Science Policy: USA/USSR. Volume II: Science Policy in the Soviet Onion

DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 199 102 SE 034 597 AUTHOR Cocka, Paul M. TITLE Science Policy: USA/USSR. Volume II: Science Policy in the Soviet Onion. SPONS AGENCY National Science Foundatkon, Washington, D.C. Directorate for Scientific, Technological and International Affairs. PUB DATE 80 NOTE 345p.: For related document, see SE 034 596. Prepared through U.S.-U.S.S.R. Working Group on Science Policy. AVAILABLE FROM Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20404 (Stock No. 038-000-00457-3, $6.50).

!DRS PRICE MF01/PCI4 Plus Postage. DESCRIPTORS *Cross Cultural Studies: Government Publications: *Policy Formation: Science Education: Scientific Enterprise: *Scientific Research: *Technological Advancement IDENTIFIERS *Research and Development: *USSR ABSTRACT The second volume cf a 700-page, two-volume study presents comparable studies on Soviet research and developmentand science policy, delineating the different structures, ideologies,and systems. A final chapter compares major areas of science policiesin the USSR and USA. This publication arose from efforts cf two U.S. members of a cooperative research working group under theOSA/USSR Joint Commission of Scientific and Technical Cooperation which compared major science policies of the two countmes in theplanning and management of research and development. (CS)

*********************************************************************** Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made from the original document.. ************************************************-x********************** Science Policy: USA /USSR

Volume Science Policy in the Soviet Union

Report prepared for National Science Foundation Directorate for Scientific, Technological and International Affairs avision of International Programs

U S DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH. DUCATION & WELFARE :TIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION

T S DOCUNENT -0AS BEEN REPRO- DUCED ExACTLv PECEIvED FpOM T E PEPsoNOaoPC.ANIZATIoNsz G N- Z. TING ITPOINTS OP VIEW...OR OPINIONS STATED DONOTNECESSARILY REPRE- SENT (:)FiCIAL NATIONAL INSTI TOTE OF EDUCATION POSI T ION OD POLICY "1

;.16, This research was conducted with supportfrom the Division of International Programs, National Science Foundation. However, any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this document arethose of the author and do not necessarilyreflect the view of the National ScienceFoundation. SCIENCE POLICY: USA/USSR

Volume II Science Policy in the Soviet Union

Paul M. Cocks and Technology 1 Centralization of R&D Planning and Management 4 The Separation of Science and Industry 9 The Systems for Guiding Technical Progress 13 THE ORGANIZATION OF R&D 18 Overall Structure and Institutional Setting 18 The Top Governing Machinery 22 The Three Institutional Subsystems Performing R&D 45 The Basic Units 64 The Organizational System:Whole and Parts 76

C THE FORMULATION OF R&D PLANS AND PROGRAMS 83 Overview of Science and Technology Planning 83 Resource Planning and Allocation for Research and Development 92 The Selection of Research Topics and Tasks 106

iii 5 The Disaggregation and Assignment of Research Tasks 128

The Decision to Import Technology . 149 The Structure and Content of R&D Plans 155 The Planning System and Its Parts 159 X THE EXECUTION OF R&D PLANS AND THE UTILIZATION OF RESULTS 176 Managing the Research -to- Production Cycle: An Overview 177 Organization of the R&D Center . 181 Conduct of R&D 184 Utilization of R&D Results 197 Evaluation of R&D Results and Performers . . 234 Diffusion of R&D Results 238 XICURRENT ISSUES AND TRENDS IN SOVIET SCIENCE POLICY . 251 The Contemporary Science Policy Debate: Context and Content 251 Integrating Science Policy and Economic Policy 255 Switching to an Intensive Growth Strategy for Science and Technology . 258 Achieving Organizational Flexibility and Institutional Restructuring . . 262 Improving Planning and Resource Allocation 269 Raising Management Effectiveness . 275 Strengthening the Bonds of Motivation 281 Science Policy Reforms: A Balance Sheet 284

iv XII A COMPARISON OF SCIENCE POLICY IN THE U.S. AND U.S.S.R. 298

The Science Policy Environment . 298 Relationship of Scientific R&D to Industry 304 Selection of S&T Goals and Evaluation of Results 311 Incentives and Obstacles to Innovation 322 Institutional Responses to New Complexity of S&T Problems 328

LIST OF FIGURES

8-1Overall Structure of the Soviet System of R&D Planning and Management 19 8-2Top Level Governmental Organizations Responsible for Science Policy Making in the USSR 27 8-3Organizational Structure of Science Policy at the Union Republic Level . . 33 8-4 Structure of the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology 39 8-5General Organization of the USSR State Planning Committee (Gosplan) 42 8-6Structure of the USSR Academy of Sciences 48 8-7 Organization and Management of R&D in a Union Level Industrial Ministry 58 8-8The Administrative Network of the USSR Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education (MinVUZ) 63 8-9Organizational Structure of a Research Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences 66 8-10Organizational Structure of a Research Institute of :n Industrial Ministry . 67 8-11 Organization and Management of R&D in a Higher Educational Institution (VUZ) 69 8-12Organization and Management of R&D in an IndustrialEnterprise 72 8-13 Management Structure for a Typical Science-Production Association (NPO) . . 75 9-1 Overview of the Content and Network of Soviet Economic Planning 85 9-2 Structure of Soviet Research, Develop- ment and InnovationPlans and Forecasts 87 9-3 Components of the System of Research, Development, and Innovation Planningin the USSR 115 9-4 Organization of R&D for the Solution of an ImportantS &T Problem 141 9-5 Organizations Involved in the Develop- ment of theT-250/300-240 Thermal Electric Turbine 145 10-1 The System of Material Stimulationof Scientific and Technical Progress in the USSR 193 10-2 Exemplary Planning Chart for Techno- logical Preparation for Production in the USSR. Ministry of the Automobile Industry 200 10-3 Organizational Structure of the Svetlana Production Association 205 10-4 Basic Scheme of the System ofPlannipc,, Financing, and Economic Stimulationof S&T Development in the SovietElectri- cal Engineering Industry 233

vi LIST OF TABLES

8-1USSR, Union Republic, and Branch Academies of Sciences (at the end of 1976) 51 8-2Regional Affiliates and Scientific Centers of the USSR Academy of Sciences (at the end of 1976) 54 8-3 Distribution of Scientific Workers by Branch of Science: 1973 (Scientific Research Institutes and Higher Educa- tional Institutions) 10-1The Structure of Bonus Awards for Technological Innovation in the USSR . 196 10-2Structural Makeup of Science- Production Associations 213

vii TNTRODUCTION

Beginning in i972 the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics signed a series of bilateral agreements for cooperation in various areas of science and technology, of which there are now eleven in number. The senior of these, the Agreement on Cooperation in Fields of Science and Technology, was signed by President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev in May 1972 and is implemented through a U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Commission on Scientific and TechnicalCooper- ation, chaired on the U.S. Side by thePresident's Science Technology Advisor. One of the twelve active Working Groups carrying out cooperative research under ele Joint Commission is in the area of Science Policy, which in turn focuses on twomajor areas of mutual interest: the Planning and Manage- ment of Research and Development,and Fundamental Research Systems. The present two volume study, SciencePolicy: USA/USSR, prepared by members of the U.S. side of the working group, is based on the firstphase of work in Science Policy by the group concernedwith R&D Planning andManagement,' which lasted from approximately 1973 to 1977. The goal of this phase was to build a base ofinformation which could then serve to orient U.S. participants to morediscrete and sophisticated analyses of the policy-making systems in the respective countriesconcerned with scientific and technical research; the principal mode of operation during this phase was exchangeof visits, written information, reports, andspecific questions and answers between the U.S. andSoviet members of the group. It became quietly apparent, although not to anyone's great surprse, thatthere I viii would be a number of problems in emerging with satis- factory products, from information access and administrative difficulties to, perhaps most significantly, entirely different perceptions of the content of the study of science policy, incompatible terminology, and divergent analytical traditions, not to mention the important substantative differences in the making of science policy in the two countries. In many senses, we were speaking entirely different languages to one another and for this reason our initial progress was often slow and painful. By 1976-1977, however, enough progress had been made to encourage U.S. participants to think about compiling what we had learned, both about ourselv, and the Soviet Union, into monograph form in orde_-_ make this information accessible to the public at large. Again, not surprisingly, the job of compila- tion was beset by many of the same difficulrf.=,, mentioned above. An initial summary prepared by Battelle Columbus Laboratories was reviewed and commented upon by U.S. participants, after which Mr. Nat C. Robertson, a distinguished technical administrator and research scientist with broad experience in the U.S. industrial sector, and Dr. Paul M. Cocks, a leading specialist on science policy in the U.S.S.R., utilized the data prepared by Battelle in writing the present volumes. The results, I believe, merit close examination by schol- ars, scientists, government and industrial officials, and the lay public. The time and effort of an unusually large number of individuals went into vaious phases of this project. Nat Robertson and Paul Cocks deserve special praise for taking on the extremely challenging task of sift- ing through the mass of accumulated material, verifying data, and integrating it with their own expert knowledge to yield an intelligent and illuminating final product. The initial summary by Battelle Columbus Laboratories was, of course, highly instrumental in getting the study off the ground and the contributions of the Battelle staff are gratefully acknowledged. The information contained in the volume on the U.S.S.R. could not have been obtained in the first place were Ix it not for the enthusiastic participation - -which was severely tested at times--by the U.S. members of the Science Policy Worklog Group, most particularly its former U.S. Chairman, Dr. David Z. Beckler, and of the members of the Subgroup on R&D Planning and Management who participated In the project's first phase (in alphabetical order), Joseph Berliner, Lewis M. Branscomb. Paul M. Cocks, Murray Feshbach, Richard T. Gray, Herbert Levine, Franklin A- Long, Nat C. Robertson, Lowell W. Steele, and Robert L. Stern. The staff of the Arlington, Virginia office of SRI Interna- tional assisted with the final editing and preparation of the manuscript. Although these studies are not official publications of the U.S side of the working group and only their authors are responsible fortheir content, I wish to take this opportunity to thank all those who assisted in their preparation. Financial support for the project was provided through the National Science Foundation.

William D. Carey U.S. Chairman, U.S.-V.S.S.k. Working Group on Science policy June 1980

'Until 1979 there were four subgroups of the Science Policy Worklag Group: R&D planning and Manage- ment, R&D Financing, Training and Management of S &T Manpower, and Systems for Stimulating the Development of Fundamental Research. Other Publications resulting from the Working Group's efforts include Louvan E. Nolting and Murray Feshbach, "R&D Employment in the U.S.S.R.," Science, v. 207 (February 1, 1980), pp. 493- 503; and S stems for Stimulatinthe Develo-nent of Fundamental Research (Report. Prepared by the U.S. - U.S.S.R. Working Subgroup on Systems for Stimulating the Development of Fundamental Research ofthe National Academy of Sciences/National Research Council), NTIS Order Number PB80-162316. AUTHOR'S ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

In the preparation of this volume, I wish to acknowledge the contribution by John P. Young, Alvin M. White, Hugh L. Shaffer, and L. Ben Freudenreich, who wrote the initial draft report for Battelle Columbus Laboratories on which this study is based. Although I have added a few new chapters and altered others, I have retained much of the information and insight included in their original analysis. At the same time, I have drawn heavily on other source material, especially the rich and extensive science policy literature that has evolved in the USSR since the late 1960s. In discussing the Kremlin's policy problems and practices, I have also tried, where possible, to cite self-critical Soviet studies in order to illuminate Russian perceptions and problem-solving approaches.

I am deeply indebted to Murray Feshbach, Louvan Nolting, Joseph Berliner, and Herbert Levine for sharing their expertise on the USSR and for offering helpful criticisms, comments, and suggestions. I am equally grateful to the Soviet members of the Science Policy Working Group for the opportunity to interact in this common effort to enhance our mutual knowledge and understanding of the other's system, though we may disagree in our views and conclusions.

My warm thanks also go to my American colleagues on the Working Group for providing me with a tremendous learning experience and "short course" on US R&D planning and management that proved invaluable in preparing the chapter pn comparative American and Soviet approaches to S&T policy. Special thanks in this regard are due to Nat Robertson, Bill Carey, and Lowell Steele for their analytical leads and thoughtful advice.

xi 3 Lastly, I also wish to thank Deborah C. Andrews for editing the manuscript and making it far morereadable than it otherwise would have been.

Paul M. Cocks August n2, 1980

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V Oti (1) 11 0 ii 0M m o H. t - i "P I2'rt Pt 0U il lifD 17' rt0 ES k4co r)(D nV HI Piv 0 ( 1 ) gl0 r CM) rtrI j C I F 1 t1,13 r e)eg0 H. 4 rt 04 14. H. HirtortmmopnNog F 1-1 rt (1 0 iv. 0: 0 14. P , 1 H(DRI 1:101-1. 0 rt 0 co V P)H. mocnno P) a ogP)0.1-1 a a 0 liltnMM4040u CI'(1)'.r 1D-'1 g 0 rt m oq rt 11 0 (D0/1000H0 r)(1)p.rj alt)n 0 tici)H4w0 NOog(cto Fh 1-1. 0 Hi m VA)0,00 00 i-h4m 0:I 1"4 0) 0 P4 l'i*Ow 000po 0 vu 1-4 H H M PO 0' 110 4i Wart Hi o P)P) V 1-4 H. o rt P)it 0 M 1-4 0 a m 0 a ,4 coOrtw Ha) 1M000 MoH.000;um0 10100 rtu)Mp. 0 a 0 FI, (o rt crl 11to 1 K 4. 0 M n 0 ri) o ca o 0 I i-i. 0 I i`4 Cl 0 it OQ 11 to 1 01 1 It 1-11 0 M ft) The importance attached to scientific andtechnical progress in Soviet ideology hasencouraged the acceptance of large expenditures onR&D, especially in the postwar period. The rate of growth of expenditures on science for the past 25 years,in fact, has outstripped the rate of increase ofboth national income and industrial production. Unlike the United States, there has been no "flight fromscience"during the past decade.While allocations for R&D rose in the US to 2.5 percent of the GNP in1965 and have fallen ever since, official expenditures onscience as a portion of nationalincome have risen in the So- viet Union from 1.3 percent in igso, to2.7 percent in 1960, to 4.8 percent in 1975. If we add development activity at the enterpriselevel, which is not included in "official" science figures, then the total share of national income hasprobably been about 7 or 8 percent throughout the 1970s. While official allocations for science have tended tostabilize in recent years at around 5 percentof the national income, this rate isstill significantly higher than that of any nation in the Westernworld. At the same time, certain tensionsand conflicts between science and ideology impede scientificand technological developments. The commitment to science is "conditional."The Soviet government, like its Tsarist predecessor, has beenambivalent toward science. On the one hand, it sees science asindis- pensable for economic modernizationand for enhancing Soviet military power; on the other hand,the regime distrusts the scientific spirit withits critical attitude towards authority and individualisticapproach to problem - solving. The evolution of science as an autonomous social activity carriesthe dangers of professional exclusiveness, elitism, and the asser- tion of rationalistic modes ofthought. 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I II' sti 4 0 rt°' ;cila) ft 4 oll Ed" i'l ell5' or 4" roft rt rt PA 0) rt 0 ri 14 0)8 A@ (3:4 0 hl. 0 0 '''Om rtHM1 4 0 i ri E i ril i' flrip) :I, lith 1 II E fal 1-3 ! ;RIRRIA'richftf: iii IV 54 rcot 07134. r) 6" rt 1i ono 1.1.1 1 to attempt to formulate a policy towards science and technology as a whole. It began conducting statistical and organizational surveys of scientific personnel and institutions a decadg before other countries, including the United States. Despite all the talk about science planning and policy during the twenties, however, little action was actually taken in this direction. The first national conference on plimming of scientific research did not meet until 1931. A. member of the Communist Party was not elected to the Academy of Sciences until 1929, and only in the thirties did the scientific affairs of the Academy begin to reflect Party desires. Actually, the innovative posture of the government in this policy sphere in the 1920s gave way to a sterile approach under Stalin. From the early 1930s until Stalin's death little was dons about the formulation of science policy and the planning of science. Though research organizations, like all Soviet institutions, drew up annual plans, these were not meaningfu3. Ser- ious attention began to be given to the plalBing and management of R&D only after the mid-1950s. By then, the USSR, the initial pioneer in national science planning, lagged behind iinumber of Western industrial nations in this area. Similarly, the search for one central coordinating agency to oversee the development of science and technology was gradually abandoned by the mid-1930s. No Commissariat of Science was ever created. Instead, responsibility for R&D planning and management rested for the next 20 years primarily with the industrial commissariats and later ministries as well as several central departments. Much like the American pattern, the Soviet R&D effort was structurally and administratively fragmented among multiple mission-oriented

6 agencies with conflictingjurisdictions and interests. Though formal control existed atthe all-Union level, there was no effective coordinationof policy at the center. Basically, there were four main organizational actors in science andtechnology policy: the USSR Academy of Sciences, theState Planning Commit- tee, the industrialcommissariats or ministries, and the commissariats or ministriesof education. Of these four the most important was theAcademy. While indus - trial R&D was formally coordinatedby the State Plan- ning Committee, each ministry inreality looked after its own research needs until1957 when the ii.inister- Lai system was substantiallyreorganized.12

Thus, nationa_ :. science planningand policy as suk_h is as much a postwar phenomenonin the USSR as it is in the United Statas. Thedevelopment of science and technology began to be planned on ageneral state basis rather than on the levelof separate institutions only in 1949, when an annualplan for the introduction of new technology wasformulated for the first time.13Only in 1956, however, didthe plans begin to include assignmentsfor scientific research. Sec- tions on the financing ofresearch and on the provision of materials and equipment werenot added to the plans for science and technologyuntil 1_962. Also at this time plans for trainingscientific manpower began to be compiled.In 1967, for the first time,targets for the applicationof computer technologyand management information systemswere included inthe annual plan for S&T. The following year theAll- Union Scientific and technicalInformation Center began recording all researchprojects in the country. Efforts to develop a comprehensiveplan for nationwide technical standards did notstart until 1971. The state registration ofall experimental design projects did not begin until1973. Moreover, the planning ofscience remained confined to a one year timeframe until the mid-1960s. In 1P66, for the firsttime, a list of 250-oddprior- ity R&D problems wasdrawn up and included inthe five year macroeconomicdevelopment plan. Only toward the end of the 1960s didsystematic lollg-range(10/15

7 21 years) studies begin to be organizedin scientific forecasting and technology assessment on the development of industrial branches and on national problems such as the future fuel and energy balance, development of the transport system, the use of metal and lumber, and the provision of an adequate food supily. Work on a "Comprehensive Development Program for Sci- ence and Technology and Its Social and Economic Con- sequences" up to 1990 started in 1972, anda draft of this program was largely completed by the fall of 1975. The issue of ecological development ham only recently become an object of central planning. TiAls the current Tenth Five Year Plan (1976-1980) includes for the first time a separate chapteron the rational utilization of natural resources and environmental protection.

Organizationally, too, the first real step towards an overall coordination of R&D was taken only in 1961 with the creation of the State Committee for Coordi- nation of Scientific Research. In 1965 this body was reorganized into the present State Committee for Sci- ence and Technology. Taken together, then, all these measures give substance to the statement by Gvishiani in early 1972 that "the various forms of state activity in the sphere of science are, on the whole, still in the formative stage. While some of them have been applied for decades, others have emerged relatively recently. u14

Inspire of some advances, however, the Soviet S&T establishment remains highly deficient asa model of effective systems planning, management, and control. Research and development continues to be housed in a myriad of institutions and fenced off by strong departmental barriers that slow and impede the innovation process. Efforts to strengthen integrating structures and functions have met with only partial success. The whole system still bears the heavy chalk marks left by the branch ministries and central agencies which participate in and share responsibility for science policy.

8 It is important to stress that Kremlinauthorities have not abandoned their basicallycentralizedap- proach and holistic perspectivetoward science policy, even in face of the growingsize and complexity of their R&D effort. On the contrary, a perceived need to accelerate science andtechnology has led them to p- ;s all the morestrongly in the 1970s for new techniques of systems planning and management.Their commitment to central planning rcmains firm."The scale and complexity of these problems," saysGvishiani, "are such that in present-day conditions they canbe tackled only on the level of statepolicy."15 Today, modern systems technology andterminology have become the fashion of the times in Sovietdis- cussions of science policy. The new systems movement and management mentality are very muchin keeping with the conventional centralized approach to science policy.At the same time, however, the new systems rhetoric continues to suggest animage of unity, coherence, and wholeness that are stilllacking in reality.

THE SEPARATION OF SCIENCE AND INDUSTRY

Science and industry in the USSRhave always been largely separate worlds, more coexisting apartthan mutually cooperating and pulling inthe same direction. They are, to use Pravda's recentimagery, like "two flagships proceeding on different courses,in different seas."16 Or, to phrase theanalogy slightly differently, they often appear like twoships "passing in the night,"unaware of theother's presence and activity. This basic 0.1nd persistentfeature of the system forms an essentialbackground to an understanding of the Soviet situation,especially the serious interface problemsinvolved in technological development and delivery. On the one hand, a bias infavor of theoretical work pervades the world of scientificresearch and 9 23 development. Lacking usually their own experimental facilities and generally neither rewarded nor penal- ized for the success or failure of their results,research scientists and design engineers tend to do their work with little reference to its practicalap- plication. Development work does not usually hold the excitement and drama of fundamental research, particularly in the civilian sector. Soviet higher educational establishments offer practicallyno specialization for designers and technologists.The notion that "small is beautiful" remains overshadowed by an infatuation with "big science" and "big technology." Historically, too, Russian science has been known for its strong theoretical orientation. Its greatest figures were theoreticians, such as M. Lomonosov and D. I. Mendeleyev in chemistry, P. N. Lebedev in physics, and N. I. Lobachevsky and P. L. Chebyshev in mathematics. In contrast to American culture little place or prestige was given to the practical tinkerer and innovator, much less the technological entrepreneur. The Imperial Academy of Sciences, from the time of its foundation in 1725, was primarily theoretical in orientation and relatively isolated from industry. The continuing predominance of the Academy as the organizational center of Soviet science assures the theoretical bias of the national scientific tradition. In general, both pre- and post-revolutionary scientific R&D have not affected contemporary economic life significantly.17 Since the earliest days of Soviet rule efforts have been made to bring science closer to practical matters and social concerns. Scientists have been constantly instructed to serve socialism and to help solve problems facing society and the economy. The R&D establishment has been repeatedly reorganized to achieve a better coupling between research and production. Nonetheless, the translation of scientific ideas into use remains a major problem to this day. The bias of the official ideology and of the regime for applied science and technology still acts as an ineffective corrective to older entrenched scientific traditions.

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The coupling processes mustac- cordingly be organized "so a% to achievea fast and effective flaw of scientific and technological ideas into industry and an equally fast and effectivecoun- terflow of orders from industryto science."Only by building better structural crosslinks can production be made "to soak up nes; sciehtific ideas like a sponge."22 Whilethe iateracti.ons between science and industry have indeed become more direct andcom- plicated in recentYears* organizational and motivational bonds have not yet been formed thatare capable of breaking down the barriers separating these two worlds. The strong military orientation of scientific R&D, along with the secrecy that surTounds it, hascon- tributed to the underdevelopment of industrial technology. Much like the United States, the Soviet regime has spent enormous sums oa defense, aerospace, and t uclear R&D while uuderinve sting in industrial R&D. Nor has there been any substantial spin-off from these national security and high technology related projects in terms of civilian applications to natior-11 needs and improvements in the quality of life. The resulting pattern has been a high con- centrat4 :n of talent and money 14 defense and space and a seT:lously distorted deployment of S&T resources. This pattern is not new to the Kremlin. A Preoccupa- tion with defense technologY and the political-military orientation of the state..41rected effort are deeply rooted in Russian history. From the time of Peter the Great Tsarist goner eats were interested in applying technology largely to military purposes. Still another thread of continuity in the Russian/ Soviet complex of science and technology deserves mention: the role of esternal influences in Russia's development. Throughout its history, Russia's scientific and technical ties with foreign countries, especially the Western world, have been limited and in- termittent, if at times quite energetic. Internal regime attitudes, Tsarist and soviet, have fluctuat- ed between two extremes. At ties the government re- sorted to artificial and imposed isolation. At other

12 6 times, it actively sought international cooperation and exchange. Since Russian science was traditionally in advance of Russian technology, thebreakdown of foreign contacts tended to intensify, in particular, Russia's technologicallag.23 Consequently, the government would periodically rely uponheavy doses of imported foreign technology to strengthenits military power and to help overcomeRussia's economic and technological backwardness. From this perspective, Moscow's intensified efforts in the1970s to expand scientific cooperation and technologytransfer, especially with the nations of WesternEurope and the United States, should be seen as partof an older tradition and development strategy.

TWO SYSTEMS FOR GUIDING TECHNICALPROGRESS

As a result of the particular coursefollowed by the Soviet Union in science,technology, and economic growth essentially two systems have evolvedfor guiding technical progress. The primary line of influence is the basic economic system. This structure was created in the prewar years and evolved in responseto the demands of rapid industrialization.Science and technology did not provide the principal motiveforce for its operation. Bearing a strong anti-innovation bias, this system remains fundamentallyoriented to the expansion of existing patternsof production and technology. A secondary line of influence is exercised by a special set of structuresand mechanisms which began to take shape around themid-1950s with the burgeoning growth of the SovietR&D effort. This supplementary system attends to theproblems of science and technology policyand performance. Accel- eration of the rate of innovationis one of its main goals. Each system has its own plans,budgetary practices, incentive schemes, andintegrating administrative organs. Typically, however, there is lack of coordination between the basicand supplementary systems. Indeed, they frequently work at cross purposes to each other.

13 )II In general, the focus of Soviet S&T policy in the 1970s centered largely on how to improve these two guidance systems. As regards the supplementary machinery, some elements are still lacking. Among them are effective procedures and organizational solutions for creating and applying new technology that involves the joint cooperation of multiple ministries and agencies. Second, some elements of the supplementary system, such as the policy of pricing new technology, need to be improved. Third, the separate parts of this system are not well coordinated. Finally, the supplementary system for scientific research, development, and innovation needs to be better integrates with the general system of economic planning and management. Controversies abound over how to solve these problems.24As yet, no grand systems solution has been found, though the search goes on.We can be sure, then, that these issues will continue to occupy a prominent place on the Kremlin's S&T agenda for the 1980s (see chapter 12).

In sum, these are some of the basic features and underlying traditions of the contemporary science and technology establishment in the USSR. An awareness of them adds to our understanding of particular So- viet patterns and problems of organizing, planning, and managing R&D, which are discussed in more detail in the following pages.

9 S 14 FOOTNOTES

1. Loren R. Graham, "The Developmentof Science Policy in the Soviet Union," inT. Dixon Long and Christopher Wright, eds., SciencePolicies in Indus- trial Nations (New York: PraegerPublishers, 1975), p. 13. 2. Ibid., p. 19. 3. Pravda, October 8, 1975. 4. Loren Graham, "The Place of theAcademy of Sci- ences in the OverallOrganization of Soviet Science," in John R. Thomas and Ursula M.Kruse-Vauctenne, eds., Soviet Science and Technology:Domestic and Foreign Perspectives (Washington, D.C.:George Washington Uni- versity, 1977), pp. 44,56. See also Raymond Hutch- ings, Soviet Science, Technology,Design: Interaction and Convergence (London and NewYork: Oxford Univer- sity Press, 1976), pp. 116-119. 5. E. I. Valuev, L. S. Glyazer,V. P. Groshev, V. I. Kushlin, M. P. Kokonina,G. A. Lakhtin, V. G. Leb- edev, Yu. K. Petrov, S. V. Pirogov,and S. M. Ryumin, "Osobennosti finansirovanlya nauki v SSSR(Unique Characteristics of the Financing ofScience in the USSR)" (Moscow, December 1976), p.7. Report prepared for the US-USSR Joint WorkingGroup in the Field of Science Policy, Subgroup IV:Financing of Research and Development. 6. See Julian N. Cooper,"The Organizatior and Plan- ning of Research and Developmentin the USSR," Paper prepared for the Conference onTechnology and Commu- nist. Culture, Bellagio, Italy,August 22-28, 1975. See also Alexander Vucinich, Sciencein Russian Culture, 1861-1917 (Stanford, Caliiz.rnia:Stanford University Press, 1970), p. xi. 7. D. M. Gvishiani and A.A. Zvorykin, eds., Osnov- nyye printsipy iobshchiye problemy upravleniyanaukol (Moscow: Nauka, 1973), p. 39.

15 9 skw9 8. Graham, "The Development of Science Policy in the Soviet Union," pp. 38-41. 9. Ibid., pp. 12-13, 22-23. 10. mid., pp. 23-24, 27-29. 11. E. Zaleski, J. P. Kozlowski, H. Wiennert, R. W. Davies, M. J. Berry, and R. Anann, Science Policy in USSR. (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1969), p. 25. 12. Graham, "The Development of Science Policy in the Soviet Union," pp. 29-30. 13. Prior to this time, the USSR and republic state planning committees and the USSR and republic academies of sciences did little more than tabulate research plans submitted by performing institutions. They made nocieffort to pass on priorities, to coordinate the plans and to eliminate duplication, or to link them to national and branch plans for industrial production and capital investment. Before 1949 no consolidated plan sections for R&D existed in the general annual and five year plans for development of the national economy. Though expansion of production facilities entailed planning new technology, most of the technology was acquired from abroad and the planning was submerged in the production plans of branches and enterprises. See Louvan E. Nolting, The Planning of Researches Development, and Innovation in U.S.S.R, U.S. Department of Commerce, Foreign Economic Reports, No.14 (Washington, D.C., 1978), p. 7. 14. D. M. Gvishiani, "Centralized Management of Sci- ence: Advantages and Problems," Impact of Science on Society, XXII (January-June 1972), P. 97. 15. D. Gvishiani, "The Scientific and Technological Revolution and Scientific Problems," Social Sciences (Moscow), I (7) (1972), p. 47. 16. Pravda, July 3, 1977.

16 17. Hutchings, SovietScience, Technology, Design, pp. 4-5. See also Ronald Amann, "The Soviet Research and Development System: The Pressures of Academic tradition and Rapid Industrialization," Minerva, VIII (1970), pp. 221-224. 18. Pravda, March 31, 1971. 19. For the best discussion of the problems of innovation, see Joseph Berliner, The Innovation Decision in Soviet Industry 'Ialmbridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1976). 20. Graham, "The Development of Science Policy in the Soviet Union," pp. 25-27. See also his excellent essay, "The Formation of SovietResearch Institutes: A Combination of Revolutionary Innovationand Inter- national Borrowing," Social Studies of Science,No. 5 (1975), pp. 303-329. 21. L. S. Blyakhman and A. F. Ivanov,"Nauchno-pro- izvodstvennoye obedineniye kak forma sistemnoi organizatsii tsikla issledovaniye-proizvodstvo,"Izvestiya Akzhdemii nauk SSSR, seriya ekonomicheskaya, 6(1971), p. 39. 22. V. G. Afahasyev, Nauchno-tekhnicheskayarevolyutsiya, upravleniye, obrazovaniye(Moscow: Politizdat, 1972), Pp. 26-27, 312-313.

22 See the discussion by Hutchings,Soviet Science, Technology, Design, pp. 9-11 and thethree volume study by Anthony C. Sutton, WesternTechnology and So- viet Economic Development, 1930-1965(Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971-1973). 24. On these two guidance systems, seeG. Kb. Popov, Effektivnoye upravleniye (Moscow:Ekonomika, 1976), pp. 128-136.

17 VIII THE ORGANIZATION OF R&D

OVERALL STRUCTURE AND INSTITUTIONAL SETTING

In keeping vIth the Kremlin's basically centralized approach to sc;:ence policy, the organization and conduct of R&D the USSR are highly structured along strong hierarchical lines. Soviet authorities attempt to plan and manage the research-to-production process as a single unit. Accordingly, the institutional structure that has been created to promote the process is regarded as an integrated "organizational system" with relatively detailed formal roles and responsibilities assigned to the vast array of individual actors and special agencies that make up its constituent parts. Generally speaking, as many observers have noted, 'the overall institutional framework resembles the internal organization of a large business enterprise that operates on mainly three levels (Figure 9-1). At the top or apex of the pyramid is the corporate "head- quarters" that includes the chief executives and their main staff assistants and offices. Their task is to develop broad strategy and to set organizational policy and procedure. In the USSR the central decision making authorities include both Communist Party and governmental units at the all-union or national level . aswell as the republic level. There a.:e also what we may term "functional" agencies which are responsible for the formulation, coordination, and monitoring of policy in a given area for all establishments in the economy. Most of these agencies are designated "state committees" and report directly to the central governmental policy-making organs. Such functions as planning, finance, and supply are the responsibility of bodies of this type.

32 18 FIGURE 8-1OVERALL STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM OF R&D PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT

Gammulet tan, I *I thee *rely& Nelms ,...... 1 thr VSSI

1 I Cornell all Iliniste;. el Om IISMI

r Salem 11epelplie----1 1 Impress Sestet MIN State Slats Cambiliew Committee IUnit. Sepoblic I tom Notarial fog 1 Commit el Nialeleed I Swamis.. rumettoctiom Surely Al iro Ali-Union apea,m1 Newt NO St.. Milos Certificetiom itintetty State &mobile Stsodeede Committee Canniest** el AseacImi finance Committee lerlemstioas Sitipcsmeries

sl sad 'Statutes's@ led ... brooches si the .1 the WS= Specialised Soemmiaty lie OSSA Matiemel Se Edorstiom

engem Oates Zotlic Sopoblie Sepoblic Stowe% Acad.,' el Ministgy el Ministries Sciences Sieber I Specialism.% Secnolary pn LoStdomtcisimel Nee ilea lstmbleseete ons ismisimems Nalemd ----1------NO and Prodectioa totabllehmemts Sdocatlenal Selebileimmete1 lastItutiume 33 Below this top governingstructure, on a second level, are the specialized andrelatively autonomous: "product" divisions and "line"agencies which are responsible for directing all activitiesof a collection of performing establishments whichoperate in a particular area. In the Soviet context thereare three such major divisionsor institutional subsystems. Each tends to concentrateon specific stages of the R&D process. Academies of sciences specialize in basic research whileindustrial branch ministries focus on applied research,design, development, and production assimilation. TheMinistry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Educationconstitutes the third performing network andincludes universities and independent R&D facilities. Such organizations engage in fundamental or applied research, depending upon the orientation of the facilityor individual researcher. Finally, at the base of thestructure are the individual units which actually conductresearch, development, education, andproduction activities.

At each level operating policy tendsto be set with the director indirect participation of the functional agencies in their respectivedomains. The nature and role(s) of pertinent specificor generic types of organs noted in Figure 9-1are described briefly in the following discussion.

To be sure, the highly centralizedpattern of organization and conduct of R&D is themost distinctive feature of Soviet science policy. This characteristic also clearly distinguishes the Kremlin'sapproach from the American format. However, our understanding of the basic functioning and fundamentalproblems of scientific RAP in the USSR will be imperfect ifwe see only the dominant hierarchical lines of theformal organizational blueprint.

Though strongly centralized, the Sovietsystem is far from being a monolith. The institutional world of R&D is, indeed, a highly com?lex andcompartmen- talized structure. Power is dispersed and authority is divided among a myriad of organizationalcenters.

20 In 1972, for example, nearly 140 ministries on either an all-union or union republic level had under their jurisdiction R&D establishments.1 This fragmented administrative structure, in turn, influences--if not dictates--the fundamentally bureaucratic character of science policy making and implementation. Adhering to the principle that "science cannot be administered exclusively from a single center,"Kremlin authorities emphasize the joint realization of planning and management functions.'- That is, the basic modus ope- randi in Soviet R&D revolves around joint decision making, power sharing, and cooperative actions in a multi-organizational context. To a large extent, the overall structure itself generates certain "pluralist" forces and tendtmcies in Soviet R&D. Though admittedly of a different kind and degree than in America, organizational pluralism exists and exerts substantial influence on the policy process. The research-to-production cycle must pass through a variety of decision paths and clearance poiats. Disagreements and delays over choices and strategies occur at every turn. Cooperation is achieved and maintained with great difficulty. Noth- ing works smoothly. Given this context, a heavy burden ;.ails particularly on those agencies responsible for coordinating R&D. As the principal referees and synthesizers, they are the ones whc must develop and display effective managerial abilities in balancing mixed coalitions of opinion, criticism, and advo- cacy in the pursuit of national goals. While these behavioral features of Soviet R&D planning and management are treated in more detail in subsequent chapters, we mention them here because they are largely rooted in and shaped by organizational factors. Moreover, structure per se is inherently static. In any brief description of formal infrastructure it is easy to lose sight of the organizational dynamics around which the whole machinery turns. It is also important to note that the Soviet S&T establishment has evolved over several decades. There

21 is no evidence that the distribution of power among the central agencies concerned with administering R&D has changed significantly during the last 10 years. At the performing level, on the other hand, considerable experimentation and some change have taken place in the organization of R&D in this interval. In general, though, institutional continuity and stability have been distinct hallmarks of Soviet science and technology. At the same time, science analysts and political leaders in Moscow have begun increasingly to take a second look at basic organizational approaches in response to complaints that R&D institutionssuffer from too much stability, that they have become structurally rigid and unresponsive to changing conditions and new demands. Subsequently, some efforts are underway to create new, or at least modified, institutional arrangements and more effective organizational forms linking and integrating the innovation process. We return to a discussion of these contemporary organizational issues in the final part of this study. For the moment, our task is to present theformal organizational chart and to outline the main entities managing and supporting Soviet research anddevelopment. This panoramic sketch helps orient subsequent discussions of the formulation and implementation of R&D plans. The latter, in turn, provideexplanations of the terminology employed in the briefdescriptions of the roles of the participating organizations.

THE TOP GOVERNING MACHINERY

All threads of decision making in sciencepolicy, as in other major issue areas, cometogether at the peak of the Soviet political pyramid. Though power tends to be highly concentrated, there is, even at the top, structural and functionaldifferentiation, which is reflected in separate institutions charged with executive, legislative, and administrativefunc-

22 tions. Thus, the organization of authority continues to take the form of an intricate, weblike structure of specialized agencies, divided responsibilities, and complex relationships. Central Policy- Making OrKans At the All-Union and Republic Levels

Policy-making authority is formally exercised by three organs at the all-union and republic levels. These are (1) the leadership elements of the Commu- nist Party, at the all-union level the Central Com- mittee and its elected Politburo and Secretariat; (2) the legislative organ, at the all-union level the Supreme Soviet; and (3) the Councils of Ministers. The authority wielded by the Party derives from its status as the only ruling party and sole repository of legitimacy in the system rather than from any formal responsibility within the Soviet governmental hierarchy. The highest organ of state authority, as specified in the Soviet constitution, is the Supreme Soviet, while the USSR Council of Ministers, reporting to the Supreme Soviet, is the central administrative organ of the government. There are counterpart bodies for the Supreme Soviet, the Council of Minis- ters, and the Central Committee of the Party in each of the 15 republics of the Union* with the exception of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, where there is no republic Central Committee. This general tripartite division of institutions and functions, however, should not be taken to imply a genuine separation of powers or checks and balances along American lines. In actuality, it has always been clear that final authority in the USSR rests with the Communist Party and its own executive apparatus. The legislative and executive branches of government are of secondary importance in the formulation of fundamental policy, and, sometimes, in de- * These are the Russian, Estonian, Latvian, Lithu- anian, Belorussian, Ukrainian, Moldavian, Armenian, Georgian,-Azerbaidzhan, Kazakh, Turkmen, Tadzhik, Uzbek, and Kirgiz Soviet Socialist Republics. 23 3? ciding even operational questions. Though a more rational division of decision making responsibility has recently evolved, the real political bargaining over basic policy still occurs within the executive organs of the Communist Party. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (cpst) Although the Party has no formal responsibility in R&D planning and management, the de facto authority of the Party is extensive. The highest organs of the Party--the Politburo and the Secretariat--generally are acknowledged to be, respectively, the leading decision-making body and chief executive arm in the So- viet Union. The Politburo defines national priorities and determines the broad contours of policy for the economy, science, and technology. Directives of the Politburo, in turn, are reflected in the policy deliberations and formulations of the USSR Council of Ministers; indeed, questions of fundamental importance are decided jointly by the Central Committee and the Council and are published as joint decrees. As evidence of the close working relationship between the Party and government leadership elements, virtually all members of the USSR Council of Ministers are also members of the Central Committee and, in some cases, also of the Politburo. The Central Committee Secretariat is the chief executive body of the Party charged with operational coordination and day-to-day decision making. The Sec- retariat reserves the right to intervene in the work- ings of the ministries and other government agencies to enforce priorities. Its Department of Science and Higher Educational Institutions exercises broad oversight responsibilities in science-related matters. In addition, this department has been a major training ground f( high level science and educational administrators. For example, M. A. Prokofiev, the Minis- ter of Education, was at one time its head as was V. A. Kirillin, the Chairman of the State Committee for Science and Technology. Other departments of the Secretariat that appear to play important roles in SST policy ar.t those of Defense Industry, Heavy

24 dr) Industry, Chemical Industry, and Planning and Fi- nance. In general, though, our knowledge of the nature and distribution of functions within the apparatus of the Central Committee in this policy sphe.e is very limited. It is clear that considerable influence is exercised by the Party machinery through its general '-ontrol of personnel selection. All major appointments in scientific and educational institutions are first screened and approved by the Central Committee or its local counterparts, depending upon the significance of the post. Below the level of the Central Committee, Party organization to a Large degree parallels the organization of the government and economy. Party crgans are established on a territorial basis (republic§ province, and city). Party cells or at least representatives are also created in all significant performing establishments. Down the hierarchies of public administration, Party officials supervise and penetrate the legislative and executive organs of government, in a complex pattern of cooptation and interdependence. A. principal reason for this kind of organizational arrangement is to enable Party authorities to monitor economic and technical planning and performance through channels independent of the government hierarchy and, when necessary, to facilitate plan fulfillment with such measures as Party assistance in resource allocation. In general, Party organs have a pronounced impact on science policy formulation and izelementation, particularly at the highest levels of the Party. While the informal or unstated nature of the impact renders it difficult to document systematically, the Party remains a potent force. The Supreme Soviet of the USSR The Supreme Soviet is the highest legislative body in the Soviet government.About 1500 deputies are elected to this "parliament," usually every five 25 years, from among the"leading elements" of Soviet society. As a general estimate, about 35 percent of the deputies are "outstanding" workers and peasants by occupation, 35 percent are Party officials and government administrators, and the remainder are various kinds of professionals, including scientistsand engineers. Though membership in the Communist Party is not required for election, about three quartersof the deputies elected to the Supreme Sovietin 1974 were Party members. The internal organization of the Supreme Soviet and the relationship of theSoviet to the Council of Ministers is illustratedin Figure 9-2. The Supreme Soviet generally meets in fullsession no more than six to seven days a year. During these sessions the deputies briefly discuss and approve legislation formulated and presented by theCouncil of Ministers and the Party CentralCommittee. Between meetings, the authority of the Supreme Sovietis exercised by its Presidium. This body includes39 members: a chairman, a firstdeputy chairman, 15 deputy chairmen (comprised of the chairmen of the supreme soviets of the 15 union republics), a secretary,and 21 ordinary members. Of the latter group elected to the Presidium in 1974, 11, includingBrezhnev and 5 other members of the Politburo andSecretariat, were members or candidates of the CPSUCentral Committee. The composition of the membershipagain shows the in- terlocking character of Party and governmentauthori- ties at the top of the politicalcommand structure. The Chairman of the Supreme SovietPresidium, it may be noted, is referred to as thepresident of the USSR. In June 1977 Leonid Brezhnevassumed this post in addition to his position as GeneralSecretary of the Party. In general, the Supreme Soviethas great constitu- tional authority but little effectivepolitical power. While the Soviet is officially the headof the government, the sessions of theSoviet are too short to permit meaningfuldeliberation of policy. Its primary concern is tolegitimize and propagandize policies made elsewhere.

26 FIGURE 8-2 TOP LEVEL GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS RESPONSIBLE FOR SCIENCE POLICY MAKING IN THE USSR

Supreme Soviet of the USSR

Council of the Union CcAvaisl of Nationalities

Permanent Commissions Permanent Commissions on Education, Science, on Education, Science, Culture, Planning and Culture, Planning and Budget Budget Presidium of the Supeme Soviet Other Permanent Com- Other Permanent Cour missions Involved with missions Involved with Science Policy Science Policy

Council of Ministers of the USSR

Presidium of the Council of Ministers

Source: "USSR Short Answers to US Questions Relating to USSR Research and Develop- ment Planning and Management," p. 13. 41 The de jure functions of the Supreme Soviet relating to R&D planning and management include discussion and approval of national plans and of legislation regarding the organization of state administration of science and technology. Overall, the involvement--if not influenceof the Supreme Soviet in policy making may have increased somewhat in 1966 with the creation of permanett standing commissions for such matters as education, science, and culture; planning and budget; industry; agriculture; and transportation and communir_ations. These commissions have the formal authorlt: to do the following:

1. Supervise activities of organs of state administration in appropriate fields

2. Make preliminary studies of appropriate sections of the national economic plan

3. Present findings on matters submitted for their consideration

4. Initiate legislation and present it to the full Soviet4. The Council of Ministers of the USSR The Council of Ministers is the most powerful organ of state administration and the final authority on the organization of Soviet ministries. Composed of nearly 100 members, the Council includes the heads of the most important government agencies, and ex officio, the 15 chairmen of the councils of ministers of the constituent union republics. With the exception of the latter group, each member of the Council is responsible for -dministering specific sectors of the nation's economic, political, military, or social-cultural life. His administrative domain may include, for example, a branch of industry; a national level or interrepublic service, such as the run- ning of the railroads; a functional area, such as planning or finance; o= such agencies as the Minis- tries of Foreign Trade, Education, and Justice.

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4. The State Committee for Construction Affairs (Gosstroy)

5. The State Committee for Inventions and Dis- coveries (Goskomizobretenlya)

6. The State ComMittee for Standards (Gos- standart)

7. The State Bank (Gosbank)

8. The Central Statistical Administration (TsSU) Other minor agencies of the Council whose activities relate to science and technology are:

1. The State Comm..Attee for Utilizat-lon of Atomic Energy

2. The Main Administration for Geodesy and Car- tography

3. The State Committee on Hydrometeorology and Environment

4. The Main Administration of Microbiological Industry

5. The Committee for Lenin and State Prizes in Science and Technology Given the unwieldy size of the Council ofMinis- ters, cohesion and coordination are providedby its Presidium, a kind of inner cabinet. The Presidium includes the chairman, two first deputy chairmen,and about 10 deputy chairmen.Among the deputy chairmen are the heads of four statecommittees which interface most importantly with SST policy (the GKNT,Gos- plan, Gossnab, and Gosstroy). The Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers is designated"Premter" and is the effective, operational leaderof the government. 30 I el The Council of MinisterIA, as the principal policy- making organ of the government, has general responsibility for organizing and administering all scientific, technical, and production activities in the So- viet economy. As illustrAted in Figure 9-1, all state facilities ultimat report to the Council. Overseeing the critical planing function is a major occupation of the Council. 2Tans for all subordinate organs and facilities are derived from the national plan, which is inspired, prepared under the guidance of, and approved by the Council of Minis- ters. In the sphere of R&D planning and management, the scope and breadth of the Council's ultimate authority are illustrated by the following Soviet enu- meration of pertinent Council responsibilities:

1. General administration of R&D

2. Resolution of all questions concerning the organization and administration of R&D

3. Development of measures to improve the management of R&D

4. Examinalon and approval of the "main directions" cif R&D

5. Establishment ofsprocedures for developing R&D plans and for introducing research results in- to the national economy

6. Development of the plan for S&T progress

7. Orgauizat ion of S&T information

8. Finance of R&D

9. Resolution of questions on wages and working conditions of scientists and engineers

10. Training of scientific and engineering personnel

11. Resolution of questions about copyright, patents, and laws on invention anddiscovery.4

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Union Republic State Planning Committee

Union Republic -1 Academy of Sciences 1 Union Republic Ministry f of Risher and Specialized,. Secondary Education

Union Republic Ministries, Agencies, and Committees for Management of the Union Republic Economy by Era:1mb - 1---

Links between union and union-republic organs of ad:ministration and the Academy of Sciences, and organs of state administration in a anion republic

Links between organs of state administration at the all-union and republic levels "USSR Short Answers ," p. 2.

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35 in their tangled branch constituencies,they are themsel-les at times heing regulated andignored. The ministries do not always accept therecommendations of these central agencies; instead, they pursuetheir own ways and wishes To be sure, the actualworkings of this machinery of coordination are much morecomplex than implied by the formal organization chart. The key to understanding Soviet policies lies not somuch in the structure of Institutions asin the fundamentally bureaucratic context in which they operate. The authority and activity of state committees arefrequently circumscribed. Caught in a constant cross fireof pressures from competingand powerful organizations, each promoting Its own interestsand R&D goals, the committees find themselveschallenged and constrained at every turn. Given the nature of theiroverlapping and shared responsibilities forR&D planning and management, the state committees arefrequently forced to seek theapproval of and some kind of accommoda- tion with various branchministries, government ge- partments, and other statecommittees, not to mention Party agencies. They are integral parts of agiant maze of bureaucraticsubsystems and circles of administrative confusion, rather thanstanding apart from it. As a result the statecommittees are forced to perform a continuous and difficultbalancing act in which national goals and priorities arereconciled with the special interestsof the numerous organizations that comprise andconduct the Soviet R&Def- fort. This process inevitablyinvolves them in heavy political conflict, bargaining,and compromise. Al- though we still know littleabout the actual mechanics of power and processes ofnegotiation within the Soviet system, the reality ofbureaucratic politics and its imprint on science policy areunmistakable. With these caveats in mind, we can nowbriefly describe the formal functionsof the major agencies involved in :IAD planning and managementat the central level. Discussion of the Academyof Sciences is taken up in the next section, asthe Academy combines

36 5 u The GKNT, an all-union agency, was formed in 1965, eplacing the union-republic State Committee for the °ordination of Scientific Research. Other predeces- or organizations of the GKNT performing a similar unction were the State Scientific and Technical Com- ittee (1957-1961), the State Committee for New Tech- ology (1955-1957), Gosplan (1951-1955), and the tate Committee for the Introduction of Advanced achnology into the National Economy (1947-1951). Un- il 1947 the planning of science and technology was within Gosplan.9 The State Committee itself consists of about 70 mbers, about a third of whom are members of the 3SR. Academy of Sciences and other academies. Some mernment ministers and prominent industrial leaders It on the GKNT. Among the ex officio members are ie President of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the iairman of the State Committee for Standards, the iairman of the State Committee for Inventions and Lscoveries, the Minister of Higher and Specialized tcondary Education, and a deputy chairman of Gos- Lan. Some top executives from the Committee staff Na also members of the GKNT. The State Committee, such, meets only once or twice a year to consider to main directions for the development of science td technology as well as to approve the list of pri- .ity R&D problems to be included in the five year

37 The executive body of the GKNT is theCollegium, composed of fewer than 20 members andchaired by G.I. Marchuk, the Chairman of the State Committee. Be- sides the various deputy chairmen, theheads of certain departments and divisions plus afew Academi- cians make up the membership. The Collegium meets weekly and examines all problems that comebefore the GKNT. Though the Collegium acts as anadvisory body, its decisicms become decrees signedby Kirillin, and its orders are followed by alldepartments of the State Committee. A simplified scheme of theinternal organization of the GKNT is presented in Figure9-4. In addition to various functionaldivisions charged with handling international liaison, informationdissemina- tion, science organization, andother tasks, departments have been established tomonitor S&T developments in particularbranches of industry, such as chemicals and machine building. Functioning under the GKNT is also an elaboratenetwork of advisory bodies which assist in the analysisof institutional and policy problems of scienceand technology. Inte- crrl to this special consultativemachinery are more -I scientific councils on majorinterbranch S&T such as oceanography, new welding processes, and catalysisand its industrial utilization. Some 5,500 persons participate inthe work of these councils, including nearly 160academicians and corresponding members of the USSR andrepublic academies of sciences, more than 1000doctors of science and about 1600 candidates ofscience.1° The councils monitor and forecast developments in aparticular field of science and technology,and/or progress in solving important, national engineeringand economic problems. The GKNT, as suggested by theabove description, is the principal state agencyconcerned with overall S&T policy and performance. While possessing limited direct authority over theactual conduct of research, development, and innovation, theGKNT exercises important guidance andliaison functions for other ministries and agencies in R&Dplanning, coordination, and performance. 38 FIGURE 8-4 STRUCTURE OF THE USSR STATE COMMITTEE FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Cmdinderna (ChnIanan and Nlabags)

reEKVIMINILL Zgorto Zonindmonda Scummails Commila lianagelsPwalar far Maier Tanerbrandin and gandammdd Sedalia. 4ft`galainac14. S4T Psnainin Crandadrr 1 Tiaandlas and -anical. Saglanditla and rameaensara ea m rani Camalamallano 12norraL Mammary Sciancsfic 11 alit Taelnlaai Plan 1 I AnTIOrl-Cass 1 Li IOrgentanalma ama 1===ril ummemlas oe Selannigle PsnalarIan and Mrsbadari ...area ZnanmminseIlialiddan amid dadlanianciesslas Itsalismorscal. Pentnatiorc

Merriam lindlatian Lacecnar-lannA. Caanonia and Sciancitta-.Taaradarl. Cenpnend Taannolagy Orgnadradlasa end lInnesammns dram= SciaddEla Ca., I Poretnr Trowel and am Organdracion and Saimaa:821a Papainaond roams teanandas et Sclandifia and I PermannaL TreansarL Smanaschi and 2worLopnand ladnramacracivn Saawlesa

isdaleLlallCraC111411

< :Ada tiortlananal PropesalIdli 1- )ParsIgn Cancaass $-A ISir Cop rncsan wIer Sarlailat Coracrlas P purce: Louvan E. Nolting, The Structure and Functions of the U.S.S.R. State Committee for Science and Technology (Washington, D.C., 1979), p.21.

