Security, Justice and Governance in South East Myanmar

REPORT SAFERWORLD AND KAREN PEACE SUPPORT NETWORK 1 security, justice and governance in south east myanmar

Security, justice and governance in south east Myanmar

SECURITY, JUSTICE AND GOVERNANCE IN SOUTH EAST MYANMAR A knowledge, attitudes and practices survey in Karen ceasefire areas

January 2019 Security, justice and governance in south east Myanmar

A knowledge, attitudes and practices survey in Karen ceasefire areas

SAFERWORLD · KAREN PEACE SUPPORT NETWORK

JANUARY 2019 © Saferworld, January 2019. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without full attribution. Saferworld welcomes and encourages the utilisation and dissemination of the material included in this publication. This research was funded by the Paung Sie Facility. All views expressed are explicitly those of Saferworld and the Karen Peace Support Network. Contents

Foreword v Acknowledgements vi Maps viii Key terms, acronyms and abbreviations xi

Executive summary xiii

1. Introduction and key findings 1 1.1 Introduction 1 1.2 Participants in this survey 8 1.3 Key findings: security, justice, governance and politics 13

2. Governance and legitimacy 19 2.1 Village-level governance 21 2.2 Perceptions and preferences regarding governance 28 2.3 Identity, governance and implications for peace 32 2.4 Armed actors that splintered from the KNU 35 2.5 Taxation 38 2.6 Understanding territory 42

3. Security forces and experiences of violence 51 3.1 Exposure to security forces 53 3.2 Violence and abuse perpetrated by authorities 56 3.3 Before and after the ceasefires 63 3.4 Perpetrators of violence and abuse 69

4. Justice 73 4.1 Attitudes towards justice 74 4.2 Actual justice cases 80

5. Peace and conflict 85

6. Conclusion and recommendations 91 6.1 Conclusion 91 6.2 Recommendations 94 6.3 Furthering the research agenda 98

References and bibliography 100 v

Foreword

Saferworld and the karen peace support network have been working together since 2013 to identify the main conflict and security issues faced by Karen people in south east Myanmar and support locally driven efforts to achieve more peaceful, just and secure communities. The members of KPSN, as the largest network of Karen civil society organisations in southeast Myanmar, have decades of collective experience working to empower local Karen communities and advocate for a sustainable and equitable peace in Karen areas. Saferworld has been working in Myanmar since 2012, building on over three decades of international experience working with partners in conflict affected areas to prevent violence and build safer lives. The way that security, justice and governance is delivered and experienced lies at the heart of the complex factors that determine how Myanmar can move towards lasting peace. Since Saferworld and KPSN first formed a partnership in 2013, it has become increasingly apparent that without efforts to transform the security, justice and governance architecture in Myanmar, this goal will remain out of reach. Con- sequently, over the last six years KPSN and Saferworld have been working to make communities more secure and peaceful, and drawing on this experience to inform and influence authorities to be inclusive and more responsive and accountable to community needs. This knowledge, attitudes and practices survey is intended to improve understanding of the experiences of ordinary people living in areas affected by Myanmar’s most historic armed conflict between the Government of the Union of Myanmar and the Karen National Union. It draws on the experiences of over 2020 respondents from 72 villages randomly selected across rural ceasefire areas in Bago, Kayin, Mon and Tanintharyi. The findings demonstrate the complexity of the governance and territorial landscape, and how these dynamics are intrinsically tied to the protracted conflict, the peace process, governance reforms and aid programmes. Although the subjects covered in this report are profoundly sensitive and complex, we hope that the recommendations to the Government of the Union of Myanmar, the Karen National Union and the international aid community will support efforts to address the root causes of conflict and insecurity in the Karen ceasefire areas of south east Myanmar.

John Bainbridge Saw Alex Htoo Country Manager Chairperson Saferworld, Myanmar Karen Peace Support Network vi

Acknowledgements

From the Karen Peace Support Network advisory team

This report would not have been possible without the information, effort and support provided by the range of organisations and individuals who dedicated their time, their efforts and their insights throughout the process. Special thanks to Saferworld for its valuable and effective technical and financial assistance in launching this survey and in developing this report. We are particularly appreciative to Kim Jolliffe and Gino C. Matibag for their technical support and coordination throughout the report process. Many thanks are extended to the wider Karen Peace Support Network for the valuable workshops and trainings attended by the partners' staff and volunteers who conducted practical work in the field. We would also like to express our thanks to the KNU local authorities, the Myanmar government local authorities, and all the respondents for their cooperation.

From the Saferworld research team

This report is the result of the collective efforts of many individuals. The Karen Peace Support Network was particularly instrumental in the research. Utmost acclaim should be given to the six team leaders and 50 enumerators provided by the Karen Peace Support Network, without whom the research and this report would not have been possible. The teams worked tirelessly and in a highly challenging environment through November 2017 until January 2018 to conduct more than 2,000 survey interviews. The Karen Peace Support Network further provided an advisory team who dedicated many hours of their time to give regular input into the initial conceptualisation of the research, the development of the methodology, the sampling of research locations, the development of the questionnaire, the interpretation and analysis of the data, the development of key messages and recommendations and the co-drafting of the final report. Saferworld hired 11 data encoders, who we are also grateful to, who worked throughout January 2018 to enter all the data into our database. Kim Jolliffe was the author and lead researcher. Gino C. Matibag was the lead quantitative expert involved in the research. Dr Theo Hollander (Saferworld) supervised the research team and provided technical support and input during all the stages of the report production. John Bainbridge (Saferworld) and Saw Lin Chel (Saferworld) helped to conceptualise research objectives, developed the partnership with the Karen Peace Support Network, and provided substantial input during the report drafting process. Jared Bissinger provided further quantitative analysis of the data and reviewed the report, specifically ensuring the quality of the quantitative analysis. Diana Trimino (Saferworld) provided critical input on gender, as well as overall feedback on the data analysis and final analysis. Charlotte Watson (Saferworld) provided input at various stages of the research, including feedback during the drafting process. Dr Tamara Duffey-Janser (Saferworld) and Robert Parker (Saferworld) were responsible for the final review and quality control. The Myanmar Information Management Unit assisted with the creation of the maps. The report was copyedited by Jane Lanigan and reviewed by Jessica Summers (Saferworld), with important input from Elizabeth Bourne (Saferworld). The report also benefited from the external inputs and reviews by Susanne Kempel and Maria Helene Kyed. Unless indicated otherwise, all photographs © Aung Naing Soe/Saferworld. saferworld · karen peace support network vii

About the Karen Peace Support Network (KPSN)

KPSN (formerly KCBPSN) is the largest network of Karen civil society organisations in Burma [Myanmar]. Its member organisations have been providing support for vulnerable people and communities in this conflict-torn region for decades, striving to empower local communities, build transparent and accountable institutions, and help create a sustainable peace in Burma. The network is dedicated to: n Raising awareness of the peace process and of human rights issues among Karen communities n Building the capacity of communities to advocate for and realise their rights n Providing practical support for communities to create sustainable livelihoods and improve their quality of life n Supporting Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and returnees n Monitoring the peace process n Facilitating consultation and advocacy for a sustainable and equitable peace in Burma [Myanmar]

KPSN member organisations and allies: Organisation Acronym 1 Back Pack Health Worker Team BPHWT 2 Karen Affairs Committee KAC 3 Karen Development Committee KDC 4 Karen Education Department KED 5 Karen Environmental and Social Action Network KESAN 6 Karen Human Rights Group KHRG 7 Karen Office for Relief and Development KORD 8 Karen Refugee Committee KRC 9 Karen Rivers Watch KRW 10 Karen Student Network Group KSNG 11 Karen Teacher Working Group KTWG 12 Karen Women’s Empowerment Group KWEG 13 Karen Women’s Organization KWO 14 Karen Youth Organization KYO 15 Mae Tao Clinic MTC 16 Hsar Mu Htaw HMH 17 Hku Po Ka Paw HPKP 18 Youth Circle YC 19 Mutraw Community Development Committee MCDC 20 Taw Oo Development Committee TODC 21 Thwee Community Development Network TCDN 22 Committee for Internally Displaced Karen People CIDKP 23 Karen Women’s Union KWU 24 Karen Lawyer Network KLN 25 Southern Youth Tinnithryi SYT 26 Karen State Civil Society Organizations Network KSCN 27 Karen Development Network KDN 28 Karen Baptist Convention KBC 29 Burma Medical Association BMA 30 Committee for Internally Displaced Karen People CIDKP viii working with businesses for peace in bangladesh

Myanmar Information Management Unit Map 1: KAP survey area and selected villages

96° E 98° E 100° E

Yedashe BHUTAN

INDIA

Taungoo CHINA BANGLADESH

Oktwin Thandaunggyi

Htantabin MYANMAR Phyu LAOS Kyaukkyi Hpapun

Kyauktaga THAILAND THAILAND Shwegyin N N ° ° 8 8 1 1 Nyaunglebin

Daik-U Bago

Waw Kyaikto Bilin

Thanatpin Hlaingbwe Kilometers 0 20 40 80 Kawa Thaton

Paung Hpa-An

Kawkareik Kyaikmaraw Chaungzon Myawaddy Mudon N N ° ° 6 6 1 1

Thanbyuzayat Kyainseikgyi

Legend * The locations shown on the map Sample Village Tracts are random points within the selected village tract and do not reflect the Map ID: MIMU1607v01 Survey area specific location of the actual villages, Completion Date: 5 July 2018. A4 for security reasons. Yebyu Projection/Datum: Geographic/WGS84

Village found to be * Data Sources: ** These are not official definitions Survey: Saferworld GoM-controlled ** Boundaries: WFP/MIMU recognised by either GoM or KNU - Place Name: Ministry of Home Affairs KNU-controlled they are illustrative designations (GAD), translated by MIMU based on data collected in this survey on service delivery, tax [email protected]

N Mix-controlled www.themimu.info N ° °

4 collection and presence of troops. 4 1 Launglon Dawei Copyright © Myanmar Information 1 Major road Management Unit 2018. May be used free of charge with attribution. Secondary road Due to security and logistical constraints River experienced during the data collection Thayetchaung International boundary phase, one village was replaced by the team leader in coordination with the State/Region boundary survey design expert resulting in a village Township boundary from outside the original survey area Palaw Tanintharyi (in Taungoo Township, Bago Region) Village tract boundary being included, as shown. 96° E 98° E 100° E

Disclaimer: The names shown and the boundaries used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. saferworld · karen peace support network ix x security, justice and governance in south east myanmar saferworld · karen peace support network xi

Key terms

‘Authority’ is primarily used throughout this report to refer to the Government of the Union of Myanmar (GoM), Karen National Union (KNU) and other armed actors that hold influence over local communities, such as the Democratic Karen Benevolent/ Buddhist Army (DKBA), Border Guard Forces (BGFs) and the Karen Peace Council (KPC). It is not used to describe village and village tract leaders or committees. ‘Direct contact’ is a term introduced in section 2.4 for samples of the survey population found to either pay tax to, receive services from or see soldiers very often or often from each authority. Respondents who met any one of the above criteria for the GoM, KNU, DKBA, BGF or KPC, were determined to have ‘direct contact’. This was primarily used for the smaller armed actors, so that meaningful analysis could be carried out about those groups from just the small samples. The terms‘GoM’ , ‘KNU’, ‘DKBA’ and ‘KPC’ were all used to refer collectively to any department or body from each of those authorities. ‘GoM’ could, thus, include the Tatmadaw (Myanmar language word for ‘Armed Forces’ used in this report as the formal name for the national armed forces), the Myanmar Police Force (MPF) or any other part of the state apparatus. KNU could include its armed wings, the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) and Karen National Defence Organisation (KNDO), or any other department or service.

Acronyms and abbreviations

BGFs Border Guard Forces CBO Community-based organisation DKBA Democratic Karen Benevolent/Buddhist Army EAO Ethnic armed organisation GAD General Administration Department IED Improvised explosive device KHRG Karen Human Rights Group KNDO Karen National Defence Organisation KNLA Karen National Liberation Army KNPF Karen National Police Force KNU Karen National Union KPC Karen Peace Council KPSN Karen Peace Support Network KWO Karen Women Organisation GBV Gender-based violence GoM Government of the Union of Myanmar MIMU Myanmar Information Management Unit MPF Myanmar Police Force NCA Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement VTA Village tract administrator xii

A man on a raft near Hpa An city. © Theo Hollander xiii

Executive summary

covering 2,020 respondents in 72 villages, this knowledge, attitudes and practices survey provides unprecedented insights into the experiences of ordinary people amidst Myanmar’s most historic armed conflict – that between the Government of the Union of Myanmar (GoM) and the Karen National Union (KNU). Logistical and security constraints notwithstanding, the survey provides information that is as representative as possible of the conflict-affected area’s population, including randomly selected individuals from randomly selected village tracts (see Map 1 on p vi). It constitutes a unique evidence base to support more conflict-sensitive humanitarian and developmental assistance, and support efforts to address the root causes of conflict and insecurity. Recommendations are provided to the GoM, KNU and the international aid community. Armed conflict between the GoM and KNU has been ongoing since 1949 through numerous periods of full or partial military rule, but has been reduced since ceasefires in 2012. The KNU is among the largest of over a dozen ethnic armed organisations demanding a federal, democratic system of government. In 2015, the GoM and Tatmadaw formally agreed to establish a “union based on the principles of democracy and federalism in accordance with the outcomes of political dialogue”, when they signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), along with the KNU and seven other ethnic armed organisations. However, the existing framework has not led to meaningful political dialogue, as concrete steps towards federalism continue to be blocked by the Tatmadaw, which insists that the peace process ‘strictly abide by the existing laws … in accord with the 2008 Constitution.’1

Summary of findings The findings of this survey demonstrate that people in the Karen ceasefire areas continue to face severe insecurity, in addition to the memories of a long legacy of extraordinarily severe and regular violence, abuse and exploitation (Figure a). Though respondents were reluctant to name specific armed actors for acts of violence and abuse, corroboration with existing KPSN, UN and other research indicates that most of the forms of violence documented are heavily associated with widespread practices carried out by the Tatmadaw and its proxy forces systematically and under unified command. As noted by the UN Human Rights Council in 2018, ‘For three decades, successive special rapporteurs on the situation of human rights in Myanmar concluded

1 The Tatmadaw’s six-point policy is available in The Nation, 23 September. 2014, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/ asean&beyon/Tatmadaw-outlines-6-point-policy-for-peace-talk-30243970.html; Sai Wansai discusses criticisms of the six- point policy from the perspective of EAOs. Sai Wansai (2016), ‘Aftermath of 21st Century Panglong: Positive Symbolism Throws the Door of Earnest Negotiations Wide Open’, Shan Herald Agency for News (SHAN), 4 September, https://www. burmalink.org/aftermath-21st-century-panglong-positive-symbolismthrows-door-earnest-negotiations-wide-open/ Fig 1.7 % 70 70 xiv security, justice and governance in south east myanmar 64

60 that patterns of human rights violations were widespread and systematic, linked to state and military policy’.2 Fig 1.10 50 Figure a. Prevalence of experiences of abuse and violence

40 Did not experience abuse and violence Experienced abuse and violence % 100 30

23 80 25% 24% 29% 20 33% 75% 76% 71% 13 60 67% 46% 10 7 5 54% 58% 3 3 40 2 2 2 70% 68%0.79 0.59 0.30 0.25 0.15 0 42%

Bwe Shan Pa-O Mon32%Thai 79% 80% Paku Dawei Keh Bar Mopwa Kayah30% Gal Bar Kayan English 20 Myanmar Pwo Karen Sgaw Karen 90% 21% 20% Fig 1.15 % 80 76 77 10% 0 70 Total Men Karen Women Portering 60 Non-Karen Shootings Flee home Land grabbing n/destroy villageForced relocation 50 Bur

40 The 2012 ceasefires, and the rotation of Tatmadaw troops to conflict zones in other parts 30 of the country, greatly reduced the levels of violence and abuse experienced by Karen 20communities, while leading to increases elsewhere. However, deep insecurity persists 10as the ceasefire agreements 8have failed6 to greatly6 reduce the overall levels of militarisation,0 delineate territories or properly implement a code of conduct for military actors. GoM KNU DKBA BGF KPC Since early 2018, Mutraw (Hpapun) District has become the target of coordinated, Fig 1.16 % 80 multi-battalion Tatmadaw operations72 which have led to the forced displacementGoM-controlled of over70 2,500 people. KNU-controlled Mix-controlled 60 58 Eighty per cent53 of households stated experiences of violence or abuse by the authorities, 50 44 such as shootings and 41burning of villages,43 each having affected more than 30 per cent 40 of the surveyed population. Forced labour and portering36 (the34 carrying of equipment 28 28 30 25 26 and weaponry for military operations) were the most20 widely experienced forms of 20 violence and abuse prior to the 2012 ceasefire, affecting a majority12 of the surveyed 9 households,10 often more than once or very regularly. 0 Forced labour Portering Burning/destroying Fleeing home Forced Figure b. Surveyed households and villagesvillages that have experiencedfor security landrelocation grabs since 2012 % Fig 1.17 60 53 Households 50 46 Villages 40

19 20

10 2.36 2.68 0.24 0 GoM-controlled KNU-controlled Mix-controlled Fig 1.19 % 50 GoM None Since 2012, the most common form of abuse has been land grabs, withKNU 1 in 47I surveyeddon’t know households having had land41 taken from them by authorities in this period (Figure b.). 40 38 According to the results of our survey, all but 42 of 43 land grab cases were in GoM- 33 32 33 30 30 30 27 26 26 2 UN Human Rights Council23 (2018), p 5. See also p 17, which notes that ‘The consistent tactical formula employed by the Tatmadaw exhibits a degree of coordination only possible when all troops are acting21 under the effective control of a single 20 unified command.’ 18 17 18 16 3 Land in Our Hands Network (2015), ‘Destroying People’s Lives: The15 Impact of Land Grabbing on communities in Myanmar’, 12 December, https://www.tni.org/files/article-downloads/lioh_research_report_eng_0.pdf11 11 10

0 Consider Want to govern: Support political Prefer to deal Keeps the community government to be: views most: with justice most safe and secure problems: Mon 1% Mixed 0.3%

Fig 1.1 Other 2%

Bamar 7% Karenni/Kayah/Kayan 2%

saferworld · karen peace support network xv

Pa-O 3% controlled or mix-controlled areas, where the GoM and mainstream business actors have gained increased access since 2012. A 2015 study by the Land In Our Hands (LIOH) network identifiedShan 4% the Tatmadaw as the Daweileading 5% entity responsible for land confiscations.3

Considering these realities, it is little surpriseGoM-controlled that 19% only 14 per cent of respondents said Fig 1.8 they were confident or very confident that the peace process would lead to sustainable peace. Additionally, 45 per cent of respondents – including 68 per cent of those in KNU-controlled areas – were worried or very worried that fighting would break out in Mix-controlledthe next five 61% years, as has happened intermittently despite the ceasefire. These results reveal a general lack of confidence in the currentKNU-controlled peace 20% process and indicate the need for a much greater commitment to meaningful political progress.

Figure c. How confident are you that the peace process will lead to sustainable peace? Prefer not to answer Very conﬁdent 1% 2% Fig 1.13 Conﬁdent 12%

Don’t know 25%

Neutral 37%

Not conﬁdent at all 23%

The KNU – which has maintained parallel like government structures for social services, land managementI don’t know who and he/ shejustice is Prefer among not to other answer key functions since independence in 1949 – 0.1% 0.5% Fig 2.4 enjoys notableDon’t know legitimacy 11.4% among large swathes of the population, predominantly among Karen people. Many respondents explicitly liked the KNU the most, would No 6.7% prefer it to govern their area, and saw it as the most suitable provider of security, safety and justice, when compared with the GoM and other armed actors (Figure d). Widespread support for the KNU among KarenYes 81.5% people in the ceasefire areas seemingly indicates support for the principles of localised governance and self-determination. This support for the KNU among Karen people appears to be due to ethnic and linguistic ties, the embeddedness of KNU institutions in local communities, the KNU’s historical position as the primary political organisation representing Karen society, and because of ties to Karen ancestral lands. Don’t know 5.5% Prefer not to answer 0.6%

Fig 1.11 % Fig 2.5 Strongly disagree 0.2% 70 Figure d. WhichDisagree of these 3.1% authorities… Strongly agree 19.7% GoM 64 KNU Neutral 16.2% I don’t know 60 None

50 45 43 40 40 39 Agree 54.7% 38 37 35 34 33 30 30 28 27 26 27 21 23 23 24 21 20 20 20 20 20 20 19 15 14 15 14 12 11 9 10 8 9

0 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. …do you …do you ...do you …would ...has …keeps the …provides ...has the …do you consider want to like the you prefer political community the most highest pay taxes to? to be your govern most? to deal views most safe social governance government? your area? with justice you support and secure? services, capacity? problems? the most? development and welfare? xvi security, justice and governance in south east myanmar

Views over the Thanlwin (Salween) river, near Hpa An. © Rebecca W Importantly, these preferences existed despite GoM social services and development reaching roughly the same numbers of Karen respondents as social services and development from the KNU. This clearly demonstrates that investments in public services and development do not automatically translate into legitimacy being conferred by the population. Such investments are central to the stated ‘peace’ strategies of successive GoM administrations but are inextricably linked to the strategic extension of centralised control over both territory and people. Sixty-one per cent of the respondents were found to be living in villages under the ‘mixed control’ of the GoM, KNU and sometimes other armed actors, based on a measure combining data on each actor’s service delivery, taxation and presence of soldiers. Twenty per cent were under near total KNU control, and 19 per cent were under near total GoM control (Figure e.). In mix-controlled areas, although the GoM provided health and educationMon 1% Mixed services 0.3% to more respondents than the KNU, 41 per

Fig 1.1 cent of respondentsOther 2% wanted the KNU govern the area while only 16 per cent favoured the GoM. In these mix-controlled areas respondents also favoured the KNU in terms Bamar 7% Karennof justicei/Kayah/Kayan provision 2% and for their political views. When asked which of the higher authorities they would prefer to deal with justice issues, the highest proportion of respondents (39 per cent) said the KNU, 23 per cent said the GoM and 9.4 per cent said “none”.Pa-O 3%

Figure e. Respondents under each type of territory (%) Shan 4% Dawei 5% (Based on a measure combining data on service delivery, taxation and exposure to soliders)

GoM-controlled 19% Fig 1.8

Mix-controlled 61% KNU-controlled 20%

Prefer not to answer Very conﬁdent Overall, respondents were reluctant1% 2% to name specific authorities causing problems or Fig 1.13 committing acts of violence or abuse. Twenty-one per cent named the GoM for forced Conﬁdent 12% labour in their community, which was the highest proportion naming any specific authorityDon’t forknow any 25% problem. Meanwhile, one of every ten respondents named the KNU for unfair recruitment practices. The GoM was also named more than any other authority for aggressive or inappropriate conduct and extortion, among other abuses.

Neutral 37%

Not conﬁdent at all 23%

I don’t know who he/she is Prefer not to answer 0.1% 0.5% Fig 2.4 Don’t know 11.4%

No 6.7%

Yes 81.5%

Don’t know 5.5% Prefer not to answer 0.6%

Fig 2.5 Strongly disagree 0.2% Disagree 3.1% Strongly agree 19.7%

Neutral 16.2%

Agree 54.7% saferworld · karen peace support network xvii

As well as being under-represented in village elections and less likely to be in formal work, women in the survey area have experienced extremely high levels of abuse at the hands of authorities, including portering, forced labour, being present during shootings, and multiple forms of forced displacement (though many of these were also experienced by higher numbers of men). Large numbers of respondents expressed that justice cases, including serious cases, were regularly not reported to any authority in their community (Figure f.). When cases are reported, respondents indicated that people nearly always go to the village leader first. Seven per cent of respondents had reported a case to an authority before, among whom 82 per cent reported it first to their village leader. The KNU system appears to provide clearer referral processes and a greater set of options for people to report their cases compared with the GoM system. Yet, both systems have huge issues to address if they are to provide adequate access to justice. High costs, lack of personal connections, long distances to authorities and the process being time-consuming were the main barriers to justice identified, most commonly associated with GoM.

Figure f. Perceptions and preferences on justice issues Fig 1.18

Would prefer the GoM to deal with ustice problems 23%

Would prefer the KNU to deal with ustice problems 39%

Don’t know which authority would prefer for ustice issues 26%

Feel it is common or very common to report cases 37% considered to be small’

Feel it is common or very common to report cases 50% considered to be big’

Feel that the village leader is the only place people first 94% report small’ cases to

Feel that the village leader is the only place people first 76% report big’ cases to

ave ever reported a case to any authority or 7% responsible person

0 20 40 60 80 100%

Fig 2.1&2 Villages with village leaders 48 GoM reporting to 53 KNU

Villages with respondents receiving 53 education or healthcare from 59

Villages with respondents paying 54 agricultural property or foraging taxes to 65

Villages with respondents who sometimes’ 62 or freuently’ see soldiers from 66

75% ave a village leader reporting to 72%

Paying some agricultural property andor 30% foraging tax to 58%

Receiving healthcare andor 54% education from 43%

Sometimes or freuently see 34% soldiers from 54%

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80%

Fig 4.5 Village leader 97.5%

Other KNU bodyofficial 7.5%

Myanmar Police Force 6.0%

Village tract Leader 5.6%

Karen National Police Force 4.7%

Village or village tract 2.0% securityustice appointee Other GoM body 2.0%

Elder 1.3%

Government lawyer 0.3%

Family 0.2%

Member of DKBA 0.2%

Member of BGF 0.2%

Priestpastor 0.2%

0 20 40 60 80 100% xviii security, justice and governance in south east myanmar

Conclusions and The findings of this survey demonstrate that people in the Karen ceasefire areas recommendations continue to face severe insecurity, in the context of protracted armed conflict, routine violence, abuse and exploitation. The survey further demonstrates that the KNU enjoys notable legitimacy among large swathes of the population in Karen ceasefire areas, predominantly among Karen people, which seemingly indicates support for the principles of localised governance and self-determination. This is significant because a belief in such desires are the main reason that Karen political leaders have long demanded a federal system of government and developed policies based on local practices, such as the KNU land policy. These findings also demonstrate that investments in public services and development do not automatically translate into legitimacy being conferred by the population, as is often claimed by the government and is a common international peacebuilding strategy. The legacy of violence and abuse effecting the region’s civilian population cannot be overstated, in particular the impacts of widespread and systematic practices of the Tatmadaw. Concerningly, only 14 per cent of respondents were confident or very confident that the peace process would lead to sustainable peace and notable majority worried fighting would break out again within five years. The report provides specific recommendations for the GoM, KNU and international aid community respectively. To summarise, firstly, a number of urgent steps are needed to ensure the basic safety of civilians. These include the immediate demilitarisation of ceasefire areas, a reduction of tensions and the enforcement of strict regulations and accountability measures for all security forces to respect human rights. Humanitarian support is needed for refugees and internally displaced persons as well as improved protection support. Steps by all authorities, especially the government and splinter groups, are needed to end land grabs and to establish laws and implementation mechanisms for restitution of all confiscated lands. Without the demarcation of ceasefire territories that limit troop movements and allow more effective monitoring and a basis for determining violations, intermittent armed conflict will continue and a return to widespread violence will remain a constant risk. Consolidating the peace will then depend on the development of an inclusive, democratic framework which allows all negotiations, political dialogue and resolutions to be established outside of the 2008 Constitution.4 Alongside this process, security sector reform is needed to create more inclusive, representative and accountable armed forces and justice institutions that can guarantee the safety of all communities in Myanmar. Interim arrangements for the period prior to a political settlement that ensure the recognition of EAO and community governance and social service systems will make ceasefires more stable, improve the well-being of conflict-affected communities, and provide space for improved governance and inclusive human development. All authorities need to take steps to enforce a moratorium on major development projects, to end land grabs, and to regulate business practices more responsibly and transparently. Transformational government reforms are needed to make the economy more inclusive, equitable and decentralised in order to end decades-old grievances linked to extraction of wealth and resources from ethnic areas to companies and individuals owned by or linked to the Tatmadaw and GoM. Official recognition of the KNU’s laws, policies and governance will be crucial to building the genuine trust and political dialogue needed to negotiate the establishment of a future federal and democratic union. In the meantime, the use of development, service delivery and humanitarian support to expand the GoM’s territorial control or gain influence over populations will drive conflict further. The KNU can take significant steps to improve its governance and social service delivery too, and to

4 KPSN (2018), ‘Burma’s Dead-End Peace Negotiation process: a case study of the land sector’, July, https://progressivevoicemyanmar.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Eng-Burmas-Dead-End-Peace-Negotiation-Process- KPSN-report-web.pdf saferworld · karen peace support network xix

cooperate with community based and civil society organisations, benefitting from their capacity and knowledge on women’s rights and empowerment, responsible development practices, environmental conservation, human rights promotion, and support to displaced persons and migrants, among other issues. All authorities also have a long way to go to ensure women are safe, secure, have access to full opportunities and enjoy equal participation in governance. This requires greater inclusion of women at all administrative levels and greater women’s participation in local elections and decision-making. Beyond that, it relies on transformation of core policies and institutions to tackle gender norms that perpetuate the insecurities and forms of marginalisation faced by women. Finally, sustainable peace will depend on leaders and the whole country coming to terms with the sheer scale of suffering experienced by conflict-affected people, by providing formal acknowledgement to those who have suffered and survived, ensuring justice and accountability for past crimes and systematically addressing the remaining causes of insecurity. None of the issues highlighted in this report will be easily solved and all require unprecedented political will and resolve from leaders on all sides of the conflict, to make compromises and commit wholeheartedly to ending the protracted cycle of conflict, violence, and insecurity. xx

Oil palm fields in Dawei, Tanintharyi region. © Karen Peace Support Network 1 1 Introduction and key findings

1.1 Introduction this survey was carried out by Saferworld and the Karen Peace Support Network (KPSN) to examine the knowledge, attitudes and practices of populations affected by armed conflict between the Government of the Union of Myanmar (GoM) and the Karen National Union (KNU), with regards to governance, security and justice. Covering 2,020 respondents in 72 villages, the survey provides unprecedented insights into the realities in ceasefire areas from the perspectives of the local public and teaches us a great deal about the causes and impacts of the conflict. Logistical and security constraints notwithstanding, this report provides information that is as representative as possible of this population, by surveying randomly selected individuals from randomly selected village tracts. It constitutes a unique evidence base to support more conflict-sensitive humanitarian and developmental assistance, and support efforts to address the root causes of conflict and insecurity. Recommendations are provided to the GoM, KNU and international aid community in part 6, section 6.2. Since 1949, armed conflict between the GoM and KNU has trapped much of south east Myanmar in a cycle of conflict and insecurity.5 The KNU demands a federal system of government that would provide greater autonomy and self-determination, as well as representation at the national level, as do most of more than 20 EAOs operating across the country. Since 1962, successive GoM administrations dominated by the Myanmar Armed Forces (Tatmadaw) have enforced highly centralised governmental systems. The most recent is enshrined in the 2008 Constitution, which instates a heavily centralised system of government and provides significant power and autonomy to the Tatmadaw. In 2015, the GoM and Tatmadaw formally agreed to establish a ‘union based on the principles of democracy and federalism in accordance with the outcomes of political dialogue’, when they signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), along with the KNU and seven other ethnic armed organisations. However, the existing framework has not led to meaningful political dialogue, as concrete steps towards federalism continue to be blocked by the Tatmadaw, which insists that the peace process ‘strictly abide by the existing laws … in accord with the 2008 Constitution.’6

5 For more on the conflict and its impacts, see Karen Human Rights Group (2017); Karen Human Rights Group (2014); Jolliffe (2016); South (2011); and Smith (1999). 6 The Nation (2014), ‘Tatmadaw outlines 6-point policy for peace talk’, 23 September, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/ asean&beyon/Tatmadaw-outlines-6-point-policy-for-peace-talk-30243970.html; Sai Wansai discusses criticisms of the six- point policy from the perspective of EAOs. Sai Wansai (2016), ‘Aftermath of 21st Century Panglong: Positive Symbolism Throws the Door of Earnest Negotiations Wide Open’, Shan Herald Agency for News (SHAN), 4 September, https://www. burmalink.org/aftermath-21st-century-panglong-positive-symbolismthrows-door-earnest-negotiations-wide-open/ 2 security, justice and governance in south east myanmar

A young man carries his belongings across a river in Mutraw District. © Saferworld

Since the 1940s, the KNU has operated a parallel governance system, including line departments for social services, resource management, formal taxation and justice delivery, among other functions.7 The GoM has slowly eroded KNU territory over the decades, through Tatmadaw military offensives that regularly targeted civilians, programmes to expand state administration and development, and by encouraging factions to splinter from the KNU and form government-backed forces. Two of these splinter factions – the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA) and the Karen Peace Council (KPC) – are now politically aligned with the KNU and signed the NCA in 2015. Other splinter factions have been transformed into 13 ‘Border Guard Forces’ (BGFs), paramilitary units under the loose command of the Tatmadaw (see section 2.4). All of these actors’ claims to territory overlap considerably and formalised territorial boundaries have yet to be demarcated.8 The data was collected between November 2017 and January 2018 by a team of six team leaders (four men and two women) and 50 enumerators (26 men and 24 women) chosen by organisations within the KPSN based on education and experience, and provided eight days’ training (see below). The research design phase was led by Saferworld staff and technical consultants, with extensive guidance and planning input from an advisory team comprised of KPSN members, during three workshops of one or two days each. Six enumerator team leaders (four men, two women) were selected by the KPSN advisory team based on research experience and the geographical spread of their networks and they were heavily involved in the final stages of the research design. The advisory team was then regularly consulted, and provided detailed input into the final report during two two-day workshops, one three day workshop and weeks of critical reviews and online communication.

Research methodology Notwithstanding the significant constraints presented by the area of study – arising from the security situation, the lack of complete maps or administrative data, the high levels of outward and internal migration, and the extreme variation in terrain and geography – a methodology was carefully developed to provide data that is as representative as possible of the populations that have been most affected by the Karen conflict since the 1970s, when the KNU left the Ayeryawady Delta and Bago Yoma regions and consolidated operations in the south east.

7 The KNU governance system is examined in detail in Jolliffe (2016). 8 For background on the formation of these splinter groups, see box 2.2 in section 2.4. saferworld · karen peace support network 3

The survey used a cross-section study design and a ‘simple random sampling’ procedure.9 The total geographic area of interest (shown in Map 1) was determined by the advisory team as the area most affected by the KNU-GoM conflict since the 1970s. This had to be done manually as both the GoM and KNU administrative boundaries for the region include areas far outside the region most affected by conflict. The selected area of interest contained 794 GoM-defined village tracts and 172 urban wards; covered all of Kayin State, as well as portions of Mon State, Tanintharyi Region and eastern Bago Region; and had a total estimated population of 3,020,682 (based on 2014 data).10 A stratified sampling method based on population was not viable due to the lack of consistent household data across the region, a result of numerous KNU-influenced areas being partially or fully excluded from the last Myanmar census (in 2014).11 A three-step simple random sampling process was therefore used to select: random village tracts or wards within the survey area; villages within village tracts; and households within the selected settlements. The first step involved selecting random points on a map of the area of interest and then choosing the village tracts or urban wards in which those points fell. As urban wards take up much less space on the map, they were less likely to be selected than village tracts, and ultimately only village tracts were chosen. This was anticipated and was deemed appropriate, as urban areas have been much less affected by direct armed violence since the late 1950s. The requisite number of respondents was determined to be 2,000, providing a margin of error of 2.18 per cent. The total sample size was raised to 2,080 to offset possible questionnaire losses, incomplete and invalid questionnaires, refusals, and non-responses during the actual data collection. It was decided that aiming for 40 respondents from 52 villages or wards would be the most effective way to reach this number, while ensuring a geographic spread that was manageable for the enumerator teams. The final number of villages rose to 72, due to difficulties encountered in reaching the 40-household target in some villages, as discussed below. A three-step process of ‘simple random sampling’ was then used to select random village tracts or wards within the survey area, then villages within village tracts, and finally households. 1. A grid system was used to randomly select village tracts or wards,12 giving every location within the area of interest an equal chance of being selected. An initial 70 village tracts were selected to then be reduced based on security and logistical considerations. An Adobe Acrobat grid was overlaid atop the map of the area of interest showing GoM-defined village tracts, dividing it into non-overlapping squares, which were each given a number.13 Random numbers were generated from the website, Random.org, to select 70 specific squares, and a red dot was then placed in the centre of those squares. The village tracts upon which those squares fell were then selected. 2. Village lists for the selected village tracts were built by combining available datasets from the Myanmar Information Management Unit (MIMU) and the Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG) (as neither set covers all areas). Then one village was selected from each village tract using a ‘simple random sampling’ procedure. Each village list was sorted in alphabetical order (whether using Karen or Burmese language) and numbered in that order. Two random numbers were generated for every village tract, to select a first-choice village and a second-choice village. As the village tracts are all

9 For more on ‘simple random sampling’, see the Wikipedia entry on the topic: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple_random_ sample. 10 This estimate was based on GoM census data and was collated with assistance from the Myanmar Information Management Unit. 11 Additionally, although using a population-based sampling method would have allowed for clearer representation of the overall population, it would have been weighted heavily towards highly populated urban centres, which have experienced very little direct armed violence and which are predominantly controlled by the GoM rather than by the KNU or a combination of both. 12 Oregon State University (2009), ‘Field methods in vegetation science. Locating quadrats using the grid system’ (http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/bot440/wilsomar/Content/SRS.htm) 13 Going from left to right, the grid was sequentially numbered from No. 1 at the upper left-hand corner down to No. 820 at the lower right-hand corner of the map. There were 20 columns and 41 rows in the resulting map. 4 security, justice and governance in south east myanmar

different sizes, two numbers were generated for each size: two numbers for every village tract containing two villages, two numbers for every village tract containing three villages and so on. This list of 70 selected villages and backup villages was then presented to the enumerator teams for them to develop a plan to reach 52 of them, based on their accessibility, distance and security concerns for the survey teams. Teams were then instructed and further assisted once in the field, to add or replace villages if 40 households were not available in the chosen village, or in the case of security or other severe concerns. Due to such difficulties arising, the total number of villages eventually reached 72, with fewer than households interviewed in some. 3. The third and final stage of sampling was done by enumerators at each village by using the ‘spin the pen’ technique. From a random starting point, a pencil was spun or thrown in the air. The first house closest to the direction of the fallen pen was selected. From thereon, every fourth house was selected. In cases where the respondent was not at home, the respondent refused to participate, or the house was not found, locked or destroyed, the house immediately next to it was selected for interview.

Eligible respondents for interview were household adults aged 20 and above, who were available and willing to be interviewed. Selected households were always given the option to select which member would take the survey, and normally did so based on presumed knowledge of the subject matter. All respondents agreed to participate orally, and were advised that they could stop the interview or ask questions at any time. Enumerators were instructed to ensure gender balance and aim for a balance in age, too, as discussed below. Both daytime and night-time interviews were carried out because data collection was done during harvest time, the period of the year when farmers are working long hours during the daytime.

Composition and The data was collected by 50 enumerators, divided into six teams with one team leader training of each, between 23 November and 5 January 2018. The team leaders and enumerators enumeration teams were provided by member organisations of the KPSN.14 Overall, 26 of the enumerators were men and 24 were women. Of the team leaders, four were men and two were women. The enumerators received eight days of data collection and research ethics training, which took place between 15 and 22 November 2017 in Mae Sot, Thailand. The training included sessions on the purpose of the knowledge, attitudes and practices survey, the methods and purposes of quantitative research, research ethics, the ‘spin the pen’ sampling technique, and gender and age balance in respondent selection, as well as in- depth training on the questionnaire itself. It also included practice sessions and a two-day field test in nearby areas. The research ethics training covered a range of principles and techniques. The enumerators were instructed that respondents must only participate on a voluntary basis, were not obliged to answer questions, could stop the interview at any time, and that they had the option to participate in private or with trusted persons. Enumerators were also provided with training and practice in observing body language to identify when people were uncomfortable and ensuring at such times that respondents were still happy to continue, in answering difficult questions from respondents, and ensuring that respondents were given opportunities and freedom to ask questions before, during and after the interview. The field tests took place across various locations in the survey area to avoid having too many enumerators at the same place at the same time, and to reduce the constraints it

14 The following organisations provided the enumerators: Karen Affairs Committee (KAC), Hser Mu Htaw (HMH), Karen State Education Assistance Group (KSEAG), Karen Office for Relief and Development (KORD), Karen Women Organisation (KWO), Karen Environment and Social Action Network (KESAN), Karen Agriculture Department (KAD), Karen Student Network Group (KSNG) and Karen Youth Organization (KYO). saferworld · karen peace support network 5

A man who fell victim to a landmine and struggles with mental illness walks through Ei Tu Hta displaced persons camp. © Saferworld

would place on the residents of the selected villages. The field tests happened over two days, with three teams on day one and the remaining three teams on day two. Each of the teams worked in different locations. After the field test, an evaluation was conducted, which included an examination of all the questionnaires and refocusing the training on the areas where there were the most mistakes or difficulties. Separate training sessions were given to team leaders to ensure that they were able lead the team, conduct regular quality controls and spot checks, and manage the logistics and administration of the data collection. This included scenario exercises to prepare team leaders on how to respond to potential problems. In addition, team leaders received training on village profiling. For each of the villages, the researchers created a village profile which provided background on the governance arrangements and histories of the village.

Limitations and Due to the constraints presented by the difficult environment, a number of clarifications clarifications and limitations should be noted.

The nature of a knowledge, attitudes and practices survey

By definition, a knowledge, attitudes and practices survey is intended to profile the subjective experiences and perceptions of the population of interest. It is not intended to provide fully corroborated factual data, objective truths or legal evidence. Questions may be interpreted differently from individual to individual, across genders, across cultures and ethnic nationalities, or across different communities. The objective is to gauge the world views of these individuals and how they relate to their stated experiences, activities and responses to their environment. This study builds on over three decades of research produced by KPSN member organisations documenting the experiences of people impacted by one of the world’s most protracted conflicts. At times, the data provided here raises as many questions as it does answers and opens up important avenues for further research and necessary areas of inquiry.

Age imbalance

Although a good gender balance was achieved, the sample was relatively elderly, with 36 per cent being aged 61 or over and only one per cent falling into the 20–29 group (see section 1.2 for details). Selected households were always given the option to select which member would take the survey. However, enumerators were instructed to make 6 security, justice and governance in south east myanmar

A young girl carries rations in Ei Tu Hta displaced persons camp. © Saferworld

gender balance an absolute priority, and to aim for a variety of ages where possible. When they fell behind on a particular gender, enumerators would encourage households to provide the gender they needed; some also did this for age, where possible. A gender balance was thus achieved, but enumerators reported that they had found it extremely difficult to achieve an age balance, for a number of reasons. Firstly, most villages had relatively few young residents and enumerators were often told that young people were away working in Thailand or in cities, or in some cases were serving as soldiers. Furthermore, many households said they preferred an older member to answer the questions, as they were seen as more knowledgeable and better qualified for the task. Finally, the survey was carried out during harvest season and so, while many households asked the enumerators to come back at a specific time and planned for one family member to wait at home to participate, they often opted to keep the youngest and most physically able members working on their farms. This means that while the survey provides a strong account of the knowledge, attitudes and practices of households overall, and particularly of leading members, it fails to capture differences in experience or perceptions among younger members of society.

Gender-based violence

The report does not include findings or analysis specifically on gender-based violence (GBV), despite this being a prevalent concern and issue in the area of study – as documented by numerous reports by KPSN members, among others (see section 3.2, box 3.3). The research team and advisory team decided that the scale of the study and the limitations on the methodology would not allow for the care and attention necessary to collect such data sensitively and responsibly, due to the heightened risks of social desirability bias, fear of reprisal, stigma and potential re-traumatisation associated with such forms of abuse. When respondents were asked to volunteer information on specific justice cases that had been dealt with by the authorities (see section 4.2), they were able to raise cases involving GBV, but these cases do not indicate prevalence of acts of GBV overall. More research is needed using a specifically tailored methodology to examine this crucial issue in more detail.

