendangeringfundamental political parties,theexclusionfrom such andoperationofapoli ary elections. Thisfact combined withthe political partiesdidnot kes thismeasure asaseriousconstrainton 342 was appliedinres

her financial matters, where her financialmatters,where s inthedecisiontodeny prohibiting organizing y inextreme casesand in thelight of theWar tical party,especially ariseofteninpost- ponse toallegedly CEU eTD Collection 345 344 political parties inpos originating mainly from Turkey.There are few evident from thejurisprudence of theECHRwhichdealtwithparty dissolution cases that there isnotalackofextremist partiesand militant democracy measures isfully applicabletotheparty closure matters despite thefact non-compliance withformal requirements. political parties wererefused registration inanumber of cases,most oftenitstemmedfrom employ militant democracy measures tothe ex As mentioned, CentralandEasternEuropepost- The application of suchalegislative ruleinSpain. from post-communist Europe,the ECHRruled ona similar matter arising from the financial supportfrom aforeignpoliticalparty. application. Inadditiontofina there istodate norelevant example for this (especially withpartiesallegedlyinvolvedin potentially be considered asameasure of milita Therefore, limitations imposedonfinancial extremism (including political on Terror,thesuspensionorwithdrawalofpu fact thatapoliticalpartyisnotallowe order.As the constitutional of protection the overall ensure to and ofdependency arelationship creating avoid order to in foreign ones by parties ofthepolitical financing system offunding of election campaigns. fund to get and party isstillallowed the party of legality Article 11(even where it isapplied parties ofother EUstates). Themeasure does not callinto question the Priban & Sadurski, Parti Nationaliste Basque – Organisation Régionale d'Iparralde v. France (2007). French legislation prohibits

Dissolution/Ban supra

t-communist Europe. of

note 242, at 228. Political

ncial constraints, political part d toreceivefunds from fo

Parties parties) became awidely-uti

as 345

the 127

344 However,thestatement ofthesparinguse of discussion tobedemonstrated inits practical associations inthosestates.Thisconclusionis support providedforpo terrorist andextremismactivities). However, nt democracy arsenal in certain circumstances While therearenocasesonthisissuecoming

s from other French parties and/or from benefit and/or s from State parties French other Main blic fundingforanorganizationpromoting reasons toexplainthehesitancedissolve communist statesareextremely hesitant to to this type of limitation, the Court found that the that Courtfound the limitation, type this of to tent of banningpoliticalparties. Whilst

Instrument reign parties isnotinitself incompatible with ies might bebannedfromhaving lized legislative measure.

of

Militant litical partiesmight

Democracy

CEU eTD Collection 347 346 principles of thepoliticalpartic adjust theiragendasand programs tocomply w message tothepotential addresseesof suchmeas constitutions andlegislativeactsnotonlywith purpose of constitutional militancy. Militant democracy provisions are present inthe national measures havebeenunder-utilized.However, against thenumber ofextremist politicalm states structure.Someone might need toprotectdemocracy from itsenemies wi affairs andallowedthedevelopment ofareasona system rather than outside. though verypragmatic reason,whichistheopinionth limitation imposedon hate speech. Some commentato states tendtoaccordas much freedom topoli limits statesintheirintenti radicalism legalones.Secondly,theunfort than is a growing perception that political mechanis promoting the ideathatextreme speechesandideas canbecuredonlyby discussionandthere openly racismandneo-fascistslogans. can affordwidertolerance towards extreme id National Radical Party (BNRP),,and the Hu Priban & Sadurski,Priban & Sadurski brings anexample of National Revival of Poland (Narodowe Odrodzenie Polski), Bulgarian First ofall,mostthedemocracies fr supra note 242, at 242, 230. note 347 ons toinvokeilliberalmeasures Mostlikelyeachexplanation co

ipation andstategovernance. claim thatifthefrequencyofpartydissolutionismeasured ngarian Justice and Life Party (MIEP). 346 ovements, itlooksasthoughmilitant democracy Thecurrentpolitical situation iscapable of 128

eas andmovements; even tothoseadvocating om theregion arebecoming more stable and thout undermining thedemocratic natureofa the purpose to be applied but rather to send a the purposetobeappliedbutrathersenda ms aremoreeffectiveincombating political unate experienceofarecenttotalitarianpast tical parties inexchange (sometimes) fora this statement doesnotmatch theoriginal ures andwarnthem so bly balancedapproachtothedilemmaof ith the rules of thegame,i.e.democratic at itisbetterhaving rs alsosuggestthatthere isanother, likepartyclosure.Moreover, ntributed to the they haveachanceto radicals insidethe current stateof CEU eTD Collection 352 351 350 349 348 lustration laws. courts andtribunalsingeneralfollowthesame order toconsolidate theauthority andothertotalitarianregimescommunism might approved aslegitimate statepolic imposed oncivilservants,thepreventivedefens transparency. practices canbeseen principally assym involved in serviceinthepublicsector(esp lenient lustration policies. communist neighboringcountrieswhereas, for position of the Czech legislator isevaluated asrelatively harshcompare toitspost- totalitarian regimes areexcludedfrom cer followed anapproachsimilar totheGerman one system adoptedinsome was post-communist states. servants tobeloyaltheConstitution.Theideaexpectpublic tobeloyalthe understanding ofmilitant democracy inGerma One aspectofmilitant democracy refers to Loyalty political rights officer rights the of police political scope the original of research. project as itgoes beyond this be covered in itwillnot however On restrictions of speech imposed during transition s transition during imposed On speech restrictions of Ibid., at 236. Formore lustrationregimes on details Sajo, of point interesting an lawsrepresent Lustration supra at219. note 128, As totheECHRevaluationofnationa

of

Public 351

(Civil)

Servants 350 s see Rekveny v. Hungary (1999). v. (1999). s seeRekveny Hungary While lustrationlawsaffected

ofanewdemocratic government.

y. TheCourtconsidersthattr in CEE region see Priban & Sadurski, & Sadurski, seePriban CEEregion in 129

discussion from the perspective of militant democracy; militant democracy; of perspective from the discussion tain positionwithin bolic measures tounderline thevalue of ecially inCzechRepublic),generalsuch the loyalty ofpublicservants. The original e aimed toaddressthecommunistdangerwas ny includes anobligation imposed onpublic example, HungaryandPoland adoptedmore lineofargumentation in andagentswhocollabo ee e.g. Castells v. Spain (1992), on restriction of the the of restriction on (1992), v. Spain Castells e.g. ee l lustrationpoliciesandotherlimitations justify restrictions on political rights in 348 CzechRepublic,forexample, asubstantialamountofpeople ansition todemocracy from supra supra publicauthority. 352 Nationalconstitutional note 242, at 232-236. at232-236. note 242, rated previously with their review of the theirreviewofthe 349 The CEU eTD Collection 357 356 355 354 353 dimension of theCourt’s tasktointerpret a of politicalparties supportive ofallege more thanrefermerely totheabuseclause reconsider itsestablished interpretation and society.” individuals ortheirgroups“t notion ofself-protectivedemocracy. activities byreferri of theabuseclauseis“topr safeguarding thefreefunctioning the functionofArticle17as down underArticle17oftheConvention(theso-calledabuseclause). Most ofsuchapplicationshavebeendeclared these actorstheCourtdeveloped concerning thesupportersandfellows offascist Unsurprisingly, from theverybeginningofCourt’s‘life’it types oflimitation imposedonpoliticalpartiesthroughmilitant democracyjustification. allegedly dangerous ideologyadvocating forwh political parties–canbesplit The ECHRjurisprudence onmilitant democracy in itsclassic version – prohibition of 3.3.2. Ibid. Ibid. Harris, Zdanoka Latviav (2004); 41 EHRR 659 para.109 (Chamber judgment). 250/57. Application (1957), Rights Human of Commission European Former the of Decision FRG. v KPD in For seeHarvey, details Militant The processofdemocratization inpost-com supra 357 However,democratizationoftheCent note 328,at 649. Democracy ng totheConvention…” supra note 52, at 52, note in intofewgroupsdependingonth

o weakenordestroytheidealsandvaluesofademocratic event totalitarianor extremist groupsfrom justifyingtheir theJurisprudence a prettyconsistentandrather of democratic institutions…” “protecting therigh 356 dly dangerousideasand ideologies. Provisions of the Convention may ProvisionsoftheConvention notbeinvokedby 355 and strikedowncasesconcerningtheprohibition nd apply thenotionof militant democracy inits 130

application of militant democracy and domuch andiscloselyconnected bytheCourtwith either manifestly ill-founded orwere struck and (or)communistideol ich partiesfacedissolution procedure, and ral andEasternEuropemade theECHR munist European stat of ts enshrinedin theECHR e groundsforpartydissolution, 354 had todeal mainly with cases simple lineofargumentation. Oneofthemain objectives

353 the Conventionby es wasnottheonly TheCourtdefined ogies. Inregardsto CEU eTD Collection Political and responsibilities,may besubject to broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and of regardless frontiers authority freedom toholdopinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference bypublic 360 359 358 restrictions imposed onpoliticalparties. national Governments veryoftenrefertothis speech. cases this article isinvoked inconjunctionw democracy debate.ItisinArticle First ofall,itisrelevancetooutline the Militant established withintheCouncilofEuropeinrelationto the politicalpart militant democracy notionasinterpreted byth states’ structures. Themajor purposeofthis ideologies, andlatertominor politicalpartiesa originally by the ECHRinrelation topolitical parties supportive of fascist and communist What follows will demonstratehow themilitant democracy concept wasinterpreted that stage) typeof politicalparties, andonmore jurisprudence. Atapointitwascalledtodecideupontheprohibitionof(quitespecificat maintaining the authority and impartiality of the the judiciary. the impartialityof and authority maintaining reputation or the rights of others, for preventing the disc the for crime, or disorder of prevention the for safety, law andare necessary ina democratic so forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the Convention. for in the Convention. thanisprovided agreater to extent forth limitation herein or at their or activity actaimed perform any to engage in right of the police orofthe admi not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. this article shall orcrime, of disorder safety, or forthe public prevention security ofnational interests the in democratic society shall beplacedontheexercise oftheserightsotherthan others, including the right to form andto join trade unions for the protection of his interests. 2. No restrictions

Article 17: Article 11: 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly andto freedom ofassociation with is read as follows: 1. Everyone has the right right to the has Everyone 1. Article 10is asfollows: read 359

Parties Democracy Article17isalsoofrelevanceastherearecasesd Nothing in this Convention may beinterpreted asimplying for any State, group or person any

in nistration of the State. Early

ECHR . This article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of Statesof the licensing from requiring prevent articleshall not . This such formalities,conditions, restrictions 11 protectingfreedom ofassociation, ciety, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public public or integrity territorial security, national of interests the in ciety,

Jurisprudence: 360 Convention’s provisions referredtointhemilitant However,Article17didnotfindwide-spread 131

protection of health ormorals, of ofthe health protection for the protection ith Article 10 guaranteeing protection of free ith Article10guaranteeingprotectionoffree case-studyisto provide anaccount ofthe e ECHRandwhatkind at the destruction on any of the rights and freedoms set freedoms and the rights any of on at the destruction dvocating challenges tovariousaspectsofthe generalissues of statevs.religion relations. such asare prescribed bylawandarenecessary ina articleintheirarguments tosupportthe losure of information recei freedom of expression. this right shall include freedominclude shall expression. of this right

An

Extensive ecided underthisprovisionand or penalties asareprescribed by

Protection ies operation. of minimum standard 358 ved inconfidence, orfor andinmost ofthe Accorded

to

CEU eTD Collection 363 362 361 submitted for election were later declared invalid its activities orgoalsviolatethe publicorder. The groundsforitsprohibitionwasaCivilCode vice-president of the political party Glimmerveen functioning of democratic institutions. In1979 theCommission decidedthecaseof Article 21(2) of theGerman BasicLaw)safe Convention, butappliedtheabuseclauseenshrinedinArticle 17(thesame meaning as Commission didnotexamine theapplicationinlightofArticle10or11 Party, bannedinaccordance withArticle 21(2) oftheGerman BasicLaw. The firstpartyclosurecaseoftheECHRwa Foundations: reason forsuchanapproachisthebroadand support inthepracticeofEC parties’ activities. is alsoapplicableincases arisingfrom the main actors inrepresentativedemocracies, theri decided onbytheirmerits. Inaddi chance tospelloutitsopinionon provision toooften.Moreover,onceArticle17is Convention andtheCourtfunctionnowisverydi in thetextofConvention conditions which will ensure the free expression opin of the the which free expression will ensure conditions Limmerveen and Hagenbeek the v. Netherlands(1979), Applications No. 8348/78, 8406/78. KPD v. FRG (1957). The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold freeelec

The and HagenbeekvtheNetherlands. 361

Early

Case­

Law theaftermath oftheSecondWo

HR, atleastinrelationtopol tion tothelisted articles,as political parties are one of the particular issues asthemajo Nederlands VolksUnie regulations andlimitations imposedonpolitical 132

ambitious languageof s ontheprohibitionofGerman Communist guarding human rightsbyprotectingthefree As aconsequencesofthisban,thepartylist ght protectedbyArticle fferent, thereforetheCourtdoesnotusethis ion of the people in the choice of the legislature. legislature. the choice of ion the ofthe in people provision:theprohibitionofassociationif , sotheapplicants claimed the violation of 363 tions atreasonableinterval invokedtheCourtdoesnotreallyhavea Theapplicantswerethepresident and prohibitedbytheDutchCourt. rld War. Thesettinginwhich itical parties.Probablythe rity ofsuchcasesarenot the provision,introduced s by secret ballot, under 3 ofProtocolNo.1 362 However,the CEU eTD Collection 368 367 366 365 364 violations of domestic lawbytheparty(that Constitutional Court.The Constitutional Court Court ofCassationreliedon dissolved politicalparty,theTurkishWorkers’ Party. and theunityofnation; name; of onesocialclassovertheothers. Counsel attheCourtofCassation wasaccused United CommunistPartyofTurkey(TBKP)in principles establishedherein here inmore detailsas theCourtrefers to vTurkeycase. was the1998UnitedCommunistParty The firstcaseonpartyprohibitiond The originating from Turkey. cases andhasdevelopedasubstantialbodyofcase- to of Article17.However,since1998theECHRhad guaranteed bythisprovision forapurposethatis declared that theapplicants cannot rely onthis their right totake part inelections (Article sections 78 and 81 of Law on Political Parties no. 2820. 2820. and ofLaw 81 Partiesno. 78 on Political sections in1983). (adopted Law Partiesno. 2820 section the 78 on Political of and Practice of the ECHR 328 note supra This is prohibited activity to be carried-out by political parties under section 96(2) section Law of by carried-out no. under to 2820. be parties activity political isprohibited This an 3 Articles2, by areprohibited activities These ofLawPartiesno. 2820. to contrary Political section on to 96(3) be appears This by actionsare Articles and These 14 prohibited 10 6, Forgeneral comments onthecaseseee.g.Harris, in

ECHR 366 havingcarriedonactivitie

Jurisprudence: , at 463-465; Pieter van Dijk, Fried van Hoof, Arjen van Rijn and Leo Zwaak, 828-829 (2006). (2006). 828-829

Setting 367

nearlyallcasesonpartyprohi and,havingdeclareditselftobe thesuccessor toapreviously the Party’sProgram tosuppor

the s likelytoundermine theterrito 365 ecided by the ECHR after Glimmerveenecided bythe ECHRafter

Standards Havingincorporatedthe 3 of theProtocol1).Ho 133

thisdecisionandcitesthemain findingsand d 66 and former Article 68 of the Constitution, and and Constitution, former 66and of the Article 68 d and and former of Constitution Turkey, Article68 the of of havingsought toestablishthedomination articlesincetheyintended tousetheright unacceptableinthelightofabuseclause supra note 328

for TBKP the opinionofTurkishPrincipalState however rejected some of thealleged dealwithnewtypesofpartyprohibition

law inthisfieldwithmost ofthecases the 368 maintained that one social class, the 364

European ThePrincipalStateCounselatthe Thiscaseisworthofmentioning at 527-528; Jacobs, White, Ovey, in bition decidedafterwards.The word “communist”intoits t theirapplicationtothe

Space rial integrityoftheState wever, the Commission

and Hagenbeek Theory and

CEU eTD Collection 371 370 369 national authoritiesasundermining theconstitutionalstructures protection affordedbytheConventionsimply becauseitsactivities areregardedbythe functioning ofdemocracy. the scope of article 11. Political parties are a form of association essential to the proper response tothesubmission oftheGovernment that parties. when ithadtodecideoncasesinvolvingdiffe principles established bytheECHRinthiscas prohibi party practicing Turkey, itused itschance to sendastrong messa Turkey awaiting ahearing,and violation ofArticle consequences prescribedbytheContrition. the arguments raisedintheapplicationandor consequently toentailthedissolutionof the LawonPoliticalPartiesno. 2820, sufficedto the mere factthat apoliticalparty included in successor toapartythathaspreviouslybeendissolved). proletariat, wassuperiortotheothersand party.” the dissolving forpermanently itsjustification and Court’s final decision the Constitutional of gazette official members, directors or supervisors in any other party for a period of five years from the date of publication in the be founders, cannot permanently tobedissolved the party caused acts partyorstatements whose a political have cannot be founded under another name. Article 69 (10) establishes that “The members, including the founders of Ibid., para. 24. 24. para. Ibid., The Case of United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey (1998). to According The Partyleadershiplodged First of all, theCourtexte Article 69 (9) Article 69 11 oftheConvention. tion andotherlimitations imposed 371 of the Turkish Constitution: A party which Constitution: Turkish ofthe permanently has been dissolved Secondly,a“politicalpartycannotbenotexcludedfrom the

the ECHRcorrectlypredicted nded protectionofArticle11 a complaintwiththeStra 369 370 party concerned.TheCourtsupportedtherestof 134

itsnameprohibi a word e werecitedby theCourtonmultiple occasions Asthereweresome more applications from that nopoliticalpartymayclaim tobethe dered thedissolutionofPartywithall rent typeof limitations imposed onpolitical trigger theapplication ge to allMember Statestoguide them in politicalpartiesshou

The Constitutional Court held that on politicalpart oftheStateandcallingfor sbourg Courtwhichfound further applications from to political partiesas a ted bysection96(3)of of thatprovisionand ld beexcludedfrom ies. Themain CEU eTD Collection enshrined inArticle11.” 375 374 373 372 to ideasthat offend,shock,ordisturbandth democracy withoutpluralism. Freedom ofexpre express them isoneoftheobjectivesth also beconsidered inthelightof Article Convention. authorities couldimmediately disband theassociat not bethecaseifArticle11werelimited to guarantee rightsthatarenottheoreticalorillusory, butpracticalandeffective anditwould Convention. Nothing from amember statejurisdiction difference between constitutional and legislative review undertheConvention.The if theStateusestheseprovisions to exercise this context whetherthe provisions inissueare constitutional ormerely legislative.” accordingly respecttherightsandprinciples ensh institutions.” their obligationsunderth law ortogive effect toconstitutional rights,must dosoinamanner whichiscompatible with the imposition ofrestrictions.State’sactions,asth Ibid., para. 52. 52. para. Ibid., Ibid., para. 33. 30. para. Ibid., 27. para. Ibid., In itsfurther arguments, theCourtreiterated thattheConvention is intendedto 374 372 Inaddition, theCourtdrewattention Third,the politicaland institutional or 375 e Convention and subject to AstheCourthassaidmany times before,therecanbeno

Court made aclearstatement 10 asprotectionofopinionsandthefreedomto the foundingofanassociation,sincenational 135

its jurisdiction, theybecome asubject of the e freedoms ofassembly is excludedfrom scrutinyunderthe the ssion asenshrinedinAr provisions whenitexercises itsjurisdictions. e Stateis theultimate guarantor ofthis rined inthe Convention. ey considernecessarytorespecttheruleof ion withouthavingtocomply withthe to theprecedent that “Article 11must ganization ofthemember Statesmust reviewbytheConvention that itdoesnotdiscernany ticle 10isapplicable andassociationas It matters little in 373 Thus, CEU eTD Collection 380 379 378 377 376 documents. Astotheparty’sname and itsleaders’trueintentions.Thus,th party commencedany activity, does notmean they national authoritiesdissolvedth decisions on anacceptable assessment oftherelevantfacts.” in conformity withtheprinciplesembodiedin doing, theCourthastosatisfyitselfthatnati the lawanddecisionsapplyingit,in of appreciation,whichgoeshandinwith within themeaningof Article 11§2 exists, the restrictions onsuchpa concerned, tobeconstrued scope. However,“theexceptionssetoutinArti well asfreedom ofspeechguaranteedbytheConve of theConvention(Klass and Othersv.Germany).” requirements ofdefendingdemocratic societyand of therighttoprotectthose accordingly, theonlyone compatible withit. European publicorder principle. Ibid., para. 47. 47. para. Ibid., 46. para. Ibid., 32. para. Ibid., 45. para. Ibid., 44. 43 and para. Ibid., At thesame time, the Courtadmitted that astate’sinstitutions couldnotbedeprived In relationtothedissolutionofTBKP,th 376 Democracy wasonceagainproclaimed featureofthe asthefundamental

and theonlypoliticalmodelcont rties’ freedom ofassociation.Indetermining whetheranecessity strictly; onlyconvincingand

institutions and“therefore e party solely on its constitu , theCourt ruled thatpolitical cluding thosegivenby e ECHRfounditnecessarytoexamine these 377 136

rigorousEuropeansupervisionembracing both Article 11and,moreover, thattheybasedtheir

Contracting States haveonly alimited margin cles 10and11are,wherepoliticalpartiesare onal authorities applied standards which were onal authoritiesappliedstandardswhichwere individual rightsisin ntion does notappearasunlimited intheir didnotreflectthepa 378 e Courtfoundthatthemere factthatthe Moreover,freedom emplated bytheConventionand, 380 some compromise between the the between compromise some tion andprogram andbeforethe compelling reasons can justify

independent courts.” parties’ name ingeneralis herent inthesystem rty’s trueobjectives of association as 379 Inso CEU eTD Collection 381 hierarchy oflegalnorms. attempt toreviewallnationalmeasures without from theCourt’ssupervision,Courtreject limitations havehigher legalstatus thanthestatutory ones withattemptstoexclude them imposed onpoliticalparties. While theMember important statement about the difference betw conclusions from thisjudgment political partiesintheCouncil introducing theCourt’s approachto theissueof political pluralism andthedissolution of democratic society (vio responsibility, isdisp started andcoupledwith abanbarringitsle immediate andpermanent dissolutionoftheTB satisfying everyoneconcerned.Therefore,theC the nation’s politicallifeinorder tofind,accord it seekstodebateinpublicthe that pointofview,ther to violence,evenwhentheyareirksome. De the possibilityitoffersofresolvingacount First of all,“theCourtpointed promotion ofseparatismandthedivision oftheTurkishnation,party wasaccusedof. not enoughtojustifyitsdissoluti Ibid., para 57. 57. para Ibid., Such adetailedlistoftheCourt’sfindings roportionate totheaim pursuedandconsequentlyunnecessaryina e canbenojustificatio lation ofArticle11).”

out thatoneoftheprincipalchar situation ofparttheState’ in allsubsequentcases.Moreove on. Furthermore, theCourtgaveassessment astothealleged of EuropeMemberStates.TheCourtreferstoandcites ry’s problems throughdial mocracy thrivesonfreedomofexpression.From 137

381 n forhindering apolitical group solely because

ed thispossibleargument andexpressedits making anydifferenceastotheirplaceinthe ourt concludedthatmeasure asdrasticthe aders from discharginganyotherpolitical een constitutionaland ing todemocratic rules, Statesmight claim thattheConstitutional KP, orderedbeforeitsactivitieshadeven and statements wasgivenforthesakeof s populationandtotakepartin acteristics ofdemocracy tobe r, thisdecisioncontainsan ogue, without recourse ogue, withoutrecourse solutionscapable of statutory limitations CEU eTD Collection violation oftheConvention. from Turkeyconcerningmainly Kurdishpar solution totheKurdishproblem aspossible. the Courtwastrying to giveasmuch freedom much widerthaniswrittenintheConstitution; or,itwasjust anaccidental statement while provisions of theTurkishConstitutionarenotexac This remains unclear what theCourtwastrying tosaybythisstatement: that some of contrary totheConstitution, itdoes notmean that that even ifitmay beassumed thatwhatth concerning thedissolutionofnotapoliticalpa open dialogue.Inthelinewiththisstatement wastheZhechevv.Bulgariajudgment discussion onthemost importantproblems of that apartyproposechangesandideasnotco structures oftheTurkishStat that party’spoliticalprogram isconsidered 384 383 382 protection of theirassociation freedoms togeth consequences. the partytoavoidadeclaration ofdissolutionbytheConstituti dissolved itself before the Constitutional Courtd of Turkey Freedom and Democracy Party (ÖZDEP) v 47. para. Ibid., v (1998). Turkey others and Turkey of Party Socialist The Only fourmonthslatertheECHRissueda Principles proclaimed intheTBKPcase . 382 TheCourtmainly reaffirmed itsprevious 384 e does not make itincompatible withtherules of democracy.”

TheOZDEPPartycaseisnotable forthereasonthatparty Turkey (1999) andsome other cases. 138

e associationwas tryingtoachievewasindeed ties andinallofthem Turkeywasfound in incompatible with thecurrent principles and This casewasfollowedbyafewothercases er with freedom of sp the Stateshouldbe the rty butapublicassociation:theECHRheld toapoliticalpartyadvocating forpeaceful mpatible withthena ecided onthe case.However,itdidnothelp

theinterference(orrather,itsdissolution) indicate thatpolitical parties enjoybroad judgment onthecase oftheSocialistParty tly democratic; that rules of democracyare judgment and statedthat“thefact onal Court withallprescribed actively debatedthrough eech. Itdoesnotmatter tional constitution,and 383

CEU eTD Collection member states,butatthisstage itisnotpossibl striking down themost drastic and obviousa including theCommunistParty,probablymeans th arena byany means. Europe to decrease theinfluenceof communi and findMoldovainviolation the Communism Party.Probablyitinfluencedth case mentioned must takenintoaccount.The be democracy measures in orderto handle the situation when theGovernment abusesitsdominant position andapplymilitant is probablynotstrongenoughtoconcludethattheECHRabsolutelycapableandwilling the unjustified attacks and criticisms of itsadve obligation not toresortcr fact thattheapplicantwasonl in caseoftheChristianDemocratic People’sPartyv.Moldova to detectsuchmoves insome instancesandpr in ordertoprotectfragilestateofdemocracy.Ho democratic regimes whichcouldpossibly refer tomilitant democracy without areal necessity opponents asmany member statesoftheCouncil militant democracy measures by anational governm parties andallotheractorsinvolvedincoin was justified. Therefore, itseems thattheCour The factthattheCourtfoundTurkeyinviol Probably oneofthereasonswasitsawarenes iminal proceedings whereothermeans areavailable to address y aminority party.ItwasheldthattheGovernment isunder of theConvention.Thiswas suppress its politic ing thepublicopinionin 139

event them throughitsjudgments. Forexample, e totestitmore definitely.The biggerproblem buse ofmilitant democracy measures bythe st ideas and pushthem awayfrom political t wasgivingaswideaprotectiontopolitical rsaries orthe media. Ho e ECHR’sdecisiontosupporttheapplication wever, therearesigns thattheCourtisable majority partyinMoldovaatthetime was ation ofthefreedom of at the Court iscapable to some extentof of Europewerestillpresentingunstable al opponents.Thecircumstances ofthe ent asamean of getting rid of political s ofthepossibilityeasyabuse within thecommon trendin

the Courtacknowledged politicalmatters. wever, thisjudgment association rights, associationrights, CEU eTD Collection 385 government fromunjustifiedintrusionintotheiractivities.Thus,section3ofthedocument democratic system andwideprotectionaccorded echoes theECHRjurisprudenceon Parties andAnalogousMeasures member statesandlateradoptedthe The VeniceCommission conducte a possibility tosanctionthebehavior of political from Turkeybutalsofrom thefactthat most measures. TheconcernexpressedbytheCouncil Commission) toconductasurv Europe requested,in1998,theEuropeanCo states inrelation totheprohibitio As aresponsetogrowingnumber ofcases The authorities toregulateandcontrol. politics asitmight bepercei On theotherhand,European properly itisdoubtfulwhether the protectionofpublicorde situation anddrawaproperbala political environment ofaparticularcountryitisveryhardtohavefullaccountthe context ofthecase.Inmany instancesitisob for theCourt’sjurisprudenceistowhat extent , supra Measures Partiesand Analogous Political European Commission for Democracy through Law (V

Council

of

Europe’s

General r, national security, andunity, etc. If the Courtisnot ableto doit

ved thatCourtinterferesin the Courtcanrenderameaningf n of political parties, the Secr nce betweenassociational freedom

ey ontheprohibitionofpo Approach Court should beverycareful . 385 matters ofimportance ofpolit d researchtostudythesitu Thedocumentconsistsofsevenmajor pointsandit Guidelines onProhibitionandDissolutionofPolitical note 193.

towards ofthepost-communist Europeanstatesincluded 140

mmission forDemocracy throughLaw(Venice coming totheStrasbourgCourtfrommember itcantakeintoaccountthebroaderpolitical parties intheir Constitutionsandlegislation. vious thatwithoutgett of Europewasnotonl topolitical parties in order toprevent a enice Commission). enice Commission).

the

Procedure the domain reservedfornational etary GeneraloftheCouncil litical parties and analogous litical partiesandanalogous with goingtoodeepintothe ul decisionondissolutions. ation existing in different ation existingindifferent ical partiesforthestable

Guidelines on Prohibition of of Prohibition on Guidelines andastate’sinterest in to

Ban y aboutcasescoming ing deeplyintothe

Political

Parties

CEU eTD Collection 388 387 386 post-communist European states demonstrates that Council ofEurope.However,analysisthe c closure, mostofthepost-communist statesfo situations. Astothe national practice of militant democracy measures inrelation toparty However, statesareonly allowedtoutilize harm totheestablishedorder,includingpo possibility ofpreventiveactionstobetakenby democracy.. TheECHRhasadevelopedbodyof which iscapableofne democracy shouldrespondtoattempts tothreat confirming itsconclusions. 1998 reportstillrepresentsthe relevant totheprohibitionof political partiesinTurkey.” Venice Commission “wasaskedtoreview the committed topromote thesame principles asestablishedin 1999.Forexample, in2008the Constitutional Court orotherap protection topartiesfacingthe political parties asmeasure of last resort onl allows advocating forpeaceful change oftheConstitution.” violence oruseitasapolitical mean toove allows “fordissolution ofpoliti Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. The most guidingrulesforthemember stat To conclude , thereisaclearcommon European utralizing extremist and allegedly da 388

procedure ofthedissolution(d cal partiesonly incaseswhere propriate judicialbody). TheC concise summaryofEuropean 141

llow thestandardsestablishedbyECHRand rthrow thedemocratic constitutional orderbut y, andthenecessitytopr such radicalanddrasti onstitutional andlegislative provisions ofthe constitutional andlegalprovisions which are en it:byopeningafree the democratic states inordertoprevent the most ofthem reservedforthe state aright ssibility toban/dissolv case-law whichingeneralsupportsthe es areprovisionsontheprohibitionof 387 386 approach to the issue of how a approach totheissueofhowa ngerous ideologiesandideasfor TheCommission foundthatthe

ecisions shouldbemade bythe parties advocatefortheuseof practice,reiteratingand ouncil ofEuropeis still c measures inextreme marketplace ofideas ovide strongjudicial e political parties. CEU eTD Collection state isinconsiderate asitispremature toca Someone might arguethat anyreference toth Agendas: ATooltoSupp 3.4. MilitantDemocracyinthePractice utilize thismeasure onaregularbasis. from Strasbourg’sjurisprudenceontheexcep national constitutional courts orlater bytheECHR.CEEdemocracies havelearnt lessons transition andthatitwasabused.Inmost of not allowconcluding that militant democracy was misapplication ofthedoctrinein long asallplayersfollowtheestablishedrulesof communist constitutionalregimes allowseveryone such activities willnot betolerated toan unlimited extent. Themilitancy of the post- send astrongmessage tothoseseekingabolis fragile regime beingattackedbyradicalsand granted more confidence tothegovernment astheyfelt hada‘back-up’ inthecaseofa presence of militant democracy provisions in of illiberal policies inthesuppressing of a communists returning toth dictated bytheexperienceof other political movements. Theinclusion of to act preventively in case there isthreatfo At thesame time, all post-communist stat es adequatelyassessed thepossibledanger e states’ structures. ress any Political Dissent (the ExampleofRussia) ress anyPoliticalDissent(the totalitarian waysof post-communist states,thes r democracy emanating from politicalpartiesand ll Russiaatruedemocracy. However,theRussian 142

e experience of Russiaasamilitant democracy llegedly dangerousideas. thecasesinaccuracieswere corrected bythe such measures inconstitutional regimes was extremists. At thesame time suchprovisions tional characterofpartyclosureanddonot of StateswithAllegedlyAuthoritarian thegame. Whiletherearesome instancesof constitutional orders duringthetransition h ordamage thedemocratic structuresthat not needed tobepresent intheprocess of governanceinthepast to participate in the political debate as toparticipateinthepoliticaldebateas ituation asitstandsnowdoes It appearsthatthe andthefearof CEU eTD Collection the aforementioned distinctive featur democracy, outcomes forthepoliticalenvironmen existing regime andwillfurtherfocusonconcer reasons behindtheexistingregime. Inwhatfo elements oftheregistrationscheme andits of association.Moreover, the Courtwasasked political parties’ activities from constitutional provisions on political pluralism andfreedom issue andderivedtherighttoform apolitical registration. TheConstitutional Court of Russi organized freelybutunderverydetaileda to suchaninstitute inthe First of all,political parties are notconstitutionalized inRussia asthere is nodirect reference from manyotherpost-communist Europeancountr measure andis amajor subjectofthischapter political parties’ activities, which isoften described as aclassicalmilitant democracy and beyond. reality-check for thedebate ontheefficiency which istakinglongerthanma it isacceptable tosuggestthatRussiaisastat militant democracy as asymptom oftransitiona case isof interest andrelevance for thisproject, especially inthelight of theargument on The Russiancasestudy willconsistoftheanalysis Federal Constitution. Second,politic ny otherEuropeanneighbors. es oftheregulatoryregime. 143

nd burdensome procedure of mandatorynd burdensome procedureofstate rulings containimportant explanationsonthe in general. Russiais,however, quitedistinctive e officiallypursuing atransitiontodemocracy of militant democracy in transitional societies partyfreely,andamo a hadanopportunitytocomment onthefirst l democracies. Forthepurpose of this project llows Iwillpresenta to decideonthecons ns itposesfrom theprospectiveofliberal t in the country andth ies inits regulationof political parties. Therefore, Russiaisagood al partiesinRussia canbe the practice re generalfreedom of brief overview of the e judicialpositionon titutionality ofsome of regulating CEU eTD Collection 390 389 reasons, the current Constitution of theRussian protection orbearadditionalobligationscomp the ConstitutionofRussianFederationto constituting entities(States) for federalconstitutionallawbutmustbe remaining chaptersthreetoei Council –butonlybyaspecially convenedbody,theConstitutional Assembly. procedure bytheFederalAssembly composed and ninerespectively). of man andcitizensamendments andthere the constitutional order:thef only providesforadifferentproceduretoamend the Constitution of theRussianFederationdoes notprohibititself from itstotal revision but such asallegedlyradicaland the elements described inpreviouschapters regulating activities of publicassociations. TheRu However, some elements ofthemilitant de Russia isnotamilitant democracy stateinits classicalunderstanding andinterpretation. General 3.4.1. total number of deputies to the Constitutional Assemb the number to of total Constitutional deputies anew draftofthe develop Federation or Russian the of ma Assembly law;theConstitutional federal constitutional the with accordance in convened be Assembly shall the State Duma, aConstitutional and Council Federation on-line at “Ifthe proposal forsuch amendment the of of aresupported deputies total number by thethree-fifths of the available the text Constitution of (articles 134-137), Revision” and Amendments 9 “Constitutional Chapter

Constitutional As political partiesarethemajor issue for this http://constitution.garant.ru/english/ Overview

389

and Thosechapterscannotbechange of theRussianFederation.

undamentals oftheConstitutional system, therights andliberties Legislative

anti-democratic politicalparties ght couldbeamended throughle .

Regulation ly or submitted to popular voting (referendum).” voting popular to submitted ly or 144

approvedbynolessthantwo-thirdsofthe mocracy notion can befoundintheprovision Constitution which shall be adopted by two-thirds ofthe two-thirds by adopted be shall which Constitution of twoChambers–StateDuma andFederation are tootherpublic are relation to tolerance of intolerant institutions; vision of theConstitution (chaptersone, two, Federationdoesnotcontain anyprovisions y either confirm the inviolability of the Constitution Constitution the of inviolability confirm the y either see if political parties enjoyany special the provisionconstituti ssian legal system isfamiliar with some of

chapter,itisworthwhilereferring to of

d throughtheordinaryamendment Political and associations.Forexample, gislative procedureprescribed associations. Forunknown

Parties’ ng theverybasisof

Activities: 390 The A

CEU eTD Collection publicassociation shall beguaranteed.2. No onemay be including the right to create trade unions for the protection of his or her interests. The freedom ofactivity of beprohibited. strife shall at undermining its security, at setting up armed units, an Federation, the Russian of theintegrity atviolating system and constitutional the of principles fundamental the associations public activitiesof and creation law. 5.The the multi-party systemshall be recogn and diversity political Federation Russian the 3.In asone. recognised. established be may be shall ideology obligatory stateor No 2. 392 391 be inconformity withthedemocratic principles elements of theexistence of political parties. Itmeans thatprinciples of partyformation must includes politicalparties, the and socialcontent,ideology, of statepowerandlo 3(2) declaringthatthepeopleshallexerciseth as ademocratic federallaw-governedstatewith association. guarantees freedom ofassociation being banned.Thefreedom apoliticalpa toform the listofprohibitedactionscannotbeformed butonceestablishedcanfacetheprocedureof applicable topolitical parties,therefore partie system shouldberecognized. proclaiming ideologicalandpoliticaldiversit of certain provision for political parties. The parties itrefers toafew articles mentioning th Constitutional Court of Russiahad todecide on functions of politicalparties inRussianpol directly relatedtopo

Article 13 Article 30 The Russian Constitution isneutral towardsthe of the Russian Constitution reads as follows: 1. In the Russian Federation ideological diversity diversity Federation ideological Russian In the 1. asfollows: reads Russian Constitution the of 392 of the Russian Constitution reads as follows: 1. Everyone shall have the right to association, to right association, havethe shall Everyone as 1. reads follows: Russian Constitution of the Inaddition,thecourtwouldalsorefer cal self-government. litical partiesandther 391 and program. Throughregulationofpublicassociations,which

Constitution justprovides for organizational and functional Thelimitation clause of thelast section of Article 13isfully and protectsfreewillfuld 145

efore nothingcouldbe s theaims and actionsofwhichareinclusive of starting point isArticle 13 of the Constitution y wherethelatter means thatthemulti-party eir powerdirectly,and is institutionorsimply therelevance implying whose aims and actions are aimed at a forced change of ataforced of change areaimed aimswhose actions and itics andsociety. However,everytime the andhuman as they rights areexpressed inthe compelled to join any association and and it. remain in association any to join compelled arepublicanform of d at instigating social, racial, national and religious and religious social, racial, national atinstigating d ised. 4. Public associations shall be equal before the the before equal be shall associations Public ised. 4. issues involving the activities of political rty isalso derivedfrom Article30 which to Article1(1)whichproclaims Russia number of political parties, their size ecision tojoin orleaveany foundontheroleand government andArticle also throughthebodies CEU eTD Collection 396 395 394 393 Federal LawonElectionsofth the preparationforsecond 2003. 450) wereoccupiedbyindependentcandidate of 1993andeightthemgotseatsintheStateDuma. threshold. Nevertheless,asmany as35electoral imposed ontheeveoffirst membership, equalityofitsmembers, self-governance, legality,andpublicity.Theonlylimit public association whichisformedfreel Political Associations wasstill entered intoforceanddeclar associations callingthemselves ‘political started in 1993 anditwasaccompanied bythe parties and theiractivities parties andtheirparticipation inelections. Public Associations were theonly legalinst constitutional order. Constitution andthat theaims andactivities of Federal Law on Political Parties as in Partiesasin force Political from Federal Lawon July 14 2011). candidates inelectionstoStatebodiesmay benominated amendments intro thelegislative Since self-nomination. municipal'noe pravo:Nauchno Prakticheskoe - i Informacionnoe Izdanie(2009). 31 Joel C.Moses, Until 14 July 2003 candidates in elections could be nominated by political parties, electoral blocks, or by by or blocks, electoral parties, political by nominated be could elections in candidates July 2003 14 Until Ibid., at 32. i in S. Partijah, A. Konstitucionnoe Avak'jan, o Politicheskih Zakonodatel'stvo Idet Kuda E.A. Volkova, democracy see to transition Russian early the the yearsof during politics regional the some of For examples 396 The secondperiodcanbeassociatedwith For aquitelongtime theConstitution ofth

Voting, Regional Legislatures and Electoral Reform in Russia canbedividedinto ed ideologicalandpoliticalplurality,the1991USSRLawon

elections totheStateDuma of State Duma electionsof1995,es valid. Accordingtothislaw,a e deputiesofStateDuma parties’. When in 1993,theRussianConstitution 393 146

y andfunctionsonthebasisofvoluntary Theregulatoryregime inrelationtopolitical ruments toregulate theactivities of political duced on 11 July 2001 entered into force on July 2003, emergence ofahugenumber ofgroupsand s, theinstitutionwhic blocks andunionstookpartintheelections by political parties only(Article36 bypolitical para, 1ofthe a fewdistinctperiods. theparty must becompatible withthe legislative amendments whichsurrounded e RussianFederationandFederalLawon 395 Ahugenumber ofseats(127out 1993wasa5percentelectoral the Federal Assemblyof the , 55 Europe-Asia, 55 Studies 7(2003). pecially theadoptionof political partyisatypeof h wasabolishedin 394 The first period period first The CEU eTD Collection activities ofpoliticalpartieswasen parties neededbetterlegislativ confuse even themost experienced andprepar the number ofpotentialgroupse many werenottakingpartinelections ofthem groups andassociationspotential conditions) canrunforelectionsandnominat 399 398 397 parties’ activities,includingmandatory procedur parties, but,more crucialforthepurposeof thisproject,imposed substantivelimits on participate inelectionsalongsidestatefinanc introduce the definition of present day(withsome furtheramendments tobediscussedlater).The lawdidnotonly this lawopened thelastperiodinlegislativ public politicalassociationscould qualifytostandforelectio public associationsweredeniedaright election theFederalLaw onPublicassociati could potentiallytakepartinthe program astoparticipateinelections.Asa and unionswhichweredefinedas Russian Federation.Thelawallowednominating a ”, 12 Journal of Democracy 35 (2001). 35 (2001). of Democracy Democracy Journal ”, 12 country. the democratic the regime See e.g.BrownArchie,of in establishment much the progress since not did and was existence still in Soviet Union the transformation while FederalParties (2002). Law Political on conclude the commentators some of Nevertheless Volkova, supra Apparently, thelackofproperlegislative note 394,at 32. apoliticalparty and declared th

e attentionandregulation.Thefi ligible tocallvoteforth ly eligibletocompete fors anyall-Russianpublicassocia acted in2001bythethirdStateDuma. 1995 electionstotheStateDuma.

to participateinth result, 258 public association and 15 trade unions result, 258publicassociationand15tradeunions ons was amended in 1998 and non-partytypeof ons wasamended in1998and 147

ial supportguaranteesprovidedforpolitical andmade ittotheStateDuma, nevertheless, e candidatesledtoanimmensenumberof e regime development andisinforcethe e ofstateregistration(whichaccordingtothe s that most successful part of Russia’s political s that part most Russia’s successful of political ed voter. Clearly, theinstitute of political arrangements todefinewho(andonwhich list ofcandidatesto e 1999elections.Thus, ns forthethird StateDuma. From Democratization to “Guided em andtheircandidatescould eats intheParliament. While e right of political parties to rst lawdevotedsolelytothe tion withamajor goalinits 397 any electoralblocks Towardsthenext 399 Theadoptionof only 398 139

CEU eTD Collection 400 reference to theprotection of theinterestsof political partiesbased onprofessional,racial national andreligioushatred.” at undermining itssecurity,atsettinguparmed principles of theconstitutional of politicalpartiesifth compliance withtherules of Article9.Firstof power andparticipateinstateaffairsconsti indication thatpolitical would bebannedanddissolved.Article9ofth former wouldnotberegisteredincaseofviol status ofapoliticalpartyandalreadyfuncti political parties proscribed byArticle 9whichis from militant democracy perspective, are limitations ontheformation andactivities of the procedure todissolve theparty ortemporarily follow; what therights andobligation of political and advocatefor;whattherequirements areforit called andwhichsymbols itmight use;whata regulating ingreatdetailhowa dissolved. law doesnotamount toreceivingstatepermission Decree? For details on the lawsee the details on For ’ in Edwin Ross (Ed.), Russian Politics under Ross ’ in under Edwin Putin (2004). Politics 39 Russian (Ed.), The 2001FederalLawonPoliticalPartiesrepr The Lawguaranteesnon-violent competition of political parties inorder toachieve 400

pluralism inRussiaisnot unlimited. eir goalsor actions areaimed ata for example,

system andatviolatingtheinte Second, thesame articleprohibitstheestablishment of political partycanbeinitiated Edwin Bacon, 148

tutionally permitted forms longastheyactin as ations of Article 9requirements whilethe latter a particulargroupasgoalinparty’sprogram oning parties.Theonlydifferenceisthatthe all, itprohibits“theformation andfunctioning , ethnicorreligiousaffiliation,whichisa e Federal Law onPolitical parties isaclear political partycannotincludeinitsprogram applicabletobothassociationspursuingthe s registration;whatinte parties are, including propertyrights; and Russia’s Law on Political Parties: Democracy by Democracy Parties: Political Law on Russia’s units, andatincitement tosocial,racial, terminate its activities. Mostinteresting, to form aparty)andthepossibilitytobe esents anunprecedented setofrules forced change ofthefundamental grity oftheRussianFederation, and organized;whatitcanbe rnal structureitmust CEU eTD Collection branches mustincludeatleastonehundredmembers. have atleast10,000members andtohaveitsdivisionsin qualify as political party for thepurpose of this and internalorganization,butalso within stateormunicipal bodies,armed fo on aterritorialbasisand 403 402 401 public associat in accordancewiththeamended of the2004amendments, before the2001 Lawandwillcontinue toactasanordinary publicassociations. In thelight Federal Law came intoforcelose their status of political public associations whichtheyhad parties which didnotfulfill thequantitative requ came intoeffectin2001.AccordingtoitsArti national, inter-regional, regional, and localcharacter). TheFederalLaw onPolitical Parties establish regional and local parties inRussia(w branches withanyfewer required thatapoliticalparty shouldhavenofe requirement waschangedthroughalegisla and reflectionofsuch 12976/07, para.31-34. No. Application Russia Russia (2011), v Partyof ofRepublican ECHRjudgement seethe membership parties Court (2004). N18-P Constitutional Russian the SeeRuling of Constitution. the with itin conformity found and religious parties and to ethnic prohibition For details on the legislative initiative and reasons and initiative legislative the on For details ArticleFederal Law Parties. of the 3(2) Political on the of the constitutionality on to decide was asked Russian federation of the Court Constitutional The The 2001Lawestablishednotonlycontent-ba ions. goals inits name. it isprohibitedtoha political partieswererequiredto bring thenumber oftheirmembers than fivehundredmembers.

Article 3(2)by1January2006,ortobereorganizedinto quantitativerestrict 401 rces, law-enforcementagencies,etc.). Third,apartycanhave 149

ve subdivisionsformed tive amendment. Theamended Article3(2) wer thanfiftythousandmembers andregional to increase the quantitative requirements of political requirementspolitical of the to quantitative increase law. Originally itrequi cle 47,allinter-regional,regional,andlocal hile ordinarypublicassociationscouldhave irements withintwoyears from thedate ions forpublicassociationsinorderto 402 sed restrictions on parties’ programs sed restrictionsonparties’programs atleasthalfof However,onDecember 2004this 403 Moreover, itis its branches created only created branches its on anyotherbasis(i.e. red apoliticalpartyto the regionsandsuch prohibitedto CEU eTD Collection Duma(para. 35). branches. the requirement of thenewlawinrelation political groupstothemargins guarantees accordedto politicalparties. This Unfortunately, ithasnothingtodowiththe 405 404 If thepartydisregardssuchwarnings,Prosec notify theparty about itandallowsome time totakemeasures todiscontinuesuchviolations. particular partyviolatesthelegislativeprovi the RussianFederationorregist political competition: asof today there was noparty bannedunder Article41. Kremlin made littleuseofthe2001lawon to say,however, that Russian authorities abused thedissolution proce requirements onthenumberofpartymembers and also if itdoes notparticipate regularly in electio Russia isthat itcouldhappen notonlybecauseaparty’sactivities contradict Article9but (Article 41).Themost noticeablepointaboutth Law suppliestheregulatinggovernmental agency elections andnominate itscandidates.When criteria itmightbedenied registration,andw registered by the andwereeligible endof topa 2007 merged parties political seven wi and associations, public theFederatio Russian Supreme of the dissolved by Court meet asatFebruary requirements 2004 the registered forty-eight of out parties political seventeen only 2007 January 1 on datathat Justice of Ministry the to Forexample, in the case of Republican Party ofRussia v Russia the European Court of Human Rights refers Kenneth, Wilson The proceduretobanapartyis,however, Therefore, incaseanewlyformed politic 405

Party-System Development under Putin

of regularpublicasso ration body(presentlytheMinistry 150

sions regulatingthepart of minimum membership. Twelve political parties were of membership.parties were political minimum Twelve to thenumber ofpartymembers andregional rticipate inthe 2 December parties toexcludeoppositionfrom the it comes to alreadyexistingparties,the2001 complexity oftheprocedureandstrong israther aconsequenceofpushingmany ill notbeallowedtoparticipateinfederal ns as well as if it do n, three political parties reorganized themselves into into themselves reorganized parties threepolitical n, e proceduretodissolv utor GeneralortheMini th bigger parties. Fifteen political parties remained remained political parties.parties Fifteen bigger th not simple.OncetheProsecutorGeneralof al partydoesnotmeet allaforementioned , 22 Post-Soviet-Affairs 4 (2006). (2006). 4 Post-Soviet-Affairs , 22 with thepossibilitytoseekitsdissolution regional branchesanymore. Itisnottrue ciation asmost ofthem couldnotmeet ofJustice)foundthata es notmeet quantitative y’s activity,theycould 2007 electionsto the State e apoliticalpartyin dure. Ingeneralthe stry ofJustice(the 404

CEU eTD Collection Democracy 407 406 parties whileatthemoment (asofJuly2011)the number ofpoliticalpartiescontinuestodrop force, andonly14politicalpartiestookpart Duma, thisnumber haddroppedto political publicassociationswereeligibleto struggle oftheparticipan The 2001Law onPoliticalPartieshadconsiderab 3.4.2. administration’s activeassistanceand could literature that partiesfavoredbytheKremlin from thepoliticalspace,butthroughadifferent procedure asitisdescribedwasneverinvok application foritsdissolu state bodywhichaskedtosuspendtheactivity political partyresolvesviolations meetings, demonstrations, participatingin to thesuspensionsofitsright suspend the party’s activity for uptosixmonths. Thesuspensi latter after two writtennotifications) canaskthe Supreme Courtof theRussianFederationto Europe-Asia studies 7 (2007). 7(2007). studies Europe-Asia For details see Chapter 4.1,at detailssee For 184. Chapter An unfortunate parallelcan be draw Kenneth Wilson,

Impact Rationale

of Party Finance in Russia: has the 2001 Law the 2001 Russia: has in Party Finance

the used Existing ts: thereisnoregionalor tion. Since the adoption of the 1993 Russian Constitutionthe tion. Sincetheadoptionof1993Russian

in as afounder of massmedia; it n with the absenceof al n withthe Order

of thelegislation itsactivity isberestored. Otherwise the Regulatory 44inthefirstelectionsaf to Perpetuatethe also enjoycomplete financial impunity. elections, usingitsba 151

andin2007therewere takepartinthe1999electionsforState in thefifthStateDuma ed. Onlyonecontrove

Regime were abletooperate withthepresidential mechanism. However, itisargued inthe localpoliticsinRussia. Ministry ofJustice’so of thepartycanbringtoCourtan le impact onthecontentofpolitical so local and regional religious groups in Russia. ‘On Political Parties’ Made a a Difference Made Parties’ Political ‘On

and Status

on oftheparty’sactivityleads ter the2001Lawenteredinto is prohibitedfrom organizing its

Purpose: nk account,etc.Oncea Quo? rsial partywasbanned election of 2005. The electionof2005.The 15 registeredpolitical fficial web-sitelists 407

Thus,while139

Is a 406 Militant

?, 59

CEU eTD Collection 411 410 409 408 requirements forpartymembers andregionalbran the same legislativeact.InFebruary 2005th couple ofmonthslatertheCourthadtodeal interests, as wellasreference tothose aims inthename of thepoliticalparty. program ofthepartyaims fortheprotection affiliation’ shallbeunderstood as includingin racial, ethnic orreligious affiliation. Thete provision ofthelawwhichprohibitedestablis the 2001Law onPoliticalParties.Thefirst judgment handedoutin2004concernsthe protecting de rational; invoking tosuppress and limit theactiv of thestate which makes the Russian case relevantfor discussion on militant democracy areneededto limitations 2001Law imposedbythe Federation dramatically inlight of thejudgments of enter into thepoliticalarenaat federal political system butratheritsignalstheseriou 2002, andonlyonepoliticalpartyfro only sevenregisteredpoliticalpa authority: Ministry of Justice Russian ofJustice the of at Ministry Federation authority: Article 9 (3) of the Federal Law on Political Parties. Law Article (3) Political Federal on 9 of the 17582/05. Artyomov No. v. (2006). Decision, Admissibility Application Russia Court (2004). N18-P Constitutional the Russian of Ruling Listofregistered political partiesinRussian Federation accordingtotheinform Unfortunately, thesestatistics arenot thesign The ConstitutionalCourtoftheRussianFe 409 mocracy. andtheECHR.

