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Número 94

ANEXO II

Alvaro Espina Vocal Asesor 12 Julio de 2011

ENTRE EL 1 Y EL 15 DE MARZO DE 2011 (En sentido inverso)

Mar 15 2011

Abduh al-Fallah: Elite Myths and Popular Uprisings

Sherene Seikaly and Pascale Ghazaleh

[Image from unknown archive] The refrain “al-sha‘b/yu-rîd/is-qât/al-ni-zâm” has proven resiliently mobile: it rang out in Tunisia, echoed in Tahrir, traveled west to Libya and Algeria, and east to Yemen, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. A central part of this poetic and exhilarating refrain is al- sha’b: the people. How do we understand the people today when the term has come to be at best a glorified, naïve idea and at worst a stale concept? As we witness popular mass mobilization overthrow some of the most entrenched and ostensibly stable regimes in the region, the time has come to revisit the political meaning of al-sha’b. Giorgio Agamben reminds us: “Any interpretation of the political meaning of the people ought to start from the peculiar fact that…this term always indicates also the poor, the underprivileged, and the excluded. The same term names the…political subject as well as the class that is excluded from politics.” Fadi Bardawil has pointed out in these pages that Arab thinkers and journalists have since the 1960s “moved from an idealization of the revolutionary potential of the masses…to locating the inherent ‘problems’ plaguing the region in the culture of these same masses.” The sha’b has gone from being a subject of idealization to an object of derision. The Arab people, in European and North American as well as Arab intellectual discourse, are passive, dormant, apathetic, and dependent on a strong leader. They are childlike. This infantilization has a colonial genealogy. Take for example, the words of Lord Cromer as he contemptuously rejected Egyptian claims to self-government: "Can any sane man believe that a country which has for centuries past been exposed to the worst forms of misgovernment at the hands of its rulers, from Pharaohs to Pashas,

2 and in which, but ten years ago, only 9.5 percent of the men and 0.3 percent of the women could read and write, is capable of suddenly springing into a position which will enable it to exercise full rights of autonomy with advantage to itself and to others interested in its welfare? The idea is absurd." The regimes that seized power through their opposition to colonialism inherited, used and developed this obstinate conviction: the people are ignorant and incapable of governing themselves. This is why it should come as no surprise that Mubarak would address Egyptians as their benevolent (grand)father. It is through a critique of infantilization that we must read Omar Soliman’s assertion that Egyptians are not ready for democracy, that parents should lock their youth in their rooms, and that loyal Egyptians should turn off the satellite stations and listen instead to their conscience. Soliman’s reference to damirakum (your conscience) was a flailing appeal to Egyptians to return to one of the vehicles through which his regime had created loyal subjects: Egyptian state TV. North American and European regimes also continue to invest a great deal of capital in this trope of infantile, passive populations. This is why British officials responded to questions on the sale of crowd control artillery to Libya with the answer: “We didn’t think they would use them.” There was no expectation of a crowd, much less a mass gathering of people loudly and clearly demanding basic political rights. This adherence to the childlike and easily manipulated character of the Arab people was particularly stark when on February 21 the Middle East’s biggest arms fair, the Idex 2011 in Abu Dhabi, brimmed with weapons and contractors just as Libyan military planes rained death on demonstrating Libyans. It is not simply colonial overlords, authoritarian regimes, and Western arms dealers that attempt to produce the Arab people as children to be herded. Arab elitist discourse has played one of the most crucial and sustaining roles in producing the people as passive, easily manipulated children. Arab intellectuals reproduce a pervasive and ongoing divide between the “educated” and the “uneducated.” After the Tunisian Revolution, an overwhelming proliferation of analyses declared that Egypt was not Tunisia because, the social scientists explained, the majority of Egyptians are “uneducated.” Elites in Egypt have embraced this system of knowledge and analysis. Since January 25th, the “educated” have, at times desperately, clung to their cultural capital. As the protests in Tahrir continued, complaints began to surface. The revolution, elites fretted, was falling out of the hands of that “educated” vanguard that had supposedly spearheaded it. The “uneducated” were hijacking the movement; they were just waking up to the fact that a revolution had occurred and would undoubtedly seize this opportunity to loot and burn. Although it is the security forces and the army that have monopolized violence in Egypt over the past month, the theme of the mob, whether angry or not, has continued to surface with increasing persistence since Mubarak stepped down. Discussions of a possible interim president reference the candidate’s ability to speak to “Abduh al- fallah.” Commentators remind each other: “If educated people like us don’t help the government, who will?” Many people in Egypt – journalists, academics, technocrats – did not see this revolution coming. After the fact, identifying those who organized the initial demonstrations as “educated, like us” became a way of declaring one’s support for change. Yet the desire

