tiA.va REPUBLIC OF THE ^anliiganbnpan Quezon City

Fourth Division

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SB-17-CRM-0494 Plaintiff, For:

Present;

versus - Quiroz, J., Chairperson Cruz, J. Jacinto, J.

CEASAR SORIANO y CANAMA Promulgated: and PERLIZA SORIANO y RUIZOL, , Accused. \J LANt^ f I ojo f ^

X-

DECISION

JACINTO, J:

This resolves the complaint for Perjury under Article 183 ofthe Revised Penal Code (RPC) against Ceasar Soriano y Canama (Ceasar) and Perliza Soriano y Ruizol (Perliza), then Mayor and Vice-Mayor, respectively, of the Municipality of Siocon, Zamboanga del Norte.

This case was initiated by an Affidavit-Complaint filed by the Field Investigation Unit (FIU) of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao against herein accused for violation of Section 8 of Republic Act (R.A.) No, 6713.' Said complaint was based on its fact-finding investigation, wherein it found that from 2011 to 2013 accused failed to declare several business interests in their joint Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN).

After undergoing preliminary investigation, the 0MB issued its Resolution dated 18 April 2016,^ finding probable cause to indict accused for two counts of Violation of Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 6713, and one count of Perjury. However, in its Order dated 1 September 2016,^ the 0MB resolved to instead

1 Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. V ^ Records, Vol. I, pp. 8-69. ^ Id., pp. 16-21. Decision People V. Ceasar Soriano y Canama and Perliza Soriano y Ruizol SB-17-CRM-0494 Page 2 of 13

charge accused with only one count of violation of Sec. 8 of R.A- No. 6713, which case was docketed before this Court as SB-17-CRM-0493, and one count of perjury, which case was docketed as SB-17-CRM-0494.

The Information charging accused with Perjury reads as follows:'^

That in April 2012, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, the Municipality of Siocon, Zamboanga del Norte, Philippines, and withifi this Honorable Court's jurisdiction, the above-named accused Ceasar Sori^i^o y Canama and Perliza Soriano y Ruizol, the Mayor and the Vice-M^yor' respectively, of the Municipality of Siocon, Zamboanga del T^orte, committing the offense in relation to office, and being required tinder Republic Act No. 6713 to accomplish and submit their Statemerrts of Assets, Liabilities, and Networth (SALN) under oath, conspiring and confederating with each other^ did then and there willfully, unlawfully' feloniously make a deliberate assertion of falsehood upon a material rtiatter in their 2011 joint SALN, which was sworn to before an officer authorized to administer oaths, when both accused omitted to declare the follO'wing businesses:

(1) Sand and Gravel Supply; (2) Digital Imaging; (3) Wine and Liquor Distributor; (4) Sunrise Money Transfer; and (5) Sunrise Pawnshop;

to the damage and prejudice of the public interest.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COURT

Accused Ceasar was arraigned on 8 January 2018 and enteTd pleas of "Not Guilty" to the charges against him.^ During the same hearing? he agreed to be rearraigned for SB-17-CRM-0493, and entered a plea of "Guilty" for viol^ion of Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 6713 for the reduced penalty of PhP 00.00.^ Thus, only the present case remained against him.

On the other hand, accused Perliza remains to be arraigned, such is considered at large.

Records, Vol. I, pp. 4-6. 'Order dated 8 January 2018, Records, p. 266. «Id., pp. 269-272. Decision People V. Ceasar Soriano y Canama and Perliza Soriano y Ruizol SB-17-CRM-0494 Page 3 of 13

Accused Ceasar and the prosecution agreed to enter into a joint stipulation of facts and accordingly submitted their Joint Motion to Admit dated 4 July 2018, with attached Joint Stipulations / Narration ofFacts with Formal Offer ofEvidence?

On 16 July 2018, the Court issued its Amended Pre-Trial Order? incorporating therein the joint stipulations made by the parties and their formal offer of evidence. With the said stipulations, the parties agreed to forgo the presentation of testimonial evidence.

As to their formal offers of evidence, in its 23 January 2019 Resolution,^ the Court admitted the prosecution's Exhibits "A,""B," "C," "C- 1," "E," "F,""G," "G-1," "H," "I," "J,""M," "M-1" to "M-4," and "N," while noting that there are no Exhibits "D" and "L." For the accused, it admitted Exhibits "2" to "4," and noted that it did not have its Exhibit "1."

On 12 March 2019, the prosecution filed its Memorandum. On the other hand, accused Ceasar failed to file his memorandum despite due notice.

EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION AND ACCUSED

The parties decided to forgo the presentation of their evidence upon jointly stipulating on the following facts;"

Accused Ceasar Canama Soriano, and his wife, accused Perliza Ruizol Soriano, former Mayor and Vice-Mayor, respectively, in the Municipality of Siocon, Zamboanga del Norte from 2010 to 2013, stand charged for one count of Perjury defined and penalized under Article 183 ofthe Revised Penal Code on account oftheir failure to declare in their Joint Swom Statement of Assets, liabilities and Networth as of December 31, 2011 the following businesses:

a. Sand and Gravel Supply; b. Digital Imaging; c. Wine and Liquor Distributor; d. Sunrise Money Transfer; and e. Sunrise Pawnshop

'' Records, pp. 330-341. 8 Id., pp. 347-356. ^ Id., pp. 402-403. Memorandum (for the Plaintiff) dated 8 March 2019, Records, pp. 412-426. "Pre-Trial Order, supra at note 8 w\d. Joint Stipulations /Narration ofFacts with Formal Offer ofEvidence, supra at note 7. 7 Decision People V. Ceasar Soriano y Canama and Perliza Soriano y Ruizol SB-17-CRM-0494 Page 4 of 13

The case stemmed from the Affidavit-Complaint dated October 31, 2014 filed by the Field Investigation Unit (FIU) of the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao, through Arizona Martin J. Boiser, against the accused Ceasar Canama Soriano and Perliza Ruizol Soriano charging the latter of violation of Section 8(a) in relation to Section 11 of R.A. 6713 and other charges, after the said FIU conducted its field verification and investigation of the Joint Complaint-Affidavit dated July 31, 2014 executed by Julius S. Lobrigas, Nathaniel B. Usin, Rosalio T. Cardenas, Jr., Boslon M. Danduh, Joseph N. Garcia, Arsenia R. del Rosario, Bonifacio S. Lobrigas, Jovelito T. Guardarama and Emir T. Arabi against accused Ceasar Canama Soriano and other former officials and employees of the Municipality of Siocon, Zamboanga del Norte.

From the evidence adduced by the prosecution, it appears that accused Perliza Ruizol Soriano was given a permit to engage in business of Sand and Gravel supply within the Municipality of Siocon by the Office of the Municipal Mayor, Municipality of Siocon, Zamboanga del Norte and paid the necessary fees and taxes thereon as per Permit No. 214 issued on February 1, 2010. Accused Ceasar Canama Soriano was likewise given the following permits to engage in certain types of business by the Office ofthe Municipal Mayor, Municipality of Siocon, Zamboanga del Norte and paid the necessary fees and taxes thereon, to wit:

Permit Type of Business Date Issued Number 192 Digital Imaging January 29, 2010 2011-0072 Digital Imaging January 07,2011 189 Wine and Liquor Distributor January 29, 2010 191 Money Transfer January 29, 2010 199 Pawnshop January 29, 2010

Furthermore, on November 5,2010, accused Perliza Ruizol Soriano applied before the Provincial Environment and Development Office, Province of Zamboanga del Norte for a commercial permit to quarry in Barangay Pisawak, Municipality of Siocon. Thus, on January 17, 2012, the Office of the Provincial Governor,Province ofZamboanga del Norte issued to accused Perliza Ruizol Soriano Governor's Permit No. OGSAG-003- 2006-0834 to extract, haul and transport Sand and Gravel for the period from January 17, 2012 to January 18, However, none of the said businesses Sand and Gravel Supply, Digital Imaging, Wine and Liquor Distributor, Money Transfer and Pawnshop were declared by accused Ceasar Canama Soriano and Perliza Ruizol Soriano when they filed their Joint Sworn Statement of Assets, Liabilities and NetWorth, Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections and Identification of Relatives in the Government Service (Joint SALN for brevity) as of December 31, 2011 before the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao sometime in April 2012.

In his defense, accused Ceasar Canama maintains that there was no deliberate assertion of falsehood upon a material matter in not declaring in their Joint SALN the following businesses since they never operated them to begin with: r Decision People V. Ceasar Soriano y Canama and Perliza Soriano y Ruizol SB-17-CRM-0494 Page 5 of 13

a. Sand and Gravel Supply; b. Digital Imaging; c. Wine and Liquor Distributor; d. Sunrise Money Transfer; and e. Sunrise Pawnshop

In a letter dated March 4, 2011, Mayor Soriano informed the Municipal Treasurer of Siocon that he is withdrawing the permits for: (a) Sand and Gravel Supply, (b) Digital Imaging, (c) Wine and Liquor Distribution,(d) Sunrise Money Transfer and (e) Sunrise Pawnshop due to lack of capital/funds to operate the businesses.

