TheFall of Kinship ¤ Towards an Epidemiological Explanation

PAULO SOUSA¤¤

ABSTRACT Kinshipused to be describedas what anthropologistsdo. Today, many might wellsay that itiswhat anthropologistsdo not do.One possible explanation is that the notionof kinship fell offanthropology’ s radar dueto the criticisms raisedby Needham and Schneider among others,which supposedlydemonstrated that kinshipis not asoundtheoretical concept. Drawinginspiration from epidemiologicalapproaches to cultural phenomena,this article aimsto enrich thisexplanation. Kinship became an unattractive theoretical conceptin the subcultureof anthropology not simplybecause of problems with kinshiptheory per se,but also on account of fundamental changes in the very conceptionof anthropological knowledgeand the impactof thesechanges on the personalidentity of anthropologists. KEYWORDS Epidemiologyof representations, history ofideas, anthropology, kinship studies.

Introduction Kinshipstudies once played a centralrole in anthropology, contributing fundamentallyto its identity in the contextof the socialsciences (Eriksen &Nielsen 2001;Kuper 1988). Kinship was a domaininvestigated almost exclusively byanthropologists (in comparisonwith other domains such asreligion, economy and politics that were also under the focusof the othersocial sciences). Kinshipwas regarded as the centralorganizing principleof “ primitive”societies, which were likewise the properobject ofanthropological inquiry (in comparisonwith the “modern”societies investigatedby the othersocial sciences). However,kinship studies have

¤Manythanks toMichael Baran, PhoebeEllsworth, Larry Hirschfeld, WebbKeane, NicolaKnight, Brian Malley,Sarah Rigg,Diego Rios, George Rosenwald, Barbara Sarnecka andDan Sperber for their criticisms andsuggestions. ¤¤Candidate,Department ofAnthropology and Culture &Cognitionprogram, University ofMichigan. E-mail: [email protected]. c KoninklijkeBrill NV, Leiden, 2003 Journal of Cognition and Culture 3.4 ° 266 PAULO SOUSA becomemarginalized since the 1970s.Kinship experts have notonly pointedout this decline ofinterest in kinship, but have alsosuggested somefacts that may have contributedto (or at least co-occurredwith) its demise: Anthropology’s loveaffair with kinship has cooledin recent decades ( : : :) This trendhas beenconstrued by some observers as aclear (ifnot relieving) sign that the studyof kinship is deador moribund. Although such views remind oneof Mark Twain’s remark that reportsof his deathhad been greatly exaggerated,they doresonate with twoimportant changes in the status, scope andconstitution of kinship studiesthat have occurredsince the early 1970s.First, theoriesand debates about what were once taken tobe the basic buildingblocks ofkinship (kinship terminologies,so-called rules ofdescent, marriage,and postmarital residence) nolonger occupy their longprivileged positionof centrality within the discourseof anthropology. ( : : :) The second importantchange ( : : :)refers tothe fact that the studyof kinship has been reconstitutedand partially subsumed under other (admittedly problematic andcontested) rubricssuch as social history,legal anthropology, and political anthropology,and ( : : :)feminist anthropology.(Peletz 1995:345) In the last ten toŽ fteen years, anthropologyhas undergonea deŽnite shift away fromtraditional approaches to the studyof kinship, formerly oneof its central concerns. Initially, this was occasionedby statements that there is really nosuch thing as kinship,at least comparativelyspeaking, and that only bygiving our attention almost exclusively toindigenous categories can anything worthwhile besaid on the matter.Later, kinship came tobe subsumedmore and more under studies into gender, personhood, the body, ritualetc. –something reecting this very same anti-formalisttendency. (: : :)quitea numberof anthropologists, refusing to be either seducedor browbeatenby the insistence ofsome oftheir colleaguesthat there isnosuch thing as kinship,have persistedin developingtraditional approaches, with many fruitfulresults. (Parkin 1997:Preface) The majortheorists ofanthropologymade their mark inthe studyof kinship. It seemed moreor less impossibleto imagine what anthropologywould look like withoutkinship. And yet fromthe 1970son, the positionof kinship as aŽeldof study within anthropologyhas been underquestion. ( : : :) It has becomestandard, in works onkinship publishedsince the 1980s,for gender, the body,and personhood to feature prominently in the analysis, while rela- tionshipterminologies are barely referred to, and kinship diagramsscarcely make an appearance.‘ The kinds ofproblems changed.’ (Carsten 2000:2-3) THEFALLOFKINSHIP 267

In thisarticle, I wouldlike toassemble these factsin acoherentexplanatory picture,by delineatingan epidemiologicalexplanation of the fall ofkinship inanthropology. Epidemiologicalapproaches are now an inuential methodological tool amongcognitive anthropologists and other cognitive scientists interested in culturalphenomena (see, e.g.,Atran et al.2001; Bloch & Sperber2002; Boyer 2001;Hirschfeld 1995; McCauley &Lawson2002; Morris et al. 2001;Nichols 2002; Sperber 1996; Strauss & Quinn1997; Whitehouse 2000).1 The general aimis to explain the processof distribution of two classes ofcausallyrelated phenomena: mental factsand public productions. By‘mental facts,’I mean the uxofmental representationssuch as beliefs, ideas,and values insideindividual minds, which are deployed by the processesof perception, reasoning and judgment. By ‘publicproductions,’ Imean the variousexternal productionsof the mindsuch as behaviors, artifactsand, more speciŽ cally, publicrepresentations (e.g., utterances, imagesin a painting,writings in a book),which constitute the interactions individualshave witheach otherand are part of the environment. Currentepidemiological studies have focusedmainly onwhy certain mental representations(and their public productions) become and remain widespreadand important. 2 Yet,inasmuch as the general explanandum is the processof distribution, the epidemiologicalrationale may beapplied mutatis mutandis toexplain why certainmental representations(and their publicproductions) cease tobe widespread and important. Thus, following thisreversal ofmotif, my goalis to explain why the ideaof kinship becameand remained an unsoundtheoretical concept in the mindsof many anthropologists,with the consequentdecrease of public productions suchas lectures, colloquia, articles and books about kinship. Toidentify the causalfactors that made the conceptof kinship unattractiveand show how they areinterrelated is the maintask ofan epidemiologicalexplanation in this case. One mainfactor emphasized by

1In denyingthat imitationis the fundamentalmechanism ofcultural transmission,these epidemiologicalapproaches should not becon ated with amemetic approach– neither in the meme-as-virus,nor in the meme-as-gene version.For a criticism ofmemetics, see Sperber1996 (Chapter 5),2000. For an overviewof traditional memetic versions,and a new proposal,see Aunger 2002. 2Beingimportant here shouldbe interpreted in terms ofClaudia Strauss’ s notionof socialdominance (see Strauss 2000). 268 PAULO SOUSA the authorsquoted above is the skepticalreappraisal of the basiccon- ceptualframework that supported kinship studies. I describethe criticisms involved inthis reappraisal in the next section.The authorsalso allude toalterations in the general view ofanthropological knowledge as another factor(“ anti-formalisttendency,” “ the kindsof problems have changed”). In the followingsection, I characterizethe epistemologicalshift that is mostrelevant toexplain the fall ofkinship. In the Žnal section,I formu- late the epidemiologicalexplanation by addressing how these twofactors areconnected, and by integrating into the explanationsome additional factshighlighted above as well (e.g.,the dilutionof kinship themes into otherareas of research, and the exaggeratedclaims of decreased interest inkinship).

TheSkeptical Dilemma Duringthe 1960s,skepticisms concerning the foundationof kinship theories startedto popup. These criticisms,which heightened duringthe seventies, raiseddoubts about the very possibilityof the existence ofkinship theory. In thissection, focusing on the possibledemarcations of the basiccontent ofkinship as a theoreticalconcept in anthropology, I describethe main argumentsput forward by two in uential “ kinshipskeptics” – the British anthropologistRodney Needham andthe Americananthropologist David Schneider.3 Morgan,the fatherof kinship studies, conceptualized kinship with an explicitreference toagenealogicalgrid deŽ ned in biologicalterms: Asystem ofconsanguinity, which is foundedupon a community ofblood, is butthe formalexpression andrecognition of these [family]relationships. Aroundevery personthere is acircle orgroup of kindred of which such personis the center, andthe Ego,from whom the degreeof the relationship is reckoned andto whom the relationshipitself returns. Abovehim arehis father andmother and their ascendants, belowhim arehis children and

3Forthe sakeof concision, I’ ll neglect oneaspect they havein common that reinforces their criticisms –bothNeedham and Schneider tend toassume a globalapproach to the semanticsof kinship terms in the sensethat they reject adivisionbetween the primary (kinship)meanings of relationship terminologies and other derivativeor metaphorical meanings.See Needham (1974), Schneider (1976,1980), and also Leach (1958, 1967) foranother versionof thissemantic position. THEFALLOFKINSHIP 269

their descendants; while oneither sideare his brothersand sisters andtheir descendants andthe brothersand sisters ofhis father andof his mother and their descendants as well as amuch greaternumber of collateral relatives descended fromcommon ancestors still moreremote. A formalarrangement ofthe moreimmediate blood kindred into lines ofdescent, with the adoption ofsome methodto distinguish one relative fromanother and to express the valueof the relationship,would be one of the earliest acts ofhuman intelligence. (Morgan1871: 10)

