Twelve Years of Shifting Sands Conflict Mediation with Yemen’S Ḥūthīs (2004-2016)

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Twelve Years of Shifting Sands Conflict Mediation with Yemen’s Ḥūthīs (2004-2016)

This article analyses the interplay between conflict and mediation by using the empirical example of Yemen’s Ḥūthī conflict. By reviewing the period from 2004 to 2016, it traces how and why local and national, later regional and international mediation initiatives failed to contain the Ḥūthī crisis

Marieke Brandt

emen’s history is both splendid – have sabotaged mediated solutions and and troublesome. Historically, “Conflict impeded the restoration of stability in the social, political, sectarian and mediation has a Yemen. tribal cleavages of Yemen’s north- As the Ḥūthī crisis is still expanding, ern regions and the associated conflict long tradition in the paper does not aim at keeping pace Ypotential have periodically undermined with a rapidly unfolding situation. It the country’s stability and led to the Yemen. One of the rather aims at enhancing the reader’s outbreak of major conflicts, including, historical perspective on attempts at most recently, the revolution and civil oldest and most mediation and conflict resolution which war 1962-1970, the civil war of 1994, have taken place between spring 2004 and the Ḥūthī conflict, which erupted famous examples and summer 2016 in Yemen’s north. in 2004 and drove the country into an By contextualising the major local, do- ever-escalating cycle of violence. At the of this tradition mestic, regional, and international me- same time, however, Yemen looks back are the endeavours diation initiatives which accompanied on a long and deep-rooted tradition of the Ḥūthī conflict since its inception, it governmental and tribal conflict media- of Yemen’s first looks for the reasons for the current re- tion that has often prevented the latent grettable, but hopefully not irreversible, and virulent conflicts of this weapon- Zaydi imam.” failure of Yemen’s respected tradition in bristling country from getting out of conflict mediation. control. It is the aim of this article to analyse the interplay between conflict and mediation by using the Mediation in Yemen empirical example of Yemen’s Ḥūthī conflict. By reviewing Conflict mediation has a long tradition in Yemen. One the period from 2004 to 2016, this article traces how and of the oldest and most famous examples of this tradition why local and national, later regional and international are the endeavours of Yemen’s first Zaydi imam, Yaḥyā b. mediation initiatives failed to contain the Ḥūthī crisis. By al-Ḥusayn, whose legendary reputation stemmed from his doing so, the article argues that not only the increasing successful mediation between Yemen’s northern tribes.1 In hybridity and complexity of the Ḥūthī conflict, but also the 897 CE Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥusayn managed to establish a Zaydi lack of commitment of the warring parties and, at times, the community in Yemen when the Ṣaʿda region and large mediators’ non-compliance with fundamental prerequisites parts of Yemen’s northern highlands had for a long time of mediation – neutrality, moderation, and fairness of the been ravaged by a protracted war between different tribal mediator, and his ability to broker face-saving compromises factions (Gochenour 1984; Heiss 1989). Since the involved which leave the dignity of the parties to the conflict intact tribes found themselves unable to resolve their conflict,

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they invited Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥusayn, a member of the family of as well as the painstaking commitment of tribal leaders the Prophet and follower of the Zaydi branch of Islam, from working on their settlement. Medina to solve their conflict through mediation and arbi- Conflicts among and between the tribes are often the tration according to sharīʿa law. After having succeeded in result of violations of individual or collective honour solving the conflict, Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥusayn took up residence (sharaf) (Adra 1982: 142-144, 185-186; Dresch 1989: in Ṣaʿda city and established a kind of Zaydi state. In the 38-70; Caton 1990: 161-165; Weir 2007: 49-51). A tribes- centuries to come he and his imamic successors strived to man’s honour can be impugned by attacks on any compo- establish their rule over Yemen’s northern tribes. The Zaydi nent of his honourable self, of which three components imams’ reign, though propitiously launched, resembled one are metonymically exalted to special iconic status – dag- of constant struggle to restore discipline over rebellious gers, women and landholdings (arḍ).2 Disgrace (ʿayb) is tribes, to halt renewed intertribal hostilities, to secure what infringes honour, and any infringement of honour tribal loyalties, and to extend Zaydi influence. requires amends. The honour of an individual tribesman The tribes in Yemen, too, have well established mecha- is simultaneously part of the tribe’s collective honour nisms of conflict mediation and arbitration according and can be defended through the entire tribal solidary to tribal customary law (ʿurf). Customary law is a set of group. In case of conflict, customary law is applied by principles, rules and local precedent cases (silf) that con- way of mediation (wisāṭa) and arbitration (taḥkīm). If tains elaborate provisions on conflict management and the problem cannot be immediately solved, the shaykh facilitates the channelling of crises into negotiation (Dresch then takes from each a pledge or surety, called ʿadl (in 1989: 38-74; Weir 2007: 190-225; Brandt 2014). The tribes the form of guns, daggers, or cash). Once the pledges are hold mediation in highest esteem, and the ability to solve taken, and until the problem has been solved, the shaykhs conflicts is one of the most important capabilities of what act as “guarantors”, meaning they provide for financial all shaykhs (tribal leaders) of influence are ascribed. Taking compensation of the plaintiff and the good conduct of the example of the tribal entanglements which in 1979 led the culprits. In Yemen tribal conflict resolution retains its to the infamous qaṭāʿ Wāʾila (the great “cutting” of Yem- pivotal and rather timeless importance since the state has en’s main road leading to Saudi Arabia), which paralysed so far been unable to fully exercise its judicial authority northern Yemen and led to a Yemeni-Saudi border crisis, through the court system, as a result of which the tribal Dresch (1989: 381-387) has impressively documented the judicial system remains the predominant arena of justice enormous complexity which tribal conflicts can assume, in many rural areas (al-Zwaini 2012).

Coup de Grace (Bild: Amr Attamimi)