410 Bothcourtsagreedwithth rties. Interestingly, m thelistwasorganizedin2009. withanother constitutional complaint involving 152

e Constitutional Courtruled onthe quantitative level. Thesituationlooksunlikelytochange rms ‘professional, racial, ethnicorreligious theConstitutionalCourtofRussian s constraints political parties face in orderto hing politicalpartiesbasedonprofessional, http://www.minjust.ru/ru/activity/nko/partii/ of professional,racial thearticlesofassociationand political ches. Bothjudgments amount infacttothe deration hadtorule ities of political parties for the sake of guard thebasisofconstitutionalorder most ofthem were of theincreasing stabilityoftheRussian e government’s claims thatthe 408 established in 2001 or established in2001or , ethnicorreligious on twoprovisionsof

ation ation of the registering 411

Only a Onlya CEU eTD Collection the Russian Federation (from facts Federation of Russian the summary the of Court Constitutional the with acomplaint lodged tion associa the the leaders of Court, lower ofthe position this upheld City Court After Moscow mainthe objective. as its Russians interests of the of the protection desp affiliation ethnic the basis of on was established party different nations” and the second “an association ofthe people of one nation”. Therefore, it wasfound that the applicant’s party also allegedly hadtwo meanings, the first being “anassociation ofpeople belonging to ( “all-nation” the word Moreover, Russians. the group, ethnic particular ambiguous and it could be understood either as denoting anything related to Russia orasreferring to one and the Ministry ofJustice insisted (based onexpert opinions) that themeaning of the word Court success. The any thewithout Courts in but the refusal contested movement the of leadership The Parties. Political Lawon the of byArticle9(3) isprohibited which group, ethnic an to referred party the namethe of grounds, including thepresence ofadj Minist ry ofJustice the MinistryJustice refusedbut of the with was lodged the application on a number of the bearing party apolitical into movement the organise the MinistryofJusticeregisteredth obshchenatsionalniy 414 413 412 character of the state mustbeinterpreted with of apartywhoseobjectivesandgoalsth residence. Therefore,therightofindividualsanyethnicityorreligiontobecome members social, racial,ethnic orreligious affiliation, gender, socialorigin, propertyorplace of political partiesisstrictlyvoluntary andca candidates for elections.The2001LawonPolitical type of publicassociation admitted toparticipate intheelectoral process and tonominate ruling oftheCourtopenswitha decided tojointhereference andcomplaints in Mr. Artyomov, Mr.Savin,and originated from areference ofone oftheMoscow restriction toestablish political parties control thegovernment might haveoverthem. endorsement ofthestate’svisiononhowpolit Ruling of the Russian Constitutional Court N 18-P (2004), para 3. Court (2004), N18-P Constitutional the Russian of Ruling Mr. Artyomov, the leader of the publicmovement Court (2004). N18-P Constitutional the Russian of Ruling However, principles of pluralism, inadditiontothemulti-party system andsecular In December 2004theConstitutional Courtof

soyuz ”). Thispublicassociation was establishe e movement asapublicassociation.

ective “Russian”(russkiy) inthe name the OrthodoxParty ofRussia. statement onthespecialroleof politicalpartiesastheonly based on religious andethnic affiliation. ey sharedcouldnotberestricted. the Artyomov v. Russia (2006) admissibility). admissibility). v.Russia Artyomov (2006) the 153

nnot berestrictedonaccountofprofessional, one caseastheyallraised thesame issue.The same name. An application for the party’s registration party’s registration the for An same name. application ical partiesshouldbe districtcourtsandindividualcomplaints by ite the fact that the party’s program did not indicate party’s indicate ite the fact thatthe programnot did regard to the particular features of the Partiesdeclaresthat Russia ruled onconst d in theearly1990s. On 7 December 1998 ‘ Russian All-Nation (“Russkiy Union’ All-Nation Russian obshchenatsionalniy In December 2001itwasdecided tore- 413 of the party. It wasconcluded that The Constitutional Court organizedandwhat 414 the membership of themembership

itutionality ofthe ) in the name ofthe 412 russkiy Thecase was

CEU eTD Collection the mere possibility of theexistence of ethni would occur if partiescould beestablished based onreligious affiliation. TheCourtlinked Court wasverycautioustopreventanypossi consolidate societyandpromote respective ethnicandreligiousgroupswhich w the presenceofsuchpartieswould inevitably afford havingpoliticalparties basedonethnicor and culture. AccordingtotheC contemporary Russiansociety does with asystem ofvaluescommon totheRu ‘Muslim’, ‘Russian’,‘Tartar’, et Russia, publicconsciousnessismore likely to identifytheterms European neighbors. Thus, theCourtnotesthat inmultinational andmulti-denominational values andculture. Christianity isnotassociated only withreligi by theCourtwasareferencetotraditionof world notaffectedbyminoritygroupsinvolvementinpolitics).Theonlyclarificationgiven countries theCourthadinmind making thisstatement asthereishardlyanydemocracy inthe countries withasingle-faith a be appliedandinterpreted inthe lightof the 415 ethnic groups,andreligiousconfessions. society as wellasthe specific country’s historicbackground, thenational, ethn Ibid., Para 4. 4. Para Ibid., The Russianrealitywasfoundtobeextremely distinctinthisrespectfrom its

nd asingle-nationsocial character ofinteractions betw c., withspecificdenominations onstitutional Court, Russian democracy isyettoofragile to common nationalvaluesfor theentirenation.Moreover, nothavesubstantialexperien 415 Therefore,the principle 154

on but refers mainly tothe European system of seekprotectionmainly fortherightsof c andreligious parties to aviolation of the Russian reality inthesame wayas inthose bility of the politiciza Christian democratic parties inEurope where ssian peoplesintheirentirety.However, ic andreligiouscomposition oftheRussian religious affiliation.In ould bedetrimental forstate’sefforts to structure(itisho een the state, political power, or ethnicgroups,ratherthan ce ofdemocratic traditions ‘Christian’, ‘Orthodox’, of secularism couldnot tion ofreligionwhich wever notclearwhat theCourt’sopinion CEU eTD Collection 417 416 Artyomov wasnotpreventedfrom reserved forstatestodecideoncriteria elections. The Courtstressed outthat theapplicant’s complaint wasabout thelatter whileitis general freedom ofassociationa findings of theadmissibility decision isadistin freedoms ofothersanditwasnecessaryinade interference pursuedthelegitimat declared Artymov’s application inadmissible. Artyomov, leaderofthepublicmovement ‘Ru authoritarianism of theRussianregime. concluded thattheCourt remains relatively weakinthecontextof thereinforced democracy becomes strongerandmorestable.Thereisnosurprisethatsome commentators however, leftunansweredthequestionifits stronger protectionduringthe dictated bytheneedtopreserve the democratic separatist tendencies in Russia.Therefore, the democratic culture andtraditions, thegrowin present circumstances of inter-ethnic andinterd establish politicalpar principle ofdemocratic andsecularstate. Constitution; equality, political, and ideological plurality as wellas the major constitutional ThreatAuthoritarianism of Artyomov v. Russia (2006). Admissibility Decision, Application No. 17582/05. 17582/05. Artyomov No. v. (2006). Decision, Admissibility Application Russia Seeforexample Marie-Elisabeth Baudoin The rulingof theConstitutional Courtwasch The Constitutional Courtindeciding onth ties basedonethnicorreligiousaff ?, 58 Europe-Asia 58 ?, Studies 697 (2006).

nd abilityof association underhisleadershiptoparticipatein period oftransition.TheCons e aims ofpreventingdisorder establishingapubl , Is the Constitutional Court the Last Bastion in Russia Against a a Against in Russia Bastion the Last Court Constitutional , Isthe 416

155

participate inelections. Atthesame time, ssian All-NationUnion,’The StrasbourgCourt g demands ofreligious fundamentalism, and andsecular characterofthestatewhichneeds ction made bytheECHRasto the applicant’s position canbechanged lateronceRussian mocratic society. Oneofthemost interesting prohibition ofethnicandreligiouspartiesis 417 enominational tensions,absenceofastable Ingeneral, ECHRaccepted thatthe e constitutionality of theprohibition to ic associationto allenged laterintheECHR byIgor iliation founditacce and protectingtherights, titutional Court of Russia, promote andexpress ptable inthe CEU eTD Collection 419 418 political partiesamounts tointerference withfr with thestatement thatprovisionof theLa within a timeframe of lessthan two months). and baseditsrulingonarguments verysimilar rights. The Constitutional Courtconfirmed thec plurality, the federalcharacter ofthe State, alleged violationofconstitutional provisionsonfr party,’ notqualifyingfor thisstatusunderth rule toupdatethenumber ofit conformity withtheserequirements. TheBaltic than 100members. Publicassociationsweregiventwoyearstoarrangetheirstructurein members atthetime) andregionalsubdivisionsin political partymust meet the requirement enacted in 2001allpublic associ association, the‘BalticRepubli regional andlocalpoliticalparties.An indi quantitative restrictionsimposed decide onits electoralsystem arrangements. the freedomofassociationclauseandastate specific aids and ideas,buttheright tostand chapter 4.3 on militant secularism in the jurisprudence ofthe ECHR). jurisprudence secularism the 4.3 on chapter in militant Ruling of the Russian Constitutional Court (2005). N the1-P Constitutional of Russian Ruling Court’s The the line arguments with arein EC overall As wasmentioned above, the Constitutional

s members andwasbannedforusingwithitsname ‘political can Party.’According tothe FederalLaw onPoliticalParties onpolitical parties aswell as ations wishingtore-registe on theminimum number ofitsmembers (10,000 vidual complaint waslodgedbyapublicpolitical 418 w onPoliticalPartiesallowing for onlyfederal and proportionalityofthe limitation ofhuman 156

419

for election is not automatically derived from for electionisnotautomatically derivedfrom is accorded awidemargin ofappreciationto e newlaw.Thecomplaint wasbasedonan eedom ofassociation,how The Courtopened its Republican Partydidnotcomply withthe onstitutionality of thechallenged provisions to theprevious case eedom ofassociation,principles political HR jurisprudenceHR onreligious partiessee(i.e. ban at leastinthehalfof

Court ofRussiahadal ontheprohibitiontoestablish r and receive the statusof regions with no fewer withnofewer regions (rulings wereadopted decision onthemerits ever itislegitimate so to decideonthe CEU eTD Collection 420 Court tofind thelimitation inconformity Apparently, theunstablecharacterofdemocracy in thenational parliament desp of Russiadidnottrusttheabilityitscitizens in preventing theestablishment of regionalpart country, andequalityofallcitizenstoth which wouldpresentathreatfordeveloping and localpolitical partieswouldleadtothe the stateanduniformity oftheState’spower. the creationofregionalpa separatist, nationalist, andte the poordemocraticex of acceptedpoliticalparty,theCourtreferredto thefragilecharacterofRussiandemocracy, account nationalaswellregionalinterest.As pursuing its activities and implementing itsprogra special type of political associations isto entire nation,butnotofsome region(s)ofth Parties meant that politicalpartiesarevestedwi limitation clause. if itmeets therequirements of Article55(3) of the State. morality, health, the rights and lawful interests ofother people, for ensuring defence of the country and security system, constitutional the of principles fundamental of the protection necessarythe extent for the to only

Article 55(3) According theCourt’sreasoninglegislat These reasonsandfearswerefoundassuffici reads as follows: The rights and freedoms of man and citizen may be limited by federal law citizenby ofman mayfederal law and freedoms and limited as The rights reads be follows: 420

perience ofthecountry,especia rties wouldinevitably rrorist groups.Moreover, theConstitutional Courtassumed that

ite thenumber oftheiradhere e realizationoffreed express andprotect nationalinterests but when 157

with thenationalConstitution. TheCourthad creation of anexcessively multi-party system e country.The taskofthepoliticalpartyasa The Courtalsofoundthat Russian democracy, federalism, unity of the Russian democracy,federalism, unityofthe ies. Itisunclear whytheConstitutional Court to decidewhichpartiestheywouldlikesee of theConstitution on the general rights endanger theterritorialintegrityandunityof th atasktoform andexpressthewillof the to theall-Russianchar in Russiawasthemost crucialpointfor the m intheregions,partiesshouldtakeinto or adoptingtheFederalLawonPolitical ent todeclarealegiti lly seriousthreatscoming from om ofassociation. nce andgeographicallocation. acter astheonlytype creationofregional mate stateinterest CEU eTD Collection 421 did notevenmention suchadevelopment inth least 500ineachofitsregionalbranches. party’s members five-fold:politicalpartymust amendments totheLawonPoliticalPartieswhic Constitutional CourtruledontheBalticRepublican Partycomplaint theStateDuma adopted purpose ofanypoliticalmovement. activity suchpublicassociations even iftheydonotpossessthe Moreover, itwasunderlinedthatpublicassociationscanstillbeactiv more thaneightyinRussia)donotmake an members andregionalbranchesinatleasthalfof parties illusory. TheConstitutio do notcontradictassuchtheConstitutionunles order tofulfillitsveryspecial mission. Quan intent requiringapoliticalpart Court didnotelaboratemuchand deeply intheeverydaylifeof democratic institutionsinRussiagetstronger fragile. There wasnowordsaidabout thepossibi need toaccordspecialprotectiontheexis followed alineofargumentation envisagedin Federal Law on Amendments to the Federal Federal Law Federal Parties(2004). Law the Political on Amendments to on On aseparatepoint,itisinterestingtoobservethatjustfewweeksbeforethe As tothe quantitative requirements impos thesocietyandpolitics.

y tohaveconsiderablesupport nal Courtfoundthatruleson theminimum number ofparty cannotpursueisparticipation status ofaregisteredpolit left this issue for thelegislator to decide. Thelegislator’s 421 It remains unclear whytheConstitutional Court 158

titative limitations imposed onpoliticalparties ting constitutional orderaslongitremains attempt tocreateapolitical partyunfeasible. haveatleast50,000members intotalandat the previous case, and relied heavily on the the previouscase,andreliedheavilyon e currentlegislationandsimply ignoredthe and democratic traditio s theymake theright to establish political lity of revisitingthis conclusion later, when h increased therequirements onnumberof theregions (thetotal number ofregionsis ed onpolitical partie ical party.Ironically,theonly within Russiansocietywasin in federalelections,thevery ely involvedinpolitics s, theConstitutional ns andcultureflew CEU eTD Collection electoral process.Itisnot cl be formed andhowmanypoliticaladherentsit only institutiontotallyincharge (i.e. theBavaria Party). Germany, afederalstate,butonewhichneve also political movement inEurope).TheCourt, made onlywhenitwasinsupportofitspositi Constitutional Courtmanipulated the comparative argument inawaythatreferences were protect the existing constitutional system, inorder to make itstrongerandmore stable.The Court inacceptingthe State’sargument thatsuch increased by fourtimes in2008.Additionally, an denied therighttovote againstallcandidates; system wasmodifiedtoallowvotingonlyforpa For example, in2005aninstituteofindepende implemented. Moreover,regularlyadoptingnew le This indicatesthatconsistentpolicyaiming to parties wereestablishedinear new politicalparties.Aswasal rulings endorsedtheoverallpolicyofcu all intheirreasoni as apoliticalparty. novelty of imposingsubstantially heavierburde It follows from theConstitutional Court’sassessment thatthefederal legislator isthe Both ConstitutionalCourtjudgments canbe ng andtheextentofsuppor ear whyapoliticalparty with ly 2000andonlyonepartyfrom thelistwas registeredin2009. ready mentioned, sixoutofseven ofdecidinguponhow 159

rrent government topreventtheemergence of however, didnotrefer statefinancial supportforeach castvote was reduce thenumberofparties wassuccessfully n onpublic associations topursuerecognition t grantedtostate’sactions.Firstofall,both on (forexampletotheChristianDemocratic rties listsofcandidate d evenmore troubling,istheposition ofthe r prohibitedtheexistenc nt candidateswasabolished;theelectoral draconianmeasures areneededinorderto gislative rulesaddsfurtheraccess barriers. must haveinordertoparticipate inthe assessed togetherastheydonotdifferat thepoliticalwillofpeopleshould 50,000 can nominate candidates for 50,000 cannominate candidatesfor currently registered political s; in2006voterswere to theexperience of e ofregionalparties CEU eTD Collection functioning ofpolitical parties is done inRussia). political parties,butnottoderiveconclusion courts andexecutiveagenciess the generalprohibitionofsuchpartiesmight make be foundintheconstitutionsof opportunity toestablishpublicassociations,in legitimately insistontheseparationofChurch vote for. makes sensetogivethepeoplemore freedom to the end,powerstodecideonstatematters weregiventothepeopleofRussiaandmaybe it option toopen theRussian political spaceforco than 50,000members canhelpinexpressing thatw unified willof theRussianpeoplecan beformed onedayandonlyfederal parties withmore politics. TheRussian Constitutional Court seem competition ofideas,thoughts,suggestion, including issues ofregional governance and good thingfordemocracy. Itisawellestablis unified willofthepeopleinacountrylikeRu organize regionalofficesinmore than40fede organize apoliticalpartyif curious if the Constitutional C elections and express the will of The Russianlegislative regime regulati The prohibitionofreligiousandethnicpartie it is required to enroll the ourt evermade any calculations hould beencouragedtolookat otherEuropeancountries(lik theentirenation but verytroubling from of theperspectives liberaldemocracy. 160

onparty’scharacterfrom itsname only(aswas cluding religiousones.Similar provisionscan hed principlethatdemocracy presupposesthe decidewhichpartytheywanttosupportand ssia couldbeeverformedandwhetheritis ral units.Moreover,itisverydoubtfulifa ng theprocedureofestablishingand mpetition in thetrue sense oftheword. In andState,especially whenthereisan s tofollow thequestionable idea thata sense, especially inthereality of Russia, ill. TheCourt didnot wanttoconsider an party with ten members lesscannot. It is s islesseasytocriticizeasastatecan required numberofmembers and e BulgariaandTurkey).While theprograms andactivitiesof on howmuchwoulditcostto CEU eTD Collection by thejudiciary: theConstitu enter intothedebateits the contentof political debatethrough regulatin Moreover, thisrationaleisabusedinordernot aborted attheverybeginningofprocessand partiesdonothaveachancetoenterpolitics. However, inRussiaitisdonetooprematurely as democracy: thereisaneed tolimit therights the emergence ofnewpoliticalmovements. diversity (Russia hassevenregi the purposeofpreservingst stage, theRussian government insi would bechangedifRussiandemocracy wouldbe registration. Itwouldbeinteres reality partiescannotpursuetheiractivitie political partiescanbeformed freelyandwith restrictions onpartyprograms andagendas.While requirements onlyastheFederalLaw onPolitical Partiesimposesadditionalcontent-based establishing politicalparties cannot beovercome viathefulfillment of organizational 422 imagine thatsomeone woulddecidetogothroughsuchhardship. a politicalparty inRussia, one need gothroug political partyistrulychallenging.AsoneRussian commentator observedinordertoregister The Russianpoliticalspaceisextremely hard Politicheskih Partij v FRG iRF, 13 Gosudarstven V.A. Sockov, Pravovoe Regulirovnie Porjadka Obrazovanija, Priostanovlenija i Prekrawenija Dejatel'nosti The major rationaleusedbytheRussiangovernme elf. ThesaddestthingaboutRussiais

ting toseehowtheState’sapproa atus quo,andtriestogivetheim stered parties, not two) but tional Courtin late2004 ‘b sts onverystrictguardianship overthe politicalspace with naja Vlast' iMestnoe Samoupravlenie. (2007). 161

of those who can potentially harm democracy. of thosewhocanpotentiallyharmdemocracy. toprotectdemocracy buttokeepcontrolover s withoutamandatory out gettinganypermission from State,in the g howmany political playersare allowed to h somany formalities thatitisdifficult to to enterandtheproc any attempt toestablishpoliticalpartiesis declared asbeingstable the official position of the State is that theofficialpositionofStateisthat nt isverysimilar tothatofmilitant at thesame time doesnot allow thatthisapproachwasendorsed lessed’ thegovernment and pression ofacer ch andjudicialinterpretation edure toestablisha procedure ofstate 422 andstrong.Atthis Difficulties in tain political CEU eTD Collection protect democracy. quantitative andterritorial limitation onpolitical supportive ofmyargumentsthatRussia abused regulation of activitiesof political parties. positive sign thatcurrentleadershipacknowledgestheunpleasant stateofaffairsinthe will taketime toseeif suchchanges willmake 425 424 423 not democratic orintended toresortillegalorundemocratic methods, thegovernment’s Article 11oftheEuropeanConventiononHuman Rights. disorder andguaranteetheri legitimate aims pursuedbythegovernment –pr membership andregional representationwa was decreasedto45,000,andfrom January required forregistrationwasenactedandfrom imposed onpoliticalpartiesbythecurrentlegislation.Asaresultlegislativeamendment President Dmitry Medvdevexpressedhisconcernabouttheburdensome requirements party andprevent anyserious competitors from entering thepolitical space. a fragile constitutional order whilepursuing itsown political goaltoempower oneparticular that theRussian government abusedthenotion parliament to pursuetheirpolicyinrelation Republican Party of Russia v Russia (2011). v (2011). Russia Russia of Party Republican No. 12976/07. Application v.Russia (2011), Russia of Party Republican at news archive NewsAgency For seeNational details Furthermore, oneofthemost recentdeve The ECHRpointedout thatinthe absence There ishoweveratinyhopeforimprovement ofthesituationasin2008Russian 424 InApril2011theECHR

ghts ofothers–andtherefor 2012 itwillbedecreasedfurtherto40,000. 162

Januaryof2010thenumber ofpartymembers political parties.Theunfortunateconclusionis anysubstantial difference, butitis already a of militant democracy andclaimed toprotect http://www.annews.ru/news/detail.php?ID=182400 the militant democracy rationaleinimposing s disproportionate to theCourt-accepted otection ofnationalsecurity,prevention parties’ activitiesinitsclaimed attempts to ruledthattherequirements ofminimum of any evidence that a political party was of anyevidencethatapoliticalpartywas lopments inthe ECHRjurisprudence is 425

e foundRussiainviolationof 423 . It CEU eTD Collection highest inEurope However, theminimum membership requirement candidates forelections. essential for theapplicant toretain thestatus impair oneof theapplicant’s main aims: particip government on apossibilityforthe membership andregionalrepresentation.Th applicant’s party was dissolvedfor itsfailure 431 430 429 428 427 426 State Duma orsubmitting acertain number Russia andconditionalparticipatio Court notedthatitmight beachievedthroughth large, popularpartiesonly.Astotheexcessi serve asjustification for limiting thenumber of the stability ofthepoliticalsystem. the elections aswelltoprev limit theirnumber inordertoavoidthedisp However, theCourtrejected thearguments of thenecessitytostrengthen politicalparties and advanced by theRussianlegislator tojustify suchaburdenonpolitical partyformations. unacceptable undertheConvention andreferred decision todissolvethepartycouldbewa Ibid., para. 113. 113. para. Ibid., 111. para. Ibid., 110. para. Ibid., 62. para. Ibid., 107. para. Ibid., Ibid., para102and 103. As to the requirement of minimum memb minimum of requirement the to As 429 andtherefore theCourtfelt necessi 427

ent excessive parliamentary frag n ofapoliticalpartyinelections(i.e. havingseatsinthe 430 applicant tofunctionasapub IntheCourt’sview,fina roportionate expendituresfrom thebudgetduring 163

rranted onlyinthemost seriouscases. e Courtrejectedtheargument brought bythe of signatures, 150,000atthepresent date). ve parliamentary fragmentation argument, the to comply withtherequirements of minimum of apoliticalpartyandthe right tonominate ation inelections.Itwas accepted that itwas political partiesandallowing thesurvivalof e 7percentelectoral to thepractice ofother member states. appliedinRussiawasfoundtobethe ership, theCourtdidnotdeclareitas ty todiscussindetailsthereasons mentation inordertopromote ncial considerationscannot lic association asitwould threshold existingin 426 The 428 431

CEU eTD Collection prohibition ofregionalparties. Court suggeststhecase-by-caseassessment 436 435 434 433 432 prevent theemergence ofanypo not followthatpreventiveself-protectivemeasur ethnic populationposespotentialproblems forth prematurely. Russiancomplex territorial organizations combined democracy rationalispresentinthebackground unplanned intrusionby theexisting legislation andgovernmental policies.Themilitant parties. illustrative of apotentialfor miscarriages inhe the time, generalrestrictions onpolitical year afterthe transition todemocracy beganand unacceptable undertheEuropeanConventionon Hu democratic society.” law-abiding politicalparty suchastheapplic “such aradicalmeasure asdissolutiononafo minorities and avoid any abuse of a dominant position.” always prevailandbalancemust beachieved participate inelections. Democr Furthermore, the Courtdisagreed“thatsmall mi Ibid., para. 130. 130. para. Ibid., Ibid. 129. para. Ibid., 120. para. Ibid., 114. para. Ibid., 436 The regionalrepresentationre To conclude,Russianpoliticalenvironment

433

435 acy doesnotsimplymean thatthe views of majority must Intheend,Courtconclude litical parties. Thecurrent quirement onpoliti imposed parties become moredifficult tojustify. 164

rmal ground,appliedto rent intheindiscriminate banning of regional nority partiesshouldnotbedeniedarightto ant, cannotbeconsidered“necessary ina of thepartyprograminsteadblanket to ensurethefairandpropertreatment of es couldbeinvokedatasearlyastageto the Courtconsiders that withthepassage of of suchpolicies;however,itisappliedtoo e survivalofdemocr is being aggressively protected from any is beingaggressivelyprotectedfrom any man Therule wasintroduced Rights. ten 432 Intheend,Courtdeclaredthat President ofRussiaexpresses withanextremely diverse cal partieswasalsofound s thatthepresentcaseis a long-establishedand acy. However,itdoes 434 The CEU eTD Collection considered asaserious encroachment onpo speech aspracticed inIndia,anddisqualificat of anypoliticalparty: participation inelecti remain inthe politicalarenabut militant democracy. Measurestobediscussedw rearrange the current party-pr alternatives toparty dissolutio substantive democracyvia regulat familiar withalternative measures ofam activities and limitations inregistration procedure. However,constitutional practice is suspension of activities of politi The previouspartsofthischapterweredevotedto Solutions from India and Israel 3.5. ‘Softer’MilitantDemocracyMe for itstruemission: tosafeguarddemocracyfromitsenemies. government to protect the dominant position ofthe events leave some hopethatmilitant democracy willcease tobeused bytheRussian protection of democracy throughdraconianlim also astrong signalthat Russiashould take mo of politicalparties inRussia isfarfrom being amendments. Moreover, therecent Strasbourg judg some concernsonthepoliticalsituationa ohibition practicesandforage n procedurescouldbeauseful nevertheless impose substantial limitations onthemajor aim cal parties,i.e. dissolution, ing whatpoliticalpartiesmi 165

ilitant democracy natureadoptedtopromote nd theywerefollowedbycertainlegislative recognized ashealthy demo on. However,contentre asures: TheExampleofAlternative itation imposed onpoliticalparties.Allthese ion oflistsandpartiesinIsrael,should be re seriousstepsto sl litical parties’activities andtheir‘softer’ ithin thissectionallow political partiesto practicesofdifferentstatesdirectedatthe existing majority partybutwillbe utilized ment isaclear indi temporary prohibitionsofparty ght advocateandpractice.The neral theoreticaldebateon hintforstatesseekingto ow down its aggressive ow downitsaggressive strictions onelectoral cation thatregulation cratic practices.Itis CEU eTD Collection emergency withinthedebateoncoreofth jurisdiction wasalreadymentioned abovefor India represents afascinating example forstud 440 439 438 437 classes of”Indian prohibited toseekelectoralsupportbyprom limits of political speech andimposed anelectoral codeto pursue this aim. freedom ofexpressioninitsConstitution,India political speechversustheneed question arose inthe circumstances oflikely agitation which ledtoviolenceanda substantial the possibility toimpose restrictionsonpo regulation measures. Inthisjuri interesting example for themilitant democracy pessimism thehealthofdemo about example ofpoliticalmobilization through the basisoflanguage,tribe,caste,religion,an protection for the militant democracy concept. 3.5.1. the partydissolutionprocedures. consequences foraffectedpoliticalplayersshou jurisdictions. jurisdictions. the on only and will concentrate story Democratic Stability Democratic Issacharoff, TheRepresentation the of People Act, No. 431951; of IndiaA.I.R. Manual (1989), v.41. For details onthe study of ethnic parties and democracy see,Kanchan Chandra, par political on rules various have jurisdictions Both Content Unfortunately, India has experienced throughout itshistoryexamplesUnfortunately, Indiahasexperiencedthroughout ofelectoral supra supra Restrictions , 3 Perspective on Politics 2 (2005). (2005). 2 Politics on , 3Perspective note 86, at 1425. at 1425. 86, note citizens “onground ofreligio

on sdiction the prohibition of political parties wasreplaced with 437 peculiar features of the militant democracy measures employed in these employed these measures democracyin peculiar featuresof militant the tomaintain publicorder.

Electoral Speech:

cracies withactiveethnicparties. litical speechduring times ofelections. 166

ethnic parties despitethe overallprofound ies ondifferentconstitutionallawissues.This violent political unrests: how tobalance free d regioncould beconsideredasasuccessful n, race,caste [or]community.” ties’ activities, however, I will not look at the whole whole at the look however, ties’ activities, I willnot Moreover, India which isdivided atleast on oting “enemy orhatred...betweendifferent e constitutional orderas sought toachievethisbalancebynarrowing ld notleadtorelaxe its constitutionalprovisionsonastateof number of fatalities.Therefore, alegitimate debate for itsalternative political party The Case Despite astrongcommitment to of India d standards compare to 438 themain object of Finally,Indiaisan

Ethnic Parties and 440 439 Inaddition, Thus, itis CEU eTD Collection 442 441 prohibits anyappealtovotefororagainstth certain politicalspeechesascorruptpractices Prabhoo casewouldleadtoadangerously India ruled thatsuchan inte candidates (inthiscasewithMus election resultswasbasedmainly onthemani his religious affiliation and wasthreatening Muslim candidates.Thedecisiontoreverse the electoral campaignofPrabhooappe Trackeray, theleaderofextremist Shiv agitation campaignamounted tocorruptpracti decided thatPrabhooshouldberemovedfromhi elected toastatelegislative officeinMaha Kunte, theIndianSupreme Court’s1996judgment. is abletokeepcontroloverac in prac theoretical possibility and the i.e. theexclusionfrom theofficeofelected these rules isitspowertoseekremedies ag religious symbols.” “on theground ofhisreligion,race, One oftheexamples ofcorruptpracticeswouldbeacalltovotefororagainstcandidate the electoral codeproscribes Prabhoo v.Kunte, A.I.R. 1996S.C. 1113. Ibid. tice. The most casetodemonstrate famous howanalternative militant democracy measure 441 Themost important roleof th “corrupt practices” tobeidentif

Indian Supreme Courthasimposed numerous similar remedies rpretation oftheelectoralcode tivities ofpoliticalpartieswo lim affiliation).However,thehi caste, community or language aled toHindusvoteforthiscandidateonthebasisof ainst candidateswhorelie e candidatebasedonhis 167

rashtra. However,theHighCourtofBombay SenaParty.TheHighCourtfoundthatthe narrow understandingofgroundstoidentify . TheHighCourtpointed representatives. Thisprovisionisnotamere ce. The campaign had been organized by Bal ce. Thecampaign hadbeenorganizedbyBal festing threat to public safety and other festing threattopublicsafetyandother s elective office due to the fact that his s electiveofficeduetothefactthathis 442 e Election Commission inenforcinge ElectionCommission Ramesh YeshwantPrabhoowas ied byanElectionCommission. rked outinIndiaisPrabhoov. inthecircumstances ofthe ghest judicialinstitutionof or theuseof,appealto, d onprohibitedspeech, religion anditdoesnot out thatlegislation CEU eTD Collection order to stake. One paragraph from atypicalspeec speech isdangerousinterms ofitsconsequences, of theIndianState.TheCourtexpresslysaid ground ofthecandidate’sreligionwasdeclaredto matter that suchappealsseemed tobeposinga 445 444 443 the limited periodoftime whenelectionsareabou freedoms. Secondly,theCourtunder though andactionthosedifferencesshould notbepermitted” language couldgeneratepowerfulemotions de its concernthatallthedifferences“ofrelig understanding oftheconstitutional commitment to constitutional status resolved potentialconstitutionalconflictbymaking twodistinct public order.However,asoneofthecomm constitutionally permissible inthe lightof wi mood o Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., at 1426. Issacharoff, should be led to victory in the name of religion. pp or worsh be showed should the Hindus against there. You will findHindu temples underneath if off the danger on Hinduism, elect Ramesh Prabhoo to join with Chhagan Bhujbal who is already Hinduismtriumph will inthis electionandwemust Not surprisingly,restrictionsonpoliticalspeechwithsuchcontentwerefound f thePrabhooelectoralcampaign: maintain theintegrity supra supra note 86, at 1423. at 1423. 86, note of theelectionperiod.

of thedemocratic processes. lined thattheprohibitionon h of 168

ion, race,caste, community, culture,creedand 444 entators onPrabhoocasenotes,theCourthas entators de constitutionalemer thatitwasnotgoing 443 Bal Thackeray speaks foritselfon the overall i ed with shoes. shoes. edwith the namePrabhoo by candidate A i Firstof all, theCourtrevisited itsearlier

threat to public orde priving peopleoftheirpowersrational t tohappen all the mosques are dugou but thatthe natureofthespeechitselfisat ademocratic politicalorderandexpressed beinconsistentwiththesecularcharacter become hon'ble recipients ofthis victory to ward . Itwasfoundtobenecessaryin speech wasdirectedonlyto findingsaboutthespecial 445 gency powers to protect gency powerstoprotect r. Seekingvotesonthe to assessonly whether todisturbdemocratic t. Anybody whostands CEU eTD Collection 447 446 very essenceofthebannedpartyistokeepit political partiesduringelectionse approach. However, the Indian example showsthepossibility of treating the conduct of parties themselves.TheGerman radicalgroups tendency to accordthe widestpossibleprotecti legitimacy. Theexample ofelectoral speechlim voters. which inthePrabhoocasewasremoval ofthecandidatesupportedbymajority on prohibitingcertainelectoralspeechesmeans elections areover. electoral code lacksclearguidan players without compromising itscommitment toth decide on measures toprotect itsconstitutional structures from allegedly dangerous political with therules of thegame impose their differencesfrom others,i.e.religion,race, terms aboutothercandidatesandappealfor This wouldmostprobablymean, thatpolitical antidemocratic appeals of political partiesarescrutinized only duringthe electioncampaign. Court hasidentifiedseriouslimitations in problematic from afreedom ofspeechperspectiv Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., at 1427. 447 ideologicallimitations onpartyprogram Therefore, whilethelimitation ofelectoral speechmight appear asseriously The Indianapproachisnotfr Moreover,measures ofaretr 446 Thisleadstothesecondconcern.The during timesofelections.

ce fordecision-makers and is parately from oftheir issues ee ofcomplexities, asanyothercase whenastatehas to oactive nature in general ra 169

the supportoftheirca away fromthechancetocompete seatsin for caste, partiesare free tospeakinantidemocratic itation practicesinI the applicationofsuchmeasures. First, an ‘outcome-determinate’ oriented-decision, e andleadpotentially to vagueconcerns,the on totheelectoral arenathanto political cases arecleardemonstrations ofsuchan or theirbehavioraslongtheycomply e principles of democracy. First of all, the Firstofall,the e principlesofdemocracy. etc. Second, theelectoralcode doesnot application ofelectoralcoderules political status.Intheend, also appliedmainly after the ise concerns regarding their ndia opposesthegeneral ndidates ongroundsof CEU eTD Collection adjusted yettothesituations whereapartyca deserve special attention from thesid special attentiontowhat candidates andpartymembers doandsayduringthecampaign candidates topresenttheparty’sprogram andto culture and generaldisinterest inpolitics.Th of crucialimportancefor theoutcome ofelections,especially insocieties withalow political until they decidetorun forelect might bepeculiar to the Indiandemocratic structure only) but let the parties function freely opted notto interfere witheverydayactivities of example isa positivesign of considerate applicationof militant democracy. Thisjurisdiction political parties withno chancestoinfluence present atroublingtendencyofmanydemocratic isnottakenasseri commitment the number ofpartiesbannedinEurope inthela political parties isaccepted to belegitimately applied onlyinextreme situations. However, political groupsseeking tochallengedtheex restrictive meantoach process deservesattentionandanalysis.Ther riots ca politica approach on electoral speechlimitation bears the parliamentandhaveasayinmatters ofpoliticsandgovernance.While theIndian

used byagitationasinIndia. The major weaknessof theIndian version of Therefore, theIndiansolution to bar extr l partiesl to correct their behavi ieve thegrand goal:toprotect polit ously asitshouldbe.Thecase-st ions. Itishard to contest thattimes of electoral campaign are or topreserveelectoral viability. e of thest 170

n mild itslanguageforelectoralcampaign but the content of thepoliti is achance forpoliticalpartiesandtheir ate, especiallywithth isting order anddamage it.Prohibitionof e isnodoubtthatitrepresents theleast appeal topeoplevot the same result itstil st couple ofdecades demonstratesthatsuch political parties for emist political parties from theelectoral states toeliminate evenutterlyminor militant democracy isthatit not ical spacefrom allegedly dangerous udies intheprevioussection various reasons(which e experienceofviolent cal debate.TheIndian e forthem. Therefore, l leaveschances for CEU eTD Collection period coverstheyears1985to199 The firstperiodstartsfrom theyearofstate’sestablishment untilthe1980s.Thesecond 450 449 448 banning ofpoliticalparties,in possibility todisqualifylistsandpartiesfr institutionala formation andfunctioning.Oneofthe activities of political parties: electoral participation istreated separately from issuesof party Israel wecanobserveaninterestingvari threats by Arabnationalists, and byright-wing Jewish nationalist extremists. In Israel,the theme ofself-defending democr 3.5.2. possible responsestothethreatcoming from on theregulation of political parties’ activities deservestobeconsideredasoneo democracy, itslegitimacy, and limits. Despiteso restrictive militant democracy measures isava eliminate itfrom politicaldiscourse. However,theIndian example of practicing less whether itwasrightthingtokeepthepartyas scene andstillremains oneofthe adjusted itspoliticalbehaviorsoitbecame possible tosecure behind the1992Hindumobwhichledtoethnicri on apa prominent Hindu nationalistparty,th will appeal todifferences between citizens Navot, supra Benyamin Neuberger, Party’s official web-page: The rty’s legalitya Suzie Navotdistinguishesthreeperiodsre

Banning note 231. 231. note of Israel nd constitutionality. Political http://www.bjp.org/ , in Thiel, supra Thiel, , in

cluding theirdisqualif major political partiesinIndia. Parties 2, whenIsraelenactedforthe e BharatiyaJanataParty(BJP) note 21, at 188. at 188. 21, note . from om allegedlydangerouspoliticalmovements. ation ontheapproachtowardsregulation 171

participationinelecti once itiselected. For example, themost luable contribution to thedebateonmilitant acy isdiscussedintwodifferentcontexts: Elections: a legitimate political actororfindawayto me seriouscomplexities, theIndian solution ots withthousandsdead.However,laterit garding thepositionofIsraelilawon rrangements inIsraelthisrespectisthe ication from participatinginelections. The its presenceintheelectoral It ishardtoassessrightnow Exampleof 448 ons butwithoutdeciding first time initshistorya wasoneoftheparties 449 Israel However,in

f the 450

CEU eTD Collection 454 453 452 451 issues. commenta grounds ofanabsenceanylegalfram Unsurprisingly therewas adissentingjudge not authorized bylaw torule mind thatthe Central Elections Committee wasch excitement expressedbysome commentators,this constitutional historyandthesymbol Yeredor caseisregardedasoneofthemost the decision of theCentral Electoral Committee. existence oftheState Israel.TheSupreme Court ofIsraelinamajority opinionendorsed grounds thatitwasanillegal participating inthe elections. electoral list disqualification began inIsrael. TheSocialistList was disqualified from party from participationinelectionsfirstarose attempt toban oneof the parties from partic electoral agenda. However,the most intrigui election the PartiesLaw law allowingthedisqualifyingofaparty.The (1965). (1965). existence of theState the wereundermining movement. that TheEl-Ard movementfor its wasandactivities objectives prohibited For seeKremnitzer,details in Navot, supra EA 1/65 Yeredor v. Chairman of the Central Elections Committee forthe Six Knesset 19 (3) PD (3) 365 this a fewmembers of included movement, thelist El-Ard the and with was identified time atthat party The 454 During thefirstperiodtherewasnolegalbasistobanapartyfrom forits election s law.

tors mention theimprecise rationale note 231,at 94. was adopted,withapeakin20 and wasdissolved. note 52, at 157. 157. at 52, supra note 451

association anditsmembers werechallengingth TheElections Committee refused toapprove thelist on the onorassessanymatters of oftheideadefensivedemocracy. 172

importantandexceptiona arguing against disqualification exactly on the arguing againstdisqualificationexactlyonthe ipating inelections.Th ng featureoftheearlyperiod wasthe actual third periodbeginsfrom1992,theyearwhen as early1965,theyear 02, whenamendments wereintroducedtothe ework for such actions. Moreover, some ework forsuchactions.Moreover,some of themajority judgmentonsomecrucial arged withmechanical tasksonly andwas ruling isfar lessproblematic if wekeepin 452 TheSupreme Court’sdecisioninthe partyplatformcontent. e questionofbarringa l decisions in Israeli whenthehistoryof 453 e integrityand Despitethe CEU eTD Collection PD (3) 541 (1992). (1992). 541 (3) PD the Cent v.Chairman of Movshowiz EA2858/92. (1988); label ita“quasi-fascist”movement. The partypromoted racialhostilityandwasextr 461 460 459 458 457 456 455 confirmed bytheSupreme Courtrulings. Party in1998elections,aswellthe1992electi for thepossibility toban parties. The reforms of of anelectorallist from upc the relation toaracistparty,theKnessetadopted probability of danger. should beanextreme measure oflastresort unpopular viewsandopinionswhilereferenceto negating the democratic characterofthestate the CourtruledthatYeredor approved theparty’scandidacyand the Supreme Court. This time theCourt struck contradictions withthefoundations participation intheupcoming electionson resurfaced issue ofaparty banwiththeappe character of the State;3.incitement toracism. 1.negation of the existence oftheState Israel asthe in elections to the Knesset if its objects or actions, expressly or by implications, include one of the following: (1985). (1985). EA 1/88. Neiman vChairmanofthe Central Electi Forexample, Section 7(a) of theBasicLaw was ame Navot, supra Kremnitzer, in EA 3/84. See for example Issacharoff, For details on Israeli experience dealing with the Kahanist see also Neuberger, In the1984elections Neiamn vChairman ofthe Central Elec note 231,at 748. note 52, at 158. 158. at 52, supra note 459 Asaresponse tosuchan optimis supra supra totheEleventhKne

oming electionsbasedontheirgoals note 86, at 1447. 1447. at 86, note case shouldnotbeextendedtodi ofthedemocraticregimea allowed ittorunfor elections. 456 461 TheElectionsCommitteebannedKachfrom

arance ofthe extremist right-wing Kachparty. 173

tions Committee for th state ofthe Jewish people; 2. negation of the democratic ons Committee for the Twelft legislative provisionsthatenabledthebanning nded and stated: A candidates’ list shall not participate list not participate shall stated: A candidates’ and nded down the actionsoftheElectionsCommittee, thelawresulted inth ral Elections Committee for th for Committee ral Elections 458 eme totheextent thatsome observerswould the groundsthatitsra to beinvokedonlyinfaceofsubstantial sset, theSupreme Court theextreme measures todenyvotingrights and democracy must evenwith anddemocracy contain ons inrelationtoth tic positionoftheSupreme Courtin nd itsdecisionwasappealedin e Eleventh Knesset squalification ofaracistlist 457 supra note449 460 e disqualifyingofKach Inamajority opinion, toprovidelegalbasis h Knesset 42 PD (4) 177 177 (4) PD 42 h Knesset e Thirteenth Knesset 46 had todealwiththe cist goalsarein e KahanaHailist, 39 PD (2) 225 , at 191-196. , at 191-196. 455

CEU eTD Collection 465 464 463 462 terrorist organization.The majority ofth to establishwitharequireddegree ofcertaintyifBasharasu party. Thecaseturned on thecarefulassessment not supporttheCommittee’s motion andruledinfavorofBishara,the againsttheIsraeliState. armed struggleorterroristorganization of theStateIsrael statement ofitsleader.Thecontenthissp introduced, theCentralElections Committeedecide include thepossibilitytodisqualify democracy. expansion ofthepartybanningprocedureto political situationsoffrequentterroristattacks, violence,a stage ofpartyregistrationandat Law hascreatedatwofold system toreviewand requirement tobeconstitutedandad registration ofpoliticalpart associated withadoptionofthePartiesLawin1992whichregulates participation in the elections is subject to approval by the Supreme Court. the Supreme by Court. approval isto subject elections inthe participation organisation against the State ofIsrael. A decision of the Central Elections Committeepreventing acandidate’s as aJewishanddemocratic state;2. Israel Stateof the of existence the 1.reject ofthe are one following: implicitly or explicitly the person of deeds the Knesset norshall anindividual person be a candidate For seeNavot, details association. and expression of freedom on restrictions serious of adoption provoked citizens Israeli actsagainst terrorist in tothe 1996 Knesset Assembly) firstelected party, For details on the case see Navot, supra caseseeNavot, Foron the details amended the in version: A 7(a) asfollows Section reads Balad (Democratic the National activities would be parties political aspects of most the troubling One of ForseeNavot, details Shortly aftertheamendments The finalstagein the establishment ofalega 463 Inthesecircumstances, theKnessetamended section7AofBasicLawto supra as aJewishanddemocratic, aswell note 231,at 749. ies. Interestingly,the 1992Lawdoesnotimposeonpartiesa supra

incite to racism; 3. Support the armed the Support racism;3. to incite thestageofaparty’sparticip note 231, at 750-751. at 231, 750-751. note apartyforitssupportofterrorism. note 231, at 751-754. at 231, 751-754. note ministered inademocratic manner. to disqualifyapartyforits e Courtwasnotconvinc 174

denying the existence eech wasallegedlyaboutdenyingtheexistence . The party’s leader statem . The party’sleader accommodate thenewchallenges for Israeli for the Knesset if the goals or deeds ofthe listf the deeds goals or ifthe the Knesset for list of candidates will not take part in the elections to elections inthe take part willnot candidates list of of thestatement ofthepartyleaderinorder control activities of politicalparties: atthe d todisqualifytheBaladlistbasedon l regime of partyregul asamounting tothesupportofan nd politicalunresttriggeredthe pported thearmed struggleofa ation inelections.However,the struggle ofan enemy or terrorist state 465 support of terrorism were supportofterrorism were TheSupreme did Court 464 ent expressing support for support expressing ent formation, status,and ed bytheevidences

leader oftheBalad 462 ation in Israelis Therefore,the CEU eTD Collection 468 467 466 grounds ofnegatingtheexistenceStat well assome criticalcomments. Forexample, Finally, theevidenceofdisqualifyingaimsmu be continuedandconsistentmustdemons and itmust beprovedthatalist as wellfrom conclusionsunequivocallyim party’s centralanddominant aims. Second,theseai lists andparties. judgment of1998andemployedbytheCourtin restrictive approach could beevident in the Israeli practicetobanpartiesfromelecti political partiesasshouldbedoneinatrue adopted quitearestrictiveviewinorderto externally.” find their expression withinthe legitima party theSupreme ofIsraeldecidedthis Court protecting itselfwithoutexceedingthe limits ofde appears tobeacompromising solutiontoth not allowfor thenewamendments tobeapplied inthis case. commentators observethattheSupreme CourtofIs presented andthereforerefusedtodenytheright Kremnitzer, in Ibid. Ibid., at751. The amendment toelectoralprocedures st In itsinterpretation of thedisqualificati 467

note 52, at 168. 168. at 52, supra note 468 Firstofall,thegroundsfordisqualificationcanbederivedonlyfrom a

takes actionstoachieve itsai democracy.Asoneofthecommentatorson ons, MordechaiKremnitzer, pointsoutthata 175

accordasmuchguaranteesandfreedoms to te framework ofthedemocracy, andnot st be‘pervasive,clear,andunequivocal’. e dilemma ofhowfardemocracy cangoin few elements created in thesecond Neiman plicit. Third,theoreticalaims arenotenough is“preferableforundemocraticpressuresto Kremnitzer arguesthat on procedure,theSupr trate highandextreme levelsofintensity. toparticipate inelections. However,some e ofIsraelasaJewishstatecannotbe ormed extensivedebatesanddiscussionas mocratic tolerance. InthecaseofBalad allfollowingjudgments ondisqualifying ms must beevidentfromdirectstatements rael inthis particular case deliberately did ms. Moreover,this activitymust 466 TheBisharajudgment eme Courtof Israel disqualificationon CEU eTD Collection 469 an easytask. However,itisimportant tokeep democracy againstitsenemies withoutcompromi democracy stateinrelationtotheprohibition case-studies clearly demonstrate that itishardly elections appearstobeafar such measures fortheself-defenseofdemo similar toIsrael soitisnot democracy measures. Unfortunately,thereis arrangement. party is allowed toexist butits electoral participation is restricted is notlikely to bea stable disqualification from elections. parliament.” test whenapartyissimply beingdisqualifie invites “courtstoapplymorest registration andduringtheelec Issacharoff doesnotwelcome theideaofhavi legislator left matters of final interpretation for theCourtwhichisdesirable toavoid. Samuel a listonthegroundsofsupportforterroristor definition of ‘terroristorganiza strict approachadoptedongroundsfordissoluti struggle againsttheStateofIsrael.Finally,th impossible, tojustifydisqualificationonthegr theoretically justified inanycase. Moreover, Issacharoff, Nevertheless, theIsraeli example isworthof including tothe list of legitimate militant 469 supra Probably,thisauthorsuspectsthatitmi note 86, at 1449. at 1449. 86, note easytoprovidesome conclusive less draconianmeasure thanba

tion’ anditposesseriousdifficult ringent standardwhenaparty Furthermore, Issacharoffsuggest tions. Hesuggeststhatsuch d from havingitsmembers electedtothenational 176

cracy. At least in theory, a ban on running for cracy. Atleastintheory,abanonrunningfor e Supreme Court failedtofollowitsendthe inmind theimportanceof political partiesin of politicalparties. Themission of protecting ounds ofsupportforaterroristgroup’sarmed ganizations armed struggleagainstIsrael.The possible toseek anideal versionof amilitant not anyotherjurisdic hebelieves that it on. SuzieNavotpointsoutthatthereisno ng todouble-checkon sing theState’sdemocratic natureisnever ght leadtorelaxingstandardsforparty nning theentireparty.The above remarks ontheeffectiveness of is outlawed andlessrigorous ies todecideondisqualifying an institutionalarrangement s thatalegalmodel wherea tion withexperience is hard, or perhaps is hard,orperhaps parties, duringthe CEU eTD Collection various timesandin jurisdictions. Th To conclude, there isasubstantivejudicial Conclusion solving similar situationsin best practicesaroundtheworldcouldbestudied, local circumstances. However,thebeauty ofth country aswellIndia,foundth extend. agendas run countertorulesofthepolitical elections sendsastrongmessage totheparty they comply withlegislative requirements. to compete forvoters’supportin in Israel isonly of atemporarycharacter. Such the denialofpossibilitytoparticipatein arrangement developedinIsrael political parties are competing for space in a valuablecontribution tothedebateonhow should bealwaysencouragedtoutilizeless a stateseek toimpose suchadrastic limitatio the marketplace ofideas andimpor The purposeofthiscase-studywasnottoappeal The Israeliexample ofdisqualifyinglistsand other jurisdictionsbuttakingin has infact thesame meaning as eir ownalternativesolutionswhic thefutureifpartyadju tance ofpoliticalspeech inge restrictive measures andsoftersolutions. elections, thedisqualificationoflistsandparties 177

practice onthe prohibition of politicalpartiesat The decisiontobanapartyfrom theKnesset game andcannotbetoleratedtoanunlimited asystem leaves political e case-study revealsthat militant democracy e comparative constitutional argument isthat apolitical arena. While theinstitutional and itsleaders thatpractices,speeches,and tosituations whereallegedlyreact dangerous n onpoliticalpartiesas analyzed, andusedasareferencepointfor parties from participating in elections is forashifttotheIs to accountthelocalconditions. sts itspoliciesandagendasso dissolutionof neral. Therefore, every time h seem tofitbettertheir partieswithachance theirdissolutionit raeli practice.This political party, CEU eTD Collection in ordertoscreenthos the preventive natureof themilitant democracy the requirement imposed bythe future interpretation andapplication of themilitant democracy principle. Theinterpretation of provisions sincethe1970s,but Constitutional Courthas become lessstrict party inthe1950sandlevelofthreat prohibition oftheCommunistPart worldwide. for thecurrent chapter andtheoverallexperience of theapplication of militant democracy the Australiangovernmentis ofamilitant demo legislative premises asthefirstGerman part democracy stateandthecaseof but inrelation todifferent enemy: communism. Au in theaftermath oftheSecondWorld War. TheAu However, theGerman FederalConstitutionalCour example of judicial intervention tothebusinessof thepreservation of constitutional security. militant democracy principle provided constitu cautious implementation of theconcept of militant democracy. Thefirst occasion toapplythe the judiciarytostandforc political background,canproducedifferentresults application isacomplicated andburdensome exerciseand, depending onthecontext and However, the second judgment of the Federal Constitutional Courtof Germany onthe Thus, theSocialistReichPartycasefrom Ge e enteringcivilservice (so-called du onstitutional democracy, andpres CommunistParty Dissolution Actwasnotbasedonthesame free democratic basicorderon the CommunistPartycasehad y isharder toreconcile w 178

posed fordemocracyinGermany. TheFederal y prohibitioncase.Thejustificationinvokedby notionwererevivedandwidelyappliedlater tional theory andpractice with arespectable in itsenforcement of militant democracy cracy natureandthereforeitisof relevance t wasnottheonlyonecapableofdoingthis for thestabilityandhealthofdemocracy. stralian judiciaryfacedquiteasimilar task, stralia does notconsider itself asmilitant rmany demonstrates thegeneralabilityof ty ofloyalty).Themost recent ith thepositionofCommunist political actorsandespecially erve itthroughcarefuland considerable impactonthe CEU eTD Collection prepared to reactin case afragile regime is the transitiongrantedmorec It appears that thepresence of militant democracy provisions inconstitutional orders during assessed thepossibledangerofil returning to the states’ structures. Atthe same by theexperienceoftotalitarianways established bytheECHRandCouncilofEurope. measures inrelation toparty closure, most of measures onlyinextreme situations. Astothenational practiceof militant democracy ban/dissolve politicalparties.However,states states inorder toprevent harm totheestablished order, including thepossibility to which ingeneralsupportsthepos dangerous ideasandideologiesfordemocrac opening afreemarketplace ofideas whichis capa approach to theissueof howademocracyshoul manner of itsapplication andinterpretation. Fi attempts todamage theexisting constitutional order. that itwillnotbeeasytodeclarepolitical this statement andtheNDPcaseshouldbeconsid effective safeguard againstundemo some commentators to conclude that concept of development in themilitant democracy jurispru The inclusion of militant democracy measures in constitutional regimes wasdictated The case-study of militant democracy inEuropereveals some specific features inthe onfidence tothegovernment andtheyfeltmore secureand liberal policiesin sibility ofpreventiveactions cratic politicalpart governance inthepastandfearofcommunists governance 179

beingattackedbyradi party unconstitutional unless thereare serious y. The ECHR has adevelopedbodyofcase-law y. TheECHRhas thepost-communist states follow the standards are allowedutilizing such radical and drastic dence inGermany –theNDPpartycaseled rst of all, there is time, allpost-communist states adequately militant democracy iswithering awayasan ble ofneutralizing extremist andallegedly suppressing ofallege d respond toattempts to threaten it:by ered ratherasasignaltothegovernment ies. However,Iwouldnotagreewith tobetakenbydemocratic a clearcommon European cals andextremists. The dly dangerousideas. CEU eTD Collection parties bythecurrent legislation andhis Medvdev expressedhisconcernabouttheburde a tinyhopefortheimprovement ofthesitu status quointerms ofpoliticalcompetitioncont insists onvery strictguardianship over thepolitical space with thepurpose topreserve the without amandatoryprocedureofstateregistration. Atthisstage,theRussiangovernment without gettinganypermission from theState, While theofficial positionoftheStateisth Political Partiesimposes additionalcontent-base overcome viathe fulfillment political partyistruly challe democracy: thepoliticalspaceisextremely hard and functioningofpoliticalpar European space. TheRussianlegislative regime regulating theprocedureofestablishing exception ofTurkey). character ofpartyclosure a democracies havelearntlessonsfrom the corrected bythenationalconstitutionalc in theprocessoftransitionandthatitwasa stands nowdoesnotallow concludingthatmilit some instances of misapplication of thedoctrin political debateaslongallplayersfollowth militancy ofthe post-communist constitutional regi The situationlooksverydifferentinRu nd donotutilizethismeasur nging. Difficulties inestablishi of organizationalrequirement ties is very troubling from theperspectives of liberal ourts, orlaterbytheECHR.YoungEuropean 180

warning wasfollowed by theenactment ofa bused. In most ofthecases inaccuracies were e establishedrulesofthegame. Whilethereare Strasbourg jurisprudenceontheexceptional at politicalpartiescanbeformed freelyand in realitypartiescanno ation asin2008Russi e inpost-communiststat d restrictionsonparty ent andlistofparticip ant democracy wasnotneededtobe present ssia, another post-communism stateinthe ssia, anotherpost-communism toenterandtheprocedureestablish a nsome requirements imposed onpolitical mes allows everyonetoparticipatein the e onaregular basis (with the s onlyastheFederalLawon ng politicalparties cannotbe t pursuethei programs andagendas. ants. Thereishowever an PresidentDmitry es, thesituation asit r activities CEU eTD Collection situations inotherjurisdictionswhile comparing differentapproaches and usethemasareferencepointforsolving similar provisions onprohibitionofpoliticalpartiesbut to theirlocalcircumstances. Thecase-study didnotappealtogiveupthelegislative of Israeldemonstrates thepossibilityof seekingalternative solutions whichseem tofit better movements withoutresortingtotheprohibitionofpoliticalpart one ofthepossibleresponsestothreat Indian solution ontheregulationof politicalparties’ activities deserves tobeconsideredas debate on militant democracy, itslegitimacy, an democracy rationaltoprotectthedomi through draconianlimitation imposed onpoli government willtake more seriousstepstoslowdownitsaggressive protection ofdemocracy grounds toexpectfurtherchangesinthe light oftherecentECHRjudgment ontheRepub legislative amendments decreasingtheminimum Examples from IndiaandIsraelarebeliev taking intoaccount nant positionof 181

coming from allegedlydangerouspolitical regulatory regime. H lican Partyof Russiavcasethere are d itslimits. Despite somecomplexities, the tical parties andwillstopusingmilitant membership requirements. Moreover, inthe rathertothinkabouttheusefulnessof ed tobeavaluable the rulingparty. the localconditions. ies. Furthermore, theexample opefully, theRussian contributiontothe CEU eTD Collection militant democracylogic applicationand more freedoms tosuppressedgroups. the Russiancase,andifitis cap communities. ThisRussiancase-study willinves there isahiddengovernmental agendatoelim Russia’s chaotic policies inrelationtoforeign religious movements givetheimpression that approach tolimit sometimes trulyarbitraryre implementation suggeststhattheRussiangove the alleged needtoprotectdemocracy.Th suppressing non-traditionalreligio from theperspectiveof militant democracy as democracy canguidethesepol the threat of religious extremism areconsistent democracy. Thepurposeofthischapteristoinve allegedly dangerous movements withareligi jurisdictions, Russia,Turkey, andtheECHR establish totalitarianideologylikefundamenta militant democracy can be used toneutraliz This chapter presents the case-studies ofthreeju Introduction Thereafter, I willcontinue w The surveybeginswiththeRussiancase-st MILITANT

DEMOCRACY itics moresuccessfully. able ofmaking theStaterecons us movements, andthepolicyofsuppressionisdrivenby ith theexample ofTurkeyto present an analysis ofthe CHAPTER AND 182

strictions imposed oncertainreligiousgroups. e movements thatusedemocratic means to list coercivereligion.Inwhatfollowsthree withtherules of democracy andif militant ous agendathroughthe lensesof militant Russian authoritiesare actively involved in interpretation asinvoked toguard the will beassessed intheir politics towards stigate towhatextendpolicies inaddressing risdictions totestoneofmy argumentsthat e analysisofthelegislationandlaw- inate the presence of all foreign religious inate thepresenceofallforeignreligious

tigate if militant democracy isrelevant for RELIGIOUS udy. Thiscaseisimportant tobediscussed rnment urgentlyneedstoreconsiderits

4:

EXTREMISM ider itsapproachto secure

CEU eTD Collection under theprevious Constitution and18 with theprohibition of political parties: the Turkish Constitutional C 471 470 fundamentalist andextremist religiousmovements, the democracy might facein combating th issues andproblems. Thirdly,th institution hasproduced asubstantialbodyof democracies whichtheymust followandabide guidance onparticularlegalissuesaregiven international courtwithbinding aspect Iwouldlike toexplore inordertotest Finally, Turkeyrepresentsafascinatingcase-study fortheheadscarfbanandthisisanother the HEPParty,andAKParty)canbecome a clearly demonstrates thatevenpartieswithsubstantialpopular support (i.e.theRefahPartisi, democracy ispotentiallydanger addition, Turkeyrepresents aninteresting example toelaborateonastatement thatmilitant militant democracy showssignsofitsextensio the principleofsecularity.The constitutionally protectedprinciples of theindivisible andterritorial integrity of the State or of therulings onpoliticalparties’ dissoluti some elements of militant democracy. for afewofreasons. Firstofall,both recen constitutionally proclaimed principleofsecularism. Thiscase-studyisofparticularinterest in Thiel, Thiel, in Ozbudun, in Ozbudun, Fora detailed account of militant democracy-type cons The ECHRisincludedinthiscase-studyfor supra note 21, at 263-310. at263-310. 21, note supra note 52, at 126.

judgments for47stateswhichm is jurisdictiondemonstratesmany andchallenges difficulties latter isanexcellentopportun ous mainly for minority parties asthe Turkishexample under thecurrentConstitution of1982. 470 Second,thecountryhas t Turkish Constitutions of1961 and1982include thehypothesisofmilitant democracyextension. 183

on werebasedthealle n beyondits traditionalareaofapplication.In to theconsiderable am the case-lawonmilitant the democracy related titutional provisions in TurkeyseeBertilEmrah Oder, by. Secondly, in last couple of decades this by. Secondly,inlastcoupleofdecadesthis e alleged threatcoming fromgrowing andhowdifficultthetasktoaddressthese target ofthepartydissolutionprocedure. various reasons.Firstofall,itisan ity totestmy hypothesisthat eans that at least the general eans thatatleast thegeneral considerable experience ourt dissolvesixparties ount oftheEuropean ged violation of the ged violationofthe 471 Third,most CEU eTD Collection 473 472 tradition toprovidedetailsin regulation of thefreedom of religionclause istotally in compliance withRussianlegal 28) constitution, theConstitutionof applicable tothereligiousgroupsaswell. provisions ontheprinciplesandrulestobe democracy perspectivewasalreadyintroducedin The generalsystem of protection of theRussianconstitutionalsyst Regime 4.1.1. 4.1. Russia:GuardingthePerimeterfrom depending onwhichpoliticalideologyor Court’s jurisprudencemight potentially reveal inconsistencies in itslineof reasoning of theCourtonArticle9.Theplacement ofthes ban isalsoextendedandassessedfrom thepr context ofpreviouslydecidedca cases astheTurkishone. However,itincludesan case-study on militant democracy inthepractice happens inthecourtroom whenreligionis meaningrule onthecontentand threats iswhile remaining true to democracy. and disseminate religious and other views and act according to them.” profess individually or together with others any religion or The Russian Federation is a secular state. No is state.No religio a secular Federation Russian The “Everyone shall beguaranteed the freedom ofconsci 472 andtheprincipleofseparation

Freedom

of

Religion aseparatefederallaw.

Russiaproclaims freedom ofre

ses oninvoluntarypartydissolu in of ‘freedom of religion,’ soitisfascinating tosee what

Russia: religion isattachedtothecase. of stateandreligion(Article14). accused ofbeing dangerousfordemocracy. The 184

observed bythedifferent Moreover, theCourthad n maybe established as astate or obligatory one.” An In addition,asanymodern-type democratic inciples establishedbypreviousjurisprudence anyForeignReligiousInterference? ence, the freedom of religion, including the right to to the right including religion, ence, the freedom of to profess no religion at all, to freely choose, possess possess choose, atall,to freely no religion to profess

alysis ofthepartyprohibitionplacedin Overview of theECHRisbasedon asimilar typeof thepreviouschapter.Theconstitutional e issuesintothebroader contextofthe

of ligion and conscience (Article tion. Theissueofaheadscarf

the Existing numerous occasions to em from themilitant associations arefully 473

Regulatory Thefurther

CEU eTD Collection Journal for the Study if Religions and Ideologies 118 (2004). at while. President Yeltsin didnotsigntheamendments andtheidea toamend thelawwasleft for a Conscience toimpose restrictionson“non-traditional” religious As earlyas1993PatriarchAlek proclaiming total freedom ofreligion.” 480 479 478 477 476 475 474 amendments inthelegislative re activities of“non-traditional” “invasion” offoreignfaithsandpeoplesthatth Orthodox Church“demandednothingelsethanst groups. “compete” againstother religiousgroupsinth Russian OrthodoxChurchasitcomplicateditsprimary objectiv Russia.” discrimination andafoundationforreligiousliber Organisations InthewakeofcollapseSovi two statutespassed (1994). (1994). Conference on Pending Russian Legislation Restricting Religious Liberty chives/2008/3/2Blitt.FIN.pdf http://lawreview.byu.edu/ar University Law Review 719 (2009).Available online at http://bestpravo.ru/ussr/data01/tex10709.htm Blitt, For details seee.g. Cole W. Durham (Ed.), Ibid., at 724. Ibid., at 720. C.Blitt, Robert Marina Gaskova, Law on Freedom ofConscience and Religious Associations (1990) 479 supra at731. note 476, 477 475 Nevertheless,theRussian Inthefaceofliberal1990legisl Theformer hasbeendescribedasgo 474 How to Entrench a de facto State Ch andOnFreedomofWorship The Role of the Russian Orthodox Church in Shaping the Political Culture Russia of Culture Political the in Shaping Church Orthodox Russian the Role of The in 1990:thelaws

religions andultimately itledto gime regulatingreligiousfreedom. sey IIrequestedtheamending Orthodox Churchcontinuedits The Future if religious Liberty in Russia: Report of the De Burght De the Burght of Report Russia: Liberty in ifreligious Future The . 476 On FreedomofConscienceandonReligious However,thelawwasnotwelcomed bythe 185

urch in Russia: A Progress Russia: in in Guide urch . e “freemarketplace” ofideas nowopentoall reatened thefabricofRussiansociety.” et Unionreligiousfree . Thelaws“establishedreligiousnon- ation onreligiousfreedom theRussian ty andseparationof ate protectionagainstwhatittermed as ing “beyondeveryone’sexpectationsin . Text of the Law in Russian is available isavailable the Law inText of Russian , 8 Emory, 8 International Law Review 1 of theLaw OnFreedom of thesubstantivelegislative 480 es anditwa organizations, however,

dom wasregulatedby effort torestrictthe church andstatein , 3Brigham Young s forcedto 478 , 7

CEU eTD Collection 486 485 484 483 482 481 the factofexistenceforaperiod ofnoless than15years losetheirrightto“produce, entities withunequalamountsofrights.” freedom toeveryone. ofreligion defence andsecurityofthestate.” constitutional order,morals, unlimited rightanditmightberestrictedincase for thepurposesofthislaw.Thelawalsore requirements thereligious groupshave tomeet toberecognized asalegitimate legal person addition, itprovidesdetailedguidanceonregi disseminate religious convictions, andac granted toboth citizens andlegalaliens), to 1997 Law)ingeneralrecognizestherighttochoose orchangereligion that iswritten before.” “openly anti-constitutional, wittingly discrimina before thelaw,furtherprovisionsofnew Constitution ontheseparationof ChurchandState,equalityof religiousassociation Conscience.” rights defendersclaimed that Russian”. See e.g. Krasikov, Law The of Religious Avineri, &,Shlomo Sajo Andras Only those religious organizations which “operated on a legal basis” 50 years ago can beconsidered “all- Article 3(2). Article 3(1). Ibid., at 153. Anatoly Andreevich Krasikov, Federal Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations. However, the1997Lawignoresprovisi In October1997,anewlawcame intoforceinRussia. The 1997FederalLawontheFreedomofCons 482 While thefirst articles of the law reproduce theprovisions of the 483 supra

note 482, at 153. at153. note 482,

this legislativeactcouldbe Church-State Relations in Russia: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow health, rightsandlegitimate in “First, itintroducedretroactiv 485

486 t inaccordance with those convictions. Second, thoseassociati 186

Identity. Models for Post-Communism 153 (1999). 153 Post-Communism for Models Identity. believe individuallyorwithothers,haveand cognizes that“freedom tory provisions, practically cancelling outall there isanecessityto legislative actcontainsawholeseriousof stration issuesandimposesanumber of ons oftheConstitutionwhichguarantees cience andReligiousAssociations(the cience entitled asLaw“Onfreedom 481 ely variouscategoriesoflegal terests ofothers,ensurethe Some ofthe Russianhuman ons thatcouldnotprove protect thebasisof of religionisnotan freely (therightis 484 from In , in , in

CEU eTD Collection http://archive.kremlin.ru/text/docs/2009/05/216229.shtml at Russian in online available Security Concept, National Russian adopted butthemere ideaofsuchle of theDumaof theBelgorodregion). Itis distributing religiousliterature 2011 theamendments tobaneveryoneexceptforregisteredreligiousorganizationsfrom Law isoftendiscussedandtherewerenumerous 492 491 490 489 488 487 mentions thatoneofthewaystoensureth national securityatleastfrom asearly2000. extremism. Thepresenceoffo presence ofanti-terrorismandanti-extremis or evenlegislatively therights guaranteeing “theOrthodox Churchamost favoured Christianity initsOrthodoxtraditions aspl them. professional work,includingpreachingandrelig media.” mass eligible to“create cultural-educational organiza materials and otherobjectsofreligiouspurposes.” acquire, export,import, anddi http://www.russiaeurope.mid www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=1555. Restrictions? Seeforexample Russian Federation NationalS seee.g.Felix Corley, Fordetails Ibid.. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. 489 The regulatoryregime offreedom ofrelig Theoverallnatureandimpactofth Publication by F18News from 24March 2011, available at 488 Moreover, eventhe right to“invite .ru/russiastrat2000.html

wasproposed and submitted totheStateDuma (aninitiative of otherreligiouscommunities.” Russia: Will Duma approve ‘anti-Constitutional” Religious Literature Literature Religious ‘anti-Constitutional” WillDuma approve Russia: reign religious groups was considered asathreattothe reign religiousgroupswasconsidered stribute religious literature gislative initiativeisalreadytroubling. . Similar provisions can be found in the updated 2009 2009 updated the in found be can provisions . Similar e national security is “by opposing the negative e nationalsecurityis“byopposingthenegative unlikely atthemoment thatamendment willbe 187

492 . t legislation applied to suppress religious t legislationappliedtosuppressreligious tions, educationalinstitu attempts toamend it.Forexample, inMarch aying theroleofofficialideology and The 487 e lawcouldbedescribedasendorsing ion in Russia is also supplemented by the ion inRussiaisalsosupplemented bythe ecurity Concept (2000), ious activities”was takenawayfrom Furthermore, suchorganizationsarenot statues, whilelimiting administratively Concept ofNationalSecurityRussia foreign citizensw or printed,audio,andvideo 490 Russia’s1997Religion tions, ortoestablish 491 available onlineat

ith the goal of

CEU eTD Collection 494 493 religions notlistedintheseprovisions.Inreality easy toseehowtheseprovisionshavebeen exactly byinsertingtheseprovisionstothepr country’s historicalheritage.Itisnoteasyto Islam, Buddhism, Judaism, andotherreligions formation and development of itsspirituality andculture, andacknowledges Christianity, Law recognizesthespecialroleofOrthodo privileges giventoanyparticularreligious considered tobe‘foreign’andther Security Conceptwhichleadtodiscrimina the governmental agenciesappliedinline policies inRussia.Thisargument couldbes traditional religions inRussia.Theformer areth discussed withinthedomain ofreligious However, thereligiouscomponent istakenaway Russia thereis aform ofreligious extremis officials but bythe Russian academia aswell. of people,butto national security aswe Orthodox religionsareconsidered influence offoreignreligious Religioznyh Organizacij v Rossijskoj Federacii. the context of national security andpublic order debate. Forexample,one commentary onregistration of religious associations presents the registration procedure in Ibid. The Russian Federationisdeclaredby lawa

organisations andmissionaries.” efore unwantedintheRussian space. as potentiallyposingathreat Nauchno-Prakticheskij denomination. However,thepreamble ofthe1997 ll. This position issupportednotonly byState upported bytheregulatoryregimeof andpractice 188

extremism whichismainly aboutforeignv. assessnowwhatthedraf with theRussianFederation’s2009National m bombing airports,metr See e.g.O.N. Petjukova, Gosudarstvennaja Registracija tory treatmentofvariousreligiousgroups eamble ofthe1997Law,however,itisvery interpreted andwhatimpact theyhaveon 494 it ledtothecreation of thespecial regulatory e most frequent targets of theanti-extremist x ChurchinthehistoryofRussiaand , as constituting an integral part of the , asconstitutinganintegralpartofthe bythestatesinthosesituations;itisnot Thesituationisqu secular state with no dominant religion or secular statewithnodominant religionor Kommentarij (2007). 493 not onlytohealthandminds Asaresult,allnon-Russian ters ofthelawmeant ite paradoxicalasin o andtrainstations. CEU eTD Collection (Church and state inSoviettimes); Krasikov, 168 (Soviet period), 168-174 (cover period from 1990 until 1999). 1999). until 1990 fromperiod (cover 168-174 period), (Soviet 168 497 496 495 group complaints ofitsmembers. the allegedviolationofentity’sright does nothaveastandingincourtastheeyes be providedforusebysuchagroupitsmembers.” privileges andthepremises andpropertyrequire public schools,hospitals,andthearmed fo letters toforeigners,cannotpubl authorities effectivelymeans th worships and teachreligion toitsmembers. Thef further transformationintoareligiousorgani legal entity”. without theregistrationwithth set upwiththeobjective of jointprofession a category isaccordeddifferent lega religious communities: groups,localorganizat impact onthe freedom ofreligion exercise. The registration anditmight becons I havealreadymentioned thatthe1997Lawes Registration discriminating ofallothers. regime for those religionsandeffectivelyestablishingprivilegedtreatment forthem andthe Ibid. Ibid. Article 7. and church of history overall Forthe The most basic unitisa“religiousgroup” wh

of 496

Religious The1997Lawsuggeststhatsuchgroups

Groups: 495

e stateauthoritiesandwithout at itcannotopenba idered as oneof the legal co ish anddistributeliterature, l status,rights,andprivileges.