The Municipal Treasurer of Siocon, Zamboanga del Norte issued a Certification dated September 11, 2014 stating that: (a) Sand and Gravel Supply,(b) Digital Imaging,(c) Wine and Liquor Distribution,(d) Sunrise Money Transfer and (e) Sunrise Pavmshop were neither opened nor operated.

The September II, 2014 Certification states that the Office of the Municipal Treasurer cancelled/revoked the business permits of:(a)Sand and Gravel Supply, (b) Digital Imaging,(c) Wine and Liquor Distribution,(d) Sunrise Money Transfer and (e) Sunrise Pawnshop upon verification that they were not operating.

The accused stipulated on the existence, due execution, and genuineness of the following prosecution evidence;

Exhibits Description A Affidavit-Complaint dated October 31,2014, of Arizona Martin J. Boiser - Field Investigation Unit, Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao and its Annexes B Joint Complaint-Affidavit of Julius S. Lobrigas, Nathaniel B. Usin, Rosalio T. Cardenas, Jr., Boslon M. Danduh, Joseph N. Garcia, Arsenia R. del Rosario, Bonifacio S. Lobrigas, Jovelito T. Guardarama and Emir T. Arabi dated July 31, 2014. C Service Record of Ceasar Canaman Soriano C-1 Service Record of Perliza Ruizol Soriano ^ E Sworn Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Networth, etc. as of December 31, 2011, of Ceasar Soriano y Canama and Perliza Soriano y Ruizol F 2010 Permit to Engage in Business No. 214 for Sand and Gravel. G 2010 Permit to Engage in Business No. 192 for Digital Imaging G-1 2010 Permit to Engage in Business No. 2011-0072 for Digital Imaging H Permit to Engage in Business No. 189 for Wine and Liquor Distributor I Permit to Engage in Business No. 191 for Sunrise Money Transfer J Permit to Engage in Business No. 193 for Sunrise Pawnshop y /fry Decision People V. Ceasar Soriano y Canama and Perliza Soriano y Ruizol SB-17-CRM-0494 Page 6 of 13

M Application for Commercial Permit to Quarry, dated November 5,2010,from Provincial Environment and Development Office M-1 O.K. No. 3204558 M-2 Breakdown of fees and charges M-3 O.K. No. 3204560 M-4 Breakdown of fees and charges N 2012 Govemor's Permit for Sand and Gravel No. OGSAG-003- 2006-0834

On the other hand, the prosecution stipulated on the existence, due execution, and genuineness of the following defense evidence:

Exhibits Description 2 Letter of the Municipal Treasurer dated March 4, 2011 2-a Signature 3 Letter of Karon Esmali 3-a Signature 4 Certification issued by the Municipal Treasurer 4-a Signature

PROSECUTION'S MEMORANDUM

The Prosecution asserts that the only question left for the Court's consideration is the presence of the third element of the of perjury; specifically, that the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood.

It submits that in the declaration of business interests per Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 6713, the law does not make a distinction as to whether an affiant's business became operational or not. Hence, accused's defense of non- operation of his businesses has no bearing on the case against him.

In addition, the prosecution states that pronounced efforts had been exefted by accused Ceasar to obtain the necessary permits and licenses for the operation of their sand and gravel supply business. Thus, on 17 January 2012, it was issued a permit to extract, haul, and transport sand and gravel for the period running from 17 January 2012 to 18 January 2013. The same amount of effort was exerted in the accused's digital imaging business. Therefore, they were able to obtain business permits for the years 2010 and 2012, on 29 January 2010 and 7 January 2011, respectively. On the basis of these circumstances,the prosecution concludes that there is no question that the said business actually operated.

/Vh/ Decision People V. Ceasar Soriano y Canama and Perliza Soriano y Ruizol SB-17-CRM-0494 Page 7 of 13

As to the accused's evidence, the prosecution submits that the Letter dated 4 March 2011 (Exh."2") sent by accused to the Municipal Treasurer's Office instead of the Office of the Mayor, which is the office that issued said permits, has no bearing. It likewise argues that the Certification dated 11 September 2014(Exh. "4"), which was issued three years after the application of the business permits, cannot be given any probative value. Lastly, it points out that while the Certification states that the accused decided to discontinue their business a week after their permits were issued due to financial constraints, the date of the document itself would show that such declaration was made only three months after the issuance of the permit for their digital imaging business.