Butfrom the turnof the centuryon, more and more anthropologists startedto follow the Durkheimianargument that kinship is nothing if notsocial (Durkheim 1898), thus downplaying a link tobiology. This more sociologicalorientation is well exempliŽed by Radcliffe-Brown’s deŽnition:

Two persons whoare kin arerelated in oneor two ways: either oneis descended fromthe other,or they areboth descended froma common ancestor. It is tobe remembered that ‘descent’here refers tothe social relationshipof parents andchildren, notto the physical relation.Kinship is thus basedon descent, andwhat Žrst determines the character ofa kinship system is the way in which descent is recognized andreckoned. (Radcliffe- Brown1950: 13)

By the beginningof the sixties,it became clear though that there was somemuddle in thisgeneral divisionbetween the biologicaland the social aspectsof kinship.A debatethat occurred in the Journal Philosophyof Science betweenthe years of1957 and 1963, among Ernest Gellner (see Gellner 1957,1960, 1963), Rodney Needham (see Needham 1960),and John Barnes (see Barnes 1961,1964) elucidated the issue.Gellner, inattempting toshow how kinship could illustrate an ideallanguage in the sense ofearly- twentieth-centuryanalytic philosophers, conceived kinship as axiomatically boundto a biologicalgrounding. Needham repliedthat Gellner confused biologicaland social relationships, and that the socialaspects are the ones relevant foran anthropologist.Barnes enteredthe discussionclaiming that three differentaspects should be set apart:the truegenetic genealogical relations(the real biologicalfacts), the culturallypostulated genealogical relations(folkbiological ideas about human reproduction), and the social normsthat regulate kinship social relations (e.g., rules of inheritance, succession,attitude etc.). That these aspectscan be neatly distinguishedis underpinnedby the factthat the genetic father (as the realbiological father), 270 PAULO SOUSA the genitor (as the culturallyconceived biological father), and the pater (as the onewho fulŽ lls the socialrole of father)need notcoincide in the same individual.According to Barnes, while the Žrstaspect is not relevant, the lasttwo are. Gellner’ s rejoinder,accepting Barnes’ distinctions, claims that anthropologistsdo indeed take forgranted biology as deŽ ned within the folkbiologyof theirown culture. Rodney Needham persistedwith his sociological orientation:

Let me simply adoptthe minimalpremise that kinship has todo with the allocationof rights andtheir transmission fromone generation to the next. These rights arenot of any speciŽc kindbut are exceedingly various:they includemost prominently rights ofgroup membership, succession toofŽ ce, inheritance ofproperty, locality ofresidence, typeof occupation, and a great deal else. Theyare all, however, transmissible bymodes which havenothing to dowith thesex or genealogical status oftransmitter or recipient. Certainly theyhave no intrinsic connexion with thefacts, or thecultural idioms, ofprocreation. (Needham 1971:3-4) (Emphasis added)

However,by the beginningof the seventies, he isinterested in questioning the theoreticalvalidity of the conceptof kinship in itself. The main pointof Needham’ s criticismsof kinship studies is that anthropologists hadsuccumbed to an unduecraving for universality. 4 Thiscraving was promptedby anthropologists’ misguided notion of classiŽ cation, namely, the ideathat a conceptdelimits a classof objects that share certain properties,and that this commonality constitutes the essence ofthe objects ofthe class.By attemptingto subsume the variabilityof socialphenomena intoconcepts or typologies whose semantic features are deŽ ning in this essentialist way,anthropologists have, accordingto Needham, bypassed the heterogeneity andcomplexity of sociallife. Take the conceptof marriage, for example. Marriagewas deŽ ned by Leachas an associationbetween men andwomen which is regulated by certainrights such as “ toestablish the legal fatherof a woman’s children, toestablish the legal motherof a man’s children,to give the husband amonopolyin the wife’s sexuality, togive the wifea monopolyin the

4Hiscriticism furthers EdmundLeach’ s previousattempt torethink anthropology(see Leach1961a), and is inspired by the work ofthe “second”Ludwig Wittgenstein (see Wittgenstein1953). THEFALLOFKINSHIP 271 husband’s sexuality, toestablish a jointfund of property – apartnership –forthe beneŽt ofthe childrenof the marriage : : :”(see Leach1961a: 107-108,for the completedeŽ nition). Following Leach, Needham argues thatnone ofthe rightsthat are part of the conceptof marriage exist inall empiricalinstances of what anthropologists call ‘marriage.’For this reason,what may constitutethe commonalityof the variousconcrete cases issimply an ideaof a “contractualunion of sexual statuses”(Needham 1971:7), too vague anotionto describe anything speciŽc tothe domain ofkinship. Therefore, Needham concludesthat ‘ marriage’“ isan odd-job word:very handy inall sortsof descriptive sentences, butworse than misleadingin comparisonand of noreal use at all inanalysis”(1971: 7-8). Asa secondexample, take the categorizationof societies according to principlesof descent. 5 Needham understandsthese principlesas different modesof transmitting rights and duties – e.g.,in patrilineal descent, transmissionon the male line; inmatrilineal descent, on the female line; incognatic descent, on both lines (Needham 1971).Furthermore, forhim these modesof transmission are domain-speciŽ c inthe sense thatin the contextof the same societydifferent types ofrights and dutiescan be allocated following different modes of descent – e.g.,the inheritanceof property being transmitted by a matrilinealprinciple, and groupmembership by a cognaticprinciple (Needham 1971).

5In thispoint, Needham also indicates an aggravatingproblem, viz., the absenceof consensuson what ‘descent’means – “( : : :)awordycon ict ofrival deŽnitions” (Needham 1971:45). There arethree main semanticdimensions that can beused separately or combinedin deŽning the term ‘descent’: (i) Ideologicalconstructs that trace genealogical relationsto common ancestors,and are conceived to be based in oneway or another onfolkbiological ideas about human reproduction– e.g.,patrilineal descent, matrilineal descentand cognatic descent. (Here thingsbecome more complicatedwhen an additional distinctionbetween Ž liationand descent is introduced.); (ii) Social groups whose criterion of identityis normally tiedto the ideologicalconstructs justmentioned – e.g.,matrilineages, patrilineagesand cognatic descent groups. (Here there isalso the further problemof characterizing asocialgroup, in particular acorporatesocial group.); (iii) Jural rules of allocationof rights andduties – e.g.,rules for the inheritance ofproperties or names,and forthe successionto political or ritualofŽ ces. Consonant with hissociological orientation, Needham’s interpretation of‘ descent’disregards the Žrst dimensionand takes group membershipas oneadditional status to be allocated,focusing hence onthe third dimension. Fordiscussions of the notionof descent in anthropology,see Dumont 1971; Fortes 1959; Kuper1982; Rivers 1924; Schef er 1966,1985, 2001b. 272 PAULO SOUSA

Accordingto Needham, anthropologistshad frequently committed a doublemistake inelaborating typologies based on principles of descent.As aformalillustration (Needham 1971),take three differentsocieties (A, B, C),each having three types ofrights or duties [from the set ( p; : : : ; v)] as importantconstituents of their social structure, and suppose r and t were transmittedmatrilineally: A p, q, r B r, s, t C t, u, v Asfar as the transmissionof these rightsand duties is concerned, there is only a“seriallikeness” among these societies– i.e.,A andB aresimilar in relation to r,BandC inrelation to t,andA andC arewholly dissimilar. Yet,and here isthe Žrstmistake, anthropologists tend to arbitrarily elect the modeof transmission of certain rights and duties as the characteristic ofa speciŽc societyconsidered as a whole– e.g.,societies A, BandC each beingnamed a matrilinealsociety, because r and/or t areelected as theircharacteristic mode of transmission. Then, as a secondmistake, the arbitraryclass of matrilineal societies, whose elements includeA, B,and C,isinductivelyestablished. Accordingto Needham, the unduecraving for universality is also reected in the attemptto elaborate simple laws that trace empirical correlationsbetween kinship structure and social structure, and to posit principlesthat could explain the correlationsthus formulated. Since this projectis based on the awedconcepts and typologies just analyzed, it isobvious that it is necessarily doomed:“ ( : : :)ifit is conceded that the socialfacts in question do not necessarily composea conventionalclass ofthis homogeneous kind, but may insteadexhibit an immense arrayof serialand more complex resemblances, then the groundsfor this method ofcomparison and explanation are removed” (Needham 1971:31). Given these types ofproblems, Needham concludesmore generally thatkinship cannot be the objectof a theory:

What informationis given,then, bythe reportthat an institutionhas todo with ‘Kinship’? Nothing,really, aboutsocial facts. Forthe labeldesignates nodistinct typeof phenomena; it provides no clue tocomprehension; and it doesnot indicate the kindof analysis that will beappropriate. ( : : :) there is THEFALLOFKINSHIP 273

nosuch thing as kinship;and it follows that there can beno such thing as kinship theory.(Needham 1971:4-5) DavidSchneider concurs with many ofNeedham’ s conclusions.However, he rejectsthe basison which Needham construesthe problem:he doesnot complywith Needham’ s strictsociological orientation in circumscribingthe contentof kinship. In relationto Barnes, he agrees thatthe folkbiological andthe socialaspects are the relevant ones,but adds that the formerhas priorityover the latter,because any characterizationof a socialaspect of kinshippresupposes a folkbiologicalreference –e.g.,adoption is a kinship relationshiponly when the culturallypostulated biological relationship is implied(Schneider 1965). AsregardsGellner, Schneideronly partlyagrees withhis last suggestion thatanthropologists take forgranted folkbiology as deŽ ned within their ownculture. Accordingly, Schneider argues that anthropologists in general assumethat genealogical relationships are the Žrstcriterion of kinship, as if aversionof Morgan’ s genealogicalgrid were the frameof a universal folkbiology.In particular,he attemptsto show that those of a more sociologicalperspective actually implicitly assumegenealogical relations as the criterionto identify kinship relationships. 6 Onthe otherhand, contrary toGellner, Schneidersees nojustiŽ cation for such an assumption.And thisis not simply due to an ethnocentricfault (a particularfolkbiology beingtaken asuniversal), since Schneider argues that the genealogical assumptionis not even adequateto describe his own culture. In other words,according to Schneider, the genealogicalgrid is not even partof folkAmerican culture.

