Kopte, Renner, & Wilke

THE COST OF DISARMAMENT: DISMANTLEMENT OF AND THE DISPOSAL OF SURPLUS

by Susanne Kopte, Michael Renner, and Peter Wilke

Susanne Kopte is a Senior Researcher on a surplus weapons project for the Bonn International Conversion Center; Michael Renner is a Senior Researcher at the Worldwatch Institute in Washington, D.C.; Dr. Peter Wilke is Managing Director of ISA Consult in Hamburg, Germany.

he and disar- anecdotal nature can be given. These poses and therefore are quite distinct mament treaties made pos- shortcomings notwithstanding, the from civilian-grade fuels. Tsible by the thawing of the data presented here do offer an esti- A number of considerations in- Cold War have generated a volume mate of the cost of coping with the fluence which methods are suitable of surplus weapons and other mili- Cold War arsenals in the coming for the dismantling and disposal of tary equipment unmatched since the decades. (A chart on page 43 sum- military equipment. Whichever end of World War II. In addition, marizes these findings.) technology is chosen, the expecta- unilateral decisions to scrap un- The dismantling and disposal tion is that it should meet several needed equipment have further challenge can be broken into criteria: 1) be easily verifiable; 2) boosted the volume of surplus. This a number of categories. The first make renewed military use difficult article analyzes the costs of disar- category is the platform or impossible; 3) prevent the theft mament and of dismantling surplus (such as a tank, warplane, or or diversion of militarily-usable weapons. The data are derived from intercontinental missile), which pro- materials released in the dismantling a variety of sources with differing vides the carrier system for an ar- process; 4) meet the deadlines degrees of reliability and precision. ray of nuclear, chemical, or conven- for completing weapons disposal They are a composite of actual ex- tional warheads, bombs, projectiles, and other stipulations of penditures, amounts budgeted, an- and munitions. The second category arms treaties; and 5) comply with nual averages of multi-year figures, concerns the key materials (such as local, national, or international and, in some cases, rough fissile materials in nuclear safety and environmental standards. order-of-magnitude estimates. In arms) contained in the different All of these criteria have an impact some cases, data from different weapon systems. Finally, there is an on the cost of dismantlement and sources are inconsistent; in other assortment of fuels and propellants, disposal, but environmental concern cases, none are available. In many of which have been specifi- is a particularly potent factor. many areas, only examples of an cally developed for military pur- Rising environmental awareness,

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1996 33 Kopte, Renner, & Wilke

more stringent national and inter- materials can be reprocessed to the details of a CTBT, including national , and growing public make them usable for nonmilitary monitoring and verification mea- participation or render the purposes; scrap from dismantled sures, are undecided, rough cost careless practices of years past less weapons and equipment can be sal- projections have been made. and less acceptable. vaged. Confronted with both a mas- Start-up costs of an international Existing arms agreements typi- sive disarmament task and a diffi- CTBT implementing authority are cally provide little guidance regard- cult economic transformation, Rus- thought to be about $100 million, ing the final disposition of surplus sia and other Soviet successor states and operating costs $60 to 80 mil- items. Arms control has tradition- are particularly eager to derive some lion per year. Challenge inspections ally been focused on deployment financial benefit from dismantling might each cost as much as $12 (permitted numbers and types of their vast weapons stocks. However, million.2 weapon systems), but has given in many cases, civilian re-use is insufficient attention to the fate of likely to be technically difficult Disabling Weapons Delivery weapons withdrawn from military or economically marginal; most Systems service and the critical materials military hardware has little intrinsic contained in them. In some cases, civilian value.1 Between 1989 and 1995, the U.S. such as the Conventional Forces in Navy spent about $780 million to Europe (CFE) Treaty or the Chemi- NUCLEAR WEAPONS dismantle ballistic missile subma- cal Weapons Convention (CWC), rines. It is planning to complete all permitted destruction techniques are Fulfilling the obligations of the START-related eliminations no later 3 specified or certain traditional meth- START (Strategic Arms Reduction than January 2000. The U.S. Air ods outlawed. But generally, much Treaty) I and II will require decom- Force is decommissioning 148 of its is left to the discretion of the gov- missioning large numbers of bal- B-52 bombers and destroying an- ernments that are party to the listic missiles and missile silos, stra- other 217; it has also mothballed different treaties, particularly re- tegic bombers, and submarines. 200 F-111 aircraft. Minuteman II garding the final disposal Although the agreements do not ballistic missiles withdrawn of weapons or weapons materials. mandate the disassembly of the from deployment are being placed Reluctant or financially strapped nuclear warheads mounted on these in storage. A small portion of governments are eager to contain the carrier systems, both the the more than 1,000 missiles that are associated costs. For example, the and are mov- expected to be taken out of service states of the former Warsaw Treaty ing ahead with the dismantlement by the end of the 1990s are being Organization (WTO) simply are of thousands of warheads. This, in sold for the purpose of launching unable to devote any significant re- turn, implies that hundreds of tons commercial satellites—hence not only sources to dismantlement of plutonium and highly-enriched avoiding the cost of destroying mis- and disposal. They are tempted, uranium (HEU) will need to be siles that cost more than $10 mil- therefore, to mothball surplus items stored, processed, and ultimately lion each to produce, but also yield- rather than dismantle them, to let disposed of. Since much latitude is ing some revenue. All in all, the Air them become unusable over time, or given to the two governments, the Force will spend about $60 million to export them. precise quantities involved are not on mothballing and dismantling sur- 4 There are some attempts to con- known, and costs can only plus arms between 1993 and 2000. vert armaments to peaceful uses be estimated in orders of magnitude. In 1993, the U.S. Air Force started rather than demolish them. In an age The Russian situation in particular destroying the first of 500 excess of (partial) disarmament, the ques- is marked by great uncertainty. missile silos (300 of these are to tion is, whether military surplus Additional expenses will be in- be destroyed at a cost of $35 mil- becomes waste material to be dis- curred if and when the lion, while the fate of the remaining 5 carded or an asset that can at least ongoing negotiations for a compre- 200 is yet to be determined). pay for part of the costs of disarma- hensive nuclear test ban Under START II, Russia is spe- ment? Military hardware might treaty (CTBT) are concluded suc- cifically required to eliminate its be reconfigured for civilian tasks; cessfully. Although many of SS-18 missiles; it could retain, but

