Twelve Years of Shifting Sands Conflict Mediation with Yemen’S Ḥūthīs (2004-2016)

Forschung Twelve Years of Shifting Sands Conflict Mediation with Yemen’s Ḥūthīs (2004-2016) This article analyses the interplay between conflict and mediation by using the empirical example of Yemen’s Ḥūthī conflict. By reviewing the period from 2004 to 2016, it traces how and why local and national, later regional and international mediation initiatives failed to contain the Ḥūthī crisis Marieke Brandt emen’s history is both splendid – have sabotaged mediated solutions and and troublesome. Historically, “Conflict impeded the restoration of stability in the social, political, sectarian and mediation has a Yemen. tribal cleavages of Yemen’s north- As the Ḥūthī crisis is still expanding, ern regions and the associated conflict long tradition in the paper does not aim at keeping pace Ypotential have periodically undermined with a rapidly unfolding situation. It the country’s stability and led to the Yemen. One of the rather aims at enhancing the reader’s outbreak of major conflicts, including, historical perspective on attempts at most recently, the revolution and civil oldest and most mediation and conflict resolution which war 1962-1970, the civil war of 1994, have taken place between spring 2004 and the Ḥūthī conflict, which erupted famous examples and summer 2016 in Yemen’s north. in 2004 and drove the country into an By contextualising the major local, do- ever-escalating cycle of violence. At the of this tradition mestic, regional, and international me- same time, however, Yemen looks back are the endeavours diation initiatives which accompanied on a long and deep-rooted tradition of the Ḥūthī conflict since its inception, it governmental and tribal conflict media- of Yemen’s first looks for the reasons for the current re- tion that has often prevented the latent grettable, but hopefully not irreversible, and virulent conflicts of this weapon- Zaydi imam.” failure of Yemen’s respected tradition in bristling country from getting out of conflict mediation. control. It is the aim of this article to analyse the interplay between conflict and mediation by using the Mediation in Yemen empirical example of Yemen’s Ḥūthī conflict. By reviewing Conflict mediation has a long tradition in Yemen. One the period from 2004 to 2016, this article traces how and of the oldest and most famous examples of this tradition why local and national, later regional and international are the endeavours of Yemen’s first Zaydi imam, Yaḥyā b. mediation initiatives failed to contain the Ḥūthī crisis. By al-Ḥusayn, whose legendary reputation stemmed from his doing so, the article argues that not only the increasing successful mediation between Yemen’s northern tribes.1 In hybridity and complexity of the Ḥūthī conflict, but also the 897 CE Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥusayn managed to establish a Zaydi lack of commitment of the warring parties and, at times, the community in Yemen when the Ṣaʿda region and large mediators’ non-compliance with fundamental prerequisites parts of Yemen’s northern highlands had for a long time of mediation – neutrality, moderation, and fairness of the been ravaged by a protracted war between different tribal mediator, and his ability to broker face-saving compromises factions (Gochenour 1984; Heiss 1989). Since the involved which leave the dignity of the parties to the conflict intact tribes found themselves unable to resolve their conflict, 104 Jemen-Report Jg. 49/2018, Heft 1/2 Forschung • Mediation they invited Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥusayn, a member of the family of as well as the painstaking commitment of tribal leaders the Prophet and follower of the Zaydi branch of Islam, from working on their settlement. Medina to solve their conflict through mediation and arbi- Conflicts among and between the tribes are often the tration according to sharīʿa law. After having succeeded in result of violations of individual or collective honour solving the conflict, Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥusayn took up residence (sharaf) (Adra 1982: 142-144, 185-186; Dresch 1989: in Ṣaʿda city and established a kind of Zaydi state. In the 38-70; Caton 1990: 161-165; Weir 2007: 49-51). A tribes- centuries to come he and his imamic successors strived to man’s honour can be impugned by attacks on any compo- establish their rule over Yemen’s northern tribes. The Zaydi nent of his honourable self, of which three components imams’ reign, though propitiously launched, resembled one are metonymically exalted to special iconic status – dag- of constant struggle to restore discipline over rebellious gers, women and landholdings (arḍ).2 Disgrace (ʿayb) is tribes, to halt renewed intertribal hostilities, to secure what infringes honour, and any infringement of honour tribal loyalties, and to extend Zaydi influence. requires amends. The honour of an individual tribesman The tribes in Yemen, too, have well established mecha- is simultaneously part of the tribe’s collective honour nisms of conflict mediation and arbitration according and can be defended through the entire