3 to declare an organic, definitional affiliation with the revolutionaries gave way to uncertainty. As events continue to unfold, seemingly beyond the control of any single social or political group, referencing one’s education has become a way to lay claim to a definitive interpretation, to speak authoritatively for the country and its future. Elites are reproducing the very infantilization of the people that has buttressed colonial, authoritarian, and neo-colonial domination. Democratic participation, in these stubborn lexicons, is not a right but something earned and learned. Certainly, workshops on constitutional amendments would be of use to many of us. But making democratic participation contingent on an ambiguous and shifting social marker is pernicious. It is through this logic that elites dismiss the Muslim Brotherhood and its broad base: these supporters are lulled by the Brotherhood’s provision of services. Material benefits are the only motive of the “ignorant,” of course. And the patronizing Marxist concept of false consciousness flourishes. In Egypt and Tunisia, the work of the revolutions continues as Libyans fight for freedom with their lives and Bahrainis, Yemenis, Saudis, and Algerians courageously forge their struggle in the streets. But there is another struggle that is central to the success of these revolutions, in the moment and in the future: the rethinking of education and culture. In Arabic these terms are almost interchangeable: the educated (“mut‘allim”) is cultured (“muthaqqaf”). But if we have learned anything since December 2010, it is that these categories are exclusionary and hide more than they reveal. If we are indeed to sink those culturalist mythologies that have plagued the Arab world, the understanding of the sha‘b as a passive political subject or an infant to be trained, disciplined, and protected from itself must be overcome. http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/910/abduh-al-fallah_elite-myths-and- popular-uprisings

From Crossroads Arabia

Peninsula Shield in Bahrain 15/03/2011 The movement of Saudi troops—likely military police from the Saudi Arabian National Guard—and a UAE police force into Bahrain gets front page coverage in the Saudi media. The stories point to the fact that this intervention is a) at the invitation of the Bahraini government, b) under the aegis of the Peninsula Shield mutual security program, and c) not there to put down insurrection, but to protect Bahrain’s infrastructure. Other GCC members are said to be sending their own contingents to Bahrain, but no specifics are given. All of these points are true, but they also elide the root of the issue: Iran. To the Saudis, and other GCC members to varying degrees, Iran represents a near-existential threat. Centuries of enmity between Arabs and Persians, between Sunnis and Shi’as, continue to color both formal relations and popular perceptions. Iran’s history of meddling in the Gulf—which it sees as a natural part of its own sphere of influence, of course—both angers and frightens the Arab states. The size of Iran’s military and its willingness to wastefully throw that military into action (See: Iran-Iraq War) does nothing to lessen the threat. The bottom line is still that Saudi Arabia will not tolerate Bahrain’s becoming a satellite of Iran, just at the other end of a 25km causeway from its own oil facilities. It is now being reported that a Saudi soldier has been shot and killed by a protester. This is a serious escalation in the situation on the ground. It will do nothing to encourage gentle behavior by the Saudi forces there who presumptively already have a negative view of the Shi’a. Kingdom takes lead to help Bahrain SIRAJ WAHAB | ARAB NEWS Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states started sending security forces on Monday to Bahrain in response to Manama’s call for military help to quell anti-government protests that have shaken the country. Bahraini opposition groups including the largest party Al-Wefaq denounced the move to invite GCC forces. But the United States, while urging Bahrain to exercise restraint, said it does not consider the entry into Bahrain of GCC security forces an invasion. MANAMA/ALKHOBAR: Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states responded positively on Monday to Bahrain’s call for military help to quell anti- government protests that have shaken the country. “The Saudi Cabinet has confirmed that it has answered a request by Bahrain for support,” said a statement carried by the official Saudi Press Agency. … _____ No interference in internal affairs, says King Saudi Gazette/Saudi Press Agency (SPA) 5