39 53 With respect to RED planning and interagency coordination, the GKNT

1. Prepares S&T forecasts and approves procedures for developing such forecasts

2. Draws up proposals for the main directions of R&D

3. Drafts a list of major S&T problems to be solved during the next five year plan

4. Cooperates with Gosplan, Gosstroy, and the Academy of Sciences In developing proposals for the five year plans for S&T

5. Cooperates with Gosplan and the Academy in proposals for'introducing R&D results into the economy.

The planning and coordination functions areparticu- larly apparent on large, important projectswhich extend beyond the boundaries of a particularministry, i.e., so-called "interbranch" problems. Such projects proposed by the ministries or otheragencies are submitted to the GKNT forapproval. The GKNT controls an important share of the financingof such projects and tries to settle disputesbetween participating organizations. The State Committee also oversees the implementationof these projects. The GKNT also has a significant rolein supporting and monitoring ongoing R&D. The GKNT works on the development of indicators to measureS&T progress and exercises control over developmentof the R&D resource base. It may decree the establishment or closing of institutions, and it approvesoverall requirements for machinery and equipmentin the draft enterprise plans. Together with Gosplan and Gossnab it participates in supplying equipment topriority projects. With Gossnah it plans the financingof material and technical supply andfinances the distribution of materials and equipment. In collaboration with the State Committee forLabor and Social 40 Gosplan has overall responsibility for the formulation of economic plans which guide the activities of middle-level management organs and their subordinate facilities in pursuit of the objectiveslaiA_ down by the central leadership. Functioning essentially as the "nerve center" of the Soviet economy, Gosplan possesses considerable power over establishments in every field. As a unionrepublic agency, Gosplan's authority extends to activities throughout the economy. A simplified internal organizational chart for Gosplan is provided in Figure 9-5. Gosplan maintains departments for at least 3a different branches of the economy and also has departments concerned with general policy matters. One of the latter is the Department forComprehen- sive Planning of the Introduction of New Technology into the National Economy, established in 1966.The concern of this department isindicative of the orientation of Gosplan in R&D planning and management. While general R&D planning is primarily the responsibility of the GKNT and of the Academy of Sciences, Gosplan cooperates with these agencies inplanning the introduction of R&D results into the economy. Specifically the pertinent functions oi'Gosplanin- clude:

1. Collaboration with the GKNT in consideration of large interbranch (interministerial) S&T projects

2. Planning the IntrodUction of new technology

3. Consideration of the overall vol =...-re ofcapital investmett for SAT

41 Administration of Affairs Staf f Organizations Administrative Part Committee Legal Financial General Main Computer Centor

Main Administrations and Departments Councils Institutes and Attached to Branches of the Commissions two sp.Lan National Economy

42 4. Collaboration with the Ministry of finance and the GKNT to determine the levels of funding for SST projects:

5. Collaboration with Gossnab on planning material and technical supplies for R&D institutions

6. Participation in developing plans for training scientific manpower

7. Collaboration-with the State Committee on labor and Social Problems and with the All-Union Council of Trade UntonS on wages and working conditions for scientific personne1.13 Overall, a major concern of Gosplan is the integration of technical plan targets with. Gosplan's principal concern, production plan targets. The State Committee for Material and Technical Supply (Gossnab) In the Soviet 'Paton the allocation of commodities is centrally planned in accordance with the output targets specified by Gosplan. Supply of the most important articles is planned by Gosplan itself while supply of the remainder is planned by all-union or territorial organs of Gossnab, a union-republic agency. Inputs for industrial R&D are included in the overall material and tc;..-LL.'-tal supply system, wille special provision has beer made for acquisition of inputs by Academy and university facilities. Faciliti -s requiring inputs submit their requests to Gossnab, manager of the material andtechnical supply system. The transfer of items takes place only when Gossnab issues orders for their delivery. In general, Gossnab's authority is used to resolve conflicting demands on supply and to balance the material needs of producers andconsumers.14 The State Committee for Construction Affairs (Gosstro7) Gosstroy, a union-republic agency, plans and mon- itors capital construction and major renovation of 43 facilities in the USSR. In S&T, Gosstroy develops and implements uniform policies directed at accelerating technical progress in construction to raise the effectiveness of this branch of industry. Specifically, Gosstroy is charged with identifying basic S&T problems in construction, construction materials, and architecture; with developing plans for research to address such problems; and with coordinating the relevant R&D. Gosstroy's S&T plans are developed in collaboration with the GKNT and ministries as well as other agencies of the Council of Ministers.15 The State Committee for Standards (Gosstandart) Gosstandart, an all-union body, assigns and di- rects work on the developmentof technical and economic standards, approves new standards that have been developed, and conducts statewide inspections to assure introduction of and adherence toapproved standards.16Recently, Gosstandart has become increasingly coL,cerned with the elaboration of uniform procedures for such activities as design andproduction assimilation. The growing importance attached to standardization relates tostepped-up efforts to improve product quality as well as to economize on design resources. The State Committee for Inventions andDiscoveries (Goskamizch7etenlya) The State Committee for Inventions andDiscoveries maintains the state register of inventions anddiscoveries and seeks to promote innovation inSoviet science and industry. Among the responsibilities of the Committee are the issuance of"author certificates" and patents, the introduction of inventions into the economy, and the protectionof state interests in inventions. Scientificdiscoveries are recognized through the issuance of diplomas. Author certificates, the most common form of recognition,differ from patents in that the rights tothe invention accrue to the state, ratherthan to the inventors. 44 The certificates give the inventors/authors public acknowledgment, and if use of the invention or innovation results in production cost savings monetary rewards often are given to the inventors. i7 An important function of the Committee is the national dissemination of information about inventions. This is accomplished through the Committee's Central Scientific Research Institute of Patent Information and Technical Economic Investigation and through the journal Discoveries, Inventions, Industrial Proto- types, and Trade Marks (Otkrytiya, izobreteniya, pro- myshlennyye obraztsy, tovarnyye znaki). The Higher Certification Commission (VAK) The Higher Certification Commission approves the awarding of advanced degrees, makes all appointments to senior academic positions, and selects _lie higher educatiorial institutions for advanced training in research. The Commission also has the authority to re- voke degrees. The Commission is made up of profes- sors, doctors of science, and members of the USSR and republic academies of sciences. Since 1974 VAK has been an agency of the USSR Council of Ministers. Pre- viously, it was subordinate to the USSR Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education.

THE THREE INSTITUTIONAL SUBSYSTEMS PERFORMING R&D

Structurally, scientific R&D in the USSR is based within three different instituticnal subsystems: (1) academies of sciences; (2) Industrial branch ministries; and (3) higher educational institutions or VUZy. The terms "academy science," "branchsci- ence," and "VUZ science" are commonly used in re- ferring to this tripartite division of the research sec zor. Indeed, Soviet science is divided predominantly along institutional and administrative lines rather than according to different kinds of activity, 45 such as "basic research," "applied research," or "In- novation." The planning and financing of R&D are also conducted primarily on an institutional basis rather than by stages, projects, or programs. Each of these subsystems has a distinct orientation. According to Nolting's estimates, fundamental research is concentrated overwhelmingly in the academy system, which accounts for roughly67 to 79 percent of the total. About 10 to 13 percent is performed in the VuZy and from 8 to 23 percent in branch R&D organizations. The latter, however, conduct the vast bulk (90 to 95 percent) of officiallyreported applied scientific research and development. Only about 5 to 10 percent of official applied R&D is done by the academies of sciences and the VUZytogether.18 Though the amount of R&D performed in the VUZy has grown recently, higher educationalinstitutions remain preoccupied with pedagogical functions. This predominantly teaching orientation reflects the So- viet pattern of research and education which haslong been based on a degree of separation of the two that is much greater than in the United States. In terms of expenditures and manpower, the academy system employs 9 percent of all scientificworkers and receives 8 percent of official allocationsfor R&D. Branch scientific institutions of all kinds have 58 percent of the scientific workers and 80 percent of the official science budget. Higher educational institutions account for 28 percent and 9 percent, respectively. Only 3 percent of all scientific personnel and 2 percent of official scieLLce expenditures are concentrated in productionenterprises and organizations.19 Organizational dissociation and administrative fragmentation are important features--and consequences--of this tripartite division of the R&D system. Each of these institutional networks is a relatively independent administrative hierarchy. Each has its own distinct focus, set of interests,reward structure_ and approaches to the R&Dfunction. All three subsystems, moreover, are separated generally 46 not only from each other but from the worldof production as well. In short, structural features help create and reinforce functional autonomy andnonin- tegrative attitudes throughout the Sovie R&D community. The following sections present the composition and organization of these three hierarchical subsystems, and briefly describe the R&D planning and management functions undertaken by the central management organ. The structure and functions of a typical industrial ministry are also outlined. Academies of Sciences The academies of sciences are prestigious organizations composed of scientists and engineers who are selected for membership in recognition of their professional competence and achievement. There are three types of academies--the all-union academy, republic academies, and branch academies. Subordinate to each academy are a number ofinstitutes, .abora- tortes, observatories, experimental stations,librar- ies, museums, and research ships. Most are organized around scientific or technical disciplines. As a rule, academy institutes tend to concentrate on fundamental research and generally constitute the leading Soviet facility in the particular scientific field. This scientific leadership is particularly true of the facilities of the USSR Academy of Sciences. The internal organization of this Academy is illustraced in Figure 9-6. All full and corresponding members constitute the General Assembly of the Academy. Be- tween sessions of the General Assembly, aPresidium consisting of elected full members of the Academy (Academicians) administers the Academy's affairs. The Presidium supervises 16 discipline-oriented divisions. These divisions oversee the activities of the Academy's research institutions. Between sessions of the Assembly, each Division is run by a Bureauheaded by the Scientific-Secretary of the Division.Members of the Bureaus and the directors of research insti- 47 FIGURE 8-6 STRUCTURE OF THE USSR ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

General Assembly L-1.4Council for Coordi- Republic Presidia: nation of Scientific Acadeel Activities of the of Republic Academies Sciences

Organisations, Councils sad Assione.A. Iffiliaces Commissions Attached to the and Scientific Cancer* Presidium ..notitutes Councils Cmmislism4

:As Administrative Apparatus Affiliates of the Presidium Inscitutes Councils last cutes :ommission

Physi Technica Mmemic ,schnical` Earth Sciences Social Sciences Mathemacical Sciences and Biological Section Section Section S41SUCOS Section

Sciencific Councils for Problems Attached to Sectiona

Divisions Divisions Olmisiona Jivissons Mathematics General and Tech- Geology, Geophys- Aisccry General Physicsand n.cal Chemistry ics and Coaches- Philosophy and .w Astronomy Physical Chemistry istry Economics Nuclear Physics and Technology of Oceanography, Literature and Physical..Technica1 Pro- Inorganic Materials 24ysics of the Languages Lees of Energetics Biochemistry. Biophys-. Atmosphere and Mechanics and Control ice and Chem airy of Geography Processes Physiologically Active Compounds Physiology General Biology

Scientific Councils of Divisions Scientific Scientific Sciencific Lostitutions I tnatitutions Institutions

Source: Gvishiani et al, Osnovnyye printsiyy i obshchiye problemy upravleniya naukoys pp. 182-183; Nolting, The Structure and Functions of the USSR State Com- mittee for Science and Technology, p. 28.

"ti48 tutee are elected by the Assemblyof the Academy. The institutes of the Academy tend tobe centered in Moscow and in the Leningrad andNovosibirsk Divi- sions. However, the Academy has established anumber of affiliates and scientific centers to promotethe scientific and economic development ofvarious regions. Their expressed purpose is to advancesci- entific progress on specific topics of morelocal importance so that the area candevelop economically. The Soviet Academy has affiliates and centers: Bashkir, Dagestan, Karel.lan, Kazan, Kola, Komi,the Far East, and the Urals. Each affiliate or center is managed by a presidium, consisting of heads ofinstitutes and affiliate subdivisions,plant managers, and representatives from higher educationalinstitutions in the region. The Siberian Division of the SovietAcademy is unique in the Academy system. Unlike the discipline- oriented departments, it is governedby its own general assembly and presidium. It is administratiely subordinate to both the USSR Academy and theCouncil of Ministers of the Russian Republic(RSFSR). Funding is provided by the RSFSR, which has norepublic academy of its own. Thus, the Siberian Division has a certain measure of independence vis-a-visthe Soviet Academy. The principal facilities of theSiberian Division are located in Novosibirskin what is known as Akac..emgorodok, orthe Academy City. The republic academies are duallysubordinate to the USSR Academy and to their respectiverepublic councils of ministers. Funding and administrative supervision are the responsibility of thecouncils of mints:,,rs; technical and functionalsupervision is provided by the USSR Academy. The republic academies are more orientedtoward solving industrial problems of theirrespective republic than is the Soviet Academy. To avoid duplication of effort, republic academiestend to be somewhat specialized and limited in scope. In a number of cases, however, the institutes ofrepublic .cad- 49 emies are on a par with those of the USSR Academy, and some, like the Paton Institute of Electric Weld- ing of the Ukrainian Academy, are recognized as the leading Soviet institutions in their fields. Despite efforts to decentralize and disperse scientific resources, however, Soviet science remains highly concentrated in a few large urban centers. Moscow alone boasts one-fourth of all scientific workers, 34 percent of all doctors of science and 26 percent of all candidates of science. Here also are the most qualified researchers: 45 percent of all scientists with the title of professor; 72 percent of all full members and 64 percent of all correspond ing members of the USSR Academy. In just three cit- ies--Moscow, Leningrad, and Kievare concentrated one fourth of all scientific institutions, nearly 40 percent of all R&D being performed in the country, and more than 45 percent of the total allocations to scientific research and development.20 Finally, in addition to the Soviet and republic academies of sciences, there are several specialized branch academies under t_he ministries of their respective fields. Some significant research facilities are subordinate to these academies, particularly in biomedicine. The specialized academies of inter est in R&D planning and management are the Academy of Medical Sciences under the USSR Ministry of Health, the Academy of Agricultural Sciences under the USSR Ministry of Agriculture, and the Academy of Pedagog- ical Sciences under the USSR Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education. It may be noted that the branch academy system was considerably reduced in the 1960s and many of its institutions transferred to the republic academies. Table 9-1 supplies data concerning the size and composition of the all-union, republic, and branch aL_demies. Table 9-2 provides data on the scientific centers of the USSR Academy of Sciences. The planning and managerial authority of the USSR Academy in fundamental research is extensive. Report- ing directly to the USSR Council of Ministers, the TABLE 8"1

ACADEMIES USSR, UNION REPUBLIC,AND BRANCH

OF SCIENCES(at the end of 1976)

WITH

ADVANCED DEGREE! NUMBER OF NUMBER OF DOCTORCANDIDATE FULL AND NUMBER OF FULL-TIME OF OF YEAR CORRESPONDINGSCIENTIFIC SCIENCES SCIENCES. MEMBERS INSTITUTIONS SCIENTISTS ACADEMY FOUNDED

iftiliinalliliMENSIIPMINIOMIN1110111111=FIMMIPPIMMIMMEr

vi USSR 3,943 18,785 733 244 42,951 Academy of Sciences 1724

Ukrainian SSR 5,7,3 70 12,250 904 Academy of Sciences 1919 300

Belorussian SSR 187 1,336 126 32 4,736 Academy of Sciences 1928

Uzbek SSR 189 1,509 92 30 3,545 Academy of Sciences 1943

Kazakh SSR 3,736 183 1,541 129 31 Academy of Sciences 1945

Georgian SSR 344 1,778 106 38 5,356 Academy of Sciences 1941 TABLE 8-1 (continued)

Azerbaydzhan SSR

Academy ofSciences 1945 102 28 4,242 249 1,704 Lithuanian SSR

Academy ofSciences 1941 49 11 1,555 60 724 Moldavian SSR

Academy ofSciences 1961 41 19 895 59 521 Latvian SSR

Nj Academy of Sciences 1946 51 16 1,688 76 744 Kirgiz SSR

Academy ofSciences 1954 44 18 1,460 68 515 Tadzhik SSR

Academy of Sciences 1951 46 17 1,262 51 512 Armenian SSR

Academy of Sciences 1943 88 31 2,898 182 933 Turkmen SSR

Academy ofSciences 1951 46 14 883 40 410 Estonian SSR

Academy ofSciences 1946 42 13 952 63

EG TABLE 8-1 (continued)

c 131 4 349 16 USSR Academy of Art 1947 127

AllUnion Academy of

Agricultural Sciences 497 5,660 203 169 11,315 imeni Lenin 192 9

USSR Academy of 929 3,262 254 42 5,488 Medical Sciences 1944

USSR Academy of b 809 14 1,687 128 Pedagogical Sciences 1943 127

RSFSR Academy of 206 5 428 10 Communal Economics 1931

a The Academy opened in1725 b RSFSR Until 1966, The Academyof Pedagogical Sciences c Including 2 VUZy

SSSR za 60 leqyubileynustatisticheskiiez1( Source: Narodnoye khozyaystvo Jubilee StatisticalYearbook) (The National Economyof the USSR for 60 years:

(Moscow, 1977), p.144 TABLE 6-2

REGIONAL AFFILIATESAND SCIENTIFIC CENTERS

OF THE USSR ACADEMYOF SCIENCES

(at the endof 1976)

WITH NUMBER ADVANCED DEGREES HUMBER OF DOCTOR CANDIDATE OF SCIENTIFIC OF OF INSTITUTIONS WORKERS SCIENCES SCIENCES

Siberian Divisionof the

USSR Academy ofSciences

Including Affiliates 49 6,289 436 2,982

Buryat 4 285 15 145 Eastern Siberia 9 1,068 53 49 Yakutsk 6 511 20 220

Scientific Centersof the

USSR Academy ofSciences

Far Eastern 19 1,976 78 762 6 TABLE 8 -2 (continued)

102 698 Urals 13 1,179

Affiliates of the USSR Academy of Sciences 30 219 Bashkir E 501 12 151 Dagestan 4 363 17 187 Karelian 8 360 15 225 Kola 8 763 307 9 124 c.n Komi 4 ul 31 256 Kazan 5 517

Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR za 60 let;yubile) statisticheskiy yezhegodnik Source: Yearbook) (The National Economy of the USSRfor year:,: Jubilee Statistical (Moscow, 1977), p. 145.

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Iriniscer

!finial:re Collation licisar=fic-Tocnnica41 reumm....11

Tocroical

'17schnica). Technical. notion Tostituto

Scionce.4roeuccion All-Onion LedostriaL Association ( PO) Production Associncion CNPO) or Main Administration (=owe) Associacion (PO)

3oni 3,10 Rood Production Production 77 ,at 'Organization DesignOrgan- ixaclocum ZAD. Prodoction and SiD. Production and Design Organixac+o Daniels Organism:lona of Seed rosciturs spcisosco-troduction Pronuction of Load Plant 1.,.....11.1.1Associacion CIPO) Association CPO) SnagIAD Sand Produce on Orgossisacina Piano

Productims and DAD. Prodoccion and Design Orgsgooat iono Dosign Organic= ion of Seed Znaticnts of 3sad ?Lane I SAD. Productions and 316D. Produccioa mod SAD. Production and Design Organimacions Design Orposicat Design Organisations I of mho NPO of mho PO of tea PO

Source: Adapted from "USSR Short Answers," p. 44 and Eugene Zaleski, "Planning and Financing of Research and Development in the U.S.S.R.," in John R. Thomas and Ursula M. Kruse-Vau- cienne, eds., Soviet Science and Technology: Domestic and Foreign Perspectives` (Washington, D.C., 1977), p. 304. 58 0.vwmH0osi. 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SCIENCE: 1973 WORKERS BYBRANCH OF DISTRIBUTION OFSCIENTIFIC EDUCATIONALINSTITUTIONS) INSTITUTES ANDHIGHER (SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH

Nuke of MOr VVZ Ytth AdrencodDEnrr .112 /111 ond and Went 1 f lc Doctor Candidate of Doctor, of of 7tecillr./ of Se Itneeewent Met of ;iodate 5elanete fuck Sefton ?wantSciences hreent Modes of Wows Westin, 11311 26.3 46499 1216 LI 7.3 11403 23.5 0112 260 1!tleies141etkietleol ).1 )940 39.0 15111 556 7.9 13284 25.0 45815 1)20 47.9 Niles! 7.1 9312 11196 149 17182 16.0 31342 7410 C6 11ologleel C 8 In) 45,9 3779 333 1141 38.1 10341 1415 5.2 Ceololy and111wrology 2.1 29010 31.1 12058 737) 3312 15.5 40410 4138 1.1 'Whales! 8.1 5107 53,8 9162 791 Agrleidtert and 4511 41.1 1348 3.8 'wigwag Medicine 35446 3,1 10908 41,0 23178 886 4.3 11047 40,5 37111 1681 Eatery sodThIlotophy 2.4 8410 38.5 22011 319 1.4 1490 25.9 37518 females LI 6814 16,6 41416 510 1,1 1/10 19,1 41111 882 ?1alolo8y 3.2 1141 43.2 1611 148 4.7' 2678 36,9 1141 341 57,8 Ceopephy 141 8.8 1446 49.9 1143 26) 7.1 VII 4165 14.1 glifliptdioto 94 Q.4 3789 4411 14.4 21501 21113 159 0.5 1,1 14111 51.3 hislog7 24607 2511 10,0 185)9 57,1 49957 5011 14tdielat sod tlferalcy 0.6 701 1.1 1958 70 1,1 1161 10.3 12182 1)9 An 411 3'.3 MO 33 2.5 2,3 811 31.4 2590 It Archltretvet 3.9 321 47,4 1228 45 5.1 741 39,9 1924 100 ?iyekeloty 13 3113 19.2 11358 231 1,1 5527 11.0 30113 321 Oder 3,3 11104 31.8 341872 1164) 1,5 224490 14.1 427709 11116 facet

rabochey vosproizvodstva Vysshaya shknla vslsteme Source: B. M.Remennikov, (Moscow, 1973), p.155. sily v SSSR CO I I I 0 I 01 6 4 I do a) 14 '004/4U 4-1 I 0 tr-1 I W u U .r1 60 0 is)(0 0 4 4) V 0 ir)00 I I Xv)a) CO 0 0 0.5 0 OD 4 0 Hg U4 .r1.4 00 0.004.) 04 14 000 g 3 "Z) 0 .r1 I Cd 4o433 0 04U4:1 0 PI 4-1 0 4-1 0 (0 00 r-1 vla) 4 4-1 41 0 > 0)0) 1:(1 I' P '' 'VI 'riL. ' t irl V 0 14 0 0 000)t))) (1) , I)ol rd tO R.4.4 0 41 4 A 0 IZ A t4 0 in N 0 4.10 o u) 44 it)1:11'ZI 0 Ch 0 N 0 a) 4-1cu 0 H 4-1Di U (0 tO 0 e H .19 4-4 ,04 al /4 kl4 i-i 4 p a) C14 (0 0 144 0 0 11.4 cl 4-1 01 O P V) 04 14 U ,r1(0 04-1 0 0) 0 c04) CO 4 44 N A H 17 U > 4.) a) 0 4 01 `ri .n 4 4-1 o p 4.1 14 4-1 4.4 0 4 d.014>,u o 4 140 0 0 V (1) 400 (0 004-40014 u)a) N 0 ir-1 >1 U 4.1(0'4-1 0 00) rd (0r-I4-1 0 .r44Ja) Ifi > Cd 0 1.4 461 2 14X .ri0 a) Npotu4) la (1) >1 'r4 V 0 0 r0W 0 0 1C) (II X (0 0 1-104 14X) 'cl.r1 0 pu1-I CI 'r1 0 4-4 0I-1 rd r-i 0(0I-1 "grl 4-1 -114t04) 4-) P0 W a.) 0 I-) X > I-1 4) 40) tH 14 41 4-1.r-1 0 0 01 1:i41 14 0 0 (i) - 41 EI 0 0 14ET 0 A 4) 0 0 0 41.r1 6r1.01 b0 4-1 4 0 1:1 0 0 o 4.4 01 1-if:IWO 0413 .ri 3 4 H 0 0 o a)4.4 H .4 oal 4 0 > o 1:1 4-1 0 0 PI.riirl z 0.1 o ca I-I RI (1) H 0 srl "0 4-I14 4 a) .t4 c0 IA 0 4-1 ljd glit0411g0 4-04 srf 4 r-i1-) 4 0 c.) IA 41 04 20 u A0 144 rd >1 N r1 u Po4) 4-4 0 4 El I o 0 u 0 0 0 4.1 0 14 4 H 0.) H 0 0 0 ) 0 PO N 0 0 'rl 4141N A kW U Ct 0 w 4) I 4-1144 1.1 0 U 0 0 et, (:14 14 .0 44 14.1-1 to 0 0 0 0 60 U 000)cdo CO 1'1 0 41 41Ai 4/ 4-4 "cd3 IS 0 4 44 r90fJ g tj) 4) 0 0 (0 >p. (0 :1 M 51 4 H H 4 0 4 > 14*011 4 1.4 f1 0 0 a) 60 4-1 0 0 0 4-1 0 H 0 44 0 IV4-4 W 4i 0)0) 0 0 0 51(/)/-1 ,r1bI) 1-4 'd >1 4114 H 14 a) 4JH?., g rd(I)a) o o 1--1 N 4 ca, 00 'v51 6.4.1 ' 44 g ?)ti t?4 " W rd t 1U4 0, 444 ,-1 4)10.0c0Uul .r4L) W 0,4 ql O 4-1 0,., 0 Elrti..-I 0 181, CO 0.) ° 0 0 y-I ainj 'd 1,:.0 0 01 0 0 u 4.)(0 ,L4 ,0 H V 4 Fi o 4-1 a) u 5114a) 4) 14 1.1 0 a) 0 4 VI c4 ON 0 +1-1 13) r-1 uH 14 C. P (t)Cii(I)> oi 4.) (A 4i 441 N (.0 0, .r-1 '1.4 1-4 r-I a) 0 ci) al4-1 )f! tt 0 0 44 4-14-4 0, 0 (0 W il CO ko h H110 g M 0) M 4-4 0 k(1) 0 0 PO 4-1 04 diAl ''" cli 0 4 eM'H 0 14 4-1 04 14 0 M riej1 .,94 ' ',7:1 4 Eil.0 04 ni 0 r-i u 0 04 CD Cd fi J n1 u A o a) 44 v-1 0 004 9-1 H a) A) X 4,JU (I 0 4-) WI-ILr1c) 't/ 14/4(1) 0 k(0 0) in 14 PO 41 144 El PI 04 > aj 4.1r..) 4.1 0 0 0 ON 0 0 111 0 0 U/J o 0 *(:) UW01 0 O 1-1 4.40,1 t.)4400H000 Ao o 1-4 rri 0 (1 w ^ N U0) U) 0 o (....7) X 'r4 'ri(1) 4-1 0 0 0 0 4 0 -14)C.) 0 srl al 4) 4 0 1.1et,4-1 0 N CO 0 4-I4.1 0 ri al 4 4-) 0 ri 03 0 0 I 0 3 A 14 4.J4) 0 ,c:0 al U 14 4 044 H 0 4 1:1 'FAN 0 U) 41 0 k 4.1 0 0)60 .1.) 41 0 (1) 01 'H14 'H (f) 04 A C> W 14 0 C14I:1 4)11 454 4)ca 14fg.r4 0 (0t1,00)0$4 1-1 .014 0 0 A 0 (,) 0 A 1:14 4 il 4,4 a d 14 . 44 .1:1 0 1-) CO W H 9-4 H 0 H 0 V 0 0 'h 80t)4-1Ntd 0 0 0 1.4(..) 4 ra, car0 r-I U C.)k 0 /4 t0 (014"r1 > 0 0 0a) g 01 4-1 A U 0 44 (e4 0 a. 0 A 01 0 0 0 0 0 4) H 14 0 01Pa /4 N W 4-1 0 0 4)U) 0 tit) 0 4 4 'Z) .r1 0> 0 00 0 0 4.1(d Di g Y4 > H0 'r4 Li 't1 Pri U NA N" aI Ch U 4J 0 a) ch 0)0 0 0 04) 1400,0EIAta 0 4.)coa) o .ri ci)ci, $4 0.1 'H 51U 01:3 >00.000 I 'rl CO 1.4 ,0 5 >1 40 4-) E-) 0440 4)4-1 u,0u),.% cl)a)004.4 t4-1 I 0)00 03 0 4)14 Xr4"r1 1.4 00 a) tv0 (3 41 0 0 u .0 '11 &J W 0 44 .H " ri 4.1 0 01 id Pi4 CA H 41 0 0 V) (014 * 0.) t0 0 A!:Itr. 'LI (.0 0 A W `4;114 A X:a) cd H 4.) 44El ,C 4.) 11 H .r1 U)0 W1 .(1) 4' tt:r4 491 W e, V a H 0 004J 0.14.) pi >1 W 0 0 4-4 a) 60 14(/) 41 rti H U 60 V 0 W 4) 014 '0 4-1 44 co 0 k 01 V 4)0 0 0 11000NO 0 r-1 0 0 41 4-1 0) 01 'H 0 0 t0(0 *-1 W (0 0 ri 0° rig (0 0 > 0 Aip-Nd 10 4.1 U U CI (II 4( $4 rd 4g ,1 vi w u k'i ?A H1.1H`H44 0 4.1 ° U0 0 irl14 41 Fl PEI tH 0 u 0 o u U 0 .r.4U c> 0 uO O H.0 Ji 0 NETWORK OF THEUSSR MINISTRYOF HIGHER FIGUR28-8 THE ADMINISTRATIVE (MinVUZ) AND SPECIALIZEDSECONDARY EDUCATION

I.. r-----UnionRepublic MinVUZUSSR-1 Council of Ministers

Union Republic INtroommtra

State PlanningCommittee

Union Republic Union Republic Academy of Sciences MinVUZ

Scientific and Technical

Council of MinVUZUSSR

Independent Scientific Scientific andTechnical Research Council of the Union Institutions ofthe Republic MinVUZ Union Republic i

Higher Educational Hi her Educational Independent Scientific Institutions (Vey) Institutions (Vey) Research Institutions of the of MinVUZ USSR of MinVUZ USSR Union Republic

MinVUZ

Answers," p. 46. Source:"USSR Short U1 et 111 4-1 0 1 14O 4.) 4.4 PC) 4.1 14.4 1 erl (4 V 1 ) P V °4 sud 0' ° 0 (11) `4 0)(13 A 0 U u1 i1/4 U rd A 1 0 0 r-1I N 4 ) 1 2 2 ?) i J t41 4-1 411a) 1-44) 0)4) 0 ctl 154 41 4'dj 1 LI .)4 A g ti V ° rd " (A V 4 4 9al ti4 .2 :21 to giro'' M 0 PB 'S tS L.9 6041 0 0V 'FI 00) (0000E-400,-1 b0 > (r) rd0 W ()) 0 4.4 'ri*ri 0)4/) Q.) oil MOIV 5 u)^ 41 0 r>4--1 4/ tIO t 1 0) cd U01 0H .0U 0:1 ID 1401 00 /-1I-4 0 1 A 0)01r100 u 4:03 .;1 '41 4' 48 14W 3 4 (04 PI0t4U4.1w,r40) .r.111 .14ir) U 1 '2' ,Ird O c()4 II P-1. r44.1 0 410 k 4.) 4 (0 4)0 ri 0i.i 4.)-1 4 00AS 4-4 0 4.4 000060 4-4 U V) 'd efld 1 r.1 t ill O0 rti '' al I:1 . 0 44. `' " 'el0 0 )4 0 T4 f1.4 0 0 0 6r1 U U i .r-I il 2 2 .T.,u 4.4 0 0 4-1 0 .1) 0.1 & 4/ 0.I-4 cOn) .ri TJ H (Itl .24 -1-11 '4 HI 6r1 1 rc!tu 4A 4-I A 4 U. 4) 34 .r4) r.i.ri V) 1-40> .riN (II A (t/60 _,1 "I .4 .4.4 4J 0 N O> a, 0 0 14 ctl 0)ta0 4.4 4.)4.411 0 0) 0 vi 4) 44(1) 0 .44.1 0 V) 00fl0 RI 4-i 1+4 44 Gri 0 44 4.1 N4) U tri 11 CI 3 qj 1-1 0 41 er40 j.(/ :.94) 4 i 4J CUj9 4 IV I. 4 1 t i) "ti 14 0 ni NH)CC 1 0 a I P(Cli 04 440 43 4.14-4 14 (I) RI 0 48 4-1 > 14 H 0 0) ± VUI tO1 41 V) 4.) 00 0 v to O (% 4.400) H4-irtian 2 -,4) 4.4 0 ta 0 a. 0) 0., 4.1000)4 t) 0 rd (0 V r414 4..1 ra Id 141 Pi u) u co $4 .1 4J .2 0 4 4.)4.4 8 44.1C) if% 4.4 sr4 041) 2 COI .44-1) g l 49 M o,L..oggo 4-I PC)0 ll.) ri 0 0 0 Y4 4.) g ri 4.4,.: : 4J0 : 0 Ti 4-I Yi W 4 0 4.1 co %I 14-1 ori 4-1 pi 0 ft, u o CO (0 ts1 4400CD /4 1-4 4 1-1 )4co > W RI 0 440)004-14-i 0 RI 0 El U 0 U)./.41, 4,)0 o :3 fdi 4-1r'IN V4 tli 7I4 4 rd .t.) 01-1WMP400 01 '44.) srl 4.14'0H0044c.) °4-1 4/11 _5 Ctl 0 4.I C.)1 000040.1.) 0 CL40 0 di M > M g Acog.ripmv , :I° t4;(i) :11' CU g rji 1.4 'r401 4(.)g 4-1W 494 l0 a) 0 0) U) 4) 24.1 )1 4.18 OJU) U CI0 r1 4-1 0 8 to' k -rl 0 1-4 4-4t 1 ) l'il`11bo14 u CD ,,g1L18 1 t4 .04.) OU )4 .0,0(0,00) ,0 0) (f) .,-1 0 04 0 4-4 00 (t1 4 u CO ell eg ti TI4 I) t 14 V (°1 I) ,. CI 0 01 1-4 . 144 0o 4-1ra H 0 N 4 i 1 ' f; W p4 > 0 .0 44 0 1cDo ,J 0 0) '',; 0 0.1 (1) *°0 tg l'a likr4)) g. 1 A CO 4.1 42 I $4g 11 11243Ill of0H,) a) CO) 1 41( 1 (114 fi 4J C0040f0k0 p.,1-1 0. A02U 4 'r40 10 0 0) H Pc1 rri 14 A 4.)tG 0 4.-4 toc.) ct1 4.J14 0 A Et t45Pri 0 0 "4) 0 1-1 0 0 Il " 74 1-1 49 a) ()0 4 . ) ' t , 1- 1 01 (1) 14 u) 44 ril 4J tt 4-44.) M ,.LI dci: 4J ea) CO A 4.) 4 0 4.10 11 bri p4 0 4) H 4-10u),°1A N b08 1 0)14 , v 014,avitd4Ja) P.% 4-1 i-i *4 > u)0 00) 0 r14 1 r-i 004.) a) ,1 ° 4 4 1 cti3 P-1 r-1 0 P k 4.) . 44 44 0 t)4 ta01 0 Cl 0)C4 4-4 194.1 'V) C1' ° H 14el H 01 60 00 14 0 4-4 co CO14ill /441) M 1:1 0 4.1 4.1 0 1-) A A trill 0 I 'S 4./ u 14.1 oig 4 (01-1 r- t4-I U %I 4-I 4-44) f-i o la, I-I 11 1 411 0 0tq al 4al 43 14 3 4"4 'I 41 1110 1 1 r 13 b011)0 Ai 0 41cti M 0 43 14 1:114 a) pl. CO .0 03P. 4 4.I0 00 0) A 49 'd A ,:u., room 4-4 44 iii g 0 41EI A 14 4) ri 14 #41 . tf N41 PI 0) .r-i al 74+441 0(30) U)03/ g ' ri bri 41d 41 1 9 Li 0%,00111 C 1 Ili Q) Pri " 1 V vi Hr4 0 0 14 C) 4..)t) it1$4 DO14 40NP.4-1 4 0)N,0 t.)0 14 E-4XI '144) 0 rd 4.1 0 b0 0 (1,10 bri 1.1 0 ')4 Alallgi,°14g4fJ&Ot9tt4 too u a 41 u u 14 4 a49 1''')(1)) g 4 co bo uocolioo00) Q 0 4.1 4 04I 4) t4 00 4) Tica0 00 0 0 ttl 'CI 0 4.14) 4 rri 4b rtt 0 T., 04 g fi 1)% 00 GI 0 14q 0 0 research institutes do only design or prototype work and no research, others do only research and no development, some research institutes concentrate almost entirely on experimental testing or assistingindustrial plants in innovation, and many design agencies have large research subdivisions, some of them operatins primarily as research organizat lons.24 At the same time, S&T activity isbecoming steadily integrated with industrial production. Organi- zational dissociation of functional performersis increasingly giving way to new, more integrated structures, like the associations. The whole organizational edifice, particularly at thelower levels, is in motion. This point should be kept in mindwhen reading the following descriptions of thebasic units performing R&D. Research Institutes Basic and applied scientificresearch and a number of design tasks are accomplished atinstitutes under academies of sciences, MinVUZ, and thebranch ministries. While some institutes are quitesmall with no more than 40 to SO persons,others are major research organizations with several hundred, or eventhou- sands, of scientists and engineers. Institutes vary widely in the presence or absenceof design, technical drafting, and testing facilities. Some research institutes are "broad-profile," engagingin all stages of R&D, and others are"specialized," limited to applied research, to development, or totesting prototypes. Some also act as "head" institutesdeter- mining technical policies andresearch assignments for a group of institutes, andothers operate independently orsubordinately.2' The internal structure of atypical research institute of the Academy ofSciences is depicted in Figure 9-9. Similarly, Figure 9-10 provides an overview of the organizational structureof a research 65 IkSpecislized esearchGrow

Experimental Department Laboratory Department Stations of Research of Education

Research 1 Observatories Laboratories( Groups andt 1 Library Sectors I

rfDesign Project IArchives and Bureau Rasesrch Groups and Sectors Scientific Information Experimental Section Exploitations [..-

Source: E.3ene Zaleski et al, eds., Science Policy in the USSR (Paris, 1969), p. 220.

66 INDUSTRIAL MINISTRY OF A RESEARCHINSTITUTE OF AN FIGURE8-10ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

Director kedosic

COVOCii Scientific-iodates) Nevi 1

Orgoniretlons iffillsted

1.1.M11.11/1011.1.011.m....66.11111.M.I....14m=10161. first Ospety Olrsctor with the inotituts 0047 Oiler ler ScientificAffairs/ (opines (Die thiof (oefroor)

noputy Dior DopAy Depifty -, DoillitY OifCtor Dl rotor Dliwtripte Director (coals! Moder. Director for for for for kw I lachsolcs for frporienntsi Naomi Galore Capitol lispaIr 1 Cawing- Seism Production ties Shop fonetruct (Plant Di- Technical Stoetity rector) leper Wald Wet liskops Services Division Overlent.**tont Scientific PommelIlopertavals of ratio, and Solootiflo Scientific Osportiont Amur Irfq tratru- hoeuch Awed Coporioontel Hating and Genets' Ad-apttat Iisviola onto Division Divisive Anotruction Pleat Product ion ol olotrotioo culposo! &galloping Juridical olln...MMOMPI fifiNC. *pito Dsportoento ,,opoction Oat f Wove *AWN Wm0 Naval lecholcsi and Sciontific-fsdakel Lobe Deily ler- locholoel Docrontstio Economic Ile- watch $1 1 inforosilai Doke iketonto 1 Lions Overload letioneilistio ospatost ad invention Orianizothe el Libor bre letting ad itorvierdIrstica

lavvetion

obshchiye zroblemyupravleniya al, eds., Osnovnyyeprintsipy I Source: D. M.Gvishiani et ProblemsintheMlentofScience)

(Moscow, 1973), p.226. 51 Institute attachedto an industrial branch ministry. In general, the structuralformat cf an Academy institute is leas complex thanthat of a branch institute. The Academy systemas a whole, in fact, is less bureaucratically organizedand run than the R&D subsystem of the ministries.

Design Bureaus Desigr nd development engineeringtasks are carried out z.y organizations knownas design bureaus or institutes. The design bureausrange in size from small groups within productionenterprises to large independent organizations ofseveral hundred design engineers and technologistsknown as experimental plants. While some design facilities limittheir work to designingnew products and machines, others build and test prototypesas well. Still other organizations are primarily engaged inprocess designing, or designing of machineryand installations, and development ofprocesses for the manufacture of new products or the modernization of production. They are variously titleddesign-technological bureaus, project-design and technological 7Ju::7.aus,or scientific research project-technologicalins,.4tutes. In addition, there are so-called projectinstitutes that specialize In the designingand planning of new plants or renovation of old enterprises.Although scientific research is conductedat design bureaus, it is of secondary importance to workon product and process development and the building ofprototypes. Some design bureaus, however, do extensiveindustri- al researchand are often indistinguishable from research institutes.26 Higher Educational Institutions Most educational institutions conductresearch of some kind. These Include (1) comprehensive universities, such as Moscow State University, where a broad curriculum of natural sciences andhumanities is offered; (2) higher schools suchas the Bauman Mosccw Higher Technical School and the polytechnic institutes, where a variety of engineeringcourses

68 FIGURE 8-11 ORG:IZATION AND MANAGEMENT OF R&D IN A =HER EDUCATIONALINSTITUTION (TUZ)

Rector

Administrative Learned Council Divisions 1 of the 17C4: of :tie VUZ Deputy Rector for RAD I Office of the Deputy Rector

Scientific Research Scientific Research ...aboratories of the VT= Institutes ofthe VUZ I

L 1 Other Facilities! Faculty

1 Deputy Dean of Dean of the Faculty Learned 1 Faculty Cooaeil ; the Faculty

1 for R&D f--1

Scientific Research ScientificResearch' Laboratories of the Znatitutes of Faculty Faculty

Other Departments Department ScientificCouncill [Seed of the of the Department Department

Problem Scientific Branch Scientific Reseerch Research Laboratories Laboratories

Source: "USSR shortAnswers," o. 88.

69 may be pursued; and (3) a large number of specialized single-curriculum institutes such as the Leningrad Institute for Aviation Instrument Construction and the Mendeleyev Moscow Chemical Technical Institute. The institutes concentrate on applied research, most of which is funded through contracts with industry. University research generally is conducted within departmental structi.l.es by an individual professor; but in some universities special scientific research in- stitut_ts have beer. formed. Figure 9-11 presents a generalized organizational chart of the administration of scientific research work in VUZy. As the chart illustrates, a VUZ scientific research iustitute may be subordinate to a related faculty of the VUZ or to the VUZ as a whole. The research laboratories may be similarly subordinated. VUZ labs may be branch laboratories or problem laboratories. The former conduct researr:: an industrial organization's needs for new matezials, processes, and equipment, whereas problem lal)orato- ries are created for the execution of major scientific, engtriee-L.i.g, and experimental design projects. In VUZ3 =nder the USSR Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education at the end of 1971 there were 55 scientific research institutes, 419 problem laboratories, and 528 branch laboratories.27 Industrial Enterprises An enterprise is a legally independent entity corgi cerned almost exclusively with production. It has its own technical, production, and financial plan (tekhpromfinplan) containing production, organizational, and technical chapters and targets, in principle well integrated. It has its own assets, including working capital. When on an independent balance sheet, it has an account in the State Bank. It most frequenzly includes a single plant. The term enterprise (predyriyatiye) is alEo a generic term that cov-,rs a number of form cif production organization. One is the plant (zavod), which

70 L. 4 U) 4.) I 4 I 1+4 1 4.) 4) 1 4) (1) 1 b0 'd 1.4 El 4.) 4 1 0r4 u) 0 040 >, H (1) (1) PHI I 1-1 U).4 Cl)n i-9 " ri 03 4.) H0 14.0(I4)4-1 0)4.) U) I-14'4 a.)t-4No4 O 1-14 0044-)0 04 0 N H 1 4-1 44 0 4-1 14 V)4) 0 0 0 (0 1 : 1 40,44 40)Ha) 4-) 4 4.) 044 0.0 cd 0 1/) 1-1 0 Cd 0 U)0 04 0 14 4-1 0 0ri N H 0 cd OJ r-160 0bb0 '04-) 4) 0 UlU) 44a) to 14 0) 0b 00 (0 U 0 1-1 C0 00fl 5 u) w 03 0 CO 4.) 0)(000 0, CO ro(34 4-1 ra, .ri0 H4-1 44 ra 41 41 00 00 4!) (0 1 0004 '1.1.r1 .4 W Cr) 0 Cd 0 CU 0 I-I 00 1-1 ())4-1 144-1 04-1 U 0 n4 H 144(14.) U) b0 4-1 4-1 ro0 4 o o r1 a)ror.-1 0.1 .r1 4) P.1 0 440 0 44 0 N 5 44 r1 44 N 4.) 4r1 4..)C.) 0 ri r4 I 4 r1 U) 11 0 3 0)0) 0 0 (44) N4-10) 0..A) r1 14 (I) 0 4)e) H (ti 0 4J4.1 -0Ucd 111,--4 1-1 4 0 ti .r4 Nr40U) o o 0 0 0I U 4.) 00 0 a)8Ocd o (1) 440 r4 1-4 H 0r1 U /4 .40 brIa) rti H 4-) 0 0) 00 44 .0 0.1-4 0 0 4-1 CIO(11 1-4 44 '1:1 1)4 r4 r1 0 .ri 4-1 orl (11 060r-40 44 id 4-141-I cd ,rc) a) .4r, N 0 a) 0. 'H 1-4 1 4) 4.1 0 0 V)H 14 1.1 '1/41 14 U 4.) UH 14 14 U 5 4.4 0 14 4.4 00..0 V) fa, 4-J 41/ 14 ?-1 (f) 4.1 > a)0 0) W U) 44to 01 0 4) 44 4-1 'H '0 4) M 14 0 4-) P0 tr) 4-44-) 1.4 En Ad JD 04 0) "13 N c r-I r-4 0 al 41 a) )-4c1 1.4 000 4.) .4a) 0 o 4.4>1 0 4-4 N 4-) 'Ti 0 a)0 4-) 0 14 kido4.34-1(04J r-1 (.0 41 )4 0 .r1 4-1 0 0 U) 4.1 (.1 u)14 0cd 0 11 H N 00 0 0 0 a) 4.1 W 0 j5.1 4-1 0 60 'H 4-4 U 4-) 00 "0 1.4r40)?) 14 1-1 LA 04 4.1 ai rt$ (0 H4-) 0 a) .ri 4 1-30) 0c4u) .ri 0 H. 0 >1 PI(30 H 4-4ro 0 14 H 411 rti144 ,-'4 4 0 o 0 u) 4./ 0 r44) 4-1 }.4 1 cd U 4 4,1 *r1 0 0 0 0 "A 4-1 H (.) b H 1-1 ed 4 0 v1 u fl.r1 000000E Cd rti r-4 ti 0 P. t11 4-4 1 H 0 O Cd 60 01 4-1 0 r1 14-1 U 44 4) 4.) 4)El 1I 4 0 00 1-4 04 4-1 044T4 r4 .140) El r-1 (/) 0 1 4 r4 U) 1J0 0 NH 0 4-) H 0 4.) 4r1 I-1 r4 f u) W 4-1 1-1 IV *rl -I 0 't1 *r1 0 04) faV) U 4--) 4 (f) 4.4 U) tJ CIS 0 *0 u 4 0 0 0 * 0 41 000 04$.1-4 N )-4 re 44-1 4-1 4.1 r1 H 04 U Pi 4) 0 0 0 0U --1(nU :0 0 4-/ 0 0 .-`44.) 0 Cl) o 04 Pi 5 41 0 U X 0 H 1) (..) 0 04 4.)rd 4 br) 44 a) 0 r1 r00I-1 M 0 4 A 0 C0 (a A u) 0 A, U) d.0 4 ) (I 4.)(44 (a 4 U (0 0 0 0(f)1.1 (.) ,4 0 H *0 r-I IJ .4() 4) tO u 4 0 op: to c4 W (.) a) n -1 n-1 14 .04) U 14 a) 0 g4icli.40(04Jalmw ra (1) A W 4-1 1-1 00411 4J00300) cd 4-4 U H 0 Ctl *H Ei *ri H 5 0 0 0 00 00'0 04 / H .0 4:43 H )4 4 41 0 440 a)0 .r.10 a+NGro0 *r-IH 'H H 4.1'H /-4 r-1 4.1 04 4-1r-1 0 0-1 H U(4) (r) 0 4) 04-) H rl *r1 pi 0 0 U4-1 0 .4 1.4 0.1 et, (t) od14 0 cd Cd frq 0 /4 .0 4,/ 0 'Ti r1 al14 H 4-44.14-14J Cd 0 /4 0N rti U U 11) 04 0)0) )4El 14 bi)rt) .1 1-4 'r1 0 or4 4) 4..) 4.4 (.1 (:)00,r1 Q11 114 (i) ,J C0 0 Cl) 0 0 0 0 1.-1 I-1 *r44-4 > to cd03 co a4'H >14-I .0 (f) U00000 ro 0 a) 1.4 4-1 'H4.) 10 0 0 a) 4-4 (1) r-t .4a)(0 0 14 ccl 00 01 n-1(I 0 4) r-1 U?% 0)V) 'H H 0 .r0i0V/ 4) 0 14 TS0 0 (1) g -4 gi41) u "0 N '1 0 (13 0 r-4tit) 'H 4 4.4 U (0 r) 0 4-1 44$ )4 4 1-1 111 011 4)4) ai° u) .44 M r4r-f (11 fl 4J004) 4.1 U) o 4.1 0 14 cd 1-4 0 4 4.) 0 b0 4) rl ridEl1-1 0 al I-I 0 11) 00 I-1a, H '0Oc.)0)4-itrica OLIO U) *H 44 4) 0 *1-1'r4 H 4.4 Cd 411 144) 1-4 o t.) 4 4) 0 .0 a)U04 0 1-) 0. w 04 41 3 4.) u0 8 41U) 4-44.1 M 04 V) U 1.44 (0 c.) tr)0U 'H H (0 0 et 0 U U FIGURE 8-12 OZANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OFR&D IN AN INDUSTRIALENTERPRISE

Director

Chief Engineer -First

Deputy Director

Chief Designer Chief Tehlologiat Laboratories Chief Mechanic' Chief Fewer Engineer Department

of Design Depart- Technological De- Department of Department of the Technical ment (Bureau) partment (Bureau) the Chief Chief Power Control

Mechanic Engineer

Experimental Department (Bureau)

Shop of Inventions and [111 Rationalization

dgioNsmimemalesb

Source: D. M.Gvishiani et al, eds., Osnovnyyeprintsyy I obshctliye.

leniya naukay (Moscow,1973),p. 230. In general, "factory science" has not been a prominent feature of the Soviet industrial order. Histo- rically, the organizational approach has emphasized the separation of industrial research from production as well as the centralization of R&D forces in institutes designed to serve the needs of the branch as a whole rather than of individual enterprises. Conse- quently, most enterprises lack adequate in-house R&D facilities. The enterprise-level R&D system of factory laboratories, design offices, experimental shops, and other scientific subdivisions serves primarily the needs of current production. In fact, enterprise scientific subdivisions are not classified under the "science and science services sector" category of economic and Social organizations, and their activity is not included in the national plan section for financing research and design work. The organization and stru-tture of technical management within a typical enterprise is presented in Figure 9-12. In many instances, ho;ever, the enterprise R&D system does play a vital role in the application of new technology, in the creation of new products and processes, _he improvement of product quality or production efficiency, and the maintenance of quality control or technological control of operations.28 Associations Production associations (proizvodstvennyye obyedineniya--POs) and science-production associations (nauchno- proizvodstvennyye obyedineniya- -NPOs) are two entities replacing the independent enterprises as the basic units of industrial organization. Even- tually, almost all of Soviet industry will be con- verted to the associational form of management. By the fall of 1976 there were more than -000 POs in industry. Though they incorporated less than 10 percent of all enterprises, production associationsal- ready accounted for nearly 40 percent of total industrial output. At ta same time, NrOs--a more se- lective form of organization--numbered less than 120. The associations were created in part to acceLer- ate technological progress and to reduce the lead times in the implementation of new technology. There-

73 fore, both the PO and NPO forms may include institutes and design bureaus. In the production association, scientific organizations are usually of local significance and confine their research-development-innovation activity primarily to the production needs of the association. In the NPO, on the other hand, these units are expected to conduct general- purpose or branch-wide R&D, developing innovations for the branch as a whole. The "head" organization also differs. While this role belongs to an industrial enterprise in the production association, it is performed generally by a powerful research institute in the science-production association. The NPO fulfills the functions of a branch scientific-technical center. Its chief task is to create and apply new technology within the shortest possible rime. It is not predominantly a producing organization but is intended primarily to carry out R&D on new products and processes. Ideally, when a new product has been brought successfully through its first production runs by an NPO, the mass production of the article is taken up by the production associations. In line with :"-eir concern for the entire research-to-production cycle, ::stveral NPOs have special start-up plants and installa ion units which assist other production facilities in introducingand debugging new technology. Some NPOs specialize in the creation of newprod- ucts. Others develop production technology and control systems. Still others concentrate on the development and assimilation of new technological processes- Among the most important tasks of NPOs are reported to be the installation and adjustment of new technology, the conduct of patent/licen3e work, the maintenance of S&T information services, the forecasting of new product demand, and the developmentof estimates of labor and mater-als requirements. In internal organization and management the aso- ciations exhibit a range of alternative formats. e degree to which the enterprises in a production association lose their autonomy varies widely. For ex-

74 til.f FIGURE 8-13 MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE FOR A TYPICAL SCIENCE-PRODUCTION ASSOCIATION (NPO)

Council of Directors Director of theNP7-7cientific-Technical of =he 'TPO Council 1

Deputy Director for Science

libbeearch Department of .rasa Office Departments Standardisation a Norm-eettiog Divisiofl of Cost/Effect- Technological. tveness Analysis Department Project Design Department of Management Computer Department Rationalization Center Dopers-moat of SST Intarmecion. Department of Technical Petents S Licenses Control Thief 3ockkeeper Deputy co to Deputy Director 7for Science Department of 7echnical Technical Department Documentation Departmentof Laboratory the ChiefhechAnic for TestsS and PowerEngineer ,Mleasuremen: for Technical BureauSecuricy ii

Deputy Director Deputy DireC777---1 Deputy Director for =a:nay/acid= for Economic !or Deneral Questions 'Niestiops :Innovation Department Planning and Economics Department of Capital Engineering Depar=ent Department Conscruction Dope:m=1mm of Lapor Deparrmenc of Material- Production Control and 7,1ages Technical Supplies and Department Daily Services Finance and ZSCLAIILLIIM Exporimental workshops Department Personnel Department Experimental ?Lent Sookkeeping Department Department of kdoim's--a-- Shop of Technological Department of Middle- ° tiara and Economic `tama4e- LEquipment S Listruments range Planning for Devel- mmt opment :ha 3:mach and Legal 3ureau of Techileal S Economic Research

Source: A. I. Bcgdanov, Problemy upravlenlya nauch-o- tekhnicheskim progressom: obzor (Moscow, 1977), P.54.

75 ample, in the Leni.igrad Optical-Mechanical Associ....- tion the general management of the PO fully replaces the plant managements. At the Svetlana Association each enterprise retains a measure of autonomy, and only the basic management functions are centralized. The management of the PO is the same as the management of the largest and most modern of the plants in the association, i.e., the "head" organization of the PO. The other plants are organized as branches of this leading plant. At the Elektrosila Association some of the plants are fully merged with the PO, whereas others have retained some autonomy. A similar pattern of structural diversity also character- izes the science-production associations. According to a model organizational statute on the NPO, issued by the central leadership at the end of 1975, however, all units joining the association lose their independence. Nonetheless, practice continues to diverge from this uniform pattern. Figure 9-13 illustrates the model management structure for a science-production association.