Problems state relations in seee.g.Blitt, in Russia state relations supra s canbe accommodatedonlythroughindividualor note 482, at 154-160 (period early20 until (period at 154-160 482, note 189

zation. Religiousgroupsareallowedtoconduct and nd dissemination offaith, rces. Inaddition,“itcannotenjoyanytax rces. oflawitdoesnotexis d fortheactivitiesofreligiousgroupshall law hascreatedthreedifferent categories of act thatthegroupisnot ions, andcentralizedorganizations. Each

Concerns tablished theregime nk account,ownproper ich isa“voluntary association ofcitizens 497 Needlestosaythatareligiousgroup arecreatedwiththeintentionof

nstructions havi and cannotconductservicesin the acquisitionofcapacitya supra t asalegalpersonand carrying itsactivities of religiousgroups’ registered withstate note 476, at 710-718 at 710-718 476, note ty, issueinvitation ng considerable th century), 161- century), CEU eTD Collection on freedom ofreligion. the attentionofECHRwhichruledinOc challenges for non-traditionalRu group toreligiousorganization.Th cause many complications thesame cannotbe category oflocalreligio the words“Russia”or“Russian”intheiroffi centralized organizations thathaveexistedfor can beregistered bycombining atleast thre to conductworshipserviceatthosepremises. foreign guestsaswellpublishliterature,and and isentitledtohaveprope or isabranchofcentralizedorganization.Lo by law:hasatleast10citizenme which shouldberegisteredwithstateauthorities 499 498 territory ofRussia.Forexample, theimmigra activities ofthosegrou regulatory regime onreligious communities inRussia.However,some aspectsof the for decades(i.e.Jehovah Witnesses). causes labelingas“newreligions”eventhose Kimlya and Others v.Russia (2009), Applications No. 76836/01, 32782/03. Article indetail 8. Regulated The thirdcategoryintroduced The nextcategorycreatedbythe1997Law Registration ofthereligiousorganization 499 ps might beaffectedbyotherlawsandregulationseffectiveonthe us organizationtoacategoryof centralized organizationdoesnot Thefifteenyearsrequirement ofpr

rty, bankaccounts,hasstanding ssian religiousgroupsandthis mbers, hasexistedasareligious groupforatleast15years e fifteenyearsrequirement seems tobeoneofthebiggest by the lawis“centralised religious organisation” which 190

tober 2009thatitviolatestheECHRprovisions tion policymight limit theimportant aspectof cial name. Whilethetransformationfrom the e localorganizationsof thesame faith.The cal religiousassociationpossessalegalstatus more thanfiftyyearsenjoyaprivilegetouse groups whichexistedelsewhereintheworld visit statehospitals,school,andarmed-forces said abouttransformati incaseitmeets therequirements established is probablythemajor component ofthe is a“localreligiousorganisation” esence intheterritory of Russia matter wasevenbroughtto in acourtroom, caninvite on fromthereligious 498

CEU eTD Collection Impact 4.1.2. purposes. groups incasetheywanttoconstructabuildingorgetpe local authorities onsuch matters very ofte citizens andpublicassociations lands andbuilding permits). While these norms areofgeneraluseandapplicabletoall 501 500 to thedatacollectedbydi i.e. Tuva,Kalmikiya andBuryatiya) there areabout onemillion Buddhists(coming from traditionally Buddhist regions of Russia million and23million (mainly populatingtheNorth Church. Thelargestreligiousminority isMuslims withapopulationestimated between10 of 142)whoidentifythemselves withthebiggestandmostinfluentialRussianOrthodox religious groupssources,international reporters numbers oftheiradherents,butfrom thedata Unfortunately thereisno singleset of reliabl Religious arrangements. foreign religiousworkersand in casetheyholdbusinessorhumanitarian visas. Church. Thevisaregulationallowsforeigners certain religious communities’ activities, i.e. on November 17, 2010, also available online at Novemberalso availableonline on 17,2010, Church. the Unification missionaryfor and member Mr. to stayNolan, of visa of of long termination

Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour International Religious Freedom Report 2010. Published Published 2010. Report Freedom Religious International and Labour Rights Human Democracy, of Bureau Seeforexample ECHR judgment onNolan and K. v. Russia (2009), Application No. 2512/04 concerning

Foreign of Demography theRegulatory 500

Anotheraspectofaregulatoryregime Religious

in

Russia

and Regime Movements fferent NGOs,Protestantsform thesecondlargestgroup of

, theconsiderabledegreeof discretionarypow imposes additionalfinancial 501

http://www.state.gov/g/dr between 250,000 and onemillionbetween 250,000and Jews.According Practice

and n imposeunjustifiedlimits onminor religious 191

e statisticsonreligiousdenominations andthe to spendonly90outof missionaries from foreign members ofthe collected from thegovernment, polling, and

estimate that about100 million citizens(out the Nodoubtitsubstantially on Caucasus regionsof Russia).Inaddition, Fear non is access toplacesofworship(i.e. is access

of ­ Orthodox l/rls/irf/2010/148977.htm

Religious rmit tousethelandforsuch burden connectedtotravel 180 daysinthecountry

Religions

affectstheworkof Extremism: ers givento .

The

CEU eTD Collection proclaimed equalityofallre demonstrates thatitmight become apowerfulreferencepoint insome instances.Despite the Law isonly anintroduction tothe lawitisstillapart of itandthe Russianexperience conflicts, disagreements, andpotentially,discrimination. Whilethepreamble ofthe1997 of givingaspecialstatustoanygroup(beitre comprised from multiple anddiverse ethnic,relig would bethepreamble ofthe1997Lawitself.ItisawellknownfactthatRussiansociety manner someprovisionsofhow the regulatory agencies (i.e. interpretation of theconstitutional equality clause if wetake acloser look atthe practice of protection from thelaw.However, situationdo religions, religiousgroups,andbe equality ofreligiousassociationsbeforethe Article 4the secularcharacter of the State(and reaffirms theConstitutional provision) and The 1997FederalLawontheFreedom ofConscien Equality denominations. Jewish (286),OrthodoxOldBelievers(283), Russian Orthodox(12,586),Muslim (3,815),Protes religious organizationsandaccording to2008da (most ofwhom arenot Roman Catholic Churchclaims tohavea Christians withanestimated twomillion adherents and 3,500 registered organizations. The The startingpointtoassessifdifferentre As ofJanuary2010theRussianMinistryJusticereportstohaveregistered23,494

of

Religions:

Is ethnicRussians).

Everybody responsible forregistrationof ligions, therecognition ofthe the 1997Lawareinterpretedand

Welcome? bout 600,000Catholicsonth 192

law. Basically, thelatter wouldmean thatall Catholics(240),Buddhi lievers are entitled toequal treatment and

ligious orethnic)might become of asource ligious groupsaretrea ious andculturalgroups, thereforethe issue ta thesegroups aredistributed as follows: es notlook exactly inconformity withthis ce andReligiousAssoci tant (3,410),Jehovah’sWitnesses (402), religious associations)andthe special roleoftheOrthodox applied bystateofficials. ted equallyinRussia e territoryofRussia st (200),andother ations declaresin CEU eTD Collection Konfessij na Zakonodatel'nom Urovne, available online at center.ru/religion/news/authorities/legal-regulation/2004/03/d2017/ 504 regulation/2004/04/d2094/ 503 center.ru/religion/news/authorities/legal-regulation/2003/01/d78/ 502 registration procedure established for religious before thelawandequalprot not easytosquarewith thegeneral declaration of theequalityof allreligious associations leaders ofthosedenominations. traditional religions astheStatehasanobligation tofindproperforms ofsupportforreligious 2004 PresidentPutinexpressedhissupportto Efremov, butalsotherearecalls the 1997Law isnotonlybeingpromoted throughstatementssimilar totheoneofMr. existence of anyotherisnotpossible”. statement that “thereareonly fourtraditiona Executive Secretary ofthecommission Mr. Efre established withintheState Duma (low that in2003acommission insupportofvalu indirectly promotes theprivilegedpositionof list tocitethem all.Inordertogiveso occasions on whichthisinterpretation waspromoted bystateofficials accord higher levelofprotection and respect tothese fourreligions. Thereare multiple of thehistoricalheritageRussianpeople couldbepotentiallyinterpretedinawayto Church inthehistoryofRussiaandnaming onlyf Rossii..." available online at Komissii Oleg Efremov: "Est' Chetyre Tradicionnyh Verovanija, i Nikakih Drugih ne Mozhet Prosto Byt' dlja "Tradicionnyh Religioznyh Obshin", available online at online available Obshin", Religioznyh "Tradicionnyh SeeCenter for Information and Analysis “SOVA”, SeeCenter for Information and Analysis “SOVA”, Ispolnitel'nyj Sekretar' Obwestvennoj Deputatskoj See for details Center for Information and Analysis The nextaspectcasting ashadow onthe . ection acco

504 toenactalawsupportsuch The statements ofdiffere ofthestate officials me examples onhowthepreambleof1997Law 503 er chamberoftheRussianParliament). rded tothem. The special status off status Thespecial 193

http://www.sova-center.ru/relig some religions it would be worthwhile to note some religionsitwouldbeworthwhiletonote l religiousdenominations communities. Thefifteen yearrequirement is “SOVA”, Parlamentarii Namere V.Putin Vyskazalsjav Podderzhku "Tradicionnyh" our religionsasconstitu es promoted bytraditionalreligionswas mov repeatedondifferentoccasionsthe the proposedlegisla . equality of religions . religions.Forexample, in our religionsmentioned in and itwillmake along ion/news/authorities/legal- tion onsupportof inRussia, andthe ting anintegralpart ny Otstaivat' Interesy principle is the principleisthe http://www.sova- http://www.sova- 502 nt levelsis Later,the CEU eTD Collection potentially seriousscrutiny ofth connected tothelengthof significant roleinsocietywas Therefore, theattempt oftheRussianlegislator 505 year rule”.The Governmentdidnotofferany that didnotform partofastrictlyhierarchical religious organisation.Itapp show either theirpresence inagivenRussianregionortheir affiliation withacentralised provision of theReligionsActonlytargetedbase provisions onfreedom ofasso found the15yearrequirement aviolationof to theECHR. religious associations).The group was rejectedbytheJusticeDepa of theChurchScientology) 15 years.Themembers ofthisgroupopenedthe religious association was thefactthatthey have registration. Themajor groundto evident examplewouldbethebattleof presence ontheterritoryofonlyRussiamatters decades (i.e.Jehovah’sWitnesses orChurchof used tolabelasa“newreligion”eventhosegroupsthatexistinothercountriesforfew Kimlya and Others v. Russia, para. 101. Another burdenimposed onreligiousgroups In October2009theStrasbourgCourtruledin ears thereforethatonlythose

presence ofthegroupinaparticularregion,butinvolves found illegitimate anddiscrimi ciation andreligion.TheCourt in 1994andnotsurprisingly exhausted alldomestic remedies andlaterfiled a complaint rtment (responsible atthemate e internalstructure,objectives, andtasksofitsactivities. reject theapplica 194

justification for suchdifferential treatment.” churchstructure wereaffectedbythe“fifteen- theEuropeanConventiononHuman Rights’ tokeepnewreligiousaway from playingany existed in the territory of Russiafor less than Church of Scientology over denial of its Church ofScientologyoverdenialits Scientology). For theRussiancontext the forthepurposesofregistration.The most first centreforstudyofDianetics(thecreed -level religiouscommunities thatcouldnot favoroftheChurchScientologyand tion toregisterthiscommunity asa by theregistrationprocedureisnot newly emerging religiousgroups nating towardssuchgroups. the applicationlodgedin2000 pointed outthat“contested rial time forregistrationof 505

CEU eTD Collection promote. religions, andhavingcertainideasintheirmi powerful weaponinthehandsofauthorities,and organization withtheConstitution andlegisla Needless to saythatthe procedure tocheck th 507 506 registration and/orcredibilityof fully itsrights.Incasethereareanydoubtson a screening procedurebeforeitcan getthestat their activitiesof anewlyestablished religious might beconcludedthatthereligiousviewsan Constitution oftheRussianFederationandlawsFederation.Therefore,it authorities toseeif theobjectivesand activitie submit allthe requiredpapers and notify theauthorities of the attempt tobe registered. financial resources;andotherpr organisation, itsbodiesofmanagement, proce and basicforms ofactivity;procedureforesta “the name, location,typeofreligiousorganisa authorities mustprovideso-calledcharterof Along withotherpapersanddoc The procedure is regulated by the Governmental Decree of 1998. Article 10 of the Federal Law on the Freedom ofConscience and Religious Organizations (1997). The charterofareligious associationwill

itsreligious doctrine, additi operty oforganisation,etc.” uments thereligiouscommunity 195

blishment andcessationof areligiousorganizati s ofareligiousorganizationruncountertothe tion andfaithdenominati communities (for Russia)willbesubjectedto nds onwhatkindofvaluesreligionsshould d thewaythey seeitappropriate to organize dure forformation andcompetence thereof; e compatibility of the charter of areligious tion of theRussianFederation could bea us ofareligiousorganizationandexercise thereligiousnatureofgroupseeking officials sticktotheideaoffourtraditional beassessedfurther bythe registration onal expertisecanbearranged.

506 However,itisnotenoughto seekingregi on whichmust include: on; objectives,tasks activity; structure of stration with 507

CEU eTD Collection Interference? procedure see Chapter 3.4, at 141. 510 509 508 the committing of depraved andother disorderly actsinconnection withreligiousactivities; or healthof citizens,includingbymeans orps ofnarcotic freedoms ofcitizens;infliction -coercionintodestroyingafamily unit; extremist activities; association might facethedissolution. Those bodies oflocaladministration.” “prosecutor’s body,federalbodyofstateregistration the dissolutionofreligiousassociationisgiven Russian Constitution, 1997otherrelevantlegislative provisions. Law,and Theright toseek Moreover, theassociationcanbebannedonly religious associationsisthat association arelistedinArtic associations existingwithinRussia). organizations (whichisingeneralcompatiblewiththesame possibility Law alsomentions thepossibility to ban already existing and registered religious not theonlylegislativeconstraintsimposedon The procedureofregistrationand Banning Conscience (1990) (see text of the previous Law at Article (2) 14 the of Federal Freedom Lawon Conscienceof Religiousand Organizations (1997). much wider for example, listis than, The incaseof The procedure to ban existing religious organization - Thebreachofpublicsecurityandorder;actionsaimedengagingin at However, themost worryinginthisproce

of

Religious

510

Associations involuntarydissolutioncanoccuronlythroughcourtprocedure. le 14ofthe1997Law.Thefirst

509 harm, established inaccordance withthe law,onthe morals

a priori

as 508 a Theprocedureandgroundstobanareligious privileged position granted to certain religions are Tool http://bestpravo.ru/ussr/data01/tex10709.htm 196

are listedinArticle14(2) and include: banning a political party. For details on party dissolution dissolution party on Fordetails party. apolitical banning

non-traditional religions to was not present in the previous Law Freedom of on inthe previous present was not dure is the list of grounds on which religious dure isthelistofgroundsonwhichreligious infringement ofthepersonality,rightsand to quite a wide range of state officials: the to quiteawiderangeofstateofficials:

for repeated and gross violations of the for repeatedandgrossviolationsofthe Guard or territorialagencies

the ychoactive substances,hypnosis, procedural guaranteegrantedto

Perimeter inRussia.The1997 for allothertypesof

from thereof, as well as thereof,aswell

). any

Foreign

CEU eTD Collection duties establishedbylawortocommitotherdisorderlyacts. force or commission ofotherdisorderly acts; incitingcitizens torefuse tofulfill theircivil harm tolife, health, property, if the threat religious association;hi a religiousassociationandotherpersonsintoalienatingtheirpropertyfor thebenefit ofthe 514 513 512 511 the association’sdissoluti Jehovah’s Witnesses ofMoscow. indeed oftenusedinpractice. unjustified biases.The1997Lawpr cases against some religiousgroups willmost probably bebasedonassumptions and civil duties).Moreover,some ofthegroundsca issues offaithitself(i.e.refusalbeingsubj to attacknearlyanyreligion,but grounds sound vagueand haveapotentialto authorities haveawidechoiceof in life-orhealth-threateningconditions; encouragement ofsuicideorthe http://www.medialaw.ru/e_pages/laws/russian/polit-part.htm Parties see LawofPolitical the 2001 of translation unofficial English the enmity.” For religious or racial,national incitement of units, military paramilitary and of formation security, national the ofth system,violation the constitutional of fundamentals Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow and others v. Russia (2010), Application no. 302/02. no. 302/02. Application Russia v. (2010), and others Moscow of Witnesses Jehovah’s if “their dissolved can be compare,parties To political Ibid. Ibid. - hindrancetoreceivingcompulsory educati One ofthemostfamous andrelevanttobe Even thequickscreeningofgroundsfo ndering citizens from leaving areligiousassociationbythreatening on wereincludedinthelawwithpa

refusal onreligiousgroundsofme

alsosome ofthem appearsas 514 grounds toinitiatetheprocedure. Thecasedemonstratesthat ovisions onthedissolutionof 511

can actuallybecarriedout 197

ected tomedical treatment andrefusal tofulfill be accommodatedthroughbroadinterpretation e integrity of the Russian Federation, undermining of undermining Federation, ofthe Russian e integrity objectives or actions aim at a forcible change of the the of change aimforcible ata oractions objectives n hardlybeprovedbyfactsandtherefore . broughtupherewouldbethecaseof on; coercionofmembers andfollowersof r dissolutiongivesan 512 rticular typeof

directinterfer all groundslistedabovefor dical assistancetopersons religious associationsare 513 , orbyapplicationof Not only do some Notonlydosome impression that religiousgroups ence intothe CEU eTD Collection beliefs: many otherissuesandtheStatecannot interfere persons candecideontheirown onmatters ofbloodtransfusionandrenderingproperty therefore was notjustified.Themajorargumen as interference intotheapplican national authorities,concluding banned religiousassociation.TheECHRrejected In June2010theECHRhandedoutjudgment anddecideduponthecaseinfavorof 517 516 515 incompatible with respectforthefreedom of thought,conscienceandreligionothers.” necessary totakemeasures aimed atrepr activities whichareharmfulto “verify whetheramovement orassociationcarrieson,ostensiblyinpurs association hadtogothrough. extremist activities)andthedecisiontoba Jehovah’s Witnesses wereaccusedonmost ofth in mind andStateauthorities hadthechancetousemost ofthem. individuals, and refusal of blood transfusion had led to grave consequences in some cases. families, had been connectedwith callstorefusecivic (Ibid., para96). government, nevertheless claimed that national courts di thelifeof a“totalitarian into families integrating “salient theocratic hierarchy” ofthe community, “mindless submissions” ofindividual members, aspiration to Ibid., para. 97. 97. para. Ibid., of disintegration to led activities Witnesses Jehovah’s that argued Government Russian para 95: Ibid., TheRussian Government claimed that“Jehovah’s’ Witn course course of their of themajority people have livesthat working asignificant, if not the greatest, aprofessional of activities comprising further, extends relationships develop and establish to and personality autonomy within which everyone canfreely pursue the development and fulfilmentof his or her life”is “private Court reiteratesthat […] the

thatRussiahadviol 516 ts freedomofreligiondidnot thepopulation”andalso“may legitimately considerit TheRussiangovernment claimed thatitwasentitledto non-secular collective” and “paramilitary discplline”. The The discplline”. “paramilitary and collective” non-secular n wassupportedbyallthe esenting certainforms ofconduct[…]judged 198

d not assessthe creeds or views ofJehovah’sWitnesses duties, negatively influenced the mental health of the ofthe the mental health influenced negatively duties, a broad term encompassing the sphere ofpersonal that farastoprotectpeoplefromtheirown esses are distinct from “traditional religions” for the forthe esses are fromreligions” distinct “traditional t oftheStrasbourgCourt wasthatadult allthearguments andthefindingof e grounds (apartfrom beinginvolved in ated Articles9and11oftheConvention with other persons and the the world.Italso personsoutside and with other or business nature since it is, after all, in the the itis,afterall,in or since business nature meet pressingsocialneed,and 515 uit ofreligiousaims, courts inRussiathe Thus,theMoscow 517

CEU eTD Collection 520 519 518 extremism of2002hasbeenusedwidely law unanimouslyreligious groups.VariousNGOs published onpersonalblogstheInternet.” frequently beeninterpretedtoincludeanycriticism ofgovernment offici any unpopularorsuspiciousreligiousgroups.Fo security, overall policyofreferenceto measures tosuppressreligiousextremism inor A further serious constrain for the exercise of freedom of religion isthe reality of enacting The religions ontheirfollowers' privatelives. leisurely activities,hadnotdi the ECHRfoundthat expectation topray, http://www.rferl.org/content/off_mic_russia_extremism_law/1948888.html LudmilaAlekseeva. Transcript interv of Radio interview with Radio FreeEurope in February 2010 by the chair ofthe Moscow Helsinki Group, Concept, Security National Federation’s 2009 As intheRussian stated 117. para. Ibid.,

Threat members. thewere mattersfellwithin sphere admissions, that of university life” “private community of including religious and personal events such as wedding anniversaries, births, housewarmings, time orpart-time, paid or unpaid employment, whether and how to celebrate events significant to them, no. 251-B). In the light ofthese principles, the decisions of Jehovah's whetherWitnesses to take full- [GC], no. 6339/05,ECHR §71, 2007-IV; opportunity of developing relationships with the outside world (see As totheallotherlimitations imposed onthemembers oftheJehovah’s witnesses, and ECHR 2004-VIII; 42-50, §§ 59330/00, 519 anti-terrorism andanti-extremist legislations are interpreted inawaytargeting

of

Religious 518

Extremism: ffered fundamentally from similar limitations imposed byother

religious extremism asoneof

Additional Niemietz v.Germany 199

iew of 4 February, 2010, available at available 2010, iew of 4 February, Sidabras and Džiautasv. Lithuania to prosecuteJehovah’sWitnesses andadherents preach door-to-door, andtheregulation oftheir

520 r example, the2002anti-extremism law“has der ensure national security. In light of the der ensurenationalsecurity.Inlightofthe Ground Targetsof suchprosecutionsareoften and regularlyreportthattheRussian

for

the threatsundermining national Unjustified supra . , 16 December, 16 1992, §29, Series A note 492. 492. note Evans v.the United Kingdom als, includingcontent

Interference? , nos. 55480/00 and and , 55480/00 nos.

CEU eTD Collection 525 524 523 522 521 definition of ‘sect’ and therefore itisnotclear accompanies thediscussion. addition totheusageof uncertainterms, like new religions almost automatically triggers speculation in anyotherjurisdiction andin their growthandsupport.Thephe religions withsects(usedinaderogatorysens open waragainstforeignreligions.Itappearsthatgovernment religious extremism thr asoneoftheprincipal to addressit. religious extremism is notclearlydefinedin immune from thechargesofallegedengageme society andthespecialstatus and banunwantedreligio issues ofcounter-terrorismandanti-extremist po regularly reportsonnumerous separate column onits websitetomonitormisuse of anti-extremism lawsinRussiaand of theTurkishMuslimtheologian SaidNursi. to all other cases of alleged abuse of the anti-extremism rationale. the anti-extremism abuse rationale. of casesofalleged allother to anti-extr only on not reports archive news anti-extremism Freedom of Religion or Belief 571-592 (2004). (2004). Belief571-592 or Religion of Freedom FreedomReligion of Belief or Religija i Zakon: Problemy iZakon: Vzaimodejstvij Religija http://www.hrwf.net/Joom/images/for Uitz, supra note 234. For details on new religious movements seee.g. Eileen Barker, For details on lack of definition and unified understanding of religious extremismsee Dvornikova O.A., the June 2011See update at Seefor example Human Rights Without Frontiers Report of2010 at This stateofaffairsistroublingforvarious Bearing inmind theprivilegedpositionof 523 However,thelackofdefinitiondoesnot us associations. , in Tore Lindholm, Tore W. , in Durham, (Eds.), Facilitating Cole G.Tahzib-Lie, Bahia http://www.sova-center.ru/en/misuse/news-releases/2011/07/d22022/ 525

bnews/2010/russia%202010.pdf. bnews/2010/russia%202010.pdf. of threeotherWorldreligions,thesebiggroupsaremostly misuses ofsuchlegislation. nomenon isnotonlyaRussianone. a, 7 Zhurnal Rossijskogo Prava (2009). (2009). Prava Rossijskogo a, 7 Zhurnal 200

Russia andthereisnounifiedapproachonhow e) andcallattentiontothe publictoprevent what is exactly atstake whenofficials of the eats tonational security orfrom fighting an ‘sect,’ theconceptof emist measures applied to religious organizations but but organizations to religious applied measures emist licies areoftenusedasareasontoeliminate 521 nt in religious extremism. Theconcept of theRussianOrthodoxChurchin TheRussianNGOSOVAorganizeda reasons.Firstofall,thereisnolegal Why the Cults? New religious Movements and and Movements Newreligious the Cults? Why prevent Stateauthorities from seeing 522 Unfortunately, the pressing pressing the Unfortunately, al policyequatesforeign

524 brainwashing usually The appearance of . Misuse of CEU eTD Collection religious groups,especially by theRussianOrthodoxChurch. The State’spolicyinrelationtoso-calledsect is theestablishment ofthecounc protection from totalitarian sects. the PublicCouncil attheMinistry measures tosuppresstheactivitie numerous examples coming from allregions of 530 center.ru/religion/news/harassment/discrimination/2009/10/d17124/ 529 center.ru/religion/news/harassment/discrimination/2008/10/d14304/ 528 center.ru/religion/news/harassment/discrimination/2003/03/d213/ 527 526 totalitarian sects (the initiative was launche regional branchofMinistryInternalAffa threat similar tothe onecoming from nationalist andfascist movements. of thenecessity of theState’s intervention in take action. connected anyhowtothesegroupsareassumed to foreign affiliation.Third, ‘sect’isalwaysbe religion. Second,thelabel‘sect’isgivenmostly State lobbytoceasethe activitiesofsuchgroups Information and Analysis movements and the label of brainwashing and sect observatories see Uitz, Ibid., 164-178. Postradavshih ot "Totalitarnyh Sekt", available online at online available Sekt", "Totalitarnyh ot Postradavshih at online available Sekt", "Totalitarnyh Zashityot Centr at online Sekt, available Totalitarnyh sDejatel'nost'ju Borot'sja For details and news archive on relations between between relations on news archive For and details Center forInformation and Analysis “SOVA”, UVD Permskogo Kraja Otkrylo "Gorjachuju Liniju" Dlja Center for Information and Analysis “SOVA”, Obwestvennom Sovete pri MVD Chuvashii Resheno Sozdat' Center for Information and Analysis “SOVA”, Vladimir Rushajlo Zajavil, Chto Gosudarstvo Dolzhno Fora detailed account of the govern One ofthemostrecentdevelopments inrela As fortheRussian experience,in2003 the 526

“SOVA” website at

s of ‘sects’andrescuetheir il tostudyreligiousmaterials mental obligationto protect agains of Internal Affairs of Chuvash Republiccreatedacenterof ofInternalAffairsChuvash 528 Asimilar initiative wasimplemented bythePerm http://www.sova-center.ru/religion/news/interfaith/against-sects/ irs whichin2009openedahotlineforvictims of d bytheCenter on Anti-extremism Policies). 201

ing mentioned inanegativesenseandcitizens the activities of totalitarian sects which posea s iswidelysupportedbytheleadersofmajor tonewreligiousgroupswithsome degreeof Russia where stateandlocalauthorities take traditional religions and ‘sects’ seethe Centerfor be introublesandthe Head of theStateSecurityCouncil warned , orhowtoreconcile tion tothefightwithreligious extremism . .. .. 530 members. Forexample, in2008 t dangeroust religions,newreligious

with thepurposetodetectin State feelsobligedto itwithfreedom of http://www.sova- http://www.sova- http://www.sova- 527 Thereare 529 .

CEU eTD Collection 532 center.ru/religion/news/authorities/legal-regulation/2009/07/d16504/ 531 and nottomake thestate more militant thandemocratic. all proceduralguaranteesareobservedinorder maintaining thestatusquounlessthereissign militant democracy rationale for preventingso worthwhile bringingattentionbacktotheissu approved bytheStrasbourgCourt)inrelation extend thepolicybeingimplemented bymany other Europeanstates(andevenbeing It isclearthatthemajor theme insucha perfectly usedbytheRussianau compatible withaparticulargovernmental ag being perfectandcontainsma officials withareputationofexpressing intoleranceandhatetowards‘sects’. against the composition oftheCouncilandre affected religiouscommunities,NGOs,andmemb control overnewreligionsthr within the structure oftheMini associations. Unfortunately, inthereality of censorship andwillimposeanadditional bur serious doubtsthattheactivityofsuchgovernmental agencies wouldnotamount to them signsofextremism (asanorganiza http://www.sova-center.ru/religion/news/a Ekspertnogo Soveta "Sektovedov" i Objavljaet Vserossijs Materialov na Predmet Vyjavlenija vNih Pr Center for Information and Analysis “SOVA”, Institut “SOVA”,Institut and Analysis forInformation Center Center for Information and Analysis “SOVA”, Pri Minjuste Budet Sozdan Sovet po Proverke Religioznyh In summary, theregulatory regime onthefreedom of religioninRussiaisfar from

ny opportunitiestomanipulate it ough reviewingtheir thorities toguardthereligiou stry ofJusticebecame an additio uthorities/legal-regulation/2009/04/d15820/ iznakov Ekstremizma,available onlineat tional unitoftheMinistryJustice). policy isprevention,and 202

Russia, thecreation of the mentioned institution ificant justification fo e ofhowastateshouldbediscouragedtouse enda orevenideology.Thisopportunitywas to thepresenceofMuslim groups.Nowitis den onnon-traditional religiousgroups and kuju Akciju "Inkvizitoram -Net!", available online at online "Inkvizitoram -Net!",available Akciju kuju to preventtheabuseofpreventivemeasures quested on multiple occasions to exclude me practicestoexist for the purpose of Religii i Prava Prosit Ministra Justicii Iskljuchit' iz iz Iskljuchit' Justicii Ministra Prosit iPrava Religii ers ofacademia wereactivelyprotesting religious materials. Adherentsofthe . s perimeter from certaingroups. nal tool toexercise stricter andinterpretitinaway r doingso,andproviding it resembles toalarge .. 532 http://www.sova-

531 Thereare CEU eTD Collection covered head. attention asinEuropeandMuslim women in movements. Theissueoftheheadscarf,for and Islam whileinRussiathegoalistokeep society. authorities topreventparticularreligiousgr similarity of thehidden intentions inthepractice of some Europeanstates and Russian ideal visionofreligiousdomain. Itwashow spiritual well-being of itscitizensand takesallpossiblesteps andmeasures tomaintain the present onthescene.For some reasontheRuss also includesaclearideaonwhichonesareda within theRussiansociety.Thisvisiondoesnot law enforcement bodiestoadjustlawspartic described aboveindetailsandth The regulatorymechanism established inRussia Democracy center.ru/religion/news/harassment/intervention/2003/03/d152/ 533 therefore suspicious,andallegedlydangerousnomatter howlongtheyhavebeenpresently the 1997LawonFreedom ofReligionarecons religious movements means thatanyreligious other NorthCaucasusregionsbutforeignreligio which religiouselements aredangerousfor 4.1.3. allowed passport photograph to be taken wearing hijab, available online at SeeCenter forInformation andAnalysis “SOVA” commentary onthe 2003 Supreme Court Judgement

Analysis The onlydifferenceinthat inEuropemost as 533 aTool

Rather,theRussiangovernment has of

the

to Freedom Wipe

e preliminary conclusionwasth out of all

Religion Non 203

­ Russia: itisnot Muslims from Chechnyaand oup from playinganysu awayallforeignand Traditional Russia can even have a passport photo with a Russia canevenhaveapassportphotowith movements notmentioned inthepreamble of example, doesnotseemtohavethesame us groups.Theinterpretation ofthe‘foreign’

ian authoritiesarevery ular visionoftherole andplaceof religion ngerous andthereforedonotdeservetobe ever extremely interesting toobserve the Regulatory only refertoChurchvs.Staterelations,but recentlyitispredominantly aboutMuslims in relationtothefreedom of religiouswas . idered asforeign, adopted aninterestingapproachin Religions?

Regime at itleftenoughroom forthe non-traditional religious non-traditional religious

concernedaboutthe in bstantial role within non-traditional, are

Russia: http://www.sova- Militant

CEU eTD Collection 535 534 Thegovernment hadgooduseofimperfections policy ofpushingawaynewreligiouscommunitie traditional religions from thesociety butnottoprotect Russian democracy. that theregulatoryregime andpracticeareaimed atel legislation, itsinterpretation,and is negativeformost ofthenewlyestablishedre governmental policiesagainstnewreligions. overall State’spolicyandinitia the stateendorsement ofthis enjoys thewidestpossiblesuppor way thedominant religioninRussia:the effect ontheactivitiesofdiffe Russia. with suppressingforeignreligiousmovements astheonesposingathreattodemocracy in committed byChechenterroristitlooks atleas over freedomofreligion.Keepinginmind the between Muslims andnon-Muslim re North Caucasusandconstantterroristattacks Russian sociallifelefttocomp paranoid abouttheelimination ofany‘foreign’intrusioninthereligiouscomponent of pursuing theiractivitieswithin Analysis “SOVA”, available online at Terror’ Forsnews archive ontheRussian seeChap terrorism Russia on in details For (2007). (2007). 534 The approachoftheRussian government to

particular faith.TheOrthodoxChur

rent religiousgroups.Thefirst theterritoryofRussiaoroutside.TheRussiangovernment http://www.sova-center.ru/religion/news/interfaith/ lete ignorancedomestic religious te different measures which arefully compatible withthe Orthodox Church v. other religions see Center for Information and and Information for seeCenter religions v.other Church Orthodox t from theauthoritiesandsome actionsamount indeedto application bytheauthorities ligious groupsaretakenaway ter 5.3, at 290. Also seeJohn Russel, 535 204

Russian OrthodoxChurch.Thisdenomination The second aspect of on thecivilians.Somehow, religioustensions t awkwardthat government isconcerned only ligious communitiesinRussia astheexisting s. The discretionary powers given to the the to given powers discretionary The s. wards freedom ofreligionhasatwofold frequency ofterroristattacksallegedly inthelegislation iminating thepresenceofnon- one affects in a very positive one affectsinaverypositive easily leadsustoconclude ch isverysupportiveofthe conflicts,i.e.Chechensin fromanyofficialdebate the governmental policy Checnya – Russia’s ‘War on ‘War Russia’s – Checnya to accommodatethe . CEU eTD Collection taking thesemeasures. important mission anddoesnotf democracy manner ittriestomake because an present. Moreover, Ihave asense thatthe Ru State anditdoesnotseethethreattoitselfcomingfrom the Russian society. TheStatewants to preserveth foreign religiousgroupsmodifytheexistingbalanceofpresentingbeliefswithin religious movements inthiscase.Thegovernment doesnotseeitasnecessarytowaituntil preventive characterand aremeant toprotect Itappears thatthe treatment ofnon-traditional religionsinRussi on the militant democracy rationale asmost of theactions takenagainst those groups are of long astheStatepromotes and public authorities of ‘new’ religions inRussiabut for sureitwillnot be aneasyprocess as in all regions of the country. Itis not clear wh religion inRussia regularlyrepo authorities. TheSOVA-Center of theMoscowbranchJehovah’sWitn Law. Thesituationalsodidnotchangeafterth requirement fortheregistrati Russia’s authoritiesdidnotrushtochange Convention. However,despitethefactofbeingfoundinviolationConvention, supervisory bodiesliketheECHRandnotsurpri minority religiousgroupsandsomeofthem ha authorities onregistrati on matters were widelyusedtoreject theapplication to register on ofthereligiousassociationwasnotremoved from 1997 the supports suchanapproach. rt ondiscriminatory treatment and otherNGOsworkinginth eel obligedtoprov 205

at couldchange the discriminatory treatment by the situation, andforexample the 15years Russian democracy from itsenemies: foreign e ECHRfoundRussiain ssian government actsinanallegedmilitant e statusquo becauseitisconvenient forthe d toseekprotectionfrom theinternational singly Russiawasfound esses and rejected all allegations of the esses andrejectedallallegationsofthe impression thatitisengagedinavery ide anysustainable justifications for religious groupsallowedtobe of thesereligiouscommunities e field of the freedom of e fieldofthefreedom of violation inthecase a isallegedlybased in violation of the in violationofthe CEU eTD Collection 537 536 can relyontheirsupport. few religious communitieswithwhichtheStat split intomany religious groups,itismore conve society. Unfortunately,thereis secularism) andnotfordemocracy, assuch,but quality oftheState(i.e.itwasneverarguedth Theoverviewoftheexistingregulatory regi to concludethattheRussiangovernment protec minimum standardofneutra traditional religions definitely lacks atighter test hypothetically dangerousforRussiandemocracy. religious groupsfacingconsiderableencroachme nt intotheiractivitiesareactuallybutnot could beacceptedundercertaincircumstances, but treatment ofmembers, andactivities. government evenhasanideahowproperreligious foreign religiousmovements andhowunwelco what ishappeninginRussia.Thereanesta suppress anything,justincase,andjustifyitbythe needtoprotectdemocracy. Thisisexactly dominant theme inthemilitant democracy stat measures isdependentonmany factorswhichar Militantdemocracycanpotentiallybeuti from extremist religious movements. Seee.g. For details on militant democracy and secularism debate see further sections of this chapter. supra note 483. 483. note l andimpartial treatment.

a strongsensethatthegovernment doesnotwantsocietyto 537 536 Thepreventivemeasures limiting religiousfreedoms However,the legitimacy of militant democracy 206

blished governmental agenda on how to treat the blished governmentalagendaonhowtotreat e hasestablished goodrelationsandtherefore e, however itdoes notfollow that a state can e notmet inthe Russian case.Prevention is a at itiscrucialforguardingtheprincipleof inorder tojustify the interference andeven ts throughsuchmeasures nottheparticular lized toaddress thealleged threat coming nient tohave peoplebrokedownintovery The Russianapproachtotreatment ofnon- foraparticularnotionofthequality intheRussiancaseitmustbeprovedhow group shouldlook me theyare in Russia.Moreover, the me anditspracticalapplicationleadsus in terms ofits structure, CEU eTD Collection demonstrate thatathreatisimminent andneedstobeaddressed. not get away withgeneralized statements thatth extremism oranythingelsewhichcanpotenti stronger justification in spiritual preferencesofitsci foreign andnon-traditiona the government willneed to provideevidence in democracy, especiallyknowing thatRussiaisnot well-being ofthesociety(which in Russia,willencourage thegovernment refocu activities and theiradherents could resolve thesituationandwillleaveforei laws are tobeinterpreted andappliedina tr it’s definitionof‘foreign’whic needs toreconsiderseriously Russia stopitisnotpossible tosay that thestate wasactinginamilitant democracy fashion. and thejudiciaryisactively militant democracy approach islegitimate only democracy cannothappeninthegovernmental acceptthatthepresenceofforeignreligious groupsis However,evenifwe detrimental forRussiandemocracy, thedenial The militant democracy rationale,if appliedpr To conclude,from whatwasdescribeda each casein ordertoprove howaparticularreligion isinvolved in l religiousmovements isdangerous involved. Unlesstheregu tizens. Suchanapproachwill its approachtowardsforeign h hasauniquemeaning intheRu isnotexactly the State’s function) tothe protection of enjoy theirreligiousfreedoms. gn religiousgroupsaloneinconductingtheir 207

ue militant democracy fashion itwillhelp to ally harm democracy. Thegovernmentally harmdemocracy. could of thefundamental rightofthefreedom of is whatthesociety needs but willhave to when allprocedural guaranteesare ensured a religious-conflict free society. In this case a religious-conflictfreesociety.Inthiscase s itsattention from protectingthe spiritual nd analyzedabove, itfollows thatRussia support oftheclaim thatthepresenceof agencies (i.e.refusalofregistration).A operly inregulationof religiousmatters lar attacksontheminority religionsin force thegovernment togivea religious movements, including fordemocracybutnotthe ssian reality.Iargue thatif CEU eTD Collection Partially this isduetothe factthatthe “T parties under the 1961 Constitution and18 the prohibitionofpoliticalparties:Turk 540 539 538 much furtherthanitspredecessor). Constitutions of1961and1982containmilitant demo case-study isofparticularinterestforanumbe interpretation inTurkeytoguardtheconstituti This section aims topresent an analysis of the militant democracy logicapplication and Introduction 4.2. MilitantSecularisminTurkey religion tovarious communities thatarebe attention backtotherealproblems andwoul its urgetopreserve the existingsocial orde so asitdoesnotidentifytheenemy correctlya to preventpotentialharmdemocracy. Howeve threat of religious extremism ispresent in Ru religious componentis of theSovietUnionwithfightingagainstte political speculationinRussia.Thiscountry 263-310. 263-310. Ozbudun, in Ozbudun, For details account of militant democracy-typ from Macklem, adopted in secularism’ term The ‘militant Unfortunately, threatscoming fromreligi supra

note 52, at 126. often present.Thismakes my argum

539 Second,thiscountryhascons 538 e constitutionalprovisions in TurkeyOder, urkish Constitution of1982(aproductamilitary

ing suppressed in Russiaatthe moment. haslong-standingexperiencesincethecollapse 208

ssia andthegovernment n ish Constitutional Court r. Militant democracy onally proclaimed principleof secularism. This nd replacedtheneedto rrorism andsecessionistmovements; andthe under the current Constitution of1982.” r ofreasons.Firstall,bothrecentr Turkish d give(guaranteedbythelaw)freedomof r, tothedategovernment hasfailedtodo supra note 54 ous extremism arenotonlyamatter of cracy provisions (whilethelatterwent ent evenmoresustainable:the . iderable experiencewith would bringtheState’s protect democracy with “has closeddownsix eeds to takemeasures supra note 470 note supra , at 540

CEU eTD Collection that “oneofthemost important analysis of the Constitutional Courtjurispr 543 542 541 militant democracy development andtoanalyze themove towardsaddressing new threats explore inthispart. ban andthisisanothe dissolution procedure.Finally,Tu HEP Party(People’sLabour Party) even partieswithsubstantial parties inorder tosilence the democracy isofpotentialdangerthepolitical sentiments intheiragenda. protection of theKurdishminority’s rights party prohibition cases couldbedivided into tw extension beyonditstraditional ar an excellentopportunity totest my hypothesis the indivisibility and territorial integrity of theSt dissolution werebasedonthealle of protection grantedto politicalparties.” coup) stillreflectssome featuresof author secularism. faced the ban (or possibility tobe ban on the case of other two while itspeople Stateand Turkish the of unity destroy aim the to with difference social cultivating TheHEPParty casewasbasedontwomain charges: Ibid., at 126. Ibid., at 125. The main purposeofthischapteristo In addition,Turkeyrepresentsachallenge r aspectofthe Turkishversion of political debate.TheTurkishexample clearlydemonstrates that

popular support(i.e.theRefahPa areasofremaining democratic ged violationoftheconstitutio ea ofapplication. Keepingin rkey representsafascinatingcase-studyfortheheadscarf 543 andtheAKParty)canbecome targetsoftheparty 542 udence onpartyprohibitioncasesdemonstrates 209

Third, most of therulingson politicalparties’ itarian, statist,and the party became a center of illegal activities and was was thepartybecamea centerofillegalactivitiesand o groups: againstpolitical parties aimed atthe environment asitmight easilytargetminor and againstpoliticalparties with Islamic ate ortheprincipleofse AK Party)foralleged viol that militant democracy shows signsofits demonstrate theinnovativedimension of to the generalizedstatement thatmilitant militant democracy Iwouldlike to deficit concerns thelowlevel mind thelocalconditions,all nally protectedprinciplesof rtisi, theWelfare Party,the tutelary character.” ationthe principleof of cularity. Thelatteris 541 The CEU eTD Collection social, political,andlegalactiv the idealsocietyofTurksasproposedbyAtatürk debate over militant democracy inTurkey(as democracy version.Oneofthemost influent suggest thatTurkeycouldeven militant democracy isascontext-sensitive as do notoffer thefull pictureof militant democracy ban politicalparties.Theconstructionandlangua provisions protectingparticularqualitiesofthe Turkish Stateandtheproceduretoinitiate parties canbe,probably, explained tosome has closeddown18politicalparties.Suchactiv It was alreadymentioned thatunderthe1982 4.2.1. the secular characteroftheTurkishstate. on theTurkish case-study andthe possibility of utilizing militant democracy logic toprotect right wing,andtheirimplications formy argument.Thesectionwillfinish withconclusions democracy isbeingutilizedtofighttheenem brought together underthemilitant democracy ‘umbrella’ to test theargument thatmilitant alleged violationoftheprincipleseculari provided inrelation toone group of party proh constitutional militancy. Themore detailedanal through militant democracy lenses.ThesectionstartswithageneralintroductionofTurkish Militant Democracy in ities startedalongtime ago,c qualifyasanexampleofth Turkey: General extend throughtheanalysis oftheConstitutional 210

sm andtheheadscarfban.Thesequestionsare ies ofdemocracy andotherextremist from the Constitution theTurkish Constitutional Court well asover anyotherconstitutional matter) is inanyother democracy. However,Iwould ial factorsinundersta ysis of militant democracy application willbe ism inthebusinessofdissolutionpolitical ibition cases: political parties banned for the in the1920s.While refo practicein Turkey.TheTurkishversion of ge oftheconstitutionalnorms themselves Observations e most-context dependant militant ontemporary Turkishpoliticsare

nding andshapingthe rms inallsphereof CEU eTD Collection any politicaldialogueonmatters state protectsitssecular religious feelingsinstateaffairsandpolitic Atatürk’s ‘dream society’and states“there sh latter seems tobeof extremely highimportan procedure of amendments. the items oftheAtatürk’sheritage. and theprinciple of secularism intheConstitutional provisions andjurisprudence isoneof party dissolveditself).Considerableattentionispaidtotheprotection of thenationalunity started theiractivities or werebanned thr provisions intheConstitutionandrelevantlaws the protection of Kurdishpeoplealmost automatically become targets of the party prohibition Constitutional Court demonstrates thatpolitical the Statewere invokedinmost ofthepart of theState, andunityof thenation. Theneces precondition ofcreatingquitean was advocatedbythe1920snationalhero. 546 545 544 by the ruleof law;Turkey asanindivisible entity andthe principle of secularism. the followingqualitiesofstate:republican, still concernedtoleadthec amended, nor shall their amendment beproposed. thepr and Republic, the of in the characteristics Article 2on provisions For detailed account eternityclau of account For detailed See for example Article 4 First of all,theConstitution of Turkeyprotects some features of theStatefrom the There isnodoubtthatsome : The provision of Article 1 of the Constitution establishing the form of the state as a Republic, the the Republic, stateas a the theform of establishing theConstitution of ofArticle1 : Theprovision www.atatruk.com character and theindivisibility of 545 ountry towards“highestlevelof Non-amendable provisions of theTurkishConstitution protect

web-site for detailed information on Atatürk biography and his reforms. se in the Turkish Constitution see Oder, Constitution theTurkish se in relatedtoreligion aggressive regime jealouslyprotectingthesecularcharacter specificfeaturesofthe ough theConstitutional Courtprocedureafterthe 211

s.” However,themanner inwhichtheTurkish ce; thepreamble totheConstitution follows the y prohibitioncases.The democratic, secular,andsocialstategoverned sities toprotect exactly all be nointerferencewhatsoeverby sacred (some ofthem werebannedevenbeforethey parties with anIslamic agendaoraiming at and minority protection(ifwedonottalk its territory does notallowinfact civilizationandprosperity” Turkish Constitutionwerea ovision of Article 3 shall not be be not Article shall of 3 ovision supra supra note 470, at 267-270. at267-270. note 470, these two qualitiesof jurisprudence of the jurisprudence ofthe 546 544 The as CEU eTD Collection dictatorship or the democratic andsecularrepublic rights, theprinciplesofequalityandrule with theindependenceofstate,itsindivisibl statutes and programs, aswell theactivities parties withfinancialsupport). Furthermore, Ar importance of political parties for democracy, andthedutyof theStatetoprovidepolitical parties (i.e. declarationoffr political parties: some provisions represent traditional norms andguarantees for political regulation of political parties’ activities. Chapter 4,SectionIII isdevoted totheregulationof achieve: toattain “themodernit tried tobeplacedundertheumbrella ofabigg 550 549 548 547 institutions).” members ofthearmed forcesandstudent servants whoarenotconsidered Court ofAccounts,civil servantsinpublic parties (judgesandprosecutors,members ofhi the samebans“personsoccupyingacerta Article about theminorities mentioned intheLausanneTreatyof1923). and politics, this norm might get different interpretation and consequences. consequences. differentinterpretation thisnormmightand politics, get and claims about recognizing them asnational minority. minorities (i.e. Ar as wererecognized Muslim groups Theprovisionisnotunique for Turk Article 68 (as amended on July 23, 1995: 4121/6 Article). Kogacioglu, in Lausanne Treaty hadsettledthequestion of Minor A furthermanifestation ofmilitant demo 550 supra supra

note 52, at 434. at 434. 52, note ofanykind,norshalltheyincitecitizenstocrime.” eedom toform politicalpartie

y andcivilizationoftheWest.” ey, though takinginto accountthe ro tobelaborersbyvirtueof ; theyshouldnotaim toprot 212

law, sovereigntyofthe ities inTurkey. According tothis document only non- institutions andorganizations,other public menians, Greeks). Theref menians, e integrity withitsterritory andnation, human ticle 68oftheConstitution requiresthat“the s whoarenotyetinhighereducation of political parties,should notbeinconflict gher judicialorgans er andmore generalgoal Turkeywantsto in positionfrom beingmembers ofpolitical cracy inTurkey couldbe foundinthe s withoutpriorpermission, the 548 ect orestablishclassgroup the services they perform,

le of the army in le ofthearmy 547 ore Kurds cannot make any any make cannot ore Kurds nation, theprinciplesof Theseprocesseswere including thoseofthe 549 Turkishsociety Moreover, CEU eTD Collection to the State.” (Section 107 (1)). by dissolved parties political assetsofthe “allthe that theparty.” Further, Lawno. 2820 dissolving permanently for its justification and decision Court’s final Constitutional the of yearsfromdate the afive of for period party caused the party to be dissolved permanently cannot be founders, members, directors or supervisors in any other another name.” have “members, party Second, the ofawhose statements acts or founders political including long beenquestionedanddebatedoutsidein to frequentpartyprohibitionpr of casesagainstTurkey.Thepoliticalenvironm dissolved partiesdecidedtoseeklaterprot being engagedinpoliticsfor5years–isprobablyoneofthereasonsthatmost ofthe 552 551 solution fortheKurdishproblem. killings, torture,disappearance,andimprisonm place. being blamed oftenforimposing ‘narrowlimits consequences forthebannedpartyanditsmembers. the executionofprohibitedactivities.”Inadditi may berendered onlyif“itis be observedbyallpoliticalpartiesandthedecision todissolveapolitic activities. For example, theConstitution of Turkey and national constitutions refer provisions onpoliticalparties;similar norms us activities of political parties. However,theConstitution of Turkeycontains very detailed and many states havesimilar provisions inco Kamrava, in Article 69 552 Drastic consequences of the party dissolution for its members – banning them from Drastic consequencesofthepartydissolutionforitsmembers –banningthemfrom Provisions ofsuchacharacterarenotunknow Forexample, differenthumanrights establishes that first, “the party which has been dissolved permanently cannot be founded under supra note 52,at 281.

established thatthe party inquestion has become acentrefor actices andthedemocratic char only toverybasicprinciplesandguaranteesofparties’ ection in the ECHR which decided uponanumberection intheECHRwhichdecided 213

the order of the Constitutional Court shall be transferred transferred be Court shall ofthe Constitutional the order ent inthecountryis on the Regulation of Political Parties which also states states also Partieswhich ofPolitical Regulation the on ually are included inth nstitutions and inthelegislation regulating ent of individuals advocating for political side thecountry; ’ within whichpolitical activities can take organizations permanently reportonthe containsaseparatear on, Article69goesintodetailonthe 551

n toconstitutionaltheoryandpractice acter oftheTurkishStatehas considered unhealthydue Turkish government is e ordinarylegislation al partypermanently ticle on principles to CEU eTD Collection ‘spare party’ system, with theabovementioned agendashaveadjustedtothesecircumstances andhadtodevelopa sentiments operateandfunctionunder thenormalized threat of beingbanned.Political parties 556 555 554 553 pleasant ordesirableconstructionforthepoliti main partycouldresume political activities in the concernsofKurdishpeopleaspos argument: uptothe2004nineoutofeighteen the main targetsoftheparty dissolution procedures threatening thelaicism principlethroughtrying integrity andpoliticalunityof democracy. Kurdishpoliticalmovements werealways challenge thesituation.Unsurpri therefore differentsocialandpoliticalmoveme (usually supported inTurkey bythe military). population wouldgradually absorb andaccept th alphabet. based onEuropeanlegal traditions, andevenArabicscriptwasreplaced bythe Latin Atatürk). established in1923asasecularstateunderthe agreed tochanges initslegal,political andso Ibid., at 435. Ibid., Kogacioglu, in Ibid. Dominic McGoldrick, As aresult,sincetheearly To achieve“themodernity andcivilisati 554 553 Religiousschoolsandsectswereclos TheSultanate andCaliphate wereabolished, Sharia Lawwas replaced withlaws supra note note 52 supra Human Rights and Religion: The The Islamic inEurope Rights Religion: Debate Human Headscarf and 556 aprocesswherenewpartyiscr , at 439. at 439. ,

theState.Atsame time singly, suchmovements werepe 1990s politicalpartieswithKu ing athreat totheunity ofthestate. 214

cial regimes. Thus,theRepublicofTurkeywas bannedpartieshadto cal environment ofdemocracyin andstability leadership ofMustafaKemel as Pasha(known to impose Shariaorder.Thesegroupsbecame nts appearedtoexpressdisagreement andto However, thiswasnotexactlythe case and caseitis banned.This isbyno means a e changescoming from governmental orders on oftheWest” mentioned above, Turkey . Statistics arehelpful ed downanditwasassumed thatthe seenas posingathreat tothe territorial eated withthepurposesothat , Islamic politicalgroupsas rceived asthreatstoTurkish rdish orpoliticalIslamic dowithaccommodating here to illustratethe 555

133 (2006). (2006). 133 CEU eTD Collection possible: the TurkishConstitutional Courtopted for excessively rigid interpretation of the and applyingthem. Unfortunately,Turkeystar the largeextentthatwould regime substantiallylimiting freedoms of politicalparties willnecessarily beestablished. To However, theConstitutionitselfanditswrittennorms arenot regime ofitsownprotectionwhichhashadanegativeimpact at speech andassociation. will notadd anythingto theprotectionands parties’ prohibition inamanner thatitbecome into account individual featuresandpeculia will lead toamore relaxedandgeneralized appr make theConstitutional Courtcarelessabout the obviously hassome otherimportant thingsto Constitutional Courtwillbepermanently deal functioning ofthepoliticalpartiesandvot space isnotalwaysan effectiveand helpfulso same program appearsimmediately.Thisdemons might beanendlessprocesswhenthegovernmentbansapartybut and form another partywiththe effectiveness oftheprocedure parties. Therefore, Turkey isan intere general; votersmight beveryconfused inattempts tofollow allthere-emerging political Therefore, itispossible toconclude that In theTurkishpoliticalenvironment parties depend ontheinterpretationgive to ban political parties. same agenda evenbeforethe sting example forthe general debate onthe 215

s theusualbusinessof theConstitutional Court rities ofeachandeverycase.Dealingwith do. Numerousparty prohibitionwill caseson upport ofpoliticalpluralism andfreedom of ing system butalsowouldmean thatthe oach toparty prohibitioncaseswithout taking ted itsmove towardsas limited aregime as the Constitution created a broad initsscope lution. Such asituationdoesnotaffectthe ing withpartyprohibition caseswhileit trates thatbanningapartyfrom thepolitical justification andgroundsofdissolution; it got usedtothepossibi n tothenorms whileinvoking main party isdissolved.This enough tosaythatthestrict leastonpoliticalparties. other partywiththe lities to be banned CEU eTD Collection of bannedpartieswasadvocatingforsolutionto be dividedintotwomajor groupsbasedonthepo As wasmentioned abovetheentirebodyof Headscarf 559 558 557 4.2.2. than ispracticed atthemoment. legitimacy andjustification towards preservi government andpoliticsaccepted amilitant democr practice initsactivities do exactlythisinordertodemonstrate thatmilitant democracy isthemodelTurkey should involving the urgeto protectthe secularcharacter through theprism ofthepartydissolutionca might betrackedespeciallythroughthean criticized foritsse ECHR andtheTurkish judiciary.In addition,th “degree ofconvergenceonthequestion sentiments or other minority issues intheir ag Turkish authoritiestoban political cases.Inaddition,whiletheECHR most ofthe parties wereinitiatedtoo often,buttheini provisions regulatingpolitic Constitutional Court of Turkey of Court Constitutional Seeforexample CerenBelge, Ibid. Ergun, in

Protecting As wasmentioned above, militant secularism in Turkeyshould be analyzed notonly supra note 52

Ban: Reasons and

lective activism inprotectingcivillibertiesthroughitsjudgments Secularism , at 136. at 136. , to protectsecularcharac , 40and Law Society, Review (2006). 3 al parties’ activities. Friends of the Court: The Republican Alliance and Selective Activism of the the of Selective Activism and Alliance TheRepublican Court: the of Friends

in Concerns Turkey: parties,itisapplicable main tiative wassupportedbytheConstitutional Courtin alysis ofthepartyprohibitioncases. of theprotectionsecularism”

The 216

ng secularism itwould cases onpoliticalpartiesdissolutioncan enda. Ontheotherhand,thereseemtobea minority protectionissues(mainly Kurdish), 557 ses butthroughthewider rangeofcases

ter of the State.Iargue thatif theTurkish e Constitutional CourtofTurkeyiswidely veryoftendisagreedwiththedecisionof Dissolution litical agendaofthe parties. Thefirstgroup of the State.Inthene Notonly those cases to dissolve political acy approach with allconditions ofits

of ly tothepartieswithKurdish

Political offer abetter solution xt section Iwilltry to

Parties 558 between the and 559 andit

the

CEU eTD Collection 562 561 560 elections became thelargestsi 1991 electionsthepartygained62outof450se 10 %threshold for theparties seeking representation in thenational Assembly). Later, inthe scored only7.1%andthereforefailedtoberepres 1983. Thefirstparticipationingeneralelectio above). names sincethelate1960s(it The RefahpartywasnotanewplayerinTurk The ishardtodisagreewiththeargum ECHR andit of theunitary character of the reason toproceedthis wayisthe factthatal unitary characteroftheStat chapter Iwill leave aside the dissolution of contribution to thewhole debate on militant democracy. However,for the purpose of this cases werelaterchallenged in theStrasbourg dissolved itself whilethecasewas pendingin theConstitutional Court. was bannedevenbeforeitpursuedanyactivities secularism. Itisnotusefultogointodetails while thesecondgroupofba Court of Turkey ordered to dissolve theorderedto dissolve NationalOder Court ofTurkey Democracy Party v.Turkey (1999). pending and in 2001 the Virtue Party was also banned. also banned. Party thewas Virtue in2001 and pending Freedom and Democracy Party (23.11.1993) despite the For more details onthe Refah Party history see Kamrava, in Constitutional Earlierthe activities. anti-secular their alleged for Refah banned party was the only one not Thecaseof United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey (1998), and Case ofFreedom and

Refah 562 ThelatestversionoftheRefahpartywith

Partisi

(the Welfare e andwill concentrateonthe

ngle blockintheparliament State were successful in challenging their dissolution inthe is cleardemonstration ofthe Party) nned parties was outlawed for violating theprincipleof nned partieswasoutlawedfor