Non-responses and responses of “I don’t know”

Multiple questions in the questionnaire garnered high numbers of non-responses and responses of “I don’t know”, especially when respondents were asked to point out negative attributes of specific armed actors and authorities. However, when not asked to name the specific perpetrators, the majority of respondents indicated that they had saferworld · karen peace support network 7

experienced often-severe forms of violence at the hands of authorities. Corroboration of this data with existing KPSN and external research indicates that the most common perpetrator of these forms of violence is the Tatmadaw. The inconsistency and under-reporting is likely due to a number of factors. Many respondents were probably reluctant to say bad things about authorities due to concerns for their personal security and that of their community, which indicates that people remain fearful even during the ceasefire period. It is also indicative of the culture of fear, common reluctance to criticise authorities and the widespread feeling that speaking out will lead to additional stress. KPSN members and member organisations have regularly seen cases where civilians were violently punished for speaking out against authorities.15 There was also a gender difference in relation to this trend on some questions. Across the 34 questions on governance preferences, covering both positive and negative attributes of authorities, the proportion of women saying, “I don’t know” was higher than the proportion of men for every question, with an average difference of just over five per cent. This was particularly high for certain questions and among certain sub- groups of women (e.g. Karen women, or women in mix-controlled areas), as discussed in the relevant sections throughout the report. However, when it came to reporting experiences of violence and abuse without naming specific authorities, men and women were equally likely to say, “I don’t know”, at only around four per cent.

Villages with few respondents

Difficulties encountered in finding 40 households to interview in every village meant that enumerator teams often had to combine multiple villages to make up the number. This led to some disparity in the sample sizes among villages. There were 18 villages with between 40 and 42 respondents, 19 villages with between 35 and 39 respondents, 12 villages with between 20 and 35 respondents, 13 villages with between ten and 19 respondents, and ten villages with less than ten respondents. This does not affect the overall randomisation of the sample, as 40 households were still surveyed per randomly selected village, and the closest available backup villages were selected in order to provide similar overall characteristics. However, it must be taken into account when analysing some of the comparisons made between villages.

Structure of the report This report is structured in six parts, each of which contains multiple sections. The remainder of part 1 includes an overview of the surveyed population and a summary of the key findings of the report. Part 2 looks at questions of governance and legitimacy, including perceptions of the various authorities and armed actors, and the governance functions they perform. Section 2.6 provides a detailed analysis of different kinds of territory, deconstructing the concepts of GoM-controlled, KNU-controlled and mix-controlled areas. Part 3 explores the security environment, in particular the ongoing insecurity faced by local populations, detailing their exposure to military actors, widespread experiences of abuse by authorities and related perceptions of different authorities. Part 4 looks at attitudes towards and practices related to access to justice, while part 5 analyses communities’ levels of confidence in the peace process and factors associated with fears of renewed fighting. Finally, part 6 provides over-arching conclusions on what the findings teach us and imply for those working on related issues, followed by specific recommendations to the GoM, the KNU and the international aid community.

15 For example, see Karen Human Rights Group (2015), p 153 for documentation of the killing of a 62-year-old woman by a Tatmadaw BGF, due to her speaking out about the unit’s involvement in illegal narcotics trade. 8 security, justice and governance in south east myanmar

1.2 Participants There were 2,020 respondents to this survey across 72 villages. Of these, 1,013 (50.15 per in this survey cent) of respondents were female and 1,007 (49.85 per cent) were male, a balance that was largely maintained across ethnicities, geography and village by village. Seventy- eight per cent of the respondents identified as Karen and among the remaining 22 per cent (441 respondents), the largest group identified as Bamar, followed by Dawei, Shan then Pa-O. The sample was relatively elderly, with 36 per cent being 61 or over and only one per cent falling into the 20–29 age group (Figure 1.2), the reasons for which are discussed in the limitations and clarifications sub-section above.

Figure 1.1 Ethnic breakdown of non-Karen respondents Mixed 0.3% Mon 1%

Other 2%

Karenni/Kayah/ Bamar 7% Kayan 2%

Karen 78% Other 22% Pa-O 3%

Dawei 5%

Shan 4%

Figure 1.2 Survey population by gender and age % 100 Fig 1.2

≥ 60 32% 80 ≥ 60 40%

50–59 21% 60

50–59 25% 40 40–49 26%

40–49 20% 20 30–39 20% 30–39 13% 20–29 1% 20–29 1% Men Women % 100 Fig 1.3 Other 7% Other 5% The KNU and the GoM each have their own administrative and mapping systems that

divide the survey region80 into incompatible administrative areas. The KNU has seven Christianity 37% Christianity 38% administrative districts, containing 26 townships, which cover much of the GoM- defined Kayin State, Mon State, Tanintharyi Region and eastern Bago Region. Tables 60 1.1 and 1.2 show how the respondents and the surveyed villages were spread out across these administrative areas. 40 Buddhism 59% Buddhism 57%

Men Women % Fig 1.4 100 Other 7% Other 8% Labourer/Carpenter/Mechanic 7% Labourer/Carpenter/Mechanic 4% Unemployed 6% 80 Unemployed 13% Gardener 14% Gardener 13% Business/Trader/Vendor 10% 60 Business/Trader/Vendor 17%

40 Farmer 57% Farmer 43% 20

Men Women % 100 Fig 1.5 No schooling 25% No schooling 27% 80 Monastic education 1% University 2% Monastic education 6% University 1% High school 12% High school 8% 60 Middle school 20% Middle school 20% 40

Primary school 41% Primary school 37% 20

Men Women

% Fig 1.6 5 languages 1% 5 languages 0% 4 languages 4% 100 4 languages 2%

3 languages 25% 3 languages 20% 80

60 2 languages 41% 2 languages 41%

20 1 language 36% 1 language 30%

Men Women saferworld · karen peace support network 9

Table 1.1 Respondents and villages by GoM-defined states, regions and townships

State/ Respondents Villages Township Villages Respondents region

Bago 149 (7%) 5 Htantabin 2 78 (4%) Region Kyauk Kyi 1 37 (2%)

Taungoo 2 34 (2%)

Kayin State 1,328 (66%) 49 Hlaingbwe 5 157 (8%)

Hpa-An 2 70 (8%)

Hpapun 16 283 (14%)

Kawkareik 4 164 (8%)

Kyainseikgyi 7 276 (14%)

Myawaddy 3 117 (6%)

Thandaunggyi 12 261 (13%)

Mon State 153 (8%) 8 Bilin 2 80 (4%)

Kyaikmaraw 4 40 (2%)

Thaton 2 33 (2%)

Tanintharyi 390 (19%) 10 Thayetchaung 1 40 (2%) Region Yebyu 4 156 (8%)

Myitta 2 76 (4%)

Dawei 3 118 (6%)

Table 1.2 Respondents and villages by KNU-defined districts

District Villages Respondents Township Villages Respondents

Doo Tha Htoo 4 113 (5.6%) Bilin 1 40 (Thaton) Tha Htoo 3 73

Dooplaya 12 473 (23.4%) Kawk T’Ree 4 157 (Dooplaya) Kruh Tu 1 40

Noh T’Kaw 1 40

Waw Raw 6 236

Hpa-an 11 362 (17.9%) Doo Yaw 1 40

Hti Lon 3 80

Lu Pleh 2 79

T’Nay has 3 124

Ta Kreh 2 39

Kler Lwe Htoo 5 76 (3.8%) Ler Doh 4 37 (Nyaunglebin) Moo 1 39

Bliq-Dawei 10 390 (19.3%) Htee Mon Pga 2 76 (Myeik Dawei) K’Ser Doh 1 40 Ler Doh Soe 7 274

Mutraw 15 272 (13.5%) Bu Tho 5 93 (Hpapun) Dwe Lo 2 54

Lu Thaw 8 125

Taw Oo 15 334 (16.5%) Daw Hpa Hko 12 261 (Taungoo) Htaw Ta Htoo 3 73 % 100 Fig 1.2 % 100 Fig 1.2 % ≥ 60 32% 10010080 FigFig 1.21.2 ≥ 60 40% ≥ 60 32% 80 ≥ 60 40% ≥≥ 6060 32%32% 8080 50–59 21% 60 ≥≥ 6060 40%40% 60 50–59 21% 50–59 25% 50–59 21% 6060 50–59 21% 40 50–59 25% 40–49 26% 40 50–5950–59 25%25% 40–49 26% 40–49 20% 204040 40–4940–49 26%26% 40–49 20% 30–39 20% 20 10 security, justice and governance in south east myanmar 30–3940–4940–49 13%20%20% 30–3920–29 20% 1% 2020 20–29 1% 30–39 13% 30–3930–3920–29 20%20%1% Men Women 20–29 1% % 30–3930–39 13%13% 20–2920–29 1%1% Men 100 Women 20–2920–29 1%1% Figure 1.3 RespondentsFig 1.3by Other 7% Other 5% Men % Women religion and gender 100 Fig 1.3 Other 7% % Other 5% FigFig 1.31.3 Other 7%7% 10010080 Christianity 37% ChristianityOther 5%5% 38% 80 Christianity 37% Christianity 38% 8080 Christianity 37%37% 60 Christianity 38%38% 60

406060 Buddhism 59% Buddhism 57% 40 Buddhism 59% Buddhism 57% 204040 BuddhismBuddhism 59%59% BuddhismBuddhism 57%57% 20 2020 Men Women

Men % Women Fig 1.4 100 Other 7% % Men Women Other 8% Fig 1.4 Labourer/Carpenter/Mechanic 7% 100 Figure 1.4 Respondents by Other 7% % Labourer/Carpenter/Mechanic 4% Unemployed 6% Other 8% gender and occupationFigFig 1.41.4 100100 Labourer/Carpenter/MechanicOther 7%7%7% 80 LaboureUnemployedr/Carpente 13% r/Mechanic 4% Other 8%8% Labourer/CarpenteUnemployedrGardener/Mechanic 14% 6%7% Labourer/Carpenter/Mechanic 7% 80 UnemployedLaboureLabourerr//Carpente 13% rr//Mechanic 4%4% UnemployedGardener 14% 6%6% Gardener 13% Business/Trader/Vendor 10% 608080 Unemployed 13%13% Gardener 14%14% Gardener 13% Business/Trader/Vendor 10% 60 Business/Trader/Vendor 17% Gardener 13%13% BusinesBusinesss//TradeTraderr//Vendor 10%10% 406060 Business/Trader/Vendor 17% Farmer 57% 40 BusinesBusinesss//TradeTraderr//Vendor 17%17% Farmer 57% Farmer 43% 204040 FarmerFarmer 57%57% Farmer 43% 20 FarmerFarmer 43%43% 2020 Men Women

Men % Women 100 Fig 1.5 Men % Women 100 Fig 1.5 % No schooling 25% No schooling 27% 100100 Figure 1.5 RespondentsFigFig 1.5 1.5 80 NoMonastic schooling education 25% 1% No schooling 27% University 2% by gender and education Monastic education 6% 80 No schooling 2525% No schooling 227%7% MonasticHigh school education 12% 1% level University 1% University 2% MonasticHigh education school 6%8% 608080 HighMonastic school education 12% 1%1% University 1% University 2%2% MonasticHigh education school 8%6%6% 60 Middle school 20% MiddleUniversity school 20% 1%1% High school 12%12% High school 8%8% 406060 Middle school 20% Middle school 20% Middle school 20%20% Middle school 20%20% 40 Primary school 41% Primary school 37% 204040 Primary school 41% Primary school 37% 20 PrimaryPrimary schoolschool 41%41% PrimaryPrimary schoolschool 37%37% 2020 Men Women

Men Women

Men % Women Fig 1.6 5 languages 1% 5 languages 0% 100 4 languages 4% % 4 languages 2% Fig 1.6 5 languages 1% 5 languages 0% 100 4 languages 4% % 43 languages 2%20% FigFig 1.61.6 3 55languages languageslanguages 25% 11% 55 languageslanguages 00% Figure 1.6 Languages 44 languageslanguages 4%4% 10010080 44 languageslanguages 2%2% 3 languages 25% 3 languages 20% spoken “well” 80 33 languageslanguages 20%20% by males/females 33 languageslanguages 25%25% 608080 2 languages 41% 2 languages 41% 60 2 languages 41% 2 languages 41% 6060 40 22 languageslanguages 41%41% 22 languageslanguages 41%41% 40

204040 1 language 36% 1 language 30% 20 1 language 36% 1 language 30% 2020 11 languagelanguage 36%36% 11 languagelanguage 30%30% Men Women

Men Women Men Women saferworld · karen peace support network 11

Fifty-nine per cent of men and 57 per cent of women were Buddhist, 37 per cent of women and 38 per cent of men were Christian, and four per cent and five per cent were of other religions, most of whom were animists, in addition to Muslims and Leke16 (Figure 1.3). The largest proportions of both men and women were farmers, covering 57 per cent of men and 43 per cent of women. Seventeen per cent of women were businesspersons, traders or vendors compared with ten per cent of men – with women traditionally taking greater responsibility when a family starts a village shop or other retail enterprise.17 Women were more than twice as likely to be ‘unemployed’ than men were (Figure 1.4). The unemployed category includes people engaged solely in unpaid work in the home, such as those responsible for child and adult care, preparation of meals and housework, tasks for which women and girls typically take greater responsibility – as per traditional gender norms.18 Women respondents were slightly more educated than men: 41 per cent of women and 37 per cent of men had completed primary school as their highest level of schooling, while 27 per cent of men and 25 per cent of women had no schooling (Figure 1.5). Only two per cent of men and one per cent of women had completed university. However, men felt that they could speak more languages well than women did: 70 per cent of men and 64 per cent of women said they could speak two or more languages well (Figure 1.6). Seventy per cent of all respondents could speak Myanmar language, 64 per cent could speak Sgaw Karen and 23 per cent could speak Pwo Karen. There were 12 other “well’ spoken languages among respondents, as shown in Figure 1.7.

Figure 1.7 Respondents who could speak each language “well” (% of total)

Fig 1.7 % 70 70 64

13 10 7 5 3 3 2 2 2 0.79 0.59 0.30 0.25 0.15 0

Bwe Shan Pa-O Mon Thai Paku Dawei Kayah Kayan English Myanmar Keh Bar Mopwa Gal Bar Sgaw KarenPwo Karen

Fig 1.15 % A80 reasonable76 balance77 of coverage was achieved across GoM-controlled, KNU-controlled and70 mix-controlled territories. Numerous measures were used to determine these types60 of territory, which are described in section 2.6. Twenty-four of the 72 villages had

only50 KNU-affiliated village leaders; 19 had only GoM-affiliated village heads; 17 had

two40 village leaders, one for the GoM and one for the KNU; nine had village leaders predominantly affiliated with the GoM, but also reporting to the KNU; and three of 30 the villages had leaders primarily affiliated with the KNU, but also reporting to the GoM.20 Using a ‘measure of control’, described in section 2.6 – based on certain services, 10 8 6 6

0 GoM KNU DKBA BGF KPC 16 Leke is a religious sect established in the 1800s in eastern Myanmar combining elements of Buddhism and Millenarianism, Fig 1.16 whose% followers are waiting for the next coming of Lord Ahrimayttaya. 80 17 As noted in Karen Women Organisation (KWO)72 (2010), p 9, in the past women “were mainly expectedGoM-controlled to remain at home, looking70 after children and performing household and farming tasks”. However, as indicated by theKNU-controlled relatively small number of women falling into this category (129) compared to men (57), KHRG (2006), p 15, describes how both house and field work Mix-controlled are60 traditionally shared between both58 genders to some extent. 53 18 KWO (2010), p 9; KHRG (2006), p 17. 50 44 41 43 40 36 34 28 28 30 25 26 20 20 12 10 9

0 Forced labour Portering Burning/destroying Fleeing home Forced villages for security relocation % Fig 1.17 60 53 Households 50 46 Villages 40

19 20

10 2.36 2.68 0.24 0 GoM-controlled KNU-controlled Mix-controlled Fig 1.19 % 50 GoM None KNU I don’t know 41 40 38

33 32 33 30 30 30 27 26 26 23 21 20 18 17 18 16 15 12 11 11 10

0 Consider Want to govern: Support political Prefer to deal Keeps the community government to be: views most: with justice most safe and secure problems: 12 security, justice and governance in south east myanmar

A village on the Than Lwin (Salween) river between Hpa An and Mawlamyine. © Jacques Beaulieu

specific taxes and indicators of military presence – it was found that 21 of the villages were under KNU control, 13 of the villages were under GoM control and 38 were under mixed control. By this wider measure, 20 per cent of respondents were under KNU control, 19 per cent were under GoM control and 61 per cent were under mixed control. saferworld · karen peace support network 13

1.3 Key findings: security, justice, governance and politics Mon 1% Mixed 0.3%

Fig 1.1 Other 2% 1. Governance in the survey area is complex and with no official territorial demarcation, the Bamar 7% Karennmajorityi/Kaya ofh areas/Kayan are 2% under the ‘mixed control’ of the GoM, KNU and, in some cases, other armed actors. Seventy-seven per cent and 76 per cent of respondents received services from, paid tax to or regularly saw soldiers from the KNU and GoM respectively. Asked who they consider to be their government, 38 per cent said the KNU, 33 per cent said the GoM, 20 per Pa-O 3% cent said “I don’t know”, eight per cent said “none” and one per cent stated smaller armed actors, such as the DKBA, BGFs or KPC.

Shan 4% Dawei 5% Figure 1.8 Respondents under each type of territory (Based on a measure combining data on service delivery taxation and exposure to soldiers).

GoM-controlled 19% Fig 1.8

Mix-controlled 61% KNU-controlled 20%

Prefer not to answer Very confident 2. The large majority of the surveyed population1% 2% (75 per cent of men, 67 per cent of women) had Fig 1.13 experienced some form of violence or abuse at the hands of armed actors or authorities. Confident 12% Respondents were reluctant to name perpetrators but corroboration with existing research indicatesDon’t that knowthe majority 25% of these acts were committed by the Tatmadaw and its proxy forces, as the forms of violence are heavily associated with the state military’s systematic and widespread practices. Other armed actors including the KNU have also committed acts of violence and abuse, but not in a systematic fashion or on a widespread scale. Every village had experienced violence and abuse and the majority of the 20 issues examined had been experienced in the majority of villages. Portering (the carryingNeutral of military 37% equipment for military operations) and forced labour were the most prevalent issues experienced, and various forms of forcedNot confident displacement at all 23% were also extremely high. An astounding 30 per cent of respondents reported being present during shootings. Karen people were more likely than non-Karen people to have experienced these issues, but prevalence was high among both groups.

Fig 1.10 Figure 1.9 IPrevalence don’t know of who experiences he/she is of Preferabuse not and to violence answer 0.1% 0.5% Fig 2.4 Did not experience abuse and violence Don’t know 11.4% Experienced abuse and violence % 100 No 6.7%

80 25% 24% 29% 33% 75% 76% 71% Yes 81.5% 60 67% 46%

54% 58% 40 42% 70% 68% 79% 80% 30% 32% 20 90% 21% 20%

10% 0 Don’t know 5.5% Prefer not to answer 0.6% Total Men Fig 2.5 Strongly disagreeWomen 0.2%Karen Non-Karen Portering Shootings Flee home Land grabbing Disagree 3.1% n/destroy villageForced relocation StronglyBur agree 19.7%

Neutral 16.2%

Agree 54.7% 14 security, justice and governance in south east myanmar

3. The KNU was found to enjoy notable legitimacy and support in the eyes of large portions of the surveyed population, especially among Karen people, seemingly indicating support for the principles of localised governance and self-determination. The majority of respondents preferred the KNU, despite the GoM reaching similar numbers of Karen respondents with development and services, demonstrating further that investments in development do not automatically translate into legitimacy and popular support. Respondents were also slightly more likely to say they got a fair return on taxes paid to the KNU than to the GoM. However, the GoM is preferred by a notable proportion of respondents particularly non-Karen. There were also significant portions who said “none” or “I don’t know” to these questions. Women commonly said “I don’t know” more than men.

Fig 1.11 % 70 Figure 1.10 Which of these authorities… GoM 64 KNU I don’t know 60 None

50 45 43 4 40 3 3 3 35 34 33 3 30 2 2 26 2 21 23 23 24 21 2 2 2 2 2 20 1 15 14 15 14 12 11 10

4. Public opinions of both the KNU and the GoM had improved greatly since the 2012 ceasefire, demonstrating that there is widespread support for efforts to end conflict. However, only 14 per cent had any confidence that the current peace process will lead to sustainable peace. The majority of respondents were worried or very worried that fighting would break out again within the next five years. This trend was most pronounced among respondents in KNU- controlled areas and among those whose main interactions with authorities were with their military branches.

Figure 1.11 How has your opinion in these authorities changed since the 2012 ceasefire? % Fig 1.12 100 No data 9% No data 11% Prefer not to answer 1% Prefer not to answer 1% Don’t know 20% 80 Don’t know 14% Signiﬁcantly improved 8% Signiﬁcantly improved 8% 60

Improved 48% 40 Improved 55%

No difference 12% No difference 10% Deteriorated 1% Deteriorated 1% Severely deteriorated 1% GoM KNU Severely deteriorated 0%

Fig 2.3 Did not know their village leader % Did not know their village leader 1.39% 100 2.2%

Knew their village leader 60 Knew their village leader 98.6% 97.8%

20 20 33% 20%

0 0 Total Women Men Who do you consider Who do you want as your government? to govern your area?

Fig 2.29 Strongly Strongly agree Neutral disagree No data 1% 9% 3% 14%

Agree Disagree I don’t know/ 14% 48% Prefer not to answer 11%

0 20 40 60 80 100%

% 3% Fig 2.30 100 3% 4% 0% 0% 1% No answer 8% 14% 14% 18% 0% Prefer not to answer 0% I don’t know 80 30% No 29% Somewhat 38% 33% 60 Yes 93%

40% 40 32% 22% 29%

20 14% 22% 19% 17% 11% 1% 2% 2% 0 GoM KNU DKBA BGF KPC (n=753) (n=1,299) (n=99) (n=28) (n=99) Mon 1% Mixed 0.3%

Fig 1.1 Other 2%

Bamar 7% Karenni/Kayah/Kayan 2%

Pa-O 3%

Shan 4% Dawei 5%

GoM-controlled 19% Fig 1.8

Mix-controlled 61% KNU-controlled 20%

saferworld · karen peace support network 15

Figure 1.12 How confident are you that the peace process will lead to a sustainable peace? Prefer not to answer Very conﬁdent 1% 2% Fig 1.13 Conﬁdent 12%

Don’t know 25%

Neutral 37%

Not conﬁdent at all 23%

5. Women in the survey were less likely to be in formal work or to have voted for their village I don’t know who he/she is Prefer not to answer leader than the men. Women’s 0.1%participation0.5% in elections was lower in villages with a KNU Fig 2.4 village leaderDon’t than know those 11.4% with a GoM village leader. A large majority of women had experienced violence or abuse by authorities, including a wide range of issues from forced labour through to shootings. KarenNo 6.7%women were more likely than any other group to have had to flee their home for safety. While men and women displayed the same overall perceptions of the GoM and KNU, women were consistently more likely to say “I don’t know” than men, suggesting that women have less confidence or relevant knowledge to express theirYes political 81.5% opinions than men, often due to exclusion from community decision-making and a lack of political recognition. Importantly, these differences were most notable in the fields of security and justice and in GoM-controlled and mix-controlled areas. This was particularly pronounced on questions related to justice and security. The proportion of women in mix-controlled areas who said “I don’t know” was higher than those who said GoM or KNU put together, demonstrating severe lack of protection from authorities in these areas. Nonetheless, the majority of women repeatedly gaveDon’t direct know and 5.5% clear answers. Prefer not to answer 0.6% Fig 2.5 Strongly disagree 0.2% Disagree 3.1% Figure 1.13 Key findings from women surveyed Fig 1.14 % Strongly agree 19.7% 100 4 Women 6 Neutral 16.2% Men

80 5 6

60 4 41 43 3 40 Agree 54.7% 35 3 33 32 24 24 22 21 20 1 1

0 In work Experienced Voted for Feel GoM Feel KNU Don’t know Would Would Don’t know outside the violence their village keeps the keeps the which prefer the prefer which home or abuse leader community community authority GoM to the KNU authority most safe most safe keeps the handle to handle they would and secure and secure community justice justice prefer to most safe issues issues deal with secure justice issues

6. Armed actors that splintered from the KNU – including the NCA signatories, the DKBA and KPC, as well as the Tatmadaw’s Border Guard Forces – were found to be far less widespread in their engagement with the survey population than either the GoM or the KNU. While small portions of respondents in specific areas had either negative of positive perceptions of them, the large majority seemingly had little or no contact with them. See section 2.4 for more background on the splinter groups. Fig 1.7 % 70 70 64

23 Fig 1.7 % 70 70 20 64 13 60 10 7 16 security, justice and governance in5 south east myanmar 3 3 2 2 2 50 0.79 0.59 0.30 0.25 0.15 0

Figure 1.14 Proportion of respondentsBwe Shan thatPa-O receive services from,Mon payThai tax to or see soldiersPaku Dawei Kayah Kayan English Myanmar Keh Bar Mopwa Gal Bar often40 orSgaw very Karen oftenPwo Karen of each authority Fig 1.15 % 80 76 77 30 70 23 Fig 1.7 60% 70 70 20 50 64 13 40 60 10 30 7 5 3 3 20 2 2 2 50 0.79 0.59 0.30 0.25 0.15 0 10 8 6 6 Bwe Shan Pa-O Mon Thai Paku Dawei Kayah Kayan English Myanmar Keh Bar Mopwa Gal Bar 0 Sgaw KarenPwo Karen 40 GoM KNU DKBA BGF KPC Fig 1.15 % 77 Fig 1.16 80% 76 80 GoM-controlled 7030 72 7. Experiences70 of violence and abuse were much more prevalent overall in mix-controlledKNU-controlled and 60 23 Mix-controlled KNU-controlled60 areas, as these58 have been the most affected by armed conflict in recent 20 53 decades.50 Looking at the period before the 2012 ceasefire, 72 per cent of respondents in mix- 44 43 1341 controlled40 areas had been used as porters by authorities, while 53 per cent had experienced 36 34 forced10 labour. KNU-controlled areas experienced the highest rates of issues associated with 30 28 7 28 26 5 25 Tatmadaw counter-insurgency techniques, such as the burning20 or destroying of villages (43 per 20 3 3 2 2 2 20 0.79 120.59 0.30 0.25 0.15 cent)0 and forced relocation (28 per cent). 9 10 8 6 6 Bwe Shan Pa-O Mon Thai Paku Dawei Kayah Kayan English Myanmar Keh Bar Mopwa Gal Bar 0 Sgaw KarenPwo Karen Figure 1.15ForcedGoM Prevalence labour KNU of PorteringviolenceDKBA andBurning/destroyingBGF abuse, pre-2012,KPC Fleeing by type home of territoryForced Fig 1.15 % villages for security relocation % 77 Fig 1.16 80% 76 Fig 1.17 80 60 72 GoM-controlled 70 53 KNU-controlled 50 HouseholdsMix-controlled 60 46 58 53 Villages 50 40 44 41 43 40 36 30 34 28 28 30 25 26 19 20 20 20 12 9 1010 8 6 6 2.36 2.68 0 0.24 0 ForcedGoM labour KNU PorteringDKBA Burning/destroyingBGF KPC Fleeing home Forced GoM-controlled KNU-controlled villages Mix-controlledfor security relocation % Fig 1.16 % Fig 1.191.17 80% 6050 GoM-controlled 72 GoM None 70 53 KNU-controlled The 2012 ceasefire has enabled extremely high rates of land grabs, particularlyKNU in areasI don’t where know 8. 50 HouseholdsMix-controlled 60 46 5841 the40 GoM and mainstream53 Myanmar companies have gained38 greatest access.Villages Since 2012, land 5040 grabs were experienced44 by one in 37 households43 in mix-controlled areas (2.68 per cent) and 33 41 32 33 40 30 36 30 one30 in 42 households in GoM-controlled areas (2.36 per cent). In34 just six years, that is an 27 28 26 28 26 extremely30 high number of families to have suffered25 such crippling impacts on their26 livelihoods 23 19 20 20 and20 identities. Conversely, only one in 401 surveyed households21 in KNU-controlled areas had 20 18 12 18 9 17 experienced10 a land grab in16 that period (amounting 15to one documented case). 2.36 2.68 12 0 11 0.2411 100 Forced labour Portering Burning/destroying Fleeing home Forced Figure 1.16GoM-controlled Surveyed householdsKNU-controlled and villagesvillages thatMix-controlled havefor experienced security landrelocation grabs since 2012 % FigFig 1.191.17 6050 0 GoM None Consider Want to govern: Support political 53 Keeps the community Prefer to deal KNU I don’t know government to be: views most: with justice Householdsmost safe and secure 50 46 41 problems: 40 38 Villages 40 33 32 33 30 30 30 27 26 26 23 19 20 21 20 18 17 18 16 10 15 12 2.36 11 11 2.68 0.24 100 GoM-controlled KNU-controlled Mix-controlled Fig 1.19 % 50 0 GoM None Consider Want to govern: Support political Prefer to deal Keeps the community government to be: views most: with justice KNUmost safeI don’tand secure know 41 problems: 40 38

33 32 33 30 30 30 27 26 26 23 21 20 18 17 18 16 15 12 11 11 10

0 Consider Want to govern: Support political Prefer to deal Keeps the community government to be: views most: with justice most safe and secure problems: Fig 1.7 % 70 70 64

saferworld · karen23 peace support network 17 20

13 9. Respondents were notably more likely to prefer the KNU to deal with justice issues than the 10 GoM, including those in mix-controlled7 areas. Only 37 per cent felt it was common to report 5 cases considered to be ‘small’ and only 503 per cent3 felt2 so even2 for2 ‘big’ cases. When people do 0.79 0.59 0.30 0.25 0.15 report0 cases, they almost always go to the village leader first, especially for small cases. Bwe Shan Pa-O Mon Thai Paku Dawei Kayah Kayan English AlternativeMyanmar options for reporting cases appearedKeh Bar mostMopwa available in KNU areas.Gal Bar High costs, lack Sgaw KarenPwo Karen of personal connections, long distances to authorities and the process being time consuming Fig 1.15 % 80were identified76 as the77 main barriers to justice, most commonly associated with GoM. More 70than a quarter of respondents said they do not know which authority they would prefer to deal

60with justice issues, the majority of which were women, suggesting gaps in access to justice.

50 Figure 1.17 Perceptions and preferences on justice issues Fig 1.18 40

30 Would prefer the GoM to deal with ustice problems 23 20 Would prefer the KNU to deal with ustice problems 3 10 8 6 6 Don’t know which authority would prefer for ustice issues 26 0 GoM KNU DKBA BGF KPC Feel it is common or very common to report cases 3 Fig 1.16 % considered to be small’ 80 Feel it is common or very common72 to report cases 5 GoM-controlled 70 considered to be big’ KNU-controlled Feel that the village leader is the only place people first Mix-controlled 60 58 4 53 report small’ cases to 50 Feel that the village leader is the only place people first 44 6 41 report big’ cases to43 40 36 ave ever reported a case to any authority or 34 28 responsible person 28 30 25 26 20 20 0 20 40 60 80 100% 12 10 9

10. In0 mix-controlled areas, the KNU was found to be notably more popular than the GoM. Fig 2.1&2 Forced labour Portering Burning/destroying Fleeing home Forced villages for security relocation However, respondents were particularly likely to not know which authorities4 they preferred GoMor % Villages with village leaders Fig 1.17 60relied upon, compared with those reporting in both to KNU and GoM controlled areas. While53 33 per centKNU 53 considered GoM Villagesto be theirwith respondents government, receiving 41 per cent wanted the KNU to govern53 their area; 38 50 Households 46education or healthcare from 5 per cent said “I don’t know” or “none”. This trend was most prominent Villageswith regard to 40preference of politicalVillages views with and respondents in the payingprovision of justice and security. Women54 in mix- agricultural property or foraging taxes to 65 controlled areas were especially likely to say “I don’t know” to these questions. In terms of 30 Villages with respondents who sometimes’ 62 keeping the community or freuently’ safe andsee soldiers secure, from women said “I don’t know” more than for the KNU 19 66 20and GoM combined. Additionally, 33 per cent of respondents had to pay tax to two or more

10authorities, which was a burden most common in mix-controlled areas. 2.36 2.68 0.24 5 0 ave a village leader reporting to Figure 1.18GoM-controlled Perceptions and KNU-controlledpreferences in mix-controlledMix-controlled areas (n=1,230) 2 % Fig 1.19 3 50 Paying some agricultural property andor foraging tax to GoM 5 None KNU I don’t know Receiving41 healthcare andor 54 40 education from 38 43

33 Sometimes or freuently see 3234 33 30 soldiers from 30 30 54 27 26 26 23 0 10 20 2130 40 50 60 70 80% 20 18 17 18 16 15 12 11 11 Fig 4.5 10 Village leader .5

Other KNU bodyofficial .5 0 Myanmar Police Force 6. Consider Want to govern: Support political Prefer to deal Keeps the community government to be: Village tract Leader 5.6 views most: with justice most safe and secure problems: Karen National Police Force 4.

Village or village tract 2. securityustice appointee Other GoM body 2.

Elder 1.3

Government lawyer .3

Family .2

Member of DKBA .2

Member of BGF .2

Priestpastor .2

0 20 40 60 80 100% 18

Aerial view of a Karen village. © Saferworld 19 2 Governance and legitimacy

the gom-knu conflict has deeply political roots, linked to territory, ethnic identity and governance arrangements at multiple levels. These are the issues that need to be addressed to build peace. Disagreements about if and how Karen lands should be defined and governed were the driving force behind the initiation of conflict between the KNU and GoM in 1949, with Karen leaders demanding an autonomous Karen state and strong representation in the Rangoon government. Since then, grievances have escalated due to decades of centralised military rule by predominantly Bamar governments, and the KNU political demands have become firmly focused on federalism and civilian democracy. Following on from the Karen National Association, a political party and social organisation founded in 1881, the KNU was originally established as a civilian organisation in 1947, and became armed in the following years as insecurity mounted. Since the 1940s, the KNU has effectively become a parallel government in many areas, in both autonomous areas and in those where the GoM also has a presence.19 This system has kept the idea of a Karen nation alive and provided a support base for the KNU resistance. While adopting key features from the British colonial system, KNU institutions have evolved in relation to traditional Karen customs and practices and are deeply embedded in local communities. Its services, laws and functions typically rely on significant time, resources and involvement from the local people they serve and are often delivered in collaboration with Karen community-based and civil society organisations. At present, territories have not been formally demarcated in ceasefire areas and huge areas are subjected to the overlapping authority of the GoM, KNU and other smaller armed actors. Ongoing disputes between the GoM and KNU regularly revolve around non-military issues such as taxation, road construction, large-scale infrastructure, business regulation and language education, among others. While the NCA recognises that signatory EAOs (including the KNU, DKBA and KPC) have been responsible for governance and security in their areas, the peace process has thus far failed to establish mutually recognised ‘interim arrangements’ that would determine the rights and responsibilities of different authorities. The KNU governance system includes bodies for service delivery, taxation, land and resource governance, justice, and regulation of commercial activity, among others.

19 See Jolliffe (2016); South (2011); and Smith (1999). 20 security, justice and governance in south east myanmar

Most of these functions are carried out by the KNU’s 14 line departments, including four that just operate at the central level and nine that are also established at the district and township levels, but are coordinated closely by ‘KNU chairpersons’ at each administration level.20 There is also an independent judiciary, with judges sitting at each level, committees for coordinating various cross-departmental activities and a number of independent but formally recognised community-based organisations (CBOs). Men have traditionally taken the majority of leadership positions in the KNU, though reforms introduced in 2012 ensure that there are at least two women in all leadership committees at each level and have notably increased the number of women in each department, owing largely to advocacy by the KWO. The GoM’s role in the region has transformed in recent years, following the establishment of its civilian–military hybrid system in 2011 and the stability provided by subsequent ceasefires. During the 63 years of open conflict, the Myanmar armed forces slowly increased its control over KNU territories, while civilian GoM bodies had very limited access and were poorly resourced. Military-led administrative councils were established at the township and village tract levels, and interaction with communities revolved around demands for forced labour and informal taxes, with only limited provision of services and minimal involvement of local people in development. Since 2012, however, roads have been built, GoM village tract administrators (VTAs) have been instated, police stations have been established, and literally thousands of GoM school teachers have been dispatched, among other changes. While access to some services has improved, the way changes have been implemented by the GoM has contributed to conflict, often facilitating the extension of state control over new territories while duplicating, undermining or capturing existing systems valued by local people. This has created feelings that the ceasefires are serving the Bamanisation of Karen lands and that the GoM is disingenuous in its willingness to solve conflicts through political compromise. International aid has sometimes been employed by the GoM to facilitate its expansion. As ceasefires have formally barred troop reinforce- ments and negotiations to establish demarcated ceasefire territories have thus far failed, civilian governance functions have often become a means for controlling and influencing territory. Nonetheless, there have been some examples of cooperation and communication particularly in the health sector and in some community development initiatives.

Overview of Across the survey area, governance is characterised by the parallel systems of the GoM governance authorities and KNU. Smaller armed actors also play governance roles in some areas, but were and functions found to be far less significant, even in areas where people interact with those groups. This study analysed four forms of governmental influence as a basis for understanding the breadth and depth of governance provided by each of the governance authorities. These were: 1) the affiliations of village leaders; 2) the presence of soldiers; 3) taxation; and 4) service delivery.21 The KNU and the GoM overlap significantly in each of these four domains. While people often use terms like ‘GoM-controlled’, ‘KNU-controlled’ and ‘mix-controlled’ to describe types of territory, there are no universal definitions for these terms, let alone formally agreed upon demarcations for such areas. Section 2.6 brings some rigour to the analysis of different territories by introducing a measure to define each surveyed village into one of these three types of territory. However, this is left until the end of part 2, as the measure depends on first understanding the overall scope and spread of each actor’s governance functions.

20 These are the departments of agriculture, alliance affairs, breeding and fisheries, defence, education, finance and revenue (sometimes called the treasury), foreign affairs, forestry, interior and religious affairs, justice, mining, organising and information, health and welfare, and transportation and communication. 21 A more detailed breakdown of how village leader affiliations operate is provided in section 2.1. Fig 1.18 Fig 1.18

saferworld · karen peace support network 21

To provide a sense of the geographical reach of the GoM and KNU in each domain, Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show the number of surveyed villages and respondents experiencing the four forms of governmental influence. While the KNU was prevalent in a higher number of villages across all forms of influence (indicating a wider geographical spread), the levels of influence among actual respondents showed greater variation. Later sections discuss each of these domains in more detail.

Figure 2.1 Number of vilages experiencing each form of influence

Villages with village leaders 4 GoM Fig 2.1&2 Villages with village leaders 4 GoM Fig 2.1&2 reporting to… 53 KNU reporting to… 53 KNU Villages with respondents receiving 53 Villages with respondents receiving 53 education or healthcare from… 5 education or healthcare from… 5 Villages with respondents paying 54 Villages with respondents paying 54 agricultural, property or foraging taxes to… 65 agricultural, property or foraging taxes to… 65 Villages with respondents who ‘sometimes’ 62 Villages withor ‘frequently’ respondents see who soldiers ‘sometimes’ from… 62 or ‘frequently’ see soldiers from… 66 66

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80% 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80% Figure 2.2 Number of respondents experiencing each form of influence

5 GoM Have a village leader reporting to… 5 GoM Have a village leader reporting to… 2 KNU 2 KNU Paying some agricultural, property and/or 3 Paying some agricultural, property and/or 3 foraging tax to… 5 foraging tax to… 5 Receiving healthcare and/or 54 Receiving healthcare and/or 54 education from… 43 education from… 43 Sometimes or frequently see 34 Sometimes or frequently see 34 soldiers from… 54 soldiers from… 54

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80% 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80%

Fig 4.5 Fig 4.5 2.1 Village-level Key findings governance n Village administration varied greatly, with villages sometimes only having a village leader affiliated with GoM or KNU, sometimes having one village leader for both, and sometimes having one (or more) for each. n All village leaders in all surveyed villages were men. n Almost all respondents knew their village leader and the large majority found them approachable, caring and capable. n All but one of the surveyed villages had some kind of election for the current village leader, but these varied greatly in terms of inclusivity. n Elections of GoM-affiliated village heads were better attended and more gender inclusive than those for KNU-affiliated village heads, likely thanks to reforms introduced to GoM local elections at the end of 2017.

The village is arguably the most important administrative unit in rural Myanmar, in terms of people’s everyday experiences with governance. Village leaders act as the primary focal point for most forms of interaction between residents and the higher authorities of both KNU and the GoM, due to a centuries-old political culture that makes central officials at each administrative level responsible for coordinating the majority of governance functions.22 Under both the GoM and KNU administration systems, village leaders report to village tract-level leaders, who in turn report to the township level, and so on.

22 The GoM, EAOs and their antecedents, such as the colonial administration and historical kingdoms, have all used ‘graded territorial administration’, meaning that central governance figures at each administrative level act as the centre point of all governance functions and report to their counterpart at the next level up. See more on how the GoM’s graded territorial administration systems developed in Kyi Pyar Chit Saw and Arnold (2014) and on the EAO’s administrative systems in Jolliffe (2015). 22 security, justice and governance in south east myanmar

The Myanmar flag flies outside a newly established government office in a region predominantly controlled by the KNU and DKBA. © Kim Jolliffe

“Among the 72 villages Despite their de facto importance, village leaders are not officially or fully recognised surveyed, 19 had only GoM- or constituted in law under the GoM system. However, and especially since 2017, they affiliated village leaders, 24 had have been gaining a clearer role as either ‘100-household heads’ or ‘village area leaders’. only KNU-affiliated village In practice, they tend to be recognised locally and relied upon by the VTAs, for a range leaders, 17 had one of each, nine had village leaders of functions beyond anything that is clearly stipulated in law or formal procedure. primarily under the GoM VTAs are officially elected, trained and provided with a small honorarium by the Gen- system but also reporting to eral Administration Department (GAD) of the military-led Ministry of Home Affairs, the KNU, and three had village but are not civil servants.23 VTAs report to GAD township administrators, who, like all leaders primarily under the senior GAD officials, are appointed without public involvement.24 The election KNU system but also reporting procedures for VTAs have become more systematic since 2017, when procedures were to the GoM. ” introduced for electing 100-household heads. Elections are carried out on a one- household/one-vote basis, but they are not always inclusive of all households, and the GAD has powers available to remove them for failing to carry out their duties.25 The KNU public administration system is more robust and formal at the village level. The organisation is essentially a hybrid between a political party and a local government, which is reflected in its structure. Village leaders are officially constituted as party ‘chairpersons’, but function primarily as local administrators, recognised as the central governance authority and responsible for coordinating all governance functions. They lead seven-member village committees officially known as ‘KNU Foundational Bodies’, which must include at least two women. Each committee member has a specific role, such as village security or revenue management. These committees are elected by the local population, usually on a one-household/one-vote basis, but in practice election processes are not fully regulated or uniform.26 In some places, village and village tract leaders are simply selected by KNU officials at the township level. Village leaders and other committee members then take part in elections for village tract-level KNU Foundational Bodies, which take part in congresses that elect the leaderships at the township, district and central levels. Village governance in the survey area is complicated by the overlapping territories of the GoM, KNU and other armed authorities. Among the 72 villages surveyed, 19 had

23 Some village leaders hold the official position of 100-household head, whose official function (reintroduced in 2017 in rural areas, having been removed since 2012) is to represent their constituent households in village tract elections. However, they are generally relied upon for a wider number of tasks. For more on the procedures of local GoM elections in Myanmar, see Kempel and Aung Tun (2016); note that this report was written before the change to the 2012 law that reintroduced the elected role of 100-household heads. 24 The GAD is under the Ministry of Home Affairs, one of three ministries whose ministers are effectively appointed by the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. 25 Now that the official election of 100-household heads has been reintroduced, most village leaders are likely elected as part of VTA elections. In these, each household gets one vote to elect their local 10-household head, who then is able to place a vote on behalf of all households for the 100-household head, who in turn votes for the VTA. This system was introduced in 2012, changed again in 2016 and is yet to be systematically implemented. 26 Common procedures include mass meetings with a nominal verbal agreement, hand raising or anonymous ballot systems. saferworld · karen peace support network 23

only GoM-affiliated village leaders, 24 had only KNU-affiliated village leaders, 17 had one of each, nine had village leaders primarily under the GoM system but also reporting to the KNU, and three had village leaders primarily under the KNU system but also reporting to the GoM. As discussed in section 2.6, there are further dimensions to mixed governance, as authorities exercise influence in numerous other ways beyond just the village leadership. “All village leaders in all the All village leaders in all the surveyed villages were men, although villagers with KNU- surveyed villages were men, affiliated leaders are required to have at least two women on the seven-member although villagers with KNU- committee. Existing research by KPSN member organisations indicates that, although affiliated leaders are required women were traditionally marginalised from such positions, they have been more to have at least two women on the seven-member regularly elected by their communities during the last 30 or so years of the conflict committee.” period. This research identified numerous reasons for this, the first being due to “the fact that men were away from the villages to a greater extent than women”, meaning more women served as household representatives in elections and so were more likely 27 to elect other women. It was also often% because communities hoped women “would Fig 1.12 be treated more leniently by the [Tatmadaw]100 than men” due to their cultural standing, No data 9% No data 11% 28 and becausePrefer not mento answer were 1% often afraid. However, women regularlyPrefer not faced to answer violence 1% while in such positions,Don’t know so 20% often only held the80 posts for a short time.Don’t knowAlthough 14% the trend appeared to create “a greater acceptance of women as leaders”,Signiﬁcantly men improvedhave retaken 8% the Signiﬁcantly improved 8% roles in most communities since the 201260 ceasefire, leaving women concerned that they are retreating “from positions of authority back to more traditional roles”.29

Indeed, theseImproved women 48% put themselves at40 greater risk for theirImproved communities 55% and often experienced abuse, but have now had to take a step back and have been disempowered.