RIYADH: King Abdullah, Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, reiterated Monday the Kingdom’s “absolute rejection of any interference in its internal affairs”. Chairing the weekly Cabinet meeting Monday, King Abdullah said the Kingdom’s foreign relations were based on “the principles of mutual respect and non-interference in domestic affairs”, with rules founded on “the Holy Qur’an and the Prophet’s Sunnah to safeguard the security, stability and peace of Saudi society from sedition and divisions”. King Abdullah thanked Almighty Allah for “the blessings of security and stability and the strong relations between the Kingdom’s people and their leadership”. The Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques cited the statement from the 118th session of the GCC Ministerial Council in reaffirming the “total rejection of GCC states of any foreign attempt to interfere in their affairs, and their determination to deal firmly with any incitement to factional sympathies, promotion of divisions between the people of member states, and threats to security”. … _____ Peninsula Shield Forces enter Bahrain to maintain order Asharq Alawsat London/Manama, Asharq Al-Awsat- Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) security forces entered Bahrain yesterday at the request of Manama to help protect government facilities from the threat of unrest, after weeks of protests in the Gulf kingdom. The Saudi government said it had responded to a call for help from its neighbor as Saudi-led forces from the Gulf countries’ joint Peninsula Shield Force crossed the causeway into Bahrain. … Once again, the Middle East demonstrates its problem with missed opportunities. Had Bahrain not treated its majority Shi’ite population less well than its Sunni minority, there would be no cause for unrest. The same applies to Saudi Arabia. Had the governments bothered to distinguish the different Shi’ite sects, rather than lumping them into one entity, they might have found willing partners. Had they not continued to demonize Shi’ism itself, they would not be facing sectarian as well as political issues today. Had they not put off reforming their political and social systems, all in the name of ‘traditional values’, they would not be faced with demands for those reforms to be made now, with no further delay. Had they seen the overthrow of the Shah in 1979 as a warning sign rather than an immediate threat, those governments might have started making changes 20 years ago instead of being confronted with angry mobs. http://xrdarabia.org/2011/03/15/peninsula-shield-in-bahrain/

RTVE.es/ TVE Ahmadineyad culpa de las revueltas árabes a EE.UU. y Europa "por apoyar a dictadores" • El presidente iraní se opone a una zona de exclusión aérea en Libia • Asegura que el pueblo europeo es "prisionero de los partidos políticos" • Lo ha declarado en una entrevista de Ana Pastor en Los Desayunos de TVE Ver también: Post de Ana Pastor sobre la entrevista a Ahmadineyad: http://blogs.rtve.es/anapastor/2011/3/15/la-entrevista-ahmadineyad RTVE.es/ TVE 15.03.2011 El presidente iraní, Mahmud Ahmadineyad, ha culpado a Occidente de las revueltas en el mundo árabe por "vender las armas a los dictadores" que ahora matan a su pueblo y ha advertido de que "una intervención militar en Libia es la peor opción". "¿Quiénes ayudaron a los dictadores en los últimos 50 años? ¿De dónde vino el armamento? ¿Fabricaron las armas el pueblo u otros gobiernos? Esta situación es fruto de la intervención de Estados Unidos y Europa en nuestra región", ha afirmado Ahmadineyad en una entrevista de Ana Pastor en Los Desayunos de TVE. A la defensiva, sin responder a las preguntas de la periodista Ana Pastor e insistiendo una y otra vez en la culpa de Occidente de todos los males, el líder iraní ha mostrado su oposición al establecimiento de una zona de exclusión aérea en Libia como medida para evitar la masacre contra la población que está cometiendo el régimen de Muamar el Gadafi. "Cualquier intervención occidental va a hacer más complicada la situación. Los occidentales tienen que dejar de lado la visión colonialista (...) Tenemos delante de nosotros las experiencias de Irak y Afganistán que han dejado miles de muertos y hasta un millón en Irak. Hay que prestar atención a la opinión del pueblo, que es el que tiene la soberanía", ha asegurado el presidente iraní. "En Europa y EE.UU. hay matanzas" Sin embargo, Ahmadineyad no ha aportado ninguna solución para para frenar los bombardeos aéreos de las tropas de Gadafi sobre la población y se ha limitado a insistir en la culpa de Europa y EE.UU. "¿Quiénes tienen bases militares en la zona y acuerdos económicos y comerciales? ¿Esas dictaduras estaban apoyadas por nosotros o por EE.UU.?", se ha preguntado. Acerca de si Teherán teme que las revueltas populares que ya han derrocado a los regímenes de Zine Al Abidine Ben Alí en Túnez y Hosni Mubarak en Egipto lleguen hasta la república islámica, Ahmadineyad ha defendido que su Gobierno no reprime al pueblo. Los vecinos de España encarcelan a la gente por escribir un libro "En los últimos 30 años hemos tenido 30 elecciones libres. Yo me paso cuatro horas a la semana hablando con la gente en la calle", ha señalado el líder iraní para luego volver a arremeter contra Occidente. "Tenemos ejemplos de matanzas en EE.UU. y en Europa, donde hay cárceles secretas y se encarcela a la gente por escribir un libro", ha añadido Ahmadineyad en una reflexión alejada de la realidad, como le ha recordado Pastor. "El pueblo europeo es el más reprimido"