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The appraisal of conflict mediation does not mean that Early attempts at mediation (2004-2005) Yemen is free from conflict. Rather, the opposite is the case and reinforces the importance of domestic conflict Since its inception in 2004, the Ḥūthī conflict was accom- resolution. Throughout history, Yemen has been haunted panied by attempts at mediation, which until 2006 were by periods of war, one of the most recent examples being unable to achieve success. These early mediation initia- the 1962 revolution and the subsequent eight-year civil tives were either thwarted by the lack of political will of war that led to the overthrow of the imamate and the President ʿAlī ʿAbd Allāh Ṣāliḥ, who ruled Yemen from establishment of the then Yemen Arab Republic (YAR). 1978 to 2012, by unauthorized unilateral actions of the During the 1960s civil war the tribes played a pivotal role armed forces, or by their non-compliance with fundamen- on the royalist and republican sides and in both pursuing tal prerequisites of mediation which require the mediator’s and mediating the conflict. From all these mediation initia- neutrality, moderation, and fairness, and his ability to tives, the 1965 Khamir Conference, in particular, retains broker face-saving compromise solutions which leave the its timeless importance as a model of tribally brokered dignity of the parties to the conflict intact. ceasefire and reconciliation between the warring parties. Ṣāliḥ’s style of governance was Janus-faced. On the Its results were, however, thwarted by the involved exter- one hand, he retained his power and position through a nal state powers (Egypt and Saudi Arabia) (al-Wazīr 1965). system of patronage and co-optation which enabled him In 2004, Yemen’s Ḥūthī conflict erupted; it ultimately to comfort his allies and to appease and neutralize many became the longest and most brutal conflict of modern enemies and threats; a system that ensured a certain de- Yemen. The Ḥūthīs arose from a multi-faceted resistance gree of stability over long periods of his reign. On the movement whose predecessors began to emerge in the other hand, Ṣāliḥ was also skilled at managing conflicts 1980s. It was directed against the marginalization of Yem- as an instrument of his political survival. This second pil- en’s Zaydi-dominated extreme north by the republican gov- lar of Ṣāliḥ’s style of governance was thus based on the ernment in sectarian, economic and political terms (Brandt fomentation of crises among his enemies and rivals and the 2017). Since the turn of the millennium this movement was exploitation of these crises in domestic and foreign policy. dominated and led by members of the eponymous al-Ḥūthī The Ḥūthī conflict, in particular, helped Ṣāliḥ to extract family, notably Ḥusayn al-Ḥūthī (d. 2004) and his younger foreign (US and Saudi) support and military assistance half-brother ʿAbd al-Malik al-Ḥūthī (the current leader); (Wikileaks 15.05.2005). Phillips has dubbed Ṣāliḥ’s style their father Badr al-Dīn al-Ḥūthī (d. 2010) being one of the of governance the “politics of permanent crisis” (Phillips movement’s spiritual masterminds. Over the past decade 2011). Accordingly, Ṣāliḥ never wanted to close the Ḥūthī this conflict has expanded from a police operation against file forever because he benefited in many ways from the Ḥusayn al-Ḥūthī in a small village in Yemen’s northern existence and prolongation of this war. mountains to a war that has consumed Observers report that during the build- almost the entire country. In 2015 the up phase of the conflict before its erup- conflict drew neighbouring Saudi Arabia “During the second tion in June 2004 und during the first into unprecedented military action while weeks of combat, Ṣāliḥ put down many tipping Yemen, the Arab world’s poorest Ṣaʿda war (March- mediation initiatives independently pro- state, into mayhem and humanitarian posed by influential tribal shaykhs and crisis. April 2005) the political figures.3 In Yemen mediation Since its inception the Ḥūthī conflict, – successful mediation, in particular – is too, has been accompanied by mediation mediation attempt associated with a high gain in prestige endeavours. So far, mediators ultimately and reputation for the mediator. Already proved unable to prevent the incessant failed, because in the early 1990s it became obvious expansion of the conflict. The reasons that Ṣāliḥ often sabotaged mediated so- for this failure are manifold. On the one the government lutions by outmanoeuvring influential hand, due to the conflict’s increasingly mistook mediation tribal mediators and preventing them hybrid and multi-sided nature, the Ḥūthī from doing their job effectively. Some of conflict as a whole did not correspond to for capitulation them died in mysterious circumstances the patterns of “traditional” tribal conflict (Dresch 1995: 44). of honour and territoriality which could and confronted the Since the onset of the Ṣaʿda wars be contained and resolved through the in 2004, too, a number of particular- tribal procedures of sureties, guarantors, Ḥūthī leaders with ly competent and influential shaykhs arbitration etc. according to customary have offered to mediate in the evolv- law. Many other reasons contributed to non-negotiable ing crisis, but many of these initiatives the failure of national, regional and inter- were dismissed by Ṣāliḥ as he was ac- national mediation efforts: the conflict’s maximum demands customed to boycotting the assignment internal dynamics on the ground and its which aimed of independent mediators who had the rapid expansion and regionalization, po- format and leverage to mediate success- litical manoeuvring, spoilers on all sides, at their total fully in the regime’s home-made crises.4 and, not least, disregard for fundamental This behavioural pattern of ill-will and rules of good mediation practice. surrender.” envy towards independent mediation

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and particularly successful mediators would repeat itself Marrān and thus rendered mediation impossible (Dorlian throughout the Ṣaʿda wars: Ṣāliḥ quickly villainized me- 2013: 135). After the eruption of armed conflict in June diators, whenever they became too successful, as Ḥūthī 2004, mediation initiatives continued to fail due to uni- supporters and pushed them out of negotiations. lateral actions of the armed forces under ʿAlī Muḥsin. In Another problem surfaced since the beginning of the war June 2004, Ṣāliḥ commissioned Yaḥyā al-Ḥūthī and Ṣāliḥ in Ṣaʿda and continued to influence negotiations with the al-Wajmān to negotiate with Ḥusayn al-Ḥūthī in Marrān.5 Ḥūthīs: the solo efforts and unilateral actions of General Due to the combat operations under the command of ʿAlī ʿAlī Muḥsin, who frequently acted out of synch with the Muḥsin and heavy shelling by the Yemeni air force, Yaḥyā political leadership. General ʿAlī Muḥsin is influenced by al-Ḥūthī and Ṣāliḥ al-Wajmān, too, were unable to reach radical Sunnism. He fought the Ṣaʿda wars against insur- Ḥusayn al-Ḥūthī in Marrān and had to cancel their mis- gent Shiʿi Zaydis not only as a general in the army taking sion without having achieved anything (al-Dirwānī 2013: orders to fight rebels, but rather by conviction and on 99-100). religious and ideological grounds (Salmoni et al. 2010: Between July and September 2004 step by step further 93). His inclination to unilateral action and his ability to members were added to this proto-committee consisting of spoil negotiations at will became evident since the first Yaḥyā al-Ḥūthī and Ṣāliḥ al-Wajmān. Its work was (deliber- mediation attempts which clustered around the opening ately?) hampered by the fact that the government appointed phase of the conflict and continued to do so during the far too great a number of people as mediators (at the end years to come. of the first war this committee comprised 34 persons) who The first mediation between the government and the were to work all together in the same team. All of them Ḥūthīs materialized in spring 2004, shortly before the had a partisan background: They were politicians of vari- eruption of armed conflict. The government assigned the ous hues, shaykhs, ministers, religious scholars, ex-generals, religious scholar Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Manṣūr etc. It turned out to be impossible to find a common un- (d. 2016, member the High Committee of the Zaydi Ḥizb derstanding within the team, let alone to broker a deal be- al-Ḥaqq party and Deputy Mufti of the Republic) as media- tween Ḥusayn al-Ḥūthī and the government. The committee tor. He travelled three times to the Ṣaʿda area but his en- members rather worked at cross-purposes and neutralized deavours were in vain because, as he explained, “Wahhabi each other reciprocally. In order to remain manoeuvrable, presidential advisers” – that is, General ʿAlī Muḥsin and sub-teams were established and sent out to various missions his aides – prevented his passage to Ḥusayn al-Ḥūthī in to Marrān. With one exception, these subcommittees, too,

