Political Visions and Historical Scores
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Founded in 1944, the Institute for Western Affairs is an interdis- Political visions ciplinary research centre carrying out research in history, political and historical scores science, sociology, and economics. The Institute’s projects are typi- cally related to German studies and international relations, focusing Political transformations on Polish-German and European issues and transatlantic relations. in the European Union by 2025 The Institute’s history and achievements make it one of the most German response to reform important Polish research institution well-known internationally. in the euro area Since the 1990s, the watchwords of research have been Poland– Ger- many – Europe and the main themes are: Crisis or a search for a new formula • political, social, economic and cultural changes in Germany; for the Humboldtian university • international role of the Federal Republic of Germany; The end of the Great War and Stanisław • past, present, and future of Polish-German relations; Hubert’s concept of postliminum • EU international relations (including transatlantic cooperation); American press reports on anti-Jewish • security policy; incidents in reborn Poland • borderlands: social, political and economic issues. The Institute’s research is both interdisciplinary and multidimension- Anthony J. Drexel Biddle on Poland’s al. Its multidimensionality can be seen in published papers and books situation in 1937-1939 on history, analyses of contemporary events, comparative studies, Memoirs Nasza Podróż (Our Journey) and the use of theoretical models to verify research results. by Ewelina Zaleska On the dispute over the status The Institute houses and participates in international research of the camp in occupied Konstantynów projects, symposia and conferences exploring key European questions and cooperates with many universities and academic research centres. The beginnings of the Polish administration in the Kłodzko region The US Consulate in Poznań (1946-1951) For more information visit www.iz.poznan.pl The issue of compensation for victims We are also on Facebook, LinkedIn and Scribd. of Nazi crimes living in Poland The Orthodox Church in Ukraine and Russia after 2013 Polish sport under the shadow of the swastika A propagandised image of Polish sport in the Polish Film Chronicle Polish candidates for and members of the International Olympic Committee tło 20 % czerni 2019 gD Quarterly Journal of the Institute for Western Affairs in Poznań Institute for Special Issue Western Affairs PRZEGLĄD ZACHODNI 2019 KATARZYNA JĘDRASZCZYK Poznań THE ORTHODOX CHURCH IN UKRAINE AND RUSSIA AFTER 2013 IN THE FACE OF POLITICAL CHALLENGES, THE RUSSIAN–UKRAINIAN CONFLICT AND QUESTIONS ABOUT THE LIMITS OF SOVEREIGNTY The years 2013 and 2014 were important dates in the history of the Orthodox Church in Eastern Europe. The Revolution of Dignity and the Russian–Ukrainian conflict showed how great a trap was the concept of russkij mir for the Orthodox cir- cles that had direct ties to the Moscow hierarchy. The annexation of Crimea and the armed conflict in Ukraine put the Orthodox Church with institutional links to Moscow in a particularly difficult position.1 STATE AND RELIGION Modern forms of state–church relations can generally be represented by three models.2 The first, the so-called separation model, seeks to completely separate state and religion in all spheres of social life. The second – the cooperationist (partner) model – provides for cooperation between the church and the state in matters of culture, education or social programmes (this applies to both organisational issues and the financing of certain activities). The third model is referred to as paternalistic (protectionist): according to this model the church, as a culture-forming and nation- forming entity, comes clearly under the patronage of the state. In this case, the church often becomes an instrument in the hands of politicians. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, there took place a theological and sociological reflection on the complementarity of Orthodoxy and democracy. Ana- lysing a social model based on Christian values, Thomas Hopko stated that reli- 1 This is an extended and updated version of an article published in Polish in „Przegląd Zachodni” [Western Review] no. 1/2018 (366). The text was submitted for printing on 25 June 2019. 2 For more on different models of state–church relations see: J. Krukowski, Kościół i państwo. Podstawy regulacji prawnych, Lublin 2000, pp. 22–43; M. Marczewska-Rytko, Religia i polityka w globalizującym się świecie, Lublin 2000, pp. 69–79; cf. also: Kościoły w Unii Europejskiej, http://www. opoka.org.pl/biblioteka/X/XU/kosciolwobecue.html (11 December 2011). 