tribal solidary to tribal customary law (ʿurf). Customary law is a set of group. In case of conflict, customary law is applied by principles, rules and local precedent cases (silf) that con- way of mediation (wisāṭa) and arbitration (taḥkīm). If tains elaborate provisions on conflict management and the problem cannot be immediately solved, the shaykh facilitates the channelling of crises into negotiation (Dresch then takes from each a pledge or surety, called ʿadl (in 1989: 38-74; Weir 2007: 190-225; Brandt 2014). The tribes the form of guns, daggers, or cash). Once the pledges are hold mediation in highest esteem, and the ability to solve taken, and until the problem has been solved, the shaykhs conflicts is one of the most important capabilities of what act as “guarantors”, meaning they provide for financial all shaykhs (tribal leaders) of influence are ascribed. Taking compensation of the plaintiff and the good conduct of the example of the tribal entanglements which in 1979 led the culprits. In Yemen tribal conflict resolution retains its to the infamous qaṭāʿ Wāʾila (the great “cutting” of Yem- pivotal and rather timeless importance since the state has en’s main road leading to Saudi Arabia), which paralysed so far been unable to fully exercise its judicial authority northern Yemen and led to a Yemeni-Saudi border crisis, through the court system, as a result of which the tribal Dresch (1989: 381-387) has impressively documented the judicial system remains the predominant arena of justice enormous complexity which tribal conflicts can assume, in many rural areas (al-Zwaini 2012). Coup de Grace (Bild: Amr Attamimi) Jemen-Report Jg. 49/2018, Heft 1/2 105 Forschung • Mediation The appraisal of conflict mediation does not mean that Early attempts at mediation (2004-2005) Yemen is free from conflict. Rather, the opposite is the case and reinforces the importance of domestic conflict Since its inception in 2004, the Ḥūthī conflict was accom- resolution. Throughout history, Yemen has been haunted panied by attempts at mediation, which until 2006 were by periods of war, one of the most recent examples being unable to achieve success. These early mediation initia- the 1962 revolution and the subsequent eight-year civil tives were either thwarted by the lack of political will of war that led to the overthrow of the imamate and the President ʿAlī ʿAbd Allāh Ṣāliḥ, who ruled Yemen from establishment of the then Yemen Arab Republic (YAR). 1978 to 2012, by unauthorized unilateral actions of the During the 1960s civil war the tribes played a pivotal role armed forces, or by their non-compliance with fundamen- on the royalist and republican sides and in both pursuing tal prerequisites of mediation which require the mediator’s and mediating the conflict. From all these mediation initia- neutrality, moderation, and fairness, and his ability to tives, the 1965 Khamir Conference, in particular, retains broker face-saving compromise solutions which leave the its timeless importance as a model of tribally brokered dignity of the parties to the conflict intact. ceasefire and reconciliation between the warring parties. Ṣāliḥ’s style of governance was Janus-faced. On the Its results were, however, thwarted by the involved exter- one hand, he retained his power and position through a nal state powers (Egypt and Saudi Arabia) (al-Wazīr 1965). system of patronage and co-optation which enabled him In 2004, Yemen’s Ḥūthī conflict erupted; it ultimately to comfort his allies and to appease and neutralize many became the longest and most brutal conflict of modern enemies and threats; a system that ensured a certain de- Yemen. The Ḥūthīs arose from a multi-faceted resistance gree of stability over long periods of his reign. On the movement whose predecessors began to emerge in the other hand, Ṣāliḥ was also skilled at managing conflicts 1980s. It was directed against the marginalization of Yem- as an instrument of his political survival. This second pil- en’s Zaydi-dominated extreme north by the republican gov- lar of Ṣāliḥ’s style of governance was thus based on the ernment in sectarian, economic and political terms (Brandt fomentation of crises among his enemies and rivals and the 2017). Since the turn of the millennium this movement was exploitation of these crises in domestic and foreign policy. dominated and led by members of the eponymous al-Ḥūthī The Ḥūthī conflict, in particular, helped Ṣāliḥ to extract family, notably Ḥusayn al-Ḥūthī (d. 2004) and his younger foreign (US and Saudi) support and military assistance half-brother ʿAbd al-Malik al-Ḥūthī (the current leader); (Wikileaks 15.05.2005). Phillips has dubbed Ṣāliḥ’s style their father Badr al-Dīn al-Ḥūthī (d. 2010) being one of the of governance the “politics of permanent crisis” (Phillips movement’s spiritual masterminds. Over the past decade 2011). Accordingly, Ṣāliḥ never wanted to close the Ḥūthī this conflict has expanded from a police operation against file forever because he benefited in many ways from the Ḥusayn al-Ḥūthī in a small village in Yemen’s northern existence and prolongation of this war.

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