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were unable to reach Ḥusayn al-Ḥūthī in time the presidential and local elec- Marrān as combat operations were in full “His local tions scheduled for September 2006 lay swing and ʿAlī Muḥsin refused to imple- knowledge and ahead, in which the people of Ṣaʿda, too, ment a ceasefire as prerequisite for any would cast their votes on the continua- mediation (al-Dirwānī 2013: 104-105; moderation, his tion of Ṣāliḥ’s long-term presidency and ICG 2009: 20). the composition of Ṣaʿda’s local council. After the death of Ḥusayn al-Ḥūthī skilful conduct Hence, at this juncture “time was ripe” on 10 September 2004 and the end of because the Yemeni government was the first Ṣaʿda war, for a few months his of negotiation, under pressure to bring the situation in aged father Badr al-Dīn took the lead of Ṣaʿda at least temporarily under control, the rebellion, after which, during the his ability to in order to hold the presidential elec- second Ṣaʿda war, the leadership was tions and to ensure Ṣāliḥ’s retention of transferred to Ḥusayn’s younger half- broker face-saving power, proving the proverb that where brother ʿAbd al-Malik. In the interim solutions which there’s a will, there’s a way. period between the first and the second For this reason, the government ap- war the rare opportunity of direct talks left the dignity of pointed for the first time a mediator who between the presidency and the Ḥūthī possessed the required credibility and leadership was missed because Ṣāliḥ re- both parties intact, leverage among all stakeholders in the fused to receive Badr al-Dīn in the capi- conflict. The chairman of the mediation tal Ṣanʿāʾ. Shortly thereafter the second and not least his committee, Brigadier General Yaḥyā Ṣaʿda war erupted. Muḥammad al-Shāmī, was a military of During the second Ṣaʿda war (March- understanding Hashemite descent who held the position April 2005) the mediation attempt of governor of al-Baydāʾ. He had been of a government-appointed group of for the Ḥūthīs’ governor of Ṣaʿda in the 1980s and was scholars and shaykhs headed by Judge grievances enabled familiar with the area and its people. Aḥmad Muḥammad al-Shāmī (leader of His local knowledge and moderation, his the Zaydi Ḥizb al-Ḥaqq party and mem- him to successfully skilful conduct of negotiation, his ability ber of the Consultative Council) failed, to broker face-saving solutions which because the government mistook me- negotiate the left the dignity of both parties intact, diation for capitulation and confronted and not least his understanding for the the Ḥūthī leaders with non-negotiable first contractual Ḥūthīs’ grievances enabled him to suc- maximum demands which aimed at cessfully negotiate the first contractual their total surrender. Moreover, dur- ceasefire.” ceasefire (ṣulḥ) between the warring par- ing this “mediation” the government ties on 23 February 2006. used a blatantly inappropriate and in- Yaḥyā al-Shāmī was able to wring sulting tone and demanded the “surrender to justice” of major concessions from both the Ḥūthīs and the govern- the “misguided elements” (26 September, 07.04.2005). ment and to initiate a cautious process of rapprochement The “Intellectual Dialogue Committee” headed by judge (Dorlian 2011: 182-201). In recognition of his services to Ḥamūd al-Hitār foundered, too. Ḥamūd al-Hitār had the ending of the third war and to the negotiation of the directed the re-doctrination and de-radicalization pro- very firstṣulḥ , Yaḥyā al-Shāmī was appointed governor of gramme for Sunni Islamist extremists, including members Ṣaʿda governorate. His inauguration ushered in a period of al-Qāʿida, which had gained international recognition of several months of détente. After the 2006 presidential in the wake of 9/11 (Bonnefoy 2006). Without getting in- elections, however, the Ṣāliḥ regime again began to rein volved in the local and sectarian context of the rebellion in things in, tensions quickly increased and culminated in Ṣaʿda, al-Hitār lumped together Zaydi Ḥūthī loyalists and May 2008 in the fourth Ṣaʿda war. The breakdown of al-Qāʿida-affiliated Sunni extremists. Observers opined that the 2006 ṣulḥ gambled away a unique and probably the al-Hitār had no credibility among the Ḥūthīs because he last opportunity for a domestic settlement of the conflict. was affiliated with Salafism, closely tied to the Ṣāliḥ regime Although further significant mediation initiatives would and not mandated to negotiate, but merely to repeat Ṣāliḥ’s take place in the future, three of them brokered by Qatar, demands.6 The annoyed Ḥūthī counterpart interpreted the none of these initiatives was able to arouse the same hopes offensive rhetoric, the non-negotiable maximum demands and the same commitment among the Ḥūthīs and the local and the refusal of the military leadership to establish a population as the 2006 ṣulḥ. ceasefire during the mediations as an evidence of bad faith and responded with cancellation of the talks. The three Doha Agreements (2007, 2008, 2010) The first and second Ṣaʿda war had been decided by military The first ṣulḥ (2006) defeat (ḥasm) of the Ḥūthīs, the third war ended by contrac- The first successful mediation initiative between the tual ceasefire (ṣulḥ) brokered by Yaḥyā al-Shāmī. From the government and the Ḥūthīs took place at the end of the fourth war onwards the situation on the ground changed third Ṣaʿda war (November 2005-February 2006). At that profoundly: The Ḥūthīs no longer acted from a position of