THE ORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEM: WHOLE AND PARTS

The previous discussion of the organization of R&D in the USSR suggests certain features and themes that desert._ emphasis. Most basic, of course, is the formal design of the whole edifice for science and technology as an "organizational system" of multiple and wen integrated parts, with elaboratz. but generally internally consistent assignments and responsibilities. This image of a highly centralized and coordinated Soviet system that is able to pursue comprehensive and coherent SST policies often prevails abroad. The image, however, conceals as much as it re- veals. Though highly centralized, the organizational structure of Soviet science and cechnology is far from monolithic. On the contrary, it is highly fragmented. An official at the top feels sometimes, in

76 fact, that he sits at theapex of an "inverted pyramid," that the vast bulkof decisions and actions are beyond his influence,much less his control. Among the prominent structural properties of the system is the segregation of activities by level in the respective hierarchies. Although there are exceptions to the general pattern, the focus of planning and managerial responsibility is centered at three levels- (1) all-union or national; (2) branch or ministry, Academy, or republic; and (3) performer organization (research, design, educational, and production establishment). When a republic organization or element of local industry is involved, a fourth or fifth level of planning responsibility may be in- terjected accordingly, but in general the three enu- merated levels designate the three types of relevant plans. For example, while republic councils of ministers are subordinate to the USSR Council of Min- isters, their plans have similar orientation and format. There is similar correspondence in the branch plans at the union and republic levels of a union- republic ministry, although the superior-subordinate relationship is clear, with plans at the subordinate levels incorporating directives of the superior level. There is a clear intent to delineate organizationally line (ordministrative) and staff (or function- a.) activities at each of the three levels. Certain organs, such as the ministries, areresponsible administratively for all activities of a subset of economic and technical establishments, usually in a particular industry. Other organs, such as the state committees, arc responsible for at least the formulation and monitoring of a functionally oriented set of policies for all Soviet establishments. The ais- tinction is carried through to the branch and performer organization levels as well. Within the ministry and performer organizations, certain administrations, departments, or individuals are responsible for overall performance of the organization as a whole or for particular subdivisions, whereas planning, finance, supply, and other departments mange

77 7 their respective functions for ,.he organization as a whole. The distinction between line and staff functions in the acadcbmies of sciences is somewhat less clear, cbte in part to their relative autonomy which in turn is related to the 'nature of fundamental research. The academies themselves conduct a relatively large shar, of the planning and other functional activities for their subordinate facilities, although academy facilities are also subject to the policy formulated by the various specialized state committees and, overall, by the GKNT. Within this context the three principal central management agencies which are concerned with R&D planning and administration are the GKNT, the USSR Academy of Sciences, and Gosplan. Of these, the GKNT's functions may be described as comprehensive, incorporating overall managerial responsibil.,ty for Soviet SST policy and particular concern with inter- branchcoordination problems and with facilitating integration between academy, university, and industrial R&D. The Academy and Gosplan are more specialized, concentrating respectively on fundamental research and on industrial R&D and technology utilization. They, in turn, are more heavily involved in operational management in their respective areas, either by formal administrative responsibility in the Academy's case or b). the significant de facto authority of Gosplan in managing the economic and technical activities of industrial establishments. The three organs jointly issue mazy position or policy statements setting forth regulations andguide- lines on one or another aspect of R&D planning and management. In general, the basic principles which :_nderlie the organizational structure also tend to andermine its "systemic character and cohesivenes. . The key to effective organization in the SovietUnion, just as in the United States, lies not in structurebv-: in relationships between individuals and 'nstitu- t:ons. With parts but no coupl:ngs between the parts there can be no system. The traditional design principlesof extreme func-onal specialization by

78 organizations and of institutional dissociation have created structural barriers rather than bonds between the various organizational actors at all levels of the Soviet SST establishment. As we have seen, the s:ructure of decision malc.Ing is predominantly vertical and thus substantially inhibits lateral communication, cooperation, and coordination. Similarly, structural features help create and reinforce functional autonomy and non-integra*Ii-ye attitudes among the organization-xl parts to the detriment of the whole. With parts ani no common purpose there can be no coupling and no system. Soviet authorities naturally intend that the various organizations and agencies complement each other in pursuit of objec- tivec specified by the leadership. In practice, however, the parochll aims and special interests of the parts frequently rr,:vall over the centrally defined purposes and needs of the nfttion or "system" as a whole. Soviet orgaal-stions have been built largely on the princ4ple c. total or near total self-sufficiency. Eac ministry is an empire of its own, operating al lost independently of the others. Each of the central administrative and functional agencies has acquired entrenched bureaucracies which compete with and frustrate each other. The very structure and nature of the R&D administrative system--with its emphasis on multiple authorities, mixed sovereign- ties, and incomplete functional mandates--inevitably exert their influence on the policy process and on performance. Though of a different kind perhaps than exists in the United States, bureaucratic politics- - with all the realities of interagency payer, clashes of priorities, and conflicts of interests--nonetheless is a pros- Event and permanent feature of the "organizational system" for scienca and technology in the USSR. It is no accident that better "linkage" and "integration" are important organizational issues in Soviet science policy today.

79 3-4. 4. Ibid., pp. 4-5. 5. Ibid., pp. 12-14. 6. Dorokhova, "Sovershenstvovaniye sistemy organov upravleniya naukoy," pp. 64-65; Piskotin et al,Organ- izatsionno-pravovyye rukovodstva naukoy v SSSR, pp. 187-192, 205. It is not surprising that the idea of creating state committees for science andtechnology in various republics, modeled after the Moscc.:body, has been urged and discussed, apparently atthe highest See Dorokhova, "Sovershenstvovaniye sistemy organov upravleniya naukoy," p.65. There is a state committee for science andtechnology in Georgia, but it is subordinate tc the Georgian republic Coun- cil of Ministers, not to the USSR GKNT. 7. For example, the USSR State Committee on Inven- tions and Discoveries is"predominantly oriented to regulating the initiatives and pro sals coming from below." Only 30 percent of its recommendations are accepted by the ministries and departments. SeeYe. Artemyev and L. Kravets, Izobreteniya-- novaya (Moscow: Ekonomika, 1974), pp. 63, 179-180. Another Soviet critic similarly notes that

f .1. 80 the state committee does not possess the authority and means necessary to fulfill its functions. See A. A. Podoprigora, Pr-,vovyye voprosy sozdaniya i vne- dtenlya novoy tekhniki (Kiev, 1975), p. 85. In drawing up the annual economic plan for 1975 the State Cc..7..ittee on Inventions and Discoveries recommended that 90 inventions and innovations be adopted but the ministries accepted only 9 or 10 percent. See G. Alekseyev, "The Effect Derived from Production," Pravda, September 13, 1976. 8. Dorokhova, "Sovershenstvovaniye sistemy organov upravleniya naukoy," p. 61. For a more detailf_d discussion of the GMT, see the excellent study by Lou- van E. Nolting, The Structure and Functions of the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology, U.S. Bureau of the Census, Foreign Economic Reports, No. (Washington, D.C., 1979). 9. Zaleski et al, Science Policy in the USSR, p. 54. 10. B. F. Zaitsev, "Struktura organov upravleniya naukoy i tekhnikoy v usloviyakh nauchno-tekhnicheskoy revolyutsii," in Organizatsiya upravleniya (Moscow, 1975), p. 36 and V. Disson, "Primeneniye programmno- tselevogo metoda pri reshenii nauchno-tekhnicheskikh problem," Planovoye khozyaystvo, 7 (1977), p. 92. 11. "USSR Short Answers," pp. 5-7. 12. Ibid. 13. Ibid., p. 8. 14. Zaleski et al, Science Policy_in the USSR, pp. 83-88. 15. V. A. Rassudcvskly, Gosudarstvennaya organizatsiya nauki v SSSR (ftscow: Yuridicheskaya literatura, 1971), p. 30 and G. T. Prokhotskiy and V. G. Khryachen- ko, Effektivnost raboty nauchno-issledovatelskikh organizatsii (Minsk, 1973), p. 31. 16. "USSR Short Answers," p. 8. 81 18. Louvan F. Nolting, The Financing of Research, Development, and Innovation in the USSR, By Type of Performer, U.S. Department of Commerce, Foreign Eco- nomic Reports, No. 9 (Washington, D.C., 1976), pp. 3-4. 19. A. I. Shcherbakov, Sotsialno-ekonomicheskiye problemy effektivnosti nauchnogo truda (Novosibirsk, 1975), p. 48.

20. V. I. Duzhenkov, "Problemy tk!rritorialnoy nauchnoy deyatelnosti," in Problemy deyatelnosti uchenogo i nauchnykh kollekttvov (Moscow-Lenin- grad, 1977), VI, pi,. 48-49. 21. "USSR Short Answers," pp. 42-45. 22. I. D. Ivanov, "Preodoleniye prepyatsviy i stimulirovaniye pri vnedrenli novoy tekhniki I novykh me- today upravleniya" (Overcoming Obstacles and Improving Incentives in the Introduction of New Technology and New Methods of Management"), p. 20. Soviet Side of the Joint US-USSR Subgroup on Planning and Management of Research and Development. Unpublished (draft) paper, 1976; V. G. Shorin and A. A. Popova,"Organiza- tsiya nauchnoy raboty v vuzakh," in Gvishiani et al, Osnovnyye printsipy i obshchiye problemy upravleniya naukoy, p. 200. 23. Ibis;., pp. 203-204; Nolting, The Financing of- Resear'-h, Development, and Innovation in the USSR, pp. 13-14.

24. Ibid., p. 8.

25. Ibid. 26. Ibid., pp. b-9; Zaleski et al, Science Policy in the USSR, pp. 406-408, 541-546. 27. "Shorin and Popova, "Organizatsiya nauchnoy raboty v vuzakh," p. 203. 28. Nolting, The Financing of Research, Develop- ment, and Innovation in the USSR, pp.14-15.

82 IX THE FORMULATION OF R&D PLANS AND PROGRAMS

ollEgKIgR OP SC1ZNCE AND TECHMLOGY PLANNINC,

plans is the Soviet Union are the fundamental in- strumeat for integrating and controlling production activities of all kinds and at all levels of aggregation,ranging:ram the state as a whole through a varietyofeconomic units to the individual.By as- sumingthisburden, plans must be not only directive, convoying the vlshes of the leadership, but also sufficiently Informativeon factors external to the plan- ringwait to permit effective coordination. Plans mustalso incorporate a system of incentives and pen- to insuresUre the accomplishment of assigned tasks. By itsverynature, R&D seems incompatible with thistype of Planning. Optimally, plans predetermine results, while R&D in varying degrees involves explo- rationof unknownor uncertain territory. Problems ofuncertaintyand risk are particularly great at the fundamental research stage and subside increasingly witiloovementtoward the development end of the R&D spectrum'andthe more deterministic world of production. In general, this factor is recognized in So- vietscience Policy. Laricbev, for example, notes f-formulationof the goals of planning depends subntantially the means of determining with a suf- degreeof certainty the expectedfinal re- sultsof R643-"1 Becau-4-it of the difficulties of pre- dictingandevaluating R&D results, their aggregation is also appreciably harder than the aggregation of production targets. Indeed, until well into the 1950s activities under research, development, and innovation istheUSSR were seen as "too complex and numer- aad theresults too unpredictable and indefinite to beworththe effort of joining them into a single coherentplan."2For that matter, R&D was still re-

83 garded as being too aloof from general economic problems and processes to permit any convergence of science policy with economic policy. Increasingly, however, the planning of science and technology has become a separate and consolidated activity in the Soviet Union, especially since the late 1960s. Like the basic approach to organization and structure, the orientation in planning is to treat the research-to-production cycle as a single complex of activity integrated along highly formal and hierarchical lines. Containing a variety of individual and sequential components that together constitute an integrated unit, the R&D plan itself is but one element of a larger plan governing all aspects ofproduction activity. In the State Plan for the Develop- ment of the National Economy, the chapter incorporating the Plan for the Development of Science and Tech- nology is accompanied by chapters devoted to planning sectoral development (including industry, agriculture, transport and communications) and capital construction, as well as to planning functional areas, such as labor and manpower, variousfinancial indicators, and foreign trade. There are similar collections of targets at all plan levels, and eachcollection for all types of indicators in principle is mutually reinforcing and internally consistent. Figure 10-1 demonstrates the interrelatedness of the separate features of the various plans aswell as the hierarchical structure of plans describedin chapter 9. At the national level, S&T problems areclear- ly one of the several types of national problems.The problem orientation of the plans must be rendered consistent with the task of establishing the appropriate "proportions" in the national economy, or in other words, ensuring that sectoral and regional development is proceeding as intended and thatthe plan as a whole is internallyconsistent. At the intermediate level, the task of reconcilingplans with different orientations -- branch of thenatioral economy or industry, program, and geographical region--isillus- trated. At the level of the performing organization, the establishment generally must be responsive tothe

84 90 FIGURE 9-1 OVERVIEW OF THE CONTENT AND NETWORK OF SOVIET ECONOMIC PLANNING

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iK inonworths I usingOrreicis I sysito or SYSIIII IN SYSIIN DI COSIACCON1111; 106 AND 5100NOSIECONIAlt CIINIHACISItC011101C If KIS AO STIMULI

(Moscow, Source: V. M. Ivanchenko, Metodologiyanarodnokhozjaystvennogo planirovanya

1975), p. 47, mft) rt 0. PA rt 0 us n 1-4 0 rt 4 D) 1-1.. hi. '0 o9,t!. Pd u) 1:1) ID 0 (D rt o PI Po ID (i) H o o Pi t9 4 (7;(1) 2 R t'-'t Pc) 1 V P illW OPO Prni [DO IT) " t itlil '14 E., ti)jg (D ID H 11 ti rt rt1-k 10 0 1 0 rt 0 1-1. 0, (I) ID 0 U) 0 A) H 0(D rt(1) 4 (^ H 0 U) 0 i4tiirinirril4 p PO It M W .1 tr 0 Ptg 0 p. H 4) V I-h iCr rt 0 M 0 1.4. H CO 0) 0 I-4 H 0 0 p-i M rt o w 0) 0 4 M 0. 0 V ECji) ri 1-11 gd Cr' t) 0 rlR. rj. . .1-1. '17;t) n i-0 H. 9 Ut;"--"(°4 fU 1I f01 0 0 la I-I rt g IT,H r(Dt U)111 rt " itii)fl(I) 0 n o ° (1 VD I& M PhMM r0t4(%Is161 tAl) it Pg (Fp= rj.. IT) Tt :3 R. N M.2 (tg HIDIA MCVLAH°U 21 w(I) V)rtI DC m 'el M1 4 OrQ iI : 5" ITI(1P) PSir21 N g PV3.4) Phrit CD (i) rt 0 rt 0 0 t u p p "I rt rtp) P0 rt IA 0IA 0 ila cnr) HIT, M 0) w W 0 (1-Di K 'rl-t G 0 ?) 0 '1-ttl PI(ItH OQ V1 g M (I)0 0 rrutitig' 0 rt 0 M PO H IA 0 'ti 0 H 0 M 4 (D(D M ID 11 0 IA0,-40'00MA) 0 0. rt IA F-1 H 0 rt II(1 Hi r0 H 0 ft I'D I:L(1)HO Hmp'n Fi PI iil 0. 0 1-1 0) 04< iTi M M 04 fl K °-. 8 Prl w r, IT -1 til 41 R N F04 "Pg 1-4VMM 0.)00)04M0lik4C 4111-1.4)00.00000WrtMOt4 1-1 rt' 1rt 1-1.ID M 0 ce U) M rt 0. FA, H Pi 0 0r0.4,P) t o (0 4 0 0 lifas A)A) A) A) v) 1-1.1-.4co K 0. 0. 11 0 ilrt 0 CuF. H 0 1-1.cr 1-1 o o a 0 ki n - 1-1 '0a)u) A) H. Hoof-too v; m rt1-J m 0 4 Fi 01 FO0 4Pi. P-IPT ii O'E...N"rii(IN(a)),.C451!°211g))0PP,")iti)40" 0 0 It M 0 o 0' k4 a)ti .& Cr MO Im Ic4000000 rt H 0 flMF.rt0M0 11M rt (D H (0It 1 0 0 I N 1(0 I I I I r t4 Ca I I 0 0 11 (i) m CD M 4)H I-4 4 0 0` rt I i 0 v (0 fa OQ I M 11 I I FIGURE 9-2 STRUCTURE OF SOVIET RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND INNOVATION

PLANS AND FORECASTS

USSR 5 -year National

Economic Plan

USSR SIT Forecasts and

Perspective Plan Republic and Branch

Forecasts and Per-

spective Plans

USSR 5-yea Plan for 4t...._ Development of Science Republic and Branch

and Technology 5-year Pians for

Development of Science

and Technology

SIT Pro rims

Scientific Organization

and Enterprise 5-year

RDI Plans

USSR Annual Plan for Republic and Branch

Development of Science Annual Plans for

and Technology Development of Science

and Technology

ScientificOrganizatild

and Enterprise 5-yea: 41.1111.1116RDI Plans

Source: Louvan E. Nolting, The Planningof Research, Development, and Innova-

tion in the U.S.S.R. (Washington, D.C.,1978), p. 23.

I in erally lagged. Such notions as "innovation process," "technology transfer," and "commercialization cycle," which figure prominently in Western writings, are relatively unknown in the USSR. Soviet analysts, on the contrary, tend to use terms like "research-production cycle," "scientific and technological complex of work," and "complex of preproduction work" to describe the sequencing, organization, and stimulation of scientific R&D. For the most part, their concepts have revolved around phase-dominant models of innovation with emphasis on separate functions and individual work efforts performed in isolation from one another and cut off from the application of results in- to production. Only recently have they begun to take a more process view of innovation with the focus on final results and overall integration. Also only recently has a predominantly linear-caus- al view of Innovation been called into question. This model emphasizes a relatively simple and orderly forward flow of work from theoretical conception to practical use. The notion that innovation involves a complex and helix-like stream of events and stages with significant feedback coupling is not commonly held. Accordingly, various stages of work are planned predominantly in sequence rather than simultaneously and in parallel. The result is significant losses of time between different phases and a lengthening of the process as a whole.3 Though important strides have been made in recon- ceptualizing R&D and _r moving toward a more sophisticated analytical base for deciding problems of scientific choice, deficiencies remain. As two experts on R&D note, "a number of questions in this complex process have not yet been studied, and some have not even been posed in theliterature."4There is still considerable ambiguity and inconsistency among Soviet writers who describe and label the stages of the R&D cycle. "No official methodological instructions by Gosplan or the Central Statistical Administration are available which delineate the precise stages," Nol- ting points out. Moreover, he adds, the conceptual division of stages is not necessarily followed in 88 planning, financing, and reporting of R&D. The basis for planning and financing -remains primarily the "institutional performer," not the stages of the research- to-production cycle.5Again the heavy organizational bias of the system is evident. Planning and the allocation of resources are organized mainly around institutions rather than projects and programs. Furthermore, R&D has been perceived and planned in rather narrow terms and time frames. The planning process has usually ended with the creation of experimental prototypes or at best with small batch production of new products. The actual introduction of R&D results has been beyond the boundaries of science planning. The focus has been on building up scientific and technological "potential."The Russian word for the latter, zadel, means literally a stock of semi - finished articles waiting to be processed. A short time horizon, usually only a year, has also prevailed. Only since the late 1960s has attention Seen given to developing the concept of scientific and technical progress, to elaborating its meaning and implications for both the research sector and the industrial sphere, and to making it the object of planning. Such an extension of the boundaries of planning complicates the task considerably.V. Yu. Buda- vey and H. I. Panova observe, "The essence of the matter is that the problem involves drawing up not just a separate section of the national economic plan but a second plan."Yet, they add, "Without global evaluations of scientific and technical progress for the long term it is impossible to work out a strategic planning policy in this areaand to determine correctly the tasks of a uniform technology policy."6 No uniform conception of the future shape of science, technology, or of the economy has emerged to guide the planners, however. Science policy analysis and planning still suffer from inadequate indicators, norms, and information. By 1974 nearly 300 different indicators were used that directly or indirectly characterized scientific and technical progress. However, they did not form a sufficiently goal-oriented system of indicators to

89 103 Insure the integrated planning of science, technology, and economic gr.:wth. In addition, their application was usually not concerned with the planning and evaluation of production efficiency.7 Scientif- ically-based norms are still lacking for financing research and for supplying it with human and material resources. Norms governing the performance of R&D are absent, as are norms regulating the length of projects and their stages. When schedules are included in planned assignments, they are often fixed arbitrarily without any sufficient basis.8 Nobel lau- reat and Academician Kantorovich noted in 1976 that "In practice consideration of the time factor is not systematic and is frequently non-existent" in R&D decision making.9Yet, without taking time into account, all Soviet science analysts agree, it is virtually impossible to evaluate any other indicators, such as the technological novelty or economic advantages of an idea. All depend directly on "time," on how rapidly scientific ideas move from the laboratory into use. Serious deficiencies also exist in the data base for planning and evaluating R&D. Decision makers are frequently faced with fragmentary and contradictory information. Statistics on expenditures for fundamental research, for applied research, and for development are not regularly collected and reported. The absence of standard concepts for various stages and categories of R&D results in unsystematic information and conflicting calculations. The information gap is particularly glaring with respect to expenditures for innovation and the introduction of new technology. Since most R&D units at industrial enterprises and associations are not formally classified as "scientific institutions," statistics on R&D performed at production establishments are n systematically gathered, nor are they included in "official" science allocations. The lack of accounting and reporting of these expenditures seriously "ham- pers the objective measurement of inputs on scientific and technical progress," note S. Golosovsky and G. Yeremenko.10 Essentially, the later stages of the research -to- production cycle fall outside--or, more

1 90 4 accurately speaking, "between the cracks" of--the system of planning and control. Finally, a constant flow of operational information is lacking on the course of plan implementation. Information comes at regular reporting periods which may not coincide with the planned completion of projects and tasks. Thus, the information may come too late to permit timely corrective action.1-1 It is also important to note that the "technology" of Soviet planning is still relatively primitive. Simple and semi-intuitive methods of evaluation and manual calculations predominate. The inadequacy of technique becomes all the more apparent in the light of the increasing scale and complexity of the task it must tackle. In preparing the annual plan alone Cos- plan works up 47 million indicators.One variant of the national macroeconomic plan requires 83 billi.711 separate calculations. At present nearly four billion documents circulate on various levels of the planning and management hierarchy. Within industrial enterprises, associations, and other economic organizations almost five billion work orders and more than two billion supplementary requests are formulated each year .12 The head of the Main Computer Cen- ter at the USSR Gosplan zeported with some pride that about 20 percent of the Tenth Five Year Plan (1976- 1980) wilAq prepared on the basis of computer techniques. On the eve of the 1980s the pocket calcu- lator has not yet arrived in the Soviet Union, and the dominant tool at hand remains the abacus. "It is no accident," observes Boris Milner, now of the In- stitute for Systems Studies, "that a serious contra- diction has developed between the growth of the volume of information and the traditional methods of data collection andprocessing."1' The need for more "science" in R&D planning and management is generally recognized among Soviet authorities today. Defects in the conduct of analytical work in scientific organizations are decried at all levels of the planning ladder.15 Special attention is being given to enhancing integrative capabilities, both analytical and administrative, of central deci- 91 sion makers to formulate comprehensive andcoherent policies. Accordingly, interest is increasing of late in developing and applying the moderntools of systems planning and managementand more sophisticated decision aids in this area. Indeed, "systems analysis" and "the systems approach" have become fa- vorite terms as the regime seeks to build a moreeffective conceptual framework for R&Dproblem-solving. These underlyiag aspects of S&T planning areim- portant to note at the outset,because the formal structure and procedures of planningtend to dc...minate Soviet discussions of science policy andsometimes overshadow these dimensions, which not only impact upon the structure but, moreimportantly, influence appreciably the quality of R&D decision making.

RESOURCE PLANNING AND ALLOCATION FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

In a centrally planned economylike that of the Soviet Union, control over real resources,and not merely the availability of funds,is the essential prerequisite for the conduct ofR&D.16 In other words, work undertaken at theinitiative of the performing or sponsoring organizationdepends in large part upon whether the activityitself and the expected capital, labor, and materialinputs are each accounted for in respective planchapters. Ruble values serve as theprincipal means of measuring and ag- gregating performance, but in most casesit is not possible to bid resources away from otherorganiza- tions as a means of expanding the scopeof work. At the least, then, funding serves as anessential if passive indicator of the magnitudesof various categories of R&D. Whether funding can serve as an active control mechanism, furnishingcommand over real resources, is a functionof the level of aggregation of the decision, the specificfund and/or organization involved, and the priorityand nature of the research. 1.,64 92 While characteristics of the "concrete" project may predominate in decision making at the level of the performer organization, with funding a secondary consideration, high-level decision making in practice cannot be made entirely dependent on a careful study and aggregation of the characteristics of specific projects. At the highest level, when estima- ting the total share of national income and determining the total share of the state budget which will be devoted to science,the Council of Ministers must consider not only the potential for scientific advance in necessarily broad categories of research and development but also the impact of expanded technical advances on economic and social developments.J7 The growth rate of expenditures on science is .4-le-r- ally set somewhat higher than the growth rate rational income and industrial production to insul:c: scientific and technical progress.18Indeed very rapid and sustained rise in total offici.ti Soviet allocations for science, equal to 2.4 billion rubles in 1958 and 17.4 billion rubles in 1975, is indicative of the leadership's awareness of the growing relative importance of technological development as a factor contributing to economic growth. The sum allocated to science, as well as its intended breakdown by user category and purpose, is specified in a chapter of the annual and five-year State Plans for Development of the National Economy. Here the total volume of outlays for scientific research projects and the sources of financing are stipulated, along with the overall wage fund fog workers at scientific institutions.19 These indices, in effect, determine the extent of money, manpower, and materials for conducting R&D. Provisions for capital investments for the construction, expansion, and renovation of scientific facilities are also included in another chapter of the macroeconomic plans as part of the total volume of capital investments for the development of various sectors of industry and the economy.20 The science ezcpenditure plans are formulated by the GiCNT in collaboration with Gosplan, the Academy of Sciences, and the Ministry of Finance, on the basis of proposals submitted by the USSR min-

93 istries and departments as well as the union republic councils of ministers. The plans emphasize, then, both the association of financial and real resources and the relationship of broad aggregates to the recommendations of intermediate level management organs and institutional subsystems. There are two broad sources of financing R&D: (1) the State Budget and (2) the fiscal resources at the disposal of ministries and agencies at the intermediate level and of enterprises and scientific organizations at the performer level. In Soviet terminology the second source is designated "own funds."Most own funds are, in fact, centralized by the ministry that administers them. Only a portion are decentralized and used directly by enterprises and organizations to contract for R&D with scientific institutions.21The amount of these resources for each ministry and agency is stipulated in the plan for financing scientific research projects as a source of financing. Slightly less than one-half of all science expenditures is financed by the State Budget. Budgetary allocations encompass, first, R&D aimed at solving national priority or so-called "basic scientific and technical problems" specified in the macroeconomic plan. These "basic problems" are usually interbranch, involving the joint efforts of multiple ministries and agencies_ The State Budget also finances research in the natural and social sciences as well as R&D projects linked to the solution of the most important branch-wide tasks. As a rule, State Budget grants are heavily used in the financing of theoretical or exploratory scientific research where R&D results cannot be closely associated with ultimate economic savings. In 1975, for example, 97 percent of expenditures by research institutes specializing in public health, 90 percent of expenditures by those in agriculture, and 80 percent of expenditures by the USSR and republic academies of sciences were financed through the state and republic budgets.22 These same sources generally seem to fund 94 S I 0 r0 I I 0 I 0 *ri X . : 4 C O I 'V ' L i I N U) 0 *0 P . I I 0 I FA rd 1 4 4J 0 4-1d1-1 ir4 0 W I I 0 I 44 4.1 (14I .r1 1-i 0 sri arl U 41 41 4G 0111 0 I O CLI0 U v-I 't141 sr41 °U td 14) (113 14 st9 11 114-1° C4111 ..11 (141 CI 4-101cil g ai481 1 1.1 0 0 U 0,- 14 4) u cd I

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(51 00400 b ° 4 1LI t4 .04 41141g01 4"1 0 104 rt4i SI 44 .V.1.0OI 1;1A 4N 4-1 41 CLI .1-1 0:1 "I 41) A CO (1) 01 4411 ;4 f.)IS 11) 1101 491 " 4-142 1tloog IH,rg g 1 ck4W 3,i9 ,,,()) v4-I0045 e " N 490 4 41)A a rtn 1W1VAlw tu ti g 4)« CO 4- 4-1-1 1,) /44/ 14 0 id 4:u1ri: 414.1 it'1%'51 Airl(t?) g H °41) 161 11 4) COI PC) VI 4:11/ °I j41 4:1 1 4-11Vi III) E 711U1 r1 ei 0 (alH :4'j 1114.1 '54j1 I'otu.1 g ' ' (1) U (I) 4) N N 0 ,Orl4.1 r04A o ri Tro a u v-i r-i 0 >14 4-1 0 01.1 a 41 0 0 (1.1 14A o 4.) t id ga/g p1E11 Vit1) 1 4.1POLI, 0 0u g.Io .ri (41H 01U 4411 3 w 3 made by the State Committee, Gosplan fixes a global sumfor the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences for the coming year. This sum increases from year to year at a more orless standard rate of four to six percent. Once the global sum has been fixed, the institutes of the Ukrainian Academy forward their claims to their Division and to the Presidium, which is aided in its delibera- tion by a special department broken down in- . to s subdepartment for overall planning.The Presidium has a number of other special departments for finance, capital construction, equipment and accounting. Figures are then prepared for each of the three Sections of the Academy which indicate the provisional sum to be made available to them for equipment and for other expenditures. The Vice President of the Academy, responsible for each section, decides on the distribution of funds among the institutesconcerned.25 The experience, Particularly the virtuallyautomatic increase in annual funding, also demonstrates that budgetary allocations play an important active role at higher levelsof aggregation and particularly in Academy fundamental research. There are similar accounts regarding re search conductedin higher educational institutions.. In the 1960s, Wienert notes, there was no relation between the natureof research projects and the available financial means.Research funds were distributed to the VUZy according tothe number of departments.26 -.0ar general, Zaleski concludes that the traditional criteria forallocation are the grossvalue of work on an historical basis and/or the number of researchtopics.27 Evidence suggests that institutionalfunding rather than projectfunding is still the predominant practice in SovietR&Das is the tendencytoward simple aggregate planning and incremental play-fling"from the achieved level." P. N. Zavlin and a group of science 96 analysts in 144Nrosiblvsk attribute the persistenceof thesepracticesto the absence offormal cV;teria for planning science and allocating resources. The lack ofany Precisenorms has allowed personal in- fluenceandestablishment reputation to carry undue weight- Dissatisfaction with existing methods causes G. PosPel-°v: a CorrespondingMember of the USSR Acad- emy. todeclare,"We. must finance not only organizations, rises, and associations but also goals and tasks' Projects andprograms."29 The system of institatil funding is also seen as a cause of in- definitefigof responsibility and poor coordination amongR &D stages and projects. Stillother writers point -;:o the contra- dictionbetweenthe conservative structure of expen- dituresbasedan financing of immobile scientific or- ganizati°ns and the inherently dynamic character of 30 science- The inertia of existing institutions and ongoingprof ects is hard to break. Indeed, it is al- ImpOSSI.e.it seems, to "shut off" any unsue- cessfu1 prograte, much less "shut down" an -maproduc- tiveinstitution.. As A. M. Birman notes, "While pro- vidingostensthle regulation and supervision, the presentsystemof financing research allows somein- stituti.ons to go for years without producing any significant results ..`31 At the same time, it is diffi- cultto get newideas_, and projects accepted. Mount- concern.Over these defects of the existing system led torising emphasis in the 1970s on the need to expand application of a "programmed-goals approach" toplanning and financing of R&D. Such an approach orientedtoward projects and end results is frequently usedin the military andspace sectors.Praising method, 1) this -ospelov notes, "The new will not have to'fight ItsWay up' from below, provingits right to exist' Under sucha system of financing, all shootsof the new will be visible from above and can alwaysbe given timely assistance."32 But program planningandzero-based budgeting have not yet become dontin87-ICforcesin Soviet civilian R&D activities.

Toreturn to the issue of budgetary distribution, Industrie-1-215'13 conducted within the ministerial system has eheavycomponent of state and ministrybud- 97 1

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M 111-tk 11 M rtPp (4) 1 rttnoaiMmcnO0 ai 5) (1) I:4 mg 4 (1) rt rt Hi 000m H 1-4 H H. 0 HI H. M 0 toH. P 0 H. }-14 r) 0 (9 rt q 0 Fa nfrti Ct Ai 0 0 ElrtI-J rirtrt rt N N 0 (1) 14 0FA rt o11 (0) I+ rt Cof)t.n (D P 0 rt M H P4 ri* (r)tIN) IIIf)j. P F.J.. 0 0 P4 H. M to 0 G H rt wow rip Hcni-si No0Hrt cortr1(Dlio) IrtP V 1-4. 0 rt 0 H. H H. H. 0 (1) 0 M H. rt 0 H P Fri '44t1)I rt4tHrah. R fg ? '1 5' 0 Ft. WNW rt 0 rt flI H 0 (D H 0 M H H i.s. 0 n n I 1 0 CD I I I I I 0'1 I kei 0 a I I I I dustry, the share of contract financing had climbed to roughly 20 percent and 38 percent, respectively. In some academy facilities in the Ukraine this figure is much higher. In the Institute for Superhard Ma- terials and the Physico-Mechanical Institute, for example, contracts accounted in 1975 for 69 percent and 70 percent, respectively, of the total work.35 The degree of contract financing in university facilities also varies considerably. In some technical schools and departments, the share is extremely high. Overall, in fact, contracts account for about 80 percent of all VUZy R&D. This high share reflects the concentration of VUZy research and development in branch laboratories, which are entirely financed through contracts made with the branch ministries.36 During the period 1971 through 1975 the volume of R&D financed through the State Budget rose by 38 percent while contract receipts increased by 78 percent.37 In the enterprise or production association several sources of funds are available for financing innovation and R&D-related work. These include the Spe- cial Fund for Financing Scientific Research of its parent ministry as well as State Bank credits. The largest source of financing is its own special purpose funds: (1) the Unified Fund for the Development of Science and Technology; (2) the Fund for Assimila- tion of New Technology; (3) the Fund for Development of Production. These funds are used to finance research, development, and innovation conducted both by enterprise scientific subdivisions and by outside perfr-mers under contract.38 In general, Berliner concludes that "the organization of the supply of financial resources for R&D appears to be no problem for the innovating enterprise."39 The real problem is to create the will to innovate. Human motivation is the commodity in short supply, not material and fiscal resources. On the whole, financial allotments at this level of R&D tend to be passive. Decisions at the level of the institute, design bureau, enterprise, and association can be related more easily to specific pro- 100 jects and input requirementswithout the necessity of allocation by lump sum. Similarly, the l_esser priority attached to decisions at thislevel implies that funding is by no means a guarantee thatreal resources can be commandedif not allotted in production and distribution plans. Thus, the importance and priority of the particular inputin question determines the extent to which fundingdecisions can have an active role,especially at this level. Taken together, then, these variousfactors and considerations illustrate that theallocation of financial resources to research anddevelopment is an integral feature of Soviet planning. They also de- monstrate the predominantlyhierarchical nature of financial planning as well as therelative importance of various sources of funding. The degree to which financial mechanisms are an"active" planning control instrument is largely a functionof the level and priority of the decision anddecision maker. In addition to these features, afew other basic points about Soviet resourceplanning and allocation merit brief mention. First, insufficient attention isgiven to the utilization of resources. Only since the late 1960s have authorities graduallybecome aware of constraints on resources andconcerned about the effectivenessof their use. He sever, analyticalwork is still deficient in this sphere, inlarge part because the whole system of planning,finaacing, and management ofR&D remains basically input-orientedrather than output- oriented. A. major aim, in fact, ofthe increased stress on the programmed-goals approachis to help shift the focus f planning, policy, andperformance toward end resin . "By directly connecting goals and resources, expenditures and output, programmingmethods of planning create a real basis forobjectively evaluating the effectiveness of resourceutilization, for choos- ing rational decisions, andfor optimizing interbranch proportions,"according to one group of So- 101 viet decision analysts-40Academician Fedorenko also describes this as an effective method of "dovetailing goals and resources and of coordinating regional, branch, and programmatic aspects of the plan for the development of the national economy.,=41 That is, program planning is regarded by some Soviet writers to be not only a more effective analytical device for problem-solving, but also a better way of allocating resources and balancing expenditures so as to insure the appropriate "proportions," noted earlier in our discussion, between the solution of key national S&T problems and the development of various economic sectors and regions. The preponderant weight of the existing branch approach to planning and financing makes it difficult to concentrate R&D resources on priority interbranch projects, to eliminate waste, and to accelerate innovation. Second, the State Budget in the Soviet Union is an annual budget. There is no five-year budget that can be linked to the five-year macroeconomic plan. Funds- - as the basis for obtaining material and technical resources--are distributed only for one-year periods. Such a short time horizon prevents the development of a genuine investment mentality toward R&D outlays that is oriented to long-term returns. On the contrary, it reinforces the dominant tendency to plan "from the achieved level" and to focus on inputs rather than results. Since unspent funds revert back to the budget, there is a strong tendency for R&D performers to use up all resources and thus "zero out" at the end of the year. There is little incentive to reduce expenses and to economize on materials and labor under the existing system. Third, there is the problem of coordinating financing with material and technical sunply. In principle, each financial flaw is to be matched by a corresponding physical flow, and whenever possible both are to be planned. In practice, however, the linkage rarely works smoothly and rapidly, and sometimes it is not made at all. Part of the problem is that R&D organizations frequently cannot anticipate their requirements for materials, equipment, and scientific 102 1 O VIOOVOWHOGAin 443000heMM

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PD HIriN:O ll)) Pa Pt r kifti P4:riOnA64,581.4 0,0t) 4 o'n8SVP2g0=0"424 vi (DPOOQ rt F. 11 M ID M 164 Ig0 0 .-.i PAPOVW I-1 M ! 0 4 I.s. ti WtrrWIWROOM 5: 4!101C-9)111%)/ p3 It (D M* rt 0 rt M 0 E. H.mortIM:RH.VN.golod cARIP(ToggifTnoap. rrjF,.glgni/1 04olAmocoortrtoi.4wmm 1111-1 rt ti IA 0 ti(t) OfOrt(DM o4 (D 0 (D 0 (D cl I-4 0M0rt(1) v 4 (1) 0 t1) "H.114;1444" 091(0)415114 WinFil0F21gOr Pi Co' raIrt(o's) r (PI wrrgP"ohVg .00QIA 0, 1-i 0 P ricoVni4rOYNagl Pglo VillAV4gggi:DIA°V1V 09 M ri51 Vragiq ,O I PI 0 t4 rt rt 0 (D 0 40 I 01-,MI I I-4 0) 0fOli I ! I I ta, Cl) I ever, is that scientific institutions have engaged in much the same kind of hoarding practices as industrial enterprises. They are reluctant to share, much less give up, valuable and scarce resources, even if they do not use them. The establishment of a rental system is a means by which to free the quantity of little used, highly expensive, greatly needed, but essentially "frozen" equipment that is growing at an appreciable rate. It represents a device by which to break down some of the institutional barriers between the "haves" and the "have nots," to bring together the demand of some organizations and the supply of others. Suffice it to note that in the early 1970s the rental of scientific instruments and lab equipment began to be organized, initially in the Leningrad region. Plans have been worked out to develop such rental services in a number of major scientific centers throughout the USSR, such as Moscow, Minsk, Tbi- lisi, Kiev, and Irkutsk. Along with filling one-time orders, the servicing of customers on the basis of long-term contracts has begun to be practiced. Rent- al arrangements sometimes involve the ;rovision not only of equipment and supplies but also of important services, such as testing and measurement. This is particularly important for extremely complex and costly instruments, which can be easily damaged if not handled properly. Given the present shortage of technicians, this is a good way to maximize the services and skills of existing specialists and to maintain quality control. Interestingly, other organizations like the USSR State Committee on Standards, the USSR Ministry of Chemical Industry, and the USSR Academy of Sciences have also begun to set up rental services involving very sophisticated equipment and precision instruments.44 Nonetheless, the inadequacy of supplies and the inefficiency of their administration remain constant complaints in the Soviet press. Here it is important to bear in mind that the supply function, like planning and financing, is fragmented among numerous organizations. There is no single master and alloca- 104 I tion holder of material resources, though the State Committee for Material and Technical Supply(Gossnab) presides over one of the most extensive and powerful bureaucratic empires in the country. Still, more than 75 percent of the 7000 supply and marketing organizations belongs to various ministries and departments. "Subdividing supplyfunctions," an article in Pr- la notes, "has the undesired consequence that each branch of the economy strives to supply'its own' enterprises first, frequently to the detriment of the state as a whole."45The cumbersome multi- level and multi-agency distribution system gives rise to poor coordination in planning,complicates work, and impedes the solution of even routine matters. Describing the defects of the system, the head manager of supplies for the Moscow regionobserved recently: The organizational structure of the USSR Gos- snab and it3 agencies does not yet fully meet the demands of the national economy in asmuch as the share of material resourcessold through this system is law, not over SO percent. The nationwide system has still not becomethe basic, prevailing system of supply either at the center or in local areas. As a result, production associations, enterprises, construc- ton and research organizations arecompelled to use numercius additionalchannels to find and acquire the materials and equipment they need to fulfill their plans and meet their commitments. At present there are no firmlyestablished procedures for planning and distributing the goods on the itemized lists stipulated by the USSR Gosplan and by the i.tate economic plan. Naturally, this makes for considerabledu- plication in the work of the USSR Gosplan and Gossnab." Largely because of the difficulties inobtaining materials and equipment through Gossnab,R&D facilities and production units continue to bypassthe whole ma- 105 119 terial supplies system and try to satisfy their needs illegally and by direct acquisition from producing organizations.

THE SELECTION OF RESEARCH TOPICS AND TASKS

Program and project selection in Soviet R&D facilities reflects the combined impact of possibilities and objectives. Important factors influencing technical possibilities are current Soviet state-of-the- art; the state-of-the-art abroad and potential for foreign technology acquisition; and the quality and quantity of material, labor, and capital inputs that can be directed to technology generation and acquisition. Important factors influencing objectives are the level of the decision maker, his independent or derived aspirations, and the urgency of the technical problem at hand in comparison to other claimants on resources. Influencing both possibilities and objectives is the productivity of investment in particular programs and projects, or in other words, the value of the results which may be expected from a given amount of inputs. While the selection procedures and criteria clearly differ depending upon the agency and type of R&D, and though our knowledge of the details of Soviet decision making is still limited at all levels, the following description supplies the important principles and general procedures. In all organizations and at all levels of the hierarchies the selection generally proceeds in three stages: (1) an evaluation of where the organization or entity (the nation as a whole, republic, or branch of the economy) is at a particular time; (2) an assessment of where the organization or entity is likely to be under the assumptions of combining possibilities with several variants of objectives; and (3) a selection of alternatives. The chief concern in the first stage is the set of indicators employed to evaluate status; in the second, techniques of forecasting; and in the third, the designation and hierarchy of plans, programs, and projects and the cri- u106 mi..q.00firtAti.kgri htrromtrorttrtwrt Pg.L.:A°g) 64 N. g '4. rj.F°. A P'i O wpONM,d0OrMm gMturi0 PFI 5' 5 1 24-R. 4Fol rhk(4) psogi 1110,p0mnom niJewON MtitimMti paiAnC 0 bt 131-40.1-40MH011 Oe. 0WomOmMn't 'tot-4 w ,TVrmt Vi 11. H0 5.:.10ortifrtilg g. TIrtm'OpMM k4va0m0v r 0m MO C 0) 0 0 0)a, 11 rt HOrtprig, O 0mmg0 TIOQW5iM mOWM4gm Oft relliHHI-4 1110H.M0t4.000M0 M 0 fla mnOM rT n0Hw00 rtn Om P00,...MOM glegH.r40 rt M p HI 0 0 H o pi a M ri 04 0 14. ., W H. ID ti 0 n Mg Pio tam tom n Hnm moonoPiwtnemn m5." 0°"n4 21Wo6ggOm m v IllooHoo plAmo'm Ha.101AD. oortnHp n ol-Ao MtiwOrtHill 14.MWHM VM PiamM oHi-A. IVO (DIn.mo lAmm mok4n 0m14. PoW5"4g ;.1411'4witIO4111111111"nv " 2 N OJOOOW vi-iman atil 0.&rfp,gownlImpotirl.tHI__ Aunwa gaHo o tiNnflo mi.A..m 'i.4.P11.104M 1-1 to rt '4 p vi Pi0' w (1) Di 0 k4 Pt rtH.Ors o no)tiM Hip:1m 411)0 PI 0 0 I-1 IA 0 w 60.,745.m0002 Ra0 00.a. mH. cnrttdH OP. MVD'olAma a OH. VIDa.V00MHP' o m eart191511V"Vn4PPnMM14.0vM M opoHOMPOHOAH.M nKm M 00 pi 4 ' W400004000 0 0014. POH .POOMIIOM rt 0 n 0 0 mmommogiArtF. liv001(1HM o OH lApvVmo4 O Hozra 040,d MW M rt FA Iiirt .4 0 1-.11:1 0m PM 00 00.0 0 HiAHH. H Mm 0 H OX01-14MMC6H.M H MM0g1W000 Hr H54 1001.0,4M rt HO 0 1-4 1-+ rt0 H V Hk Pi O HM wOHOP 0 r r6A fij). PPai (1) m0mOWK0mHort IWCOOMr0 4 MOKInH n m f A m w n i . A . m o oIA p. M H Pt H 1-4 m o um H014. o m o o n o 1-1 ri Oil P, rt rt 0,19 0on 400.4H. aam m MilHOM14. 000mH.mnWn aoPili MOO H.P 11 PO I.J.M0A P ',4' Mwp100 k4 (4 I 0, 1-3 0.1011 05: Niu)Pi 00q rt OQ 0 11 cr 04rt O P OH o0W 4 HM MI-400,MMOMI-4PHr CI OM W0014. 14101/440A4140,0PMH.M00, Mm14.0s 1-6 rt 0 0 00 ft M0 M 0 P PIroulaVlant14,k4Pt IDr'tHomnonH.0 000 00 0 rt Pi 4 M 0 it HI ift4 H n mook4mortrtHompo oonmp.p11.4mH PI 11 P rt P 0,4t.44rtoo pa° (1" Oo 0Nro'itcrorio t,..; 0 ywthrtoomorttiv4n" ,0 oMMot$000 HIJO.MMH0H.H Pymi,i0 H P'1.10 1114.14.0 H. n no 0WM 511V 11$0,0 011) ii.. comoMOMOP.OMtimM400 WO.M wm61 Km1-40 as m 1.4 ft 0O pommo onom000 00Hmgm 'Cm 0'1214V(14. pH mmcruom a 000r-i. n 100)41(1134511clicr Mo MPtlFh0 0 M n rPO I-4 OMP.crttOMOPOW ti VG.W"clo.OU P ,0 MrtMO OM;GPttMIOrg OC o ometp.go ommwoo c404k4HP rt rIMP'r!HAB 0 P.O 11) 0(DOw HI N. M no m 1-10 mt.4 M ivrl HO H P rt IA OMIP.1-0ZOME f0NCI, 4 hht4rtl-i. N. wMircillYgPTo Pi i nP. 0 It n 0 a>4 M it P M PP1.1a 14.000 11:31(4))) 8.H. '11.1-1' M P O n o mtOrt r t P 0 H 0 g , g , o H M T S P O M W PhNI H IPPO G I4!1-41.4Pam001-41-,1-6 M 0010HOPM0 onooMm0H0M polionm p4Om rt0 Hy Nn coMHO rt rt v* 00.00000 P ,0P.H11 amp MIDIOPOOpV m100 WID H. PIYI rot7 g rul°"tgkc4L Cl) VI-J. OHO rip004HCLI w I 11 t.4 w 1 1 0 1 4 01 Ix tn(4, MI mIiirj 0 11) k4 I P- I OA M I 0 .1 Is to be oriented to accelerating therates of scientific and technical advance and to raising the efficiency of production along the following broad lines:

1. The creation and introduction of fundamentally new tools, materials, and technological processes which surpass the best domestic and world standards 2. The comprehensive improvement of product quality in all sectors of the nationaleconomy 3. A rapid rise in the technical level of the stock of technological equipment anda faster pace of replacement and modernization of obsolete machines and units

4. A reduction in the amount of materialscon- sumed in production by improving the product mix and the design of machinery, by using advanced technology, and by utilizingmore fully raw and other materials A rise in the level of electrification of production and in the efficiency of energy use

6. 'the creation of machine systems for complete diechanization and automation of the most im- p,rtant production processes in industry, -onstruction, agriculture, and transportation 7. The renovation of existing and introduction of progressive standards and specifications for achieving a high technological level and quality of output

8. The broad introduction of modern methods of planning, organizing, and managing production, including the use of up-to-date business machines and computer technology. 48 These broad directions, expressed in terms ofappro- priate volumes, rates, and proportions, have subsequently been referred to by Soviet science policy officials as "basic indicators" for measuring scientific and technical progress.49 108 -)° In fact, the 1974 planninginstructions included, for the first time, a list of"basic technical and economic indicators" for industrialproduction, which are directlyrelated to the broad evaluativeconsid- erations noted above. Constituting a new subdivision of the plan for the developmentof science and technology, these technical standards aredesigned to serve several purposes. First, they provide criteria for determining the usefulnessand desirability of proposed research, development,and innovation measures, and inparticular for calculating the return on investment. Second, they induce enterprises to enhance technologicalperformance, raise economic efficiency, and improve product quality.Third, they aim at enforcing the utilizationof R&D results in production.50 In effect, these technicalstandards are to serve as the basicindicators for evaluating statusand for determining technological advancethroughout the planing hierarchy. The indicators are couched ingeneral terms for application to the economyas a whole and to the republics, inintermediate terms for the various branches of the economy, andin highly specific terms for separate productionunits. The general indicators include, for example, thefollowing:

1. The proportion of productsmatching or exceed- ing the best world standards

2. The volume of sales of suchproducts

3. Changes in proportion and volumeof substan- dard and obsolete products

4. The proportion of obsoleteproducts withdrawn from maaufacture to totalproducts

5. The amount of productionassimilated for the first time or assimilated inless than 3 years time

6. The degree of mechanizationand automation of labor 109 1 3 Relative reductions in the labor force due to the rising technical level of production

8. Incx_ases in labor productivity

9. Economies in the use of materials 10. Reducations in cost. Indicators for each branch or enterprise specify the production standards required to meet the general indicators, such as, the average content of nutrients in chemical fertilizers, the drilling speed of oil and gas drilling equipment, and the proportion of total steel output er plant produced by the contil.Alous smeltingmethod.51The orientation of these indicators is clearly economic and demonstrates that pressure on the scientific community is strong and growing to induce all researchers, designers, and engineers to serve the needs of the economy. It is of course difficult to conceive of a set of concrete indicators which might represent the level of achievement in a particular scientific discipline, especially in fundamental research. This is also at- tributable to the fact that no single organizational unit is held responsible for advance in a specific field, though leading Academy of Sciences departments, councils, and facilities would come closer to assum- ing this role than may comparable American facility. Accordingly, the state of advance in a scientific discipline is evaluated in informal discussion within the relevant scientific community and more formal de- liberation in a scientific problem council of the Academy or of the GKNT responsible for the area. So- viet status relative to the rest of the world is also certainly an important consideration. Prospective paths of scientific and technical advance are determined through forecasts, a procedure which really constitutes the first stage of planning. Much attention has been given in the USSR in recent years to S&T forecasting. Its development has been encouraged in large part to broaden the short time 110 horizon and to alter the incremental styleof Soviet decision making and thereby improve strategicplan- ning in both science policy and economicpolicy. SEeT forecasts are projections ofalternate trends in major areas of science and technology. The variants ultimately selected as abasis for planning reflect established priorities andpreferred options, ideally arrived at by comparative evaluationof ex- pediency, costs, and benefits. The approved forecasts are the foundation forso-called "basic directions in the development of scienceand technology during the five-year plan period." The incorporation in forecasts of the combined impactof possibilities and objectives is reflected inthe fact that subsequent "basic directions" are designated asthe framework for addressing the "basic S&Tproblems" listed in the five-year plan. Forecasts may be short term(5-7 years), medium term (10-15 years), and long term(20 years and over) and impact on the respective planperiods accordingly. Short-term forecasts are used in machinebuilding and metalworking to project newmodels of machinery and equipment. The longer term forecasts are used to project new types of products orengineering systems. They are commonly made for problems or areas of nationalimportance, and sometimes for branches when the problemis clearly withinthe confines of a particular branch. Long-term forecats have been prepared, for example, forthe fuel and energy balance up to the year 2000, forhydro-electric power, long-termchemicalization, and development ...)f branches of heavyindustry.52 Thougi more than 150 diffe,:...ut forecastingmethods have been developed, they fall generallyinto three major types: extrapolation, expertjudgment, and modeling. Techniques of extrapolation areusually used in areas where changes aregradual and not disrupted by radically new discoveries. The future is projected largely on the basis of thecontinuation of present tendencies of development. In expert judgment, forecasting involves analysis of trendsby groups of 111 experts in particular fields and the weighing of opinions as to predominant probabilities in science and technology. The method of modeling consists of building information models, games models, mathematical models, and other systems of logic incorporating present and future technical and economic characteristics in particular fields of R&D.53 In general, methods of collectiveexpertise and evaluation are most frequently used,particularly when broad or nebulous questions areunder examination, such as prospective advance inan area of fundamental science. Modeling is leastused. This is certainly in part due to the heavy demands placed on extensive and consistent data panels and on careful specification of parameters. Modeling is more ame- nable to such tasks as the projection of performance characteristics for certain categories of machinery and the development of branch-of-the-economy forecasts.54 On the procedural side, the forecasting of R&D of national or interbranch scope is directed and monitored by the "Big Four" planning agencies: the USSR Academy of Sciences, the GKNT, Gosplan, and Gosstroy (the USSR State Committee for Construction Affairs). The Academy and the GKNT, in particular, are the main agencies in this activity. Each maintains an elabo- rate structure of special probl-- councils and expert groups which separately and jointly conduct forecasting studies. S&T forecasting that is limited to an intrabranch focus is the province of relevant branch ministries, though subject to constraints imposed by central forecasts. Branch-wide forecasts selected by the ministries are also submitted to the "big four" agencies for review and approval.55 It needs to be noted, however, that the whole area of scientific forecasting and technology assessment continues to suffer from serious deficiencies. Long- range planning and forecasting are still relatively undeveloped on the branch level. Some branches, Nol- ting points out, do not even bother to draw up forecasts or perspective plans of intrabranch R&D. Fore- 112 casting in these ministries is confined tothat portion of R&D conducted in connection withmajor interbranch S&T programs.56 Serious complaints are regis- tered regarding the quality of forecasts. The latter frequently do not take into account economic return, eocial consequences, the dynamics of prices,etc.57 The real problem is that no universallyacceptable methods have been found for evaluating thesefactors, nor is there any agreement onhow they interface. Be- cause of these generalevaluative deficiencies, forecasting continues to 71:ve so-celled"black spots" that reduce its value as an instrumentof Soviet planning and analytical tool for decidingproblems of choice. Nonetheless, with evaluations of current status and forecasts in hand, planners areprepared to select programs and projects. The selection of programs is aniterative process among experts andcouncils in a position to know the constraints placed on R&D by the availabilityof in- tellectual, human, and material resources, onthe one hand, and the economic and political authoritieswho provide the objectives and orientationfor science on the other. The selection of programs and projects and their subsequent eit.iaggregationgenerally follow administrative lines corresponding to theinfrastruc- ture depicted in chapter 9. In important instances, however, problems are of interbranchsignificance, and R&D conducted on the problem requirescoordina- tion between Academy, university,and/or industrial facilties of several ministries. Similar, multi-facility programs are developed within ministries. The delegation and management of programs andprojects, both administratively and functionallyoriented, is discussed in greater detail later in this chapter. For now, attention is given only tothe selection of original projects at various levels andparticularly the criteria of selection. National and branch long-range plans for S&T are essentially a bridge between forecastsand the five- year plan. The long -range plan is "apparently a ten- tative selection of the variants ofbasic directions yielded by the forecasts and sets forthin broad 113 terms the new technology to be developed."58 Five- year and annual plans are the operational periods for program sei_t_r:tion and control, and the basic S&T problems that are included in the national economic plan form the orientation for much of the R&D performed in the Soviet Union, both because of their magnitude and the high priority attached to their solution. In the Eighth (1966-1970) and Ninth (1971-1975) Five- Year Plans the basic problems reportedly consumed about 40 percent of the allocations to science, while in the Tenth Plan (1975-1980) they garnered about 25 percent of the official science budget. The number of problems has also ',een reduced from nearly 250 to around 200. The links between S&T forecasts, basic directions, and basic problems as well as the latter's subsequent breakdown into programs and projects are depicted in Figure 10-3. The list of basic S&T problems is prepared by the State Committee for Science and-Technology in collaboration with Gosplan and the Academy of Sciences. Ap- parently only about 10 percent of the problems--the most important--actually go to the Council of Minis- ters (and most likely the Politburo) for approval at the highest level, but this portion probably absorbs more than half of all expenditures. The rest are more likely then approved on the spot by the "Big Four" central planning agencies.59The largest of the work programs associated with these problems un- dergo expert evaluation at the State Expert Commis- sion of the USSR Gosplan. For individual programs, the GKNT organizes the expert judgment. The basic criteria for the selection of these problems of national priority are their interbranch im?ortance, their social significance, and the technical-economic benefit to be derived from their solution. The list of basicp°roblems reportedly contains no military projects.b A basic S&T problem is defined as a complex of in- terrelated tasks, the fulfillment of which plays an important role in accelerating technological modernization of the national economy as a whole. The "solution" of a problem takes generally one of the fol-