Encouragingly, the vast majority (98.220 per cent) of respondents stated that they knew

their villageNo differenceleaders. 12% Among those who didn’t know a villageNo differenceleader, 1410% were male and 22 were femaleDeteriorated (Figure 1% 2.3). Deteriorated 1% Severely deteriorated 1% GoM KNU Severely deteriorated 0%

Figure 2.3 Men and women who knew their village leader Fig 2.3 Did not know their village leader % Did not know their village leader 1.39% 100 2.2%

Knew their village leader 60 Knew their village leader 98.6% 97.8%

Men Women % Fig 2.13 % 1.3% Fig 2.9 100 1.7% Did not say they voted 100 1.0% The large majority of respondents felt their village leaders to be approachable, caring 1.4% Other armed actors Said they voted 7.8% 8.7% and capable: 81.5 per cent said they felt they could approach their village leader with a Prefer not to answer 80 20% None 80 23% problem (just 6.7 per cent said they could not) (Figure 2.4). In response to the statement, I don’t know “the village leader really cares about the community”, 30 per cent strongly agreed and KNU 60 60 GoM 55 per cent agreed (only 2.5 per51.5% cent disagreed or strongly disagreed) (Figure 2.6). 55.0% 38% In response to the 58.5%statement, “the village leader has the necessary capacities to serve 45% 48.5% 40the community”,45.0% 20 per cent strongly agreed and 55 per cent agreed (only40 three per 41.5% cent disagreed) (Figure 2.5). 20 20 33% 20%

0 0 Total Women Men Who do you consider Who do you want 27 KHRG (2016), p 24. See also, pp 25–26. as your government? to govern your area? 28 KWO (2010), pp 10–11, 13. In particular, male village leaders were more commonly “being accused of having links with the Karen resistance, and being tortured and killed”, p 11. Fig 2.29 Strongly Strongly 29 agree KHRG (2016), p 24. Neutral disagree No data 1% 9% 3% 14%

Agree Disagree I don’t know/ 14% 48% Prefer not to answer 11%

0 20 40 60 80 100%

% 3% Fig 2.30 100 3% 4% 0% 0% 1% No answer 8% 14% 14% 18% 0% Prefer not to answer 0% I don’t know 80 30% No 29% Somewhat 38% 33% 60 Yes 93%

40% 40 32% 22% 29%

20 14% 22% 19% 17% 11% 1% 2% 2% 0 GoM KNU DKBA BGF KPC (n=753) (n=1,299) (n=99) (n=28) (n=99) Mon 1% Mixed 0.3% Mon 1% Mixed 0.3% Fig 1.1 Other 2%

Fig 1.1 Other 2% Bamar 7% Karenni/Kayah/Kayan 2% Bamar 7% Karenni/Kayah/Kayan 2%

Pa-O 3% Pa-O 3%

Shan 4% Dawei 5% Shan 4% Dawei 5% GoM-controlled 19% Fig 1.8 GoM-controlled 19% Fig 1.8

Mix-controlled 61% KNU-controlled 20% Mix-controlled 61% KNU-controlled 20%

Prefer not to answer Very confident 1% 2% Prefer not to answer Very confident Fig 1.13 1% 2% Confident 12% Fig 1.13 Don’t know 25% Confident 12% Don’t know 25%

Neutral 37% Neutral 37% Not conﬁdent at all 23% 24 security, justice and governance in south east myanmar Not conﬁdent at all 23%

Figure 2.4 Do you feel you can approach your village leader when you are, for example, faced with a problem? I don’t know who he/she is Prefer not to answer 0.1% 0.5% Fig 2.4 I don’t know who he/she is Prefer not to answer Don’t know 11.4%0.1% 0.5% Fig 2.4 Don’t know 11.4% No 6.7% No 6.7%

Yes 81.5% Yes 81.5%

FigureDon’t 2.5 know Does 5.5%the village leader havePrefer the not necessaryto answer skills0.6% to serve the community? Fig 2.5 StronglyDon’t disagree know 5.5% 0.2% Prefer not to answer 0.6% Strongly disagreeDisagree 0.2% 3.1% Fig 2.5 Strongly agree 19.7% Disagree 3.1% Strongly agree 19.7% Neutral 16.2% Neutral 16.2%

Agree 54.7% Agree 54.7%

Figure 2.6 Does the village leader really care about the community Don’t know 4.4% Prefer not to answer 0.2%

Fig 2.6 Strongly disagree 0.1% Don’tDisagree know 2.4%4.4% Prefer not to answer 0.2%

Fig 2.6 StronglyNeutral disagree 8.3% 0.1% Disagree 2.4% Strongly agree 29.9%

Neutral 8.3% Strongly agree 29.9%

Agree 54.7%

Agree 54.7% Figure 2.7 People who said “no” when asked if they could approach their village leader (by gender) Fig 2.7

Fig 2.7 Women Men 47% 53% Women Men 47% 53%

Prefer not to say 0% No data 1% Don’t know 3% There werePrefer no not elections to say 4%0% No data 1% Fig 2.8 No, there were elections butDo nobodyn’t know 3% in my household voted 3% There were no elections 4% Fig 2.8 No, thereNo, werebut someone elections in but my nobody inhousehold my household did 10% voted 3% No, but someone in my household did 10% Yes 45%

Yes 45%

No 33%

No data 8% Fig 2.28 Four+ 1% None 14% Three 2% No data 8% Fig 2.28 Four+ 1% None 14% Three 2%

Two 30%

Two 30% One 46%

One 46%

Fig 3.1

Fig 3.1 Very often 31% Very often 31%

Often 34% Often 34% Don’t know 4.4% Prefer not to answer 0.2%

Fig 2.6 Strongly disagree 0.1% Disagree 2.4%

Neutral 8.3% Strongly agree 29.9%

saferworld · karenAgree peace 54.7% support network 25

Among the 133 respondents (6.7 per cent of total) who said they could not approach their village leader, 53 per cent were male and 47 per cent were female. Closer analysis

Fig 2.7 of the answers to all three questions found that while more than half of all surveyed villages contained small marginalised or dissatisfied contingents, very few villages showed signs of poorly performing village leaders overall. For example, when asked if they felt they could approachWomen their village leader,Men there were 26 villages in which 47% 53% nobody said “no”, 28 where less than ten per cent said “no”, 14 in which between ten and 20 per cent said “no”, and four where more than 25 per cent said “no”. The latter % Fig 1.12 included one village where 55 per cent 100said “no”, likely demonstrating significant No data 9% No data 11% problemsPrefer with not to that answer particular 1% leader or environment. Prefer not to answer 1% Don’t know 20% 80 Don’t know 14% Figure 2.8 Did you vote for your primary village leader? Signiﬁcantly improved 8% Signiﬁcantly improvedPrefer 8% not to say 0% No data 1% 60 Don’t know 3% There were no elections 4% Fig 2.8 No, there were electionsImproved 48% but nobody 40 Improved 55% in my household voted 3%

No, but someone in my 20 household did 10% No difference 12% No difference 10% Deteriorated 1% Deteriorated 1% Severely deteriorated 1% GoM KNU SeverelyYes 45% deteriorated 0%

Fig 2.3 Did not know their village leader % Did not know their village leader 1.39% 100 2.2% No 33%

No data 8% Fig 2.28 Forty-fiveKnew theirper villagecent leaderof all respondents said60 they had voted forKnew their their primaryvillage leader village Four+ 1%98.6% 97.8% 30 None 14% leader, whileThree 11 per 2% cent said someone in their household had voted but not them. As village leader elections are typically 40carried out on a one-household/one-vote basis, these figures reflect the fact that a senior member of each household typically

answered the survey and so are not representative20 of every adult individual in these communities. Two 30% Figure 2.9 Who voted for their primaryMen village leaderWomen (by gender)? % Fig 2.13 % 1.3% Fig 2.9 100 One 46% 1.7% Did not say they voted 100 1.0% 1.4% Other armed actors Said they voted 7.8% 8.7% Prefer not to answer 80 20% None 80 23% I don’t know KNU Fig 3.1 60 60 GoM 51.5% 55.0% 38% 58.5% 45% 48.5% 40 45.0% 40 41.5%Very often 31% 20 20 33% 20%

0 Often 0 Total Women 34%Men Who do you consider Who do you want as your government? to govern your area?

Fig 2.29 AnalysisStrongly of the answers across villages found that all but one of Stronglythe surveyed villages agree Neutral disagree No data had1% some kind of9% election, but these varied greatly in terms of inclusivity.3% On the14% whole, however, village elections appeared relatively well-attended. In 24 of the villages, somewhere between 41 and 60 per cent of the surveyed households had voted for their

villageAgree leader. In 21 villages, between 61 andDisagree 80 per cent had voted.I Indon’t only know/ 18 villages, less than14% 41 per cent of surveyed households48% had voted. There werePrefer three not tovillages answer in 11%

0 20 40 60 80 100% 30 There were nine respondents who had voted for a secondary village leader but not the primary leader; these are not analysed here.

% 3% Fig 2.30 100 3% 4% 0% 0% 1% No answer 8% 14% 14% 18% 0% Prefer not to answer 0% I don’t know 80 30% No 29% Somewhat 38% 33% 60 Yes 93%

40% 40 32% 22% 29%

20 14% 22% 19% 17% 11% 1% 2% 2% 0 GoM KNU DKBA BGF KPC (n=753) (n=1,299) (n=99) (n=28) (n=99) 26 security, justice and governance in south east myanmar

which none of the surveyed households had voted for their primary village leader, despite elections appearing to have taken place.31

Figure 2.10 Number of villages in which x% of surveyed households voted

Fig 2.10 % 25 24

21 20 Number of villages 15

10 9 8 7

5 3

0 12 214 416 61 11 Percentage of respondents who said they or someone else in their household had voted

Fig 2.11 % 60 54 Men Elections were better Elections were better attended52 and53 more gender inclusive in villages with just a GoM- “ 50 Women attended and more gender 50 affiliated leader, which may reflect the reintroduction44 of formal 100-housholdOverall head inclusive in villages with just a elections in late 2017, soon before the data was collected (Figure 2.11). Gender disparity 40 38 GoM-affiliated leader, which 35 was highest in villages with a KNU-affiliated village leader only33 (see box 2.1). Having may reflect the reintroduction 29 two30 separate village leaders at the village level appears to be associated with less of formal 100-housholdFig 2.10 head % 25 24 elections in late 2017, inclusive20 elections (Figures 2.11 and 2.12), which may be a result of neither the GoM soon before the data nor KNU having full control of the village and21 thus able to instate systematic practices. was collected.” Figure20 10 2.12 shows the percentage of surveyed villages of each leadership type where 0–190 per cent of surveyed households had voted, where 20–39 per cent had voted and Number of villages GoM village leader KNU village leader Two village leaders so15 on. It appears that villages with only one village leader had far better turnouts than Fig 2.12 % 70those with a village leader for each system. Seventy-five per cent of villages with just a 0–19% GoM10 village leader61 and 74 per cent of villages with just a9 KNU village leader20–39% had more 60 8 than a 60 per cent turnout7 among respondents, compared to only 18 per40–59% cent of mixed 60–79% 50administration villages. Thirty-five per cent of the mixed administration villages had 5 80–100% a lower than3 20 per cent turnout (among41 surveyed households), while 29 per cent had 40 35 a 20–39 per cent turnout. 33 0 30 12 214 416 61 1129 FigurePercentage 2.11 Respondents of respondents who who said personally they or someone voted else in for their their household village had leadervoted 20 18 18 Fig 2.11 % 14 14 15 60 11 10 54 Men 52 537 50 4 Women 50 0 0 0 44 Overall GoM Village Leader KNU Village Leader Two Village Leaders 40 38 35 Fig 2.15 % 33 40 29 30 36 GoM 35 33 KNU 20 30 Smaller armed actors 30 None 25 2510 23 I don’t know 20 20 Prefer not to answer 0 15 GoM village leader KNU village leader Two village leaders 12 12 Fig 2.12 % 10 70 0–19% 5 361 2 20–39% 60 1 1 0 40–59% Men Women 60–79% 50 80–100% % 6 41 Fig 2.18 40 60 35 GoM None 33 KNU I don’t know 30 29 5 50 4 31 In two of the villages, multiple respondents said that elections had taken place but no one in their household had voted. 20 45 18 18 44 In the other, elections14 had been14 conducted for the15 secondary village leader and all (of only three) surveyed households had 43 taken part. 11 4 4 41 40 10 7 3 4 34 0 0 0 3 31 3 30 GoM Village Leader KNU Village Leader Two Village Leaders Fig 2.15 % 24 40 20 36 GoM 35 33 KNU 15 14 30 Smaller armed13 actors 30 12 None 1 1 10 25 25 23 6 6 5 I don’t know 20 4 3 20 Prefer not to answer 0 15 …do you 12…do you …do you like 12 …has political …keeps the …provides …would you …has the consider want to govern the most? views you community the most prefer to deal highest 10 as your your area? support the most safe social services, with justice governance government? most? and secure? development problems? capacity? 5 3 and welfare? 1 2 1 0 Men Women

% 6 Fig 2.18 60 GoM None KNU I don’t know 5 50 4 45 44 43 4 4 41 40 3 34 3 31 3 30 24

20 15 14 12 13 1 1 10 6 6 5 4 3 0 …do you …do you …do you like …has political …keeps the …provides …would you …has the consider want to govern the most? views you community the most prefer to deal highest as your your area? support the most safe social services, with justice governance government? most? and secure? development problems? capacity? and welfare? Fig 2.10 % 25 24

21 20 Number of villages 15

10 9 8 7

5 3

0 12 214 416 61 11 Percentage of respondents who said they or someone else in their household had voted

Fig 2.11 % 60 54 Men 52 53 50 Women 50 44 Overall

40 38 35 33 29 30

saferworld10 · karen peace support network 27

0 Figure 2.12 VillagesGoM village in leaderwhich x% ofKNU surveyed village leader householdsTwo voted village leaders Fig 2.12 % 70 0–19% 61 20–39% 60 40–59% 60–79% 50 80–100% 41 40 35 33 30 29

20 18 18 14 14 15 11 10 7 4 0 0 0 GoM Village Leader KNU Village Leader Two Village Leaders Fig 2.15 % 40 36 GoM The Karen flag hangs 35 33 KNU outside a home in a 30 Smaller armed actors 30 KNU-controlled village. None 25 © Saferworld 25 23 I don’t know 20 20 Prefer not to answer

15 12 12 10

5 3 1 2 1 0 Men Women

% 6 Fig 2.18 60 GoM None KNU I don’t know 5 50 4 45 44 43 4 4 41 40 3 34 3 31 3 30 24 BOX 2.1 Gender and village elections 20 Forty-nine per cent of men said they voted and 41.9 per cent of women said they voted. A closer 15 14 look at the spread of voters across villages, however, shows a12 notable variety13 in levels of gender 1 1 10 equality between villages. In 49 of the surveyed villages, the proportion of men who had voted was higher6 than the proportion of women.6 There were seven5 villages in which the proportions 4 3 among genders were the same (including five where no one voted) and 16 in which the 0 proportion of women who voted was higher than the proportion of men. Among the 49 villages …do you …do you …do you like …has political …keeps the …provides …would you …has the in whichconsider a higher proportionwant to govern of men hadthe most?voted, in 16,views the proportion you ofcommunity men was morethe than most prefer to deal highest 20 peras cent your higher. Ofyour the area? 16 villages where women weresupport more the likely tomost vote safe than men,social there services, with justice governance government? most? and secure? development problems? capacity? was more than a 20 per cent difference in only three. and welfare? The gender balance was strongest in GoM-controlled areas, where women were slightly more likely than men to have voted (Figure 2.11). It was weakest in villages with only a KNU village head, where 53 per cent of men had voted for their village leader compared to 35 per cent of women. Despite the clear gender disparities displayed here, the advisory team suggested the reality could be even less equal than these figures suggest. Indeed, as voting takes place on a household-by- household basis, gender equality largely depends on how decisions are made at the household level, rather than who carries out the act of voting. More specific research is needed to fully examine the ways in which women are taking part in these elections and how much control they have over their households’ voting decisions. It is also notable that among the 211 respondents who said someone in their household voted on their behalf, 133 (63 per cent) were female and 78 (37 per cent) were male. 28 security, justice and governance in south east myanmar

A nurse checks in patients at a clinic in Ei Tu Hta displaced persons camp despite depleting funds (October 2017). © Saferworld

2.2 Perceptions Key findings and preferences n Respondents were more than twice as likely to want the KNU to govern their area than the GoM, indicating a preference for localised governance and suggesting support for the regarding principle of self-determination. governance n The KNU was liked the most, preferred for handling justice issues, considered to keep communities most safe and secure, and had political views supported the most, among notably higher proportions of respondents than the GoM. The GoM was slightly more widely recognised for providing the most social services and development and having higher governance capacity. n Women were slightly more likely to say “I don’t know” than men to all 34 questions about their governance preferences, suggesting less civic participation and a greater reluctance to speak about their political opinions. n Respondents were reluctant to name specific authorities for problems caused in their communities, but small groups complained about GoM for extortion and KNU for high taxation.

Figure 2.13 Governance The KNU was found to be more popular than the GoM as a governance provider, while perceptions and preferences other armed actors barelyFig registered 3.2 in% the data. Respondents were first asked single- 70 69 67 Fig 2.13 Other armed actors choice questions regarding their opinions of 65the governance and armed actors in their 61 62 Prefer not to answer area (henceforth referred to as ‘authorities’).60 Thirty-eight per cent said they considered None the KNU to be their government while 33 per cent said it was the GoM (Figure 2.13). I don’t know 50 KNU When respondents were asked which authority they wanted to govern their areas, GoM however, 45 per cent said the KNU and40 only 20 per cent said the GoM. Importantly,

% 1.3% 1.7% around 20 per cent said “I don’t know”30 and almost ten per cent said “none” to both 100 1.0% 1.4% questions. Among those who considered the GoM to be their government, 17.2 per 7.8% 8.7% 20 cent said they actually wanted the KNU to govern their area. By comparison, only 20% 10 80 23% 1.5 per cent of respondents who considered the KNU to be their government wanted the GoM to govern their area. 0 Overall Men Women 45 60 38% The small number of responses concerning the DKBA, BGFs and KPC are covered in 45% section 2.4. 40 The findings show a widespread preference for the KNU in most domains, particularly

20 33% on the straightforward question of which they liked the most and in the handling of 20% justice cases, as well as on whose political views they support the most (Figure 2.14).

0 These findings demonstrate there is a widespread preference for local governance and Who do you Who do you indicate support for the principles of Karen self-determination and federalism. consider want to as your govern your The apparent reasons for these preferencesPrefer are notdiscussed to answer in section 2.3 government? area? Not recorded Very disatisfied Fig 2.33 Disatisfied % Satisfied 70 Very satisfied Female Total: Male 61% 25 60 4 50 20 4 40 30% 15 30 31% Total: Total: 12 2 20% 10 1 20 19% 2 10% 10% 10 5 8 6 9% 10% 4 0 1 1 GoM KNU Mixed 0 KNU GoM Village (n=24) (n=12) tract authorities (n=9)

Fig 5.8

% 50 No data 2% GoM KNU Prefer not 43 to answer 2% 40

Yes 16% 30 28 I don’t know 18%

No 62% 11 10 10

0 …bring the …cause beneﬁt of trying problems by to build peace? initiating armed conﬂict? saferworld · karen peace support network 29

Figure 2.14 “Which of these authorities…”

Don’t know KNU Fig 2.14 50 1 GoM None 5 43 4 4 40 3 3 35 34 6 2 3 2 30 2 2 2 26 1 24 23 24 21 2 2 21 20 1 15 15 14 12 11 10 5 3

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Which do you Whose political Which keeps Provides the Which of these Which of these like the most? views do you the community most social groups would groups has 4 support most? most safe and services, you prefer the highest secure? development to deal with governance and welfare? justice capacity? problems?

% Fig 2.16 60 The findings show a “ 5 Meanwhile, the GoM was slightly more widelyGoM considered to have the highest widespread53 preference for governance capacity and to provide the mostKNU social services, development and welfare. the KNU in most domains, 1 50 This was due to the GoM’s higher provision of services to non-Karen6 respondents; as particularly on the 5 section 2.3 shows, Karen respondents were more likely9 to say KNU for these questions2 straightforward question43 of 43 41 too. Wider service4 and development provision reflects the GoM’s far4 greater financial 40which they liked the most 3 3 and in the handling of justice and human resources,35 resulting from its sovereign status. The extent of services 33 2 cases, as well as on whose provided by the KNU was remarkable for an armed resistance organisation that is still 30 2 2 8 1 3 political views they support not fully recognised by the state, has limited territorial control and that has been long the most.”23 preoccupied with conflict and organisational survival.32 20 2 1 26 At the same time, significant portions of respondents said “none” or “I don’t know”, 12 1 1 10 suggesting notable gaps in knowledge of, and access7 to, good governance. Overall, 4 there appeared to be a particularly low response rate to the questions on political views and governance capacity. 0 6 5 While men and women displayed the same overall perceptions of the GoM and KNU, Providing healthcare 1 women were consistently more likely to say “I don’t know” than men,33 and this was

ProvidingProviding educationdevelopment community 2 projects that provide 3 support particularly 4 pronounced when stating explicit preferences. Figure 2.15 shows the average responses across seven selected questions on governance preferences.34 Women were Promotion and protection of religion 7 Bringing NGOs orBuilding other organisationsroadsProviding or other land infrastructure tenure/land registration5 6 on averageProtect your moreethnicTrying and to likely buildlinguistic peace to identity withsay other “I8 don’t groups 9know” (33 per cent) than to say either the KNU (30 per cent) or the GoM (20 per cent), suggesting that women have less confidence or relevant knowledge to express their political opinions than men, often due to exclusion % 1 Fig 2.17 12 12 12 from community decision-making and a lack of political recognition. This is linked GoM to traditional gender norms that mean women have been ‘mainly expected1 to remain2 KNU 8 35 10 at home, looking after children and performing household and farming tasks’. Importantly, these differences were most notable in the fields of security6 and justice 8 and in GoM-controlled and mix-controlled areas, as discussed in later4 sections.36 2 Nonetheless, the majority of women repeatedly gave direct and clear answers. 6 6 7 3

4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 2 2 32 Social service specialists1 in the KPSN1 advisory team also noted that the GoM’s focus on hard infrastructure meant its service delivery might be more visible to local communities even where the KNU 6and related civil society are providing services.4 0 33 Women said “I don’t know” more than men to all 34 questions on governance preferences, covering both positive and negative attributes of the authorities. On average, across these questions, the proportion of women saying “I don’t know” 5 was 29 per cent, while the proportion of men saying “I don’t know” was 25 per cent. 34 In these questions, respondents were asked which single authority “… do you like the most?”, “… would you prefer to deal Taking bribes with justice problems?”, “…Over-taxation has political 7 views you support most?”, “… keeps the community most safe and secure?”, from communities 1 “… provides the most social services, development and welfare?”, “ … has the highest governance capacity?”, and Engaging in or allowing “… do you want to govern your area?”. harmful business practices 2 35 KWO (2010), p 9. Involved in illegal practices such as narcotics, gambling and prostitution36 3When asked which authority they would prefer to deal with justice problems, 32 per cent of women said “none” compared Unable toto communicate 21 per cent due of men.to language On the 6 question of which authority keeps the community most safe and secure, 33 per cent of women saidExtortion “I don’t and takingknow” of compared property without to 24 paying per cent 8 of men. Harmful developmentThreaten your of ethnic,roads and cultural infrastructures and linguistic 4 identity 5 Fig 2.10 % 25 24

21 20 Number of villages 15

10 9 8 7

5 3

0 12 214 416 61 11 Percentage of respondents who said they or someone else in their household had voted

Fig 2.11 % 60 54 Men 52 53 50 Women 50 44 Overall

40 38 35 33 29 30

0 GoM village leader KNU village leader Two village leaders Fig 2.12 % 70 0–19% 61 20–39% 60 40–59% 60–79% 50 80–100% 41 40 35 33 30 29

20 18 18 14 14 15 11 30 10security, justice and governance7 in south east myanmar 4 0 0 0 Figure 2.15 GoMAverage Village responsesLeader acrossKNU Village seven Leader questionsTwo on Villagegovernance Leaders Fig 2.15 % 40 36 GoM 35 33 KNU 30 Smaller armed actors 30 None 25 25 23 I don’t know 20 20 Prefer not to answer

15 12 12 10

5 3 1 Don’t know 2 KNU 1 Fig 2.14 50 1 0 GoM None 5 Men Women 43 4 4 40 % 6 3 Fig 2.18 60 3 35 GoM None The34 wider spread of GoM services and development6 came across even more strongly2 KNU I don’t know 3 when respondents were asked to list which groups, if any, they received2 specific 30 2 2 2 5 50benefits from and could4 26 give multiple answers (Figure 2.16). Fifty-eight1 per cent of 24 24 23 45 44 21 2 2 respondents said the GoM provided their21 community with education and 53 per cent 43 20 1 4 4 41 40 said it provided healthcare.15 These figures are likely much3 higher than they would have 15 14 12 been just a few years ago, as the GoM has expanded11 its presence and service34 delivery in 10 3 31 3 30these areas rapidly since the ceasefire, sometimes5 creating tensions with the KNU and3 37 communities. 24 The KNU also demonstrated relatively high delivery of those services, 0 reaching more than 40 per cent of respondents with both. Many communities received 1 2 3 20 4 5 6 Which do you Whose political Which keeps Provides the Which of these Which of15 these these services from both authorities. Due to recent expansion of GoM4 education,14 the like the most? views do you the community most social groups would groups has 12 13 support most? most safe and services, you prefer the highest KNU was more widely appreciated than the GoM for trying to build1 peace with other 1 secure?10 development to deal with governance groups, andand6 for welfare? protectingjustice ethnic, linguisticcapacity?6 and religious identities. 5 4 problems? 3 0 % Figure 2.16…do youDoes your …docommunity you receive…do you any like of the…has following political benefits…keeps fromthe authorities?…provides …would you …has the Fig 2.16 60 5 consider want to govern the most? views you community the most prefer to deal highest as your your area? GoM support the most safe social services, with justice governance 53 government? KNU most? and secure? development problems? capacity? 1 and welfare? 50 6 9 5 43 43 2 41 4 4 40 3 3 35 33 2

30 2 2 8 1 3 23

20 2 1 26 12 1 1 10 7 4

0 6 5 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Providing healthcare 1

ProvidingProviding educationdevelopment community projects that provide support

Promotion and protection of religion Bringing NGOs orBuilding other organisationsroadsProviding or other land infrastructure tenure/land registration Protect your ethnicTrying and to buildlinguistic peace identity with other groups

With only eight per cent of respondents saying “none” for healthcare and six per cent % 1 Fig 2.17 12 12 12 saying “none” for education, service coverage was relatively strong overall, particularly GoM 1 2 for a region that has experienced more thanKNU 70 years8 of armed conflict. Increased co- 10 ordination and cooperation between service providers has the potential to significantly 6 benefit local populations. 8 4 2 6 6 7 3

4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 37 See Jolliffe and Speers-Mears (2016); and Davis and Jolliffe (2016). 2 2 1 1 6 4 0 5

Taking bribes Over-taxation 7 from communities 1 Engaging in or allowing harmful business practices 2 Involved in illegal practices such as narcotics, gambling and prostitution 3 Unable to communicate due to language 6 Extortion and taking of property without paying 8 Harmful developmentThreaten your of ethnic,roads and cultural infrastructures and linguistic 4 identity 5 Don’t know KNU Fig 2.14 50 1 GoM None 5 43 4 4 40 3 3 35 34 6 2 3 2 30 2 2 2 26 1 24 23 24 21 2 2 21 20 1 15 15 14 12 11 10 5 3

% Fig 2.16 60 5 GoM 53 KNU 1 50 6 9 5 43 43 2 41 4 4 40 3 3 35 33 2

30 2 2 8 1 3 23

20 2 1 26 12 1 1 10 7 4

0 6 5

Providing healthcare 1

ProvidingProviding educationdevelopment community 2 projects that provide 3 support 4

Promotionsaferworld and protection · karen of religion peace 7 support network 31 Bringing NGOs orBuilding other organisationsroadsProviding or other land infrastructure tenure/land registration5 6 Protect your ethnicTrying and to buildlinguistic peace identity with other 8 groups 9

Figure 2.17 Do authorities cause any of the following problems in your area?

% 1 Fig 2.17 12 12 12 GoM 1 2 KNU 8 10 6

8 4 2 6 6 7 3

4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 2 2 1 1 6 4 0 2 3 4 5 6 8 5

Taking bribes Over-taxation 7 from communities 1 Engaging in or allowing harmful business practices Involved in illegal practices such as narcotics, gambling and prostitution Unable to communicate due to language Extortion and taking of property without paying Harmful developmentThreaten your of ethnic,roads and cultural infrastructures and linguistic identity

Figure 2.17 shows responses to questions about perceptions of problems caused by the governance authorities. Overall, respondents were far less forthcoming with negative opinions of governance actors, so the figures may be less representative (see clarifications in Section 1.1). Importantly, however, the two most prevalent issues related to extractive practices, with 12 per cent of respondents pointing to extortion by the GoM and seven per cent highlighting excessive taxation by the KNU. Six per cent felt there were language issues when communicating with the GoM. Later sections will deal with violent abuse by authorities and taxation regimes in more detail. Illegal practices such as narcotics, gambling, and prostitution were only mentioned by very few respondents, with four per cent naming the KNU for this issue, likely indicating the actions of a small number of officials in such activities, in violation of KNU official policy. More research is needed to explore the issue of illegal narcotics, as other research has indicated the issue is rising in the ceasefire area (see more in section 2.4).

People wait inside a clinic. © Saferworld Fig 2.10 % 25 24

21 20 Number of villages 15

32 10 security, justice and governance9 in south east myanmar 8 7 Students learning Sgaw 5 Karen and3 Myanmar languages. 0 © Saferworld 12 214 416 61 11 Percentage of respondents who said they or someone else in their household had voted

Fig 2.11 % 60 54 Men 52 53 50 Women 50 44 Overall

40 38 35 33 29 30

0 GoM village leader KNU village leader Two village leaders Fig 2.12 % 70 0–19% 61 20–39% 60 40–59% 2.3 Identity, Key findings 60–79% 50 n Karen respondents were far more likely to80–100% support the KNU than they were the GoM; non- governance and 41 40 Karen respondents were most likely to favour the GoM. 35 implications for 33 n Widespread support for the KNU among Karen people in the ceasefire areas seemingly 30 29 peace indicates support for the principles of localised governance and self-determination and is 20 based on ethnic affiliation,18 historical18 position of the KNU and attachments to Karen ancestral 14 14 lands.15 11 10 7 n The majority of respondents preferred the KNU, despite the GoM reaching similar numbers of 4 0 Karen respondents with development0 and services, demonstrating further that investments in 0 GoM Village Leader KNU Villagedevelopment Leader do notTwo automatically Village Leaders translate into legitimacy and popular support. Fig 2.15 % 40 36 The starkest trends in perceptionsGoM of governance authorities came when comparing 35 33 KNU Karen30 and non-Karen respondents:Smaller armed 48 per actors cent of non-Karen wanted the GoM to 30 None 25 govern their area, while only six per cent wanted the KNU to (Figure 2.18). Similarly, 25 23 I don’t know 5620 per cent of Karen wanted the KNU to govern their area, and 14 per cent wanted to 20 Prefer not to answer the GoM to (Figure 2.19). 15 12 12 10 Similar trends were found across all questions and Karen respondents were more

5 3 likely to say the KNU even in response to the two questions where the GoM was more 1 2 1 0 popular overall – on services and community development and on governance capacity. Men Women Figure 2.18 Non-Karen perceptions (n=441): “Which of these authorities…” % 6 Fig 2.18 60 GoM None KNU I don’t know 5 50 4 45 44 43 4 4 41 40 3 34 3 31 3 30 24

Fig 2.19 % Figure 2.19 Karen perceptions (n=1,537): “Which of these authorities…” 60 56 GoM None KNU I don’t know 5 50 4 4 43 41 40 3 34 3 30 25 26 25 25 25 23

20 1 1 1 14 15 14 14 15 15 13 12 13 1 11 10

0 …do you …do you …do you like …has political …keeps the …provides …would you …has the consider want to govern the most? views you community the most prefer to deal highest as your your area? support the most safe social services, with justice governance government? most? and secure? development problems? capacity? and welfare? % Fig 2.20 60 Notably, however, ten per cent of non-KarenGoM respondents felt the KNU kept them most 53 52 KNU 50 safe and secure, while nine per cent preferred it to deal with justice problems. Thirteen 50 48 per cent of Karen respondents said they liked the GoM the most and 15 per cent said they would prefer the GoM to deal with justice problems. Non-Karen respondents 40 were often more likely to say “none” than say the KNU to these questions, as were 34 Karen respondents30 regarding the GoM. 30 29 Political and armed movements based on ethnicity in Myanmar are as old as the country 22 20 itself, but there was previously little information available to confirm that ordinary people supported such movements.14 According15 to analysis from KPSN members, Karen support for the KNU is based on a number of factors. Firstly, ethnic and linguistic ties 10 and deep embeddedness of KNU institutions in local communities means that people have much greater recognition of the KNU as a leadership and de facto government 0 Healthcare Education than theCommunity GoM. This isBringing also related NGOs toBuilding the KNU’sroads historical position as the primary development or others that or other politicalprojects organisation representingprovide support Kareninfrastructure society. Furthermore, as an indigenous people with strong connections to the land and natural environment, Karen people in long- Fig 2.21 & 22 % 6 60 held territories tend to favour local leadership and often see encroachment or inva- 53 sions by the Myanmar state as a threat to this relationship. 51 GoM 50 KNU This is significant because a belief in such desiresNone are the main reason that Karen I don’t know 4 political leaders have long demanded a federal system of government and developed 40 36 policies based on local practices,3 such as the KNU land policy. Apparent support for these positions among Karen people in the 34ceasefire areas, therefore, lends legitimacy 30 to the KNU at the peace negotiation table. 2 25 26 24 25 Investments in development Importantly, these preferences22 exist despite GoM social services and development “20 1 and social service delivery reaching roughly the same numbers of Karen people as those from the KNU (Figure do not reliably translate 13 11 1 2.20). Clearly, investments in development and social service delivery do not reliably 10 into political support or translate into political support or clearly 6affect governance preferences, as even where clearly affect governance6 5 preferences, as even where Karen people do recognise benefits from the GoM, they often maintain political 0 support for the KNU and see it as a more reliable provider of justice and security. KarenNon-Karen people do recogniseNon-Karen Karen Karen Non-Karen Karen benefitsmen from the GoM,women they menSince thewomen 1990s, the GoM has441 touted road construction153 as a central element of its 22 221 2 often maintain political ‘border development’ programmes aimed at building peace by winning the support support for the KNU and see Fig 2.23 % of the ‘national races’. While 34 per cent of the surveyed population recognised this 20 it as a more reliable provider as a benefit provided by the GoM, it appeared to sway few people on their DKBApolitical (n=156) or of justice and security. ” 1.5 BGFs (n=129) governance preferences. Additionally, KPSN and external research has foundKPC ( nthat=125) 15 road construction in Karen ceasefire areas has led to land confiscation, facilitated militarisation and created new conflicts between armed splinter groups.

6. 6. 6.2 6.2 6.2 5.43 5.6 5.6 4. 5 4. 3. 4. 3.21 3.21 3.21 2.56 2.4 1.2 2.4 1.2 1.6 1.2 .64 0 …do you like …has political …keeps the …provides the …would you …has the …do you …do you consider the most? views you community most social prefer to deal highest want to govern to be your support the most safe services, with justice governance your area? government? most? and secure? development problems? capacity? and welfare? Fig 2.19 % 60 56 GoM None KNU I don’t know 5 50 4 4 43 41 40 3 34 3 30 25 26 25 25 25 23

20 1 1 1 14 15 14 14 15 15 13 12 13 1 11 10

0 34 security…do you, justice and…do governance you …doin south you like east myanmar…has political …keeps the …provides …would you …has the consider want to govern the most? views you community the most prefer to deal highest as your your area? support the most safe social services, with justice governance government? most? and secure? development problems? capacity? Figure 2.20 Benefits received by Karen respondents (n=1,579) and welfare? % 60 Fig 2.20 GoM 53 52 KNU 50 50 48

Fig 2.19 % 40 60 56 34 GoM None KNU I don’t know 30 29 30 5 50 4 4 22 43 20 41 40 3 14 15 34 10 3 30 25 26 25 25 25 23 0 20 Healthcare1 Education Community1 Bringing NGOs Building roads 1 development or others that or other 14 15 14 14 15 15 13 projects provide12 support13 infrastructure 1 11 Fig 2.21 & 22 %10 6 60 These findings demonstrate Collectively, these findings demonstrate that peacebuilding strategies based on “ 53 that peacebuilding strategies 0 strengthening the state to provide social51 and economic ‘peace dividends’ willGoM not work based on strengthening the 50 …do you …do you …do you like …has political …keeps the …providesKNU …would you …has the and considercan even exacerbatewant to govern conflictthe unlessmost? they viewsare basedyou firmlycommunity on the inclusiontheNone most and prefer to deal highest state to provide social and as your your area? support the most safe social services, with justice governance promotion of existing systems and address the political drivers of conflict.I don’tIt is knowcrucial economic ‘peace dividends’ government? 4 most? and secure? development problems? capacity? 40 and welfare? will not work. that KNU and Karen36 community institutions are included in3 the development of a ” % 34 genuine60 federal union as a means to build sustainable peace. Fig 2.20 GoM 30 2 53 KNU The ethnic25 differences in preferences52 were consistent across genders,26 with the25 large 50 24 majority50 48of Karen men and women preferring the KNU,22 and non-Karen men and 20 1 women preferring the GoM. However, women in both groups were more likely to say 13 40 11 “I don’t1 know” than their male counterparts to all questions. As a result, across seven 10 questions on governance preferences,38 non-Karen men were more 34likely to state 6 5 6 30 preferences30 for the GoM (on average 51 per cent)29 than were non-Karen women 0 (on average 41 per cent) and Karen men were more likely to state preferences for the Non-Karen Non-Karen Karen Karen Non-Karen22 Karen men women men women 441 153 KNU20 (on average 43 per cent) than were Karen women (on average 36 per cent). 22 221 2 Overall, non-Karen women were more likely to say “I14 don’t know” than Karen15 women

Fig 2.23 % to every question (11 per cent and seven per cent respectively, on average). Figure 2.21 20 10 illustrates these dynamics, showing responses to the question “who do you want to DKBA (n=156) govern your area?”. 1.5 BGFs (n=129) 0 KPC (n=125) 15 Healthcare Education Community Bringing NGOs Building roads Figure 2.21 Who do you want to governdevelopment your area? or othersFigure that 2.22or Do other you receive (by ethnicity and gender) projects provideprotection support infrastructureof your ethnic and Fig 2.21 & 22 % 6 linguistic identity from any 1060 authorities in your area? 53 51 6. GoM 6. 6.2 6.2 6.2 50 5.43 KNU 5.6 5.6 4. None 5 4. 3. 4. 3.21 3.21 I don’t know 3.21 4 2.56 2.4 1.2 2.4 40 1.2 1.6 1.2 36 3 .64 34 0 …do you like …has political …keeps the …provides the …would you …has the …do you …do you consider 30 the most? views you community most social prefer to deal highest2 want to govern to be your 25 26 support the most safe 24services, with justice governance25 your area? government? most? and secure? development 22 problems? capacity? and welfare? 20 1

13 11 1 10 6 5 6

0 Non-Karen Non-Karen Karen Karen Non-Karen Karen men women men women 441 153 22 221 2

Fig 2.23 % 2038 See footnote 34 for a list of the seven questions. DKBA (n=156) 1.5 BGFs (n=129) KPC (n=125) 15

Thirty-four per cent of Karen respondents said the KNU provided the benefit of protecting their linguistic and cultural identity, while only six per cent said the same of GoM. Notably, however, large numbers of Karen said “none” or “I don’t know”. Meanwhile, 22 per cent of non-Karen people said the GoM protected their ethnic and linguistic identity, the largest portion of which were Pa-O (technically, a Karen-related group), while only five per cent of non-Karen said that the KNU protected their ethnic and linguistic identity. As section 2.6 explores, the large majority of non-Karen respondents were in GoM-controlled areas, including almost all the Pa-O respondents.

KNLA soldier travelling by boat. © Kim Jolliffe

2.4 Armed Key findings actors that n Very small portions of respondents were found to have ‘direct contact’ with the DKBA, BGFs or KPC, defined as them paying tax to, receiving services from, or regularly seeing soldiers splintered from from that authority. the KNU n Even among these small samples, few respondents demonstrated governance preferences for these authorities and were reluctant to criticise them despite existing research of regular abuse and exploitation. n Small portions of respondents associated these groups with problems, including illegal activity, extortion, excessive taxation and aggressive behaviour. n Respondents in two villages in Hlaingbwe Township felt that the BGFs kept them most safe and secure, while others near the headquarters of the DKBA Klo Htoo Baw faction recognised numerous benefits, such as education and healthcare.

Other armed and governance actors were mentioned far less frequently than the KNU or GoM, meaning that very little useful data about them was retreived. The only three other authorities that came up in the surveys to any significant degree were the Border Guard Forces (BGFs), the Democratic Karen Benevolent/Buddhist Army (DKBA) and the KPC,39 which are all splinter factions from the KNU and are described in box 2.2. The DKBA category included both the main ‘Khlo Htoo Baw’ faction, as well as the newer ‘Buddhist’ faction together, due to difficulties in clearly distinguishing the two (see box 2.2). The 13 BGF battalions active in the regions were also analysed collectively, due to the significant overlap in their territorial presence. Indications of the factions being discussed are noted in the analysis below, where possible.