34 Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1996 Kopte, Renner, & Wilke

not deploy, all other surplus mis- (UDMH) as a propellant posal technologies.11 siles. Even in the absence of START, and nitrogen tetroxide (NTO) as an however, Russia would have been oxidizer. But the never Decommissioning of Nuclear forced to decommission a large por- developed any means of disposing Submarines tion of its intercontinental ballistic or reprocessing these materials, be- missiles, strategic bombers, cause they were always recycled into Some 300 nuclear-fueled subma- and ballistic missile submarine fleet new missiles. At present, several rines worldwide—including strategic due to physical obsolescence. Re- tens of thousands of metric tons of (ballistic missile-bearing) and portedly, a total of 208 aircraft these hazardous substances are non-strategic (attack) submarines— (Tu-95s, Tu-16s, and Tu-22s) are to stored in tanks, awaiting disposal or will need to be taken out of service be destroyed at the Engels recycling. As the military business by the turn of the century, because Airbase before the year 2000. Sev- shrinks, propellant manufacturers they are reaching the end of their 12 enty of these have to be eliminated in are becoming more and more life-cycles. accordance with the CFE Treaty and interested in fuel demilitarization The U.S. Navy is planning to de- START I and II. The remainder programs. commission about 60 nuclear sub- are aircraft that completed their ser- In November 1993, for instance, marines between 1992 and 2000, at vice lives and were brought to the a U.S.-Russian team initiated a projected cost of $2.7 billion. (A base from all corners of Russia and a demonstration project for the de- total of 165 U.S. submarines have the other former Soviet republics. militarization of Russia’s liquid- and been built since 1954.) Prior to In current prices, the disassembly solid-fueled ballistic missiles and the 1992, 42 submarines already had of one Tu-95 will cost about 7 mil- conversion of recovered materials to been deactivated, most of them lion rubles. Additionally, it chemicals and other products. since 1986. During 1988 to 1990, costs 300,000 rubles to remelt one The ICBMs’ nitrogen tetroxide oxi- the average cost to complete a de- ton of pure metal (some 37 to dizer could be processed into nitric activation and reactor compartment 40 tons are obtained per aircraft).6 acid and used to produce fertilizer removal and disposal was $23.6 Unclassified assessments by the and other products, but possible ci- million. During 1990 to 1992, costs Russian military estimate vilian applications are limited com- were in the $12.8 to 21.4 million that implementing START might pared with the size of the existing range, depending on the shipyard cost Russia 90 to 95 billion stockpile. UDMH fuel from where the work was performed. rubles. Expressed in 1992 prices, liquid- propellant ICBMs could be From 1992 on, deactivations were this would have been equivalent to processed into ammonia undertaken exclusively at the Puget roughly $6 billion, though the rav- and demethylamine, both viable Sound shipyard in Washington, the 13 ages of Russian inflation render any commercial products with signifi- yard with the lowest costs. current dollar estimates somewhat cant industrial consumer demand. Before 1989, when the toxic ma- arbitrary.7 Demethylamine, for example, has a terial PCB was discovered market price in the United States of in submarine hulls, the U.S. Navy Disposal of Missile Propellants about $1,000 per ton and can be had planned to dispose of the hulls used as a surfactant.9 at sea. Instead, the hulls are now Most Soviet-made missiles are Burning these fuels would be the being recycled and sold for scrap. liquid-fueled, whereas U.S. missiles cheapest, yet also environmentally The recycling cost per unit is esti- are primarily solid-fueled. The man- most objectionable, disposal op- mated at $3.5 to 4.5 million, after ner in which the fuels are discarded tion.10 The United States has con- taking into consideration the roughly is critical—not only do they ducted routine open air burning $1.5 million value of the scrap ma- contain highly hazardous materials, of obsolete missile fuel for many terials. But recycling the hulls is still 14 but the older or less well maintained years, involving several hundred cheaper than storing them. a missile, the more dangerous and tons a year. Growing against With adequate funding, produc- 8 costly the dismantling job becomes. this practice, however, led the U.S. tion facilities, and infrastructure, the Soviet-made missiles use unsym- government to initiate a research United States was able to initiate metrical dimethyl hydrazine program to develop alternative dis- an integrated program for the dis-

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1996 35 Kopte, Renner, & Wilke

posal of nuclear-powered subma- date, funds for the work are being to Western nongovernmental ana- rines in the early 1990s. To date, provided by cutting expenditures on lysts.24 Ministry of Atomic Energy the United States has decommis- maintaining the combat readiness of (Minatom) head Viktor Mikhailov sioned 69 of these submarines, of the Navy’s ships. But the Navy’s stated in 1994 that Russia is spend- which 32 are completely dismantled budget has already been cut to the ing up to 1 trillion rubles on dis- and 37 deactivated awaiting bone and the available funds for mantling warheads; he put the cost final disposal. The estimated cost of decommissioning will be insuf- to dismantle a single one at deactivating and scrapping ficient.19 Russia especially lacks $100,000. Hence, Russia may one nuclear submarine is about $38 adequate facilities to dispose of sub- be spending the equivalent of some million.15 marine reactors and their spent fuel $200 to 250 million per year.25 Between 1989 and 1993, more properly. By early 1993, only The other former Soviet repub- than 80 Soviet/Russian submarines one-third of the submarines slated lics with nuclear arms on their ter- were retired from service, and, due for decommissioning had their ritories have agreed to ship them to to arms control treaties, a similar spent fuel removed. Reactor Russia for dismantlement. In 1993, number is likely to be removed by vessels removed from Pacific Fleet Ukrainian officials estimated the the year 2000. In the past, the So- submarines are left floating at dismantling and withdrawal cost at viet government had gotten rid of at the Pavlovsk naval base, as storage $1.5 to 5 billion.26 least some obsolete submarines by facilities on land are unlikely to be sinking them.16 available before the year 2000. It Converting Highly-Enriched The naval nuclear support infra- may take as long as 30 to 40 years Uranium (HEU) structure in the former Soviet Union to dispose of all the Russian subma- was already in poor condition prior rines that will be pulled out of ser- Following warhead disassembly, to the massive write-off of subma- vice during the 1990s.20 the fundamental question is how to rines. It is now stretched to its limit, The 1995 budget of the Russian dispose of the dangerous fissile with decommissioned submarines government provides for expendi- materials contained in them. The with their fuel still on tures to handle nuclear waste to the options are more straightforward for board accumulating at bases and tune of 450 billion rubles. If the fleet HEU than for plutonium. The gen- shipyards in the North and Far were to receive at least half of erally accepted path is to blend HEU East.17 Although Russia has devel- this money, there would be hope that with depleted or natural uranium, in oped a concept and adopted the problem of salvaging effect diluting it from weapons-grade a program for complete disposal of nuclear submarines slowly could enrichments of 90 to 95 percent to nuclear-powered submarines, a key start to be resolved.21 below five percent. This dilution problem has been the lack of financ- makes it usable as commercial re- ing and actual implementation of the Dismantling Nuclear Warheads actor fuel. program. For example, a detailed Under a 1992 agreement, the plan has been drawn up at The U.S. Department of Energy United States is to purchase 500 tons Severodvinsk for a submarine (DOE) has been dismantling be- of HEU derived from Russian war- scrapping infrastructure, including tween 1,000 to 1,600 nuclear war- heads over the next 20 years. (Rus- the construction of more dry heads annually in recent years. The sia is believed to have 1,200 tons of docks, a fuel assembly removal Congressional Office of Technology HEU.) Diluted to some 15,000 tons plant, and storage and Assessment estimated annual costs of low-enriched uranium, this would transport facilities. The plan in- for dismantlement and fissile be enough to run U.S. nuclear reac- volves a total projected cost of al- materials disposition to be $500 tors for roughly a decade. The entire most 23 billion rubles.18 million to $1 billion over the next deal is estimated to be worth about 22 27 According to Vice Admiral Viktor decade. A more recent estimate $11.9 billion. In each of the ini- Topilin, chief of the Russian Navy’s puts the annual costs closer to the tial five years, the United States is 23 Main Technical Directorate, break- high end of this range. Russia is to purchase 10 tons of HEU, bring- ing up a single nuclear vessel costs probably dismantling fewer than ing Russia some $240 million an- more than 5 billion rubles. To 2,500 warheads per year, according nually; the amount will then rise to

