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ie--k /33,/ DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HISTORICAL DIVISION AN AIRBORNE PANZER CORPS MS* B-628 Genit. Schmalz bili$ Docurnet,, 11111111Palasn loading Big&Bar" (File N. _ Date - -- ­ '16 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 4.0 SCHMALZ Summary FS PZ CORPS HERMANN GOERING AN ORGANIZATIONAL STUDY In January 1943, Genit Schmalz was detailed to Pz Div Hermann Goering as instructor. He found an organization of elite volunteers which Luftwaffe officers were clumsily attempting tot.;lansform into a panzer division. As a result of Schmalz's advice and endeavors,. the table of organization of a standard panzer division was adopted and the proportion of soldiers trained in ground operations gradually increased. In the spring of 1944, he assumed command of the Division and a few months later began expanding it into a panzer corps. Throughout his experience with the Hermann Goering organization, 'Schmalz was plagued with one major handicap: although his unit was a part of the Luftwaffe, its equipment was supplied by the Beer (Army) and it was employed in regular ground combat rather than as an airborne force. As a result, Genit Schmalz had to retrain his Luftwaffe personnel and to struggle continuously with supply agencies of the Heer. Despite these conditions and the fact that his unit was in action in Poland and East Prussia during the period of expansion, he had a panzer division and a panzer grenadier division ready for action at the beginning of the Russian offensive in January 1945. FS Pz Corps Hermann Goering embodied a number of unusual organizational features. In order to enable division commanders to give their undivided attention to tactical mat ters, Corps assumed all supply responsibility. Corps troops included an antiaircraft regiment and a "shock" battalion; the latter was formed in order to eliminate the necessity of weakening the divisions in order to provide a corps-reserve. Although the circumstances and events of the last year of World War II kept the Germans from actually forming and using an airborne armored force, Schmalz is convinced that, in modern warfare, airborne tanks must be landed early in the formation of any strategic airhead ia-nd that, once landed, they must be used in mass. s/ KARL W. LILLGE let Lt Inf Historical Editor MS # B-628 Title FS Pz Corps Hermann Goering; An Organizational Study Author Genit Schmalz, Wilhelm Position Cmdr, FS Pz Div Hermann Goering Cmdr, FS Pz Corps Hermann Goering Date of MS 14 Jul 47 Place HDIE, Neustadt, Germany Prepared for Capt F. C. Mahin & Capt. J. F. Scoggin Jr. :Translator Mrs A. J. Edwards -2­ Preface FS PZ gORPS HERMANN GOERING AN ORGANIZATIONAL STUDY MS # B-628 was prepared by Genit Wilhelm Schmalz at the Historical Division Interrogation Enclosure, Neustadt, Germany. The study was written from memory, without the aid of documents or other former German officers. In order to improve the coherence and readability of Schmalz's manu­ script, the editor has changed slightly the author's order of arrangement and has translated certain obscure and vague passages rather freely. FS PZ CORPS HERMANN GOERING AN ORGANIZATIONAL STUDY TABLE OF CONTENTS Pag_e I. Organization and Development . .. • 0 .. • • 4 • • •• 5 II.. Practicality of the Organization ..a • • • • • ... 12 III. ,Employment of an Airborne Panzer Force a . • .... 13 Appendices MS # 8-628 I. Organization and Development 1. In Jan 43, I was detailed by. the Heer (Army) to Pz Div Hermann Goering as instructor. I can report very little, from personal experience, about the initial formation of this Division. From the conversation of long-time mem­ bers of the unit, the following picture has remained in my. memory: In 1934 a Wach (Guard) Bn Hermann Goering was formed from members of the police, and in 1938 the Battalion was reorganized into an antiaircraft regiment and a guard battalion. Replacements for these units had to be volunteers, at least 168 am (5 ft 6 in) in height; have a clean record, and possess good vision without glasses. Membership in the National Socialist Party was immaterial. Large numbers volunteered from the existing unit when the first parachute troops were activated. The antiaircraft regiment, with elements of the guard battalion, probably saw action for the first time in Russia, in 1941, and re­ turned to the zone of the interior in the winter of that year. Elements were committed in Africa in 1942. 