6It isinteresting tonotice that there isa continuum ofdifferent interpretationsof kinship,as far asthe content ofkinship as an autonomousdimension of social structure is concerned. Somesee it as a broadjural-political dimension (see Needham above), others takeit simplyas a strict domesticdimension (see Fortes 1959), and yet others,like Beattie (1964)and Leach (1961b), argue that kinshipis rather acontentlesslanguage used to talk aboutother dimensionsof social structure –“Tosay ( : : :)that asocialrelationship is akinshipone is to tell usnothing atall of its content. The wholepoint about kinship relationsfor the socialanthropologists is that they mustbe something else, for example, political,jural, economic or ritual.Kinship is the idiomin which certain kindsof political, jural,economic, etc. relations are talked and thought about in certain societies.It isnot a further categoryof socialrelationships ( : : :)”(Beattie1964: 101-110). Even ifSchneider does not mention thiscontinuum, he suggeststhat allanthropologists of the more sociological traditionare subject to his criticism. 274 PAULO SOUSA

In orderto understand the gistof Schneider’s interpretationof Ameri- can“ kinship,”it is necessary toelucidate the type ofcultural analysis that frameshis approach. He distinguishesthe culturalsystem fromthe nor- mative system, each beinga type ofabstract dimension of human actions, and,respectively, the objectof cultural analysis andsociological analysis. 7 The normativesystem comprisesthe socialrules and roles that guide hu- manaction, whereas the culturalsystem ismade up of the symbolsand meaningspresupposed by human actions and the normativesystem:

Bysymbols andmeanings Imean the basic premises which aculture positsfor life:what its units consist in;how those units aredeŽ ned and differentiated; howthey forman integratedorder or classiŽ cation; how the worldis structured;in what partsit consists andon what premises itis conceived toexist, the categoriesand classiŽ cations ofthe variousdomains of the world ofman andhow they relate onewith another,and the worldthat man sees himself livingin. ( : : :)Culturetakes man’s positionvis-à -vis the worldrather than aman’s positionon how toget along in the worldas itis given;it asks “Of what doesthis worldconsist?” where the normativelevel asks, “Given the worldto be made up in the way itis, how doesa man proceedto act in it?”Culture concerns astage,the stage setting,and the cast ofcharacters; the normativesystem consists in the stagedirections for the actors andhow the actors shouldplay their partson the stagethat issoset. (Schneider 1972:38)

Schneideralso argues that there aretwo different levels ofabstraction ofthe culturalsystem, whichgive the rationalefor two different types ofcultural analysis –the pureanalysis andthe conglomerateanalysis. In the purelevel, culturalunits are analyzed distinctlyand independently ofany normativesub-system, that is, any particularinstitution. In the conglomeratelevel, onthe otherhand, cultural units are analyzed together butonly tothe extent thatthey areinvolved ina particularinstitution – the conglomeratelevel ofanalysis iscalled ‘ conglomerate’because it deals with

7By the endof the Žfties,the anthropologistAlfred Kroeberand the sociologistTalcott Parsons,drawing from Parsons’theory ofsocial action (see Parsons 1951) and re ections onprevious deŽ nitions of the conceptof culture (seeKroeber & Kluckhohn 1952),put forwarda manifestowhere adivisionof labor between anthropology and sociology was delineatedin order tofurther the scientiŽc progressof (and the collaborationbetween) bothdisciplines (see Kroeber & Parsons1958). Schneider’ s conceptionof cultural analysis isanoffshootof thisproposal (see Schneider 1968,1972, 1976). THEFALLOFKINSHIP 275 the meaningful conjunctionof variouscultural units like gender,class and age ina speciŽc institutionlike the family,not because it deals with the norms of the speciŽc institution(e.g., the normthat a middleclass father should earn the money tosupporthis family), which are part of the normativesystem. For example, ina pureanalysis, onewould study the meaningsand symbols ofgender, age andclass severally andindependently ofany institutionlike the family,the stateand the church;in aconglomerateanalysis, onewould studythe meaningsand symbols of gender, age andclass conjointly and insofaras they areinvolved inoneparticular institution like the family. American“ kinship”can be analyzed bothat the conglomeratelevel andat the purelevel. However,for Schneider, “ kinship”is not a cultural unitat the purelevel (itis nota purecultural unit), even ifit is such a unit atthe conglomeratelevel (itis aconglomeratecultural unit identiŽ ed with the institutionof the family). 8 In analyzing “kinship”at the purecultural level, oneis interested in the general meanings andsymbols that deŽ ne apersonas arelative asagainsta non-relative.According to Schneider,there aretwo basic semantic features thatcontribute to this deŽ nition – the ideaof sharedbio-genetic substance andthe ideaof diffuse, enduring solidarity. Moreover, the combinationof these featuresentails three basictypes ofrelatives: bloodrelatives (both featuresbeing present), relatives innature (only the Žrstfeature being present),and relatives-in-law (only the secondfeature being present). However,the basicfeatures do not establish a speciŽc culturalunit becausethey areco-extensive witha general distinctionthat exists atthe purecultural level: the orderof nature versus the orderof law (in the broadsense ofa domainof norms, costumes and traditions). According toSchneider, this claim is supported by the factthat at the purelevel Americansdo not distinguish “ kinship”from other units like “nationality,” whichare also co-extensive withthe general distinctionbetween nature and law: toabstract the pure[nationality] system we simply ask, What makes aperson acitizen? What arethe distinctive featureswhich deŽne aperson’s nationality?

8The classiŽcatory division ofthe normative systemin different institutionalsub-systems like the family,the state,and the church ispart ofthe cultural system(i.e., it is a classiŽcation ofthe different conglomeratecultural units),even ifthe norms ofeach particular institution arepart ofthe normative system. 276 PAULO SOUSA

He is either bornan American orhe is –andthe wordis ofcourse quite signiŽcant –naturalized.Once againwe Žndthat the distinctive featureare shared substance (beingborn American) anda codefor conduct which enjoins diffuse,enduring solidarity: being a loyalAmerican, lovingone’ s country,and, President Kennedy’s felicitousphrase, “ Ask notwhat yourcountry can dofor you.Ask rather what youcan dofor your country.” (1972: 41)

In otherwords, because there isno distinction between “ kinship”and “ na- tionality”at the purelevel ofanalysis, neither “kinship”nor “ nationality” canbe aspeciŽc purecultural unit. Butcouldn’ t someonecounter-argue that the ideaof sharedbio-genetic substance,normally phrased as shared blood, is something more speciŽ c that,instead of having simplya discreterole of delimiting general types of relatives, alsofunctions as a gradedstructure that determines genealogical distance?And couldn’ t onesay that,after all, thiscalibration of the amount ofcommon substance is justthe basisof the genealogicalgrid supposed by Morgan? True,as Schneider himself acknowledges,Americans talk about“ kin- ship”in just such terms:

It is saidthat they can trace their bloodthrough certain relatives, that they have “Smithblood in their veins.”( : : :)Because bloodis a“thing”and because itis subdividedwith each reproductivestep away froma given ancestor, the precise degreeto which twopersons share common heredity can becalculated, and “ distance”can thus bestated in speciŽ c qualitative terms. (: : :)Peoplewho are blood relatives share acommonidentity, they believe.This is expressed as “beingof the same esh andblood.” (Schneider 1968: 25)

Nonetheless, accordingto Schneider, this is merely an apparentcontra- dictionin his argument, one prompted by too literal an interpretationof Americans’way of talk. He offerstwo main arguments against this par- lance beingevidence forthe hypothesisthat the genealogicalgrid is part ofAmerican culture. Firstly,if the genealogicalgrid were determinant in calculating ge- nealogicaldistance, one would predict that Americans have aprecisecon- ceptionof “kinship”distance. But cases like the famousrelative and,in ad- dition,the vagueness ofthe notionof distance tend to show that whether THEFALLOFKINSHIP 277 someoneis considered a closeor distant relative isestablished in con- junctionwith other categorical variables like socialstatus, class differences, geographicaldispersal etc. In otherwords, the calibrationof distanceis un- stableand exists only atthe conglomeratelevel (see Schneider1968: 72-75, 1970).More importantly, Schneider argues that these supposedbio-genetic semanticfeatures, which seem tobe part of the Americanconception of “kinship,”are symbolic:

The alternate strategy ofstudy which Icommendedyielded the suggestion that these deŽning elements of‘ blood,’of one  esh andblood, of bio-genetic identitycould be understood as symbols which stoodfor social relationships ofdiffuse, enduring solidarity. ( : : :)Indeed,at many pointsthe scientiŽc facts sharply contradictedthe culturalfacts aboutbiology; but the fact that the scientiŽc facts hadlittle orno discernible effect onchanging the cultural facts seemed goodevidence forconcluding that the bio-geneticelements inAmerican kinship were primarilysymbolic ofsomething else andhardly relevant tobiology as anaturalor actualstate ofaffairs.(Schneider 1972:59)

Itmust be clear by now that, for Schneider, “ kinship”is all abouta genealogicalconception entertained only inthe anthropologists’subculture:

‘Kinship’is an analytic categorywhich has beenprevalent in anthropology since MorganŽ rst invented it. In theway in which Morgan and his followers have used it, it doesnot correspond to any cultural category known to man .The closest thing toit is the Western Europeancategory of ‘ family,’but if I amcorrect in my analysis even that is notclose. ( : : :)Tospeak precisely, the title ofmy book, AmericanKinship ,is amisnomer.I really didnot deal extensively with ‘kinship’ atthe conglomeratelevel nordid I intendto; in the purecultural level there is nosuch thing as ‘kinship.’Hence my use ofthe term ‘purekinship level’ is wrongtoo, which Ihave triedto suggest bythe use ofquotes around the word.(Schneider 1972:50; author’ s emphases) 9

9Ofcourse, from the assumptionthat kinshipdoes not existin American culture, there isnovalid induction to the conclusionthat itdoes not existin other cultures– in particular, in non-western cultures.Later, drawing on his ethnographic experienceamong the Yap andalso on the “virgin birth”controversy (see,e.g., Leach 1966; Derrett 1971;Montague 1971;Spiro 1968, 1972), Schneider givesfurther justiŽcation to his general conclusion bytrying toshow that there isn’t aconceptionof kinship in non-western cultureseither: kinshipethnographic descriptionsin the anthropologicalliterature havebeen simply the result ofan unreective imposition of the genealogicalgrid on the data(Schneider 1984). 278 PAULO SOUSA

Together,the criticismsof Needham andSchneider can be construed as embodyinga general theoreticaldilemma: if one tries to delimit kinship on the basisof the contentof social norms, kinship does not exist; ifone tries todelimit kinship on the basisof a folkbiologicalcontent, kinship does not exist. Ergo:kinship does not exist.

TheHermeneutic Turn Epistemologicalrepresentations are second order representations that set the criteriafor the elaborationand/ orjustiŽ cation of Ž rstorder represen- tationsas knowledge. They arenormative meta-representations supposed toregulate the distributionof knowledge representations. The aimof this sectionis to characterize in detail a change ofepistemological representa- tionsin the anthropologicalsubculture (i.e., a change inthe epistemology sharedby anthropologists)that was fundamental to the fall ofkinship(i.e., thatnegatively regulatedthe distributionof kinship representations) – the hermeneuticturn. The expression‘ hermeneuticturn’ can be utilized to refer to the general importanceacquired by symbolic meaning as an objectof inquiry sincethe beginningof the 1960s.Even discountingthe uniquespin that each anthropologistputs on the deŽnition of the expression‘ symbolic meaning,’its more conventional senses may leadto different (but not necessarily incompatible)interpretations of this Ž rstsense ofthe turn: (i) amove tothe studyof the ideationalin itsown right, that is, meanings withouttheir being subordinated to any morebasic determinant; (ii) a move tothe studyof a type ofideational, that is, the meaningsinvolved inapparently irrational beliefs and behaviors; (iii) a move tothe studyof anothertype ofideational, that is, the meanings motivatedby relations such asresemblance, contiguity, opposition or inversion. While somedecrease ofinterest in kinship may becorrelated with a stresson some of these notionsof symbolic meaning, I hypothesizethat this was not an important causalfactor in the fall ofkinship. Levi-Strauss, for example, discontinued hisaffair with kinship by assuminga forefrontinterest in the symbolicnot becausehe concludedthat kinship wasn’ t aworthwhilesubject, but simply dueto his primary interest in the studyof the humanmind: This Žrst experience [the onerelated to the book“ The Elementary Structures ofKinship”] was insufŽcient becausein the domainof kinship the constraints THEFALLOFKINSHIP 279

arenot purely internal. What Imean is that itis notcertain that they have their originin the structure ofthe mind:they may bethe result ofthe exigencies ofsocial life,and the way itimposes its ownconstraints onthe operationof thought. (Levi-Strauss 1963:630; my translation) The hermeneuticturn that is relevant toexplain the demiseof kinship, even ifitincorporatesan emphasison the symbolic,is a morefundamental change relatedto the theoreticalambitions of anthropology. The project ofa generalizingand explanatory science oncewas legitimate in the anthropologicalmainstream, and sometimes was even understoodin terms ofa strongcontinuity with the naturalsciences: My view ofnatural science is that itis the systematic investigationof the structure ofthe universe as itis revealedto us throughour senses. There are certain importantseparate branches ofscience, each ofwhich dealswith a certain class orkindof structures, the aimbeing to discover the characteristics ofall structures ofthat kind.So atomic physics dealswith the structure ofatoms, chemistry with the structure ofmolecules, crystallography and colloidalchemistry with the structure ofcrystals andcolloids, and anatomy andphysiology with the structures oforganisms.There is,therefore, I suggest, place fora branch ofnaturalscience which will have forits task the discovery ofthe general characteristics ofthose social structures ofwhich the component units arehuman beings.Social phenomena constitute adistinct class of naturalphenomena. (Radcliffe-Brown 1952: 190) Subsequently,the mainstream’s legitimateaim shifted to oneof interpreting single cultures,with an eye towardsneither cross-culturalgeneralization norexplanations, as is re ected in these passagesfrom the mostimportant catalystof the turn: 10

The concept ofculture Iespouse( : : :)is essentially asemiotic one.Believing, with Max Weber,that man is an animalsuspended in webs ofsigniŽcance he

10In what follows,rather than an overallinterpretation ofGeertz’ s epistemological claims,my characterization ofthe hermeneutic turn selectsthe aspectsof his claims (and the claimsof other comrades)that illustratethe new epistemologythat becamepredominant. In Britain, Evans-Pritchard headedin asimilardirection: “ It [anthropology]studies societies asa moral systemsand not asnatural systems( : : :),ittherefore seekspatterns andnot scientiŽc laws,and interprets rather than explains”(Evans-Pritchard 1962:26); “ There’s only onemethod in socialanthropology, the comparativemethod – andthat’ s impossible” (citedin Needham1975: 363). 280 PAULO SOUSA

himself has spun,I take culture tobe those webs, andthe analysis ofit to be thereforenot an experimental science insearch oflaw butan interpretiveone insearch ofmeaning.It is explicationI’ m after,construing social expressions in their surface enigmatic.(Geertz 1973:5)

(: : :)the essential task oftheory buildinghere is notto codify abstract regularitiesbut to make thick descriptionpossible, not to generalize across cases butto generalize within them. ( : : :)Rather than beginningwith aset of observationsand attempting to subsume them undera governinglaw, such inference beginswith aset of(presumptive) signiŽ ers andattempts toplace them within an intelligibleframe. (Geertz 1973:26)

The waythis turn contributed to the fall ofkinship will be the subjectof the Žnal section;what is important here isto give adeŽnite characterization of it. Firstof all, the hermeneuticturn should not be con ated with the epistemologicalquestion of intertheoretical relations between anthropology, psychologyand biology, namely, the extent towhich the substantive claims putforward by psychologists and biologists are regarded as pertinent to explain socio-culturalphenomena. There are two general positionson thismatter: emergentists and interactionists. Emergentists, in one version oranother, embrace the postulatethat was fundamental to the birthof autonomoussocial sciences: “ Thedetermining cause of asocialfact should besought among the socialfacts preceding it and not among the states ofindividual consciousness” (Durkheim 1982[1895]: 110). 11 And here is ananthropologist’s endorsement:“ cultureis a thingsui generis which can beexplained only interms of itself : : : Omniscultura ex cultura”(Lowie

11Noticealso Durkheim’ s rejectionof the relevance ofbiology to kinship in the previous section.One could counter-argue that ageneralrejection of biology is not correct in this issue,since the typeof functional explanation used by Durkheim andfollowers seemsto have a physiologicalinspiration. Nonetheless, this is not aquestionof inter- theoretical relationsin the technical senseused here (see,e.g., McCauley 1986; Nagel 1961: chapter 11),but simply one of an explanationbeing modeled on the pattern ofanother (Nagel1961: 520). No speciŽ c substantiverelation can beinferred from thismodeling, but only (andnot necessarily)the ideaof amore abstractmechanism common toboth domains. Tomake this point clear, takethe conceptof meme asa unit ofcultural transmission:it is basedon amore abstractversion of the mechanism ofnatural selection,but no substantive similarityis credited between memes and genes; quite the contrary, the conceptof meme impliesthat cultural transmissioncan becompletely independent of genetictransmission. THEFALLOFKINSHIP 281

1966[1917]:66). Interactionists, on the otherhand, accept the relevance ofpsychology and biology to the explanationof socio-cultural phenomena, agoodexample beingLevi-Strauss, who not only sawan intrinsicrelation betweenanthropology and psychology, but also envisaged an all-outunity of science:

Ibelievethe ultimategoal of the human sciences tobe not to constitute, but todissolve man.The pre-eminent valueof anthropology is that itrepresents the Žrst step in aprocedurewhich involves others.Ethnographic analysis tries toarrive at invariants beyondthe empiricaldiversity ofhuman societies; and,as the present work shows, these aresometimes tobe found at the most unforeseen points.( : : :)However, itwould not be enough to reabsorb particularhumanities into a general one.This Žrst enterprise opensthe way forothers which Rousseauwould not have beenso ready to accept andwhich areincumbent onthe exact naturalsciences: the reintegrationof culture in natureand Ž nally oflife within the whole ofits physico-chemical conditions. (Levi-Strauss 1966[1962]:247)

The emergentistconception has been prevalent inanthropology, and the hermeneuticturn simply rephrased it in more semiotic terms: 12 “Culture, thisacted document, thus is public, like aburlesquedwink or a mock sheep raid.Though ideational, it does not exist insomeone’ s head;though unphysical,it isnotan occultentity” (Geertz 1973:10). What isintrinsic to the turnis a meta-theoreticalprescription behind the notionsof symbolicmeaning ,the knowledgeto be produced, and in- terpretation ,the means oftranslation of such knowledge. Interpretation is foundedon a semioticsthat should drive the methodologyof anthropology awayfrom the naturalsciences, towards the humanities(see Geertz 1983). Thisdirection can be highlightedby acontrastwith Levi-Strauss’ opposite inclination:

The anthropologistsare in avery peculiarsituation in relationto linguistics. Formany years they have beenworking very closely with the linguists,and all ofa suddenit seems tothem that the linguists arevanishing, that they aregoing on the otherside of the borderlinewhich dividesthe exact and naturalsciences onthe onehand from the human andsocial sciences onthe

12But seeLawson & McCawley1996 and Sousa 1998, for a discussionof the logical implicationsthat the hermeneutic turn hasfor the questionof intertheoretical relations. 282 PAULO SOUSA

other.All ofa suddenthe linguists areplaying their formercompanions this very nasty trick ofdoing things as well andwith the same sortof rigorous approachthat was longbelieved to be the privilegeof the exact andnatural sciences. Then, onthe sideof the anthropologistthere is some,let us say melancholy, anda greatdeal of envy. We shouldlike tolearn fromthe linguists howthey succeeded in doingit, how we may ourselves in ourown Želd,which is acomplex one– in the Želdof kinship, in the Želdof social organization,in the Želdof religion,folklore, art, and the like –use the same kindof rigorous approach which has provedto be successful forlinguistics. (Levi-Strauss 1963[1956]:69-70) Symbolicmeaning is a type ofknowledge that should not involve general- izationsand explanations. I elaborateon this denial of generalizationsand explanationsin turn. The notionof generalization represents a continuumwhich may be brokeninto a crescendoof degrees: an ethnographicdescription of a sin- gle society,regional generalizations which compare cultures of a certain area(e.g., African political systems), generalizationswhich are on the or- bitof the distinctionbetween the “traditional/primitive”and the “mod- ern/western”(e.g., classiŽ catory versus descriptive kinship terminologies), andgeneralizations which purport to be universal on some level (e.g.,the incesttaboo). For this reason, by tracing oppositions within different por- tionsof this continuum, and being selective aboutwhat is the important partof the workof speciŽc anthropologists,it isalways possible to portray the historyof anthropology as an everlasting strugglebetween “ relativists” and“ universalists,”both in the contextof different domains of research (e.g.,substantivists versus formalists in economic anthropology), and in the contextof different traditions (Malinowskians versus Radcliffe-Brownians, Durkheimiansversus Levi-Straussians, and Boasians versus non-Boasians). Butin order to do that, one has toforget, for example, thatMalinowski hadextreme theoreticalambitions too, that Raymond Firth was at the same timea mainMalinowskian in hisethnographic style andthe fatherof formalismin economic anthropology, and that both Durkheim and Levi- Strausswere interested in elementary structures,which they thoughtcould beinferred even fromthe studyof a single simplecase. Withoutdenying thatthere issome value inthese adhoc oppositions, and that the knowledge produced byanthropologists may belocalized in differentlevels ofthe generalizationcontinuum, this picture does not THEFALLOFKINSHIP 283 capturethe fundamentalrupture of the hermeneuticturn. What isat stake here isa change inthe conceptionof the possibilitiesof anthropological knowledge– itis a meta-change thatprescribes the knowledge that should be produced.Didthe mainstreamepistemological position before the 1960s proscribethe possibilityof going beyond ethnographic descriptions? Take forexample, FranzBoas, an anthropologistwhose work is surely on the relativistside of the generalizationcrescendo. Would he deny the prospectof going further? Not really, sincehis relativism was a step backagainst simplistic evolutionist generalizations, rather than aprincipled epistemologicalrejection of generalizations: The immediateresults ofthe historical methodare, therefore, histories of the cultures ofdiverse tribeswhich have beenthe subjectof study. I fully agreewith those anthropologistswho claim that this is notthe ultimate aimof our science, because the general laws, althoughimplied in such a description,cannot beclearly formulatednor their relative valueappreciated withouta thoroughcomparison of the manner inwhich they becomemanifest indifferent cultures. ButI insist that the applicationof this methodis the indispensablecondition of sound progress ( : : :)When we have cleared upthe history ofa single culture andunderstand the effects ofenvironment andthe psychological conditionsthat arere ected initwe have madea step forward, as we can then investigate inhow far the same causes orother causes were atwork inthe developmentof othercultures. Thus bycomparinghistories of growthgeneral laws may befound. (Boas 1982[1896]: 278-279) Thus,although, as an attemptto secure the relevance ofanthropology in the contextof the socialsciences andof an ethnographyin the context ofanthropology, the “Bongo-Bongoism”and “ the searchfor the exotic” have alwaysbeen around,the gistof the turnlies herein:in the beginning, the mainstreamepistemological position did not rule out going beyond ethnographicdescriptions, but afterwards the prescriptionbecame one of reducinganthropology to thickdescriptions, of reducing anthropology to a type ofethnographic enterprise. In thissense, whatis implied by the shift isnot simply a stepback against the simplisticlaws eventually broughtout byan idealof a naturalscience ofsociety: cross-cultural generalizations are nowto be seen astrivial deformations of the native’s pointview, and no formof light may beenvisaged atthe endof the tunnel. Leaving asideexplanations of single events (e.g.,the deathof captain Cook),explanations in anthropologydeal with a regularitycontinuum par- 284 PAULO SOUSA allel tothe generalizationcontinuum described above, in which case Idi- videthe continuuminto regularities in agiven society(cultural regularities) andregularities across societies (cross-cultural regularities). Not to put too Žne apointon it,in the case ofexplanations of regularities,to explain isto identifythe causalfactors that contribute to the reoccurrenceof the each token ofa regularity.Since the rejectionof cross-cultural generalizations impliesthe nonexistence ofsigniŽ cant cross-cultural regularities, I comment merely onthe hermeneuticrejection of explanationsat the culturallevel. Why meaning instead of cause indealingwith human cultural action? An actionis made up of two components: one ideational, another behavioral. Toexplain an actionis to take the ideationalcomponent as a causal factorwhose effect is the behavioralcomponent. For example, inan actof winking, the intentionto convey acertainmessage isviewed as acausalfactor whose effect is the behaviorof closing and opening the eyelids. Froma hermeneuticpoint of view, this causal construal of the relationbetween the ideationalcomponent and the behavioralcomponent ismisleading. Intentions (or reasons in general) arenot really causesof actions,they areinstead analytically connectedto the identityof the action beingdescribed – the closingand opening of the eyelids is a wink if and only ifthe intentionto convey acertainmessage ispresent. The ideational andbehavioral elements arenot two separable elements ina relationof causeand effect; they arein a logicalrelation of deŽ niens todeŽ niendum instead(see Rosenberg1995). For this reason, the text analogyis the most appropriate,for each ideationalelement gives the meaningof a speciŽc behavior,and hence constitutesthe speciŽc action.In otherwords, the ideationaland the behavioralelements aretwo sides of the same coin– the symbol.This passage from another in uential contributor to the turn illustratesthis point well: As structuredrelationships of symbolic freedoms,cultures arerelative and historical formsof life, each having aparticularvalidity without some universal necessity. Hence the character ofour cosmographic explications, their sufŽciency withoutnecessity, which consists intheir beingof the nature oflogico-meaningful motivations of the practice inquestion. Physical things have causes, buthuman things reasons –symbolically constructed reasons even when they arephysically caused.And this makes anthropologya science ofanother kind, different from the naturalsciences, becauseits objectand methodare of the same kind.(Sahlins 2000:28-29) THEFALLOFKINSHIP 285

Moreover,because this system ofsymbolsconstitutes an emergentistshared code(one that“ doesnot exist insomeone’ s head”), humanactions have regularoccurrence in a given society.Finally, becausethis shared code is evinced notonly inactions but also in all otherpublic productions, all cultureis to be decoded via the same interpretiverationale.