Las organizaciones de derechos humanos y los periodistas internacionales han informado de una violenta represión de los opositores en Irán, donde no solo son marginados sino que a menudo también encarcelados, como es el caso de Mir Hossein Musaví y Mehdi Karrubí. Los europeos son prisioneros de los sionistas "Si incendian edificios públicos y pegan a la gente, ¿en España no se les encarcela? Yo sé que el Gobierno español reprimió a los separatistas vascos", ha indicado el líder iraní, comparando a la oposición política con terroristas. "El pueblo europeo es el más reprimido, está obligado a votar a unos cuantos partidos políticos que están controlados por los sionistas y su propaganda", ha sido la respuesta de Ahmadineyad a una pregunta sobre la lapidación de las mujeres en Irán. La intensidad de la entrevista ha hecho que Ana Pastor no se diera cuenta de que se le había caído el velo que cubría su cabeza, como se exige en Irán. Un asunto que se ha convertido en uno de los temas más comentados en las redes sociales de todo el mundo. http://www.rtve.es/noticias/20110315/ahmadineyad-culpa-revueltas-arabes-eeuu-europa- apoyar-dictadores/417060.shtml

Monday, March 14, 2011 The devil is now in the details for Egypt's democracy

Commentary by Rabab Fayad

The attention of many has begun to wane in the face of what is seen as the “administrative” phase of the Egyptian revolution, as the country transitions from the revolutionary protests of January to the first rounds of post-Mubarak elections in the coming weeks – and with a newly appointed Prime Minister, Isam Sharaf. Yet, there are still several critical steps that need to be taken to ensure Egypt is on a path toward a stable democratic system of government. While the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces – the transitional authority tasked with governing the country – and the committee it has appointed to amend the country’s constitution have shown a commitment to preparing for upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections, important gaps remain that leave the system vulnerable to corruption and possible foreign influence. On Feb. 26, the Supreme Council released its proposed constitutional amendments to the public in advance of a March 19 public referendum that will give the amendments the power of law. Parliamentary elections are scheduled for June, and three months later Egypt will hold its presidential election. The June elections will set the overall political tone for the presidential election and, more importantly, the very composition of political parties in the Parliament may determine who is nominated to run for the presidency. In addition, the new Parliament will be tasked with determining if the constitution should be rewritten. There is a need to enact measures that facilitate the formation and strengthening of political parties and regulate campaign finance, either by referendum before March 19 or in subsequent laws prior to the parliamentary elections. The ongoing state of emergency in the country must also be rescinded. As one method for determining presidential candidacy, Article 76 of the proposed constitutional amendments allows political parties that have at least one parliamentary seat to nominate a candidate for president. This new policy for presidential nominations is extraordinary for Egypt, which has had one political party – the National Democratic Party – in control for over 30 years. But despite this reform, there is a further need for concrete laws regarding the credentialing of political parties. There is no institution in place to ascertain whether a candidate is from a legitimate party. Although Article 88 of the new amendments reinstates the judiciary as the body responsible for monitoring elections and addressing electoral legal grievances, it does not