39 Respondents also had the option of listing the New Mon State Party, the Thandaung Peace Groups or “other groups”, but these categories were only selected in very few cases and so did not provide enough data to meaningfully analyse. 36 security, justice and governance in south east myanmar

Border Guard Force soldiers. The Karen BGFs are splinter groups of the KNU that have aligned themselves to the Tatmadaw and now full under Tatmadaw command structures, while retaining relative levels of autonomy. © Karen Peace Support Network

BOX 2.2 Background of armed factions that splintered from the KNU The KNU suffered a major splintering in 1994 when a faction of Buddhist commanders broke away and formed the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA). The DKBA aligned with the Tatmadaw and fought against the KNU until 2010. That year, the DKBA splintered again as the majority of units transformed into 12 Border Guard Forces (BGF), under more direct Tatmadaw command. Other factions realigned with the KNU and rebranded as the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA). This ‘benevolent’ faction split again in 2015 and another faction was formed, once again called the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army. Other units splintered from the KNU at various times in the late-1990s and 2000s, including the Karen Peace Council, which was formed in 2007, and is now allied once more with the KNU – despite remaining separate. Another faction, the Karen Peace Force, formed a 13th BGF battalion. The Thandaung Peace Groups, which hardly registered in the data, were formed by two former KNU commanders in 1998 and 1999 and are now officially constituted as a People’s Militia Force, with units also under Tatmadaw command but with slightly less Tatmadaw oversight than the BGFs.

“Smaller groups, such as the Overall, these groups came through in the data far less than the KNU or GoM. It is also DKBA, KPC and BFGs, came because they are much smaller and their presence is much less widespread. A model through in the data far less was developed to identify populations that had some form of ‘direct contact’ with the than the KNU or GoM... groups, defined as either seeing soldiers from the group sometimes or frequently, This is partly because they do not have significant civilian paying some form of tax to the group or receiving services from the group. On this administration bodies and basis, 156 respondents were found to have contact with the DKBA, 129 respondents play far less significant roles with the BGF, and 125 respondents with the KPC. This is partly because they do not in local governance.“ have significant civilian administration bodies and play far less significant roles in local governance. More research utilising a methodology that targets people affected directly by these groups is needed to fully understand people’s relationship with them, though some observations are possible based on the limited data retrieved and existing KPSN research. Even among these small samples, very few respondents stated positive or negative opinions about them. The Karen Human Rights Group and other KPSN members have often found that people are reluctant to speak openly about these groups because they are essentially armed militia rather than governance actors and because they have often used violence and intimidation against local people, particularly as the BGFs and previously the DKBA have conducted military operations against Karen civilians alongside the Tatmadaw. The KHRG has documented at least one case of a civilian being killed by BGF soldiers for speaking out against their involvement in the illegal narcotics trade.40

40 KHRG (2015), p 153. Fig 1.7 % 70 70 64

13 10 7 saferworld · karen peace support network5 37 3 3 2 2 2 0.79 0.59 0.30 0.25 0.15 0

Figure 2.23 Proportion of respondentsBwe Shan thatPa-O receive services from,Mon Thai Paku Dawei Kayah Kayan English Myanmar Keh Bar Mopwa Gal Bar pay taxSgaw to or Karen seePwo Karensoldiers often or very often of each authority

Fig 1.15 % 80 76 77

10 8 6 6

0 GoM KNU DKBA BGF KPC

Fig 1.16 % 80 72 GoM-controlled Among70 the few interesting findings, Buddhists made up 82 per centKNU-controlled and 72 per cent of the respondents found to have direct contact with the BGFs and DKBA,Mix-controlled respectively, 60 58 while those having53 direct contact with KPC included 51 per cent Christians and 45 per 50 44 cent Buddhists.41 The 41majority of respondents43 in two villages GoM-defined Hlaingbwe 40 36 Township (or the KNU-defined Lu Pleh and Ta Kreh Townships),34 felt the BGFs kept 28 28 30 25 26 them most safe and secure, while complaining of the20 DKBA – seemingly the so-called 20 “Buddhist” faction – for excessive taxation. This area experienced12 significant fighting 9 between10 the two actors in 2016. 0 AmongForced those labour who had directPortering contactBurning/destroying with the DKBA,Fleeing 17 homeper cent saidForced they receive villages for security relocation the% benefits of healthcare and road construction from the group and nine per cent Fig 1.17 60 mentioned education. Almost all of these respondents53 lived near the headquarters Households area50 of the Khlo Htoo46 Baw faction of the DKBA, where the organisation administers an impressive high school, numerous primary schools and clinics,Villages all in cooperation 40 with the relevant departments of the KNU and, in some cases, the GoM.42 The DKBA was30 criticised for extortion by 13 per cent of the sample who had direct contact with it,

for excessive taxation by 15 per cent,19 and for harmful business activities by 11 per cent, 20 most of whom were also in this area. 10 The BGF2.36 was mentioned by between six and 2.68eight per cent of the relevant sample for 0.24 extortion,0 harmful business practices, and illegal activities. Importantly, the BGF GoM-controlled KNU-controlled Mix-controlled Fig 1.19 battalions% causing these problems appeared to be distinct from those mentioned in a 50 positive light, above. The majority of the respondents listing problemsGoM causedNone by BGFs KNU I don’t know were in the GoM-defined41 Myawaddy and Kawkareik Townships. 40 38 While the survey focuses on 33 32 33 taxation of ordinary 30 30 30 residents, GoM and EAOs 27 26 26 also retrieve significant 23 revenue from taxing the 21 20 18 extraction of natural 18 17 16 15 resources. This photo shows 12 11 11 a small gold mining 10 operation on Thanintharyi river in Dawei township. © Karen Peace Support 0 Network Consider Want to govern: Support political Prefer to deal Keeps the community government to be: views most: with justice most safe and secure problems:

41 Christians made up 20 per cent and nine per cent of the respondents that had direct contact with the DKBA and BGFs respectively. Animists made up seven per cent of those with contact to DKBA, five per cent of those with contact to the BGFs, and four per cent of those with contact with the KPC. The remainder (2.3 per cent for BGFs and 0.6 per cent for the DKBA) were Leke. 42 This area is in southern Myawaddy Township according to the GoM system and eastern Kaw T’Ree Township in the KNU system. 38 security, justice and governance in south east myanmar

Members of the Thandaunggyi Township Forest Department of the GoM collect cardamom taxes from Karen cardamom farmers in October 2015. © Karen Human Rights Group

2.5 Taxation Key findings n Respondents were far more likely to pay taxes to the KNU than they were to the GoM, indicating that KNU tax collection was more widespread than GoM taxation in rural parts of the survey area, but not necessarily of a higher value. n The most common form of taxes paid to the both GoM and KNU was agricultural tax, followed by property tax, which could include all personal effects. n Fourteen per cent of respondents felt that, overall, their taxes were a major burden on their household and 30 per cent of respondents were paying tax to more than one authority. n The majority of GoM and KNU taxpayers felt they got a fair or somewhat fair return on their taxes, which is likely due to protection of property and land rather than due to service provision. The KNU performed marginally better than the GoM, reflecting the relatively widespread popular support for the organisation discussed in previous sections. n Respondents were more likely to say the KNU charged the most tax or caused problems with excessive taxation than any other authority, but more commonly named others, including the GoM, for extortion.

Seventy-eight per cent of respondents reported paying some kind of tax to at least one authority. Among the respondents, 64 per cent paid tax to the KNU and 37 per cent paid tax to the GoM (Figure 2.24). This indicates that the KNU’s tax collection was more widespread in the surveyed areas than the GoM’s, but does not indicate the amount of tax being collected. Indeed, there were 23 villages where the KNU taxed more than 50 per cent of the respondents living there and where no other authority taxed more than ten per cent. Both authorities have formal systems with standardised tax tables for the collection of such agricultural and property taxes, which are generally collected according to a regular schedule and depend on the authority having a relatively stable relationship with the village The KNU’s ability to collect formalised taxes from ordinary residents across a widespread area further confirm how embedded the KNU’s administration system is in the conflict-affected region. Overall, the GoM likely collects much greater tax revenue in south east Myanmar than the KNU as it controls the major urban areas, trade corridors and border crossings. The number of respondents paying tax to other groups was visibly much smaller, although it is important to note that far smaller numbers of respondents had any contact with them at all. Fig 2.24 % 20 DKBA (n=156) 1 1 BGFs (n=129) KPC (n=125) 16 15

11 1 1 10

6 6 5 5 5 4 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 Providing Providing Providing Bringing NGOs Building roads Promotion Protect your Providing Trying to build healthcare education community or other or other and protection ethnic and land tenure/ peace with development organisations infrastructure of religion linguistic land other groups projects that provide identity registration Fig 2.25 support % 15 15 DKBA (n=156) 13 BGFs (n=129) KPC (n=125) 12 11

6 6 5 4 4 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 0 Over- Taking Extortion Engaging in Involved Creating Causing saferworldtaxation · karenbribes peace from support and takingnetwork or allowing in illegal religious land issues 39 communities of property harmful practices such disharmony without business as narcotics, paying practices gambling and Figure 2.24 Respondents Figure 2.25 Types of taxes paid to each authority Don’t know 4.4% Prefer not to prostitutionanswer 0.2% that pay tax to each group Fig 2.6 (n=2,020) Strongly disagree 0.1% Agricultural tax (land, crops) Disagree 2.4% Property tax Fig 2.26 & 27 % 70 Other general support Neutral 8.3% 64 Strongly agree 29.9%Foraging/bamboo/wood Road tax 60 No tax

50 46 43

40 3

30 Agree 54.7% 22 23 23 20 1 14 11 10 10 6 6 5 4. 4. 5 4 4 Fig 2.7 2. 2 2 1.4 2 2 1 1 0 GoM KNU Other armed actors KNU GoM DKBA KPCOther BGFs Women Men 47% 53% Fig 2.32 Seventy-eight perFig cent2.31 of %Ninety-nine respondents said they paid at least one form of tax to the DKBA and the “ 60 58 respondents reported paying same figure paid tax to the KPC. Only 28GoM paid tax to the BGFs, which is likely due to some kind of tax to at least 54 KNU the GoM’s long-held policy to encourage armed actors under% its patronage to engage one authority... Thirty per 50 25 25 43 GoM (n=1,540) cent of respondents reported in business rather than take funds directly from the population. 43 KNU (n=1550) paying at least one form of DKBA (n=156) 40The most common form of taxes paid to the both GoM and20 KNU was agricultural tax, tax to two authorities, two BGFs (n=129) followed by property tax (Figure 2.25). Property tax includes personal effects, such as BGFs (n=129) per cent reported paying to Prefer not to say 0% No data 1% KPC (n=125) vehicles, 30livestock and weapons, as well as homes or other buildings. A remarkable15 15 three authorities, and one 30 Don’t know 3% 15 14 per cent to four or more 43 per centThere of wererespondents no elections did 4% not pay any tax to the GoM, many of whom live in areas 13 authorities.Fig 2.8 “ No, therewhere were it electionshas not consolidatedbut nobody firm control, as shown in section 2.6). 20 in my household voted 3% 10 .1 . . The term ‘other general support’ was developed by the advisory team to refer to . No, but someone in my 5.5 10nondescript taxes that authorities sometimes collect for the5 general financing of their household did 10% 3.4 operations. This was the most common form of tax collected by armed actors other 1.5 1.6 Yes 45% than0 the KNU (from seven per cent of respondents) and was0 the third most common type collectedPaying agricultural, by both theReceiving KNU healthcare(11 per cent) and GoM (six per cent).Who Taxescharges for foraging Over-taxation Extortion and taking of property and/or and/or education from… the most tax? property without paying are sometimesforaging tax charged to… by authorities when people collect natural resources from the forest or in other public spaces, either for selling or personal use; many non-landowners No 33% sustain themselves through such activities.

Figure 2.26 How many authorities do respondents pay tax to? No data 8% Fig 2.28 Four+ 1% None 14% Three 2%

Two 30%

One 46%

Fig 3.1

43 Paramilitary actors, militiaVery and often ceasefire groups are all regularly encouraged to do this by the GoM. It is presented solely as a means to reduce the burden on31% local populations, but also has the effect of rupturing ties between armed actors and local communities.

Often 34% % Fig 1.12 100 No data 9% No data 11% Prefer not to answer 1% Prefer not to answer 1% Don’t know 20% 80 Don’t know 14% Signiﬁcantly improved 8% Signiﬁcantly improved 8% 60

Improved 48% 40 Improved 55%

No difference 12% No difference 10% Deteriorated 1% Deteriorated 1% Severely deteriorated 1% GoM KNU Severely deteriorated 0%

Fig 2.3 Did not know their village leader % Did not know their village leader 1.39% 100 2.2%

Knew their village leader 60 Knew their village leader 98.6% 97.8%

40 security, justice and governance in south40 east myanmar

“KNU taxpayers were most Thirty per cent of respondents reported20 paying at least one form of tax to two authorities, likely to say they got a fair two per cent reported paying to three authorities, and one per cent to four or more return or somewhat fair authorities (Figure 2.26). In some cases, people have to pay multiple taxes on the same return on their taxes lands or properties. The formalMen KNU and GoM systemsWomen often exist in parallel, while % (46 per cent), followed by Fig 2.13 % 1.3% Fig 2.9 100the DKBA sometimes mimics the KNU and demands the same amount be paid to 1.7% Did not say they voted 100 1.0% GoM (44 per cent). 1.4% Other armed actors them. These double taxpayers also includeSaid people they voted who pay road tax to one or more 7.8% 8.7% Nonetheless, among those Prefer not to answer authorities, in addition to more regular taxes. that pay taxes to each 80 20% None 80 23% authority, around a third or I don’t know While taxes form a central part of any governance system, if they are not collected KNU more of respondents said responsibly60 or are managed improperly, they can cause great hardship for 60those paying GoM 51.5% they did not get a fair return 55.0% 38% and can become a major58.5% grievance among citizens. Among all respondents, less than on them. 45% “ 48.5% one40 per cent45.0% said they strongly agreed with the statement “I feel that taxes 40are a major burden on my household”41.5% and 14 per cent agreed (Figure 2.27). More than half

disagreed20 or strongly disagreed. This situation could be much worse, given the number 20 33% of actors collecting tax.44 However, 15 per cent of the population is still significant and 20% this indicates more could be done to reduce the burden. 0 0 Total Women Men Who do you consider Who do you want Figure 2.27 The taxes I pay are a major burden to my household (n=2,020) as your government? to govern your area? Fig 2.29 Strongly Strongly agree Neutral disagree No data 1% 9% 3% 14%

Agree Disagree I don’t know/ 14% 48% Prefer not to answer 11%

0 20 40 60 80 100%

KNU taxpayers were most likely to say they got a fair return or somewhat fair return % 3% Fig 2.30 100on their taxes (46 per cent), followed by GoM (44 per cent). Nonetheless,3% among those 4% 0% 0% 1% No answer that pay taxes to each authority, around8% a third14% or more of respondents said they did 14% 18% 0% Prefer not to answer 0% not get a fair return on them (Figure 2.28). This is not uncommon. PollsI don’tfrom know the USA 80 30% No over the past ten years show that, each year, between29% 30 and 50 per cent of taxpayers 45 Somewhat say that the38% amount they33% pay is not fair. BGF taxpayers, although a very small sample, 60 Yes were least likely to say “no” to this question (32 per cent), followed93% by the KNU (33 per

cent). 40% 40 32% 22% 29%

20 14% 22% 19% 17% 11% 1% 2% 2% 0 GoM KNU DKBA BGF KPC (n=753) (n=1,299) (n=99) (n=28) (n=99)

A teacher instructs children in a school supported by the community and the KNU. © Saferworld

44 There was no clear statistical relationship between the number of authorities respondents were paying tax to and their perceptions of the burden on their household, though existing research has found this to be a significant problem for some communities. 45 Gallup (2018), Taxes (http://news.gallup.com/poll/1714/taxes.aspx). % Fig 1.12 100 No data 9% No data 11% Prefer not to answer 1% Prefer not to answer 1% Don’t know 20% 80 Don’t know 14% Signiﬁcantly improved 8% Signiﬁcantly improved 8% 60

Improved 48% 40 Improved 55%

No difference 12% No difference 10% Deteriorated 1% Deteriorated 1% Severely deteriorated 1% GoM KNU Severely deteriorated 0%

Fig 2.3 Did not know their village leader % Did not know their village leader 1.39% 100 2.2%

Knew their village leader 60 Knew their village leader 98.6% 97.8%

Men Women % Fig 2.13 % 1.3% Fig 2.9 100 1.7% Did not say they voted 100 1.0% 1.4% Other armed actors Said they voted 7.8% 8.7% Prefer not to answer 80 20% None 80 23% I don’t know KNU 60 60 GoM 51.5% 55.0% 38% 58.5% 45% 48.5% Fig 2.24 40 45.0% 40 % 41.5% 20 DKBA (n=156) 20 20 1 1 BGFs (n=129) 33% KPC (n=125) 16 20% 15 0 0 Total Women Men Who do you consider Who do you want 11 as your government? to govern your area? 1 1 10 Fig 2.29 Strongly Strongly agree Neutral disagree No data 1% 9% 3% 14% 6 6 5 5 5 4 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 Agree1 1Disagree I don’t know/ 14% 48% Prefer not to answer 0 saferworld · karen peace support network 11% 41 Providing Providing Providing Bringing NGOs Building roads Promotion Protect your Providing Trying to build healthcare education community or other or0 other and protection20 ethnic and 40land tenure/ peace60 with 80 100% development organisations infrastructure of religion linguistic land other groups projects that provide Figure 2.28 Do you get aidentity fair return onregistration your taxes from each authority? Fig 2.25 support % 15 (Among respondents who pay some form of tax to that authority) 15 DKBA (n=156) % 3% 13 Fig 2.30 100 BGFs (n=129) 3% 4% 0% KPC0% (n=125) 8% 1% No answer 12 14% 14% 18% 0% Prefer not to answer 11 0% I don’t know 80 30% No 9 29% Somewhat 38% 33% 60 Yes 6 93% 6 5 40% 4 40 4 32% 3 322% 3 29% 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 20 14% 0 22% 19% Over- Taking Extortion Engaging in Involved Creating Causing17% 11% 1% 2% 2% taxation bribes from and taking or allowing in illegal 0 religious land issues communities of property harmful practices such disharmonyGoM KNU DKBA BGF KPC without business as narcotics, (n=753) (n=1,299) (n=99) (n=28) (n=99) paying practices gambling and prostitution

This highAgricultural preference tax (land, for crops) the KNU, despite more widespread health and education Property tax 46 Fig 2.26 & 27 % being received from GoM, shows that a ‘fair return’ cannot be simply reduced to the 70 Other general support 64 provisionForagin ofg these/bambo socialo/wood services, and likely relates more to people’s political and securityRoad perceptions. tax 60 No tax The slightly more widespread perceptions of fairness of the KNU taxes compared with 50 46 those of the GoM, therefore, likely relate to the overall popularity of the KNU identified 43 in previous sections, their support for its political views and its provision of security, 40 3 justice and protection of identity.

30 KPSN analysis suggests that people in the ceasefires likely relate fairness of return on

22 23 taxes to the provision of security23 of property, business assets or land that comes from 20 local armed1 actors recognising and documenting them and providing official receipt. 14 11In particular, the KNU provides explicit land ownership, which is often seen as an 10 important benefit of registering one’s land with the KNU. In many cases, people are 4. 4. 6 6 5 2. 4 4 1.4 2 unlikely aware 2of their1 1right to services or other public goods in return for taxes. 0 GoM KNUExisting researchOther armed has alsoactors shown how Karen people in some areas were willing to pay KNU KPC GoM DKBA Other BGFs taxes to be under the protection of authorities to avoid abuses by other armed actors.47

Fig 2.32 Fig 2.31 % Figure 2.29 Perspectives on extractive practices among respondents with ‘direct contact’ 60 58 GoM with each authority 54 KNU % 50 25 25 GoM (n=1,540) 43 KNU (n=1550) DKBA (n=156) 40 20 BGFs (n=129) KPC (n=125) 30 15 15 30 15 13 14

20 10 .1 . . 5.5 10 5 3.4 1.5 1.6 0 0 Paying agricultural, Receiving healthcare Who charges Over-taxation Extortion and taking of property and/or and/or education from… the most tax? property without paying foraging tax to…

46 While respondents were nearly twice as likely to pay agriculture, property or foraging taxes to the KNU than to the GoM, they were 25 per cent more likely to receive healthcare or education from the GoM. At least 15 per cent of the surveyed population were paying tax to the KNU, but seemingly not receiving healthcare or education in return. There were 45 villages in which more people said they paid tax to the KNU than they said their community received healthcare or education from that authority; 29 of these 45 showed the inverse for the GoM: with more people saying the community received services than those who said they paid tax. 47 South (2012), p 199. See also, South (2011). 42 security, justice and governance in south east myanmar

Figure 2.29 displays answers to three separate questions related to extractive practices by authorities among only the respondents who had direct contact with that authority (see section 2.4 for a definition of ‘direct contact’). Although responses to these questions were low overall, they give an indication of trends in practices by each authority. The KNU was the authority most likely to be named for charging the most tax by people who had direct contact with it. Both the GoM and BGFs, meanwhile, were less associated with charging high taxes among their relevant samples, but were much more likely to be seen to perpetrate extortion (13 per cent and eight per cent, respectively). The DKBA was seen to be the highest charger of tax by 15 per cent of the sample who had direct contact with it, and was the most likely authority to be viewed by its sample to perpetrate extortion and excessive taxation.

Myawaddy town, across the banks of the Moei river. Several armed groups hold territory in Myawaddy, creating a highly fragmented governance context. ©Axel Drainville

2.6 Key findings Understanding n Sixty-one per cent of the surveyed villages were found to be under mixed control, based on a territory measure combining data on service delivery, taxation and exposure to soldiers. n The majority of respondents under the control of the GoM wanted to be governed by the KNU, while respondents in mixed-controlled were more than twice as likely to want to be governed by the KNU than by the GoM. n Village leadership alone is not an adequate indicator of which authority is in control, as authorities may exercise control even where they do not formally oversee the village leadership. n Ninety-nine per cent of respondents in KNU-controlled areas and 83 per cent of respondents in mix-controlled areas were Karen, further demonstrating the link between ethnicity and governance experiences. n Mix-controlled villages varied greatly, each displaying diverse patterns of village leadership, taxation, military presence and services. n Respondents from KNU-controlled territories were almost universally pro-KNU. The GoM was also the most popular governance actor in the areas it controlled, but by much smaller margins. n KNU service delivery and taxation coverage appear more widespread/far reaching in KNU areas than the GoM’s services/taxation GoM areas. n In mix-controlled areas, the KNU was notably more popular than GoM, despite the GoM providing more widespread services, charging fewer people tax and its soldiers being seen less frequently. n While KNU and particularly GoM were found to provide services to many in mix-controlled areas, nine per cent said their communities were not being provided with education services and eight per cent not with healthcare. n In both GoM-controlled and mix-controlled areas, just under ten per cent of respondents said their community received no healthcare or education from any authority. saferworld · karen peace support network 43

Territorial boundaries are rarely explicitly drawn in Myanmar’s conflict areas, making it difficult for outsiders to determine which armed actors control what and where. This section brings some rigour to the understanding of the different kinds of territories that do exist, and provides basic categories used throughout the rest of the report. In times of conflict, the rough terrain means that fixed positions are hard to defend and that armed authorities can easily drift in and out of each other’s sphere of influence. Since the ceasefires, negotiators have failed to reconcile on-the-ground realities with the higher-level interest in dialogue and so talks on territorial demarcation have made little progress. As such, local residents are often paying tax to, receiving services from and interacting with soldiers from different authorities to varying degrees. These levels of influence may also fluctuate over time. Territorial control has been relatively fluid for hundreds of years. More than 40 of the surveyed villages were established before or during the colonial era, during which most of today’s south east Myanmar was administered as the Tennasserim Division.48 The division included numerous areas that were ‘excluded’ or ‘partially excluded’ from centralised administration, giving significant autonomy to local Karen leaders.49 Within the formal colonial system, too, Karen men were given preferential access to administrative and military positions of influence compared with other groups. By 1949, when the conflict began, many Karen leaders in the old Tennasserim Division were aligned with the KNU, and most of it quickly came under the group’s control. The area that had been most autonomous under colonial rule, the former Salween Hills District, became (and has since remained) the KNU’s major stronghold.50 The last 70 years has seen a steady erosion of KNU territory through Tatmadaw counter-insurgency and the expansion of the state. From the late-1950s until the early- 1980s, almost the entire border was controlled by the KNU, as were vast areas much deeper into the region, though many settlements (including 14 of the surveyed villages) were slowly taken by the GoM during this period. From 1984 onwards, sustained military offensives by the Tatmadaw allowed the GoM to secure control of much of central and southern Kayin State and much of Mon and Tanintharyi. The splintering of the DKBA in the mid-1990s, and then the transformation of many of its units into BGFs in 2010, helped consolidate GoM control and kept the KNU out of many Karen communities (see box 2.2). Meanwhile, Tatmadaw bases were established even in the KNU’s most autonomous territories, as hundreds of thousands of Karen people were displaced (see part 3). Numerous surveyed villages were either taken over or burned to the ground by the Tatmadaw during this period.51 Since the ceasefires, the GoM has expanded its presence further, primarily through economic development and extension of the military-led General Administration Department, alongside continued militarisation. Observers have often categorised Myanmar’s armed conflict areas into three types of territory: ‘GoM-controlled’, ‘EAO-controlled’ and ‘mix-controlled’. Many people, including some affected communities themselves, also use the morbid Tatmadaw doctrinal terms, which label them ‘white’, ‘brown’ or ‘black’, respectively (see more in part 3). There are, however, no universally recognised categories and the reality is far messier than any of these terms suggest. Closer examination finds that each authority exercises multiple forms of influence, to varying degrees from area to area. See the introduction to part 2 for the overall spread of GoM and KNU influence. Most obviously, they establish administrative authority over village leaders, as discussed in section 2.1. However, this paints only part of the picture, as authorities regularly provide services, collect taxes and maintain a military

48 ‘Tennasserim Division’ was also the name given to today’s Tanintharyi Region during the Ne Win era. During British rule, the division was much larger. 49 See Jolliffe (2016), p 9, for more detail on these arrangements. 50 The Salween Hills District covered much of today’s Mutraw (Hpapun), Taw Oo (Taungoo) and Kler Lwe Htoo (Nyaunglebin) Districts, as well as parts of the Hpa-an and Doo Tha Htoo (Thaton) Districts. 51 For more on this history, see Jolliffe (2016); South (2011); and Smith (1999). 44 security, justice and governance in south east myanmar

presence in or around settlements, even where they are not fully in control. The KNU was found to collect taxes and provide services in multiple villages with only a GoM village head.52 Additionally, numerous villages with only KNU village heads have Tatmadaw bases nearby or receive services from GoM. A measure was therefore developed to categorise the surveyed villages as KNU- controlled, GoM-controlled or mix-controlled, based on a range of factors. These categories were used for analysing broad differences across territories, but it should be understood that there is a wide spectrum of different governance arrangements, so this is not a perfect typology. The categories are not statements on which authority should control any given territory, nor do they relate to categories used by any of the authorities themselves. Their primary purpose is to provide a general picture of the complexity of governance arrangements across the region in general The measure was worked out by examining the data on every village and determining which authorities met at least one of the following criteria: n At least 20 per cent of respondents said they paid agricultural, property or foraging tax to the authority. Fig 3.2 % 70 69 67 Fig 2.13 Other armed actors 65 n At least 40 per cent of the respondents said the community 61received education62 or Prefer not to answer 60 None healthcare from the authority. 50 I don’t know n At least 80 per cent of the respondents said they saw soldiers from the authority very KNU GoM often or often. 40

% Thirteen1.3% of the surveyed1.7% Surveyed villages were then categorised30 as GoM-controlled, if only the GoM met the 100 “ 1.0% villages and 19 per cent1.4% of 7.8% 8.7% above conditions; as KNU-controlled,20 if only the KNU met the above conditions; and respondents were mix-controlled, if one or more actors met the conditions. 20% 10 80 determined to be23% in GoM-controlled areas, These thresholds were chosen based 0on careful consideration of what would constitute 21 villages and 20 per cent Overall Men Women 45 60 a significant presence in each domain. The ability of an authority to collect these three of respondents38% were in taxes indicates a relatively regular and sedentary presence. As there were few settle- KNU-controlled areas, and 45% ments where the majority of people were paying them to any one actor, 20 per cent was 40 38 villages and 61 per cent of respondents were in sufficient to indicate that the authority had notable influence in the village. For health- mix-controlled areas. care and education, even where they are provided, not all residents would use them; at 20 33% ” the same time, parts of a given population may travel to other areas for these services. 20% Forty per cent was thus considered indicative of relatively well-established service 0 Who do you Who do you delivery. As is discussed in section 3.1, the large majority of respondents saw soldiers consider want to from various sides very often or often. Therefore, 80 per cent was considered the as your govern your Prefer not to answer government? area? Figure 2.30 Respondents in threshold necessarily to clearly demonstrateNot that recorded an authority had enough of a fixed each type of territory and Very disatisfied Fig 2.33 military presence in the area to establish authority that way. by gender Disatisfied % By this measure, 13 of the surveyed villagesSatisfied and 19 per cent of respondents were 70 Very satisfied Female Total: determined to be in GoM-controlled areas, 21 villages and 20 per cent of respondents Male 61% 25 60 were in KNU-controlled areas, and 38 villages and 61 per cent of respondents were in mix-controlled areas. Box 2.3 provides a snapshot4 description of seven examples of 50 mixed villages as an indication of the20 widely varying characteristics they can display. There were no villages where smaller armed actors4 were the only actor to meet the 40 30% above conditions. In two villages where15 the DKBA did meet the conditions, the KNU 30 did so also, meaning they were classified as mix-controlled. 31% Total: Total: 12 2 20% 10 1 20 19% These findings demonstrate that village leadership alone is not a reliable indicator of 2 10% 10% which authority is in control: among the 38 mix-controlled villages, 17 had only a GoM- 10 5 8 affiliated village leader and five had only a KNU-affiliated6 village leader. Similarly, in 9% 10% multiple villages one authority was found to have4 more influence than the other – 0 1 1 GoM KNU Mixed even where the other had a village leader0 in place. KNU GoM Village (n=24) (n=12) tract authorities (n=9)

Fig 5.8

52 People received services from the KNU in eight villages and were paying tax to the KNU in 13 villages. % 50 No data 2% GoM KNU Prefer not 43 to answer 2% 40

Yes 16% 30 28 I don’t know 18%

No 62% 11 10 10

0 …bring the …cause beneﬁt of trying problems by to build peace? initiating armed conﬂict? saferworld · karen peace support network 45

The gender balance of the surveyed population was maintained across the three types of territory (Figure 2.30). Analysis of other demographics displayed some striking results: while these specific samples were not designed to be representative, the extent of some trends is telling. The ethnic breakdown of the populations was remarkable, with 99 per cent of the population in KNU-controlled villages and 84 per cent of the population in mix-controlled villages identifying as Karen (Figure 2.31).

Figure 2.31 Ethnic composition of respondents (by type of territory) Fig 2.34 Mixed 0.04% Other 3.94%

GoM-control Bamar 19.42% Dawei 23.10% Karen 38.06% Pa-O 15.22%

Bamar 0.73% Mon 0.24%

KNU-control Karen 98.53%

Dawei 0.24% Shan 0.24% Mixed 0.41% Other 1.38% Dawei 0.41% Karenni/Kayah/Kayan 2.93% Shan 5.69%

Mix-controlled Karen 83.82%

Bamar 4.47% Pa-O 0.08% Mon 0.81%

0 20 40 60 80 100%

Fig 3.3 The majority of non-Karen respondents were in GoM-controlled villages: 19 perVery cent often GoM/ 10% 23% 10% 34% 13% 9% Often Tatmadaw identified as Bamar, 23 per cent Dawei and 15 per cent Pa-O. Not often 1% 1% Never Only 26 per cent of respondents from KNU-controlled villages said they could speakDon’t know Prefer not to answer KNU Myanmar23% language well,31% compared to 907% per cent20% of respondents6% in12% GoM-controlled villages and 79 per cent under mixed control (Figure 2.32). Pwo Karen speakers Nowere response recorded five times as prevalent in mix-controlled villages and more than twice as prevalent in 0 GoM-controlled20 villages,40 when compared60 with KNU-controlled80 villages.100 This% under- lines the extent to which Sgaw Karen has become the dominant language in KNU Fig 2.36 1.6% areas, despite the organisation’s official policy to promote both languages. Fig 4.3 % 60 Very common Fig 2.35 Primary school “Small case” Figure 2.3236% Population who5.5% said they could speak36% selected languages5.8% “well”15% Common (n=2013) High school % 52 Neutral 99 Middle school 100 2.4% 50 Uncommon Myanmar 90 Very uncommon University Sgaw Karen Monastic education “Big case” 5.1% 45% 21% 6.6% 20% Don’t know 42 (n=2017) 79 Pwo Karen 80 40 No schooling 35 36 63 0 60 20 40 60 80 30 100% 25

20 21 40 20 Fig 4.4 32 28 15 26 1% 13 12 GoM-controlled Very common 208% 36% 4% 22% 10% 10 19% 8 areas 12 Common 6 2% 1% 1% 6 Neutral4 4 2 2 KNU controlled 46% 26% 24% Uncommon 1 1 0 areas 0 Very uncommon GoM-control KNU-control Mix-controlled2% GoM-control KNU-control Mix-controlled Don’t know Mix-controlled 5% 47% 19% 7% 19% Missing answer areas 2%There were notable disparities in access to education between areas. In KNU-controlled Women in GoM- Figareas, 2.37 which31% tend% to be more6% remote, 42 per38% cent of respondents (the12% highest11% proportion) controlled areas 80 had no schooling (Figure 2.33).2% However, the high portion2% of ageing respondents, 6 GoM I don’t know Women in KNU- 70 KNU DKBA 3%deemed by enumerators32% 65 to be a result of high37% numbers of younger people24% being controlled areas None BGFs 1%migrant labourers,60 likely affected these findings, as education systems in the region 51 5 Women in mix- have improved35%50 notably in recent6%64 decades. 34% 9% 14% controlled areas 45 44 40 35 32 33 0 3020 40 2 60 80 2 100% 22 20 14 14 1 11 12 1% 10 1% 6 6 5 5 5 4 4 Fig 5.1 1 1 0 Severely deteriorated GoM 12% Consider48% Like most: 8%Support 20%Prefer to 9% Want to DeterioratedCommunity Community Pay agri, “Often” or government political deal with govern No differencereceives receives property or “Very often” to be: views most: justice the area Improvededucation healthcare foraging see soldiers 1% problems:1% from: from: tax to: from: Signiﬁcantly improved Don’t know KNU 10% 55% 8% 14% 11% Prefer not to answer Missing answer 1%

0 20 40 60 80 100 % Fig 2.38 % 100 4 GoM 2 1 3 6 6 KNU 3 None 80 I don’t 66 know DKBA 60 BGFs

25 20 1 5 6 2 4 3 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 0 Consider Like most: Support Prefer to Want to Community Community Pay agri, “Often” or government political deal with govern receives receives property or “Very often” to be: views most: justice the area: education healthcare foraging see soldiers problems: from: from: tax to: from:

Fig 2.39 % 80 GoM 70 6 66 KNU 62 None 60 56 I don’t 50 know 41 DKBA 40 3 3 3 33 35 35 35 BGFs 3 32 3 30 2 24 26 23 21 2 1 20 1 15 16 12 11 11 10 6 1 2 1 0 Consider Like most: Support Prefer to Want to Community Community Pay agri, “Often” or government political deal with govern receives receives property or “Very often” to be: views most: justice the area education healthcare foraging see soldiers problems: from: from: tax to: from: 46 security, justice and governance in south east myanmar

FigureFig 2.36 2.33 Highest education level reached % 60 Fig 2.35 Primary school High school % 52 99 Middle school 100 50 Myanmar 90 University Sgaw Karen 42 Monastic education 79 Pwo Karen 80 40 No schooling 35 36 63 60 30 25

20 21 40 20 32 28 15 26 13 12 20 10 8 12 6 6 4 4 2 1 1 2 0 0 GoM-control KNU-control Mix-controlled GoM-control KNU-control Mix-controlled

BOX 2.3 Examples of mixed villages Fig 2.37 % 80 Village 1 is in GoM Hlaingbwe Township,6 and in KNU Hpa-anGoM District.I don’t It know has a population of 1,700, only a GoM village leader and has been under GoM control since around 1980, when the 70 65 KNU DKBA village leader says the “whole village was burned downNone by the TatmadawBGFs and a lot of people 60 died”. There is a Tatmadaw base three miles away and a BGF base 3.5 miles away. Thirty-eight 51 5 50 64 per cent of respondents said they saw BGF soldiers frequently or sometimes. According to the 45 44 village leader, “Mostly, the BGF takes responsibilities for security and coordination and GoM 40 35 32 takes responsibilities for administration”. However, the KNU also33 has a notable presence: 51 per 30 2 cent of respondents2 in the village received health or education from the KNU (76 per cent from 22 20 GoM). The local BGFs also support school buildings and other infrastructure. Sixty-seven per 14 14 1 cent pay11 agricultural property or foraging12 tax to the KNU (77 per cent and ten per cent to the 10 6 6 5 GoM and BGFs respectively).5 Thirty-three5 4 per cent saw4 KNLA/KNDO soldiers frequently or 1 1 0 sometimes. Consider Like most: Support Prefer to Want to Community Community Pay agri, “Often” or government political deal with Villagegovern 2 is in GoMreceives Thandaunggyi receives Township andproperty KNU Tawor Oo“Very District. often” It has a population of to be: views most: justice the area education healthcare foraging see soldiers problems: 387, including Karen,from: Shan, Bamar,from: Wa and Chintax households, to: whofrom: are predominantly Christian. It has one village leader each for the KNU and GoM governance systems. The area is heavily militarised, with a Tatmadaw base on the outskirts of the village that was built in 1980 on 50 acres of confiscated land. A notable majority of respondents said they saw soldiers frequently or sometimes from both the Tatmadaw (82 per cent) and the KNU (75 per cent). Ninety-six per cent and 50 per cent of respondents received health or education from the GoM and KNU, Fig 2.38 % respectively. Thirty-nine per cent and 82 per cent paid agricultural, property or foraging taxes 100 to the GoM and KNU,4 respectively. GoM 2 1 3 6 6 KNU Village 3 is in GoM Myawaddy Township and KNU3 Kawkareik Township. It was first conquered None 80 by the Tatmadaw in 1991, and has changed hands numerous times since,I don’t primarily under the influence of the Khlohtoobaw faction of the DKBA, which shifted alliance from the GoM to the 66 know KNU in 2011. Its residents are predominantly Buddhist and include aroundDKBA 60 per cent Sgaw 60 Karen, 40 per cent Pwo Karen with a few Bamar residents. There is a DKBABGFs base five minutes’ walk away and a Tatmadaw camp three minutes away, but due to an understanding between the DKBA and KNU, the KNU is the sole administrative authority – despite its military camp base 40 being one hour away. The village has a population of 1,020 and only a KNU village head. 25 Sixty-seven per cent of respondents said they received healthcare or education from the KNU, 20 37.8 per cent from the DKBA (much of this jointly provided)1 and only 2.7 per cent from the GoM. Agricultural, property and foraging taxes were paid by 16 per cent of respondents to the 5 6 2 4 GoM, by 70 per cent to3 the DKBA, by 76 per cent to the KNU and by3 2.7 per cent to the BGFs 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 0 (based many miles away). Thirty-two per cent, 100 per cent and 94 per cent of respondents saw Consider Like most: Support Prefer to soldiersWant to of the Tatmadaw,Community KNLA/KNDOCommunity and DKBA,Pay agri, respectively, “Often” sometimes or or frequently. This government political deal with govern receives receives property or “Very often” to be: views most: justice indicatesthe area: the Tatmadaweducation soldiershealthcare tended to stayforaging in the barracks.see soldiers problems: from: from: tax to: from: Village 4 is in GoM Kyainseikgyi Township and the KNU Dooplaya District. Its population of 400–500 people is roughly half Mon and half Shan, with a few Bamar households. Until the 2012 ceasefires, neither the KNU nor the GoM had a stable presence in the village – during this period, portering and forced disappearances happened regularly. Today there are two village heads, one each for the KNU and GoM systems, who jointly attend all village meetings and so Fig 2.39 % 80 govern in collaboration. There are no military camps anywhere in the entire village tract, but Tatmadaw, KNU and New Mon State Party soldiers visit from time to time.GoM Twenty-four per cent 6 70 of the population said they received education or66 healthcare from the GoMKNU and 19 per cent 62 None 60 from the KNU. Fifty per cent paid agricultural, property or foraging56 taxes to the KNU and ten per I don’t cent to the GoM. This is an interesting case study as it shows the KNU providing services to a 50 know non-Karen41 population. DKBA 40 3 3 3 33 35 35 35 BGFs 3 32 3 30 2 24 26 23 21 2 1 20 1 15 16 12 11 11 10 6 1 2 1 0 Consider Like most: Support Prefer to Want to Community Community Pay agri, “Often” or government political deal with govern receives receives property or “Very often” to be: views most: justice the area education healthcare foraging see soldiers problems: from: from: tax to: from: saferworld · karen peace support network 47

Village 5, in GoM Kawkareik Township and KNU Hpa-an District, is within three miles of Tatmadaw, KNU and KPC bases. It has one village leader each for the KNU and the GoM systems and its population of 675 are all Buddhist Karen. Fifty-six per cent of the respondents received healthcare or education from the GoM and 19.5 per cent from the KNU. Sixty-one per cent of the respondents said they paid agricultural, property or foraging taxes to the GoM, 71 per cent to the KNU, seven per cent to the DKBA, five per cent to a BGF and ten per cent to the KPC. Village 6 is in GoM Kyaikmaraw Township (Mon State) and KNU Dooplaya District. Its population totals around 500: all are Karen and are a mixture of Buddhists, Christians and Leke. Tatmadaw, BGFs, KNU and DKBA soldiers all operate in the region. The village is spread out and so is administratively divided into two parts, with a village leader for each half: one reporting to the KNU and the other to the GoM. In practice, both village leaders work together on most local issues. The GoM has carried out community development projects, including for village roads, while KNU provides education support. Fifty per cent of the population said they received education or healthcare from the GoM and both authorities took the above types of tax from around 38 per cent of respondents. Village 7 is in GoM Kyauk Kyi Township, Bago Region, and KNU Kler Lwe Htoo District. It was first founded over 100 years ago, but was burned down by the Tatmadaw in 1997, during an attack in which many of the villagers were reportedly killed. It was re-established in 2013 and now has a population of just 105 (in 22 housholds), who are all Karen animists and Christians. There is a KNU/KNLA/KNDO camp two hours’ walk away and all governance is provided by the KNU: there is only a KNU village head. Fifty-three per cent of the respondents said they received education or healthcare from the KNU and 93 per cent paid tax to it. There is a Tatmadaw base three hours away, and 80 per cent of the population said they saw Tatmadaw soldiers frequently or sometimes.