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weakness but rather from a position of strength. They had of reconstruction and development assistance for Ṣaʿda, developed their strategic and tactical skills and acquired which wisely should be disbursed only after implementa- weapons, and the armed forces’ brutal and arbitrary actions tion of the ceasefire agreement. At the core of the agree- had driven many new followers into their arms. The times ment was Qatar’s pledge to finance reconstruction and in which the government was able to decide the war by launch major development projects in Ṣaʿda, possibly to the military defeat of the Ḥūthīs were definitely over. tune of USD $300 million-$500 million, although figures Confronted with the increasing military strength of the were never released (ICG 2009: 22). Ḥūthīs, from the fourth war onwards the Yemeni govern- Both sides were initially working to implement the cease- ment systematically began to enlist tribal militias – most fire provisions. Yet Doha I ultimately failed because on all of them from ʿAmrān’s Ḥāshid tribes – and Sunni radicals sides – government, armed forces, Ḥūthīs, tribes – radical and threw them into battle in Ṣaʿda.7 Governor Yaḥyā groups and spoilers had emerged who rejected any kind al-Shāmī, who had brokered the 2006 ṣulḥ, was sacked of compromise and political deal and instead insisted on and replaced by anti-Ḥūthī hardliner Muṭahhar al-Miṣrī. military solutions and total defeat of the enemy. Ṣāliḥ’s and By confluence of these factors a hybrid, explosive conflict ʿAbd al-Malik al-Ḥūthī’s public commitments to the Doha situation emerged that bore little resemblance to the initial Agreement had little influence on these spoilers, let alone conflict situation in 2004. Tribal feuding, the emergence of the countless feuds and revenge issues raging throughout a war economy, domestic political intrigues, foreign med- the conflict zone which had arisen from or been aggravated dling, and the growing sectarian momentum of the conflict by the violence of the war. began to develop inexorable dynamics. On both sides In November 2007, the deteriorating security situation powerful groups of spoilers emerged who undermined the and the mounting problems nationwide, especially the implementation of every subsequent agreement between unrest in Yemen’s south, led to the reinvigoration of the the warring parties. stalled Qatari mediation efforts. In February 2008 the Sec- Acting on US proposal, for the first time a foreign me- ond Doha Agreement (Doha II) was signed, which was es- diator stepped in: Qatar. Qatar appealed to a number of sentially based on the ceasefire conditions of Doha I. Doha actors within Yemen’s political arena because of its deep II, too, did not have much impact on the ground. After its pockets and (in comparison to Saudi Arabia) less histori- conclusion, both the Ḥūthīs and the Yemeni government cal baggage in Yemen. Qatar’s largesse to offer financial took a step here and a step there in order to demonstrate incentives (the so called “carrots”) to the warring parties their goodwill. Yet soon the implementation reached again positioned it well to mediate in Yemen’s major conflict a deadlock, each side blaming the other for the failure. (Peterson 2006: 733-748; Kamrava 2011: 539-556). Qatar Given the failure of implementation, Qatar’s pledges in has always mediated in regional conflicts to the envy of reconstruction assistance for Ṣaʿda province were still Saudi Arabia which has often thwarted held back. Another point of contention Qatar’s efforts. Now Qatar was meddling was that Ṣāliḥ apparently had insisted in Saudi Arabia’s hypersensitive files in “Doha I ultimately on these funds being controlled by the Yemen – hence Qatar’s wish to avoid Yemeni government, while the Qataris publicity until a deal was done. The Qa- failed because felt that there were too many Yemeni tari mediation was rather going through officials with authority to access funds secret channels. On 16 June 2007, after on all sides – without sufficient accountability. The two months of negotiations, the signing episode caused a great deal of friction of a Qatar-brokered ceasefire agreement government, armed between the two governments (Barakat between the Ḥūthīs and the government, 2014: 15). known as the First Doha Agreement (or forces, Ḥūthīs, In July/August 2010, five months after Doha I), brought the fourth Ṣaʿda war the end of the sixth and last “official” to an end. tribes – radical Ṣaʿda war, when the Ḥūthīs kept expand- The First Doha Agreement provided groups and spoilers ing their sphere of influence and literally nine provisions which aimed at estab- overran Sufyān in northern ʿAmrān, the lishing a ceasefire rather than conflict had emerged who Yemeni government tried to reinvigorate resolution (Kamrava 2011). These in- the stalled Qatari mediation efforts in cluded, inter alia, the Ḥūthīs’ agreement rejected any kind Ṣaʿda for the third time. Qatar reluctant- to vacate their strongholds and to turn ly sponsored another meeting in Doha. in captured medium and heavy weapons. of compromise and The Third Doha Agreement (Doha III) The government was committed to de- hammered out a 22-point agenda that clare an amnesty and launch Qatari-sup- political deal and would guide both sides to meeting obli- ported reconstruction projects in Ṣaʿda. gations under the February 2010 truce The agreement provided safe haven (or: instead insisted on which ended the sixth war and had been exile) for ʿAbd al-Malik al-Ḥūthī, Yaḥyā military solutions thwarted by violence from both sides. al-Ḥūthī, ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Ḥūthī, and An additional goal of the Ḥūthīs was to Ḥūthī field leader ʿAbd Allāh al-Razzāmī and total defeat of obtain the release of around 1,000 pris- in Qatar. To help sweeten the deal for oners. The government agreed to meet both sides, Qatar pledged a huge amount the enemy.” this demand, and in return the Ḥūthīs

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agreed to surrender captured government weapons to Qa- known is that Fāris Manāʿ also was a skilled, successful tari mediators (Terrill 2011; Kamrava 2011: 550-552). and immensely influential tribal mediator commanding None of these provisions has been seriously implemented; enormous hayba (prestige) and nufūdh (influence) among Doha III proved to be irrelevant. the tribes of Ṣaʿda. Fāris Manāʿ was an insider mediator, a type of mediator that is generally known as the “insider- partial” as opposed to the “outsider-neutral”. One of non- Local emergency mediation (2008, 2009) official mediators’ greatest strengths is that they are more agile than official mediators. Non-official mediators have But back to Doha II of February 2008: After the failure more room for manoeuvre, the advantage of not having of the Second Doha Agreement, the crisis area lurched to rely on a long chain of command and the mind-sets and towards the fifth Ṣaʿda war. The fifth Ṣaʿda war (May 2008- over-complex mandates of states and inter-governmental July 2008) was a rather brief episode of two months but organizations. in many respects fateful for the future: The Ḥūthīs delib- Indeed, Fāris Manāʿ and his team succeeded to broker a erately began to expand and forcefully pressed from Ṣaʿda ceasefire (hudna) between the government and the Ḥūthīs, governorate into the governorates of ʿAmrān, Ḥajja, and which allowed for the safe withdrawal of the besieged 17th al-Jawf. Banī Ḥushaysh at the outskirts of the capital near Infantry Brigade from Marrān. Despite his success – or Sana’a International Airport became embroiled in deadly precisely because of it – Fāris Manāʿ nonetheless had to fighting. A particularly worrisome development was the face harsh criticism. After the deal was done, the govern- continued siege of large military units by Ḥūthī forces. In ment reproached him for having obliged the armed forces the Marrān mountains, where the Ḥūthīs were besieging to withdraw from Marrān, but not obliging the Ḥūthīs to hundreds of soldiers and officers of the 17th Infantry Bri- withdraw, too, and thus ultimately enabling the Ḥūthīs to gade, a disaster continued to unfold. By June 2008, the extend their control over the whole of Marrān. Brigade was about to surrender to the Ḥūthī forces. The For the Yemeni army the sixth and last “official” Ṣaʿda army would never have recovered from this defeat. The war (August 2009-February 2010) – officially called “Op- situation took such a dramatic turn that Ṣāliḥ agreed to the eration Scorched Earth” – would have generated into disas- offer of an independent local mediation team composed of ter without the intervention of the Saudi Air Force. Rather tribal shaykhs from the Ṣaʿda area chaired by Fāris Manāʿ. than a swift and decisive “Scorched Earth” operation, the Fāris Manāʿ was one of the wider region’s biggest arms army’s performance in the sixth war resembled a ponder- dealers, who for many years maintained good (and highly ous, hapless, nerve-wracking stop-and-go process which profitable) relations to the Ṣāliḥ government. Yet, by 2008, repeatedly got stirred up deliberately and was slowed down this once close relation was already in shatters.8 Less well by political manoeuvring.