9 vest in them the authority to legitimize or certify political parties. A second issue in need of immediate attention is the lack of any campaign finance law. Thus far, no cap has been put on campaign spending or the amount an individual can donate. Political groups would be able to accept unlimited funding from individuals, corporations or even foreign powers interested in influencing the presidential elections. This may open the door to wealthy donors to essentially fund campaigns in full and “buy” seats in Parliament either for personal gain or so that the party they are contributing to nominates them to run for the presidency. This will leave the political system ripe for corruption – a critical element that was an underlying cause of and fuel for the revolution. In essence, the Egyptian Parliament can become a pure product of lobbies, rather than a body that can govern in the interest of the people. Lastly, the Supreme Council has yet to remove the emergency laws put in place by former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak 30 years ago. The emergency laws not only vest broad powers in the police, allowing for arrests with no accountability, they also stifle speech and debate – key components of democratic political campaigns. It is impossible for candidates to speak candidly or in some cases even run for office if they feel that they may be up against a police favorite in any district. The continuation of the emergency laws serves as a deterrent for candidates with a strong platform of anti-corruption, anti- torture or anti-police brutality from running for office. To address these problems, the Supreme Council must not only immediately lift the emergency laws so that citizens have time to prepare for parliamentary elections, it must put in place laws that vest the power of political party credentialing in a government body and that puts limits on campaign financing. The laws should have a sunset clause in place so that they may be re-addressed by the newly elected Parliament. However, in the interim, there is a need for a clear and expedited process so that the upcoming elections are free, fair and the first step toward a well-functioning and representative political system in Egypt.

Rabab Fayad is a foreign relations analyst in Geneva, Switzerland. THE DAILY STAR publishes this commentary in collaboration with the Common Ground News Service (www.commongroundnews.org).

Tuesday, March 15, 2011 Revolution will not dislodge 'stability' from U.S. thinking

Commentary by Chris Toensing

Stability is the least understood and most derided of the trio of strategic interests pursued by the United States in the Middle East since it became the region’s sole superpower. Vexing, because it is patently obvious code for coziness with kings, presidents-for-life and other unsavory autocrats. Perplexing, because it seems to involve only cost, lacking the material benefit of protecting oil deposits or the domestic political profit of backing Israel, the two other members of the troika. For decades, idealists of the right and left have taken aim at the concept of stability, hoping to marshal disgust at its amoral nature or disillusionment with its blowback. Such are the impulses of activists for human rights and a just peace; such was also the thought underpinning then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s dictum that “for 60 years, my country, the United States, pursued stability at the expense of democracy in this region here in the Middle East, and we achieved neither.” Such was not the thought that counted, however. The Bush administration, despite its willingness to part with stability in policy salons, proved quite happily married to the notion when elections in Palestine hinted that democratic polities in the Middle East would not be so pliable as the potentates when it came to oil and Israel. For the bipartisan foreign policy consensus in Washington, which the Obama administration personifies, stability is not so hard to love or difficult to comprehend. Its ethical challenges, when they are bruited at all, are greatly outweighed by the geopolitical advantages. For 60 years, minus a few revolutionary interruptions, stable regimes have pumped oil to the world market, keeping the price per barrel relatively low and allowing the U.S. Navy to police the tanker lanes. For 40 years, with an occasional dissent, stable Arab regimes have acquiesced in Israel’s colonization of Palestine, some of them signing up as partners in the various U.S.- sponsored “peace processes” intended to license the illegal facts on the ground. To these clear strategic benefits has been added the eagerness of stable Arab regimes to enlist in the U.S.-led “war on terrorism” and repress the less militant Islamist movements that have long raised the most credible specter of disruption to the preferred order. Now that non-religious popular uprisings have given flesh to the threat, it is still the commitment to stability that guides the White House. Where rebels rushed to the dictator’s ramparts, as in Libya, the U.S. has cut its client loose, pursuing sanctions and indictments, in hopes of forging ties with a steady-handed successor government. Where the CIA calculates (so far) that despots can withstand the tide, as in Bahrain or Yemen, 11 the U.S. has confined its interventions to lectures reflecting the liberal distaste for violence. That unease is, of course, relative, expressed in much stronger terms to the “delusional” Moammar Gadhafi in Libya than to the “moderate” Al-Khalifa in Bahrain. In Tunisia and Egypt, the Obama administration underestimated the power of the crowds, standing by its men Zine al-Abedine Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak for unseemly durations before each in turn was ousted. The White House’s maneuvers in Egypt, in particular, revealed the grip of the stability cult in Washington. The administration’s more traditional realists gathered around Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and urged reassurance of Mubarak and his cronies, while the liberal internationalist wing pushed vague pro- democracy rhetoric while busily designing constitutional stratagems to help the octogenarian Egyptian president manage his own “orderly, peaceful transition” to retirement. In both cases, the underlying prerogative was to blunt the will of the street, which might take Egypt’s revolution in unpredictable directions. Barack Obama is the president who invited America’s predatory insurance industry to help draft his health care reform legislation; with regard to this key U.S. ally, as well, his instinct is that deals with the forces of darkness are the best guarantor of minimal friction. Stability, after all, is prized for its own sake, in addition to the succor it lends to other strategic goals. Historically, and particularly in the last 30 years, stable regimes in the Middle East have been malleable interlocutors with Washington – not puppets or yes-men in some crude sense, but reasonable sorts who, precisely because they were unaccountable to their populations, were willing and able to put free markets and “peace processes” above wealth redistribution and justice for the Palestinians. Revolutions in the Arab world cannot dislodge stability from its perch in U.S. thinking. But if the revolutions are completed, and produce governments that derive their stability from genuinely participatory politics, Arab chanceries will drive much harder bargains – and Washington does not relish the prospect.