All these taken together, the prosecution submits that it was able to prove accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

As noted earlier, accused Ceasar failed to file his memorandum.

ISSUE

The parties phrased the issue accordingly:'^

Whether accused Ceasar Canama Soriano made a deliberate assertion of falsehood upon a material matter in not declaring the following businesses in his SALN with his wife, to wit:

a. Sand and Gravel Supply; b. Digital Imaging; c. Wine and Liquor Distributor; d. Sunrise Money Transfer; and e. Sunrise Pawnshop

DISCUSSION

Accused are charged with Perjury as defined and penalized under Art. 183 of the RFC, to wit.

Art. 183. False testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn affirmation. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any person who, knowingly making untruthful statements and not being included in the provisions of the next preceding articles, shall testify under oath or make an , i

Supra at notes 7 and 8. /rr/ Decision People V. Ceasar Soriano y Canama and Perliza Soriano y Ruizol SB-17-CRM-0494 Page 8 of 13

affidavit upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires. Any person who, in ease of a solenrn affirmation made in lieu of an oath, shall commit any of the falsehoods mentioned in this and the three preceding articles of this section shall suffer the respective penalties provided therein.

The essential elements necessary to prove the said crime are as follows;'^

(i) the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material matter; (ii) the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized to receive and administer oath; (iii) That in that statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood. (iv) That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a legal purpose. Upon the stipulations made by the parties, the only issue left to determine is whether the third element has been proven in this case.

In all intentional , malicious intent must be proven together with the constitutive criminal acts. This basic precept in was further elucidated in Jabalde v. People^^ thus:

The case of Villareal v. People is instructing. In that case, the Court discussed that the RFC belongs to the classical school of thought. The criminal liability is thus based on the free will and moral blame of the actor. Th^dentity of mens rea — defined as a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful P'rf^ose or criminal intent — is the predominant consideration. In order for an intentional felony to exist, it is necessary that the act be committed by means of"do/o" or "malice". The Court further explained that the term "c/o/o" or "malice" is a complex idea involving the elements of freedom, intelligence, and intent. The element of intent is described as the state of mind accompanying an act, especially a forbidden act. It refers to the purpose of the mind and the resolve with which a person proceeds. On the other hand, the term

"Diaz V. People, G.R. No. 65006, 31 October 1990. / >■» G.R. No. 195224, 15 June 2016. / Decision People V. Ceasar Soriano y Canama and Perliza Soriano y Ruizol SB-17-CRM-0494 Page 9 of 13

"felonious" means, inter alia, malicious, villainous, and/or proceeding from an evil heart or purpose. With these elements taken together, the requirement of intent in intentional felony must refer to malicious intent, which is a vicious and malevolent state of mind accompanying a forbidden act.

In order to be found guilty of the felonious acts under Articles 262 to 266 of the [RFC], the employment of physical injuries must be coupled with dolus mains. As an aet that is mala in se, the existence of malicious intent is fundamental, since injury arises from the mental state of the wrongdoer — iniuria ex affectu facientis consistat. If there is no criminal intent, the accused cannot be found guilty of an intentional felony. Thus, in case of physical injuries under the [RFC], there must be a speeific animus iniuriandi or malicious intention to do wrong against the physical integrity or well-being of a person, so as to incapacitate and deprive the victim of certain bodily functions. Without proof beyond reasonable doubt of the required animus iniuriandi, the overt act of inflicting physical injuries per se merely satisfies the elements of freedom and intelligence in an intentional felony. The commission of the act does not, in itself, make a man guilty unless his intentions are. (citations omitted)

Particular to the felony of perjury, the Supreme Court reminds in Villanueva v. Secretary ofJustice^ ^ that a mere assertion of a false objective fact is insufficient to prove the said crime. There is a need to prove malicious intent, and as such a statement of false belief is not perjury:

A mere assertion of a false objective fact, a falsehood, is not enough. The assertion must be deliberate and willful. Perjury being a felony by dolo, there must be malice on the part of the accused. Willfully means intentionally; with evil intent and legal malice, with the consciousness that the alleged perjurious statement is false with the intent that it should be received as a statement of what was true in fact. It is equivalent to "knowingly." "Deliberately" implies meditated as distinguished from inadvertent acts. It must appear that the accused knows his statement to be false or as consciously ignorant of its truth.