36 Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1996 Kopte, Renner, & Wilke

30 tons per year, with an implied to civilian use in the future.30 and the U.S. company General value of about $725 million annu- Atomics signed an agreement to ally. The first shipment was received Plutonium Problems build a $1.5 billion fission reactor.35 in June 1995, but implementation But the country is so cash-strapped of the agreement has been clouded Plutonium poses a much greater that its plans may remain just that. by pricing and trade disputes.28 disposal challenge than HEU. Al- The United States has not yet offi- In November 1994, another pur- though a variety of options are be- cially decided what to do with its chase of weapons-grade material was ing discussed, none will be available plutonium. But whereas Moscow completed. Details of “Operation for many years to come. Arjun regards its plutonium as a treasure, Sapphire,” the code name for the Makhijani, president of the Institute Washington is inclined to see it as secret transfer of more than 1,320 for Energy and Environmental Re- a dangerous waste that needs to be pounds of weapons-grade uranium search in Maryland, explained that discarded.36 White House Science from Kazakhstan to the United DOE “is extending its definition of Advisor John Gibbons has stated States, were disclosed only after interim [storage] to longer and that “Plutonium has essentially a completion of the transfer. Accord- longer periods. Before, ‘interim’... negative economic value.”37 ing to U.S. Defense Department of- was six to 10 years. Now, Planned U.S. facilities to vitrify ficials, President Nazarbayev they’re talking about building military high-level nuclear wastes 31 of Kazakhstan had learned early in 50-year storage facilities.” are large enough to accommodate 1994 of the existence of the large Thus, the surplus plutonium will all U.S. weapons plutonium, should stockpile of HEU at a metallurgical need to be placed in guarded storage the decision to do so be made. plant in Ust-Kamenogorsk. Al- for an extended period, at an esti- However, plans to construct and though Kazakhstan was guarding the mated cost of $2 to 3 billion for a operate two vitrification facilities 32 material, which had been intended decade. have experienced repeated delays, for use in military naval reactors, the Most discussed are proposals to technical difficulties, and cost over- effort was a drain on its meager re- blend the plutonium with uranium runs. At one of the two facilities, at sources. Moreover, the uranium into so-called MOX fuel to be used Savannah River, Georgia, costs have posed a temptation for any terrorist in adapted or newly-built light wa- escalated from $1.53 billion group or renegade nation in the ter reactors, to burn it in breeder to nearly $4 billion.38 market for nuclear arms compo- reactors, or to encase it in glass (vit- Regardless of what is done with nents. After extensive negotiations, rification) for burial in so-called the plutonium, eventually it will the United States agreed to geological repositories. Though have to be placed in some kind of provide cash and material support none of these paths is entirely satis- repository. Identifying proper and to Kazakhstan, with different sources factory, vitrification appears far acceptable permanent burial sites reporting the value of assistance at preferable from the perspective of remains an unresolved and highly anywhere from $30 to 100 million. disarmament, economics, public controversial endeavor. Projected 33 The cost of the transfer itself was safety, and the environment. The opening dates for U.S. repositories $7 million.29 costs are rather speculative at in Nevada and New Mexico, for The U.S. government has begun this juncture; they are likely to range example, continue to slip further into to convert some of its own military from several hundred million to a the future. Cost estimates are of HEU into civilian nuclear reactor few billion dollars. A November necessity speculative and are likely fuel. The volume involved—13.2 1993 RAND study suggested that to grow significantly (already, some tons—is equal to only a little more vitrification might be the least costly $4 billion has been spent at 34 than one percent of its stockpile of option. the Nevada site).39 994 tons. An additional 50 Russia is determined to derive The other declared nuclear pow- tons, with a market value of $500 some economic benefits from dis- ers—China, France, and the United million and reprocessing costs mantling its nuclear arsenal; with Kingdom—are not part of the U.S.- of $100 million, are currently sched- Japanese and German aid, it is ex- Russian dismantlement process. To uled for dilution. Additional ploring the MOX and breeder reac- the extent that they dismantle any amounts of HEU may be converted tor options. Also, in 1993, Russia carrier systems or warheads, it is