Chris Toensing is editor of Middle East Report, published by the Middle East Research and Information Project. This commentary first appeared at bitterlemons-international.org, an online newsletter.

http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=10&categ_id=5&article_id=125987 #

Don't exaggerate Arab support for Libya No Fly Zone Posted By Marc Lynch Tuesday, March 15, 2011 - 4:24 AM Share

The approval by the Arab League of a No-Fly Zone for Libya, combined with increasingly urgent appeals from the Libyan opposition and some Arab voices, has helped build support for an international and American move in that direction. I am just leaving the Al-Jazeera Forum in Doha, where I had the opportunity to discuss this question in depth with a wide range of Arab opinion leaders and political activists as well as several leading Libyan opposition representatives (see this excellent post by Steve Clemons from the same conference). There is both more and less to this Arab support than meets the eye. Arabs are indeed deeply concerned about the bloody stalemate in Libya, and want international action. But if that action takes military form, including the kind of bombing would actually be required to implement a No-Fly Zone, I suspect that the narrative would rapidly shift against the United States. While Arab public opinion should not be the sole consideration in shaping American decisions on this difficult question, Americans also should not fool themselves into thinking that an American military intervention will command long-term popular Arab support. Every Arab opinion leader and Libyan representative I spoke with at the conference told me that "American military intervention is absolutely unacceptable." Their support for a No Fly Zone rapidly evaporates when discussion turns to American

13 bombing campaigns. This tracks with what I see in the Arab media and the public conversation. As urgently as they want the international community to come to the aid of the Libyan people, The U.S. would be better served focusing on rapid moves toward non-military means of supporting the Libyan opposition. The deep concern for Libya is real, intense, and passionate. Arab activists and opinion leaders repeatedly warned that if Qaddafi survives it could mean the death of the Arab revolutionary moment. This is part of the wider identification across the unified Arab political space which has palpably emerged among young activists and mass publics. This includes Bahrain, by the way, where the intervention by GCC security forces against the protestors has had a comparable chilling effect even if it has received less coverage on al-Jazeera than has Libya. There is no question that most Arabs desperately want something to be done to save Libya from Qaddafi, and that this is seen as having broad and deep regional implications. When it comes to military intervention, however, this deep identification with the Libyan protestors intersects uncomfortably with the enduring legacy of Iraq. The prospect of an American military intervention, no matter how just the cause, triggers deep suspicion. There is a vanishingly small number of Arab takers for the bizarre American conceit that the invasion of Iraq has somehow been vindicated. The invasion and occupation of Iraq remains a gaping wound in the Arab political consciousness which has barely scabbed over. Any direct American military presence in Libya would be politically catastrophic, even if requested by the Libyan opposition and given Arab League cover. A No-Fly Zone with Arab and UN cover would be more palatable, if controversial, but any serious analysis must take into account the likelihood that it would not work and would only pave the way to more direct military action. While I supported it early on, I have learned much from the debate which has ensued. I understand and sympathize with the moral urgency to do something for Libya. But that should not blind us to the costs and risks of a no-fly zone and the limited prospects that it would tip the balance. It isn't a costless, easy alternative to war... it is more likely the preface to deeper military involvement. I am frankly baffled that anyone would take seriously the clamoring of inveterate hawks to ignore the reservations of the military and jump into another ill- considered military adventure in the Middle East. Listening to assurances that military action will be smooth and cheap, with no complications and with great Arab support brings back all the bad memories of 2002. Discussing a No-Fly Zone means discussing the possibility of military invasion. Anything else is irresponsible. That doesn't mean the U.S. should do nothing. The administration should move quickly and aggressively to recognize the provisional Libyan government, release the frozen Libyan assets to that provisional government, and allow the flow of weapons to them. It should push for ever tighter targeted sanctions against Qaddafi, and continue to mobilize international consensus against his regime to make sure that he remains an absolute pariah without access to international institutions, revenues, or support. It could jam Qaddafi's communications and provide intelligence, and more. The debate should move away from an exclusive focus on military action. That is a dead end where we have been before, and should not be going again. http://lynch.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/03/15/dont_exaggerate_arab_support_for_lib ya_no_fly_zone