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During the sixth war, the Ḥūthīs expanded along the whole to the Ṣaʿda war. Consequently, after the London Confer- common border with Saudi Arabia (the so-called 1934 ence the final negotiations between Ṣāliḥ and ʿAbd al-Malik Ṭāʾif Line which spans from the Red Sea to Jabal al-Thaʾr al-Ḥūthī set in. Yet, surprisingly, the sixth war was not near Najrān) and again managed to besiege a military bri- ended by contractual peace (ṣulḥ) but rather by verbal gade in Marrān. Again Fāris Manāʿ acted as mediator and “communication” (tawāṣil) of the parties to the conflict and brokered a deal which enabled the soldiers to withdraw Ṣāliḥ’s sudden decision on 11 February 2010 to suspend unharmed from Marrān. According to the terms of the deal, hostilities. The sixth and last “official” Ḥūthī war ended all soldiers were released along with their personal weap- with a stalemate: Contrary to official statements, there ons, but the Ḥūthīs kept the brigade’s heavy weaponry. was no written agreement and no document between the The consequences soon became clear when two Yemeni parties to the conflict which would set a seal on their last fighter jets crashed in the following days, likely because ceasefire. The war only paused, changing to standby mode. the Ḥūthīs had obtained anti-aircraft guns as a result of the deal Fāris Manāʿ struck with them in Marrān (Wikileaks 12.10.2009). A few months later, in October 2009, Ṣāliḥ GCC-Initiative, NDC, and PNPA (2011-2014) blacklisted Fāris Manāʿ and threw him into prison. Fāris’ With the eruption of the popular uprisings in 2011, the defeat was, however, provisional. In March 2011, after the Ḥūthī conflict began to marble into the variety of other na- Ḥūthīs’ power seizure in Ṣaʿda, he rose from the ashes and tional crises: the secessionist Ḥirāk movement in the south; became governor of Ṣaʿda. intra-regime struggles between the Ṣāliḥ regime and Sunni Islamists; the fight against corruption; partisan, sectarian, civil society, feminist and youth movements, etc. The dy- Mediation during the Sixth Ṣaʿda War (2009-2010) namics of the Ḥirāk movement, in particular, developed an The combat operations and aerial bombardments of the enormous impact on Yemen’s political landscape (Dahlgren sixth war led to a major humanitarian catastrophe with 2010). We will continue to focus on how mediation has 250,000 internally displaced persons. Foreign governments handled the specific issue of the Ḥūthī movement within and humanitarian organizations increased the pressure the dynamics of the larger Yemeni crisis. on the parties to the conflict to stop the war. A flurry of With the eruption of the “Arab Spring” or “Change Revo- domestic and foreign mediation initiatives overlapped, yet lution” in Yemen, a range of complex and potentially vio- were unable to stop the war except for a few days or even lent issues began to merge on the national level. Alliances hours. In addition to the localized emergency mediation shifted suddenly and surprisingly, opening the space for by Fāris Manāʿ, several mediation initiatives by foreign new political moves and coalitions. The multitude of issues sides sympathetic to the Ḥūthīs were launched during the raised in Yemen’s Change Revolution rendered the rapidly sixth war, all of them having been turned down by the changing contexts of conflict in Yemen increasingly multi- Yemeni government: Iraq’s Shiʿi leader Muqtadā al-Ṣadr layered and complex. Dialogue and mediation in this fluid, and Hezbollah Secretary General Ḥasan Naṣrallah offered fragmented context henceforth bore resemblance to the to mediate in the war between the Yemeni government Sisyphean – and quite often futile – task of “herding cats”.9 and the Ḥūthīs but were refused by Ṣāliḥ. Also, Iranian On 23 November 2011, after much prevarication, Presi- Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki confirmed Iran’s dent Ṣāliḥ left office under the terms of a “transition agree- readiness to mediate, but the Yemeni government rejected ment” mediated by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). any “Iranian tutelage” in Yemen (Mareb This so called GCC Initiative forced Press 11.11.2009). Ṣāliḥ to resign, regulated the transfer During the first three months of the of presidency to former vice president sixth Ṣaʿda war, the Ḥūthīs clearly had “The multitude of ʿAbd Rabbuh Manṣūr Hādī, and outlined the upper hand. Only after the entry of a UN-sponsored transition roadmap that Saudi Arabia into the war in November issues raised in included three principal tasks: holding 2009, provoked by violations of the in- Yemen’s Change a National Dialogue Conference (NDC) ternational boundary, did the Ḥūthīs with the goal of producing recommenda- begin to show readiness for talks. The Revolution tions for a new constitution to be writ- government, however, strengthened ten and approved before elections were by the Saudi air support, redoubled its rendered the to be held in February 2014; addressing commitment to a military solution in issues of transitional justice; and reform- Ṣaʿda. When Saudi Arabia reduced the rapidly changing ing the armed forces (Carapico and Phil- air strikes in Ṣaʿda in January 2010 and brick Yadav 2014; Lackner 2016). By declared “victory” over the Ḥūthīs the contexts of doing so, the GCC Initiative aspired to a conditions were ripe for political nego- settlement of Yemen’s multiple national tiations between Ṣāliḥ and ʿAbd al-Malik conflict in Yemen crises. al-Ḥūthī . During the International Con- increasingly On 18 March 2013, the NDC com- ference of the Friends of Yemen in London menced which involved representa- in January 2010, the Yemeni govern- multi-layered and tives of all political parties, civil society, ment came under further US and donor Southern Movement, Ḥūthīs, women, pressure to reach a negotiated solution complex.” youth groups etc. in order to discuss