Perjury cannot be willful where the oath is according to belief or conviction as to its truth. A false statement of a belief is not perjury. Bona fide belief in the truth of a statement is an adequate defense. A false statement which is obviously the result of an honest mistake is not perjury.

There are two essential elements of proof for perjury: (1) the statement made by the defendants must be proven false; and (2) it must be proven that the defendant did not believe those statements to be true. G.R.No. 162187, 18 November 2005• / Decision People V. Ceasar Soriano y Canama and Perliza Soriano y Ruizol SB-17-CRM-0494 Page 10 of 13

Knowledge by the accused of the falsity of his statement is an internal act. It may be proved by his admissions or by circumstantial evidence. The state of mind of the accused may be determined by the things he says and does, from proof of a motive to lie and of the objective falsity itself, and from other facts tending to show that the accused really knew the things he claimed not to know.

A conviction for perjury cannot be sustained merely upon the contradictory sworn statements of the accused. The prosecution must prove which of the two statements is false and must show the statement to be false by other evidence than the contradicting statement. The rationale of this principle is thus:

... Proof that accused has given contradictory testimony under oath at a different time will not be sufficient to establish the falsity of testimony charged as perjury, for this would leave simply one oath of the defendant as against another, and it would not appear that the testimony charged was false rather than the testimony contradictory thereof. The two statements will simply neutralize each other; there must be some corroboration of the contradictory testimony. Such corroboration, however, may be furnished by evidence aliunde tending to show perjury independently of the declarations of testimony of the accused, (citations omitted)

The totality of the prosecution's evidence is composed of the business permits issued to the accused. Said pieces of evidence, paired with the fact that said businesses were not included in accused Ceasar's SALN, constitute an omission of necessary details and clearly results in the violation of Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 6713, a special law. However,for a successful prosecution for the felony of perjury, accused's deliberate and malicious intent to conceal his business interests must be proven.

Accused's non-inclusion of interest in his SALN of any subsisting business within the relevant period is objectively wrong and violates R.A. No. 6713. However, while the evidence on record can sustain a finding for violation of the said law, it is insufficient to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, accused's culpability for perjury.

The existence of the permits to operate can only prove that accused was capacitated to engage in such businesses. He could, in fact, have commenced operations upon conferment of such permits. However, the ability to engage in a business cannot directly translate to its operation. Here, the prosecution failed to show accused's conscious, malicious concealment in executing his SALN. It could have done so by presenting circumstantial evidence that would tend to prove his malicious intent, such as proof of the actual operation of said businesses. It could likewise have presented positive testimony that / Decision People V. Ceasar Soriano y Canama and Perliza Soriano y Ruizol SB-17-CRM-0494 Page 11 of 13

accused wished to conceal the fact of the operation of such businesses from the public by not declaring them in his SALN or from other relevant government offices such as the Bureau of Internal Revenue or Department of Trade and Industry to avoid regulation. This, however, it failed to do.

On the other hand, accused Ceasar claimed in his defense that he believed in good faith that his businesses' non-operation and his declaration before the Municipal Treasurer's Office would mean that he no longer needed to declare the same in his SALN. As discussed above, Villanueva recognizes that a false statement of a belief avoids a charge for perjury. For lack of independent proof of operation of accused's businesses, nothing else exists on record that would serve to disprove the basis of his allegation of good faith.

In sum,the prosecution failed to supply the quantum of proof required to prove the presence of the third element of perjury. Such failure becomes even more significant when viewed in light of accused's presumption of innocence.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, accused CEASAR SORIANO y CANAMA is hereby ACQUITTED of the charge of Perjury under Art. 183 of the Revised Penal Code, for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The cash bond posted by accused for his provisional liberty is ordered RELEASED, subject to the usual accounting and auditing procedures, and the Hold Departure Order issued against him is hereby LIFTED.

As for accused PERLIZA SORIANO y RUIZOL, who remains at large, the case against her is hereby ARCHIVED until the Court obtains jurisdiction over her person.

SO ORDERED.

BAYANI/H.|flACINTO AssodiateVustice Decision People V. Ceasar Soriano y Canama and Perliza Soriano y Ruizol SB-17-CRM-0494 Page 12 of 13

WE CONCUR:

CLEX L. QUI RET^ALP^.CRUZ Associate Justice / Associate Justice Chairperson Decision People V. Ceasar Soriano y Canama and Perliza Soriano y Ruizol SB-17-CRM-0494 Page 13 of 13

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation with the Justices of the Court's Division.

^LE^.QUI Associate Justice Chairperson, Fourth Divisi

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

TAJE-T Presiding Justice

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