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1996 37 Kopte, Renner, & Wilke

primarily for reasons of obsoles- of constructing incinerators at the In October 1995, the Russian cence rather than disarmament. In eight locations where chemical government approved a federal pro- its 1994 budget, the French govern- warfare agents are stored (avoiding gram for chemical weapons elimi- ment revealed for the first time how the need to transport any weapons).43 nation for the period from 1996 to much it spends on disassembling But the prototype facilities have 2009. According to this program, warheads. At 65 million francs experienced persistent mishaps. The Russia will start eliminating 7,500 ($11 million), the expense was target date for completing the de- tons of blister agents in newly- equivalent to less than two struction of stocks has slipped from built facilities in the city of percent of the French nuclear September 1994 to December 2004; Kambarka (Udmurtia) and the weapon program during the same and total cost estimates have soared village of Gorniy (Saratov region). year.40 from the original $1.7 billion in The annual capacity will amount 1985 to $11.9 billion currently.44 to 1,850 tons.48 CHEMICAL WEAPONS Annual funding for the U.S. Army’s In a second stage, chemical artil- Chemical Material Destruction lery shells and aviation bombs with The CWC was completed in Agency has risen from about $200 phosphorite-organic agents will be late 1992 and is expected to come million in the late 1980s to dismantled. Stocks are estimated at into force within the next year. about $600 million by 1995.45 In ad- 32,500 tons. New facilities for It mandates the destruction of all dition to the weapons stockpile, this purpose will be built in the stockpiles and production facilities. there are large amounts of old, bur- Kurgan region and near To date, only the United States, ied chemical munitions. The Army Kizner (Udmurtia). Elimination of Russia, and Iraq formally have de- estimates that disposing of them weapons should be completed clared the possession of chemical properly will cost another $17.7 bil- by 2005. Work to decontaminate and arsenals. Iraq, despite being forced lion over the next 40 years.46 close down facilities for dismantling to destroy its chemical stocks under is expected to be finished by 2009.49 U.N. supervision as a condition of Costs of Chemical Weapons It is, however, next to impossible the 1991 Persian Gulf ceasefire, did Disposal in Russia to come up with any reliable cost not sign the CWC. However, the projections for Russia. Official Rus- destruction of Iraq’s 125,000 chemi- In 1993, Russian President Boris sian cost estimates have varied cal munitions and 600 tons of Yeltsin said that destroying his widely; in 1994, a Russian expert bulk chemical agents is virtually country’s stocks of chemical put the cost in the range of $1.3 to 41 completed. weapons (officially put at some 2.8 billion. This does not include 40,000 tons, though some have the cost of demolishing production Chemical Weapons Disposal in charged that the stocks are much facilities.50 Even aside from the dif- the United States higher) could cost more than all ficulties of expressing costs ad- of Russia’s other disarmament pro- Destroying chemical weapons is equately in U.S. dollars or other grams combined. While the Western currencies, ruble estimates estimated to cost up to 10 times as United States has begun to destroy much as producing them.42 The differ considerably: In March 1994, small numbers of chemical during State Duma hearings, an es- United States has considerable ex- weapons, Russia’s program has been perience in chemical weapons de- timate of 2.5 trillion rubles was men- delayed by technical difficulties, lack 51 struction, but the amounts disposed tioned. The plan approved in Oc- of money, and popular opposition tober 1995, by contrast, is thought of to date nevertheless pale to possible environmental conse- in comparison with the volumes now to involve expenditures of 16.6 tril- quences that is at least as strong as lion rubles.52 awaiting destruction—some 31,400 that in the United States. Russia tons. The U.S. Army has adopted planned to have three facilities op- Costs for International high-temperature incineration as the erating by 1997; however, these Verification sole destruction method. It has plants would be able to eliminate operated two test facilities at Tooele, only 43 percent of existing stocks In carrying out the stipulations of Utah, and at Johnston Atoll in the by 2004, the likely deadline imposed the CWC, the United States, Rus- Pacific Ocean, and is in the process by the CWC.47 sia, and all other signatories will

38 Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1996 Kopte, Renner, & Wilke

have to bear an additional cost. vador, for instance, a great part of weapons is comparatively cheap. Unlike in the realm of nuclear and some 300,000 weapons distributed The whole CFE disarmament pro- conventional disarmament, a whole by the army to civilian supporters cess is not expected to cost more new body, the Organization for the are still in circulation.55 There have than $1 to 2 billion. NATO’s Verifi- Prohibition of Chemical Weapons been several disarmament and de- cation Coordinating Committee con- (OPCW), is being set up to oversee mobilization efforts and a few weap- cluded in late 1994 that destruction the implementation of the treaty. ons buy-back programs, such as in or decommissioning is less costly The 1994 and 1995, OPCW bud- Haiti, but their success is limited than mothballing surplus equip- gets were $29.7 million and $32.5 and their contribution to long-term ment.57 million, respectively. Once the CWC peace and security unclear. Among members of NATO, Ger- enters into force and the organiza- many and the United States have tion is fully operational, annual costs Conventional Force Reduction in by far the largest expenses in carry- may rise to $75 to 100 million.53 Europe ing out the CFE provisions. The Still, these expenses are consider- annual expenditures of the other ably lower than anticipated. Initial The CFE Treaty came into force NATO states are far lower—typically plans foresaw a staff of up to 1,000 in 1992 and was to be not surpassing $5 million each.58 (compared with the current plan of fully implemented by November Germany is disposing of about 80 365) and an annual budget of $150 1995. To comply with the percent of the equipment of the de- to 180 million. Western governments treaty, arsenals from the Atlantic to funct East German armed forces and successfully insisted on curtailing the Urals had to be slashed a projected 30 percent of that of the costs despite possibly compromising by almost 15,000 tanks, more than pre-unification Bundeswehr. All in the OPCW’s ability to detect, and 10,000 armored vehicles, about all, close to 11,000 major weapon hence deter, treaty violations.54 5,000 artillery pieces, and a much systems were targeted for elimina- smaller number of combat aircraft. tion by 1995, and as many as 25,000 CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS As much as 90 percent of these cuts during the following 15 years.59 The had to be made by members of the German government spent DM 864 56 Conventional arms control, by former Warsaw Pact. The treaty, million—slightly more than $500 and large, has been limited to the however, gives considerable leeway million—during 1991 to 1994 on CFE European continent, much of it be- as to how the reductions in destruction.60 ing enshrined in the CFE Treaty. deployed weaponry may be Through the NATO Cascading Beyond Europe, considerable achieved. A substantial portion of Program, the United States amounts of mostly small arms have the surplus equipment is not being (like Germany) transferred large become surplus with the end of a destroyed, but instead relocated out- numbers of treaty-limited equip- number of long-standing conflicts, side the geographical area covered ment to other NATO members. including those in Nicaragua, El by the treaty (an option available to Thus, during the first full year of Salvador, Haiti, Namibia, Ethiopia/ Russia, the United States, and the CFE implementation period, the Eritrea, and Mozambique. In many Canada), exported, converted to ci- United States avoided any binding cases, it is far from clear what vilian use, or recategorized. Given obligation to eliminate equipment actually happens with this hardware. the range of options, the share of the (though it made a voluntary decision A substantial danger exists excess equipment actually destroyed to destroy more than 600 old tanks that much of what is still usable may is unclear. stored in Italy). During 1991 to find its way to new zones of conflict Any effort to track down 1994, the United States in- rather than being dismantled and CFE-related expenditures is curred $134 million in CFE-related destroyed. peace- hobbled by the poor availability of expenditures (including destruction, keeping missions have played impor- relevant data, in part due verification, diplomatic, and tant roles in terminating almost all to inadequate record-keeping by bureaucratic costs).61 these conflicts, yet overseeing dis- government agencies. However, The former Warsaw Pact states armament all too frequently remains generally speaking, the scrapping have had to undertake far an unfulfilled mandate. In El Sal- and dismantling of conventional larger reductions in their arsenals