114 FIGURE 9-3 COMPONENTS OF THE SYSTEMOF RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND INNOVATION PLANNING IN THE USSR

Party and Government Economicd Decisions -canonic and Social Forecasts

Sciencific and Technical Expertise and tnformation Variants of Scioncilic and Technical Forecast Panic Directions in - Developmenc of the i Nacional Economy For ?erspective at.d 5-year Periods "V/ 3esic Direction in It= for Perspective or 5-year Period (chosen variant)

Basic SZT Problem of 5-year Period

Program ail 5-year Period 211hilleamI General General Assignmenc or Assignment or Target Target

Specific Specific Project: or Job 1Pro!ect or Job

Source: Louvain E. Nolting,The Planning of Research, Development, and Innovation inthe U.S.S.R., p. 20. 115 lowing forms:

1. Development and assimilation of new systems of machines, new equipment for mechanization and automation, and new materials and products

2. Development and assimilation of improved technological processes and methods of reducing environmental pollution

3. Improvements in production organization and management, including the introduction of automated control and management information systems

4. Work on problems in the fields of construction, architecture, agriculture, and public health. To solve the 200 basic S&T problems in the current Tenth Plan, nearly 1900 new kinds of machines, instruments, and products, 900 new economical materials, more than 1000 new technological processes, and shout 700 automated control systems are slated for development.61 In general, fundamental research problems are not included among the basic S&T problems but are listed among the problems in the natural and social sciences, which are also funded from the State Budget. For example, only six percent of the basic problems in the Eighth Plan incorporated the fundamental research stage, but none was limited to it. More than half of the problems were confined to areas of applied research ..ad/or development. Only about 40 percent of the problems extended through the stage of innovation and production assimilation.62 In accord with the increasing emphasis in science policy on the need to utilize R&D results in the economy, the list of 200 basic problems in the Tenth Plan contains a greater proportion of innovation-directed projects. More than half of the new hardware, technology, and materials in development are planned to be carried through to the phase of trial lot 7produc-

0'/ i16 tion or to the successful operation of production processes.453 To illustrate the nature and variety of basic S&T problems, let us offer the following examples from the Tenth Plan. There are programs devoted to the development and expanded use of numerically-controlled machine tools and the development of modern equipment for mechanizing and automating local materials handling and warehouse operations as well as timber cut- ting. Other programs focus on raising the unit capacity of machines and equipment, especially for the chemical, power, and ferrous metallurgical industries. These include building large ammonia producing plants, and turbines and generators with a capacity of 500, 800, and 1000-1200 megawatts; developing ultra-long 1500 kV DC and 1150 kV AC transmission lines and nuclear power plants equipped with 1500 megawatt reac- tors; and designing special excavatingmachines with 40, 65, and 180 cubic meter bucket draglines for coal mining. On another level are basic problems in the development of furnaceless metallurgy, spindlelessspin- ning, and shuttleless weaving. New methods of producing metal and high-grade steels, including oxygen converters and electric smelting, are the subjects of other programs. At the Oskol Electrometallurgical Combine technology will be introduced for the production of steel by direct reduction of iron ore without blast furnace processing. Still other programs concentrate on the production of efficient materials, such as synthetic resins and plastics. Develop- ments in laser technology and in industrial rcbots also figure among the basic S&T problems. Finally, problems in applied research--rather than development or innovation--include programs on the use of scientific principles ofsuperconductivity and magneto-hydrodynamics, space and oceans research, mo- lecular biology, and seismology. A basic S&T problem in the field of public health concerns thedevelopment of methods and means for theprevention, diagno- sis, and treatment of cardiovascular disorders. Other

117 programs deal with ways to protect the soil against erosion as well as research on plant nutrition and ways of raising soil fertility.64 The procedure for project selection at lower levels of the hierarchy is similar, although correspon- dingly shorter and simpler with fewer organizations involved. In Academy and university facilities, "Initiative" fundamental research not associated with problems of superior bodies or contractual obligations materially reflects the professional interests of the individual or research .-311ectives. In industry, ministries define problems of branch importance in the same way that all-union R&D problems are defined. The ministry scientific-technical council is the chief consultative body. Large production associations and other establishments may engage in a similar procedure. In general, while personnel in industrial institutes, design bureaus, and production establishments may have some latitude to pursue their professional interests, the heavily applied nature of the work at these facilities severely limits the scope of R&D. Indeed, the selection process itself is influenced by the character of the R&D in question. While the consumer of the results frequently influences project selection in industrial R&D, the resource base--the qualifications, creative potential, and experience-- - of the fundamental research organization also tends to limit the scope of its work. In planning fundamental research, Larichev notes that "the resources of the executors predetermine to a considerable degree the goals that are achieved."On the other hand, for predominantly development-oriented projects "the composition of the performers has comparatively small influence on the goals that are achieved; the same R&D can be assigned to different groups of performers." Applied RAD occupies an intermediate position in this regard.65Academician Kapitsa also observes that with fundamental research planning "the choice of talented individuals should have priority, even over the choice of subjects."As he points out, "A lame man cannot be taught to run however -.Duch money is spent on him."66 118 Precise figures are not available on the proportions of R&D directly planned by central authorities, the branch ministries, and local R&D performers. Al- though the 200 basic S&T problems account for only about 25 percent of total official R&D, central planning is not limited to these programs and may approach 40 to 50 percent, in Nolting's opinion.Ministerial- ly planned R &D activities constitute probably about 30 percent of the total effort while lower level performers account for theremainder.67 Throughout the discussion of selection, we have referred to the pertinent criteria. In general, at all levels and in all organizations criteria may be grouped in three categories--economic, technical, and social--with emphasis on the first. The criteria themselves also are similar throughout the economy, with allowance for the pertinent arena of the decision maker. Both the problems and the answers should generally be formulated in a language appropriate for the given planning environment. That is, scientific evaluation, Larichev explains, "in spirit should be a concrete response to problems of theplanning organization." "Logical models of information conversion which use verbal definitions of qualities are more practical than mathematicalones," he adds.68 In general, strong preference exists for relatively simple evaluative methods and indicators rather tLan for highly sophisticated analytical techniques and complex quantitative formulas. For the moat part, R&D questions are seen by Larichev and other Soviet science analysts to fall into the class of"weakly structured decision problems," for which modern systems analytic techniques, includingcost/effectiveness methods, are not very useful. Only in the more deterministic world of production-oriented development projects are these conceptual aidsdeemed to be of value in planning and deciding problems of choice and uncertainty.69Also as a general rule, Kapitsa notes that the figures to be watched in projectplan- ning are not the absolute ones but the relative In- dicesthe percentages of the total used for sala- riesfor administration, for scientific equipment, etc.,0

119 ;) Until the late 1960s, economic criteria did not figure prominently in Soviet R&D decision making. Scientists and engineers were generally not sensitive to parametersof"cost" and to constraints on resources. Their dominant attitude, as expressed in the Academy's main journal, was that "there is no un- equivocal criterion for the resources that should be allocated to science. All of us must try to obtain the greatest amount of resources possible."71Once when commenting upon the difficulties the leadership faced in drawing up the first list of basic S&T problems, Academician Kirillin, Chairman of the GKNT, observed that scientists did not always help policymakers resolve the problems of choice. They willingly gave positive endorsements and sometimes were indeci- sive about a particular problem. But almost never did they render negative opinions.72 Similarly, the economic benefit or return of proposed R&D was not always considered, much less cal- culated, in the selection process. In 1968, for example, the branch plan for the development of new technology prepared by the Ministry of Instrument Ma- king, Automation Equipment, and Control Systems included estimates of the economic return for only six percent of its applied research work, for about 30 percent of the undertakings devoted to the creation of management information systems, and for about 60 percent of the projects dealing with the degqlopment of new instruments and means of automation. The absence of calculations of economic return is explained in large part by the fact that they were not obligatory at this time. "Without estimates of economic return,"E. V. Kosov notes, "It is impossible to evaluate and compare the activity of organizations working in the field of science and technology."74 Suffice it to say that mince the late 1960s Krem- lin authorities have mandated that all R&D projects in the plan must be supported by calculations of economic return redounding to the users of the new technology and to the economy as a whole. The main aim of this requiromer.t is to weed out nonpaying, imprac- tical R&D, to promote technological innovation, and 3.; 120 to raise the general cost-effectiveness consciousness of the R&D sector. For basic S&T problems of national priority, the prescribed indicators of economic effectiveness include specific capital investments, Labor costs, expenditures on materials, electric power per unit of increase in production capacity, and general expenditures in terms of cost. For each problem there is also compiled a technical level chart which compares the projected new technology with the beat domestic and foreign technology, indicates the branches of the economy in which the new technology is to be applied, and gives rough projections of the demand and export potential for the new or improved technology.75 The economic orientation of the criteria and their similarity to the indicators of development described earlier are apparent. Nonetheless, the requirement to include calculations of economic return in R&D planning is not uni- versally observed and enforced. Basic science appears generally to be excluded from this policy and from the subject matter of the "economics of research,"a special field of study that has emerged in the USSR since the mid-1960s. As one of its leading experts observes, It is not possible to reduce the labor embodied in Mendeleyev's discovery of the periodic table to the cost of the cards on which the atomic weights of chemical elements are entered and to the cost of the sheets of paper on which Mende- leyev recorded his idea of the periodic law.76 More broadly, too, cost/effectiveness estimates tend to be neglected or arc elaborated pro forma simply to justify decisions already made. The crux of the matter is that no uniform set of procedures has been established for defining and calculating economic return applicable to individual branches and enterprises. In general, L. Gliazer notes, "Almost all economic calculations that are presently made in science have a low degree of reliability. Here broad use is made of various kinds of analytical techniques that impart the appearance of objectivity to all manner of 121 subjective constructions."77 S. M. Yampolskiy also concludes that the calculation of economic return has been made mandatory, in effect, only fo: projects of major importance approved by the USSR Council of Min- isters or for special bonus projects in which an enterprise assimilates a technology new to theUSSR.78 Even for the highest priority basic SST problems, however, economic analysis has limitations and deficiencies. Among the current 200 basic problems economic return was not determine.1 in a number of cases , nor were the technical level charts alwayscomplete and accurate. In some instances, information was lacking on important indicators. Analogies were sometimes used and not the latest achievements in comparing technological merit. As a GKNT official notes, "All this prevented the conduct of careful analysis and expert review for all the problems. It is necessary to give more attention to analysis and evaluation of new technology, to make more precise the information on the technical level charts."79 Studies by Soviet science policy specialists in the early 1970s exposed a number of analytical and methodological deficiencies in the handling of this special class of decision problems. Commenting on the experience of cost overruns--sometimes quite stag- gering--among the 246 basic SST problems during the Eighth Five Year Plan, Kosov and Popov concluded that "cost" was not, in fact, substantiated in the system of coordination plans for these problems. No reliable or universal methodology was used in calculating the cost of either individual projects or programs as a whole. Nor was there any consistent effort to relate cost to economic return. Economic return was not an important or obligatory object ofplanning. There was also some duplication among the problems so that parallel programs existed, for example, on developing new kinds of paper, new types of irrigation systems for agriculture, and data processing systems for handling S&T inf,irmation.80 Other specialists, including O. I. Volkov, Boris Zaitsev, and Boris La- pin, also conclude that the coordination plans for 1966-1970 were deficient in "economic effectiveness."81For the most part, the methods of planning 1 3G122 basic problems did not change until the Tenth Plan, when central authorities tightened up on procedures and laid down the "basic technical-economic indicators" to guide the selection process. All the same, despite improvements in calculating effectiveness, economic return on R&D is not an absolute criterion for selection of basic problems. There are other factors, such as national prestige, defense, social and even technological goals, that may override considerations of economic benefit and cost/effectiveness ratio. V. N. Arkhangelskiy, a major authority on the planning and financing of R&D, labels this the "criterion of necessity."In cases where this criterion applies, he writes, only the cost and not the economic return need beestimated.82 Though he gives no specific examples of basic SAT problems that fit this category, we can surmise that "necessity" may have determined the choice of some of the research-oriented problems in the areas of space, oceanography, public health, and atomic energy. Examples of past technology-oriented basic problems that may have been perceived in these terms were the development of the Soviet supersonic transport plane, the TU-l44, and the new series of Arktik class atomic ice breakers. Even more difficult to quantify than economic criteria are the two others, technical and particularly social criteria. But these exert significant influence on project selection. The project to mechanize production operations at the large ZIL truck plant IP a case in point. As a Soviet case study of the decision-making process that underlay this modernization program notes: The program of reconstruction had great economic, technical, and social significance. The economic significance of the program consisted in that it was viewed as the creation of significant economic return: the growth of labor productivity, increase of profitability of production, and guaranteeing stability of quality production. 123 13? ,, a) .. I I a) i Ai 0 I-1 a) 0 a) co I (.) a) I t11 I ca .r4 u) 4 P-1 0 H N 1 I 1.1 A I 0 PO rdPI N (44./ 44 0 irl CY) 0 (6001 fia4 1 044 4.i 0w .1-11 .1, fj 8 '8 ° (t 01NP41 El (/)(0 1 W 0 1:/ 0 14 0 0 41 4-1v-1 (13 u404 fa' 0 (4 0 0 ((idIlir°. 4-1 (0(0 4/ 0 (0 4-1 W >1 irl0) 4-1 (1) C./orl DI 0 4) 0 4-4 14 (1) 44 44(.)1.14 C./ 1-1 41e(9 9-1 0 1-14i0(00 (0 )rci gl ge;:i4 (00:1 fj 0 4)id.rig 0440 OWO 04 'r1 114041-114t 0 1), . in (iii) 4-10 O'.4 rig,_ . C.) ti (2g 4-1 41 60 (1) 0 ti ° 4H 8 si;JI c'di v ouvook tuu4J0 0Q , III0 El .r44./4.)

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The Academy of Sciences, Gosplan, and the GKNT, representing their respective areas of R&D, coordinate and establish the basic objectives, render- ing them more detailed and comprehensive. The GKNT, in particular, has overall responsibility for plan formulation on the functionally oriented program plans. "Control figures," or preliminary plan assignments, are transmitted down the respective hierarchies--Academy, ministry, republic - -to the performing organizations. This stage should be completed by the middle of the year. Establishments prepare draft plans which are rout- ed up through the hierarchy, aggregated at each stage. They are considered and reconciled (with bargaining) by the triad of central management organs noted above. This stage should be completed by the end of Septem- ber. Plans are then approved by the Council of Min- isters and the Politburo, approved by the Supreme So- viet, and transmitted down the administrative ladder with formal and official plan assignments specified at c- .h level. Preparation of five-year plans proceeds in a similar fashion with, of course, a different time frame. Integration of the various sets of plan targets contained in the separate plan chapters is highly important and sometimes essential. At the least, for example, supply and production targets must be largely consistent, but the same is true for R&D and especially innovation targets. The latter assignments generally disrupt normal establishment operations and, if not accounted for in the plan, may thereafter threaten fulfillment of primary production tasks. On the positive side, primary production assignments can function as a strong stimulus to innovation if they 130 o rt Cr PdigmInVIntP') 11 rOt gln Pl tpil Hrxn roil) rg Pa gi g of: 2 Nt2' ' 2> is t.,,0 "1,4,1161 ig Hi 0110 Hi 1 rt Q. 11 tirt rt rt#.I. w w to P.Pa 04"En3 ei etti: 0 t.. pacl,1:44 to 4o. I r rpt 110v1;1 40nrop.ntratwol:ImPlwriwN ,I' tH 0 m 04°Allo rt 4tirtioPo ro oo p. rt H. 0 0 n rt g 2 6 as o tottlrt. lik P4al M ft I'D I'D M 0 0 11 H t1 lo"1 g (a)) Fol P11 04 p,) v g 0 0 a 01 tose M 0 0 CIO PIIIM n 0 P (I)P.t1 Hi °5 0 a o 11IV IA 4 11 110 0 0 0 W H. P.. 0 0 IA IA ft M 4 4 0 0 0 0 PO n 4 M 0 P. ri M tDrf f3, Ph 0 I-' 0 0 0 0 P.glirlia:DIVrtrgagA th PtIor!iql P Vtflirt 41.14-11"4 4Mi4CD H rt nmoll-i ooma.0 v...omreo,,tn- CO 0 0 M rt 0 4 Pi 0 rt H FPI rj4 H. I-I rt Naar rt 0 rt M fl rt P. 0 rt rt H M M gl"VA a 0(D N 0 H f!t ri 2 0")Ag CV10.4 g71 4 111ti1m4 rt 164 11. H to 0 H V 04 i.A. n to1-11-4 04 0 0' Hs 0 H. 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The relative autonomy enjoyed by the Academy system clearlyis at- tributable more to the nature of fundamental research than to any conscious decision on the part of the regime. Indeed, any degree of autonomy is likely to be granted grudgingly. This leaves open the question of how the leadership influences the course of Academy and university fundamental research. While certainly not well defined, the process of issuing "basic directions" for science and technology appears to be significant. Un- like plan targets, basic directions do not have the force of law. In an important way, however, they partly substitute for plan targets in areas where (1) superior agencies are not qualified to fix detailed plan assignments, or (2) superior agencies are not administratively capable ofdetermining approllri- atetargets.9'The former concerns situations where the performers themselves are uniquely capableof determining the specific course of their work(e.g., Academy departments). Political authorities, for example, would not regularly presume to judge the merits of this or that research project in theoretical physics, but, by specifying the broad objectives to which a department's research program shouldcontrib- ute, the leadership guides theselection of assignments. The second condition is more interestingbecause it is pervasive in science and the economy.Optimal- ly, decision making at all levels should bechanneled by a combination of specific orders, incentives,and penalties to assure that all activities contributeto the accomplishment of goals set by thecentral leaders. In fact, decision makers frequently havesub- stantial autonomy, either because activitiesunder their jurisdiction have not been adequately encom- passed by the instructions of superiors orbecause elements of these instructions may conflict. Insuch 132 -I IC, instances, the basic directions provide a set of highly visible priorities to which decision makers can flexibly relate in deciding problems of choice. Basic directions facilitate the practice described by American observers as "decentralizing through priorities." In an important way, then, they form "a parallel mechanism to the plan, ideally correcting for the plan's limitations and contradictions. 1,10u Finally, the significance of the "basic directions" has been attested to in a message by General Secre- tary Brezhnev to the Academy of Sciences on its 250th Birthday: Scientists and specialists in the various branches of the natural sciences, technology, and the social sciences have given and are continuing to give the Party enormous help in accomplishing all these tasks and in working out plans and implementing them. For this, the Party gives them all heartfelt thanks. However, comrades, in the future you will have to work even harder, more persistently and more effectively. We have no intention of dictating to you the details of research topics--that is a matter for the scientists themselves. But the basic directions of the development of science, the main tasks that life poses, will be determined jointly.101 In the industrial ministry hierarchy, research, development, and innovation objectives must be incorporated with other economic goals. The character of R&D at this stage, especially the increased predict- ability of results, eases the task somewhat. The disaggregation is usually straight-forward, although difficult to realize in practice. Targets of all-union importance, by way of the GKNT, are included in plans of ministries along with tasks of branch significance initiated at that level. As a rule, the technical administration of the ministry is charged with formulating branch targets, a process which in principle is conducted in close coordination with the economic- 133 to 9 tbi `g1. 61 Pc, ftt6ItP. 14 rtil / .6.4id 1;1 f,), ci,2,°I-1 rg ut Om .'6""te"c°gl" ! /°.)11 SI m li g m 0:1":: 5. liin 3H. > ti91 fi PtE r/o11o1 m eh Th-i4n n 0 H. H. og t4 riit o n 1-i 0 1-a p.. 4p.QQ(.4110q:1 VIptM r;t0401.Volpt 0,,.. (14 6ecla mg g 1!)1 6" G. rt goT1 1" 1:Vr't 0oII ';' fill 13 c/1 g R 135. r/,... r 0 r ri i. ,-, 0 1 . F., _.... 9OQ -.41-10::r ut Ot4 (I)Pt w -4 oil 4 g".41 it . , ,,,,t0 0 w ,,,. 0 ,.0.0 00 ?,. F., .,04 f'i) ti toHI M M to 5' ° c'' 11 Rm15'0 tP:1) It 1 ;)t 1;141'44 w: r, :i 1 " " 11 Pt ti." 07 0'' . H 0) 0 rt OQ (1) H rt f) to H ki H ri M (1'4CI. p. 0 rt rt to.. won't 0.w0) (0 rt 0 H. 0) 1-1. alIA rt g (4 ra 11 0'0 rt tfia' 11) 1 0' 1-4 0 ID rt f)

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Furthermore, contractual relationshipsand commitments between performer and consumerestablish- ments do not includesupply organizations and hence do not influence thelatter's behavior in meeting the needs of contractingparties.106 The system of contracts as such does not and cannotinsure the mutual responsibility for the fulfillment ofassumed tasks. It is not an effective legalinstrument for conducting business. Its bass deficiencies are a contin- ual reminder that the Soviet systemis fundamentally a system of administrativerules and plans, not a system of law, at least inthe Western sense of the term. Multiagency Programs Earlier in this chapter wediscussed the procedure and criteria for designatinginprtar4L S.ST problems. By design, all elements ofthe problems are. delineat- ed with relatively littlec.,nsideration f the organizational infrastructure sL:1377ortf.research and development. The leadership in:_ends thatthe problems be defined on technical andeconomic grounds a=d not be artificially circumscribedby organizational considerations. Partly as a result ,most problems are of interbranch importance,sr,metimes involvin&- facilities from all of the R&Dhie-.:-archies. Hence, special plans or programs aredeveloped to direct work on such problems. In she Eighth (1966-1970)and Ninth (1971-1975) Five-Year Plans the main managerialdevice for integrating the whole complex oftasks and projects involved in solving a priority SSTproblem was called a "coordination plan." In the Tenth Plan coordination plans have been replaced by"scientific and technical programs," which are generally morecomprehensive and specify more clearlythe introduction of results. There were approximately 2/.Crcoordination plans and are now about 200 programs,the reduction in number largely accounted for by the greatercomprehensive-

138 ness of programs. Responsibility for a particular basic problem is assigned by the GKNT to themost ap- priate ministry or department, designated the "head ministry" or lead agency. As a rule, the latter is the main consumer of the results of the solutionto the problem. By their nature, basic S&T problemsare large- scale, complex science policy efforts. The 246 problems in the Eighth Plan, for example,were broken down by the lead agencies intoover 3000 assignments and projects and distributed to appropriate performers. The USSR Ministry of the Chemical Industry, for example, acted as the head ministry for 14 basic problems. R&D organizations and production units from more than 20 different ministries and departments were enlisted to work on them. At the same time, R&D facilities of the Ministry of the Chemical Industry participated as coperformers in nearly 150 projects for 51 problems under the auspices of 27 ministries and departments. Similarly, the USSR Ministry of Heavy, Power, and Transport Machine Buildingwas responsible for solving 10 basic problems In which 23 other ministries took part. This ministry, in turn. worked on more than 240 projects dealing with different priority problems for which other ministries were in charge. In total, more than 65 all-union and union-republic ministries died agencies as well as over 350 performing organizat'.ans were involved in the activity related to this select list of problems. Some problems alone had as many as 50 or more institutional paLz_icipants.1°7 The overall magnitude of effort remains about the same for the current 200 basic S&T problems. The total number of ministries and departments has climbed to over 70 while the number of performing establishments exceeds 400.With the transfer to more comprehensive work programs that extend through the innovation stage, the average number of organizational actors engaged on a given problem has grown. In addition, the USSR Academy of Sciences is involved on more than half of the 200 programs. About one-third of the basic problems also entail the participation 139 of various East Europeanstates who are membersof the Soviet-led Councilfor Mutual Economic Assis- tance.108 While the GKNT has acentral role in establishing methodology for programformulation, in approval of draft plans, inauthorization of funding,and in monitoring implementation,the branch ministry or organization selected as thelead agency is accordedpri- mary operationalauthority and responsibility. The lead agency drafts the plan orwork program for the problem, distributesspecific assignments, arranges for financial and materialsupport, and acceptsthe completed work from thevarious performers. In preparing the plan, thehead ministry creates acommis- sion of experts fromvarious organizationswhich works in close collaborationwith the scientific- technical council and thetechnical administration of the ministry aswell as the R&D facilityselected by the ministry to bethe lead scientificorganiza- tion for the problem. Through the expertcommission, the ministry setspreliminary assignments,determines possible prrarmers,including organizationsunder its own jurisdiction andsubordinate to other ministries to whom certainportions of the work canbe contracted out, and fixesapproximate deadlinesfor implementation. These are then sent tothe appropriate ministries andagencies which, directlywith their R&D units,consider the possibilityof meeting the targeted technicalgoals within suggestedtime and cost c-)rstraints. Some performers comeback with counterproposals regardingdeadlines, financing, and technical criteria. To settle unclearissues and to facilitate final agreement,the head ministry organizes bilateral andmultilateral discussions. Any disputes that cannotbe resolved by interagencybargain- ing are arbitrated atthe GKNT. The final draft ver- sion of the plan or programis also sent to theGKNT for adjustment andapproval. The organizationof work on a basic S&Tproblem is illustratedin Fig- ure 10-4. One issue which isstill not settled isthe extent to which thelead agency can imposeits authority over the facilitiesof another ministryin the event 140 1 5 4 FIGURE 9-4 ORGANIZATION OF R&D FOR THE SOLUTION OF AN IMPORTANT SST PROBLEM

State Committeefor Science and Technology

Scientific Council for Fe .11 the S3.7. Problem

4 `finistry Responsible for Solution of the SST Problem

_IScientiZic-Technical Council

I of the ,Iinistry Ministr7 Technical Admin4str3tion was -17

Lead R&D Organization 11=11 IIMP ------for the Problem

Minist.'"es and Agencies of the :7SSR and

a . '.:nion Republics, RSO Organizations, and MP OD MI.I :industrial Enterprises Participating in he Solution of the SST Problem

I R&D Organizations and Mndustrial Enterprises Participating in the L .111.alb --I Solution of the Problem

Administrative Links Functional Links

Source: "USSR Short Answers to US Questions," p. 17. 141 of conflict between program and branch assignments. Clearly, the authorities attempt to preempt such.oc- currences by requiring that program assignments be fully incorporated in branch and establishment plans. Presumably, this is an area where the authority of the GKNT can be exerted. Interestingly, one of the developmen*-s in the transfer from coordination plans to programs is enhancement of the role of the GKNT. Where a single ministry does not dominate in a program, the State Committee can assume the responsibility of project distribution and direction. Examples of such areas among the current 200 programs are computer technology and environmental protection.109 To illustrate both the size and complexity of such plans and programs, it is of interest to recount in some detail the experience of developing the advanced thereto- electric turbine. Each of the involved organizations is represented in Figure 10-5 by administrative affiliation. The prototype T-250/300-240 turbine was created as part of the solution to the problem, "To Develop and Take Measures to Ensure the Fur- ther Development of Centralized Heat Supply for Cit- ies and Industrial Enterprises."The latter was one of the 246 basic S&T problems included in the Eighth Five Year Plan. The lead agency in this instance was the Ministry of Power and Electrification. The following tasks were included in the coordination plan for this particular project:-10

No. Nature of Tasks Responsible Performer 1. Issuance of the tech-The scientific-techni- nical tasking for thecal council of the Min- design of the turbinesistry of Power and Elec- trification

2. Examination and ap- The scientific-techni- proval of the prelim-cal council of the Min- inary project design istry of Power and Elec- of the turbine instal-trification lationb

3. Approval of the tech-The scientific-techni- nical project design cal council of the Min- of the turbines istry of Power and Elec- trification 1 -4" 142 4. Outfitting the primaryThe Urals Turbine Motor test bench for the as-Plant (UTMZ) and the sembly and testing of Ministry of Construc- the turbine tion of the RSFSR

5. Building the prototype UTMZ of the turbine generator

6. Manufacturing the feed-The "Ekonomayzer" Plant er turbine pump for theand the Kaluga turbine turbine installation plant

7. Constructing the test The USSR Ministry of stands for full-scale Power and Electrifica- trials at the Sredne- tion Urals combined heat and power supply station

8. Assembly of the pri- The Mosenergo electric mary and auxiliary power station, the Mos- equipment for the Mos- energomontazh trust, energo electric power UTMZ, and the Taganrog station boiler factory

9. Conducting start-up The National Trust for operations and testing the organization and the blocks with the rationalization of re- T-250/300-240 turbine gional electric power at the Mosenergo elec-stations and systems tric power station (ORGRES), Mosenergo, UTMZ, TKZ

10. Checking the vibrationORGRES, Mosenergo, the condition of the ro- All-Union Thermotech - tors, stresses in the nical Institute, UTMZ, vanes, temperature TsKTI fields and transfer- ences under different conditions of turbine operation, and checking the system of control and oil supply, the economy of the tur- 143 -Lk) bine generator, and characteristics of the heat exchangers in different operating regimes

aThe technical tasking is compiled by the organizations that order the equipment for the manufacturer and contains all of the basic requirements of the consignee: unit power, basic steam parameters (pressure, temperature); parameters of the extracted steam (pressure, temperature, amount), the magnitude of vacuum, assigned temperature and amount of cooler water, specific ex- penditure of heat per generated kilowatt hour, etc. bThe preliminary project design is compiled by the manufacturer of the equipment and serves as the basis for developing several variants of the or- dered turbine. The elaboration of several variants is required for the final choice of the turbine by the consignee. cThe technical project design serves as the basis for the final development of the thermal and design system of the turbine and is done in accord with the approved draft design based on the variant selected by the consignee. In the technical design all of the basic qualitative indicators of the turbine are finally refined: the specific flow rate of heat, vacuum, internal efficiency of the cylinders, etc. The technical design is examined by experts of the consignee and is approved by the latter. The technical design also determines the manufactured price of the turbine and is the ba.sis for drafting the working blueprints and other technical documentation of the plant which is manufacturing the turbine. Each task was also divided into separate work stages and projects. Later, in the course of installing and adopting the turbine it became necessary to make certain changes both in the design of the turbine and in the thermal 144 5 s OF THE T-250/300-240 FIGURE 9-5 ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED IN THE DEVELOPMENT

THERMAL ELECTRIC TURBINE

05S1 MINISTERS

61....1140 16411AWIPM10~ .41 1... ,Mlnlatry)of Pam' State ensmItier Ministry at Oa Ministry at heavy,POW for Science and tinctrotichntcal and Napoli MAW Ad Electrification Technology (CENT) Industry Wilding (until SDI) ;Special

1.1 Criertlerldn I klentItic- hchn Council Main Atiministtat Inn 1:.ntral for Antler *044 Tu,rbint Construct inn Turbine InIn Administrations .no Institute

(TUTU National Trust fur Urals Turbine Organization and Motor Plant All-Union Stele instioar All-Anlon bt lenal 'ration of _Kahle Turbine fur the Resign and PlanningThereat Techni- Regional Electric Plant of Thermal Electric Power cal Nat tote Power Stations Elektrorils lionomyter Plants (TErIDELITTIOtilinTEKT) (VT1) Systems (WAS)

.Vennkov Arwatime Trust (or kelp :Hid Macon Regional All -onion Plant Manning Energy Power Systes Scient if it Installations laningrad Metals Aden istrat ion Re4earch Plant (FAIMPRITAZIIPROYEKT) (nOSOIERCO) Institute

littl ler Cleaning Trust of Hydro- KMINKAISTKATnmt Englneering (VNIIC) ...... " Design it Planning Central Electrical Office of MosenerguH Power installation (roSMENAPROYErt) Trust (ELEETIOTSrOtiOgrAZI1 Trust)

InntaliAlon-ApplIcstioo, Adsinlatnalon

Adoption Source: Adapted from the case study by V. I.Vodichev et al, "Development and

of Combined Heat and Power SupplyTurbines with a Capacity of 250,000Kilowatts." system of the generator. In general, the changes fell into threegroups. The first group included questions involving modificationsin the technical documentation for the workingdesign of the turbine generator. The answers to these questions,for the most 1-_,rt, were handled by the electricpower station in collaboration withthe organizations that helped install the equipment andput it into operation. Usually, by decision ofthe Chief Engineer of the electric power stationor the Moscow Regional Power System Administration,a group of specialists was set up to handle particular problems. The group included representatives from thedesign, layout, assembly, scientific research, andother organizations,as well as the manufacturers of theprimary and auxiliary equipment. After thisgroup of experts arrived ata decision, the general designermade the appropriate changes in the operatingblueprints and the consignee issued an order to theassembly and installationor- ganizations to carry out thework. The second group ofchanges included technical decisions regarding alterationsin certain components of the turbine installation. Responsibility for solving these matters lay primarilywith the manufacturers. who supplied the requirednew parts and attach- ments.

The third group of changesincluded problems that were first identified during operationand layout, involving aspects in the operationof the turbine installation thatwere not noted earlier. Here the ministries of the consignee andof the equipmentman- ufacturer organized specialexpert commissions to address the problems. One of the most serious diff i- culties that arose duringthe initial period of installing and operating theturbine concert dpoor vi- bration stability of the turbine. In this instance, a decision was made by theScientific-Technical Coun- cil of the Ministry ofPower and Electrification, with the approval ofthe Ministry of Heavy, Power, and Transport Machine Building,to create a special expert commission to tackle the-roblem. Representa- tives from participatingorganizations in both minis- 146 tries took part in the work of the commission.The recommendations of the latter were examined and approved by the Sc-ntific-Technical Council of the Ministry of Power and Electrification. Finally, the two principal ministries involved made a jointdeci- sion on the matter, which facilitated its solution in a relatively short time.111The whole process illustrates the role of expert commissions and the place of bilateral and multilateral consultation in Soviet R&D decision making, and especially in the distribution and coordination of tasks. Not all coordination plans were as well formulated and organized as the above example, however. Concep- tualization of problems was frequently inadequate so that the coordination plans were "a hodgepodge instead of a network of logical systems."112 Some plans were unwieldy and included activitythat was not relevant to the problems being addressed. Other plans consisted of small projects inappropriately named "basic problems."Various stages of work and projects were not correlated. Many of the plans were not oriented to goals. Some had no fixed objective at all. Ambiguity in defining goals and assigning tasks led, in turn, to gaps and incoherence in program development, which resultedultimately in the delays, cost overruns, and duplication noted earlier. As M. A. Gusakov concluded, "In essence, themix of tasks for a bass c. problem is chosen to a large extent by intultion."11-5 The replacement of coordination plans by SST programs seeks to remedy thesedeficiencies. Much more than before, the accent is on the actual introduction of R&D results into the economy. Coordination plans usually reached only to the stage of creating prototypes of new items, trying out new processes, oris- suing recommendations for series production. How- ever, some new ma-'ines anddesigns were held up for years at the recommendation stage. The new programs emphasize bringing the R&D forward through the innovation phase. Hence, more than 60 percent of the machines, equipment, and instruments as well as80 percent of the new processes,materials, and data 147 processing systems being developed in connection with the 200 basic S&T problems in the Tenth Plan are "programmed" to be put into production or use. Timetables are fixed for intermediate work stages as well as for final completion. The design and construction of pilot plants, and the creation of industrial facilities assigned primary responsibility for the manufacture of new items, are also stipulated. The old coordination plans rarely specified these assignments. A program, then, is a more comprehensive and systematic grouping of assignments than a "coordination plan. 114 In addition, the procedure for drawing up S&T programs has changed. In the past, coordination plans were prepared mainly by the lead scientific organizations and the technical administratior.s of the ministries; these were not always coordinated with the other functional divisions of the ministries. To integrate more effectively science and economic planning, the process of drafting S&T programs has been made more of a collaborative effort involving the entire ministerial staff. Comparing the old system of plans with the new system of programs, Nolting concludes, "Although both combined and coordinated all of the projects relating to a given problem, the redesigna- tion is more than a change in name."115 At the branch level program-type planning, called "continuous" planning, has been implemented experi- mentally in a few ministries. Such planning is done in concert with a special form of financing R &D, the Unified Fund for the Development of Science and Tech- nology, which consolidates the funding of all stages of the innovation cycle. A lead research institute, design bureau, association, or enterprise is designated, and all work stages are implemented by an intra- ministerial contract called a work order. The structural similarity to interbranch programs at the all- union level is apparent. Because such plans are closely tied with implementation and incentive and financial policy, discussion of them is postponed until the next chapter. In summary, the importance of multiagency programs is attested to first by the criticality of their 148 themes and the significant amounts of resources which they command. At the same time, formal procedures for multiagency planning techniques are a relatively new development, still clearly undergoingmodifica- tion. Multiagency programs offer great potential for improving coordination across organizational lines, but they made create significant problems if merely superimposed on the traditional branch planning structure. Soviet authorities recognize the importance of careful integration of program and branch assignments to avoid sending conflicting signals to the performing facility. Evidence is still fragmentary concerning evaluation of the scope of application and management of multiagency programs; therefore, it is unclear whether the significant benefits of such programs are being fully realized. It is also too early to tell the extent to which the shift from coordination plans to integrated programs overcomes some of thefaulty systems planning and management of the past.

THE DECISION TO IMPORT TECHNOLOGY

Though the Soviet Union has long imported technology and machinery from abroad, thedecision to acquire foreign technology was not made until recently an explicit and integral feature ofR&D policy planning. A number of Soviet surveys conducted in the mid-1960s disclosed that few research institutes pos- sessed, much less used, comparat data on foreign technology and Soviet products.1-'-) )uring the spring meeting of the USSR Academy of enzes in 1965, it was noted that many of the itemsincluded in the plan for new technology and slated for development by 1970 could, in fact, already be bought from the United States, Japan, and GreatBritain.117At this time little attention was given to the purchase of foreign patents and licenses or, for that matter, tothe protection of Soviet inventions abroad. Only in July 1965 did the USSR begin to adhere to the Paris Conven- tion for the protection of international property.In general, the idea that it may be cheaper and more ef- 149 fective to borrow technology than to develop it do- mestically is still somewhat novel for Soviet decision makers. As Robert W. Campbell points out, "They have surely often thought it would be convenient to solve some problem with foreign equipment, but the notion of a conscious policy choice to be made rou- tinely an systematically is probably still not very common."li° Three factors in particular have contributed to this situation. First, the planning of R&D has been oriented to building up S&T potential that can serve as a basis for the solution of future problems. The planning of technological innovation and utilization, on the other hand, has been geared to solving current production tasks. The two spheres of activity have generally been decoupled, and each has proceeded more or less on its own. Second, the time factor and the "cost" of time have not figured prominently in R&D decision making. Only since the late 1960s have efforts been made to extend, the time horizons of planners and to make the five-year plan rather than the annual plan the basis for S&T Third, the Soviet R&D establishment has been inward-looking and has tended to display a "not-invented-here" sentiment. As a recent article in the Gosplan journal noted, There are more than a few examples where ministries and departments try for years to solve through their own efforts problems that have long been solved in other countries. In a number of cases the leaders and specialists of certain scientific organizations consider the decision to buy licenses as testimony regarding their own S&T inadequacy. But only a precise and competent opinion as to how each item and process compares with the world standard and to its prospects for further improvement should be an important consideration in the decision to accelerate our own research and development or turn to the acquisition of a foreign license.119 150 prtmoRHrt44HM0aHlo 94M< 0 V WO 0 A H m4M0HOHMWHPIpPciNN CH ; R° .1.1 O Pg t7 41 mnnolocurinoop OaHH 00H4MV1104W010 Mr101;giggi itVipgrtWrIAHOM MMH rtHOMOM;V mpirtHoop41-1.0P WWM 00H DOF00Blal?"41V4011WOO+ Or p00 VI2MMROPtglg OMHIAV mp o ViJaHIAOP 1:1140g0F4Vi cmon aoRtilmi-row cla W PO HoPp O MMOMhH0004h0V0O, 014104 m 414400,4 WHolo OHli H4PahH MHOM 000w opo v00 (01.41A1 nOWHwO wil) o wooM 00Vm4o ooPio0 0 040MV4Mo rtoMn MH.I.A. 14. OMmOmt"ri4HAM 5ligiriM4m """ir01611MmilW0a P rptPIIHMEill (mplid"r011144 milgoortmHoon ! prtprt OMM Hp0 0 Pa pinto cli w p. o Pi Oa 0 V H el PI Fa o O tilitulaggtOlm IA rt(t)164NUorri:miW M V P m w 4 O a IAPI "i 1-1 rt r t H . n e a H HOMOOV 00010$POIggrOlOalM 0 IV Q 1.4 14$ (1)gl"NoP14OVIA hOO O0 IAN rt onomm WHOh1100o0 WOO OH 040oHo OPO4FM0141,14 VOrtP' FA 0 rt M H.° o H m ill to,0. wij:,-b, N ti."). roi. 454 (porno oan4mrt n "Igro1119111gti)4 H 41M0 MO CI (M) tr4t a 04 rt 11 rt p rot rt 0 reg' gu o 1-1.rt in 111 fl I-4 i-i 4 ct HIIlIntO(AMN H Ol t O a s g r t 0 r t rt r i rtA4 6'4N nIA rt KC4410WV4gto (MP'HOOM01-4011 V PIOrtWV?4aaPV 0h0OwmMt0V maimplAP/ OPIHOMOMwo0 IA (1)A, Co H H P.Ogci, 5'1A4107-4(04:0 orno44 IA rpliNTril"arPoti OilltiWipht4 itliPnvlitIVIrtro4 ri4umicr;oirtsgrni,N3roMn4"t;' oil 1-6 0 11) a 1.4 0 0)'d (D(11)) 0 o o rt H o o m 1.4 o o H. H FA zrt V?) (ori rj. rt

41-ollovralo;la frp)tti i-+ N AlV11)14 i litti g N. (HI. oVIAH WrgAliVoommm " 'ill HMIAOM 0110 IA m coo4mowtno4 R. t 4'. 14 g riIIg00. ti f-)1 400o M 4 grtmnTrtglq00"nq ov.a,HilHnM CM1MemOloin 1-4 p4 con0b rn M 4 M P om mn I V'Thge54 o410g1PWO 6181190W0a, m nnow cr it t-i.OH 1.4.0 ring) 0 0 ce 0 P to ylik4 MPTOW1944 PAHhiAoH_Mrper111(740.41owroowno k4nrK44mompsttlAgp. "P30 "Vot4 rtvpntomomrs IA rtH oono1.4m1JH VE) Pt rt 6" '7)i'r)) ii 1 Mts 64 " 2 Vrt rtiboon it(11101R?Ii 0 al 0 OQ 'Ll V 1.4 HI..immmmrtm4 oP4 WM :CP Q 4 rt (n (1) Co< 1.4P) Nor3144 11) kC 13IA 0.1 rt co1-1 Id k4 r1g0111191P4M2H110" rt rt 0 1 rt A)1-1VzsgP rt p'll MIOH.OV qtEgilq" ""Ig g7 go7n'ill (V41 OW O 00-41 M I I I II MIM IMI hl 1 o with, the types of patents and models to be acquired, the equipment and materials needed for the assi"ila- tion of foreign technology, requirements for capital construction, the R&D performers and industrial facilities to be assigned to the adaptation and installation of the imported technology, legal rights and obligations in the use of this technology, and the estimated economic return from its adoption and diffusion. At the same time, a determination must be made of what scientific R&D projects should be termi- nated after purchase of "Ireign patent.121

The extent to which these new procedures are ad- hE...d to and the overall impact of changes in import policy on the planning process are impossible to - sess from available infomation. Calculation of the economic effectiveness of technology, we have seen, is still fraught with many problems and deficiencies. Methods and criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of foreign technology au? the comparative advantage of borrowing from abroad or building domestic capability are only beginning to be developed. According to one Western authority, "So far it appears that planning calculations of this type have had little role in the actual planning of ex- ports and imports. 122 In addition, decisions to import technology are still limited to high priority problems and projects. For the bulk of Soviet R&D, the inside-outside choice simRly does not arise. Bor- rowing is not a real option.143

More generally, these changes in R&D policy planning have coincided with considerable exp.t..n.ion of Soviet participation in international tr-,de and technology transfer. Reasons for such expansion are typical: a combination of certain pressures which induce international cooperation, such as global environmental problems, and the standard benefits which accrue to all who take part in -!nternational division of labor in science and L ology.124 In- creasingly, Kremlin authorities a come to realize that it is expensive--and not necessary--to reinvent the wheel and to be self-sufficient in all areas of science and engineering. They have also lome to re-

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ID04 1 Og I CP 0) H rt w 0 0 0 0, 0 co 0 0 '.-1 Q... r:VnN p' 00rook40n (Dm ik4 la 0 0 4 n 0, o N:1 H 0 10 H 0 ID 0 M t-,. 0, n %4 gc) 0 (D 0 11 (1) 11) faJ Fe It 0 P4 (0 n rt 111-1 0) I-I, M t001-h (DG 0 0 0 fA 0 V 0 (n rd H..'11 0 .tPt g rt: rIcilmggOtIll Ili)Pt 0H1 t-i 0 ,O 0, 0 04 n H w O 11 ,i 0 1 i'. ouPi w HZ 1.-1,, rt... ft) I'D O 0 0 OQ rt (D tilft)0,i'Dti g M tal Pi-ilPg (11 Ei ToV o 0 H 0"0 1:1) fli 0 4 a It 04 0' 04 fp n M 11 0 0, % 0 ro(2H. H Pi A)rti.-41-1. 0 0 11 H H 0 fD 0 H ft) 0 t'D 01 A) 01, 1 01 -I H ti 0 0' 0 0 H 0, CD CD 11) A) D 0 I 0' Cort*(I) 17 n1) 5* rna):i vg4) et) 0 ft.(0 i-J. 0 I ril I 0 FJ. H I 1 0 0N 0, H 0 v w 0 1 H 1 '4 3. Production assimilation of new industrial products

4. Introduction of advanced technological processes and mechanization and automation of production processes

5. Sale of Soviet patents abroad, purchase of foreign patents and models of new products, and their utilization in the USSR national economy

6. Introduction of computer technology into the national economy

7. Establishment of state standards governing the most important types of products and metrolo- gical support of the national economy

8. Introduction of scientific organization of labor

9. Basic indicators of the technical and economic level of production and output

10. Financing of scientific research

11. Training of scientific personnel and science teachers-130 The content of each chapter is self-explanatory. Cer- tain chapters are concerned with a general category of R&D, such as the introduction of new products; some pc-rtain to a special category, such as licensing or the application of computer technology; and still others focus on the establishment of operating and evaluative criteria, such as standards and technical indicators, which support the remaining chapters. In addition, the universal correspondence between physical and financial flows is exemplified by inclusion of the financial plan. At the stage of the intermediate level m==lagement organs, plans become more concrete. Plans incorpo-

156 rate targets specified in chaptersof the national plan, but are organized differently inrelation to the character of the R&D in thehierarchy. In the Academy and university systPrnci, the program or project is the centerpiece of theplan, with most indicators concerned with measuresof inputs (e.g., wage funds) and the scheduling of work. Emphasis is also placed on specifying the ultimate userof results, and calculations of economic return arerequired where possible. Plans in industrial ministries are oriented to the application andintroduction of R&D results. Branch plans contain divisions that correspond to and derive from the macro stateplan divisions for tine assimilation of productionof new types of products and the introductionof new processes. There are also divisions for improvingthe stock of equipment, the organization of production,and the quality of output. The annual plans of the branch ministries also include a specialdivision for scientific research and test-design, whichlists the R&D assignments under the special programsfor solving the basic S&T problems. At the performer level in thehierarchy, the structure and ceIntent of planscorrespond to the orientation of the superiororganization's plan and the character of R&D activity. Independent research and design facilities draft five-yearand annual "thematic" or project plans inwhich the central object is the research project. Nolting observes, "There are no standard methods and forms fordrawing up project plans among scientific organizationsthat are under different ministries and perform differentkinds of work, but there is a basic procedureand set of requirements."131 In general, project plans have two main sections: one for R&Dconducted within the facility, the other for assimilationof finished R&D to be transferred to the appropriateproduction organizations with the advice andassistance of the scientific facility.132 Information in the yearly projects plan includes thefollowing: the general volume of scientificresearch and experimental design work for the plan year; theexpected economic return; the periods for completionof work on each project; 157 1 71 estimated costs; the sources of financing; the ra- tionale for including the work in the plan; and the designation of the industrial enterprise to receive the R&D results for application.133The emphasis on defining ultimate uses is apparent and is to some extent a new element, at least in degree. Along with the thematic plan, a "calendar" plan is developed which schedules work by stages and designates performers and inputs. In the production enterprise, the "plan for increasing the efficiency of production" or, as it is generally called, "the new technology plan" carries through the applied orientation reflected in the ministry's plan. In the past, five-year plans of this sort were drawn up only in the larger enterprises or production associations. With the Tenth Five Year Plan, however, they have apparently become mandatory for all enterprises.134 The annual enterprise new technology plan, which has been a basic feature of Soviet planning since the late 1920s, is drafted in minute detail and contains the following subdivisions:

1. Assimilation of new types of products and improvement of the quality of production

2. Introduction of advanced technological processes and mechanization and automation of pro- ductfon

3. Introduction of scientific organization of labor

4. Improvement of the organization, planning, and management of production

5. Scientific research and experimental design

6. Basic indicators of the technical and economic level of production and output

7. Protection of the environment and rational use of material resources.135

158 In each subdivision the documentationrequired on a project basis is extensive and similar in scopeto the other examples already cited.

