Animal health Here are Safoso’s findings on the pig compartment system

Summary prepared by Dr Thandi Limited be improved among farm managers Chiappero and Dr Peter Evans, The online structure of the survey and farm personnel. SAPPO is limited by the understanding of Gaps in biosecurity identified by all participants of the questions. the survey include lack of biosecurity Compartments in South Africa are Follow-up explanations could not monitoring and lack of ASF contin- populations of pigs separated by be provided as in an interview. gency plans in many compartments. specific biosecurity standards com- There was a range of gender, age, ASF contingency plans reportedly do plying with Veterinary Procedural and educational differences. Each not have dedicated finance associ- Notice 39 of 2011 (VPN 39). Each is manager and vet were asked to rate ated. The annual audit required by given a unique ZA number. risk factors from negligible risk to VPN 39, which is often limited to Considering the cases of ASF high risk and these responses were the paperwork only, is not deemed in three registered compartment arranged to make various charts to sufficient to maintain and monitor a units in South Africa in 2020, SAPPO evaluate the data. minimum standard of biosecurity. commissioned a study by Safoso to establish perceived gaps in biosecu- ‘Biosecurity is not what is Risk factors rity as suggested by farm managers between fences, but what Risk factors for the introduction of and consulting veterinarians. Safoso ASF were mainly agreed upon by is a Swiss company specialising in is between your ears.’ farm managers and veterinarians research and training on animal dis- and the top three were: eases, including ASF. The company A serious problem with biosecu- • Farms with poor biosecurity locat- is, among others, doing work on ASF rity standards is that they need to ed in proximity to the compart- in Asia. be applied at all times, despite them ment; The survey included as many farm being inconvenient. This means • Insufficient control of scavenger managers and veterinarians as pos- that biosecurity is dependent on all animals in proximity to the com- sible and there was a good response management and farm personnel on partment unit premises; rate, already showing a certain level farms understanding and applying • High on-farm domestic pig densi- of commitment to the ASF issue. the standards, even when super- ty. Once gaps are identified, they can vision is not present. There is an Some risk factors had different be addressed appropriately. apparent discrepancy between the ratings between farm managers and The study was conducted using training received by management veterinarians. Vets rated the risk of an online survey with two slightly on farms and farm personnel in this fomites on clothing, boots, facilities, different surveys for farm manag- regard. If the standards are not un- and equipment to be higher than ers and veterinarians. In total, 97 derstood they cannot be effectively farm managers did. While farm man- farm managers and 13 consulting applied. This leaves compartments agers rated the risk of insufficient vets were emailed to represent all vulnerable to gaps in biosecurity and decontamination of non-swine deliv- 125 compartment units, which are therefore entrance of diseases. Fur- ery vehicles as higher than veterinar- grouped into 75 compartments (pig thermore, the study identified that ians. Farm managers also responded flows). knowledge of ASF transmission, clini- that ASF underreporting is more of cal signs, prevention and control can >>> to page 8

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<<< Compartment system from page 7

Recommendations for improving biosecurity for top rated risk factors in of average % units rated “high” “medium” from highest to lowest among farm managers and veterinarians. Risk factor Recommendation for improved biosecurity 02. Farms with poor biosecu- • Keep pigs indoors at all times while maintaining an rity located in proximity to enriching environment to optimise animal welfare. the compartment (< 5km) ° For units that must allow outdoor access for pigs due to animal welfare require- ments, outdoor access can be resumed once ASF has stopped spreading in domes- tic pigs in the region and farms have recovered from outbreaks. Active surveillance of animals with outdoor access for ASF will be essential in the recovery period. • Fence in compartment unit with non-porous fencing. ° All pig production areas / units must be totally and effectively fenced (pig proof) with a fence that is a minimum of 1,8m high. ° All access gates must be closed and locked at all times. ° Limited access shall be allowed. ° Highly recommended that a concrete or similar base be used to secure bottom of the fence and to prevent animals burrowing under fence. ° An SOP is required detailing when and who checks the fence. This must be done at least weekly and a register must be kept detailing any faults and corrective actions. ° No domestic animals shall be allowed inside the fenced area of a piggery. 01. High on-farm domestic Adhere to ideal pig stocking density recommendations. Separate sick pigs from pig density healthy pigs. #32. Insufficient control of Control of scavenger animals (e.g. sacred ibis, feral cats, feral dogs, feral pigs) scavenger animals outside • Control scavenger access to pig farm or around the but in proximity to the com- farm (within 5 km of the compartment unit premises). partment premises (< 5km)/ • Fence in compartments with non-porous/stock-proof fencing. #31. Insufficient control of • Bury carcasses and organs to a proper depth (3 m) following slaughter. scavenger animals within the • A comprehensive documented program (SOP) should be in place for the control and compartment premises extermination of scavengers where necessary. • A responsible person must be identified and trained as scavenger animal control officer. 18. Hunting/ culling of wild • Hunters should have no contact with pigs within 48h after hunting suids outside but in proximity activity. to the premises (< 5km) of • Wild boar carcasses should be found and disposed of quickly. The disposal the compartment without of carcasses to be carried out either by deep burial, bringing to the proper disposal of carcasses rendering plant or burning (under supervision of the competent veterinary and offal resulting in pres- authorities). ence of contaminated materi- • Possible use of appropriate chemicals for local disinfection of the carcass als on the site burial site. 23. Presence of biting flies • Implementation of (minimum) tick and fly control measures (e.g. Stomoxys calcitrans) in • Fly control in and within 5 km of the compartment premises where and if and around (< 5km) the com- possible partment premises without • Implementation of insect control can include control of ticks, especially fly control measures of O. savignyi (tampan) ticks, to reduce the risk of transmission of ASF virus from ticks to pigs 33. Insufficient pest control Thorough pest control (e.g. mice, rats, birds) within the compartment unit premises within the compartment • A comprehensive documented program (SOP) should be in place for the control and premises extermination of vectors (rats/ mice/ flies / insects, feral cats), where necessary. • A responsible person must be identified and trained as pest control officer. • All pest control stations, if used, must be clearly indicated on the farm plan 12. Insufficient cleaning and Enforcement of boot cleaning & disinfection or boot & clothes changing of exter- disinfection or changing of nal people, livestock officers/ veterinarians/ para-veterinarians, and compartment clothes and boots, facilities personnel that are in contact with pigs upon entering the pig site and equipment of compart- • Establish foot dips for disinfection at the entrances to the pig houses. ment personnel that are in • Change rubber boots/slippers upon entering pig houses. contact with pigs • Change clothing when going in/out of pig houses. • Establish a biosecurity plan that is approved/recommended by veterinary services that includes physical cleaning, washing and drying, disinfecting and rest period.

