ie--k /33,/ DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HISTORICAL DIVISION
AN AIRBORNE PANZER CORPS
MS* B-628 Genit. Schmalz
bili$ Docurnet,, 11111111Palasn loading Big&Bar" (File N. _ Date - -- '16
GERMAN REPORT SERIES 4.0 SCHMALZ Summary
FS PZ CORPS HERMANN GOERING
AN ORGANIZATIONAL STUDY
In January 1943, Genit Schmalz was detailed to Pz Div Hermann Goering as instructor. He found an organization of elite volunteers which Luftwaffe officers were clumsily attempting tot.;lansform into a panzer division. As a result of Schmalz's advice and endeavors,. the table of organization of a standard panzer division was adopted and the proportion of soldiers trained in ground operations gradually increased. In the spring of 1944, he assumed command of the Division and a few months later began expanding it into a panzer corps.
Throughout his experience with the Hermann Goering organization, 'Schmalz was plagued with one major handicap: although his unit was a part of the Luftwaffe, its equipment was supplied by the Beer (Army) and it was employed in regular ground combat rather than as an airborne force. As a result, Genit Schmalz had to retrain his Luftwaffe personnel and to struggle continuously with supply agencies of the Heer. Despite these conditions and the fact that his unit was in action in Poland and East Prussia during the period of expansion, he had a panzer division and a panzer grenadier division ready for action at the beginning of the Russian offensive in January 1945.
FS Pz Corps Hermann Goering embodied a number of unusual organizational features. In order to enable division commanders to give their undivided attention to tactical mat ters, Corps assumed all supply responsibility. Corps troops included an antiaircraft regiment and a "shock" battalion; the latter was formed in order to eliminate the necessity of weakening the divisions in order to provide a corps-reserve.
Although the circumstances and events of the last year of World War II kept the Germans from actually forming and using an airborne armored force, Schmalz is convinced that, in modern warfare, airborne tanks must be landed early in the formation of any strategic airhead ia-nd that, once landed, they must be used in mass.
s/ KARL W. LILLGE let Lt Inf Historical Editor MS # B-628
Title FS Pz Corps Hermann Goering; An Organizational Study
Author Genit Schmalz, Wilhelm
Position Cmdr, FS Pz Div Hermann Goering Cmdr, FS Pz Corps Hermann Goering
Date of MS 14 Jul 47
Place HDIE, Neustadt, Germany
Prepared for Capt F. C. Mahin & Capt. J. F. Scoggin Jr.
:Translator Mrs A. J. Edwards
-2 Preface
FS PZ gORPS HERMANN GOERING
AN ORGANIZATIONAL STUDY
MS # B-628 was prepared by Genit Wilhelm Schmalz at the Historical Division Interrogation Enclosure, Neustadt, Germany. The study was written from memory, without the aid of documents or other former German officers.
In order to improve the coherence and readability of Schmalz's manu script, the editor has changed slightly the author's order of arrangement and has translated certain obscure and vague passages rather freely. FS PZ CORPS HERMANN GOERING
AN ORGANIZATIONAL STUDY
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Pag_e
I. Organization and Development . .. • 0 .. • • 4 • • •• 5
II.. Practicality of the Organization ..a • • • • • ... 12
III. ,Employment of an Airborne Panzer Force a . • .... . 13
Appendices MS # 8-628
I. Organization and Development
1. In Jan 43, I was detailed by. the Heer (Army) to Pz Div Hermann Goering
as instructor. I can report very little, from personal experience, about the
initial formation of this Division. From the conversation of long-time mem
bers of the unit, the following picture has remained in my. memory: In 1934
a Wach (Guard) Bn Hermann Goering was formed from members of the police, and
in 1938 the Battalion was reorganized into an antiaircraft regiment and a
guard battalion. Replacements for these units had to be volunteers, at least
168 am (5 ft 6 in) in height; have a clean record, and possess good vision
without glasses. Membership in the National Socialist Party was immaterial.