Dissolution: l politicalparties bannedfo 217

about themost ridiculous caseswhentheparty Court and represent an Party (20.05.197 Party ents theStrasbourgCourtgaveinthosecases. political partiesforallegedviolationofthe n of1987wasnotsuccessfulandtheparty ish politics,itwaspresentedunderdifferent ats inParliament and ented intheParliament (inTurkeythereisa fact that party dissolved itself while the case was andespeciallyincaseswhentheparty Background supra mainly anIslamic agendaappearedin note 52, at 286. at286. 52, note with 21.5%ofthepopularsupport second groupofcases.Themain rty (25.10.1983), 1), Turkey PeaceParty(25.10.1983), spare-party system mentioned

of

the important and valuable after the1995general r theallegedviolation

Case 560 561 Manyof these

CEU eTD Collection Turkey criticized by domestic andintern Party wasbuilt aroundthreemajor groupsofreasons: party wasdissolved,itsassetsweretransferred totheTreasury. Thecase tooutlawtheRefah becoming acentreofactivitiescontrarytothe Path Party(centre-rightoriented 565 564 563 “one oftheindispensibleconditionsdemocracy” also contradictory tothe Constitution. TheC legitimacy tothedissolutionincasegovernme importance, probablythedetailedanalysisof never lookedatthepartyprogram. While both charges werebased ontheactivities andspeeches (158 seatsoutof450). together. Democratic LeftParty14.5%,RepublicanPeople’s and 41344/98, para. 24. 24. para. 41344/98, and Refah Paritsi (Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey (2001), Applications Nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 41343/98 41342/98, 41340/98, Nos. Applications (2001), v. Turkey and Others Party) (Welfare Paritsi Refah Seefor example: David Schilling, Eu December 1995 electionsresult:Re , 26 Loyola of Los Angeles International &Comparative Law Review , AngelesInternational (2004). LoyolaofLos 26 The ConstitutionalCourtjudgment sparked - - - In May1997thecasetodissolvepart

the complete domination ofIslam insociety. Reference bysome Refahmembers tothec applicable totheMuslimcommunity; Intention to introduceIslamic law(Sharia) discrimination ongroundsofbelief; Proposal tointroducepluralityoflega 563 In June 1996 Refah formed aco InJune1996Refahformed

party)andcame intopower. ropean Islamaphobia and Turkey - Refah Partisi (TheWelfareParty) v. ational politiciansandscholars. fah Part 21.5%, MotherlandPart fah 218

Party 11%, smaller parties gained 14.5% of the votes onstitutional Courtobserved thatsecularism is principles ofsecularism. OnJanuary1998the thepartyconstitutionwouldaddmore ofthepartyleaders y was initiated, thepa elements ofpartyact 565 nt could prove that party intentions were nt couldprovethatpartyintentionswere extensive publicdeba anditissafeguarded inTurkeymainly l system which wouldleadtothe oncept of jihad, a holy war to fight for oncept ofjihad,aholywartofightfor as the ordinary lawandas the law alition government withtheTrue y 19.5%,True PathParty 19%, 564 Forexample, allthe mainly andtheCourt ivities areofequal rty wasaccusedof te andwashighly CEU eTD Collection 568 567 566 not theparty)andnosinglewordwassaidaboutpartyprogram. charges againstthepartywerebasedonlyonin received 35%oftheto claimed more than fourmillion members, had158seatsintheNationalAssemblyand the rulingpartywhenitwasdissolved. Itwas thelargest politicalparty inTurkey and banned beforetheymanaged topursueanyac became anordinary practiceinTurkey.Moreover banned politicalparties inTurkeygivesanim compulsory dissolutionofpoliticalpa Turkish Constitutional Courtdoes nottakese not afault of thejudiciary only(namely theCo fifteenth politicalparty dissolved in its legitimacy andeffectiveness. Firstof all,aswasalready mentioned, Refah wasthe the Refah partyisquitedistinct andinstruct for theintroduction of thedoctrine into the na and tragedieswhichoccurredinth principle of secularism. While theapplicati speeches and variousactivitiesof of theConstitutional Court provided along list ofgrounds fordissolution which included because “country’s historical experien reality of the right to reality of and choose. vote substantial number ofvoters to berepresented by the party oftheir choice poses serious questions about the representation of their choice. Taking Measures, Partiesand Analogous ofPolitical and Dissolution Prohibition Therefore, one third ofthe votes were given to the non-existing party andpeople wereleft without Seeforexample European Commi Ibid. tal votesinlocalelect

ssion for Democracy Through Law (V into accountthatdemocracy el isabout thepartyleaders, whichtheCourtfoundcontraryto e pastisnotnewandindeed Turkeyinrecent times. Itisworth noting here that thisis ce andthespecificfeaturesofIslam rties asameasure oflastresort. ive for the debate onmilitant democracy, namely 219

on of militant democracy toprevent the events tivities and get any popular support, Refah was tivities andgetanypopularsupport,Refahwas pression that theprohibitionof political parties tional constitutionalorde nstitutional Court).However,itseems thatthe ions ofNovember1996. dividual statements ofthepartyleaders(and riously the widelyaccepted practice of , whilemostofthepreviousparties were supra supra is quiteoftenthemain reason enice Commission), Guidelines on ection of therulers, denial ofthe note 193 note r, theTurkish caseof 568 . 567

.” Furthermore, the Thenumberof 566 Thedecision CEU eTD Collection 570 569 should bedissolved.TheConstitutionalCour arguing tobringreligionthe cultural domain arepreserved thereandnot al also theunityofnation.Unitymight be Moreover, thejudgment concludedthatRefahthreatens notonlytheprinciplesoflaicism but Court hasconcludedthattheRefahpartyto politics, andwhetheritisajudicialtaskingeneral. legitimate to questionwhether the judiciary isab believes thatitis necessary to represent itasameasure necessa culture, thistime theCourtdidsame withreligion.Itis in theHEP casetheissue oflanguage andet life andpoliticswasinalinew proper place intheconscience ofthe people. sake ofsavingreligionfrom beingatoolin humanity.” the enlightenment of science, Court of Turkey,laicism isinfact the“basis protect itthrough banningthisparticularpolit the preamble of the Constitution as oneofthefoundations oftheState)andnecessity to Constitutional Courtinitsjudgment concentrated Ibid. Ibid. Kogacioglu, in The RefahPartisistoryis relevantforthisparticular Based onthis distinction andinterpretation of the laicism principle the Constitutional 569 TheCourtpointed out the necessity to supra supra note 52, at 441. at 441. 52, note

eliminate culture and religion from ith arguments brought nation, independence,national ry toprotectthereligionand politics was athreat tothe un 220

achievedonlyifsocialphenomena from the the handsofadministration andensureits 570 of thevisiondemocracy thatdevelopswith lowed toenterthedomainofpolitics.Refah hnic diversitywasplacedinthedomain of ical player.AccordingtotheConstitutional le todraw aclearbord TheCourt’sdistinctionbetweeneveryday t made itclearthatreligionshouldbe beexcludedfrom th ontheprinciple of laicism (proclaimed in keepreligion away from politicsforthe earlier in theHEPcase.However,while interestingthat safeguard itsdignity.TheCourt ity ofthe Stateandtherefore sovereignty and the ideal of ideal the and sovereignty publicdebateanditisfully er between culture and chapter because the e domain of politics. the Courttriedto CEU eTD Collection issues ofabortionandsame always involveactive sexmarriage issues veryoftengainstrong supportordisagree countries andMuslim partiesinTurkey.For exactly thecaseif wecompare theposition of comparative arguments might beverymuch in coming from otherdemocraciestosupporttheba Turkish government reliedextensively oninternational practice andconstitutional norms comparative lawinjustifying its‘protectionism threat totheunityof thenationandthereforedangerousfordemocracy. applicable totheclaims topreserve minority languages whicharealsoconsidered as posinga population from beingbroughtintothepolitical therefore itisnotpossibletodetach completely religious preferences of themajority of the views oftheAtatürk.Wealsoshouldnotforget through denying anyclaims ofthereligious and ethnicidentity asbeing differentfrom the think itisfeasible toachieve the entire unitywithinanymodern state and callitdemocracy repeating itselfandtoaccordst introduce strongprotectioninthe throughout itshistory.Therefor It isawell-knownfactthatTurkeyhasexperienced thepresenceofreligiousfundamentalism The Turkish democracy ingeneral. of potentialthreat for the prin that anypoliticalpartymentioning religioninits completely banned from the publicdebateand

Refah This isquiteanintriguingobservationthattheTurkishgovernment refersalottothe

Party

Dissolution:

Problems ciple ofsecularism andunityof theState,andtherefore,for rong guardianshiptotheunityof e, someone might arguethatithasreasonablegroundto national constitutionalinorder

and 221

example, many highlydeba

Consequences from thelanguageofjudgment itfollows ment ofthereligiousleaders(forexample the that Turkeyisapredominantly Muslim state; theChristian democrats inmany European favor ofcertainsoluti ’ ofthesecularcharacterState.The program orin thespeechesofitsleadersis n oftheRefahandsimilar parties.While debate.Thesame lineofcriticism is

theState.However,Idonot interference ofthereligious to preventthehistoryfrom ons, however, it is not ons, however,itisnot ted andcontroversial CEU eTD Collection 571 dissolution procedureduetoitsmoveli accused ofviolating theprincipleofsecularism. Theparty becam leaders and foreign politiciansas AK Party(theJusticeandDevelopment Party) environment ifwelookbriefly disregarding them doesnothelp factors thatcouldbeexcludedfr business isaworldwideacceptedpractice.Neverthe religion from theinfluenceof balance betweenreligiousdemands andprefer is notthesame asunwillingness toengage for thesakeofprotection State couldsimply disregardthem andbanthemfrom beingdiscussedin imposed onnational governments isneveran of Islam asjustifyingexclusionth parties shouldbemore consistent justification onthedrasticlim in casesonpoliticalparties’dissolution.The justification givenbytheTurkishauthorities general. Thecomparative lawargument doesnotseem toaddmore legitimacy tothe selective initscomparative ar beliefs especially in conservative societies). http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7533414.stm Seeforexample’ Turkey's ruling part The Refahpartycasewasveryinstructive The task to accommodate religious beliefs a

itations beingimposed onpoliti gument andpicksonlythefactsin democracy.Intentoftheprotect om anyinvolvement inthe domain at thelatestdevelopment ofthe inthisfield.The2008case the Stateand notallowing reli the State’s mission ofestablishingastabledemocratic order. . Published: 2008/07/30. andconvincingthanmere reference tothespecificfeatures e Refahfrom politicalarena. a “victory forTurkishDemocracy”. 222

Therefore, the Turkishgovernment seems tobe ft theexisting banonwearingtheheadscarf y escapes ban’. Story from BBCNEWS: in dialogueandcompromise andfindafair wascalledbymany commentators, AKparty easy one.However,itdoesnotmeanthe that ences anddemocracy survival.To protect nd views ofthedifferent religious groups less, religious andethnic diversity arenot for theTurkish judi cal freedomsthroughoutlawing ion ofthecons gion toovertaketheState’s e atargetofthecompulsory favorofthepartybanin of politics. Thepolitics of thepoliticaldomain 571 ciary andpolitical The party was Thepartywas titutional order CEU eTD Collection online at online Turkey’s Ikinci, Seeforexample, Sinan universities. atthe ban ofheadscarf abolition the amendment aimedat Constitutional of initiative aparty wasthe ban “persisted inits rigid andauthoritarian interpretation” the partywas deniedhalf ofitspublicfunding. Inthisjudgment theConstitutional Court judges decided thatAKPartybecame afocalpoint of anti-secularism activ was onevoteshortoftherequiredqualifiedmajority ofsevenjudges)but10outthe11 shining assomeone might seeitfrom thefirst While someone cancalltheAKPartycaseavictor 574 573 572 does notmean thatIslamic fundamentalism willcome backtomorrow. However,thecase international community(especially theEU),or the dissolution: theneed to support the majority. Itishowevernoteasytoconcludewith certaintywhatmade theCourtnotvotefor democracy applicationasthetargetwas governingpartywithahugeparliamentary protection asinthemajority ofmodern democracies. tendency” inTurkeyisstillquitestrongand majority oftheCourtinfavor of theAKPartyclosure indicatesthat “theprohibitionist constitutional principle of theTurkish Republic. This fact combined withan absolute the Constitutional CourtofTurkeyhandedout governing politicalpartyinTurkeysince2002 overturned therelevantamendment inJune2008). (however the move could beconsideredas http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/inde Ibid., 137. Ergun, in Turkey 30.07 of Court oftheConstitutional Decision The decision tobanAKPartywouldbeanunprecedented eventin themilitant Procedure tooutlawtheJusticeandDeve http://www.wsws.org/articles/2008/apr2008/turk-a02.shtml supra note 52, at 137. at 137. 52, note x.php?l=content&lang=en&id=137

223

Chief Prosecutor Seeks to to Seeks Chief Prosecutor glance. The party was not dissolved (the Court glance. Thepartywasnotdissolved(theCourt .2008, E.2008/1 (SPK), K.2008/2. Summary available at at Summary (SPK),K.2008/2. available E.2008/1 .2008, the judgment against AKPartydissolution. progress ofdemocracy, pressurefrom the wasinitiatedinMa a failure sofar as the Constitutional Court theconclusionthatli political partiesdonothavesame levelof y ofTurkishdemocracy thestoryisnotas 574 lopment Party(AKParty) which is a

. Main argument to initiate the procedure to to the procedure argumenttoinitiate . Main . 573 of thenotion of secularism as rch of2008.InJuly2008 Ban the Ruling AK, available theRuling Ban fting theheadscarfban ities. As a result ities. Asaresult 572

CEU eTD Collection 575 debate becausethejustificationforsuchameas headscarf. source oftheconstantpoliticaltensionsinTurk However, some backgroundinformation certainly the headscarfdebateinTurkeythisprojectanditwillgo beyondits purposeand scope. studies ofthe headscarf( I wouldfullyagreewith thestatement thatTurkey The included inthissurvey:theheadscarfbandebate. However, thereisanother dimension of militant Constitution (secularism) whichisaprecondition forthestabledemocratic regime inTurkey. the government aims toprotecttheparticular regime withmilitant democracyisthereasontobanapartyorparties: through thisprocedure of militant democracy buttosome extent only. and thedissolutionofpart not beextendedevenfurther.Thislineof militant democracy measure (whichisprobably democracy, andinterpretationofthecore parties with KurdishandIslamic sentiments more attentiontothearguments andjustific gave hopesthatthesituation withpolitical pl Facilitating Freedom of Religion or FreedomReligion of Facilitating Cover ControversyinContemporary Turkey Seeforexample Ozlem Denli,

Headscarf To conclude,thesituationwe At thispoint Iwouldliketostress thattheheadscarf bancaseisincluded intothis

Ban:

Background hijab Between Laicist State Ideology and the Modern Public Religion: The Head- The Religion: Public the Modern and Ideology State Laicist Between y shouldbeconsideredas

Belief: A Deskbook 497-511 (2005). (2005). 497-511 Deskbook Belief: A ). 575

of Unfortunately,itisnotfeasibletoprovideafullhistoryof

the can observe inTurkey can beconsidered as anexample , in ToreLindholm,W. , in Durham Cole G. Tahzib-Lie, &Bahoa

Debate ation broughtbythegovernme havior shouldprobablybefollowedinthefuture 224

theConstitutionto uralism might getbetterand courtswillpay ure givenbythegovernment isverysimilar to ey sincethe1980sinrelationtobanof

broader than necessary atthemoment) would and democracy practiceinTurkey thatshould be automatically posea threattoTurkish The main similarity of theexisting Turkish qualityoftheStat represents one of the most fascinating case representsoneofthemostfascinatingcase willhelptounders

the a measure oflastresort.

Turkish

Approach be protected through a be protectedthrougha e establishedinthe tand thenatureand nt toconvincethat

CEU eTD Collection 1930 wasoneofthemeasures banning ofthetraditionalTu worships andreligiousceremonies.” 580 579 578 577 576 modern nations,andreplaceitwiththehatthat isthecomm hat worncurrently,which hasbecome amark who wantstobecome family amember ofthe of headgear,whichiscompletelyunimportantin the justificationforlawintroducingbanof importance forthevisionofStateandsoci without anydistinctiononth through creationofthereligion-freezonewher the leadershipofAtatürk(MustafaKemel Pasha)wasdeclaredasecularrepublic. Muslim (more than90per cent). constitutional order. ban, theveryfirstreasongivenbygovern protect religiousfeelingsa Leaving asidethearguments Turkishgovernment ofthe abouttakingtheseactionsinorderto religion intheeveryday lifeofTurkish society the onegiven in cases of prohibition of political parties advocating for moreactive roleof rights to womenrights (in1934),replacement equal political granting amendment Code,Constitutional ofthe Swiss Civil the introduction (in 1928), religion The Dress (Regulation) Act of 3 McGoldrick, Ibid.,at 133. Among othermeasures couldbelistedtherepealof Ibid., at 133. McGoldrick, Later in1934abanwasimposed “onwearingre Turkey has apopulationofaround 70m supra note 553,132. at nd eliminate subversionofwome e groundofreligion:themain goaloftheAtatürkreforms. rkish headcoverformen (fez December 1943 (Law

578 of the Arabic alphabetwithLatin). 576 adopted in pursuit of the achievement of modernization In1923theCaliphatewasabolishedandTurkey(under 580 Itseems thattheissue ofheaddresswascrucial 225

al orderAtatürkhadinmind. Forexample,in of modern nations.We toabolishthe propose No 2596). Q. and discussingitwithin theConstitutionalprovisiondeclaringIslam astate e allcitizenswouldbetreatedequallyand ofdifferencebetweenTurkeyandother the head covers it was noted that “the issue theheadcoversitwasnotedthat“theissue and ofitself,isspecialvalueforTurkey ment isprotection ofthebasis illion peopleanditis overwhelmingly ligious attire other ) in1925andoftheIslamic veilin n throughliftingtheheadscarf on headgearofallmodern, thepoliticaldomain. than inplacesof 577 579 The

CEU eTD Collection female body,dressingitinaccordan environment wheresecularstates wasperceive background andspiritofthemodernization and attire butitfollowsfromthel 585 584 583 582 581 Turkish state wasremaining thesame for ma of religious attiretoamatter of Turkishnational security.” states facingthesame phenomenon). the issueofwearinganIslamic headscarfin was notunanimous andtheintellectualspol way thatIslamcannotpossibly closely undertheumbrella ofsecularism since i.e. inschoolsanduniversitie society, universitystudentswear Turkey’s newnationalidentityforaWestern global gaze.” the wholecountry:astateensuringmodern should beaccompanied withthepromotionofth civilized nations.” Comparative Perspectives Symposium: Perspectives Comparative Ibid., at 891. Ibid. . at 902. Ibid., Ibid., at 900. Alev Cinar, However, inthe1980sanunexpectedphen However, withinafewyearstime theheadscarf“wentfrom beingacontroversialitem The liberationofwomen wassupposedtobe Subversion and Subjugation in the Public Sphere: Secularism and the Islamic Headscarf 581 While thelaws mentioned abovedidnottargetformallyonlywomen’s

s. Aswasmentioned previousl eader’s statement and exist inauniversitycampus. ing theIslamic headscarfstartedtoappear inpublic places, Gendered Migrations 899 (2008). (2008). 899 Migrations Gendered ce withsecularidealsandpr andcivilizedlifeforitscitizens. 226

public(asinFranceandmanyotherEuropean ny years and wearing aheadscarfin public Atatürk’s reforms anditwasinterpretedina e visibilityofwomen itical communityares d “asthepolitical agent that unveiled the civilization ledtotheestablishment ofthe omenon startedtori spirit ofthelawsthatbreakthrough usedtodemonstrate thenew image of 583 584

585 Thereactiontothismovement y, thepublicspherewaskept Theofficialpositionofthe inciples soastodisplay in thepublicsphere. till deeplydividedon se withinTurkish 582 Thedescribed , 33 CEU eTD Collection including classrooms, unive country –andcalledfortheenforcement of “Islamic threat” –the single most important threatto the well-being andsecurity of the Security Councildeclaredthehead Moreover, inordertocalm downtherisingpo a headscarfisperceived asadangeritwasmain reasontooutlawThe FaziletPartisi(the religion inthepublicdomain asdangerousfor established structureandpartic parties withIslamic agendahave political experience oftheState.Therefore, constitutional orderofthec abroad. end, LeylaSahinhadtoleave later wassubjectedtothedisciplinary proceedings bytheuniversity administration. Inthe studies forwearingaheadscarf. Latershewas was deniedaccesstothe lectures, tutorials,an between awoman of Turkish nationality andher ownStatebegan in1997 whenLeylaSahin 588 587 586 coming fromTurkeyistheLeylaSahinstory. universities wasbannedthroughdifferent practice before LeylaSahin Case seeMcGoldrick, headscarf-hijab. concerning the refusal to provide the degree certificate for women provided identity photograph wearing Theother case in the similarvein is Karaduman and Others v.Turkey (2008), Application No. 8810/03 - case Cinar, headscarve on regulations the of account For detailed The Turkish Constitution clearly indicates th The most famous and controversial (but The most andcontroversial famous supra 549. note rsities andpublicoffices.” ountry anditisexplained

ular qualitiesof theStateandseesthat anypresence of similar reasonsbehind them: theStatewantstopreserve her home countryandgotofi scarf “asoneofthemain indi supra note553 227

588 the headscarfbanandel the establishedorder(e denied entrancetothewritten examination and pularity ofwearinghead a banontheheadscarfinallpublic places, governmental regulationsandcirculars. d coursesonthefifthyearofheruniversity s wearing in educational institutions and the judicial the judicial and institutions s wearing ineducational Theeventsleadingtothe long-lasting battle not theonly)caseonheadscarfdebate at secularism hasaspecial placeinthe 587 , at 135-137. , at135-137.

justified bythehistorical and cators ofwhattheycalledthe nish hermedical education ven advocatingwearing imination ofpolitical scarves, the National 586

CEU eTD Collection 4.2.3. affiliated anyhow withChristianitywasnorma well (itwas notthecase before mainly dueto militant democracy might beusedagainst political fascism ofseparatistandnationali orsupportive jurisprudence oftheEuropeanstates concerns mentioned inaprevious chapterthatthe including awiderrangeofpoli democracy logic isusedbygovernmentstoaddre party prohibition. And moreover, itisevident from the Turkishexample thatmilitant headscarves inpublicplaces. democracy argument in doingboth banning certai Turkish government (includinglegislator,execu Turkish government later,butwhatisobviousfrom allthediscussionaboveisthat 589 branches inordertosuppress political dissen all procedural guaranteestobe ensured inorde the prohibition ofpoliticalpartiesmustbeame the businessofbanningpoliticalpartiescomes in appear tobeunprecedentedpr A considerablenumber ofpoliticalpartiesdissolv Militant Virtue Party)in2001. list as applicant withdr list asapplicant Fazilet Partisi and Kutan v. Turkey (2006), (2006), Applica Turkey v. Kutan and FaziletPartisi Militant Therefore, itconfirms my

Democracy Secularism ew the application. application. the ew

in 589

Turkey: Iwillelaborateon theassessmen in

actice fortheEuropeandemocracies. The Turkish activism in Turkey: tical ideologiesbeingbanned

Business argument that militant democracy isbeingextendedbeyond Businessas

as

228

Usual tion No. 1444/02. The casewasstroke out ofthe Court’s t and eliminate competitors from politics.The l formost oftheEuropean states). majority of thecase-law coming from the r to minimize the risk of abuse by the political r tominimize theriskofabusebypolitical political ideologies referring tocommunism, the fact that thepresence of political parties asure oflastresortforthegovernmentswith st movements, butTurkeydemonstrates that contrast with the prevailing approach where contrastwiththeprevailingapproachwhere ss theallegedthreatofreligiousextremism, ed inTurkey within only coupleofdecades

tive, andjudiciary)referstoamilitant players withareligion-related agenda as n political parties, and the prohibition of Usual t of themeasures taken by the

from thepublicdebate.Itwas CEU eTD Collection 591 590 it isdonethroughpeacefuldemocra indicates thatthefoundationalprinciplesof Turkishrepublic cannotbequestionedevenif three articlesoftheTurkishConstitution. to attainbroaderprotectionforpoliticalpartie institution had achance toestabl Turkish Constitutional Courtis also partially procedure to initiate the case(without any substa which goesbeyondcriteriarecognizedbythe partially aresultoftheregul Constitutional Court had todeal withparty pr Turkey isthatwhatshouldbeanexcepti was motivated bythemovetobangoverningAKParty. provisions whicharerelevant tothe pr Europe sent a request to theVenice Commission“toreviewtheconstitutional and legal September 2008theMonitoring Committee ofthePa wide rangeofinternationalorganizations,incl of notonlythosecloselyinvolve the ECHRonpartyprohibitionagainstTurkey. applied withsome defects.Thisconclusioncan number of bannedpoliticalparties in Turkeyse Constitutional and Legal Provisions Relevant to the Prohibition of Political Parties in Turkey, PartiesinTurkey, of Political Prohibition the to Relevant Provisions Legal and Constitutional Ibid. Ibid. the on DemocracyLaw Opinion Commission). for through (Venice Commission ForseeEuropean details The situation withparty prohibition inthis The case-law of theConstitutional Courtof Turkeyonpolitical parties’ dissolution The first flaw inthemanner militant democracy logicisinterpreted and appliedin

atory regime –listofgrounds ish astricter test andinterpre d inmonitoring andresearchi tic process.Ingene ohibition of political partiesinTurkey”. 229

onal measure became aregularone andthe ECHR andVeniceCommission;relativelyeasy s; includingthe interpreta uding theCouncilofEurope.Forexample,in 590 besupportedwithnumer nds astrong signalthat militant democracy is ohibition cases onregularbasis. This isthe ntive democratic control)–butnotonly.The responsible forthecu

particular jurisdiction rliamentary AssemblyoftheCouncil ral, theprotectionof thebasisof t the party activities’ regulation to findpartyunconstitutional ng thissubject-matter butof tion given to the first tion giventothefirst rrent situation. This ous casesdecidedby has gainedattention supra 591 Therequest note 224. note 224. CEU eTD Collection introduced intoTurkish society in1920s.Itwas dictated bythepoliticalsituation andalleged and anyattemptstochallengeitautomati Constitutional Courtinsists onthestatement that missing fromthecasesofpartyprohibitionan consequences ittries toprevent areindeed da democracy givenabove,theStatemust have headscarf ban than the previous one. According to problematic aspectofmilitant democracy practice Apart fromthepracticeofbanningpolitical Militant between Stateandreligiousgroupsforever. be usedasajustification tocutanydebateon the roleof religion andrethinkingtherelations be ausefultooltoguardthe with such backgroundisanabuse ofthemilitant democracy concept.Militantdemocracy can entertain Atatürk’sdreams abouttheidealsoci in Turkeynottoprotectandguardthedemocr Turkish Constitutional Court. Infact, principles of secularism andunityof theStateare used facilitated by the relevant constitutional pr the Statewere removed artificially from th in awaytobananydiscussionoverthem. Theprin of thepoliticaldebate. It also does not mean th not followthattheprincipleforming thebasis constitutional order falls within theboundaries Society First of all,theideaof secularism which

Democracy

in

Turkey, constitutionally recognizedprincipleofsecularism, butitcannot

or

How cally qualifyasdang Islam 230

ngerous fordemocracy.Ibe ovisions andjurispru e publicspaceanddebate.Thisprocesswas ety. Referencetomilitant democracy measures of theconstitutionalor at states caninterpret constitutional principles acy only.Rathertheyar of militant democracy logic. However,itdoes is beingkeptawayfrom anyquestioning was parties onaregularbasisthereisanother is d headscarf bancoming from The Turkey. convincingarguments thattheactsand inTurkeywhichhasmorerelevance tothe religionmustbekeptawayfrom politics

the theoretical justification of themilitant ciple ofsecularism andtheindivisibilityof Dangerous erous fordemocracy. for

a dence developed by the dence developedbythe Predominantly der cannotbeasubject e invokedinorderto lieve thiselement is

Muslim

CEU eTD Collection with anIslamic agendaandtheheadscarf ban. talk aboutonlyintheirhomes. Thisgoesfor related toIslam) awayfrom thepublicdomain andwantsittobeinternal matter peoplecan affiliates withonereligious group,insistsonke universities, etc).Itlookssomehow strange going oninthesociety(i.e.problems ofKu if itimposes principlesandvi Turkey. Ibelievethatno statecansucceed in strongly disagreeswiththefash never acountrywithpredominantly Muslim populationandisnotatth its 2004Lawontheheadscarf-hija reality looksirrelevantandunjustifiedasitrefe attempts oftheTurkishgovernment toconnect years agoand seeifthey arestill compatible and acceptableinsocietytothefullextent. The would arguethatprobablyit immediatelytothepu the principleofsecularism andallowreligionflow adjust itbettertothecurrent considerably sincethenandth achieve thesebiggoals.However,itisapparentthat the political situationhaschanged and elimination ofreligionfrom publicdom the Turkey wantedtoconvinceitsEu 592 need forsuddenchangesinor McGoldrick, It isapparentfrom thenumber ofsupporte supra note 555,133. at state ofaffairs.Idonotargue

is notabadideatoreconsid e Atatürkreforms andideasshoul ews peopledonotshareanddoes ion principleofsecularism be der togetinclos ropean neighborsthatitiswas b bananditsapproachtothis 231

ensuring asecure andhappy lifeforitscitizens both aspectsmentionedabove:politicalparties that theState,where90%ofpopulation rs, for example, tothepracticeofFranceand rs, forexample, eping anyreligiousmatters (including those theheadscarfbandebatewithcurrent ain wasconsideredasoneofthewaysto rs oftheRefahandAKpartiesthatsociety er touchandcooperationwithEurope. rdish minorities, the headscarf baninthe er theideasintroducedabout100 herethatTurkeyshouldabandon ing promoted andguaranteedin issueingeneral(Francewas a civilizedandmodern state, d beinterpretedinawayto not wanttolistenwhatis e moment either). blic sphere. RatherI 592

CEU eTD Collection with fundamental democratic principles.” provided that means used to that end are legal anddemocratic andthat thechanges proposed isitself compatible fundamental the to inimical as intrinsically regarded be 593 in elementary schoolistotallydifferentfrom religious clothinginpublicinstitu uncontrolled activities of religious parties; neit enemies ofthedemocracy. headscarf ban(at least inthe universities) or operate underthenormalized threat ofbeingbannedandthoseadvocating forabolition ofthe democracy. Thisassumption causes the situati religion inapartyprogram andthespeeches ofitsleadersareassumed advocating tointroduceShariaandreplaceth Muslim partyadvocatingforbetteraccommodationofreligiousbeliefsand aparty and threatto thedemocracy. Thegovernment isnotwillingtoacceptthe differencebetweena government andjudiciarydonotseeitnecessarytoestablishthelinkbe women wearing headscarvesareconsidered da necessarily undemocratic. any religion-relatedagendais, actions. First,itcouldnotconvincepoliticians potential, but becausethe government didnotbr actions. Notbecauseitwasasituation beyondth Parties in Turkey, Turkey, Parties in Political of tothe Prohibition Relevant Legal Provisions and theConstitutional on Opinion Commission). The same conclusion was reached by theEuro I believethe Turkishgovernment didnotsucceed intaking militant democracy Once again,Idonotargue supra note 224: “a political party animated by the moral values imposed by a religion, cannot cannot areligion, by imposed moral the values by animated party “apolitical 224: note 593 IntheTurkish example the problem isthatIslamic partiesand

tions shouldnotbeanissue(i per se that Turkeyoranyothe , dangerousfordemocracy;suchapartyisnot pean Commission forDemocracy throughLaw (Venice 232

the maturethe femaleuniversitystudentinamatter women coveringtheirhe principles of democracy, asset forth intheConvention, her doIargue thatahe and commentatorsthatapoliticalpartywith ngerous forthedemocracy assuch,andthe e existinglegalsystem. Anyreferencesto ing convincingarguments insupportofsuch on wherecertaintypesofpoliticalparties e reachofmilitant democracy’sprotective .e. headscarfwornbyteachers r democracy shouldallow tween theseactivities adscarf oranyother ad areperceivedas to beathreat CEU eTD Collection means thatStateandreligion exist and func principle of secularism iswidelypresent inmodern democratic constitutions anditbasically phenomena canbebannedanditcouldjus parties buttoothersignsofreligiousextr Turkey wasagoodchoicetotest it.Thisstat democracy canbeutilized toaddress thethr proper militant democracy practice. headscarves inthe university areable todestro prove that activities of apart left aloneinitsbusinessofprotectingthede democracy andarguethatitisdonefor thesake justified andprovedtobeamatter ofsurvival. sometimes militant democracy interference is It iswell-known thatpolitical matters coul the judiciary isexpected toreveal indisputab this particularpartywithcertainagendaandpr parties takes greatresponsibility asit,inf changes awaited bythesociety. TheConstitutiona representing theinterestsof 594 of coveringtheirheads). International Law International Karayanni, headscarf laws in France Germany France and in laws headscarf For more detailed account on different approaches to In conclusion tothis sectionI wouldlike The Statecannotnothideanyactions itfinds Religion in the Public Sphere: A Comparative AComparative Sphere: the Public in Religion (2007); McGoldrick, McGoldrick, (2007); 594 Ionlywanttoclaim thattheSt the majority of the population and ban it for advocating for a the majorityofpopulationandbanitforadvocatinga

icular politicalpartyisdang , 36 Theory and Society 4 (2007). (2007). Society4 and , 36 Theory supra note 555; Christian Joppke, Joppke, Christian note 555; act, substitutes the willof thepeoplewho votefor eat coming from religiousextremism andIguess 233

le and compelling reasons in supportoftheban. emism (i.e. wearing religious clothes). These emism (i.e.wearingreligiousclothes).These mocracy. Where thegovernment isreluctantto ement goesnotonlyforthereligion-affiliated y Turkishdemocracy, it eferences. Inordertojustify suchinterference, d notbehandedtothemajority onlyand tified bytheneedtosustaindemocracy. The needed. However,itislegitimate onlywhen tion separately.Militan ofdemocracy; moreover, theStatecannotbe Islamic headscarf see: Wi l Courtdeciding onprohibition of religious to re-state my argument thatmilitant necessaryunder theumbrella ofmilitant Analysis of German, Israeli, American and ate cannotignorepoliticalparties erous and thatwomen wearing State Neutrality and Islamic andIslamic State Neutrality nfried Brugger&Michael could neverqualifyas t democracy canbe CEU eTD Collection values sharedbythesuper-majority ofthepopulationcannotbecompared withfascist or discussed andincludedintothepoliticalpartie excluded from thepolitical space and therefore st Someone mightobject government toprovehowtheymight bede not coverautomatic exclusion ofcertainma of thepopulationaffiliatesitself justify when thematters of religionare keptaw entertaining acertainvisionofthesocietydr should beallowedtoprotectedby militant democracy. within politicalspaceareundemocratic. Therefore, interpreted inawaythatreligionis notamatte conservative parties referring to Churchsupport onmany occasions. Secularism isnot is applicable tothetraditions of Christian the Biblearenotconsidered asenemies ofdemocracyinmanystabledemocracies. Thesame as dangerous for democracy. Political leaders visiting church servicesand taking an oathon program/activities ofthepoliticalpartiesshoul democracy shouldnotbeinterpretedinaway proper applicationof themilitant democracy religion/race/ethnic group canbe justified inso becoming apoliticalideology. perfectly utilizedtoguardtheseprinciples The principle ofmilitant democracy shoul The example oftheprohibitionpoliticalparties withdirect refe that fascism andcommunism (andso with aparticular beliefsystem. Militantdemocracy alsodoes Democratic partiesin western democracies and 234

tters from politicswithoutanyburden onthe eamed longtime agobyAtatürk.Itishardto andpreventreligionovertakingState ay from politicsespecially wherethemajority d beprohibitedandauto s’ agenda.However,thereligiousviewsand me circumstances andthat could qualify as a trimental fortheexistenceofdemocracy. r forpublicdebateandanyreferencestoit ates cansometimes vetosome matters tobe concept inpractice. However,militant that anyreferenceto exactly thisinterpretationofsecularism d notbeused byparanoidpoliticians me otherideologies)arealso matically considered thereligionin rence toaparticular CEU eTD Collection were foundtobedecidedbytheTurkishauthorit militant secularism doesnotlookproblematic asbothcases –RefahPartyandLeylaSahin body: theECHR. Therefore,from theECHRcase problem withtheTurkishexample isthatits possibility toprotectits democracy throughm the conditions ofmilitant democracy legitimacy. Th secularism shapedbyAtatürk’sideassome hun Turkey uses militant democracy first of all,too often, second, toprotect corrupted version of of religious extremism andre-establishing th religion andjustifyitbytheneedtoprotectdemocracy? or gaymarriage) thenwhyshouldtheTurkis Christianity isallowedtobetakenintoacc great controversyarediscussedfrom adiffer refer tothemfromtime totime andthereareex from beingdiscussedonly at homes. Peoplewilltalkabout itandpoliticians willhaveto and whenthesevaluesaresharedbysome 90% governments may wishit. similar ideologywith.Religiousfeelingsca Turkey hasthepotentialtoprotect its cons Religious beliefsleadtoparticularvaluessharedbyth ount ondebatesdifferentmatters (likeabortion nnot bebannedbythelawnomatter howmuch actions werefoundlegitimate bythesupervisory 235

h government shoulddenyanyinteractionwith ilitant democracy means. However,thebiggest ent pointofview,incl e Caliphate, etc. However,atthe moment dred yearsago,andthird,withoutobserving ies inaccordancewith amples fromother countrieswhereissuesof of the population a state cannot keep them ofthepopulationastatecannotkeepthem titutional structure from thepossiblethreat -law pointofview,theTurkishversion erefore, Turkeyabusedtosome extentthe e members ofthesame group European standards. uding religiousones. CEU eTD Collection to the abuse clauseand strikedown casesc established interpretation andapplication of militant democracy anddomuchmore thanrefer However, democratization oftheCentralandEa 596 595 were struckdownunderArtic argumentation. Mostofsuchapplicationshaveb In regards tothese actors the mainly withcasesconcerning Fascist and(or) justification. Notsurprisingly,from theverybeginningofC procedure andtypesoflimitation imposedonpo dissolution: allegedly dangerousideologyad political parties–canbesplitintofe remaining truedemocracy is. extremist religious movements andhowdifficult thetask toaddress thesethreats while democracy might faceincombating allegedth problems. Third, this jurisdiction demonstrates many difficulties andchallenges that has producedasubstantivebodyofthecase-law which theymustfollowandabideby.Second,inthelastcoupleofdecadesthis institution particular legalissuesaregiventothecons Court withbindingjudgments for47stateswhic The ECHRisincludedinthiscase-studyforvarious Secularism inthePracticeofECHR 4.3. MohamedcomestoStrasbourg:OnMilitantDemocracyan For details see Harvey, in in For seeHarvey, details “Mohamed Comes to Strasbourg” expression is adopted from Goldhaber, in The ECHRjurisprudence onmilitant democracy initsclassic version –prohibition of supra note 52, at 413. at413. 52, note

Court developed apretty consistent and rather simple line of le 17oftheConvention(theso-calledabuse clause). w groupsdependinguponthegroundsforparty 236

595 iderable amount democracies oftheEuropean reats coming from growingfundamentalist and Communist ideologiessu oncerning theprohibiti vocating for whichpartiesfacedissolution

h means thatatleastthegeneralguidance on een declared either manifestly ill-founded or een declaredeithermanifestlyill-foundedor on themilitant democracy related issues and stern Europe made theECHRreconsiderits litical partiesthrough militant democracy reasons.Firstofall, supra note 213. ourt’s ‘life’ithadtodeal on ofpoliticalparties pporters andfellows. d thePrincipleof it is an international it isaninternational 596

CEU eTD Collection freedom ofassociationonthenumber ofpeop members, andthereforethisjudgment amounts the ECHRjurisprudence onmilitant democracy th on thefindingsinthiscase.However,itisimpo 598 597 at the material time, andwhatit chapter onTurkey,sothereisnoneedtorep in itsdecisiontodissolveapoliticalparty.Th 4.3.1. democracy. have alsochangedtogether with theprocess of extending the paradigm ofmilitant established standards and justification for militant democracy cases intheECHRjudgments appear anditisbeingextendedbeyonditstraditional sphere ofapplication.Howeverthe case-study istodemonstrate that the militant de threat coming from growingreligiousextremist movements. democracy conceptchanged sinceearlycase-la more generalissuesofstatevs.religion.Inwh decide upontheprohibitionofquite and applynotionsofmilitant democracy initsju post-communist Europeanstateswasnottheonly supportive ofallegedlydangerousideologies Court’s Refah PartisiandOthersvTurkey Importance Refah Partisi (Wefare Party) and Others v. Turkey (2001). v. (2001). Turkey Others and Party) (Wefare Partisi Refah to at130. 3.3.2 seeChapter democracy in relation militant political parties on For jurisprudence

Mohamed

Attitude of Dialogue

to comes

the

Issues on to

Strasbourg, Political wasbannedfor.Atthispointit

of 598

specific(atthatstage)types Political wasthefirstoccasion fortheECHRtosupportTurkey Issues

or 237

eat how the party appeared, how popular was it eat howthepartyappeared,popularwasit

e RefahPartycasewasdiscussedpartlyinthe

at follows I am goingtotrackhowthemilitantat followsIam Pluralism, How and ideas.However,thedemocratization in

le affected.TheECHRfoundthat“Turkey rtant tonoteinthelightofdiscussionon mocracy conceptismore alivethanitmight w andwasextendedtoaddressthealleged risprudence. Atsome pointitwascalledto to thelargestsingle at theRefah Partyhadoverfour millionof dimension of theCourt’s task tointerpret

the Refah

Diversity 597 isappropriatetoconcentrate

Partisi Themajor purposeofthis of politicalparties,andon of interference withthe

Case Opinions

changed and

the the

CEU eTD Collection campaign forachangeinthelaworlega However, theCourtforfirsttime systemized itsviewsabout 605 604 603 602 601 600 599 systems, introducingdiscrimination onthegrounds principle of secularisminthreedimensions: ECHR wenttodeepanalysisinordera original paradigm (minor polit demonstrates theCourt’sstruggle inthe the Court,waytheseprinciples wereappliedinRefahPartisi caseisproblematic and pluralism” and “freedomofsp cases). TheCourtreaffirmed itsearlieres (so, theCourt ismore thanconsistent inusin independent judicialpower.” powers andauthorityoftheState” given arole” others.” public safety,preventionofdisorder orcrime andpr pursued legitimate aims listedintheConvention, Ibid. Ibid. 47. para Ibid., para.44. Ibid., Ibid. Ibid. 43. para Ibid., 42. para Ibid., a) While theseformulated principles aretotallyco b)

“the means usedtothatendmust in principles.” “the changeproposedmust itselfbeco 599 Itwasdeclaredonceagainthat“democ 600 ; “onlyinstitutions created byand for thepeoplemay bevestedwiththe 605

602

eech protects alsoideasthat Article11must alsobeconsid ical partiesbeingbulliedbythedominating parties). The 601 and “statutelawmustbein ssess theallegedviolationbyRefahparty every respectbelegal and democratic” l andconstitutionalbasisoftheState: application ofmilitant democracybeyondthe 238

tablished principles:“nodemocracy without Refah intended to set up a plurality of legal Refah intendedtosetupapluralityoflegal g thistechnique tode namely -protection of nsistent withtheprev of belief;RefahwantedtoapplySharia to mpatible withfundamental democratic racy requiresthatth otection oftherights that offend, shock ordisturb.” ered inthelightofArticle10 terpreted andappliedbyan

how apoliticalpartymay cide partydissolution nationalsecurityand ious jurisprudenceof e peopleshouldbe andfreedoms of

604

603

CEU eTD Collection violation of the Convention. retain it.TheCourt also ithadadoptedanambiguous their intention ofsetting upapluralityoflega and consideredthem ashavingmet apressingso the necessityofpenaltiesimposed onthe incompatible withtheConvention. InthiscasetheCourtpositively answered thequestion on 609 608 607 606 judgment onthesame case.However,dissentingjudgeswerenotalone democratic orderinTurkey”. encourage actsofviolence orre with Conventionnorms, todestroyorundermine after enteringGovernment, tookanystepstor lack of“anycompelling orconvincingevidence Bratza). judgment (jointdissentingopinionofj political method. the Muslimcommunityandreferencesmadeby Refahmembers tojihad(holywar)asa Ibid., at 47. The Grand Chamber where the caseas referred handed 81. para Ibid., 69. para Ibid., There isinteresting and substantial dissenting opinionsattached tothemajority 608 Themost important partof thedissenting opinion isthestatement thatthereis steps thatmight prejudice civil peacean concrete through it implement to made is attempt an before provisions, Convention’s the with democracy, amayState reasonably forestall theexec part of inherent isitselfan parties and theideas pluralism since of isconcerned, parties political of left to appreciation of themargin though even 606 took theviewthat OnebyonetheECHRfoundallin

609 ligious hatred,orotherwisetoposeathreat tothelegaland LaterthisclaimwasaddressedintheGrandChamber stance withregardto udges Fuhrmann,LoucaidesandSirNicolas d the country’s democratic regime. 239

l systems andintroducingIslamic law(Sharia); founding members ofdiss ealize politicalaims whichwereincompatible to suggestthattheparty,whetherbeforeor out the unanimousout decision cial needasRefah’sleadershad declared States must bea narrow the secularsociety,toengageinor ution of such a policy, which is incompatible isincompatible a which policy, such of ution theuseofforcetogainpowerand tentions oftheRefahpartyas one where the dissolution the dissolution where one in theirdisagreement olved politicalparty 607 that there hasbeenno that

CEU eTD Collection 612 611 610 concrete stepstoimplement policyincompatible and a withthestandards oftheConvention required towait,beforeintervening,untilapoliti (in responsetothedissentingopinion approval of State’s right of preventiveinterv oftheGrandChamber’sdecisionis party’s leadership.However,themaincontribution arguments tobetakenintoaccount. Ratherit of itsmembers. Itheld thattheConstitution a Court elaboratedontheissueoflitigiousness dissolved (as they were experienced politicians and members of parliament). Inaddition, the applicants to thecasewere definitely inpositi the individual adequate protecti are indicatedwithsufficientclar entail.” degree thatisreasonable inthecircumstances sufficient precision toenablethem –ifneedbe,withappropriate advice–toforesee,a question; requiringthatitbe“accessibleto measure shouldhaveabasisindomestic lawanditalsoreferstothequalityofin by law.Itwasfoundthattherequirement ‘pre The GrandChamber decisionpaid Grand many scholars, commentators,politicians,a with theCourt’sfindingsandconclusion.Thecas 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98and 41344/98. Ibid., para 57. 57. para Ibid., 57. para Ibid., Case of Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey. Grand Chamber (2003). Applications Nos.

Chamber 611 TheCourtpointedoutif“thescopeofth

Decision 610

on againstarbitrary interference.” ity, havingregardtotheleg moreattentionastowhethe nd RefahPartyleadersan ention (militant democracy). TheCourtdeclared 240

on toforeseethepossibility oftheirpartybeing nd program of apolitical , the consequences which a given action may , theconsequenceswhichagivenactionmay the personsconcernedandformulated with Chamber judgment) that cal partyhas seizedpower andbegun totake must becomparedwiththeactions of the ofapolitical partyoftheactsandspeeches scribed bylaw’means firstofallthatthe e discretionandthemanner ofitsexercise e wasandisbeingwidelycriticizedby itimate aim inquestion, togive r thelimitation wasprescribed 612 TheCourt foundthatthe d supporters. party are nottheonly a“statecannotbe CEU eTD Collection 617 616 615 614 613 Party wasadvocatingIslamic Lawandviolence TheECHRruledagainstRefahbyfourto confirmed bytheunanimousdecisionofGrand right toadvocate for changes whicharenot established case-lawandbroad theRefa DEP).In and Party, OZDEP,HEP, few times inbanning parties withaKurdish freedom ofassociationisnotadeadletter.Tu political Islam intheEuropeanproject. From previous caselawitclearly follows that statement thatShariaisnot AsIalreadymentioned oftheECHRonRefah casecaused above,thedecision numerous critiquesand attacks. Themost cont the Courtstatedthathistoricalcont the partywhich wasincompatible withtheconcept ofa’democratic society.’ formed awholewhichgaveclearpicture of party asawhole; speeches oftheleadersandmemb supposing ithadbeenprovedtoex threat todemocracy:1)whetherthere waspl and imminent.” democracy, eventhoughthedange Ibid., para. 105. 105. para. Ibid., Ibid. Ibid. 104. para Ibid., 102. para Ibid., Then theCourt providedatestonhowto 613 615

and, 3) whethertheactsand speech compatible withdemocracyand

interpretation ofassociationa ext alsohastobetakenintoaccount. ers ofthepoliticalpartyconcernedwere imputable tothe ist, wassufficientlyimminent; r ofthatpolicyfordemocracy compatible withthenationalConstitution. 241

rkey wasfoundinviolationoftheConventiona a modelofsocietyconc ausible evidence thatthe risktodemocracy, h casetheCourtseems todepartfrom its agenda (theCommunist roversial part isprobably thattheCourt’s Chamber. ItwasconcludedthattheRefah to pursuethisgoal. assesswhetherapoliticalpartyposes three votes, but later the judgment was threevotes,butlaterthejudgment was es imputableto thepoliticalparty therefore thereisnoplacefor l freedom whichincludes the 614 issufficientlyestablished 2)whether theactsand eived andadvocatedby The Courtintensively 617 Party,theSocialist

616 Furthermore, CEU eTD Collection 618 of religiousfundamentalism. has migrated toanewdomain andassesshowmuch limitation of religious clotheswearing withapu democracy. onthe InthenextsectionIamgoingtodiscussECHRjurisprudence solution adopted byStrasbourgCourtcanbeseen on Islamic headwearis aserious issueforma decisions onheadscarvesbanscoming toStra cases aswell.Themost evidentpartofthejuri ECHR isindirectlypromotingexactlythism undemocratic andIslamic lawsarestable and judgment andkeptondecidingcaseswithth anger andmade accusationsofIslamophobia. with thelatter.Some commentatorsevenexpr not compatible, andthepresenceofformer fully justifytheCourt’sprovocat government withoutenteringinto that theTurkishIslamists arepopularenough abuse anddestroydemocracy throughthedemocr feasible that totalitarian political movements or parties inEuropewhichmanaged toseizethepo cited partyleaders’ statementsalso referredtothehistory andspeeches.It ofantidemocratic Goldhaber, in The Strasbourg Courtdid notwanttohearand acceptthe critiqueof itsRefah supra note 213, at 93. at93. note 213,

ive andaggressive statement thatIslam anddemocracy are anycoalition.However,noneofthesearguments could 242

eaning andimage ofIslam intheothergroupof 618 essed theopinionthatsuchstatement provokes sbourg infactnotonlyfromTurkey.Theban sprudence todemonstrate thisstatement isthe ganized intheforms of

in politics excludes anypossibility tocoexist rpose todemonstrate thatmilitant democracy ny Europeanstatesatthemoment andthe wer throughdemocratic means isstill andit andatsome stagetheycouldform the not acceptable inademocratic state.The andanalyzedthroughthelensesofmilitant atic means available tothem. Itwasfound e assumptionthatShariaisinherently doesithelpto address the alleged threat political partiesmight CEU eTD Collection 619 declared thatthereisno contradiction withthe Convention andleftMissSahin’sreligious feelings andbeliefunprotecteditwas judgment of29June2004heldunanimously th lectures and takingexamswhile stress thatthecaseconcerned afemale medi necessary to revealthedetailed statement off Turkey, of it:justification forsuch measures believe theCourtstoppedhalfwa justified onlywithmilitant democracy reason principle ofsecularism. Allheadscarfbancas itslineofargumentationthe ECHRcontinued expression of religiousbelief withthe veryc interrelations betweensecularism anddemocracy aswell thecompatibility of particular agenda ofreligiousnature’andthereforeitin case from thefirstglance:partyprohibition.Ho extension of the scopeof theapplication wasarranged through theclassic militant democracy that the idea of militant democracy constitutional commitments toaprincipleofse emptive measures to protect core featuresofth judgment ontheRefahPartycasesuggests thatm In theprevioussections ofthis chapterI 4.3.2. Leyla Sahin v. Turkey (2004), Application no. 44774/98. 44774/98. no. Application (2004), Turkey v. Sahin Leyla Headscarves, The firstcaseinthe lineofheadscar 619 mentioned inthe previous section onmilit Religious

Extremism, covering herheadw y andappliedthelogicbutleft isatthe heart of the Court’sargumentation. Therefore, the as necessary torescue democracy. was trying todemonstrat 243

oncept ofdemocracy. Intheheadscarfbancases acts ofthecasehere.However,itisimportant to cal studentwhowasprohi cal evitably involvedtheC and e constitutionalorder, ing, butnotfreedom ofreligion. However,I Convention ifanadultfemale hastoleavethe es decidedbytheStrasbourgcourtcouldbe f bandisputeswascas cularism. ItisclearfromtheRefahjudgment on how democracy can protect itself and the canprotectitselfandthe on howdemocracy wever, thepartyinque ilitant democracyallowsstatestotakepre- Militant at therehadbeen ant secularism inTurkey. Idonot find it ith an Islamic headscarf.TheChamber Democracy outthemost important part which includesnowalso e that the recent ECHR ourt’s assessment ofthe e ofLeylaSahinv. stion hada‘pluralist bited fromattending no violation of the no violationofthe

CEU eTD Collection community. measure (nomatter howthecourts notion of constitutional order, i.e.theheadscarf banwasindeedas a militant democracy to upholdtheprincipleofsecularism whichisconsidered and accepted bytheECHR:limitation ofweari different fromtheotherArticle9casesbecause While thisapproachisusualforthefreedom of granted awide margin ofappreciationtodecide the statestodecideandregulatethemselves. country, arecontextandculturedependentth cases. Asaresult,theCourtmentioned thatrelig Convention andapplieditsusual While the case wasdecided inamilitant democracy 623 622 621 620 protected form of religiouspractice, itwasinpursuanceof alegitimate aim toban it. inspired bythereligiousbelief; various religiousgroups that freedom ofreligion manifestation canbelimited inorder toreconcile the interestof year afterthattheTurk university campus. Thecasewasreferredtothe country andfinishherhighereducationabroadforrefusaltoremove theheadscarfat See for example: Antje Pedain, 67. para. Ibid., 66. para. Ibid., 97. para. Ibid., The LeylaSahin judgment garneredsubstantiv The main arguments ofthe 623 However,thebestsummary oftheweaknessarguments given in the ish authoritiesdidnot 620 and,therefore, Article9doesnot Do Headscarfs Bite Headscarfs Do

621 and establishedtechniquesto and,whilewearingaheadscarfingeneralamounts toa and government refertoit). Court toupholdthenationalauthorities judgments were 244

violate theConvention. ? 63 Cambridge Law Journal 540 (2004). (2004). 540 Journal Law Cambridge 63 ? In ECHRterminology itmeansthatTurkeywas religioncases,Sahinandsubsequentcasesare ofthejustificationgiven bythegovernments ious practiceregulationvaryfromcountryto Grand Chamberwhichruledabitmorethan is amatter whichCourtusuallyleavesfor onmatters of religious attiretobe worn. ng religious attirewas dictated bytheneed spiritthe Courtrefers to Article 9of the e criticism from the tobeanimportant protecteveryactmotivated or handlefreedom ofreligion legal andscientific partofthewider 622

CEU eTD Collection 626 625 624 at thesame time moved evenfurtherawayfr France theECHRcontinueditspractice of refe democracy logicinfreedom ofreligioncases. “extremists” whoseekto impose theheadsc fundamentalism anditisvitaltodistinguishbetweenthosewhoweartheheadscarf Tulkens’ statement that“merely wearing assumption onhowaheadscarfisdangerous deeper andthatiswhytheCourtwassupposed about wearingaheadscarfbythisparticularap contravened thisprinciple.However,itis this case wasthreatening theprinciple of s worries orfears. secularism, thedissentingjudgewouldliketose ‘European Supervision.’ Asto case themargin of appreciation was interpreted university education. consensus on thismatter: none oftheMember appreciation: unliketheCourtst First ofallshe criticizes thecomparative argumen to supportthebanofwearingaheadscarfwhichis to give a summary of this opinion as it reflects themajor problem inthe Court’s justification Sahin judgment foundinthedissenting canbe Ibid., para.10. para.10. Ibid., 5. para Ibid., Leyla Sahin v. Turkey (2004). Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tulkens, para. 3. The caseof LeylaSahinwasnotthefurthest steptowards applyingmilitant 625 IagreewithTulkens Jthatthere we 624 Inaddition,Tulkens Jexpressedher

the measures takenbytheState ated, JudgeTulkenspointedoutthattherewasaEuropean obvious thatthecasewasnot(andcouldbe) arf astheydootherreligioussymbols.” 245 ecularism orthatsheconductedanyactwhich

om thestandardswhichmakethesemeasures plicant only.Theissuein rence tothemilitant democracy argument but opinion ofJudgeTulkens.Ifinditimportant States hasabanonhe e indisputablefactsa a headscarfcannotbeassociatedwith in awaytofreetheMemberStatefrom the In the subsequent cases originating from Inthesubsequentcasesoriginatingfrom for democracy. I would agree with Judge for democracy. IwouldagreewithJudge t of themajority tojustify thewide margin togiveastrongerargument thanmere ofrelevanceforthischapteringeneral. re no evidencethat theapplicant in concern thatinthisparticular to preservetheprincipleof nd reasonsbutnotmere adscarves extendedto thiscasewas much 626

CEU eTD Collection rights protectedbyArticle9. on thefreedom ofreligionanddoesnotaddanythi The caseingeneralrepresents an lasting battlewheretheFrench school forrefusingtoremoveherheadscarfduringphysicaleducationclassesbecamealong- 628 627 protect andpreservetheconstitu troubling thing aboutthe ECHRjurisprudence measures whicharein fact theapplication of militant democracy. However,themost preserve theprinciple of secularism thenit we agree withtheCourt’s argument that th secularism (whichaccordingtothe Refahcasefallsoutside theprotection ofArticle11).If headscarf constitutes an attitudethat fails to training classes forreasons ofhealthandsafety However, insteadofgivingajustification regulation concernedonlysportsclassesandgirlscouldwearheadcovers inother classes. secure theprinciplesecularism minor freedom ofreligioncaseasitisbui within themargin ofappreciationtheState. possible alternativesfor tolerance betweendifferentre appreciation andthereforeitis inthesematters free todecidehowitisgoingensuremutual decided caseofDogru legitimate and democratic. The latest development inECHR jurisprudence wastherecently Ibid., para 75. 75. para Ibid., 27058/05. No. Application (2008), France v. Others and Dogru of Case . 627 the Muslim girltocover theirhead

The caseofanelevenyearold

ligious groups.The regulationof commitment tosecularism ( . TheCourt’sargumentation isabitpuzzlingastheschool TheStatewasreconfirmedto tional commitment tothe principle ofsecularism isthefact example oftheapplication demonstrates anotherexample ofthepre-emptive lt aroundatheme ofmilita 246

respect France’s constitutional commitment to 628 whyascarfmight be e main reasonfortheheadscarf ban wasto , theCourtwentontoco However,thecasecannotbeconsideredasa in applyingmilitant democracyrationaleto ng inrelationtothescopeandnatureof Muslim girlbeingexpelledfrom during thesports classes,wasleft laicite thewell-settled jurisprudence theschoolwear,including haveawidemarginof ) became thecentralissue. prohibited inphysical ncy beinginvokedto nclude thatwearing a CEU eTD Collection 629 interesting tasktospeculate about howtheSt the system asawhole)isthe measures toprotectdemocracy(eventhroughthe religious symbols. Theonlyproblemwithth Strasbourg Courtinquitevagueterms); parties which fail torespect core features of aliberal constitutional order (formulated bythe only toban partiescommitted toallegedly dangerous political ideologies butalso political the headscarf bancases clearly demonstrate that militant democracy has migrated from thetrad All casesdiscussedabove wererevealed with Maintain 4.3.3. other more traditi exclude particularreligious groupsfrom politics of maintaining aparticular legal order within European Court canturneditsjurisprudenceon jurisprudence andhowitshouldbechanged, would summarize my arguments onhowm could beresolved through theproper application of militant democracy measures. Before I Christianity andIslam eveninArticle 9jurisp from theEuropeanspace. However,itisevident thatthe levelof protectionaccorded to the ECHRisbiasedandtarget that itaffectsonlyone For more detailed account of Formore interpretation account liberalismRefah of of in seeMacklem, detailed

Militant Legal Particular

onal confessions. Democracy religious group:Muslims. Itwould Order?

s politicalIslam asaphenomenon

fact thatitaffectsonlyone reli in

Strasbourg 629 andevenimpose restrictionsonpublicdisplayof 247

rasbourg Courtwouldreacttoapoliticalparty the Europeanspacewh e ECHRextendedacceptanceofpre-emptive rudence differssubstantiallyandIbelievethis itional domain. Boththe Refah Partycaseand apurposetodemonstrate thattheideaof I willtryto supportmyargument thatthe the principle of secularism to theinstrument militant democracy logic isbeing usednot and accorditlessjudicial upholding ofparticularpr ilitant democracy is appliedinECHR

Jurisprudence: probably betoomuch tosaythat gion: Islam. Itwouldbean that hastobeeliminated supra note54

An ich hasatendencyto

protection thanto inciple ratherthan Instrument .

to

CEU eTD Collection 633 632 631 630 political theoretical discourse. Forexample, some yearsagoitwasbelievedthatChristianity else. Ingeneral,thequestionofreligionanddemocracy relati which conditionsMuslims canmake compatible theirreligion withdemocracy,oranything them inherentlyundemocratic(ordemocratic) complexities). exclusively onIslam(andnotionofdemo hard tochallenge thestatement thatthe‘Islam debatecentersalmost v.democracy’ ‘whether Islam iscompatible with and principles.Moreover,therearelegitimate its interpretation andapplication is variable an history might proveittobeamongst th subordinate andinferiorclass as inherentlyundemocratic withtheUSSuprem rights court. fundamentalism” and similar shouldbeavoided Refah PartyGrandChamber judgment that values ofChristianity areatstake. Iwould Party judgment andsubsequentheadscarfbancase that agendawouldbealsoofreligiousnatureotherthanIs ban ifthepartyhappenstohave Ibid. Ibid. Asef Bayat, Goldhaber, in supra note 213,95. at SeeConcurring Opinion of Judge Kovler. Many scholarsworkingonIslam issuesagreeth 630 Islam and Democracy. What 633 Onecommentatorevengoesasfar Asthereisnothingintrinsic inIs

of people(DredScottdecisions apluralistagendainmind similar totheoneRefahhadand democracy’ isinherentlywrong topose. is the real Question is real the e stupidestjudicial agree withone ofthec 248

d might beadjustedtodemocratic traditions e CourttreatmentAmericans ofAfrican asa then theissueturnsouttobeaboutunder arguments andclaims thatthequestionof the useof theexpression like“Islamic in thelanguageoftheinternationalhuman cracy is presented asfreefrom any s suggestthatitmight bedifferentifthe lam oranyotherre ? 8 ISIM paper 9 (2007). 9(2007). 8 ISIM paper ? to comparetheconclusionaboutSharia at Shairaitselfmay beimmutable,but generalizations. lam. ThelanguageoftheRefah ons isnotnewforsocialand of1865),andsuggeststhat oncurring opinioninthe ligion whichmakes 631 632