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1996 39 Kopte, Renner, & Wilke

than NATO members, but they surplus. As a result of cuts in defense aircraft carriers, which were among also have very limited financial re- expenditures and reduction in armed the most sophisticated in the Rus- sources for this task. Though their forces, military holdings must be sian Navy). The contract prohibits expenditures may not seem particu- further downsized.64 During the last military use of the vessels; they are larly large by Western standards, five years, much of this surplus has to be disarmed before the sale they are substantial for countries that been offered on the international and dismantled under Russian su- are economically hard-pressed. arms market. In fact, since 1989 a pervision. Precise financial arrange- Belarus, for instance, estimates its growing number of all major arms ments are not known, but the carri- total cost at $33 million. During a sales have involved transfers ers’ scrap value is estimated at about 1994 meeting of the CFE Joint Con- of surplus stocks. In 1994, $100 per ton. There has been sultative Committee, a number of second-hand sales accounted for 30 some speculation that the sale might Eastern states unsuccessfully called to 40 percent of all major arms ex- be offset against Russia’s $1.5 bil- for the creation of an international ports. The Stockholm International lion debt to South Korea.66 fund to support weapons destruc- Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) es- tion. Russia in particular has repeat- timates trade in used weapons at Scrapping of Conventional edly complained about its CFE $6.1 billion for 1994 with roughly Ammunition costs. It would prefer to let its sur- 80 percent of all major weapons plus tanks rust away rather than un- coming from the United States None of the presently existing dertake the expensive process of and Germany.65 arms control or disarmament trea- cutting them apart.62 Russia does In the coming years, even more ties concern themselves with ammu- not even have enough money to keep second-hand weapons and equip- nition. However, in the wake of the a Soviet-era promise to scrap mili- ment will be offered for sale. Par- end of the Cold War and in parallel tary equipment withdrawn from ticularly in the United States and with CFE equipment reductions, a western parts of Russia and stored Russia, surplus stocks include a number of governments are east of the Urals as well as in former large number of highly sophisticated reducing their holdings. The United Central Asian republics. The Soviet weapons: combat aircraft, battle States, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Union moved the weapons to avoid ships, submarines, and tanks. Some and Germany are among the coun- their being counted against CFE of these weapons are given away for tries with the largest amounts of sur- limits. By November 1995, Russia free or at very low prices (ships are plus. had destroyed 19 percent of the often leased to foreign countries). By far the largest amounts of 6,000 tanks, 40 percent of the 1,500 While this reduces the revenue ammunition are held by governments armored vehicles, and 39 percent of gained, it also avoids or reduces the in the former Soviet Union. Russia the artillery systems in question— cost of mothballing or scrapping the apparently has some 35 million tons, most of them obsolete. Russia weapons. some of it dating back to the estimates that it needs three more Russia faces far greater difficul- early parts of the 20th century and years to complete the task and ties in using exports as a way to get entirely obsolete. Belarus has one puts the cost at about 100 billion rid of surplus. One illustrative ex- million tons, and Ukraine at least rubles, or about $21 million.63 ample is its Navy. Russia is unable 750,000 tons. In the United States, Sales of scrap from destroyed to maintain the sizable armada that more than 500,000 tons of ammu- pieces of equipment are offsetting at the Soviet Union had built up. Much nition are slated for demilitariza- 67 least part of the costs incurred. of the Russian (and Ukrainian) Navy tion. The U.S. military has a stock- is wasting away. Because Russia is pile of more than 5.6 million tons 68 Conventional Surplus and Arms unable to sell the ships on the world of conventional munitions. Export arms market, it has decided to sell In 1990, Germany had about them for scrap. A South Korean 295,000 tons of ammunition left 69 Even after fulfilling the reduction company will buy as many as over from the East German Army. liabilities under CFE, most NATO 259 ships from Russia's Pacific Dumping at sea was the preferred and former Warsaw Pact states still Fleet (including 220 surface vessels, option in the past, and this practice have large amounts of conventional 39 submarines, and two Kiev-class has still not entirely stopped. At the

40 Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1996 Kopte, Renner, & Wilke