Large numbers volunteered from the existing unit when the first parachute
troops were activated. The antiaircraft regiment, with elements of the guard
battalion, probably saw action for the first time in Russia, in 1941, and re
turned to the zone of the interior in the winter of that year. Elements were
committed in Africa in 1942.
2. When I arrived in Jan 43, I was informed that a panzer division was
to be organized from those elements which had not gone to Africa, and from
new volunteers. I found a planned organization (App 1) devised by. Luftwaffe
officers at their own discretion and bearing little resemblance to the organi
zation of a panzer division of the Heer (fcrmy). It was an impracticable plan.
• One had to decide whether to create a panzer division or an infantry division
with armored elements. In the event of the adoption of the first solution,
it was necessary to concentrate on tanks supported by infantry mounted on
.armored vehicles. If the second plan were selected, the infantry would need MS # 8-628
no armored vehicles. The planned organization was, therefore, illogical:
nine infantry battalions mounted on armored vehicles was excessive for two
tank battalions. Furthermore, the Heer furnished all armored material,
including artillery. Since panzer divisions of the Heer had only two tank
battalions and four infantry. battalions (and only one infantry battalion
was mounted on armored vehicles, it was inconceivable that the Heer woUld
equip nine armored infantry. battalions. I made the following recommendations,
based on many years of experience in peace as well as war, to the Division
Commander:
a. The Division shotild continue recruiting volunteers.
b. The Heer should be requested to furnish experienced
officers and noncommissioned officers of the Panzerwaffe (Armored Command)
as instructors and leaders.
. The Heer should be requested to continue furnishing equip
ment to the Division.
d. The Division should be re-formed in accordance with the
organization of a panzer division of the Heer. (See App. 2)
3. These recommendations had the following results:
a. Up to 20,000 men were recruited annually at the rate of
approximately 1,500 per month. This figure proved to be a basis for all
plans until the end of the war.
b. It was impossible to properly organize, train, and lead
a panzer division, with the available Luftwaffe officers and noncommissioned
officers because they had no practical knowledge of grolind.warfare. As a MS # B-628
result of consultations with the Heeres-Personal-Amt (Army. Personnel Office),
we managed to obtain a-large number of officers and nonccimmissioned officers,
who were selected from panzer divisions in exchange for unsuitable personnel.
Luftwaffe personnel, transferred to the Heer during this exchange, were
assigned to panzer divisions for training.
c. All weapons and equipment, except antiaircraft guns,
were furnished by the Heer.
d. The table of organization of a standard panzer division
was adopted and further strengthened by an antiaircraft regiment of three
battalions; this organization proved effective throughout the entire war.
4. Initial organization and training of the Division was carried out
at training areas in Germany and in southern France. The reason for the
activation of this Division remained unknown to me.
Training was to have been completed in Apr 43; however, two
panzer grenadier (armored infantry) battalions and the pionier (engineer)
battalion were suddenly dispatched to Tunis by air, without motor vehicles
and before they had been completely trained. The assembly of the division
as an integral unit became highly questionable. To replace the departed
battalions, new recruits were trained immediately at a training area in
Germany. During the summer of 1943, troops of the Division were assembled from all corners of the Reich and transferred to the vicinity of Naples, Italy,
where the units of company level and above were fully tr'ained. New recruits
were now concentrated in the replacement and training regiment, some parts
of which were located in Holland and others in Berlin. (See App 5.)
-7 MS # B-628
At that time the division was also charged with the mission of sending replacements to Vlach (Guard) Bn Goering and to an antiaircraft regiment which was responsible for the protection of Hitlerts Headquarters. Thus, the entire personnel situation was under the control of the Division, but material and tactical employment were controlled by. the Heer.