Firstof all itis CEU eTD Collection from injurytoreligiousfeelingswas accordedthe broadestpossible protection. in Europe)at least inlitigationsinvolving pr of religiousrightsthosesuppor inconsistency canbederivedfrom theanalysis 638 637 636 635 634 or afemale wearingaheadscarf)represents assumption rather thanlegitimate justification on mentioned caseswerediscussedindetailabov relying ontheECHRjurisprude national levelalsoeagerlyadoptedtheECHRap followed bythealreadymentioned RefahParty,LeyalSahin,andDogrucases.Thecourtsat Muslim the languageofCo religious groupscanbefoundalreadyqui democr illustration of thispolitical struggle withnotthebestoutcome beingpromoted Islamic agenda and limitations im speculation, butofpoliticalstruggle”. question ofcompatibility of and democracy wereincompatible. on the premises. the on school (1994); Wingrovev. UnitedKi Begum v.Denbigh High School is the 2006 House of Lords Judgment concerning ademand to wear jilbab Seeforexample Chouldryv.United Kingdom (1991 For details see e.g. Danchin, in Ibid., at 13. Ibid. atic order. The sequencebeganwithdecisioninthe In fact,theworryingdisparityin treatm communities. urt change ngdom (1996); Kokkinakis v Gr supra supra

religion withdemocracy“isnotamatter ofphilosophical note 54. 54. note ting Christianity(whichis nce (Begum v.DenbighHighSchool). s dramatically whenitdecide posed onpublicdisplayofre 634 635 However,Iwouldagreewiththestatement thatthe TheECHRjurisprudence onpolitical partieswithan 249

otection ofreligioussensibilitieswherefreedom te earlyin a threat to democracy. Anditisindeed very e andinallof them conclusionsarebasedon ofthecasesinvolvingprotectionfreedom proach anddecidedsimilar casesextensively howtheissue atstake 2001 Dahlabv.Switzerland casewhichwas ) Commission; Otto-Preminger-Institute v. Austra ent oftheclaimsmajorityandminority eece(1993) and other cases. Article 9jurisprudence. the dominant religioustradition d onthereligiousclaims of ligious symbols isabright (be itapoliticalparty 638 Some ofthe 637 However, 636 for the This This CEU eTD Collection rights o belief.” religion ingeneral,butabouta troubling thattheStrasbourgCourtmade these kindsoffindings 641 640 639 not, however,inmilitant democracy migrated tothesubstantive concepts of democracy and infacthadimmunized statesfrom theStra preemptive measures requirestrictersupervis deeply intothebusinesstoreframe religious the freedom ofreligionandimportance ofit also asinstrument ofgovernancemain “Strasbourg Courtcanbe seento Refah Partysupporters.Thatiswhysome co Turkey, France,andotherEuropeancountries, authorities andtheStrasbourg Courttoprotectreligiousf Islam theCourthasdevelopedbroadconceptionofpublicordersoitcanfreenational through wearingparticulartypeofcl and todenytheclaims of Muslimminorities in allowed theexclusionofclaims tolegalplur might becalled‘liberal anti-pluralism,’ which is athreat “the differential treatment of IslamandChristianity […] isjustified […] becausethe former Ibid., at 35. Ibid., Ibid., at 33. Danchin, in The ECHRsteppedawayfrom itswell-est In relationtoMuslim communities,theC 639 f certainpoliti

to, whereasthelatter is compatible with,theright tofreedom ofreligionand supra supra note 54, at 32. at 32. 54, note cal partiesasathreattodemocracy.

particular one.Itfollowsfrom beactingnotonlyasaninde othes intheSahinandDogru cases. taining aparticular alism and collectiveautonomy intheRefahcase 250

ion andmore limited margin of appreciation, freedoms o means anarrowreadingofArticle9which has s protectionfor democracy, theCourtwent sbourg judicialinterference.Theproblem is ourt has adopted a mode of reasoning which ourt has adoptedamodeofreasoningwhich mmentators wentontoconcludethatthe or thepoliticalrightsandfreedoms ofthe Europetomanifest theirreligious belief ablished doctrines and traditions that ablished doctrinesandtraditionsthat socialorder”. f aparticulargroupandpolitical eelings of Muslim women in pendent protectorofrightsbut the ECHR jurisprudence that theECHRjurisprudencethat notaboutallreligionsor 641 640 Instead of treating Incases involving CEU eTD Collection brave tointerpret associational freedom inrelatio my otherobserv democracy notionandwidelyuses protect democracy.Therefore, itiseasy toobserve thattheECHRisfamiliar withthemilitant France, or elsewhere– arebeing claimed tobe measures ofpreemptive character employed to – dissolutionofRefahParty(and such measures bynationalgovernments andsuppor jurisprudence onprinciple of secularism withm perfectly analyzed through the lens of militant numerous attempts torealizeitin practice. demonstrates thatthisassumption isnotme the allegedthreatcoming from growingfundame illustration ofmy hypothesisthatmilitantdemocr necessi interfere withindiv in aproper waytoensure that itis notabus major theme: theprevention ofthethreatto with itslegitimacy standards.Militantdemocracy jurispru invoked thejustification Strasbourg Courthasstoppedinthemiddle ofits (liberal, secular,republican,oranyother),bu ty todoso. From theearlycase-law onpartyprohibiti To conclude,theStrasbourgCourtjurisprude dence. ation concernsth idual ri but failedtheotherimportant part: ghts andfreedoms withoutbotheri e darkersideofthemilitant its predecessors) and prohibiti itinits Article9 (and not the foundation of the State, but it should be done the foundationofState,butitshouldbedone 251

t inthemanner itwasapplied.Iargue thatthe democracy. Themain similarity of the ECHR ed anddoesnotallowna re theoretical speculation butthat there are All casesmentioned inthissectioncanbe ilitant democracy isthejustification givento ntalist religiousmovements. Thiscase-study n topolitical partiesin acy could bepotentiallyutilizedto address cannotbejustifiedonlybyreferringtoits businesstoapplymilitantdemocracy. It ted laterbytheStrasbourgdecisions.Both on itisobviousthattheCourtwasvery nce onpreserving secularism is a bright to applyitproperlyinaccordance democracy storyinStrasbourg only) jurisprudence.However, on ofheadscarvesinTurkey, ng tojustifyandprovethe thebroadestpossible tional authoritiesto CEU eTD Collection precautionary lawsandcontrolmechanisms. required towaituntildemocracy actions. Thisisexplainedbythe order –however,itdoesnotfollowthattheStat democracy isdesignedtoprotectaverypartic assumption onhowsome actsorpartyprograms aredangerousfordemocracy. Militant acceptable tolimit thescopeofprotection rightsandfreedom on fundamental dependent onthemanner inwhichitwasapplied.Thepreemptivemeasures imposing limits have already arguedin theearlychapters th the democracy orthethreat ofheadscarves fo democracy. Idonotarguethat however itfailed toestablish the linkbetw militant democracylogic touphold theheadscarf banand thedissolutionofRefahparty; planned andnotgoingtochangeanytime soon.TheECHRwasextensivelyreferringtothe however, thesubsequentcaselawonheadscarfban practice withitsgeneralizedconclusionson the compatibility ofIslamanddemocracy; even more complicated. TheRefahPartycouldbecome anunl political agenda wasof arelig of Monarchy,secession, etc.)butpopularparty cannot doanything.Thefactthatthe Refah’s why small partiescanadvocateforanythingand support changesthescopeandform failed toexplainandjustifyw way, butwhenthecasewasaboutsome mino hy theappearanceinStrasbourgofapartywithstrongpopular ious natureandthatreligionwasIslam makes thesituation the Courtwastotallywrongin is destroyed fact thatstatesaretaking s requirelegallystrongjustification.Bynomeans isit s at offreedoms giventopoliti 252

r democracy, buttheECHR ular andimportant construction–constitutional and more precauti at militant democracy measures legitimacy is r andunpopularparties.However,theCourt een prohibitedactivities andthethreatto accorded by Articles9-11 basedonpure e shouldbefreedfrom thedutytojustifyits propose evencrazychanges(likerestoration appears tosignal that thisstrategy iswell- actions inadvanceand arenot finding Refah dangerous for findingRefahdangerousfor onary measures requiremore ucky accidentintheCourt’s cal parties.Itisnotclear couldnotproveit.I CEU eTD Collection democracy conceptand evenimplement some of as international institutions for human right present inthe describedjurisdictions. Thesurveyrevealsthat national legalsystems aswell democracy isproperlyapplieditmight leadto to addressthethreat coming from growingex The case-study abovedemonstratesthatmilitant Conclusion human rightsshouldbeable militant democracy destroys rather thanprotect authorities arguments thatdemocracy shouldbepr opponents, butreligious andethnicminorities proven. Militantdemocracy canbeeasilyturned and justified, andwherethelinkbetweenpr national authorities’ decisions of amilitant Court wouldproducelesscontroversialjudgmen groups (religious,ethnic,political,etc.)with democracy designedtoprotectde the European community see appropriate version wasdeployedinorderto The waythe concept inquestion was interpreted version ofmilitantdemocracy wheretheright concept forECHRjurisprudence.Unfortunate Therefore, from thissection Iconclude that militant democracy is stillauseful to seeandpreventit. facilitateaparticularpolitic mocracy throughdenialofrightsprotectiontoparticular 253

democracy character only whenitislegitimate at themoment. Bynomeanswasmilitant logic wasusedbutwit out givinganyjustification.TheStrasbourg more successful democratic solutions thanare s protection arefamiliar withthe militant s constitutional democracies andinternational tremist religious movements. Where militant ohibited activitiesandthreattodemocracy is democracy isofrelevanceforstates’ policies by theCourtdemonstrates ly, todatetheCourtemployed modified into aweapontoeliminate notonlypolitical if theCourtwillal ts onArticle9-11onceitstartstouphold otected byanymeans. Thisisexactlywhen its elements tojustify statepolicies and al concept which the ECHRand hout properju ways buythenational that the corrupted stification. CEU eTD Collection religious motives areoftenpresen long-standing experience infighting agains religious extremism arenotonlyamatterofpolitical speculation inRussiaasthecountry has extremism oranythingelsewhichharms th stronger justificationin eachgiven casetopr spiritual preferencesofitsc foreign andnon-traditiona the government willneed to provideevidence in society (whichisnot exactlytheState’sfuncti make thegovernment refocus itsattention from protecting thespiritual well-beingof the The militant democracy rationale applied inre alone inconducting their activities and theirad democracy fashion.Itwillhelp improve thesi religious movements. Iarguedthat thelawssh through militant democracy lenses.Russianeeds toreconsideritsapproach towards foreign only therationalisappliedbutallcond religious extremism andimplement militant democr Therefore, alljurisdictions needtoreconsidertheir approach towardsthe allegedthreat of widely referred toinorder topursue apolitical ideal: secularism andunityof thestate. the purposetoprotectanidealvisionofso missing from thejurisdictions analyzedabove. understanding ofthemilitantdemocracy notion as judicial decisions.However, The situationwithforeignreligiousgroupsinRussiaisof l religiousmovements isdangerous itizens. Suchanapproachwillforcethegovernment togive the case-studydemonstrates that t. Therefore,thethreatof re itions ofitslegitimacy areobserved. 254

t terrorism andsecessionistmovements, and on) totheprotectionofdemocracy. Inthiscase e stateofdemocracy. Threatscoming from tuation andwillleaveminor religiousgroups ove howparticularreligionareinvolved in herents could enjoy thei enjoy could herents ould beinterpreted andappliedina militant ciety whileinTurkeymilitantdemocracy is gulation of religiousmatters inRussiawill In Russiamilitant democracyis applied for support oftheclaim thatthepresenceof wellasconditionsofitsapplicationare acy inastricter waytoensure thatnot ligious extremism ispresentin fordemocracybutnotthe a deeper and consistent adeeperandconsistent relevancetobeassessed r religious freedoms. r religiousfreedoms. CEU eTD Collection secularism from thepossiblethreat of religi should beallowedtoprotectedby militant democracy. references toitwithinpoliticalspaceareunde necessarily interpreted inawaythatreligi automatically prohibitedandconsideredas reference tothereligionin democracy logic.However,militant democracy shouldnotbeinterpreted inawaythatany can bejustified insomecircumstances andco prohibition of political partieswith direct refe and preventreligionovertakingtheState constitutional order,militant democracy canbeperfectly utilizedtosafeguard thisprinciple constitutional principle of secularism. Asitconstituted one of thebases of the Turkish headscarves. Thesecases werebuiltaroundtheal cases: theprohibitionof religion-affiliated extension to address thethreatcoming from moment. government willhavetojustifythe needforin protection tovariouscommunities thatarebein need topreservetheexistingsocialorder rationale employedbythegovernme including the useof militantdemocracy m Russia andthegovernment cantakemeasures Turkey has thepotentialtoprotect its In thecaseofTurkeyargument onthe the program/activities of the ntal policieswouldbringthe ous extremism re-establishingtheCaliphate, and 255

on isnotamatter forpublicdebateandany politicalIslam waste becoming apoliticalideology.Theexampleof easures. Theconcept of militant democracy dangerous fordemocrac real problems. Thisw rence toparticular religion/race/ethnic group political parties, andthe banonwearing uld beanappropriate application of militant g suppressedinRussiaatthemoment asthe mocratic; thisinterpre terference underastricter leged governmental necessitytoprotect the to preventpotentialharm todemocracy, constitutional structureandprincipleof relevance ofmilitant democracy andits political part State’s attentionfrom the sted onatwogroupof ould alsogivestronger y. Secularism isnot tation ofsecularism test thanatthe ies shouldbe CEU eTD Collection judgment onArticles9-11 onceitstartstouphold without givinganyjustification.TheStras through thedenialofrightsprotectiontopartic appropriate atthe moment. However, militant to facilitate aparticular political concept The wayitwasinterpretedbytheCourtdemonstr jurisprudence. However,theCourthasemploye familiar withthemilitant democracy notionand usesitinitsArticle9(andnot only) character employedtoprotectdemocracy. Therefore,itiseasy in Turkey,France,orelsewhere– arebeing – dissolution oftheWelfare (Refah measures bythenationalgovernments andsupported the principle of secularism withmilitant democracy is thejustification given tosuch numerous attempts torealize it demonstrates thatthisassumption isnotme threat coming from growingfundamentalist religiousmovements. Thiscase-study my hypothesisthatmilitant democracy couldbe jurisprudence onreligiouspartie State militant rather thandemocratic. militant democracy and,therefore, its approach legitimacy. Therefore,Turkeyabusedthepos corrupted version of secularism, anddoes notobservethe conditions of militant democracy etc. However,atthemoment Turkeyusesm The jurisprudence ofthe ECHRsuggeststhat in practice. The main similarity s’ prohibitionandtheheadscarf ) Party(and itspredecessors), which theECHRandEuropean communitysee bourg Courtwouldproducealesscontroversial 256

ilitant democracy toooften, protectsthrough it democracy was designed toprotect democracy re theoretical speculation butthat there are sibility ofprotectingitsdemocracy through should bereconsidered in ordernotmakethe claimed tobeameasures ofapreemptive ular groups(religious,ethnic,political,etc.) d amodified versionof militant democracy. ates thatthemodified versionwasdeployed potentiallyutil national authorities’ decisionsofamilitant laterbytheStrasbourgdecisions.Both militant democracy isrelevant inits of theECHR ju to observe that theECHRis andprohibitionofheadscarf ban. Infact,itsupportswell ized toaddressthealleged risprudence on CEU eTD Collection ideologies as well. democratic means toestablishnotonlytotalita successful solution incaseswherestateswant application. Properlyinterpreted and appliedthenotionofmilitant democracymight offer my earlierstatement thatmilitant democracy should beabletoseeandpreventit. than protect theconstitutional democracies an should beprotectedbyanymeans. Thisisexac minorities if theCourtwill alwaysbuythenati turned intoaweapontoelim prohibited activities and the thre democracy characteronly whenitislegitima In conclusion,thecase-studyonmilitant de inate notonlypoliticaloppone at todemocracy isproven.Mili 257

te andjustified andwhere the linkbetween the rian, butfundamentalist andcoercivereligions to prevent the growth d theinternational human rights institutions is applicable beyonditstraditionalareaof tly whenmilitant democracy destroys rather onal authorities’ arguments thatdemocracy mocracy andreligious extremism confirms nts, butreligiousandethnic tant democracy canbeeasily of movements thatuse of movements CEU eTD Collection 642 how militant democracy canbe applied tocope problem ofterrorisms presencewithinthepolit issue butalso apoliticalproblem. Militant democr hypothesis. of thefightagainst terrorism; how Russia. powers balance.Thisargument powers, anddiscretionoftheexecutive,aswe serious flawsofanti-terrorism policies,i.e.ex democracy might beausefulguidingprinciple tolead the War onTerrortoremedy some fighting against terrorism. Themain purposeof perspective atthenational level only, andwillnot appeal to theinternational cooperation in will belimited totheanalysis of counter undesirable consequencesforthefoundationalpr policies. Anti-terrorism lawsandtechniques enacted worldwide might potentially cause forthetheoreticaldebate might berelevant traditional scope of application. Inwhatfollowsitwillbediscusse This chapterpresentsanother example ofth Introduction jurisdictions and to check the validity of my of hypothesis the validity tocheck and jurisdictions to areoveranalyzed policies anti-terrorism argument, their While the United States and the United Kingdom are also potentially interesting jurisdictions to test my totestmy jurisdictions interesting Kingdom are United also potentially the Statesand the United While 642 The chapterbeginswiththecaseofterrorismwasnotonlyasecurity Spainwhere Alljurisdictions differ substantially intheiranti-terrorism policiesandexperience MILITANT

DEMOCRACY

will betestedon three case ever, each ofthem representsa CHAPTER e potentialuseofmilitant democracybeyondits AND 258

cessive curtailsoffunda on non-well discussed anti-terrorism national policies. policies. national anti-terrorism discussed non-well on

-terror policies from andpracticalapplicat with terrorism. Spainrepresentsawonderful ical arena anditisan ll asamore generalshiftinseparationof date and it is more challenging analyze some other some analyze other more itis challenging and date inciples ofdemocracy. Thechaptercontent this chapteristodemonstrate that militant

THE

acy wasutilizedin thiscaseto solvethe 5:

WAR -studies, Spain,Australiaand

ON valuable example to testmy d howmilitant democracy

TERROR mental rights,extended a militant democracy excellentexampleof ion of anti-terrorism

CEU eTD Collection 643 driven bymilitant democracy logic initspreventiveanti-terrorism policies.Moreover, terrorism mattersandtotesthowthesituatio toobservetheconse represents agoodexample Australia’s anti-terrorismlawsthat comprehensive defensivemechanism. Itwouldnot of counter-terrorism lawsofapreventivenatu country freeofpoliticalviolenceandterrorism response toterrorism andhandleitmoresuccessfully. is todemonstrate howmilitant democracy wouldbehelpful for thisStatetosystematize its still does not aid copingwithterrorism successf enactment ofthechaoticpolicieswithgran example whichlacksasystemized approach curtailment ofhuman rightswhen comprehensive mechanism ofcounter-terrorism a relativelylongtime, thereforeitmight a years already.Russiaisacountry War onTerroristheexampleof measure andit makes Spainafascinati political partiesanditsimmediateapplica the so-called‘War onTerror.’ case tostudy theconstitutional migration of theideaof militant democracy tothedomain of , 24 Australian Feminist Law Journal 96 (2006). (2006). 96 recent (Theoretical) Journal Law Feminist ReturntoAustralian Carl Schmitt, 24 Matthew Matthew ‘ Sharpe, Towards the endof the chapter I willbring in The secondjurisdiction totesttheargument ofmilitant democracy’srelevanceinthe Thinking of the Extreme Situations…’ on the New Anti-Terrorism Laws, or Against a a Against Laws, or New the Anti-Terrorism on ExtremeSituations…’ the of Thinking

The legislativenoveltyintroducedtheproceduretooutlaw Russia,acountryfacingthepr where the threat ofterrorism the threat of terrorism isreal. However,this isindeed an “everything aboutthemisexceptional.” ng example toinvestigatehere. 259

tion wasinvokedasaremote anti-terrorism ppear as though it should have developed a ppear asthoughitshouldhavedevelopeda n wouldlookdifferently ully. Thepurposeofbringing-upthisexample re, and,withinjustafewyearsdeveloped , Australiahasadoptedanincredible number to addresstheproblem anditleadstothe ting of broad powers to the executive and it ting ofbroadpowerstotheexecutiveandit policy, andshouldfinditeasiertojustifythe quences oflegislating beanexaggerationtosayinrelation theexample ofAustralia.Whilebeing a remains real and has done for remains realandhasdonefor esence ofterrorism formany ifthegovernment is with urgencyinanti- 643 Australia CEU eTD Collection 645 644 the scopeof thisproject andtheaim of thischapter. However,itis important toreview techniques used bydifferentstates intheface terrorism policies.Idonotconsideritnecessary this traditional division andstatesseekforanother legalregime toaccommodate newanti- terrorist attacksontheUnitedSt distinction betweentimes ofc extraordinary emergency powers. danger isnotonlyahypotheticalone. of suchmeasures compared withsituations wher perceived or imagined enemy. Therefore, potentia problematic tojustify due totheadoption and ap real andactiveterrorism experienced presently incertainjurisdictions. Theformer ismore concerns willbemostly relatedtothepoliticsagainstthreatofte First of all,itisimportant tomake areservation thatthis overview andespecially the parton 5.1.1. Introduced 5.1. TheWaronTerrorandMilitantDe this experiencecanbetakenintoacc Australia had experience withmilitant democracy Suitable for Them? Suitable Australia. of MichelRosenfeld, Here I mean Australian Communist Party vThe Commonwealth (1951) 83 Anti Since theSeptember 11eventsmanywester ­ Terrorism , in Austin Sarat (Ed.), Sovereignty, Emergency, Legality 240 (2010). Emergency, 240 (2010). , inAustin Sarat (Ed.),Sovereignty, Legality Should Constitutional Democracies Redefine Emergencies and the Legal Regimes Regimes Legal andthe Emergencies Redefine Democracies Constitutional Should and Policies:Typology

onstitutional normalcy andstatesofemergency. However,the ates in2001andstates’reactio 645 ount whilefightingtheWaronTerror. Theconstitutional theory is familiar with the clear 260

of thethreatterrorism. Thiswillgo beyond mocracy: TheExtensio plication of anti-terrorism measurestoonly a e terrorism ispresent withintheState andits lly itposes moreconcerns tothelegitimacy Concerns andrelevanttolistallthecounter-terror 644 applicationanditisworthanalyzingif n-type democracies haveresortedto

ns totheseev CLR rrorism asopposedtothe 1 decided by the High Court n oftheConcept ents challenge CEU eTD Collection handling of theterrorism problem”. model centersaround“theproperst where allcounter-terrorism laws The secondalternativementioned bySajoisthe necessary answerstoanytypeofcrisiswithouttheneedre ‘business asusual’model pres 651 650650 649 648 647 646 of a‘preventivestate’whichassumes mass deten which willbe themain focusof thischapter. involved. crisis’) primarily interms of theseverity,intensity, andduration of therespective threats of stress,accordingtoRosenfeld,differfrom ‘times ofstress’ (mainly through criminal law)butwithso normalcy,’ where response tothe threatof terrorism. The startingpointis states refertoindefendingtheirstatestru rhetoric isusuallyplaced. constitutional responsescomm Responses to Violent CrisisAlways Constitutional toViolent Responses be and crisis. The lawintimesofwarremains strictly followed be to andnorms rules legal continue absolutis ofconstitutional on notions isbased Usual model Rosenfeld, Rosenfeld, to theWar on Terror Rosenfeld, p.2259 Ibid., See for example Gross,Id.and Aolain, andrefersto asusual’ callsit‘Business also A.Sajo Sajo, Seeforexample MichelRosenfeld, supra Andras Sajointroducedat 651 A Pluralist Theory of Political Rights in the Times in of Stress Rights Political of Theory A Pluralist supra Thethirdmodel inSajo’stypologyism note 55, at 2257-2258. at note 55, 2257-2258. note 643, at 241. at241. note 643, model , 27 Cardozo Law Review 2085 (2006) or Rosenfeld, supra note 643, at 240-272 or Michel Michel or at240-272 643, note supra Rosenfeld, or (2006) 2085 Review Law Cardozo , 27

in relation to terrorism policies inMichel Rosenfeld works.

on fordifferentjurisdictions upposes thatthe legal system the regime which couldbecharacterizedas‘constitutional the regime which and theirapplication remain with Judicial Balancing in Times of Stress: Comparing Diverse Approaches ypology ofsuchmeasures. supra note 222 andards tobe appliedby the the sametimes asin ofpeace.”InGross, Chaos and Rules: Should 649 Thereisalsovaluable ?, 112 Yale Law Journal 1011, 1021 (2003). (2003). 1011, 1021 Journal Law 112 Yale ?, terrorism isaccommodated bytheexistingrules me shiftin theproportionalityanalysis. The model following militant democracy isthat 261

ctures from beingdamaged ordestroyedby with nosubstantive change even in times ofemergency Oren Gross description of this phrase: “TheBusiness as , at 252., a stateofemergency (hecallsit‘times of tion asthepreferred choice ofaction andall m perfection. model, this and to ordinary According ‘twilight zone,’or‘times ofstress’model, ilitant democracy appliedtoterrorism, , in Sadurski, , in Sadurski, to seewheretheWar onTerror sort toextraordinarypowers. 646 iscapableofprovidingall judiciary intheconstitutional and detailedaccountofthe Heoffers sevenparadigms in the judicial states but the the but states judicial the in supra note 167 , at 12-54. 650 647 Times The 648

CEU eTD Collection Analysis 45 (2006). (2006). 45 Analysis the Legal Response of Common Law Nations to the Threat of Terrorism, 8JournalComparative of Policy 653 652 demonstrate thatgovernments’ reactionmotivat be onlysuccessfulbutlawful,t and panicfrom recently occurredterroristatta the legislator isencouragedtoenact laws cannot ignoreandmeasures shouldbetakentopr bombings orotherterroristactivitiesinstates. before 11September 2001enactedoramended theexistinglawsprimarily inresponseto occurring elsewhereintheWorld. counter-terror regimes (thoughtheyarenotpresen some commontroubling features for constitutional rightscausedbysuchpolicies.However,there are as thelevelofcurtailingfundamental regimes following eachotherisoftenblurred. regards to thecontent of limitations andrisk invoked byliberaldemocracies, atleastfora rightsguar including theseparation fundamental of powersand policies asallofthempresuppos emergency,’ and ‘war’ –wouldprobablyconstitute extreme examples of anti-terrorism three remaining models mentioned inSajo’spa anti-terrorism measures arebuilt Oklahoma and the World Trade Centre. in to the events response EffectiveDeath PenaltyActin and inAntiterrorism 1996 States enacted United campaigns; New Zealand adopted counter-terrorism la Forexample, theUnitedKingdom hasenactedrange of Williams,& Gerogre Golder seeBen For details First ofall The arsenal of anti-terrorism measures varies from jurisdictionto aswell , anti-terrorism representa lawsoften

oo. Thepracticeofmanystatesfacingthethreatterrorism around preventive considerations in a very broad sense. The aroundpreventiveconsiderationsinaverybroadsense.The e considerabledeparturefrom

652 Evennations thathadanti-terrorism legislationwell proposed bythegovernment Balancing National Security and Human Rights: Assessing 262

assessment standards,th w after the 1985 bombing ofthe Greenpeace boat; the cks. Thestruggleagainstterrorism not should long periodoftime. Wh ed bydevastationandfeardonotmakenew event futureattacks,it t tothesame extentinallstates). per –‘thecounter-terro laws as response to the Irish Republican Army Republican Irish the to lawsasresponse democracy present inth 653 While terrorism isaphenomenon we reactive responseto acts ofterrorism antees, andarenotlikelytobe major democratic principles, e boarder-linebetween shouldnotmeanthat beingdrivenbyfear ile regimes differ in r state,’‘stateof e vastmajority of CEU eTD Collection 656 655 654 chance tobe remedied. While thereareexamples deliberations andmany controversialaspectsof as possible. Needles to saythatsuch speed democracies ofteninsistedthatparliaments enact laws adoptedinthepost-September 11era. from, acceptedunderstanding ofbasiclegalprinciples”. enacted legislation.Asa for theprincipleofnon-retroac attacks. Therefore,thereactiv measure tobetakenfindthoseresponsible emotional andaffectstheabilitytoassessadequate initiated bythegovernments inth especially whenthethreatofterrorism is elements areoftenmissing fromthelaw-making its necessity, effectiveness, reasonableness, existing insociety,buteverypieceoflegisla terrorism strategy”. less significantachallengeforthegovernme measures moreeffective butmight createan atmo at 45. (2008). 225 Journal Law , 33 Alternative MuslimCommunities Australia’s Forexample, theUSAPATRIOT Act & Williams, Golder Lynch Andrew & McGarity, Nicola In otherwords,thereis Second, legislatingwithurgencybecame aco 654 supra

note 615, at 44. at44. note615, result anti-terrorism lawshave“o

e characterofanti-terrorism nothingwrongwithagovernme tivity of criminal laws,but alsoaffect thequality of the Counter-Terrorism Laws. How Neutral Laws Create fear and Anxiety in in Anxiety and fear Create Laws Neutral Laws.How Counter-Terrorism e aftermath of theterroristat was enactedonlysixweeksafter th and proportionality totheaim pursued.These 263

tion shouldbeassessedfromtheperspectiveof for committed crimes ofterror,andprevent new present. Ithappensmainly becauselawsare y legislative processes resulted in shortened 656 counter-terrorism meas nts than“achievinganeffectivecounter- theproposedanti-terrorism lawsasquickly Governments from sphere ofdistrustin ofparliaments successfullyresistingthis ly theriskof future attacks, characterof process when securityisatstake,and mmon featureofma 655

laws doesnotonlyposeconcerns ften qualified,andevendeparted tacks, whichisalwaysvery e 11September attacks,see Ibid., nt reactingtoproblems a society whichisno many western-type ures didnotgaina ny anti-terrorism CEU eTD Collection Australia). as fartoallowtheshort-term detention extended powersofthepoliceandintelligencese 660 659 658 657 The anti-terrorism policies inmany democracies arebased ontheassumption that anti- is notnew,butitpresupposesstrongprocedural action orcivilprotest(forexample in definition ofterrorism whichinsomejurisdic of terrorism.Thetensionsbetw the tendencytotradeawayhuma individual rightsandfreedoms. counterbalance theextendedpower business. Thisisatroublingf crimes associated with acts of agencies, especially intelligence services, inre should operate”. amount substantialdeparturefrom toa the powers andmany anti-terrorism adoptedintheaftermath laws 11 oftheeventsSeptember scrutiny, trend andsubjectingthecounter prevent the catastrophetoth similar the prevent derogating from rights protection instruments and even ca Moreover, as Kent Roach observes, there has been even flouting in international human rights law, at 47. Ibid., at 44. Ibid., Ibid. Another unfortunatefeaturecommon tomost Third 657 660 theoveralltendencyistoenact Theideatolimit human rightsfor legitimate aims, including national security, , newanti-terrorism policies affect thetraditional concept of separation of 658 Theanti-terrorism lawsofmany na e one of September 11. See Roach,e oneofSeptember11. See

eature asitweakensth terrorism withatendencytokeep een nationalsecurityandhuma n rights inorder toprotect thecommunity from futureacts -terrorism lawsinitiatedbythegovernment tocloser s oftheexecutiveinserious the UnitedKingdomandStates). such laws undertheallegedurgency. 264

“long heldunderstandingofhowlegalsystem tions might capturelegitimate actsofindustrial of non-suspects(i.e.pr lation tothe preventionandinvestigation of guarantees beforeastateimposessuchlimits. rvices causefurtherconcernsasitmight go lls to legalize torture when necessary to prevent to to prevent to necessary when torture legalize lls to of theanti-terrorism lawsworldwideis e roleofthejudici tions extendedpowersoftheexecutive supra limitations beingimposedon note 55, 172. 55, note n rightsstartfrom thevery ajudiciaryawayfrom this eventive detentionin ary whereitshould 659 The CEU eTD Collection Rights Research Series No.34 128 (2009). (2009). 128 Series No.34 Research Rights does notnecessarilypromotenationalsecurity, 665 664 663 662 661 but isindeed ashift from theliberty regime tothesecurity regime. approach not onlyrepresent aserious departure from theregime of constitutional normalcy, the closest modelwesterndemocracies optedfor. seriously re-considered.From thetypologyintr facing thethreatofterrorism anditiseviden human rightsandseparationofpow situations itishardforthe are passedinresponsetorecentactsofterr rights inthename ofnationalse Apparently,theeventsof11September pr challenge andtest.Manyjurisdictionsacross serious socialcost, i.e.resultingintheresi we trytofight. this way,sacrificing disproportionate repressionsotheStatelosesits counter-productive, forexample, is littleevidence that it terrorism measures infringingcivillibertieswillwork. detention without trial. In addition counter-terror statesmi counter-terror addition trial. In without detention religion and association, far reaching ad being restricted in counter-terror state is quite extensive and includes: freedom ofmovement, freedomof speech, (2006). 240 Security National Thelatter presupposes more wide-ranging list ofrights limitation imposed by these regimes. Thelist ofrights Sajo, Anna Oehmichen, Ibid., at 242. DavidCole& James X.Dempsey, supra note 55 663 , at 2290. , at 2290. Moreover, drasticmeasures againstcertain communities represent also Terrorism and Anti-Terror Legisla human rights andfreedoms, governments willdomore goodthan harm. parliament toassessthoroughly

Terrorism and the Constitution. Sacrificing Civil Liberties in the Name of of Name the in Liberties Civil Sacrificing Constitution. the and Terrorism curity. Partlyitmight beexpl due tothereasonthatterrorist ministrative surveillance isallowedas ers principles. Thissituation iscommon tomany states stance andalienationoftheMuslim community. 265

t thatthecounter-terro orism anditisdoneingreathaste.Insuch often worksonlyinana the worldwent too farincurtailing human oduced above,thepreventivestatewould be credibility andthesuppor ght shift the burden of proo of the burden shift ght tion: The Terrorised Legislator However,aswasmentioned previouslythis esented democratic states withagreat 662 661 Anti-terrorism le However,curtaili ained bythefactthatmany laws the impactofsuchlawsupon play intohandof s aim toprovoketheStateinto well as denial of due process anddue process of as denial well 665 rism policiesshouldbe However,thereisno f in criminal matterswith criminal f in rrow sense, and there rrow sense,andthere t ofthecitizens.In gislation couldbe ?, School?, of Human ng civilliberties theterrorists 664

CEU eTD Collection implication on those affected by immigra strong reliance ongovernment evidence together with the conceptmight beabetter anti-terror lawsadopteda regime ofstrictproceduralguarantees.This should beapplicable bothtothecontentof but whenthenecessitytoinvokesuchmeasures democracy logic.In general, thisallowsthead constitutional normalcy, butsuchadeparture states facingapermanent threat measures liketheprohibitionofdangerouspolit fight withterrorism couldbeaddressed but alsowillhaveachance to curesome flaws the War onTerror theme. Thiswillnotonly bri states, Ibelievethatmilitant democracy woul Taking intoaccountthatthereisnoconstitution Terror? 5.1.2. but alsofromthecentraltheme ofbothregimes: prevention. the similarities between the perimeter militant democracy andanti-terrorism regimes guard, could beconsideredasabetterapproachtoguideit.Thisconclusionfollowsnotonlyfrom demonstrates howthemilitantdemocracy debate democracy logicinenactment andapplication of anti-terrorism laws.Thefollowing section I arguethat democracies couldbemore successf necessity to searchforanythi

Militant The militant democracy conceptwithallthe

Democracy: nd thewaytheyareapplied. ng new toaccommodatethe anti-terr Improved pproach tohandletheWar on ofterrorism shouldbeallowe tion rules (see Sajo, Ibid., at 2274). at 2274). Ibid., (seeSajo, rules tion

Constitutional only throughthe classical militant democracy 266

d beanappropriateframework toaccommodate limitation onaccess limitation ofinfo option ofmeasures ofa of theexistingregime. Idonotarguethatthe should beauthorized and drivenby militant and restrictions actually exists and under the andrestrictionsactuallyexistsunderthe ng more legitimacy toanti-terrorism politics, ul infighting terrorism if theyfollow militant ally authorizedregime isrelevant for theWar onTerrorand whyit ical movements. Theclaim isratherthat attributes required for thelegitimacy of

Framework Terror as itallows formany d todepartfrom astateof orism practices ofthe State. forthecounter-terror rmation andfar reaching preventive character,

for the

War on

CEU eTD Collection 667 666 existing constitutional system bydenyingrights andfreedoms tothosewhoarebelieved this isthe major aim behindthe measures. Mil democracy. political partiesbutotherthreatswhichar favor ofconsideringmilitantdemocracy asa self-defense isavitalquestion ofany democratic system. and replaceitwithatheocratic regime). that the aim of Islamist terrorists isnot onlytoabolish theState,buttodefeat thedemocracy group achievetheirgoalsanddestroythesystem ofgovernance(some commentatorsargue should notwaituntiladangerous reference to thepreventive character ofthemeas cope withthreatoftotalitarianmovements and terrorism aslongtheydonotaccentuatethe prevention isthemain theme inbothregimes. us tospeak abouttherelevanceofmilitant de supervision ofthejudiciary. constitutional legislation,a constitutionalism, suchadeparture isrec necessary. While militant democracy regime alsorepresents thedeparture from ordinary preventive action but only whenthe threat is three chambers. Inaddition,themilitant democr narrow rightslimitations andisaimed atpres Ibid. Ibid. See for example, Thiel, Furthermore, bothofthese regimes claim toprotect democracy from itsenemies and Militant democracy and anti-terrorism havemanyfeatures incommonwhichallows supra note 19, at2. 19, note nd therearestandardsofappl

political party,coercivereli 666 Statesareallowedtotakemeasures inadvanceas ognized bygovernments, isauthorizedbythe 267

erving theregularbala e potentiallyabletodamage andsubvert useful toolnotonlytocopewithdangerous mocracy fortheWar onTerror.First ofall, itant democracy’s main ideaistoprotect the real andlikelytooccur,limitations are Ordinarylawsandrights limitation cannot acy conceptappliedproperlypermits taking ures. Itis apparentthat states cannot and 667 Thesearethemain argumentsin ying suchmeasures underthe gious movement, orterrorist nce ofpowersbetween CEU eTD Collection 669 668 purpose andthevalidityofmanycontroversial pressure. Forexample, eventhesunset clau and reviewinganti-terrorism lawsisthatit from theside oftheexecutive.Onebi given thechance tospeak onthematter andscruti executive anddenyingthejudici logic requiresthepreservati limited willbeshortened andwillexclude atleas to theanti-terrorism measures forthefollowing Terror, too. practice toremedy exactlythis diseaseand it subvert suchactivities. Militantdemocracy wasintroduced toconstitutional theory and terrorist movements canbesuicidalfordemocr emotion. main methods usedbyterrorism –fearand in movements isnotverydifferentfromwhatdriv regimes together andreplacestheruleoflaw.Inthisregard,emotionalism ofterrorist movements. Moreover, very closerelationscould beobserved betweenterrorandfundamentalist political means thatdangerousmovements choosetoda militant democracy aim toprevent andcure similar outcomes withtheonlydifference in abuse the system withthepurpos Ibid., at 2263. at 2263. Ibid., Sajo, supra To conclude 669 Tolerance towards emotionalism attri 668 note 55, at 2255. at note 55, 2255. AsKarlLoewenstein argued,emotionalis , militant democracy asappliedtoterrorism wouldgivemore legitimacy on oftheseparationpower

ary itstraditional e ofdestroyingordamaging it.Anti-terrorism regime and 268

se oftheUSAPATRIOTActdidnotserveits ggest challengesforthe very hardtocontrol theexecutive and resist its s experiencecouldbeap acy andthere must beamechanism presentto timidation –alsocreateakindofpolitics t fair trial rights.Second, militant democracy es extreme politicalparties.Inaddition,the provisions wasrenewedmore thanonceto reasons. First, alist of mage andconstitutionalorder. democracy nize thelaws theyadopted without pressure buted toextreme politicalparties and functions. Third,parliaments shouldbe m isgluethat holds authoritarian s balancewithout favoringthe parliaments inenacting rights allowed to be rightsallowedtobe plied tothe War on CEU eTD Collection been nobroadcommitment towindback,orevenrevisit,thelaws.” example, inAustraliathelaw-making hasstoppe the previouslyadoptedlawsandremedies so 672 another-look-at-its-antiterrorism-laws-so-w 671 670 existing regime theyshouldgivebetterjustifi governments shouldre-shapetheir should notgoasfartoallo rights protection.While itisanove what kindofmeasures totake,whatrightsli militant democracy framework thenitwouldminimize executive privileges indeciding on proposed measures thaninthean exceptional circumstances rather th requite statestofollowtherulethatex and theirapplication. face asituationof‘normalization of exception’ its meaning and legitimacy ifitisinvokedona ordinary constitutional regime allowed onlyin exceptionalcircumstances. Theconcept loses example, incaseoftheAustralian even withsomewhat ridiculouslawswhichar date. Morning Herald. 14 April 2011. Available on-line at on-line Available 2011. April 14 Herald. Morning at online Gross & Ni Aolain, George Williams, Seefor details for example, USCongress votes to renew Patriot Act provisions. 27 May 2011. Available 670 Finally, militant democracy requiresgovernme In addition, militant democracy isconsider Atthemoment, therearenosignsthatparl http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-13572833 Britain is taking another look at its anti-terrorism laws, so why can't we can't why laws,so itsanti-terrorism at look another taking is Britain supra 672 note 222, at 228. However,adherencetothem

w thedetentionofnon-suspectsfo regime detention). ofpreventive ti-terrorism state.If an becoming aregula hy-cant-we-20110413-1ddzc.html#ixzz1OhfFvSAd rall trendtopassthesecurity anti-terrorism policiesandif ceptional measures shouldbeinvokedonlyin 269

http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/politics/britain-is-taking- mewhat theproblems posedbysuchlaws.For cation thanprobabilityof mit, andhowfartogoinloweringthelevelof e notactually beingapplied inpractice (for through provisions oftheanti-terrorismlaws regular basis.Manycounter-terrorismstates d for a while onthismatterbut“therehas d forawhile iaments seriously considerthereviewof ed asan authorized departure from the . nts togivestronger anti-terrorism policyisplacedwithin r practice. ilitant democracy conceptwould r example.Inotherwords, matters totheexecutive,it they wanttopreservethe 671 newterroristattacks Itdoesnothappen justification forthe . ?, The Sydney?, CEU eTD Collection 674 673 terrorism policies inSpainwerealwaysdirect as theendofnineteenthcentury. terrorism, andthehistoryoflegislationagainstte the War onTerror.Firstofall,Spainhasa There are few reasonsto include Spain inthe Terrorism: LessonsfromSpain 5.2. SettinganExample? laws andhystericpoliticaldecisions. democratize anti-terrorism policiessostatesdonotembarrasses themse departure thestrongerth it isbetter toconstitutionally authorize such hard toavoidthedeparturefrom ‘constitutionali automatically mean theneedtosearchforanew governments shouldkeepinmind andtrytofoll success oftheWar onTerrorisofnoless implementation, tomake them more compatible for some statestoreconsider anti-terrorism, policies oratleast manner of their Therefore, militant democracy and anti-te and thisis whytheexperience of militant demo parliaments. evaluated onlyonthesecretinformation th Kingdom, Spain, Germany and France and Germany Spain, Kingdom, on Its Implications and Legislation Counter-Terrorism Anna Oehmuchen Sajo, supra note 55, at 2291. at note 55, 2291. , Terrorism and Anti-Terror Legislation: The Terrorised Legislator? AComparison of e judicialcontrol.”

183 (2009). The Banning ofPolitical PartiesasResponse to 674 Unlikemany othermodern 673 270

a departurebasedonprin case-study onmilitant democracy application in Militant democracy might long andpainfulhistory cracy applicationmight berelevantanduseful Human Rights in the Legal Systems of the United the United of Systems Legal the in Rights Human ed againstaparticular internalenemy–the ey cannotrevealtothepublicandeven sm asusual’intheWar onTerror.However, regulatory regime. Securityiscostlyandit with themajor principlesofdemocracy. The rrorism inthiscountrygoesbacktoasearly ow thisstatement, whichhoweverdoesnot rrorism policies arealike in many instances importance than itslawfulness. National democracies, theanti- lves withpoorquality ciple “the greaterthe of strugglesagainst beausefulhintto CEU eTD Collection political partywasappliedinrelationtoasingl However, thepointofrelevanceforthischapte the newLawonPoliticalPartiesin2002). parties asastrategy against terrorism (from thede democracy until recentlyandthecountry has pr 680 679 678 677 676 675 which existedandwaspracticedintheSp that itscontent andpractical application poses political partywasintroducedfor thefi developments intheSpanishlegislationonpo the verybeginningofitsexistence. democracy tostrengthen its fragiledemocratic driven bytheneedtocombatBasqueterrorism. by rushingtoadoptnew anti-terrorlaws,andthe independent andseparateBasquestate. engaged inaviolentcampaign withaclear probably thebiggestcontemporary terroristorganizationonEuropeansoil. Basque FatherlandandLibertygroup( Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism onwards. Terrorism Measures in Spain than seventy and injured more than 2000 people. See in Human Rights Watch, note 52, at 734-735. at 734-735. 52, note See for example Le Parties(inSpanish Political on Law Organic 6/2002 Sanchez, in Oehmuchen, last four the in to statistics official According at 104-108. seeIbid., ETA’sactivities of account For detailed Furthermore, Spanish constitutionalism wasnotfamiliar withtheconcept of militant However, themost important reasontoin supra supra note 674, at 216.For details onthe Spanish anti-terrorism legislation seeIbid., at 183 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and note 52, at 9. at 9. 52, note 14(2005).

Euskadi TaAskatasuna rst time intotheSpanishlegalorder 676 decades ETA has killed around 900 people, kidnapped more people, kidnapped 900 around ETAhas killed decades Spaindidnotreacttoth . MissiontoSpain (16 Decem 271

678 anish democracy formore than 25years. 677 serious concernsforth e partyallegedlyhaving litical parties.In2002aproceduretoban Therefore,Spaindidnotresorttomilitant acticed thewidesttole structure and protectitselfagainstattacksat y Organcia 6/2002 de 27 junio del Partidos Politicos) Politicos) y Partidos de 6/2002 27 junio del Organcia political purposeinmind: an toestablish r isthefact thatth legislative activism in

feat ofthe Francoregi clude theSpanishcase- (ETA))– nextto theIRAitis e eventsofSeptember 11 Setting an Example: Counter- Example: an Setting e procedure tooutlawa ber 2008);Turano, in rance towards political e concept of tolerance me totheadoption of this fieldwasalways links withterrorism. study istherecent 679 675 anditisargued ETAhasbeen supra 680

CEU eTD Collection simply failed.” stable democratic regime andallattempts to Until the establishment of theconstitutional m 682 681 historical fact.Theregime of be characterizedasuniqueandphenomenal fo regime ofpoliticalpartie transition to democracy inSpain inordertoac Therefore, itmakes sensetoprovidesome concerns that the militant democracy feature of Spanishdemocracy isnotdesirable. democracy rationalewithintheframeworkof turned into amilitant democracy state.Theref fact thatatleast onepolitical partywasba The historyoftheapplication 5.2.1. of terrorism. concern of militant democracy (party ban) isbeing transformed intonew concern: the threat militant democracy state. Therefore, Spainrepresents aclearexample of howatraditional represents, probably,evenmore remoteameas basically forthelackofcondemnation ofterro strategy and indeedwasameasure ofapreventivecharacter asthe partywas banned Therefore, a traditional militant democracy meas Ibid., at4. Franco Fordetailsseeforexample Rich Seeforexample Laura Desfor Edles, 4 (1998). Terrorism The relativelyrecent Spanishtransitionfrom authoritarianregime todemocracycan 682 Thatis whytheSpanishtransitiontodemocracy wasaremarkable and Politics s’ regulationinSpain. ard Gunther, Jose R. Botella, R.Botella, Jose Gunther, ard

Generalissimo Francowasbased in militant democracy inSpain israther short. Evendespite the Symbol and Ritual in the New Spain: The Transition to democracy after after to democracy Transition The NewSpain: in the Ritual and Symbol

Spain: Historical nned, Spaindoes notwishto acceptthatitwas 272

background information about process of the backgroundinformation aboutprocessofthe establish andpreservedemocracymade before the anti-terrorism policieswasaccompanied by onarchy in1978 “Spain has never experienced centuate theplaceandsignificanceofnew r political,historical rism. Banningapoliticalpartyforitssilence ore, theprocess of reference tothe militant ure than the simple preventiontheme ina ure was applied aspart of an anti-terrorism Democracy in Modern Spain Modern in Democracy Background on the explicit re , andculturalreasons. and Context 21(2004). Edles, jection ofall 681

CEU eTD Collection the aidthethe of Axis powers [...]does not representtheSpanish people [...]” provided that “Franco Fascist Government of Spain, which was imposed by forceupon the Spanish people with it wasrathera“no-partyregime.” 689 688 687 686 685 684 683 war andsuccessfully transitto democratic regime. groups thatonlythroughdialogandcompromise dichot around theauthoritarianismvs.democracy vote Communistsistodemocracy”. activities aroundsymbols ofdemocracy. EventheCommunistPartyadoptedslogan“To competing fortheplacesin1977parliamentary electionsbuilttheirprograms and and sloganofthisprocess.Allmajor andmi characterized asthe‘triumph ofdemocracy,’ adoption and ratification of theSpanish Co democratic electionstook place,and, in1978the remarkably quiescent process ofre its existencewasnevercontested,especiallyoutsideSpain. authority.” etc.). Thedictatorwas“theultimate rule traditional attributes ofthe democracy (i.e.fr ansition. The main argument was already brought above above brought wasalready argument main The transition. afterthe and during debate in political participate Basic Law.However, Spain opted not to impose limitson any ideology andall of them wereallowed to preventive measures after the defeat ofFranco’s regime aswasdone in Germany through Article 21(2) ofthe claim that the Spanish story is similarto the German oneand therefore it would be logical to adopt some it I survive? itis to guess help democracy and young did not Why Spain transition. the during use democracy admission into the UN. Consider for example, Resolution 39 (I) adopted by the GA on 12 The specific nature of the transition in Spain answ in Spain ofthe specifictransition nature The Edles, Ibid., at 51. See for example PaulPreston. Edles, Ibid., at 6. It waswell defined by the General Assembly ofthe UN in its resolutions and Spain wasexcluded from Gunther, supra note Edles, After Franco’sdeaththecountryturned supra note 683 Officiallyitwasasingle-party authorit 681, at 681, 65. 682, at 65. at 65. 682, The Triumph of Democracy in Spain

684 form andstrategyofconsensus”. Theanti-democratic nature oftheFrancoregime during 688 Therefore,theentiretr legitimate to make parallels with post-WWII Germany and make with post-WWII parallels to Germanylegitimate and 273

r ofthecountryandsource political 687 ee elections, political pluralism, freespeech, nstitution. The Spanish transition couldbe ers is an interesting case for the debate on militant militant on the debate casefor ers is interesting an anddemocracy assuchwasthemain theme introduce militant democracy militant measuresintroduce its to protect nor politicalpartiesandgroupsthatwere towards establishingdemocracy “througha omy. Itwasacceptedby allideologies and period ofconsensuswasculminated bythe it wouldbepossibletoavoidanothercivil arian state,butsome authorsarguethat (1986). (1986). 689 68 5 Formany politicalscience

ansition processwasbuilt 686 InJune1977thefirst th of December 1946 ofDecember CEU eTD Collection distinct from Germany,distinct from Francowasno circumstances ofsocietiesat a given time. istolarge determined interpretation and application regime. This demonstrates once again that militant democracy is context dependant and its content, manner of in post-Franco considered was not ideologies ms parties’and progra of political restrictions content-based to regime.were abused imposeAs totalitarian Spain di version of militant democracy was introduced exactly toaddress thee in Spain was imposed without any involvement of democratic processes and people’s participation. The German 692 691 690 than be worse to wereconsidered ideologies existing process. The democracy in Spain was too fragileatthat dialog: compromise andconsensus were considered asmain the components of the new regime-building political unitoftheStateandasaunique under theFranco regimeSpainwashighlycentr long andcomplicatedhistoryof 54.5 percentoftheBasqueelectorate toabstainfrom thevote.” parties advocatedthatvoters democracy, theBasqueleadersdidnotshare of theirtraditional arguments and claims for thesakeof transition andestablishing on dialogueandconsensus.While Catalanleader lived underthethreatofvi including journalists, intellectuals, politicians, kidnapped people;thousandsofpeople(whowere the activityofthisgroupanditsaffiliatescausedasignificant comprehensive scheme ofcriminalizing actsof separatist movement hasalways accompanied transition from authoritarianism todemocracy.” commentators, Spainis the“very modelof elitesettleme of Peace Special Report3(2006). The Basque Conflict. New Ideas and Prospects forPeace Prospects GorkaEspiauand NewIdeas Conflict. Idoiaga, Basque The Detailed account of anti-terrorism legislation could be found at Oehmechen, Edles, The BasqueCountrywasanunfortunate ex Unfortunately, theSpanishtransition todemocracy wasnot peaceful:theBasque note 681, at 6. at 6. supra 681, note olence fromETAmembers. donotsupporttheconstituti t electedbythepeople throughthede divisionsandtensionsbetweenitspopulations.Moreover, ethnic group(aspunishment fortheiropposition 274

Francoism. Moreover,as this passion.Forexampl d not have similar experience, the possibility to impose toimpose thepossibility havesimilar experience, d not extend by the historical, political, social and cultural cultural and social theextend by political, historical, police officers,andmembers ofthejudiciary, 690 terrorism andotherstrategiestofightETA, point to introduce such measures and none of the s, communists, andsocialistsgaveupmany

alized andBasquesweresuppressedasa the transition process. Mindful ofthe notsupportiveofnationalistmovement) ception totheprocessoftransition based 691

onal referendum of1978,leading xperience when democraticprocesses nt”, alessonon“consensual” number ofdeaths,injuredand 692 mocratic elections.The dictatorship TheBasquecountryhada supra was already mentioned above, , 661 United States Institute Institute States United , 661 note 637, at 183 onwards. at onwards. note 637, 183 e, “Basquenationalist

CEU eTD Collection (1990). (1990). Process Political Basque ETA and the Violence: Terrorist apacifistprotest. has built that Country in Basque violence against reaction grassroots Peace, 699 698 697 696 695 694 693 elections and affectedtheelections outcome). relevant torecallherethe2004Madridbombi democratic regime ingeneral,andthepredictabil Country. which presentevidenceofanegativeeconomic impact oftheterroristconflictinBasque independence. Thisactivityhas paramilitaries kill,hurt, destroy,andmenace country remains oneofthe“theonlyregi killing “has become morespecialised.” While ETAactivities have substantiall large operationin1961,ETAisclaimed tobere the matter and widelyusedviolenceandcriminal activitiestoadvanceitsgoals.Sincefirst independence. From verybeginningETA the self-governance and“anyvisible during theSpanishCivilWar). 93 The American Economic Review, (2006). Movements and TheirAudience (2007). (2007). Light of Social Movement Formore A.Bali, seeValentina details Alberto Abadie, Javier Gardeazabal, Ludger Mees, CarlosPestana Barros (Ed.), SeeforexampleMaria J. Funes, GorkaEspiauIdoi For a more detailed history of the Basque Country seeEdles, Special Report 661, April 2006. 2006. April 661, Report Special The terroristgroupETAwasformed in 698 Moreover,the terrorist activities might s Politics, Economy orCulture?Th aga ofPeace, United StatesInstitute , 33 Theory and Society 325 (2004). , 42 The Journal of Conflict Resolution 4 ( Resolution ofConflict Journal The , 42 The Timing of ETATerrorist Attacks

1 (2003); William A. Douglass, Joseba Zulaika, Zulaika, A. Joseba Douglass, William (2003); 1 693 seriously jeopardizeddemocracy.” Social Response to Political Violence in the Basque Country: Peace Peace Country: Basque the in Violence to Political Response Social elements unique,centuries-old Basqueculture.” ofthe The Economic Costs of Conflict: ACa Conflict: of Costs The Economic Franco’sregime fullysupp Terror and Elections: Lessons from Spain from Lessons Elections: and Terror y decreasedinthelast15-20years, 696 e Rise and Development ofth After theNorthern Irish conflict, theBasque 275

was expressingextreme andradicalviewson ons withinEuropeanUnionwhereviolent ng occurredafewdaysbeforethenational sponsible formore than800deathsinSpain. ity of theelectionresults inparticular(itis 699 , 32Comparative Studies The Basque Conflict. New Ideas and Prospects for Prospectsfor NewIdeas Conflict. and Basque The in ordertoachievepoliticalgoals,i.e. 1959 tofightfortheBasqueregion’s Therefore,byallaccounts,domestic note 681, at 122-138. at 122-138. 681, supra note ubstantially affect thestabilityof the , 28 Journal of Policy Modeling 337 1998) that demonstrat that 1998) ressed the Basquesystem of se Study of the Basque Country, Country, Basque the se of Study 697 e BasqueNationalisminthe Therearealsostudies in Society and History 2 and History in Society On the Interpretation of theInterpretation On , 26 ElectoralStudies, 695 es thatthereare thetypeof 694

CEU eTD Collection the politicalstrategyis The SpanishConstitution of1978incorporatedso 5.2.2. presence ofterrorism inSpanishpolitics. political pluralism andwasadopted Ley OrganicadePartidosPoliticos and introducedanewlawwhichcontainedthepo Therefore, theSpanishGovernmentoptedfora‘softer’ measure todeal withthis situation individual party members with arigid standardof proof of theirguilt in committing crimes. law procedureasitwould requireasignificantnumber ofprosecutionsinrelationto Spanish government wasalwaysstrugglingtoou 702 701 700 there is evidence that Batasuna andETAha often defendedandtried toexcuse initsspeech 12 %ofpopularsupportandhad7 party wassupportedbytheminority oftheBa nationalist movement hadties(or “unresolved challengefor thesystem” the stabilityofdemocracy terrorism isavery unple hard to imagine that it could itcould to imagine that hard thfor consequences serious will cause revision atotal that l However,if wetake other. a closer the than revise democracy cannotbecalled militant. TheSpanish Constituti revised or abolished). For some reasons, Spanish Government seesit adecisive element in absence of which be to possibility isno fromnormthe there protected that means (which from revision itstotal Constitution The main argument in support of this position is the absence of constitutional norms protecting the norms protecting of constitutional istheabsence this position of support in main argument The See,Comella, in & Zulaika, Douglass Spain: Despite theconsiderabledegreeoffreedom inpoliticalexpressionETAhasbeenan Towards supra note52 note 698, at 246. at 246. 698, supra note not toaccept thisfact. ever happen in practice. asant phenomenon notonlyforthes Militant and electoral processes. , at 134.

rather had till 2003) with the political party Batasuna. The rather hadtill2003)withthepoliticalpartyBatasuna.The Democracy out of75seatsintheregional asaresponsetothetroub considerablymodified themuch praisedmodel of 700 formany yearsmainlyduetothefactBasque d beensharingstructuresandinformation. ook at the Article 168 of the Constitution, it demonstrates it demonstrates ofthe Constitution, atthe Article 168 ook 276

702 sque population(in2002electionsitgained10-

Forexample, Article 6of theConstitution is es theterroristpractices ofETA.Moreover, tlaw theBatasunaPartythroughcriminal e entire system of government of the country, so itis so the country, of government systemof e entire ssibility tooutlawpoliticalparties.Thenew me elements ofmilitant democracy evenif on isdivided intotwopart ecurity ofthenation,butalsofor ling situationoftheconstant Parliament). Batasunavery s: oneisbeingeasierto 701 The CEU eTD Collection 706 705 704 703 new lawintroducedtotheCortes(S need towaitforanoccasionapplycriminal and thepossibilitytobanalegitimate butdange be changedwiththeintroductionofnewlaw: only retroactivelywhenatrag through criminal lawdependsontheindividualgui members commitacrime. Theproscription of alone cannotaddressthethreatof law wasdealing mainly withtheprocess of fo ETA. the Spanishdemocracy: theBatasunapartyandit 1978 and2002. procedure tooutlawapoliticalpartyunderthe when organizations andactivitie its activities fit into the defin 1978 LawonPoliticalParties providedforthepossi Constitution. regulating theactivitiesof internal structure must bedemocratic. devoted topolitical parties. It demandsthat activity are free within the observance of the Constitutio ofthe the observance arefreewithin activity area will, and popular basic pa for instrument political must bedemocratic”. Turano,in SeeSanchez, in Politicos). Partidos (Ley de Parties(1978) Lawon 54/1978 Political Article 6 706 Thesystem wasineffectivebecause itdi : “Political parties express democratic pluralism, assist in the formulation and manifestation of the of the manifestation and formulation the express democratic assistin parties pluralism, : “Political supra supra 704 705 However,therights and privilegesof supra supra note 52, at 732. at 732. 52, note However,theseprovisions werenotabletoaddress themajor challenge to note 52, at 8. at 8. 52, note

ition of criminal association provided inthe criminal law,and edy couldhavealreadyhappene political parties adoptedalmost atthesame time as s ofthepartydisregarddemocr politicalpartieswithadanger panish Parliament) inMarch2002. 703 Similar provisionswerecontainedintheLaw 277

parties observe theConstitution and parties’ rmation). Thecriminalrmation). law provisionsstanding 1978 Lawwasnotapplied law provisions –wasmeant tobe filled witha rous andundemocratic politicalpartywithout n and the laws. Their intern laws.Their the and n rticipation. Their creation and the exercise of their of exercise the and Theircreation rticipation. s connectionswiththeterroristorganization thegap–absenceofpreventivemeasures organizations (including politicalparties) d nothavepreventive means (theprevious lt ofitsmembers,soitcouldbeapplied bility todissolvea political partiesare notunlimited. The d. Thesituation wasmeantto ous politicalag atic principles.However,the al structure and operation andoperation al structure political partywhen at anytime between enda unlessits CEU eTD Collection the conductprohibitedbylawap 709 708 707 becomes lessconvincinginthelight seeking todestroy thesystem government ofdemocratic islegitimate ground forbanningit,it scope andimpreciseindefinition.Whileatfirs second criticalremark on adopted withtheintentiontooutlawapar shadow overitslegitimacy andeffectiveness.Th interest for thiscase-study asthisnorm allowsthepossibilityto declare apartyillegal. most important innovationsaretobefoundin address allpossibleforms ofactivitiesprov between these twobig political actors contai compromise betweenthegoverningpartyand supportive ofterrorism intheSp 2002. Thereisnodoubtthatthelawappearedas The newLawonPolitical Parties( The of subverting the constitutional order. order. the constitutional subverting of aim with the terroristorganizations to support political giving and c)assisting and possible; pluralism political make that conditions undermine asameansto the or ends political achieve to means asa used to be violence by reasonofideology,religion,belie justifying, or excusing attacks onthe life or dignity ofthe person or the exclusion or persecution of an individual partie activities of manner.political Prohibited grave and reiterated a in arerealized if they conduct, following ofthe any through it, eliminate or democratic system, the it itsactivity through when particular, Sew Oehmichen, For brief description of the new law see Ibid., at 730-740. Article 9(2):

Paradigm? new The 2002 Law on Political Parties could be criticized on a few accounts which cast a The 2002LawonPoliticalPartiescouldbecriticizedafewaccounts whichcasta

Law supra note 663,216. at A political party shall be outlawed when its activity violates the democratic principles, in in the democratic principles, violates itsactivity when be outlawed shall party A political

on

Political thislawconcernsthe

Parties:

fs, nationality, race,sex,orsexual seeks to deteriorate or destroythe system ofliberties, ormake impossible anish politics.The enactment of pears nottobecontroversia Ley Organcia dePartidos Politicos oftheactivitiesdescribedby Extending ticular politicalgroup: 278

iding anytypeofsupportterrorism. ned provisiontointrodu

fact thatthestatuteis the main party inopposition.Theagreement Militant Articles 6-9;however,Ar e first problematic conclusionisthat lawwas t sightitmight appearthatthepartywas a responsetothepresenceoforganizations s: a) violating fundamental rights by promoting, promoting, rights by fundamental s: a)violating

Democracy ientation; (b) encouraging or enabling l, anditisreasonable theBatasunaparty. thislawwasaresultof the law asillegal.Some of unnecessary wide in the unnecessarywideinthe

Application ) ce legal changes to

was passedinJune ticle 9isofmajor

towards 707 708 709 The

The

a

CEU eTD Collection political dissent.However,itiscrucialtome In certainpoliticale threat for the activities of politic much more thanprohibitionofBatasunaandsimilar parties. Thelawmight poseasignificant question did notmake itlook more effectiv Batasuna andanyotherda behind thislawandattempted todemonstrate th obvious fromthelanguageofprovisionsthat fightingagainsta expressed foraforeignpoliticalmovement geographical limitation andendstobeach and ‘legitimizingviolenceasamethod toach law. supporting and/orinspiredbyc prosecute homosexual behavior(whichmight ha commentators toconclude thatapolitical pa nationality, race,sex, orsexual orientat the exclusionorpersecutionofanindividua the prohibitiontopromote, justifyorexcuseat prohibited tobecommitted bypol 711 710 legitimate toprohibitsome behaviorlistedinthelaw. terrorists (Article 9.3). terrorists (Article9.3). systematicallyin accordance with terrorist or violent organisations or that protect and support terrorism and act that any group to support institutional giving parties; lawto political by given prerogatives and rights the terrorist organisation to conceding organisations; terrorist to links togroups with belong who those publicly renounced terrorist methods and aims, ormaintaining among its membership a significant number of directing bodies and on its electoral lists persons who have been convicted of terrorist crimes andwho have not Comella, in Forexample the prohibition of the following activities should be contested: including regularly in its 711

Not leastcontroversialarepr supra note note 52 supra nvironments thelawmight bemanipul , at 142., ngerous politicalparty.However,

onservative religiousviews)c al partiesinthe future if the itical partiesarenotthatuncontroversial. One of them is ovisions ontheprohibitionof ‘tacitsupport ntion herethatthewi 279

e andlegitimate and,in ion. Thisprovisionlegitimately led some ieved through violence (what about support ieved throughviolence(whataboutsupport rty advocating for criminal lawsanctions to tacks onthelifeordignityofpersons, l byreasonofideolog ieve politicalends’withoutspecifyingany ppen in the event of a political movement ppen intheeventofapoliticalmovement at thelawwouldbee thelegislatorwantedtocoverreason ated andeasilyappliedtosuppress 710 the broadlanguageofLawin ould beoutlawedunderthenew statute is tobe taken seriously. However,some oftheacts de and ambiguous language de andambiguouslanguage dictatorial regime?). Itis fact, itmight capture qually applicableto y, religion,beliefs, to terrorism’ CEU eTD Collection 713 712 compared toordinarycriminal procedure. at stake, theSpanishGovernment decidedthat criminal penaltieswouldbeimposed onindividual perceived as abetterapproach compared tocr affect individualsbutonlypartyitself:itisdisso illegality and legality.Underthenew law,if a legislators came upwithidea to create interm for theSpanishgovernment. Maybethatwasar using criminal means toachieve itspolitical pr connection withETAandtheref Statute. criminal associationanditmight bedissolved existing criminal lawprovisions. Article515of information. and therewasevidence thatBatasunaan the ETAgroup: itdefended andtriedtoexcuse As wasmentioned above,Batasunadidnotcommit terroristacts general tendtobebroad,imprecise, and example, there isstill no consensus on howtodefine terrorism, andall anti-terrorism lawsin is ausual(butunfortunate)attributeofmost

The Spanish Criminal Code (1995) (Ley Orgánica 10/1995, de 23 de noviembre, del Código Penal). Código del de denoviembre, 23 10/1995, (Ley Orgánica Code (1995) Criminal Spanish See, Ibid., at 134.

