1. Preliminary Remarks 1. The Questions on Avidyd It is an unquestionable fact that since the dawn of Indian Philosophy the concept of avidyd (ignorance, nescience) has never lost its philosophical significance. There are perhaps two fundamental reasons why its significance has been taken for granted. First, the presupposition of the transmigration of the individual soul has brought about the deliberation of its cause, and accordingly avidyd has been taken to be the direct or indirect cause of bondage that is generally equated with the transmigration. Second, as knowledge or jndna has been the central issue of the philosophy in the sense not merely that it is a direct or indirect means of liberation but also that it is associated with all epistemological problems, so there has been an interest in something other than knowledge, which is nothing but ignorance. With regard to this sort of significance of avidyd, Sankara’s Advaita Vedanta is not an exception, but rather, he develops and systematizes the doctrine of avidyd to the peak. Precisely speaking, there are only two important basic concepts in Sankara’s system—the concept of Brahman {Atman) and that of avidya.^ All other concepts are either related with these two concepts, or made use of with less importance. According to Sankara, Brahman is the only reality and is always identical with Atman, that is the inmost supreme Self. From the empirical point of view It is eternal, pure, intelligent, free by nature, and omniscient and omnipotent, and is the material cause as well as the efficient cause of the world. As far as Brahman is described positively. It is Existence (satya). Knowledge (jndna), and Infinite (ananta)-, as far as the negative language is concerned. It is merely “neti, neti'\ which is said to be Its final description. Since Brahman is only one without a second and is an already established fact, Sankara has to do something to keep on non-dualistic doctrine {advaita)? It is by the employment of the concept of avidyd that Sankara can describe or explain everything else other than Brahman epistemologically, ontologically and soteriologically. If Brahman is self-evident and self-proved Pure Knowledge (jndna). Pure Intelligence (vijndnaghana), or Pure Consciousness (cit), the epistemological error or delusion should be charged off to avidyd, which is intrinsically natural to a cognizer who mutually superimposes the subject and the object. Again, if Brahman is ‘Cf. G. R. Malkani, R. Das, and T. R. V. Murti, Ajndna—Theory of Ignorance, p. 4. Advaita literally stands for “no-two-ness” , and thus, Advaitism should be called Non-dualism (advaitavdda) rather than Monism {aikyavdda). Existence (sat, satya), the supreme Reality {paramartha), or the Truth of truth {satyasya satyam), then the existence of an empirical world should be taken to be the product of avidyd in order to avoid the pluralism. Moreover, if Brahman as Atman is eternally free from bondage and is Freedom Itself {moksa), the state of bondage should be regarded as the false conjured up by avidyd. Therefore, it is really the concept of avidyd that is used as a device of Sankara’s system for showing the illusory nature of all other concepts except Brahman {Atman)} In this regard, it may be questioned if the traditional Advaitins and modern scholars properly and precisely interpret the nature and role of this avidyd as the key-concept of Sankara. The most serious obstacle of clarifying the nature of avidyd in Sankara’s Advaita Vedanta is the general belief that avidyd is the same as mdyd. For all that this presumption hardly has any basis on Sankara’s own statements, it has just been believed without reflection as if Sankara himself directly says that avidyd is mdyd. For the later Advaitins, of course, avidyd has been used synonymously with mdyd while it also preserves its epistemological sense of false knowledge. But as far as Sankara’s own philosophy is concerned, the ground of identification of both terms is anything but convincing, for mdyd as a general term stands for something illusory, or the creative power of God (isvara) unlike avidyd as a technical term. Can it be said that this kind of wrong belief does not affect the precise appreciation of Sankara’s ^Cf. Swami Satchidanandendra Saraswati, Sankara’s Clarification of Certain Veddntic Concepts, p. 63. whole philosophical system, and further that of the Advaita Vedanta? This is not the exclusive example of misbelief on the concept of avidyd, but there is as much a serious example that avidyd is the cause of adhydsa (superimposition). As a matter of fact, this misbelief on the relationship between avidyd and adhydsa is the inevitable result of a conviction that avidyd is the positive entity {bhdvarupa) which possesses two powers of concealment (dvaranasakti) and projection (viksepasakti) suggested by Post-Sankara Advaitins.