5. The division was assigned to the Fallschirm Armee * when the latter was activatedin 1944, but the assignment was qualified by the provision that the status of the. Division's volunteers should remain essentially un changed. The tactical employment of the Division.remained under the control of the Heer. The FS Army, therefore, exercised supervision chiefly in matters of discipline, military justice, awards and decorations, and promotions0 kp the time of subordination to the FS Army, the plan arose to train the members of Pz Div Hermann Goering as parachutists and to transport the heavy weapons in large airplanes; this plan, however, was not carried out because of in adequate gasoline supplies for training.
6. I assumed command of the Division in the spring of 1944 and in
October of that year I received orders to expand the Division into a panzer corps, in accordance with my own ideas. (See App 3.) My first proposal, the formation of two panzer divisions from the existing unit, was impracticable
Eds By 1944, the ratio of Fallschirm-Truppen ("parachute" troops) to Luftlande-Truppen ("air-landing" troops) had become espeolally high in the Wehrmacht. Fallschirm-Truppen were a part of the Luftwaffe, and the FS Army initially functioned as an Airborne Command. Although the FS Army became responsible for a sector on the Western Front in Sep 44, it continued to perform at least some of its former training, organizational, materiel, and administrative functions for many months thereafter.
-8 MS # B-628
because of the lack of tanks. A compromise was reached by creating a panzer division and a panzer grenadier (motorized) division. additional personnel was obtained by the addition of an FS regiment, personnel from the Luftwaffe
•,•• (including two signal battalions), and a medium artillery. battalion (Heer).
A corps staff, two divisional staffs, and the new regimental staffs were organized from the existing divisional staff and regimental staffs.
The old Division supplied cadres for the new'regiments.
7. The accomplishment of this expansion was made exceedingly difficult during the period Oct - Nov 44: the Division saw action in Poland, near
Tilsit (to which it was suddenly transported by rail), and near Gumbinnen in East Prussia (where it engaged in an offensive). By the time these battles were concluded in Nov 44, final accomplishment of the project seemed questionable because of the heavy casualties incurred during the fighting.
Replacement personnel and equipment arrived slowly. Transferred Luftwaffe officers and noncommissioned officers and troops, who had had no previous experience in ground warfare, received practi6a1 combat training °either in their own units or in training sclwols" in the FS Army area. Despite all the handicaps encountered, both divisions were ready for action at the outset of the Russian offensive in Jan 45.
8. As a result of long experience in warfare, I had made the divisions essentially stronger th?in'normally. The Corps was in direct control of a corps Ishock" battalion and a corps engineer battalion0 & panzer fuesilisr battalion, envisaged as a reserve, was assigned directly to each division.
A plan to increase each panzer grenadier regiment from two battalions to M # B-628
three was not accomplished because of the lack of time. The antiaircraft regiment, augmented to four battalions, was placed under the direct command
of the Corps, in order that it might be committed at the point of main effort.
9. The entire supply organization was detached from the divisions and
placed directly. under Corps, which. assumed all supply responsibility. The purpose of this measure was to 'release division commanders from the routine task of supply and to enable them to give their undivided attention to the tactical direction of their units. The effectiveness of relieving the divisions of supply problems prayed itself during the course of subsequent fighting. Divisional staffs became smaller and, consequently, more flexible.
The division supply officer routed all his requisitions directly to the Corps
Quartiermeisterabteilung (supply and administrative staff group), which was able to plan its work more effectively, since all supply trucks were at its disposal.
10. The corps "shock ti (assault-gun) battalion was formed in order to eliminate the necessity of weakening the divisions in order to provide a corps reserve. Each division commander, therefore, could expect to have. his entire unit available for the performance of all his missions. This battalion was to be expecially trained for raids and surprise thrusts and for cooperation with tanks.
The corps engineer battalion was to be supplied first
of all with heavy bridge equipment, but this plan was not carried out.
It was to complete tasks begun by division engineer battalions, in order that the latter might provide continuous support to the advancing elements MS # 13-628
of their divisions.
The corps tan14 (Mk VI, "Tiger") battalion was earmarked for commitment at the point of main effort.