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the country’s problems and facilitate a newly appointed cabinet resigned. In peaceful transition (Schmitz 2014; Lack- “Yet after February 2015, Hādī escaped to Aden ner 2016). The Ḥūthīs’ position towards conclusion of and rescinded his resignation. The the GCC Initiative and their participation Ḥūthīs dissolved the parliament, took in the NDC was initially ambivalent. The the NDC in over Yemen’s government institutions Ḥūthīs rejected the GCC Initiative, in and established a “Revolutionary Com- whose negotiation they had not been January 2014, the mittee” to assume the powers of the involved. Yet, despite their immense res- presidency, Muḥammad ʿAlī al-Ḥūthī, a ervations, they participated in the NDC, transition process relative of ʿAbd al-Malik al-Ḥūthī, act- justifying their politically inconsistent ing as its head. position on the grounds that the NDC slowed down and On 15 February 2015 the UN Security had “greater legitimacy” than the GCC Council issued resolution 2201 which Initiative, and that the idea of having a political decision condemned the Ḥūthīs’ unilateral ac- dialogue was not a result of the GCC Ini- making – the tions and demanded that they uncondi- tiative but rather a human and national tionally engage in good faith in UN-bro- need (Brandt 2018). drafting of the kered negotiations and withdraw their The NDC produced nearly two thou- forces from government institutions.11 sand recommendations which aimed country’s planned In March 2015, Hādī fled from Aden to to tackle the political crisis. Yet after Saudi Arabia; his government has since conclusion of the NDC in January 2014, federal system, in been mainly based in Riyadh. Upon re- the transition process slowed down and quest of Hādī, on 26 March 2015 Saudi political decision making – the drafting particular – began Arabia, spearheading a coalition of nine of the country’s planned federal system, Arab states, began a bombing campaign in particular – began to follow again the to follow again dubbed “Operation Decisive Storm” old exclusive patterns (Lackner 2016). the old exclusive against the Ḥūthīs and their allies from The Ḥūthīs accused Hādī of not imple- among Ṣāliḥ’s former ruling party and menting the NDC outcomes and of de- patterns.” security apparatus. laying the transition process. The fronts On 14 April, UN Security Council hardened, tensions intensified, threats issued resolution 2216 calling on the became conflict, and the Ḥūthīs – now allied with their Ḥūthīs to withdraw from the capital, relinquish captured former arch nemesis Ṣāliḥ against Hādī – continuously arms, and cease all actions falling within the authority expanded their military dominance and marched on Ṣanʿāʾ. of the “legitimate” Hādī government. The resolution also Numerous locally limited covert and overt mediation ini- called on all Yemeni parties to abide by the GCC Initiative tiatives took place to stop their territorial advance in and the NDC outcomes “to continue the political transition ʿAmrān’s tribal-military environment. A number of local- in order to reach a consensus solution.” 12 Oddly enough, ised ceasefire deals were mediated and broken during this resolution 2216 called only on “Yemeni parties” to end period, with the Ḥūthīs largely using ceasefire agreements the use of violence. There was no mention of the Saudi-led to reposition and improve the terms the government and bombing campaign, which continued to turn Yemen into others were offering (Salisbury 2015). Consequently, many rubble, and the maritime, air, and land embargo, which began to see mediators as the ones who were helping the aimed at starving Yemen into submission. Ḥūthīs to gain ground and achieve victories without fighting. By autumn 2014, the Ḥūthīs had established a military stranglehold on the capital, which they eventually seized UN negotiations (2015, 2016) in September 2014 with the help of allies in security ap- After three months of Saudi-led bombing campaign in paratus, parts of which were still loyal to Ṣāliḥ. Yemen, UN-sponsored negotiations between the exiled After the Ḥūthīs had gained control in Ṣanʿāʾ, on 21 Hādī government and the Ḥūthī/Ṣāliḥ side set in. In 2015 September 2014 the Ḥūthīs, President Hādī, UN Special and 2016 three rounds of negotiations took place: June Adviser on Yemen Jamal Benomar, and representatives of and December 2015 in Geneva and Biel (Switzerland), and various political groups and movements signed the “Peace April-May 2016 in Kuwait. In these UN-brokered negotia- and National Partnership Agreement” (PNPA) which em- tions, the Yemen-wide all-inclusive dialogue required by phasized inclusiveness and transparency and stipulated GCC Initiative, NDC and PNPA had again narrowed to the the formation of a technocratic unity government, which binary Hādī and Ḥūthī/Ṣāliḥ representatives, and excluded would also represent the Ḥūthīs and members of the Ḥirāk other key actors from the negotiations and the UN-backed movement, who had been marginalized in the transitional peace process in general. The UN-talks involved only a process after the NDC.10 After the agreement, a new cabinet small subset of critical stakeholders, without taking into headed by Prime Minister Khālid Baḥāḥ was formed. But account Yemen’s other multiple crises. even the PNPA was unable to soften the hardened positions As the most global of intergovernmental organisations, of Hādī and the Ḥūthīs and bring the stalled transition the UN is often considered the most legitimate actor to process back on track. Cornered and literally beleaguered lead the mediation of national and international peace by the ever bolder Ḥūthīs, in January 2015 Hādī and the processes. Yet precisely this strength also generates its

