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Science Policy: USA/USSR. Volume II: Science Policy in the Soviet Onion DOCUMENT RESUME ED 199 102 SE 034 597 AUTHOR Cocka, Paul M. TITLE Science Policy: USA/USSR. Volume II: Science Policy in the Soviet Onion. SPONS AGENCY National Science Foundatkon, Washington, D.C. Directorate for Scientific, Technological and International Affairs. PUB DATE 80 NOTE 345p.: For related document, see SE 034 596. Prepared through U.S.-U.S.S.R. Working Group on Science Policy. AVAILABLE FROM Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20404 (Stock No. 038-000-00457-3, $6.50). !DRS PRICE MF01/PCI4 Plus Postage. DESCRIPTORS *Cross Cultural Studies: Government Publications: *Policy Formation: Science Education: Scientific Enterprise: *Scientific Research: *Technological Advancement IDENTIFIERS *Research and Development: *USSR ABSTRACT The second volume cf a 700-page, two-volume study presents comparable studies on Soviet research and developmentand science policy, delineating the different structures, ideologies,and systems. A final chapter compares major areas of science policiesin the USSR and USA. This publication arose from efforts cf two U.S. members of a cooperative research working group under theOSA/USSR Joint Commission of Scientific and Technical Cooperation which compared major science policies of the two countmes in theplanning and management of research and development. (CS) *********************************************************************** Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made from the original document.. ************************************************-x********************** Science Policy: USA /USSR Volume Science Policy in the Soviet Union Report prepared for National Science Foundation Directorate for Scientific, Technological and International Affairs avision of International Programs U S DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH. DUCATION & WELFARE :TIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION T S DOCUNENT -0AS BEEN REPRO- DUCED ExACTLv PECEIvED FpOM T E PEPsoNOaoPC.ANIZATIoNsz G N- Z. TING ITPOINTS OP VIEW...OR OPINIONS STATED DONOTNECESSARILY REPRE- SENT (:)FiCIAL NATIONAL INSTI TOTE OF EDUCATION POSI T ION OD POLICY "1 ;.16, This research was conducted with supportfrom the Division of International Programs, National Science Foundation. However, any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommen- dations expressed in this document arethose of the author and do not necessarilyreflect the view of the National ScienceFoundation. SCIENCE POLICY: USA/USSR Volume II Science Policy in the Soviet Union Paul M. Cocks and Technology 1 Centralization of R&D Planning and Management 4 The Separation of Science and Industry 9 The Systems for Guiding Technical Progress 13 THE ORGANIZATION OF R&D 18 Overall Structure and Institutional Setting 18 The Top Governing Machinery 22 The Three Institutional Subsystems Performing R&D 45 The Basic Units 64 The Organizational System:Whole and Parts 76 C THE FORMULATION OF R&D PLANS AND PROGRAMS 83 Overview of Science and Technology Planning 83 Resource Planning and Allocation for Research and Development 92 The Selection of Research Topics and Tasks 106 iii 5 The Disaggregation and Assignment of Research Tasks 128 The Decision to Import Technology . 149 The Structure and Content of R&D Plans 155 The Planning System and Its Parts 159 X THE EXECUTION OF R&D PLANS AND THE UTILIZATION OF RESULTS 176 Managing the Research -to- Production Cycle: An Overview 177 Organization of the R&D Center . 181 Conduct of R&D 184 Utilization of R&D Results 197 Evaluation of R&D Results and Performers . 234 Diffusion of R&D Results 238 XICURRENT ISSUES AND TRENDS IN SOVIET SCIENCE POLICY . 251 The Contemporary Science Policy Debate: Context and Content 251 Integrating Science Policy and Economic Policy 255 Switching to an Intensive Growth Strategy for Science and Technology . 258 Achieving Organizational Flexibility and Institutional Restructuring . 262 Improving Planning and Resource Allocation 269 Raising Management Effectiveness . 275 Strengthening the Bonds of Motivation 281 Science Policy Reforms: A Balance Sheet 284 iv XII A COMPARISON OF SCIENCE POLICY IN THE U.S. AND U.S.S.R. 298 The Science Policy Environment . 298 Relationship of Scientific R&D to Industry 304 Selection of S&T Goals and Evaluation of Results 311 Incentives and Obstacles to Innovation 322 Institutional Responses to New Complexity of S&T Problems 328 LIST OF FIGURES 8-1Overall Structure of the Soviet System of R&D Planning and Management 19 8-2Top Level Governmental Organizations Responsible for Science Policy Making in the USSR 27 8-3Organizational Structure of Science Policy at the Union Republic Level . 33 8-4 Structure of the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology 39 8-5General Organization of the USSR State Planning Committee (Gosplan) 42 8-6Structure of the USSR Academy of Sciences 48 8-7 Organization and Management of R&D in a Union Level Industrial Ministry 58 8-8The Administrative Network of the USSR Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education (MinVUZ) 63 8-9Organizational Structure of a Research Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences 66 8-10Organizational Structure of a Research Institute of :n Industrial Ministry . 