1. Preliminary Remarks

1. The Questions on Avidyd

It is an unquestionable fact that since the dawn of Indian

Philosophy the concept of avidyd (ignorance, nescience) has never lost its philosophical significance. There are perhaps two fundamental reasons why its significance has been taken for granted. First, the presupposition of the transmigration of the individual soul has brought about the deliberation of its cause, and accordingly avidyd has been taken to be the direct or indirect cause of bondage that is generally equated with the transmigration. Second, as knowledge or jndna has been the central issue of the philosophy in the sense not merely that it is a direct or indirect means of liberation but also that it is associated with all epistemological problems, so there has been an interest in something other than knowledge, which is nothing but ignorance. With regard to this sort of significance of avidyd, Sankara’s Advaita Vedanta is not an exception, but rather, he develops and systematizes the doctrine of avidyd to the peak. Precisely speaking, there are only two important basic concepts in Sankara’s system—the concept of Brahman {Atman) and that of avidya.^ All other concepts are either related with these two concepts, or made use of with less importance.

According to Sankara, Brahman is the only reality and is always identical with Atman, that is the inmost supreme Self. From the empirical point of view It is eternal, pure, intelligent, free by nature, and omniscient and omnipotent, and is the material cause as well as the efficient cause of the world. As far as Brahman is described positively.

It is Existence (satya). Knowledge (jndna), and Infinite (ananta)-, as far as the negative language is concerned. It is merely “neti, neti'\ which is said to be Its final description. Since Brahman is only one without a second and is an already established fact, Sankara has to do something to keep on non-dualistic doctrine {advaita)? It is by the employment of the concept of avidyd that Sankara can describe or explain everything else other than Brahman epistemologically, ontologically and soteriologically. If Brahman is self-evident and self-proved Pure

Knowledge (jndna). Pure Intelligence (vijndnaghana), or Pure

Consciousness (cit), the epistemological error or delusion should be charged off to avidyd, which is intrinsically natural to a cognizer who mutually superimposes the subject and the object. Again, if Brahman is

‘Cf. G. R. Malkani, R. Das, and T. R. V. Murti, Ajndna—Theory of Ignorance, p. 4. Advaita literally stands for “no-two-ness” , and thus, Advaitism should be called Non-dualism (advaitavdda) rather than Monism {aikyavdda). Existence (sat, satya), the supreme Reality {paramartha), or the Truth of truth {satyasya satyam), then the existence of an empirical world should be taken to be the product of avidyd in order to avoid the pluralism.

Moreover, if Brahman as Atman is eternally free from bondage and is

Freedom Itself {moksa), the state of bondage should be regarded as the false conjured up by avidyd. Therefore, it is really the concept of avidyd that is used as a device of Sankara’s system for showing the illusory nature of all other concepts except Brahman {Atman)} In this regard, it may be questioned if the traditional Advaitins and modern scholars properly and precisely interpret the nature and role of this avidyd as the key-concept of Sankara.

The most serious obstacle of clarifying the nature of avidyd in

Sankara’s Advaita Vedanta is the general belief that avidyd is the same as mdyd. For all that this presumption hardly has any basis on Sankara’s own statements, it has just been believed without reflection as if

Sankara himself directly says that avidyd is mdyd. For the later

Advaitins, of course, avidyd has been used synonymously with mdyd while it also preserves its epistemological sense of false knowledge. But as far as Sankara’s own philosophy is concerned, the ground of identification of both terms is anything but convincing, for mdyd as a general term stands for something illusory, or the creative power of God

(isvara) unlike avidyd as a technical term. Can it be said that this kind of wrong belief does not affect the precise appreciation of Sankara’s

^Cf. Swami Satchidanandendra Saraswati, Sankara’s Clarification of Certain Veddntic Concepts, p. 63. whole philosophical system, and further that of the Advaita Vedanta?