“Governance dynamics vary Governance dynamics vary greatly between the three different types of territory greatly between the three (Figures 2.34, 2.35 and 2.36). Respondents from KNU-controlled territories were almost different types of territory. universally pro-KNU, with 92 per cent and 91 per cent stating that they considered the Respondents from KNU- Fig 2.36 KNU their government and wanted the KNU to govern their area, respectively. Almost controlled territories were % 60 Fig 2.35 almost universally pro-KNU. all of the few remaining respondents said, “I don’t know” to these questions. The largePrimary school High school % The GoM was also by far the majority said they received52 healthcare (93 per cent) and education (94 per cent) from 99 Middle school 100 50 most popular governance the organisation.Myanmar This demonstrates extremely high coverage in KNU’s areas, likely 90 University actor in areas it controlled, Sgaw Karen reflecting the highly adaptive healthcare system, which uses ‘backpack’42 and community-Monastic education 79 Pwo Karen 80 but by much smaller margins. embedded health workers,40 and its support for small primary schools – even in remote No schooling 36 In mix-controlled areas, the villages with small numbers of children. Sixty-six per35 cent said they supported the KNU was found to be notably 63 KNU’s political views the most, while 25 per cent said, “I don’t know”. 60 more popular than the GoM, 30 25 despite the GoM providing The GoM was also by far the most popular governance actor in areas it controlled, but 20 21 40 more widespread services, 20 32by much smaller margins – as many respondents said “I don’t know” or “none” in 28 charging fewer people tax 15 26 response to questions. Healthcare and education13 were widely provided, though less and its soldiers being seen 12 20 than in KNU areas,10 with nine respondents8 saying no authority provided either of these 12 less frequently.” 6 6 services. More than half of the respondents4 did not pay any of the three taxes to the 4 2 1 1 2 0 GoM, suggesting GoM0 tax collection in these rural areas is weak. Overall, respondents GoM-control KNU-control Mix-controlledin these areas saw soldiers muchGoM-control less than in KNU-controlledKNU-control or mix-controlled areas.Mix-controlled

Figure 2.34 Governance in GoM-controlled areas Fig 2.37 % 80 6 GoM I don’t know 70 65 KNU DKBA None BGFs 60 51 5 50 64 45 44 40 35 32 33 30 2 2 22 20 14 14 1 11 12 10 6 6 5 5 5 4 4 1 1 0 Consider Like most: Support Prefer to Want to Community Community Pay agri, “Often” or government political deal with govern receives receives property or “Very often” to be: views most: justice the area education healthcare foraging see soldiers problems: from: from: tax to: from:

Fig 2.38 % 100 4 GoM 2 1 3 6 6 KNU 3 None 80 I don’t 66 know DKBA 60 BGFs

Fig 2.39 % 80 GoM 70 6 66 KNU 62 None 60 56 I don’t 50 know 41 DKBA 40 3 3 3 33 35 35 35 BGFs 3 32 3 30 2 24 26 23 21 2 1 20 1 15 16 12 11 11 10 6 1 2 1 0 Consider Like most: Support Prefer to Want to Community Community Pay agri, “Often” or government political deal with govern receives receives property or “Very often” to be: views most: justice the area education healthcare foraging see soldiers problems: from: from: tax to: from: Fig 2.36 % 60 Fig 2.35 Primary school High school % 52 99 Middle school 100 50 Myanmar 90 University Sgaw Karen 42 Monastic education 79 Pwo Karen 80 40 No schooling 35 36 63 60 30 25

20 21 40 20 32 28 15 26 13 12 20 10 8 12 6 6 4 4 2 1 1 2 0 0 GoM-control KNU-control Mix-controlled GoM-control KNU-control Mix-controlled

Fig 2.37 % 80 6 GoM I don’t know Fig 2.36 70 65 KNU DKBA % None BGFs 60 60 Fig 2.35 51 5 Primary school 50 64 45 44 High school % 52 99 Middle school 100 40 50 Myanmar35 33 90 32 University 30 2 2 Sgaw Karen Monastic education 22 42 79 Pwo Karen 80 20 40 No schooling 14 12 14 1 11 35 36 10 6 6 5 5 5 4 4 63 1 1 60 0 30 Consider Like most: Support Prefer to Want to Community Community Pay agri, “Often” or government political deal with govern receives receives property or “Very often” 25 to be: views most: justice the area education healthcare foraging see soldiers 20 21 40 problems:20 from: from: tax to: from: 32 28 15 26 13 12 20 48 security, justice and10 governance8 in south east myanmar 12 6 6 4 4 2 1 1 2 Fig0 2.38 % Figure 2.35 Governance0 in KNU-controlled areas GoM-control100 KNU-control Mix-controlled GoM-control4 KNU-control Mix-controlledGoM 2 1 3 6 6 KNU 3 None 80 I don’t know Fig 2.37 % 66 80 DKBA 60 6 GoM I don’t know BGFs 70 65 KNU DKBA None BGFs 60 40 51 64 5 50 45 25 44 40 35 1 20 32 33 30 2 2 225 6 2 4 3 3 20 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 0 14 12 14 Consider Like most: Support1 Prefer to Want1 1to Community Community Pay agri, “Often” or 10 government6 6 political5 deal with govern receives 5 receives5 4 property4 or “Very often” to be: views most: justice the area: education healthcare foraging see soldiers 1 1 0 Consider Like most: Support Preferproblems: to Want to from:Community from:Community taxPay to: agri, from:“Often” or government political deal with govern receives receives property or “Very often” to be: views most: justice the area education healthcare foraging see soldiers In mix-controlledproblems: areas, the KNU wasfrom: found to befrom: notably moretax to: popular thanfrom: the GoM, despite the GoM providing more widespread services, charging fewer people tax Fig 2.39 % and its soldiers being seen less frequently. Many of these areas were partially occupied by 80 the Tatmadaw and proxy Karen splinter groups during the 1990s. These results furtherGoM 70 6 66 KNU Fig 2.38 % show that provision of services does not translate62 directly into political legitimacy orNone 10060 56 4 GoMI don’t 2 support for the GoM. Thirty-three1 per cent of respondents3 said they considered the 50 6 6 KNUknow GoM to be their government and 30 per cent said the KNU. However,3 the respondents 41 NoneDKBA 8040 3 3 3 33 35 were much more likely to say they wanted the KNU35 to govern35 their area (41 per cent)I don’tBGFs 3 32 3 30 2 know 24 66than26 they were to say the GoM (16 per cent). Similarly, 35 per cent said they liked the 23 21 DKBA 2 1 6020 1 KNU15 most, while only 1617 per cent said the same about the GoM and 20 per cent said 12 BGFs 11 11 10 “none”. When it came to whose political views they supported the most,6 respondents 1 2 1 40 0 in mixed-control areas were most likely to say “I don’t know” (38 per cent), while Consider Like most: Support Prefer to Want to Community Community Pay agri, “Often” or government political deal with govern receives receives property or “Very often” 2625 per cent said KNU and 18 per cent said GoM. Interestingly, on the question of to be: views most: justice the area education healthcare foraging see soldiers 20 dealing withproblems: justice issues, which dependsfrom: not justfrom: on one’s preferencetax to: 1butfrom: also on the capacity of that actor to enforce decisions, 32 per cent said KNU, 21 per cent said GoM 5 6 2 4 3 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 0 and 30 per cent said “I don’t know”. GoM services reached nearly double those of the Consider Like most: Support Prefer to Want to Community Community Pay agri, “Often” or government politicalKNU, anddeal while with this suggestsgovern quitereceives strong coveragereceives overall,property nine orper cent“Very said often” their to be: viewscommunities most: justice receivedthe no area: educationeducation services fromhealthcare authorities foraging and eightsee per soldiers cent said problems: from: from: tax to: from: they received no healthcare. While providing less widespread services, for reasons discussed in section 2.2, the KNU was most prevalent in its tax collection and presence of its military.

Fig 2.39 % 80 Figure 2.36 Governance in mix-controlled areas GoM 70 6 66 KNU 62 None 60 56 I don’t 50 know 41 DKBA 40 3 3 3 33 35 35 35 BGFs 3 32 3 30 2 24 26 23 21 2 1 20 1 15 16 12 11 11 10 6 1 2 1 0 Consider Like most: Support Prefer to Want to Community Community Pay agri, “Often” or government political deal with govern receives receives property or “Very often” to be: views most: justice the area education healthcare foraging see soldiers problems: from: from: tax to: from:

These broad trends were relatively consistent among both men and women across the three types of territory. Figure 2.37 shows the average responses among each sub-group to the seven main questions on governance preferences.53 Women in all three areas

53 In these questions, respondents were asked which single authority “… do you like the most?”, “… would you prefer to deal with justice problems?”, “… has political views do you support most?”, “… keeps the community most safe and secure?”, “… provides the most social services, development and welfare?”, “ … has the highest governance capacity?”, and “… do you want to govern your area?”. saferworld · karen peace support network 49

were more likely to respond “I don’t know” than their male counterparts, but these differences were most pronounced in mixed areas – where the proportion of men saying “I don’t know” was 28 per cent on average and the proportion of women was 37 per cent on average. While women in mix-controlled areas were therefore less likely to say either GoM or KNU than their male counterparts, this difference was largest regarding the KNU. The differences were least pronounced in KNU-controlled areas, where the proportion of men saying “I don’t know” was 15 per cent on average, compared to 18 per cent for women.

Figure 2.37 Average responses to seven questions on governance preferences % Fig 2.40 78 80 75 GoM 70 KNU I don’t know 60 50 50 44 40 36 37 31 30 28 28 22 24 18 19 20 15

10 6 5 2 2 0 Men in Women in Men in Women in Men in Women in GoM-controlled GoM-controlled KNU-controlled KNU-controlled mix-controlled mix-controlled areas areas areas areas areas areas

Fig 3.2 % 70 69 67 65 61 62 60

0 Overall Men Women 45 Fig 3.12 % Non-Karen men (n=220) 60 5 Karen men (n=787) Non-Karen women (n=221) Karen women (n=787) 50 45 42 40 3 3 3 35 35 33 33 3 3 30 2 26 25 24 24 24 23 22 2 20 1 1 1 1 16 14 14 11 11 1 11 11 11 10 1 6 5 4 3 .5 0 Burning Violent Destroy Flee home Forced Landmine Torture Portering Shootings Forced Extortion Land grab village threats property for safety displace- labour ment Fig 3.14 % 80 GoM-controlled 72 KNU-controlled 70 Mix-controlled 60 58 53 49 50 44 43 41 40 38

30 28 28 26 25

20 14 12 13 9 10 10 2 0 Portering Forced labour Forced Burning/ Destruction Landmines relocation destroying of property of villages

% % Fig 3.16 & 17 3.0 60 2.68 53 2.5 2.36 50 46

2.0 40

1.5 30

19 1.0 20

0.5 10 0.24

0.0 0 GoM- KNU- Mix- GoM- KNU- Mix- controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled 50

Karen women and children fleeing home with a few belongings during military operations. © Prachatai, Burma Campaign UK. 51 3 Security forces and experiences of violence

for ordinary people living in rural south east myanmar, seven decades of conflict has meant seven decades of insecurity, amid regular fighting, targeting of civilians and perpetual militarisation. Soldiers are an everyday feature in many people’s lives and experiences of violence and abuse by the authorities that are supposed to keep people safe, particularly the Tatmadaw, are all too common. Heavy militarisation and regular armed violence have been the norm in the survey area since World War II. Then, Karen communities faced brutal violence at the hands of the Japanese forces, while large numbers of men fought alongside the allies. In 1945, the original Tatmadaw was formed, with a Karen commander-in-chief and multiple Karen Rifles units. Though established as a civilian political organisation in 1947, the KNU soon began to exercise leadership over home guard units called Karen National Defence Organisations (KNDOs), which were being established by Karen communities across lower Myanmar in response to the rise of communist insurgencies and increased antagonism between Karen and Bamar nationalists.

BOX 3.1 The Tatmadaw’s four cuts strategy In the 1960s, the Tatmadaw developed the ‘four cuts’ strategy for clearing out areas controlled by EAOs and communist insurgents. In 2018, the UN Human Rights Council confirmed that the strategy is still in use today.54 The term ‘four cuts’ has been interpreted in various ways, but the basic aim is to drive a wedge between armed organisations and their civilian support base. Areas held by armed organisations are designated as ‘black’ areas, GoM-held territories as ‘white’ areas and mix-controlled areas as ‘brown’ areas. Entire populations of black areas are then ordered to abandon their homes and land and move to white or brown areas, often to designated relocation sites. Those who remain, particularly of the same ethnic group as the target armed organisations, are then targeted as combatants in ‘clearance operations’, often involving the burning of civilian settlements, destruction of food and livelihoods, as well as violent acts of intimidation, including sexual violence. According to the UN Human Rights Council, these methods are ‘unwarranted: military necessity would never justify killing indiscriminately, gang-raping women, assaulting children and burning entire villages. The tactics used by the Tatmadaw are consistently and grossly disproportionate to actual security threats in Myanmar.’55

When conflict began in 1949, Karen commanders were removed, General Ne Win took over, and large portions of the Karen Rifles soon defected to the KNU. From thereon, the Tatmadaw grew rapidly in size, taking mostly Bamar recruits, and developing an

54 United Nations Human Rights Council (2018), p 15. 55 Ibid. 52 security, justice and governance in south east myanmar

increasingly Bamar-Buddhist character. Much of the rural south east and large parts of today’s Bago and Ayeryawady Regions came under firm control of the KNU, while the KNDOs and the defectors were moulded into a standing army called the Karen National Liberation Army. A unified KNDO was later revived as an auxiliary home guard force under centralised KNU command. During the 1950s, the GoM established strong control of the towns and key roads, but rural areas came under firm KNU control. Every able Karen family in these areas provided a male recruit, and the organisation became the centrally-recognised authority. From the 1960s onwards, the Tatmadaw developed its ‘four cuts’ strategy, which targeted populations considered to be supporting insurgents, forcibly removing them from rebel territories into relocation sites. Those who would not move, including women and children, would be targeted as combatants in what became known as ‘clearance operations’ (see box 3.1). During the 1960s and 1970s, the majority of Tatmadaw campaigns against the KNU focused on its positions in Ayeryawady Delta and Bago Yoma regions and just the fringes of territories in the country’s south east. In 1984, the Tatmadaw began four cuts offensives on and near the Thailand–Myanmar border, removing the KNU from some of its most strategically important posts. It began establishing relocation sites on the outskirts of towns or along roads it controlled and, over the coming decades, moved hundreds of thousands of people out of KNU areas, placing them under strict movement restrictions. At the same time, tens of thousands of people fled to Thailand and established the refugee camps that remain to this day. Landmines and patrol squadrons, ordered to shoot anyone on sight, were used to keep areas unstable so that the KNU could be routed out. The Tatmadaw’s area of operations expanded dramatically in 1995, when a large faction of Buddhists within KNU broke away and formed the original DKBA. They aligned with the Tatmadaw and helped the GoM to push the KNU out from much of Mon State, Tanintharyi and central Kayin State, while displacing hundreds of thousands more civilians. Communities living in remaining strongholds in northern Kayin State and eastern Bago were subjected to regular clearance operations and targeted violence. In areas under closer Tatmadaw and DKBA control, forced labour, portering (the carrying of military equipment for military operations), land confiscation and other forms of exploitation for military purposes, public sector objectives or profit became widespread. The 2012 ceasefires, and the rotation of Tatmadaw troops to conflict zones in other parts of the country, greatly reduced the levels of violence and abuse experienced by Karen communities, while leading to increases elsewhere. However, deep insecurity persists as the deals have failed to greatly reduce the overall levels of militarisation, delineate territories or properly establish a code of conduct for military actors.

A KNLA soldier watches youth play football. © Saferworld Don’t know 4.4% Prefer not to answer 0.2%

Fig 2.6 Strongly disagree 0.1% Disagree 2.4%

Neutral 8.3% Strongly agree 29.9%

Agree 54.7% saferworld · karen peace support network 53

Civilians and soldiers of the Karen National Liberation Army. Fig 2.7© Karen Peace Support Network

Women Men 47% 53%

Prefer not to say 0% No data 1% Don’t know 3% There were no elections 4% Fig 2.8 No, there were elections but nobody in my household voted 3% 3.1 Exposure to Key findings No, but someone in my security forceshouseholdn did Karen 10% ceasefire areas remain militarised despite the ceasefires, with the majority of respondents saying they see soldiers often or very often. n Respondents were most likely to see soldiers fromYes the 45% KNU, followed by those of the Tatmadaw. n The majority of respondents described their interactions with soldiers as friendly or civil and cordial, especially for the KNU. n RespondentsNo 33% were more likely to have distrustful or hostile interactions with the Tatmadaw than with soldiers from any other authority, particularly among those who see the Tatmadaw very often.

No data 8% Fig 2.28 The Karen ceasefire areas Four+The 1% Karen ceasefire areas remain heavily militarised, despite more than six years of “ None 14% remain heavily militarised, Threerelative 2% stability. Thirty-one per cent of respondents said, in the period since 2012, despite more than six years they saw soldiers from at least one authority very often, while 34 per cent said they saw of relative stability. ” them often. There were 18 surveyed villages in which the majority of respondents saw soldiers from at least two authorities very often or often. Two 30% Men saw soldiers slightly more regularly than women, while under-45s had greater exposure than over-45s (Figure 3.2). This is likely due to men and younger people taking on greater responsibilities that involve travelling to other areas or along routes One 46% where soldiers are present.

Figure 3.1 How often do you see Figure 3.2 People who reported seeing soliders (since 2012) ceasefires? soldiers very often or often since 2012

Fig 3.1 Fig 3.2 % 70 69 67 Fig 2.13 Other armed actors 65 61 62 Prefer not to answer 60 None Very often I don’t know 31% 50 KNU GoM 40

% 1.3% 1.7% 30 100 1.0% 1.4% Often 7.8% 8.7% 34% 20

20% 10 80 23%

0 Overall Men Women 45 60 38% 45%Respondents were mostly likely to see KNU soldiers,56 with more than 50 per cent 40 seeing them often or very often (Figure 3.3). Thirty-three per cent saw GoM (i.e., Tatmadaw) troops often or very often and ten per cent saw them not often. Military 20 33% actors are a resolute feature of everyday life in the ceasefire areas. 20%

0 56 This could include troops from either of the KNU’s main armed wings, the KNLA or its home guard force, the KNDO. Who do you Who do you consider want to as your govern your Prefer not to answer government? area? Not recorded Very disatisfied Fig 2.33 Disatisfied % Satisfied 70 Very satisfied Female Total: Male 61% 25 60 4 50 20 4 40 30% 15 30 31% Total: Total: 12 2 20% 10 1 20 19% 2 10% 10% 10 5 8 6 9% 10% 4 0 1 1 GoM KNU Mixed 0 KNU GoM Village (n=24) (n=12) tract authorities (n=9)

Fig 5.8

% 50 No data 2% GoM KNU Prefer not 43 to answer 2% 40

Yes 16% 30 28 I don’t know 18%

No 62% 11 10 10

0 …bring the …cause beneﬁt of trying problems by to build peace? initiating armed conﬂict? Fig 2.34 Mixed 0.04% Other 3.94%

GoM-control Bamar 19.42% Dawei 23.10% Karen 38.06% Pa-O 15.22%

Bamar 0.73% Mon 0.24%

KNU-control Karen 98.53%

Dawei 0.24% Shan 0.24% Mixed 0.41% Other 1.38% Dawei 0.41% Karenni/Kayah/Kayan 2.93% Shan 5.69%

Mix-controlled Karen 83.82%

Bamar 4.47% Pa-O 0.08% Mon 0.81% 54 security, justice and governance in south east myanmar 0 20 40 60 80 100%

Figure 3.3 How often do you see soldiers (since 2012 ceasefires)?

Fig 3.3 Very often GoM/ 10% 23% 10% 34% 13% 9% Often Tatmadaw Not often 1% 1% Never Don’t know Prefer not to answer KNU 23% 31% 7% 20% 6% 12% No response recorded

0 20 40 60 80 100%

Nonetheless, these interactions are not always viewed as problematic per se. When 1.6% Fig 4.3 asked how they would describe their interactions with soldiers of the Tatmadaw, KNU, DKBA and BGFs, large proportions of respondents for all groups said thatVery these common inter- “Small case” 36% 5.5% 36% 5.8% 15% Common (n=2013) actions were friendly or civil and cordial. This was particularly notable inNeutral the case of the KNU, as 39 per cent2.4% of respondents who answered said that their interactionsUncommon with KNU soldiers were friendly and 24 per cent said they were civil and cordialVery (Figure uncommon “Big case” 5.1% 45% 21% 6.6% 20% Don’t know (n=2017) 3.4). Only 1.1 per cent said they were distrustful and 0.1 per cent (one individual) said the interactions were hostile.

0 20 40 60 80 100% Figure 3.4 How would you describe your interactions with soldiers of each authority? Fig 2.33 Fig 3.4 (% of recorded answers) % % 70 Female 100 1.1% 0.9% 1.7% 1.6% Fig 4.4 Prefer not to answer Male 15.8% Don’t1% know 60 0.1% Hostile Very common GoM-controlled 8% 80 36%37.3% 4% 1.1%22% 10% 19% areas Distrustful Common 19.4% 50 2% 1% 1% Neutral Neutral 67.7% 68.4% KNU controlled 46% 0.7% 26% 24% Civil and cordialUncommon areas 60 40 12.3% Friendly Very uncommon 2% 30% 23.6% Don’t know Mix-controlled Missing answer 30 5% 40 47% 19% 7% 19% 31% areas 23.9% 2% 0% 0.4% 20 6.7% Women in GoM- 10.3% 31% 6.8% 6% 38% 12% 11% controlled areas 20 39.0% 6.9% 10% 10% 7.4% 10 2% 9.2% 2% 18.0% 2.1% 9% 10%Women in KNU- 7.8% 9.9% 3% 32%0 37% 24% 0 controlled areas GoM KNU DKBA BGF GoM KNU Mixed 1% (n=1,328) (n=1,378) (n= 480) (n= 487) Women in mix- Fig 3.5 35% 6% 34% 9% 14% controlled areas While the majority said the same about the Tatmadaw, too, respondents were more % 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.2% 0% 100 1.1% 0.5% likely1.9% to describe their0.9% interactions with the Tatmadaw1.1% as distrustful or hostile than 0 20 40 1.6%60 80 Hostile100% 14.5% 11.4% 18.2% they were with16.4% soldiers from any other authority. Distrustful 23.9% Neutral 80 41.5% 42.5% 1% 44.8% Remarkably, however, increased exposure to these groups1% was correlatedCivil or withcordial more Fig 5.1 27.2% SeverelyFriendly deteriorated 33.7% 41.0% favourable descriptions of those interactions (Figure 3.5). Among those who frequently 12%54.5% 48% 8% 20% 9% Deteriorated 60 GoM saw soldiers of the DKBA (n=44)32.2% or BGFs (n=33), none described their interactions as No difference 17.5% 1% hostile or distrustful and more than 75 per16.0% cent described1% them as friendlyImproved or civil and 8.3% 25.7% Signiﬁcantly improved 40 13.1% cordial. Frequency and quality of interactions were also positively correlated for the Don’t know KNU 10% Tatmadaw,55% but55.6% trust appears low overall:8% even14% among those11% who saw them frequently 15.2% Prefer not to answer 4.8% 42.0% 41.5% 40.0% 20 38.7% (n=234), more than 18 per cent described the interactions as distrustfulMissing and answer more than 30.8% 1% 22.9% a third were neutral. People who saw KNU soldiers frequently were almost twice as 18.9% 0 20 40 60 80 100 % 0 likely (83 per cent) to describe their interactions with them as friendly or civil and Very often Often Not often Never cordial comparedVery often to those whoOften saw the NotTatmadaw often frequentlyNever and said the same (47 per cent).

% 0% 0% 100 0% 0% 0% The0% negative responses0% among those0% who reported0% seeing armed actors never or rarely 6.5% were likely in some12.9% cases due to negative attitudes in general about that actor – for 17.0% 18.4% 25.0% 35.7% example, Karen people in remote KNU strongholds35.0% tend to be particularly distrusting 80 11.3% of the Tatmadaw,19.4% as well as the DKBA and BGFs, which may be seen as traitors to the 58.3% Karen people or as a distant36.7% threat. In other cases, these people likely had negative 60 38.6% experiences with soldiers of these groups during wartime,83.9% but have seen them rarely 47.2% or never since the ceasefire. 35.0% 50.0% 67.7% 40 6.1%

29.2% 5.0% 20 36.4% 38.8% 24.5% 25.0% 14.3% 8.3% 4.2% 9.7% 0 0% Very often Often Not often Never Very often Often Not often Never 0%

Did not experience violence or abuse % Experienced violence or abuse Fig 3.7 100

80 25% 24% 29% 27% 33% 31% 76% 75% 73% 71% 69% 60 67% 46%

54% 40

0 Total Men Karen Women Over 45 Non-Karen

Under or equal to 45 (personal experiences) Fig 2.33 Fig 3.4

% % Fig 2.33 Fig 3.4 70 100 Female 1.1% 0.9% 1.7% 1.6% Prefer not to answer Male 15.8% % % Don’t know 7060 0.1% Female 100 1.1% 0.9% 1.7% 1.6% Hostile 80 37.3% 1.1% Prefer not to answer Male 15.8% Don’tDistrustful know 50 19.4% 60 0.1% Neutral Fig 3.2 % 67.7% 68.4% Hostile 80 37.3% 1.1% 69 Civil and cordial 60 0.7% 70 67 Distrustful 40 65 Fig 2.13 50Other armed actors 12.3% 19.4% 62 Friendly 23.6% 61 Neutral 30% 67.7% 68.4% Prefer not to answer 0.7% 60 Civil and cordial 30 60 40None 40 Friendly 31% 12.3%23.9% 30% 50 23.6% I don’t know 0% 0.4% 20 6.7% 30KNU 40 10.3% 31% 20 23.9%6.8% 39.0% 6.9% GoM 10% 10% 40 0% 7.4% 0.4% 2010 6.7%9.2% 2.1% saferworld · karen peace support18.0% network 10.3% 55 % 1.3%9% 10%1.7% 20 6.8% 30 39.0% 6.9%7.8% 9.9% 10% 10% 0 100 0 1.0% 7.4% 10 1.4% GoM KNU DKBA9.2% BGF 7.8%GoM KNU Mixed 18.0% 2.1% 8.7% (n=1,328) 20(n=1,378) (n= 480) (n= 487) Figure 3.5a9% Quality 10%of interaction vs frequency Figure 3.5b Quality of interaction7.8% vs frequency9.9% 0 Fig 3.5 0 of exposure20% with Tatmadaw soldiers GoM of exposure10 KNU with KNLA DKBAsoldiers BGF 80 GoM KNU23% Mixed (n=1,328) (n=1,378) (n= 480) (n= 487) % 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.2% 0% Fig 3.5 100 1.1% 0.5% 1.9% 0.9%0 1.1% 1.6% Hostile 11.4% Overall Men Women 45 60 14.5% 16.4% % 18.2% 0% 0% 0% Distrustful 38% 0% 23.9% 0.2% 0% 100 1.1% 0.5% 1.9% 0.9% 1.1% Neutral 80 1.6% 41.5% 42.5% Hostile 14.5%45% 11.4% 44.8% Civil or cordial 18.2% 16.4% Distrustful 40 27.2% 23.9% Friendly 33.7% 41.0% Neutral 80 54.5% 41.5% 42.5% 60 44.8% 32.2% Civil or cordial 27.2% 17.5% Friendly 20 33.7% 41.0% 16.0% 33% 54.5% 60 8.3% 25.7% 32.2% 40 13.1%20% 17.5% 55.6% 16.0% 0 15.2% 8.3% 25.7%4.8% 42.0% 41.5% 40.0% Who2040 do you38.7% Who do 13.1%you consider want to 30.8% 22.9% 55.6% as your govern your 18.9%15.2% 4.8% Prefer42.0% not to answer41.5% 40.0% government?20 38.7% area? 0 30.8% Not recorded Very often Often Not often 22.9%Never Very often Often Not often Never 18.9% Very disatisfied Fig 2.33 Disatisfied 0 Very often Often Not often Never Very often SatisfiedOften Not often Never % Figure% 3.5c Quality0% of interaction vs frequency Figure 3.5d0% Quality of interaction vs frequency 70 of100 exposure with0% DKBA soldiers0% 0% 0% of exposure0% withVery satisfied BGF0% soldiers 0% Female Total: 6.5% 17.0%61% 12.9% Male 0% 250% 18.4% 60 % 25.0% 0% 0% 35.7% 0% 0% 0% 0% 35.0% 0% 10080 11.3% 19.4% 4 6.5% 17.0% 12.9% 58.3% 18.4% 50 25.0% 20 35.7% 36.7% 35.0% 80 60 11.3% 19.4% 4 38.6% 83.9% 40 58.3% 47.2% 35.0% 15 36.7% 30% 50.0% 67.7% 4060 6.1% 30 38.6% 83.9% 47.2%31% 35.0% Total: Total: 29.2% 12 25.0% 20% 50.0% 67.7% 10 6.1% 1 20 204019% 36.4% 38.8% 2 24.5% 25.0% 10% 10% 14.3% 29.2%8.3% 5.0% 10 4.2% 8 9.7% 200 36.4% 5 38.8% 6 0% Very often10% 24.5%Often Not often Never Very often Often Not often Never 9% 25.0% 0% 8.3% 4 0 14.3% 9.7% 4.2% 1 1 0GoM KNU Mixed 0 0% Very often Often Not often Never Very often Often Not often Never KNU GoM Village 0% (n=24) (n=12) tract Did not experience violence or abuse authorities % Experienced violence or abuse (n=9) Fig 3.7 Figure100 3.6 Do you fear The pervasiveDid not experience presence violence of or abusemilitary actors can also lead to civilians being punished by engaging with any armed % one for theirExperienced interaction violence or abuse with, or supposedFig 5.8 support for, another. Sixteen per cent of the Fig 3.7 actor10080 due to risk of reprisals25% 24% 29% 27% by another? 33% survey31% respondents said they feared reprisals% from authorities for engaging with other 76% 75% authorities73% (Figure 3.6). These fears are50 particularly widespread GoMduring periods of No data 2%71% 69% 8060 25% 67% 46% 24% 29% 27% 43 KNU Prefer not 33% active31% armed conflict. Given the general reluctance of respondents to complain about to answer 2% 75% 76% 73% 54% 40 71% the69% conduct of authorities, such fears could be more widespread. 6040 67% 46% Yes 16% 54% 30 28 4020I don’t know 18%

200 20 Total Men Karen Women Over 45 No 62% Non-Karen 11 10 0 Under or equal to 45 10 (personal experiences) Total Men Karen Women Over 45 Non-Karen

Under or equal to 45 0 (personal experiences) …bring the …cause beneﬁt of trying problems by to build peace? initiating armed conﬂict?

A landmine victim sits on the floor of his home. Myanmar is one of the most landmine contaminated countries in the world. © Saferworld 56 security, justice and governance in south east myanmar

Civilians forced to carry weapons and supplies for the Tatmadaw in Tanintharyi Region, 1995. Forced portering was the most common form of violence and abuse documented in this survey. © Karen Human Rights Group

3.2 Violence Key findings and abuse n Seventy-one per cent of respondents and 80 per cent of surveyed households had experienced some form of violence or abuse by authorities. In the majority of cases, they had perpetrated by experienced these issues more than once or very regularly. authorities n Corroboration with existing KPSN, UN and other research indicates that the majority of these acts were committed by the Tatmadaw and its proxy forces, as the forms of violence are heavily associated with the state military’s systematic and widespread practices. Other armed actors including the KNU have also committed acts of violence and abuse, but not in a systematic fashion or on a widespread scale. n Portering, forced labour, fleeing home for safety and shootings were the most common forms of violence and abuse experienced. n Out of 20 examined forms of violence and abuse, each one was experienced in 46 of the 72 surveyed villages and 15 were experienced in more than 60 villages. n Men were more likely than women to have experienced almost all types of abuse, but large proportions of women had experienced the majority of abuses. Karen women, however, were more likely to have had to flee home for safety than any other sub-group examined. Existing local research has found concerning levels of sexual violence by authorities, particularly against women; however, this was not included in these questions due to methodological constraints. n Karen households had experienced every form of violence and abuse in higher numbers than non-Karen households, especially issues commonly associated with Tatmadaw clearance operations. n Land grabs and restricted access to services were experienced by near equal proportions of Karen households and non-Karen households.

This section displays high rates of violence and abuse experienced by survey respondents at the hands of authorities. Enumerators listed 20 specific forms of violence and abuse and respondents were asked to state if any had been experienced by them personally, by someone in their household, or by others in their village, either once, more than once, or very regularly. Respondents had the option to not state an answer for any of the questions. As was the case through the entire survey, respondents were informed they could stop the interview at any time. Corroboration with existing KPSN, UN and other research indicates that the majority of these acts were committed by the Tatmadaw and its proxy forces, as most of the forms of violence documented are heavily associated with widespread practices carried out by the state military systematically and under unified command. As noted by the UN Human Rights Council in 2018, ‘For three decades, successive special rapporteurs on the situation of human rights in Myanmar concluded that patterns of human rights violations were widespread and systematic, linked to State and military policy’.57 Other

57 UN Human Rights Council (2018), p 5. See also p 17, which notes that ‘The consistent tactical formula employed by the Tatmadaw exhibits a degree of coordination only possible when all troops are acting under the effective control of a single unified command’. Fig 2.33 Fig 3.4

% % 70 100 Female 1.1% 0.9% 1.7% 1.6% Prefer not to answer Male 15.8% Don’t know 60 0.1% Hostile 80 37.3% 1.1% Distrustful 19.4% 50 Neutral 67.7% 68.4% Civil and cordial 60 0.7% 40 12.3% Friendly 30% 23.6%

30 40 31% 23.9% 0% 0.4% 20 6.7% 10.3% 20 6.8% 39.0% 6.9% 10% 10% 7.4% 10 9.2% 18.0% 2.1% 9% 10% 7.8% 9.9% 0 0 GoM KNU DKBA BGF GoM KNU Mixed (n=1,328) (n=1,378) (n= 480) (n= 487) Fig 3.5

% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.2% 0% 100 1.1% 0.5% 1.9% 0.9% 1.1% 1.6% Hostile 14.5% 11.4% 18.2% 16.4% Distrustful 23.9% Neutral 80 41.5% 42.5% 44.8% Civil or cordial 27.2% Friendly 33.7% 41.0% 54.5% 60 32.2% 17.5% 16.0% 8.3% 25.7% 40 13.1% 55.6% 15.2% 4.8% 42.0% 41.5% 40.0% 20 38.7% 30.8% 22.9% 18.9% 0 Very often Often Not often Never Very often Often Not often Never

% 0% 0% 100 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 6.5% 12.9% 17.0% 18.4% saferworld · karen25.0% peace support network 57 35.7% 35.0% 80 11.3% 19.4% 58.3% armed actors including the KNU have also committed acts of violence and abuse, 36.7% which are60 discussed in more detail below, but not in a systematic fashion or on a 38.6% 83.9% widespread scale. 47.2% 35.0% 50.0% 67.7% 40 6.1% These findings provide a general picture of the extent of violence experienced across the whole of society, but may not directly correspond to29.2% definitions under international 5.0% 36.4% 38.8% humanitarian20 law. They reflect respondents’ own perceptions and categorisations of 24.5% 25.0% their experiences. Additionally, some respondents14.3% may have8.3% spent time as combatants 4.2% 9.7% 0 themselves, and listed experiences of violence from that time here. 0% Very often Often Not often Never Very often Often Not often Never 0%

Figure 3.7 Respondents who personally experienced some form of violence or abuse

Did not experience violence or abuse % Experienced violence or abuse Fig 3.7 100

80 25% 24% 29% 27% 33% 31% 76% 75% 73% 71% 69% 60 67% 46%

54% 40

0 Total Men Karen Women Over 45 Non-Karen

Under or equal to 45 (personal experiences) “More than 71 per cent of More than 71 per cent of the respondents stated having personally experienced at least the respondents stated one form of violence or abuse by an authority, at least once, at some time in their life. having personally Eighty per cent said someone in their household had had such an experience (Figure experienced at least one 3.7). The full list of forms of violence and abuse is shown in Figure 3.8 and shows that form of violence or abuse by large proportions of these survivors had experienced severe violations of their rights. an authority, at least once, 58 at some time in their life. In 69 per cent of responses, respondents said that they had experienced the abuse Eighty per cent said someone more than once or very regularly, as analysed further in section 3.3. These figures are in their household had had extremely high given the method of random sampling used, even in a context with such an experience.” such a prolonged experience of war. It should also be noted these do not include the hundreds of thousands of refugees currently in Thailand or other countries, among whom such experiences are likely higher.

People fleeing after their village was attacked by the Tatmadaw in Dooplaya District in February 1997. © Karen Human Rights Group

58 The 2,020 respondents collectively stated 2,382 forms of violence or abuse they had experienced “once” (31 per cent), 2,382 that they had experienced “more than once but not regularly” (46 per cent) and 1,717 that they had experienced “very regularly” (23 per cent). 58 security, justice and governance in south east myanmar

Fig 3.8 % 70 Figure 3.8 Experiences of violence and abuse by authorities among individuals and households (from most to least common) 63 Personal experience 60 Personal or household experience

50 4

42 40 3 36 35 36 32 32 3 30 2 2 2 2 25 24 22 21 2 20 1 1 14 14 15 12 1 1 10 1 6 5 4 4 5 4 5

Portering Shootings Extortion Landmines Forced labour Violent threats Land grabbing Forced relocation Ethnic discrimination Summary executions RestrictionDestruction of movement of property Religious discrimination Burning/destroying villages Having to ﬂee home for safety Restricting access Tortureto services and physical violence DestructionAttacks of religious of schools, buildings clinics and staff Forced recruitment (including children) Fig 3.9

80 Among the 20 forms of violence and abuse listed, the most common experienced by

1 respondents themselves were portering (the carrying of military equipment for military 70 6 6 66 65 operations), forced64 labour,64 having64 to63 flee63 home for safety and shootings (see box 3.2 for 61 6 60 descriptions). The proportion of men who stated incidences (75 per cent) was greater than the proportion of women (67 per cent) (Figure 3.7). Karen54 54 households54 were 50 significantly more affected than non-Karen households, at 76 per cent compared46 46 with 54 per cent. These differences are all discussed in more detail below. 40

30 BOX 3.2 Description of key forms of violence and abuse 20 “Among the 20 forms of To gain a comprehensive understanding of the forms of violence and abuse discussed here, violence and abuse listed, the readers should refer to the ample documentation by the KHRG among other key sources over 59 10 most common experienced recent decades. Importantly, most of the forms of violence and abuse listed here have been by respondents themselves consistently found to be committed by the Tatmadaw on a systematic and widespread scale, sometimes alongside local proxy militia (such as BGFs and formerly the DKBA). The KNU has also 0 were portering, forced been implicated in certain forms of abuse but these have not been systematic and have not labour,Portering havingShootings to flee home included campaignsExtortion of targeted or regularLandmines violence. Short descriptions of some of the most Forced labour Violent threats Land grabbing for safety and shootings. important issues are providedForced relocation here: Ethnic discriminationSummary executions Karen householdsDestruction of property were Restriction of movement Religious discrimination Burning/destroying villages Restricting access to services Torture andHaving physical to ﬂee violence home for safety‘Portering’, the systematic use of civilians by the Tatmadaw and its proxy forces to carry military significantly more affected DestructionAttacks of religiouson schools, buildings clinics and staff equipment, toForced serve recruitment as guides (including or to children) provide human shields to deter ambushes from EAOs, has than non-Karen households, been well-documented over the decades.60 Such practices made international headlines in 2011 Fig 3.13 % at 76 per cent compared for a GoM programme of using prisoners as military porters.61 Yet, far more regularly, local 70 with 54 per cent.” civilians are used for these purposes, sometimes for weeks at a time, often involving significant 63 violence and intimidation and causing severe health problems or even deaths. The KNU has also Personal experience 60 utilised civilians as porters, sometimes making it a compulsory duty during conflict periods. While this presents risks to personal safety it has not been associatedPersonal or withhousehold severe experience violence and intimidation. Therefore, although the nature of portering used by the Tatmadaw and its proxies 50 is different from that of the KNU, according to an enumerator team leader, the reason this issue 4 is so common is because “all sides do it”. 42 40 3 36 36 35 32 32 3 30 2 2 2 25 23 24 21 22 59 For a detailed look at local2 experiences and responses to abuse, see KHRG (2007), KHRG (2008), KHRG (2009), KHRG (2014), 20 1 KHRG (2017), among the many1 other reports and raw testimony provided on the KHRG website. For a legal analysis of Tatmadaw counter-insurgency in the late-2000s, see15 IHLC (2014). See also Amnesty International (2008) and Amnesty 14 13 International (2018), as well as a collation of UN human12 rights documentation in ‘Documents on Myanmar’ collated by the 1 1 1 10 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. 60 As noted in a 2016 UN High Commissioner for Human Rights report, “There are6 also ongoing5 reports5 of the5 use by both the military and ethnic armed groups of civilians as porters, sentries, guides and human shields”4 (UNHCHR4 4 2016, A/HRC/31/71 para. 52). 0 61 IRIN 2011.

Portering Shootings Extortion Landmines Forced labour Violent threats Land grabbing Forced relocation Ethnic discrimination Summary executions Destruction of propertyRestriction of movement Religious discrimination Having to ﬂee home for safetyBurning/destruction of villagesTorture and physicalRestricting violence access to services Destruction of religious buildings Forced recruitment (incl. under-18s) Attacks on schools, clinics and staff saferworld · karen peace support network 59

‘Forced labour’ can also take on many forms in this context. Under military rule, it was routine for the GoM to conscript forced labour for public, military or commercial purposes, and these practices continue to some extent today. EAOs also take civilians for labour duty on a regular basis in some areas, as do some religious actors or other people of influence. The community spirit and sense of collective responsibility that exists in rural Myanmar is regularly exploited. Forced displacement is covered here under a number of forms of violence and abuse. ‘Fleeing home for safety’ suggests a choice was made, but in response to an imminent threat. The categories ‘forced relocation’ and ‘burning or destruction of villages’ refer to systematic Tatmadaw practices whereby populations in places labelled as ‘black areas’ are targeted and either ordered to relocate to specific sites under GoM-control, or simply have their villages burned down to force them to flee, often deeper into EAO territories or across international borders, as part of four cuts campaigns (see box 3.1). But forced relocation also includes people being moved for development purposes or for another reason on orders of authorities. ‘Shootings’ and ‘destruction of property’ both take place in a range of contexts, but are primarily enacted by the Tatmadaw, as part of ‘four cuts’ operations. The full description of destruction of property in the survey questionnaire included ‘food, tools and livestock’, all of which are regularly rendered unusable during clearance operations as a means to clear out communities or destabilise the local food supply. Clarifications with enumerator teams confirmed that interviewees understood a personal experience of a shooting to refer to the person being present when shots were fired at them, at others with them or generally in their direction while fleeing their village or area. Most of these were said to have taken place during Tatmadaw attacks on villages or clearance patrols in forested areas where people were foraging or hiding. The Tatmadaw sometimes designates certain areas as ‘shoot on sight’ zones, where all remaining persons can be considered military targets. A number of documented cases, however, may have involved shootings when respondents had served as soldiers. ‘Summary executions’ have also been carried out by all sides, particularly when someone is suspected of being an informant, or sometimes as a means to strike fear into local communities and establish order. KHRG has reported that: “During the conflict the vast majority of indiscriminate and extrajudicial killings were perpetrated by the Tatmadaw, with some incidences by the DKBA [the so-called Buddhist faction] and BGF, with the intent to oppress Karen civilians, to punish supporters of the KNU and to create widespread fear”.62 ‘Landmines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs)’ have been used regularly by armed actors on all sides of the conflict and, in some cases, by communities themselves.63 The Tatmadaw uses landmines, manufactured in-country or imported from abroad, which can remain active for decades. They have regularly been used to restrict civilians from returning to cleared villages or farms or to stop them fleeing to certain areas. EAOs extensively use IEDs to defend military facilities or restrict Tatmadaw movements. The KNU has an official policy to ensure local civilians are always informed of the locations of mines, but more research is needed to determine how systematically this practice is enforced. Clarifications with enumerator teams confirmed that respondents understood a personal experience of landmines or IEDS to involve detonation while they were present. Many respondents had been left with injuries, and in numerous cases had seen companions maimed or killed during these incidences.