2. When I arrived in Jan 43, I was informed that a panzer division was to be organized from those elements which had not gone to Africa, and from new volunteers. I found a planned organization (App 1) devised by. Luftwaffe officers at their own discretion and bearing little resemblance to the organi­ zation of a panzer division of the Heer (fcrmy). It was an impracticable plan. • One had to decide whether to create a panzer division or an infantry division with armored elements. In the event of the adoption of the first solution, it was necessary to concentrate on tanks supported by infantry mounted on .armored vehicles. If the second plan were selected, the infantry would need MS # 8-628 no armored vehicles. The planned organization was, therefore, illogical: nine infantry battalions mounted on armored vehicles was excessive for two tank battalions. Furthermore, the Heer furnished all armored material, including artillery. Since panzer divisions of the Heer had only two tank battalions and four infantry. battalions (and only one infantry battalion was mounted on armored vehicles, it was inconceivable that the Heer woUld equip nine armored infantry. battalions. I made the following recommendations, based on many years of experience in peace as well as war, to the Division Commander: a. The Division shotild continue recruiting volunteers. b. The Heer should be requested to furnish experienced officers and noncommissioned officers of the Panzerwaffe (Armored Command) as instructors and leaders. The Heer should be requested to continue furnishing equip­ ment to the Division. d. The Division should be re-formed in accordance with the organization of a panzer division of the Heer. (See App. 2) 3. These recommendations had the following results: a. Up to 20,000 men were recruited annually at the rate of approximately 1,500 per month. This figure proved to be a basis for all plans until the end of the war. b. It was impossible to properly organize, train, and lead a panzer division, with the available Luftwaffe officers and noncommissioned officers because they had no practical knowledge of grolind.warfare. As a MS # B-628 result of consultations with the Heeres-Personal-Amt (Army. Personnel Office), we managed to obtain a-large number of officers and nonccimmissioned officers, who were selected from panzer divisions in exchange for unsuitable personnel. Luftwaffe personnel, transferred to the Heer during this exchange, were assigned to panzer divisions for training. c. All weapons and equipment, except antiaircraft guns, were furnished by the Heer. d. The table of organization of a standard panzer division was adopted and further strengthened by an antiaircraft regiment of three battalions; this organization proved effective throughout the entire war. 4. Initial organization and training of the Division was carried out at training areas in Germany and in southern France. The reason for the activation of this Division remained unknown to me. Training was to have been completed in Apr 43; however, two panzer grenadier (armored infantry) battalions and the pionier (engineer) battalion were suddenly dispatched to Tunis by air, without motor vehicles and before they had been completely trained. The assembly of the division as an integral unit became highly questionable. To replace the departed battalions, new recruits were trained immediately at a training area in Germany. During the summer of 1943, troops of the Division were assembled from all corners of the Reich and transferred to the vicinity of Naples, Italy, where the units of company level and above were fully tr'ained. New recruits were now concentrated in the replacement and training regiment, some parts of which were located in Holland and others in Berlin. (See App 5.) -7­ MS # B-628 At that time the division was also charged with the mission of sending replacements to Vlach (Guard) Bn Goering and to an antiaircraft regiment which was responsible for the protection of Hitlerts Headquarters. Thus, the entire personnel situation was under the control of the Division, but material and tactical employment were controlled by. the Heer. 5. The division was assigned to the Fallschirm Armee * when the latter was activatedin 1944, but the assignment was qualified by the provision that the status of the. Division's volunteers should remain essentially un­ changed. The tactical employment of the Division.remained under the control of the Heer. The FS Army, therefore, exercised supervision chiefly in matters of discipline, military justice, awards and decorations, and promotions0 kp the time of subordination to the FS Army, the plan arose to train the members of Pz Div Hermann Goering as parachutists and to transport the heavy weapons in large airplanes; this plan, however, was not carried out because of in­ adequate gasoline supplies for training. 6. I assumed command of the Division in the spring of 1944 and in October of that year I received orders to expand the Division into a panzer corps, in accordance with my own ideas. (See App 3.) My first proposal, the formation of two panzer divisions from the existing unit, was impracticable Eds By 1944, the ratio of Fallschirm-Truppen ("parachute" troops) to Luftlande-Truppen ("air-landing" troops) had become espeolally high in the Wehrmacht. Fallschirm-Truppen were a part of the Luftwaffe, and the FS Army initially functioned as an Airborne Command. Although the FS Army became responsible for a sector on the Western Front in Sep 44, it continued to perform at least some of its former training, organizational, materiel, and administrative functions for many months thereafter.

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