This is not the exclusive example of misbelief on the concept of avidyd, but there is as much a serious example that avidyd is the cause of adhydsa (superimposition). As a matter of fact, this misbelief on the relationship between avidyd and adhydsa is the inevitable result of a conviction that avidyd is the positive entity {bhdvarupa) which possesses two powers of concealment (dvaranasakti) and projection

(viksepasakti) suggested by Post-Sankara Advaitins.^ For them, that the non-Self is superimposed on the Self has to be explained by supposing its cause which conceals the true nature of the Self and projects the false non-Self. There is a certain confusion since Sankara does not definitely say that adhydsa has its cause, avidyd, although adhydsa itself somewhat has those two characteristics of concealment and projection. In this way,

should there be any other proof for the identification of avidyd and adhydsa, which is distinctly mentioned in the introduction (so-called

Adhydsabhdsya) of Sankara’s commentary on the Brahmasutral ^

Therefore, do we need some different approach to explicate the nature of

avidyd so that this key-concept of Sankara is understood in its own context within his own works?

As is commonly known, Sankara does not make clear statements on

such questions as “what is avidydT', “whose is avidyd?”, etc.^ which

‘*The origin of two aspects of avidyd is ascribed to Mandanamisra who is a contemporary of Sanicara. ^Henceforth B S B for the BrahmasHtra-bhasya. ^ h e question of “ whose is avidydT' is that of the locus (dsraya) of avidyd. The later Advaitins completely agree that the object {visaya) of avidyd is Brahman, but with regard to the locus of avidyd there are two different opinions. Mandanamisra and those who belong to Bhamati school (Vacaspatimisra, Prakasananda) are of the have been treated more seriously by the later Advaitins. These questions are the inquiries on the nature and origin of avidyd, and further on its object, locus and proof. Then, why does Sankara not care for these very essential questions no matter what difficulties take place in his system?

It cannot be said that he does not know what logical defects there are since there are at least more than three occasions in which he himself makes questions which are exactly the same as the above questions.^

Thus we cannot help but presuppose that Sankara disregards those questions because those are not useful for the realization of the Self.

Reasoning or argumentation for him is conducive to the consistent interpretation of the Upanisads, but when it is confronted directly with a matter of liberation he simply rejects it in the form of counter-questions or making the questions null and void in order to show its futility. If it be so, is it reasonable to trace Sankara’s real positions on the nature and role of avidyd without any distinct sources?

Regardless of Sankara’s negative attitude on the inquiry of avidyd through reasoning or argumentation, we have some indispensable statements of avidyd by Sankara on which our investigation can firmly set forward. It is a matter of common knowledge that by its etymological implication, avidyd is wrong knowledge or epistemological defect, notwithstanding that it sometimes is endowed with certain ontological features when it is supposed to be primary matter of the universe. Our starting point is, in this regard, based on the firm conviction that as far

view that the locus of avidyd is the individual self (/iva), whereas others belonging to Vivarana school insist that it is Brahman. ’See B S B 4.1.3. U SI 2.49; 2.62-65. as Sankara’s own Advaita Vedanta is concerned, avidyd is a pure epistemological concept and not otherwise.* It is an opposite term of knowledge {jndna, vidyd) and is used synonymously with ajndna, adhydsa, mithydjndna, etc. Because of its presence, one falsely regards him as a bounded soul; because of its removal through knowledge one can experience his own true nature that he is always one with Brahman and is liberated. But then, does avidyd function only negatively and become negated at the end for the Self-realization? Of course, avidyd is the object of negation by the true knowledge, but as far as we can tell, it does not always function negatively in Sankara’s system. Though it does not have such functions of concealment and projection as something positively existent, it should have some other positive functions as the key-concept of Sankara. There is a strong possibility that Sankara employs avidyd not merely in the sense of false knowledge but also for the establishment of his own system of non-dualism. In other words, while avidyd preserves its own terminological sense epistemologically, it at the same time contributes for certain ways to the construction of

Sankara’s whole system methodologically. This does not mean that avidyd is a methodological concept of Sankara, but rather, that it is used methodologically by keeping on its epistemological sense.