Qaddafi Under Siege A political psychologist assesses Libya's mercurial leader. BY JERROLD M. POST | MARCH 15, 2011

The rambling statements of Muammar al-Qaddafi since the uprising in Libya began on Feb. 17 have led many to characterize the idiosyncratic Libyan leader as a madman, psychotic, out of touch with reality. Among the statements made by Qaddafi that have led observers to question his sanity are his characterization of the rebels as "drug-crazed youth" whose Nescafé the United States plied with hallucinogenic drugs. He also accused al Qaeda of being behind the rebellion, only to then again accuse the United States. In his first media interview on Feb. 28 since the uprising began, with BBC, ABC, and the Sunday Times, when asked about his countrymen rising against him, Qaddafi denied it: "There are no demonstrations at all in the streets. Did you see the demonstrations? Where? They are supporting us. They are not against us. There is no one against us.

Against me for what? Because I am not president. They love me. All my people are with me. They love me all. They will die to protect me, my people." RedditBuzz More... This led many to conclude that he was denying reality. He also went on a rant blaming al Qaeda: "It is Qaeda, it is Qaeda, it is Qaeda, not my people. It is Qaeda, Qaeda, Qaeda, yes. They came from outside. It's al Qaeda. They went into military bases and seized arms and they're terrorizing the people. The people who had the weapons were the youngsters. They're starting to lay down their weapons now as the drugs that al Qaeda gave them wear off." When he was asked in the interview whether he would step down, Qaddafi again denied that he has any authority: "If they want me to step down, what do I step down from? I'm not a monarch or a king. It's honorary. It has nothing to with exercising power or authority. In Britain, who has the power? Is it Queen Elizabeth or David Cameron?" Most recently Qaddafi indicated that the rebellion was the result of a conspiracy by the West to recolonize Libya in order to gain control of its oil. Characterizations of being psychotic have been leveled at Qaddafi since he took over the reins of Libya in a bloodless coup in 1969 at the age of 27. A Time magazine article from April 1986 quoted U.S. President Ronald Reagan as calling him "the mad dog of the Middle East." But for the most part, during his 42 years at the helm of Libya, he has been crazy like a fox. While this is not a definitive clinical diagnosis, Qaddafi can best be characterized as having a borderline personality. The "borderline" often swings from intense anger to euphoria. Under his often "normal" facade, he is quite insecure and sensitive to slight. His reality testing is episodically faulty. While most of the time Qaddafi is "above the border" and in touch with reality, when under stress he can dip below it and his perceptions can be distorted and his judgment faulty. And right now, he is under the most stress he has been under since taking over the leadership of Libya. Thus, the quotes elaborated above probably accurately reflect his true beliefs. He does sincerely cling to the idea that his people all love him. Qaddafi's strong anti-authority bent and his tendency to identify with the underdog can be traced back to his childhood. He was born in a tent in the desert to a Bedouin family in 1942. When Qaddafi was 10 years old, Gamal Abdel Nasser took over the reins of Egypt at the head of the Free Officers Movement, which made a deep and lasting impression on the young Qaddafi. He initially attended a Muslim school, where he was recognized as being very bright, and was sent to Tripoli to continue his education, but was teased by the children of the cosmopolitan elite for his coarse manners, leaving him with a bitter resentment of the establishment. In Libya at that time, a military career provided an opportunity for upward mobility, and Qaddafi entered the Libyan military academy in Benghazi in 1961. Nasser and his revolutionary nationalism assumed a heroic stature in the mind of Qaddafi and his fellow students. He first began to think of organizing a military coup against the corrupt regime of King Idris while in military college, and on Sept. 1, 1969, with a small group of junior military officers, formed Libya's own Free Officers Movement and successfully led a bloodless coup to depose the king.