TheEpidemiological Explanation Criticismsof a theoreticalconcept are a possiblecausal factor in endan- geringits attractiveness, and so are atheoretical epistemologies, for the downgradingof theories in general may depreciateany theoreticalconcept inparticular. In thissection, I considerwhether and how these twotypes offactors, as discussed before, played a causalrole in the fall ofkinship, asa theoreticalconcept in anthropology.In thisway, I’ ll delineate anepi- demiologicalexplanation of the fall ofkinshipin anthropology – whatis it all about? Itis important to noticeŽ rstthat one of the factorsmay notbe causally signiŽcant. In particular,since the rejectionof a speciŽc theoreticalconcept doesnot presuppose in effect an atheoreticalposition, the hermeneutic turnmay nothave hadany causalrole. Actually, neither Needham nor Schneiderassumed in principle an atheoreticalposition:

Comparisonstands abetterand quite different chance ofsuccess ifit is conductedin formal terms. ( : : :)Here we have formalproperties which can be deŽned in purely formal terms, e.g.,in the notationof symbolic logic,without reference toany classes ofentities, however the classes may becomposed, orto the characteristic empiricalfeatures of their members. (Needham 1976: 365)13

It is unnecessary toraise the oldproblem of how itis possiblefor two things tobe compared as wholes when each is wholly unique.We arespared this burdenby the fact that the basisfor comparison is giveby our deŽ nition of culture as asystem ofsymbols andmeanings. Symbolsand meanings can be comparedjust as easily as modesof family organization, the roles ofseniors tojuniors, or the methodsof agriculture.(Schneider 1972:48)

13Ifthe later Wittgenstein(1953) was the inspirationfor Needham’ s criticisms,his reconstructive sideseems to go in the directionof the early Wittgenstein(1922). 286 PAULO SOUSA

Idonot rule out thepossibility that thereare universals .ButI dorule out the attempt tostate them aprioriand the attemptto infer them fromcommon sense and the so-called facts oflife. (Schneider 1976:211) (Emphasis added)

Nonetheless, froman epidemiologicalpoint of view, more important than the factthat some authorshave rejectedthe conceptof kinship without as- sumingan atheoreticalposition, is the factthat, if there wasa hermeneutic turnin anthropology as characterized, more and more anthropologistsac- ceptedan atheoreticalposition, which suggests at least somekind of mutual inuence –the criticismsof kinshipconŽ rming the hermeneuticpostulates, the atheoreticalposition augmenting the acceptabilityof the criticisms. Buteven then, itis still possiblethat in reality the hermeneuticturn wasnot causally operative, whereas speciŽ c epistemologicalclaims need notnecessarily guidethe elaborationand/ orjustiŽ cation of knowledge. Actually,Geertz seems notto have abandonedthe conceptof kinship completely:

“Kinship”turns outto be avariety ofsocial idiom,a way oftalkingabout and understanding,and thus shaping,some aspects ofsocial life.( : : :) symbolism arisingout of the experience ofliving as achild, spouse,parent, and elder in asmall, walled yardof pavilions,kitchens, granaries,toilets, and altars with a dozenor so familial others doesnot determine the whole.But neither, as we trust we have shown, doesit leave ituntouched.(Geertz &Geertz 1975:169)

Indeedthere need notbe any causallink betweenthe epistemological claimsput forward by social scientists and their knowledge production. 14 AsI saidbefore, epistemological representations are normative meta- representationsthat set the general criteriaof acceptability of representa- tionsas knowledge. Ideally, they wouldhave astrongselective rolein the distributionof knowledge representations: if representations are in accor- dancewith a speciŽc epistemology,they shouldbe accepted as knowledge andbecome widespread amongst those who advocate the epistemology, otherwisethey shouldbe rejected and die out (or, simply leave tracesin artifactsthat no one ever reads).But in reality, oftentimes social scientists donot follow their proclaimed epistemology – e.g.,Durkheim assumed

14Fora relateddiscussion in the context ofthe natural sciences,see Feyerabend 1988 andLaudan 1984. THEFALLOFKINSHIP 287 an emergentistposition but built his theory of religion on the notionof the sacred,which is deŽ ned in terms of psychologicalstates such as awe. Therefore,given thisfreedom to contradiction, hermeneutic anthropolo- gistscould have pursuedsome theoretical constructions of kinshipanyway. Epistemologicalrepresentations may nothave aneat causalrole in this respectfor another reason: frequently they arevague andhence suscepti- ble todifferent interpretations. It may bethat the hermeneuticclaims do notspecify the exact theoreticallevel thatshould be avoided,and that an- thropologistssometimes interpret them asnotso radically atheoretical. For example, anthropologistscould have maintainedcertain basic theoretical conceptslike economy,religion and (why not?)kinship as an intelligible framethat makes thickdescription possible. Eitherway, ultimately the hermeneuticturn might not be a causal factor,or mightbe simplya meagerone, which could be neglected without muchexplanatory ado. In thiscase, the problemsof kinship theory per se, aspointed out by Needham andSchneider, should be regarded as the relevant causalfactor in the decreaseof interest in kinship. From now on,I shall arguethat, on the contrary,the hermeneuticturn did play a fundamentalcausal role. I startby putting forth some doubts about the “causalsufŽ ciency” of the criticismsof kinship theory – whileundeniably an importantfactor, the criticismsdo not seem toconstitute a sufŽcient explanationin and of themselves. One type ofproblem is that, although many ofNeedham’ s and Schneider’s criticismswere sound, they donot seem tocall foran extreme anduniŽ ed conclusion. Their criticisms are normally interpreted as a commonforce against the existence ofkinship. This is an intriguingfact initself, because they arebased on quite different premises of would-be kinshipconcepts. Why thisperception of alliance againstkinship? Why notaccept one line ofargument and reject the other,and then criticize the former?It is possible to accept Schneider’ s basicorientation and then showsome weakness andvagueness thatundermines Schneider’ s sweeping conclusions. RegardingSchneider’ s ideathat even inAmerican culture there is noconception of kinship, mentioning three qualmsshould sufŽ ce. 15 It is

15Fora more completediscussion of Schneider’ s approach,see Schef er 1976,1991, 2001a. 288 PAULO SOUSA doubtfulthat Americans naturalize nationality in the waythey naturalize kinship,and therefore that they donotdistinguish kinship from nationality atthe purelevel. The useof the adjective‘ naturalized’to refer to citizensafŽ liated simply by law suggests, pace Schneider, that there is adifferentsense of‘ natural’in question – becominga citizenby law immediatelyincorporates some sense ofbecoming natural. Besides, if Americansconceptualize kinship at the conglomeratelevel asSchneider himself recognizes,if the distinctionbetween conglomerate and pure levels isa theoreticalartifact of the analyst (notone made by the native), andif the aimis to capture the native’s pointof view, the self-defeatingconclusion seems tobe that Americans do conceptualizea notionof kinship.Finally, as faras Schneider’s symbolichypothesis is concerned,even Americansmany atimecannot grasp it: “ ( : : :)the culturalaspects of action are particularly subtle,sometimes particularly difŽ cult to comprehend partly because they aresymbols not treated usually as symbols but as true facts. So it isdifŽcult attimes to convince an Americanthat blood as a uidhas nothingin it whichcauses ties to be deep and strong.” (Schneider 1972: 48) 16 In thiscase, a less radicalinterpretation of the conclusion“ kinship doesnot exist” would be that it does not exist outsidethe US.But,as Schneideradmits in his postscript to American Kinship ,anotheryet more tepidinterpretation is possible: “ Itriedto show that “ kinship”as a thing, asan objectof study, was at best only possiblein a very restrictedsense, andthen probablyonly inWestern culturessuch as that in the United States.This is the moreconservative, temperate statement ofthe message (1980:119).” In thiscase, kinship would not exist outsidewestern cultures. Lastbut not least, sinceSchneider analyzed only onenon-western culture

16There isa kindof dilemma in Schneider’s interpretation here: ifAmericans accept that in fact (i.e.literally) blood is adeepand strong natural substancethat determines kinshiprelatedness, by deŽ nition blood is not asymbolof anything; ifAmericans accept that symbolicallyblood is adeepand strong natural substancethat determineskinship relatedness,blood is not asymbolof enduring solidarity as Schneider wants,but of a deepand strong natural substance.One way out of thisdilemma is aprecisepsychological characterization ofa more generalnotion of shared natural essenceas the basisof the computationof relatedness in kinship(see Hirschfeld 1986):some Americans may identify bloodwith thisessence; others takeblood as a symbolof this essence. This notion of essencemay haveimplications to the moral domain(see Bloch &Sperber2002), but it is not asymbolof enduring solidarity. THEFALLOFKINSHIP 289 indetail (but see Kuper2000: 146-158), there isthe even morefavorable renderingthat kinship is not universal, which leaves openthe possibility ofit being somewhat pervasive innon-western cultures. Therefore, given the vagueness ofthe conclusion,why have anthropologiststended to go for the interpretationsthat deny any importanceto kinship? Doesn’ t thisdo kinshipan injustice? Anothertype ofproblem appears when the broaderdistribution of basictheoretical concepts in anthropology is taken intoaccount. One ofthe general lessons tobe drawn from Needham’ s andSchneider’ s criticismsis thatthe traditionalanthropological partition of its object into basic domains isto be disposed of: ifa colleaguetells youthat he is interested in kinship,his choice ofphrase impliesthat he couldhave statedinstead that he was keen onsubsistence economies orprimitive law, and the wordhe actually employs doesindeed giveyou a vagueidea of his theoretical bent,the bookshe has read,and the kindof technical conversation he is likely toengage you in. In this case as well, however, itcannot beinferred that his interest inkinship will be unconnected with economics orlaw; and in fact,of course, it will probably turnout that he has todeal with these topicsalso and that they in turn demanda recourse tokinship. (Needham 1971:4-5)