The question again arises: why does avidyd have to be interpreted as that which has methodological usage? This question should be

*It may be said that Sankara’s starting point is intimated in his Adhydsabhdsya of B S B by declaring the present human condition in the name of adhydsa or avidyd. Avidyd or adhydsa is “not to be conceived as a cause or a temporal antecedent but as an immanent condition of phenomenal experience.” cf. G. C. Pande, Life and Thought of Sankardcdrya, p. 211. answered in connection with Sankara’s task that he is confronted with in his time. First of all, Sankara’s biggest task may be said to be the reconstruction of the traditional orthodox line of thought that has been handed down from the Upanisads against other philosophical trends like the Samkhya, the Buddhism, and the Mimamsa. Since his tradition is deeply rooted in jndna-kdnda of the Vedas, i.e. the Upanisads, he has to protect it against non-Vedic schools as well as against Vedic-oriented schools. Furthermore, as before Sankara there have already been various positions with regard to the interpretation of the Upanisads themselves, so he has to defend the non-dualistic interpretation against the different trends of interpretation from his own. Within the tradition of the

Upanisads the requirement of the consistent interpretation has led to the various standpoints on the Upanisads, and in the course of time, many sub-schools of the Upanisads have been built up through contact with themselves and other philosophical schools.^ Finally in the age of

Sankara these complicated situations reach the peak, and he has to do something to solve the interpretative conflict and to establish the suitable orthodox system. In this regard Sankara’s task is directed by two strategies: first, he constructs a complete frame based on the

Upanisads through the favorable interpretation, and second, he rules out other possibilities of interpretation as well as other philosophical positions by means of the same frame. These two strategies are

’Cf. Hajime Nakamura, A History of Early Vedanta Philosophy, pp. 108-116. For the various schools of the Advaita Vedanta before Sankara, see Sangam Lai Pandey, Pre-Samkara Advaita Philosophy, pp. 73-243. '“About the Advaitins' protection of the truth Clooney states similar opinion, cf. Francis X. Clooney, S. J., Theology after Vedanta, pp. 88-89. operative mutually and simultaneously, as both are in fact the positive and negative side of the same strategy. To put it in another way, l^ankara’s task is to prove the superiority of the Upanisadic philosophy to the action-oriented MImamsa through the emphasis on knowledge and liberation. Moreover, it is to differentiate his non-dualistic interpretation on the Upanisads from other kinds of interpretation on them through his consistent method and dialectical skill. At any rate, these hermeneutical tasks influence Sankara’s conceptualization and usage of philosophical terminologies, although the latter is also determined by the already supposed frame of the Upanisads. At last, there is the concept of avidyd that can solve at a stretch the problem of constructing the frame and that of destroying what is foreign to the frame.

The basic frame of the Upanisads according to Sankara is the knowledge of the identity between Brahman and Atman which is yet not known through other sources but the Upanisads. In consequence,

Sankara tries to prove the authority of the Upanisads before everything else in order that the frame can have firm ground and support. Here, it is by the logic of avidyd that Sankara’s making of the text'* can be completed. The logic that Sankara employs is related with the subject- matter of the Vedas: the Upanisads deal with the removal of avidya

*’W e use the term “text” only in the sense of the “Upanisads” throughout the whole thesis. Though the most important source for the study of Sankara is B S B which is an interpretation on the text, i.e. the Brahmasutra, it can be safely said that B S B is also an interpretation on the Upanisadic texts, since the Brahmasutra is the culmination of the Upanisadic thoughts and is actually commented by Sankara on the basis of the Upanisadic texts. which is the same as the emergence of knowledge, whereas the

Brdhmana portions of the Vedas the action, which is the result of avidyd.

In other words, while the former is the means of negation of avidyd, the latter cannot but be the product of avidyd. The scripture that has the subject matter of avidyd cannot escape from the charge of being avidyd itself, and accordingly, the counter-scripture that emphasizes the removal of avidyd can have comparatively superior authority. Therefore, the concept of avidyd plays a vital role in Sankara’s establishment of the text, and may be said to be used methodologically. On the other hand, the basic frame of the Upanisads proposed by Sankara needs to be interpreted with consistency, though the Upanisads themselves do not convey any single and uniform philosophical idea unanimously. For this

Sankara as a Mimdmsaka adopts a number of interpretative maxims of the Mimamsa, of which the best instrument is known as the “purport”

{tdtparya). Whether the frame, viz. the knowledge of the identity between Brahman and Atman is accomplished by the purport, or the purport is determined by that frame, it is again by the logic of avidyd that Sankara’s reconciliation of the text is completed through that purport. The logic that Sankara employs is the distinction between what is compatible with the purport and what is not, and the former is treated to be the truth itself'^ and the latter the result of avidyd. By putting