Day Law Pya village in Hpa- An District was burned down by the DKBA in 2002. © Karen Human Rights Group

62 KHRG 2017, p 84. 63 A survey published by Danish Church Aid (Cathcart et al. 2016) found that 22.5 per cent of respondents across south east Myanmar found that “landmines keep the community safe” and that five per cent said they placed landmines around their settlement to “protect village/ward assets”, pp 38–39. See also KHRG (2018), pp 49–52. 60 security, justice and governance in south east myanmar

Youth leaving school for the day in Ei Htu Hta displaced persons camp. While humanitarian funding for these camps in the south east are drying up, people do not feel secure enough to return. In many cases, people have nowhere to return to as their land has been taken, and they have little faith that the peace process will lead to Fig 3.8 % 70 sustainable peace. © Karen Peace Support 63 Network Personal experience 60 Personal or household experience

50 4

42 40 3 36 35 36 32 32 3 30 2 2 2 2 25 24 The 20 types of violence The 20 types of violence22 and abuse were spread out widely across the 72 surveyed “ 21 2 20 and abuse were spread 1 villages (see Figure 3.9).1 Experiences of portering were reported in all but one village, out widely across the while forced labour, shootings14 and14 destruction of property were experienced15 in all 12 72 surveyed villages. 1 1 10 but two. Every abuse was experienced 1in at least 46 villages (64 per cent), and 15 were Experiences of portering 6 5 experienced in more than 60 villages (83 per cent). There4 were4 5some4 5 notable differences were reported in all but one between KNU and GoM-controlled areas, however, as discussed in section 3.3. 0village, while forced labour, shootings and destruction of In all 20 forms of violence and abuse, except land grabbing, personal experiences Portering Shootings Extortion Landmines Forced labour Violent threats Land grabbing property were experienced were statedForced more relocation frequently by men than by women (Figure 3.10), but only by narrow Ethnic discrimination Summary executions RestrictionDestruction of movement of property 64 Religious discrimination in all but two. Burning/destroyingmargins in villages most cases. Having to ﬂee home for safety ” Restricting access Tortureto services and physical violence DestructionAttacks of religious of schools, buildings clinics and staff Forced recruitment (including children) Fig 3.9 Figure 3.9 Number of villages where respondents stated that they, their household or someone in their village had experienced violence or abuse 80

1 70 6 6 66 65 64 64 64 63 63 61 6 60 54 54 54

50 46 46

Portering Shootings Extortion Landmines Forced labour Violent threats Land grabbing Forced relocation Ethnic discriminationSummary executions Destruction of property Restriction of movement Religious discrimination Burning/destroying villages Restricting access to services Torture andHaving physical to ﬂee violence home for safety DestructionAttacks of religiouson schools, buildings clinics and staff Forced recruitment (including children) Fig 3.13 % 70

63 Personal experience 60 Personal or household experience

50 4 64 The differential displayed in Figure 3.10 shows the difference between the percentage of surveyed men and the percentage 42 of surveyed women who said they had experienced each abuse. 40 3 36 36 35 32 32 3 30 2 2 2 25 24 23 22 21 2 20 1 1 15 14 12 13 1 1 1 10 6 4 5 4 5 4 5

Figure 3.10 Prevalence of experiences of violence or abuse among men and women (in order of differential) Fig 3.10 % % 60 3Ò Men 54 Women Differential 50 23 25 43 Differential 40 20 36 33 16 32 32 31 3 2 3 30 14 2 15 24 25 21 21 Proportion of respondents Proportion 2 20 2 1 2 10 15 13 6 6 13 11 1 1 5 4 10 5 5 3 5 5 5 2 3 1. 1.6 4 1.4 1.3 4 . . .2 0 0 .3

Portering Shootings ExtortionLandmines Violent threatsForced labour Land grabbing -5 Forced relocation Ethnic discrimination Restriction of movement Destruction of property Religious discrimination Torture and physical violence Restricting access to services Had to ﬂeeBurning/destroying home for safety villages Attacks of schools, clinicsDestruction and staff of religious buildings

Fig 3.11 % % 80 40 BOX 3.3 Gender-based violence against women Non-Karen (n=441) Karen (n=1,579) 70 6 Gender-based violence against women in the context of armed conflict in Myanmar has Differentialbeen 35 well-documented by the UN, and by local and international human rights organisations for 65 60 decades. Abuses committed by the Tatmadaw have been most prominent, often in the context 30 26 of four cuts operations or as a result of high levels of militarisation and impunity for offending 51 5 66 Differential 50 25 soldiers, though other armed actors have also been implicated. 25 41 41 21 21 KPSN member41 organisations have documented such violence regularly in Karen conflict areas, 40 particularly prior3 to the 2012 ceasefire, but also since. In 2004, the KWO reported that: “rapes 20 32 16 16 33 3 [by the Tatmadaw]15 occur as part of a strategy designed to terrorise and subjugate the Karen Proportion of households Proportion 30 people,2 to2 completely destroy their culture and communities”.2 67 Analysing reports of 16 15 13 12 24 incidences of GBV committed between the January 2012 ceasefire and March 2016, the KHRG 21 1 20 1 10 1 found that despite signs of decreased prevalence, 16 “women remain vulnerable to GBV 15 14 13 14 12 committed by a range of powerful11 actors,11 including soldiers [from the Tatmadaw, BGFs, DKBA13 11 11 5 5 10 5 4 5 and KNU] … as well as village6 tract leaders, officials from the [GoM]6 and ordinary6 community6 4 3 3 members”.68 1 1 2 1 1 0 0

Portering Shootings ExtortionLandmines Violent threats Forced labour Land grabbing Forced relocationFor a number of reasons, however, it should not be concluded that men have suffered Ethnic discrimination Summary executions Destruction of property violence by authorities more than womenRestriction overall. of movement First, this dataReligious does discrimination not include Had to ﬂee home for safety Burning/destroying villages Torture and physical violence Restricting access to services DestructionAttacks of religious of schools, buildings clinics and staff specificForced recruitment cases (including of sexual children) violence or other forms of GBV, which existing research by KPSN member organisations and others has found to be prevalent in Karen and other conflict-affected areas of Myanmar and to women more than men (see box 3.3). Fig 1.14 % % 100 50 4 Respondents were not given specific examples of GBV in this list ofWomen abuses, due to 6 the heightened risks of social desirability bias, fear of reprisal, stigmaMen and potential Differential69 80 5 re-traumatisation associated with such forms of abuse and their disclosure. These40 6 factors also mean that survivors may have been less likely to report other forms of

60 violence and abuse where they had concurred with GBV, as is common in Karen30 conflict4 areas.70 41 2 43 2 3 Differential 40 35 20 33 32 14 3 12 24 24 1 1 22 1 21 20 10 5 65 Key recent contributions include Women’s League of Burma (2016); KWO (2004); KWO (2007); KHRG (2006); KHRG (2016); 0 SWAN (2002); Gender Equality Network (2015); UN Population Fund (UNFPA) (2017); Amnesty International (2018),0 In formal Experienced Votedpp 88–95;for HumanFeel GoM Rights WatchFeel (HRW) KNU (2017);Don’t UN Flash know Report Would (2017); prefer Redress Would & Institute prefer for InternationalDon’t know Criminal work violence theirInvestigations village keeps (2018); the and Internationalkeeps the Rescuewhich Committee (2016).the GoMSee alsoto ‘Documentsthe KNU to on Myanmar’which collated by the UN or abuse leaderOffice of the communityHigh Commissioner community for Human Rights.authority handle justice handle justice authority most safe most safe keeps the issues issues they would -10 66 Redress & Instituteand secure for Internationaland secure Criminal Investigationscommunity (2018), pp 3–4, p 9. prefer to 67 KWO (2004), p 6. most safe deal with 68 KHRG (2016), pp 74–75. secure justice issues -20 69 These factors are all discussed in the context of collecting such data in Myanmar in Redress & Institute for International Criminal Investigations (2018), pp 31–32. As noted by KHRG (2006), p 48, “Traditional notions of propriety lead many rape victims to remain silent about the abuse”. 70 The KWO has found that: “the rape of women is often committed in conjunction with other human rights violations-30 such as beating, mutilation, torture, murder, forced labour, denial of rights to food, water and shelter, and denial of the right to legal redress”. See KWO (2004), p 6. In other contexts, Saferworld has found a high correlation of sexual abuse and forced recruitment. 3 -40

-50

-60 62 security, justice and governance in south east myanmar

“The most common forms Some forms of violence and abuse are experienced more often by men than by women. of abuse stated by women This is likely because men are more likely to have been combatants or targeted on such were, in order of prevalence, suspicions or are more likely to be selected for duties involving hard labour. Regardless, having to flee home for safety most of these forms of abuse were also stated by large numbers of women. (31 per cent), portering (30 per cent), forced labour The most common forms of abuse stated by women were, in order of prevalence, having (29 per cent) and shootings to flee home for safety (31 per cent), portering (30 per cent), forced labour (29per cent) (27 per cent). The most and shootings (27 per cent). The most common forms of abuse stated by men were Fig 3.10 common% forms of abuse % 60 3Ò portering (54 per cent), forced labour (43 per cent), violent threatsMen (36 per cent) and stated by men were portering 54 Women shootings (33 per cent). Land grabbing was reported by a slightlyDifferential higher proportion (54 per50 cent), forced23 labour 25 (43 per cent), violent threats43 of women (10.2 per cent) than men (9.8 per cent), and is also experienced differently Differential 40 20 (36 per cent) and36 shootings by each gender, as discussed in section 3.3. The issues displaying the largest differences 33 16 32 32 31 (333 per cent).2 between genders3 were portering, violent threats, forced labour and restricted movement 30 ”14 2 15 24 (see Figure 3.10).25 21 21 Proportion of respondents Proportion 2 20 2 1 2 10 15 13Karen households were found13 to have experienced every form of violence and in 6 6 11 5 1 1 10 higher numbers than4 non-Karen households (Figure 3.11). Karen households5 were far 5 3 5 5 5 2 3 1. 1.6 4 1.4 1.3 4 more likely to have experienced issues commonly associated. . with.2 Tatmadaw clearance 0 0 operations, such as having to flee home, property (including livestock.3 and food) being Portering Shootings ExtortionLandmines Violent threatsForced labour Land grabbing -5 destroyed, violent threats, burningForced relocation or destroying of villages, and forced relocation. Ethnic discrimination Restriction of movement Destruction of property Religious discrimination Torture and physical violence Restricting access to services Had to ﬂeeBurning/destroying home for safety villages Figure 3.11 PrevalenceAttacks of schools, of experiences clinicsDestruction and staff of religious of buildings violence among Karen and non-Karen households

Fig 3.11 % (in order of differential) % 80 40 Non-Karen (n=441) Karen (n=1,579) 70 6 Differential 35

60 30 26 51 5 Differential 50 25 25 41 41 21 21 41 40 3 20 32 16 16 33 3 15 Proportion of households Proportion 30 2 2 2 15 13 12 24 21 1 20 1 10 1 16 15 14 13 14 12 11 11 13 11 11 5 5 10 5 4 5 6 6 6 6 4 3 3 1 1 2 1 1 0 0

Portering Shootings ExtortionLandmines Violent threats Forced labour Land grabbing Forced relocation Ethnic discrimination Summary executions Destruction of property Restriction of movement Religious discrimination Had to ﬂee home for safety Burning/destroying villages Torture and physical violence Restricting access to services DestructionAttacks of religious of schools, buildings clinics and staff Forced recruitment (including children)

Fig 1.14 % % 100 50 4 Women 6 Men Differential 80 5 40 6

60 30 4 41 2 43 2 3 Differential 40 35 20 33 32 14 3 12 24 24 1 1 22 1 21 20 10 5

0 0 In formal Experienced Voted for Feel GoM Feel KNU Don’t know Would prefer Would prefer Don’t know work violence their village keeps the keeps the which the GoM to the KNU to which or abuse leader community community authority handle justice handle justice authority most safe most safe keeps the issues issues they would -10 and secure and secure community prefer to most safe deal with secure justice issues -20

-30

3 -40

-50

-60 % Fig 2.40 78 80 75 GoM 70 KNU I don’t know 60 50 saferworld · karen peace support network 63 50 44 40 36 37 31 30 28 This is likely because Karen people are28 more likely to be suspected of supporting the 22 24 KNU and so are targeted18 during four cuts campaigns.19 Karen were also were 20 15 significantly more likely to have been used as porters, but this was still experienced 10 6 5 by2 more than 502 per cent of non-Karen households. Karen households were more 0 Men in Women in thanMen in three timesWomen as likely in to haveMen in experiencedWomen forced in recruitment, almost certainly GoM-controlled GoM-controlled KNU-controlled KNU-controlled mix-controlled mix-controlled areas areas predominantlyareas areas by Karen EAOs,areas including areasthe KNU. Land grabs and restricted access

Fig 3.2 % to services were experienced by only slightly higher proportions of Karen households 70 69 67 65 than non-Karen households. 61 62 60 Examining gendered and ethnic differences together finds that Karen men experienced 50 almost all forms of violence and abuse more than any other sub-group (Figure 3.12).

40 The majority of Karen male respondents (57 per cent) had been forced to porter for an authority at some time in their life. However, Karen women were slightly more likely to 30 have had to flee home than Karen men, while other issues linked with forced displace- 20 ment – burning of villages and forced relocation – were found to be near equally as

10 common among Karen men and Karen women.

0 Overall Men WomenFigure 3.1245 of violence and abuse (by ethnicity and gender) Fig 3.12 % Non-Karen men (n=220) 60 5 Karen men (n=787) Non-Karen women (n=221) Karen women (n=787) 50 45 42 40 3 3 3 35 35 33 33 3 3 30 2 26 25 24 24 24 23 22 2 20 1 1 1 1 16 14 14 11 11 1 11 11 11 10 1 6 5 4 3 .5 0 Burning Violent Destroy Flee home Forced Landmine Torture Portering Shootings Forced Extortion Land grab village threats property for safety displace- labour ment Fig 3.14 % 80 GoM-controlled 72 KNU-controlled 70 Mix-controlled 60 58 53 Key findings 49 50 3.3 Before and 44 43 41 n Before 2012, the most common forms of violence and abuse were portering, forced labour, after the 38 40 shootings, destruction of property and fleeing home for safety, affecting between 35 and ceasefires 63 per cent of surveyed households. 30 28 28 26 25 n For all of these abuses (and most others) the majority of survivors said they had happened 20 more than once or very regularly.14 12 13 9 10 10 n Portering and forced labour were extremely regular before 2012, especially in mix-controlled areas. Since 2012, they have continued, with one2 in 87 households experiencing portering 0 during this period. Portering Forced labour Forced Burning/ Destruction Landmines relocationn destroying of property Forty-three perof villages cent of surveyed households in KNU-controlled areas had experienced the burning or destruction of villages by authorities, almost certainly by the Tatmadaw and local % proxy forces.% This and other abuses associated with Tatmadaw’s four cuts operations were Fig 3.16 & 17 3.0 most prevalent60 in KNU-controlled areas. 2.68 53 n Since 2012, one in 47 surveyed households had experienced land grabs, making it the most 2.5 2.36 50 46 prevalent form of violence or abuse in this period. 2.0 40 n Forty-two of 43 land grab cases were in GoM-controlled or mix-controlled areas, where the GoM and mainstream business actors have gained increased access since 2012. 1.5 30

19 1.0 20

0.5 10 0.24

0.0 0 GoM- KNU- Mix- GoM- KNU- Mix- controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled 64 security, justice and governance in south east myanmar

Respondents were asked to specify whether their experiences of violence and abuse took place before or after the 2012 KNU ceasefires. Although violence and abuses have continued since the 2012 ceasefires, some types have become less frequent, while others have become more visible. There is evidence from other research that the overall prevalence of violence and abuses has decreased,71 but the data here was not designed to reflect that. Incidence totals from the two timeframes are not directly comparable, as pre-2012 was the respondent’s entire lifetime and post-2012 was just six years. However, comparisons can be made between pre-2012 trends and post-2012 trends. For example, while the most common issues pre-2012 largely mirrored the overall totals shown above, other issues have become more prominent since 2012 – such as land grabbing and forced recruitment (both analysed below).

Before 2012: targeted Understanding past experiences of violence and abuse among conflict-affected violence and everyday populations is crucial to building peace. These experiences have likely left survivors exploitation with significant trauma and greatly impact their political perspectives, their opinions of authorities and their confidence in ongoing peace negotiations. A review of pre-2012 violence and abuse in south east Myanmar is also informative for understanding ongoing conflicts elsewhere in the country, and the rare incidents of renewed conflict in the south east. If the ceasefires with the KNU and other Karen EAOs break down, many of these issues will likely become commonplace once more.

Table 3.1 Frequency of violence and abuse experiences (pre-2012)

Me My household In my village

Once More Very Once More Very Once More Very than regularly than regularly than regularly once once once

Portering 8% 19% 14% 8% 30% 18% 3% 40% 30%

Forced labour 6% 19% 11% 7% 23% 12% 4% 29% 19%

Had to flee home for safety 12% 13% 7% 12% 14% 7% 11% 18% 10%

Forced relocation 9% 8% 3% 10% 10% 3% 9% 12% 5%

Burning/destroying of villages 11% 8% 2% 12% 10% 2% 14% 14% 5%

Destruction of property, food, 8% 14% 6% 9% 18% 7% 4% 26% 13% tools, livestock

Shootings 6% 17% 6% 9% 19% 7% 8% 34% 10%

Summary executions N/A N/A N/A 3% 2% 1% 6% 9% 2%

Torture or grievous bodily harm 4% 5% 1% 6% 9% 2% 5% 23% 6%

Violent threats 6% 11% 6% 5% 14% 6% 4% 20% 9%

Landmines 2% 2% 1% 3% 4% 2% 8% 15% 4%

Table 3.1 demonstrates the high regularity with which many of these forms of abuse were experienced by respondents, or by others in their households or villages. Portering was the most widespread and most regular form of violence and abuse before 2012, experienced by 63 per cent of surveyed households and 42 per cent of individuals during that period (see Figure 3.13). Fourteen per cent of all respondents had been used for portering very regularly and 19 per cent had been used more than once (see Table 3.1). Thirty per cent of respondents said that people in their village had been used for portering very regularly during this period, and 40 per cent said people in their village had been used more than once. This indicates systematic exploitation of civilians for military purposes. Forced labour showed similar trends. Portering and forced labour were most common in mix-controlled areas, which fits with existing research by KPSN members, including the KHRG. The KHRG documented heavy

71 KHRG (2014) and KHRG (2017). Fig 3.8 % 70

63 Personal experience 60 Personal or household experience

50 4

42 40 3 36 35 36 32 32 3 30 2 2 2 2 25 24 22 21 2 20 1 1 14 14 15 12 1 1 10 1 6 5 4 4 5 4 5

1 70 6 6 66 65 64 64 64 63 63 61 6 60 54 54 54

50 46 46

saferworld karen peace support network 0 · 65

Portering Shootings Extortion Landmines Forced labour Violent threats Land grabbing exploitation of populationsForced relocation in areas that were partially taken by the Tatmadaw and the Ethnic discriminationSummary executions Destruction of property DKBA duringRestriction the late-1990sof movement and 2000s, which includeReligious most discrimination of the areas found to be Torture and physical violenceBurning/destroying villages Restricting access to services Having to ﬂee home for safety 72 under mixed control in this study. DestructionAttacks of religiouson schools, buildings clinics and staff Forced recruitment (including children) Fig 3.13 % 70 Figure 3.13 Respondents and households that experienced each abuse before 2012 (ordered by prevalence) 63 Personal experience 60 Personal or household experience

50 4

42 40 3 36 36 35 32 32 3 30 2 2 2 25 24 23 22 21 2 20 1 1 15 14 12 13 1 1 1 10 6 4 5 4 5 4 5

“Experiences of forced Experiences of forced displacement, including fleeing home for safety, having one’s displacement, including village burned down or destroyed, or being forcibly relocated, were experienced more fleeing home for safety, than once or very regularly by notable portions of surveyed respondents and house- having one’s village burned holds (Table 3.1). Eight per cent of respondents had had their village burned down down or destroyed, or being forcibly relocated, were more than once, and eight per cent had been forcibly relocated, demonstrating the experienced more than once pervasive impact of the Tatmadaw’s four cuts strategy in the region. Thirteen per cent or very regularly by notable of all respondents had personally had to flee more than once. Indeed, during conflict, portions of surveyed entire communities living in areas designated as ‘black areas’ by the Tatmadaw would respondents and households. regularly have to flee and hide in the forest or would find a new place to settle only to Eight per cent of respondents face new insecurity there. Fourteen per cent of respondents had had their property, had had their village burned food, tools or livestock destroyed more than once; 39 per cent said this had happened down more than once, and in their village more than once or very regularly. As noted above, such attacks on basic eight per cent had been essentials are heavily associated with Tatmadaw ‘clearance operations’. In contrast with forcibly relocated, demonstrating the pervasive forced labour and portering, these counter-insurgency-related abuses were most impact of the Tatmadaw’s prevalent in KNU-controlled areas, where 43 per cent of surveyed households had four cuts strategy in had their villages burned down or destroyed and 49 per cent had had their property the region.” destroyed (Figure 3.14). Violent acts committed by authorities were also common before 2012 (Table 3.1). Twenty-nine per cent of respondents had personally experienced shootings, including 17 per cent who had experienced them more than once. Thirty-four per cent said shootings had happened in their village more than once and ten per cent said they had happened in their village very regularly. Seven per cent of respondents said that a member of their household had been summarily executed at some time before 2012, amounting to one in 14 households. One in 41 respondents (2.43 per cent) said this had happened more than once and 11 per cent of respondents said that summary executions had happened either more than once or very regularly in their village. Ten per cent of all respondents had been tortured or severely harmed physically, while 23 per cent had been violently threatened. Nine per cent of respondents said that violent threats were very regular in their village.

72 In particular, see KHRG (2007) and KHRG (2006). See also, KHRG (2002); KHRG (1998); KHRG (2008); KHRG (2009); The Border Consortium (2002 to 2014); Amnesty International (2008). % Fig 2.40 78 80 75 GoM 70 KNU I don’t know 60 50 50 44 40 36 37 31 30 28 28 22 24 18 19 20 15

10 6 5 2 2 0 Men in Women in Men in Women in Men in Women in GoM-controlled GoM-controlled KNU-controlled KNU-controlled mix-controlled mix-controlled areas areas areas areas areas areas

Fig 3.2 % 70 69 67 65 61 62 60

0 Overall Men Women 45 Fig 3.12 % Non-Karen men (n=220) 60 5 Karen men (n=787) Non-Karen women (n=221) Karen women (n=787) 50 45 42 40 3 3 3 35 35 33 33 3 3 30 2 26 25 24 24 24 23 22 2 20 1 1 1 1 16 14 14 11 11 1 11 11 11 10 1 6 5 4 3 66 security, justice and governance in south east myanmar .5 0 Burning Violent Destroy Flee home Forced Landmine Torture Portering Shootings Forced Extortion Land grab village threats property for safety displace- labour Figure 3.14 Surveyed households in each typement of territory that experienced selected abuses Fig 3.14 % 80 GoM-controlled 72 KNU-controlled 70 Mix-controlled 60 58 53 49 50 44 43 41 40 38

30 28 28 26 25

20 14 12 13 9 10 10 2 0 Portering Forced labour Forced Burning/ Destruction Landmines relocation destroying of property of villages

% % Fig 3.16 & 17 3.0 Landmine and IED incidents were most prevalent60 in KNU-controlled areas (13 per cent) 2.68 53 and mix-controlled areas (ten per cent) – where the Tatmadaw, EAOs and communities 2.5 2.36 50 46 themselves all actively use such devices – compared with GoM-controlled areas 2.0 (two per cent) (Figure 3.14). Six per cent of respondents40 (one in 17) and nine per cent 1.5 of households (one in 11) directly experienced30 landmine or IED incidents, while 15 per

cent of respondents said that others in their village had experienced19 such incidents 1.0 20 more than once. 0.5 10 0.24

0.0 0 GoM- KNU- Mix- GoM- KNU- Mix- Since 2012: Pervasive Sincecontrolled the 2012 ceasefires,controlled controlledmost violence and abuses controlleddirectly associatedcontrolled withcontrolled the land grabs and Tatmadaw counter-insurgency have been greatly reduced, while others have become ongoing abuse more prevalent. Broader GoM reforms, and a period of relative stability under the Thein Sein government, greatly reduced the abuses resulting from exploitation and arbitrary mistreatments carried out by the Tatmadaw and its proxy militia forces. Other issues have become more prominent, either because they have actually increased or simply because they make up a larger proportion of experienced abuses (Figure 3.15). The levels of ongoing insecurity demonstrate that the conditions are not yet in place for refugee repatriation to take place voluntarily and in safety and dignity.

Figure 3.15 Number of respondents and households that experienced each abuse since 2012 (ordered by prevalence) Fig 3.15 No. 50

43 Personal experience 40 Personal or household experience 34

30 25 24 23

20 1 1 1 1 14 14 14 12 13 13 1 11 1 1 10 6 6 5 5 5 4 2 1 1 0

Portering Shootings Extortion Landmines Land grabbingForced labour Forced relocation Violent threats Ethnic discrimination Summary executions Restriction of movement Religious discriminationDestruction of property Had to ﬂee home for safety Restricting access to services Burning/destructionTorture and of villagesphysical violence Destruction of religious buildings Forced recruitment (incl. under-18s) Attacks on schools, clinics and staff

Fig 4.8 % 60 GoM 56 KNU

44 44

40 3 3 34

30 2 2 2

22 22 20 1 16 15 Proportion of all barriers listed of all barriers Proportion 12 1 1 10 6 5 6 2 2 0

Other High costs Time consuming Language Fearbarriers of insecurity

Lack of personalLong distance connection to authorities Nobody to help with seeking Lackjustice of trustLack inof thetrustDistrust authority’s in authority’s of the will individual capacity in charge Negative past experiences with authority Lack of information on the authority’s mandate

% Fig 4.11 30 2. 41

20 1. 26

13.6 15 2

.5 .5 10 14 14 Proportion of all documented cases Proportion 6. 6.1 1 4. 4. 3.4 5 2. 2. 5 4 4 1.4 2 . 0

Adultery Black magic Land disputes Rape or sexual abuse Land grab by authorities Domestic disputes/violence Drug or alcohol-relatedDisagreements problems concerning debts Physical abuse/humanDon’t know/Prefer trafﬁcking not to answer Theft, robbery, destruction of property Other abuse/problem created by authorities Murder or arbitrary arrest/abduction of a loved one Other abuse/problem created by community members saferworld · karen peace support network 67

“Since the 2012 ceasefires, The most striking change is land grabbing becoming the most common form of violence most violence and abuses and abuse, having been the 14th most common before 2012 (Figure 3.15).73 A total of directly associated with the 43 respondents (2.1 per cent) from across 20 villages said they or someone in their Tatmadaw counter-insurgency household had suffered a land grab since 2012. In other words, one in 47 respondents’ have been greatly reduced, households had experienced a land grab in the past six years. Given the limited time- while others have become frame in question, this is a significant number of people to have experienced such a more prevalent, in particular devastating blow to their livelihoods due to powerful interests. Land grabs were said to land grab cases. ” have taken place in 30 of the 72 of the surveyed villages.74 Other forms of violence and abuse have also continued since 2012, including forced labour (one in 81 households), forced recruitment (one in 84 households) and portering (one in 87 households) (see percentages in Figure 3.14).

BOX 3.4 Contested land governance Land management and ownership are inextricably linked to conflict. Successive central governments have sought to extend state control over the country’s land and natural resources, a strategy that supports the broader goal to defeat EAOs and consolidate a centralised system of governance. Current GoM land-related legal frameworks, provided in the 2008 Constitution and in laws promulgated from the colonial era through to 2015, make all land the property of the state and subject to centralised management and taxation, while essentially legalising certain forms of land grabs. Laws from 2012, in particular, have aided the dispossession of small holder farmers from their lands and livelihoods, while simultaneously promoting land as an investment opportunity for large companies. A 2015 study by the Land in Our Hands network found the Tatmadaw was the leading entity responsible for land confiscations, accounting for 47.7 per cent of all land confiscations surveyed, while government departments were involved in 18.8 per cent, and companies in 13.9 per cent. Similarly, this KAP survey found all but 1 out of 43 land grab cases documented were in areas where the GoM had full or partial control. GoM land-related policies and practices contradict the existing land administration systems developed by the KNU and Karen communities. The revised 2015 KNU Land Policy focuses on community-based decision making, allowing people to own and use land according to their traditional and customary land management systems.

Land confiscation has likely increased in prominence as the relative stability of the ceasefires has created significant opportunities for outside companies to conduct business. As the KHRG explained in a 2018 report, “the bilateral ceasefires of 2012 and the succeeding Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement of 2015 have ushered in a period of intensifying investment. Infrastructure development and natural resource extraction are on the rise in south east Myanmar. This has resulted in an increase in land disputes, as rural populations come face-to-face with local and international companies who intend to make a profit with little regard for the needs and grievances of the local communities,” 75 and that “the development of south east Myanmar has resulted in an upsurge in land confiscations, severely undermining the livelihoods of rural communities.”76 Companies have benefited from increased transport, construction of roads, better access to natural resource deposits and, in some cases, contracts linked to peacebuilding funds. New finance has also become available due to foreign investors entering Myanmar since sanctions were lifted in 2012. One prominent example of this new web of cooperation is the ongoing construction of a section of ‘The Asia Highway’, running from Myawaddy on the Thailand border to Hpa-an, the official capital of Kayin State. The road has been hailed as a symbol for peace and cooperation, but has led to at least 17 families being displaced from their land and resulted in heightened tensions, distrust and conflict between multiple armed actors.77 However, the majority of land grabs are likely associated with less high-profile enterprises, by local businesses with powerful local connections. Gold mining, stone

73 This figure displays the results in numbers of actual cases, as the percentages are very small. 74 As experienced by at least one respondent. 75 KHRG (2018), p 2. 76 KHRG (2018), p 6. 77 [KESAN, KHERG, TCDN] (2016). See also Su Myat Mon and T Kean (2018). % Fig 2.40 78 80 75 GoM 70 KNU I don’t know 60 50 50 44 40 36 37 31 30 28 28 22 24 18 19 20 15

10 6 5 2 2 0 Men in Women in Men in Women in Men in Women in GoM-controlled GoM-controlled KNU-controlled KNU-controlled mix-controlled mix-controlled areas areas areas areas areas areas

Fig 3.2 % 70 69 67 65 61 62 60

0 Overall Men Women 45 Fig 3.12 % Non-Karen men (n=220) 68 security60 , justice and governance in south east myanmar 5 Karen men (n=787) Non-Karen women (n=221) Karen women (n=787) quarrying,50 hydropower infrastructure and monocrop plantations are among the many business interests that have been most associated with land confiscation. 45 42 40 These findings clearly Land grabbing was found to be almost3 non-existent3 in KNU-controlled areas. Only 3 “ 35 35 demonstrate that one of the land grabbing cases experienced by a respondent or someone in their33 house- 33 3 3 communities are most 30 2 hold took place in a KNU-controlled area, making up only 0.24 per cent (one in 401)26 of 25 vulnerable to land grabs in 24 24 24 respondents in those areas (Figure 3.16). Meanwhile,23 land grabs were experienced22 by areas where there is a degree 2 2.3620 per cent (one in 42) households in GoM-controlled areas and 2.68 per cent (one 1 1 1 1 of GoM control, which is 16 crucial for outside companies in 37) households in mix-controlled14 areas. When asked whether 14land grabs had taken 11 11 1 11 11 11 being able to access the areas, 10 1 place in their village, only four of the 21 KNU-controlled villages had respondents who 6 particularly those operating 5 4 said someone in their village had experienced this, compared with 346 per cent of elsewhere in Myanmar. .5 ” GoM-controlled0 villages and 53 per cent of mix-controlled villages. Furthermore, in all Burning Violent Destroy Flee home Forced Landmine Torture Portering Shootings Forced Extortion Land grab four ofvillage the KNU-controlledthreats property villagesfor wheresafety respondentsdisplace- said land grabs had taken labour place, there were also signs of other armed actorsment being present.78 Fig 3.14 % 80 GoM-controlled These findings clearly demonstrate72 that communities are most vulnerable to land KNU-controlled grabs70 in areas where there is a degree of GoM control, which is crucial for outside Mix-controlled companies60 being able to 58access the areas, particularly those operating elsewhere in Myanmar. Meanwhile,53 KNU-controlled areas, particularly in the highly autonomous 49 50 Mutraw District,44 remain far less affected. The most 43vulnerable areas are mixed-control 41 areas,40 where there is some GoM presence but a lack of consolidated authority,38 and thus

likely fewer28 legal protections for civilians.28 Nonetheless, KNU-affiliated companies 30 26 established since the ceasefires are among those benefiting25 from harmful projects in 20 mix-controlled areas, as are pre-existing companies linked to the14 BGFs and factions 12 13 9 10 of10 the DKBA. 2 0 Figure 3.16Portering HouseholdsForced under labour each typeForced FigureBurning/ 3.17 VillagesDestruction under eachLandmines type of of control that experienced land grabsrelocation controldestroying that experiencedof property land grabs of villages since 2012 since 2012 % % Fig 3.16 & 17 3.0 60 2.68 53 2.5 2.36 50 46

2.0 40

1.5 30

19 1.0 20

0.5 10 0.24

0.0 0 GoM- KNU- Mix- GoM- KNU- Mix- controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled

There was also great variation across geographical areas, though it should be noted that the sampling method did not ensure that these were representative figures. Twenty-nine (67 per cent) of the 43 households that experienced land grabs were in Taw Oo (Taungoo) District. This translates into 8.7 per cent (one in 12) surveyed households from that district reporting land grabs (Figure 3.18). Meanwhile, no surveyed households in Doo Tha Htoo (Thaton), Kler Lwe Htoo (Nyaunglebin) or Mutraw (Hpapun) reported land grab cases. Land grabs were most widespread across villages in Blih-Dawei (Myeik-Dawei), where respondents from 90 per cent of surveyed villages said they or others in the village had experienced land grabs (Figure 3.19). The high number of land grabs in Taw Oo District were concentrated in just eight of the 15 villages surveyed there. Among them, there were two villages in which more than 20 per cent of the surveyed households had experienced land grabs, both of which were under mixed control.79

78 Two had village leaders who also reported directly to the GoM’s GAD; one is in an area under mostly DKBA control; and the other is near a Tatmadaw camp and receives some GoM services. 79 Both had two village leaders, one each for the KNU and GoM systems. saferworld · karen peace support network 69

Figure 3.18 Surveyed households under Figure 3.19 Proportion of surveyed villages each KNU-defined district area that under each KNU-defined district area that experiencedBOX 3.5 landsThe humangrabs since and 2012 gendered impactsexperienced of land lands grabs grabs since 2012 A recent study by Saferworld (2018) found that for Karen participants who had experienced a range of violations in their lives, land grabs had the gravest long-term consequences. As one man explained, “The land grab is not killing you, but it’s like it is indirectly killing you… we were already married and had a family to take care of. Those of us living in the hilly areas also have no opportunities to change our livelihood, and all our siblings’ and family’s land was grabbed”. While land confiscations impacted men and women both in profoundly negative ways, there were gendered differences in how this was experienced. Men said that they experienced a significant decline in their ability to be a provider, which meant a perceived decline in their ability to be masculine. Women experienced a significant increase in their workload to make up for the family’s decline in income; this, alongside traditional caregiving responsibilities, led to loss of sleep. Several research participants indicated that frustrations in their ability to fulfil traditional gender roles, and increased tension in families over financial issues and decision-making, led to an increase in intimate partner violence. According to one woman, “Men think that growing crops is their only duty, but after losing their land they feel they have no more duties. So, the men just get drunk and then come back home and bring trouble”. Few participants had been successful in getting their land back and many remained deeply mistrustful of GoM and of the ability of land departments to resolve their claims fairly.

Land grabs were the only form of violence and abuse stated as a personal experience by women (51 per cent) more than by men (49 per cent). In any case, land grabs tend to deeply impact entire households in a more direct way than other forms of abuse, which primarily affect the specific individuals. Box 3.5 explores the crippling human impacts that land grabs have on households, including important differences in impact between genders.

3.4 Perpetrators Key findings of violence and n Respondents were much less willing to name specific authorities for causing problems in their communities than they were to disclose experiences of violence and abuse without naming abuse specific actors. This led to limited new data on the specific perpetrators of violence and abuse. n Respondents named the GoM for forced labour in their community more than any other issue with any authority. n One in ten respondents named the KNU for unfair recruitment practices. n Among respondents who engage directly with the smaller authorities, the DKBA was named most frequently, particularly for forced labour and use of landmines and IEDs. BGFs were also named by small groups of respondents who engaged with them.

Respondents were not asked to name the perpetrators of specific cases, in order to protect the security of enumerators and to avoid undue pressure on respondents. More general questions about respondents’ perceptions of problems caused by the full range of armed actors gave some indication of which authorities commit and are responsible for which issues, but do not correlate directly to the categories of violence and abuse. As noted previously, corroboration with existing research was the primary method used to determine the main perpetrators, and found heavy association with the systematic practices of the Tatmadaw and its proxies. Respondents were reluctant, however, to report concerns about specific actors even when speaking in general. Respondents who had experienced violence and abuse by authorities personally or in their household were far more likely to name specific authorities (57 per cent) than other respondents were (ten per cent). This association is likely, in part, because those respondents have more negative views of the authorities; it may also demonstrate that some respondents were more confident to speak out than others overall. As section 3.2 noted, corroboration with existing research found that most of the forms of violence and abuse are heavily associated with the systematic 70 security, justice and governance in south east myanmar

practices of the Tatmadaw. Other armed actors have also committed acts of violence and abuse but not in a systematic way. Fig 3.18&19 % % 10In any case, even among those whose households100 had experienced violence or abuse by authorities,.6 43 per cent did not state a single problem caused by a specific authority – 8demonstrating significant under-reporting. 80Most prominently, out of 357 respondents whose household had experienced a land grab, only 17 per cent named a specific

6authority as ‘causing land issues’. Out of 388 respondents60 whose household had 55 53 experienced ‘forced recruitment’, only 34 per cent named a specific5 authority as carrying out ‘unfair recruitment practices’. 42 4 40 Nonetheless, the responses that were given provide some insight into the grievances 2.13 2 Proportion of surveyed villages Proportion 2people are1.54 willing to state. The most widely stated20 problem attributed to any authority Fig 3.18&19 % 1.1 % 10was the GoM for forced.5 labour (21 per cent). 100As noted above, this was the second most . . . 0prevalent.6 form of violence or abuse experienced0 overall. Six per cent highlighted the 334 3 362 43 113 6 22 KNU8 for this issue (Figure 3.18). Totals 80 Totals

Taw Oo Hpa-an Mu Traw Blih-Dawei Dooplaya Hpa-an Taw11 Oo 15 Mu Traw 15 Doo ThaKler Htoo Lwe Htoo Blih-Dawei 1 Dooplaya 12 Figure 3.18 Do any of the authorities cause any of the followingKler LweDoo problems Htoo Tha 5 Htoo 4 in your area? 6 60 (all respondents) 55 53 5 Fig 3.20 % 25 42 4 40 GoM 21 KNU 20 2.13 2 Proportion of surveyed villages Proportion 2 1.54 20 1.1 .5 15 14. . . 0 0 6 334 3 11362 43 113 22 Totals Totals 10 10 10 Taw Oo Hpa-an Mu Traw Blih-Dawei Dooplaya 8 Hpa-an Taw11 Oo 15 Kler Lwe Htoo Dooplaya 12 Mu Traw 15 Doo Tha Htoo Blih-Dawei 1 Doo Tha Htoo 4 Kler6 Lwe Htoo 5 5 4 Fig 3.20 % 25 GoM 0 21 KNU Unfair Inappropriate Use of Forced and 20 recruitment or aggressive land mines/IEDs obligatory practices interactions labour practices with community members 15 14 Fig 3.21 % 100 11 The KNU was more than twice as likely,10 however,10 to be associated with unfairGoM recruit- 10 ment practices (11 per cent). While8 existing86 research85 has regularly found theKNU Tatmadaw Don’t know 80to engage in forced recruitment, it has rarely recruited directly6 from rural Karen populations5 4 in areas where it is fighting the KNU. The Tatmadaw was nearly twice as 60likely to be associated with inappropriate or aggressive interactions with members of 0 the community47 and six times as likely to be associated with sexual abuse (by just 49 Unfair Inappropriate Use of Forced and 41 recruitment or aggressive land mines/IEDs obligatory 40respondents compared with36 eight). 38 practices interactions labour practices 31 28 with community 27 members Figure 3.19 Which authority keeps your community most safe and secure? 20 20 17 16 Fig 3.21 % 10 100 9 5 6 GoM 1 1 0 86 85 KNU Men in Women in Men in Women in Men in WomenDon’t in know 80 GoM-controlled GoM-controlled KNU-controlled KNU-controlled mix-controlled mix-controlled areas areas areas areas areas areas

47 Fig 3.22 % 25 41 24 40 36 DKBA (n=156) 38 22 BGFs31 (n=129) 28 27 KPC (n=125) 20 20 20 17 17 16 9 10 5 6 15 1 1 0 Men in Women in Men in Women in Men in Women in GoM-controlled GoM-controlled10 KNU-controlled10 KNU-controlled10 mix-controlled mix-controlled 10 areas areas areas areas areas areas

6 5 5 Fig 3.22 % 3 25 1 24 1 DKBA (n=156) 0 0 22 BGFs (n=129) Unfair Inappropriate Use of Forced and KPC (n=125) 20 recruitment or aggressive land mines/IEDs obligatory practices interactions17 labour practices with community members 15

10 10 10 10

6 5 5 3 1 1 0 0 Unfair Inappropriate Use of Forced and recruitment or aggressive land mines/IEDs obligatory practices interactions labour practices with community members Fig 3.18&19 % % 10 100 .6

8 80

6 60 55 53 5 42 4 40

2.13 2 Proportion of surveyed villages Proportion 2 1.54 20 1.1 .5 saferworld · karen peace. support. . network 71 0 0 6 334 3 362 43 113 22 Totals Totals When respondents were asked which communities kept them most safe and secure, Taw Oo Hpa-an Mu Traw Blih-Dawei Dooplaya Hpa-an Taw11 Oo 15 Mu Traw 15 Doo ThaKler Htoo Lwe Htoo Blih-Dawei 1 Dooplaya 12 the biggest differences were observed between types of Klerterritory. LweDoo Htoo Tha 5 InHtoo 4KNU-controlled areas, 86 per cent of men and 85 per cent of women felt that the KNU kept them most Fig 3.20 safe% and secure (Figure 3.19), undoubtedly reflecting the reality that their communities 25 have been targeted by the Tatmadaw for decades. Comparatively,GoM 47 per cent of men KNU and 41 per cent of women in GoM-controlled areas said21 the GoM kept them most safe 20 and secure.

15Overall, 33 per cent of women14 and 24 per cent of men said “I don’t know” in response to this question, which was the second largest gendered difference among all the 11 10 10 10questions comparing different authorities. Notably, the proportion of women in mix- controlled areas who said “I don’t8 know” was higher than those who said GoM- or KNU-controlled areas put together, demonstrating severe6 lack of protection from 5 4 authorities in these areas.