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weakness: UN missions operate under UN Security Council demands of the respective government since the beginning mandates that impose strict limits on envoys’ roles. Not of mediations in the Ḥūthī conflict in 2004, and obviously only is the Security Council often divided between its veto- neither the GCC Initiative, NDC, and PNPA, nor the sheer wielding permanent members, but it has also been prolific power constellation on the ground in Yemen had changed in approving ambitious mandates while later proving the respective government’s imperious conduct towards unwilling to provide the sustained political pressure and/ them. During the UN-negotiations, Hādī and his delegation or resources the missions or envoys on the ground need seemed intent on defining the terms of the Ḥūthīs’ surren- for their implementation (Antonini et al. 2009). The lack der rather than achieving a political settlement that would of general understanding of the UN’s internal structure by lead to equal representation of all the country’s factions conflict parties can also hamper its role as a mediator. In in a future government (vom Bruck 2015). the Yemen case, the Ḥūthīs had a problem with regarding Another factor for the failure of the UN talks was that the UN as “honest broker”, because they found it hard to the humanitarian ceasefires requested by the UN for the differentiate between the role of the UN Security Council time of the negotiations had little effect on the ground (which in November 2014 had imposed sanctions on two (al-Maghafi 2015). Neither the cessation of hostilities nor of their leaders plus former President Ṣāliḥ and giving a set of so called “confidence-building” measures were “legitimacy” solely to the exiled Hādī government) and implemented. On the contrary, during the negotiations the the mediation role of UN Special Envoy to Yemen, Ismail fighting even intensified. The Ḥūthīs continued to expand Ould Cheikh Ahmed.13 militarily and besiege their enemies, and the Saudis, ap- The three UN-brokered consultation rounds were marked parently out of synch with the Hādī government, continued by the dispute over weighting of UN resolution 2216 and to shell targets all over Yemen’s highlands. Each however PNPA. The Hādī delegates insisted that they were not cautious and fragile rapprochement at the negotiation willing to negotiate but rather wanted to implement UN table became promptly nullified by gross violations of the resolution 2216, which stipulates the Ḥūthīs withdraw ceasefire. The peace talks seemed disconnected from the their forces from all areas they have seized, including the dynamics on the ground. capital Ṣanʿāʾ, and relinquish all captured arms (vom Bruck By April 2016, at the time of the Kuwait negotiations, the 2015; Schmitz 2015 and 2016). In other words, the Hādī war had already killed more than 6,200 people (locals put delegation insisted that the Ḥūthī forces withdraw first, the dark figure much higher), wounded more than 35,000 especially from the Yemeni capital, hand over weapons and and displaced millions (Ghobari 2016). The Ḥūthīs had recognize President Hādī’s legitimacy as part of resolution endured thirteen months of a withering Saudi-led bombing 2216, before talks on a political settlement of the conflict campaign that was among the deadliest and most indiscrimi- can set in. nate in the region’s recent history. Ḥūthīs and Saudis were The Ḥūthī/Ṣāliḥ delegation, in con- beginning to face enormous problems. trast, categorically refused to accept UN The Ḥūthīs still held sway in northern resolution 2216 as the single basis for and central Yemen, but their dominion the talks. They instead insisted that the “The Ḥūthīs had resembled a shambles. The Saudis came GCC Initiative, the NDC outcomes and a problem with under pressure of the international com- particularly the PNPA of October 2014, munity and the UN who wanted the war signed by Ḥūthīs, representatives of the regarding the to come to an end. Moreover, the war Hādī government and UN Special Ad- was costing them a lot of money at a viser on Yemen, Jamal Benomar, form UN as “honest time of belt-tightening at home. The UN the basis of the negotiations. The PNPA, and foreign diplomats exerted additional we recall, emphasizes inclusiveness and broker”, because pressure by telling both sides that no one transparency and stipulated the prompt would be allowed to leave Kuwait with- formation of an inclusive unity govern- they found it hard out an agreement (Ghobari 2016). ment, including Ḥūthīs and members of In this context Hādī’s sudden deci- the southern secessionist Ḥirāk move- to differentiate sion to reshuffle the cabinet and replace ment, who had been excluded from the between the role prime minister and vice president Khālid GCC Initiative and marginalized in the Baḥāḥ (who had favoured a political resulting transitional process. In es- of the UN Security settlement) with hardliner General ʿAlī sence, the Ḥūthīs in principle declared Muḥsin (who had led the six Ṣaʿda wars their willingness to withdraw from the Council and the against the Ḥūthīs and was forced into capital and deliver captured weapons, Saudi exile in 2014) was a particularly but only after a political solution based mediation role of negative signal. From 2004 to 2010 ʿAlī on the NDC outcomes and the PNPA had Muḥsin had continued to sabotage me- been developed. UN Special Envoy diations and ceasefires with the Ḥūthīs The Hādī delegation’s relapse into a by unauthorized unilateral actions. The language of capitulation rather than to Yemen, Ismail timing and substance of ʿAlī Muḥsin’s power sharing went down very badly Ould Cheikh appointment as prime minister and vice with the Ḥūthīs since they had been con- president was an outrageous message to fronted with non-negotiable maximum Ahmed.” the Ḥūthī/Ṣāliḥ side and also to the UN

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and the international community at a who managed to expand enormously time when the conflict parties were re- “During the UN- during the Operation Decisive Storm, quired to negotiate, implement a cease- negotiations, Hādī would have been tantamount to an in- fire and discuss a more inclusive govern- citement to suicide, in fact. ment through UN-sponsored talks. and his delegation In July 2016, the UN-negotiations The UN-brokered negotiations seemed were postponed indefinitely after hav- particularly affected by the hardening seemed intent on ing failed to produce results. Still, the of attitudes, the hatred and the utter position of the Hādī delegation had lack of confidence between the conflict- defining the terms become entrenched by its international ing parties. The UN had to shoulder the recognition as Yemen’s “legitimate” difficult legacy of twelve years of failed of the Ḥūthīs’ government and its uncompromising mediations and broken ceasefires which hard-line interpretation of UN reso- on the part of the Ḥūthīs gave rise to surrender rather lution 2216, while the rival Ḥūthī/ insurmountable distrust and the abso- than achieving a Ṣāliḥ camp remained emboldened by lute will never to cease their weapons their continued grip on Ṣanʿāʾ and the in front of their enemies who – with political settlement exile government’s inability to regain few interruptions – had exposed them the territory. The tragedy of these ne- since 2004 to withering air raids. The that would gotiations was that both parties basi- uncompromising harshness with which cally agreed on the measures that were the Ḥūthīs resisted their disarming lead to equal needed to resolve the conflict – cease- has also to be seen against the back- fire, stability of borders, handover of ground that the UN negotiations left un representation of captured weapons, release of prison- addressed Yemen’s other conflicts and ers, restoration of state institutions, violent groups. To force the Ḥūthīs to all the country’s resumption of inclusive political dia- disarm without simultaneously disarm- factions in a future logue and formation of an inclusive ing their archenemies of the Salafis, the government as outlined by the PNPA –, Islamic State and al-Qāʿida in Yemen, government.” but that the bitter struggle for the