‘^We are employing the term “ truth” in this thesis in two senses: first, it signifies both epistemoiogical and ontological principle in this chapter and chapter 4, The Truth and Avidyd, just as the Sanskrit term sat or satya implies the epistemoiogical truth as well as the ontological reality, and second, it signifies only epistemoiogical truthfulness as opposed to falsity or falsehood in some part of the thesis. However, the second usage of the term, we believe, can also have the implication of the first case in Sankara’s Advaita Vedanta. inconsistent passages of the Upanisads under the scope of avidyd, the text can have perfect authority with harmony, and can be the valid means of the knowledge of Brahman which leads to liberation. Therefore, there is a strong possibility that the concept of avidyd is made use of methodologically in Sankara’s textual interpretation for the presentation of the truth of Brahman.

Apart from these two possible methodological usages of avidyd, there is another instance that avidyd may have that usage with reference to the Self-realization. If the Upanisads cease to be the Upanisads and become false (mithyd) after liberation, this fact implies that even the text itself, which provides the knowledge of Brahman, is finally the product of avidyd. The text can be operative within the realm of avidyd, and this is why it indicates Brahman in negative ways like ''neti, neti”.

All the false ascriptions to Brahman are necessary for the knowledge of

Brahman, and yet those are negated at the end, as Brahman can never be described by words. In this sense it can be said that the Self-realization is possible through false means, i.e. the Upanisads, which is governed by the logic of avidyd. Thus even though avidyd is the object of negation for the realization of Brahman, since the whole process of realization takes place within that avidyd, we may have to say that it is methodologically used with regard to the Self-realization.

Now, how can the epistemological concept of avidyd be extended to the methodological usage? Is this intended by Sankara, or has this happened by the implication of avidyd itself? It is needless to say that the methodological usage of avidyd is originated from the implication of

10 the concept itself and is developed in the process of interpretation by

Sankara. Once avidyd is represented to take charge of all the non-

Brahman factors as is seen in the definition of superimposition, the inquiry on Brahman itself cannot be freed from the tag of avidya.^^ The hermeneutics of liberation starts from avidyd but not from Brahman judged from the point of view of methodology since these two are inescapable natural conditions. But at the same time, the former is the invariable starting point as the present question for the aim of the latter.

The position of Sankara is that we do not know the outside of the text without the text although the truth is outside the text, and similarly, there is no knowledge of Brahman without crossing over the domain of avidyd although Brahman is realized at the moment of the end of avidyd.

Thus it is because of the nature and role of the concept of avidyd that this paradoxical situation is existent centering on Sankara’s hermeneutics of liberation. Brahman is affirmed within avidyd', avidyd is negated after Brahman. Does this “paradox”, if we can call it, have to be solved, or how can it be solved? As long as the paradox of avidyd is at work within avidyd, and it functions for the purpose of actual liberation, it needs not to be solved as the method but should be solved in the end.

The paradox itself is apparent if there is something beyond paradox outside the text as a producer and a remover of the paradox, i.e.

Brahman or Atman, but it still remains at the same place actively and

‘^Superimposition (adhydsa) is defined as “the appearance of something other than itself” , which means the false appearance of the non-Self (non-Brahman) on the Self {Brahman). As the definition of adhydsa or avidyd is placed in the front line of B S B , it may be said to be the tag of interpreter in the process of interpretation.

11 dynamically in the very scope of avidya till the final liberation.

The concept of avidya in Sankara’s Advaita Vedanta is so crucial

and unique that there are no other philosophical models which have

similar characteristics and roles of Sankara’s avidya in India. If any philosophical discourse aims at the knowledge of the reality, or

liberation, then there should be another opposite concept that can explain the non-apprehension of the reality or the cause of bondage.

Almost all Indian philosophers who deal with the concept of avidya

more or less agree that it is either of the obstacle of the true knowledge

or that of liberation. However, Sankara is not satisfied with the

application of avidya to that extent, but drives the concept even to the

paradoxical situation, where the boundary between the truth {Brahman)

and the false {avidya) is mutually and apparently intervened and

intermingled. For him, avidya is in fact the best weapon to criticize and

break up other positions as well as to protect and build up his own side.