THE PLANNING SYSTEM AND ITS PARTS

In pr; iple, these numerous sets of plans, dif- ferentiat_.2 along temporal and organizationallines as well as hierarchicalbranch and functional program lines, form an internally consistent andwell integrated "system" of plans regulating theresearch-to- production cycle. In practice, however, there are many "holes in thewhole,"and coordination falls far short of its target. Given the scope and comprehensiveness of Soviet planning, this is not surprising. Perfect coordination is unlikely in any system, partly because of the unpredictability ofthe results of scientific research anddevelopment. But as mol- ting observes, "Soviet R&Dplanning has been poorly coordinated even if judged by standardsless than ideal."136 Only since the late 1960s, it maybe recalled, have Kremlin authorities pursued apolicy of integrated systems planning of R&D,innovation, and production- Even today such a policy is applied,for the most part, only in high priorityprojects. Soviet planning is generally still of two kinds: "compila- tion planning" and"implementation planning."The former involves primarily a listing ofassignments while the latter entails more systematicand deliberate efforts to specify targets, toassign responsible performers, and to coordinate tasks. Implemen- tation planning is limited primarily tothe interbranch S&T programs of national priorityand to the continuous plans in certain branchministries. Com- pilation planning remains the predominantform with results that are less than optimal. Again Nolting provides the best descriptionof the system: RDI Cresearch-development-innovation]planning has often amounted to little morethan 159 a simple listing of projects to becarried out without relating them to broaderpur- poses. In large part the projectsare suggested by lower units in the planningchain and reflect the interests andexpertise of performing organizations. Many such projects are reported to be trivialand mar- ginal in their technologicalbenefits. The proposals submitted by lowerechelons are not always -roperly screened and thoseac- cepted are not worked into coherentplans consistent with the general technological dil_ctians of the higher planningechelons. In other words, RDI plans tendto be accu- mulations rather than syn..rieses.137

The demand for techniquesto view projects in a total systems perspective is clearlyfelt and provides the impetus behind thesystems movement in So- viet science policy today. Network planning andpro- gramming methods enable decisionmakers to perceive projects more broadly as systems andto depict the interrelationships among tasksto be performed. In general, though, theseare still new and untested tools. "Many deficiencies in planningscientific and technical progress," explainsone Soviet science policy expert, "are rooted inthe lack of appreciation of programming methods and inthe narrow front of their application."138 Even for basic S&T problems, systems planning is stillvery much an evolving technique. A deputy director and researchana- lyst at Gosplan's Central ScientificResearch Insti- tute of Economics acknowledge, "We have stillnot accumulated sufficient experience indrawing up long- term SST programs. It is possible to say that the formulation of programs inmost cases is still in the formative stage."13° On the branch level, too,progress has beer slow and limited in devel -pingprogram- type planning. By 1974 only three mini =ries had transferred to the system ofcontinuous planning, though by 1978 this number had climbedto 11. The rest continue to plan R&D largely aroundseparate organizations rather than broadprograms. a I IA 1- to tO' ft, '0 1 i to ,cico g I A a)>, 1 0 I A: 1 0 1-1 I o g m14 p v A I a) col, in IA 4) w 0 Nb0b00(411) 0 0 0 0 1-1 1-4 4-i00 1,4 0 0 $.14-1 i-4 ra jo 1 44dp444 o4.) o1ciVib.rii .4'al 1 8 If.) 'A' In 14 1 ta,'0s-4 w +I 1.4 cn4-1 U r-1 4-1 4.1 CA 41 -4C.) U 4 4 4 '0 0 ,0 >) A 4-1 0 U 114 '0 4-I .Awcnouogg0 u u 44pl a)a) pi u w 4 pi 4 wlu 4w4'14ipi :.R44v4.110.14,w a) 4,0000) (pogoni 0,O0 il A 4) W 1.0 V 4-4(1 t-1 0 OW ,0 I-1 0 0 r0 El0) 4 0 0 44,1 4 i- Cal r-14) Z 0 0 4 0) 4-4 t--141-441 CD 0 pi u sri r-1 4 C.) Of po>, 44 44 I 0)0) r2 2 U41)4 ,`4.tl'°WO 0 A &I 4 bei 1-1 1.4.rl 4-1 ,0 r1 41 60 0 .r1 4rIkrtic0000ZO>14.404-1144) U44/01-11-1 U1-10,-Ial a)m icii)g tc1)o;., f:1) ( 4 4 /0 U N - 4 0 O 00 14 4 0 s-4 0 ,0 41 4) '1:/b0 0 RI 0 UN 0.0,4 14 r-1 4 0 C O 1 4 4 ,c) 0 4) 0 f-I4) P 0 1.-1 4 tO 4- o4.1(3, 11/1-1 0 1.1 4.1 r1:0 04 ,0 0 4)th 0 U) .r1 0 AVI'llt'41(17AtHo013 Tji :Li 1 A 4 ran) mo Oata) d 1 r-104 4) 414.4bocupr4flu 1'd C.) 4 '0 4-1(I i)ni.fc-Wri alpbo oirtw000rd.ri:3I/ 14wg (II.rti 71 48cl a N0 11N (-4 OTIVWWOOgo VOOHW'r444'140'0000 04 1-1(el 4 44 t1:4.4 tdik 11 N U W 0 4J o td u vi 0 0 O T1114144-14-J 0 61-1(d 0 U 4 N h1-41 are-1 S-4 OD 0 11)b0 ,M4 m 000 ww,4011o00 w W 44W494A NV44 al970420+410gZ1-°)440.121":640 . ofqm owpioow m wo4Jbou .1:4ArcalrilOg_mpo o 4.4wq u) 4.1 CO m jr9"IA°° co 4J o >4 0)4 1-4 p000,-, IA 2P.1"61414Migggl m k u N 1 4 . 4 0 i i t i r - I 0 ) HA Wacd4tduo wopilv114 1-11) 4100044u19 covicoo441 mum w oiri.1.4 14 H PC, 0-1 060PdA o Hooqongalprit4,0 tp IS e't7lIrgCI WV g 1-1 0 0 ri 11'rith 14 bOWNHirlPir" Or.14-1 ''''rfi(!t4'4'Ri ligO'r404-"(11TIwwg H (N0-10.1"1(00UV 14014 4"1(114-1 TipoMMO0 4WH W 0004.4.0 roTiAH OH Uf-1044J 0 0 tlf OH a -i 'd rd mum w :211.Irjti1 49 v51: .49 el 19p; 01-1 0 u a m v R mu m ci4 o o N 60600 00000 V 1:00 0 4.)ID 44 4.I dWt0b0 P'00'0,4 (1.1-1.r1 NO w.,,ogsprimi.m.9 1)3 biri14 15:4ile0 vA bp cu ri ill 0 (!) A 0 sti 0 0 *4 0 14 A e°:11SI g. 4-141 4314,-1 W4./ 03 yo 0,-11-1 .0 W I:, .,1to 05Po 9:,to 4) 0 1W14 U 111.4(0004 ' 4 1 0 1,14 ti4vcd AIWACIUL1441ge wogUirg4 it 0 14 li 4 11 A 8 4 04 ce4m iv:rd-1,-, 1.44-1 91 0 III 0 rd 14VT.Iltj0uli gotl (').90o,,141 okla larg, h°4:lijkl'M I-I m ;4 0.1 04 cuti .r.4 mu Upi 0 44 . 0 1-1 cO cl 001400 ^V a);3Clicc) ON4-1M4304.1r-10 co 631-1> k 44,0co 'f449p°Atlelowr(1.4g4, g0111001.1.1Amtdi et' g 4.1:), '4J4(1 Ille,41V"41A''Mv>itim 41 40 4)4.1 > (I 0 alb0 144.1 W tin

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163 FOOTNOTES

1. 0. I. Larichev, "Dostoinstva i nedostatki sistemnogo podkhoda k planirovaniyu I upravleniyu nauchnymi issledovanlyami, vklyuchaya analiz tstolmost-effektivnost"(Merits and Defects of the Systems Ap- proach to Planning and Management of Scientific Re- search ir-luding Cost-Effectiveness Analysis"),p. 4. Soviet Si_s of the Joint Soviet-American Working Sub- group on Planning and Management of Scientific Re- search and Development. Unpublished (draft)paper, 1976.

2. Louvan Nolting, ThePlanning of Research, De- velopment, and Innovationin the USSR, U.S. Depart- ment of Commerce, ForeignEconomic Report No. 14 (Washington, D.C., 1978),p. 1. 3. See Yu. M. Kanygin,Nauchno-tekhnicheskiy potentsial (Problemy nakupleniya I ispolezovaniya), (Novosibirsk: Nauka, 1974), pp. 157-159, 179-182 and also his Nauchno- proizvodstvennyi tsikl- Voprosy teorii i organizatsii (Novosibirsk: Nauka, 1.-1). 4. Yu. Kanygin and S. Kostanyan, "Nauchno-prolz- vodstvennyi tsikl," Voprosy ekonomiki, 12 (1976),p. 62. 5. Louvan E. Nolting, Sources of Financing The Stages of the Research, Development, and Innovation Cycle in the USSR, U.S. Department of Commerce, For- eign Economic Reports No. 3 (Washington, D.C. 1973), p. 3. 6. V. Yu. Budavey and M. I. Panova, Ekonomiches- kiye problemy tekhnicheskogo progressa (Moscow: Mysl', 1974), p.19. 7. N. M. Oznobin and A. S. Pav--ov, Kompleksnoye planirovaniye nauchno- tekhnicheskogo progressa (Mos- cow: Mysli, 1975), pp. 155-156. 8. L. Sh. Gaft and Ya. S. Krasov, Podsistema uprav- 164

°."."1:f leniya nauchno-issledovatel'skimi rabotami v otrasli (Moscow, 1976), p. 53; P. N. Zavlin, A. I. Shcherba- kov, and M. A. Yudelevich, Trud v sfere nauki (Moscow: Ekonomika, 1973), p. 247; M. S. Mintairov, E. B. Fokko, O. E. Kovalevseiy, and A. A. Nikonov, "Planirovaniye zatrat na nauku na osnove normativnogo metoda," in Problemy deyatel'nosti uchenogo i nauchnykh kol1.k- tivov (Leningrad-Moscow, 1977), p. 29. 9. Leonid Kantorovich, "Economic Problems of Sci- entific and Technical Progress," Social Sciences, 3 (1976), p. 87. 10. S. Golosovskly and G. Yeremenko, "Measuring the Effectiveness of Scientific and Technical Progress," Voprosy ekonomiki, 12 (1975), pp. 142-145. See also B. Zaytsev, "Voprosy ucheta zatrat na issledovaniya i razrabotki," Vestnik statist:-...1, 1 (1977), pp. 10-14. 11. Gaft and Krasov, op. cit., p. 53. 12. B. Z. Milner, "Sovershenstvovaniye organiza- tsionnykhstruktur upravleniya," in Sovremennye metody upravleniya narodnym khozyaystvom (Vilnius: Lit- ovskiy Nauchno-Issledovatel'skly Institute Nauchno- Tekhnicheskoy Informatsii I Tekhniko-Ekonomicheskikh Issledovanii, 1974), pp. 4-5. 13. Statement by N. P. Lebedinskiy to a group of American specialists visting the USSR in the fail of 1974 as part cf the Joint US-USSR Science Policy Work- ing Group 14. Milaer, op. cit., p. 4. 15. See, for example, I. P. Kozlov, V. P. Vorobyev, and A. S. Korotkov, "Voprosy analiza deya- el'nostl --raslevoy nauchnoy organizatsii," in Prob- lemy deyat'nosti uchenogo i nauchnykh kollektivov (1977), pp. 78-81 and Oznobin and Pavlov, op. cit., pp. 148-149. 16, M. L. 3ashin, Planirovaniye rabot otraslevykh NII i KB (Moscow: Ekonomika, 3973), p. 171. 165 17- M. G. Kolodnyy and A. P. Stepanov, Planiro- vanlye narodnogo khozyaystva SSSR (Kiev, 1975), p. 90. 18. Valuyev et al, "Unique Characteristics of the Financing of Science in the USSR," (Russian text), p. 43. 19. "Official" science expenditures in the USSR do not include outlays on (1) R&D performed by enterprise scientific subdivisions in. most ministries; (2) development and testing of "Industrial" prototypes under factory conditions; (3) scientific and technical assistance to and collaboration with enterprises by branch, academy, and VUZ scientific organizations; (4) R&D financed under special innovation fund& in industry or under capital investments in economic branches; (5) the portion of VUZy R&D financed under the specific budgetary allocation for VUZy; and (6) probably some categories of military and spa. R&D. See LGuvan Nolting, The Financing of Research, Devel- opment, and Innovation in the USSR, by Type of Insti- tutional Perfr.,-mer, pp. 2-3. 20. Nolting notes that "These investments are not confirmed or allocated specifically as investments in science, but rather as investments attributed to pertinent economic branches, although the investments are monitored and audited by the State Comanittec for Science and Technology." See ibid., p. 26. 21. Ibid., pp. 17-19. 22. "Unique Characteristics of the Financing of Science in the USSR," p. 48. 23. V. I. Kushlin, Uskoren:;_ye vnedreniya nauchnykh dostizhenly v proizvodstvo (Moscow: Ekonomika. 1977), p. 138. 24. Gvishiani, "Centralized Management of Science: Advantages and Problems," p. 77 25. Helgard Wienert, "The Organizat'.on and Planning of Research in the Academy System,' in Zaleski et al., 166 Science Policy in the USSR, p. 250. 26. Helgard Wienert, "The Organization and Planning of Research in the Higher Educational Establishments," ibid., p. 354. 27. Eugene Zaleski, "Central Planning of Research and Development in the Soviet Union," ibid., p. 42. 28. Zavlin et al, Trud v sfere nauki (Novosibirsk: Nauka, 1971), p. 29. G. S. Pospelov, "Management and the Pace of the Age," Izvestiya, March 21, 1974. 30. E. I. Voyevodova and A. D. Zusman, "Nekotoryye voprosy sistemnogo podkhoda k ekonomicheskim aspektam deyatel'nosti nauchno-issledovateltskoy organIzatsil," in Problemy deyatel'nosti uchenogo I nauchnykh kollektivov (1977), p. 56. 31. A. M. Birman, "What Finance Can Achieve," Eko- nomika I organizatsiya promyshlenuogo proizvodstva, 1 (1978), p. 32. Pospelov, op. cit. 33. K. A. Yefimov, GYa. Kiperman, anc C. M. Fedo- Low, "Development :-nr3 Realization of Prc ,rams of Com- plex Mechanization of Fundamental and Auxiliary Pro- cesses of Production at the Moscow Production Asso- ciation ZIL," p. 5. Soviet Side of the Joint Soviet- American Working Subgroup on Planning and Management of Scientific Research and Development. Unpublished (draft) paper, 1976. 34. B. E. Paton, "Effektfvnost' nauchnykh issledovaniy i uskoreniyeprotsessa vnedreniya," Vestnik Akadell Nauk SSSR, 2 (1977), p. 50. 35. Ibid.; Kushlin, op. cit., p. 138. 36. Nolting. The Financing of Research, Development, and Innovatior, in the USSR, pp. 29-30.

167 37. B. Labkovsky, "Higher Schools Help Science, Science Helps Higher Schocl," Izvestiya, May 20, 1976. 38. Nolting, The Financing of Research, Development, and Innovation in the USSR, pp. 33-35. 39. Berliner, The Innovation Decision in Soviet In- dustry, p. 174. 40. B. A. Raiz-berg, E. P. Golubkov, and L. S. Pekar- skiy, Sistemnyi podkhoc: v perspektivnom planirovanii (Moscow, 1975), p. 128. 41. N. P. Fedorenko, "Urgent Tasks of Economic Sci- ence," Ekonomicheskaya gazeta, 21 (May 1976), p. 10. 42. Zaleski et al, Science Policy in the USSR, p. 83. 43. I. Fetisov, "The Sales Service," Izvestiya, April 16, 1976. 44. V. Semenov, "Laboratory for Rent," Pravda, Sep- tember 6. 1973. 45. I. Fetisov, "Put Resources in a Single Pair of Hands," ibid., August 1, 1976. 46. Fetisov, "The Sales Service." 47. Ya. D. Gartsman and V. M. Ignatenko, "Sover- shenstvovaniye planirovanivn nauchno-issledovatel'- skikh rabot v n,inisterstvaic, i vedomstvakh," in Ekon- omicheskiye problemy nauchno-tekhnicheskogo progresses v _arodnom khozyaystve USSR(Ylev, 1974), pp. 14-15. 48. Metodicheskiye ukazaniya k razrabotke gosudarst- vennykh planov razvitiya narodnogo khozyaystva SSSR (Moscow: Ekonomika, 1974), p. 9.

49. "USSR Short Answern," p. . 50. Nolting, The Planing of Research, Develo?ment, and Innovacion in the USSR, pp. 6, 10, 17.

168 51. Ibid., pp. 17-18. 52. Budavey and Panova, op. cit., p. 186. 53. Nolting, The Planning of Resear_h, Development, and Innovation in the USSR, pp. 14-15. 54. Ibid., p. 15. 55. Ibid., p. 24; Thomas and Kruse-Vaucienne, So- Science and Technology, pp. 247-248. 56. Nolt1_3, The Planning of Research, Development, and Innovation in the USSR, p. 5. 57. Budavey and Panova, op. cit., p. 187; Yu. A. Zykov, "Nekotoryye metodologicheskiye voprosy postro- yeniya sistemy ekonomicheskikh prognozov nauchno-tekhnicheskogo progressa," in L. M. Gatovskiy, ed., Ekon- omicheskiye problemy nauchno-tekhnicheskoy revolyutsii Sri sotsializme (Moscow: Ekonomika, 1975), pp. 173- 182. 58. Nolting, The Planning of Research, Development, and Innovation in the USSR, p. 15. 59. Thomas and Kruse-Vaucienne, Soviet Science and Technology, pp. 246-248, 278. 60. "USSR Short Answers," pp. 18, 20, 32. 61. V. Disson, "Primenenlye programnno-tselevogo metoda pri reshenil nauchno-tekhnicheskikh problem,IT Planovoye khozyaystvo, 7 (1977), p. 7'. 62. Ye. V. K7sov and G. Kh. Popov, Upravleniye Mezhotraslevymi nauchno-teichnicheskimi programmami (Moscow: Ekonomika, I '2), pp. 42-43, 63. V. Disson, "From Idea to Production Line," Iz- vestiya, January 20, 1976 and V. Kirillin, "PrL,E;rammy nauchno-tekhnicheskogo progressa," ibid., May 15, 1976.

64. See24.Vilenskiy, "Tekhnicheskiy progress v 169 desyatoy pyatiletke,"Voprosy ekonomiki, 11(1976), pp. 47-55; Disson,"Primeneniye programmno-tselevogo metoda," pp. 74-75; "USSR ShortAnswers," p. 18.

65. Larichev,"Dostoinstva i nedostatki sistemnogo podkhoda k planirovaniyu iupravleniyu nauchnymi issledovaniyami, vklyuchaya analiz'stoimost'-effektiv- nostt,'" p. 5. 66. Peter L. Kapitsa,"Scientific Policy in the USSR: The Scientist and thePlans," Minerva (Summer 1966), p. 559. 67. Nolting, The Planning_of Research, Development, and Innovation in the USSR, p.1.

68. Larichev, op. cit., p.8. 69. Ibid., pp. 7-8. 70. Kapitsa, op. cit., p.558. 71. Vestnik Akademii NaukSSSR, 2 (1965), p. 16. 72. V. A. Kirillin,"Nazrevshiye problemy tekhnicheskogo progressa,"Ekonomicheskaya gazeta, 21('May 1968), p. 12. 73. Ye. V. Kosov,"Ekonomicheskiye problemy upravleniya nauchno- tekhnicbeskimrazvitiyem narodnogo khozyaystva," in Nauchnoye upravleniyeobshchestvom (Moscow, 1971), V, p. 114. 74. Ibid., p. 115. 75. Nolting, The Planningof Researcn, Development, and Innovation in theUSSR, p. 16; "USSR ShortAn- swers," p. 32. 76. L. Glyazer, "TheEconomics of Science an the Science of Economics,"Voprosy ekonomiki, 6(1973), reprinted in The ScvietReview, XV, 1 (Spring1974), p. 45. 117o 77. Ibid., p. 37.

78. Cited in Nolting, The Planning of Research, D- velopment, and Innovation in the USSR, p. 6. 79. Disson, "Primeneniye programmno-tselevogo metoda pri reshenli nauchno-tekhnicheskikh problem," pp. 81- 82. 80. Kosov and Popov, op. cit., pp. 44-57. 81. See 0. I. Volkov, Planovoye upravleniye nauchno- tekhnicheskim progressom (Moscow: Nauka, 1975), p. 153; B. F_ Zaytsev and B. A. Lapin, Organizatslyz planirovaniya nauchno-tekhnicheskogo progressa (Moscow; Ekon- omika, 1970), p. 213. 82. V. N. Arkhangel'skly, Planirovaniye i finansiro- vanlye nauchnykh issledovaniy (Moscow: Finansy, 1976), p. 61. 83. K. A. Yefimov et al, op. cit., p. 2. 84. These percentages are cited by Vilenskiy in his article discussing the new 200 S&T programs. See his "Tekhnicheskiy progress v desyatoy pyatiletke," p. 50. 85. V. I. Vodichev, S. P. Goncharov, V. I. Dobro- khotov, E. K. Kuznetsov, and N. I. Serebryanikov, "Razrabotka i vnedreniye teplofikatsionnykh turbin moshchnost'yu 250 tys. kvt" (The Development and Adoption of Combined Heat and Power Supply Turbines with a Capacity of 250,000 Kilowatts), p. 4. Soviet Side of the Soviet-American Working Subgroup on Plan- ning and Management of Scientific Research and Devel- opment. Unpublished Ldp- -'ft) paper, 1976. L.6. N. P. Fedorenko, "Urgent Tasks of Economic Sci- ence," Ekonomicheskaya gazeta, 21 (May 1976), p. 10. 87. Nolting, The Planning of Research, Development, and Innovation in the USSR, pp. 3, 6, 12. 88. Kosov and Popov, op. cit., pp. 48-49. 171 ;Li 89. M. P. Ring, "Problemnoye upravleniye v nauke: pravovyye aspekty," VestnikAkademii Nauk SSSR, 7 (1975), pp. 15-16, 13. 90. G. Kh. Popov, Effektivnoye u2ravleniye, pp.24- 25. 91. Disson, "Primeneniye programmno-tselevogo metoda," p. 75. 92. See the discussion in Ronald Amann, Julian Coop- er, and R. W. Davies, eds., TheTechnological Level of Soviet Industry (New Haven and London: YaleUniversity Press, 197o) ,pp. 61-62. 93. Ibid., pp. 52-58. 94. Ibid., p. 62 95. Nolting, The Planning of Research,Development, and Innovation, p. 6. 96. Amann et al, op. cit., pp. 62-63. 97. Zaleski et al, Science Policy in theUSSR, p. 82. 9L, Nolting, The Planning of Research,Development, and Innovation in the USSR, p.16. 99. This discussion of the role "basic directions" arz._ws on the excellent studyby John Young and Andrew Hull, Mainz Directions as an Instrumentin the Plan- ning and Management of Soviet SciencePolicy, Battelle Columbus Laboratories (Cclumbus, Ohio,1976). 100. Ibid., p. 7. 101. Pravda, October 8, 1975. 102. "USSR Short Answers," p. 96. 103. Zaleski et al, Science Policy in the USSR, p. 466. 172 104. Labkovskiy, "Higher Schools Help Science, Sci- ence Helps the Higher School." 105. G. I. Levi, "Neprostoy put' vnedreniya," Vest- nik Akademli Nauk SSSR, 2 (1977), p. 11. 106. See the editorials,"Supply and Production," Pravda, September 9, 1976, and "Strict Schedule for Supplies," ibid., May 16, 1977. 107. Zaytsev and Lapin, op. cit., pp. 129-130, 140. 108. See G. A. Dzhavadov, Upravleniye nauchno-tekh-.- nicheskim progressom. p. 14; E. S. Rakhmatullina, ed., Strategiya i taktika kommunisticheskikh partil (Alma Ata, 1974), p. 15; P. Fedoseyev, "Krepit' svyazi nauki I praktiki," Kommunist, 9 (1976), p. 38. 109. Disson, "Primeneniye programmno-tselevogo metoda," p. 76. 110. Vodichev et al, op, cit., pp..8-9. 111. Ibid., pp. 12-13. 112. Nolting, The Planning of Research, Development, and Innovation in she USSR, p. 11. 113. M. A. Gusakov, "Tekhrika programmno-tselevogo metoda planirovaniya," in S. S. Kugel', ed., Problemy deyatel'nosti uchenogo i nauchnykh kollektivov (Lenin- grad-Moscow, 1973), p. 242.

114. Disson, "Primeneniye programmno-tselevogo metoda," pp. 77-79. 115. Nolting, The Planning of Research, Develop- ment, and Innovation in the USSR, p. 19. 116. Zaleski et al, Science Policy in the USSR, p. 396. 117. Statement by Dr. I. L. Mandelshtam in listnik Akademil Nauk SSSR, 6 (1965), p. 17. 173 118. Robert W. Campbell, "Issues in Soviet R&D:The Energy Case," in Jolikt. EconomicCommittee. Soviet Eco- nomy in a New Perspective(Wash!_ngton, D.C., IS76), p. 111. 119. Planovoye 10-lozyaystvo, 11(1975), p. 8. 120. M. Perakh, "Utilization of WesternTechnologi- cal Advances -n Soviet Industry," NATOEconomic Direc- torate Colloquium, 1976,cited in Philip Hanson, "In- ternational Technology Transfer from the West tothe USSR," in Soviet Economy in a New Perspective, p.806. 121. Nolting, The Planning of Research,Development, and Innovation, p. 17 and Metodicheskiyeukazaniya (1974), pp. 17-19. 122. Jack Brougher, "USSR Foreign Trade: AGreacer Role for Trade with the -est," inSoviet Economy in a New Perspective, p. 686. 123. Campbell, op. cit., p. 111.

124. Ivanov, "Overcoming Obstacles andImproving Incentives in ,.he Introduction of NewTechnology and New Methods of Managemtlt," p.5. 125. Brougher, op. cit., p. 685. 126. Ibid., p. 679. 127. Campbell, op. cit., p. 112. 128. John P. Hardt, "The Role of Wester:Technology in Soviet Economic Plans," NATODireL:torte of Econom- ic Affairs , lloquium, 1976, pp.9-12. 129. See Hanson, op. cit., pp. 786-812.

130. Metodicheskiye ukazani71.(1974), pp. 9-10. 131. Nolting, The Planni.ofResearch, Develop- ment, and Innovation in theUSSR, p. 19. 174 132. Ibid., p. 21. 133. Bashin, Planirovaniye rabot otraslevykh XII i KB, p. 53. 134. Nolting, The Planning of Research Develop - ient, and Innovation in the USSR, pp. 21-22. 135. Tipovaya metodika razrabotki pyatilPtnogo plana proizvodstvennogo obyedinenlya (Kombinata), i,redpri- yatiya (Moscow, 1975), p. !S. 136. Nolting, The Planning of Research, Develop- ment, and Innovation in the USSR, p. 4. li/. Ibid. 138. V. Budavey, "Kompleksnoye planirovanlye nauchn-- no-tekhnicheskogo progressa," Voprosy ekonomiki, 11 (1975), p. 18. 139. Budavey and Panova, op. cit., p. 181. 140. M. Viienskiy, "Planirovaniye effekta nauchno- tekhnicheskogo progressa," Voprosy ekonomiki, 1 (1978), pp. 106-107. 141. Nolting, The Planning of Research, Develop- ment, and Innovation in the USSR, p. 11. 142. Ring, "Problemnoye upravleniye v nauke: pravovyye aspekty," pp. 30-31. 143. Ya. V/adychin and I. Syrayezhin, "According to Tomorrow's Normatives," Pravda, May 7, 1977 144. Igor Berman, "From the Achieved Level," Soviet Studies, XXX, 2 (A ----i1 1978), p. 167. X THE EXECUTION OF R&ZPLANS

AND THE UTILIZATION OFt...ESULTS

As we have seen, the R&D plan rommits the research institute, design bureau, and production enterprise to a comprehensive and detailed set oftechnical and economic objectives. The annual plan, subdivided in- to quarterly and monthly targets, isthe basic operational docuuient. It has the force of law, and is the principal stimulus to implementation. Although certain objectives are imposed by superi- or organs, and theplan must be approved in detail by superior authorities, the performer establishment manager does participate plan formulation. The manager has a certain degreeof autonomy, especia3ly compared to earlier periods of Soviet history,but he still lacks one common ingredient of autonomy:flexibility. Even if the approval by superiors is merely pro forma, the manager isstill committed to the plan for its duration. Only rarely are superior bodies inclined to permit alterations in annual plan targets. They discourage the raising and reducing of targets because such actions can reverberate and disruptthe economy. The plan Is thus ambitious and inflexible: this consideration alone fosters conservatismand works against unpredictable activities likeR&D. In this chapter we look at control mechanismsand incentive systems used to put the plan intopractice. In their detail and comprehensiveness, plansprovide more than general directionsfor the performer establishment. Yet the manager still .exercises discretion in decisions concerning how plan tasks canbe accomplished. To aid the manager in selecting the most effective means of fulfillment, the state has created an organizational structure and a setof decision rules aimed at engendering strong effortand effectiveness. Such incentives as the size of expected 176 I r bonus funds with plan fulfillment are also incorporated formally in plans, although these are derived mainly post facto bl application of formulas to match indicators against actual establishmentper- f!_mance. Organizational, economic, and managerial me.:zhanisms for plan implementation, like the plan targets themselves, shoulkl of course be internally consistent and move the establishment on the track desired by the central leadership. In practice, however, the plan and the machinery for its execution frequently break down. The translation of scientific ideas intonew products and processes becomes an obstacle course of endless delays and difficulties. During the 1960s losses dueto the slow transfer of R&D results into useran between six and eight billion rubles a year, or the equivalent of one-fifth )f all funds allocated for innovation. For the period of the Seventh Five Year Plan (1959-1965) these losses amounted to about half of the total investment in scientific research and development. It is estimated that an additional five to six billion rubles can be saved annually if the time lag for innovation is reduced by just one year. Even now not more than 30 to 50 percent of completed R&D finds its way into production. The remainder is either not used at all or ar-,:imilated so slowly that it is already obsolete by the time of its introduction. In certain fields as much as 80 percent of finished R&D falls by the wayside without practical utilization.) Clearly, a major challenge facing Kremlin leaders today consists in formulating a science policy to encourage innovation and the utilization of S&T results.

MANAGING THE 7.ESEARCH-TO-PRODUCTION CYCLE: AN OVERVIEW

Technological innovation in the Soviet Union at present is essentially a bureaucratic function, with situations referred upward through long organizational lines for resolution. Indi-vid.,a1 and institutional performers rarely collaborate directly. Most ex- 177 (I ) ternal transactions among organizations are managed through ministerial offices and departmental channels. A research institute or design bureau,for example, reports its results to a technical administration, branch glavki, or industrial association to which it is subordinate. The latter, in turn, decides on what should be the next phase of work,by whom, and where. This structure impedes innovation in at leas- important ways. First, the long approval route delays decisions and prolongs the zesearch-to-production cycle. To create a new machine, for example, requires typically 25 approvals at differentlevels. To build a new technological system of 10 to 15 machines and mechanisms may require as many as 400 to 500 clearances-2 In general these agreements areob- tained sequentially and not inparallel.3 Forward movement is constantly stalled byrounds of negotia- tion; by waiting for approval of reports bydepart- mental and interdepartmental expert commissions or for the return of tests on prototypes; by theabsence of supplies, equipment, and financing; by theneed to find the right customer with the appropriateexperi- mental base. Considerable time is spent on correspondence and on trips to ministries in pursuitof support for innovation. The -ath from conception to commercialization can be espe...ally long andprecari- ous if the technology entails new processesor products .inrelated to establishedinterests and activities or if it involves much interbranchnegotiation. The effort devoted to gathering signaturesof approval is due in part to statutory regulations. However, it also serves, Berliner explains,"as a device for limiting; each organization's responsibilityfor its ava stage of the workand for reducing one's vulnera- bility in the event of difficultiesencountered in later stages."4 According to studies by the StateCommittee for Science and Technology it frequentlytakes as much time to secure agreements and totransfer documents from one organization to another asit does to con,- duct the necessary scientificdevelopment-5 That is, the bureaucratic process of moving researchresults 178 , II 4 H 1 0 0) 0) d 00 "Jo 0 g 0 0 NP P0 0000,r0WPMM' 1N 4.1 00440400 OW 00 WHO ,r4 I g(/1 A 04100g WOOH150-144 4.4 14 i 6r1 4./ g w tiA.r.1 dorld AM000.14 OW44-400>40.0 (/ 0) ) 0 000 AW 0 viri4)0444-ioup OHW4J "ItiOltol.riaulgrilt4 H mI WA rdo3oA WA .1.44 pHAHH 14 O' d CI(0 01 .11W 4g1.11 MuclZiAt44? 0 I46) wW) ;ItiNgl 04 44000A010 0)00 'd4/4.I A 4.) 0 3 cd womo w A000m CO 4 '0034./6r14.1 t/1 0 '-I 124 Vo001H ri 0, A g.00014 trtmll Al"O 'OA '4 111 U) " A.0triig§ g49A ?) 1.44.)Abo O 0o 0oAw 00 0 () . 4 g ° f r i ol A .8 4?4 4' g00000040 o000 14 ocl (01-40.(1) vi A O 404o0 0HHAN ncl 00 giupg 00AH mmrtil"Vol..W 14144TI0 0009.1iHni A (104 0 01 '0 . 000g11111gdwA0 M HM (Jog 0oHuw.ripl 6111.4tit St'Vdc1 140m44-InAH04 44ggirloo4 ofiNwo iRmito' N g.o>0IllAr.lo 0OHN 4044 o IciiNj451MAI-141.1$414404d 1 o vamoNgovm OH Ao 014.4 .14WWO turipj OH g0Hm00 14004H 14140,0000 H 00 1 (.) 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Some responsible staff even lack a highereducation-8Nonetheless, many branch R&D organizations display greattimidity toward their ministries. The studies they conduct are often pro forma exercises that fail to exposedefi- ciencies in the development of thebranch, much less in the leadership of theministry.9 Generally speaking, the Soviet approach tostruc- turing and managing innovation hasbeen premised on an image of technologytransfer that prevailed largely in the West until the early1960s. According to this view, the transfer process isenvisaged as "the passage of disembodied'ideas and methods,' endowed with some quasi-independence inthe manner of genes, from one state of existence or milieu toanother." The underlying assumption isthat technology is primarily "an assemblage of piecesof information which can be extracted orexpelled from one sector of organized creativity and transposed toanother to produce differentoutputs."10The whole process is reduced to clerical reporting, to amechanical transmission of documents and routingof information. As has happened in the West,this perception of technology transfer is beingincreasingly questioned and replaced by a more dynamicand systems view. Oue of the major Soviet discoveriesabout innovatio -.. in the 1970s, in fact, wasthe importance of the "management connection." The very phrase "research-to- production" cycle is said to be amisnomer because action throughout must benegotiated and mediated. It is better to speak in termsof a system of "research-management-production," to use the wordsof some Soviet analysts. Such phraseology, they note, conveys a more adequateimage of this complex process. It also explicitly identifiesand emphasizes the management function andlinkage-11With gradual movement away from a strictlyphase - Dominant to a more, process view ofinnovation, the need for a systems model of organizationand management has become more and more apparent. Indeed, it is not too much of an exaggeration to say thatthe Soviet research- 180 V V pl ti rt V rt14- rt 1 0 ,9,3 ,7 1co N Po" 131 1 PIA ros (1 D) 164.13tHlii6PocREEE 0 11 ; 0 (D an n a ti 03 o 41 H II) Q fD H II1;1 ? rt (II n n i-100 0 "Mr4ftni4lai t i CI a P lj lig141 trilUDI rn1 g 11 fe) 27iPtfmtailvl.t1P'Icitrillg.n1V Le rt 0 H OQ 1..et 131 H M ZBa" 0 H H 11) n rt 0.. n o) rt rt p w rt rt o f-t)2 rmtIO` oaf:0 V) rt Pt S g ITPt 41 A II P. 14 CI Pt0O4 c' Fti Pi v, IA 0 11 0 CO"P) 0 rt H o n P0 r)A' -)1 I ill))1-4g rn in rstgcl.:lei F61 rtFl." 1 Firt 0 lb DVr1ft' IC)Ii tgl)0gtt I It VIJrit) 011) PC) 11 r44CliPI r(D g(I (I rat'Iti it /.1 n cu rt pi al 11 0 ti co (1) 4)ii i-4 ti w I t7 ft tli0 P. " geq.rt'(F1 B o 0 alco(T) 4 n Prt H1:0 0 0 H11 P* Fg i0 H CD tJ 0lg.H IA H. rt 04 U) to n 11) E P 040 '4 bo I-4 0 rt 1-1, rt 0 00` paps PO Pt g rn/ 0 n It °4 " 00)Pt 0°iitvrt0 oh H rt M 0 00(10000. H o N II 1-1 r, Fos '8 v; 5. s gi 09d gi 11 mo gi nO 4 11 p fD ID) 61 n 14 P telt (1114 71g tP)0v 0 0 04 1109 0 Pi P H. n coCD P 0 CO Ho H gCnfl-t(411?)kciP,1:1tr)Pti 0Pt 4g Psrai e rot V 1.10.41-1 0 cr a) a '44 Va Itft11rq ' N. ti 0 4K ft n rt 0 11) 0 rt M rt 141 rt 1.1. H Cr M It 0 al Po nps g rt gt:sp.np OD Z (I) ft)0) 03 0 CO ID 11 Pk 54 2 H 01 Pi 2 A Frjts Urt) Nt fp wW ri N PiCr N `41 rilw PhP-: 19. 14 0 Pt gl H OQ 0 H 03 0 0 (0 1 it M irpe 04 r 4 1'4 ; 41 1-1 H Vio) riu-A i;PhHI rt rt,"1 012 IC:10 a n'N H r) 0 Vf5t Mo 1:1: e 04 0 0 P) r- PA w C0 F.. rt fD 0Bj°I IP., 13 1-1 rtn la 495101 .-. ID 0) ink 0() P C0 CL 0 H. 0) 04 rt OklIt 0 CI, 1-i Pi M11 H rt m%41gi Fi. gIt ki 0 ,9, g 7 (6°0 Hi kiti") 4 0)rt . .-, 0 r. Om 14 ,ti . tliat,siii f,!go,igrf')!3..,t,,t10 0,715thort 01 0 . E i) II)m4' RI (fiD) " 11) N.goPil'itli krti rt . 04 000wH(OP HCoQ000J 011it LI." rot 5 .Pil FD6 " "1R 3.11 0. it 0 n 0 rt °girttirtP)M 1-HO'h,11 1.4 P. o }J Co p' rt 0) 0 (0CO ft H 0 CD `4 rt f0inrt prt P P I-4 P 11ts) 6 Ch) 0Q to CO 0 cort co 1QD0 0 It:F-ti) 111 6'nla (71rt"341115.n C/1 rt H Cif t1IVO fil 0.11 ft4ft 40 11 11:/411" la11to 0 11 M M 11) ID-imt-h51.Nf`i't3.11.0i til re?' 0 OQ IA H. P, OQ M rt fD 0 0 `4 PC11) VI V)13 Pt (frig °11?) 13 (1-11) POrail 0,'Pt I 64 0 Ot) 11 (I) P CD t* 11 11 ri. rt Ort0t/ 0) I art110 I 0 11fli 0) Pt 0' 0) I 0 ID I H 0' I'D I 11 I rt rt k4 rt n n11:1 i'D I ? 1 5' I 0 rt CD I R&D subdivisions at industrial establishments inthe early 1970s actually conducted scientificR&D. The remainder were engaged in servicing the needs of production or in making minor improvements in thetechnological base.12 In the new associational forms linkingresearch with production, the status of the R&D center varies. In a science-production association (NTO), aresearch institute or design bureau is ordinarily the lead organization, while in a production association a research institute, design bureau, or general R&Dde- partment is generally subordinate to production management. In these new complexes and integrated structures, management must be concerned, in varyingde- grees, with both production and R&D,and functional departments typically service performers of both activities. Because these organizations are heavily concerned with the application of results inproduc- tion and use, we consider them further in that context later in this chapter. Recently, Soviets have become more interestedin the organizational problems of R&D andproduction facilities. The drive to create an optimal systemof intervelationships between individuals and groupsis termed "scientific organization oflabor," and it may be recalled that a section of the S&T planis devoted to this subject. For the most part, this concernde- volves into "time and motion" studies andanalyses of material flows on the shop floor, but thereis also mounting concern with organizational structureand the management process. The Soviet regime has long formulated standard organization tables for establishments by function and by size of labor force. However, these have generally not beenscientifically substant.Lated and have been characterized by extreme specialization of functions with emphasis onvertical lines of command. The lack of organizational flexibility hasindeed been one important obstacle to innovation.13 Scierv:Ific work has been organized like industrial activity. Little attention was given to the optimal size and structure of personneland operations. As a rule, leaders of R&D units havedemand- 182 1 G 4riglintitIrgre V v, '0 tirt rtH a4n n 0 ft it WS gla 111018nWt9P; 141741PPOVIlii :]1?°141"11:9Pil° n at 9 gA4Figa4mm faSi 0 0 DAra, rli 1..1 ii noonttBm441"t pips, V1.4° ole.02ng °"n4Vgrt i Ft 0164 faMairtPil kt r. Pi V4rtgltortPti I"rtP 0'1 P.,o E.00 41 al irlg'r4tInrain"agn glIT mnz2 otwn Fun m nt-11451np. rtnm n m owqmo mpi4o9ptonnP";" 415.0towl.o nrOlOoriogn ID; it Ps

, .?) g4"Ili 4%ci-Ihk4 CaliMilk Prit : rt M gvRhsqi,ENVIRcoglwega.risi.1 n m H. n fa 11 IA 40Knqi111,741.01. 64c4 '2 `pitc71f3)40)to' gil.,n41,4vigav H WWNW IAN H II it p.!. co n101(114014 641401)00. rialHconMM w 1-A915i:filo '13. Ba191(065.4IViolrmtn`r4t*5'''to's rt m4r. ?",1 ktii a w u cti rn 09 rt rt SA'. n"411gBITIVProT04Eig,0,1a064°001 .m4r1'1a w o4 4 v to v o 811 ,4rt (I 14 MO It M M 14 mu' Vi; L4M Pp miAwn0041.4rtwollArtAgto04 13 2nong nmi-iplisriltg WV 01,409 M ro 54M400M HO 0 w0QP,Onco Miln OMMiAnMil 0WHHOomH. WHMiJOHtirt OV141401d rt climVuo0H.m ticcoommn ni-li 14.6"r1.4144°PoM61 MPHMM i- 4 H.n.mvf.louotogmmom IggitgiliWI Panr?rgrIrriF"o P1 GL finwmp.i.nomni onicom R S ?A. oRo

'NI Han o n H 11 prI,Inotli ..1,64E.1,16h"r, r1pi. au) rrotirt PIti." 'I REar ; nv.o4o 2 Pat.0IP 0 0 0 F., WO W M O $0 a : " 4 191, NJ1-ti 1-1 ta pr. 4mnt-hcommy rtptict 5'Co rt tilg 111 6" n l11.4 it410 a OhE.. (1) OA 14 It 11 rtog 4 to 04 N rt WrtrISWOragi1126M64. MM w VoM hi. nnWgra5114^0Ng n 5. VH4 Pillgr.J9ggig MW(11-4P tint moa Omh etrth 1.4 6hi B°19(19,05tT4r4g nMVM nmwmCw0p.Wnli, II m n c A li o la 0 to r C1Q 0 P. Ci. OmMn 0 w M 4 WIJ. , n1019141-4 : I g i 1 3 4 1 5 . 14 3 mo i 7"7 5. og V it 4 n o Fti a) rt 11,4 M14 I I I I The most ambitious research complex isthe one that has grown up inthe Academic City of Novosibirsk, which is taking on someof the characteristics of the research-based industrial clusters around Boston, Palo Alto, and Houston.16 The Academic City at Novosibirskincorporates predominantly Academy facilities of differentdepartments, some of which havedeveloped close ties with branch design bureaus and pilot plantfacilities. Science- production centers are also planned tobe built around institutes of the Lithuanian Academy ofSciences in chemistry, chemical technology, and thephysics of semi-conductors. Similarly, in Kurgan the recentfor- mation and expansion of facilities of fourministries concerned with ground vehicles,including automotive, agricultural, railroad, and constructionequipment, reflect this enhanced belief inindustrial "cross fertilization."Bureaucratic barriers, rooted inand reinforced by the organizational andspatial separation of R&D performers, areincreasingly recognized as harmful. The structure of the Soviet R&Destablishment is thus influenced first by the natureof the activity in question. Beyond this, organizational structures tend to permit little flexibilitycompared to Western standards. Extreme specialization of activityand vertical lines of command arethe norm. Basically, the research-to-productioncycle has been broken up in time, task, and territory. Recent developments of particular interest sm-e the closerorganizational ties between research and production inthe "association" unit and the development ofresearch complexes char- a=terized by geographic collocation.

CONDUCT OF R&D

Execution of R&D plans depends onacceptable criteria of fulfillment. While production targets may be measured by tone, units,rubles, or other physical 184 1 WOM110001:106Ertrt0' IA I4i!IIMR 71$14MIllilltaliPP:g1 10"IVi4" °E1Fingilip la q.H°' rilgr mEMgITAPIg:14: 11KP418 5 gltS/11-005emMg1S to 1454HOMM14g4 0/ft rt(t4 M w * tOII 0)I/ HI 41r. Mtin rtHi4Ow 19 V 1 rt tortta it: mot:, Tri041a/fIgi (11 fill P3'4 71 ' Pi,c 1 Ii" 'o''4 ' ol°o 5 0 lwrAVIVjOralg No i.4(I)51 tt,. p 0,1 t 1,3.'col Aiirt. ID GQ Il PI 1-4 H WM ci 41.1 rta cilnWFtelgir,AL4PilitHa; gmloplio 1400VA 41 H.OOMMOO la. M H 0 1k' ft 0 M M rt it bo,.cr vi -N rnI, or16hr, tio 8 ft ° trit ' it V') isfroft' ''' 11 grAPicotiFt"JO il 5, Ftt (12441a2VI.gwn""0 0 to ,...0). v gaFttiggW:co'': 1-1. m IA a m cr . n . 1.44 (1) co * 0'41 N grin (1) PI B Ntg""(T.0 1 34 :1 ' 1 1 fli.ifirts limnw oot non ' VmmolAH.olignrIP'0 A Pi ri A g 0. 411 n"m 10il041114.0 rt :V144150oWS1000gi HMO 00kft 0 1p"r434W comwONm too Dog F.4101 O'i*gOigHlfM01 4111i MI 0,try6sli'S?1,41(°"' noommawgm0.11 o H.I.A. VPTC011 PitcLmgi p.,11 0.1%.% w Fs rt 0 (1)* It 0 000M0 Mai 8 '1ge '4 ft V Fr tri'4to %.4 cort 4M ltbs, ' 1 mnmmi... Ito 0000 (7 111 Pg° ; 34 'Fil"416MM0000< 0 40P'M MI-00001-4v °I, 411;1104 t-ti 0 v rt p rt rt 0 M toto Ngg111%141-1?":11u) rt01-10fcrAitriravgp!oril S'14" tO rt 1 rt; 0141.4HMI100 F.I. V 0 o 1a031-4M1-10. OMM 4 It C rt 4 ror 61045 111 ,-.4flortwil 'IP MH. OH HHO v. M L.41.4.0Mrt MrtIll 1-611 D001.4 00la flt1 OH.ftHrt4.4.11M 00000.(00 0W,A0WOomM 0, M 110 41Mrt M H M 0 M n 0 MAID it 0 m 00 1- pm to P. rt .4 "VMPia ri"" oEl Ojs Fj° riitl 2(14S,p) 0 HO 8 kvi; ' n '''iti I-4 St° r2° 4112a i:/911 01.°) Frill 11 it '.44 1 Lo El CD rt Rrt 0;A Pt ..1%, 0 moom o rt0 0i+ m ommrt utv m OOMMP tAWO Olt np.o rirt V n to DI 09 rt 0 rt gmmTo mo rt H. oVOHit ItrtOPcop.4M0 ol gMRIVBVV044151FoHo MHOP. 0li rtFO Pi m P3tto M I-1 W Hi KV17Pr09 Wrt mi-Art mmn 0 a' to(t) omok4 mZHO ma IA M ninm low 0. ID 1-111-4 Cr 01 11 I I f3 M W MO 1 0.11 HI il I V of the Council of Ministers. State committees, in turn, monitor exe%_ution of important tasks(e.g., the GK NT) or a functional area of the establishmentplan, such as supply (Gossnab). In addition, Go sbank has an important role in overseeingthe financial flows which are planned to correspond to physical flows, and the CPSU exercises a general oversightfunction. Within the performing establishment, program control techniques incorporated in various plansfacil- itate conduct of the R&D project. We noted, for example, that thematic plans of research institutesand design bureaus are based on "calendar plans;" for- mulz.ted on a project basis, these subdivide the work into stages, designate responsible individuals,and schedule completion dates. Recently, a more formal research management technique has been developed: "network planning and control." In broad terms, a network model is any construct which is"dynamic, informational, and reflective of the process of performing a complex of tasks directed to theachieve- ment of a singlegoal."18 In practice, this can mean little more than such tools as grid schedules and Gantt charts for diagramming activities in sequence and for monitoring time, cost, and quality parameters. However, it also includes Soviet development and application in the early 19E0s of moresophisti- cated techniques which resemble PERT andcritical path methods-19 In the mid-1970s, network methods aresaid to have gotten their "second wind,"according toDr. Yu. I. Maksimov. Three factors have stimulatedthis recent growth: (1) the introduction of management information systems that provide the necessaryinformation, norms, and technology fortheir application; (2) increased utilization of multistage econome'zicmodels linking the stages of planning, design, andproduction; and (3) the development ofanalytical aids and computer programs for calculatingand optimizing not only specific network charts but alsoalternative stochastic network models. Examples of more sophisticated network techniques along thelines of CPM and PERT that surfaced in the 1970s forcomplex in- 186 terbranch projects are the so-called "Sputnik" and "Skalar" systems. In addition to evaluating time and cost elements, network methods are also improving handling of materials and technical supplies and allocating manpower in R&D organizations. On the whole, however, their application remains limited; they are still largely confined to the major scientific centers, notably Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, and Novosibirsk, and to major large-scale projects.20 Such planning and control techniques, it may be noted, are compatible with the Soviet predilection for structured, planned activities. Their development and application to date have been constrained, in large part, by structural factors and the organizational-managerial fragmentation of the innovatio1 cycle. Other features of program control in the Soviet performer_establisixment center on the creation of the optimal inte=rnal organizational structure for support of R&D. As previously indicated, much interest has been expressed in the development of "organic" links between R&D and production, the topic of the next section. But even within the independent R&D estab- lishmen-:, Soviet authorities have found it advantageous to associate and link R&D personnel responsible for distinct stages or aspects of a complex project. Two pertinent dimensions may be identified: association between individuals working on separate stages of product or process development, and association between individuals working at the same stage of, respectively, product and process development. The benefits of such close contacts are said to have been instrumental in developing the ceramic tile manufacturing process.21 Accordingly, numerous research institutes and design bureaus are expanding direct forms of cooperation and collaboration among the various participants in the research-to-production cycle. In addition. some performer establishments have begun to experiment with forms of project management and matrix organization to break down intrainstitu- tional barriers, departmental and functionz1, and to 187 2LI accelerate the innovation process. A discussion of the pressures generating the conversion to matrix management is found in chapter 12. The deficiencies and limitations of traditional hierarchical forms of administration are thus being increasingly felt, and efforts are underway to develop new and more dynamic structural designs to cope with the problems of advancing technology and complexity.