beginning of 1993, new interna- around DM 5,000 per ton.73 Specifically, the facilities of the tional restrictions under the A cost-neutral alternative to am- nuclear weapons complex in the Convention for the Protection of the munition destruction is being pur- United States and the former Soviet Marine Environment of the North sued by Ukraine in a joint venture Union (and presumably also in the East Atlantic came into force. Most with the U.S. company Alliant other nuclear weapons states) NATO members have, in accordance Techsystems, the largest supplier of are severely contaminated. In the with the London Dumping Conven- munitions to the Pentagon. The ven- United States, official projections of tion, agreed to stop dumping obso- ture involves the scrapping of waste management and environmen- lete bombs at sea by the end of 1995. 220,000 tons of surplus ammuni- tal restoration costs now run any- Currently, open air burning and tion. Operations started in January where from $200 billion to 350 bil- detonation—as questionable environ- 1995 and are to continue for five lion.75 Other estimates suggest that mentally as ocean dumping—appear years. After the munitions are they may very well range as high as to be the most common methods.70 taken apart, the propellants and ex- $1 trillion. In the second half of the 1980s, plosives are removed and put No matter how much money is the U.S. Army demilitarized an av- to commercial use in mining and made available, however, the un- erage of about 24,000 tons of am- construction or converted into fer- pleasant truth is that a real “cleanup” munition each year. But with the end tilizer. Scrap metal from munitions is virtually impossible. The most of the Cold War, the stockpile slated casings—copper, steel, brass, and that can be expected is that for demilitarization grew substan- aluminum—is to be sold by another the contamination problem will be tially. About 340,000 tons of am- venture participant, the British met- contained without any disastrous munition were demilitarized during als trading company Rapierbase. accidents. There is, hence, a con- 1990-95, at a cost of about $300 Sales are expected to generate more siderable non-monetary cost in the million—almost $900 per ton. The than $100 million in revenue over fact that certain areas will have to annual budget grew from $15 mil- five years, while the total cost of be closed to human use permanently. lion in 1990 to $100 million in dismantling is estimated to be $57 Little information is available for 1995.71 million. Alliant is investing $17 mil- Russia, but it is clear that Moscow The case of the former East Ger- lion.74 However, adding the costs of devotes insufficient resources to man ammunition stocks offers an dismantling ammunition in Ger- cope with contamination that is at interesting example for the disposal many makes the cost projections by least as severe as that faced by the of surplus ammunition. Approxi- Alliant Techsystems appear to be United States. In 1994, Alexei mately 295,400 metric tons of very low and overly optimistic. Yablokov, head of the Interagency ammunition had been handed over Commission on Ecological Security to the West German Bundeswehr in ENVIRONMENTAL of Russia’s National Security Coun- 1990. Out of this amount, only RESTORATION cil, estimated the need for 14,000 tons were kept in military cleanup spending “without service. Roughly 40 percent or The full costs of meeting the sur- chemical and radioactive polluted 118,172 metric tons were exported— plus weapons dismantlement and areas” (i.e., contamination related the bulk of that amount simply be- disposal challenge can only be just to conventional military activi- ing given away or sold guessed at. A factor of considerable ties) at about $2 to 3 billion. Actual at extraordinarily cheap prices. By uncertainty relates not to the weap- spending appears to be only a the end of 1995, 175,000 metric ons per se, but the industrial facili- miniscule fraction of the require- tons had been dismantled and de- ties at which they were ments.76 The Russian government stroyed in three facilities.72 manufactured and the bases where budget contains a provision for Initial estimates of the costs were military equipment is deployed, “cleanup of nuclear accidents” of on the order of DM 1.5 billion (or stored, and maintained. Manage- 275 billion rubles in 1993 and 838 $1 billion). Depending on the type ment of wastes generated and de- billion rubles in 1994.77 of ammunition, estimates ranged contamination of land and facilities In all countries, expenditures to from DM 1,000 to 15,000 per ton, are pressing, and very expensive address the environmental aspect of with the average cost somewhere tasks. weapons production and disposal are

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1996 41 Kopte, Renner, & Wilke

still in an early stage. For example, devoted to traditional military pur- of military budgets—thus helping to 1994 was the first year that the U.S poses. establish more of a balance between Department of Defense spent more Since many countries face simi- military and disarmament expendi- money on actual remedial activities lar types of technical challenges, a tures. than on investigations and studies.78 cooperative international program Expenditures, in the United States to investigate, develop, and share and elsewhere, are likely to grow as promising technologies to dismantle cleanup efforts gather momentum. and dispose of military equipment and materials safely is vitally impor- MILITARY EXPENDITURES tant. A series of pilot projects and AND DISARMAMENT workshops have been conducted EXPENDITURES within the framework of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council The availability of disarmament (NACC). However, they are rela- expenditure data in many countries tively limited in scope and are not is poor, but the number of disarma- accessible to the large number of ment commitments and the size of non-NACC countries. A more glo- their respective surplus arsenals bal undertaking could easily be fi- would suggest that the United States, nanced out of world military R&D Russia, and Germany are incurring budgets—which still absorb tens of by far the largest expenses. billions of dollars each year—devoted Germany’s expenditures are in the to developing new weapons dis- realm of conventional arms, whereas mantlement technologies. the United States and Russia are Given the economic difficulties of concerned with the entire range many former members of the WTO of armaments. Of these two, data and the uncertainties whether treaty availability is incomparably better deadlines, such as the one imposed for the former. And the United States by the CWC will be met or whether has substantially greater resources surplus items will be disposed of in at its disposal to tackle the challenge a responsible manner, it would seem of dismantlement and disposal. that there is a strong need for im- Compared with spending for mili- proved financial aid to the countries tary research and development in question. The United States and (R&D) and the procurement and other Western countries have maintenance of weapons and equip- pledged aid, but the amounts in- ment, worldwide expenditures for volved are insufficient and disburse- the dismantlement and disposal of ment is often slowed by bureaucratic surplus weapons are still very small. obstacles.80 Instead of a piecemeal Identifiable and estimated expendi- approach, it would be sensible to tures for nuclear, chemical, and con- establish a well-endowed interna- ventional disarmament rose from tional disarmament fund. This fund $1.5 billion in 1989 to $3.4 billion might be established for a variety 79 in 1994. Clearly, these figures do of disarmament and peacebuilding not capture the entire range of endeavors worldwide. Since suffi- spending that is taking place. But cient funding for weapons dis- they leave no doubt about the enor- mantlement and disposal provides a mous discrepancy between budgets clear boost to international security, devoted to disarmament and those this fund would best be financed out

42 Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1996 Kopte, Renner, & Wilke

Overall Costs of Dismantling Weapons and Disarmament

Country Selected Programs Time Period Estimated total costs (examples) in U.S. dollars)

Nuclear United States • Dismantling ballistic missile 1989-95 780 million submarines (Navy) • Air Force mothballing and 1993-2000 60 million dismantling • Dismantling 500 missile n.a. 50 million silos • Dismantling warheads 10 years 5-10 billion and fissile materials • Buying HEU from Russia 20 years 12 billion • Storage of HEU/plutonium 10 years 2-3 billion • Vitrification or similar technology 3-5 billion • Overall costs 10 years 20-30 billion • Cleaning and safeguarding militarily used nuclear facilities and sites n.a. 400-1,000 billion

Russia • Implementing START I 10 years 6 billion • Overall costs 10 years 8-15 billion • Cleaning and safeguarding nuclear sites and facilities n.a. n.a.