Among0 the respondents who were found to have some form of direct contact with the Unfair Inappropriate Use of Forced and DKBA,recruitment BGFs and KPC,or aggressive respectively, land the mines/IEDs DKBA appearedobligatory to be the most commonly associatedpractices with these interactionsviolent practices. Twenty-fourlabour per practices cent of respondents associated with community the group with forcedmembers labour, 22 per cent with the use of landmines or IEDs, and 17 per

Fig 3.21 cent% with inappropriate or aggressive actions towards communities. The KPC was 100 most commonly associated with unfair recruitment, but only by six per centGoM of those that had contact with this authority. Ten86 per cent of85 people that had contact KNUwith the Don’t know 80BGFs named them for forced labour, inappropriate interactions and use of landmines or IEDs, most of whom were in GoM-defined Myawaddy Township. 60 These findings appear to demonstrate a link to conflict between the DKBA (Buddhist 47 faction) and the BGFs41 in 2016. Numerous respondents who named the DKBA for use 40 36 38 of landmines and aggressive actions were in areas of Hlaingbwe 31Township, in villages where a notable28 portion of respondents stated that the BGFs kept them27 most safe and 20 20secure, and near to where the two sides fought repeatedly in 172016 (see section16 2.5). 9 10 These issues5 were all also6 raised regarding the DKBA in areas controlled by the Klo 1 1 Htoo0 Baw faction. Men in Women in Men in Women in Men in Women in GoM-controlled GoM-controlled KNU-controlled KNU-controlled mix-controlled mix-controlled Figureareas 3.20 Problemsareas observed by respondentsareas thatareas had ‘direct areascontact’ with theareas DKBA, BGFs and KPC

Fig 3.22 % 25 24 DKBA (n=156) 22 BGFs (n=129) KPC (n=125) 20 17

10 10 10 10

6 5 5 3 1 1 0 0 Unfair Inappropriate Use of Forced and recruitment or aggressive land mines/IEDs obligatory practices interactions labour practices with community members 72

Women nearby their land that was confiscated. There is now a sign that reads “Government land. Do not trespass.”. © Saferworld 73 4 Justice

justice provision is often among the core demands of civilians living in conflict-affected areas. Establishing a reliable, effective and consistent justice system is thus central to an authority’s legitimacy in the eyes of local people and to establishing its authority. Justice is a crucial public good in itself and is particularly important for consolidating peace. Justice delivery in Myanmar’s conflict areas was, until recently, an area of little academic or policy interest, but a number of recent initiatives have begun to fill that gap.80 These include projects by Saferworld to better understand and directly strengthen the justice mechanisms relied upon by conflict-affected populations. Long-term and in-depth research into the KNU justice system has been carried out by the Karen Women Organisation (KWO) with the aim of strengthening mechanisms for justice and building capacity to effect reforms in key areas. Both the GoM and KNU justice systems evolved from the British common law system, which was established during the colonial era. Both have penal and civil codes of law, as well as courts established at the township, district and higher levels, and police forces for law enforcement.81 The KNU judiciary is independent from the administrative and military wings of the organisation, while the 700-strong police force, called the Karen National Police Force (KNPF), is a civilian body, under the Interior and Religious Department. The Myanmar Police Force (MPF) is under the Tatmadaw-led Ministry of Home Affairs and is mostly active in urban areas, but its coverage is being slowly extended via new police stations in numerous smaller administrative centres. In practice, the large majority of justice issues are handled at the village or village tract level, as has seemingly been common for hundreds of years. Communities are encouraged by authorities to handle smaller issues at the lowest level possible. A recent survey by the MyJustice project found that a large majority of ordinary people felt ward or VTAs, and 100-household heads, were “the best way” to settle “community issues”.82 Therefore, customary practices play a central role in the actual delivery of justice. These often rely heavily on arbitration and emphasise the restoration of harmony between aggrieved parties and within the community. Village and village tract leaders can refer more serious cases to higher authorities. The KNU system provides village and village tract leaders with far more detailed guidance, specific powers and institutionalised connections to higher tiers of the judicial system. The KNU procedural code outlines the steps local leaders should take in handling cases and stipulates which levels of the judiciary (e.g., township, district or supreme courts) should ultimately have jurisdiction

80 Key works include Saferworld and Overseas Development Institute (2016), McCartan and Jolliffe (2016), Kyed (2018). See also the website of Danish Institute for International Studies’ Everjust project and associated publication of Kyed (2018). 81 The founder of the KNU, Saw Ba U Gyi, was a lawyer by training, as were numerous other senior members. The organisation currently uses four books of law, which were compiled in the 1970s, and have been upgraded numerous times since, by the quadrennial congress. 82 MyJustice (2018), sections 2.3 and 2.4. 74 security, justice and governance in south east myanmar

with each type of crime, based on severity. However, the KWO and other KPSN members have found that these procedures need to be more strictly enforced, particularly to ensure that cases of sexual violence are consistently referred to the KNU Supreme Court as is required in the code. The NCA, which is legally binding, having been ratified by the Union Parliament, acknowledges that signatory EAOs, including the KNU, DKBA and KPC, “have been responsible for development and security in their respective areas” and commits parties to cooperation in “matters regarding peace and stability, and the maintenance of rule of law”. There are currently, however, no formal referral mechanisms for other forms of official cooperation between the GoM and EAO justice systems. This is despite signs of some criminal issues increasing since the signing of ceasefires, most notably the production, trade and use of illegal narcotics, which has also been associated with a number of violent crimes at the community level.

Karen people protesting the construction of large hyrdopower dams on the Salween (Thanlwin) River. Without an effective justice system, few options are available to ordinary civilians to counter the harmful development practices of powerful actors. © Karen Peace Support Network

4.1 Attitudes Key findings towards justice n Respondents were most likely to prefer the KNU to deal with justice issues, compared with other authorities, most widely in KNU-controlled areas and among Karen people. n Less than half of respondents felt it was common or very common to report ‘big’ justice cases to any authority or responsible person. n Women in mix-controlled areas were more likely to say “I don’t know” in response to which authority they would prefer to deal with justice issues than either GoM- or KNU-controlled areas put together, and the majority said it was very uncommon or uncommon to report cases. n When people do report cases, the overwhelming majority go to their village leader first. n Respondents in KNU-controlled areas were more likely than any others to name alternative options for first reporting, including village tract authorities, the KNPF and other KNU bodies. n High costs, lack of personal connections, long distances to authorities and time consumption were the main barriers to justice identified, most commonly associated with GoM.

When asked which of the higher authorities they would prefer to deal with justice issues, the highest proportion of respondents (39 per cent) said the KNU, 23 per cent said the GoM and 9.4 per cent said “none” (Figure 4.1). This fits with a recent qualitative, empirical study, which found people living in two villages under full or partial KNU control had “a strong preference for the KNU justice system, which is seen as more effective and legitimate when compared to the GoM system”.83

83 Kyed (2018), Saferworld, forthcoming. saferworld · karen peace support network 75

Figure 4.1 Which authority would you prefer to deal with justice issues? Fig 4.1 % 100 GoM KNU None 80 Don’t know Other EAOs 60 51 5 4 43 40 3 34 31 32 32 3 3 26 24 25 23 22 21 21 20 15 12 1 3 2 2 2 1 2 .5 2 0 Total Women Men GoM- KNU- Mix- Non-Karen Karen controlled controlled controlled 441 15 31 4 123 Fig 4.1 % 100 GoM The GoM and KNU were KNU %“ The biggest differences were between different control areas and between ethnicities. Fig 4.2 100 each the most widely None The80 GoM and KNU were each the most widelyGoM preferred authority in the areas they 90 Don’t know preferred authority in the KNU control, overwhelmingly84 in the case of the KNU, where 87 per cent said the KNU. The Other EAOs areas they control, Don’t know 80 KNU was more popular overall in mix-controlled areas, with 32 per cent to the GoM’s overwhelmingly in the case of 60 21 per cent. A notable 12 per cent of respondents51 in mix-controlled areas said they 5 the KNU, where 87 per cent 4 wanted none of the authorities to deal43 with justice. Forty-seven per cent of Karen 60said the56 KNU. The KNU was 40 3 34 32 32 more popular overall47 in respondents said they would31 prefer the KNU to deal with justice issues, and 153 per cent 3 26 24 25 said they23 would prefer22 the GoM. Fifty21 per cent of non-Karen preferred21 the GoM and 40 mix-controlled areas, 38 38 36 20 15 with 32 per cent to the 15 per cent preferred the KNU. These findings demonstrate that control area12 appears to 27 1 GoM’s 2125 per cent. 23 24 determine one’s2 justice preferences2 more2 than20 ethnicity, likely1 2because, for an authority3 2 20 ” .5 to0 deliver justice effectively, they must have de facto control and authority. This is also Total8 Women10 Men GoM- KNU- Mix- Non-Karen Karen 7 6 likely why higher numbers of people in mix-controlledcontrolled areascontrolled are left preferringcontrolled “none”.441 15 1 1 31 4 123 0 Men in Women in Men in Women in Men in Women in GoM-controlled GoM-controlled FigureKNU-controlled 4.2 Which KNU-controlled authority wouldmix-controlled you prefer mix-controlled to deal with justice issues? villages areas villages areas villages villages % Fig 4.2 100 GoM 90 KNU 84 Don’t know 80

Myanmar Police Force Fig 4.6 % Other GoM body 60 56 1. 20 Karen National Police Force 47 Other KNU body/official 40 38 Village Tract leader 38 36 15 14.4 Village or Village Tract 27 25 security/justice appointee 23 24 20 1. 20 1.4 Elder 10 .4 8 10 7 .5 6 6.6 1 1 0 5 3.2 Men in Women3.5 in Men in Women in Men in Women in 2.2 GoM-controlled GoM-controlled 2.3KNU-controlled2.5 2.5 KNU-controlled mix-controlled mix-controlled 1.6 1.6 villages areas villages .areas1.1 villages villages .5 . . . 0 GoM-controlled 16 KNU-controlled villages 21 Mix-controlled 653 Women were significantly more likely to say “I don’t know” to this question (31 per cent) than men were (21 per cent) indicating a disparity in access to justice and knowledge about available authorities. Importantly, this was the largest gendered difference Fig 5.2&3 Myanmar Police Force Fig 5.8 Fig 4.6 among% all questions comparing different authorities. Correspondingly,Other GoM women body were 1. 20 Karen National Police Force % in particular less likely% to say the KNU (34 per cent), than men% (43 per cent) and were Other KNU body/official 50 slightly less likely to80 specifically say GoM.6 As shown in Figure50 4.2, women in GoM- 4 Severely deteriorated GoM Village Tract leader GoM Deteriorated15 14.4 KNU 43 KNU controlled areas (3870 per cent) and mix-controlled areas (36 per cent)Village were or Village far more Tract No difference security/justice appointee 40 likely, to say “I don’t know” to this question than women in KNU-controlled40 areas (ten Improved 1. 60 1.4 5 Elder 10per cent). In mix-controlled areas, women were more55 likely to say “I don’t know” than 33 Significantly improved 52 .4 to say they preferred50 either the GoM or KNU, and were.5 notably less likely to say they 30 2 6.630 28 preferred the KNU (27 per cent) than men were (38 per cent). Non-Karen women were 5 40 3.2 3.5 more likely to2.2 say “I don’t know” to this question (36 per cent) than2.3 2.5Karen women2.5 were 20 1 1.6 1.6 20 30 . 1.1 .5 . . .25 14 0 23 11 GoM-controlled 2016 KNU-controlled villages 21 Mix-controlled 653 10 10 10 4 10 3 2 1 1 0 Fig 5.2&3 0 0 DKBA 156 KPC 12 BGF 125 GoM- KNU- Mix- …bring the benefit …cause problems Fig 5.8 controlled controlled controlled of trying to build by initiating armed areas areas areas peace? conflict? % % % 50 80 50 4 Severely deteriorated 6 GoM GoM Deteriorated KNU 43 KNU 70 No difference 40 40 Improved 60 5 55 33 Significantly improved 52 50 30 2 30 28 40

20 1 20 30 25 14 23 11 20 10 10 10 4 10 3 2 1 1 0 0 0 DKBA 156 KPC 12 BGF 125 GoM- KNU- Mix- …bring the beneﬁt …cause problems controlled controlled controlled of trying to build by initiating armed areas areas areas peace? conﬂict? Fig 2.34 Mixed 0.04% Other 3.94%

GoM-control Bamar 19.42% Dawei 23.10% Karen 38.06% Pa-O 15.22%

Bamar 0.73% Mon 0.24%

KNU-control Karen 98.53%

Dawei 0.24% Shan 0.24% Mixed 0.41% Other 1.38% 76 Dawei 0.41%security, justice and governance in south east myanmarKarenni/Kayah/Kayan 2.93% Shan 5.69% Fig 2.34 Mixed 0.04% Other 3.94%

Mix-controlled Karen 83.82% GoM-control Bamar 19.42% (30 perDawei cent). 23.10%84 Similar trends wereKaren noted 38.06% in responses to thePa-O question 15.22% of which

Bamar 4.47%authority keeps the community most safe and secure, as discussed in sectionPa-O 0.08% 3.4. Mon 0.81% Bamar 0.73% It appears that justice cases regularly go unreported in many of the surveyedMon 0.24% house- 0 holds.20 Respondents were40 asked, “If someone60 in your village80 experiences a justice100% issue KNU-control considered to be a ‘smallKaren case’” 98.53% or a “justice issue considered to be a ‘big case’, how 85 Fig 3.3 Dawei 0.24% common is it to report it to any authority?”. The terms ‘big’ and ‘small’Shan were Very0.24% oftennot GoM/ 10%Mixed 0.41% 23%defined by the10% enumerators, so34% served as an efficient13% andOther simple 1.38%9% means toOften collect Tatmadaw Dawei 0.41% Karenni/Kayah/Kayan 2.93% Shan 5.69% people’s willingness to approach authorities, rather than as a measure of whatNot often kinds 1% 1% Never Mix-controlled of issues they considerKaren to be83.82% big or small. Notably, only 50 per cent said it wasDon’t common know Prefer not to answer KNU 23% or very common31% to report a ‘big7% case’ to any20% authority.6% Twenty-eight12% per cent said that Bamar 4.47% it was uncommon or very uncommon (Figure 4.3). This suggests Pa-Othat, 0.08% evenNo responsewhen peo recorded- Mon 0.81% ple have major grievances or concerns, large proportions of communities would not 0 0 20 even20 try to report40 them.40 60 60 80 80 100%100%

Figure 4.3 How common is it to report a ‘case’ to any authority or responsible person? Fig 3.3 Very often 1.6% Fig 4.3 GoM/ 10% 23% 10% 34% 13% 9% Often Tatmadaw Not oftenVery common “Small case” 36% 5.5% 36% 5.8% 15% Common (n=2013) 1% 1% Never Don’t knowNeutral 2.4% Prefer notUncommon to answer KNU 23% 31% 7% 20% 6% 12% No responseVery recordeduncommon “Big case” 5.1% 45% 21% 6.6% 20% Don’t know (n=2017)

0 20 40 60 80 100%

1.6% Fig 4.3 Cases are most likely to go unreported and unaddressed when they involveVery common powerful “Small case” Fig 4.4 36% actors. In particular,5.5% the KHRG36% and other KPSN5.8% members15% have documentedCommon frequent (n=2013) 1% violent crimes committed by Tatmadaw BGFs against local people, includingNeutral murders, GoM-controlled 8% 36% 2.4%4% 22% 10% 19% UncommonVery common areas sexual attacks, torture and grievous bodily assaults but have not been penalised.Very uncommonCommon While 2% 1% 1% Neutral “Big case” 5.1% the45% BGFs lack sufficient internal21% mechanisms6.6% to hold20% their own membersDon’t knowto account, (n=2017)KNU controlled 46% 26% 24% Uncommon areas they are not reliably subjected to justice through the official military courts. VeryThere uncommon are 2% some cases where compensation is provided to victims or their families but theseDon’t are know Mix-controlled 5% 47% 19% 7% 19% Missing answer 0 areas 20 not delivered40 through an independent60 and impartial80 mechanisms100 and% appear ad hoc. 2% Women in GoM- Figure31% 4.4 How common6% is it to report38% a ‘big’ justice case to any12% authority11% controlled areas or responsible person? Fig 4.4 2% 2% 1% Women in KNU- 3% 32% 37% 24% GoM-controlledcontrolled areas8% 36% 4% 22% 10% 19% Very common areas 1% Common 2% 1% 1% Neutral Women in mix- 35% 6% 34% 9% 14% KNU controlledcontrolled areas 46% 26% 24% Uncommon areas Very uncommon 2% Don’t know Mix-controlled 5% 0 20 47% 40 19%60 7% 80 19% 100%Missing answer areas 2% Women in GoM- 1% 31% 6% 38% 12%1% 11% controlled areas Fig 5.1 Severely deteriorated 2% 2% GoM 12% 48% 8% 20% 9% Deteriorated Women in KNU- 3% 32% 37% 24% No difference controlled areas Improved 1% 1% 1% Signiﬁcantly improved Women in mix- 35% 6% 34% 9% 14% Don’t know controlledKNU areas 10% 55% 8% 14% 11% Prefer not to answer Missing answer 1% 0 20 40 60 80 100% 0 20 40 60 80 100 %

1% 1% Fig 5.1 Severely deteriorated 84 For comparison, 25 per cent of men in GoM-controlled areas, 24 per cent of men in mix-controlled areas, eight per cent of GoM 12% 48% 8% 20% 9% Deteriorated men in KNU-controlled areas, 25 per cent of non-Karen men, and 19 per cent of Karen men, said “I don’t know” to this question. No difference 1% 85 It should be noted that in Burmese, the term ‘case’ is a common word1% for any problem or issue Improvedin general and is commonly used in this context. Signiﬁcantly improved Don’t know KNU 10% 55% 8% 14% 11% Prefer not to answer Missing answer 1%

0 20 40 60 80 100 % saferworld · karen peace support network 77

Rice-wine being distilled in someone's house. Many communities link domestic violence and violent disputes between community members to alcohol abuse. © Kim Jolliffe

“The reporting of justice The reporting of cases is considered to be less common by women than men, and cases is considered to be less appears least common in GoM-controlled areas compared with KNU-controlled or common by women than mix-controlled areas (Figure 4.4). Overall, women were twice as likely to say reporting men, and appears least ‘big cases’ was very uncommon (8 per cent) than men (4 per cent) and the proportion common in GoM-controlled areas compared with KNU- who said common (34 per cent) was slightly less than the proportion of men (38 per controlled or mix-controlled cent) who said the same. Fifty per cent of women in GoM-controlled areas said it was areas. Overall, women were very uncommon (12 per cent) or uncommon (38 per cent) to report a ‘big case’, as did twice as likely to say reporting 44 per cent of men in those areas, which was notably higher than in KNU-controlled ‘big cases’ was very or mix-controlled areas. Women and men in GoM-controlled areas were also least uncommon (8 per cent) than likely to say it was very common or common to report ‘big cases’. High proportions men (4 per cent) and the proportion who said common of both men and women in KNU-controlled areas (24 per cent of each) said “I don’t (34 per cent) was slightly less know”, leaving some ambiguity when comparing those areas with mix-controlled than the proportion of men areas; respondents in mix-controlled areas were more likely to give definitive answers (38 per cent).” either way. When people do seek justice, the village leadership is the primary channel used, especially when it comes to ‘small cases’. Respondents who said it was very common or common to report a case or who were neutral, were asked where people usually go first to report cases. They could give multiple responses, including formal authorities and informal actors, such as family members and elders. For ‘small cases’, 98 per cent of the respondents who were asked (n=872) said a villager leader, among whom 96 per cent gave village leader as their only answer. For big cases, 98 per cent of respondents who were asked (n=1,051) said a village leader, 76 per cent of whom gave village leader as their only answer. Beyond the village leaders, elders was the most common answers for ‘small cases’, while formalised KNU or GoM authorities occurred more frequently for ‘big cases’. For small cases, 19 respondents (2.2 per cent) said an elder, while only 14 (1.3%) said either the MPF or another GoM body;86 only 11 (1.3 per cent) said either the KNPF or another KNU body.87 For ‘big cases’ (Figure 4.5), 97.5 per cent of the respondents who were asked, said a village leader, 12.2 per cent said either KNPF or another KNU body, and eight per cent said either MPF another GoM body.

86 Eight respondents said MPF, and four said “other GoM body”. 87 Two said KNPF, and nine said “other KNU body”. Fig 1.18

Would prefer the GoM to deal with ustice problems 23%

Would prefer the KNU to deal with ustice problems 39%

Don’t know which authority would prefer for ustice issues 26%

Feel it is common or very common to report cases 37% considered to be small’

Feel it is common or very common to report cases 50% considered to be big’

Feel that the village leader is the only place people first 94% report small’ cases to

Feel that the village leader is the only place people first 76% report big’ cases to

ave ever reported a case to any authority or 7% responsible person

0 20 40 60 80 100%

Fig 2.1&2 Villages with village leaders 48 GoM reporting to 53 KNU

Villages with respondents receiving 53 education or healthcare from 59

Villages with respondents paying 54 agricultural property or foraging taxes to 65

Villages with respondents who sometimes’ 62 or freuently’ see soldiers from 66

75% ave a village leader reporting to 72%

Paying some agricultural property andor 30% foraging tax to 58%

Receiving healthcare andor 54% education from 43%

Sometimes or freuently see 34% soldiers from 54% 78 security, justice and governance in south east myanmar 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80%

Figure 4.5 Where are ‘big’ justice cases first reported? (n=1,051, multiple answers possible)

Fig 4.5 Village leader 97.5% Fig 4.1 % 100Other KNU bodyofficial 7.5% GoM Myanmar Police Force 6.0% KNU None 80 Village tract Leader 5.6% Don’t know Karen National Police Force 4.7% Other EAOs Village or village tract 2.0% 60securityustice appointee 51 5 Other GoM body 2.0% 4 43 40 3 Elder 1.3% 34 31 32 32 3 3 Government lawyer 0.3% 26 24 25 23 22 21 21 20 Family 0.2% 15 12 1 Member of DKBA 0.2% 3 2 2 2 1 2 .5 2 0 Member of BGF 0.2% Total Women Men GoM- KNU- Mix- Non-Karen Karen Priestpastor 0.2% controlled controlled controlled 441 15 31 4 123

0 20 40 60 80 100%

% PeopleFig living 4.2 in 100People living in KNU-controlled areas appear to have greater access to alternative “ GoM 90 KNU-controlled areas channels for reporting ‘big cases’ beyond their village leaders than those in eitherKNU 84 appear to have greater Don’t know GoM-controlled80 or mix-controlled areas (Figure 4.6): 14.4 per cent of respondents access to alternative from those areas who were asked this question said people usually reported ‘big cases’ channels for reporting ‘big to the KNPF and 10.4 per cent said they reported them to another KNU body/official. cases’ beyond their village 60 56 leaders than those in either Additionally, 20 per cent47 said it was common to report cases directly to the village tract GoM-controlled or mix- leader and 7.5 per cent said the village or village tract security or justice appointee 40 38 38 36 controlled areas. (a formal position provided for in the KNU constitution). The MPF was listed by ” 27 25 23 24 respondents in both GoM-controlled areas (10.8 per cent) and mix-controlled20 areas 20 (6.6 per cent). In mix-controlled areas, the KNPF and another10 KNU body were listed 7 6 8 more frequently than the MPF or another1 GoM 1body. Notably, in KNU-controlled areas,0 the KNPF was listed more commonly than another KNU body, while the Men in Women in Men in Women in Men in Women in oppositeGoM-controlled was true inGoM-controlled mix-controlled KNU-controlled areas. This KNU-controlled reflects the mix-controlledreality that themix-controlled KNPF is villages areas villages areas villages villages better established in KNU strongholds than in areas where its presence is less stable, meaning justice responsibilities often fall to other departments and officials.

Figure 4.6 Where are ‘big’ justice cases first reported? (by type of territory)

Myanmar Police Force Fig 4.6 % Other GoM body 1. 20 Karen National Police Force Other KNU body/ofﬁcial Village Tract leader 15 14.4 Village or Village Tract security/justice appointee 1. 1.4 Elder 10 .4 .5 6.6

5 3.2 3.5 2.2 2.3 2.5 2.5 1.6 1.6 . 1.1 .5 . . . 0 GoM-controlled 16 KNU-controlled villages 21 Mix-controlled 653

When respondents were asked what barriers they experienced in accessing justice, the Fig 5.2&3 response rates were low. This is likely mainly due to a reluctance to complain about Fig 5.8 authorities, as noted in other questions. However, it may also be simply because few % respondents had attempted to use the justice systems% available to them and so had few % 50 80 6 50 opinions or found4 the questionSeverely deteriorated to be too abstract. GoM GoM Deteriorated KNU 43 KNU 70 No difference 40 40 Improved 60 5 55 33 Signiﬁcantly improved 52 50 30 2 30 28

No 62%

saferworld · karen peace support network 79

Figure 4.7 Proportion of stated barriers to justice that were attributed to each authority

Fig 4.7 KPC 1.6% Other 0.3% BGF 0.3% Thandaung Peace Group 0.3% DKBA 1.2% NMSP 0%

KNU 32% GoM/Tatmadaw 64%

Fig 3.15 No. 50

43 Personal experience 40 Personal or household experience 34 “The most common issues In total, 1,005 barriers to justice were listed by 123 respondents, comprising 65 women raised for the GoM were high and30 58 men. Among the barriers, 64 per cent were attributed to the GoM and 32 per 25 24 costs (listed by 56Fig per4.10 cent of cent to the KNU (Figure23 4.8). Given the small sample sizes, this does not conclusively those who answered the 20 1 show that there1 are greater barriers1 1 in accessing the GoM system compared to the question), lack of personal 14 14 14 KNU’s system overall. Yet, these12 figures do provide13 13 a strong indication of the types of connections (44 per cent), 1 11 1 1 10 barriers associatedWomen with each authority.Men The most common issues raised for the GoM long distances needed to 6 6 5 5 5 were high costs (listed 77by 56 per70 cent of those who answered the question), lack4 of travel to access the 2 1 1 (52%) (48%) authorities (44 per cent), personal0 connections (44 per cent), long distances needed to travel to access the time-consuming (38 per cent) authorities (44 per cent), time-consuming (38 per cent) processes, and lack of Portering Shootings Extortion Landmines Land grabbingForced labour processes, and lack of information on the authority’s mandate (Figure 4.8). TheseForced followed relocation Violentroughly threats the same Ethnic discrimination Summary executions information on the order of prevalenceRestriction for of movementboth the GoM and the KNU,Religious but discrimination all Destructionissues were of property raised for the Had to ﬂee home for safety Restricting access to services Burning/destructionTorture and of villagesphysical violence authority’s mandate. Destruction of religious buildings ” ForcedGoM recruitment by more (incl. under-18s) respondents than for the KNU. Attacks on schools, clinics and staff

Figure 4.8 Barriers to accessing justice from the GoM or KNU (n=126) Fig 4.8 % 60 GoM 56 KNU

44 44

40 Fig 4.12 3 3 34 Myanmar Police Force 9 6%

30 2 2 2

22 22 Other KNU body/ofﬁcial, 6 4% 20A village Other, 30 leader, 117 18% 1 16 No answer,15 4 3% Proportion of all barriers listed of all barriers Proportion 82% 12 1 1 10 Village tract leader, 3 2% 6 Karen National Police5 Force,6 2 1% Other GoM body, 2 1% Don’t know/Prefer not to answer,2 2 2 1% 0 Tatmadaw, 1 1% Government lawyer, 1 1% Other High costs Time consuming Language Fearbarriers of insecurity

% Fig 4.11 Eleven30 2. per cent of respondents said they agreed with the statement: “It is more difficult for women41 to report cases to authorities than it is for men”, while 60 per cent disagreed

or25 strongly disagreed (Figure 4.9). Men were slightly more likely than women to disagree with the statement. However, analysis from the Karen Women’s Organisation suggests that women do face particular difficulties in accessing justice particularly in 20 1. cases of GBV,26 which are sometimes minimised and defined as less serious issues by

13.6 15 2

.5 .5 10 14 14 Proportion of all documented cases Proportion 6. 6.1 1 4. 4. 3.4 5 2. 2. 5 4 4 1.4 2 . 0

village leaders. These responses may be largely due to a widespread lack of experience trying to access justice, as well as a reluctance to complain, which seemingly affected numerous questions regarding negative assessments of authorities. However, even among the 77 women who were documented as having dealt with a justice case through the authorities before, the same trends were found. Only five agreed with the statement, 44 disagreed and four strongly disagreed.88

Figure 4.9 Is it more difficult for women to report cases than it is for men? % Fig 4.9 100 25 Don’t know/prefer not to answer Prefer not to answer 18% 14% 21% Strongly disagree 4 Not recorded 3.3% Disagree Very disatisfied 80 4% 20 3.8% Neutral Disatisfied 4 Agree Satisfied Very satisfied 60 Strongly agree 15 61% 64% 58% 12 2 40 10 1 2

20 5 8 7% 6.8% 6.2% 6 4 12% 12% 11% 0% 0% 0.2% 1 1 0 0 Total Men Women KNU GoM Village tract (n=24) (n=12) authorities (n=9) No data 2% % Fig 5.4 100 1% 1% 0% 1% 2% 0% 0% 1% Prefer not to answer 2% Prefer not to answer Fig 3.6 Yes 16% 23% 22% Don’t know I don’t know 18% 25% 27% 27% 25% 32% 28% Not confident at all 80 4.2 Actual Key findings Neutral Confident justice cases n Seven per cent of respondents10% had reported24% a justice 12%case to authorities before,23% the slight 23% 26% Very confident majority60 of whom were women. 23% 33% n Land disputes and domestic disputes or violence were the most common issues concerned, 41% No 62% though40 these figures do not indicate prevalence. 39% 38% 37% 38% 36% 35% n In 82 per cent of cases, the respondent went first to their village leader and the majority of cases20 were fully or partially resolved28% and closed at that level of reporting. 19% 18% n Among 42 cases that were reported, the majority13% were in KNU-controlled areas13% and to the 12% 11% 12% 2% 2% 5% 1% 2% 3% 1% 3% 1% KNU,0 with only two being reported to the GoM, indicating more established referral Fig 4.7 KPC 1.6% Other 0.3% mechanisms.Overall ThereGoM- were two casesKNU- whereMix the MPF hadNon- referredKaren respondentsMen to a localWomen BGF 0.3% Thandaung Peace Group 0.3% controlled controlled controlled Karen unofficial judge. areas areas areas DKBA 1.2% NMSP 0% Fig 5.6 % n The majority of respondents who had reported cases said they were satisfied% or very satisfied Fig 5.5 100 100 with the outcome, but a notable minority were not. Don’t know/no answer 8% Not worried at all 12% 11% 18% 18% 18% 18% Not worried at all 20% Neutral 14% Neutral 15% Worried 80 5% 80 20% 13% Worried Very worried As noted18% in the introduction10% 15% to this part, in both the KNU and GoM justice systems, Very worried KNU 32% GoM/villageTatmadaw leaders 64% are encouraged to handle minor cases at the local level where possible, 30% 60 18% 16% 60 19% 42% but to refer more serious cases to higher authorities. Unlike the GoM system, the KNU 60% system has a procedural49% code in place which gives village leaders specific processes50% to 40 40 follow, powers to issue certain punishments,38% and mechanisms for referring cases to 31% 36% 40% Figure 4.10 Respondents higher levels, including stipulations for the specific courts that crimes must be referred 20 20 who had to settle a case to, depending on their severity. GoM procedures are much vaguer, giving the local 32% (n=147) 19% 19% 14% 15% 18% leaders no authority to issue13% punishments or specific referral mechanisms. In both 10% Fig 4.10 0 0 cases,GoM- village leadersKNU- tendMix- to use theOverall threat of referrals to the higher systems asOverall their Civilian Both civilian Military controlled controlled controlled 2 41 and military 165 mainareas form of leverageareas to enforceareas perpetrators to accept punishments, pay compensation 12 and commit to not reoffending.89 Women Men 77 70 (52%) (48%) One hundred and forty-seven respondents (seven per cent of total) said they had “experienced a case that required an authority or other responsible person to solve it”. Fig 5.7 % Seventy-seven100 (52 per cent) of these respondents were female (Figure 4.10) and 70 Not worried at all 11% 12%90 were male; 143 cases16% were documented20% in detail. Among these,Neutral 41 cases (29 per cent) Worried 80 15% 24% Very worried 88 In addition, three were26% “neutral”, six said they “don’t know” or “prefer not to answer”, and 16 had no recorded response. 89 Kyed (2018), Saferworld, forthcoming.30% 90 No further 60answers were recorded for four of the 147 respondents who stated that they had had to settle some kind of case with an authority. 53% 50% 40 42% 35%

Fig 4.12 20 Myanmar Police Force 9 6% 16% 15% 15% 20% 0 Other KNU body/ofﬁcial, Overall6 4% Civilian Both civilian Military A village Other, 30 2 41 & military 165 leader, 117 18% 12 No answer, 4 3% 82% Village tract leader, 3 2% Karen National Police Force, 2 1% Other GoM body, 2 1% Don’t know/Prefer not to answer, 2 1% Tatmadaw, 1 1% Government lawyer, 1 1% Fig 3.15 No. 50

43 Personal experience 40 Personal or household experience 34

30 25 24 23

20 1 1 1 1 14 14 14 12 13 13 1 11 1 1 10 6 6 5 5 5 4 2 1 1 0

Fig 4.8 % 60 GoM 56 KNU

44 44 No data 2% 40 Prefer not to answer3 2% 3 Fig 3.6 34 Yes 16% I don’t know 18% 30 2 2 2

saferworld · karen22 peace support network 22 81 20 1 16 15 Proportion of all barriers listed of all barriers Proportion 12 involved land disputes with neighbours,1 26 cases (18 per cent) involved1 domestic 10 violence, 20 cases (14 per cent) involved drugs or alcohol, and 14 cases (nine percent) 6 5 6 each involved debts or other intra-communal issuesNo (Figure 62% 4.11). Ten cases2 (seven2 per cent)0 involved adultery.91 The Karen Women’s Organisation felt that the actual number Other of rapeHigh cases costs that are reported could be higher because these are sometimes not defined as rape dueTime to consuming traditionalLanguage definitions Fearbarriers of insecurity that minimise such cases and define them

asLack less of personalLong serious distance connection issues.to authorities Nobody to help with seeking Lackjustice of trustLack inof thetrustDistrust authority’s in authority’s of the will individual capacity in charge Fig 4.7 KPC 1.6% Other 0.3% Negative past experiences with authority FigureLack 4.11 of information What issues on theBGF authority’s did 0.3% the mandate case involve?Thandaung (Out Peace of 143 Group fully 0.3% documented cases; multiple answers possible) DKBA 1.2% NMSP 0% % Of the 147 justiceFig cases4.11 30 2. “ 41 that required an authority or other responsible person to 25 solve it, 41 cases (29 per cent) involved land disputes with neighbours, 26 cases 20 KNU 32%1. GoM/Tatmadaw 64% 26 (18 per cent) involved domestic violence, 20 cases 13.6 15 2 (14 per cent) involved drugs or alcohol, and 14 cases .5 .5 10 14 14 (nine per cent) each involved of all documented cases Proportion 6. 6.1 1 debts or other intra- 4. 4. 3.4 communal issues and ten 5 2. 2. 5 cases (seven per cent) 4 4 1.4 2 . involved adultery. ” 0 Fig 4.10

Adultery Black magic Land disputes Rape or sexual abuse Land grab by authorities Domestic disputes/violence Drug or alcohol-relatedDisagreements problems concerningWomen debts Men Physical abuse/humanDon’t know/Prefer trafﬁcking not to answer Theft, robbery,77 destruction 70of property (52%)Other abuse/problem(48%) created by authorities Murder or arbitrary arrest/abduction of a loved one Other abuse/problem created by community members

This sample does not represent the overall prevalence of each type of crime. Firstly, as respondents indicated, it is rare to report cases in most communities; these figures are likely much lower than the actual number of people experiencing such grievances and so do not indicate prevalence of the crimes. Additionally, a sampling method that targeted people who had reported crimes specifically would be necessary to generate a larger and more representative sample. Nonetheless, it provides a snapshot of the types of cases that arise and how they are handled.

Figure 4.12 Where did you first go to report your case?

Fig 4.12 Myanmar Police Force 9 6%

Other KNU body/ofﬁcial, 6 4% A village Other, 30 leader, 117 18% No answer, 4 3% 82% Village tract leader, 3 2% Karen National Police Force, 2 1% Other GoM body, 2 1% Don’t know/Prefer not to answer, 2 1% Tatmadaw, 1 1% Government lawyer, 1 1%

91 Adultery is technically a crime under KNU law, though it is reportedly still often treated by local authorities as like a civil incident by local authorities. 82 security, justice and governance in south east myanmar

Officers of the Myanmar Police Force. Of the 143 cases in the survey where people reported cases to an authority, 9.6 per cent of the cases were directly reported to the Myanmar Police Force. None of these cases were then referred to the official GoM courts. © 2013; Flickr commons

“In 117 (82 per cent) cases, In 117 (82 per cent) cases, respondents said they reported the case first to a village leader respondents said they (Figure 4.12). Women were marginally more likely to have reported to the village leader reported the case first to a first (83 per cent), than men (79 per cent). Eleven cases (7.7% per cent) were reported village leader and the directly to the GoM, including nine to the MPF (seven by women) and two to another majority of these cases (61 per cent) were said to be GoM body. Eight of the cases (5.6 per cent) were reported directly to the KNU, including fully or partially resolved at two to the KNPF and six to another KNU body. that level. This confirms The majority of these cases (61 per cent) were said to be fully or partially resolved at existing research that that level while four per cent were not solved, but did not go any further.92 KPSN suggests that large majority of cases in Myanmar, analysis and existing research confirm that there is a widespread preference for justice particularly in rural areas, to be handled at the local level, as is the case across the country. However, as noted in are dealt with at the lowest section 4.1, while the GoM does not have official referral mechanisms, those stipulated level possible.” in the KNU procedural code are not always followed in practice. For example, rape cases are sometimes wrongly defined by local leaders and so are not referred accordingly, leading to them being handled at the local level, which sometimes involves oppressive traditional practices, such a requiring survivors to marry their attackers in order to restore internal harmony and dignity of the community. This confirms existing research that suggests the large majority of cases in Myanmar, particularly in rural areas, are dealt with at the lowest level possible.93 Forty-two (29 per cent) of the cases were referred to another agency, body or official. Among these referred cases, 18 were finally settled by the KNU (seven by the KNPF and 11 by another KNU body); six by a village tract leader; six with a lawyer or local judge not affiliated with any group; and only two with the GoM.94 These findings indicate that while respondents were more likely to go directly to the MPF than they were to the KNPF, cases were more likely to be referred to the KNU by village or village tract leaders than they were to the GoM. The majority of these referrals (28 or 67 per cent) were chosen by the respondent themselves: because the respondent believed in their capacity to resolve issues (18 cases); because it was common practice in their area (four cases); because the authority was fair in judgement (three cases); or due to personal connections (three cases). Cases were much more likely to be referred in KNU-controlled areas (65 per cent) than then they were in GoM-controlled areas (28 per cent) or mix-controlled areas (25 per cent), which is likely a result of the KNU having specific procedural guidelines and

92 Two respondents stopped answering the question at this point, and so these are percentages among the remaining 141 cases. 93 Kyed (2018), Saferworld, forthcoming; Overseas Development Institute (2016); McCartan and Jolliffe (2016). 94 One was ultimately settled by the MPF and the other by another GoM body. Fig 3.2 % 70 69 67 Fig 2.13 Other armed actors 65 61 62 Prefer not to answer 60 None I don’t know 50 KNU GoM 40

% 1.3% 1.7% 30 100 1.0% 1.4% 7.8% 8.7% 20

20% 10 80 23%

0 Overall Men Women 45 60 38% 45% 40

saferworld · karen peace support network 83 20 33% 20% Figure 4.13 Satisfaction with referral mechanisms for village leaders or other responsible figures.95 This was further 0 cases handled by authorities indicated by the fact that of the 27 referred cases in mixed areas, 12 were referred to Who do you Who do you (higher than village leader) consider want to the KNU (five to the KNPF and seven to another KNU body), while only two were as your govern your Prefer not to answer government? area? referred to GoM authorities (one to the police and one to another GoM body). Not recorded Very disatisfied Remarkably, none of the cases in GoM-controlled areas were referred to higher Fig 2.33 Disatisfied authorities, instead being dealt with by unofficial local ‘judges’ (two cases), an elder % Satisfied (one case), directly by a lawyer (one case) or by a village tract official (one case). 70 Very satisfied Female Total: In both of the cases handled by an unofficial judge, the referral had been made by the Male 61% 25 60 MPF. 4 50 20 In total, out of the 143 fully documented cases, 11 per cent of respondents said they 4 were very satisfied with the outcome of their case and 57 per cent said they were 40 satisfied. Thirteen per cent were dissatisfied and three per cent were very dissatisfied.96 30% 15 30 As shown in Figure 4.13, out of 24 cases that were ultimately handled by the KNU, 31% Total: Total: 12 2 respondents said they were very satisfied in four (17 per cent), satisfied in 12 (50 per 20% 10 1 20 19% 2 cent) and dissatisfied in four (17 per cent). Out of 12 cases handled by the GoM, 10% 10% respondents reported they were very satisfied in one case (8 per cent), satisfied in six 10 5 8 6 (50 per cent), dissatisfied in two (17 per cent) and very dissatisfied in one (eight per 9% 10% 4 0 cent). The very dissatisfied case involved a female Buddhist in Tanintharyi Township, 1 1 GoM KNU Mixed 0 who reported a case of domestic violence directly to the police and was referred to an KNU GoM Village (n=24) (n=12) tract unofficial local judge. All nine cases handled ultimately by village tract authorities left authorities (n=9) the respondent satisfied (eight) or very satisfied (one).

Fig 5.8

% 50 No data 2% GoM KNU Prefer not 43 to answer 2% 40

Yes 16% 30 28 I don’t know 18%

No 62% 11 10 10

0 …bring the …cause beneﬁt of trying problems by to build peace? initiating armed conﬂict?

95 Four of these cases were solved by the village tract leader, three by another KNU body, two by the KNPF and two by another village leader. 96 In 15 of the cases (ten per cent), answers were not recorded, and in seven (five per cent), the respondent said they would prefer not to answer, which possibly signified a lack of satisfaction. 84

Karen National Union chairperson General Saw Mutu Sae Poe shakes hands with Myanmar president U Win Myint during the third Panglong conference in July 2018. Also in the picture are Myanmar commander-in-chief, senior general Min Aung Hlaing and state counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. © Prachatai 85 5 Peace and conflict

Key findings

n Public opinion of all authorities had improved greatly since the 2012 ceasefire. n However, confidence in the current peace process was very low, especially in KNU-controlled areas. n The majority of respondents were worried or very worried that fighting would break out again within the next five years. n Respondents in KNU-controlled areas were especially worried; this included in areas where fighting did break out just months after this data was collected. n Respondents whose main interactions with authorities were with the military branches, were most likely to fear conflict breaking out again.

while ceasefires have resulted in greater physical security for conflict-affected communities in most areas, improvements to security, justice and governance will depend upon progress towards an inclusive peace agreement based on meaningful political dialogue. Indeed, the KNU has repeatedly stated that the central reason for signing a ceasefire and initiating talks was in order to take part in union-wide dialogue towards a federal, democratic system of government. Despite the holding of three Union Peace Conferences since 2016, there has been a lack of clear agreement on many of the most fundamental issues, and confidence is low. There has also been a notable lack of public participation, including of people in conflict areas, to affect the focus of talks. Furthermore, intermittent armed conflict has continued, due to structural weaknesses in the design and implementation of ceasefires.