The Corps Arzt (chief medical officer) controlled four medical battalions. One battalion, including specialists of all kinds, set up a stationary field hospital in which casualties could be treated until the time of their recovery. In combat, a battalion was attached to each division to operate field hospitals and forward aid stations. One batta lion remained in reserve for relief purposes or for the preparatory or ganization of alternate sites.
11. Concerning the organization of the Corps, one additional fact remains to be emphasized: the plan to organize two panzer divisions could not be effected because of the shortage of materiel.
II. Practicalf the
12. My practical experience forces me to challenge the right of this unit, so characteristically a part of the Heer (Army), to exist in the Luft waffe.
a. Because of its nature, the unit could have been employed and administered more effectively by the Heer than it was by the Luftwaffe
b. The absorption of excellent volunteers by the Hermann
Goering units deprived the Heer of a large number of badly needed officer type personnel.
c. The constant battles with supply agencies of the Heer for
weapons of all kinds would have been avoided if the unit had been a part
of the Heer. As matters were, equipient was issued reluctantly; tanks and
-11 MS # B-628 self-propelled assault guns were particularly hard to obtain.
13. I would have been in favor of the organization if the plan of the FS Army had materialized; this plan envisaged use of the panzer divi sion, and later the_panzer corps, as a parachute and airlanding force.
Once an airborne force has been landed, its operations are always handi capped by its lack of heavy weapons, especially tanks. An airborne army with an armored command at its disposal is an operational force with enormous possibilities. I consider it unnecessary to go into further details on this point, because modern armies will study these questions from all angles.
III EulammL2Lan_AlEborne Panzer Force
14. Studies made in 1944 concerning the formation of a real Allopy panzer division (See App 4) led me to the following conclusions:
a. In a major strategic commitment of parachute and air-landing troops, it is essential that the airborne force, once landed, be able to hold its own and to retain some freedom of action. Typical objectives of such major operations are oil fields; centers of war industry, main lines of communication, etc.
b. Whether the airborne force is defending or attacking, enemy reaction will become progressively stronger from day to day; the enemy will employ all possible weapons, including tanks. 1The amount of time
p4uired for the link-up between the ground front and the airhead varies with the size of the operation. The forces in the airhead, however, must not be left to fight a hopeless battle until the link-up occurs. In modern warfare, however, it is impracticable to hold out without tanks, and ag gressive strategic action without them is unthinkable.
-12 MS # B-628 •
c. Obviously, air superiority and a sufficient number of trans
port aircraft are prerequisites for a large airborne operation. I consider it more important to mention that the supply of ammunition and rations must be continuous after the initial commitment. The standardization of ammuni tion is important. Thus, there should be no caliber variations in in fantry ammunition and no fluctuations in caliber among the tanks, rocket
projectors, mortars, and antiaircraft artillery. Despite standardization, there will inevitably be plenty of different types of ammunition.
150 I had established the following landing schedule for the commit ment of an airborne panzer division:
First Wave: All nine parachute battalions, accompanied by their machine guns, mortars, and engineers.
The division operations staff • (parachutists).
Second Wave: The armored battalions of the three regiments.
Armored vehicles mount 20 mm antiaircraft guns which are useable against both ground and fte1 targets,
The signal battalion and the remainder of the division staff.
Third Wave: The tanks, which provide both active and passive antitank defense, as well as armored artillery.
Fourth Wave: Antiaircraft artillery (rocket projectors)
Fifth Wave: Field artillery (rocket projectors)
Sixth Waves Engineer battalion and medical battalion.
The first wave is a parachute wave; all others are airlanding waves. The second through the sixth waves include supplies of ammunition.
16. The landing schedule above is based on the assumption that a MS # B-628
single division is to be used. When all elements of the division have landed, the division commander will reorganize his forces for the main effort on the basis of the general situation, form a reserve, and -- above all endeavor to regain command control of his tank regiment. The well- known cry of the infantry for tanks should not cause the division command to relent, and dibsipate the shock, defensive, and fighting power of its most important weapon. The tactical employment of the tank regiment must be constantly under division control.