Batasuna 713 Toinitiatethis procedure itwasnecessary toprovethat Batasunahad close 712

However,theSpanishGovernmentf Party

Dissolution

ore isengagedincriminal sometimes pathetic intheirlanguage. 280

bytheCourtunderArticle520ofsame d ETAhadbeensharingstructuresand initsspeeches the terro ediate regime andplace itbetween criminal of thelawswithanti-terrorism notes.For ogram; thesetasksseemed tobechallenging iminal lawmeans asinthatcasethesevere it ispossible torelaxprocedural guarantees political partyisdeclar theCriminal Code providesadefinitionof lved andassets aregiven totheState.Itwas eason tolookforanalternativeoptionand s. Asthere isnoissu ound ithardtooutlawBatasunathrough cooperation whichisequalto but allegedlyha e ofindividualliberty ed illegalitdoesnot rist practicesofETA d linkswith CEU eTD Collection Court, STC 48/2003 STC48/2003 Court, oftheConstitutional Decision (unanimously). Statute the of the validity Courtupheld the Constitutional 2003, tried and Court Constitutional the to acomplaint brought 715 714 Supreme Courtconcludedthatthe Batasuna activitiesamount to members, andmainly topartyleaders’refusa terrorism related crimes of some of thepart terrorist organization.The Supreme Courtmade ETA group,theyhadsubstantiallythesame id charge of‘tacitsupportterrorism.’ Itwases Batasuna illegal(unanimously). Batasuna was tryingtobebanned foritspast activities. August 2002occurredaftertheen of terrorism (duetotherefusal tocondemn terro terrorist actofAugust2002inSanta Polaand Most outof23chargesconstituting thecasewere Supreme Court assigned withpower topolitical bystanders werekilled.InSe attack onAugust4,2002,inSantaPola,wh violation ofthenewlaw.Themotion wasprom approved themotion torequire Just afewweeksaftertheenac The Decision of theSala Especial ofthe SalaEspecial the before casewaspending the While

Case

to

Outlaw

Batasuna

ptember thecasewasbrought tothespecial chamber ofthe and tment ofthenewlaw,lowerhouseSpanishParliament 715 SpanishSupreme Court, STC 27/ 2003. the government tobringacti

ThedecisiontobanBatasunawasbasedprimarily onthe the actment ofthelaw,butitwa

Validity 281

tablished thattheparty y members, thespeeches ofits leaders and of theSupreme Court,the

Batasuna wasaccusedmainly oftacitsupport l tocondemn theattackinSantaPola.The of eology, anditwascloselycontrolledbythat pted byBatasuna's refusaltocondemnETA's to challenge the constitutionality of the Law. March the In of constitutionality the to challenge ich acarbombexplodedandasresulttwo rist attacks). Chargesrelatedtotheeventsof partiesundertherecently enactedstatute.

related to Batasuna’sreactiontothe ETA’s the referencetothecriminal convictionof

Statute 714

TheSupreme Courtdeclared on against Batasuna for its on againstBatasunaforits assisting andgi s obvious,nonetheless,that Basque regional government had closelinkswiththe ving political CEU eTD Collection procedures at thenational level. Therefore, theBatasunaPartyprohibitionca 719 718 717 716 in thecontextofterrorist suspects’preventive about criminal jurisprudencebutalotmore. ban employed aspartofanti-terrorismstrategi Outlawing Batasunaforthereason application. TheBatasunadissolutionisnot logic wasextendedbytheSpanish legislatorandjudiciary beyonditstraditional scope of condemnation ofterroristacts–is acrucial 11). violation oftheConventions’pr application intheECHRwhichhandedout January 2004 made unanimously, the Cons on thepreliminary approvalofthe2002Lawon impartiality ofthejudgeSupreme Courtwascontested and association;and,oftheprinciple on thegroundsofallegedviolati 9.2(c) oftheLawonPoliticalParties). support toterroristorganizations Batasuna is compatible with fundamental rights provisions of the Constitution Constitution the of rights provisions with fundamental iscompatible Batasuna laterthe Constitutio and Ban Batasuna on a judgement refra parties fromrequires political model ofmilitant democracy andinsisted that the new Herri Batasuna and Batasuna v Spain (2009) (Applications no: 25803/04 and 25817/04). 25817/04). and 25803/04 no: (Applications Batasunav Spain (2009) Batasunaand Herri lawitselfwaschalleng ofthe validity constitutional The STC5/2004 Court, theConstitutional Decision of madereferen Supremealso the Court Interestingly, 719

The reasontobanBatasunaparty–ta The decision tooutlaw Batasunawas challenged laterbefore the Constitutional Court ining fromining activities. certain

718 on of theright toafairtrial; ovisions (theappli withtheaim of subverting th Inaddition,theBata s outlinedaboveisratheran 716

282

Anti-terrorism isaboutpreventionbutnotonly judgment onNovember of2009,findingno detention andinvestigatio presumption ofinnocence.Inaddition,the point todemonstrate thatmilitant democracy ce to the Spanish constitutional system as not being a being system asnot constitutional ce to the Spanish es. Thisprovesthatanti-terrorism isnotonly exactly atraditionalpa Law does not changethestateofaffairs as itonly se involvedactuallyth titutional Court dismissed the appeal. nal Court confirmed that the judgement to outlaw to outlaw thejudgement Courtconfirmed that nal ed, the special division of the Supreme Court issued ofthe issued division Supreme Court the special ed, cants claimed violatio Political Parties.Bythejudgment of16 cit supportofterrori suna PartychallengedtheLawandits freedom thoughts, ofexpression, as he was involved in a report as hewasinvolvedinareport e constitutional or anti-terrorism orientedparty ns. States’ policies to rty prohibitioncase. n ofArticle ree separate court ree separatecourt sm andlackof der (Article s 10and 717

CEU eTD Collection 720 Court extended applicationofth political party.Butbystatingth executive tohearfrom theCons legislators sotheywouldbecarefulnexttime. application buttriedtopreventsimilar situatio It appearsthattheConstitutionalCourthadno show thatthe intention to soon aspossible. politics. The Government wasverymotivated Law onPolitical Parties wasinspired andmotivated bythepresence of terrorism inSpanish introducing thenewlegalregime. However,it all players from thepoliticalarenawereused It wasaccentuated abovethatSpainhaspracticed 5.2.3. remarkable factaboutthismove isthat applied inSpain, IwouldconcludethatSp presence of militant democracy inmodern cons activities to becommitted, which ironically includes speeches for example), theinherent account thepreventivenatureofnewlaw (even thoughitrequireswaitingforsomeillegal (if notopenlyandformally)inanyfunctioni procedure prescribedbycriminal law. prevent actsofterrorismcouldrefertoquiteremote pre-emptive measuresbeyondthe Comella, in Spanish Moreover, aswasalready mentioned above, supra Militant 720 note 52, at 138. at 138. 52, note TheConstitutional Courtof coursehand Democracy outlaw Batasunawasonlythe

at theintentiontooutlawBata titutional Courtthatthelawwas is pieceoflegislation inthe Model it happenedthroughanti- ain movedtowardsmilitant democracy andthe 283

­ to itandwerenotready It wouldbeembarrassingforthelegislatorand Wise ng democracy, includingSpain.Takinginto to eliminate Batasunafrom political arenaas reservations aboutthe was clear thatthemove tointroduce thenew titutional orders and manner thenewlaw was ns inthefuture and‘sent amessage’ tothe widetolerance towardspoliticalgroups and

militant democracy ispresent inherently occasio occasio led thisissueinsuchawayasto suna wasonlytheoccasion, terrorism policies. future to anypoliticalparty adopted totargetaparticular but notthe Law anditsimmediate to radical changes via ratio of thelaw. CEU eTD Collection 721 fairly criticizedonthese grounds. more thanthirty years old.Therefore, thelaw political pluralism, arelatively stablefuncti targeting aparticularpoliticalgroupwasadopted political partywasintroducedduringastateof cons was drasticandhadaffected millions of lives.In character. Moreover, theresult defeat of theNaziregime anditsprovisions necessarily badpracticefordemocracy. German some accounts,soitisnotpos possibilities from coming backtopower.The ideologies/groups prohibited,but its Article21wasalsoadoptedwithaspecifi other jurisdictions.Ifwecons democracy. TheSpanishexample isnotunique, however, andwecanfindmatching storiesin target (group,party,race,region,etc.)inmind is, might bedisputedonthegroundthat soon aspossible,thenit opinions thatifthelawwasadoptedonlytomake itpossibletooutlawthisparticularpartyas neither optionisadesirableandacceptablepr Batasuna wasonlythe language oftheLaw’sprovisions. covered bythescopeofthislawwhichmight bedangerousinthelightofambiguous Ibid., at 148. It ishard to say in certain terms what occasio doesnotdomuchharm forthedemocraticsystem.

ider theGerman example, itis orthe intenttooutlaw Batasuna wasaratio of absenceanycontrolover sible toconcludeincertain there isnodoubtthatitwas themere fact that theLaw oning of democratic institutions, andconstitution c enemy inmind. TheBasicLawdidnotlistany 284

on militant democracy clearly hadapreventive is different from the German caseandcould be is differentfromtheGerman actice foratruedemocracy. Therearesome option wouldbepreferab Spanish and German casesaredifferent by contrast, inSpaintheprocedure tooutlawa in Spain2002theenvironment ofwide BasicLawwasadoptedshortlyafterthe titutional stability. Therefore, thelaw per se obviousthattheBasicLawand terms whetherbothcasesare , an undesirable practice for , anundesirablepracticefor aimed ateliminating fascists’ was adoptedwithaparticular political parties in Germany le: thatbanningof ofthenewlawas 721 Thisargument CEU eTD Collection 722 traditional understanding: itdoesnot deal,forexam against itsown name”. law doesnotmatch itsname andpurpose“the the textoflawsuffersfrom seriousflaws argument thattheintent tooutlawBatasunawas onlythe and woulditbeanydifferentthan this Lawiftherearefewpoliticalpartiesin democracy. However,itwouldbeinterestingto justify adoption of alaw targeting asingle political party isan undesirable practice for opposition whichisuncomfortable tohaveforth terrorist organization,butnobodycanguaranteeth and fastelimination ofpoliticalopponents.This mainstream partiescanalwaysinvoke thisle legitimate democratic measure. Minoritypa Law seems troubling.Itmight createadangerous immune from thisstatute’sa outlaw thepartyitmight beconc be abusedtodeterand suppressopposition.Ta the possibilitytodissolve apoliti dissolution ofthepartybylistingitascriminal example, the State couldprobablyusecrimin

Sanchez, in Spain might havereferredtoothersolutio The situationdoesnotlookany supra note 52, at 12. at 12. 52, note 722 Itisnotalawregulating theactivitiesof politicalparties inits pplication. Thatisw

cal partyisalways potentiallydangerous practiceas itmight luded thatinpracticebig part was inrelationtoBatasunadissolution? better ifweaccepttheSp Spain allegedlyhavinglinkswithterroristgroups 285

gitimized practiceanduseittofacilitateeasy in itsdefinitionsandsc organization.Adoptionofalawprovidingfor time itwastheBatasuna Partywithlinkstoa rties wouldnotbesafeanymore asthe al prosecutionofthepartymembers orthe speculate aboutwhatthereactionwouldbeto e ruling majority. Therefore,anyattempt to king intoaccountthewholeprocedureto law’scontent isdisappointing asmeasured precedent ifweacceptthispractice asa hy thereasonbehind ns initsmove tooutlawBatasuna.For ple, withissuesofpartyfundsandisnot at nexttime itwillnotbeapartyin occasio ies inSpain are ingenerally anish ConstitutionalCourt’s . Aswasmentioned above, ope ofapplication.The the adoptionof CEU eTD Collection for peoplecommitting crimes ofterrororconne criminal organization.However, mainly forseriousconsequencestheindividu harder toinvokecriminal lawprocedure.The non-reference tocriminal lawwasjustified but possible.Forvarious reasonsthe government wasnotable(or not willing) towork through criminal andtodeclarea lawprovisions principle ofnon-retroactivity. occurred beforetheenactment ofthelawandit legitimacy andeffectiveness. TheBatasuna Party wasbanned mainly for its activities which is problematic from theperspective of bothelements of militant democracy doctrine: and implied limitations) towardsmilitant democracy, democracy tofollow.IfweacceptthatSpaindi Forafewreas prohibition case? What canconstitutional theory andpractic Spain: guaranteeing thepolitical functioning of amulti-party system which isth activities might fall within the scope of theLaw Moreover, thereisnoprocedure its hardtoforesee thepossible consequences mind. However, some forms of theproscribed parties acomplete andclear turnaway from terrorism whichisabsolutely legitimatetomy long andextensivelistofproscribedbehavior. precise about therequirements ofaparty’

A Moreover, therewerealternativemeans av

Plausible

Model

pluralism principle. to

Follow? designed bytheLawtosignalth it isnotclearwhy theState should careabout consequences ons, Spaindoesnothaveaplausiblemodel ofprotective

internal democracy; however,thelawprovides 286

e learnfromSpainandtheBatasunaParty behavior are broad and imprecise which makes behavior arebroadandimprecisewhichmakes of theLawand itsapplication inthe future. e main purposeandresulttobe achieved by The lawattempts todemand frompolitical party acriminal association.Itwasnoteasy, d itsmove andfurtherstep(beyond inherit and italso substantially affects the effective al members inthecaseofdeclaring party a cted toit.Ibelieve thegovernment cannot recalls seriouscritiqueifweadheretothe ailable todeal withapolitical party we havetokeepinmind thatthiscase e party that its behavior and and behavior its that party e CEU eTD Collection 723 Strasbourg Courtconcluded that principles enshrined in theSpanish Constitu strategy tocarry outits political project which judgment thatactionsoftheBatasuna“must be society; possiblyfollowed bytheviolentmovements. and speechesofthepartyleaders and members might causeconfrontati terrorism activitiesofETA. Th those whichfosteredaclimate c ofsocial ECHR initsjudgment classifiedthebehaviors enough toconcludethatBatasunawasapolitical the lackofcondemnation ofte Court of Spaininitsjudgment tooutlawBatasuna violation oftheArticles fact thattheECHRsupporteddecision of compatible with democratic principlesandfoundations. argue thatBatasunadidnotdese government’s lifeeasierinits tolerance established in Spain after the dict terms. Therefore,supportersoftheStatute deci other politicalpart convenient tobanapoliticalparty.Mo accord legitimacy toitsattempt toenactthe Herri Batasuna and Batasuna v. Spain (2009). (2009). Spain Batasunav. Batasunaand Herri The veryimportantfindingforthisdiscussi The Ley OrganciadePartidos Politicos y, itposesmany furtherquestionsasitspeaksin general andabstract 11 and10oftheConvention.

rrorist attacksbyETA,butalso e ECHRsupportedthenationalcourtargument thattheacts task ofoutlawingapartys rve tobebanned,butthewayit the prohibitionofBatasuna wa reover, iftheStatueistobeappliedinfutureany onfrontation andthosewhicharesupportiveof 287

theSpanishGovernment anddidnotfindany tion”. Towards theendof thejudgment, the atorship regime forthesakeofmaking listed bytheSupreme Courtintwocategories: ded tosacrificethec cannot sustaincriticism, evenconsideringthe statute tomake iteasier, faster,andmore is initsessence contrary to the democratic instrument ofterrorist Partydidnotconfineit analysedintheiren on istheCourt’sfinding inpara.87ofthe 723 TheCourtnotedthattheSupreme upportive ofterrorism. Idonot presentedalistofbehaviors s notbasedexclusivelyon its was doneisSpainnotfully oncept ofdemocracy and strategy ofETA.The on within the Spanish tirety aspartofthe self onlytorefer to CEU eTD Collection 724 citizens. and democracy. Afterfewyearsitseems to and members ofthepartydidnotachievest the Batasunabandidnotcauseanyseriousvi with relativelyradicalagendaswhichcouldbe solution forSpain.Thelawwasnotinvokedasingletime sincethen(thoughthereareparties introduced andBatasunawasbannedunderthis however, toavoidthemisuse ofsimilar m criminally prosecuted). Themajor challenge for theState and democracy inthis respect is, immune fromthepossibilityofbeingbannedunde in thiscase. would beabigsurpriseiftheECHRha legislation and constitutional structures. are important elements ofthedemocraticsystem andtheycancampaignforchangesof until political partybegin toimplement itsdange Strasbourg Courtrevisited matter andcould beequivalenttoexplicitsuppor omissions or silence which might amounttoa behavior ofthepoliticiansin contrary totheConvention.Th been basedsolelyuponthelack silence about theterrorist acts.However,itwas (the Welfare Party) and Others Partisi Refah (1999), v.Turkey Democracy Freedom and Party of (2003), Turkey Partyv. and Others Socialist ECHR mentions in its judgment at least United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey (1998), (1998), v. Turkey Others and of Turkey Party Communist atleastUnited in itsjudgment mentions ECHR To conclude,Idonotclaim thatapolitic v.Turkey (2001), etc. its earlierfindingsfrom similar case

cludes notonlytheiractions ofcondemnation ofviolence e reasonforsuchstatement is 724 Overall,thejudgment wasnotunexpectedandit 288

easures. Fewyearspassed sincetheLawwas become acceptedbythescholars, politicians, ve foundSpaininviolationoftheConvention atus ofsuper-heroeswhosufferedforfreedom olent protests;didnotbecome more popular, easilycapturedbytheLawinquestion)and political position and opinion on aparticular noted thateveniftheprohibitionwouldhave t ofaction.Inotherpartsthejudgment the Law. The time proved that it was not a bad Law. Thetime provedthatitwasnotabad rous program andprojects, political parties r asimilar lawasinSpain(andtobeonly al partyengagedinterrorism shouldbe and speeches,butalsotheir and terrorism itwouldnotbe s: State doesnotneedtowait theCourt’sbeliefthat CEU eTD Collection power withactiveinvolveme case inmany anti-terrorism regimes) andwit to some extend)withoutexcessivecurtailingof the party.Second,thiscase-studydemonstrates overall strategyorthepolitical when itwasexpectedtocondemn theactsofte for itscriminal activities (orrather criminal ac technique but itwasapplied intheWar onTerr Political Parties isof apreventivenatureandincorporates aclassical militant democracy political partywithextreme politicalagenda, bu demonstrates theapplication of the classical militant democracy measurenot onlytoa to acceptthemilitant characterofthedemocr democracy toarelativelynewtypeofthreat.Despite theresistance of dissolve the BatasunaParty represents to my mind aclear example of extending militant following. First,the2002SpanishLaw onPolitical Parliament would agreeonitsnecessity. about itsconstitutionality andvalidity,soitmight beutilized anytim approved byfourjudgments from threedifferent might beused.Theconstitutionality of theLawonPolitical Partiesand itsapplicationwas predict whomight wintheelectionnexttime used for good and itwas the right solution for this universal andrecommendable toothercounties facingsimilar problems. Thistime itwas However, thefact thatitworkedoutinSpainthis time doesnotmake thissolution The major lessons constitutional theory can learn from theSpanish story are the nt ofthejudiciary. agenda ofthepartyandwasf 289

hout shiftingthebalancebetweenbranchesof tivities of itsmembers) butfor keepingsilence andforwhichpurposestheLawinquestion rrorism. Silencewasconsideredtoamount the basichuman rightsandliberties(whichisa how terrorismcanbedisempowered (atleast or. TheBatasunaPartywasnotbannedonly t toathreatofterrorism, too.TheLawon Courtsandtherecouldbenomore debate acy intheircountry,this particularcase particular situation. Ho Partiesanditsimme ound tobealegitimate tooutlaw theSpanishjudiciary e themajority ofthe diate applicationto wever, itishardto CEU eTD Collection Systemized Approach to Anti-Terrorism Policies. Systemized Approachto 5.3. Russia’sWaronTerror:Militant various reasons.Firstofall,th Russia wasselectedforthecase-studychapte problem: terrorism asatool banning procedures,Russiarepresentsacomplete While Spainoptedtodealwith Introduction options. example whenitwasapplied anditactuallywo democracy canbeused aspartofanti-terrori significant difference of Spanishterrorism from globalterrorism) isthatthe militant this techniqueworkedout.Themostimportant harder tojustifyandmorestrictsc for non-transitional countries limitations imposed case oftheRepublicanPartyRussiav.c law, itsbroadandvaguelanguage,theway movement canbeeliminated from thepolitical democracy couldbeproblematic. Spainisnot theperfectexample ofhowadangerous A furtherlessonisthatmilitant democracyintroducedatlaterstagesof constitutional The Spanishexample isnotperfecttobefo

to achieveterritorialindepe is statehasexperiencednumerous deadlyterrorist attacks inthe presenceofterrorism inits rutiny shouldbeexercisedbythecourts. 290

sm policiesand there is atleastone practical arena (meaning mainly thereason toadopt the rked may bebetterthanmany otheravailable r on terrorism and militant democracyfor r onterrorismandmilitant Democracy asatooltoIntroduce it wasapplied).TheEHCRjudgment inthe conclusion for thisproject (despite the llowed, butthistime andinagivensetting llowed, ould berelevanthere,asitwasstatedthat on political participation rights aremuch ly differentapproach ndence foracertainethnicgroup. political arenathroughparty- toa very similar CEU eTD Collection 726 725 terrorism wasactivelyusedbysome ethnicandre democracy andstrengthening itsterritorial integrity. achieving political goals became aninalienabl terrorism withinthete Russia isdirected primarily towards internal terrorism: theoperatingand committing actsof most ofwhichhavelittletodowiththetr The Russian Federation anti-terrorism regime is 5.3.1. how militant democracy logicmight pot terrorism regime inRussia,unde legislative and law-implementing policies. In might behelpfultofindabettertheoretical regime toaddress thethreatof terrorism andIfind itusefultoseeif militant democracy countries intheWorld mostaffectedbyterro fault oftheweaklegislativeregime Despitebeingoneofthe existingatthemoment. those nationalgovernments constantlyfailinfightingtheWar onTerroranditispartiallythe interests: nationalsecuritya the threat of terrorist attacks from theperspec opportunity toinvestigatetheissuesofresponse country’s unfortunatelylongexperienceof past decadeandtheyare stillhappening inRussiawithworryingregularity. 125. See for example, Oemichen, Federation. ofthe Russian unity political and aterritorial being (2007). iEkonomika 11 Zakonodatel'stvo Analiz, Veka: Politiko-Pravovoj see Ka Formore data wereinjured. statistical 3358 1998 and356 in 2004.50biggest terrorist actscommittedinRussiagrows Russianterroristsarecharacterise Forexample,1290 terrorism-related crimes werecommitted in Russia in 1997 and 1728 in 2005. Number of Overview of the rritory oftheRussianState.Unfo Existing nd fundamental freedoms. Third,th terrorist actscommitted inRussiafrom

d by some commentators astargeting mostly symbols ofoppression, i.e. rline major problems andconcernsattempt toanalyze dramatically every year: 18 acts of terrorism in 1996, 32 in 1997, 21 in in 21 in 1997, 32 1996, terrorism actsin of 18 year: every dramatically Anti ­ entially improvethesituation. Terrorism linin B.Ju., Terrorizm v Rossii v Konce XX - Nachale XXI XX-Nachale Konce v Rossii v Terrorizm B.Ju., linin agic eventsofSeptem 291

approach which wouldlead tomore successful tive of thebalance of twopotentiallyconflicting fighting a War on Terror isanexcellent fightingaWaronTerror what follows Iwillintroduce the existinganti- rism, Russiadidnotdevelopacomprehensive compiled ofarelatively modestlistof laws, to arealpresenceofterrorism asopposedto ligious groupstoachie e attribute oftheRussiantransition to Regime 726 Atthebeginning of thetransition, rtunately, terrorism asamethod of

2001to 2005 killed1115persons, e caseofRussiademonstrates ber 11..Anti-terrorism in ve independence,but 725 supra at 637, note Second,the CEU eTD Collection 731 730 729 728 727 was modified substantiallyafterRussiajoin the Russianlegislator totakeot that in1994thethreatofterrorism wasnot 1994. Thetextofthearticleandespecially of terrorism asaseparatecrime wasintroducedinthe1960Crim The Russian legalsystem wasunfamiliar withcrim Crimes Counteracting toExtremist Activities terrorism isdefinedasoneof The prominent place inanti-terrorism policiesis Decree onCounter-Terrorism Strategies, terror assetoutinthe terrorism regime aimed attheprevention which resultinnumerous fatalitieseverytime, Russiadidnotdevelopacomprehensive anti- major threats tonational security. until 2020activitiesofthevarious achieve throughapolicyof terrorist groupsappeartobemo later this ethno-religious andterritorial identi terrorism. at online available (2009), Article 213(3) provided for example for punishment of 3 to 5 years of imprisonment for committing act of Extremism Federal Law Counteracting on (2002). Federation Russian the of President the by Approved Terrorism. on Counteracting National Concept E.g. Terrorism Federal Law (2006). Counteracting on Russian Federation Concept of National Security,

To thedate,Russia’santi-terrorism regime of

Terrorism

http://base.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc;base=LAW;n=92779 Federal LawonCounteractiontoTerrorism of2006, constantviolence.Accordingto

thetypesofextremist activities,i.e.FederalLawof2002on her morecomprehensive measures. re diverseintheir members’ iden 727 terroristorganizationsarest Despitethe factofsufferi 730 . 729 of newterroristactsfrom happening. andtheStrategyofNati supra taken seriouslyanditt 292

fication ofthetypicalte ed (ratifiedin2006) ‘severity’ ofthepunishment allowconcluding note492, Section 37. occupied by theanti-extremist legislation as complies withtheprovisionsoncrimes of es ofterroruntil aslate1994. Theact the Strategyof ng from regularterroristacts tities and goalstheyclaim to inal LawofS ill consideredasoneofthe 731 ook another few years for ook anotherfewyearsfor onal Securityuntil2020. The criminal legislation rrorists blurred and now the Council of Europe the CouncilofEurope 728 National Security, thePresidential oviet Russiain . CEU eTD Collection acts of terrorism; financing, andassisting incommitting anactofterrorism itself, butalsoincitement tocommit According toArticle205.1assistanceofterrori terrorism as itclassifies incitement tocomm sentence. Anotherinterestingfeatureofthis provisions ofArticle205.1whic list ofcrimes ofterrorlookssomehow irresp terrorism-related crimes listedintheCriminal C Russian criminal lawis applicableforplanned hostage-taking (Article206);a incitement to commit ofterrorism acts andpub terrorist activitiesincl Chapter 24(Crimes againstpublicsecurity):ac had tobeamended tomeet theinternationalobligations. terrorism (Articles5,6,and7re criminal offenceunderitsdomestic law,to party toadoptmeasures toestablishpublicpr 736 735 734 733 732 in theiractivities; Convention onthePrevention ofTerrorism. http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/Cher at available ratifications and signatures Ibid., Article 211. Ibid., Article 208. Ibid., Article 206. Ibid., 205.2. Article (1996), Federation Russian the of Code Criminal Text ofthe Convention available at However, foracountrysufferingfromterrorist attacksonaregularbasissuchmodest The currentCriminal CodeofRussia 733 735 hostage-taking; hijacking (ofanaircraft uding recruitment, training,andfinancialassistance(Article205.1);

nd, falsecommunication ofacts spectively). Therefore, thecrim h includesallforms ofassi http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/196.htm 734 organization of illegal armed-forces and participation cheSig.asp?NT=196&CM=8&DF=01/02/2011&CL=ENG 732 293

, ferry,orrailwaytrain); TheConventionimposes obligationsoneach criminalize therecruitment andtrainingfor ovocation tocommit a terrorist offence asa it certain crimes asa ode areofpreventivenaturetosome extent. article is its reference to what amounts to article isitsreferencetowhatamounts or intended crimes, soitcanbe argued that lic justificationofte onsible especiallyif sm includesnotonlyrecruitment, training, ts ofterrorism(Artic 1996includesafewcrimesofterrorin sting terrorism inthesame ofterrorism (Article207). inal provisionsonterrorism rrorism (Article205.2); 736 ssistance toterrorism. le 205);assistanceto we analyzecarefully attempted murder of ; Chart of . CEU eTD Collection Russian authoritieshowever tooknewactionsn obligations attheminimum levelanddidnot with theimpression thatRussiawasonlycon recruitment forthepurpose ofcriminal prosecu provide detailsonthecrucialel terror inRussia,mixes upafewdifferentcrim the Russianlegislator.Itdoesnot that atleastthecriminal lawelement ofthe committed fortotallydifferent motives asterrorism crimes. terrorism ifthelaw-enforcement bodieswouldinvestigate andreport criminal activities way thearticleiscomposed might potentially of thearticlewasdrafte unclear constructionofArticle205. from takingcertainactions willbe prosecuted under thecrime of ‘assistingterrorism.’ This taking forpurelypragmatic reasons(i.e.money) terrorism anditisnotclear protected bythosecrimes. Forexample, hos and itsdistinct features asa crime, butal and ,attacksonpersonsorinstitutionsenjoyinginternationalprotection 740 739 738 737 a publicfigure; Ibid., Article 360. Ibid., Article 279. Ibid., Article 278. Ibid., Article 277. Ibid., The analysisoftheCriminalLawprovisionsoncrimes ofterrorallowsustoconclude By including allthese crimes inthelist corrupts notonlythedefinition of terrorism 737 forcible seizure of powersorretentionofpowers; d underpoliticalandsocialpressure whyagroupofpeopleintended

giveaclearunderstandingof ements ofcrimes, i.e.whatis considered as trainingand 1 might leadtotwounfortunate War onTerrorinRussiaisnottakenseriouslyby 294

so undermines andprobablylimits thevalues es bynatureandconsequences,doesnot tage-taking might havenothingtodowith take thetaskasseriouslyitshould.The distract theattentionfromrealproblems of tion ofterrorism? Allthismight leaveone early after allmajor terrorist attacks butit to forceapersondosome actsorrefrain cerned with complying withinternational isarealhassle,andsecond,the what acts amount to crimes of what actsamounttocrimes of to commit crimeto commit ofhostage- conclusions:first,thetext 738 740 armed rebellion; . 739

CEU eTD Collection rights andobligationsofthecitizens affectedby th providing alegalandorganizationa 743 742 741 enforcement bodies in their activities related to of terrorism, terrorist activities, and terrorist acts tobe used byalllegislative and law- on thislawcontentsee below).However,impo of whicharedevotedtotheregime ofcounter possible military intervention inthefight agains and theminimization ofconsequencesacts principles of counter-terrorism policies,includin finally replacedwithanewlawwhichenteredintoforcein2006. law didnotmeet alltheneeds,wasamended afewtimes (in2000,2002,and2003),was the firststepinhistoryofmodernRussia terrorism policiesinRuss provisions. Russiaisnot It iswell-known factthatanti-terrorism Non substantial legalimportance anddonotform animportant partofan concepts oncontactingterrorism, programs topr punishment foraterroristmore severeisusua substance of thecriminal provisions wereatstake. usually wasonlyaboutincreasingthepunishme http://base.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi? Criminal CodeoftheRussian Text of the law is available at lawisavailable Text the of Federal Law on Combating Terrorism (1998). Seeforexample themost recent chan ­ Criminal The newFederalLawonCounteractingTerrori

Anti­ Terrorism an exception tothis mode ia wasadoptedin1998. http://zakon.kuban.ru/private4/2001/130250798.shtml

Legislation ges to the Criminal Code l basistocoordinatethefight req=doc;base=LAW;n=107760;fld=134;dst=100010 measures cannot be built around onlycriminal law

295

lly accompanied withtheadoptionofdifferent to systemize itsanti-terrorism policies butthe combating terrorism. Thedefinitions given by -terrorism operation(fordetailsandconcerns t terrorism. Thelawcontains27articlesmost rtantly the lawalsointroduced thedefinition Federation, 1 December at Federation, 1 2010 of terrorism, andasthelegalbasisfor g preventionofterroristattacks,liquidation 742 event crimesofterror,etc.,whichhaveno ofactions.Thefirst nts for acts ofterrorismnts foracts andrarelythe Thelawwasadoptedwiththepurposeof e anti-terrorism policies. of Russia: Federal Law on Amendments tothe 741 Themovestomake thecriminal sm declaresitselfassettingbasic withterrorism, andclarify ti-terrorism regime. law dealingwithanti- . 743 Thelawwas . CEU eTD Collection for law-enforcement agenciesanddifferent consequences. Itisdisappointingtoseethatmo into account the frequency of terrorist atta preventing it.Thelegislative approach to issues regime existinginRussia.Itdoesnotprovidearealmechanism forresistingterrorism and and thesituation withterrorism inRussia,aswe extremist m religious associations;and,seriouslimitations signs of extremism intheiractivities; thepossibility tosuspend theactivities of publicor possibility ofissuingawarningtothepublic provisions ofthe2002lawwhicharemost 744 therefore allnorms onanti-extremist aretobeappliedintheWar onTerror Counteraction toExtremist Activit overlapping withcounter-extremism legi (Article 23), andrewards citizensforassisti introduce measures of social protection for those involved incounter-terrorism activities the 2006Law providesforthepossibilitytoou modern statestoincludevagueandunclearnor Law might capturepotentially,whichisnonet the lawarenotperfectandposeso discrimination and some others. the state,incitement of integrity territorial and order constitutional ofthe alteration forced Lawlists the extremism of forms other Among activities. terrorist other According to In general,theAnti-Terrorism Lawof2006is Another strikingfeatureoftheRussianan aterials. Article 1 extremism for the purpose of this Law incl ofthis purpose the for extremism

ies liststerrorism asoneform me seriousconcerns astoth slation. ThecurrentFederalLawof2002on ng inthefightwithte 296

anti-terrorism committees andcommissionsat to hatred, social, racial, ethnic, religious and linguistic linguistic and religious racial, ethnic, social, hatred, to or religiousorganizationsonthepresenceof cks inRussia and the severity of their ms inanti-terrorism legislation.Inaddition, st oftheissuesoncount imposed oncirculationoftheallegedly ll asisthe overalllegislative anti-terrorism heless within the overall tendency of all heless withintheoveralltendencyofall of terrorism isreallysurprising if wetake tlaw terroristorganiza relevanceforthissectionwouldbethe disappointinginrelationtoitsname ti-terrorism regime isitsconstant udes public justification of terrorism and and ofterrorism justification udes public rrorism (Article 25). e realrangeofactivitiesthe ofextremist activitiesand er-terrorism areleft tions (Article24), 744 . The CEU eTD Collection Activities. Forexample, Article 3 of theLaw Terrorism preventiontheme itisverymuch pr large extentbyanti-extremism legislation. policies. like tointroduce abrief analysisof theexisting legislation andapproachtoanti-terrorism Russian approach towardsthreatofterrorism wh anything allowedbytheRussianConstitution. Therearesubstantial inconsistencies inthe differently andevenintroducedanexceptiona character ofterrorism sincethe 11 Septembe many actionswithintheiranti-te unnecessary other crime againstpublicsecu attacks on Russiancitizensdid not cause trea One might seethe positive side ofthe Russian st 746 745 on regionalauthoritiesintheNorthernCaucasusrepublicsandintelligenceauthorities. seem tobewilling togiveupth feasible toidentify anypolitic trend ofRussia’santi-terrorism strategyisth the aftermath ofterroristat approach onhowtoaddressthethr means highpotentialforabuseandamounts to federal andregionallevels.Itiswell-knownth available on-line at available on-line Ibid. Ibid. Mihail Logvinov, Bor'ba s Terrorizmom” kak Katalizator Terroristicheskoj Ugrozy vRossii? (2011), As wasmentioned above,counter-terrorism At themoment, theRussiananti-terrorism re http://www.regnum.ru/news/1381147.html tacks anddoesnotsaymuch a

al strategy against terrorism. e responsibility for thefailure to rity. Manymodern democracies eat emanating from terroristgroups. 297

rrorism policiesandit Unlike theFederalLa r events.However,Russi esent intheLaw onCount e prosecution ofcrimes ofterroranditisnot ting terrorism asanythingdifferentthanany l regulatoryregime whichdoesnotfitinto ory asitseems thatte at under-regulationofsuchmatters always ich needtobeaddres states that anti-extremist policiesinclude the absenceofasystemized andunified . policiesinRussiaar gime ismainly about measures takenin 745 bout theprevention.Theoverall Moreover,federal governments prevent new acts of terrorism prevent newactsofterrorism are criticizedfortakingtoo amounts toassuming new w onCounteractionof rrorism anditsregular sed. Butfirst,Iwould a doestreatterrorism eraction ofExtremist e influencedtoa 746

CEU eTD Collection states that the President of the Russian Federation determ Federation theRussian of the President states that criminal lawprovisionsand The federalanti-terrorism regime inRussiaat the legislative levelconsists of twoelements: Regime 750 749 748 747 5.3.2. serious protection wouldbeaccorded toanyrights andfreedoms limitations. discussed above,anuncontrolledexecutiveisneve major regulationofcounter-terrorisminRuss parliament speaksinverygeneraltermsonly27shortarticles.Therefore andincludes the neglecting thesituationwithte Concept ofCounteractingTerrorism. decisions. accommodated bythefactthat overall accompanying theWar onTerror. happening inRussiaandthephenomenon of“ inevitably might leadtoitsarbitrary application inpractice.Thela clear indication that law is extremely wide-r individuals. extremist activitiesof publicandreligiousassociations,otherorganizations prophylactic measures topreventextremist act available at hear. See forexample, “Misuseofan to want not does the government fitinto does not which opinion any to silence method asa authorities regional propagandistic measures directed atth Russian Federation Concept of National Security, supra note 492. 492. supra note Security, National of Concept Federation Russian Thiscompetence ofthePres and federal by legislation anti-extremist abuse of about speaking widely NGOsare example, different For Article 5

Russian Moreover, thechaotic andarbitrary wayto

749 http://www.sova-center.ru/en/misuse/ further clarifies what does amount to the prophylacticmeasures and it includes educational, 747 Thus, in2009thePresident oftheRu Readingfurtherprovisionsofthelaw

War on

Terror: ident is prescribed FederalLawon the by isprescribed ident the 2006FederalLaw onCounteractingTerrorism. Thecontent

ti-extremism” archive of rrorism inRussiaasanti-terrorism legislation enacted bythe e prevention of extr of e prevention 748

Problems

. 750 This state of affairs appears to be somehow Thisstateofaffairsappearstobesomehow 298

and ines the basics ines of thestat anging intheareaofitsapplicationwhich emist activities. emist activities. national strategy isguided byexecutive ia is vested with the executive. As was ia isvestedwiththeexecutive.Aswas ivities ingeneralanddetectprevent

the Center Informati for Center the r asignofhealthylegalsystemwhere Concerns illegal orunlawfulanti-extremism” is ssian Federation issued aDecreeonthe fighttheWar onTe does notclarifymuch apartfrom the Counteracting Terrorism (Article 5.1. Terrorism (Article5.1. Counteracting

of

the e’s counter-terror policies). policies). e’s counter-terror Existing on and Analysis“SOVA”, tter isunfortunately rror inRussia is

Legislative CEU eTD Collection terrorist activitiesand ideologies in thedefini activities, and acts of terrorism. Thefirst noticeable feature of this lawistheinclusion of the from theveryfirstarticles.Thus,Article3of serious concernsfrom thepers changes, some ofwhichareahighlycont replaced an earlierlawonthesame subject- However,the most interesting for the purpos Law onCounteractingTerrorism wasmentioned of2006.As abovethislegislativeact mainly atthe prevention of terrorist it wouldmake sensetopaymore attentionto While itdoes notmean thatRussiahad to follow exactly this approach, inthe existing reality a terrorist offence, recruitment forterrorism andtraining forterrorism asseparate crimes. Europe ConventiononthePreventionofTerrori in thelightofRussia’sratifi but atleastthreedifferentcriminal acts,as punishment of crimes connectedtothesame i that theRussianlegislator wasnotwillingtosystemize thecriminal prohibitionand different partsofthecriminal and arenot groupedaround same Theplacement chapter. ofthe terrorism-related crimes in positioning ofthecrimes ofte investigation andprevention.Bythelackofsy and absenceofimportant characteristicsofthe those norms andcriminal approachtowardsterr of criminal lawprovisionswasbriefly discusse cation oftheinterna law is not wrong orterribly problematic assuch,butitshows rror withintheCriminal Code pective ofliberaldemocracy a attacks tooccur inthefuture. for example Article205.1.Thearticlewasinserted 299

matter but therecentlawintroduced significant the Lawgivesadefinition ssue. Moreover,some articlesrepresentnotone tion of terrorism andterrorist activities. Thus, roversial meaning. Thete stemized approach Imean asomewhat chaotic details and carefully draft the norms, aimed d aboveandthemajor concerninrelationto sm talksaboutpublicprovocationtocommit crimes of terrorwhich affect theireffective orism isabsence ofasystemized approach tional convention.However,theCouncilof es of this section would be the Federal es ofthissectionwouldbetheFederal : theydonotfolloweachother nd major democratic principles of terrorism, terrorist xt of the law poses xt ofthelawposes CEU eTD Collection на 752 751 The2006Law isofparticularinterestforthisdebatemainly foritsprovisionsonthe regime operation(Artic ofcounter-terrorist matters. committed terroristactandsuppress thefree accommodate the needtofilter the information communicatedonthe happening hostage or assi Moreover, the‘informational agenda incompatiblewiththegovernmental po given in the same article might easily leadto a terrorist act.” other typesofaidingandassistingwithregard armedforming ofillegal forcesandparticipatin information whichcalltoterroristactivityand committing acts of terrorism, propaganda of te the 2006Lawisbroaderthanoneof‘terrorism’ andincludes“planning,preparation includes referencetocertainpractices.However, sense if‘terrorism’ isdefinedonlyasideol terrorist activities andhow itmight make the the populationorthrough otherformsofillegalviolent action.” decisions ofgovernment,localself-governmentor internationalorganizations byterrorizing terrorism isdefinedinArticle международными http://base.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/ противоправных Federal Terrorism Law Counteracting (2006), Article 3(2). on

Article 3 принятие It isnotexactly clearwhytheRussianlegisl reads as follow (in the original text): T text): original (inthe readsasfollow

решения

752

организациями Thedefinitionof‘terrori

органами насильственных online.cgi?req=doc;base=LAW;n=113621

, 3as“ideologyofviolencea государственной связанные stance’ intheabsenceofclear

st activity’ combined withdefinition of ‘terrorism’ с

ерроризм ogy asopposedtoterrorist les 11-17).Theregime hasbeenknowninthe 300

действий. Available online at устрашением

War on Terror more effective. Itwouldmake abroadinterpretation to planning,preparationorimplementation of dom ofcommunication onterrorism-related власти, justify orsupportthene g intheiractivities andalsoinformational or rrorist ideas; dissemination of materials or the definitionof‘terroristactivity’givenin licies (especiallyintheRussianreality). ator decidedtodistinguishterrorism from -идеология органами

населения nd practiceofinfluencingthe . 751

насилия guidelinescouldbeusedto местного

и ( that includes political

activities, и или) ed forsuchactivity;

практика самоуправления иными

воздействия but italso

формами

или

CEU eTD Collection terrorist operationwhile thecurrentlawdoesno law allowedderogationsfrom ordinaryhuman Counteracting terrorismmodified theprevious there areno provisions onaccountability orparliamentary control. The2006 Lawon emergency, theregime ofcounter-terroristope complying withproceduralgua butwithoutproclaimingstate ofemergency terrorism operationimposes nearlythesame re but formally itdoesnotqualifyasastateofemer Themajor problem withtheregimeofc beyond theordinaryrightsrestric only intimes ofpublicemergency whichmust beofficiallyproclaimed. 753 the EuropeanConventiononHuman Rightspermit de with international standards, i.e. the Internati controls imposed bytheLaw.Theregulationofa State Duma. The Presidentissuesadecreeapprovedbythe state of emergency is provided inthe FederalConstitutional Lawon theStateof Emergency: restrictions onrights emergency. Article 56 of theConstitution providesfor possibility to impose certain does notacquiescewiththetextofRu construction. Theregimeofcounter-terrorism op Terrorism aswell;however,thecurrent lawhad Russian legalsystem since1998anditwaspr Federal Law on State of Emergency (2001). 753 Thedeclarationofastateemergenc and liberties during astateofemer

rantees for such limitations. Moreover, unlikeastateof tion clause(Article 301

onal CovenantonCivila a stateofemergency thereforewithout and law onthismatter substa rights protectiononlyin ration isnotlimited intime orlocationand ssian Constitutiononmatters ofstates esent in the previous Law on Counteracting esent inthepreviousLawonCounteracting strictions onrightsandlibertiesasduringa Federation Council,with gency aswell. Infact,theregime ofcounter- modified theprovisionsonthisstrange legal eration appearstobeverycontroversialand t mention anddefinethe‘areaof counter- state ofemergencyis ounter-terrorism operati 55(3)) onthescaleof rogations from civil y issubjecttonumerous restraintsand gency. Theproceduretointroducea nd Political Rights, and in generalcompatible ntially: theprevious the areaofcounter- notification of the notificationofthe rights’limitations, rights andliberties on is that it goes on isthatitgoes CEU eTD Collection mightcounter-terrorist regime warrant: of emergency andsome areunpr Astotherestrictions ofhuman rights terrorist operationtheyamount nearlytothesa example cannotbeintroducedformore terrorism operationseems tobeunlimited in has removed thisconstrainforthelaw-enfo operation nearlyonthewholeterritoryof definition ofthe‘counter-terrori terrorism operation’.Probably,theRussian regime restrictions might be imposed andwhat terrorism operation’at all. Th ------

communication networksanddevices; suspension ofthecommunicationsfor individuals ororganizationsfrom chemicals, radioactivematerials, etc); seize oftheindustrialproductionusingda circumstances ofthevehiclesinth use ofmeans oftransportationbelonging about thecommitted act(s)ofterro electric communicationchannelsand thema screening ofnegotiations,letters andothercommunications,conductingsearchesof removal ofpeopleforspecifiedlo ID checks; erefore itdoesnotimpose inf st operation zone’andcould not ecedented even forthelatter. than 30days)andterritoriallocation. cations andtowing ofvehicles; e propertyofprivateindividuals; rism andpreventionofothers; 302

Chechen Republic.Therefore,newlawof2006 authorities wereunhappyabouttoonarrowa rcement bodies andtheregime ofcounter- me scaleofrightslimitation asduringastate and libertiesduringtheregime ofcounter- terms oflength(astateemergency for couldbedeclaredasa‘zoneofcounter- ngerous materials andcomponents(i.e. il for thepurpose toseek information to legalpersonsandinexceptional act anylimits onwherespecial According toArticle11(3) the accommodateitslarge-scale CEU eTD Collection 754 terrorism operation. provideclearguidance on whoexactlyof thelawto shouldbeinchargeofthecounter- operation areallowedto accesshouseswit takes itawayfrom anyjudicial As totheinviolability ofhome guaranteed without seeking acourtwarrant Constitution). Blanketinterference withtheprivacyof anunlimited number of individuals order issued inrelation toparticular person orentity(Article 23(2) of theRussian and inthepresenceofstrongj communications. Thesetypesoflimitationsarein The firstitem isthescreeningofmail, separately astheygoevenbeyondthelimitation counter-terrorism operationismorethan therefore, should be in charge ofit: incharge therefore, should be

Article 12 - - - - -

homes and landplots,andtopremises of unrestricted accessbypersonsconducting acounter-terroristoperation toprivate fighting terrorism; restrictions on movement of restrictions on counter-terrorist operation; temporary evacuationoftheresidentsfrom Another problematic areaofthe2006Law The list of the limitations that can poten restrictions orbanonthesa checks andsearches atthe entranceto instructs thefollowingabout who can declare th 754 Themagical figure,however,hasenormouspowerastheycoordinate

udicial guarantees:itispossibl руководитель is notpermitted eveninthe re protection as State agents involved incounter-terrorist le ofcertaingoods,including vehicles andpedestrians; hout anyrestrictions andwarrants.

федерального byArticle25oftheConstitution, thenewlaw 303

theterritory coveredby theregime; impressive andsome shouldbementioned phoneconversations,telegraphandother s allowedevenduringa generalallowedbutinverylimited cases all typesoforganizat tially beimposed duringtheregime of on CounteractingTerrorism isthefailure e regime of counter-terrorism operation and and who, e counter-terrorismoperation regime of the territories affected bytheregime of

органа e onlythroughobtainingacourt

исполнительной gime ofastateemergency. guns, weapons,alcohol,etc. ions forpurposesof state ofemergency. власти

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CEU eTD Collection Security Act Federal Constitutional Court StrikesDownaProminent Anti-terrorism Provision intheNewAir-transport Manuel Ladiges, the New Air-transport Security Act, 7German LawJournal 9(2006); andthe follow-up on this publication by German C Aircraft:The Federal the insofar asitaffectedtheinnocentpa German BasicLawand statedthat AirSafety However, theFederalConstitutional Courtof 757 756 755 обеспечения course ofdefendingpeopleonthegroundwhereaircraftwasaimed. be made objectsnotonlyofthehijackingbut norm inGermany wasadopted (Section14oftheAirSafetyAct( legislative provisionofthiscontentcanbef allow thecountry's military tofire on passenger who actuallywasresponsibleforcounter-t identify thepersoninchargeofoperation and itisstillunknown(a potentially frequentuse.Ironi especially inastatewhere the irresponsible from thesideofgovernment Russia thepossibilitytoapplythesenorms ar mind thelimitations allowed during thisregime andthefrequencyof the wholeprocessandispersonallyresponsibleforhowoperationconducted.Keepingin Law(2008). Constitutional Raymond Youngs, Germany: Shooting Down Aircraft and Analysing Computer Data органа исполнительной принято руководителем For further details onthe Court’s Judgement and other controversial anti-terrorismmeasure in Germany see s judgement and Court’s For onthe reasoning details Luftsicherheitsgesetz (A

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CEU eTD Collection expends lotsofeffortand resourcestoaddre operation. ItisnoteasytocriticizetheRussian through theunfortunatereality necessity to Russia recognizes theexceptional characterofterro a regulatoryregime compatiblew for theRussianauthoritiesatmoment; therearenodebatesonitsalterationorlookingfor of terrorism. Theregime ofcounter-terrorism operationseems tobetheonlyfeasibleoption Russia wecanobservethetendency toseekextr mentioned intheConstitutionanditdoesnotqu announcement isnotspecifiedinthelaw.There provide anysubstantialprotectionagainstabuseastheformat andprocedureofsuch measures andrestrictionsinvolved.However,thisrequirement doesnot is tobeannouncedimmediatel control. Theonlyguaranteegiveninthelawisth mainly duetothefactofpossibility to constitutional ju the Russian realityand couldbeutilized in very similar inbothjurisdictions.Therefore, th gunning-down ofanaircraftisbasedonthefactthatoperative Federal Constitutional Court justification toqua 8 ofthe2006FederalLawonCounteractingTerrorism. ThesuggestiontofollowtheGerman but tomy knowledgethere werenomovestochallenge theconstitutionality of Articles7and

To summaries, theregime ofthecounter-te I wouldsuggest thatthe Russianauthoritie risprudence. y withgivingpreciseinform ith theConstitutionof impose far-reachingrights ss thethreatofterrorism. Nevertheless, itcannot 305

asimilar way asitwasdonebytheGerman government asitisinadifficultposition and e dignityargument isnotcompletely aliento a-constitutional regime toaddress the threat at theregimeofcounter-terrorism operation alify asastate ofemergency. Therefore,in sh thesepieces of legislationallowing for s should follow thesame line of argument, rrorist operationisof gime isineffectexceptionalbutitnot sustain theregime ofcounter-terrorist rism anditsthreat, andtherefore justifies theRussianFederation.Atthisstage, ation indicatingtheareaand basicrightsprovisionsare limitations withoutany exceptionalcharacter bearpotentialto CEU eTD Collection potentially targetandprevent farmorethan offence. assistance toterrorism listsplanning andprep public figuremight havenothingtodowithte related bymentioning them inothercrimes’ prov terrorism regime asasystemized andcoherentunit. Some crimes areidentifiedasterrorism- the Russianlegislatordidnotputenougheffortsin the Criminal Codeprovisionsarespreadover or 50ofimprisonment, andcriminal lawcannotbeusedeventorestorejustice.Moreover, bombers anditisobviousthattheydonotcarea is noteffective.Thus,many of the ultimate solutionto addressthethreat of te an important andsignificantas criminal lawasameans tofightsits War onTerro reality and thenecessity to takemore coordinate The existing legislation andthewayitisimplemented arenotconsistent withtheRussian does notsuccessfullyperform the From theanalysisofRussiananti-terror 5.3.3. relevant fortheRussiancase. anti-terrorism policiesfrom theperspectiveof militant democracy and seehowitmight be even furtherthantheregime of justify theblanketlimitations onindividual Anti Secondly, theanti-extremism lawswhich ­ Terrorism Policies astateofemergency. NowIwouldliketoaddresstheRussian pect ofRussia’santi-terrorism theterrorist attackscommitte in task ofprotectingitscitizens

Russia: The 306

ism regime givenabove, itfollowsthatRussia needed. Forexample, theSOVAnewsarchive rights andfreedoms whichsometimes can go rrorism; theRussiancase demonstrates that it a fewchapterswhich leadtoconclusion that rrorism, buttheCriminal Codeprovisionon bout theseverityofpunishment,beitfive d actions. Firstofall,Russiareliesmainlyon aration ofsuchcrime asterrorism-related isions. Forexample, attempted murder ofa Need r. Criminalization of terrorist activities is to thepresentcriminal aspectofananti- guide theanti-terro for a Systemized policies;howeveritcannotbe d inRussia involved suicide from thethreat ofterrorism. rism policiescan Approach

CEU eTD Collection goals. strategy inRussia(asthereforeanti-terrorism 763 762 center.ru/misuse/news/persecution/ 761 center.ru/misuse/publications/2011/05/d21668/ 760 759 758 separate law.The2006LawonCo accommodate ananti-terrorism policywithin systems are familiar withanti-terrorism legisl promoting andsupportingacertainvisionof protection oftheconstitutionalpr threat inRussia but areal problem. minority religioninsteadofprotectioncitizens claimed that the government widelyabuses policies are beingseriously criticized for such limitations onspeech andpress rather than anything else. listing wassuccessfullyappealed. when thesame materialswerebanned twiceor possession of suchmaterials. extremist materialsandcheckingstatem reveals that themajor concernof anti-extremist activitiesisextending thelist of anti- available online at available online FSB, Prokuratu Terrorizma ot Grazhdan Mnirnyh Zashity media andindividuals. Presledova Jasno Sformulirovannyh Zadach, available online at http://www.minjust.ru/ru/activity/nko/fedspisok/ 891 items, includingmusic albums,magazines, articles, books and brochures: http://www.sova-center.ru/misuse Verhovskij, ibid. Seefor example Center for Information and Analys Seeforexample CenterforInformation andAnalysis Center for Information and Analysis “SOVA”. Alek we atthe ListofExtremistispublished Federal Materials Center for Information and Analysis “SOVA”. Sankcii v otnoshenii sotrudnikov bibliotek, available online at 763 Thirdly, Russiaunfortunately is notdistinctfrommany otherjurisdictions whoselegal Inthis respect, wecanobserve some similarities withtheTurkish story, where http://www.sova-center.ru/misuse/discussions/2011/04/d21527/ /news/persecution/2010/05/d18706/ 758 . nija Organizacij, SMI i Chastn nija Organizacij,SMIi

Thelistisextremely long inciple ofsecularism isusedtocoverthehiddenagendaof 760 762 unteracting Terrorism describedaboveplacesoneofthe Apparently, Russia’sWar Moreover, itisargued that theoverall anti-extremism . . 307

the societyendorsedinAtatürk’smind. is “SOVA”.is Galina Krylova from terrorism whichisnotonlyanimaginary “SOVA”. Archive onpersecution ofassociations, mass morebydifferentcourtsorbannedafterthe aspecialregime introducedthrough the ation. TheRussianlegislator also seeksto sandr Verhovskij, Bor'ba s Ekstremizmom neImeet ashift inthefocus of attention and itis anti-extremist legislat as well)doesnothave ra, Minjust Presledujut Religioznye Men'shinstva", Men'shinstva", Religioznye Presledujut ra, Minjust unicipal librariesinordertodetectthe bsite ofthe Ministry ofJustice andcontains to date yh Lic, available online at . 759 andtherearemultiple occasions 761 Russia’scounter-terrorism on Terrorismore about . Napominaet, Chto "Vmesto "Vmesto Chto Napominaet, ion mainly tochase clearly formulated http://www.sova- http://www.sova- CEU eTD Collection introduced intheanti-terrorism regime of Russi from whatwassaidabout Spainand Australia. First of all, if militant democracy reasoning is mechanism andmost oftheeffortsar is beingsubjectedtoregular missing from theanti-terrorism inRussiaisreal preventive actionsagainstthreat order ofthecountry.Moreover,inexisting and regularterroristattacksarewithoutanydoubtsharmful forthebasisofconstitutional to harm anddestroythesystem. Theconstantpr democracy isaboutprotectingthefoundationof possibility toimplement militant democracy l communities (both were analyzed in the preceding of themeasurestakeninregardstopolitic Russian anti-terrorism policies. lead thiswar. Thisisthe pointwhereIfind militant democracy relevant,includingthe caseof however, itdoesnotassume theneedforeveryst cannot behandledonlythrough departure from ordinary constitutionalism. This other countriesfightingaWar onTerror,a measures imposedduringastateofemergency. imposing substantiallimitsonrightsandfreedom elements ofanti-terrorismregime beyondor I believethat militant democracy isof relevance for Russia,butfor reasons different Russia isfamiliar withthemilitant democracy terroristattacks butdoes nothave adecent preventive s of terrorism. Thefactthat ordinary criminal lawandpr e takenafter tragic 308

ogic intheRussianWar onTerror. Militant al partiesandgroups a itwillforce thelaw-makerandexecutive to esence ofterrorism insome regionsofRussia ly puzzling.Thisisnot is avalidpointthatthe current War onTerror nd itsanti-terrorism policiesrepresentthe dinary therightslimitation clause,allows the Statebydenyingrightstothosewhoaim reality Russiacanleg In thatrespectRussiaisnodifferentfrom s, similar totheir content andeffect of the ate toinventitsownregulatoryregime to chapters). Thisis argument in favor of the conceptand appliesittojustify some eventshappen. the prevention theme isnearly eventive measures areneeded; clearhowthecountry itimately takeserious as wellreligious CEU eTD Collection claim thatthelevel of terrorism threat in regime intoanythingallowed by theConstitution.Itmight belegitimate whichdoesnotfit to Russia isnotanexceptionfrom thegeneraltr require seekingnewregulatoryregimes asit strategy atthemoment. Imentioned afewti provisions oncounter-terrorist the threat of terrorism. legitimate possibility to establish alinkbetw the argument infavor of militant democracy reasoningeven more valid.There willbea present inRussiaanditisnotamatter of th keep itwithinacceptablelimits. Itisofcrucial possibility couldmodify theove procedural protection inthecase ofprecautiona presence ofconvincinglinksbetweenthethreat the conditions ofitslegitimacy, thenpreventi Furthermore, if thelaw-maker andgovernment follows thelogicof militant democracy, and prevention mustbeintroducedintotheRu preventive measures;thereforethetheme of address thethreatofterrorism any without major themeof the anti-terrorism regime willsh of itscitizensbutalso Once Russiangovernment realizesthatterrorism is creating system ofpreventivemeasures tosafe reconsider theoverallapproachtowardsthreat of terrorism. Militant democracy allows Second, militant democracy might berelevant fortheState’s structure, andthat rall direction ofanti-terrori operations whichappearto eoretical andpolitical 309