230 Katarzyna Jędraszczyk gious pluralism and moral liberalism resulting in the “privatisation”3 of the religious world view cannot be combined with the values of Orthodoxy.4 The problem lies not so much in the approach to democracy (the idea of sobornost and decentralisa- tion of church structures in Orthodoxy may be closer to democracy than the “mon- archist” and centralised system of the Catholic Church) as in the attitude towards religious pluralism. However, what the Orthodox Church does is not at odds with the functioning of civic society. There is potential here in the tradition of elective hi- erarchs, work ethos, and the strength of the Orthodox Church’s actions in the social, educational and cultural spheres. However, the Moscow Patriarchate treats liberal democracy cautiously, usually identifying it with Western imperialism. The Russian Orthodox Church opposes the absolutisation of human rights and freedoms, indicat- ing that there are values which rank “not lower” than those rights and freedoms: faith, morality and the homeland.5 The Church can influence state policy in an institutional sense through the ac- tions performed by the church structures and clergy. The universality of the ideas that it preaches means that it often claims the right to comment on many aspects of state functioning and citizens’ activity. In the context of foreign policy, the foreign activity of churches (as non-territorial and transnational units) is a challenge for every coun- try. Such church activities can reinforce or weaken foreign policy depending on the relationships between the secular and church authorities.6 From the perspective of the state viewed as an actor in international relations, the identification function of the Church is important.7 In the case of co-creation of an “internal identity”, religion performs the function of integrating the society. At the same time, it creates the image of the state to the outside world, thus determining an “external identity”. If religion is a component of national (state) identity, it may serve as a source of legitimisation of foreign policy or as a mobilising factor. In addition, various operational tasks of religious institutions (mediation, conciliation or organisa- tion) should be mentioned here.8 In the case of the Orthodox Churches in Ukraine, 3 The term was introduced by Thomas Luckmann, who claimed that religions were not disappearing despite the progress of technology and globalisation. Two contradictory processes can be observed – the shrinking of religion and its simultaneous expansion in other parts of the world. In post-industrial socie- ties, the sacrum moves from the public to the “private” and non-institutionalised dimension. See T. Luck- mann, The Invisible Religion. The Problem of Religion in Modern Society, 1967. 4 T. Hopko, Orthodoxy In Post-Modern Pluralistic Societies, The Ecumenical Review, 1999, vol. 51, no. 4. 5 Основы учения Русской Православной Церкви о достоинстве, свободе и правах человека, 26 June 2008, for the full text see: http://pravoslavie.ru/27021.html (30 January 2018). 6 A. Curbanović, Czynnik religijny w polityce zagranicznej Federacji Rosyjskiej, Warsaw 2010, p. 41; A. Curbanović, Religia jako czynnik Soft Power Federacji Rosyjskiej, in: Religia we współczesnym świecie, B. Bednarczyk, Z. Pasek, P. Stawiński (eds.), Kraków 2010, pp. 195–206. 7 Sociology also distinguishes many other functions of the church: ideological, communicative, regulatory, legitimising and culture-forming. 8 A. Curbanović, Czynnik religijny..., pp. 42–43. The socio-political situation in Russia and also Ukraine at different times allows us to reflect on the politicisation of religion and the involvement of The Orthodox Church in Ukraine and Russia after 2013 231 most of these functions were particularly noticeable at the time of the political-social crisis at the turn of 2013 and 2014, after the annexation of Crimea by Russia and dur- ing the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine. THE PATH TO DIVISION OF THE ORTHODOX CHURCH IN UKRAINE A feature of the religious situation in Ukraine is the coexistence of four Eastern Churches within one state: the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriar- chate (UOC-MP), the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate (UOC- KP), the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC).9 Based on numbers of parishes (hromada), religious orders and clergy, the UOC- MP is institutionally the strongest, followed by the UOC-KP, the Greek Catholic Church and the UAOC.10 Comparing the statistics for 2005 and 2007, it is found that the UOC-KP is the fastest growing in terms of the number of parishes. The institu- tional division of the Orthodox Church took place in the early 1990s. In the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, only the Russian Orthodox