On the other hand, the philosophical discourse cannot escape the scope

of avidya, and yet it can be perfected if there is the negation of that

___ t avidya. These are what we want to prove through Sankara’s own works

in the following. We cannot say that critical philosophy is dead and a

speculative one has been revived in India after the disappearance of the

Buddhism and the emergence of the Advaita Vedanta, so far as

Sankara’s philosophy is concerned.'"^ Our examination is how Sankara

‘“'Whaling states that Sankara is not primarily a speculative philosopher but mainly a “ path” philosopher, since his main concern is not to show that moksa is possible, but rather to show how moksa is possible, cf. Frank Whaling, “ Sankara and Buddhism” , Journal of Indian Philosophy, vol. 7, p. 11. Taber also suggests a practical nature of Sankara’s teaching by saying that he is primarily a spiritual

12 can complete the philosophical investigation through the concept of avidyd, and how do we properly understand his heritage through the logic of avidyd.

2. The Fixing of Sources

The study of Sankara’s Advaita Vedanta, like any other study of

Indian Philosophy, has a serious problem of the authorship which cannot be lightly disregarded. If there are disagreements of some philosophical points and difference of terminological usages among Sankara’s works that are traditionally attributed to him, his philosophy cannot be brightly exposed due to the contradiction and inconsistency. The fixing of the limit of sources in the case of Sankara is to trace what he really intends to say, and yet the latter is dependent on the former. Thus there is no other way to determine the authorship of Sankara except the making of the principle standard that is accepted unanimously. In this connection out of three or four hundred works that are said to be authentic, BSB should be the only standard of determination of authorship as the name of Sankara is defined as its author.'^ By the reference of some lists given by modern scholars and by adopting BSB as a criterion of judgment, we will fix the limit of sources as best as we can.

It is S. Dasgupta who first draws up a list of Sankara’s genuine

master intent on leading his disciples to liberation, cf. John Taber, “Reason in Sankara’s Vedanta”, Journal of Indian Philosophy, vol. 9, pp. 300-301. ‘’Cf. Sengaku Mayeda, A Thousand Teachings, p. 6. He first establishes this principle in the critical edition of the Upadesasahasrl.

13 works by confessing that the making of the list is extremely difficult to be absolutely certain. First of all he gives two reasons why such vast numbers of works are attributed to Sankara: first, because there were writers who had the same name, i.e. Sankaracarya, and second, because there was such attribution to Sankara to increase his dignity by later writers. He chooses only those works that have been commented on by other writers, and the list is as follows: the commentaries on the ten

Upanisads (Isa, Kena, Katha, Prasna, Mundaka, Mandukya, Aitareya, f Taittirlya, Chdndogya and Brhaddranyaka), SdrJrakamlmdmsd-bhdsya,

Aparoksdnubhava, Gaudapddiyakdrikd-bhdsya, Atmajfidnopadesa, Eka- sloka, Atmabodha, Atmdndtmaviveka, Atmopadesavidhi, Anandalaharl,

Upadesasdhasri, Cid-dnanda-stava-rdja (Dasaslokl), Drgdrsya- prakarana, Panclkaranaprakriyd, BhagavadgJtd-bhdsya, Laghuvdkya- vrtti, Vdkyavrtti, and Vivekacuddmani. In the case of the

Vivekacuddmani, though there is no available commentary, Dasgupta includes it in the list. His classification of Sankara’s genuine works, however, does not rely on the internal criteria but the external one, i.e. the mere presence of the commentary, and therefore, it is not reliable presentation for the authorship of Sankara. On the other hand, S. K.

Belvalkar founds the philological criteria, though he does not mention in detail, and suggests eleven almost genuine commentaries and five independent treatises: Brahmasutra-bhdsya, Bhagavadgitd-bhdsya, and nine commentaries on the Upanisads (Isd, Kena, Katha, Prasna,

Mundaka, Aitareya, Taittirlya, Chdndogya, and Brhaddranyaka),

‘®Cf. Surendranath Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, vol. II, pp. 77-82.