Russiarequires extraordinary measures and een democracy’s self-protective measures and mes alreadythattheWar onTerrordoesnot end, andintroduceditsowncounter-terrorism ve policieswould begovernedbythe testof importance tounderlineherethat terrorism is ry measures. Therefore,a militant democracy guard thefoundationalqualities oftheState. happens inmany atthemoment. countries and measures beingtakenaswellstricter ift. Unfortunately, there isno possibilityto ssian regime of anti-terrorism policies. ofathreatnotonly to reconsider theexisting legislative therearemeans to addressit,the sm policiesinRussiaandwould be the major anti-terrorism be themajor anti-terrorism speculation only.Itmakes for thelifeandhealth CEU eTD Collection regulation of activities of politicalparties, religious associations andanti-extremism admitted and onlynice things could besaid of promoting animaginary system ofsociet is notutilizedjustifiablyandeffectively.Th and strongjudicialprot constitutionally-compatible regime of prevention terrorism policiesandintroduceamorecohere might beusefulandrelevantforRussianaut leading andcoordinating thecounter-terrorism freedoms withoutanyform ofcontrol,andwith legislation whichwouldnotgivepowerstoimposeseriou complicated amendment procedure),butatleast constitutional regime ofexception(chapter procedural guarantees.Probably,incaseofRussiaitwillnot departure from ‘constitutionalism asusual’by constitutionally endorsed militant democracy model whichconstitutionally authorizes control must be.’Thebestoption for the anti-terrorism policies wouldbetofollowa constitutional normalcy thestrongerjudi of militant democracy andfollow the principle of ‘the greater the departure from the limitations issue. however, itdoesnotjustifyunauthorizeddeparturefrom thec probably counter-terrorismopera To conclude,Russiais familiar with thec The existingLawonCounteractingTerrorism mu ection forprecautionarymeasures tion isoneofthemost effectivemeasures available; e ideaisknownfrom th 310

y, where only certain religious groups can be y, whereonlycertainreligiousgroupscanbe operation.However, militant democracy logic 2onfundamental righ cial protectionandothe about the government anditspolicies.The horities toreconsider itsapproachtoanti- nt, logical,andeffectivemodel basedona out naming thestateoffi oncept ofmilitant democracy eventhough it it couldbedonethrough setting levelsofdepartureandminimum with strictly regulated levelsof departure against itsgreatdomestic enemy. st beassessedfrom theperspective s limitations uponrightsand beeasytointroduceanother onstitutional rulesonrights e governmental practice r forms of external external of r forms ts issubjecttoa cial responsible for cial responsiblefor aproperpieceof CEU eTD Collection 764 departure from thepreviouslyexistingregime World (Bali,theUnitedKingdom, andMadrid). counter-terrorism). Mostofthem werereactio (since 2001theAustralianParliament adopted quick toadopt alargenumber of theanti-terrorism legislation situation changeddramatically hijacking, bombing, orimplementing in before 11September events(apartfrom thos fact thatAustraliabelongsto Australia hasbeenrelativelyuntroubledbyterro Introduction 5.4 MilitantDemocracya and racism widelypresentinthecountry. refocused from thepromoting animaginary societytotherealthreat ofterrorism, separatism, terrorism is real in Russia,thedirection of anti-terrorism politics could besuccessfully enemies and how topromote greaterdemocrac valuable andusefulguideonhowtodefendthe system. Ifthere aresome effort idea toprotect thesystem from itsenemies is notalientotheRussianlegaland political rights to participate in public affairs those w legislation areusedtoprotec http://www.aph.gov.au/library/int at AustraliaParliamentary library of Parliament webpage: the online available For detailed list of anti-terrorism legislation see the seethe legislation anti-terrorism listof detailed For

guide/law/terrorism.htm#terrleg nd theWaronTerror:Th

t andendorseanidealvision the listofcountrieswhichneve after 11September attacksa s takenatthefederal level,theidea could beturned intoa ternational treatie 311

ho disagreeswithsuchamodel. Therefore,the andposemany questionsandconcernsabout ns tonewterroristat Internet Recourse Guide ‘Australian Terrorism Law’ Terrorism ‘Australian Guide Recourse Internet Newlyadoptedlawsam rist attacksovertheyearsanditexplains fragile semi-democratic system from itsreal e dealingwitheithercrimes asmurder, y. Takingintoaccountthatthethreatof 44 legislativeactsdirectlydealingwith

e CaseofAustralia nd theAustraliangovernment was s onterrorism). of thesocietythroughdenying r hadanti-terrorism legislation in averybriefperiodoftime tacks elsewhereinthe ount toasignificant 764 However,the CEU eTD Collection (Part 5.3) (The Anti-Terrorism Act (No.2) 2005). 2005). (No.2) Act (TheAnti-Terrorism 5.3) (Part United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 which requi which 1373 Resolution Council Nations Security United September events two additional regimeswere introduc intelligence servicesnew powers, 769 768 767 766 765 terrorist organizations, with anti-terrorism. Currently,Australia’s anti As wasmentioned, since2001theAustralianPa 5.4.1. in Australia. terrorism policies andconclusion on howmilitant democracy isrelevant for thewar on terror followed bytheoverview of themost recent constitutional development inthe field of anti- current situation. First,theregimeitselfand major concernswillbeintroducedto Australia’s anti-terrorism polic terrorism measures (amongst Australia hasadopted one ofthemost the necessityofsuchlaws, one) was the regime of ‘unlawful association’ established in the 1920s. Australia Legislation Organisation Intelligence of questioning and detention authorising and questioning the terr with orassociation involvement criminal offence of being involved in planning or committing of a terrorist act, criminalise individual’s terroristact,introduce the define (Cth). to New wereadded Act2002 Amendment provisions Legislation Act (1995) was amended in its Schedule 1,Part 3.5 (Terrorism) to add Divisions 101-103 (The Security a series of newterrorismAustralia introduced legislation Human Rights Commission at http://www.hreoc.gov.au/legal/publications/counter_terrorism_laws.html (See “A Human RightsGuide To Australia’s Counter-Terrorism Laws” (2008) adopted by the Australian and expression; the right to non-discrimination; the right to aneffective remedy fora breach of human rights association to freedom of right the to privacy; theright torture; to to besubject arrest; the right not and detention of on many individual rights and liberties, i.e. the ri to proscribe terrorist organisations. Prior to 11 September 2001, the only possibility to ban an organisation in Australia (including the terrorist terrorist the Australia(including in organisation an ban to possibility only the September to 2001, 11 Prior Inthe aftermath ofthe 2005 London bombings the new anti-terrorism legislation package wasintroduced in anew powe ASIO gained wasadopted Bill 2003 Afterthe Asaresponse to the events of11 September 2001, in the very first package ofthe Government’s anti- Forexample,the Australian Human Rights Commissionwarms about potential negative impact ofexercise Overview This case-studyhasthepurposetoinvestigat 768 and Divisions 104 (Control Order) and 105 (Preventive Detention) were added to the Criminal Code of Australia’s 769 besidesothers. Iwillexclude thecriminal aspectsof Australia’s their effectiveness,andappr the westerndemocracies).

orist organisations. In addition, the addition, In orist organisations. Amendment (Terrorism) Act2003). ies, andhowitmight addressthenumerous concernsofthe Anti 767 measures ofpre-emptive policy, ­ Terrorism rigid andunprecedentedby many accountsanti- 312

-terrorism regime includes: crimes ofterror, ght to a fair trial; the right to to freedom right fromarbitrary afairtrial;ght the to crimes to capture the terrorist activities. Criminal Code CriminalCode activities. terrorist the crimes capture to ed: the first regime wasadopted in response tothe rliament adopted44la the person (Division 3, Part III Australian Security r to seektwo kinds of sp Regime red member states to take measures in relation to to in relation member measures red take statesto e ifmilitant democracy hasaplacein opriateness oftheresponse. and Attorney-General was given the power was the given Attorney-General

However, in the aftermath the 11 in of However, Major ecial warrants:authorising Concerns ws directlydealing 768 proscriptionof 765

In fact, Infact, ). 766

CEU eTD Collection 775 774 773 772 ASIO/Overview.html 771 770 organisations. proscribed inactivities of involved Code established acomprehensive scheme proscribing for anorganisation and alist ofoffences for individuals was introduced by the Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002. Division 102 of the Criminal terrorist organisations’ financial flows and the second regime –a scheme to proscribe terrorist organisations - Original Billwentthroughserioustransforma to passtheBill(sofaritis longest strong opposition totheBillcausedlongdebates piece oflegislation ever reviewedbytheCommittee andDSD”. onASIO,ASIS powers weresubstantiallyincreased. budget oftheorganizationhavebeensubstantiallyincreased inrecentyears; ingeneral.However,afterthe communism the agency wasconcernedmainly withthepossiblethreatofSoviet espionage and advice toprotect Australia,it role is“toidentifyandinvestigatethreatsto The AustralianSecurityIntellig legitimacy, andeffectiveness ofsuchmeasures. the anti-terrorism packagerepresentmany seri aspects ofthe anti-terrorism regime. However, it criminal prosecutioncasesandwillfocusin anti-terrorism policiesasmilitant democracy do introduced to the Parliament on March 21, 2002 a Bill amending the Act. the 1979 aBillamending March 21, the2002 on Parliament to introduced and initiated government Howard the events September 11 afterthe Shortly Act 1979. Organisation Intelligence 2003 (Cth) and the Case of R v Ul-Haque Sorial, the AS following ASIOin millionparticular to A$131 Taking aStockAustralia’sof Anti-TerrorLaws Australian Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Organisation Intelligence Security Australian A Human RightsGuide to Australia’s Counter-Terrorism Laws (2008), Prior to 11 September 2001 ASIO powers and methods of work were regulated by the Australian Security general and in agencies intelligence to million A$232 Government allocated Howard example, the For ASIO:Overview”, “About Organisation, Security Intelligent Australian terror ofcrimes account For detailed The Use and Abuse of Power and Why We Need Bill WeNeed a Why and of Power Abuse The Use and

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Intelligence s peopleanditsinterests”. ence Organization (ASIO)wasestablished in1949.Itsmajor

Organization , 34 Monash University Law Review 403 (2008). aspect see Andrew Lynch & George Williams, & Lynch Williams, George aspect seeAndrew 773 14-28 (2006). (2006). 14-28 Theamendment waslabeled“themostcontroversial Amendment(Terrorism) Act(2003) (Cth). known parliamentary debateinAustralia). 11 September 2001thenumberofstaffand 313

IO (Terrorism) Amendment Ac tion throughparliamentary processes,i.e.the security, wherevertheyarise,andtoprovide 770

my analysisonthepreventivenon-criminal and es nothave theopportun is important to notethat criminal aspects of and deliberationsittookfifteenmonths

ous concernsinregardsofjustification,

its of Rights: the ASIO (Terrorism) Amendment Act ASIO(Terrorism) Act Rights: the Amendment of

New 771 Intheearlystagesofitsoperation

Powers supra note 764.

http://asio.gov.au/About- t 2003 (Cth), see Sarah (Cth),seeSarah t 2003 ity tobeappliedin What Price Security? 772 moreover, its 774 775 The The

CEU eTD Collection up to7daysandquestioningfornomore than24hoursin amaximum eight hoursblocks interpreter. Underthequestioni last forupto24hours(inblocks the thing that may belaterrequested to terrorist act,may notappearbe immediately theymight divulgetheinvestiga question, theAttorneyGeneralmust enough toinitiatetheprocedure. collection of intelligence information thatisimpo the warrant inquestion. If personisbelieved tobeable‘substantially assist inthe someone of beinginvolved incommitting orplanning tocommit anactof terrorism toissue General ofASIOmust seekthe appointed bytheAttorney-General).However, A warrantmustbeobtainedfromthe‘issuing special warrants:authorizingthequestioning, all points, itstillremains highly conteste it issubstantiallydifferentfrom theoriginal Even thoughthefinalversion oftheBilleliminat 777 776 allow entitlement tolegalrepresentation original Billallowedforthedetentionofchildren (i.e.personsunder18years)anddidnot Tham, K.D. Ewing, 3, PartIII. (2007). 480 Review Law University Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment Legislation Organisation (Terrorism) Intelligence Security Act Australian (Cth), 2003 Division to ASIO’s powers changes the of account Fordetailed A questioningwarrantmight beissuedforupto28daysandquest After the2003BillwasadoptedASIOgained Limitations of aCharter of Rights in the Age of Counter-Terrorism

fore theauthoritiesforquestio ng anddetentionwarrantapersoncanbekeptin custodyfor consent of theAttorneyGeneral. There isnoneedtosuspect In theinstanceofapplyingforwarranttodetainand ofnomore thaneighthour besatisfiedthatifthepe bepresentedtotheauthorities. d. during preventivedetentionandquestioning. version andwasmeant toreachacompromise on 314

tion toother person(s) involvedincommitting a and detentionquestioningoftheperson. during the parliamentary deliberation see Joo-Cheong before applyingforthewarrantDirector ed themost ofthecontroversialprovisions, rtant inrelationtoa terrorism offence’ itis authority’ (afederalmagistrate orjudge anewpowertoseek twokindsof ning, ormay destroyordamage rson isnottakentothecustody s each)or48hou ioning itselfmight , 31Melbourne rs withthe 777 776

CEU eTD Collection always ormisusing itspo proven casesofASIOabusing ASIO might find helpful inobtaining intelligen warrants, and warrants tointercept thetele further ASIOpowers(inrelationtoissuing 10 years(to July2016).Inaddition, since2003,fivemore lawswereenactedto extend directly relatedtofairtria to thedenialofmost fundamental individualrightsandfreedo powers togovernmental intellig preparation for terrorist activities. However, preventive characterand statesmight takeactio prosecution of thosewhocommitted them). Theref anti-terrorism legislation istheprevention of the anti-terrorism policy.Noonewouldcontes Australia’s pre-emptive policyca However, in2006,Parliament extendedthesunset and Parliamentwhichisevident from theth or misuse ofthewarrantsystem). (without anyexceptionsforreporti after thewarrantexpired: itisforbidden todisclose that someone issubjecttothe warrant criminal investigationprocedure.Inaddition, than ifaterroristsuspectis (without being suspectedofcommitting acrime of Pre ­ Emptive present. The measures wereacceptedtobesome

Policy:

Preventive l guarantees).Intheaftermat questionedbytheAustralianFe ence agencieswhereapplication ofthose powerscould lead

Detention n qualifyas theexample ofthe ng byjournalists,even

and serious concernsposepol 315

communications ofinno the legislationinquest future terroristattacks(andnotonlycriminal search warrants, postal and delivery service t thatthemain purposeoftheentirebody

ree years sunset clause set upinthe Bill. ns wellinadvance, forexample, criminalize Control wers, theriskthatonedayitmight happenis what extraordinaryevenbythegovernment ce related to security). While there areno clauseontheASIOle ore, many anti-terrorism measuresareof a terror).Thelatteris seventimes longer h ofthe2005Londonbombings the

Orders ifthereportis deral Policeundertheregular

most controversialitem in ion imposesobligations cent people which the icies grantingextended ms (especiallythose about possibleabuse gislation foranother CEU eTD Collection 780 779 778 consent from theAttorneyGeneraltorequest proscribed terroristorganization, suspect thattheperson(overw believe thatmaking theorderwould‘substantially Thepowertoseekaninterim Orde Control Australia FederalPoliceonly.Firs those relatestoaperson’swork);orhavingwear atrackingdevice. using certaintypesoftelecommunications, from times; preventapersonfrom certainpla goingto aspects ofsomeone’s liberty: itmay requirea person to stayinacer offence. Atthesame time, limitations imposed bytheControl Ordermight affectmany quite aspecific context:thepersondoes notneed keep some control overtheiractionsandbehavi found guilty ofseriouswrongdoingand,therefore, crime orotheroffence.Inwords,such from theprison oron probation butinany cas itself isnotsomething unknownbefore;itmight A ControlOrderisameasure ofpreventivechar Control 5.3). (Control Order)and105(PreventiveDetention)wereaddedtotheCriminal Code(Part new anti-terrorism legislation package wasintroduced inAustralia http://www.aph.gov.au/library/int For details see Lynch & Williams, & For seeLynch Williams, details (Cth). (2005) (No.2) Act Anti-Terrorism The Announced by thePrimeMini 779

Orders

guide/law/terrorism.htm#terrchron ster afteraninternalre

supra at 770, 42-43. note hom theControl Order or receivedatrainingfrom it. t ofall,theAFP member musthavereasonablegroundsto measures aretraditionallyimposedonsomeone 316

e confirmed bythe Courttohave committed a an interim orderfrom theCourt(theFederal or. However,Australiaus acter. Thecontentandnature ofthe measure ces ortalkingtocertainpeople,accessing tobechargedorprosecutedforanykindof view of terrorism legislation. For more details see more see For details terrorismlegislation. view of carryingoutspecific beimposed onpersonsrecentlyreleased r weregrantedtoseniormembers ofthe assist inpreventing aterrorist act’ or authorities havelegitimate grounds to is sought)hasprovidedtrainingfora . The nextstepistogetwritten 780 778

activities(including tain placeatcertain andDivisions104 es thisinstitution in CEU eTD Collection 782 781 parte Another strikingfeatureofthe of criminal justice,andoneof highly undesirable;itisindeedaseriousdepa actually amounttohous character ofthelimitations imposed onindivi proof forcivilcaseswhichdonotaffectin the balanceofprobabilities.’Thetest itselfis Themost controversialprovisionforsett probably be thepowerofissu circumstances [includingtheperson’s must takeintoaccounttheimpact oftheoblig reasonably necessary,andreasonabl the listedterroristorganisation.” preventing aterrorist actorthatthe personha the Courtmustbelieve,on grounds presentedbytheAFPmembers’ request.In General. TheCourtwillassess The requesttotheCourtmust bemade inthesame form asitwaspresented totheAttorney General is granted, the AFPmember can request the interim ControlOrder from theCourt. sought andalsoreasonsagainstsu member hastoprovidetheAttorneyGeneralwi Court, Family Court,orFederalMagistratesCourtcan issuesuch anorder). TheAFP Ibid, Sections 104.4 paragraph (2). Criminal CodeAct (1995) (Cth), Sections 104.4 paragraph (1)(d) . So,theindividualaffectedis e arrest),sucharelaxedtestfor the balanceofprobabilities

thereasonableness the major democratic principles procedure isthat the interimControl Ordersare issued ing Courtto decideabout the necessity toissueanorder ‘on ch anordertobeissued.OncetheconsentofAttorney 781 y appropriateandadapted” notpresentintheCourtand Inaddition,theCourtmu financial andpersonalcircumstances].” 317

not anovelty,buttraditionally itisastandardof s receivedtrainingfrom ation, prohibitionorrestrictionontheperson’s rture from thegenerally duals under the Control Order (which might duals undertheControlOrder(whichmight dividual liberties.Taki th detailsonwhatgroundstheorderisbeing ing uptheControlOrde of issuingtheCont order“toissuetheinterim controlorder , the Court’sassessment seems tobe that itwouldsubstantiallyassistin –ruleoflawingeneral. it is only for the Courtto to decide on it, “the court to decideonit,“thecourt st ensurethe order “is or providedtrainingto recognizedprinciples rol Orderonlyonthe ng intoaccountthe rs mechanism would 782

ex CEU eTD Collection AFP canmakenewrequests followingthesame pr months forpersonsbetweensixteen would confirm theinterimControlOrderfullya necessary, reasonablyappropriate, satisfied thatthereweregroundstoimpose a might betheremoval ofsome measures/limitati grounds toissueaninterim ControlOrder.Anotherpossibleoutcome oftheCourt’shearing TheCourtmight declaretheordertobevoid were nogroundsforit.Thismight beembarrassing if problems andconcerns. is asignificant improvement of theoriginaldraft oftheBill,itstilldoes notsolveallthe While thepresenceof person in thecourtr the evidence against them andhereagainweha to besent thepersonaffected, thereisstillnoguaranteethat theperson willbeawareof all police. Inotherwords,eventhoughthenotice revealing itwillbeconsidered toundermine na get theirconsent. However,some information of thegroundstoseekanorder,andcopies whom theControl Orderissoughtwillbegi member hastogotheCourtagainandseek Onceaninterim ControlOrderisissued by if theordershouldbeconfirmed ornot.Incase to bedecided decide ifthereareexceptional circumstances ex parte . and adapted.Thethirdpossibl andeighteen years ofage). ven a48hoursnoticeofthehearing,summary 318

described by the AFP member sothematter described bytheAFPmember has oom whentheControlOrde the documents giventotheAttorney-General Control Orderbutmeasures arenotreasonably on thehearingandsummaryofgroundare a confirmed order.Thistime, thepersonover the ControlOrderisto tional security orjeopardize operations of the ons imposed ontheindividualifCourtis still might behiddenfr nd itmay lastuptotwelve months (orthree ve seriousconcernsfor the Court,AFPmember hastodecide ocedure. While the order is stillinforce, if itfinds that atatime itwasmade there theCourtitselffindsthattherewereno After anorderhasexpiredthe e outcome isthatthe Court be confirmed, the AFP om theindividual if fair trial guarantees. r istobeconfirmed CEU eTD Collection 785 784 783 issuing authoritywouldbeaseniormember issuing authority.Theconsentof custody forupto24hours(butwiththepossibi evidence of, orrelating to,arecent terrorist act.” ordertopreventan in short periodoftime 105 oftheCriminal CodeAct The PreventiveDetentionOrder(PDO)regime Preventive case (see below). regime, butin2007theHighCourtupheldcons Australian judiciary had achance toreview theconstitutionality of theControl Orders rights andfreedoms asprobableconstrainon Act inmind TheAustralian model oftheControl Order major difference isthat the UKcarefully drafted itwiththeprovisions of theHuman Rights alternatively theconfirmation of theoriginal order couldbenotrevealedto sense ifwekeepinmind theprocedureto individual hasarighttoappl limitations, orrestrictions with noneedfor the AFPmayapply to theCourt tomodify th comparison Criminal Code Act Code (1995) Criminal (Cth (Cth) (2005) (No.2) Act Anti-Terrorism The See further Bronwen Jaggers, In order to obtain aPDOmember of the ’, 29 Australian Parliamentary Library Research Paper (2008).

Detention 783 whiletheAustralianParliament didnotneedtohaveconsiderindividual

), Sections 105.1and (a) (b) y to revoke and modify the order (which does not make much y torevokeandmodifytheorder(whichdoesnotmake much

Anti-terrorism control orders in Australia and the United Kingdom: a 784 theindividualoverwhomthe theAttorneyGeneralisnot . TheverypurposeofthePDO is“todetainapersonfor confirm theorderwheregroundsforwhy order canbeappealed 319

imminentterroristacttooccurorpreserve the Attorney Generalconsent this time. The lity ofittobeextendedup48hours). of AFP itself, but for the continued PDO it of AFPitself,butforthecontinuedPDOit is setupandregulatedindetailsbyDivision e originalorderto Australian Federal Policemust applyto an the contents of thelawsitenacts. The is basedontheUK’s scheme, howeverthe titutionality ofthisre 785 Initiallyapersoncanbetakeninto required. FortheinitialPDO Control Orderissought),or to a higher court. court. higher a to add more obligations, gime intheThomas CEU eTD Collection 789 788 787 786 terrorist act.” engagement ofapersonin,terroristact;orhasdoneanactinpreparat engage inaterroristact;orpossessesthingthat be satisfiedthatthere arereasonable groundsto and isexpectedtobeoccurredinthenext14days. making procedureisthepresence of athreat of committing a terrorist act whichisimminent puzzling situation. do nothavelinkswiththejudicialofficeanym judge atthesame thelegislatorrequire time as the individualholdingjudicialo looks awkward.Istheexerciseofnon-judici disconnect themaking ofthePDO must beamember ofthejudiciary,andon somewhat unusualandstrangethatontheoneha very strict terms the list of powers t Courts, butareactingin personalcapacities (mainly because AustralianConstitution setsin making, extending, orrevokingthePDO,judicial would beaservingorretiredjudgewho could easily reach its goals with the latter itsthe seeLynch only, easilyreach with & goals could Williams, powers tothe judiciary). additional PDO granting the regimerequire to itwould (otherwise wasintroduced orher capacity personal his in acting ajudge of construction the why is This judiciary. Australian the of domain traditional the fitinto not does example ofjudicial powerexercise while the nature of the preventive detention order and procedure to impose it Criminal Code Act Code Sections(1995) Criminal (Cth), 105.4 paragraph (4) (a) two conditions these that mention Some commentators’ Toorder detention or punishment after someone hasbeen found guilty ofacrimewould be aclassical Sections 105.2 For seeIbid., details To issueaPDOfewconditionsmustbe 789 Theissuingauthoritymust alsobe

ffice, i.e.canthejudgeweartw from thedutieswithinj hose canbeexercised bythejudiciary). gave consenttoactinsuchacapacity 320

al powerslikemaking aPDOcompatible with s? Thecaseiseasierfo s? isconnectedwiththepreparationfor,or the otherhand,legislatorattempts to suspectthatthesubj ore, butforactingjudgesthismight bea nd itisimportant that do notseem to be necessa 788 met. Thefirstgr officers donotactasmembers oftheir Inaddition,“thei satisfied that“making theorderwould supra note note 770 supra o hatsandbe udicial office.Thesituation ound toinitiateaPDO r retiredjudgesasthey ect [ofthePDO]will ion for,orplanning,a , at 49. ssuing authority must ssuing authoritymust the issuingauthority ry includedand the law judge and not a judge andnota 787 Thislooks 786 . While CEU eTD Collection days] andiftheperiodofdetentionisnecessaryforthispurpose.” purpose “topreserveevidencerela for thepurposeofpreventingaterroristact. 792 791 790 terrorism. information andothertaskscarried the interest ofpreserving evidenceandpreventi their detention.However,theright person canmake acomplaint totheOmbudsman a family member deliversuchashortandstrange be contactedforthetime being(needlessto information aboutbeingdetained one businesspartner.However, whilemaking th taken intocustodyisallowedtocontact:onefa obtained. questioned underaPDO andthiscouldbedone to theconditionofde custody must besuppliedwiththecopyofor of powersasof arresting someone for committing acriminal offence. The persontakeninto the personistakenintocustody; the periodforwhichpersonistobedeta substantially assist in preventing aterrorist act occurring”

Ibid., Sections 105.4 paragraph (6) (6) paragraph 105.4 Sections Ibid., (c) (4) paragraph 105.4 Sections Ibid., (b) (4) paragraph 105.4 Sections Ibid., One oftheproblematic featuresof theP tention andtheprohibit

the officertakingpersoninto custodyhasthesame range and isallowedonlyto tocontactafamily member outbythe intelligenceagenci ting toarecent terrorist act [which occurred in last 28 321 ined undertheorderisreasonablynecessary”

The second ground to make a PDO is for the forthe Thesecondgroundtomake aPDOis sayhowstrangeitmight soundifsomeone’s ion oftorture.However,thepersoncannotbe mily member (orhousemate), anemployer,or ng intervention totheprocess of gathering the message duringthephonecall).Thedetained DO regime isthelistofpeopleperson der and there are also general guarantees as der andtherearealsogeneralguaranteesas ese contactsthedetaineecannotreveal onlyifaseparatequestioningwarrantis nd consultalawyerabout theconditions of saythatheorsh 790 and“detainingthesubject for or alawyercanbelimited in es in relation toan actof 792 OnceaPDOisissued e issafebutcannot 791

CEU eTD Collection 793 (including theterroristone)wasregime of Prior to11September 2001,theonlypossibili Terrorist magic powersofsuperprecautionary laws. another message againstlaws itself: there wereno preventive detentionordersissuedtodate in Australia anditsends laws andmakesthem undesirable and onaneverydaybasis,themere possibilityof occur andthegovernment claimed ittobemeasure prosecution andimprisonment ofuptofiveyears.While thesesituations arenotlikelyto not informed yet)aboutthei shares and effective.Situations whenaperson over acrime of terror investigation and preventio contacted wouldbeaclearsignaltotheentirece terrorism, then theirdisappearance andsuspicious callaboutbeingsafebutnotabletobe member of aterrorist organization planning to and G.William intheirbookpointoutthatevenif effectiveness ofsuchameasure islegitimate extend toprohibitcontactof behind sucharegime might beunderstandable and itcouldbeacceptedasreasonable tosome the personsubjecttoorder,lawyer, anyone theexistenceofPDO(punishablebyup Nicola McGarity & George Williams, McGarity &George Nicola Review 1 (2009). (2009). 1 Review Formore details on procedure, concerns and recomm Another interestingfeat

Organizations 793

r childbeingdetain

ure of the PDOregime isthatit adopted inarush,fear,and Proscription of Terrorist Organisations in Australia the detainedpersonwithpot a priori . Another factabout thePDOregime speaksfor 322

ly contestedbymany co commit orhaving recently committed an actof police officers, andinterpreters.Thereasons the information withtheirpartner (if theyare ll. While itisimportant tokeepsome secrecy suchcausalitiescasts adarkshadowonsuch endation to improve the scheme seeAndrew Lynch, n, thesemeasures stillhavetobereasonable ed underaPDOmight befollowedbythe ‘unlawful association’ established inthe weassume thatthe su ty to ban an organization in Australia ty tobananorganizationinAustralia of thelastresortbut to 5yearsimprisonment) anditappliesto misleading ambitions aboutthe strictlyprohibitsdisclosingto ential terrorists, butthe mmentators. A.Lynch not tobeusedwidely bject ofthePDOisa , 37 Federal Law Law Federal , 37 CEU eTD Collection 796 OpenDocument 795 794 of aterrorist act[whether ornotaterrorist acthas occurredor willoccur] it “isdirectlyorindirectlye According totheSection102.1aregulationspecifyinganorganizationaste Terrorist offences forindividualsinvolvedinac Code establishedacomprehensivescheme fo the Security Legislation Amendment (Terro flows. Thesecondregime–ascheme toproscribe terroristorganizati which requiredmember statestotake measures regime was adoptedinresponsetotheUn introduced andbecame importantelements 1920s. and directly praises terrorism in circum http://www.ema.gov.au/agd/www/nationalsecurity.nsf/AllDocs/95FB057CA3DECF30CA256FAB001F7FBD? October 2005, 10 September 2007 and 8 September 2009. Available online at Islamic Palestinian 2009; September and 8 2007 September 10 2005, 7 October 2005, June 5 re-listed 2003, 9 November Listed - Lashkar-e-Tayyiba 2009; March 17 8 September 2009; Lashkar-e Jhangvi (LeJ) - Listed 11 April 2003, re-listed 11 April 2005, 31 March 2007 and and 22 July 2010; Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)-Li 2008 8 August (JI) 2006, August 26 Jemaah Islamiyah 2004, September 1 re-listed 2002, October 27 Listed - 2008; 3 November and 2006 3 November 2004, 5 November re-listed 2002, 14 November - Listed Mujahideen) Ul- as Harakat known (formerly ul-Ansar Jamiat 2009; March 17 and 2007 March 31 2005, April 11 2005, re-listed 31 March 2007 and 17 March 2009; Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) - Listed 11 April 2003, re-listed March 2007andMarch 17 2009;Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan -Listed11 April 2003, re-listed 11April 31 2005, April 11 re-listed 2003, April Listed 11 - (IAA) Aden May 2007 of Army Islamic May2009; and 15 8 September 2009; Hizballah External Security Organisation -Listed 5 June 2003 and re-listed 5June 2005, 25 Brigades -Listed in Australia 9November 2003, re-listed 5 June 2005, 7 October 2005, 10 September 2007 and April 2003, re-listed 11 April 2005, 31 March 2007 and 17March 2009; Hamas’s Izzal-Din al-Qassam March 2003, re-listed 27 March 2005, 27 March 2007 and 17 March 2009; Asbat al-Ansar (AAA) -Listed 11 slam (formerly al-I knownasAnsar Ansar al-Sunna)– 2009; Listed 27 August 21 Listed - Al-Shabaab 2010; (AQIM) -Listed 14 November 2002, re-listed 5November 2004, 3 November 2006, 8 August 2008 and 22 July Listed 2 March 2005, re-listed 17 February 2007 and 3 November 2008; Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb commence after disallowance period; Al to -Listing (AQAP) Peninsula the in Arabian Al-Qa'ida 2010; 22July and 2008 2006, 8 August August 26 November 2006and 3November2008; Al-Qa'ida (AQ)Listed- 21 October 2002,re-listed September1 2004, Advocacyis defined as “directly or 2004, 3 5 November 2002, re-listed -Listed 14 November Sayyaf Group Abu are: organizations Banned Crimes Act1914 (Cth) Part IIA. 794

Organization: However, inthewakeof 11Septemberevents,twoadditional regimes were . Definition ngaged in,preparing,planning,assi

indirectly counsels,urges or providing stances where there is a riskthatsu where thereisa stances -Qa’idain Iraq (AQI) (formerlylisted asAl-Zarqawi and TQJBR) -

tivities ofproscrib of Australia’santi- ited NationsSecurityCouncilResolution1373 323

rism) Bill2002. Division 102oftheCriminal sted 17 December 2005,re-listed 27 September 2007and in relation to terrorist r proscribinganorga Jihad - Listed 3 May 2004, re-listed 5 June 2005, 7 2005, 5June re-listed May -Listed 3 2004, Jihad ed organizations. sting inorfosteringthedoing terrorism regime. instructions on doing terrorism act ch praisemighthave theeffectof ons –wasintroducedby organizations’ financial nization andalistof 796 oradvocatesthe rrorist is made if rrorist ismade if 795 Thefirst CEU eTD Collection Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committeeas raising the mostconcerns. Attorney-General gained significant comm Legislative amendments confe 800 799 798 797 aterroristact.” in leading a person (regardless of his or her age or any mental impairmentthat the personmight suffer) to engage The concernsareraisedevenfurtherifta sustainable ifwekeepinmind thatthisproced arguing thattheorganizationcanbede-listed confront thestatement abouttheunlimited the Attorney-Generaldecision tolistanor and DSD) some protectionmechanism (likeReviewsbyParliamentary JointCommitteeonASIO,ASIS powers tolist,de-listandre-l prior consentoftheParliament isnotneeded. ban anorganizationifitisr that hadbeenidentifiedbytheUNSecurityCounc parliament passed alawin2004removingtheli affiliation). were bannedthroughthisprocedure(eight described aboveasitwasusedquiteextensiv measure ofthe anti-terrorism packagelegisla doing of aterrorist act [whether ornotaterrorist acthas occurred orwilloccur]”. (2004). (2004). Criminal Code Act Code Section (1995)(Cth), (a) 102.1 Criminal A Human RightsGuide to Australia’s Counter-Terrorism Laws, Tham, Joo-Cheong 2 (a)(b) paragraph 102.1 Section (Cth), (1995) Act Code Criminal After theseamendments theGovernment 800 799 butitdidnotprovetobeaneffectiveremedy andastodatenodisallowanceof Thesituation aroundthisscheme became evenmore controversialwhen Causalities of the Domestic War on Terror on War Domestic the of Causalities easonably believedtobeinvolvedinterroristac ist anorganizationasterroris rring powerstoproscribeate ganization asterroristwasmade. Someone may unity opposition andwasevenreportedbythe 324

king intoaccount thevague languageofthe ely. BySeptember2008ni character ofnewAttorney-Generalpowers een oftheseorganiza ure isalsoin thehandsof thesame official. mitation ofbanningonlythoseorganizations tion isquitedifferentfrom many others as terrorist,buttheargument isnotvery il. TheAttorney-Generalisallowednowto gained nearlyunlimited anduncontrolled , 28 Melbourne University LawReview, 518 supra note 764 note supra t. TheCriminalCodeprovides rrorist organizationuponthe . tions haveMuslim neteen organizations tivities andthe 798 This 797

CEU eTD Collection Tayyiba%29%20Bill%202003%22;rec=0 ome%22%29%20Title%3A%22Crimin revParl%20SearchCategory_Phrase% ome%22%29%20Title%3A%22ASIO%20Legislation%20Amendment%20Bill%202003%22;rec=0 revParl%20SearchCategory_Phrase% 801 the establishedsystem ofgovernance,andthe negative impact ontheprotectionofindividual legislating withurgency, the predominantly reactiverespons problematic bymany accountsandmajor problems terrorism. Theanalysis ofAustralia’santi-terrorism policiesreveals thatsome laws are only fewyearsandresortedtovariousmeasures and seekanindependentreviewofthe the Attorney-General’spowers,lackof imprecise definition of‘advocating a procedure haslotsofflawsand provides anextensive list of crimes forindividua organization causesdrasticconsequencesfor grounds tolistanorganizationinvolvedinitasaterroristone). Criminal Codeprovisions definingadvocacyof http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/dis at AustraliaParliament of webpage 2003 and passed only eight days later. eight days passed only and 2003 http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/dis Search seeParlinfo the bill of passage purp forthe wasrecalled Senate (and was introduced Amendment Bill2003 (HamasCode Lashkar-e-Tayyiba) and Forexample, theASIO Legislation Amendment Bill 2003 wasintroduced to the Parliament on27 November To summaries,Australiahasdevelopeda The most crucialconcern aboutthescheme br 801 ashift intheseparation of powersandgeneral interference with

3A%22bills%20and%20legislation%22%20Dataset_Phrase%3A%22billh 3A%22bills%20and%20legislation%22%20Dataset_Phrase%3A%22billh

al%20Code%20Amendment%20%2 nearly every element of itcould of the bill see Parlinfo Search, seeParlinfo Search, bill the of the on passage information For detailed . e toterroristattacks,poorqua terrorist act’,the lackofclea decision toproscribeanorganization. opportunitiestoopposetheintendedproscription query=%28Dataset%3AbillsP play.w3p;orderBy=alphaAss; query=%28Dataset%3AbillsP play.w3p;orderBy=alphaAss; 325

its members asSubdivi ose to pass the Bill). For detailed information on the the on information detailed Bill).For the pass ose to , Parliament of Australia webpage at , at Parliament of Australia webpage ls affiliated withterrorist organizations. The terrorism forexample (whichisone ofthe , including crimes associatedwith actsof was passed even quicker – only two days after it twodays afterit –only quicker even was passed comprehensive anti-terrorism regime in could besummarized, butnotlimited to iefly outlinedaboveisthatthelisting of 8Hamas%20and%20Lashkar-e- r criteriatoguide theuseof be seriouslycriticized,i.e. lity oflawsasaresult sion BofDivision102 ; Criminal ; Criminal CEU eTD Collection not overreactand seek toexpand its powers tofightterrorism, theAustralian caseis amended. Whilethereisprobablynoexample is nosinglemeasure thatwasnotsubjectedto properly assessesagainstthehum all thelawstoproperprocedure initiatives tointroducenewdraconianmeasures Australia’s anti-terrorism regime, howeverit of abillrightswi 804 803 802 seriously andtothemoment thismatte rights the decision-maker isnot going to take compatibility with human rightsconcerns rights protectionas based ontheUKmodel (i.e.ControlOrders),Au similar to other jurisdictions. While some anti-terror measures were enacted inAustralia judicial review,andsecond,itweakensthe citizens cannot secureprotectionfrom excessi a billof rights andithas seriousimplications for thejustification of theWar onTerror.First, potential tocreate rights andfreedoms. Thelistedproblematic featur Crucial Challenge Crucial following Septemberevents 11 (seeJohn von Doussa, month a times in more complaints 20 registered telephone hotline racial hatred Council’s Arabic Australian TASA Conference paper, University of Western Australia &Murdoch University, 156 (2006). Moreover, the Poynting, Perry, Scott e to reported with ofpeople number together growing 654 (see for example, Lynch note & McGarity, supra For details see Doussa, in For seeDoussa, details For seee.g.Jaggers, details that it“created scholars conclude and Commentators To conclude The human rightsconcernisbeingaggravated , 13 James Cook University Law Review 122 (2006). (2006). 122 Review Law , James13 University Cook aclimate ofhate Inspiring Islamophobia: Media and State targeting of Muslims in Canada since 9/11 the UnitedKingdom. , there are some seriousflaws inAustralia’s anti-terrorism regime. There ll notbecome auniversalsolution supra supra note 744. note763,at 122.

of the judicialreviewwherean an rightsprotectionclause. 802

r hasreceived“inadequateattention.” 803 Intheabsenceof a writtenand assembled billof 326

xperience anincrease inracism (seeforexample, Barbara , at 225) and anti-Muslim bias in Australian media is media is in Australian bias anti-Muslim and , at225) will indicate some limits for thegovernment comparative argument of in themodern worldwhereagovernment did ve rightscurtailedthro Reconciling Human Rights and Counter-Terrorism-a Counter-Terrorism-a and Rights Human Reconciling fear and anxiety in Australia’s Muslim communities” Australia’s Muslim communities” in anxiety fear and andwillempowerindi critical remarksandcallstobeabolishedor stralia cannot offer thesame levelof human es oftheanti-terror by the fact that Australia does not have bythefactthatAustraliadoesnothave of allconcerns andproblems with ti-terrorism measures couldbe ugh theprocedureof laws also provide the viduals bysubjecting adoptingmeasures 804 Theadoption , CEU eTD Collection Lesson 805 few reasons.Firstofall, Iwould agree that protecting nationalsecurity. against thegovernment’s acti The casewasalreadymentioned aboveasanhonorable example abilitytostand ofjudicial 5.4.3.1. 5.4.3. above. guide thecountryinitsWar onTerrorandc constitutional normalcy. Iarguethatthemilitant the government’s policyinresponsetoterrori Australia ismisguided bythefear individuals toseekprotectionin separation ofpowersmustensu state must must be guided bytheruleoflaw,human rights bepreserved,andtheprincipleof be justified solelyby the War onTerror rhetoric and astateofemergency. Thedeparturefrom name ofidentifying and sacrifice many foundingprinciples anti-terrorism measuresinthe terrorism initsterritory adoptedthe most- especially problematic andworrying.Acountrythathasneverexperiencedanyactof Communist SeeChapter 3.1.2,at 103.

Militant Australia createdanunknowntotheconsti

Worth Australian PartyCase

Remembering

Democracy

Communist catching terrorists. to

Thomas 805

Thecase isworthbrining into the War onTerrordebate for a and lack of astatutory billof rights. Thegovernment decidedto

ons undermining democratic pr Party re theaccountabilityofgovernment andpossibilityfor thecourts.Departurefromall theseprinciplesprovesthat ofterrorism, andunlessast oftheState’sstructureand

Australia’s v

Case: Mowbray unprecedented forthewest it isacceptable“todraw ananalogybetween the

327

Relevance the regime of constitutional normalcy cannot ould addressmany oftheconcernsoutlined sm shouldremain withintheboundariesof

democracy logicmight beahelpful toolto . Inthe absence ofarealwardemocratic War

tutional theoryregime betweennormalcy on for

Terror:

the ate ofemergencyisintroduced,

War democratic principles in the democratic principlesinthe inciples inthename of

From on ern-type democracies

Terror

the

Debate Australian

and

CEU eTD Collection throughout theworld.” were describedas“activelyworkingtounde devastate communities andthreatenthenationa General, DarylWilliams, who statedin2002that rationale foritsintroduction.NicoleRogers identify thesimilarities intheenvironment 810 809 808 807 806 of themost controversial measure from thean arisen intherecentThomas vMowbraycase(whi before theHighCourtinAustraliaCommunistPartycasewereverysimilar tothose are equally applicabletothe than whenwethinkaredefendingit” them. ThewarningsofPrime MinisterChifleyin package bearsimilar concernsaboutcurtailingofrightsandlibe democracies areeasilycomparable security” unscrupulous opponentsofreligion, context of War onTerror. Forexample, co called toproscribetheCommunist Partyitusedstrongrhetoricverysimilar tooneusedinthe moral panicsurroundingterror andComm moral panicsurroundingCommunists Democracy, 7 Singapore Journal of Legal Studies, 167 (2002). Ibid., at 168. Ibid., at 167-168. Ibid. Ibid. NicoleRogers, Aidan Ricketts, Second, bothCommunistPartyDissolutionAct 807 whilecommunism waspicturedas 809 Therefore,challengesposedby

Fear of Freedom: Anti-Terrorism Laws and the Challenge to Australian to Australian Challenge the Lawsand Anti-Terrorism of Fear Freedom: current War onTerrordebate. Furthermore, the main issues ists andterrorism today.” withthoseposedbyterrorism. of civilizedgovernment, of 810 inrelationtodissoluti 328

and AidanRickettsquotetheFederalAttorney- surrounding currentanti-terrorism regime and “analienanddestructivepest.” rmine andtherightsofpeople democracy ti-terrorism package:Control Orders). Both l andglobaleconomy” andterrorists forces 1948that“neverisliber “terrorism has thepotentialtodestroy lives, mmunists weredescribedas“themost ch wasanattempt tochallenge thevalidity unism is Australia in the 1950s, and the unism isAustraliainthe1950s,and and laws of Australia’s anti-terrorism and lawsofAustralia’santi-terrorism 806 Communism tothewesternliberal WhentheMenziesgovernment rties whileargu on of the Communist Party on oftheCommunist law andorder, ty more easilylost 808 ing toprotect It is easy to ofnational CEU eTD Collection communist couldnot work for thegovernment or party waspunishedbyimprisonment foruptofive be seized, allaffiliated organizations wereto enacted and thepartywasdeclaredanunlawfu 813 812 811 decided tooutlawthepartythrough theor anymore refertoits extraordinary power to pose athreattosecurity).However,in1949 the warwhenexecutive hadthe powertode Constitution didnotprovideaclear mechanism to task. The Communist party existed inAustralia for more than30 years and the Federal the governmentstartedtoplanactionsitpromised totake.However,itwasnotaneasy 1949. on anti-terrorism regime inAustralia. former decisionwastakenmore seriously,andwhat party caseinthisdebateandseehowdifferenttheoutcomeThomas casewould beifthe powers withinthegovernment. surrounding theenactmentoflaws,their effect onindividuallib however wastotally different despite the fact of numerous similarities in the situation and cannotdoduringtheso-calledtimes ofstress. cases wereaboutthescopeofdefensepower 73 (2006). be invoked in times of war. to Constitution the by tooksimilargiven tothose ofwar situation measures but was not in asthe country author Australian Communist Party Dissolution Bill (1950) Bill(1950) (Cth). PartyDissolution Communist Australian Dyzenhaus, David in the Legislature Constituting “Times ofstress” construction wasnot used by the Cour 812 The banoftheCommunist Partywasapart Oncethepartycame topowerandRobert Menzies became thenewPrime Minister,

Therefore, Ithink itisimportant tobring theCommunist The Constitution of Law. Legality in a Time a Emergency in of Legality Law. of Constitution The 329

dinary legislativebill.In1950theBill bantheCommunistParty.Therefore,itwas the warwasoverandexecutivecouldnot be dissolvedand continuation of workfor the l organization,partypropertywasorderedto cide on dissolution of organizations of they cide ondissolutionoforganizationsthey s andwhatdifferentbranchesofpowercan t inanyofthese casesandisdefined assuch by the the military. Ittook half ayear for theBill dothat(thesituation wasdifferent during years. Moreover, a person declared to be a years. Moreover,apersondeclaredtobe effectitwould haveinthegeneraldebate of theLiberalParty electioncampaign in 811 Theoutcome ofthesetwocases erties andbalanceof 813 was . CEU eTD Collection 815 814 Constitution inawaythatitisunconstitution government grantedtothegovernment.TheHigh enact theAct inquestion. was sufficient toextend thescopeof thedefense powersoitwouldconstitutionally allow manage topursuetheCourtthat High CourtdidnotupholdtheCommunistParty undertook topresentCommunism asarealthreatdangerous Government knowsbetterhowtodealwithsuch judicial reluctancetodeal importance ofjudicialreviewin enactment ofsuchalawisconstitutional concern fortheCourtwasscope ofCo judgment hasnothing to dowithfreedom of the government’s defensepowerstoenactsuch law if itischallenged, so ittriedtodraft itin unconstitutional hearing and judicialdeliberat to the HighCourtto seek an Once theActwasenacted, theCommunistParty to beenactedanditwashighlycriticized Pintos-Lopez, &Williams, Pintos-Lopez, Rickets, Rogers, In general,theCommunistpartycasecanbe The Government wasawarethatitmight ha The Courthad toexamine verycarefully th .

supra

note 806, at 168. note 283, at 108. supra at108. note 283, ions theHighCourtdeclared

with national security issues andimplied assumption that injunction againstimplementing th thethreatposedbycommunist the modern Australiandemocracy”. under theSection51(vi) oftheConstitution. 330

opposed bythelaborpartyleaderandmembers. mmonwealth powersandnamely whetherthe awaytoprove thatitwas withinthe scope of speech, association,property, etc.The major al toenact legislative provisions imposing matters andalltheeffortsGovernment of Australiaand unions turned immediately Dissolution Act. The GovernmentDissolution Act.The didnot Court interpretedthe legislation.UnsurprisinglytheCourt’s e powertodefendtheexistingsystem of ve further difficulties with justifying the seen as“an iconic statement about the Communist PartyDissolutionAct for Australian democracy, the for Australiandemocracy, s andcommunism inAustralia e Act.Afterfourmonthsof 815 Section 51(vi)ofthe Despitethegeneral 814

CEU eTD Collection judgment “standsforthe proposition thatthere Courts totheexecutiveindefenseand other western democracies. Despite thewide depend ontheexecutiveevaluationwith the Constitution.Inthatcase constitutionally addressedthr is currently notintimes ofpeaceandther existing anti-terrorism regime inAustralia consti legislation asitwasinterpretedbytheHighCo membership inthoseorganizationsamountexactlytotheunsupportedbydefensepowers questioning anddetentionpowers,proscriptionofterroristorga within theframework oftheWar onTerror. C their status,rightsandliabi characterisation [...]anddoesnot proceeds directlyagainst part conduct orofestablishingobjec opinion oftheExecutive”andwhich“doesnottake during thetimes of peace itisunconstitutional to enacta legislation which “operatesonthe Parliament might authorize theexecutive to 817 816 conduct, orinparticularactivities” “penalties onindividualsandbod Ibid., at 169. &Rickets, Rogers The CommunistPartycaseis In fact,thejudgment preciselyprohibits supra note767,at 168. lities onceandforall.” ough theexerciseofdefens

the parliament canenactale icular bodies orpersons by tive standards or tests of liability uponthesubject,but tive standardsortestsofliability ies beforetheyactuallyengage tentatively orprovisionallybut 816 an importantlessonnotonly unlessthecountryisatwar,whichmeans thatthe all theconsequenceslistedabove. 331

national securityma exercise such powersinwar times. However, ontrol andpreventivedetentionorders,ASIO ly accepted andpracticeddeferenceofthe everythingtheAustralianGovernment does tutional itisneededtodeclare thatAustralia urt in1951.Therefore,ordertofindthe 817 are some thingsthat governments arenot efore thethreatof terrorism couldbe

thecourse offorbid gislation whichoperationwould e powersunderSection51(vi)of nization andcriminalizing of name or classification or tters, the 1951 High Court tters, the1951HighCourt d inaparticularcourseof soastoaffectadversely for Australia,butall ding descriptionsof CEU eTD Collection not happen. out tothegovernment thelimits ofitspowers a chancetoconfirm thecommitment tostand These arethe lessonstobelearnt forAustra circumstances itwouldstayintheshadow. the judiciary canstand for therule of lawand 821 820 819 818 orders. ThejourneyofthecasebeganinNove validity ofthemeasure from theanti-terrorism package;inthiscaseitwasregime ofcontrol This wasthefirstoccasionforhighestcourt ofthecountryto checktheconstitutional On August2007theHighCourtofAustraliaha 5.4.3.2. valu ability tobe“aguardianoftheabiding ever poseasignificantthreatofdoingso.” Act,and“yetdidnotover Court invalidationoftheDissolution events inthe wakeofit.TheCommunistPart entitled todowithoutthemost Ibid. Ibid. & Lopez Pintos Williams, inDyznehaus, Ascited &Williams, Pintos-Lopez, assist thoseholding power toresist form ofgovernment ought not to bebased onaconception, if otherwise adequate, adequate only to existing an of protection for the legislate to the power theory ofconstitutional In point be protected. to institutions the arisefrom to within fromlikely dangers protection may governmentForms need of power. executive the holding seldomthose by not done been ithas suppressed unconstitutionally in showsthat history, ancient notonly and History The decision become evenmore valuable or the form of government they defend.

War

on

Terror supra

reaches note 283, at 108. supra at108. note 283, note 283, at 109. supra at109. note 283, note 812, at 812, 72. note

compellingofcircumstances.”

the

High orsuppressobstructions oroppos 819 Court

820 Consider thefollowingpassageofDixonJ: lia’s WaronTerror.ButwhentheHighCourthad 332

TheHighCourtofAustraliaprovedthejudicial mber 2004whenJosephThomas from theState es thatlieattheheartofConstitution.” democracy even whentrad for democracy, rightsandlibertiesbypointing to fightaWar onTerrorthisunfortunatelydid nded downtheThomas vMowbrayjudgment.

y was not abolished asaresultoftheHigh y wasnotabolished of

Australia once we consider the development of the once weconsiderthedevelopment ofthe countries where democratic institutions have been been have where institutions democratic countries

818 throw theAustralianState nor TheHighCourtprovedthat ition or attempts to displace them ition orattempts to itionally inthesame 821

CEU eTD Collection October of2008 826 825 824 823 law/joseph-thomas.asp 822 104 oftheCriminal CodeActconfersjudicial imposition oftheControlOrder(w allegations: 1)Thefederal courts wereconferrednon-judicialpowers todecideonthe constitutionally permitted intimes ofpeace. question goesbeyondthescopeofdefensepow regime, Thomas shouldhavetheHighCourtconvincedthatlegislativeprovisionin High CourtofAustralia decided tochallengetheconstitutionalityofDivision104 Order. In the Thomas casehearing toconfir The procedure toissue aControlOrderrequires the factthathehad August 2007. Federal MagistrateMowbraysubjectedJack for aninterimControlOrderunderSubdivision Australia’s counter-terrorism regimeasin a falsified passport. to aterroristorganization). Code Act(receiving fundsfrom aterroristor of Victoriawaschargedwith appeal (see for details Pintos-Lopez & Williams, & Williams, Pintos-Lopez details (seefor appeal Itwas aspecial caseanadjunctto proceedings involv (2006). 1286 FMCA Thomas [2006] v Jabbour 9A(1)(e) Section (Cth), Act1938 Passports 620 VSC (2008). RvThomas [2008] For detailed account ofJack Thomas see trials In ordertosuccessfully challengethec 825 Themain reason forthedecisiontoimpose aControlOrderonThomaswas 823

andhewasacquittedofterrorism offencesbutfoundguiltyofpossessing 824 received trainingfrom AlQa’ida However,theThomas caseisaremarkable event inthehistoryof 826 . 822

ThefinalverdictonThomas’ chargeswashandeddownin a numberofterroristoffences hich violates ChapterIIIoftheConstitution);2)Division supra August2006,AFPOfficerRamzi Jabbourapplied 333

http://www.gtcentre.unsw.edu Thomas basedhisarguments around three main m theControlOrderwasadjournedasThomas ganization, and intentionally providing support note 283, at 95). Thomas tothe interim ControlOrder on26 powers onafederalcourt,butitinstructsto further confirmation oftheinterim Control ing the original jurisdiction by the court, but not an an not court, but the by original jurisdiction ing the onstitutional validityof theControlOrder BofDivision104theCriminal Code. ers and that the content of the law is not ers andthatthecontentoflawisnot in2001-2002(onhisownadmission). under Part5.3oftheCriminal the Criminal CodeActinthe .au/resources/terrorism-and- CEU eTD Collection 828 827 exercising theirpowers within theanti-terro expected from theCourttogivelongawaite highest courtongovernmental the War policiesinfighting onTerror.Itwasreasonably counter-terrorism regime,many surprise thosewhowerefollowingthestoryandin While theCourt’sdecision tosupport themech Thomas Subdivision BofDivision104the protect thenation(under 104 wassupportedbythedefensepowersandthat cannot beextendedtobroaderactivities toprotectthecommunity. ‘naval andmilitary defense’ in to defendbodiesofthepolitic out ofthegovernment’s defensepowers);Comm private groupsandthereforeWar onTerrormeasur Constitution islimited todefense against thre question, theplaintiffThomas made thefo the defensepowersdoesnotcoversuchmeasures). (either express orimplied) toenactlawsesta exercise thepowerinamanner contrarytoChap Melbourne University Law Review 1189 (2008). (2008). 1189 Review Law University Melbourne Hopes note 283, at 96. &Williams,supra at96. note 283, Pintos-Lopez Andrew Lynch, Thomasv Mowbray. Australia’s ‘War onTerror’ Reachesthe HighCourt. Case Note

The government respondedthattheControl As tothesource ofthelegislative powertoenact lawsestablishing the measure in

v

Mowbray:

Implications s. 51oftheConstitution).Amajor

the textofConstitution shoul s butnotcitizens (residents) were disappointedintheirhope

for Criminal CodeActwasvalid.

the

War llowing submissions. Defensepowerunderthe 334

blishing ControlOrderregime (i.e.thescopeof rism regime. TheAustralia Communist Party

on ats from foreignStates (asopposedtothe d guidanceforallbranchesofpowerto ter III;3)Absenceofthelegislativepowers anism oftheinterim controlorderdidnot onwealth defensepowersaretobedirected

827 terested inthedevelopments inAustralia’s Terror es aimed tocapture suchorganizationsfell governmentisempowered tolegislate

Orders scheme esta

and ity oftheCourt

and theirproperty;thewords Disappointment d beinterpretednarrowlyand 828 s tohearawordfrom the

blished byDivision (5:2) ruledthat

of

Great

, 32 , 32 CEU eTD Collection state, andeven anenemy isnotnecessa using thisnotiontheStatedoesnotneedtobe Therefore, theHighCourtextended thelimits 831 830 829 the “enlargedconceptionofdefence extension ofthedefencepowertomattersin matter noticed thateven priortoThomas v. including theCommunist Party to thedefensepowerinmostofpreviously enliven the[defense]power.” probably influenced theCourt’sstatement that“the the Thomas case:hehadreceived training from aterroristorganizationabroad.Thisfact some extendbythecircumstances ofthecase. Ther that theinterpretationgiventoscopeofth order mechanism wasavalidlegislationunderth external threatonly.TheHighC powers undersection51(vi)oftheConstitution didnotempowertolegislate toprevent Criminal CodeAct. upheld theconstitutionalityofregime human rights. However,inasomewhat disappoi able once againtoraise apow judgment handeddownover60yearsagowasagr Defence Power Ibid., at 177. Ibid. Oscar I Roos, First andprobablythemostimportant fi , 15 James Cook University Law review 176 (2008). (2008). 176 review Law University JamesCook 15 , Alarmed, but not Alert in the ‘War on Terror’? The High Court, Thomas vMowbray and the

829 erful voiceandstandforbetter ourt foundby6:1(KirbyJdissenting)thattheinterim control Thisconclusionisadepartur case. Nevertheless,thosewho studiedthecase-law onthis rily organized asacollective oragroup power isendorsedinThomas vMowbray” 335

of ControlOrdersunde e defense powerinthiscase wereinformed to Mowbray “therewassome authorityforthe decidedcases relatedtoAustralia’sdefense, nting judgment thehighest ternal, aswellextern of the defense power.Inordertolegislate of thedefense at war,threatneednotcome fromanother nding oftheCourtwasthatdefense e defense power. It is possible to suggest e defensepower.Itispossibletosuggest re neednot alwaysbeanexternalthreatto e wasanexternal threat aspect involved in ound tohopethatthejudiciarywouldbe e from theinterpretation given protection ofdemocracy and r Division 104 of the r Division104ofthe al security” andthat courtofAustralia 831 . 830 . CEU eTD Collection 834 833 832 Burvett), from theverybeginning;mainly intheligh it byreference tothewords‘naval andmilitary’ –didnot havemany chancestosucceed ‘effectively unlimited’ defense the governed,dissentingjudgewasagainstsuch observation givenbytheCourtmake poses noless threat to thepeople andtheirpropertythan inthefirst case.While this force ittodosomething. Where aterroristgr against apersonsand(or)theirpropertyitis politic, this beingEnglishlawfor centuries.” politic” cannotsensibly judges tojustifytherejection only forcethegovernment totakeornot committed or indented tobeco power. Forexample, Section100.1oftheCrimin it wouldplacesome piecesofanti-terrorism However, itcouldbeaninterest argument, atthefirstsight,might lookasthoug property –wasalsorejectedby powers –confinedsolelytothreatsposed Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., at 100. &Williams,supra Pintos-Lopez The second argument raised by the plaintiff in regards to the scope of the defense The secondargumentbytheplaintiffinregardstoscopeofdefense raised The lastarguments inrelationtothescopeof thedefensepower–necessity torestrict 834 andindeednotmany judgesaddressedtheissue. betreatedapartfrom those note at99. note 283,

power. ing development iftheCourtwoul of theplaintiff’sargument wa mmitted with the intentiontointimidate thepublic andnot the CourtwithonlyonejudgeKirbyJdissentedonit.The s senseasitisnoteasyto 833

336

particular measures. Themajor trendamong the oup intimidates andcoercesthegovernment,it legislation outside the h takingthedebateoutofmajor concerns. the same astointimidate thegovernment to 832 the bodiespoliticratherthantopersonsor t ofanexistingapproach(sinceFareyv. Inother words,ifthe threat isdirected al CodeActdefineasterroristactions aninterpretationasitmight leadtoan who areboundtogetherbythatbody s that“anotionofa“body dividethegovernment from d agree with the plaintiff as domain of the defense domain ofthedefense CEU eTD Collection powers arejudicialinnature. issues ofsimilar naturebuttheCourtdidnot person potentiallymight dointhefuture). TheAu not judicialinnature(because itallows functions ofeachbranch. Thomas arguedthatth doctrine governingtheinteraction betweenth examples ofbailandapprehendedviolenceorders. that some powersarejudicial were criticizedasunsatisfactor therefore theDivision104cannot majority foundthatpowergrantedtothecourtsin for theoutcome ofthecaseanddecisionon answering thequestiononnatureofpowe 836 835 interim Orderre Control test standards,butitdoesnotmakeCourtun ask from theCourtmore thantheyusuallydo (Chapter III).Themajority oftheCourthowev authorizes courts toexercise judicial power in determination issuesunderDivision104.Th individuals whohavenotbeenfoundguiltyor even chargedwithanycrimina that thedrastic distinction oftheControl Ibid., at 1202. at1202. Ibid., For details see Lynch, Thomas inhis challengingmove relied The taskfortheCourttodeci supra gime wassustained. note 827,at 1201.

