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Cyber-Digital Task Force Report U.S. Department of Justice REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S CYBER DIGITAL TASK FORCE U. S. Department of Justice Office of the Deputy Attorney General The Deputy Attorney General Washington, D.C. 20530 July 2, 2018 Dear Mr. Attorney General: You have emphasized that "upholding the Constitution and protecting the rule of law is the fo undation ofeverything we do" at the Department ofJustice. Our impo11ant duties include keeping America safe by fighting crime and preserving the Nation' s security. As President Trump has observed, "The United States faces an extraordinarily dangerous world, filled with a wide range ofthreats that have intensified in recent years." Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats explained earlier this year that the cyber threat "is one of[our] greatest concerns and top priorities." The Department ofJustice shares that assessment. Every day, malicious cyber actors target our citizens, our businesses, our military, and all levels ofour government. They cause billions ofdollars in losses and attempt to undermine our democratic values. Combating cybercrime and cyber-enabled threats to our Nation' s security must remain among the Department's highest priorities. In February 2018, you directed the formation ofa Cyber-Digital Task Force to undertake a comprehensive assessment ofthe Department' s work in the cyber area, and to identify how federal law enforcement can even more effectively accomplish its mission in this vital and evolving area. The initial assessment is complete. It is my privilege to present this report ofthe Attorney General's Cyber-Digital Task Force. I hope this report will assist as all Americans keep moving forward to protect our people, promote our economy, and preserve our values. Sincerely, REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S CYBER DIGITAL TASK FORCE United States Department of Justice Ofce of the Deputy Attorney General Cyber-Digital Task Force 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20530 https://www.justice.gov/cyberreport INTRODUCTION Table of Contents Letter from the Deputy Attorney General .............................. i Attorney General’s Cyber-Digital Task Force ...................... vii Introduction ........................................................................................ xi Chapter 1 Countering Malign Foreign Influence Operations ...................... 1 Chapter 2 Categorizing Sophisticated Cyber Schemes .................................... 23 Chapter 3 Detecting, Deterring, and Disrupting Cyber Threats ............... 9 Chapter 4 Responding to Cyber Incidents .............................................................. 83 Chapter Training and Managing Our Workforce .......................................... 95 Chapter 6 Looking Ahead ..............................................................................................109 Appendices Appendix 1: Memorandum Establishing the Task Force .......... 131 Appendix 2: Recent Successful Botnet Disruptions ................. 133 Appendix 3: Recent Successful Dark Web Disruptions ............ 137 Appendix : Glossary of Key Terms .....................................................1 1 v TASK FORCE MEMBERS ATTORNEY GENERAL’S CYBER-DIGITAL TASK FORCE Task Force Members Sujit Raman, Chair Associate Deputy Attorney General Ofce of the Deputy Attorney General John P. Cronan Andrew E. Lelling Assistant Attorney General (Acting) United States Attorney Criminal Division District of Massachusetts John C. Demers David T. Resch Assistant Attorney General Executive Assistant Director National Security Division Federal Bureau of Investigation Carl Ghattas Beth A. Williams Executive Assistant Director Assistant Attorney General Federal Bureau of Investigation Ofce of Legal Policy John M. Gore Peter A. Winn Assistant Attorney General (Acting) Chief Privacy & Civil Liberties Ofcer (Acting) Civil Rights Division Director, Ofce of Privacy & Civil Liberties CYBER-DIGITAL TASK FORCE REPORT Task Force Contributors Matthew J. Sheehan Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General Staf Director Elizabeth Aloi Brendan Groves Erica O’Neil Leonard Bailey Aarash Haghighat Richard Pilger Michael F. Buchwald William Hall Jason Poole Mark Champoux Christopher Hardee Andrew Proia Tomas Dettore Adam Hickey Kimberley Raleigh Richard Downing Ray Hulser Peter Roman Benjamin Fitzpatrick Anitha Ibrahim Opher Shweiki Lindsey Freeman Matthew Kluge Michael Stawasz Tashina Gauhar John T. Lynch, Jr. Andrew Warden Josh Goldfoot Katrina Mulligan J. Brad Wiegmann Bonnie Greenberg Sean Newell Cory Wilson And representatives from: Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives Ofce of Strategic Intelligence & Information Drug Enforcement Administration Ofce of Investigative