17. The circumstances and events of the last year of the War pre vented materialization of plans for training such an airborne panzer division. Appendices
FS P'Z CORPS HERMANN GOERING
AN ORGANIZATIONAL STUDY
MS # B-628
App 1 Pz Div Hermann Goering Planned Organization : Jan 43
App 2 : Pz Div Hermann Goering : Actual Organization Spring 43
App FS Pz Corps Herman Goering : Organization Oct 44 App 4 : FS Pz Div : Proposed Organization
App 5 ; Replacement and Training Organization RESTRICTED
MS B — 620: APP I
PZ DIV HERMANN GOERING PLANUNG Faa NEUAUf5TELLUNG Pt 41 . ••: . .;. • • r V • PLANNED ORGANIZATION Uu &epioCI Hal:a .JAN 43
r.;
3 ( - ) 2 (P1 -Irk) ( - Trk _t› .1111.116..
[ It.S71
I t 9 a tFo IF=1.1 trlit
CED ATaE3 t,et •t. (ALL ORGANIC ELMS OM izo Oben Iti r2 A , *Niul t. t si SP iv En
rr e 77 ' Ti W47. it4.vo i 4.reo It4o • A 4 .4 A
16Et1'IiI131±1 tiqJ 6It 5W 4Et! ,t21 e TS SP •4 Ts o 6 re SP •4.ISO 4-4110 44r30
Rcn (.4LL ORGANIC ELMS AITI) COM9Hq rj
6*Hv 51±1Ron 41tAT 3 Sct C IIa pi4gfp \ %V,NA 118'1 ••• Ic _t \t`i AID (1 0 PO 44MbJH.71' P1 it]
III FLAA. ;:tu7 I Br Mtz Flame ffi 3EtiMta Rod II S lip Thrower"' go.) ill U3_ , II, 2 , r) is t r cts..x.r!. ,Ati (ALL ORGANICELMSkW) - 4 r3,1 • xis r.4 4 , :..,...../ 4 4 4 • • 9 •.P.. • ..0 ..a.
).SAN. - ABT 1 Kq 11;) lig Heti ) riiilj tz ra4 gp l° Corn Corn Corn ,IT lr, 17,7 IT,
v±; cf-51 2 If;)t 1,141"--1.• 1, Iry ir, 17". 1,12 IT, IT, IT, tr, w"0 (7;1' S 16 a 24_24 _26 12--,--D. I PAM 15122 14 13It 121t 10 9rki PI/ 122 4E? 312S1 2122 'Pit try crir r-er 9Fii' cro•, 17 xi, _fritosp 9.120sp #:- 4' w 4413 11.--1011P 41 so 4 6 83 4111 4I in 4 4 se _. 10-14, SP •._12$ 4 4,IC 4411 - • OVADRUPL( NTS) zi. QUADRUPLE NTS) XX 15.74 CD (ALL ORGANIC ELMS AITI)
(ALL ORGANIC ELMS WI)
7 6O 25O Work St% Arnb MBIN _O_ 1;!)Water 7
.•• GOO 00 2NOM 28 24:13Trit 301-11Trk 2MAmb MIN Butcherya Water 20 I 7 kto linWater ••• A PO lbEti .1( 3MArnb 3Et3F tiosp Bkryln 4pFuel ATAL4 6(4 3c1. Et] PREPARED BY EUCOM HD °NCB (LOAD CAPACITY EACH LIGHT rRucle COLUMN- 56 LONG TONS) LEGEND: (FROM A CHART BY ENLT iry.5:ALZ)1 (0)- Hv VehIcle Rep APPROVED BY:!'' 0 (b)-AA Guns SP Work Sh • RESTRICTED RESTRICTED
M 13— 628: APP PZ ,DIV HERMANN G1ERING ACTUAL ORGANI:ATION •. SPRING 43 i); •.: . • , .: 2 k)i• • Mop