8 Risk factor Recommendation for improved biosecurity 12. Insufficient cleaning and Enforcement of cleaning & disinfection of facilities and equipment of compartment disinfection or changing of personnel that are in contact with pigs clothes and boots, facilities • Routine (regular) cleaning of facilities and equipment with effective disinfectants. and equipment of compart- • Remove manure and litter from facilities and equipment routinely. ment personnel that are in • Establish a biosecurity plan that is approved/recommended by veterinary services contact with pigs ... CONTINUE that includes physical cleaning, washing and drying, disinfecting, and rest period. 03. Proximity of the compart- Compartment units neighbouring ASF-infected farms can implement a provisional ment (< 5km) to a farm that quarantine of the compartment units was infected with ASF within • Stop all animal movement (in and out) unless necessary for slaughtering the last three months • Intensified movement restriction of personnel and service providers (i.e. feed supply etc.). 25. Insufficient decontami- Thorough decontamination of non-swine delivery vehicles entering and leaving the nation of non-swine delivery compartment premises especially when also used for internal movement of pigs, feed vehicles entering and leaving or raw materials the compartment premises • Washing and disinfection of vehicles. • Designated area for washing and disinfection of vehicles. • Vehicle access restrictions and biosecurity. • Down time for vehicles. • Use appropriate vehicle stocking densities. • Biosecurity plan approved/recommended by veterinary services For more details, see Pork360 guidelines 1.3 and 2.1-2.2 24. Insufficient decontam- Thorough decontamination of swine transport vehicles entering & leaving the com- ination of swine transport partment premises and thorough decontamination of vehicles used to transport vehicles entering and leaving pigs from the compartment to the abattoir between shipments especially when also the compartment premises used for internal movement of pigs, feed or raw materials • Washing and disinfection of vehicles. • Designated area for washing and disinfection of vehicles. • Vehicle access restrictions and biosecurity. • Down time for vehicles. • Use appropriate vehicle stocking densities. • Biosecurity plan approved/recommended by veterinary services For more details, see Pork360 guidelines 1.3 and 2.1-2.2 14. Underreporting of • Develop capacity of compartment personnel and farm managers on ASF, especially suspected ASF cases due to on recognition of ASF clinical signs. See section 5.2 for more details. various factors e.g. insuffi- • All deaths of post-weaning animals and adult animals must be recorded in a register cient capacity to recognise indicating suspected reasons. ASF clinical signs, lack of an • Check the ASF reporting system through a simulation exercise for a suspect ASF case easy reporting system to identify and address gaps in the reporting system • Raise awareness among compartment personnel in contact with pigs on the importance of reporting suspect cases to farm managers, veterinary and livestock field officers • Build trust between compartment personnel and farm managers and between farm managers and veterinarians through risk communication. a risk than the response from the ‘Biosecurity breakdowns ASF and biosecurity as they are the veterinarians. A question was posed ones who are responsible for imple- to veterinarians as to whether they occur due to ignorance mentation of biosecurity protocols. were aware of biosecurity breaches and arrogance.’ Farm managers working in the in compartments. It is disquieting three ASF positive compartments that on 25% of compartments there that there needs to be a biosecurity did not receive any training on ASF was a definite yes (8%) or unsure/ monitoring/auditing programme to in the last five years as reported by possible (17%), i.e. only 75% report- ensure continual compliance by farm farm managers. ed no breaches observed. These owners, managers and personnel to Areas that can be further inves- breaches were centered on removal biosecurity protocols. tigated in relation to ASF include of mortalities from the unit and Secondly, an ASF contingency interviews with state veterinarians, laundry procedures. plan needs to be drawn up for all pig updating of VPN39 requirements farms with dedicated plans on how and encouragement of farmers Summarised recommendations to manage an outbreak including to join the Pork360 accreditation The recommendations that arose financial considerations. scheme. from the report addressed areas Thirdly, it is also therefore, recom- All three compartments that of concern. The most important mended that farm managers and farm broke with ASF were not Pork 360 recommendation in our opinion, was personnel receive regular training on accredited.

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