As regards methods of conflict resolution the experience of modernizing production operations at ZIL Is instructive. Whenever delays or deviations in program development arose, a meeting wasconvened of representatives from ZIL, organizations participating in the project, local organs, and pertinent ministries. Problems were settled through joint agreements of the interested parties with theformulation of the appropriate protocol. Any conflicts between organizations subordinate to the Ministry of the Au- tomobile Industry which they could not settle themselves w=re resolved by the leadership of the min-. istry. The solution was binding for both sides. If disagreements arose between organizations of different ministries, the matter wasexamined by the appropriate ministerial authorities. Sometimes a joint decision by the interested ministries resolved the issue. Disagreements over questions of planning were examined by Gosplan, supply problems were handled by Gossnab, and SST problems were mediated by theGKNT.22 The formality and rigidity of theseprocedures to resolve conflict prevent rapid application of corrective measures. Such procedures also breed conservatism in the performer at the time of planformulation and, in a sense, frustrate central controlby insula- ting the performer with layers of paper anddelays.23 Conflicts are inevitable in any project. Coordi- nation is the process of managingconflict. Conflict management practices keepdifferent units together as they work tc'ward integrated goals. In the Soviet Union organizational separation andadministrative fragmentation of the innovation process complicate greatly the task of coordination and necessitate cum- 188 I a 1 4 I 4) r-1fl I 12 1 Ts 00 tJ > 1 I I 0 o 0 v4 AId4 4 1gs r.t o o ti)i 45 .- O 44411VgillYllig (IJ 0 Pogii- I u).h t4, vi 10 u4.1"'?)( :1,1 co iu60?4 1 h 1as th1 r4 Jd 711Ig (0) id4.1 0 4) 0 4J 4.J 41 1,- " , 2>Iti:rAurfi44° la 4-14) rt:14-1/4004-) W> 44 H 0 04 O. :. , 04 1)0 0 4.1 0 U 18 4.1 Iv.1(2.40A01.44JW4J.H004.4.4r/H 1.2 e;110 .. 444g 14 04 4J ijiki 1 rf 1:1 u 414J4JOU til 0 4 40citt41(194.1° VOUU "eid0140).91-c419 4-11I:4 0 0 4-4 0 41 014 04) 14 0 4J 0 oj 0 44 r4 4) 14 >19 u 4./ 0 1.4 U) .i.41 4,8Icli H41 Iiril ri str'lu,1) VI, O 11 14 "I 14 olIt t2 ill 1 tti 44 0 0 )4 c U tA 4 .11.4 t-4 41 vi 1:1 IV IA to 4,) cotd)14° te9 1) LI) o' 19 44J V) P.1 WU 1 0' riW (1; 41 0 14 14 401-1V0U0 04)) 4J g tv4 co 'd 0 /4 >13,1WLIOU4.1 COVC4 000 4J144)044 4..i o g 4s1co fj 409 gt, 4.1 0 0 '4 41 g 44 TI > 11))4 44 w .,9 V 1:1 0 0 .. 0 u 1 140 44 ° A V4 I/4.1 44 CU C4 '0 4./ ri444 4)i.1 0 tidsgligit4C41..0g 2 41 161) t>, u 4./ 14 H 01 0 W 0) r-i >r-I (4 U sr44) Cd 117V) 443 .1J ci 49 4J 00 a) 4 4) 4-1 4 ri H N-4td 0 11 fj 1 14470 M 14'm Ft'isto 14 41:: (44)P0 i al," IC)4) 011 : Uriti" ri 1:1 Ill U 01 41 cd T4 40 :WFV"Itticdn.,98Axig 1 14144404ctl 1,i4.01 8(2 1 fibofi Ili 1 'xito, eil yi .ri4/ 44 14 04 4) > a Pt, vi 4,)4t.)-I .r1 (1) 4) 0 0 U 41A 0 44 0 41 N 4.)bl) 60 O8 to)vli''' 4 I'to e'al144 0 rl W1 134i.1.1 41 tj 'Ol 0 1.4 gil : $ 41 4141 ti 1 rilTA8 O 14 4.114 > 00 A 0 41 r1 A 03 14 cd 4-1 0 4) A 04 4-1 yi A 4.1 4 0) 0 , ... . U .ri ( 1 ) U ri 60 4)',1 11 vi V 0 4..1 4141 4c) CU 0 44 44 4)td ,-I00 040J(i.2,1c4 ON 01 14 ri 0 Cd c3 IA CO %4) 4 cz4cO4 g4.;t gc: 0 (44q8o144v1 ri 4) > 14 r4 v4 4,1> 0 14 V 0 0 04 ou (,) 4j4tal0r41 gti tiNg ° er4 44101((I/ 441 PA 49 t4)Hill 711 444.1 0 "I 14 1414 0 i44.1 ow i di 4J g F0 4414) 1:), u 4,) 0 11 U 0 .r1 44 td 0) 44 01Cle U pi h 4-1 z 4)4) r1 "rtli 21 3 1 ,n4 te :44Wli:41 g 14 1-1 A PaVAtil 8 gt: tol4J8 ckal o'81 'd vci 44 yui 4.J litsri A 7111 u tl 04 4 2 ru 0 0 o 444) ToI4/ 14 cg) 1414 ivew rz.1 td r-1 49 0 000 0 t4) 14I g45'W'.01, 1 t,i) 1 fj e4.11 oodt til 4 . ) 4jC 13 " 4. 45 4 ) )4 4(40 A e) VC44 1 C 4 0 1 4J. ty I-4ar 0 ,44. 13 g 4_4471"i,Le > 03 44 vi srl 1411841 0 a w "I A4.1 4) "I 44 T) ri 4.1 4 4.1 41C) wo Sgl/4 PI tilti) 144-1 4J4)4) U AI II C° :14 4j TIJ 6r4 114.10 stLog" 114(14 T4.1 gr`lbe 'lij a °$41 41 0 4,1 fa, 4-1 u 0;1 9 (4 't/El)0 0 0 arl A 0 0 ir :Ilet8410ligto'itet .11314 ou 11 4.1 U 0 irl .0 14 0 44 0 g 14)( ) g A 14 es 1 la vs 411 rt o .ri7.44 g Sw tuchi tto vlU WI $4 U orl 1 1a till o; 1 titl ari43414i 1 01 44 13. id ' 4toPpowo14116

tg) H r Ilel4-41 0) Vrw ° 1 g 1 11HI 11U Cil 0 4J 4 v " "iv ?40 t earl ,1cc, w 4) 6 4ri444r4 N A ,,04J13a 0uo .ri 0 141;114tOtgA: 1 U ils404ag IJI141 1La6 :AI 4°4 tion of personnel, then, generally is assured, with one major exception. Maximum salary levels are fixed in relation to the nature of the organization at which the scientist or engineer is employed. Accord- ingly, the best S&T personnel have tended to gravi- tate away from industry to the Academy system, and within industry from production to R&D establishments. This doubtless has hindered industrial R&D and associated production assimilation, although in recent years the relative position of industry seems to have improved somewhat. At the same time, certain deficiencies of the system of planning and training scientific manpower merit brief mention. Surpluses of specialists exist in some, more traditional fields of science and technology and shortages in other areas, such as computers, biochemistry, and microelectronics--the main paceset- ters of modern S&T progress. Experts in the modern social sciences and management sciences are also lacking. The orientation of planning and professional training has not kept pace with changes in science, technology, and organization. "Existing programs of education are not designed to train specialists in the subjects needed by modern society and by research, planning, and design organizations," observes Gvishi- ani.24 The acceleration of technical progress also makes obsolete information, knowledge, and acquired skills, so that the retraining of scientific, engineering, and managerial personnel is becoming increasingly necessary. This need is all the more pressing in view of the mounting constraints on manpower resources which require greater attention toqualita- tive improvements rather to quantitative increases in the size of the S&T establishment. Acquisition of material supplies, another control mechanism, generally is planned at the same time that basic R&D and production assignments are formulated. Gossnab is the principal agency in charge of planning and distribution of supply. The Soviet material and technical supply system is conducive to large-scale deliveries of fairly standardized products, but not to the typical small-lot deliveries of special pur-

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IN THE USSR

Aerial Stliarlatian at Sciaatifia ott Tack laal kagtass

hoe* rts Us IAA Stiolattaaat Irclhnia Provos lattalictlos of No(Omni Author isausollan old evouseg tar* lacratha Lvater oilWA loal Wavle

I al

.No

1° 1 a

Materialno eNstisnliro- Source: P. S. Miroshnikov, A. F.Kotlyarov, and V. P. Babich, vaniyenauchno-tekhnicheskogo propessa(Kiev, 1973), p. . ftvommomtAommprtnp4mm 0d0111MOVrtHOH00 on itso ftrt oammom0P100.(1M00)01-hmo (MD gi Ogg un) 0 rtit a' 5. tin 1?)a,11 a IA TarallgiF ?Igo°Mmti pn V111-401-Aw H W Milt 1/4100MOOM0h46100mWMrtVAINgialinmit rttCn ig.ghi,mRr Ogrirt"VO .ta. ts n 0 nfD rttiOrt HNm HOMmk MOVIAMm 0 h V 2rIgrtgle:545.(01'WOHH0M0H0i'ottLmkog"gRI: 4F.4MOVO0 (A0f.Fittlir40.113_2!1:600H oalg Hmmt.tirtriors. 000H 04 wHONN OW4p HOW000WM11000 H0000k4 MpH011i MMMa141AIRPttrit1g0 co1-1 miArtpw E4tirt gir-inWoleg4PP)Wg'r)g MM"oitN:inmW$) 0umVp00 Oa 'rat PV0HH II rt 0 H rt CD 011fD %.4 W M0)-4 M 6 0 60 it IA %< 0 Ft; 11 O" : rt (i)R) ft" 4 ITI11 Cr ce ti 0.) 0000HHHH.M0 0'401mi-kop wtvigtri (0 rt H FA m (D POMOmMWVHOVHH40HVMOOE4tgr,trmm,!ArD 0 011

THE STRUCTURE OF BONUS AWARDSFOR TECHOLOGICAL INNOVATION INTHE USSR

Annual Economic

Return

of the Innovation Amount of Bonusas Percentage iot114...ndrubles)tt of the AnnualEconomic Return

Up to 10 6 to 25%, but notover 2000 rubles 10 to 20 5 to 20X, but notover 3400 rubles 20 to 50 4 to 17%, but nctover 6000 rubles 50 to 100 3 to 12%, but notover 10,000 rubles 100 to 500 2 to 10%, but notover 35,000 rubles 500 to 2000 1 to 7%, but notover 80,000 rubles 2000 to 5000 0.7 to4%, but notover 150,000 rubles above 5000 0.5 to 3%, but notover 200,000 rubles

Source: I. D. Ivanov, "OvercomingObstacles and Stimululation Duringthe Introduction of New Technology andNew Management Methods (Russiantext),"p. 11. funds have diminished the effectiveness cf this program. Yet there is potential in this a.d other programs to redirect the attentionof scientists and engineers to economic application, which is perhaps the major theme of all current developments inSoviet program management and controlmechanismsregulating the conduct of R&D.

UTILIZATION OF R&D RESULTS

The growing Soviet concern,reflected throughout this study, for effectiveapplication of R&D results in production and use is a consequenceof two trends: (1) the rising dependence of continuingSoviet economic growth on technologicalinnovation; and (2) relatively poor Soviet performance intranslating scientific ideas into new products and processes.The first necessitates improvedperformance in the entire R&D sector. The second focuses onthe greatest problem within that sector.As General Secretary Brezh- nev phrased the Issuein 1971, "If one examinesall the links of the complex chainuniting science with production, it is not too difficult to seethat the links connected with the practicalrealization of scientific achievements and theiradoption in mass production are theweakest."31 The overriding reason for thisdeficiency is the absence, under traditional Sovietoperating practices, of individuals and organizationsthat are both capable of and interested in effectingthe transition to application. In principle, the independentresearch, design, and development organizations areobligated to supply the productionestablishment with technical doctr- -station, working blueprints,and/or prototypes of n, products and p-.;zocesses ostensiblyready for utilization. But the effective judgeof the "readi- ness" of an innovation is thedesigner or developer himself, and he has little incentive toundertake gratuitously activities whichwill only help the producer. The latter, in turn, receiveslittle or no 197 rt0) 0) n rt rt 11rtcoEl 9., n H 14. frat Frt rg ;1 rt' ° N IV rt fl F; 1:1,7 o o m 4. 0 H 71 1 re2 rtt N 1 V 11 0' th n 4 rnE. 0 vg v%.; 04 4 (PTA) PI(A Vil VI 11- 2 ritsor w 40ort Cr' 00)pgMt-hprt 001-1 chop' I-h04m O L-4gf '''1 1-1kTirt:7.IS ria It"""r2IVQ"2".`"Ploo 1Y: ft It M g' ° rcottr) ii trjM(9'0 FA. rt t112t (0) II 'tit 4100It I-h 11 PR) I-ti !34 Ptt.h19h il Pfil) 0) II (° ft M(1 " 00 rt 04A 0 M 0 P4 PA fl)111 M lbI-h 'A VI:: R 11o 0 13 rt. 0-1" 11---t1 ij)j 0 0"c1 " N0PAi ft n8 (4fl (fit'P.Pi gII 0WI R 17 Pt .ID H rtPg04 11) (rtPrit OS. a ill 8r)`4 51 (V6oVI:: 60, (D0) 0' rt m rt 0 a' 4 W0 0)() 0 rt III 11) ) r igtrt-i l) 11) lr; (04 in-,) fAl i R0, ( b45'a r t ° lit A ° 51 wg " VH. m2 r0t) ° 1-1 (a.k4 1E:rt(I)P. V4 P§6 'AN PI tli II 00gl. t-l D4 '4 rt rt P. 0) i ft;t. A, 0f 1'1 rt M rt P. 0 Cr rt g Pi 0 0 It 9 rt rt V 0 0) fDrt p 1-. v. 0 IA rt M H i\) 0 4) H r.:_ti111 0 M 5V;P 5.0 tt;la 17)'(i) M 19 "t F-4r07) : 5' I's" R. (IAty(1) ii' 2 (`Do roc? ',.4 5.-of rr 0 g v rtM0c)0' w rt rt)P. Eh rt H N I 'Vol; 4 A gi fl .." RIrt 11 ID'I t, , g rrnt' fr D 11)0) SA a'Itan;:osto4514pliggcnRe9 2:, l40)PA 0) M V0)ID 1E4151.C6FAHOdoirle V Pg Pg " frl111.1 VA V t il) 001F4M EVP. 'irtV V"0)Ntb H 01-1fDrt 0)F.103.01-hrtrttD0A HIIMIJtrt1-101-1.ti plotv40P P) . N 4 II t:/a)rt PIft Co (1) P H piI1 M N rt k o 4 0 4 r01 Ha'A"V2 'A 2, " c'-)t & ; rtf01)a'1) M 0) 0 0) M 44 T N 1 2 tig VH O H W4IN 0 fa. Il0) 0 la H. 0 Elrt rt M 0 pct (")Pi FA n I-, CD 514 013 g g f-1rmtrtPicJi 181-D4 (up, 2. r.:(1,)i,}g. m Ph 11, a',3 H rt k4 a 1-1 m t<01 0 4 ivgi Ei M Ir-i 0, IS' r tiol (F3-I Fa rt. tTI'o 19i 5641 ° 3 00, rt EI coPtHi IA HI fD00 04M rt0V M (DIg5it/)(01900114100114 ii.iin' H 0 M rt rt ot)or.u)k

Detignation of Duration Accordingto Plan Actual by Fundamental Steps Execution Performing , 1 a Order 15 x 2 and Operations 19 x 3 Organization eftlialmomilmommildOmmullwomsimo' 7171=T-TrinxV 111 raIV

A. DesignPreparation Department of the

Chief Engineer(OCK)

Experimental Shop(ITS)

Project-design vork DesignBureau (13); (Development ofdocu- menttion)

Preparation of experi- ITS;OM mental models

Testing ofexperimen- ETS; Laboratoriesof tal models the OGK

Mining ofdesigns ETS; Laboratoriesof in experimental pro- the OGK duction

1. Technological Chief Technologist; Preparation Chief Metallurgist FIGURE 10-2(continued)

No. Designation of Duration According to Plan, Actual Execution by kluadamental Stages Performing 19 x 1 19 x 2 1 19 x 3 Order and Operations Organization lin 'III] IV I II III Iv I II III IV

1. Technological analysis of drawings, development of paths lor pro- Technological duction of parts in Services shops

Allocation of asaign- ments to shops, depart-OPP of the Technical meets Department

2. Development of technol-Technical Unit of ogical processes; for- Technological De- mulation of tasks for partment; Technolog- desiga of machinery, ical Bureau of Shop tools, equipment and Production other means of production

3. Designing means of Design Bureau of the tooiing production departments of de- processes signing production equipment

4. Preparation of machin- Tool Production ery, equipment, tools

15 FIGURE 10 -2(continued)

Designation of Duration Accordinto Plan Actual FuodusatalStages Execut (in

and Operations

Department of

equipleat, secbanic

Project-installation service

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In this context, we discuss production associations (POs) andscience-production associations MOO. These new complexesrepresent an attempt to build unified organizationalsystems rather than un- related or disjointedarrays of tasks, functions, and individual efforts. Such integrated structuresare designed to give institutionalexpression and coherence to the innovation process. Some science policy experts in Moscow argue, in fact, that onlythrough research and development complexescan the "research to production" cycle be effectivelycarried out from beginning to end.34The move to create specialor- ganizations concerned with applicationsengineering and diffusion is less well advanced,and only brief attention is given to chem.

As noted previously, the Soviet enterprisetypi- cally corresponds toa single-plant Western company wit4 extremely limited design, development,and exper!--ental capabilities. The production association, combining formerly independent R&D andproduction units, is fast becoming the basic economicorganiza- tion er Soviet industry. A major aim of establishing POs is to insure that seriesor mass production of the most advanced items isset up for the internal market and for export. The POs are comprised of tech- nologically integrated productionenterprises with research institutes and design bureaus attachedto them. For example, the Leningrad instrumentmanufacturing production association Svetlana has experimentalre- search and design divisions that workclosely with its production facilities in developingnew hardware models, a special design bureau forcreating technological equipment for their industrialtesting, and shops for manufacturing this equipment. The organizational structure of this associationis depicted in Figure 11-3. Note the experimental design bureaus (OKBs) which are subordinateto two of the association's plants. The presence of a comprehensiveex- perimental research facility ischaracteristic of POs especially in machine building, andthe metallurgical, 204 SVETLANA PRODUCTIONASSOCIATION FIGURE10-3 ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE

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2.1j chemical, and oil refiningindustries. A number of large POs even have researchcenters of all-union importance, such as the R&D servicecf the KAMAZ, and the scientific researchand experimental designcen- ter of E'ektrosila, whichoccupies a leading position in the world in turbine construction.35

A distinguishingcharacteristic of the PO is the clear emphasison production at large-scale, efficient rates ofoutput. A production facility,in fact, is the lead unit.Thus, while improvedinnova- tive performance isan important objective, other standard economic benefitsof such larger units also are expected. These include economiesof large s.: -Ile production, specializationof subordinate units,and wider application ofadvanced managerialpractices. The use of integratedplanning techniques,computer- ized data processingsystems, and organizational designs based on principlesof purely projector matrix management has allegedly beeninstrumental in accelerating innovation In thesenew structures. Accord- ing to Ivanov, the research-to- production cycle has been reduced for certainproducts by 50 to 75 percent in the UralelektrotyazhmashProduction Association. In the L'vov InstrumentManufacturing PO imeni V. I. Lenin this cyclewas cut on an'average by 50percent, and the degree ofinterchangeability of assemblies was boosted to 80 percent whiletheir weight wasre- duced by half and theirreliability was raised bya factor of 3 or 4. In the Svetlana and Elektrosila production assoclations almostall developmentpro- jects reach the production stage.3'

The most significantorganizational development, from "the longrange view of scientific and technical progress," is the creationof science-productionas- sociations.37 Set up in the late 1960sexplicitly to organize innovationas a distinct and major task, NPOs functionas special nurseries for the rapidgen- eration and application ofnew technology. Though they exist in nearly allbranches of industry, they are concentrated mainly in machinebuilding, especially in the electrotechnical,electronics, instrument manufacture, and aviationsectors, as well as in the chemical and petrochemicalindustries. 206 2 ;2 Within industry, three basic typesof NPO may be differentiated according to their finalproduct: (1) those that specialize indeveloping primarily new products and technological equipmentfor their manufacture; (2) those that concentrate oncreating new means of mechanizationand automation of production, including management information systems;and (3) those that engage in the developmentof new materials and technological processes. The third type is less prevalent than the other twoassociations. A few NPOs, like Mikrobioprom(microbiological industry), Soiuznauchplitprom (wood processing), andPlastpoll- mer (chemicalindustry), engage simultaneously indeveloping new products, new processes Aand new kinds of equipment and automateddevices.3' NPOs differ also in terms ofthe scope of their specialization and product use.The majority are of branch importance. However, some NPOs like Plastpol- imer are primarily subbranchwhile still others are essentially interbranch. The latter include Soimma- uchplitpram and Soluzsteklamash(glass machine building), which develop articles used inconstruction, electronics, and defense as well asin the automobile, electrical engineering, instrumentmanufacture, light, food, chemical, and medicalindustries. Similarly, the All-Union NPO Soiurtransprogress wasformed in 1974 to design, develop, andinstall transport con- tainer systems throughoutthe country.39

Numerous benefits are ascribed tothese new integrated and integrating structures. The process of creating and applying newtechnology has been reduced in many. NPOs by two and eventhreetimes.40 The quality of research, development,and innovation is also higher. in the electrical -Angineeringindustry the share of output stamped withthe seal of highest quality is 1.5 to 2.5 times greaterin the NPOs than in the branch as awhole.41In the associations from40 to 50 percent(and climbing to 80 and 90 percent)of completed R&D is actually introducedwhile in autonomous scientificand technological organizationsonly 15 percent is successfullyutilized. 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If these two tasks are =it delimited organizationallybetween science-pro- duation and production associations but are donewith- in the NPO, then confusion and a distortion offunc- tions takes place. The inclusion of enterprises engaged in series production leads to an expansion of manufacturing operations to the detriment of scientific READ activity. The main function of the NPO--prototype development-becomes subordinate tothe task of fulfilling current production programs. Indeed the claims and fears of those adopting this view are confirmed Ly experience. In several NPOs the share of scientific research and experimentalde- sign comprises only 5 to 15 percent of the volumeof industrial production activity. Some of these NPOs have, in fact, been subsequently renamed POs. Inoth- ers, R&D results areaccumulating and cannot find an outlet either at the association or at other enterprises of the branch. The share of new products orig- inating in the NPO and assimilated into seriesproduc- tion has also declined in recent years atElektroap- parat and Kondensator. More thanhalf of the work of series production facilities at some NPOsdeals with assignments that have nothing to do withthe activities of their own R&D units and sometimes evenfall outside the specialized profiles of theassociations. NPOs having major enterprises of series and mass production have shown a strong tendency to becomeinter- ested mainly in improving productionindicators and not in accelerating innovation.To weaken the desire to maintain production runsof the same items and to encourage greater product mix andrenewal, a new rule has recently been introduced. If an NPO issues a particular product more than three years,deductions to its incentive funds are then reducedby 50 percent.44 On the other hand, many specialistsinsist equally strongly that series or batch productionis an integral part of the NPO.The role of series production facilities is not to increaseindustrial output but to serve as an arena within whichthe NPO can test and perfect its innovationsunder actual production conditions. If NPOs lack series production capability, this forces them to transfer theassimila-

209 tion of .ew products and processes to other organizations. That prolongs the process and reduces the quality of innovation. In effect, the NPO is excluded from the most important stage connected with the introduction of R&D results into the economy and can- nct perform its role of connecting link between science and industry. When the NPO concentrates mainly on "preproduction" work, it cannot really qualify as a "science-production" association-45 Views also differ concerning the place of the NPO at the research end of the innovation process. For that matter, there Is no agreement in the Soviet Union about the place and role of basic research more generally in the research-to-production cycle-46Until recently, major NPOs like Pozitron themselves performed fundamental research equal to nearly 10 percent of their total scientific research effort. It became necessary to abandon this practice by the mid 1970s, however. While a few NPOs still engage in some exploratory research, the majority contract with institutes of the Academy of Sciences to conduct fundamental research for them.47 Befitting their role and development as "branch" institutions, NPOs focus predominantly on applied R&D. At the same time, the scope and volume of scientific research and development vary widely among NPOs. In some associations the share of R&D may be less than 10 percent of the total cost of production activity while in others it may account for as much as 50 percent.48 Some Soviet specialists believe that a fixed percentage should be established for the ratio of "science" and "production" activity as a mandatory condition for the functioning of an NPO. Though he disagrees with this view, Taksir notes that whet a complex is headed by a small research institute which conducts an insignificant volume of R&D (less than 10-12 percent), then the NPO is generally unable to direct effectively the research-to-production cycle. Arkhangelskiy also demonstrates that the capacity of the R&D center must be nearly 20 percent of the production capacity for an NPO to perform successfully its variousfunctions.49 210 Lith2 r, p icrg g fiJ fl (1 g4 1 i 11 r4 t,4,3 ftt,. g. r, (rD, % s 014 191 `4 ri V .8 14 Pi:).a ?.? ft rot g. i r)...... 0 .

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DO 0 I I 0 1 is the leading center for plastics and has overall responsibility for high pressure polyethelenes, poly- styrenes, fluoro-plastics, and polyvinylacetates. Be- tween 1969 and 1973 the NPO introduced 117 innovations into Soviet industry. In the cryogenic engineering industry nearly 90 percent of all machinery and equipment produced is based on designs developed at the industry's NPO Kriogenmash. In radio electronics Pozi- tron is the S&T center.51 At the same time, it is also clear that not all NPOs serve as S&T centers for their branches. Some associations serve only a few enterprises and contain very small R&D units. Others that do exercise branch- wide functions do not provide all the special services mentioned above. Some NPOs are unable to perform broad S&T tasks either because they lack a research institute or the one they have is not the leading link in the association.52 These basic differences in perception and practice determine the structure of science-production associations. Table 11-2 shows the structural makeup of 15 leading NPOs. All these associations contain both a scientific research institute and a series production unit. Thirteen have an experimental production capability. Other evidence suggests, however, a less uniform picture for the NPOs as a whole. In a study of 40 NPOs, Kushlin notes that 10 percent had no series production unit while 8 percent lacked a scientific research subdivision. Eighteen or 45 percent of the NPOs had no experimental production or testing facility.53 Particular .y absent, it seems, are facilities such as start-up and adaptation organizations and training centers which can promote more rapidly and effectively the utilization of R&D results. A few NPOs, like Pishchepromavtomatika (food processing), Soiuznauch- plitprom, and Impuls (computers), have established special services that help introduce new products and processes directly at client _mterprisesand train their personnel in the use and repair of equipment. At series plants of their branches other associations 212 6.1.11110111=mommmftwomimull V 11 ro 5 12 F rtMA 0 rt I 1 1 i i 1 1 I H It i11o psi .)' CgCA r4rt 8 i I gir. e-quay m .1. + , , , Scientific ...... 0 IA( I " i i i Art gi , , , , , iteloarch Institute 0 IAIA . I-4 0CO H CrP. V Igo iiiip Bureau z n I i I 4$111110Design Dceign-Technological *-4u) pl.n CIA I Bureau %,.. 0.-4 p gi 0 $0+I +If I I -----,...... , to.. 11 I ftrt-th iv r re. rt + 18+1+ + + + + + Project Organization 4 0n M Pi I o 01.1111.Experiabental k irt) rr + +If/SIM+++ + + + + + + + + + + Production Plant ri.115.11 M 0 4 4. 4. 4 4. .1. 4, .1. .1. 4, + 1, .1. .1, Series Production i i%) P. Cti ri (l an4 n Vto I-, Allembly,Facility Startup and SI0 Ni t; W 01 + i t 111;11111.1.11nstallation Organization tisn0.1. 114. iiiiiiiiiii MethodsATraining Center and -...... 8g have created special departments (affiliate services of the NPO) which include design engineers and technologists who assist the plants in retooling and manufacturing new products.5 In general, though, this set of important functions is not yet beingperformed by the majority of NPOs. Underlying these issues ofrh^optimal structure, composition, and functions of the science-production association is the problem of what in American business terminology is called "k)roductdifferentiation." Given the array of new structural designs and associational forms that have evolved since the late 1960s, the NPO has had difficulty in gaining and maintaining a distinct identity. Lacking a precise definition of the NPO, some ministries have arbitrarily classified the new complexes. What are labeled NPOs are, in fact, production associations or complex scientific institutions. Some NPOs have experienced problems in preserving their fundamental dual character. Overdevel- opment of their scientific functions turns the NPO into a traditional research institute, only larger. Hypertrophy of production operations, on the other hand, transforms the complex into a production association. The difficulties of maintaining a "dialec- tical unity" of functions have led some experts to press for a fixed ratio or at least minimumlevels regulating these activities.55 The problem of product differentiation is made all the more difficult because in some instances it is practically impossible to distinguish between an NPO and a PO which contains its own large R&D complex. For example, the Uralmash Production Association includes a scientific research and engineering design institute of heavy machine-building which has more than 6000 workers and does business by contract with more than 60 R&D establishments inthe country. Dur- ing the Ninth Plan the PO developed more than 100 prototypes of new machines andequipment.56 The distinction becomes especially fine when a production association creates new products in small series or single lots and is one of the major producers of this type of product, as with Elektrosila. 214 On another level, the relations of science-production associations with higher ministerial authorities are not uniform and regularized. In some branches there is no permanent body to lead NPOs. Where such organs exist they sometimes fail to take into account the distinct features of individual associations and regard them all as alike. Some ministries and agencies approach NPOs as ordinary research institutes or industrial enterprises.5 The lines of subordination also vary. A few NPOs, such as Soiuznauchplitprom and Mikroblopramreport directly to the ministry (frequently to a deputy minister). The majority, however, operate on a three-link system (NPO- -glavk /industrial association--ministry). They report either to one of the glavki or main administrations in their respective ministry or to an all-union industrial association. Plastpolimer provides an example of the latter pattern, which will probably become more common as the ministries reorganize and the glavki are liquida- ted or transformed into industrial associations. The majority of NPOs function as the first link of management. Yet a number of them conduct from 30 to 100 percent of all R&D done in the branch. In addition some NPOs are essentially all-unionassociations. These differences are not reflected in their legal status, however. This causes some specialists to argue that certain NPOs should haveadditional powers and prerogatives compared to otherNPOs.58 Internal organizational development has also been marked by problems and diversity. The key issue has been the degree of legal authority to be exercised by the central management or head organization as against that retained by the constituent units. "The criteria for establishing a happy median between loose or formal merger and overcentralization of decision making are apparently difficult to arrive at observes Nolting.59 The aim of creating these new complexes, it will be recalled, is to break down structuralfrag- mentation, to bring the multiple participants ininno- vation into closer association and even under common administration. Meanwhile, the evolution of NPOs up to 1976 shows two negative tendencies. On the one hand, Integra- 215 22j tion stopped far short of the goal of a unified and organic system. Amounting to little more than a mechanical conglomerate of autonomous units, the NPO was transformed into "an administrative superstruc- ture, a superficial link on the path from the ministry and glavk to science and production."60 Even among the earliest and most tauted NPOs institutional consolidation was slow and incomplete. An investigation of nine major NPOs of this kind by the Academy's Institute of Economics in 1974 found that a council of directors had not yet been formed in three of the complexes. One still lacked a scientific-technical council for the association.61 On the other hand, centralization was sometimes carried to an extreme. Constituent units of an NPO were denied any autonomy, even in operational management and control. This situation proved especially debilitating when the association contained subdivisions that were highly diverse and geographically dispersed. As a result the NPO became unmanageable. The decision process became frozen as each unit was forced to go to the highest levels and much time was lost in getting agreements and approvals. In short, association members became caught in the familiar bureaucratic chain from which they were supposedly to be liberated. Of these two tendencies, the first was the most dominant. The retention of autonomy by components almost everywhere impeded, if not prevented, the development of an integrated planning and management structure for the association as a whole. Pressure subsequently mounted on Moscow authorities to impose greater centralization. Significantly, the official statute on the NPO, which was finally approved by the Council of Ministers on December 30, 1975, stipulates that al: nits joining an NPO are denied any legal autonomy. At the same time, the ministries and republic officials have been given some discretion in applying this ruling and making exceptions.62 Intra- associational relations are likely to continue to reflect substantial diversity in practice, if not in form. How successful the 1975 statute will be in overcoming formal merger without leading at the same 216 time to excessl.ve centralization still remains to be seen. Writing in the Academy's main economic Jour- n 1 a year after passage of the statute, two Sovict science experts admit, "While some services are centralized, a system has still not been found of organizing the mutual relations of structural units and the machinery of management for the complex as a whole. "63 Indeed until 1976 NPOs were not even reg- istered as an independent institutional category at the USSR Central Statistical Administration. All accounting was done strictly in terms of their individual structural components.64 Underlying these prob..ems of the continuing fragmentation of planning, financing, and management of NPOs are serious and unresolved methodological issues. New integrated performance criteria have not yet been devised. This explains partly, in fact, why ministries and higher planning and financial agencies per- sist in issuing plans and finds to separate NPO subdivisions.Many performance indicators still relate to the activities of R&D and production units in their previously independent status. Existing indicators do not differentiate between R&D subdivisions that belong to NPOs and those that do not. According to current methods of accounting and reporting, it is not possible to aggregate the activity of organizations that relate to material production and to the world of nonproduction.65 To be sure, some efforts are being made in this direction. Some norms have been devised for determining the average length of the research-to-production cycle and are used in measuring the performance of some NPOs. According to Tabachnikas and Skliar, however, these norms are established rather arbitrarily, largely "by eye."No fixed and uniform methodology exists yet for this purpose. In other associations indicators are used to determine the degree to which the research- to-production process has been reduced over time. Tak- sir points out, however, this kind of norm is of dubi- ous value because reduction of the innovation cycle obviously has a limit." What methodological progress has been made in developing integrated evaluative in- 217 dicators and norms for NPOs is still largelyexperi- mental. Not everyone realizes yet that theNPO is not simply the sum ofits parts but represents a qualitatively new type of organization. Looking back on the first decade of itslife, then, we can say that this newinstitutional form has still not found its properplace in the Soviet scheme. Very few NPOs have approached--much lessachieved--the goal of creating an organizationally,technological- ly, and economically integrcted systemfor promoting innovation. In most, "science" and"production" continue to lead separate lives. The administrative barriers between them have not beeneffectively broken down. Organization-building has been marked by much confusion and diversity, not to mentionbureau- cratic opposition and lethargy. In the absence of clear guidelines from the center, branchministries created NPOs as they saw fit, oftenobliterating the boundaries between different kinds ofresearch and production complexes. Sometimes NPOs were put together without any systematic researchand analysis of design and development problems. Little consideration was given to their place in thecontext of future directions and needs of thebranch as awhole.67 Initially, the lack of a formal statutepermitted needed flexibility and experimentation. It also reduced the danger of putting these new structuresin- to an organizationalstraitjacket and monolithic mold. More and more, however, the absenceof a document establishing the legal status of the NPOand defining its basic functions andprinciples of organization had prevented the solution of a numberof complex problems. The associations were recognized asbeing frozen in their units, forms,and relations. A new stage of development came in1976. After confirma- tion of the NPO statute, Kremlinauthorities stepped up efforts to impose greaterclarity, order, and direction in the affairs of theassociations. The effect of these measures remains tobe seen. Taken together they form :art of a broaderdrive to make the Tenth Plan a period of"development not only in breadth but also in depth" for research andproduction complexes of all kinds, and notjust NPOs. As for the latter specifically, they areexpected to grow to 200 to 250 by1980.68 218 At the same time, expectations for the NPOs seem to have cooled. Much of the initial optimism that surrounded them has dissipated. As one Soviet observ- er noted in the summer of 1976, "One can hardly find now defenders for the view that every branch inst:.- tute should be turned into an NPO. The opinion .1..s growing slowly but steadily that the number of NPOs in industry cannot be big, perhaps three or four in one ministry." "And if this is so," he continued, "then it is necessary to recognize directly that the NPO is a partial solution to the problem of strengthening the ties between science and production."69 V. G. Shteingauz also concludes, "The NPO must be regarded as a successful but far from the only form of integrating research with production."70The NPO is still expected to play an importantand even Increas- ingrole in accelerating innovation and technical progress, but other integrating structures will have to be developed. In this light, the growing Soviet interest in establishing specialized introduction organizations whose task is explicitly the implementation and diffusion of new technology and production techniques merits brief discussion. Since this function is not the main job of either scientific or production organizations, a new type of institution is needed for this purpose that is neither a research institute nor an industrial enterprise, some specialists argue. They see innovation--the exploitation and application of new ideas and designs--as a distinct activity that is fundamentally different from both research and production. Hence, they maintain that new technology transfer vehicles are required to perform vital but neglected innovation functions. Such specialized organizations are depicted as the new connecting links between science and industry which serve as important "middlemen" facilitating and mediating the research- to-production process.71 Attention to these new structural forms has grown in part because the science-production associations have proven to be more successful at creating new technology than at applying it.While a few NPOs conduct extensive innovation activities, they are the 219 4H.crN 0 M rtti 0, rt ce 0'0 rt 4 etlbEl g rFati.D) roil 1?, Pm RI5' ti 7 Ve rg P 51 RA4 pv1P-)1 004P. k4 ti 0 0 0' M 0 0 11 0 CDi o rt, r, to fD 0 0 0 1-1. ti 0 rt M M N rat 1 1 rt0 4 c s ) 0 a nm u )o. Pi 2rt it a' Pt I f1 Pt 1(1) :3. 1.4 110 ? 8 ii. ti g i.r.) i p. n 041 PH:03 'til Vt.:M2rt64 i rh. H rt rt Iv (1) 5. F.. a. 1:t4 64 g g5. rt?artg 8 tri) rt Ngg roti;,,tr.1

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They are created and sustained through the privateinitiative of technological entrepreneurs seeking toexploit S&T advances. Offering a broad profile of services, these organizations exist essentially outside theformal economic system and beyond official planningand control. Paradoxically, this is both their greatest strength and their greatest weakness. In accord with the initial decentralizing spirit of the 1965 economic reform, more than a dozen of these newtechnical firms sprung up across the USSR. They included, for example, Fakel (The Torch) in Novosibirsk,Novator (Innovator) in Baku, Iskra (The Spark) in Tomsk, Po- isk (Search) in Severodonetsk, and Telm(Tempo) in Moscow. By the early 1970s, however, most of them were forced to closetheir doors. Others continue to lead a semi-legal life. In general, these institutions have not been stable and survivingadditions to the Soviet S&T establishment. This is not because they have been inefficient but, on the contrary,because their success andviability have not been ac- ceptable in ideological and political terms. Tndicative of the nature and fate ofthese ent re- preneurial vent- res is the "tale of theTorch."7' Fakel was set up by a few young scientists-entrepreneurs in 1966. It had no budget, no material supplies, no paid staff, and no office space. After compiling a list of prospective consultantsand their specialties, the founders simply set upheadquarters in a dormitory of the University ofNovosibirsk and began soliciting contracts. Consultants would be selected to work on problems in their sparetime. Var- ious organizations were paid for the useof their equipment and facilities during non-workinghours. The Torch received 3.5 million rublesfrom 263 contracts for the period up to June1970. Allegedly, the innovations introduced by it resultedin a savings of 35 million rubles. These included the development of an optimal plan forforest exploitation in 222 Novosibirsk Province, a system of computer analysis of seiRmi_c materials for a local geographical expedi- tion, and an experimental model of a Torch-built swamp vehicle for oil exploration in Western Siberia. Other projects were in '1,a^ fields as gold extraction, the use of manure, and -be ,levelopment of control devices for the Novosibirsk tower Station. Despite support from the Presidium of the Siberian Division of the Academy of Sciences, not to mention the local Komsomol authorities under whose wing Fakel formally operated, however, this efficient but unconventional organization came under strong attack and eventually closed down in May 1971.75 One of the few firms of this kind to have survived (in modified form) is Novator. Formed in 1967 and reorganized by leaders of the Azerbaidzhan Republic in 1971, it has since been put under dual subordination to the Azerbaidzhan Ministry of Local Economy and the State Committee on Inventions and Discoveries. Basi- cally, the firms seeks and screens relatively simple 'orphaned inventions" from institutes throughout the USSR that cannot exploit them. By 1976 Novator was doing an annual business of over a million rubles. Since its creation the firm has developed and dissem- inated more than 120 innovations. Some of these have been awarded state medals, and others have been dis- played at the Leipzig international trade fair.76 Scientists in particular attempt recurrently to revitalize and legitimize these entrepreneurial firms. Recently in the Academy's main economic journal Tak- sir and M. T7Zrasnokutskly argued that these institutions were viable and desirable. They urged that these products of private initiative be turned into state organizations with a firm legal basis.77The central issue is the institutionalization, if not bu- reaucratization, of entrepreneurship. The problem is how to preserve these efficient innovating forms without destroying their spontaneity, independence, and elan vitalthe very foundation of their success. Some Soviet specialists recognize that entrepreneurship is frequently associated with specific and special personality traits. Like R. M. Shteinbok, they

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D. 0 1 1 MyiOnW must reflect "socially necessary expenditures ofproduction." With new product innovation, the problem with the traditf.onal system isas simple as it is severe. As cumulative output increases,cost declines for a host of reasons which collectivelymay be la- belled "learningcurve effects." While market competition acts to force corresponding declinesin prices, fixed prices will yield larger profitsas the product becomes increasingly dated. Formulating price-setting methodology andmonitor- ing its application are the responsibilityof the State Committee for Prices. Fairly recently, the Com- mittee has begun to implementmeasures for introducing at least step-wise or staged price flexibility. The essence of the new techniques is described by Ivanov:

One of the rules of price formation is thatthe savings obtained by an innovating enterprise should not exceed 50 percent of the totaleco- nomic gains. Prices on new articles may change with time, assuring the producer fast write-off of initial start-up costsas well as reasonable profitability of production at all stages of the market cycle' of the innovation. Specifically, prices for items which make only minor improvements or changes in existing prod- ducts are established in conformity with the price level of their prototypes with adjustments made for the savings effected by the product improvements. Prices for radically new items are established in stages. First, temporary prices are fixed which include planned cost of production of the new article plus a profit margin that is based on the norm of profitability of the enterprise for a given year for its basic output. However, it should not exceed 20 percent or be less than 10 percent of the planned cost of production. After the expiration date of temporary prices (When the initial costs for new production have been written off), permanent wholesale prices are established fornew products. In case of high quality products which 229 2 1 have been awarded the State'Seal of Quality," prices may include a specialincentive markup amounting to 0.5 to 1.0 percentof the profitability norm, but under thecondition that this does not increase theproducer's share of economic returns by morethan 50 percent. This markup is establishedfor a period of 3 years and can belifted if the article does not meet high qualitystandards during the next certification. In turn, permanent wholesaleprices on new products may be fixed for a limitedperiod of time and in stages. Such differentiation has the goal of imparting toprice formation additional effectiveness as a weaponfor re- moving from the market obsoleteproducts, as well as preserving the fairdistribution of economic gains producedby the application of new technology betweenthe producer and the consumer as the costof production decreases. Step-like, sequentiallylowered _,-4,zes are thereforeestablished for prod- whose costs are particularlyelastic in relation to the volume ofthe series which saturates the internalmarket to a high degree and also forproducts with high rates ofobsolescence.89 Important elements of thisdescription are the attempt to tie productprices to a measure ofquality and the intent to dividethe "benefits" oreconomic returns an a newproduct between the producerand the consumer, therebyrendering the productadvantageous to both. This benefit is transmittedthrough the effect of higher prices onestablishment success indicators and, hence, onthe primary bonus fund. And, finally, the step-wisecharacter of pricing isin- tended to promote product turnover. Imparting price flexibility by administrative meansis costly and cumbersome, but promisesbenefits. Other recent effortsrelate the size of primary bonus funds to technologicaladvance and the evalua- 230 1

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8 ir "iii44 4 16 0 I g 'li g P,' 4"`4 'col is : g fl if im49 496 lutviiam 1 ti Sr80. A 48' u1 dau14/t bonus fund is to be used for lump sum payments to individuals or collectives as a reward for particularly noteworthy achievements. Innovation is prominent on the list of such achievements. We do not know the extent to which such payments are actually made to reward innovation activity, but they do offer the potential of a flexible and effective stimulus, at least from the perspective of the recipient. However, the caveat applicable to the Fund for the Creationand Introduction of New Technology is also pertinent here. A lump suo payment may make the participant better off, but if the innovation should cause the entire bonus fund to shrink, the labor force as a whole will suffer. Indeed, the motivating effect of all these special incentives for innovation is limited. The statutory ceilings on individual bonus earnings are such that no person may receive an excess of 90 to 110 percent of his base salary in bonuses of all kinds. The relative balance of risk and reward associated with innovation, Berlinerconcludes, still tends to motivate Soviet decision makers and managers to discriminate against innovation in favorof alternatives that involve no change in products or processes. In sum, throughout this section we havedescribed briefly (and incompletely) elements of Soviet planning, managerial, and finAncial policy which influence the degree and rateof new technology utilization. While noting that the system must infact be formulated and set in operation as an integral unit, we have been forced to analyzeeach unit separately. Yet, for traditional practice, this approachdoes not severely distort reality, since the stages of R&D, the participants, and the various policymakers all tend to be disjointed. However, we note in passing that experiments are underway in certain ministries to "unify" not only the stages of R&Dbut also the entire policy-making process. The system, depicted schematically in Figure 11-4, originated in the electrical engineering industry. Planning is to be "continuous," accounting for all stages of the innovation process. Similarly, financing originates in a Uni- fied Fund for the Development of Science and Technol- 232 FIGURE 40-4 BASIC SCHEME OF THE SYSTEM OF PLANNING, FINANCING, AND ECONOMIC STIMULATION OF S&T DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOVIET ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING INDUSTRY

Ministry (Functional Administrations

R&D Plan Plan for Assimilation of New Products and Removal of Old Items

Assignment on Share of Assignment on Economic Products in Highest and Effect (Return) Lowest Quality Categories

Scientific Research, Unified Fund for (.4 Design, and Technol - IFinancing R&D ogical Organizations DeveloPment of

I Forms of New Financing the Preparation Economic Development for Production of New Deductions to Stimulation Projects Technology the Unified Fund

Industrial Certification of Markups on Price Enterprises Product Quality of Highest Quality Products uc W 4.10 0 To the 0National 1:4 Economy IDeductions to the Incentive Funds

Source: G. A. Dzhavadov, Upravleniye nauchno-tekhnicheskim progressom (Moscow, 1975), p. 32. 27 ogy, again accounting for all stages. Wit.iin this system planning, finance, management, incentives, .71/1.1 other elements are to be closely integrated. This system does represent a radical departure from traditional practice and has been successful, though it has been slow to diffuse. The pattern and impact of its broadening application in Soviet industry should be followed carefully.

EVALUATION OF Raj RESULTS AND PERFORMERS

The basic notion of comprehensive planning of R&D and economic activities implies the ability to predetermine results in some detail. Thus, in the planning process, a set of evaluative criteria, the targets themselves, are generated and in fact are used in assessment at designated plaa cLAIines. Because the resulting performance rewards, suds as the size of bonus funds, sometimes are planned it may even be said that evaluation telf sot- extent is pre- determined.

Of course, the accuracy of this characterization increases as the precision and cf planning increase, which occurs as R&D approaches the production assimilation stage. Thus, for design, development, and production establishments formal evaluative criteria are utilized which, whenever possible, incorporate quantitative measures. Indicators employed in pia' formulation (volume of work, number of projects completed) and project selection (economic return, technical measures, social criteria) are also used in evaluating the establishment. Though calculations of actual or realized economic return are, in principle, to be made following the application of R&D results in production or use, they are in practice rarely computed or recorded. Decisions regarding evaluation and incentives are taken predominantly on the basis of planned or projected estimates of return, not on real results ane savings.

234 2.4 The fact that individual compensation to some extent is tied to plan and project measures implies that evaluation of employees and participants proceeds in similar fashion. Of course, subjective judgment always enters into personnel evaluation, but attempts are made to maximize reliance on objective criteria. Performance in meeting quantitative plan targets affects not only income but also careers of production managers, for example, and thus is held to be an indicator of general managerial capability. As planning becomes less precise and detailed in applied and fundamental research, there is a commen- surate increase in reliance on subjective evaluation. In practice, a mix of objective and subjective criteria is employed to take into account the originality and long-range promise of R&D, its economic and social usefulness, etc.91At the same time, the procedure for performance evaluation tends naturally to be internalized 3r1 research facilities, as the researcher's professional colleagues may be the only group qualified to judge performance. Still, though, the formality and hierarchical procedures characteristic of most Soviet bureaucracies are also press Lit in the research evaluation process. The results of the evaluation, in turn, are an important input in the decision to contil:iu, modify, or terminate projects which extend beyond standard plan periods. Rec- ommendations of consultative organs and expert groups are transmitted up the hierarchy to respective GKNT, Academy, r-Id Ministry authorities for official determination of future establishment and project directions.92 Relatively little information is available concerning performance evaluation criteria and procedures for individual scientists. Presumably, they differ across facilities. We briefly describe below the example of the evaluation system developed and used at the Sci- entific Research Institute of Physical Chemistry imeni L. Ya. Karpov.93The Karpov system, as it has come to be known, is gradually being adopted in other Soviet research facilities. 235 Salary at the Karpov Institute depends on academic degree attained, length of service, and results of work. To evaluate the last element, a "certification" commission convenes which includes leading scientists and representatives of management and social organizations. The commission evaluates employees not less than once every three years. A 10 point ra- ting system is used, and the following criteria are employed to evaluate the individual:

1. Professional qualifications

2. Diligence at work

3. Prospects for further activity

4. Originality of research

5. Theoretical level of research

6. Experimental level of research

7. Value of research for theory

8. Value of work for practice

9. Ability to work independently

10. A-Ility to org...nize work for subordinates

11. Participation in work of technology utilization

12. Participation in social activities

13. Direct participation in experiment work94 The commission makes two kinds of recommendations as a result of its assessment: (1) maintain or modify job tasks; and (2) increase or decrease salary or keep it at the present level. The results of the evaluation are approved by the learned council of the institute. The decision of the council is final."

236 In general, Soviet procedures for evaluating R&D results and performers tend to be formal and highly structured. The work of both individuals and institutions is evaluated primarily in terms of their formal fulfillment of thematic and financial plans, not on the basis of the real value of their S&T achievements. There is a strong tendency therefore to pro- pose "safe" and relatively minor themes, whose parameters are fairly well known and results more certain. As Academician Ya. Kolotyrkin comments, "An institute can fulfill its subject and financial plans year after year without contributing anything to technical progress."96 Recently efforts to tie R&D planning and resource allocation, management and incentive programs to end results--the ultimate application of technology in new products and processes--have mounted. Throughout this study we have mentioned the increasingly ubiqui- tous tho=igh still ambiguous measure of "economic return or effectiveness." If the utilization of R&D was almost ignored in science policy in the past, then since the /ate 1960s it has come to have almost exaggerated emphasis. There are important limitations, however, on the utfaity of practical application as a criterion for evaluating R&D results and performers. Some science specialists contend that RSD organizations should not be evaluated in terms of the final stages of the innovation process in which they still have little direct participation, much less control. Furthermore, the evaluation of results and real returns must be long range because of the necessarily prot acted process of moving results from the lab in- to use. Hence, the operational character of evaluation is lost, and its motivating role is diminished.97 As 0. I. Volkov notes, scientific R&D organizations cannot be evaluated by the same criteria as production establishments. They require an independent system of indicators, instruments, and special organization of management which, though closely linked with the economy, possesses at the same time necessaryautonomy." Science has its own internal development needs which must be attended to, besides its external relations and linkages with productiorl. 237 DIFFUSION OF R&D RESULTS

In the Soviet economy, under traditionalorganiza- tional and operating principles, diffusion of new technology should not differ markedly frominnovation. That is, the first introduction andsubsequent introduction are not so sharply distinguished in theUSSR as in the West. Part of the reason for this is organizational. When branch institutes or design bureaus are independent, they are meant to serveimpartially all production facilities in the branch, and proprie- tary rights over innovations are notassociated with the first introduction or use. Innovation may be introduced simultaneously or sequentially infacilities, with little advantage accruing to the first user. The absence of competitive pressures inthe Soviet economy also means that theeconomic viability of the noninnovator is not automatically threatenedby its failure to act. The production facility in the USSR is responsible to its administrativesuperiors. For the most part the facility is competing notagainst other facilities but instead against its ownperfor- mance in previous periods. Because targets tend to be set in relation to earlier own-facilityresults, and because of conditions of general excessdemand, facilities of widely differing productivitylevels and innovative postures can coexist inthe Soviet economy for indefinite periods. Today these situations are changingsomewhat, in part because of a consciousdesire of the Soviet lead- ship to encourage more rapid technologydiffusion. Or- ganizationally, the affiliation of R&D andproduction establishments, as in the science-productionassociation, tends to distinguish an innovationfrom a diffusion process. Innovation may be thought of as oc- curring when the NPO plant successfullyintroduces the technology, while the NPO leaves theproblem of diffusion to other branch plants. Similarly, to generate pressure for morerapid process innovation, So- viet authorities are attempting torely as much as possible on branch-wide performancecriteria for target formulation. Of course, branch standards haveal- 238 ways been the ideal, and the process is slowed by the fact that inefficient plants are not placed in a severely disadvantageous position. Yet the greater accent now placed on branch-wide performance compari- sons may ultimately have a favorable Li pact on technology diffusion. In large part, however, the factors outlined previously which influence technology delivery and utilization by the first producer similarly influence succeeding adopters. Plans may stipulate introduction and in general are the basic coordinating and motivating mechanism for diffusion. Organizational and financial mechanisms may be employed to create a favorable disposition toward innovation in all potential adopters. The impact of clearly superior economic performance is exemplified by the experience of developing new ceramic tile manufacturing technology: In this case it is also vital to note that the socio-economic consequences of replacinc the old technology of producing ceramic tiles in tunnel kilns with a new technology using automated conveyer assembly lines with slit kilns were so obvious that adoption of the new method in industry... rotonly encountered no resistance, but, on the contrary, a whole number of enterprises and agencies sought additional ways to move up the fixed schedule for putting this system into operation.99 In certain Instances, however, the age of a product determines the applicability of a special innovation- related program. For example, compensation fcr high start-up costs from the Fund for Assimilation of New Technology is only permitted for new products, where "newness" is defined bureaucratically to apply "if (a) it is the first instance of the product's production in the USSR, or (b) no more than two years have elapsed since it was first introduced in the USSR.100 Special Soviet programs to facilitate diffusion resemble those in any advanced industrial country.

239 Technical information services, managed by the All- Union Institute for Scientific and Technical Infor- mation (VINITI), are among the best in the world. VINITI disseminates Soviet journals, translation journals, and comprehensive abstracts of foreign and domestic publications, and assists in publicizing patents. Most industrial ministries have similar agencies. Academy, university, ministries, and S&T societies host frequent technical conferences which facilitate personal interaction, a potent means of technology transfer. Actual transfer of personnel with the direct or indirect intent of transferring technology tends to occur less frequently, and is particularly rare across ministerial boundaries. Standardization programs, such as those concerning design documentation, facilitate transfer but are a relatively recent development. Finally, a common Soviet technique of technology diffusion which avoids many of the administrative problems described previously is the construction of entirely new facilities which "embody" the new technology. However, the performance of the Soviet construction industry is itself quite poor, especially concerning lead times, and the shift of investment funds away from new construction to reconstruction of facilities reduces the scope for this approach. In sum, the Soviet innovation and diffusion processes are rendered similar, if not indistinguishable, by the nature of Soviet economic organization and administration. The general absence of competitive pressures in particular is a severe deterrent to rapid diffusion. Special programs designed to encourage internal technology transfer, particularly relating to information and (potentially) standardization, can alleviate some of the problems but are not, in our view, sufficiently effective to overcome barriers to innovation created by fundamental attributes of the Soviet economic mechanism.

240 FOOTNOTES

1. See L. S. Blyakhman, ed., Voprosy ekonomiki i planirovaniya nauchnykh issledovaniy (Leningrad, 1968), p. 93; N. I. Dryakhlov, S. I. Nikishov, Yu. K. Plet- nikov, and S. V. Shakhardin, eds., Nauchno-tekhnicheskaya revolyutsiya i obshchestvo (Moscow, 1973), p. 446; V. P. Aleksandrova, ed., Problemy p1anirovan- iya i effektivnosti razvitiya nauki i tekhniki v ukrainskoy SSR (Kiev, 1976), p. 50;V. Sominskiy and L. Blyakhman, eds., Ekonomichesklye problemy yovyshen- iya effektivnosti nauchnykh razrabotok (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1972), p. 177; V. N. Arkhangel'skiy, Organ- izatsionno-ekonomicheskiye problemy upravleniya nauchnymi issledovaniyami (Moscow, 1977), p. 33; V. I. Kushlin, Uskoreniye vnedreniya nauchnykh dostizhenly vproizvodstvo (Moscow: Ekonomika, 1977), p. 3; Nolt- ing, Sources of Financing the States of the Research, Development, and Innovation Cycle in the USSR, p. 3. 2. Kanygin, Nauchno-tekhnicheskiy potentsial, p. 225. 3. L. S. Blyakhman, "Nauka kak otrasl prolzvodst- vennoy deyatel'nosti," in Blyakhman,ed., Voprosy ekonomiki i planirovanlya nauchnykh issledovaniy, p. 15. 4. Berliner, The Innovation Decision in Soviet In- dustry, pp. 103-104. 5. K. I. Taksir, 7ategratsiya nauki i proizvodstva pri sotsializme (Moscow: Znaniye, 1975), p. 14; Kush- lin, opcit., p. 122. 6. V. G. Shteingauz, Ekanomichesklye problemy re- alizatsil nauchno-tekhnicheskikh razrabotok (Moscow. 1976), p. 118. 7. A. Zalkind, "Akademiya dlia 'neakademicheskikh' nauk," Literaturnaya gazeta, 12 (March 24, 1976), p. 11. 241 8. A. N. Bortnyakh, ed., KPSS i sovremennaya nauchno-tekhnicheskaya revolyutsiya (Kiev, 1974), pp. 379 380. 9. Zalkind, op. cit. 10. See Tom Burns, "Models, Images, and Myths," in William H. Gruber and Donald G. Marques, eds., Factors in the Transfer of Technology (Cambridge, Massachu- setts: MIT Press, 1969), pp. 11-23. Ore of the best discussions of Soviet views of innovation is by Kany- gin. See his Nauchno-tekhnicheskiy potentsial, pp. 151-213. 11. V. I. Berlozertsev, "Soedineniye nauchno-tekhnicheskoy revolyutsii s preimushchestvami sotsializma," in Problemy soyedineniya dostizheniy nauchno- tekhnicheskoy revolyutsii s preimushchestvami sotsializma (Voronezh, 1974), pp. 11-12.

12.Kanygin, Nauchno-tekhnicheskiy potentsial, p. 222.

13.Berliner, op. cit., p. 140.

14.Zavlin et al, Trud v sferenauki(Moscow, 1973,2nd edition), pp. 123-125,129,206-207.

15.Ibid. (First edition), p.

16.Berliner, op. cit., p. 116.