14 Aparoksdnubhava, Atmabodha, Upadesasdhasrl (only verse part),

Pancikarana, and Sataslokl.^^

Unlike Dasgupta and Belvalkar, Paul Hacker and Sengaku Mayeda employ certain fixed methods to investigate the problem of Sankara’s authorship, namely, the external criterion of nomenclature by Hacker and the internal criterion of agreement of language and contents by both.

Hacker and Mayeda agree with each other about the works of Sankara,’^ and their list is as follows: Brahmasutra-bhdsya, Bhagavadgltd-bhdsya, and ten commentaries on the Upanisads {fsd, Kena, Katha, Prasna,

Mundaka, Mdndukya, Aitareya, Taittirlya, Chdndogya and

Brhaddranyaka), Gaudapddiyakdrikd-bhdsya, Upadesasdhasrl,

Adhydtmapatala, Yogasutrabhdsyavivarana.^^ Compared with the lists of Dasgupta and Belvalkar, Hacker and Mayeda’s list is short, and the inclusion of three works such as Gaudapddiyakdrikd-bhdsya,

Adhydtmapatala, YogasHtrabhdsyavivarana is a specific feature. The completely agreed list by all of them is therefore: BrahmasHtra-bhdsya,

Bhagavadgltd-bhdsya, nine commentaries on iht Upanisads {Isd, Kena,

Katha, Prasna, Mundaka, Aitareya, Taittirlya, Chdndogya and

Brhaddranyaka), and Upadesasdhasrl. However, this list cannot be the final since some works of the list are still debatable, and even outside the list there are several works that might be included in Sankara’s

‘^Cf. S. K. Belvalkar, Vedanta Philosophy, pp. 217-227. ‘^Rather, Mayeda accepts Hacker’s list without any objection. '®Cf. Paul Hacker, “On Sankara and Advaitism” , p. 30; “ Sankara the Yogin and Sankara the Advaitin: Some Observations” , pp. 127-128, Edited by W . Halbfass, Philology and Confrontation—Paul Hacker on Traditional and Modern Vedanta. Sengaku Mayeda, A Thousand Teachings, p. 6. Henceforth, all quotations from Paul Hacker belong to Halbfass’ edition. Philology and Confrontation.

15 genuine works.

The Svetasvataropanisad-bhasya and the Vivekacuddmani have sufficient reason to be rejected, even if the two are traditionally ascribed to Sankara.H acker is of the opinion that the commentary on

f the Svetasvatara Upanisad can hardly be regarded as genuine in its present shape, and it may have been interpolated and remodeled by a later author. We can summarize the reasons for rejecting this commentary; first, it lacks Sankara’s typical style which is seen in the commentaries on the other Upanisads', second, it contains many quotations from various Purdnas like Brahma Purdna, Lihga Purdna,

Visnu Purdna, etc., from which Sankara never quotes in BSB; third, it does not explain many words of the very Upanisadic text unlike the other ten commentaries on the Upanisads', and fourth, it is far different from BSB and other probable works in terminology, style, lucidity, dignity, etc. In the same manner, several scholars point out that the

Vivekacuddmani cannot be ascribed to Sankara, and for example, D.

Ingalls shows: first, this work makes an absolute equation of the waking and dreaming state, to which Sankara is very careful to distinguish them from each other, and second, it accepts the three classical distinctions of the existent (sat), the non-existent (asat), and that which is indescribable (anirvacaniya), in which Sankara is never interested and out of which anirvacanlya is associated with ndmarUpa alone in BSB as

^®Cf. Hacker, “ Sahkaracarya and Sarikarabhagavatpada: Preliminary Remarks Concerning the Authorship Problem” , pp. 45-47. ^'Cf. ibid., p. 50.

16 a characteristic of primary matter of creation. Thus it is hardly intelligible to say that these two works are written by Sankara as they are much different in style and content from BSB and other probable works as well.