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sequencing of the solution (first withdrawal of the Ḥūthīs 2014: 119). In this respect, the record of the Ṣāliḥ govern- or first political solution?) became the all-important ques- ment was dubious, at least. tion which determined who would emerge as the “winner” During the second phase, which covers the fourth, fifth, and who as the “loser”: an increasingly pointless power and sixth Ṣaʿda wars (2007-2010), the Ḥūthīs had already struggle, marked by utter mutual mistrust, which jeop- overcome their defensive position and were able to meet ardised the UN-negotiations and offered bleak prospects the state’s army at eye level. Consequently, mediation for any future talks. efforts became broader, more professional, the mediators more influential and with more incentives (the so-called “carrots”) to the parties to the conflict at their disposal. A history of failures Yet, rather than negotiating political solutions, during the Since its inception in 2004, the Ḥūthī conflict has wit- second phase mediation merely aimed at diffusing ten- nessed a broad range of mediations and mediators: official sions. The three Doha Agreements, for example, made no and unofficial mediations, “insider-partial” and “outsider- attempt to address the root causes of the conflict, but rather neutral” mediators, mediation by persons, tribes, states, aimed at establishing ceasefires. They had no sustainable and international organizations, local emergency media- approach and were ultimately undermined by the conflict’s tion, and attempts at comprehensive conflict settlement. internal and external dynamics as well as spoilers on both Yet, after 12 years of negotiations with the Ḥūthīs, no sides that had emerged in the course of the expansion and sustainable solution and no golden for- brutalization of the war. mula for achieving mediation success In the third phase, which began with have been found. the profound transformations of Yemen’s This is not to say that mediation never “Change Revolution” in 2011, the overall had a chance to succeed. In retrospect “The tragedy of situation in Yemen complicated dramati- we can distinguish three distinct phases. cally. On the national level the Ḥūthī In the first phase, from 2004 to 2006, it these negotiations conflict marbled into Yemen’s other cri- would well have been possible to get the ses, among them the Southern Issue, all conflict under control through media- was that both of which threatened to shatter the coun- tion and to solve it through face-saving parties basically try’s stability and to tear apart the fabric political deals. However, the numerous of national unity. Consequently, what mediation efforts during the early stages agreed on the was now needed was a comprehensive of the conflict were thwarted by the lack political solution to Yemen’s multiple of political will of the Ṣāliḥ regime to measures that were conflicts. This is the point where the GCC end the crisis, by unauthorized unilateral Initiative stepped in. The GCC Initiative actions of the armed forces, and also, in needed to resolve and the associated NDC stressed inclu- part, due to the non-compliance of many siveness and a fundamental and sustain- mediation initiatives with fundamental the conflict, but able solution to Yemen’s crises. They prerequisites of mediation: neutrality, were, however, unable to prevent the moderation, and fairness of the media- that the bitter transitional government under President tor, and his ability to broker face-saving struggle for the Hādī from falling back into the old au- compromise solutions between the war- thoritarian and exclusive patterns. The ring parties which leave the dignity of all sequencing of revolving democratization and open- sides intact. During this period, the Ṣāliḥ ing process after conclusion of the NDC regime acted from a position of strength the solution (first ended with the Ḥūthīs’ power seizure, and saw no necessity of making com- who have since themselves turned into promises with the Ḥūthīs. An underly- withdrawal of the an oppressive regime which ruthlessly ing cause for these failures was that the persecutes its opponents. The Saudi-led policy of fomenting conflict among its Ḥūthīs or first military intervention in Yemen added rivals and foes has always been a central further to the extreme hardening of posi- part of the survival strategy of the Ṣāliḥ political solution?) tions. This is the environment in which regime. In the Islamic history of north- became the all- the UN negotiations of Biel and Kuwait ern Yemen, since the arrival of the first operated and ultimately failed. Zaydi imam in 897 CE, mediation has important question In a country that is famous for its trib- always been a central asset and sign of al mediation customs and traditions and the quality of good governance in state which determined its culture of dialogue, this history of activities, as the state was historically failures is particularly tragic. The hatred operating within a wider tribal environ- who would emerge and mistrust between the parties will ment where addressing and mediating outlast years and probably undermine smaller and larger conflicts belonged to as the ‘winner’ many future peace talks. The restoration the more regular routine operations of of confidence and the “reconstruction of running a government, wherever it did and who as the souls” in this war-torn country may well have at least some influence (Gingrich ‘loser’.” take a long time.

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Notes 1 The Zaydis are a sect of Shia Islam who trace their name back to Gingrich and Siegfried Haas (eds.): Southwest Arabia across History: their eponym Zayd b. ʿAlī, the great-grandson of ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib. 2 Essays to the Memory of Walter Dostal, Vienna, pp. 117-124. On the social significance of the Yemeni dagger, see Heinze 2015. Gochenour, David Thomas (1984): The Penetration of Zaydī Islam into 3 Author’s interviews with tribal and government representatives. 4 Early Medieval Yemen, Ph.D. Thesis, Harvard University. Among them, for example, Shaykh Mujāhid Abū Shawārib of Khārif, Heinze, Marie-Christine (2015): Yemen Through the Janbiya: The Social who died in November 2004 in a mysterious traffic accident. 5 Lives of Daggers in Southwestern Arabia, Ph.D. thesis, University of Yaḥyā al-Ḥūthī was Ḥusayn’s brother, Ṣāliḥ al-Wajmān a minor Bielefeld. shaykh from the Ṣaʿdah region. 6 Heiss, Johann (1989): ‘War and mediation for peace in a tribal society Author’s interviews with tribal and government representatives. th (Yemen, 9 Century)’, in: Andre Gingrich, Sylvia Haas and Gabriele 7 Ḥāshid mercenaries had been active in Ṣaʿda since the first war, but Paleczek (eds.): Kinship, Social Change and Evolution: Proceedings of from the fourth war onwards the recruitment of tribal mercenaries a Symposium Held in Honour of W. Dostal, Horn, pp. 63-74. and Sunni extremists became central to government strategy, see International Crisis Group (27.05.2009): ‘Defusing the Saada time Brandt 2014: 105-122; 2017: 228-237. 8 Relations between President Ṣāliḥ and Fāris Manāʿ had already bomb’, Middle East Report 86. soured in 2006/2007 due to the latter’s alleged connections with Kamrava, Mehran (2011): ‘Mediation and Qatari foreign policy’, in: Muammar al-Gaddafi. The Middle East Journal 65/4, pp. 539-556. 9 According to a term launched by Crocker, Hampson, and Aall de- Lackner, Helen (2016): Yemen’s ‘Peaceful’ Transition from Autocracy: noting difficult mediation processes in complex multi-party conflict Could It Have Succeeded?, International Institute for Democracy environments, see Crocker et al. 1999. and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA). Available at https:// 10 For the provisions of the PNPA, see http://www.europarl.europa. www.idea.int/publications/catalogue/yemens-peaceful-transition- eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/darp/dv/darp20141204_05_/ autocracy-could-it-have-succeeded (24.02.2018). darp20141204_05_en.pdf. Mareb Press (11.11.2009): ‘Al-khārijiyya al-yamaniyyatarfuḍ al-wiṣāya 11 For the full text of resolution 2201, see http://www.un.org/en/ga/ al-īrāniyya’, in: Mareb Press. Available at http://marebpress.net/ search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2201%20%282015%29. news_details.php?lng=arabic&sid=20016 (24.02.2018). 12 For the full text of resolution 2216, see http://www.securi- al-Maghafi, Nawal (26.12.2015): ‘Behind the scenes at Yemen’s peace tycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- talks in Switzerland’, in: Middle East Eye. Available at http://www. CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2216.pdf. middleeasteye.net/columns/behind-scenes-yemens-peace-talks- 13 Author’s interviews with Ḥūthī leader, July 2015. switzerland-506308571#sthash.wzQunOcF.dpuf (24.02.2018). Peterson, John E. (2006): ‘Qatar and the world: Branding for a micro- Bibliography state’, in: Middle East Journal 60/4, pp. 733-748. Adra, Najwa (1982): Qabyala: The Tribal Concept in the Central High- Phillips, Sarah (2011): Yemen and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, London. lands of the Yemen Arab Republic, Ph.D. thesis, Temple University. Salisbury, Peter (11.02.2015): ‘Greed, brutality, and an unraveling Antonini, Blanca, et al. (2009): Security Council Resolutions under coup in Yemen’, in: Vice. Available at https://news.vice.com/arti- Chapter VII: Design, Implementation and Accountabilities, Madrid. cle/greed-brutality-and-an-unraveling-coup-in-yemen (24.02.2018). Barakat, Sultan (2014). 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