17.Zaleski et al, Science Policyinthe USSR, p. 93. 18. D. Bobryshev and Ye. Nisevich, Setevyye metody v upravlenii(Moscow, 1973), p. 14. 19. See Robert W. Campbell, "Management Spillovers from Soviet Space and Military Programs," Soviet Studies, XXIII, 4 (1972), pp. 586-607. 20. See Yu. I. Maksimov, "5-!cond Wind for Network Methods," Ekonomika i organizatsiya promyshlennogo 242 proizvodstva, 4 (July-August 1976), pp. 205-211; V. G. Afanasyev anu V. S. Chesnokov, "Sistemy tselevogo planirovaniya -- instrument effektivnot=o upravleniya nauchnymi issledovaniyami," in Nau#-Iinoye upravlenlye obshchestvom (Moscow: Mysl', 1972), VI, pp. 268-331; D. M. Gvishiani, ed.,Vorosteorlipctikiurav- leniya I organizatsil nauki (Moscow: Nauka, 1975), pp. 17-22, 82-95; G. M. Dobrov et al, Programmno- tselevoy metod upravleniya v nauke, pp. 24-27. 21. V. I. Dobuzhinskiy, D. D. Katanov, and E. L. Rokhvarger, "Razrabotka novoy tekhnologii keramiches- kikh plitok" (Development of A New Technology of Cer- amic Tiles), p. 7. Soviet Side of the Joint Soviet- American Working Subgroup on Planning and Management of Scientific Research and Development. Unpublished (draft) paper, 1976. 22. Yefimov et al, "Developme-.it and Realization of A Program of Comprehensive Mechanization of Funda- mental and Auxiliary Processes of Production at the Moscow Production Association ZIL," pp. 7-8. 23. Zaleski et al, Science Policy in the USSR, p. 280. 24. Gvishiani, "Centralized Management of Science: Advantages and Problems," p. 103. 25. Ivanov, "Preodoleniye prepyatstviy i stimulirovaniye pri vnedrenii novoy tekhniki I novykh metod- ov upravleniya," p. 10. 26. Ibid. 27. Ibid., p. 12. 28. A. G. Orlc.i, Oplata truda rabotnikov nauki (Moscow: Nauka, 1973), p. 52. 29. Ivanov, op. cit., p. 11. 30. Ibid. 243 31. XXIV Syezd KPSS: Stenograficheskii otchet (Mos- cow: Politizdat, 1971), I, pp. 80-81. 32. L. M. Bashin, "Ekonomicheskiye problemy vnedreniya novoy tekhniki," Voprosy izobretatel'stva, 7 (1975) P. 12. 33. See G. D. Anisimov, L. S. Glyazer, A. M. Omarov, V. G. Pankratyev, and M. P. Ring, Nauchno-tekhnicheskiy progress i khozyaystvennaya reforms (Moscow: Nauka, 1969), pp. 119-127; "The Quality of Designs,"Pravda editorial, May 13, 1977. 34. L. S. Blyakhman, "The Association: Experience and Prospects," Pravda, December 1, 1971. 35. Ivanov, op. cit., p. 21. 36. Ibid. 37. Ibid., p. 22. 38. K. I. Taksir, Nauchno-proizvodstvennyye ob"yedineniya (Moscow: Nauka, 1977), pp. 42-53, 57-58; Yu. Subotskiy, Novyi etap razvitiya ob"yedinenlyv promyshlennosti (Moscow: Znaniye, 1973), p. 26; E. I. Gavrilov, Ekonomika i effektivnost' nauchno-tekhnicheskogo progressa (Minsk: Vyshaya shkola, 1975),p. 290; L. N. Andrukhovich, Upravleniye kachestvom (Mos- cow: Znaniye, 1976), p. 47. 39. Taksir, Nauchno-proizvodstvennyye ob"yedineniya,

p. 57; G. A. Dzhavadov, Upravleniye nauchno- tekhni-- cheskim progressom (Moscow: Znaniye, 1976), p. 23. 40. Taksir, op. cit., p. 132. 41. V. Pokrovskiy, "Perestraivayas' na warshe," Sotsialisticheskaya industriya, July 13, 1977, p. 2. 42. Taksir, op. cit., pp. 125-154; Louvan E. Nolt- ing, The 1968 Reform of Scientific Research, Develop- ment, and Innovation in the USSR, U.S. Department of Commerce, Foreign Economic Report No. 11 (Washington D.C., 1976), p. 16; Shteingauz, op. cit., pp. 120- 244 122, 127 and her "Novye organizatsionnyye formy svyazi nauki s proizvodstvom," in Ekonomlka ior$anizatsi- ya 3 (1973), pp. 46-47; M. A. Yudelevich and M. A. Gusakov, "Putisokrashchenii tslkla 'issledovanlye-proizvodstvo,'" in Blyakhman, ed.. Voprosy ekonomiki i planirovaniya nauchnykhis- sledkovanix (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1968), pp. 93-95; G. A. Dzhavadov, "Nauchno-proizvodstvennyyeob"yedineniya--forma integratsi1 nauki, tekhniki, proizvodstva," Sovetskoye gosudarstvo 1 pravo, 1 (1975), p. 37,43- 44; Andrukhovich, op. cit., pp. 48-50; Sominskiyand Blyakhman, Ekonomicheskiye problemy povysheniya effektivnosti nauchnykh razrabotok, pp. 179-180. 43. Berliner, op. cit., p. 135. 44. See Dzhavadov, "NPO--forma integratsil nauki, tekhniki, proizvodstva," p. 37; Yu. V. Subotskiy,Raz- vitiye ob"yedineniy v promyshlennosti: Voprosyteoril 1 metodologll (Moscow, 1977), pp.66-67; V. Kochikyan and V. Kushkin, "Osnovy khozyaystvennogorascheta v nauchno-prolzvodstvennykh ob"yedinenlyakh," Planovoye khozyaystvo, 7 (1977), pp. 25-26; K. I. Taksir,"Nau- chno-proizvodstvennyye ob"yedineniya," Voprosyekono- mlki, 11 (1972), pp. 46-49 and his Nauchno-proizvodstvennyye ob "yedineniya, p. 39;Pokrovskiy, "Perestrai- vayast na marshe," p. 2. 45. Taksir, Nauchno-proizvodstvennyyeob"yedineniya, pp. 35, 39-40; Shteingauz,Ekonomicheskiye problemy reallzatsil nauchno-tekhnichesklkh razrabotok, p.124; V. N. Arkhangel'skiy, Planirovanlye ifinansirovaniye nauchnykh isnledovanly (Moscow: 'nsy, 1976), pp. 158-160; Kochikyan and Kushkin_ cit., p. 26. 46. Yu. Kanygin and S. Kostanyan, "Nauchno-proizvodstvennyi tsikl," Voprosy ekonomiki,12 (1976), p. 61. 47. Yu. M. Mikhnevich, Ekonomicheskiyeproblemy upravleniya nauchno-tekhnicheskim progressom(Lenin- grad, 1974), p. 57. 48. Taksir, Nauchno-proizvodstvennyyeob"yedinenlya, p. 110. 245 49. Ibid., p. 111 and Arkhangelvskiy, Planirovaniye i finansirovaniye nauchnykh issledovaniy, p. 162. 50. These tasks are listed in the statute on the NPO. See "Polozheniye o nauchno-proizvodstvennom ob"- yedinenii," Sobraniye postanovleniy pravitel'stva SSSR, 2 (1976), pp. 24-25. See also Subotskiy, Raz- vitiye ob "yedineniy v promyshlennosti, p. 67 and Dzhavadov, "NPO--forma integratsii nauki, tekhniki, proizvodstva," pp. 38-39. 51. Taksir, Aauchno-prolzvodstvennyye ob"yedineni- ys, pp. 43-79. 52. Ibid., pp. 38-39, 74-79; Kushlin, Uskoreniye vnedreniya nauchnykh dostizheniy v proizvodstvo, p. 111. 53. Ibid. See also Pokrovskiy, "Peretraivayas' na marshe," p. 2. 54. Taksir, Nauchno-proizvodstvennyye ob"yedineniya, pp. 48-49, 139-140. 55. Ibid., pp. 32, 37 and L. A. Bulochnikova et al, eds., Problemy sovershenstvovaniya upravleniya sots- ialisticheskoy ekonomikoy (Moscow: Mysl', 1976), pp. 135-136. 56. Taksir, Nauchno-proizvodstvennyye ob "yedineni-

, pp. 17-22. 57. K. I. Taksir, "Nauchno-protzvodstvennyye ob "yedineniya," Voprosy ekonomiki, 11 (1972), p. 50. 58. Taksir, Nauchno-proizvodstvennyye ob"yedineniya, pp. 36, 55-56, 78, 157-158 and Shteingauz, Eko- nomicheskiye problemy realizatsii nauchno-tekhnicheskikh razrabotok, p. 124. 59. Nolting, The 1968 Reform, p. 16. 60. Sominskiy and Blyakhman, Ekonomicheskiye prob- 246 lemy povysheniya effektivnosti nauchnykh razrabotok, pp. 188-189 and Dzhavadov, "NPO--forma integratsii nauki, tekhniki, protzvodstva," p a 40. 61. Taksir, Nauchno- proizvodstvennyye ob"yedinen1- 2A, pp. 54-55. 62. "Polozheniye o NPO," p. 23. 63. B. Tabachnikas and M. Sklyar, "Khozyaystvennyy raschet nauchno-prolzvodstvennykh ob"yedinenly," Vo- prosy ekonomiki, 12 (1976), p. 73. 64. Kushlin, Uskoreni7e vnedreniya, p. 112. In its decision approving the NPO statute the USSR Council of Ministers stipulated that the USSR Ministry of Fi- nance and the Central Statistical Administrationhad to draw up within six months appropriate bookkeeping and statistical reporting forms for the NPOs. 65. See Nolting, The 1968 Reform, p. 16; Gavrilov, Ekonomika i effektivnost' nauchno-tekhnicheskogo, pp. 297-305; B. Tabachnikas _Ind M.Sklyar, "Otsenk.4 raboty I printsipy obrazov_iniya fonda material'nogo pooshchreniya nauchno- proizvodstvennykh ob"yedinenly," Planovoye khozyaystvo, 2 (1974), pp. 123-124. 66. Tabachnikas andSklyar, "Khozyaystvennyy raschet NPO," p. 77 and Taksiz, Nauchno-proizvodstven- sun2ttlyaianixI, pp. 101-112. 67. Gavrilov, op. cit., pp. 294-295; Mikhnevich, op. cit., pp. 71, 85. 68. Subotskiy, Razvitiye ob "yedinaniy v promyshlennosti, p. 5 and Taksir, Nauchno-proizvodstvennyye ob "yedineniya, p. 158. 69. R. M. Shteinbok, "Komu vnedryat' novuyu tekhniku?" Ekonomika i organizats±ya promyshlennogo pro- lzvodrtva, 6 (1976), pp. 78-79. 70. Shteingauz, Ekonomichesklye problemy realiza-

247 tsii nauchno-tekhnicheskikh razrabotok, p. 125. 71. See Taksir, Sushchnost' i formy soyedineniya nazi s proizvodstvom pri sotsializme (Moscow: Vys- shaya Shkola, 1974), pp. 92-104; V. Pavlyuchenko, "ot stola konstruktura do zavodskogo konveiera," Pravez, June 13, 1971 and his Ekonomicheskiye problemy uprav- lealya nauchno-tekhnicheskimproc,ressom (Moscow: Nau- ka, 1973), pp. 202-213; Shteinbok, op. cit., pp. 76- 85; Kanygin, Nauchno-tekhnicheskly potentsial, pp. 237-241. 72. See Shteinbok, op. cit., pp. 79-80 and L. Davy- and R. Shteinbok, "Formy organizatsii vnedreniya novoy tekhniki," Voprosy ekonomik, 9 (1977), 134. 73. See Taksir, Sushchnz.,a,-T i formy soyedineniya nauki s proizvodstvom pri sotsializme, pp. 92-104 and his Nauchno-proizvodstvennyye ob"yedinnlya, pp. 24- 25. 74. See the excellent article by John Lowenhardt, "The Tale of the Torch: Scientists-Entrepreneurs in the Soviet Union," Survey, XX,4 (43) (Autumn 1974), pp. 113-121. 75. Ibid., pp. 117-118. 76. K. Taksir and M. KrasnokutsIriy, "Formy organizatsii vnedreniya novoy tekhniki,' Voprosy ekonomiki, 1 (1977), p. 50; V. Pokrovskiy, "Novaya tekhnika: Dorogi i porogi," Ekonomicheskaya gazeta_z_ 10 (March 10, 1976), p. 10. 77. Taksir and Kr:_snokutskiy, op. cit., p. 50. 78. Shteinbok, "Komu vnedryat'novuyu tekhniku,' P- 80. 79. K. I. Taksir, Integratsiy. ski 1 proizvodstva pri sotsializme (Moscow: Zflanlye 1975), pp. 47-48. 80. Ekonomika i organizatsiyapromyshlennogo pro-

248 izvodst.a, 5 (1977), p. 160. These difference of view were expressed in the debate in this issue eL EKQ (pp. 143-146) under the subject, "Komu vnedryat' novuyu tekhniku?" (To Whom Should the Introduction of New Technology Be Entrusted?) This was the title of Shteinbok's essay that appeared in the journal the year before. The discussion in the May 1977 issue contains reactions to Shteinbok's article and call for specialized introduction organizations for new technology.

81. Ivanov, op. cit., p. 7.

82. L. M. Gatovskiy, Nauchno-tekhnicheskiy progress i ekonomika razvitogo sotsializma (Moscow: Nauka, 1974), p. 202.

83. "USSR Short Answers," p. 57.

84. Berliner, The Innovation Decision in Soviet In- dustry, p. 271.

85. Zaleski et al, Science Policy in the USSR, p. 119.

86. Ivanov, op. cit., p. 8.

87. Berliner, op. cit., p. 493 and Ivanov, op. cit., pp. 8-9.

88. Berliner, op. cit., p. 488.

89 Ivanov, op. cit., p. 7.

90. Ibid.

91. "USSR Short Answers," p. 25.

9 . Ibid p. 29.

93. P. A. Sedloy, Material'noye stimulirovaniye rabotnikov za sozdaniye i osvoyeniye novoy tekhniki (Moscow: Ekonomika, 1975), p. 55.

249 2 94. Ibid., p. 56. 95. Orlov, Oplata truda rabotnikov nauki, p. 118. 96. Ya. Kolotyrkin, "0 rezervakh uvelicheniya ot- dachi of nauchnogo potentsiala," Kommunist, 8 (1974), p. 53. 97. A. Kansan, "Pokazateli nauchno-tekhnicheskoy deyatel'nosti VIII, KB, i NPO i proizvoditel'nosti truda nauchnykh rabotnikov," Planovoye khozyaystvo, 3 (1976), pp. 133-140. 98. O. I. Volkov, Planovoye upravlenive nauchno- tekhnicheskim proressom (Moscow: Nauka, 1975), p. 157. 99. Dobuzhint.eiy et al, op. cit., p. 12. 100. Berliner, op. cit., p. 200.

250 M rim Hoep H. RiltOlg;RII1Vit1-4 11 w O ;MARBURV0madom 0 et) V 0 M IA HM4 rt (0 M 0 M 0rt rt0) 00 Mti) 00 01.4 faltglrINPrMtflp t tinH 0110M(in:;'H.0 gOrtHrtrOVOMFr)t1CDOVIDPI'1442 2 Mrtqr.1141-4Ag CO H mon (1,mm 0) rum owmrt0 /tt. 0 MOP4OMIIIKr01:140V11.101M10.vrto) rttov us r) rti-hrtritorr 0 M . 11.01A IA Ilg NOOm F4 HX Wer454%4R MNJ41-4MH1-45P.100.40..4 tww icio1/404n oN1.4.41 rtvFovvirtwmm on44gmoleI Irn4V(VP.Ng04g(19/8(0.40,MV0A1 nm" (1 0 01) thH iiir,Ensfrrt(!ri, (D P4 M o 0°41rOtt(grOlOal" (aoirI o (K1 0 OR M 2141 81 111 kr 1.<1 (D 5 ti 1-110 0 0 8w H4 11Hoo4mmw2 1 ,vdp.w 1-4 11 11, H.. C)(n 0 ID 431'NOIrmartoN * 4'.4 OPI 16., mu' O 11010 M thHN C.1V)MH H MHOO,lopuink4O 430OPMWOrtP 4MM 0 Ce 0 crM otlH PiIrt1:1111114(111034vnotiwnl.n00'4 ortmtipit'(to wrt m0 rt OMNO 14.0111.1lotop.mo romg.8 "414m 1AM H0 V)tri 6,) UmPRV1rNmV P-H qf lArmitm/Afiigg°Q3DMV1151mwaimommg_ (1) rtmprt 04 PdN0 C.f O410MMOWVOft'410,1-4tl 0,h0P'ft0' groM ORWM011110414 0 Pg ()" " PEhom 1-+ M 0d rtM HOt-1 441.0 r(D)' giM" ; HI `44) VI 0 .'n"DNI'JYh 00GrtUs 0I-Ir 013,0P01) QM 0 0rt rt Qtai A,C)0IA I-, rtodors MVP.. 0 rt rtmOdfli.40I-4 I-4 IA -sti ri " " rt PAC) U)U V(D1:74 t:I nIl t.4 I-4 0 oci 1-4 rt 0` 0 r)4 IJ, to rt 0 11) wo(1) I-1) moqiIii-4M1111.0M0M110040111-4 avthrimp004P11100M1111-4 0A, "P rtooniAmortrtiWrtliFtirtW mto in 11 H..td>tii OP51'14.0171.poohcortp1.40rtMoti(DO Ni3411PHIJNvr.r4KRogmnort F-1 n n H. 'C N0 0 o Pli P, ID 'd rt P'HMOOrt. WO pi n OHotimmiloOpHvomnM00 Hodgoo4 kopwcot ntik4om mdfInHm11.4 HE4 0Ilimwm VIPILII0M;IMI-Jk4WOH. n/oM rho HWOOrt mwMNmtir, o opP rg 0 woomIcen.pommo(DoiI I 100 0,11H I tivOrtmo 0000Nrt °OH° I M01011A11-1 4 I comes not only the key force driving modern society forward but also a major arena of competition between the world's two opposing social systems. Underlying the notion of the STR is also implicit- -and sometimes explicitrecognition of Russia's relative backwardness and growing technology gap with the West, especially the United States. As a letter of appeal from dissident but concerned Soviet scientists to Party and government leaders in March 1970 noted frankly, with respect to the computer age: "We are simply liv- ing in a different era. The second inch trill revolution came along and now, at the onset of the seven- ties, we see that far from having overtaken America, we are dropping further and further behind."1-Thus, a "historic" task facing the USSR today, as defined by General Secretary Brezhnev at the 1971 Party congress and reaffirmed by the 1976 congress, is "to combine organically the achievements of the STR with the advantages of the socialist economic system, to unfold more broadly our own, intrinsically socialist forRis of fusing science with production. "2 Second, there has also been growing realization that the Soviet economy is approaching the limits of "extensive" growth and entering a new era that calls for more "intensive" methods of development. Declin- ing supplies of manpower and material resources require a basic shift in development strategy and greater emphasis on qualitative improvements rather than quantitative increases of inputs as the main source of future growth. Already at the end of the 1960s, Brezhnev declared firmly that intensification "becomes not only the main way but the only way of developing our economy."Moreover, in this approach he told the 1971 Party congress, "the acceleration of S&T progress forges into first place both from the point of view of current tasks and of the long-term future."Premier Kosygin similarly insisted at the 1976 congress that without faster translation of S&T into production "the economy can no longer successfully advance along the path of intensification and quality improvement."3

252 c International and domestic pressureshave combined, therefore, to make the acclerationof S&T progress a major issue of the 1970s andbeyond. Just as he had defined this to:be the "keytask" of economic policy in 1971, Brezhnev also listedit first among the "key problems" of the period of the TenthFive Year Plan (1976-1980). Indeed, the General Secretaryaffirmed, "In our entire economic developmentperhaps no tasks today are more urgent and moreimportant."4 There is also enhanced awarenessin Moscow of the need to raise the quality of R&Dplanning and management. No longer can sciencepolicy afford to be built on the basis of"subjective evaluations andwishes," contends V. A. Trapeznikov, afirst deputy chairman of the GKNT. Gvishiani describes as a major taskof the day, "To put the developmentof science itself on a strictly scientificbasis."Dr. Semyon Mikulinsky, a leading sciencepolicy expert, similarly stresses, "The whole point is that science mustbe brought to bear on the management of scienceitself."5 Accordingly, there has been aproliferation of science policy studies and"research on research" in the USSR during the lasz decade. Virtually the entire social science researchsector has been put to work on the problems ofacclerating S&T progress.The main purpose of such studies,Gvishiani notes, is to provide a strong "theoreticalbasis on which the fun- damentals of science policy areworked out." Under- lying the growth of the"science of science" movement is an intrinsic belief inand professed need"to study science as a controllable systemand to attempt a more thorough exploration of theinterrelationship of different aspects of this systemwith a view to increasing the efficiency withwhich itfunctions." In line with the basic Sovietapproach to science and technology generally, thedominant emphasis in both theoretical study andpractical policy has been on the need for a"systems approach."As Gennady Do- brov explains, "More than half a centuryof experience in theformulation and implementationof Soviet State science policy showsthat one cannot expect to 253 1 (11 1 1 1 1 1 li 1 I-1 I 1-4 0 0 f 4i ,. WI 1 I 0,-104/0 0 4,1 14-inPo0) 4-1 N 0 to 41 0 4-I >1 0 I CI W Fl pn r-1 0 1 (11 1--1 U 0 0 0 $4 0 I I 1 0 (0 41 tri tt 0 A 1 op g tOn , 'rl 0 1.4 0 0 0 0 El .,r1 0 U if01.4,9 (a II A Cl ' 0001)(110 4-1.1-1 1-i 0 60 0 0 V "1:1 U 0 4.1 40 04)11000 /-1 W 0 W 41 0 A P E I f l 4-) >1-4 4 0 1 4 0 0 r-1 r-I g o X rob 0 > U U 0 0 04 1-4't-i c1i 04 j41 0 4.1Pr1 H 0 1 °IpC "E1"gi 4 co11) to rla04 0 .0 o (!) 0 131jOIEllicOdr4:21)V1itiii)V1 031-.1 0 Cl 0 04 0 --1 .r.1 4.4 0 0 0 (6 0 U (0 Ei,...1.ri(1El4.) W 144 40 4WIlj 6014 g tc:0 tli g 4 g S 1(11) a)) ta. 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Li r-1 >r-I 1-1 0 14 0 (01.44 to0o TO 0 0 >1 r-1 N 44U) 0 0 '4-14.1 01 ti '10 0 U 0 00-4 0 0 44 0 Wg44 rt)4-1 (11 4,1 Yi U 0 0 pci 0O .r4 0 U 41 0 0 0 0 0 0 b0 4-4 0 W 0 0 0 01 0 1 04 0 0 $.4r-4 1:1 A 44 1-103 0 0 0 'ri "ti 050eri ni(0 0'44 04 td 0 01 01 00 4-4(0(0 11 1:1 IACl 0 *ri41 cd have become the key terms of thedebate. They point clearly to the major interfacedifficulties and deficiencies that underlie such anapproach in general and the Soviet R&D system inparticular. Behind So- viet thought and action is thehope that "the holes in the whole" can be filled and moreeffective coupling can be achieved in the creationand application of new te-1,nology.

INTEGRATING SCIENCE POLICY AND ECONOMICPOLICY

An implicit feature of Sovietthought in the 1970s was the movementtowards a broader concept of science policy and the closer integrationof R&D with the to- tality of domestic and foreignpolicy. Traditional- ly, scientific R&D has beenconceived apart from the wider political and economic contextrather than as an organic partof it. In fact, science has often been viewed more as an appendage ofsocial and cultural policy than as an aspect ofeconomic policy. Increasingly, however, attention isbeing given to its status as a direct force ofproduction and key source of economicgrowth in the era of the STR. The focus is on relating S&T to amuch broader range of national aims and activities, onthe role of R&D in solving contemporary economicand social problems. In line with this morestrategic approach is emphasis on external rather thaninternal criteria in science policy. By the end of the 1960sGvishiani had sounded the new line. He noted that R&D planning and management was no longersimply a question of the rational planning of scienceexpenditures, of the training of scientific manpower,of the allocation c.2 resources, or of thesupply of scientific instruments. "The issue is broader anddeeper," the deputy chairman of the GKNTaffirmed, It is about the future,about the long-term development of socialist countries,about the very fate of the world andof socialism, 25c For now only that system can win which is able to assure itself a vanguard position in scientific and technical progress-8 To phrase the isst.e somewhat differently, the object of planning has gradually shifted from primarily "new technology" to "scientific and technicalprogress" more broadly. Prior to the Eighth Five Year Plan (1966-1970), planning agencies operatedwith only the conc- = of new technology. The notion of technical progress was confined to theoretical social and economic literature. Brezhnev himself observed in 1971, however, that the demands of the timesrequired a change of focus: "In an age when the role of science as a direct force of k:roduction keeps growing, separate scientific achievements, no matter how bril- liant, are no longer the central issue.What is central," the General Secretary asserted, "isa high S&T level of production as a whole."9 However, there is no consensus in the Soviet Union regarding the definition of "new technology," "the technical development of production," or "scientific and technical progress."1U To a large extent, disagreements about the meaning of "managing S&T progress" replicates the ongoing disputes about the generalcon- cept of "management."A semantic jungle exists in both spheres.11 In essence, the issue is how to make the concept operational, how to designate the boundaries of S&T progress--its structure, content, and component elements--as an object of planning. Without a precise definition it is extremely hard to establish the place and role of the concept in the general system of economic planning and management.12 Acade- mician Fedorenko admits, in regard to the prolem of modeling technical progress and its economic, social, and ecological cc%1_;equences, "we are only at thevery beginning cf complex and arduous rese-rch." Signif i- cantly, with the Tenth Five Year Plan a new subdivision on basic indicators of S&T progress was added to the plan for the development of science and technology. It represents the first attempt to define some basic technical and economic parameters characteriz- ing the level of production and the manufacture of 256

4. - output. However, in the words of onehigh Gosplan official, the choice of appropriateindicators remains problematic,because "there is essentially no experience in thisarea."13 As Kremlin policy makershave focused less and less on R&D as a relativelyisolated entity and more and more on theinterplay of R&D with industry,official Insistence grows thatR&D and its applications be closely linked.The aim of policy cannotbe sole- ly the expansion of S&T per se or"science for science's sake" but must include its use asan instrument for economicgrowth and industrialization."Rel- evance" has become a big issue,if not the fad of the day, as the Sovietleadership seeks greater andfast- er payoffsfrom the nation's substantialinvestment in scientific R&D. Indeed, a major challenge consists in formulating ascience policy to promotein- novation, to build aneffective strategy ofresearch utilization. In the early 1970sBrezhnev, in fact, singled out the applicationof R&D results as the most important butalso the most deficient aspectof S&T policy. "If we examineall the links of thein- tricate chain that bindsscience to production, we shall easily see theweakest links are thoserelating to the practicalrealization of scientificachieve- ments, to theiradoptioi in massproduction." It was necessary, theGeneral Secretary stressed,"to create conditions compellingenterprises to manufacturethe Latest types of products,literally to chase after S&T novelties, and not toshy away from them,figura- tively speaking, as thedevil shies away fromholy water."14 Despite the espousedneed for more effective coupling, however, theintegration of sciencepolicy and economic policy has beenslow and difficult toachieve in practice. In May 1974 theChairman of Gosplan still noted, "It is urgentlynecessary toshift from the planning of S&Tpotential, which is whatthe S&T plan is at present, tcplanning the massproduction and diffusion of newtechnology."15Planning R&D remains geared to thecreation of new technologyand 257 ((g Ptt) 5'1C-1; Cri)t 1911 [Is).1-51 1,6113'g o o 0) o rD ur;1/44-'r1)1 (lc (D w 0 P 4, ortN N4 fD U9 S) tn00H00 NHPM 0.00n B'b O p fD g"n P C 0 H. M °42 1.2 04 PS 0 rOt 5 49`Ili Hg tc rt gM NmIA rrnrjOHMO%H4W rt co M Re Pt th To R. MO Hno 0 UM) °'t) M(s) Pak< (44 nif)P1 H r)tCt *: gFl Cu chH O 0

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oWS 19h (T) rtii)41 M0G20 1/4'4' 2 8 P "Pi m,.i.r.g. P,)I: D tmn° PtirMitt"P' 4RI rtirtrt 0 rt v01 ID th M I 1-3 H fD 04 rt 0 0 0 0 H. p n)iii v Fa 0 0 01 V W fD 0 rt th th Ma P"):100 li4MIIJAW7401-11P11. 00" Hittl0 MOM( P. D' 00000-100,M.4 t(DOM MOW 11 M rpm H. rt 0 0 rtcn., Utill(?),14 N,Arce78g1t; Piili rt M Ikl 04 M k4 o iGo I N M M M I.J. g H. I'4 OH M 1-J W I HvIII I I 111 I I 1 ciency- -and this must be said again and again--is the most importat component of our entire economic strategy. In the 1980s accomplishment of this task will become especially urgent."23 Under these conditions, problems of choice, priority, and policy have become increasingly important. In turn, they have fed the quest for relevance and the driv to weed out unpromising and unimportant lines of research. That much still remains to be done in this regard, however, is evident from Brezh- nev's remarks to the presidents of the academies of sciences of several socialist states in February 1977, "Butwhynot admit it," he said frankly. "The live and healthy tree of science sometimes has dry and even barren branches. It still happens sometimes that research is conducted in completely peripheral or even in simply fruitless directions."24 Unfortunately, there are no reliable statistics that show the impact of the government pressure for technology development and delivery on the actual structure of R&D expenditures. It apr._77s, hawever, that the commitment to fundamental researc- remains firm and that there has been no significant shift of funds away from basic science. Indeed, the budget of the USSR Academy, the citadel of basic science, has reportedly grown faster in recent years than the national budget for R&D as a whole.25 These pressures for economy in R&D and for improving research utilization, in turn, have generated rising interest in cost effectiveness studies. m in- tense search is underway for criteria and ways by which to measure the return on investment in new technology. Opinions differ greatly and obstacles abound, however. A number of specialists caution against adhering too stringently to economic cost alone in as- sessing new technology. Some stress the need to take into account "social effectiveness," as expressed in improved sccial relations or better working conditions. Similarly, a few champion what is sometimes called "ecological" or "wasteless" technology, such as pollution control devices. Adopting yet a different 260

. 4 view, others argue that "science is not a lottery with guaranteed prizes. Many lines of research produce no profit, or at least none measurable in terms of money." There are also some who emphasize that the magnitude of the socio-economic return depends not only on the result itself, but also on the speed and scale of its application. Many a good scientific idea or engineering solution quickly becomes obsolete.26

In addition to this diversity of opinion about the efficiency of technology, various procedures have been developed for calculating its effectiveness. Un- til recently, each ministry and state committee used its own method and set of indicators. Without uniform methodology, however, ar comparative evaluation and choice among alternative S&T designs is impossible. Significantly in February 1977, a unified methodology for the calculation of the economic return of new technology, inventions, and efficiency proposals was made compulsory for all branches of the economy. The procedures contained in the methodology had been tested since 1971 in the unified fund ministries. However, in spite of the comprehensiveness of the methodology and the extensive preparation and experimentation behind it, the individual ministries are still required to devise instructions for adap- ting it to their own accounting practices and categories of output.27

In general, past procedures for measuring economic return have had major deficiencies. The anticipated effect has been systematically exaggerated, and the actual return is not properly considered or monitored. In fact, no statistics are kept in -zhis regard. The -Iystem of 'ncentives is also pegg,d to the calcula- ted return: Not surprisingly, therefore, Lev Gatov- sky, a prominent authority on the subject, confirms frankly, "Up to now the economic effectiveness of new technolog has not been a leading principle in economic managemon.t or an object ofplanning."Z8V. S. Ta- rasovich and Yu. B. Kliuka add,

261 Calculations of effectiveness, as a rule, are made only after basic work is completed, that is, when expenditures have already been made and time and resources are spent. Con- sequently, these calculations essentially are directed not to substantiating the ex- pediency of conducting work but to the 'just- ification' of costs already incurred."29

At a national round table on S&T progress, held in Moscow in the fall of 1975, it was noted that the dominant engineering thought of the country remains: "I create technology and leave the effectiveness of production to others."30 Thus, much remains to be done before substantial progress can be made inziov- ing towards an intensive mode of growth and before an effective strategy for using S&T can be worked out.

ACHIEVING ORGANIZATIONAL FLEXIBILITY AND INSTITUTIONAL RESTRUCTURING

In seeking ways to improve effectiveness of R&D, Soviet analysts and policy makers have begun to think seriously, really for the first time, about Organiza- tion. Basic concepts related to organization and the structural requirements of technical progress are being reexamined and revised. A relatively stati7 view of organizational structure as an immutable given !.s being replaced by more dynamic conception of orga ization as a set of complex variables about whizhc siderable choice can be exercised.

Organizational design itself is becoming recognized as a distinct and important area of expert analysis and management specialization. To be sure, there has long been a penchant for organizational engineering. Almost by reflex the remedy for any prcr)lem has been "to reorganize " - -of ten without organization studies. Until recently, the political commaad simply did not see any need to do anything abut organization, to think about organization, much less to thinx

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'0 cd (0 0 V (a ii 4-/ >IA 0 W 0 -r1 0 W arl r-1 4 41 k 3 4:1 vi 0 0 44 Ul4-1 pi4.11441.4quiir-I U 40411,81°Uflt:^(11 'CI 0 U 03 ri 'ti 4 4.1 M 0 0 .19r0 44 co o vi U 0 0 PC(i)PN V >1 .0rn p ri 0 M 0 i4(t) 4) 4-1 H$44 ).4 4) 0 4) 0 tel iiIll g1:1085 bog 150 4) 0 4-1 44 0 00 AI 0 ,r1 0 0 N '0 ,0 pi NAcluoposq,-, U 00(00 it1 ,0 41 > 0 41 r441 0 >1 t4 V4)eril4 'J,41 A k 144.1 rti U 0 dr' 0 0) N 0, "Ag5 C.) 41 H 0 4 41 04 0.0 0 a, H414)04JW:1%,(-14: 1"4:1:1'44J 1.4'CI0) 0 Hooluut.lu toe. trl a) 14 > 14 a) 1414 0 .ricd r-1pied)14 0)0)4.1 31,1t0Q0U0e490trIA '49tatOlgEr-104H°4) A O Sheinin also notes that many R&D institutions"izon- tinue to exist largely by inertia, become preoccupied with far fetched of secondary problems, and avoid new directions and new questions, becoming ends in themselves. "37 Two major organizational deficiencies in science and technology come in for particular criticism. The first is the relative rigidity and bureaucraticchar- acter of R&D institutions. E. I. Gavrilov faults these organizations for "their slow response to changing goals, tasks, and projects, their incapacity for extensive integration and cooperation, and their in- effectiveness in resolving scientific and production tasks."V. N. Arkhangelsky sees the main weaknesses of R&D structures as their "static quality" and"organizational exclusiveness." In the same vein, Mi- kulinsky writes, "New lines of research find it ever harder to find their place within the fram-=work of established collectives and crystallized organizational forms." Gvishiani, too, speaks about science having "a surplus of stability and in some instances even of conservatism.' One of the main demands being made on science, he stresses, "is that itshould become much more flexible and laobile and capable of much easier and faster reorganization and even of total restructuring, when the needarises."38 At the same time, organizational change is recognized as being a formidable task. Gvishiani himself admits, "It is extremely hard to recast the structure of a scientific establishment that has takendecades to shape." In practice, it is easier to create a new R&D facility than to transform an old one. This option, however, which has been frequently used, is less viable today given the constraint.; on resources and need for intensive de relopment of bothscience and industry. Moreover, restructuring involves building organizations that are not only morefluid but also both flexible and stable. Yet finding the -ighr_ blend of adaptability and stability is the"ma_ difficulty" in the organization of Soviet S&T today, Gvishianiemphasizes."The deputy chairman of the GKNT and others also acknowledge that themajor prob- 266

3 lams in restructuring frequently revolve around the inability and unwillingness of scientists and engineers to switch from one field orproject to another. The creation of large integrated research and production complexes requires a corresponding psycho- logical remolding of collectives which areused to working in isolated groups.40 In short, institutional restructuring involves considerablebehavioral engineering and attitudinal change. The organizational issues, therefore, go beyond strictly structuraland technical factors, a point that some--but notall- - organizational reformers and "enthusiasts" realize. The second major deficiency concerns the organiza- tio--1 dissociation of R&D participants and the severe coupling problems thatthis creates in moving ideas from the lab into use. The traditional approach to innovation, based upon extremefunctional specialization by institutional performers, has left the process structurally fragmented andshapeless. Structural barriers have been created allalong the innovation chain. In essence, the process has been unorganized and unmanaged. To overcome this fragmentation, specialemphasis is now being put on the need toapply a systems model of organization to innovation. Virtually every major writer on science policy inthe 1970s, in fact, joined--if not led--the burgeoning systems movement in the USSR today. Because it focuses attention on interrelationships, interdependencies, andintegra- tion, the systems approach is regarded by many tobe a viable conceptualframework for analyzing and solving structural design problems. Its emphasis on study of organization of the research-to-production cycle as a total system is new and underscoresthe emerging broader view ,.-:-.f organizational structure as a means offacilitating decision making, motivation, and control. The application of a systems model transforms the innovation processallegedly into "a unified and self-regulating dynamicsystem."The research cycle becomes "a continuous andgoal-dixected process."41Recent organizational policy alms, then, at making the process bothmanaged and manageable. 267 Practical manifestations of the systems approach to organization are seen in the variety of integrated structures and new associational forms linking research, development, and production activities that have arisen in recent years. Research and production complexes have indeed become a pLenomenon of the times. Regional R&D centers, modeled somewhat after American research and industrial parks, have sprung up in a number of areas and joia industry and educational institutions or academy institutes and experimental production facilities. Wrestling with the problems of innovation, Kremlin authorities have become increasingly aware of the importance of linkage and of the need to structure more explicitly and effectively the vital interfaces in the transfer process. Accordingly, linkage is a prominent feature in the designing of new structures or modification of established arrangements. The search for more effective and flexible designs has also led to rising interest in project and matrix forms of organization and management. Indeed, the matrix model is seen by some analysts to be the ideal structure for R&D in the future. It is regarded as an effective way of institutionalizing flexibility and stability. 42 At present, however, matrix organization is still used on a limited and experimental basis in civilian R&D. Nonetheless, current organizational the .ght, at least in some prominent Soviet circles, poir.ts to an expansion of the matrix and of other shapes for R&D management in the 1980s. In sum, a new and more sophisticated style of thinking about organization and the structural requirements of technical progress has recently developed in the USSR. New attitudes and approaches are emerging as the leadership begins to address some of the fundamental structural problems impeding S&T performance and capacity. Both foreign and domestic experience have cunvinced some sr-ments of the ruling elite that "the management structure of economic organizations should be designed no less carefully than new technology," according to Georgy Arbatov, Direc- tor of the Institute for the Study of the USA and Can- 268 ada.43Monolithic organizational perspectives are gradually giving way to multi-institutional views as the Kremlin seeks to cope more effectivelywith advancing techn:Aogy and complexity. To be sure, practice lags behind conceptual advances. V. A. Trapeznikov of the GKNT admits that in structuring and managing large complexes and organizational SST systems "we are essentially only beginning wrrk."44 Organizational experimentation and structural change have been limited. Nonetheless, the leadership appears increasingly serious about helping make organization itself a positive force for, rather than impediment to, innovation. Given the heavy emphasis on organizational issues and approaches, in fact, the kf.; to innovation seems, at times, to be simply "management by structure." In any case, it is important to note that the basic building blocks are beginning to assume new shapes. Integrat- ed research and production complexes are coming into being. Organizational arrangements are being repat- terned and authority lines recycled. The Soviet S&T establishment is in motion and in transition.

IMPROVING PLANNING AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION

There is also enhanced awareness of the complexity of planning and stimulating S&T progress. Some of the shortcomings and disincentives of the planning system with respect to innovation have become steadily apparent, as has also the need for greater initiative and use-,--stimulated innovation in R&D. "We cannot divide the 'plan-stimulation' formula into two parts and subordinate one totheother," some specialists argue. "We all realize," they add, "thatit is impossible to solve the whole problem by moving just one lever alane."45 Thus considerable attention was given in the last decade to strengthening the role of "economic mechanisms" (e.g., prices, credit, profitability) and of various incentive schemes in promoting scientific research, development, and delivery.

269 s._ The dominant approach to S&T policy, however, remains fundamental] -- management-centered rather than entrepreneur- Gr market-centered. V. M. Ivanchenko, an official of the USSR Gosplan, expresses the prevailing view: "If_ is impossible to transfer problems pertaining to she acceleration of S&T progress economic levers and stimuli alone." The predilet, Drt for central planning persists. The commitment to central planning remains firm. Indeed, it is said, "The management of technical progress needs to be centralized more than any other area of economic management."The national economic plan proper, concluded the recent round table of experts, "must be the main link that we must grip in order to pull the entire research-to-production chain ."46 In the sphere of SST planning, attenton has focused largely on two needs: long-range forecasting and planning geared to the ultimate utilization of research results; and :ore integrated program-type planning and effective project control. To meet the first need, Soviet authorities have pressed the cam- paign to extend the horizons of Planning beyond the prevailing short-term incremental mold in order to accommodate the kind of decision making and long lead times inherent in the development of science and technology. For all prac:.:ical purposes, Soviet economic planning is an annual matter. The dominant tendency is to plan "from the achieved level."The expansion of existing production patterns prevails over the development and introduction of new products and processes based upon S&T. As a result the plan for S&T has remained largely "an appendage of the general economic plan, an independent chapter insufficiently integrated with the whole."47 Significantly, in 1971 Brezhnev st_essed ':_hat a new approach was needed to make the macroeconomic plan a powe-.rful lever of S&T progress, to ensue the rational managelLant of both economic -owth and -ew technology. He called for t..e formulation of a comprehensive program for the development of science and technology that could th,,I be used as the basis upon which to build a 15 year general economic development

I 4 270 plan. Such a program, he told the Party congress five years later, "provides points of reference and orientation without knowledge of which it is impossible to manage the economy successfully.48

Since 1973, in fact, work on such a general development plan that would extend to 1990 has been under- uay. Given the tremendous and recurring difficulties the leaders have in trying to devise even t%;risible five year plans, however, it is no wonder that such long-range planning has e4countered stiff resistance and serious methodological obstacles. The Academy and the GK TT completed a partial draft of a "Compre- hensive Program of S&T Progress and Its Social and Economic Consequences for 1976-1990" by the fall of 1975. Indicalp that this effort did not yet meet with full approval, the Part: Congress in February 1976 instructed the Academy and the State Committee "to continue" work on this subject and "to see tr it" th. the forecasts "are better grounded."49 Prepa ation of a general 15 year development plan for the country continues to encounter delays and difficulties.

Though we still know very little about the details of the Comprehensive Program for S&T, it is possible to glimpse from available information at least a few of the central concerns surrounding this endeavor. In gene:al, the more than 150 forecasts prepared for various fields of science and technology before drawing up the Comprehensive Program were only partial forecasts. They focused on the development and production of only a few select products and processes. In addition, eacu forecast was developed predominantly on a branch basis, separate from the rest in material and labor resources. The lack of a "systems approach" to planning and resource allocation admittedly dimin- ishes the value of the forecasts.50

Particularly significant, the major projects included in tZle Comprehensive Program are based only upon SETT achievments that have already found practical application. "This reduces, of course, the 271 possibilities for technical progress posed in the Comprehensive Program but, at the same time, makes the general targets and indicators realistic and reliable," cia.;_ms a study produced by the Higher Party School under the CPSU Central Committee.51Nonethe- less, there are P.ome, like A. S. Gusarov of the Acad- emy's Institute of Economics, who disagrees with this approach to planning, uncertainty, and risk. He emphasized at the 1975 round table, "After all, we must be concernd.d not only with mastering the experience that has been amassed in the course of SST progress, but also with mastering the ongoing revolution in science and technology."Gusarov and others apparently fear that this conservative approach to building the future entirely on the accomplishments of today, no matter how high, will only lead to "planned obso- lescence." As a recent major Soviet work on science policy put it, such planning amounts essentially to backwardness, not progress."52 It also does not constitute a viable strategy for closing the technology gap with the West. On the contrary, it carries the possible danger that the USSR will fall even further behind. As Gusarov observes, "After all, it is possible to lag even while movingforward."53 To meet the second need, continuing emphasis has been placed on broadening the application of a "programmed-goals approach" to planning and management. A kind cf "programmitis" has gripped the Kremlin as many have fastened on this management-integrative tool with high hopes of solving the mounting problems of complexity and change. Its use is being urged for major construction projects, like the territorial- production complexes being built in Siberia, Central Asia, and the Far East, as well as for large-scale R&D programs. Calling for comprehensive programs centering on key scientific, engleering, economic, and social problems, Premier Kosygin at the 1976 Par- ty congress singled out as priority tasks the development of the nuclear power industry and the mechanization of manual and heavy physical labor. A. P. Aleksandrov, President of the Academy of Sciences, suggested that the modernization of agriculture and 272 development of computer technology be raised to this special national program status. Brezhnev, on the other hand, stressed to the congress the importance formulating comprehensive programs for the development of the fuel and power complex, metallurgy, and the leading branches of machine building.

As regards science policy specifically, movement towards -rogrammed-goals planning is most evident in the switch from "coordination plans" to "integrated programs" for high priority S&T problems. The number of basic problems has also been reduced to around 200. Much more than before, the accent is on the actual introduction of R&D results into the economy, on integrating science, technology, and production. This follows Brezhnev's own stress at the 1976 congress on the nc d to focus planning and management more on "end results.""This approach becomes especially urgent," he explained, "as the economy grows and becomes more complex, when these end results come to depend more and more on a multitude of intermediate units, on an intricate system of intrabranch and interbranch ties." "In these conditions," Brezhnev insisted, "It is easy to overlook the most important thing--the end results."54 Scientific R&D has in particular fregt ntly been caught in "the activity trap," when activities become an end in themselves aad their end results are lost to sight. As we have noted, even the coordination plans for priority S&T problems have tended to end with the experimental design and testing stage and, in exceptional cases, with the production of prototypes. For all practical purposes, the planning process has stopped short of series production. Scientific R&D thus has failed to produce substantial practical results, to follow through to industrial assimilation. Suffice it to note that another important aim of the new integrated S&T programs is to facilitate more effective coordination of R&D plans with investment plans and with the allocation of material and technical resources. Thus, the change in planning involves more detailed control and managerial surveilla'ce, not just the introduction of R &D results.

273 Underlying this heavy accent on the systems approach to planning is the need to deal more effectively with major interbranch problems that cut across ministerial lines. Brezhnev particularly complained to the 1976 congress about too many "nursemaids,"about the fragmentation of decision making and administration, leading to unwarranted cost overruns and protracted delays. "What r: quired here," he told the congress, "are integrated and centralized programs embracing all stages of work, from project design to practical implementation." Lending his support to the systems movement, the General Secretary charged that "the questionof improving the methods of solvinc major interbranch and territorigl problems of state importance cannot be put off."5' M. P. Ring, a prominent science policy expert, also emphasizes that the Soviet government cannot continue to solve majorcomplex S&T problems incrementally "by pieces," and by means of territorial and branch planning alone. Such a policy leads to "slow, incomplete, and insufficient solutions."56

It is important to mention again that,despite the long tradition of central e-onomic planning, Soviet authorities have lacked unt relatively recentlythe necessary organization, techniques,authority, and exp4rience to plan and manage R&D on a comprehensive level. This is particularly true for thecivilian sector with the exception of a fewcrash development and high priority programs, like chemicaltechnology oratomic energy. Planning of R&D has been--and still predominantly is--conducted on aninstitutional basis. Given the extreme functional specialization of institutional performers and the structuralfrag- mentation of the innovation process, it has notbeen possible to plan and manage projects within the framework of one or two organizations. A major aim of the drive to create large research andproduction complexes is to build an organizational basisfor broader program planning. Such structures permit the development and use of more sophisticatedtechniques of systems management and project control.

274 .) Thus, systems planning and programming is seer by many to offer a remedy--if not a panacea by which to overcome existing deficiencies. But experience remains limited in this area. As Academician T. S. Kha- chaturov, editor-in-chief of the main Soviet economic journal, cautioned the 1975 round table or S&T "This is indeed an enticing prospect, but to what degree has the ground been laid for program-integrated planning?" Indeed he reminded them, "It is appropriate to remember that work is only now beginning on questions pertaining to planning based on complexes and programs."57There are still many unresolved issues not only about programming per se but also about how to fit programming techniques into the general system ,:)f Soviet planning. The issues here are far from purely methodological.

RAISING MANAGEMENT EFFECTIVENESS

Problems of choice, priority, and policy are, above all, management problems. Indeed it is possible to say that managezent has emerged as the "central issue" in Soviet science policy and development strategy today. A. V. Sobrovin of Moscow University expresses the prevailing official view: "The problem of technical progress is first and foremost a question of management."58 In June 1970 Brezhnev observed, "The solution to many of our economic problems should now be sought at the junctures between progress in science and technology and progress in management."59 Gvishi-lai writes similarly:

It is no exaggeration to say that the pace of our advance hinges on organization and capabilities in the system of management. Fusion of the latest achievements in science and technology with the most up-to-date achievements in organization and management is an imperative of the contemporary STR.60

275 2 Growing appreciation of the critical role of management, in curn, has brought enhanced awarenessof the need for more effective R&D administration. So- brovin says frankly, "Let us build a modern systemof management of technical progress. If we do not do this, we will accomplish nothing.'161 Stating what has since become a slogan of the times,Brezhnev declared in June 1970 that "the science of victoryin building nmmunism is in essence the science of management."° The linchpins of his grand strategy have become the "management of science" and the"science of management." A critical "management gap"therefore is an integral part cf the perceived "technologygap" in the USSR. Soviet authorities have come to recognize more and more that the existing technologyof management is increasingly inadequate in copingwith modern R &D problems. Innovations in planning, organizing, and controlling activities have lagged along withadvanc- es in technologicalhardware. There exists a new level of awareness of the need to develop and to apply modern decision-making techniques and management attitudes toward S&T policy. Indeed underlying these concerns, it seems, is theidea that perhaps the fast- est and most effective meansof overcoming Russia's technological backwardness in modern hardwareis through a great leap forward in"software" and management know-haw. Again, as in organization andplanning, the major problems in management lie in thefragmentation of R&D decision making and administration. This results in poor direction and integrationof effort--the heart of management functions. Integrative capabilities are, moreover, becoming increasinglyimportant in S&T policy. "The problem of ensuring continuity of the process at every stage of R&D,including the introduction of results into massproe'action," writes Gvishiani, "is now being brought to thefore as the most complex organizationaltask. It is absolutely obvious that this process requiresintegrated management."Professor G. Kh. Popov, Dean of the Economics 276 Faculty at Moscow University, also notes, "Today virtually all questions of any importance--and above all the key problems of S&T progress--have become interbranch in nature." "This is why," he explains, "improvement of the mechanismof interbranch coordination is one of the core problems of management." As regards this problem, Politburo member M. S. Solomen- tsev, who is also Premier of the Russian Republic, acknowledges flatly, "There is nothing of greater urgency."63 Indeed, the administrative machinery en- counters its greatest challenges in dealing with complex S&T problems. At a time when the importance of this class of management problems is rising, the deficiencies of the existing system of coordination are becoming all the more apparent. Official concern with surmounting these shortcomings provides, in fact, the impetus behind the growing systems movement in the Soviet Union today. Sys- tems technology is fast becoming the final word in prganization, planning, and management as the leadership seeks more effective methods of integration and :ontrol. Taken together, developments in the areas of or- omization, planning, and management indicate, to a Large extent, the efforts being made to bring space- age management perspective and technique to the Krem- lin. The current emphasis on setting objectives, de- 'eloping action plans, determining the means to ac- :omplish them, and appraising performance on the ha- ;is of results is the essence of modern management. Mille "programmed-goals approachis basically Soviet- ;tyle "management by objectives," "results management," and "systems planning, programming, and budgeting," to Ise equivalent Western terms.Much like leaders of :amplex organizations the world over today, in gov- rnment and business, Brezhnev and company are at- :empting to use these tools to improve managerial )erformance and effectiveness as well as to ensure 'arty control. In the organization of management, two problems in >articular are being singled out. The first is the 277 need to separate strategic and coordinating functions from operating management and control. The failure of existing management structures to incorporate and maintain this division of tasks has caused them "to freeze the development of technology and the efficiency of production," writes Milner. In practice, both strategic and operational functions are concentrated at the highest levels of management. Conse- quently, the command channels become overloaded as problems are constantly referred upward. Top executives become absorbed in current operations and di- verted from strategicconcerns.6'

Second, there is need to formalize and expand horizontal patterns of management as well as to combine vertical and horizontal channels of administration. Integration can take place only at the apex of the organizational pyramid. Thus, top management becomes heavily involved in securing horizontal joint actions and coordinating goal achievement by various functional units at lower levels. Again the result is the overload described above and the failure of organizational leaders to conduct strategic planning and decision making for the future. At the same time, the nur.ber of complex problems demanding team work and joint effort is growing daily. Numerous attempts have been made at plants and associations to create special bodies responsible for coordinating and har- monizing lateral ties at all levels of management. However, they have proven to be ineffective, Milner points out, "because they try basically to adapt the line and staff structure to solve tasks for which it is not suitable." Such problems can be solved most effectively, he adds, "within the framework of a special structure, one that cooperates with a line and staff structure, supplements it but is not identical to it."65

Basically, the Scviet structural response to these needs has followed closely the pattern of organizational and managerial adaptation in the United States. During the 1960s many American business firms found that well-known and well-tested structural designs

278 4') and management shapes were inadequate in coping with complex problems of advancing technology. They faced many of the same pressures and design problems that preoccupy the Kremlin today. Similarly, interest in the design of strategic planning systems mushroomed as ways were sought to free top executives from operational worries. Differentiation and integration :oncepts were applied to structural design to achieve greater organizational flexibility and management effectiveness. Additional managerial roles were creat- td to provide horizontal coordination across function- lines and vertical flows of authority. Among the most important structural innovations to emerge out )f the 1960s were project management and matrix or- paniz,lion. Significantly, these same two concepts lay at the masis of Soviet structural refinements and managerial :eforms in the 1970s. According to Milner, tr.,.;_,y pro- ride for "a flexible and dynamic system of interfunc- :ional coordination and subordination of diverse ef- !orts of individual links for accomplishing set ob- iectives."66 "Project teams overcome intraorganiza- :ional barriers and therefore avoid the basic contra- Lictions of a functional structure," writes Taksir.67 E. E. Drogichinsky notes, "In the matrix structure are optimally combined vertical and horizontal flows f leadership, the management of current production nd scientific research, the development of new technology and retooling for manufacturing new products rithout violating the rhythm of production."68 The ain advantage of matrix organization, Gavrilov ex- lains, is that it makes possible the transfer of perational management to lower levels and thus per- Its top management to step out of day-to-day deci- ion making and to concentrate on strategy develop- ent.69 Accordingly, the concepts of project and matrix anagement are beginning to find application in the evelopment and introduction of new technology in the ivilian sector. Science-production associations in articular have become crucibles for experimentation

279 2 :13 (Y4004Mmi-tlin 0MOOng V0w0W04mWVpanoon00,0Gn4OW4 0Mt-40Pituro

The motivational and collaborative issues leftun- attended by previous approaches to innovationare also receiving greater attention today. On one level, efforts have been made to strengthen the role ofeconomic stimuli. Some specialists feel, in fact, that too much emphasis is being placed on this direction. According to Gusarov, "Essentially thesystem of stimulation has been reduced to a system of material incentives, and this is not correct."Others argue, "We must not fear the creation of largeincentive funds at enterprises producing high quality products: they pay for themselves entirely by eliminating losses due to low quality production."73New incentive funds have been established at R&D organizations, and steps have been taken to tie the funding and awarding of bonuses more closely to the return that R&Dre- sults yield the consumer and the economy. A number of experiments are also underway that seek to relate salary levels to productivity and to the results of work of research personnel. In general, though, there remain a number of trou- blesome and unresolved issues surrounding this whole question. Yu. V. Borozdin notes, "The fact of the matter is that to date there is still a certain gap between the system of planning, the system of incentives, and the system of price formation." The awarding of incentives is based upon faulty and obsolete (1968) methods of pricing new products and of equally ineffective and outdated (1961) methods of determining economic return on new technology. Two systems of incentives still exist at production enterprises: one is geared to the fulfillment of basic economic activity and the other to the application of new technology. Not only do the two frequently contradict each other, but the latter system, according to M. I. Vol- kov, "is easily overshadowed" by the former. Lev Gatovsky similarly writes that the stimuli for new technology cannot serve as a real "counterweight" to the rewards for basic production. "Methods of cost 283. accounting, the evaluation of economic activity, and the system of material incentives are too little oriented toward national economic effectiveness based on S&T progress," he affirms.74Despite the strong accent since the late 1960s on the importance of accelerating innovation, in fact, the relative share of incentive funds for applying new technology compared to the bonuses for fulfilling basic production targets has actually declined over theyears.75 Writing in the Academy's economic journal in May 1977, Gatovsky asserts that the innovating enterprise still finds that it does not occupy an advantageous and privileged position. On the contrary, this is still held by en- terpri3es producing old and obsoletetechnology.76

In addition, the development of a unified incentive structure has been a special problem at all levels of the administrative hierarchy. Just as in R&D planning and management generally, divided authority and fragmented administration have been the rule in this sphere as well. Only recently have a few ministries switched to a system of unified funds for planning and stimulating the research-to-production process within the branch as a whole. Only in 1976 were guidelines laid down for thescience-production associations on the formation and utilization of unified incentive funds. Previously, the central management or head organization of the NPOlacked authority to redistribute assets, investments, and funds of the constituent units. Each subdivision formed and spent its own fund for material incentives, and the NPO did not have any right to these funds. As a result top management could not utilize these resources or part of them as an economic instrument. The absence of unified funds and uniform rates for bonuses has prevented NPO' fromusing monetary incentives to ercourage associationmc_bers to pull in the same direction. A similar problem exists with respect to the use of incentives across ministerial lines to stimulate interbranLh R&D. Scientific R&D organizations receive deductions for their material incentives fund from profits of individual enterprises only in their own branch. This dampens their

282 29r interest in doing work ofan interbranch character. At present thereare no procedures that permit an easy transfer of bonus and wage funds, capitalin- vestments, and material resources fromone branch to another to stimulate organizations, regardless of their departmental affillation.77

On another level, strong emphasishas been placed on strengthening motivational bonds throughthe creation of a unifying goals framework. This tendency :o view questions pertaining to incentivesthrough :he prism of the plan is inkeeping with the basic :e"i.tralized approach to S&T policy. Because the re- ;earch-to-production process has basicallylacked art Lntegrating goals structure, the focus hasnot been on final results and overall integrationbut on parate functions and individual work effortsper in isolation from one another. Coupling hz.s een loose and disjointed. Individual and institu- tonal participantsare not fully aware that they .re involved in a connected process. The whole ac- ivity chain moves throughdifferent links without he integrating force ofcommon purpose and sense of eamwork.