Tomy mind,it will nolonger be acceptable toconsider ‘religionas acultural system’any morethan itwouldbe acceptable toconsider ‘kinship asacultural system’or ‘ politicsas aculturalsystem.’ Each culture must beapproached apartfrom its institutionalsegments, itsocial organizationalsegments, orits social structural segments, andfrom a purelycultural perspective. (Schneider 1972: 60)

Ifthe criticismsadvanced by Schneider and Needham hadsuch a driving force,it seems thatall traditionalbasic domains should have been dissi- pated.But what happened in fact, as mentioned in the introduction,was the progressiveincorporation of kinship into other basic domains. So, why weren’t these otheradmittedly problematic domains diluted as well? And why suchan attemptto hide kinship-related phenomena in their province? In addition,similar criticisms were directed speciŽ cally atsome other basic theoreticalconcepts – e.g.,Needham analyzed the conceptof beliefin sim- ilarterms (see Needham 1972),and the conceptof genderwas approached ala Schneider(see Collier& Yanagisako1987). But these criticismsdo not 290 PAULO SOUSA seem tohave hadany causalin uence inthe fortuneof these concepts. Then,why didsimilar causes have differenteffects for kinship? Why such partiality? Granted,these doubtsdo not constitute knockdown arguments, but they dopoint to an alternative.I’ ve been employingmetaphors that call forththe ideathat some anthropologists have alliedto persecute kinship,and others have been uncomfortablewith studying phenomena traditionallyidentiŽ ed as partof kinship. My mainaim though was simply tosuggest that there issomething more against the conceptof kinship thanthe argumentsraised by the kinshipskeptics; and the hypothesisis thatthis has todo with the hermeneuticturn. I explicate nowthe overall explanatorypicture that springs up from this hypothesis. The realimport of the hermeneuticturn is to be understood in the contextof its implications for how anthropologists conceive the identity ofanthropology as a discipline,and hence fortheir personal identity as anthropologists.For this reason, it isnecessary todiscuss the categorization involved inthisconstruction of identity. Take thisgraph:

On the onehand, the tree (1)signals that disciplines are classiŽ ed insome discrete categories organized in a taxonomicstructure – e.g., sociology,as the name indicates,is a socialscience, and biology, a natural science.The identiŽcation of a disciplinewith one of these categoriesis stableat the institutionallevel, butessential tomy discussionare the current epistemologicalpositions existent ineach discipline,which may ormay not bein accordance with the establishedidentiŽ cation, and, in the latter case,may even driveresearchers to Ž ghtfor a change inthe institutional THEFALLOFKINSHIP 291 landscape.On the otherhand, the line (2)at the bottomindicates that there issome concurrent fuzziness in this categorization, which is related tothe perceptionof different levels ofscientiŽ city. This fuzzy perception may occurnot only inrelation to speciŽ c disciplines– e.g.,biology being furtherto the rightthan psychology, – butalso in relation to speciŽ c theoreticaltraditions in each discipline– e.g.,behaviorism being further to the rightthan psychoanalysis in psychology. These twocharacteristics, the taxonomicand fuzzy traits, suggest that somethingakin towhat has been called‘ prototype’in the psychology ofcategorization is part of this process of classiŽ cation. 17 Restricting the discussionto the ambitof anthropology, particularly relevant tomy concernis the set offeatures that compose the prototypeof a theoretical enterpriseaspiring to reach the rightend of line (2)– the prototype ofthe idealof a naturalscience ofsociety. One hypothesisis that this prototypecomprises the notionsof formal precision, positivistic neutrality, lawfulregularity and natural causality that are invoked respectively bythe featuresof the followingdimensions: (a) Typeof language: the useof formal languages in general and/or mathematicallanguages in particular. (b)Type of methodology: the useof formal analysis and/orstatistical methods. (c) Scopeof knowledge:the constructionof generalizingtypologies and laws. (d)Type of explanation: beyond the useof explanations with social causes,the useof explanations with psychological or biological causes. Eachof these dimensionscan be a matterof degree. It is important to com- ment onthe morecomplex last dimension though. Even ifanthropologists tendto interpret the ideationalas an emergent culturallevel independent ofpsychology,when the ideationalis compared to the folkmind-body du- alismgenerally assumedby social scientists, it is still morerelated to the

17Fora discussionof prototypesand other current theoriesof concepts, see Medin 1989 andSmith &Medin1981. Some authors introduce a distinctionbetween core categoriza- tionand identiŽ cation procedures that may berelevant toa more precisepsychological characterization ofthe processof categorization involved here (for adiscussionsee Smith etal.1984), but this is beyond the scopeof this article. 292 PAULO SOUSA mindthan to the body.That’ s why itisnot difŽ cult to Ž ndanthropologists phrasingtheir subject as “ hownatives think,”even when they aremaking culturaldescriptions that are not supposed to dealwith psychological facts. Therefore,the appealto biological causes invokes morethe notionof a naturalscience ofsociety than the appealto psychological causes. This is alsore ected in the perceptionof the causalweights put on the different dimensionsof the social.For example, aweighton economy will invoke morethe naturalthan aweighton politics, because economy is more re- latedto the infrastructure(and therefore to the subsistenceof the body), andpolitics is more related to the superstructure(and therefore to the ideational).Ecological explanations that make useof a biologicalnotion of adaptationwill invoke even moredirectly the notionof a naturalscience ofsociety. The limitingcase probablyis sociobiology. Otherthings being equal, the morea theoreticalenterprise shows the featuresof the prototype,the moreit will be perceived as a project whoseaim is the constitutionof a naturalscience ofsociety. But there isa perspectivalvariable calibrating this perception as well, forthe same theoreticalenterprise may beperceived differently according to the epistemologicalposition of each anthropologist.For example, atheoretical enterprisethat somewhat matches the prototypewill be perceived as the pursuitof anaturalscience ofsociety by someonewho thinks the identityof anthropologyshould be positionedmore to the sideof the humanities,but notnecessarily soby someone who thinks itsidentity should be positioned simplyon the placeof the socialsciences. Now,before the hermeneuticturn, the mainstreamepistemological positionin anthropology tended to identifyanthropology with the sciences –mainly asa socialscience distinguishedfrom the naturalsciences, but many timesas a socialscience thatshould strive in the directionof the naturalsciences. But the adherenceto hermeneutic epistemological claims pushedthe identityof anthropology in the directionof the humanities. Anthropologistshave toconciliatebeing scientists and being in permanent irtationwith the humanities.For this reason, in the rightend of line (2), hermeneutistshave theirgreat antagonist – beyondan atheoreticalposition, the hermeneuticturn entails an anti-ideal-of-a-natural-science-of-society. In otherwords, the hermeneuticturn is a negationof all featuresof the prototypedescribed above. THEFALLOFKINSHIP 293

Also,by the 1960s,and just concomitant with the startof the turn, kinshipstudies seemed tohave reacheda scientiŽc apex.A sophisticated formal(at times mathematical) language to describe kinship genealogies andterminologies, a rigorousformal methodology to analyze the semantic ofkinshipterms, and a hostof typologiesand theoretical laws about kinship classiŽcations and their relations to socialstructure had been advanced.In the Britishtradition, descent theorists, under the guidanceof functional- structuralism,focused on the functionallaws of descent groups and their contributionto social equilibrium (see, e.g.,Radcliffe-Brown 1950; Fortes 1953).In the French tradition,alliance theorists,under the guidanceof structuralism,dealt with the principlesof alliance betweendescent groups impliedby different rules of marriage and somewhat correlated with differentkinship terminologies (see, e.g.,Levi-Strauss 1969[1949]; Dumont 1953).In the Americantradition, Murdock furnished an accountto the lawsof kinship systems andtheir relation to social structure, buttressed by cross-culturalstatistical tests (see Murdock1949), and formal approaches tothe studyof kinship semantics were developed as part of the school ofethnoscience, which later became cognitive anthropology (see, e.g., Goodenough1956; Lounsbury 1964). And,even ifnot all kinshipauthors just mentioned saw their theorizing asthe pursuitof anaturalscience ofsociety (from the perspectiveof many, itmeant simplyone of asocial science ofsociety),the areaof kinshipstudies becameidentiŽ ed in the mindsof anthropologists with a hermeneutic perspectiveas a theoreticalenterprise pursuing the rightend of line (2). The pointin this epidemiological approach is neither whetherkinship studieswere really aboutto achieve an idealof natural science ofsociety, norwhether kinship studies were perceived to bereally aboutto achieve an idealof a naturalscience ofsociety, but rather that kinship studies became identiŽed as the carrierof a projectwith suchan intent inthe mindof those whothought the identityof anthropology should be positioned more to the sideof the humanities. So,the additionalelement inexplaining the decreaseof interest in kinshipis the conclusionof the followingargument. With the hermeneutic turn,more and more anthropologists tended to identify anthropology as aprojectthat should be coupled with the humanities,away from the naturalsciences; because kinship had always been stronglyassociated 294 PAULO SOUSA withthe identityof anthropology in itself, and because kinship became stronglycorrelated with the aboveprototype, it became the symbolof anthropologyattempting to go in the directionof the naturalsciences; therefore:kinship became unattractive for more and more anthropologists, sinceit became the symbolof anthropology aiming in the rightdirection, namely, the wrongdirection. I hypothesizethat this symbolic association inthe mindof individual anthropologists is a fundamental(albeit perhaps notfully conscious)factor in the decreaseof interest in kinship. This factorinteracted with the existing criticismsof kinship theory by making them moreacceptable, by channeling theirinterpretation to more extreme conclusions,and also by making the countercriticismsthat eventually appearedignorable. Thistype ofexplanation predicts a secondstage in the decline of interestin kinship. The hermeneutic epistemology was widespread by the beginningof the 1980s,but there wasan importantdevelopment afterwards:

Rosaldonoted that in the 1970s,Geertz was preachingthe blurringof dis- ciplinary boundaries,the “reconŽguration of social thought,”and he rather fancifully suggestedthat there was aconnection between Geertz’s advocacy ofinterpretive ethnography and the New Left’s adoptionof a rainbowcoali- tionof minoritycauses. As Rosaldosaw it,the “reorientationof anthropology was itself partof a series ofmuch broadersocial movements andintellectual reformulations.”Be that as itmay, Geertz’ s writings hadformed the new generationof anthropologists, just as much as their irtationswith the New Left.Those who elected tofollow an academic career hadprudently written conventional interpretiveethnographies. But Geertz’ s advocacy ofliterary the- orydid offer an openingtoward a moreradical reorientation. Providentially enough,exciting new literary theories nowappeared, as “deconstruction” swept throughthe departmentsof literature. It is thereforenot altogether surprisingthat the next turnin American anthropologywas towardan ex- treme relativism andculturalism, the programof Geertz, butstripped of all reservations. (Kuper1999: 205-206)

Therewas no strong homogeneity among the authorsof the post-modern movement mentionedin this quotation (“ the next turnin American anthropology”– see, e.g.,Clifford & Marcus1986), but there wasan THEFALLOFKINSHIP 295 inuential general message consonantwith broad post-modern convictions –anextreme particularismand an extreme relativism. 18 The extreme particularismis a furtherextension ofthe hermeneutic atheoreticalstance. Beyond the rejectionof knowledge professing regular- itiesacross societies (cross-cultural regularities), it involves adismissalof knowledgeportraying regularities within a speciŽc society(cultural regular- ities).It is the very notionof culture with its implications of temporal sta- bility,homogeneity, and holistic integration that should now be considered theoreticallyunsound, since in reality societiesare completely dynamic, internally diversiŽed and fragmentary. 19 The extreme relativismis a furtherextension oftraditional cultural relativism.Most anthropologists tend to be relativistsconcerning the truth ofotherpeoples’ beliefs. People of each differentsociety live inaculturally constructedworld and have truebeliefs according to their culturally constructedworld – noepistemological justiŽ cation exists forassuming thatthe westernscientiŽ c descriptionof the worldis moreaccurate than a religiousdescription found in a non-westernsociety, for example. Butat the same timemost anthropologists tended not to berelativistsconcerning the possibilityof their interpretation of other peoples’ beliefs being accurate, whichis actually a necessary conditionfor the Žrsttype ofrelativism, sinceto postulate a pluralityof culturally constructed worlds, one has toaccept the possibilityof achieving real knowledge of the different culturallyconstructed worlds. The post-modernist position is that all claims toknowledgelack rationalfoundation. 20

18‘Particularism’here isrelated to the scopeof possible knowledge – itis a denialof generalizationsor universals;‘ relativism’related to the possibilityof knowledge – itis a denialof the differencebetween accurate and non-accurate descriptionsof the world(or ofthe differencebetween more accurateand less accurate descriptions of the world).In anthropology,the term ‘relativism’is normally usedin thesetwo senses, but no necessary connection existsbetween them: onecan denythe possibilityof generalizations and yet assumethe possibilityof some particular descriptionsbeing accurate, others not. 19Since the beginningof the seventies,there hadbeen criticisms pointingout that the essentializingimplications of the traditionalconcept of culture madeit irrelevant (Ortner 1984).The post-modernistextremist implicationis not simplythat the traditionalconcept ofculture isinvalid,but that noconcept of culture can bevalid. 20Since the beginningof the seventies,there hadbeen re exive criticisms questioning the ideologicalbasis of anthropological knowledge – the linksbetween anthropology and colonialism/imperialism(see, e.g., Asad 1973; Hymes 1974)and the masculinepoint of view 296 PAULO SOUSA

Theoutcome of a thoroughly uidobject of study and an entireab- sence ofobjectivity is a projectwhose aim is to reduce anthropologyto lit- eraryexperimentation or political demystiŽ cation, two somewhat different trendsof post-modernism. The extent towhich these antiepistemological normswere coherently followed,and to which the post-modernproject waseffectively realizedis notthe importantpoint here. What isfundamen- talis the implicationfor the personalidentity of anthropologists and their perceptionof scientiŽ c projects.If the hermeneuticturn implied a tension betweenbeing coupled with the humanitiesand being still ascientist,the post-modernmovement tendedto release the cognitivedissonance: an- thropologistsbecame unconstrained, qua anthropologists, in their pursuit ofpolitical and literary ventures. At the same time,the post-modernper- spectiveincreased the anti-scientiŽc biasamong anthropologists: the right directionbecame more like the rightpolitical direction, and the signsof science lostall theiraesthetical enticement. Forall this,my explanation entails thatthe post-modernmovement introduceda furtherdecrease of interestin kinship. The mainpredictions or retrodictions of the explanationcan be sum- marizedas follows: wherever hermeneuticor post-modernistclaims became widespreadand important amongst anthropologists, there shouldbe a sig- niŽcantly correlateddecrease of interest in kinship (and even strongerin the post-moderncase). Thus far, this “ wherever”has been understoodin the general contextof anthropology,but it can be understoodin the more speciŽc contextsof the differenttraditions or schools of anthropology. For example, althoughthe hermeneuticand post-modern claims reached a widedistribution in anthropology,they originatedmainly (andwere more inuential) in the Americantradition; therefore the predictionis that kin- shipbecame more unattractive in the Americantradition than inthe other traditions.On anotherlevel, althoughmore widespread in the American tradition,the claimswere not catchy for a schoolsuch as cognitiveanthro- pology,and the predictionis that there has been nosigniŽ cant decrease ofethnographic descriptions(see, e.g., Rosaldo & Lamphere1974). On the other hand,the emphasisput on interpretation bythe hermeneutic turn impliedalso that anthropological knowledgeis not amatter ofdirect observation.The post-modernistextremist implication isnot simplythat apositivisticconception of knowledge is invalid, but that noepistemic conceptof knowledge can bevalid. THEFALLOFKINSHIP 297 ofinterest in kinship in this school. In the end,the mostprecise pre- dictionis this: in any randomsample of anthropologists there willbe a signiŽcant correlation between their being in uenced by hermeneutics or post-modernismand their thinking that there cannotexist any theoryof kinship. My explanationcan also integrate the otherrelevant factsmentioned previouslywithout much difŽ culty. That the same criticismsdidn’ t have the same effectin relation to other basic concepts, that the traditional domainof kinship was incorporated by other basic domains instead ofa general dissolution,suit the singularsymbolic value thatkinship has forhermeneutists and post-moderns. The exaggerationof kinship’ s deathis to be understood in the contextof an ideologicalattempt to establishthe hegemony ofthe newepistemological trends and self-image ofanthropology, and therefore to reconŽ gure the distributionof academic prestigein the discipline.It is not only negligence ofthe workof supposedly conservativeanthropologists who insist in studying spurious objects, but alsoan attemptto assure the deathof the myth ofa naturalscience of society.

Conclusion

Ofcourse, much more empirical research is needed inorder to test the adequacyof the hypotheses andpredictions raised here. Forthis reason, my explanatorypicture is not much more than a logicalpossibility with someplausibility. But I wouldlike toconclude by pointingout another type oflimitation, one related to the internalcompleteness of my explanation asan epidemiologicalexplanation. Acommonexplanatory picture in anthropology is that the decline of kinshipas an objectof study is just a resultof the progressof knowledge ofthe discipline,which converged to the conclusionthat Homosapiens isa specialspecies whose behavior and thought cannot be understood incausal terms and whose only speciŽc andsubstantial commonality is the symboliccapacity to realize different cultures. The pointof interest formy Žnal remarkis that this picture entails an explanationfor the spreadof the hermeneuticepistemology that is incompatible with my approach– the hermeneuticturn is simply the epistemologicalconclusion ofthis development of knowledge about the basicontology of human 298 PAULO SOUSA beings.Even thoughmy explanatorypicture envisages thatthe criticisms ofkinship and other basic concepts contributed to the Žxationof the hermeneuticepistemology, it entails thatthis cannot be the wholestory. The hermeneuticturn is a necessary additionalfactor to explain the kinship fall,but something more is also required to explain the hermeneuticrise andits post-modern developments. So, a morecomplete epidemiology of the spreadof hermeneutic and post-modern claims in the anthropological subcultureis necessary. The wayto follow should be in line withthe general suggestionsof Kuperand Rosaldo (see Rosaldo1989) in Kuper’ s quotationabove: a look atthe ideasand values comingfrom the wideracademic context and also fromthe socialmovements ofthe time.In otherwords, it is important to dealwith the broaderscope of the distributionof ideas and values that helped toshape the hermeneuticand post-modern claims and that set the groundfor their attractiveness by co-optingsusceptibilities already existent amonganthropologists. In the end,probably, one will have toexplain why certainromantic ideas and a certainopposition between rationality and irrationalitybecame so contagious to the westernmind.

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