••
Mtz 14751
Mtz II5Mtz (H—TrIt) —s ett I HChrDg1 trta sikHlt 4da $t) 4123P441kgdin tab liarigab
.SUMMEF 43 rtil(ALL ORGANIC ELMS MT%) 3....s.4.I. '• - SP Din I,. 124150 31:AP , ,o,4- •104tio ssis isT 15 $ 4 ifile0 !OP° . 4090
3ww
C!3Mtz PI NAI SluCti Cin pi pi:rt AST Wcts III BT SUMMER 4.3 w/f'5%LI(,t I WtEANL/Uf T
1111 FLAK-CO ABT. Etkoz gmt. Arr AllilAGE WI! imou.,E I
,( wvia of
7 PREPARED BY EUCOM :OHGE3 (FROM A CHART BY GINO' SCVALZ) APPROVED BY://* dr..‹E`p,..."0/11 RESTRICTED # B-628: APP 3 ES PZ CORPS HERMANN GOERING o.Rc/wg4i7oNdu... ME_ASINSS, , ORGANIZATION GlIEDERUNGDESTALL5CHIP1 PANZER sHOwIr IN GREEN WERE_PLANNED, SLIT NOT(rfEGTED_ 8EC4uSE OCT 44 /MAPS HERK6ORIII6" OF MArprqa SRORTAGES OA '444 • fli.G114.11 PIM PLAtediVe;1C41W/q&., Ala NAN &EL./rm. mnitrieha tilaCIferif,a0lierWEALDEN, F K IGEFr
t,...•.:•'• :a _•• .5 -,,A., ••
Pr,
411
"SUPPLY" UNITS 8 FOUR MED 8NS AS SHOWN //V APP 1 .•;81 ;;;‘,.;0, I
Pr/ FUESILIEROMtz
1
2 Mtz 1 kltz
tI Mtz H-Irk) IletMtz FA I -Irk)
In d
131[:_tiSP 1
I RcntSct C .1 gjk41. -3r_ Ct) MK rir S1 u P.• CifSCH PAPatifIZ iri7terIER Ot41-1-3.K. [13i I !1P24 560 MK it'kutHER" 56,<> 7% 1 F ReptiMtz H-Trk rf E5 1 flit:I-ERSATZ BIL rP, 2.CM wa emiutr_Jewt Cr?."6, COS MAT4R1E siTowges _PREVENTED 77.1E SECOND vilsres HAkiNg _THE SAAle ,ORG)ItigATiosie AS THE F/R,S77 gONNTif sva-tvaie ck, a toverm. it.v Agit_ A PICHT Dther4V7* 2. c.cwartar. wretEN. (ALL ORGANIC ELMS mrz) .° -A8T - E1L.
FUESILIER
A02
EP2 Ft.DERSATZ STLIRMGelCti P .- ENTL. 2 tBTL.2 AV.2 n[n
2 F Remit! 2 Rcn Sct C 2 ti PREPARED BY EUCOM : HD: OHGB (FROM A CHART BY GENLT !plIAA APPROVED BY:/lv`3 97-5/. "---=RESTRICTED RESTRICTED
MS*B - 628. APP 4 FS PZ DIV GEDACHTE 6LIEDERUNG EMU FALLSCHIRM-Pil NZER DIVISION PROPOSED ORGANIZATION
[IMAGE 4 XX
3(H-Trk) 2(H-Trk) I(H-Irk)
itUPt PANTfriE14 IN GA:SS ARTILLERY: LONG FIL,62fUGEN Sf61EQN RANGE ROCKET 71. Nth? AUS WERFEQN aESTMENO, 111 (ALL TANKS TO OE MIT 6ROSSEN SCHUSSWEITEN.AIS ZUG- PROJECTORS TRANSPORTED IN min& KETTENKODER MANNSCHAff.521.1 PANE MOVERS: HALF-TRACK FUR MUNI7..ON 2 RADWARQEN MOTOR LARGE AIIMAIES CrCLES8 MANPOWER 8 GLIDERS) AMMUNITION TRANSPORT: TWO-WHEEL CARTS 560 MK 31 fit .