Through more explicituse of a goals-oriented sci- ace policy and purposive technological innovation, he leadership is tryingto build a more effective ramework for cooperation and interorganizational collaboration. The accant on objectives and endre- alts in programmed-goals planning andsystems man- gement approaches currently in vo1ue is designedto alp build commitment andcommon purpose that can Ise structure and people in joint action. Through search and production complexes andassociations le authorities hope to reshape the attitudes of R&D ?xsonnel and to create a coincidence ofinterest icing all participants in the smooth and rapid trans- :r of technology. Instead of being guided by its in special interests and parochial views, each unit to be motivates by common objectives, by "onlyone onAcept: ours." The new complexes are seen as means which to transform 'awkward external cooperation 283 2(4 7 into harmonious intrafirmcooperation."78 Such integrating structures are expected tobuild a more appropriate climate for innovationand to help get needed team play. Indeed, the Russian term most frequently used 'o describe thesecomplexes and associations--obedineniye--cnmes from the verb"to unite" or "to join." It captures the explicitdesign emphasis on integration andcooperation.

To be sure, efforts arebeing made on a variety of fronts to strengthenmotivational bonds all along the research-to-productioncycle. Current approaches focus almost entirely on the creationof positive incentives to promote and rewardinnovation. Little attention, much less emphasis, isbeing given to the creation and use of negativeincentives or sanctions that punish non-innovativetehavior, such as are provided by a competitive market economy. In general, though, motivational bonds aredifficult to assess until these is greater knowledgeand understanding of the nature of anti-innovationattitudes and resistance to new '_echnology inthe Soviet Union. In- deed, this point was made bySobrovin at the 1975 national round table on S&T progress: "We still do not know the reasons for the slowintroduction of S&T advances by enterprises,and hence we do not know the objective base for searching for newforms and methods ofstimulation."79

SCIENCE POLICY REFORMS: A BALANCE SHEET

Following Soviet S&T policies overthe last de.:ade, one is struck by anumber of features. First, the growing sophistication ofresearch and analysis in this area is amply evident. Important steps are being taken to advanceunderstanding as a first step toward improving the practiceof scientific R&D. The proliferation of "research onresearch" has lee, to in- greater awareness ofthe multiplicity of factors

284 volved in moving ideas from tae laboratory intouse, along with greater appreciation of the importance of effective coupling throughout the process. Nonethe- less, understanding of the innovation cycle remains incomplete. Many questions still lack adequate answers; some important issues have not yet even been raised in the literature. At the same time, practice Conti:::ues to lag appreciably behind perception. Just as in modern technological hardware, so also in made= software the implementation and diffusion of innovations in R&D planning and management remainsa critical problem. Indeed, the ongoing science policy debate is rp.Lete with complaints that progress in introducing its is slow. Brezhnev observed at the 1976 congress,"The improvement of planning, the restructuring of she economic mechanism, and the policy of intensifying production proceeded slower than planned."He particularly lamented, "Despite the fact that thisques- tion was raised repeatedly and insistently, the application of SST achievements is still a bottleneck in many branches.,30Even more outspoken is L. A. Vaag of the State Committee for Science and Technol- ogy, who told the national round table on S&T progress in the fall'of 1975, "Five years have passed and there have been no major changes."81 Though the Kremlin's new strategy for science and technology stresses the need for a total systems out- look and approach to remedy the problems of incomplete planning and disjointed administration of R&D, reforms themselves have been adopted in a piecemeal, experimental, and incremental fashion. Despite some steady gains made in the 1970s, a great gap persists between the aspirations of Soviet authorities for comprehensive and coherent S&T policies and their abilities to implement these wishes. In short, the Kremlin's reach still exceeds its grasp in this policy sphere. The two systems for guiding S &T progress still prevail, and opinions continue to differ over how to 285 improve and how to integrate them. The basic system of economic planning and managementis oriented toward the expansion of production andtoday's technology, while thesupplementary system is concerned with the planning and management of R&Dtoward the technology of tomorrow. For the most part, the targetof attention and action has been thesupplementary system. This prompts Vaag to exclaim,"We must think of improvements in the basic system and must notconfine ourselves to improving supplementary systemsfor the stimulation of S&Tprogress."82

At issue is largely the role andfuture of the supplementary system. On one side are those who question the need to improve and to preservethis secondary line of influence. For them the central issue is making the basic system work for scienceand technology. If the economy as a whole is notaltered to inspire and promote technologicalinnovation, then improvements in the supplementary system, nomatter what, will be of no avail. If the fundamental work- ings of the economy can be somodified, then a supplementary set of S&T mechanismswill be unnecessary. On the other side, there are somewho focus almost exclusively on improving the lattermachinery. They tend to inflate its role in andpotential for accelerating S&T progress whiledownplaying the need for general system reorientation andchange.

A middle position on this issueis held by Profes- sor Popov of MoscowUniversity. His views also probably represent the majority opinion amongthe Soviet ruling group at this time. Given the complexity of science and technology under modernconditions, Popov contends that it is necessary toretain, even in the future, two channels of influence. In describing the specific task of the supplementary system,he draws an analogy with modernaviation. Just as some advanced aircraft require an initialbooster engine in order to accelerate to a certainlevel before the main engines cut in and take overflight control, so a modern economy needs asupplementary booster support system for thedevelopment and acceleration of

286 science and technology. This secondary system of special mechanisms for R&D planning and management can fulfill its role only when it is closely integrated with and subordinated to the basi,; links of economic management. "It is impossible for his supplementary system alone to solve all the problems of managing S&T progress," Popov emphasizes.83 While everyone generally agrees that both the basic system and the supplementary system need to be improved, there is considerable dispute about what to improve and how. According to Popov, it Is possible to identify three main schools of reform. One group focuses on improvements in planning, the search for better indicators, more sophisticated analytical techniques, etc. A second favors structural approaches and organizational solutions. A third school emphasizes the importance of improved economic mechanisms, such as more effective material incentives, better pricing policies, integrated financing, etc. The "best" policy, in Popov's opinion, is to pursue improvements along all three avenues, to unite all links of the supplementary system, and to integrate this system with the basic econ:,wic mechanism. Indeed, this multi-dlnuamsional approach has been generally the path of reform in recent years. On a broader level, developments in the 1970s con- firm that in the Soviet Union, as elsewhere, the formulation and implementation of science policies depend not only on their substantive effectiveness but on their political feasibility as well. Suffice it to say that substantial disagreement persists within the leadership about the intensity of the "technological imperative."Opinions differ over the urgency of making the transition to more intensive growth in general and more rapid technological advance in particular. Political differences and conflict among the major elite groups constrain action in this policy sphere. Indeed it is politics that accounts largely for the basic discrepancy between the es- poused strategy for S&T with its emphasis on the need for a systems perspective and approach to problem- 287 solving and the tactics ofimplementation which recognize the need for a cautious,experimental, and incremental mode of reform. At the same time, it is inaccurate to attribute the slow pace of science policyreform simply or sole- ly to bureaucratic resistanceand political conservatism, The responses of Soviet leaders tothe man- ifold problems at hand appear tobe based on a more complex calculus of decision. Not only do they recognize some of the fundamental and not just politi- calconstraints at work in the Sovietsystem. They also are more aware of thecomplexities of modern science, technology, and development. To be sure, some still cling tothe hope of simplistic solutions. But solutions to complexproblems are themselves usually complex. While this is not alwaysunderstood, some Sovietspecialists and political leaders are fully aware of the difficultiesof effecting organizational and behavioral change.Milner himself ar- ticulates well the basicdilemma that confronts So- viet policy makers in scienceand technology as the USSR moves into the1980s. There is no doubt, he says, that modern systemsapproaches and more sophisticated techniques make R&Dplanning and management more. difficult. They bring it "into a newclass, in- to a newsituation." "But it is not possible by any other way," he emphasizes,"to solve the new and complex problems of developmentof the national economy, which have no precedent in ourpastexperience."84 Perhaps the greatest stridein contemporary Soviet SST policy has been thediscovery that there are no simple or final answers tothe problems of advancing technology and change. FOOTNOTES

1. See Andrei Sakharov, Roy !fedvedev, and V. F. Turchin, "Letter of Appeal of Soviet Scientists to Party an:: Government Leaders of the USSR," March 19, 1970, reprinted in Survey, No. 76 (Summer 1970), pp. 161-170. 2. AXIV S"yezd KPSS: Stenograficheskii otchet (Moscow: Politizdat, 1971), I, p. 82 and XXV S"yezd KPSS: Stenograficheskii otchet (Moscow: Politizdat, 1976), II, p. 237. 3. L. I. Brezhnev, Ob osnovnykh voprosakh ekonomicheskoy politiki KPSS na savremennom etape: Rechi doklady (Moscow: PolitiZdat, 1975), I, F. 41C; XXIV S"yezd KPSS, I, p. 80; XXV S"yezd KPSS, II, p. 24. 4. XXV S"-zzd KPSS, I, p. 73. 5. V. A. Trapeznikov, "Upravleniye naukoy kak or- ganizatsionnoy sistemoy," in Gvishiani et 21, eds., Osnovnyye printsipy I cbshchiye problemy upravleniya naukoy (Moscow: Nauka, 1973), p. 39; Gvishiani, "The Scientific and Technological Revolution and Scientif- ic Problems," Social Sciences, I (1972), p. 49; Vla- dislav Kelle and Semyon Mikulinsky, "Sociology of Science," ibid., 3 (1977), p. 86. 6. Gvishiani, "The Scientific and Technological Revolution and Scientific Problems," p. 48; Gennady Dobrov, "Science Policy and Assessment in the So- viet Union," International Social Science Journal, XXV, 3 (1973), p. 322. 7. Ibid., p. 318. 8. Quoted in L. V. Golovanov, "Sistema upravleniya naukoy v SSSR I voprosy ee sovershenstvovaniya," in Nauchnoye upravlenlye obshchestvom (Moscow: Mysl', 1969); III, p. 35.

289 3 i-) 9. XXIV S"yezd KPSS, I, p. 80. 10. See K. Yefimov, "Nauchno-tekhnicheskiy progress: organizatsiya i planirovaniye," Voprosy ekonomiki, 12 (1974), pp. 22-23; A. A. Podoprigora, Pravovyye voprosy sozdaniya I vnedreniya novoytekhniki (Kiev, 1975), pp. 14-32; 0. I. Volkov, Planovoyeupravleniye nauchno- tekhniches.cim progressom (Moscow: Nauka, 1975), pp. 12- 16; V. D. Volkova, Sovershenstvovaniye metodologii planirovaniya naudhno-tekhnicheskogo progressa v usloviyakh razvitogo sotsialisticheskogo obshchestva (Sverdlovsk, 1975), pp. 6-9;V. I. Pavlyuchenko, Eko- nomicheskiye problemy upravleniya nauchno-tekhnicheskim progressom (Moscow: Nauka, 1973), pp. 9-37. 11. Yu. M. Sheinin, "Osnovnyye ponyatiya organizatsii i upravleniya nauchnoy deyatel'nostyu," in Uprav- leniye, planirovaniye i organizatsiya nauchnykh I tekhnicheskikh issledovaniy (Moscow: VINITI, 1970), II, p. 178; M. I. Piskotin, V. A. Rassudayskiy,and M. P. Ring, eds., Organizatsionno-pravovyye voprosyrukovodstva naukoy v SSSR (Moscow: Nauka, 1973), p. 31. 12. See M. A. Vilenskiy, "Nauchno-tekhnicheskly progress kak ob"yekt planirovaniya(voprosy metodologil)," Voprosy ekonomiki, 12 (1973), pp. 71-81; S. M.Yam- polskiy, "Ekonomicheskiye grartitsyprolzvodstva I pri- meniye novoy tekhniki pri sotsializme," in L. M.Ga- tovskiy, ed., Ekonomicheskiye problemy nauchno-tekhnicheskoy revolyutsii pri sotsializme (Moscow:Ekonomi- ka, 1975), pp. 128-137. 13. N. P. Fedorenko, "Urgent Tasks of EconomicSci- ence," Ekonomicheskaya gazeta, 21 (May 1976), p. 10; Yefimov, "Nauchno-tekhnicheskiy progress: organizatsiya i planirovaniye," p.26. 14XXIV S"yezd KPSS, I, pp. 80-81. 15. Trud, May 23, 1974. See also Yefimov,"Nauchno- tekhnicheskly progress: organizatsiya iplanirovani- ya," p. 24. 3L 290 16. Volkov, Planovoye upravleniye nauchno -tekhni cheskim progressom, pp. 17, 19. Emphasis added. 17. Dobrov, "Science Policy and Assessment in the Soviet Union," p. 308. 18. L. Blyakhman commented on the increasing number of scientists in Neva, 1 (January 1973), pp. 173-181. See also K. L. Gorfan, N. I. Komkov, and L. E. Minde- n, (Moscow: Nauka, 1971), p. 8.For the budgetary projections, see E. Kosov, "Ekonomicheskiye problemy upravleniya nauchno-tekhnicheskim progressom,".Ekono- michesklye Ilauki, 7 (1971), p. 51. 19. See S. Mikulinskiy, "Prdblema nauchnykh kadrov v usloviyakh nauchno-tekhnicheskoyrevolyutsii," Kom- mimist, 5 (1973), pp. 76-88; Zavlin et al, Trud-v. sfere nauki (Moscow, 1973), pp. 123-124. 20. G. N. Volkov, Sotsiologiya nauki: Sotsiologi- cheskiye ocherki nauchno-tekhnicheskoy deyatel'nosti (Moscow: Politizdat, 1968), p. 216. 21.Dobrov, "Science Policy and Assessment in the Soviet Union," p. 309.

22.XXIV S'yezd KPSS,II,p. 19.

23.XXV S"yezd KPSS,I,p. 67.

24.Pravda, February19,1977. 25. Statement by E. I. Sklyarov of the State Com- mittee for Science and Technology as reportedby Loren Graham in his "The Place of the Academy of Sciences System in the Overall Organization of SovietScience," in Thomas and Kruse-Vaucienne, op. cit., p.55. 26. See M. A. Vilenskiy, "Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskaya effektivnost' nauchno-tekhnicheskogoprogresses," in Gatovskiy, Ekonamicheskiye problemynauchno-tiAh- nicheskoy revolyutsii pri sotsializme, pp.138-146; 291 V. Yu. Budavey and M. I. Panova, Ekonomicheskiye problemy tekhnicheskogo progressa (Moscow: Mysli, 1974), p. 26. Statement about the lack of profit in research made by Alexander Birman, cited in Science and Public Policy, III, 4 (August 1976), p. 367. 27. Louvan Nolting, The Planning of Research, De- velopment, and Innovation in the USSR, U.S. Depart- ment of Commerce, Foreign Economic Report No. 14 (Wash- ington, D.C., 1978), pp. 12-13. 28. Lev Gatovskiy, "Effektivnost' novoy tekhniki kak ob"yekt upravleniya nauchno-tekhnicheskim progressom," in Organizatsiya upravleniya (Moscow, 1975), pp. 63- 71 and his article, "0 kompleksnom upravlenii effektivnost'yu tekhniki," Kommunist, 14 (September 1973), pp. 60-73. See also Gatovskly's remarks in "Planiro- vaniye i upravleniye nauchno-tekhnicheskim progressom v X pyatiletke," Voprosy ekonomiki, 8 (1975), p. 128. 29. V. S. Tarasovich and Yu. B. Kliuka, "Organiza- tsionnyye formy tekhniko-ekonomicheskogo obosnovaniya nauchnykh issledovaniy i razrabotok," in V. P. Alek- sandrova, ed., Problemy planirovaniya i effektivnosti razvitiya nauki i tekhniki v Ukrainskoy SSSR (Kiev, 1976), p. 44. 30. "Planirovaniye I upravleniye nauchno-tekhnicheskim progressom v X pyatiletke," p. 117. 31. Boriz Z. Milner, ed., Organizatsionnyye struktury upravleniya proizvodstvom (Moscow: Ekonomika, 1975), pp. 4-5 and Brezhnev, Ob osnovnykh voprosakh ekonomicheskoy politiki KPSS na sovremennom etape, II, p. 386. 32. B. Z. Milner, "Formirovaniye organizatsionnykh struktur upravleniya," Ekonomika I organizatsiya promyshlennogo proizvodstva, 6 (1975), pp. 4-5. 33. Milner, Organizatsionnyye struktury, pp. 5, 6, 16-17, 37. 34. N. S. Kalita and G. I. Mantsurov, Sotsialls=1- 292 cheskiye proizvodstvennyye ob "yedineniya (Moscow: Ekonomika, 1972), pp. 3-4 and Boris Milner, "Organi- ization of the Management of Production," Social Sci- ences, VII, 3 (1976), p. 48. 35. XXIV S"yezd KPSS, I, 90, 179-180; P. Danilav- tsev and Yu. Kanygin, Ot laboratorii do zavoda (Novo- sibirsk: Nauka, 1971), p. 40. 36. Kelle and Mikulinskiy, "Sociology of Science," p. 87. 37. Yu. M. Sheinin, "Nauka 1 organizatsiya," in E. A. Belyayev, S. P. Mikulinskiy, and Yu. M. Shel- nin, eds., Organizatslya nauchnoy deyatel'nosti (Mos- cow, 1968), p. 114. 38. E. I. Gavrilov, Ekonomika i effektivnost' nauchno-tekhnicheskogo progressa (Minsk, 1975), p. 277; Kelle and Mikulinskiy, op. cit., p. 87; D. M. Gvishi- ani, "Sotsial'naya roll nauki I politika gosudarstva v oblasti nauki," in V. Zh. Kelle and S. P. Mikulin- skiy, eds., Sotsiologichesklye problemy nauki (Mos- cow: Nauka, 1974), p. 215. 39. Gvishiani, "Sotsial'naya roll nauki i politika gosudarstva v oblasti nauki," pp. 213-215. 40. Ibid., p. 213; Kelle and Mikulinskiy, "Sociol- ogy of Science," pp. 88-89; I. A. Turchaninov,"Ten- dentsit i formy vzaimosvyazi nauki i proizvodstva na sovremennam etape," in Probiemy deyatellnosti uchenogo i nauchnykh kollektivov (Leningrad and Moscow: Nauka, 1977), P.9: 41. L. S. Blyakhman and A. F. Ivanov, "Nauchno- prolzve-istvennoye ob"yedineniye kak forma sistemnoy orgai atsil tsikla is-ledovanlye-proizvodstvo," Akademii Nauk SSSR, seriya ekonamicheskaya, 6 (1971), p. 39 arid K. I. Taksir, Nauchno-prolzvodstvennyye ob"yedinenlya (Moscow: Nauka, 1977), p. 16. 42. See Milner, Organizatsionnyye struktury uprav- 293 3 if 7 leniya proizvodstvom, pp. 7, 9, 108-111; N. E. Drogi- chenskiy, ed., Sovershenstvovaniye mekhanizma khozya- ystvovanlya v usloviyakh razvitogo sotsializma (Moscow, 1975), pp. 160-170; D. M. Gvishiani et al, eds., Vo- prosy teorii I praktiki upravleniya iorganizatsii nauki (Moscow: Nauka, 1975), pp. 14-15. 43. G. Arbatov, "Proektirovaniye organizatsii krup nykh prolzvodstvenno-khozyaystvennykh kompleksov I upravleniya imi," Planovoye khozyaystvo, 5 (1975), p. 2 . This article was also republished as "Sistemy upravleniya krupnymi proizvodstvenno-khozyaystvennymi kompleksami," in Vestnik Akademli Nauk SSSR, 10 (1975), pp. 46-53. 44. Trapeznikov, "upravleniye naukoy kak organiza- tsionnoy sistemoy," p. 24. 45. "Planirovaniye i upravleniye nauchno-tekhnicheskim progressom v X pyatiletke," p. 120. 46. Ibid., pp. 119-122; G. Kh. Popov, Effektivnoye upravleniye (Moscow: Ekonomika, 1976), p. 136. 47. A. V. Bachurin, Planovo-ekonomicheskiyemet .'dy upravleniya (Moscow: Ekonomika,1973), pp. 385-386. 48. XXV S"yezd KPSS, I, p.72. 49. Ibid., II, p. 239. 50. Nauchno tekhnicheskayarevolyutsiya: Ekonomika i upravleniye sotsialisticheskimproizvodstvom (Mos- cow: mys1.13 1976), p.28. 51. Ibid., p. 29. 52. M. I. Piskotin et al,eds., Organizatsionno- pravovyye voprosyrukovodstva naukoy v SSSR, pp.388- 53. "Planirovanlye Iupravleniye nauchno-tekhnicheskim progressom v Xpyatiletke," p. 117.

54. XXV S"yezd KPSS, I, p. 83.

294 55. Ibid., p. 85. 56. M. P. Ring, "Problemnoye upravleniye v nauke," Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR, 7 (1976), pp. 12-14. 57. "Planirovaniye i upravleniye nauchno-tekhnicheskim progressom v X pyatiletke," p. 115. 58. Ibid., p. 121. 59. Pravda, June 13, 1970. 60. D. M. Gvishiani, Organization and Management: A Sociological Analysis of Western Theories (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972), p. 172. 61. "Planirovaniye i upravleniye nauchno-tekhni-- cheskim progressom v X pyatiletke," p. 121. 62. Pravda, June 13, 1960. 63. Gvishiani, "The Scientific and Technological Revolution and Scientific Problems," p. 52; G. Popov, "How Reliable Are the Interfaces?" Pravda- July 27, 1976; XXV S"yezd KPSS, I, p. 164. 64. Milner, "Formirovaniye organizatsionnykh struktur upravleniya," p. 8 and his Organizatsionnyye struktury upravleniy4 proizvodstvom, p. 7. 65. Ibid., pp. 7, 8, 16, 108 and his "Formirovani- ye organizatsionnykh strukturupravleniya," pp. 8-9. 66. Milner, Organizatsionnyye struktury upravleniya proizvodstvom, p. 108. 67. Taksir, Nauchno- proizvodstvennyye ob "yedineniya, p. 85. 68. Drogichenskiy, op. cit., p. 169. 69. Gavrilov, op. cit., p. 280. 295 3Lij 70. See Ekonomika i organizatsiya promyshlennogo proizvodstva, 6 (1975), pp. 36-37.

71. Popov, Effektivnoye upravleniye, pp. 12-13.

72. Ibid., p. 13; G. A. Dzhavadov, V. N. Varvarov, and A. V. Sobrovin, "Organizatsiya ratsionalizatsii upravleniya nauchno-tekhnicheskim progressom v otrasli," in G. Kh. Popov, ed., Problemy organizatsii so- vershenstvavaniya upravleniya sotsialisticheskim proizvodstvom (Seminar g. Ka]mmin 1-10 fevralya 1974g/ (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo Universiteta, 1975), p. 253.

73. "Planirovaniye i upravleniye nauchno-tekhnicheskim progressom v X pyatiletke," pp. 118, 121.

74. Ibid., pp. 120-122, 128.

75. V. Ya. Elmeyev, E. F. Denisov, and S. F. Zotov, "Ekonamicheskiye usloviya soyedineniya nauki s proizvodstvom," Izvestiya Akademli Nauk SSSR, seriya ekonomicheskaya, 3 (1976), p. 56.

76. L. Gatovskiy, "Usileniye orientatsii planov i stimulov na vysoko effektivnuyu tekhniku," Voprosy ekonomiki, 5 (1977), p. 123.

77. See V. N. Arkhangel'skiy, Planirovaniye i finansirovaniye nauchnykh issledovaniy, p. 162; A. Vershin- ina, "Nauchno-proizvodstvennyye ob"yedineniya i sti- muliravanlye tekhnicheskogo progressa," Sotsialisti- cheskiy trud, 7 (1976), pp. 32-36; V. Pokrovskiy, "Upravleniye effektivnost'yu nauki i tekhniki," Eko- nomicheskaya gazeta, 32 (1977), p. 10.

78. A. Bachurin, "Promyshlennoye ob"vedineniye i tekhnicheskiy progress," ibid., 43 (1970), pp. 5-6.

79. "Planirovaniye i upravleniye nauchno-tekhnicheskim progressom v X pyatiletke," p. 121.

80. XXV S"yezd KPSS, I, pp. 62-63.

296 81. "Planirovaniye i upravleniye nauchno-tekhnicheskim progressom v X pyatiletke," p. 122.

82. Ibid.

83. See Popov, Effektivnoye upravleniye, pp. 128- 136.

84. B. Z. Milner, "Sovershenstvovaniye organizatsionnykh struktur upravleniya," in Sovremennyye metody upravleniya narodnym khozyaystvcm (Vilnius, 1974), p. 22.

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"All-union," rather than "union-republic," much less "republic," ministries and agenciesshape S&T policy and direct the national R&D effort, just as they do in economic policy anddevelopment more generally. On the whole, both countries have madeinordinate- ly high investments in defense, aerospace, andnucle- ar R&D while underinvestingin technology for economic growth. Though technological innovation has certainly been a more prominent and widespreadfeature of the American economy than of the Soviet,still 80 percent of all US R&D has beenconcentrated in just five "intensively engineered" industries. Further- more, 80 percent of federallysupported R&D goes to just two of these sectcrs--aircraft andmissiles, and electrical equipment and communications. In both nations, scientific R&D remainshighly concentrated geographically in a few majorurban centers and is performed by a fewlarge institutions. The Soviet penchant for large-scale organizationand functional specialization is well known. Tradition- ally, head research institutes and designbureaus have been given primary responsibility fordeveloping the main thrusts in science and technology. They are organized to serve whole branches of industryrather than individual production facilities. The small business firm and individual entrepreneur do play an important role in American science and technology, especially in innovation, that is virtuallyabsent in the Soviet system. But even in the UnitedStates, industrial R&D is dominated by a smallnumber of large corporations. Just 10 R&D performing firms account 299 3 7 . i o) w I 1.-I 0 4) f:1 um 0 (f) 0 4 1 0 m i4 0 44 0 rd cy I 04 4.) cd ril I )-i1-1 44J (.) 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There are strong parallels between the budgetary process, whichis the main tool for planning, review, and control--atleast in the public sector--in the United States, and the planning process in the Soviet system; and betweenthe OMB and the GKNT in their executive management oversight and mediating functions in S&T matters.As the principal advisory arms in science policy at the apex of the two respective governmental structures, the OSTP and the GKNT play somewhat analogous roles. In interagency R&D coordination, the FCCSET is a kind of American functional counterpart to the GKNT.On a more general level, certain parallels mayeven be drawn between Congress and the Supreme Soviet asin- stitutional arenas where S&T policies arepublicly debated and legislated. But such national compari- sons do not really take us far. Though some procedures or institutions look the same, theireffects and significance may be quite differentbecause they operate in different environments, eachshaped by its own national traditions, values,and circumstances.

The main characteristics that distinguishthe American and Soviet environments are rooted inthe fundamental differences between a competitivemarket economy and political pluralism, onthe one hand, and a centrally planned economy andpolitical cen- tralism, on the other. It is these underlying systemic dissimilarities that account forand shape the alternative approaches to science andtechnology in the two nations.

In the United States the S&T policy processis diffuse. The organizational structure ofthe federal government is highly fragmented anddiversified with a multitude of crosscuttingand competing agencies in both the Executive and Legislativebranches concerned with S&T matters. In most of these bodies R&D is only an activity in support of abroader set of roles and missions. In the American framework no 301 315 real mechanism exists to guide polic: making and priority-setting, much less to blueprint and administer the whole enterprise. Science policy emerges not as a grand design but rather as the end product of a complex interaction of diverse and partial wills. The overall set of S&T policies lacks unity and coherence.

In the Soviet Union, on the contrary, there is a much more formal process, structure, and policy for science and technology. The set of institutions responsible for R&D planning and management is more explicit and functionally specialized; procedures are more uniform and clearly defined; and authority is hierarchical and centralized at the top. The whole system is built, in principle and aspiration, to produce comprehensive and unified S&T policies that are an integral part of overall macroeconomic plans and development strategies.

The roles and responsibilities of government, in particular, are perceptibly different. In the Amer- ican setting government plays primarily an indirect and supporting role, serving as a catalyst to create a climate favorable to science and its applicaticms. The system is premised upon a basic division of labor between public and private institutions as well as the belief that whenever possible private incentives and the normal play of market mechanisms should be relied on to generate relevant R&D and technolog.,.cal innovation. Only in those areas where market forces are deficient or where it has major responsibilities, such as defense and space, does government take a direct administrative role. The difference between federal markets and competitive private markets must be recognized. In the former the government frequently plans, funds, and manages directly the R&D and is also the principal customer of the results. The whole process is heavily authoritarian with strong emphasis on roles and controls, resembling that of the USSR with its one giant public sector and command economy. In the latter, the competitive private market, the government's role is only indirect. This is the major American market.

302 By contrast, the Soviet governmenttakes generally an active anddirecting role in S&T policy anddevelopment. Just as industrial advanceis the product of state initiative andadministration, the spur to innovation also comes fromcentral political authorities. Through state ownership of R&Dresults and detailed plans the governmentintervenes directly from beginning to end of theresearch-to-production cycle. Administrative bodies deliberatelyplan and introduce new products and processes. The mode of advance is predominantly innovation by orderfrom the top down; administrative levers and bureaucraticinstruments are relied on todrive the whole process. Thus the Soviet government stressesorganizational and procedural solutions to science andtechnology problems. It is important not tooverdraw the image of two sharply dichotomous models ofscience and technology for the US and USSR. The Soviet system is neither af. unique nor as monolithic asit is sometimes assumed to be. Though highly centralized, theS&T establishment is also heavilycompartmentalized among numerous functional agencies andinstitutional subsystems.Al- though military R&D issystematically managed, Soviet civilian S&T is less centralized.The GKNT has only partially succeeded as general overseerby concentrating on a limited numberof priority areas rather than all R&D activities. Nor is the American system as anarchic andfreewheeling as it seems atfirst glance. Government regulation ofinnovation dampens the entrepreneurial spirit.Contradictory impulses and policies coexist inboth environments. Each system excels in certain respectsand falls short in others. To underline the comparativedimensions of Ameri- can and Sovietapproaches, the followingdiscussion focuses on three major areasof S&T policy: (1) relationship of scientific R&D toindustry; (2) the use of indicators and measurementtechniques in policy planning and management;and (3) incentives andob- stacles to innovation. Finally, the new complexity barriers that both countries facetoday in framing 303 317 4 I I

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Each sphere proceeds more or less on its own. Organizational structure and the overall planning processcontinue to reflect the fact that science and industry arestill largely separate worlds, coexistingrather than interacting. American R&D, on the contrary,is more closely coupled to other subsystems of society.Science for science's sake has not been an aim of publicpolicy. Rather, like everything else, scienceshould pay off if it is to merit public support. In government agencies, R&D is not considered inisolation but as part of their broad mission. In industry, management works on the principle that R&D ofitself is not enough; it must ultimately be exploitedin the mar- ketplace. Thus, R&D is made a component ofoverall business strategy and operations. A major consequence of the greaterinsulation of science in Soviet society is thatR&D enjoys far more stability and continuity in the USSRthan in the US. Kremlin policy makers have much moreof an investment mentality toward S&T as growth enterprisesthan their American counterparts. The mode of incrementalplan- ning "from the achievedlevel" provides the Soviet S&T establishment an assured andrising level of funding that contrasts sharply withthe variability of American R&D funding patterns. Neither the federal government nor industry inthe US is officially com- mitred to a base level of funding norto standard levels of increase. On the contrary, R&D fundingby industry varies widely with currenteconomic conditions as does federal spending. In both the public and private sectors the vulnerabilityof R&D as dis- cretionary outlays makes difficultthe formulation of durable science policies. In addition, the Soviet practice of institutional blocfunding, as opposed to the American system of projectfunding, makes for much greater stability at thelevel of the R&D performer. At the same time, this highdegree of stability characteristic of Soviet science exactsits price. 305 31 Conservttive tendencies stifle creativity and change. The inert-1 of institutions and projects is hard to break. R&D facilities and programs can go for years without producing any significant results. Above all, the isolation of research from production decreases technological innovation and causes problems in delivery. The American S&T structure, though not as stable, is more flexible and dynamic. The greater stress on results and ultimate use as well as the closer industrial nonrection keeps research and development both resp'nsive and relevant to the changing demands of the customer. Though it does not permit the same security for performers and continuity for projects that institutional funding does in the USSR, the American mode of project funding coupled with external peer review provides a more independent and flexible instrument for terminating unproductive R&D and initiating new programs. In general, the market environment causes the research sector to make painful adjustments from time to time to direct capabilities to where they are needed.

The two systems differ fundamentally in their approaches to integrating research, development, and innovation. In the USSR integration is a bureaucratic function assigned to a hierarchy of special agencies. There is little direct collaboration among institutional R&D performers.Most external transactions are managed through superior ministerial offices and departments. Interorganizational linkages, therefore, are essentially administrative. The ac- 2ent throughout is on hierarchical organization, extensive use of rules, multiple clearam:es, and long approval routes. Coordination across organizational boundaries and functional subsystems is partict:larly complex and difficult.

In the US the conduct and coupling of R&D take place under different operating conditions.The vertical relationship between organizations and plans for S&T activities is abbreviated because there are few steps in the chain of command between the setting of goals and the performance of R&D. Further, there

306 Is little coordination by the governmentbetween the determination of goals and objectivesfor departments and agencies and production activitiesin the private sector. Private firms competefor R&D contracts from government agencies and offerservices that compete with those provided by the agenciesthemselves. The actors in American R&D are separateinstitutions, mostly nonhierarchical and relatively autonomous. They act independently and competitively,and come together by agreement in mutualself-interest. Link- age does not occurthrough directives and approvals but on the basis of competition andpluralism. Such cooperation of public and private institutionsis one of the most original characteristics ofthe American science and technology enterprise. These systemic differences underlyingthe architecture of linkage, in turn,shape attitudes of R&D personnel. In the USSR innovation by orderand top down planning and management causesR&D performers as well as their supervisory ministries tolook upward. They are oriented primarily to pleasingtheir own administrative superiors in the hierarchy. Since they are not concerned withthe distribution and use of their results, producers allalong the innovation chain are not output-oriented. They are, on the contrary, keenly concerned withinputs on the supply side because this is where major uncertaintiesand problems in innovation lie in the Soviet system. Furthermore, the emphasis on functionalspecialization and organizational separation tends to directthe vision of individuals and management bodiestoward separate efforts rather than the overall enterprise. As a result the whole S&T establishmentis inward-looking. Each performer takes a narrowview of his responsibilities, tasks, and interests. In the American milieu of ahighly consumer-oriented society generally and withmarket pull a major driving force for successfulinnovation, R&D performers are orientedoutward, to satisfying their customers. Competition for customers on thebasis of price and quality makes output and useimportant considera- 307 tions. Supply is generally nota problem. Abundant resources are usually available, given sufficient capital. Rather, attention is directedto the demand side where in the American setting thebasic uncertainties and risks are lodged. Individual and inst- tutional actors focus on environmentalexternalities that may stimulate or constrain innovation,especially SST activities beyond theirown in-house efforts that may pose new opportunitiesor competitive threats. Given these divergent orientations, R&D personnel maintain different patterns ofcommunication and interaction. In the USSR functional performers tendto be separate from each otherorganizationally and spa- tially. The predominantly verticalstructure of decision making inhibits lateral interaction. Working contact between R&D specialists anduser or client groups is weak. The later links of the innovation chain--the introduction and debugging ofnew technology--are in particular poorly developed.Throughout there is little real interplay, much lessteam play, to integrate individual efforts. Self-sufficiency rather than cooperation is the goal. The accent in American R&D ison direct interaction and interdependence among major performers.Continuing communication among the various participantspromotes mutual understanding, trust, andacceptance. Though the "not-invented-here" sentiment exists, it isnot so pervasive an attitude as it seems to be in the So- viet system. In the US personnel also movemore both within and among the differentsectors of academe, industry, and government. Close contact between generators and use-s of research is another important feature. Indu.try particularly stresses linkagenot just in R&D but also between R&D and manufacturing, marketing, sales, and services. These connections help assure the viability ofnew products and processes. Some firms organize R&D to involve theuser early in the development of innovations and clients also participate at critical po-!.nts. Good will and good customer relations, it is said, domore for technological utilization than almost anything.

308 Taken together these features point todifferent approaches to technology transfer. In the USSR communication takes primarily theform of the transmission of documents and routingof information through formal administrative channels. The main interactions are between functionalperformers and higher ministry authorities who serve as administrativegatekeepers at critical transfer: points. The whole activity chain moves through differentlinks and stages by hierarchical referral and bureaucratic relay. In general, the research-to-production cycle is not an integrated or integrating process. In the American framework emphasisis on person- to-person contact rather thanreliance upon printed information and communication through amiddleman. Informal and oral sources providekey communications about both needs and technicalopportunities. Bridg- ing roles are played by"technological gatekeepers," "market gatekeepers," and"manufacturing gatekeepers," all of whom provide informationabout environmental conditions that can influence theflow of action. This close linkage allows scientists andengineers to cooperate in shaping technical programsand an information base. Feedback from the market plays aself- correcti,ig role and keeps R&Dresponsive to the user. This brings us to the questionof technology utilization and delivery mechanisms. These mechanisms differ between the private and governmentsectors in the US. The federal government, despiteits large investment in R&D, does not take anactive role in R&D diffusion and has not, with a fewnotable exceptions, been effective in promoting it. Diffusion is largely the province of the private sector. Most federal agencies do not have explicitpolicies or special programs for promotingtechnology transfer. Those that do usually fall short of theutilization stage. Among the mechanisms used by federalagencies the mostcom- monand expensive are the S&Tinformationdissemina- tionservices. They are also judged to havethe lowest impact, reflectingthe general ineffectivenessof written communication as a meansof technology transfer in the American setting. The most successful ap- 309

3'''aft" LP proach, on the other hand, has been the highly active Agricultural Extension Service where fieldagents know well the local users and serve, in effect,as salespeople for new technology. All these governmental programs encourage research utilization only after the R&D results have beengen- erated. Most effective industrA...1 approaches to technology utilization, however, begin much earlier in the innovation process. Industry itlso provides an integrated and coordinated system from conceptualization to commercialization that does not exist in the governmental sector. Indeed such an approach is used in the public sector only in areas like defenseor space when the federal government both creates and defines the market and is the principal customer itself. Even here, however, systems planning and management isnot always efficient or economical.

The practical translation of R&D results isone of the most deficient areas of S&T policy in the USSR. Traditionally, Soviet economic policy has minimized investment in an experimental base and scientific instruments industry in favor of investment in on-line production facilities. The development sector, the crucial intermediary between research and production, tends to be neglected. The share of expenditures on development and engineering applications has beenon- ly about two-thirds that in the United States. Asa result there continues to be a scarcity of experimental facilities to develop and test prototypes. In general, the vital interfaces in the transfer process have not been explicitly and effectively structured or linked. The utilization of R&D has fallen outside the bounds of both science planning and production planning. Innovation or the introduction stage has not been an organic part of the system of planning and administration. There is no special purpose organization charged with managing diffusion in the Soviet Union. For the most part, extensive--but ineffective--S&T information storage and retrieval systems have been relied on. These services, which 310 11 4 are managed andcoordinated centrally, befit tne general pattern of Soviet communications. Since the late 1960s Kremlin authoritieshave shifted from passive mechanisms to moreactive strategies of technology transfer to enhanceindustrial research utilization. Adopting a process view of innovation, they have established newinstitutional arrangements and organizationalforms that seek to span and integrate the multiple participantsand stages in the innovation cycle. The development of research complexes along the lines of some Americanindustrial research parks has been emphasized in thebelief that the desired benefits of cross-fertilization,sharing of facilities and interdisciplinary cooperation are better achieved through such close association. Dif- ferent types of research complexes haveevolved, including (1) formal incorporation of research,design, and production facilities in singleorganizations, such as the production andscience-production associations, and (2) more recently, geographiccolloca- tion of R&D facilities. The creation of special organizations concerned wich the introductionof new technology is less well advanced. Forms of project management and matrix organizationused in American R&D are, however, being modified and triedin the So- viet context.

SELECTION OF S&T GOALS AND EVALUATION OF RESULTS

In the United States majorgoals (problems) need- ing S&T solutions are selected not as aformal planning activity but through acomplex political-economic process that is notwell understood or economically efficient. No formal procedure or timeschedule exists for such selection, no onebody to establish goals and to measure results. Both the Executive and Legislative branches have identifiedsuch major goals as space exploration, cancerresearch, improved environmental protection, and energyresearch and devel- 311 opment. In general, the mission agencies ofgovern- ment have assumed responsibility and authority for recognizing scientific opportunities and for steward- ship. Given the decentralized nature of American R&D neither the selection of topics nor the allocation of funds is a simple process in government. The fragmentation of structure and competence mediates against comprehensive policy planning and analysis. In the US the budget processrepresents the clos- est thing in government to a systematic effortat resource planning, program evaluation, and integration. But it is a highly imperfect tool. There is no special budget or special budgetprocess to integrate R&D into a broad S&T policyor national goals. Rather, the budget is prepared and judgedon a departmental basis; the total federal R&D budget is largelyan after-the-fact-summary of the R&D budgets requested by each agency and justified in terms of theirseparate missions. The multitude of agencies in she Executive Branch concerned with S&T matters is matched bya multitude of committees in Congress that sharere- sponsibility for budgetary analysis and appropriation. This pluralistic method of budgeting for R&D makes difficult the formulation of policies and coordination of activities across traditional governmentsectors and independent agency lines. Although some efforts are made--largely by the OMB and, toa lesser extent, by the OSTP ---to ensure priorities and balance in S&T programs, no integrative mechanism draws science policy toward a rational approach to problems of choice, of costs and benefits, of needs andopportu- nities. To be sure, the need is generally recognized for some central focus and oversight toensure greater consistency and coordination among plans and agen- cies_ Rem, rdless of how compelling thecase seems for more systematic S&T planning and evaluation, however, the basic fact remains that such a planning and analysis function does not fit easily into the pluralistic form and competitive ethos of Americangovern- ment with its fundamental emphasis on political advo- cacy, bargaining, and compromise in reaching public ) r 312 decisions. The capability for such policyanalysis and integrated systems managementexists only in exceptional instances where the nationhas been galv.i- nized towards a single goal orwhere a single national project has the general consentof the populace. For the most part, decisions are madepiecemeal. Throughout the process there is considerableconfu- sion and disagreement, but the nation acceptsthese inefficiencies and imbalances as the cost ofdiversi- ty and of decision makingthat values open markets, adversarial relations, and consensusbuilding in public policy. In the Soviet Union the planning of R&Dis highly structured in a top down manner. Mostimportant S&T goals are formally identified andselected. Current- ly, this list consists ofapproximately 200 major problems. The solutions to these problems aresched- uled over periods of from c'ne tothree five-year in- crements and are incorporatedinto the macroeconomic plans for the USSR as a whole. Not only do plans specify general objectives, but theyalso detail all measures necessary forthe attainment of goals,such as requisite resourcesand their interrelationship, experimental design, assignments for outputand technology transfer, construction of newfacilities. In addition, the mechanisms for planexpression and en- forcement, such as indicators, norms,standards, and incentives, are similar at alllevels and in principle are mutually reinforcing andinternally consistent. In the USSR, then, the wholestructure of hierarchical relationships is designed tointegrate the various activities of differentunits around centrally determined general goals. Thus, in principle at least, the Soviet system offers greatpotential for comprehensive planning, coherentanalysis, and balancing assessments in S&Tpolicies. In practice, however, Soviet R&Dplanning suffers from serious deficiencies. Someof these result from the inherent uncertaintiesand unpredictability of innovation itself. Othersare deeplyrooted, however, in Soviet organization andprocedure. Though highly 313 centralized, policy planning and analysis is heavily compartmentalized not only in vertical branch ministries but also in the numerous special functional agencies. The innovation cycle is fractured in time, task, and territory. The basis of planning, financing, and management is still primarily the functional- institutional performer rather thanprograms, projects, and work stages. Furthermore, SST planning is also separate from and insufficiently coordinated with the planning of production. Much as in the US, therefore, it is difficult for central S&T policy makers in the USSRto exert integrating influence upon a basically pluralistic administrative structure. The heavy chalk marks which delineate different bureaucratic subsystems and institutional domains are not easily erased. To be sure, there are more deliberate attempts than in the USat overall priority-setting, program assessment, andco- ordination. But the capabilities of the GKNT--the main balancing wheel of the Soviet S&T mechanism--and other functional agencies to analyze and evaluate alternative program goals, costs, and benefitsarc constrained at every turn. They frequently lack the authority and means to perform their integrating functions. Given the nature of their overlapping and shared responsibilities for R&D planning andmanagement, the state committees are often forced to seek the approval of and accommodate themselves to various ministries, departments, and other state committees, not to mention Party agencies. As a result they perform a continuous and difficult balancing act in which national goals and priorities are reconciled with the special interests of the numerous organizations that conduct the national R&D effort. The Soviet planning process, then, like the Ameri- can budget process is salted with bureaucratic rival- ries. Though calls are periodically heard to strengthen the integrative capabilities of the GKNT, there is still little inclination to give the State Committee or any other body the clout necessary to forge coherent, focused programs across ministerial and depart- 314 NW n rt t ip i 0 0 O i l 0 0 r t It 0 rt 42 rtg 2.111r151 ID1 : 11 Tog H." r g 0. gl Pi'to 000P(Dt/H1101-401-40 0I I-h 64 M :3' H. g 040(104Ortitm04 0 0 rt 0 0 00 8 Rrg 01 gi8. 1-1 0001-1 H. 4 mmnOma. 0 M fro 0 ei s g u) H. M (D f0 4H. M H. 1-.1 0 H M rt It 0 0 rt 04 ri, co 4 li n (i) o n 4 0().."0 00P0 .-10004 00 tr 1-i,1-h V 1-1. rt H,MOCIAm(101-ii-im 01-JhtOt '4MOOOMNIIPJ14MHOM V11 1--:iii 8 °'`IJ.H. I-4 N a 0H. P FJ...4 0 ta. n 4. 74 ot)H. 0 11 0006000011 10(1mq:1(1)00i-1 IA 0) 4 rtCia t4 t4ta. 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In the United States several specialized planning (e.g., PPBS) and project management (e.g., PERT and CPM) methods came into use during the 1960s. They were designed primarily for large development programs in aerospace and defense-related fields--that is, in sectors which operate much like command economies. The magnitude.and complexity of these programa demanded sophisticated and high-capacity management control systems. Although only the largest companies and the military use PERT techniques and only on the most complex projects, systems thinking is a prominent feature of the research management environment in general in the United States. The inherent uncertainties in R&D and the difficulties of trying to quantify social benefits, however, generally rule out the application of highly quantitative systems planning and management techniques.

In the USSR a similar systems movement burgeoned in the 1970s. The demand for techniques which view projects in a total systems perspective began to be clearly felt as the regime launched a number of crash development programs to speed technological innovation. Formal program-type planning methods appeared along the lines of PERT and other sophisticated Amer- ican models. These techniques were developed, in particular, for application in the complex interbranch S &T programs ,f national priority, which previously suffered from faulty systems planning and management, and to improve management effectiveness in general.

Such sophisticated planning and control techniques are compatible with the Soviet predilection for highly structured activities. Used for some time in the defense sector, such methods have not generally been applied in civilian R&D which is constrained by the structural and administrative fragmentation of the research-to-production cycle. Formal procedures for multiagency planning, financing, and management are still confined largely to the interbranch programs and complex projects, although a few ministries have

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At issue in both systems is the problem of balancing the risks and rewards associated with innovation. The balance rests on profits tied to the market in the American setting and bonuses tied to plan fulfillment in the Soviet. Both company profits and enterprise bonuses vary with general organizational performance, as do the rewards to management. Hence, Soviet industrial managers tend to maximize bonuses as their American counterparts maximize profits. In neither country is the management reward structure attuned to the pace of innovation. Both American and Soviet management work with a short time horizon, and each tends to fall into a profit,NOW and bonus-NOW syndrome. Ori- entation to product4on means that innovation consists largely in the adoption of less risky, small size cost-reducing processes rather than the creation of basically new products.Moreover, the problems of innovation in both countries lie not so much in internal management as in relations with outside organizations, principally with suppliers in the Soviet Union and with customers in the United States.

On the whole, the balance of risk and reward in the USSR still tends to work against innovation. Al-

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H4-9 0"0(1) 141 *5 cuci 4.J c to I' I' '01.,c i " j 1 )'ws io8 04 u 8 li Ili' i H. s4 q u to NCO 0 W 4 4 >, al 1:ita.4rapzi H 4-1 4.) U, H 0 0 0a 00 El H Q) ' fJ LI" `) h) ' Iti) 'H 1.4' 4 0 ai 44aiRI 14 r-120 4 >1 4)VI 0 0 g .r44J41' °0 t 44 3:Atti i Sol0li 498 2J)18 fi 2 8 A 1-4 0 44 U AIRI .r.4iJ 1-1 ,0-1 4 0) In neither system, however, are present mechanisms well suited to solve contemporary S&T problems. Each nation has evolved over the years a relatively settled division of responsibility among an array of special administrative agencies and separate performing institutions. But the problems and the solutions in science policy today cut across established boundaries. Effective problem- solving requires a high level of coordination and cooperation. The multiple participants in the innovation process need closer relations that still recognize their distinct roles. The creation and administration of such linkages, it turn, demand of both systems a new level of management and of imagination.

Though both nations are beset by the mounting complexity of S&T problems, the nature and source of complexity differ in the two systems as do their evolving institutional responses to overcome the new barriers. In the United States both the public and the private sectors--and their interaction--are growing more complex. This complexity acquires added significance as science policy focuses increasingly on solutions of domestic civil sector problems, requiring a more diverse and less centralized approach than military and space problems. The role of the federal government and of industry in public technology and methods for stimulating innovation to improve the quality and efficiency of public services are unclear. In particular, government regulation has grown as a national concern. The proliferating dezands and standards imposed by government and the costs of regulation are beginning to inhibit seriously both university research and industrial innovation. Reform efforts are underway to rationalize the whole regulatory process and to make regulation itself cost-effective by introducingand requiring economic analysis and attention to costs in regulation. Underpinning regulatory revision is the need for new approaches to achieving a better balance between risk and benefit. Nonethe- less, basic knowledge about the factors involved is still weak, and there is no agreement about how to measure the costs and benefits associated with this new set of S&T problems.

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I 1 1 1 o I 0 (0 rD 1 1-11 H I'd 1 H '5' 1 rt n I I losophy, property relations, and socialvalues. These factors tend to rule out certain practicesaltogether and circumscribe the, possibilitiesof change. It is evident, however, that improvedunderstanding in each country of the other country's approaches isvaluable in its own right and creates theopportunity for each to benefit from the other's experienceand collective knowledge of its citizenry.And with greater mutual understanding it may be possible forboth giants to cooperate in solving some of their mutualtransnation- al problems through science andtechnology.

331 e u_ s_ covERrumiErrr PRIMINGOFFICE 1960327-927/6532