^ For them, that the non-Self is superimposed on the Self has to be explained by supposing its cause which conceals the true nature of the Self and projects the false non-Self. There is a certain confusion since Sankara does not definitely say that adhydsa has its cause, avidyd, although adhydsa itself somewhat has those two characteristics of concealment and projection. In this way, should there be any other proof for the identification of avidyd and adhydsa, which is distinctly mentioned in the introduction (so-called Adhydsabhdsya) of Sankara’s commentary on the Brahmasutral ^ Therefore, do we need some different approach to explicate the nature of avidyd so that this key-concept of Sankara is understood in its own context within his own works? As is commonly known, Sankara does not make clear statements on such questions as “what is avidydT', “whose is avidyd?”, etc.^ which ‘*The origin of two aspects of avidyd is ascribed to Mandanamisra who is a contemporary of Sanicara. ^Henceforth B S B for the BrahmasHtra-bhasya. ^ h e question of “ whose is avidydT' is that of the locus (dsraya) of avidyd. The later Advaitins completely agree that the object {visaya) of avidyd is Brahman, but with regard to the locus of avidyd there are two different opinions. Mandanamisra and those who belong to Bhamati school (Vacaspatimisra, Prakasananda) are of the have been treated more seriously by the later Advaitins. These questions are the inquiries on the nature and origin of avidyd, and further on its object, locus and proof. Then, why does Sankara not care for these very essential questions no matter what difficulties take place in his system? It cannot be said that he does not know what logical defects there are since there are at least more than three occasions in which he himself makes questions which are exactly the same as the above questions.^ Thus we cannot help but presuppose that Sankara disregards those questions because those are not useful for the realization of the Self. Reasoning or argumentation for him is conducive to the consistent interpretation of the Upanisads, but when it is confronted directly with a matter of liberation he simply rejects it in the form of counter-questions or making the questions null and void in order to show its futility. If it be so, is it reasonable to trace Sankara’s real positions on the nature and role of avidyd without any distinct sources? Regardless of Sankara’s negative attitude on the inquiry of avidyd through reasoning or argumentation, we have some indispensable statements of avidyd by Sankara on which our investigation can firmly set forward. It is a matter of common knowledge that by its etymological implication, avidyd is wrong knowledge or epistemological defect, notwithstanding that it sometimes is endowed with certain ontological features when it is supposed to be primary matter of the universe. Our starting point is, in this regard, based on the firm conviction that as far view that the locus of avidyd is the individual self (/iva), whereas others belonging to Vivarana school insist that it is Brahman. ’See B S B 4.1.3. U SI 2.49; 2.62-65. as Sankara’s own Advaita Vedanta is concerned, avidyd is a pure epistemological concept and not otherwise.* It is an opposite term of knowledge {jndna, vidyd) and is used synonymously with ajndna, adhydsa, mithydjndna, etc. Because of its presence, one falsely regards him as a bounded soul; because of its removal through knowledge one can experience his own true nature that he is always one with Brahman and is liberated. But then, does avidyd function only negatively and become negated at the end for the Self-realization? Of course, avidyd is the object of negation by the true knowledge, but as far as we can tell, it does not always function negatively in Sankara’s system. Though it does not have such functions of concealment and projection as something positively existent, it should have some other positive functions as the key-concept of Sankara. There is a strong possibility that Sankara employs avidyd not merely in the sense of false knowledge but also for the establishment of his own system of non-dualism. In other words, while avidyd preserves its own terminological sense epistemologically, it at the same time contributes for certain ways to the construction of Sankara’s whole system methodologically. This does not mean that avidyd is a methodological concept of Sankara, but rather, that it is used methodologically by keeping on its epistemological sense. The question again arises: why does avidyd have to be interpreted as that which has methodological usage? This question should be *It may be said that Sankara’s starting point is intimated in his Adhydsabhdsya of B S B by declaring the present human condition in the name of adhydsa or avidyd.