The presumption that the Yogasutrabhdsyavivarana is composed by

Sankara has first been known to the academic circle by P. Hacker, though it seems that he insists on it on the ground of another presumption that Sankara was a yogin before his conversion to an

Advaitin. Some scholars such as Frauwallner Festschrift, Hajime

Nakamura, Sengaku Mayeda agree with Hacker, and yet Halbfass and

Wezler are of the opinion that its authorship ascribed to Sankara is mere possibility.^'^ In fact those who believe Sankara’s authorship on it do not provide enough evidences, since their proofs are generally based on the comparison between this text and Upadesasdhasri, Gaudapddiyakdrikd- bhdsya, BhagavadgUd-bhdsya, etc. The point is that if they want to attain unanimous consent on this Yogasutrabhdsyavivarana, they have at least to prove its similitude with BSB, but not with other works that are still on the controversy of authorship. One more point to be added is that if Sankara did compose the Yogasutrabhdsyavivarana, Vacaspatimisra,

^^Cf. Daniel H. H. Ingalls, “The Study of Samkaracarya”, Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, vol. X X X I II , p. 7. It can be added that the VivekacQddmani is a transitional work in the developing advaitic movement which harmonizes knowledge and devotion than it is to see it as a work of Sankara, cf. Robert E. Gussner, “ Sankara’s Crest Jewel of Discrimination: A Stylometric Approach to the Question of Authorship”, Journal of Indian Philosophy, vol. 4, pp. 265-278. “ Cf. Paul Hacker, “ Saiikara the Yogin and Sankara the Advaitin", pp. 101-134. It is two Indian pandits, P. S. Rama Sastri and S. R. Krishnamurti Sastri who say that the Yogasutrabhdsyavivarana belongs to Sankara in its first edition, Madras Government Oriental Series, no. 94, in 1952. ^Cf. Trevor Leggett, Sankara on the Yoga Sutras, pp. 39-41.

17 who is the writer of the sub-commentary on the Vydsa-bhasya to the

Yogasutra, called the Tattvavaisdradl, had to mention something about

Sankara’s work. However, Vacaspati does not say anything about

Sankara to whom he really pays homage in another work of his, the

Bhdmati, and moreover, his interpretation on the Vydsa-bhdsya is completely different from the Yogasutrabhdsyavivarana}^ In this way we are not going to include the Yogasutrabhdsyavivarana in the list of

Sankara for our study, no matter that it has certain degree of possibility to be genuine.

In the case of the Mdndukyopanisad-bhdsya and the GaudapddJya- kdrikd-bhdsya (Agamasdstra-vivarana) Dasgupta, Hacker, and Mayeda^** accept them as genuine, whereas Belvalkar, V. Bhattacharya, Renou, and

R. De Smet do not. About the Mdndukyopanisad-bhdsya, it is generally said that the commentary is somehow more idealistic than the doctrine in

BSD as the commentators who have more idealistic trends have quoted it.^’ So far as BSB is concerned Sankara does not relate the third state, i.e. sleeping state with mdyd unlike the introduction of this commentary on the Mdndukyopanisad, but he usually explains this state for the

S. Rukmani says that the work could have been written between the twelfth and fifteenth centuries by a Sahkarapujyapada, influenced by Vacaspatimisra whom he definitely admired. She also points out its loose style, inclination to scholastic formalism, and the inclusion of the proofs for the existence of Isvara, all of which are unusual in B S B . cf. T. S. Rukmani, Yogasutrabhdsyavivarana of Sankara, vol. I, Introduction, p. xxxi and p. xii. “ Out of three scholars, M ayeda’s investigation on two works is especially noticeable because of his famous comparative philology based on B S B . cf. Sengaku Mayeda, “On the Author of the Mdndukyopanisad- and the Gaudapddiya-bhdsya", The Adyar Library Bulletin, 31-32, pp. 13-94. ^^Cf. Sara Grant, Sahkardcdrya’s Concept of Relation, p. 12^There are in fact two commentaries on the Mdndukyopanisad-bhdsya, by Anandajiiana and Mathuranatha Sukla, and one summary, called MdndHkyopanisad-bhdsydrtha- satngraha. cf. S. Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, vol. II, p. 78.

18 analogy that the individual self is merged into the supreme Self.