835 by virtueoftheirexercise judicial bodiesandreferringto y, especially inrespectofthe Thistime theHighCourtc beinvalidated.Thefindings de inthiscasewasindeeda imposing limitation on person onthebasisofwhat 337

inawaycontrary to the Constitutional norms Order mechanism: theymight beimposed on and lawsareoftenendorsingbroaddefinitions, able toapplythose laws. Thevalidity of the give aclearanswertothequestionifsimilar e plaintiffThomas arguedthatthisprovision er decidedthatprovisi e powertoimposeanin thevalidityofm e differentbranchesbutalsosettingthe issuingcontrolorders stralian judiciaryhad achanceto dealwith r toissue ControlOrdersasitwascrucial a lot on the strict separation of powers a lotonthestrictseparationofpowers 836 Andrew Lynchpointsoutcorrectly observation oftheChiefJustice ould notwalkawaywithout bout the standards applicable bout thestandardsapplicable of theCourtinthismatter easure inquestion.The ons inquestiondonot terim controlorder is judicial innatureand l offence. CEU eTD Collection 838 837 measures areapplied might bereally dramatic powers couldbechecked.Thenegativeimpact meet thehopesofmany peoplebyignoring defense poweritself might beaccepted asarightandnecessary move, buttheCourtdidnot powers, sonow itisadjusted to the‘world of more complex threats.’ example 88AustralianswerekilledinBali aimed atpreventingterrorist attacks similar to somehow tohearfrom frustrating theCourtth the defensepower.ThiswasssomewhatpredictabledecisionofCourt,asitwould be expansion of terrorism lawsasitisnotclear th freedoms withoutproperinstitutionalprotection.Thedecisionisagreatgroundforthefuture regime of interaction between branches of agreed withthepolicyofgovernment toa between warandpeace wasblurre power eventhoughAustraliaisfarfrom being terrorism is sufficient tobroadenand modify thetraditional interpretation of thedefense subject ofdefense’. defense powerumbrellaeven the times of peace. Afterthe Thomas case,theCommonwealth can legislate under the about times ofwarorregulatingthearmed fo the defensepowerinAustralian for theWar onTerrorrhetoric. Firstofall,th Ibid., at 107. &Williams,supra at102. note 283, Pintos-Lopez There arenodoubtsthatitwas 837 Second,itwasre-confirmed bytheC

ng to do with the ‘immediate onmatterswhichhavenothingtodowiththe‘immediate history. Itwasdeclaredthat d). Therefore, theCourtdid a significantlyimportantcase 338

rces, theirtraining,andfinancialsupportduring e Thomas case represents amajor expansion of powers,and seriousl in 2002).So,theCourtexpandeddefense the question of the means by which expanded the questionofmeans bywhichexpanded dopt lawssufficientlychangingtheestablished in some cases, however at defense power does not extend to measures at defensepowerdoesnotextendtomeasures thosewhichoccurredin at anti-terrorism laws involved inarealwar(andthedividingline on individualsincasetheanti-terrorism the defensepowerisnotonly ourt thatthecurrentthreatof not say expressly butindeed with lotsofimplications 838 y curtailingrightsand would besupportedby theCourtdidnotfind Theexpansionofthe othercountries(for CEU eTD Collection Terrorism 839 current regime: legislatingwithurgency, extension oftheexecutivepowers,denialactive address the threat of terrorism. Thisconclu clear example of theState’s departure from theregime of constitutional normalcy inorderto From theoverviewand analysisof Australia’s anti-terrorism regime followsthatthisisa 5.4.3.3. governments duringthetimes oftheWaronTerror. militant democracyisrelevant toWar onTerrorand whyitmight beabetterapproach tolead on Terror.Unfortunately itdid nothappeninAu wonderful demonstration ofhowmilitant democr of howthejudiciarycanraiseits judgment onthedissolutionofCommunist Part for theWar onTerror.IncasetheHighCourt approve theuseofdefensepowers the debateonanti-terrorlawsofAustralia.Fo expand thescopeofdefensepowerstomeet theth manner as the Communist Partycase.Whileth applies theproportionality causing harm ofacomparable scale”. must“invoke thedefensepower[...]threats eitherbemilitary in natu executed. George Williams suggests forexample th some limits lawsaswe onsubstanceofthenew it important to elaborateonhowtopreventth Ibid. Ibid. Therefore, theHighCourtofAustraliadid

Militant

Policies

Democracy

into

the test more strictly.

Regime

in

Australia’s voiceandstandforthedemocracy.Butalsothatwouldbea in themost seriouscasesbut

of 839

Constitutional TheCourtwouldhavedoneamuch greaterjobifit

War 339

sion isbasedonnumerous concernsposedby ere werenotmany doubts e possibleabuseofsuchmeasure andimpose r example, itcouldindicatesome and limits

would havefollowedthelogicof1951 ll asonthe fashion inwhichthese lawsare acy logicmightbehelp on stralia, soIwillhave toelaborate onhow reat ofterrorism, itstillcoulddomorefor y that would be another excellent example y thatwouldbeanotherexcellentexample at theCourtshouldlimit thepossibilityto

not wanttodecide the case inthe same Terror:

Normalcy

Useful not toapproveitsregularuse

Guidance that theCourtwould ful toguidetheWar re orbecapableof

to

bring

Anti­ CEU eTD Collection policies. The levelof allowedrights limitation combined withextraordinary powersgranted constitutional normalcy whichisoneofthe image ofanti-terrorism policiesa helpful toaddressmost oftheconcernsposedbycurrent regime and improve the overall democracy apossiblesolution toleadthe circumstances andcharacteristic of Australia’s anti-terrorism regime Ifind militant in generalandallstatedaboveisfullyapp grounds toclaim therelevanceofmilitant demo analyze Australia’sWar onTerror.Theintroduc to make themclosertoastate of constitu and seekforaconstitutionallypermittedframew policies, aswellmany otherstates.Therefore, and democracy. Unfortunately,the national governments candemonstr national security atany costs. ‘Times of even iftoacceptthatitispresent,doesnotgive War onTerror. limits inthe form of testsorsimilar rules la Australian judiciarymissed theopportunityto others besides.Unfortunately,despiteexte judicial involvement, limitation offundamental First of all, militant democracy does notamount to departure from theregime of Militant democracyrepresentsaconceptual I cannotcontesttherealityof dopted bytheAustraliangovernment. Australian government failed todo so initsanti-terrorism ate its true adherence and commitments to the rule of law thethreatofterrorism fortheAustraliannation,but tional normalcy ratherthanpreventive state. w-enforcement agenciesmust observefighting the stress’ regimes aretheperfectoccasionwhen 340

War onTerror. Militantdemocracy might be licable tothecaseof comment onState’s policiesandimpose some nsive criticism of theexistingregime, the major problems forAustralia’santi-terrorism rightswithoutpropersafeguards,andsome cracy withintheanti-terrorism policydebate ork toplaceanti-terro thisStateneedstoreconsideritsapproach carte blanche tory sectiontothischapterhasprovided framework thatmight berelevantto tothegovernment toprotect Australia. Inthegiven Australia. rism policies inorder CEU eTD Collection will subject ittotheexternalscrutiny of the the handsof theexecutive predominantly, but established powers.Therefore,preventive policies state apparatusfunctionsasusualandeverybr will notallow aseriousshift inthebalanceof powerstoimplement preventivepolicies. The Communist Partytosuccessf to proceduralguaranteesinthecaseofright compromising ademocracy. Carefulassessment ofthreatandcommitment oftheimmanency of howmilitant democracy might beuseful Australia isfamiliar withthisconcept andhasa the current AustralianConstitution andbeuseful emergency regime. practical approachtotheprev content. Militantdemocracy might curethispr with terrorism. Itcauses seriousinconsistencies betweenthelegalstatus of theregime andits use astateofemergency tojustifythedeparturefrom ordinaryconstitutionalregime tofight terrorist attacksis,luckily,only situation (natural disaster, military attackfrom frame butmainly becauseastateofemergency presupposesrealexistenceofexceptional proclaim astateofemergency during astateofemergency. It to theexecutive todecide exclusively onsuch Second, militant democracy isnotconsidered Militant democracy can beaccommodatedbythe existingconstitutional framework of ul solutionoftheproblem. entive politicsastatemight ad because ofaterrorism threat,notonlybecauseofthetime is clearthatnogovernment at a possibility atthemoment. Th 341

judiciary. Thejudicial interference ineach and oblem asitrepresents atheoretical concept and s limitation led inthecase of theAustralian limitation are verysimilar towhatisallowed at thesame time militant democracy rational brilliant example initsconstitutional history guidetoleadtheWar onTerror.Moreover, anch ofpowerexerciseitsconstitutionally to address athreattotheStatewithout outside,etc.). InAustralia thethreatof inthe name of nationalsecurity remains in asanexceptional regime; thereforeit opt withoutmovingtowardsan themoment canlegitimately erefore, itisnotpossibleto CEU eTD Collection exceptional measure; forexample, dissolution of and freedoms. trust inthegovernmental policies,andpotentia Therefore, militant democracy wouldbringmore legitimacy inthe preventive measures, more those affectedbyanti-terrorism lawscannotch especially relevantfor than ‘reasonable belief’ insomething andsimilar should notbepartoftheregime; however,itw in Australia’s War onTerror,itwillnotclaim rights limitations areexercisedwith suppress opponentsandundesiredgroups(ethnic,re system’s enemies. However,inordertoa democracy concept.Astate cantakemeasures terrorism measures isvery similar towhatis abuse theirrightsinor limitations. Theconceptallowspreventive measures adherence toproceduralguaranteesestablis regular balanceofpower,includingmoreactive roleof logic appliedinaproperwaywouldallowexer enforcement agencies to actin accordance with mere awareness ofthecontrolmechanism every caseisnotnecessary toensure proper Finally, militant democracy initsclassi Third, militant democracy practicelegitimacy isconditional anddependsonthe Australia asthecountrydoesnothave der toharm ordestroytheexistin strongproceduralguarantees. 342

void thepossibleabuseofsuchmeasuresto hed forthefundamental rightsandliberties that possiblelimitations ofrightsandfreedoms existence couldputsome pressureonlaw- considered asthefoundation ofthe militant cising preventivepolicie exercise ofthe executive tasks; howeverthe to protect thesystem established guarantees. Militant democracy allenge themagainstahuman rightsclaim. lly strongerprotectionforindividualrights relaxed standardsofproof.Thisargument is ill subject thoselimitations tostrictertests a politicalpartyisallowed onlyasalast cal interpretation isconsidered asan directedatdenialofrightstothosewho ligious, gender,etc.)itisrequiredthat thejudiciary. g system. Theessence of theanti- constitutionalbillofrightsand If thisapproachisapplied by denyingrightstothe s while preserving the s whilepreservingthe CEU eTD Collection extremely positive role inimproving current the The case-studyofthreejurisdictions demonstrat Conclusion during thetimes ofstresssu will demonstrate itstruecommitment totherule regime more trustable and compatible withmajo Militant democracy as leading theme intheWa reference to secret information andactsof terrorism committed elsewhere inthe world. government willbeobligedtojustify itsactions andpolicywithstronger arguments than minimized, rights limitations willbe accompanied bystrong proceduralguarantees, andthe normalcy (asopposedtoastateofemergency) anti-terrorism measures. Itwillplace theexisting policywithintheregime of constitutional found. balanced solutionfornationalsecurityvs.adhe beforeimplemen the immanency ofthethreat measures (includingtheadoptionof newlaws).This theme inthe War onTerror willenabletheStat nearly inemergencysituation. question them,torturepeople,wa become the everyday business ofstate agencies their necessity. Keepinginmind theextentof states follow this logic itwillmake them cons resort measure. Inthecase oftheWar onTerror To summarize, militant democracy appearsto ch asthe War onTerror. Moreover, militant democracy adopted by theState as leading ive fairtrialguarantees,and 343

ider more carefullythemeasures takenagainst preventive measures inAustralia, itshould not ting anti-terrorism policies,howeveramore rence todemocratic ru of law,humanrightsvalues, andjusticeeven r onTerror in Australia willmake the entire where theshiftinbalancewillbe ofpowers r democratic principles. As a result Australia r democratic principles.AsaresultAustralia situation inrelation to anti-terrorism policies es thatmilitant democracy might playan to detect anddetain suspected terrorists, this isnot realistic to observe;however, if e toofferstrongerjustificationfortaken isnot feasible torequire states toprove be arelevant framework forAustralian convince thepublicthatwelive les dilemma shouldbe CEU eTD Collection the anti-terrorism measures forthefollowing reasons. necessary. Asaresult,militant democracy asa permits takingpreventiveaction,butonlywhenth powers between three chambers. Inaddition, th Terror asitallowslessrights’ limitations andis w required forthelegitimacyofconcept Therefore,thereisnostrongnecessityto anti-terrorism practice ofdiffere institutionalize preventivemeasures tofightterrorism throughtheprism ofthisconcept. anti-terrorism policiesintogreater complia during times of stress.Itwasdemonstrated that militant democracy mightassist inbrining to some extent,nonetheless,allofthem are agencies. While the concerns of theexistinganti-terrorism regimes inthreejurisdictions vary the situation intheevent that itisproperl War on Terror rhetoric and militant democracy concept. preventive policies indifferent settings. Thisisdue tothefact of substantialsimilarities of the Militant democracycan beutilized toguide substantially. However,Ifinditastrongsuppo of terroristattacks, wayaterrorist threat is the War onTerrorwastested,therefore,in thre situation and circumstances. Theargument thatmilitant democracy isof greatrelevance in of thethreatterrorism and eachjurisdiction createditsown uniqueregime basedonlocal in verydifferentsettings.Russia,Spain,and Each case-studyledtotheconclusion that nt states. Militantdemocracy logic with allthe attributes y appliedbythelegislatorsandlaw-enforcement theWar onTerrorandcan accommodatestates’ expressed, andlegalculture 344

nce withnationalcons Australia are allconcerned withthe prevention ould bebetterapproachtohandletheWaron about adherence to the democratic principles about adherencetothedemocraticprinciples e militant democracy concept applied properly e differentenvironment wherethepossibility pplied toterrorism givesmore legitimacy to search foranything newtoaccommodate the aimed atpreservingtheregularbalanceof rtive argumentinfavor militant democracy might helptoimprove e threatislikelyoccurandlimitations are titutional regimes and of the society differ ofthesocietydiffer ofmyhypothesis. CEU eTD Collection hysteric politicaldecisions. anti-terrorism policiessostatesdonotembarrasses themselves withpoor qualitylaws and to searchfor anewregulatory regime. Militantdemocracy isauseful hinttodemocratize mind andtrytofollow thisstatement, whichhoweverdoesnotautomatically mean theneed on Terrorisofnoless make themmore compatible with the major pr states toreconsideranti-terro Militant democracyandanti-terrorism policies arealikein many instancesandthisis why theexperience ofmilitantdemocracy applic importance thanitslawfulness.Nati rism policies, or atleast the 345

inciples of democracy. The success of the War inciples ofdemocracy.ThesuccesstheWar ation might berelevantandusefulforsome onal governments shoul manner of their im plementation to d keepitin CEU eTD Collection 841 840 issues. Themajor conclusionoftheprojectis militant democracy invariousjurisdictions, of militant democracy withasubstantive prac practice ontheextension ofmilitant democracy democracy. Thestatement issupported furt no means a‘witheringaway’concep constitutional practices from various jurisdicti deceased democracies. are stillvalidfortoday’sreal power. Democracymust become militant.” destination, itmust fightonitsownplanea stabilizing governments: “ifde democracy intoamilitant form, thesolutiones anti-democratic parties.Theonl democracies werelegallyboundtoallowtheemer Europe. Democraticfundamentalism andlegalistic blindness ledto asituation where The term ‘militant democracy’wasintroduced in Optimism The Ibid., at 658. SeeLoewenstein,

Militant The overview of thecurrenttheoretical debate overmilitant democracy issuesand This project presented theanalysis ofmajor theoreticalconsiderations ontheconcept and

Democracy Who supra are note 5, at 423. at423. 5, note 841

theEnemies? CONCLUDING

Principle: ity, includingtheoneondanger y possibilityto curethisunfortunate situation was turning mocracy isconceivedthat ithas not yetfulfilledits t butrather alivelyand practi

Democracy 840

346

OBSERVATIONS and ondiverseaspectsof militant democracy ons demonstrated thatmilitant democracy isby Loewenstein’sarguments formulated in1930s her bytheevidences from theconstitutional that although militant democracyisadmittedly

tical component investig technique whichservesonlythepurposeof beyond itstraditionalsc pecially needed attimes of transition and gence andriseofanti-parliamentarian and the1930swhenNazisstartedtoinvade

on

its

Guard to neglecttheexperienceof

cal toolusefultoprotect ope ofapplication. ating thepracticeof against too

much

CEU eTD Collection 842 structures toneutralize fascistmovements. democracy protects.Originally,militant democracy is feasible tomake certain generalizations on whoaretheenemies andwhatmilitant state could offer variousjustifi case-study demonstrates thatthemilitantdemo political theory,engagingstatesmen andph fact thatthedefinitionof“democracy” still militant democracy protection isinterpreted differently in everydemocracy,also duetothe this project wascompleted. Theanswer isnot an expressions. Thereforeanswertothisquesti militant democracy protects, andwhatitprotects from, apartfrom vaguephrasesand principles in theconstitutional practice of modern democracies. was usednotasamere theoreticalconcept in this project were based onpractical observations, therefore the term ‘militant democracy’ militant democracy anda militant democracy state. constitutional phenomenon itwasconcludedthat procedures. As‘militant democracy’ was tu those whowanttooverturnordestroyitth structure possessingopportunitiestopreserve democracy bytakingpreventiveactionsagainst by undemocraticactors. important safeguard of democracy whenitisthre a somewhat problematic concept,throughcons Fox & Nolte, &Nolte, Fox Constitutional theory doesnotoffer much clarification interms of whatexactly For thepurpose of thisproject militant democracy wasdefined aslegal andpolitical supra supra note 56 , at 2. , at

cations tointroduce militant democracy measures. However,it on was postponeduntilthecase-study element of ilosophers indebate since ancient times. 347

Later,the fear of remains oneofthefund but ratherasamanifestation ofitsmajor cracy conceptiscontext-sensitive andeach atened tobepotentiallyharmed ordestroyed rough utilizing democratic institutions or rough utilizingdemocratic institutionsor rned many years ago intoapractical easyonetogive.Firstofall,thescope thereisnopracticaldistinctionbetween Mostof theexamples, cases, and analysis iderate applicationit wasargued tobeintroduced tothestate communism made many amental questionsof couldbecome an 842 The The CEU eTD Collection 843 simply thoseinoppositiontothegover procedure. Thiswillpreventthepotentia stable; therefore,strong justif measures might bepoten individuals “fundamental choicesinstructuringtheirsociallife.” competes forbeingpresentinthe publicdi democracy isnotnecessarilyapoliticalparty enemy ofdemocracy andprovoketheapplica State through abuseoftheprivileges topart democratic structuresandwhichtheagendaof threats interms oftheirid Militant democracyproved to beadynamic con democracy from certain ideologies andmoveme compatible withmajor democratic principles. adherent tocertainideologiesorrequire restrictions imposed onpolitic various elements of militantdemocracy inth democracies inCentral andEa the UnitedStates).Inth cherished democraticprinciplesforthesakeof democracies with stablesystem countries adoptlegislationagainstthepossibl Sajo, supra at210. note 128, Therefore, itisprobably notcorrect tost tially abusedforpoliticalpurposes, e wakeofthecollapse eological foundations.Anymoveme

ication andprocedural guarantees must beaccorded tothis stern EuropefollowedtheGerman exampleandintroduced s ofgovernments wereonthevergeoftrading-offmost al parties inthe form of nment as‘enemies ofdemocracy.’ l labelingofunpopularorunwantedgroups, or 348

ment tohave partyprograms andactivities but anygroup,association, e riseofcommunism andevenconstitutional icipate inpolitical pr protectingtheirdemocr contradictsthedemocr scourse andtakingpartininfluencingthe eir newconstitutions, mostlyinrelation to tion ofmilitant democracy. Anenemy of cept, abletoaccommodate different type of ate thatmilitant democracy aims toprotect nts, predefinedas enemies ofdemocracy. communist regime many young a priori especially indemocracies notyet nt which aimsnt which toharm the prohibitionsofparties ocesses can become an 843 atic foundationsofthe acy (i.e.Australiaand Militantdemocracy ormovement which CEU eTD Collection democracy withoutthesupportor structure and weaknesses ofthedemocratic minority.’ Therewereexamples inthepast majority decisions,but alsoprevent thesituation of the‘majority captured byanintolerant democracy’s enemies couldbedetrimental fordemocracy. explained bytheparadoxoftolerancewhic in their freedoms underthe militant democracy abolish democracy, citizensandtheirassociatio disrespecting democratic rules. content ofmajority decisions.Militantde prevent suchdevelopments isthatdemocracy democracy shouldbeabolishedandreplacedw guarantee thatamajority willnotdecideto modern democraticstates.Furthermore, a purely proceduralview political populism basedonthepoliticsofemoti the politicsof emotions. While this enemy wasidentified inKarl Loewenstein’s essays, its legalisticblindnessandbepreparedtoneut the democratic order.Inorde technologies adjustedtosuchphenomenon and Those beingawareoftheideas towards itspotentialenemies. Firstofall,de Constitutional theory offers few justifications for themilitant stand democracy cantake Legitimacy v. However, militantdemocracy canimpose so Effectiveness r toavoidsuchunfortunateev Revisited So,unlesssomeone intendsto ofdemocratic fundamental consentofthemajority (i.e.theWeimar Republic). The

349

mocracy measures areinvoked onlytowards mocracy hascertainproblems points. andweak becomes substantiveand managed tograspthepowerandabolish ralize oneofthemajor enemies ofdemocracy: voteonedaythatatyrantshouldruleand ns aresafefrom beingsuppressedandlimited h means thatunlimited tolerancetowards ons stillremains atroublingfeatureofmany use itforthepurposeto ith anotherregime. Theonlypossibilityto whenintolerant minorities utilized the me limits notonlyonthesubstanceof rational. Thisreacti ents, democracy shouldoverstep use democratic institutions to ism might develop political ofdemocracy cannot takes intoaccountthe on ofdemocracy is destroyordamage CEU eTD Collection 846 845 844 obligation imposedbythepublicin are some signsof moving towards the percepti practice offers some further justification for the abuseofopportunities be ajustifiedconceptaslongitis“capable tragedies of thepast and absenceof anyrealis ideological andphysicalattacksfromwithin worldwide astheonlystructureofstateeven into the‘suicide pact.’ democracy inforeseeable futureand nodeclarat very unlikely thatsomething likeCommunism orFascism willhitthe worldandexistence of measures indemocratic constitutionswasprovedbythetragiceventsofpast.While itis and transitionaldemocracies.Moreover,then processes” provenance and(mainly orsolely)relyonself-re “democracy shouldrefrainfrom legal regulations providing andmeasures ofa‘militant’ the businessofrescuingdemocracy whenits damage or even abolishademocracy. stop them beforeanintolerantminority empowers structures andultimate goalofprotectingrigh preventive natureof militant democracy aimed atthepreservation of thedemocratic Sajo, Sanchez, Thiel, supra at211. note 128, In addition totheabsence ofalternatives Furthermore, at the moment there are noreal supra supra 844 note 92, at 417. at417. 92, note isofcourseverydesirable,butdoesnotsoundrealisticespeciallyforyoung note 52 , at 6. 845 Thelastfewdecadesdemonstrated thatdemocracy isaccepted for restrictingrights.”

ternational lawwhichpromotes militant democracy measures. Forexample, there 350

ts anddignitycan‘fi tic alternatives, militant democracy appears to on of militant democracy measures as positive ofexcludingconceptuallyandinstitutionally and outside.Therefore,keepinginmind the 846 thoughitisyetnotco gulative powersofthe ion ofrightsriskstoda ecessity to havecertain self-preservation

existence isendangered.Theideathat andhistoricalargum istic alternatives to militant democracy in itself tothedegree whereitisableto lter’ suchmovements and arather substantive view mpletely securedfrom electoral and political y tobe transformed ent, constitutional CEU eTD Collection 850 849 848 847 problematic one.First of all,militant democracy democracy from beingdestroyed, theconcept of militant democracy isaseriously certain politicalparties.” Court’s judgment “leavesopenthepossibilityto recently decided casefrom Spainontheprohibition ofBatasunaParty. endorsed inconstitutionallegislation,isal states topracticeadefensivedemocracy, includ ECHR judgment ontheRefahPar public internationallaw canbe attempting toabolishthis rule. Supportforth obliged atleasttoprotect their democraticsy example ofaninternationaldutyto dangerous religiousmovements. Inthesame legislation. democratic partiesand states cando itpre-em the ECHRleadto conclude that public inte Europe membership requirement. Furthermore, Discrimination Political Rights support ofthisargument, e.g.Article22(2)ofthe of democracy. Thereareateleast fewexamples from international Ibid., at 277. O’Connel, supra I.e. Article 25(b) of the ICCPR or Article 3 of the Protocol 1to the European Convention on Human Rights. &Nolte, Fox However, apartfrom beingperceivedasusef 847 Aparallelcanbemade withwidely supra supra , EUaccessioncriteria(knownasCope , Article4ofthe note 153, at 277. note 56,59. at

850

international courts, i.e. the also foundinjurisprudenceofinternationalcourts,i.e.the tisi (Welfare Party) could beinterpreted in awaytoallow “holdgenuineperiodicelections.” of all Form of Racial Convention ontheEliminationofallFormRacial 351

lowed. RoryO’Connelbringsanexample of otively byenactingdemocracy’s self-protection line ofargumentation, FoxandNoltebringan rnational lawsallow for actions against anti- stems from thepotential e justification ofmilitant democracy inthe Article 5(1) of theI seems tobeaself-contradicting concept asit arguethat the state ing thepossibility to accepted prohibition ofhatespeechand ul, justifiedandlegitimate tooltoprotect International CovenantonCiviland nhagen criteria)andtheCouncilof treaties thatcan becited in CCPR andArticle17of may haveadutytoban 848 rulerswhowouldbe 849 ban politicalparities Therefore,statesare Hearguesthatthe CEU eTD Collection 851 government andtakeinto accountlocal conditions a democracy measures, thejudiciaryshouldbeactiv always. When itcomes tothedifficultywith democracy targetsthelattergrouponlyandform those whodenyrelianceondemocracy as there isacleardifference between thosewho could bepossiblyabolished.Otherwise, democr democracy cannotaffordtoremain inactivewhen The critiqueofthedoctrinecanbeoutweighed extremely political nature anditinevitably posesa Last, butnottheshould initiatetheprocedure? on it.Howtodefinethepointwhendemocracy isendangered,whocandecideonitand a clearline betweenacceptablecri hard to define theright moment toinvoke militant should bekeptundercontrol instead ofbeingsuppressedand illegitimated. Furthermore,itis and repressionbreadinghate.Itisalsoaseriousdilemma ifallegedlydangerousmovements number ofvoter non-representedintheparlia difficulties affectingitseffectiv important to admit thattheapplicationof one of themajor dilemmas of militant democracy: howitworkspolitically andlegally. It is practice, the former doesnotpresuppose thelatter. OttoPfersmann outlined thisproblem as justification of militant democracy intheoryshou democracy canbehave inamilitant wayand remain a truedemocracy. Secondly, the limits rights andliberties inorder tosecure theirexistence. It is questionable whether Sajo, supra note 128, at 211. at211. note 128,

eness, i.e. banning of popular partiesandeness, leavingsubstantial i.e. banningofpopular tiques ofademocraticregime a aprimaryprocess of decision-making. militant democracy canbesurroundedbyvarious 352

ment, concernsaboutfearbreedingrepression definingarightmoment toinvokemilitant disagree withsome policiesand democratic least, militant democracy isaconcept ofan acy turnsintoself-c ld notbeconfused withitseffectiveness. In by quitesimplisticarguments. First of all, democracy. Itisnever an easytasktodraw itsbasicstructuresarebeingattackedand ely involvedtoassess risk ofbeingabusedfo nd degreeofthethreat.Judicial controlis er enjoysthesame levelofprotectionas nd adirectori ontradiction. Moreover, the arguments ofthe r politicalpurposes. ndirect attack 851 Militant CEU eTD Collection 852 democracy principlebeyond itstraditional scope of The major contribution of thisproject wasthe analysis of theextension of themilitant Principle Democracy fundamentalist andcoercivereligi when itcomes toutilizingmilitant democracy against new enemies of thedemocracy: time, constitutionaljurisprudencedemonstrates democracy measures wereemployed withinits freedoms. Thelatterstatement is,however,ap and resist governments intheirunjustified intrusion intothe exercise of political rights and solution are institutionalizedandperc The dilemmacouldbefurthereffectivelyaddressedindemocracies wherefundamentalrights standards of thepractices tolimit fundamental misuse ofmilitant democracymeasures and the sake ofdemocracy’s self-preserv government’s motion toimpose limitsonsomeone’s insist oncomplying withallprocedural presupposes judicialinterference fundamental rights.Theruleoflawasonethedemocracy’s imperative as militant democracy measures measures in 13 jurisdictions, so appears to be somehow reliable and logical. SeeThiel, Such conclusion is made in the final chapter of the book complied from case-studies of militant democracy democracy fromcomplied ofmilitant thebook case-studies of chapter final the ismade in conclusion Such The Overallpracticeof militant democracy proves itself as aworkable andplausible 852 to andjudiciarieshaveprovedinmany instan

New and

Threats its

New

eived astheultimate goalof

Enemies: ation. Thejudicialcontrolplayaroleofpreventingpolitical ons andthreatofterrorism. where rightsare atstake.C

The 353

may come dangerously closeto limiting rights forthesakeofprotectingademocracy. thatcourtsmightbemisled bygovernments rules andrequirements beforeapproving Extension ication. At the same traditional areaofapplication.Atthesame plicable more tothecases wheremilitant judiciary isresponsible to introduce legal application.Theargument wastestedon politicalparticipa ces tobe abletostand fordemocracy the constitutionalregime. of

ourts shouldbecautiousand the foundational principles Militant supra tions rightsforthe note 92, at 417.

Democracy

CEU eTD Collection approach towardsthe alleged threat of religious extremism andimplement militant measures). Therefore,alljurisdictions included a properbalancing exercise (i.e.how realistic isthethreat totakemilitant democracy than acceptingthemilitant de from religious extremism. However,atthemome judicial institution(i.e.Islam Court, butalsoittakesuponitselftodeci symbol oppressivepoliticalregime. ofan No decide onthebanofreligiouspartiesandgoesas secularism andunityofthestate.Thelanguage Turkey militant democracy iswidely referred militant democracy isapplied for the purposeof pr well asconditions ofitsapplication aremissing demonstrates thatdeeperandconsistent understandingofthe militant democracy notionas of itselementstojustifyst rights protection arefamiliar withthe militant survey reveals thatnational legalsystems as more successful democratic solutions than are present inthedescribed jurisdictions. The extremist religious movements. Where militant de concept isofrelevanceforthestates’polic growing fundamentalist religiousmoveme two case-studiesdevotedtotheapplication of Therefore, militant democracy isof potentialusetoguard thedemocratic perimeter The case-study onmilitant democracy andreligious extremism demonstrated that the is notcompatible with democracy, andsimilar conclusions). mocracy rationalegivenbythe ate policiesandjudicialdeci nts andtofightthe‘War onTerror’. 354

democracyconceptandeven implement some t onlyarethelocalconditionsignoredby ies toaddress threats wellas international institutions for human de onmatters notassignedforinternational of theECHRchangesradicallywhenithasto militant democracy toaddressthethreat of from thejurisdictionsanalyzed. In Russia, in thecase-studies need toreconsider their nt the judiciary is not equipped to go further nt thejudiciaryisnotequippedtogofurther toinorder topursue apoliticalideal: far astodeclarecertain religious attireasa otecting an ideal vision of society, whilein mocracy is properly applied itwillleadto sions. However,thecase-study government withoutundertaking coming fromgrowing CEU eTD Collection movements choosetodamage thedemocracy and aim tocureandpreventsimilar outcomes with system withapurpose to destroyor damage it.Anti-terrorism regime andmilitant democracy constitutional system bydenyingrightsand the major aim behindthemeasures. Militantdemo applicable bothtothecontent measures ispresent,andunderaregime ofst undertaking ofmeasures ofapreventivecharacte should beauthorizedand drivenby militant de should beallowedtodepartfrom thestate political movements only.Theclaimwasrather be addressedthrough the classicalmilitant demo cure some flaws of theexisting regimes. Idid not argue that thefight against terrorism could only bringmorelegitimacy toanti-terrorism po through an adjustment of themilitant democracy constitutional framework toplacetheso-calle basic proposition ofthis case-study wasthat thereisno necessity toinventanew existing constitutional paradigms of theconstitutional normality andstate of emergency. The the currentanti-terrorism polic of itslegitimacy areobserved. democracy inastricterway,toensure that no Further, bothoftheseregimes claimtoprot The secondcase-study on militant democracy and theWar onTerror wereinspiredby of theanti-terrorla ies practicedbyva of constitutional normalcy, butsuchadeparture 355

freedoms thosewhoarebelievedtoabusethe t onlyistherational ap d ‘War onTerror’ into, but toaccommodate it theonlydifferenceinmeans thatdangerous litics, butwillalsopresentanopportunityto cracy measures likeprohibition ofdangerous mocracy logic; whichin generalallowsthe ws adoptedandthewaytheyareapplied. rict proceduralguarantees.Thisshouldbe principle toanew reality.This willnot cracy’s main ideais toprotect theexisting ect democracy from itsenemies andthis is constitutional order.Moreover,veryclose r, butwhenthenecessitytoinvoke such that statesfacingthethreatofterrorism rious stateswhichveryoftengobeyond plied, butallconditions

CEU eTD Collection 855 854 853 preventive detention). are notactuallybeingappliedin commitment torevisitthelaws.Itdoesnotha example, inAustraliathelaw-making hasstoppe previously adoptedlawsandremedy some moment, therearenotmany signsthatparlia terrorism laws isthat itisveryhard tocontroltheexecutive andresist itspressure. Atthe executive. Oneofthebiggestchallengesforth speak onthematter andscrutinize denying judiciary itstraditional functions. Third, the preservationofsepara shortened and willexclude atleastfairtrial Militant democracy asappliedtoterrori terrorism measuresfor thefollowing reasons.First, this diseaseanditsexperiencecouldbe Militant democracy was introduced tothecons suicidal fordemocracy andtheremustbeme towards emotionalism attributed toextreme poli by terrorism–fearandintim very different from whatdrivesextreme political parties. replaces the rule of law attheend. In thisre Karl Loewensteinargued,emotionalism isclue that holdsauthoritarianregimes togetherand relations couldbeobservedbetweenterro Ibid., at 2263. at 2263. Ibid., Ibid. Sajo, supra note 55, at 2255. at note 55, 2255. idation –also createaki

tion ofpowersbalancewithou practice(forexample incase the lawstheyadopted appliedtothewaronterrortoo. r and fundamentalist politicalmovements. r andfundamentalist rights. Second,militant democracy logicrequires gard, emotionalism ofte 356

ppen evenwithsomehow ridiculouslawswhich how theproblems posedbysuchlaws.For e Parliaments inenacti titutional theory and practice tocure exactly sm wouldgivemore legitimacy totheanti- chanism present tosubvert such activities. tical partiesandterroristmovements canbe d for a while butthereisnoexpression of d forawhile ments seriously consider toreview the listof rights allowedtobelimited willbe Parliaments should begivenachanceto nd ofpoliticsemotion. withoutpressurefrom thesideof 854 Inaddition,main methods used t favoringtheexecutiveand of theAustralia’sregime of rrorist movements isnot ng andreviewinganti- 855 Tolerance 853 As CEU eTD Collection While theconcerns of existinganti-terrorism regimes inthreejurisdictions vary tosome the situation incase itisproperly applied by democracy concept. This isdue tothefact of substantialsimila guide thewar onterrorandcanaccommodate stat strong supportiveargument infa threat isexpressedandlegalcultureoftheso tested onthreedifferentenvironm circumstances. Theargument thatmilitant democr threat and eachjurisdiction createdits own different settings.Russia,SpainandAustralia are allconcernedwithpreventionofterrorism play anextremely positiveroleinimprovingcurre The case-studyofthreejurisdictionsde parliaments. attacks evaluatedonly the existing regime theyshould give better words, governments shouldre-shapetheiranti-terrorism policiesandiftheywanttopreserve executive, itshouldnotgothatfarastoallowde the levelofrightsprotection.Wh deciding onwhatkindof measures totake,what within themilitant democracy framework than proposed measuresthanintheanti-terrorism state.Ifthean

Each case-studyledtotheconclusion that Finally, militant democracy requiresgovernme on thesecretinformation theycanno vor ofmyhypothesis.Militant ile itisanoveralltrendtopa ents wherepossibilityofterrori 357

rities of thewaronterror rhetoric and militant ciety differssubstantially.However,Ifinditas justification thanprobability ofnewterrorist the legislators andlaw-enforcement agencies. unique regime basedonlocalsituation and rights tolimit andhowfar togo in lowering tention ofnon-suspectsforexample. Inother itwoulddecrease executive privileges in es’ preventivepoliciesindifferentsettings. acy isof relevance inthe waronterror was monstrates thatmilitant democracy might militant democracy might helptoimprove nt situationwithanti nts togivestronger t revealtothepublicandeven ss thesecuritymatters tothe ti-terrorism policyisplaced democracy canbeutilizedto st attacks, waysofterrorist -terrorism policies in justification forthe CEU eTD Collection 856 context-dependant nature of militant democracy: “successful defence […] depends ontoo more confidencetodemocracy, especially However, thepresenceof militant democracy arsenal intheconstitutional structures affords of politicalpartiesand imposingsimilar limitations its frequentapplication.Theovera democracy measures in thetexts ofthenati democracy measures inpractice.Thecase-st Democracy cansuccessfullyexercise this func should notbeover-optimistic aboutexisting approach to themilitant democracy principle also tothe mastering ofthecurrenttechniques to thefactthatdemocracies “Much hasbeendone;stillmore tobedone.” remains present-day reality in the bus danger oftheFascistmovement inmind, nevert his I wanttofinishthisprojectbycitingKarl Conclusion preventive measures tofightterroris policies in greater compliance withnationalconstitutional regime andinstitutionalize of stress.It wasdemonstrated that militant de extent, nonethelessallof Loewenstein, Loewenstein, Militant Democracyand I alsodonothaveanyproblems agreei

supra note 5, at 656. them areabout adherencetothe are notimmunizedfrom thenew Fundamental RightsII

iness ofprotecting ll tendency is thatstates are m throughtheprism ofthisconcept. in thecaseofyoungdemocratic states. Loewenstein, concluding with observations from Loewenstein, concludingwithobservationsfrom onal constitutions doesnot automatically means 358

by developingamore consistentandlegitimate mocracy might assist in brininganti-terrorism tion evenwithoutregular referenceto militant and potentialfutureenemies ofdemocracy. udies prove thatthepresence of militant in practice. Itotally agree that democracy heless Ifindhisremarks applicabletothe ng withLoewenstein’sargument onthe democracy against itspotential enemies. onparticipants of the political discourse. essay.Hewaswritinghispaperwiththe 856 Thisstatement isapplicablenotonly democratic principlesduringtimes cautious regardingthebanning types ofthreatsappearingbut CEU eTD Collection 863 862 861 860 859 858 857 unfortunate mistake ofgivingitsdeadlyenemies themeans bywhichtheymay destroyit. constitutional theoryandpr for democracy’s survival toneglect th “for theultimate ends to beredefined” word –“authoritarian,”democracy.” concepts intothenewinstrumentalities of“dis by self-appointedleaders,bu be expected from abdicationin favor of emoti throughout thewholeproject. over-generalized statements about militant de country, aswellthetr stratification, thesociological pattern andthespecific juridical technique of eachindividual many factors.” Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. at 658 Ibid., Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. at 657 Ibid., Furthermore, hearguesthat“salvationoftheabsolutevaluesdemocracy isnotto 857 860 Helists atleast“national traditi and“liberal-minded men” of liberalgovernment: hum end ofworldpolitics”.

actice shouldbeonguardto t by deliberate transformation

859 e experiences ofdeceaseddemocracies; Intheend, Loewensteinarguesthat “democracy has 359

onalism, utilized for wantonorselfish purposes

861 ciplined”, oreven–letusnotshyfrom the 858 mocracy practice invarious jurisdictions an dignityandfreedom.” shouldapplythedisc Thiswasthe main reason Itried to avoid ons, economic considerations,thesocial protect democracy from the of obsoleteforms andrigid ipline ofdemocracy 862 Itisdetrimental 863 therefore, CEU eTD Collection 1.

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• • • • • • • • • • Progress C., BLITT, Robert of theConstitutionalCourtTurkey FriendsoftheCourt:TheRepublic BELGE, Ceren, and History,238(1990) Violence: ETAandtheBasquePoliticalProcess DOUGLASS, William A., Right G.,IslamintheSecularNomosofEuropeanCourt ofHuman DANCIN, Peter 891 (2008) Islamic Headscarf CINAR, Alev, Politics, 235(2005). CHANDRA, Kanchan,EthnicPartiesandDemocraticStability Convention ofHumanRights National Party:AnAnalysisofSecroLtd BROWN, Archie, Comparative LegalStudies BRAND, Oliver,ConceptualComparisons:Towards aCoherentMethodologyof International andComparative Law,41(2004) Politics and SecurityinGermany’Anti-Terrorism Legislation Law,Terrorism BOYNE, Shawn andSocialMovements:TheTensionBetween CARIOLOU, Leto, Democracy, 35(2001) , 32MichiganJournalofIn , 3Brigham YoungUniversity Subversion andSubjugationintheP , 33Comparative Perspectives Sy From Democratization How toEntrenchadefactoStateChurchinRussia:AGuide The RightnottobeOffendedby , 32BrooklynJournalofInternationalLaw,405(2007) ZULAIKA, Joseba,OntheInterpretation ofTerrorist , 35IndustrialLawJournal,415(2006) ternational Law,663(2011) , 40LawandSocietyReview,653(2006) 364

LawReview,707(2009). v RedfearnintheLi to “GuidedDemocracy , 32Comparative Studies inSociety an Alliance andSelectiveActivism ublic Sphere:S mposium: GenderedMigrations, the MembersoftheBritish , 12CardozoJournalof ght oftheEuropean , 3Perspectiveon ecularism andthe ”, 12Journalof CEU eTD Collection

• • • • • • • • • • Interest Rashad, HUSSAIN, Rights, EuropeanLawReview,407(2004) Paul, HARVEY, Constitutiona Oren GROSS, Terrorism Rights: AssessingtheLegalResponseof GOLDER, Ben&WILLIAMS, George, (2004). Political Culture ofRussia Marina, GASKOVA, Movements andTheirAudience J. FUNES, Maria International LawJournal,1(1995). George, FOX, GregoryH.&NOLTE, 125 (2010); Constitutional Court and The European Courtof HumanRights ERGUN, OzbudunPartyProhibitionCases:Different Approach by TheTurkish Rossijskogo Prava(2009) DVORNIKOVA, O.A., Emory InternationalLawReview,1(1994) Burght ConferenceonPending RussianLegislationRestrictingReligiousLiberty,8 DURHAM, ColeW., DURHAM, ”, 113YaleLawJournal (2004) , 8JournalofComparative PolicyAnalysis,43(2006) l, 112YaleLawJournal,1333(2003). Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crisis Always be Chaos andRules:ShouldResponsestoViolent CrisisAlwaysbe Social ResponsetoPoliticalViolen Militant Democracyandthe Security withTransparency:JudicialReview in“Special The RoleoftheRussianOrthodoxChurchinShaping The FutureifreligiousLiberty Religija iZakon:ProblemyVzaimodejstvija , 7JournalfortheStudyifReligionsandIdeologies118 , 42TheJournalofConf 365

Balancing NationalSecurityandHuman Common LawNationstotheThreatof Intolerant Democracies,36Harvard European ConventiononHuman ce intheBasqueCountry:Peace lict Resolution,493(1998) in Russia:Report of the De , 17Democratisation, , 7 Zhurnal , 7Zhurnal CEU eTD Collection

• • • • • • • • • • KROTOSZYNSKI, RonaldJ. KROTOSZYNSKI, Parties inTurkey, 38LawandSocietyReview,433(2004); KALININ, B.Ju., Germany JOPPKE, Christian, (2007). ISSACHAROFF, Samuel, Journal 3(2007) Anti-terrorism ProvisionintheNewAir-transport Security Act the Aircraft: TheGermanFederalConstitu LADIGES, Manuel, Constitutional ValueinGermany Free Speech,MilitantDemocracy,andthePrimacy ofDignityasaPreferred KOGACIOGLU, Dicle, 314 (2006) WilsonKENNETH, Party-SystemDevelopment underPutin Parties’ Made aDifference KENNETH, Wilson, Constitution KEMMERZELL, JorgK.,WhyThereisnoPartyBanintheSouthAfrican Studies 275(1998); Rise andDemise ofTurkey's Refah Party KAMRAVA, Mehran, Pravovoj analiz , 36TheoryandSociety,313(2007) , 17Democratization, 687(2010) , 11Zakonodatel'stvo ijekonomika (2007) Terrorizm vRossiikonceXX-NachaleXXIVeka:Politiko- Comment. OliverLepsius’sHum State NeutralityandIslamiche Party FinanceinRussia: hasthe2001 Law‘OnPolitical Pseudo-Democratic Politics and Progress, Unity,andDemocr ?, 59Europe-AsiaStudies,1089(2007) ?, Fragile Democracies A Comparative Perspective on the First Amendment: A Comparative PerspectiveontheFirstAmendment: , 78TulaneLawReview,1549(2004). 366

, 25BritishJourna tional CourtStrikes DownaProminent , 120HarvardLawReview,1405 an Dignity and the Downing of an DignityandtheDowningof adscarf lawsinFranceand Populist Possibilities: The Populist Possibilities:The acy: DissolvingPolitical , 22Post-Soviet-Affairs, l ofMiddleEastern , 8German Law CEU eTD Collection

• • • • • • • • • • Parties, 14PartyPolitics,745(2008) FightingTerrorismNAVOT, Suzie, inthePoliticalArena. TheBanningofPolitical Europe-Asia Studies,1049(2003) C., MOSES, Joel (2004) Basque NationalismintheLightofSocialMovement Politics,MEES, Ludger EconomyorCulture? TheRiseandDevelopment ofthe http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1660649 Freedom inEurope(2010),publishedat MACKLEM, Patrick Terrorist OrganisationsinAustralia Ni Andrew,McGARITY, LYNCH, Law Journal,225(2008) Laws CreatefearandAnxietyinAustralia’s MuslimCommunities Andrew&McGARITY,Nicola, LYNCH, High Court.CaseNote Andrew, LYNCH, American PoliticalScienceReview417,638(1937) LOEWENSTEIN, Karl, Democracies, I,II,38Columbia LawReview 591,725(1938) LOEWENSTEIN, Karl, the NewAir-transportSecurityAct Federal Constitutional CourtStrikes Down LEPSIUS, Oliver, Voting, RegionalLegislaturesand Human DignityandtheDowningof Thomas vMowbray.Australia’s‘WaronTerror’Reachesthe Guarding Democracy thePerimeter:Militant andReligious , 32MelbourneUniversityLawReview,1182(2008). Legislative Control ofPolitical Extremism inEuropean Militant DemocracyandF , 7German LawJournal(2006) , 37FederalLawReview,1(2009) 367

cola &WILLIAMS, George, a ProminentAnti-terrorism Provisionin Counter-Terrorism Laws.HowNeutral Electoral ReforminRussia , 33Theory andSociety, 311 undamental RightsI,II theAircraft:TheGerman , 33 Alternative , 33Alternative Proscription of , 31 , 55 CEU eTD Collection

• • • • • • • • • • Review, 2255(2006); SAJO, Andras, Approaches totheWaronTerror Michel, ROSENFELD, 169 (2008) Thomas vMowbrayandtheDefencePower I, Oscar ROOS, (2002) the ChallengetoAustralianDemocracy Aidan, Nicole&RICKETTS, ROGERS, 1117 (2003) of theDecent”FailsBeforeFederalConstitutionalCourt RENSMANN, Thilo,ProceduralFairnessinaMilita Tasmania LawReview,83(2008). Thomas vMowbray &WILLIAMS, Hernan George, PINTOS-LOPEZ, PEDAIN, Antje, (2010). and PositiveObligations inaDemocracy Rory O’CONNEL, Justification NIESEN, Peter, Paradigms forBanningPoliticalParties,I,II NIESEN, Peter , 17Democratization, 709(2010). From Militant Democracytothe PreventiveState?, Do HeadscarfsBite Political PartyBansinRwanda1994-2003:ThreeNarrativesof Alarmed, butnotAlertinthe Anti-Extremism, NegativeRepublicanism, CivicSociety:Three Realising PoliticalEquality:the andtheNewScopeofDefencePower,27University Judicial BalancinginTimes of Stress:ComparingDiverse , 27CardozoLawReview,2085(2006) ? 63Cambridge? LawJournal,537(2004) 368

, 7SingaporeJournalofLegalStudies,149 Fear ofFreedom:Anti-TerrorismLawsand , 61NorthernIrelandLegalQuarterly263 , 15James CookUniversityLaw Review, , 3German Journal(2002) Law ‘War onTerror’?TheHighCourt, European CourtofHuman Rights Enemies ForeignandDomestic’ nt Democracy:the “Uprising , 4German LawJournal, 27CardozoLaw CEU eTD Collection

• • • • • • • • • Terrorism, TURANO, Leslie, Michigan JournalofInte TIETEL, Ruti, of Counter-Terrorism THAM, Joo-Cheong&EWING, K.D., University Law Review,518(2004) THAM, Joo-Cheong,Causalities ofthe Domestic War on Terror Monash UniversityLawReview,400(2008) Act2003 ASIO (Terrorism)Amendment SORIAL, Sarah, i mestnoe samoupravlenie(2007). prekrawenija dejatel'nostipolit V.A., SOCKOV, Australian Feminist LawJournal,95(2006) Terrorism Laws,orAgainstarecent(Theoretical) Return to CarlSchmitt Matthew‘ SHARPE, Political LawQuarterly,527(1997). Carl.J. SCHNEIDER, Review, 501(2004) Party) v.Turkey SCHILLING, David 1 International Journalof Militant Democracy:ComparativeConstitutional Perspectives The Use andAbuseofPowerWhyWe , 26LoyolaofLosAngelesInte Pravovoe regulirovnieporjadka Spain: Banning aPoliticalPartiesas aResponsetoBasque European Islamaphobia andTurkey- , 31MelbourneUniversityLawReview,462(2007) Thinking oftheExtreme Situations…’ onthe NewAnti- Political PartiesandtheGermanBasicLaw rnational Law,49(2008) icheskih partijvFRGiRF Constitutional Law,730(2003); 369

Limitations ofaCharterRights inthe Age (Cth) andtheCaseofRvUl-Haque obrazovanija, priostanovlenijai rnational &Co , 13Gosudarstvennajavlast' Refah Partisi(TheWelfare Need a Bill of Rights: the NeedaBillofRights:the , 10TheWestern , 28Melbourne mparative Law , 24 , 29 , 34 CEU eTD Collection Australia European 3.

Table • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Data YOUNGS, Raymond, Challenge, 13James Cook UniversityLawReview,104(2006) Von DOUSSA,John, izdanie, 31(2009) Konstitucionnoe imunicipal'noe pravo:Nauchno -prakticheskoe iinformacionnoe VOLKOVA, E.A.,Kudaidetzakonodatel'stvoopoliticheskih partijah Fazilet PartisiandKutanv.Turk Rights, Application250/57 KPD v.FRG(1957),DecisionoftheForm Garaudy v.France(2003),Application Dogru andOthersv.France( Christian DemocraticPeople’sParty Commission ofHuman Ri Chouldry v.UnitedKingdom (1991),Admissibility Decision oftheformer European Castells v.Spain (1992),ApplicationNo.11798/85 Artyomov v.Russia(2006).Admissibili R v.Thomas, VSC620(2008) Jabbour v.Thomas FMCA,1286(2006) Australian Communist Party

of

(listed

, 6InternationalJournal ofConstitutional Law, 331(2008)

Court cases

of chronologically).

Human Reconciling HumanRightsand Germany: Shooting Down Aircraft and Analysing Computer Germany: ShootingDownAircraftandAnalysingComputer

Rights ghts, ApplicationN v. Commonwealth,83CLR1(1951) 2008), ApplicationNo.27058/05 ey (2006),ApplicationNo.1444/02

(listed

v. Moldova(2006),ApplicationNo.28793/02 370

No. 65831/01.Admissibility Decision ty Decision,ApplicationNo.17582/05.

alphabetically). o. 17439/90Commission; er EuropeanCommissioner ofHuman Counter-Terrorism-a Crucial

, 31 CEU eTD Collection

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Rekvényi v.Hungary(1999) (Applications nos.41340/98,41342/98,41343/98 and41344/98). Refah Partisi(theWelfare Party)and 41343/98 and41344/98) Refah ParitsiandOthersv.Turkey No. 46626/99 Partidul Communistilor (Nepeceristi) and Application No.71251/01 Parti NationalisteBasque Otto-Preminger-Institute v.Austra(1994), ApplicationNo.13470/87 Nolan andK.v.Russia(2009),ApplicationNo.2512/04 Linkov v.CzechRepublic(2006),Application No. 10504/03 8406/78 Limmerveen andHagenbeekv.theNetherlands(1979),ApplicationsNo.8348/78, Leyla Sahinv.Turkey.GrandChamber(2004), Application No. 44774/98 Leyla Sahinv.Turkey(2004) Kokkinakis v.Greece(1993), ApplicationNo.14307/88 andOthersv.Russia(2009),ApplicationsNos.76836/01,32782/03 Kimlya Kalifatstaat v.Germany (2000), Karaduman andOthersv.Turkey(2008),ApplicationNo.8810/03 Jehovah’s Witnesses ofMoscowandOthers Herri Batasunaandv.Spain 23885/94 Freedom Democracy Party(ÖZDEP) and – Organisationrégionaled'Iparralde v.France(2007), , ApplicationNo.25390/94 , ApplicationNo.44774/98 Applications No.48391/99and48392/99 371

(2001) (Applicationsnos.41340/98,41342/98, (2009), ApplicationsNo. 25803/04,25817/04). Others v.Turkey.GrandChamber (2003) Ungureanu v.Romania(2005), Application v.Russia(2010),ApplicationNo.302/02 v. Turkey(1999),ApplicationNo. CEU eTD Collection Spain Israel India Germany • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Republican PartyofRussiav.Ru Thirteenth Knesset46PD(3)541(1992) EA 2858/92.Movshowizv.Chairman oftheCentralElections Committee forthe Knesset 42PD(4)177(1988); EA 1/88.Neiman v.Chairman oftheCent Knesset 39PD(2)225(1985) EA 3/84.Neiamn v.Chairman oftheCentralElections CommitteefortheEleventh 19 (3)PD365(1965) EA 1/65Yeredorv.Chairman of theCentralElections Committee for theSixKnesset Prabhoo v.Kunte,A.I.R.1996S.C.1113. National DemocraticPartofGermany Case. 2BVB1/01,2/01,3/01(2003) Radical GroupsCase.47BVerfGE198(1978) Communist PartyCase. Socialist ReichPartyCase.2BVerfGE1(1952) Zhechev v.Bulgaria(20 Zdanoka v.Latvia(2004),ApplicationNo.58278/00 Wingrove v. UnitedKingdom (1996),ApplicationNo.17419/90 (1998), ApplicationNo.19392/92 United CommunistPartyv.Turkey Tsonev v.Bulgaria(2006),ApplicationNo.45963/99 Socialist PartyofTurkeyandOthers v. Turkey(2003),ApplicationNo.26482/95 (listed (listed (listed

chronologically) chronologically).

chronologically). 07), ApplicationNo.57045/00 5 BverfGE85(1956)

ssia (2011),ApplicationNo.12976/07

372

ral ElectionsCommittee fortheTwelfth CEU eTD Collection U.S. 4.1. 4.1.2. 4. U.K. Turkey Russian the

Table • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

country)

National National Ruling oftheRussianConstitutional CourtN1-P(2005) Ruling oftheRussianConstitutional CourtN18-P(2004) Decision oftheSalaEspecial Decision oftheSpanishConstitutional Court,STC 48/2003 [Spanish] Constitution (1978) [Russian Federation]Constitution (1993) [Polish] Constitution (1997) [Italian] Constitution (1948) [German] BasicLaw(1949) [French] Constitution (1958) [Bulgarian Constitution] (1991) Dennis v.UnitedStates.341U.S.494(1951) R (Begum) vGovernorsofDe Decision oftheTurkishConstitutional Decision oftheSpanishConstitutional Court,STC 5/2004

of Federation

legislative

constitutions Constitutions

(listed

and

related

chronologically): and nbigh HighSchool[2006]UKHL15

Statutes

materials. Spanish Supreme Court,STC27/2003 373

Court E.2008/1 (SPK),K.2008/2(2008)

(listed

alphabetically

according

to

CEU eTD Collection

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 4.1.2. [Turkish] Constitution (1982) [Russian Federation]Federal Law Parties (2004) [Russian Federation]FederalLaw onAmen [Russian Federation]FederalLaw [Russian Federation]FederalLawonPoliticalParties (2002) [Russian Federation]FederalConstitutio [Russian Federation]FederalLaw Associations (1998) [Russian Federation]FederalLawonAmen Associations (1997) [Russian Federation]FederalLawonFr [Russian Federation]Criminal Code(1996) [Indian] TheRepresentationofthePeopleAct,No.431951 [German] AirSafetyAct(2005) [German] FederalEl [Australian] TheAnti-Terro (Cth) [Australian] SecurityIntelligenceOrga [Australian] SecurityLe [Australian] Criminal CodeAct(1995)(Cth) [Australian] PassportsAct 1938(Cth) [Australian] Communist National Statues ectoral Law(1956) gislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill(2002) (Cth) PartyDissolutionBi andrelated rism Act(No.2)(2005) on CounteractingTerrorism (2006) on CounteractingExtremism (2002) on Combating Terrorism (1998) 374

materials. nisation (Terrorism) Amendment Act(2003) nal Law onStateofEmergency (2001) ll (1950)(Cth). dments totheFederal LawonPolitical eedom ofConscienceandReligious dments totheFederal LawonPublic

CEU eTD Collection 4.2.2. 4.2.1. 4.2. chronologically). • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Others.

International [USSR] LawonFreedomofConscienceand [Turkish] LawNo.2820onPolit [Turkish] TheDress(Regulation) Act (LawNo2596)(1943) Partidos Politicos) [Spanish] OrganicLaw 6/2002onPoliticalParties (LeyOrgancia6/2002de noviembre, delCódigoPenal) [Spanish] OrganicLaw10/1995 Partidos Politicos) [Spanish] OrganicLaw54/1978onPolitical [Russian Federation]NationalConcept the EuropeanCommunity(TreatyofLisbon)(2007) Treaty ofLisbonamending theTreatyonEur International CovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights(1976) European ConventiononHuman(1950) Rights Statute oftheCouncilEurope(1949) (1993) European CouncilinCopenhagen,21-22June 1993, ConclusionofthePresidency United NationsGeneralAssembly Resolution39 (I).(1946) Intergovernmental

Treaties

organisations

(listed ical Parties(1982) Criminal (LeyOrgánica10/1995,de23 Code

chronologically) 375

on CounteractingTerrorism (2009)

Parties(LeyOr decisions Religious Associations(1990) opean UnionandtheTreatyestablishing

and gancia 54/1978de

guidelines

(listed

CEU eTD Collection 5.

Studies, • • • • • • • • • • (2009) European Commission forDemocracy th United NationsSecurityCounc Guidelines onprohibition ofpoliticalpart European Commission forDemocracythroughLaw(VeniceCommission). Universitat Darmstadt. WorkingPaper N.9(2007) Niesen, Peter, (2008). Kingdom: acomparison Jaggers, Bronwen,Anti-terrorismcontrolordersinAustraliaand theUnited United StatesInstituteofPeaceSpecialReport3 (2006). Idoiaga, GorkaEspiau, Spain, 14(2005). Human RightsWatch Report,Setting http://www.state.gov/g/ Report 2010.PublishedonNovember Labour International Bureau ofDemocracy, Humanand Rights Europe, 7Working PaperSerieson theLegalRe Bourne, AngelaK., Bayat, Asef, Parties inTurkey.AdoptedbytheVeniceCommissionatits78 on theConstitutional and LegalProvisions Venice Commission atits41

reports, Islam andDemocracy:WhatistheRealQuestion

working , Technische Banning PartiesinGermany:Lessonsfrom Europe, Technische Democratisation andthe drl/rls/irf/2010/148977.htm The BasqueConflict. New IdeasandProspectsforPeace

’, 29AustralianParliamentar y LibraryResearchPaper and st Plenarysession(1999).

il Resolution1373(2001) conference 376

an Example:Counter-TerrorismMeasuresin ies and analogousmeasures. Adoptedbythe rough Law(VeniceCommission). Opinion papers 17,2010,availableonlineat Relevant totheProhibitionof Political Illegalisation ofPo gulation of Political Parties6(2011) (listed

? ISIMPaper8(2007) ? alphabetically). Religious Freedom th Plenary Session PlenarySession litical Parties in litical Partiesin , 661

CEU eTD Collection 6. alphabetically)

• • • • • • • • Interviews, Perry, Barbara&Poynting,Scott, Legislator Oehmichen, Anna, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7533414.stm. Turkey'srulingpartyescape BBC NEWS, insurgency?_s=PM:WORLD 22/world/algeria.emergency_1_islamist-party-emergency-decree- news archiveat http: Algeria lifts1992emergency decree.Fe 21, September 2003 Pildes, Richard, Australia &MurdochUniversity,156(2006). paper, of MuslimsinCanadasince9/11,TASA Conference Democracy inSpain(2003 Sanchez, MiguelRevenga, December 2008); and Fundamental Freedoms whileCounteringTerrorism. MissiontoSpain(16 Report oftheSpecialRapporteur onthe Ethnic PartyBansinAfrica.” Report ontheProject“ManagingEthnic Conf Public LawandLegalTheory Working Papers(2010). ?, SchoolofHuman?, RightsResear

newspaper Political Partiesand Constitutionalism Terrorism and Anti-TerrorLegislation:TheTerrorised ), PaperdeliveredattheEC

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other Promotion andProtectionofHuman Rights bruary, 22,2011,availableatCNNWorld ch Series No.34128(2009).

s ban, July, 30, 2008, available at s ban,July,30,2008,availableat lict throughInstitutional Engineering: on ­ line PR Conference,Marburg,18-

, 179 New York University , 179NewYorkUniversity //articles.cnn.com/2011-02- publications University of Western dia andStatetargeting

(listed

CEU eTD Collection 7.

Miscellanea • • • • • • • • http://www.telospress.com/main/index.php?ma press blog,availableat Bendersky, JosephW. Horkheimer, "MilitantDemocracy" andWar, from theTelos http://www.hreoc.gov.au/legal/public the Australian Human RightsCommission at A Human RightsGuidetoAustralia’sC http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-13572833 US Congressvotestorenew antiterrorism-laws-so-why-cant- http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/politics/britain-is-taking-another-look-at-its- can't we Williams, George, http://www.hrwf.net/Joom/images Human RightsWithout Fron http://www.rferl.org/content/off_mic_russia_extremism_law/1948888.html available at Helsinki Group,Ludmila Alekseeva.Transc Radio interviewwithFreeEuropein (2011),availableon-lineat Rossii? Mihail Logvinov,Bor'basTerrorizmom” kak online athttp://www.wsws.org/ar Ikinci, Sinan, Turkey’s Chief Prosecutor Seeks to Banthe Ruling AK,available ?, TheSydneyMorningHerald.14 ?,

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alphabetically) Britain istakinganotherlookat Patriot Actprovisions.27 we-20110413-1ddzc.html#ixzz1OhfFvSAd ticles/2008/apr2008/turk-a02.shtml /forbnews/2010/russia%202010.pdf http://www.regnum.ru/news/1381147.html

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• • • • • SIO%20Legislation%20Amen 20legislation%22%20Dataset_Phrase%3A%22billhome%22%29%20Title%3A%22A ry=%28Dataset%3AbillsPr http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/ Parlinfo Search,Parliament ofAustraliawebpage at www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=1555 http://asio.gov.au/About Australian SecurityIntelligent Organisation,“AboutASIO:Overview”, restrictions? Felix Corley, Russia:WillDumaapprove‘anti-C http://www.aph.gov.au/library/intgui Parliament ofAustraliaParliamentary librarywebpage: Internet RecourseGuide‘AustralianTe available athttp://www.s available athttp://www.sova-center.ru/en/ Center forInformation andAnalysis“S PublicationbyF18Newsfrom -ASIO/Overview.html ova-center.ru/en/religion/ evParl%20SearchCategory_Phrase%3A%22bills%20and% dment%20Bill%202003%22;rec=0 dment%20Bill%202003%22;rec=0 de/law/terrorism.htm#terrleg 379

display/display.w3p; OVA”, Misuseof anti-extremism portal, misuse/ andReligioninsecularsociety rrorism Law’availableonline atthe 24March2011availableat onstitutional” religi orderBy=alphaAss;que ous literature