GoM-control Bamar 19.42% Dawei 23.10% Karen 38.06% Pa-O 15.22%

Bamar 0.73% Mon 0.24%

KNU-control Karen 98.53%

Dawei 0.24% Shan 0.24% Mixed 0.41% Other 1.38% Dawei 0.41% Karenni/Kayah/Kayan 2.93% Shan 5.69%

Mix-controlled Karen 83.82%

Bamar 4.47% Pa-O 0.08% Mon 0.81%

0 20 40 60 80 100%

Fig 3.3 Very often GoM/ 10% 23% 10% 34% 13% 9% Often Tatmadaw Not often 1% 1% Never Don’t know Prefer not to answer KNU 23% 31% 7% 20% 6% 12% No response recorded

0 20 40 60 80 100%

1.6% Fig 4.3 Fig 4.1 Fig 4.1 % % 100 100 Very common GoM GoM “Small case” 36% 5.5% 36% 5.8% 15% Common (n=2013) KNU KNU Neutral None None 80 80 Uncommon 2.4% Don’t knowDon’t know Very uncommon Other EAOsOther EAOs “Big case” 5.1% 45% 21% 6.6% 20% Don’t know (n=2017) 60 60 51 51 5 5 4 4 43 43 40 40 3 3 0 20 40 34 34 60 80 100% 31 31 32 32 32 332 3 3 3 26 26 24 24 25 25 23 23 22 22 21 21 21 21 20 20 15 15 12 12 1 1 Fig 4.4 86 security, justice and governance in south east myanmar 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 1% .5 .5 2 2 0 0 GoM-controlled 8% Total 36%Total WomenWomen4% Men Men22% GoM- GoM-10% KNU- KNU-19% Mix- Mix- VeryNon-Karen commonNon-KarenKaren Karen People’s overall areas opinions of controlledcontrolled controlledcontrolled controlledcontrolledCommon441441 1515 “ 2% One of the most striking findings1% is that people’s31 overall311% opinions44 of all 123authorities123 have all authorities have gone up Neutral KNU controlled gone up significantly since the ceasefires were signed (Figures 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3): 55Uncommon per significantly since the 46% 26% 24% areas cent and 48 per cent of respondents said their overall opinion of the KNU and theVery uncommon ceasefires were signed, 2% %GoM% had improved, respectively, while the portion who said opinions had significantlyDon’t know signifyingMix-controlled thatFig a4.2 strongFig 4.2 100 100 5% 47% 19% 7% 19% GoM GoMMissing answer areas improved was eight per cent for both.90 Only90 ten and 12 per cent of respondents said commitment to ending KNU KNU 2% 84 84 conflict will be a key in there was no difference and few said their opinions had deteriorated or significantlyDon’t knowDon’t know Women in GoM- 80 31%80 6% 38% 12% 11% maintaining controlled popularity areas with deteriorated. This demonstrates that, despite the many imperfections of the peace the general population.” process, people in the2% survey area are supportive of efforts2% to end conflict. This should Women in KNU- 60 60 3% 32%56 56 37% 24% controlled areas be no surprise given the great suffering people endured during times of conflict. It may 47 47 1% also indicate that both authorities have improved in terms of their conduct and their 40 40 38 38 38 38 Women in mix- ability35% to provide better6% governance. Regardless,34% it is clear9% that for authorities14% to 36 36 controlled areas 27 27 maintain and25 build25 popularity with the general population,23 a strong2324 commitment24 to 20 20 20ending20 conflict will be key. 0 20 40 60 80 100% 10 10 7 7 6 6 8 8 1 1 1 1 0Figure0 5.1 How have your opinions of authorities changed since the 2012 ceasefires? 1% Men in Men in Women Womenin in Men in Men in Women Womenin in1% Men in Men in Women Womenin in Fig 5.1 GoM-controlledGoM-controlled GoM-controlled GoM-controlled KNU-controlled KNU-controlled KNU-controlled KNU-controlled mix-controlled mix-controlled Severelymix-controlled mix-controlled deteriorated villagesvillages areas areas villagesvillages areas areas villagesvillages villagesvillages GoM 12% 48% 8% 20% 9% Deteriorated No difference 1% 1% Improved Significantly improved Don’t know KNU 10% 55% 8% 14% 11% Prefer not to answer MyanmarMyanmar Police Force Police Force Missing answer 1% Fig 4.6 Fig 4.6 % % Other GoMOther body GoM body 1. 1. 20 20 Karen NationalKaren National Police Force Police Force 0 20 40 60 80 100 % Other KNUOther bod KNUy/official body/official Village TractVillage leader Tract leader 15 15 14.4 14.4 Village orVillage Village or TractVillage Tract Notably, opinions of GoM and KNU most widely improved in areassecurit controlledysecurit/justicey /appointeejustice by appointee each authority1. 1. (Figure 5.3). Seventy-six per cent1.4 of respondents1.4 livingElder in KNUElder areas said 10 10 that their opinions of the KNU had improved, while only 25 per cent said.4 the.4 same of .5 .5 the GoM (many likely have limited contact with the GoM).6.6 People6.6 in GoM-controlled 5 5 areas were3.2 much3.2 more likely to say their opinions of the3.5 GoM3.5 had improved compared 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.52.3 2.52.5 2.5 1.6 1.61.6 1.6 to the KNU. . 1.1. 1.1 .5 ..5 . .. . 0 0 GoM-controlledGoM-controlled 16 16 KNU-controlledKNU-controlled villages villages21 21 Mix-controlledMix-controlled 653 653 Figure 5.2 How have your opinions Figure 5.3 Proportion of respondents of authorities changed since 2012? in each type of territory whose opinions (Smaller armed actors) of government and KNU had ‘Improved’ Fig 5.2&3Fig 5.2&3 or ‘significantly improved’ since the 2012 ceasefires Fig 5.8 Fig 5.8

% % % % % % 50 50 80 80 50 50 4 4 SeverelySeverely deteriorated deteriorated 6 6 GoM GoM GoM GoM DeterioratedDeteriorated KNU KNU 43 43 KNU KNU 70 70 No differenceNo difference 40 40 40 40 ImprovedImproved 60 60 5 5 55 55 33 33 SigniﬁcantlySigniﬁcantly improved improved 52 52 50 50 30 30 2 2 30 30 28 28 40 40

20 20 1 1 20 20 30 30 25 25 14 14 23 23 11 11 20 20 10 10 10 10 10 10 4 4 10 10 3 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 DKBA DKBA156 156KPC KPC12 12BGF BGF125 125 GoM- GoM- KNU- KNU- Mix- Mix- …bring …bringthe benefit the benefit…cause …cause problems problems controlledcontrolledcontrolledcontrolled controlled controlled of tryingof to trying build to build by initiatingby initiating armed armed areas areas areas areas areas areas peace? peace? conflict?conflict?

Opinions of the smaller Karen armed groups, among those who had contact with them, had also improved since 2012 – but not as dramatically (Figure 5.2). Among respondents that had contact with the BGFs and DKBA, opinions of the groups only improved or significantly improved among 16 per cent and 31 per cent, respectively. In the case of the DKBA, a higher proportion said there had been no difference. saferworld · karen peace support network 87

Vice president Henry Van Thio (L), Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, former president U Htin Kyaw and vice president U Myint Swe in the front row of parliament. © Saferworld

“Only 12 per cent of BOX 5.1 Renewed conflict in Mutraw District respondents said they were In March 2018, 2,295 people from 12 villages in the KNU-defined Mutraw (Hpapun) District confident that the peace were displaced due to Tatmadaw troop movements and subsequent conflict with the KNU.97 process would lead to Tensions had been escalating in the area since December 2017, over Tatmadaw plans to sustainable peace; just two upgrade a dirt trail into a vehicle road, on the outer edge of a KNU stronghold. Eight hundred per cent said they were very Tatmadaw troops were moved into the area in February 2018, leading to 37 clashes within a confident; while 23 per cent three-week period and the killing of a Karen indigenous land defender by the Tatmadaw while said they were not confident he was transporting a KNU soldier. at all.“ The KNU stated that the Tatmadaw’s actions illustrated ‘total disregard for the NCA and demonstrates their lack of respect for the KNU as a dialogue partner’.98 The Tatmadaw has maintained that the road upgrade was for routine ‘development purposes’ and for the ‘use of the local people’, and has accused the local KNU brigade of aggression.99 Talks in May 2018 appeared to resolve the issue and the Tatmadaw agreed to postpone road % construction and (according to the KNU) to withdraw troops. However, intermittent clashes Fig 4.9 100 25 have continued since and it remains unclearDon’t know/prefer how long not the to postponementanswer will last or if displaced Prefer not to answer 18% 14% communities would feel21% safe to return.Strongly This escalation disagree of conflict is also a reminder4 that the Not recorded 3.3% Disagree Very disatisfied 80 4% ‘ceasefire areas’ referred to in the NCA remain poorly defined. Until 20military actors reach 3.8% Neutral Disatisfied agreements over ‘areas of operation’ and commit the necessary political will to 4upholding such Satisfied agreements, it is highly likely that theseAgree incidents will become more regular. Very satisfied 60 Strongly agree 15 61% 64% 58% 12 2 40 Respondents demonstrated very low confidence in the peace10 process, despite 1 the above noted support for authorities’ efforts to end conflict in general. Overall,2 only

20 12 per cent of respondents said they were confident that the peace5 process would lead 8 7% 6.8% 6.2% 6 to sustainable peace; just two per cent said they were very confident; 4while 23 per cent 12% 12% 11% 0% 0% 0.2% 1 1 0 said they were not confident at all (Figure 5.4). 0 Total Men Women KNU GoM Village tract (n=24) (n=12) authorities Figure 5.4 How confident are you that the peace process will lead to sustainable peace? (n=9) % Fig 5.4 100 1% 1% 0% 1% 2% 0% 0% 1% Prefer not to answer 23% 22% Don’t know 25% 27% 27% 25% 32% 28% Not confident at all 80 Neutral Confident 10% 12% 23% 23% 24% 60 26% 23% Very confident 33% 41% 40 39% 38% 37% 38% 36% 35%

20 28% 19% 18% 13% 13% 12% 11% 12% 2% 2% 5% 1% 2% 3% 1% 3% 1% 0 Overall GoM- KNU- Mix Non- Karen Men Women controlled controlled controlled Karen areas areas areas Fig 5.6 % % Fig 5.5 100 100 Don’t know/no answer 8% Not worried at all 97 KPSN (2018), ‘The Nightmare Returns: Karen hopes for peace and stability dashed by Burma12% Army’s actions’, April, 11% 18% 18%https://karenwomen.files.wordpress.com/2018/04/the-nightmare-returns-english-version.pdf18% 18% Not worried at all 20% Neutral 14% 98 KNU (2018). Neutral 15% Worried 80 5% 80 20% 99 Myanmar Times (2018). 13% Worried Very worried 18% 10% 15% Very worried 30% 60 18% 16% 60 19% 42% 60% 49% 50% 40 40 38% 31% 36% 40%

20 20 32% 19% 19% 14% 15% 18% 13% 10% 0 0 GoM- KNU- Mix- Overall Overall Civilian Both civilian Military controlled controlled controlled 2 41 and military 165 areas areas areas 12

Fig 5.7 % 100 Not worried at all 11% 12% 16% 20% Neutral Worried 80 15% 24% Very worried 26% 30% 60

53% 50% 40 42% 35%

16% 15% 15% 20% 0 Overall Civilian Both civilian Military 2 41 & military 165 12 88 security, justice and governance in south east myanmar

% Fig 4.9 100 25 Don’t know/prefer not to answer Prefer not to answer 18% 14% 21% Strongly disagree 4 Not recorded 3.3% Disagree Very disatisfied 80 4% 20 3.8% Neutral Disatisfied 4 Senior delegates at the Agree Satisfied Very satisfied Union Peace Conference 60 Strongly agree 15 (2017). 61% 64% 58% © Saferworld 12 2 40 10 1 2 More than 50 per cent of Confidence appears lowest in the KNU-controlled areas, where 33 per cent said they “ 20 5 8 all respondents were worried were not confident7% at all; 6.8%meanwhile, only6.2% five per cent and one per cent said they were 6 4 or very worried that fighting 12% 12% 11% confident and very0% confident, 0%respectively. 0.2%Karen people were more than twice as likely 1 1 will break out again in the 0 0 as non-KarenTotal people to beMen not confidentWomen at all, seemingly correlating with their higher KNU GoM Village tract next five years, while only (n=24) (n=12) authorities 13.5 per cent were not levels of experience with abuse lower levels of confidence in GoM than non-Karen. (n=9) % worried at all. Fig 5.4 Aside from100 women being1% more1% likely to0% say “I don’t1% know”2% than men,0% the results0% were 1% ” Prefer not to answer relatively similar across genders. 23% 22% Don’t know 25% 27% 27% 25% 32% 28% Not confident at all 80 Answers to the question “Do you worry fighting will break out again in the next five Neutral years?” showed similar trends (Figure 5.5). More than 50 per cent of all respondents Confident 10% 12% 23% 23% 24% were worried60 or very worried, while only 13.5 per cent were not 26%worried at all. Sixty-eight23% Very confident per cent of people in KNU-controlled33% areas said they were worried or very worried, 41% 40 39% most of whom were in KNU-defined Mutraw District, where fighting 38%did actually 37% 38% break out shortly after this data was collected, displacing more36% than 2,000 people35% (See box20 5.1). While intermittent fighting28% has continued since the 2012 ceasefires, 19% 18% KPSN has noted growing fears of widespread13% conflict breaking out. 13% 12% 11% 12% 2% 2% 5% 1% 2% 3% 1% 3% 1% 0 Overall GoM- KNU- Mix Non- Karen Men Women Figure 5.5 Do you worry thatcontrolled fightingcontrolled (armedcontrolled conflict)Karen will break out again in the next five years? areas areas areas Fig 5.6 % % Fig 5.5 100 100 Don’t know/no answer 8% Not worried at all 12% 11% 18% 18% 18% 18% Not worried at all 20% Neutral 14% Neutral 15% Worried 80 5% 80 20% 13% Worried Very worried 18% 10% 15% Very worried 30% 60 18% 16% 60 19% 42% 60% 49% 50% 40 40 38% 31% 36% 40%

20 20 32% 19% 19% 14% 15% 18% 13% 10% 0 0 GoM- KNU- Mix- Overall Overall Civilian Both civilian Military controlled controlled controlled 2 41 and military 165 areas areas areas 12

Fig 5.7 % 100 Not worried at all 11% 12% 16% 20% Neutral Worried 80 15% 24% Very worried 26% 30% 60

53% 50% 40 42% 35%

16% 15% 15% 20% 0 Overall Civilian Both civilian Military 2 41 & military 165 12 % Fig 4.9 100 25 Don’t know/prefer not to answer Prefer not to answer 18% 14% 21% Strongly disagree 4 Not recorded 3.3% Disagree Very disatisfied 80 4% 20 3.8% Neutral Disatisfied 4 Agree Satisfied Very satisfied 60 Strongly agree 15 61% 64% 58% 12 2 40 10 1 2

20 5 8 7% 6.8% 6.2% 6 4 12% 12% 11% 0% 0% 0.2% 1 1 0 0 Total Men Women KNU GoM Village tract (n=24) (n=12) authorities (n=9) % Fig 5.4 100 1% 1% 0% 1% 2% 0% 0% 1% saferworld · karen peace support network 89 Prefer not to answer 23% 22% Don’t know 25% 27% 27% 25% 32% 28% Not confident at all 80 % Neutral Fig 4.9 100 25 Prefer not to answer Confident Don’t know/prefer not to answer 10% 24% 12% 23% 18% 14% 23% 26% Very confident 21% Strongly disagree 4 Not recorded60 23% 3.3% 4% DisagreeFig 3.2 % Very disatisfied 33% 80 70 20 69 67 3.8% Neutral 65 Disatisfied Fig 2.13 Other armed actors 4 62 41% Agree 61 Satisfied 40 39% 38% Prefer not to answer 60 37% 38% Strongly agree Very satisfied 36% 35% 60None 15 I don’t know61% 64% 50 58% 20 28% KNU 12 2 19% 18% 40 40 10 1 13% 13% GoM 12% 11% 12% 2 2% 2% 5% 1% 2% 3% 1% 3% 1% 0 % 1.3% 1.7% 30 Overall GoM- KNU- Mix Non- Karen Men Women 100 20 1.0% 5 8 controlled controlled controlled Karen 7% 1.4%6.8% 6 7.8% 8.7% 6.2% 20 areas areas areas Fig 5.6 4 12% 12% 11% % 0% 0% 0.2% 1 1 % 80 0 20% 10 0 Fig 5.5 100 100 23% Don’t know/no answer 8% Not worried at all Total Men Women KNU GoM Village tract 12% 11% (n=24) (n=12) authorities 18% 18% 18% 18% Not worried at all 20% Neutral 0 (n=9) 14% Overall Men Women 45 Neutral 15% Worried 60 % 80 5% 80 20% 13% Worried Very worried Fig 5.4 100 38% 1% 1% 0% 1% 2% 0% 0% 1% 18% 10% 15% Prefer not to answer Very worried 45% 30% 23% 22% Don’t know 16% 40 25% 27% 27% 25% 28% 60 18% 60 32% Not confident at all 19% 42% 80 60% Neutral 49% 50% Confident 20 10% 24% 12% 23% 40 40 33%23% 26% Very confident 60 23% 36% 38% 20% 31% 40% 33% 20 20 0 41% 32% 40 39% Who do you Who do you 38% 19% 18% 19% 37% 38% 14% 15% consider want to 36% 35% 13% 10% as your govern your Prefer not to answer 0 0 government? area? Overall Civilian Both civilian Military 20 28% Not recorded GoM- KNU- Mix- Overall controlled controlled controlled 2 41 and military 165 19% 18% Very disatisfied areas areas areas 12 13% 13% Fig 2.33 12% 11% 12% 2% 2% 5% 1% 2% 3% 1% Figure3%Disatisfied 5.6 Worries1% of fighting breaking out in next Figure 5.7 Worries of fighting breaking out in next 0 Satisfied % Overall GoM- KNU- Mix Non- Karen Men five Womenyears (according to main interaction with KNU – five years (according to main interaction with GoM – 70 controlled controlled controlled Karen Very satisfied Female civilian, military or both – since 2012) civilian, military or both – since 2012) areasTotal: areas areas Fig 5.6 Male 61% 25 60% % Fig 5.7 % Fig 5.5 100 100 100 Don’t know/no answer 4 8% Not worried at all Not worried at all 12% 11% 11% 18% 18% 18% 18% 16% 12% 50 Not worried at all 20% Neutral 20% Neutral 20 14% Neutral 15% Worried Worried 80 5% 80 20%4 80 15% 13% Worried Very worried 24% Very worried 40 18% 10% 15% Very worried 26% 30% 15 30% 30% 60 18% 16% 60 60 30 19% 42% Total: 31% 12 2 60% Total: 50% 53% 20%49% 10 1 20 19% 50% 40 40 2 40 42% 38% 35% 10%31% 10% 36% 40% 10 5 8 20 20 6 20 9% 10% 32% 4 0 19% 18% 19% 20% 14% 15% 1 1 16% 15% 15% GoM KNU Mixed 13% 0 10% 0 0 KNU GoM Village 0 GoM- KNU- Mix- Overall (nOverall=24) (n=Civilian12) tractBoth civilian Military Overall Civilian Both civilian Military controlled controlled controlled 2 41 authoritiesand military 165 2 41 & military 165 areas areas areas (n=9)12 12

Fig 5.8Figure 5.8 Do any of the Continued militarisation in the ceasefire areas has seemingly played a role in sustaining authorities in your area… % these fears. There is a notable association between the extent to which respondents Fig 5.7 % 50 No data100 2% GoM described their interactions with authorities as ‘civilian’ or ‘military’ and their worries Not worried at all KNU Prefer not 11% 12% 43 16% 20% Neutral of renewed conflict (see Figure 5.6). Fifty per cent of those whose main interactions to answer 2% Worried 40 80 15% with GoM had been with civilians since 2012 were worried or very worried, compared 24% Very worried Yes26% with 73 per cent of those whose main interactions were with the military. Respondents 16% 30% 30 28 whose main interaction with the KNU was with the military were three times more I don’t know60 18% likely to be very worried than those who interacted mostly with its civilians. 53% 50% 40 42% 20 When asked about the various benefits provided by different authorities, 43 per cent 35% No 62% 11 saw the KNU as trying to build peace, while 28 per cent said the same of the GoM. 10 20 10 Eleven per cent and ten per cent recognised initiating armed conflict as a problem 16% 15% 15% 20% caused by the GoM and KNU, respectively (Figure 5.8). 0 0 Overall Civilian Both civilian Military …bring the …cause 2 41 & military 165 beneﬁt of trying problems by 12 to build peace? initiating armed conﬂict? 90

6.1 Conclusion the findings of this survey demonstrate that people in the Karen ceasefire areas continue to face severe insecurity, in the context of protracted armed conflict, routine violence, abuse and exploitation. The findings also paint a picture of extremely complex governance dynamics, which are intrinsically tied to the conflict. The KNU – which has governed parts of the region consistently since independence in 1949 – maintains a governmental presence across a widespread area, including in many areas far from the border with Thailand. The majority of villages in the survey areas appear to be influenced by both the KNU and the GoM, and in some cases other armed actors, without any official demarcation of territory or delineation of authority. While meaningful political dialogue towards federalism has been precluded by the Tatmadaw’s insistence on abidance to the 2008 Constitution, the findings of this report demonstrate that far greater effort is needed to address the many practical challenges on the ground. The survey shows that the KNU enjoys notable legitimacy among large swathes of the population in Karen ceasefire areas, predominantly among Karen people. Many explicitly liked the KNU the most, would prefer it to govern their area, and saw it as the most suitable provider of security, safety and justice, when compared with the GoM and other armed actors. People living in KNU-controlled areas were near unanimous in these views, and few showed any preference for the GoM. At the same time, however, the KNU was criticised over a number of issues – including unfair recruitment practices, use of improvised explosive devices and excessive taxation – by a significant minority of respondents (less than 20 per cent). Meanwhile, the GoM was named more than any other authority for forced labour, aggressive or inappropriate conduct, and extortion, among other issues. The legacy of violence and abuse effecting the region’s civilian population cannot be overstated, in particular the impacts of widespread and systematic practices of the Tatmadaw. With 79 per cent of households affected by violence and abuse, and targeted acts such as shootings and burning of villages each having affected more than 30 per cent of the surveyed population, there is likely severe lasting trauma. Despite experiencing fewer incidents of armed violence in recent years, communities remain subjected to heavy militarisation, ongoing violence and abuse, landmines, rising threats related to development, and new and renewed cycles of armed conflict and displacement. 92 security, justice and governance in south east myanmar

Views from the top of Mount Zwegabin Widespread support for the KNU among Karen people in the ceasefire areas seemingly (Kwekabaw) in indicates support for the principles of localised governance and self-determination. Hpa An township. © program monkey/Flickr This is significant because a belief in such desires are the main reason that Karen (https://bit.ly/2pNggrk) political leaders have long demanded a federal system of government and developed policies based on local practices, such as the KNU Land Policy. This support for the KNU among Karen people appears to be due to ethnic and linguistic ties, the embeddedness of KNU institutions in local communities, the KNU’s historical position as the primary political organisation representing Karen society, and because of ties to Karen ancestral lands. Importantly, these preferences existed despite GoM social services and development reaching roughly the same numbers of Karen respondents as social services and development from the KNU. This clearly demonstrates that investments in public services and development do not automatically translate into legitimacy being conferred by the population. Such investments are central to the stated ‘peace’ strategies of successive GoM administrations but are inextricably linked to the strategic extension of centralised control over both territory and people. The Tatmadaw has consistently downplayed the violence committed against ethnic communities, while pointing to GoM investments in development as evidence of their positive treatment of minorities and communities in the so-called ‘border areas’. The survey provides strong evidence that conflict-affected communities in Karen areas support an end to armed conflict but that confidence in the peace process and in the sustainability of ceasefires remains low. Indeed, there are no guarantees that Karen areas are on a linear path to lasting peace, amid continued militarisation, continued contestation at the local level, and very little progress towards a political solution at the national level. Firstly, a number of urgent steps are needed to ensure the basic safety of civilians. These include the immediate demilitarisation of ceasefire areas, a reduction of tensions, and the enforcement of strict regulations and accountability measures for all security forces to respect human rights. Humanitarian support is needed for refugees and internally displaced persons as well as improved protection support. Steps by all authorities, especially the government and splinter groups, are needed to end land grabs and to establish laws and implementation mechanisms for restitution of all confiscated lands. Without the demarcation of ceasefire territories that limit troop movements and allow more effective monitoring and a basis for determining violations, intermittent armed conflict will continue and a return to widespread violence will remain a constant risk. saferworld · karen peace support network 93

Consolidating the peace will then depend on the development of a more inclusive and democratic political dialogue framework that allows resolutions to be established outside of confines of the 2008 Constitution.100 Alongside this process, security sector reform is needed to create more inclusive, representative and accountable armed forces and justice institutions that can guarantee the safety of all communities in Myanmar. Interim arrangements for the period prior to a political settlement that ensure the recognition of EAO and community governance and social service systems will make ceasefires more stable, improve the well-being of conflict-affected communities, and provide space for improved governance and inclusive human development. All authorities need to take steps to enforce a moratorium on major development projects, to end land grabs, and to regulate business practices more responsibly and transparently. Transformational government reforms are needed to make the economy more inclusive, equitable and decentralised in order to end decades-old grievances linked to extraction of wealth and resources from ethnic areas to companies and individuals owned by or linked to the Tatmadaw and GoM. “All authorities also have a During the interim period, official recognition of the KNU’s laws, policies and long way to go to ensure governance will be crucial to building the genuine trust and political dialogue needed women are safe, secure, have to negotiate the establishment of a future federal and democratic union. Meanwhile, access to full opportunities the use of development, service delivery and humanitarian support to expand the and enjoy equal participation in governance. This requires GoM’s territorial control or gain influence over populations will drive conflict further. greater inclusion of women at The KNU can take significant steps to improve its governance and social service all administrative levels and delivery too, and to cooperate with CBOs and CSOs, benefitting from their capacity greater women’s participation and knowledge on women’s rights and empowerment, responsible development in local elections and decision- practices, environmental conservation, human rights promotion, and support to making. Beyond that, it relies displaced persons and migrants, among other key issues. on transformation of core policies and institutions to All authorities also have a long way to go to ensure women are safe, secure, have access tackle gender norms that to full opportunities and enjoy equal participation in governance. This requires greater perpetuate the insecurities inclusion of women at all administrative levels and greater women’s participation in and forms of marginalisation local elections and decision-making. Beyond that, it relies on transformation of core faced by women. ” policies and institutions to tackle gender norms that perpetuate the insecurities and forms of marginalisation faced by women.

100 KPSN (2018), ‘Burma’s Dead-End Peace Negotiation process: a case study of the land sector’, July, https:// progressivevoicemyanmar.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Eng-Burmas-Dead-End-Peace-Negotiation-Process-KPSN- report-web.pdf 94 security, justice and governance in south east myanmar

Finally, sustainable peace will depend on leaders and the whole country coming to terms with the sheer scale of suffering experienced by conflict-affected people, by providing formal acknowledgement to those who have suffered and survived, ensuring justice and accountability for past crimes, and systematically addressing the remaining causes of insecurity. None of the issues highlighted in this report will be easily solved and all require unprecedented political will and resolve from leaders on all sides of the conflict, to make compromises and commit wholeheartedly to ending the protracted cycle of conflict, violence, and insecurity.

6.2 These recommendations were developed in collaboration between the KPSN and Recommendations Saferworld, and draw on KPSN’s existing work and experience in a range of sectors. They are divided into recommendations for the GoM, the KNU and the international aid community.

To the Government of A. Urgent steps to ensure the basic safety of all civilians the Union of Myanmar 1. Demilitarise ceasefire areas by moving infantry, BGF and other military facilities away from communities; cease all escalatory actions and preparations for renewed offensives; decrease troop numbers and limit military contact with civilians to emergencies. 2. End impunity and enforce strict regulations on the conduct of all civilian personnel and security forces, including BGFs, to ensure protection of human rights. 3. Lift all restrictions on humanitarian assistance, guaranteeing the safety of humanitarian workers, even where EAOs are involved in, or are overseeing, delivery. 4. Avoid promoting refugees to return to ceasefire areas, in recognition that the situation is still not safe and secure, while ensuring the rights and needs of spontaneous returnees are fully upheld. 5. Continue to work with the KNU and other EAOs to demarcate territorial boundaries and further develop the code of conduct to limit the movements of armed actors to permitted areas, to allow more effective monitoring and a basis for determining ceasefire violations. saferworld · karen peace support network 95

6. End land grabs, reform land laws in line with customary practices and existing land management structures, and establish laws and implementation mechanisms for restitution of all confiscated lands.

B. Necessary steps for consolidating the peace

1. Establish a genuine federal and democratic system that devolves governance, land management and social services to state/region, district and township authorities, as appropriate, to allow policies and practices to be aligned with the customs and specific needs of the country’s diverse ethnic nationalities. 2. Commit to security sector reform to create more inclusive, representative and accountable armed forces and justice institutions that can guarantee the safety of all communities in Myanmar and that are suitable for a federal and democratic system of government. 3. Establish interim arrangements that formally and legally recognise the authority and legitimacy of the KNU and that are fully inclusive of civil society and affected communities for the period prior to the establishment of a federal and democratic system of government. 4. Work with the KNU to determine its role in the establishment of a democratic and federal Union of Myanmar, recognising that it has governed millions of the country’s citizens since independence, and is still seen as legitimate, and cannot simply be replaced through the expansion of the Myanmar state. 5. Initiate transformational reforms to make the economy more inclusive, equitable and decentralised to end decades-old grievances linked to extraction of wealth and resources from ethnic areas to companies and individuals owned by or linked to the Tatmadaw and GoM. 6. Enforce a moratorium on mega projects in ceasefire areas for the interim period and ensure all development activities adhere to the principles of free, prior and informed consent. 7. Focus peacebuilding efforts on addressing the political drivers of conflict and reducing militarisation and violence, rather than on economic development, recognising that development projects and social services alone will not bring peace or necessarily make the GoM more legitimate in the eyes of the people. 8. Address the legacy of violence and abuse faced by conflict-affected communities, by recognising the right to remedy for victims of human rights violations; publicly acknowledging and ensuring justice for past crimes; permitting independent forums, museums and memorials to be established; and investing in psychosocial support. 9. Actively promote greater inclusion and participation of women and ethnic and religious minorities in administration, justice provision and security sector governance at the village, village tract, township, state/region and union levels. This should include honouring the commitments the government made on the implementation of the National Strategic Action Plan for the Advancement of Women, in particular all the provisions in articles 13 and 14, and on the implementation of Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.

To the Karen National A. Urgent steps to ensure the basic safety of all civilians Union 1. Consult communities on the main threats to their security and improve policies and practices to further ensure their safety, and prioritise the passing and implementation of the KNU Women Protection Act. 96 security, justice and governance in south east myanmar

2. Ensure the full enforcement of all policies on humanitarian conduct, such as the ban on underage recruitment, and the informing of all local civilians on the locations of improvised explosive devices. 3. Work with INGOs and CSOs to develop and implement a comprehensive and transparent agenda for advocating on behalf of refugees and internally displaced persons, to secure continued international assistance, gain greater international commitment to finding genuine durable solutions, and avoid encouraging premature repatriation. 4. Strengthen and enforce regulations on the conduct of all KNU personnel to ensure protection of human rights. 5. Review, update and then fully enforce the KNU Humanitarian Policy to ensure all civilians have access to adequate assistance through an appropriately regulated system that avoids NGO duplication or irresponsible programmes. 6. Continue to work with the Tatmadaw to demarcate territorial boundaries and develop the code of conduct to limit the movements of armed actors to permitted areas, to allow more effective monitoring and a basis for determining ceasefire violations. 7. End all land grabs in areas of KNU influence and hold accountable all independent or KNU-affiliated individuals and companies involved; ensure that development projects are only approved once all necessary safeguards are in place.

B. Necessary steps for consolidating the peace

1. Make security sector reform a priority at peace process negotiations[18] to demand more inclusive, representative and accountable armed forces and justice institutions that can guarantee the safety of all communities in Myanmar and that are suitable for a federal and democratic system of government. 2. Work with other EAOs, the GoM and Tatmadaw to secure interim arrangements that conform to the NCA text by formally and legally recognising the authority and legitimacy of the KNU and other EAOs, and that are fully inclusive of civil society and affected communities for the period prior to the creation of a federal and democratic system of government. 3. Continue efforts to promote women’s involvement in Karen politics and local governance by developing a gender sensitivity policy, mainstreaming gender into all other policies, encouraging greater women’s participation in local elections and increasing the proportion of women representatives at all administrative levels to at least 30 per cent with particular efforts to increase the number of women village leaders. 4. Fully implement the KNU Economic Policy, with a particular focus ensuring communities have free, prior, and informed consent; and that all projects are properly regulated through transparent mechanisms. 5. Use the KNU’s influence as a prominent stakeholder in the peace process to enforce a moratorium on mega projects in ceasefire areas for the interim period and ensure all development activities adhere to the principles of free, prior and informed consent. 6. Consult communities to hear any concerns about existing taxation policies and to initiate necessary reforms to reduce the burden on communities where necessary, particularly in mix-controlled areas. 7. Continue to strengthen and improve the justice and policing systems, to reduce direct contact between military units and civilians, in line with international norms. 8. Ensure the justice procedural code is fully enforced at all levels so that crimes are consistently referred to the appropriate level and particularly that cases of gender- based violence are not minimised by the responsible authorities. saferworld · karen peace support network 97

9. Improve organisational capacities for policy-making, public consultation and community outreach, and cooperate with CBOs and CSOs to benefit from their capacity and knowledge on women’s rights and empowerment, responsible development practices, environmental conservation, human rights promotion, and support to displaced persons and migrants, among other key issues. 10. Continue to strengthen KNU departments and administrative bodies and to collaborate with CBOs and CSOs to provide education, healthcare, access to justice and social security for all people in the KNU-controlled and mix-controlled areas. 11. Develop and implement an organisation-wide policy to consult people of all ethnicities and religions and to cooperate with relevant CSOs to ensure that there is no discrimination or marginalisation of minorities within KNU-controlled and mix- controlled areas. 12. Initiate independent processes and demand that the GoM establishes nationwide processes to address the legacy of violence and abuse faced by conflict-affected communities, by publicly acknowledging and ensuring justice for past crimes; permitting independent forums, museums and memorials to be established; and investing in psychosocial support.

To the international A. Urgent steps to ensure the basic safety of all civilians community 1. End cuts to humanitarian aid for refugees in Thailand and internally displaced persons in south east Myanmar and ensure readiness for potential new displacements in the context of renewed conflict. 2. Review current approaches to supporting the peace process, with particular efforts to address asymmetry of influence that favours the Tatmadaw and GoM, provide technical capacity and resources available to less powerful stakeholders, and utilise diplomatic pressure to encourage a greater commitment from the GoM to compromise and steps towards federalism. 3. Ensure that all aid initiatives in conflict areas are conceived, implemented, and monitored with the support of – and are accountable to – local-level actors who are fully trusted by local communities.

B. Necessary steps for consolidating the peace

1. Refrain from treating Karen ceasefire areas as a post-conflict context or primarily as a development challenge. Avoid development programmes that assist unwarranted government expansion into ceasefire areas or strengthening of government institutions in areas where trust in the government remains low, recognising that neither government access nor presence of government-affiliated village leaders guarantee government control. 2. Ensure all development activities adhere to the principles of free, prior and informed consent and refrain from large-scale economic development projects in the ceasefire areas until stable interim arrangements that guarantee fully transparent, inclusive and conflict sensitive procedures are in place at the subnational level. 3. Avoid peacebuilding programmes that focus on material economic development and instead base strategies on countering the core drivers of conflict, such as by promoting decentralised and local governance, strengthening existing social service systems, supporting land restitution or assisting transitional justice efforts. 4. Recognise the legitimacy of the KNU as an important governance actor in the ceasefire area, consulting the organisation on all aid programmes and interventions in territories where it has influence. 98 security, justice and governance in south east myanmar

5. Provide aid to support the establishment of ‘interim arrangements’ by supporting the KNU and associated CBOs and CSOs to strengthen and improve their programmes and functions in the main areas of governance, security and service delivery. 6. Invest in community-led peacebuilding initiatives that improve local resilience and response to conflict and connect ordinary people to the peace process. 7. Maintain support to human rights research, documentation and advocacy, particularly to groups working in conflict areas, including women’s organisations. 8. Support moves towards transitional justice, by empowering domestic actors working on the issue, piloting initiatives aimed at publicly acknowledging past experiences, and supporting justice and accountability. 9. Support women’s organisations to promote gender sensitive policies and greater inclusion of women in decision-making at all levels, including in governance, peace negotiations and formal political institutions, particularly in conflict-affected areas.

6.3 Furthering More research is needed to understand the issues explored in this study in greater the research detail and to support efforts to find solutions. In many ways, this report raises as many agenda questions as it provides answers, demonstrating the incredible complexity of and lack of reliable information on the context. The following research questions should be explored further: n What security and justice issues do men and women consider most prevalent and concerning in ceasefire areas, and how are they different depending on gender and other power dynamics? How do they perceive the specific responses of authorities to these issues? What policies, practices, or programmes are needed to support communities and authorities to better respond to gendered issues arising and make ceasefire areas safer and more secure for women and girls and men and boys? n How can local politics, security, justice, and governance be made more inclusive, particularly of women? How can local-level elections be made more inclusive of women, particularly in communities with both GoM and KNU village leaders? Why are women less willing or able to voice preferences on governance issues, and how is this related to marginalisation in other aspects of social, economic and political life? n How are authorities and service providers at all levels preventing and responding to the multiple forms of GBV, including sexual abuse by powerful actors, intimate partner violence and girl-specific forms of GBV? What options exist for survivors of such abuse to access protection, justice and other forms of support? What are the main barriers survivors face in accessing the different types of GBV services? What works in the varied Myanmar contexts to prevent GBV and how can peacebuilding organisations include this in their work? What steps can be taken by authorities to end such violence and to ensure adequate services to survivors? n What are the experiences and perceptions of the smaller Karen armed actors among people living under their direct influence? What does this tell us about the protection needs of these communities and about the potential roles of these armed actors in a future federal union? n What are the mental health impacts of high levels of violence and abuse on communities in conflict areas? How do they differ for men and women? How prevalent is post- traumatic stress disorder and other related mental and physical health conditions, and what local approaches have been taken to help cope with or manage them? What formalised services are needed to help communities recover and how can these be delivered gender sensitively? saferworld · karen peace support network 99

n What are people’s priorities for the overall management of the country’s security sector and how can these be better included in related areas of the ongoing peace talks? n What are the most prevalent justice and criminal issues in ceasefire areas? Are issues associated with illegal narcotics on the rise, and how do they affect ordinary people? What steps can be taken by authorities to curb these threats? n How common is migration of young men and young women out of ceasefire areas for work or other reasons? Where are they going? What is the rate of return? What impact do these movements have on the political economy of ceasefire areas? n What are the impacts of such great differences in experiences and perceptions among Karen and non-Karen people in the ceasefire areas? Do tensions between communities exist, and how do these relate to the overall conflict dynamics? What are the implications of these differences for the goal of building a democratic and federal union of Myanmar? Will the impacts of electoral politics become more prominent and influential in the region over time? n How do various authorities co-exist in areas of mixed control? What are the impacts of international interventions on these dynamics, and how can this aid be delivered in a more gender- and conflict-sensitive way? n How has international aid to the region evolved over time and how much aid is currently going to the GoM-affiliated governance system versus that of the KNU? What are the impacts on the political economy over the long-term and how can aid policy be designed to support peace rather than drive conflict? n What are the risks and opportunities involved in the potential return of over a hundred thousand Karen refugees to the ceasefire region? What types of territory will they return to and how can their protection be assured? What will the impacts of such a migration be on conflict dynamics at the local level and how can problems be mitigated? 100

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Karen Human Rights Group (2014), ‘Truce or transition: trends in human rights abuses and local response in southeast Myanmar since the 2012 ceasefire’, May Karen Human Rights Group (2016), ‘Hidden strengths, hidden struggles: women’s testimonies from southeast Myanmar’, July Karen Human Rights Group (2017), ‘Foundation of fear: 25 years of villagers’ voices from southeast Myanmar’, October (http://khrg.org/sites/default/files/khrg_foundation_of_fear_ english_full_report_october_2017_w2.pdf) Karen Human Rights Group (2018), ‘Development without us’: Village Agency and Land Confiscations in Southeast Myanmar’, August Karen Peace Support Network (2018), ‘Nightmare Returns: Karen Hopes for Peace and Stability Dashed by Burma Army’s Actions’, April, (https://kesan.asia/index.php/resources/ download/13-reports/122-the-nightmare-return-karen-hopes-for-peace-and-stability- dashed-by-burma-army-s-actions) Karen National Union (2018), ‘Statement regarding the Tatmadaw’s reinforcement and activities in KNU Brigade-5 Area, Mudraw (Papun) District’, 10 May 2018 Karen Women’s Organisation (2004), ‘Shattering silences: Karen women speak out about the Burmese military regime’s use of rape as a strategy of war in Karen State’, April Karen Women’s Organisation (2007), ‘State of terror: the ongoing rape, murder, torture and forced labour suffered by women living under the Burmese military regime in Karen State’, February Karen Women’s Organisation (2010), ‘Walking amongst sharp knives: the unsung courage of Karen women village chiefs in conflict areas of Eastern Burma’, February (https:// karenwomen.files.wordpress.com/2011/11/walkingamongstsharpknives.pdf) Kempel S, Aung Tun (2016), ‘Myanmar ward and village tract administrator elections 2016: an overview of the role, the laws and the procedures’, Norwegian People’s Aid Kyed H M, Pohl Harrisson A, McCarthy G (2016), ‘Local democracy in Myanmar: reflections on ward and village tract elections in 2016’, Danish Institute of International Studies, September Kyi Pyar Chit Saw, Arnold A (2014), ‘Administering the state in Myanmar: an overview of the General Administration Department’, The Asia Foundation Land in Our Hands Network (2015), ‘Destroying People’s Lives: The Impact of Land Grabbing on communities in Myanmar’, December, (https://www.tni.org/files/article-downloads/lioh_ research_report_eng_0.pdf) McCartan B, Jolliffe K (2016) ‘Ethnic armed actors and justice provision in Myanmar’, The Asia Foundation, October Myanmar Times (2018), ‘KNU, Tatmadaw ‘ready to end clashes’’, 4 May 2018, https://www.mmtimes.com/news/knu-tatmadaw-ready-end-clashes.html MyJustice (2018), ‘Searching for justice in the law’, March (https://www.myjusticemyanmar.org/ sites/default/files/Policy%20Brief_20042018_Screen_fit_0.pdf) Oregon State University (2009), ‘Field methods in vegetation science. Locating quadrats using the grid system’ (http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/bot440/wilsomar/Content/SRS.htm) REDRESS (2018), ‘Supplement to the international protocol on the documentation and investigation of sexual violence in conflict: Myanmar-specific guidance for practitioners’, March Saferworld (2018), ‘Gendered experiences of land confiscation in Myanmar: Insights from eastern Bago Region and Kayin state’, May (https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/ publications/1175-gendered-experiences-of-land-confiscation-in-myanmar-insights-from- eastern-bago-region-and-kayin-state) Selth A (2001), Burma’s Armed Forces: Power without Glory (Norwalk: East Bridge) Smith M (1999), Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity (London: Zed Books) South A (2011), ‘Burma’s longest war: Anatomy of the Karen conflict’, March, Transnational Institute, Burma Center Netherlands South A (2012), ‘The politics of protection in Burma’, Critical Asian Studies 44 (2), pp 175–204 South A, Perhult M, Carstensen N (2010), ‘Conflict and survival: self-protection in South-East Burma’, September (https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/109464) Su Myat Mon, Kean T (2018), ‘ADB puts brakes on Kayin State quarry’, Frontier Myanmar, 2 January (https://frontiermyanmar.net/en/adb-puts-brakes-on-kayin-state-quarry) Shan Women’s Action Network (SWAN) (2002), ‘License to rape: the Burmese military regime’s use of sexual violence in the ongoing war in Shan State’, May 102 security, justice and governance in south east myanmar

Thawnghmung A (2007), The Karen Revolution in Burma: Diverse Voices, Uncertain Ends (Washington: East West Center) The Border Consortium (2002-2014), Central Karen State sections of ‘IDPs Reports’ (http://www.theborderconsortium.org/resources/key-resources/) The Nobel Foundation (2012), ‘Aung San Suu Kyi Nobel lecture’, 16 June, (https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1991/kyi-lecture_en.html) The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) (2017), ‘Report of OHCHR mission to Bangladesh: interviews with Rohingyas fleeing from Myanmar since 9 October 2016’, February (https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/ MM/FlashReport3Feb2017.pdf) The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) (2016), ‘Situation of human rights of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar’, 28 June (http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session32/_layouts/15/ WopiFrame.aspx?sourcedoc=/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session32/ Documents/A_HRC_32_18_AEV.docx&action=default&DefaultItemOpen=1) The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), ‘Documents on Myanmar’ (http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?c=125&su=129) United Nations Population Fund (2017), ‘Powerful myths hidden secrets’ (http://myanmar. unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/PowerfulMythsHiddenSecrets_EDITED.pdf) United Nations Human Rights Council (2018), ‘Report of the independent international fact- finding mission on Myanmar’, September (https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/ MyanmarFFM/Pages/ReportoftheMyanmarFFM.aspx) Women’s League of Burma (2016), ‘Shadow report on Burma for the 64th session of the committee on the elimination of discrimination against women’, July (https://tbinternet. ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/Shared%20Documents/MMR/INT_CEDAW_NGO_ MMR_24233_E.pdf) Saferworld is an independent international organisation working to prevent violent conflict and build safer lives. We work with people affected by conflict to improve their safety and sense of security, and conduct wider research and analysis. We use this evidence and learning to improve local, national and international policies and practices that can help build lasting peace. Our priority is people – we believe in a world where everyone can lead peaceful, fulfilling lives, free from fear and insecurity.

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