Another externally distinguished fact is that Sankara, while he quotes in

BSB innumerable passages from other Upanisads that are traditionally

ascribed to him, never quotes any single passage from the

Mandukyopanisad, for all that he discusses in BSB the topic of three

states more than twenty times. With regard to the Gaudapadlyakarikd-

bhdsya Thomas Wood who doubts the authorship of Gaudapada on the

kdrikds argues that the Gaudapddlyakdrikd-bhdsya or Agamasdstra-

vivarana is not written by Sankara with several reasons. For instance:

first, there are two benedictory stanzas at the beginning and three at the

end, the form which is unusual in the old treatises; second, in the

introduction the Bhdsyakdra reveals a kind of sphota-vdda or sabda-

brahma-vdda which Sankara obviously objects in BSB 1.3.28; and third,

two of the main theses of the last three prakaranas of the Agamasdstra,

namely, (1) there is no real distinction to be drawn between sleeping and

waking, and (2) everything is nothing but the activity or vibration

(spandana) of the mind (vijndna, citta), both of which Sankara criticizes

in BSB putting them as a doctrine of the Buddhist Vijiianavada.

Irrespective of these evidences Woods points out that the ideas of

the Agamasdstra-vivarana are much influenced by the Buddhist thoughts

that are quite contrary to what are seen in BSB. On the other hand, there

are several positive evidences for Sankara’s authorship on this

^®See BSB 1.1.9; 1.4.18; 2.1.6; 2.1.27; 2.3.40; 3.2.7, etc. We can also find this analogy for the most part in BrB and ChB. _ ’Cf. Thomas E. Wood, The Mandukya Upanisad and the Agama Sastra—An Investigation into the Meaning of the Vedanta, pp. 97-100.

19 Gaudapddlyakarikd-bhasya, so we are not in the decisive position that this work is not composed by Sankara.

In the light of all the existing evidences and examinations on

Sankara’s authorship Karl Potter provides a conclusion as follows:

The upshot of the most careful scholarship to date on the works of Samkara, therefore, is that the following may without question be accepted as the work of the author of the Brahmasutrabhasya: the Brhaddranyakopanisadbhdsya, the Taittirlyopanisadbhdsya, and the Upadesasdhasrl. There seems no real reason to question the inclusion of the Aitareyopanisadbhdsya, the Chdndogyopanisadbhdsya, the Mundakopanisadbhdsya, and the Prasnopanisadbhdsya on this list. Beyond this point, however, is only speculation.

Of course, Potter’s presentation is a minimum probable list by the

exclusion of all works that are on the controversy. The first three works

without question are based on the works of Suresvara, a disciple of

Sankara, since he wrote two vivaranas on the Brhaddranyakopanisad­

bhdsya and the Taittirlyopanisadbhdsya respectively, and quoted many

verses from the Upadesasdhasrl in the Naiskarmya-siddhi. The next four

works that have no real reason to question are those commentaries on

the Upanisads, which have almost unanimous agreement in style and

content. The exclusion of Ud, Kena, Katha Upanisad bhdsyas, and

Bhagavadgltd-bhdsya seems to be due to their contents that are not

completely compatible with BSB, and also due to no unanimous

^°Karl H. Potter, Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, vol. ///—Advaita Vedanta up to Samkara and His Pupils, p. 116.

20 judgment as the work of Sankara.

On the problem of Sankara’s authorship, there cannot be a final list with which all scholars can have satisfaction and agreement. Thus we have to fix the limit of sources by ourselves on the basis of reasonable

ground and by the consideration of the theme of study. If we make

advance an extreme argument, the Brhaddranyakopanisad-bhasya would be the only agreeable text with BSB in external criteria and internal ones. However, there would be a compromise in which the fixed texts

are used mainly and other probable texts complimentarily, and

consequently, the main references can be founded on the former and

some extended references on the latter. In this way, we regard Potter’s

minimum list as the most suitable one for our study of avidyd, and put

the limit that some references from out of this list would be contingent

as the necessary supports of the important issue. Therefore, the main

sources of this study are: Brahmasutra-bhasya, Brhaddranyakopanisad-

bhasya, Chdndogyopanisad-bhdsya, Taittirlyopanisad-bhdsya,

Aitareyopanisad-bhdsya, Mundakopanisad-bhdsya, Prasnopanisad-

bhdsya, Upadesa-sdhasrl, and the subsidiary texts for casual references

are: fsopanisad-bhdsya, Kenopanisad-bhdsya, Kathopanisad-bhdsya, and

Bhagavadgltd-bhdsya.

21