Technology Federal Bureau of Investigation Counterintelligence Division Federal Bureau of Investigation Counterterrorism Division Federal Bureau of Investigation Criminal Investigative Division Federal Bureau of Investigation Cyber Division Federal Bureau of Investigation Digital Transformation Ofce Federal Bureau of Investigation Information Technology Branch Federal Bureau of Investigation Ofce of Private Sector Federal Bureau of Investigation Ofce of the Chief Information Ofcer Federal Bureau of Investigation Ofce of the Director Federal Bureau of Investigation Ofce of the General Counsel Federal Bureau of Investigation Operational Technology Division INTERPOL Washington, the U.S. National Central Bureau Justice Management Division Ofce of the Chief Information Ofcer/ Cybersecurity Services Staf United States Marshals Service Investigative Operations Division United States Marshals Service Judicial Security Division viii INTRODUCTION Introduction Cyber-enabled attacks are exacting an enormous toll on American busi- nesses, government agencies, and families. Computer intrusions, cy- bercrime schemes, and the covert misuse of digital infrastructure have bankrupted frms, destroyed billions of dollars in investments, and helped hostile foreign governments launch infuence operations de- signed to undermine fundamental American institutions. Te Department of Justice’s primary mission is to keep the American people safe. We play a critical role in the federal government’s shared efort to combat malicious, cyber-enabled threats. n February 2018, the Attorney General policy—grounded in our longstanding prin- established a Cyber-Digital Task Force ciples of political neutrality, adherence to within the Department and directed the the rule of law, and safeguarding the public ITask Force to answer two basic, foundational trust—that governs the disclosure of foreign questions: How is the Department respond- infuence operations. ing to cyber threats? And how can federal law enforcement more efectively accomplish its Chapters 2 and 3 discuss other cyber-enabled mission in this important and rapidly evolv- threats our Nation faces, particularly those ing area? connected with cybercrimes. Tese chapters describe the resources the Department is de- Tis report addresses the frst question. It be- ploying to confront those threats, and how our gins by focusing on one of the most press- eforts further the rule of law in this country ing cyber-enabled threats our Nation faces: and around the world. Chapter 4 focuses on the threat posed by malign foreign infuence a critical aspect of the Department’s mission, operations. Chapter 1 explains what foreign in which the Federal Bureau of Investigation infuence operations are, and how hostile for- plays a lead role: responding to cyber inci- eign actors have used these operations to tar- dents. Chapter 5 then turns the lens inward, get our Nation’s democratic processes, includ- focusing on the Department’s eforts to recruit ing our elections. Tis chapter concludes by and train our own personnel on cyber mat- describing the Department’s protective eforts ters. Finally, the report concludes in Chapter with respect to the upcoming 2018 midterm 6 with thoughts and observations about cer- elections, and announces a new Department tain priority policy matters, and charts a path xi CYBER-DIGITAL TASK FORCE REPORT for the Task Force’s future work. Over the criminals rely upon to penetrate our borders. next few months, the Department will build We use legal authorities to take control of upon this initial report’s fndings, and will virtual infrastructure—such as networks of provide recommendations to the Attorney compromised computers called “botnets”— General for how the Department can even to prevent future victimization. We share in- more efciently manage the growing global formation gathered during our investigations cyber challenge. to help victims protect themselves. And we do all of these things to fght modern threats Te Department’s Cyber Mission while remaining faithful to our Nation’s re- spect for personal freedom, civil liberties, Computer intrusions and attacks are crimes, and the rule of law. and the Department of Justice fghts crime. Tat is true regardless of whether the crimi- Where appropriate, we also work closely nal is a transnational organized crime group, with our interagency partners to support f- a lone hacker, or an ofcer of a foreign mil- nancial, diplomatic, and military measures itary or intelligence organization. In addi- to bring all possible instruments of national tion, the Department has unique and indis- power to bear against cyber threats. Other pensable cybersecurity roles in the realm of departments have the primary responsibil- foreign intelligence and counterintelligence. ity for helping victims recover from cyber- attacks;
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