Ukraine • Withdrawal and dismantling 10 year 1.5-3 billion of nuclear weapons

Chemical United States • Dismantling, storing, and 10-20 years 11-15 billion burning materials • Environmental clean-up 20 years 15-20 billion

Russia • Dismantling, storing, and 20 years 5-15 billion burning materials • Environmental clean-up n.a. 10-30 billion

All countries OPCW-related costs 20 years 1.5-2 billion

Conventional All CFE countries • Dismantling, scrapping 5 years 1-2 billion of weapons • Verification 10 years 500 million

Ammunition All countries • Dismantling, scrapping, 10-20 years 5-10 billion storage of old ammunition

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1996 43 Kopte, Renner, & Wilke

1 Michael Renner, “Cleaning Up After the Arms 18 Thomas Nilsen, “The Nuclear Threat From 35 William J. Broad, “A Plutonium Pact Will Aid Race,” in Lester R. Brown et al., State of the the Russian North Fleet,” Bellona Working Paper Disposal,” The New York Times, April 6, 1993, World 1994, Worldwatch Institute (New York and No. 2 (Oslo: Environmental Foundation Bellona, p. 11. London: W.W. Norton & Co., 1994), 1993), p. 84. 36 Ibid. pp. 137-155. 19 Vladimir Maryukha, “Obsolete Nuclear Ves- 37 Matthew L. Wald and Michael R. Gordon, 2 Eric Arnett, “The Comprehensive Nuclear Test sels Leave Us No Choice - Either We Bury Them “Russia Treasures Plutonium, But U.S. Wants to Ban,” in Stockholm International Peace Research or They Will Bury Us”; in JPRS-TEN- 94-023 Destroy It,” The New York Times, August 19, Institute (SIPRI), Yearbook 1995 (Stockholm: (28 September 1994), p. 32. 1994, p. A1, A10. SIPRI, 1995), pp. 697-724. 20 Sergei Leskov, “Lies and Incompetence,” The 38 Schwartz. 3 Captain F. G. Leeder, deputy chief of Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 49 (June 1993) 39 Ibid. information, Department of the Navy, Office of and Joshua Handler, “Trip Report: Greenpeace 40 IDDS (1994). Information, Washington, D.C., private commu- Visit to Moscow and Russian Far East, July 41 David C. Morrison, “Political Chemistry,” Na- nication with author, May 6, 1994. to November 1992. Subject: Russian Navy tional Journal, May 14, 1994, p. 1134. 4 Major Cindy Scott-Johnson, Department of the Nuclear Submarine Safety, Construction, Defense 42 Perry Robinson, Thomas Stock, and Ronald Air Force, Public Affairs Office, Media Relations Conversion, Decommissioning, And G. Sutherland, “The Chemical Weapons Conven- Division, Washington, D.C., private communi- Nuclear Waste Disposal Problems,” Greenpeace tion. The Success of Chemical Disarmament Ne- cation with author, September 30, 1994, and Nuclear Free Seas Campaign (Washington, D.C.: gotiations,” in SIPRI, Yearbook 1993 (Stockholm: Edmund L. Andrews, “New Careers for World Greenpeace U.S.A., 1993). SIPRI, 1993), pp. 705-734. War Relics,” The New York Times, April 15, 1994, 21 Dmitriy Litovkin, “Decommissioned Nuclear 43 Office of Technology Assessment, “Disposal p. D1. Submarines Are Still Awaiting A State Salvage of Chemical Weapons: Alternative Technologies,” 5 Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies Program. But they Are Already Threatening To Background Paper (Washington, D.C.: Govern- (IDDS), Arms Control Reporter (Cambridge: Cause a Disaster”; in FBIS-SOV-95-135 (14 July ment Printing Office, 1992). IDDS, 1994), and Scott-Johnson, Ibid. 1995), pp. 31-33. 44 Thomas Stock and Anna De Geer, “Chemical 6 Leonid Kostrov, “Guillotine Being Tried Out at 22 Office of Technology Assessment, “Disman- Weapons Developments,” in SIPRI, Yearbook Engels. American Satellites Will Track the Dis- tling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Ma- 1994 (Stockholm: SIPRI, 1994), pp. 315-342, section of Russian Aircraft From Orbit”; in terials” (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing and Mickey Morales, Department of the Army, FBIS-SOV-95-136 (17 July 1995), pp. 14-15. Office, 1993). Chemical Material Destruction Agency, Public 7 Alexei Arbatov, ed., “Implications of the START 23 Stephen I. Schwartz, “Atomic Audit: What the Affairs Office, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Mary- II Treaty for US-Russian Relations,” Report No. 9 U.S. Nuclear Arsenal Really Cost,” A Prelimi- land, private communication with author, July (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, nary Report by the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Cost 25, 1995. 1993). Study Project, Washington, D.C., July 11, 1995. 45 Morales, Ibid. 8 Jordi Molas-Gallert, “Disposal of Surplus 24 Robert S. Norris and William M. Arkin, 46 U.S. Army, Survey and Analysis Report (Ab- Missiles: Technical Difficulties and Commercial “Nuclear Notebook: Estimated Russian (C.I.S.) erdeen Proving Ground, Maryland: Chemical Interest,” in Edward J. Laurance and Herbert Nuclear Stockpile September 1994,” The Bulle- Material Destruction Agency, Non-Stockpile Wulf, “Coping with Surplus Weapons: A Priority tin of the Atomic Scientists 50 (September/Octo- Chemical Material Program, 1993). for Conversion Research and Policy” (Bonn: Bonn ber 1994). 47 Stock and De Geer. International Center for Conversion (BICC), June 25 IDDS (1994). 48 FBIS-SOV-95-208 (26 October 1995)(on-line). 1995), pp. 23-30. 26 IDDS, Arms Control Reporter (Cambridge: 49 Ibid. 9 Jeffrey Lenorovitz, “U.S./Russian Team Bids IDDS, 1993). 50 Sergei Kiselev, Deputy Head of the Delega- For ICBM Demilitarization,” Aviation Week & 27 IDDS (1994). tion of the Russian Federation to the Prepara- Space Technology, November 1, 1993, pp. 89-90. 28 William J. Broad, “Experts See Peril for U.S. tory Commission for the Organization for the 10 Robert Darst, “Disposal of Liquid Missile Pro- Pact to Buy Up Russian Bomb Fuel,” The New Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Embassy of pellants,” in Graham Allison et al., eds., “Coop- York Times, June 12, 1995, p. A1, and “Nuclear the Russian Federation in The Hague, Nether- erative Denuclearization: From Pledges to Deal With Russia Is Reshaped,” The New York lands, private communication with author, July Deeds,” CSIA Studies in International Times, July 9, 1995, p. 4. 10, 1994. Security No. 2 (Cambridge: Harvard University, 29 Mark Thompson, “Sapphire’s Hot Glow,” Time, 51 Thomas Stock and Anna de Geer, “Chemical 1993), pp. 79-86. December 5, 1995, pp. 38-39, and Schwartz, pp. and Biological Weapons: Developments and 11 William J. Broad, “New Methods Sought to 20-21. Destruction,” in SIPRI, Yearbook 1995 Dispose of Rockets With No Harm to Earth,” The 30 William J. Broad, “Quietly, U.S. Converts Ura- (Stockholm: SIPRI, 1995), pp. 337-357. New York Times, September 17, 1991, p. C4. nium Into Fuel for Civilian Reactors,” The New 52 FBIS-SOV-95-208 (26 October 1995)(on-line). 12 Jackson Davis and John M. Van Dyke, “Dump- York Times, June 19, 1995, p. A10. 53 Sergei B. Batsanov, Director for External ing of Decommissioned Nuclear Submarines at 31 Matthew L. Wald, “Today’s Drama: Twilight Relations, Preparatory Commission for the Or- Sea,” Marine Policy (November 1990). of the Nukes,” The New York Times, July 16, ganization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weap- 13 General Accounting Office (GAO), “Nuclear 1995, Week in Review, p. 5. ons, Provisional Technical Secretariat, The Submarines: Navy Efforts to Reduce Inactivation 32 David Rohde, “Disposal of Warhead Plutonium Hague, , private communication with Costs,” GAO/NSIAD-92-134 (Washington, D.C., Awaits Federal Study of Options,” Christian Sci- author, April 7, 1994. GAO, 1992). ence Monitor, June 14, 1994. 54 Frances Williams, “Hopes High for Interna- 14 Ibid. 33 Frans Berkhout et al., Disposition of Sepa- tional Chemical Weapons Treaty,” Financial 15 Samuel Loring Morrison, “US Naval Battle rated Plutonium (Princeton, New Jersey: Center Times, August 26, 1992. Force Changes: 1 January 1994-31 May 1995,” for Energy and Environmental Studies, Princeton 55 International Security Digest 2 (April 1995). U.S. Naval Institute, Naval Proceedings, Vol. University, 1992), and Arjun Makhijani, ”Options 56 IDDS (1991, 1992). 121/6/1108, p. 47. for Plutonium from Dismantled Nuclear 57 Z. Lachowski, “Conventional Arms Control 16 Joshua Handler, “No Sleep in the Deep,” The Weapons,” Science for Democratic Action (Win- and Security Dialogue in Europe,” in SIPRI, Year- Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 49 (April 1993). ter 1992). book 1995 (Stockholm: SIPRI, 1995), pp. 17 Oleg Bukharin and Joshua Handler, “Russian 34 “Beyond the Bomb: Dismantling Nuclear Weap- 761-790. Nuclear-Powered Submarine Decommissioning,” ons and Disposing of their Radioactive Wastes,” 58 Michael Renner, “Budgeting for Disarmament: Science & Global Security 5 (1995), p. 245. (Seattle: Nuclear Safety Campaign, 1994). The Costs of War and Peace,” Worldwatch Paper

