The Debate Over Selected Presidential Assistants and Advisors: Appointment, Accountability, and Congressional Oversight
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The Debate Over Selected Presidential Assistants and Advisors: Appointment, Accountability, and Congressional Oversight Barbara L. Schwemle Analyst in American National Government Todd Garvey Legislative Attorney Vivian S. Chu Legislative Attorney Henry B. Hogue Specialist in American National Government March 31, 2014 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov R40856 Selected Presidential Assistants and Advisors Summary A number of the appointments made by President Barack H. Obama to his Administration or by Cabinet secretaries to their departments have been referred to, especially by the news media, as “czars.” For some, the term is used to convey an appointee’s title (e.g., climate “czar”) in shorthand. For others, it is being used to convey a sense that power is being centralized in the White House or certain entities. When used in political science literature, the term generally refers to White House policy coordination or an intense focus by the appointee on an issue of great magnitude. Congress has noticed these appointments and in the 111th Congress examined some of them. The Senate Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Committee on the Judiciary, and the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, for example, conducted hearings on the “czar” issue on October 6, 2009, and October 22, 2009, respectively. One issue of interest to Congress may be whether some of these appointments (particularly some of those to the White House Office), made outside of the advice and consent process of the Senate, circumvent the requirements of the Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution. A second issue of interest may be whether the activities of such appointees are subject to oversight by Congress. This report provides background information and selected views on the role of some of these appointees. Additionally, it discusses some of the constitutional concerns that have been raised about presidential advisors. These include, for example, the kinds of positions that qualify as the type that must be filled in accordance with the Appointments Clause, with a focus on examining a few existing positions established by statute, executive order, and regulation. The report also reviews certain congressional oversight processes and assesses the applicability of these processes to presidential advisors. Legislative and non-legislative options for congressional consideration are presented. Congressional Research Service Selected Presidential Assistants and Advisors Contents Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 1 Background ...................................................................................................................................... 2 Selected Views on Special Assistants and Their Roles .............................................................. 5 Pay and Reporting Requirements for White House Staff .......................................................... 9 Vetting of Appointees .............................................................................................................. 10 Background Investigations ................................................................................................ 11 Financial Disclosure .......................................................................................................... 15 Outside Employment Limitations ............................................................................................ 16 Appointments Clause and Presidential Advisors ........................................................................... 19 Officer/Employee .................................................................................................................... 20 Principal Officer/ Inferior Officer ........................................................................................... 23 Analyses of Certain Presidential Advisors .............................................................................. 24 Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy .................................................... 24 Director of Urban Affairs .................................................................................................. 25 Special Master for TARP Executive Compensation .......................................................... 26 Summary of Presidential Advisor Analyses ...................................................................... 28 Congressional Oversight of Presidential Advisors ........................................................................ 28 Congress’s Oversight Authority............................................................................................... 28 The Relationship Between Advice and Consent and Congressional Oversight ...................... 30 Potential Legal Bases for the Denial of Access to Presidential Advisors ................................ 31 The Deliberative Process Privilege ................................................................................... 32 Executive Privilege ........................................................................................................... 32 Application to Potential Congressional Oversight of Presidential Advisors ..................... 40 Options for Congressional Consideration ...................................................................................... 41 Legislative Options .................................................................................................................. 41 Option: Report and Wait Provision ................................................................................... 41 Option: Add Advice and Consent Positions in the EOP .................................................... 42 Option: Reduce and/or Confirm Presidential Staff............................................................ 43 Oversight Options .................................................................................................................... 44 111th Congress Hearings ................................................................................................................ 46 Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Constitution ................................. 46 Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs .................................... 52 Contacts Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 59 Congressional Research Service Selected Presidential Assistants and Advisors Introduction1 Article II, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution provides that the President shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments. A number of the appointments made by President Barack H. Obama to his Administration or by Cabinet Secretaries to their departments have been referred to, especially by the news media, as “czars.”2 For some, the term is being used to convey an appointee’s title (e.g., climate “czar”) in shorthand. For others, it is used to convey a sense that power is being centralized in the White House or certain entities. When used in political science literature, the term generally refers to White House policy coordination or an intense focus by the appointee on an issue of great magnitude. Congress has noticed these appointments and in the 111th Congress examined some of them. The Senate Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Committee on the Judiciary, and the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, for example, conducted hearings on the “czar” issue on October 6, 2009, and October 22, 2009, respectively.3 Legislative action has focused on prohibitions on the use of appropriated funds to compensate certain appointees. P.L. 113-76, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, enacted on January 17, 2014, prohibits the use of funds to pay the salaries and expenses for the (1) Director, White House Office of Health Reform; (2) Assistant to the President for Energy and Climate Change; (3) Senior Advisor to the Secretary of the Treasury assigned to the Presidential Task Force on the Auto Industry and Senior Counselor for Manufacturing Policy; and (4) White House Director of Urban Affairs.4 A similar provision was included in P.L. 112-74, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, enacted on December 23, 2011.5 Division C of the law included the Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) Appropriations Act. The Office of Management and Budget’s 1 Barbara L. Schwemle, Analyst in American National Government in the Government and Finance Division (7-8655), wrote this section. 2 The use of the term “czar” to refer to government officials is not new. In the 19th century, for example, these officials had that moniker attached to their names: Nicholas Biddle, President of the Bank of the United States, during the “bank wars”; Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, during Reconstruction; and Thomas Reed, Speaker of the House of Representatives, during disputes over the rules for the