So 56 5o Itt 0MK 560MK It 560 WV 560 MK
SAN.-- ABT. P1.-BTL
If et.u67EtIo&N • SUAEIZN (n2DE TRANSPORTED IN AIRPLAAES a GLIDERS)
frEA 'PEA?, 7AV7N.CPOk'T IN ANT/AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY:ROCKETPROJECTORS fit/62E4;6E1i ..-.c.'6!" 75. Nif 44'71. le 04.";ii'I PRIME MOVERS: SIMILAR TO THOSE OF FIEZD RUC 61'02. 1:1111,721.'6E.Y )tQJPT ARTILLERY PIP R61. /)/fIct;) 2C/6117CH 6161.v 1l'C.72.'t.i. I8N HAS LIGHT ANTIAIRCRAFT GUNS ;it I moutvreo av ARMORED VEHICLES: THESE GUNS ARE flEADILY USABLE PREPARED BY EUCOM: HD: OH G B AGAINST BOTH GROUND 8 AERIAL (FROM A CHART BY ,cENtrT S All). TARGETS APPROVED BY:14e0P MS1-628 APP 5
*PERFORMS LIAISOAI BETWEEN REPLACEMENT HERMAN GOERING UNITS AND I RECRUITING OFFICES(FOR VOWNr(ERS) 13 TRAINING ERSATZ uNDAUSBILDUNGS RGT. 2. OFFICE OF DEPENDENCY BENEFITS BIS SEPTEAldEQ 1944 3. PROCUCEMENT AGENCIES FOR ORGANIZATION WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT 4 OThER BERLIN AGENCIES UNTIL SEP 44
ILLIRepi.6 Trig (Mtz) IpI F 1 ARTI. Pz- tsT.GIS° °GUN. ° c. 1 FLAK. GREN. !3, Tanks r i P2 SPAriWG 1 NA- 1.13. F Arty SP Assault One Co nm. nittz & AAA Guns of this en Sct & Arrnd C is o Sig Co VON DIE UNMMELBAR 6E1EatT UNDER DIRECT CONTROL OF PI DIV HERMANN GOERING FkEIPI/11/ofN.RVA.nii..i. STELLI. VERCf.s-/Q Berlin Driver Trtginmtz BEHOQDEN. VERSOA:te 4Vs Rtli L5i Uft bNo NM. VERB K DR. FT FAHPER TEDBLitDINER. RESctob BERLIN C/A6 YON ifA11f.V* GEPAT. A058ILDLING
AFTER SEP 44 E.p, BRIGADE owl a Tng
2. ! 11111
tRI & Trig Rep' & Tng .1011111' M 11°' P2.- 00 uE5Ct1. OREN. GREN. PZ-S 1J.-GE.S.cH OPEN I GREN. Tanks h W8 INA. Kr>. vz..-SPAtiw6 110. NA. SP Guns F Arty[n One Co ,g1M12 Mta Sct & & MA of this an I I ARTL. PI Armd C FLAK. I I ARTL. PI is a Sig Co ,FlAk UNDER DIRECT CONTROL OF FS PI.CORPS HERMANN eCERAVG VON kOPPSCNI-IIITEIBR Berlin Ln * Driver TngEnkitz GEL1.'TEr 00 VERB.KDR. KRAFT FAHRER BERLIN p AUSBILDuNG
PREPARED BY EUCOM HO:OHO& (FROM A CHART BY_JEfit.T SC 2) APPROVED 114:Pre! b>4!0 ,xXig
48 8500 • COMBINED ARMS RESEARCH LIBRARY FORT LEAVENWORTH,KS 1 1 11 1 1 11 1 1 II I I 3 169500587 2924 l.
..
. . RES7RIIC7D
ERESREIC==ED