44 Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1996 Kopte, Renner, & Wilke

122 (Washington, D.C.: Worldwatch Institute, tute, Washington, D.C., and New York, 1995. 1994). 80 Michael Renner, “Budgeting for Disarmament: 59 Arthur Volmerig, “Die materielle Hinter- The Costs of War and Peace,” Worldwatch Pa- lassenschaft der NVA,” Wehrtechnik Spezial (May per No. 122 (Washington, D.C.: Worldwatch In- 1993). stitute, 1994). 60 Bundeshaushalsplan 1991-1994, Einzelplan 14, Geschäftsbereich des Bundesministeriums der Verteidigung, Bonn, Germany. 61 General Accounting Office (GAO), “Conven- tional Arms Control: Former Warsaw Pact Na- tions’ Treaty Compliance and U.S. Cost Control,” GAO/NSIAD-94-33 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 1993). 62 Ibid. 63 Associated Press, “Russia Unable to Scrap Weapons,” November 21, 1995 (as posted on CompuServ Electronic Forum “AP Online”). 64 For estimates, see Susanne Kopte, and Peter Wilke, “Surplus Weapons,” in Bonn International Conversion Center (BICC), Yearbook 1995/1996 (Bonn: BICC, 1996 (forthcoming)). 65 Ibid. 66 Agence France Press, “Russian Ships to South Korea for Scrap,” April 7, 1995 (on-line). 67 Matthew Kaminski, “US-Ukraine Venture to Recycle Munitions,” Financial Times, January 20, 1995. 68 Lenny Siegel, “EPA Circulates Draft Muni- tions Rule” (posted on the APC electronic con- ference bulletin board at “igc:cpro.military” on July 21, 1995). 69 Otfried Nassauer, “An Army Surplus - The NVA’s Heritage,” in BICC, ed., “Coping With Surplus Weapons: Priority for Conversion Re- search and Policy,” BICC Brief 3 (Bonn: BICC, 1995), pp. 37-67 70 “Dumping of Arms at Sea Accelerated as Janu- ary 1993 Restrictions Draw Near,” International Environment Reporter, September 23, 1992, p. 597. 71 “Army Looks for Ways to Reuse, Recycle Mu- nitions,” U.S. Army, Environmental Update 5 (A Quarterly Publication of Army Environmental News)(October 1993), p. 7. 72 Nassauer. 73 Michael Sirak, “The Problem of NVA Surplus Munitions,” unpublished graduate student semi- nar paper, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 1995, p. 15. 74 Eric Schmitt, “Selling the Shreds of War,” The New York Times, July 28, 1993, p. D1. 75 Estimating the Cold War Mortgage. The 1995 Baseline Environmental Management Report, Volumes I and II and Executive Summary (Wash- ington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy, March 1995). 76 Alexei Yablokov, Russian Federation National Security Council, Interagency Commission on Ecological Security, private communication with author, Moscow, August 1, 1994. 77 Paul George et al., “World Military Expendi- ture,” in SIPRI, Yearbook 1995 (Stockholm: SIPRI, 1995), p. 404 78 Michael Renner, “Military Mop-Up,” World Watch (September/October 1994), p. 27. 79 Database on Worldwide Expenditures for Disarmament,Conversion, Peacekeeping, and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, Worldwatch Insti-

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1996 45