67 8-11 Organization and Management of R&D in a Higher Educational Institution (VUZ) 69 8-12Organization and Management of R&D in an IndustrialEnterprise 72 8-13 Management Structure for a Typical Science-Production Association (NPO) . 75 9-1 Overview of the Content and Network of Soviet Economic Planning 85 9-2 Structure of Soviet Research, Develop- ment and InnovationPlans and Forecasts 87 9-3 Components of the System of Research, Development, and Innovation Planningin the USSR 115 9-4 Organization of R&D for the Solution of an ImportantS &T Problem 141 9-5 Organizations Involved in the Develop- ment of theT-250/300-240 Thermal Electric Turbine 145 10-1 The System of Material Stimulationof Scientific and Technical Progress in the USSR 193 10-2 Exemplary Planning Chart for Techno- logical Preparation for Production in the USSR. Ministry of the Automobile Industry 200 10-3 Organizational Structure of the Svetlana Production Association 205 10-4 Basic Scheme of the System ofPlannipc,, Financing, and Economic Stimulationof S&T Development in the SovietElectri- cal Engineering Industry 233 vi LIST OF TABLES 8-1USSR, Union Republic, and Branch Academies of Sciences (at the end of 1976) 51 8-2Regional Affiliates and Scientific Centers of the USSR Academy of Sciences (at the end of 1976) 54 8-3 Distribution of Scientific Workers by Branch of Science: 1973 (Scientific Research Institutes and Higher Educa- tional Institutions) 10-1The Structure of Bonus Awards for Technological Innovation in the USSR . 196 10-2Structural Makeup of Science- Production Associations 213 vii TNTRODUCTION Beginning in i972 the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics signed a series of bilateral agreements for cooperation in various areas of science and technology, of which there are now eleven in number. The senior of these, the Agreement on Cooperation in Fields of Science and Technology, was signed by President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev in May 1972 and is implemented through a U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Commission on Scientific and TechnicalCooper- ation, chaired on the U.S. Side by thePresident's Science Technology Advisor. One of the twelve active Working Groups carrying out cooperative research under ele Joint Commission is in the area of Science Policy, which in turn focuses on twomajor areas of mutual interest: the Planning and Manage- ment of Research and Development,and Fundamental Research Systems. The present two volume study, SciencePolicy: USA/USSR, prepared by members of the U.S. side of the working group, is based on the firstphase of work in Science Policy by the group concernedwith R&D Planning andManagement,' which lasted from approximately 1973 to 1977. The goal of this phase was to build a base ofinformation which could then serve to orient U.S. participants to morediscrete and sophisticated analyses of the policy-making sys- tems in the respective countriesconcerned with scientific and technical research; the principal mode of operation during this phase was exchangeof visits, written information, reports, andspecific questions and answers between the U.S. andSoviet members of the group. It became quietly apparent, although not to anyone's great surprse, thatthere I viii would be a number of problems in emerging with satis- factory products, from information access and admin- istrative difficulties to, perhaps most significantly, entirely different perceptions of the content of the study of science policy, incompatible terminology, and divergent analytical traditions, not to mention the important substantative differences in the making of science policy in the two countries. In many senses, we were speaking entirely different languages to one another and for this reason our initial prog- ress was often slow and painful. By 1976-1977, however, enough progress had been made to encourage U.S. participants to think about compiling what we had learned, both about ourselv, and the Soviet Union, into monograph form in orde_-_ make this information accessible to the public at large. Again, not surprisingly, the job of compila- tion was beset by many of the same difficulrf.=,, men- tioned above. An initial summary prepared by Battelle Columbus Laboratories was reviewed and commented upon by U.S. participants, after which Mr. Nat C. Robertson, a distinguished technical administrator and research scientist with broad experience in the U.S. industrial sector, and Dr. Paul M. Cocks, a leading specialist on science policy in the U.S.S.R., utilized the data pre- pared by Battelle in writing the present volumes. The results, I believe, merit close examination by schol- ars, scientists, government and industrial officials, and the lay public. The time and effort of an unusually large number of individuals went into vaious phases of this project. Nat Robertson and Paul Cocks deserve special praise for taking on the extremely challenging task of sift- ing through the mass of accumulated material, verifying data, and integrating it with their own expert knowl- edge to yield an intelligent and illuminating final product.
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