From the very beginnings of his leadership of the junta known as the Revolutionary Command Council, the deeply anti-establishment Qaddafi actively supported groups that he considered underdogs, who represented themselves as attacking imperialism. He became one of the world's most notorious supporters of terrorist groups around the world, with no particular benefit to Libya. His support of terrorism was both wide and deep. He sent arms to the Irish Republican Army, provided financial support to the social revolutionary group FARC in Colombia, and to the Red Army Faction in Germany and the Red Brigades in Italy. He reportedly provided major financial support to the "Black September" organization responsible for the massacre of the Israeli Olympic team at the Munich Olympics in 1972. He praised the terrorist attack by the Japanese Red Army on the Lod Airport in Tel Aviv, Israel, urged Palestinian terrorist groups to carry out attacks on Israel, and offered to provide financial support and training. Following Nasser's lead, he attempted to create a pan-Arab nation, merging first with Egypt and Syria, and then later attempting to merge with Tunisia, but his would-be partners were quick to discover that to merge with Libya was to be taken over by Qaddafi, leading to the swift failure of these proposed unions. In Qaddafi's modest view, he and Libya were at the very center of three overlapping circles: the Arab world, the Muslim world, and the Third World. Reflecting his deep antipathy to formal authority, Qaddafi not only disclaimed any formal title, but institutionalized this as a governing philosophy in what he called a "popular democracy," later "Islamic socialism." Dismantling parties and institutions, he formed "people's committees" across the country to establish a direct democracy. This principle was codified in the three slim volumes of his Green Book, the quixotic tome on political philosophy he published in 1976. Then, in 1977, at Qaddafi's bidding, the General People's Congress, which was in effect a committee of committees, conferred upon him the honorific title of permanent "Brotherly Leader and Guide of the First of September Great Revolution of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya," (jamahiriya is loosely translated as democracy of the masses or state of the masses, with no formal organizations other than the "people's committees"). In this democracy of the masses, Qaddafi would have no formal leadership role. This was the basis for Qaddafi's explanation in his Feb. 28 press conference that he can't resign because he has no official position. After the revolution, Libya nationalized some 70 percent of the oil companies operating in Libya, including British Petroleum and Continental Oil, and joined the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), with a resultant large increase of oil revenues for Libya. Using Libya's petroleum wealth, Qaddafi not only bankrolled terrorists, but almost indiscriminately funded rogue leaders around the world, including Idi Amin Dada of Uganda, Emperor Bokassa of the Central African Empire, Haile Mengistu of Ethiopia, and Daniel Ortega, leader of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. In reviewing Qaddafi's career, two things stand out. A consistent theme is his identification with the underdog, standing up against authority. And while he eschews the titles of power, he has, in fact, been quite ruthless in eliminating any threats to his own power. It has been estimated that some 10 to 20 percent of the Libyan population works for the people's committees, identifying threats to his power, dissidents, and regime critics, and eliminating them, forming a network of secret informers rivaling that of Saddam Hussein, Josef Stalin, and the East German Stasi. So sensitive to plots is his regime that even to engage in a discussion with a foreigner is a crime punishable by 17 three years in prison. The fear of dissidents includes those living abroad, who have sought the sanctuary of exile, and he has dispatched assassination teams abroad to silence outspoken anti-Libyan dissidents, for example shooting at 10 anti-Qaddafi protesters in Britain in 1984. And his reach extended to the United States: In 1980, he attempted to assassinate a Libyan graduate student at the University of Colorado, seriously wounding him, and killed a Libyan exile just before his U.S. citizenship ceremony in 1990. Amnesty International once estimated that Libya carried out at least 25 assassinations abroad in the 1980s. In Qaddafi's constellation of enemies, the United States was to occupy a special role. To have the courage to stand up to the world's only superpower would surely magnify his stature. And stand up he did. Reagan recalled in his diaries that Qaddafi mounted an assassination plot against him in November 1981. In early 1986, when Qaddafi declared the Gulf of Sidra as Libya's territory, which extended some 200 miles beyond the coast, and threatened attacks against anyone who dared to cross "the line of death," the U.S. Navy carried out a longstanding planned exercise that indeed crossed the line. Qaddafi sent two sorties of jets against the American fleet, which were promptly shot down. Qaddafi then thanked the United States for making him "a hero to the Third World." Later that year, Libyan agents bombed the La Belle disco in West Berlin, a favorite hangout for the U.S. military, killing three and wounding 229. Intercepts revealed this was a Libyan plot, providing Reagan the long-sought "smoking gun" to fulfill his inaugural commitment to make attacking terrorism his No. 1 priority. The United States mounted a bombing raid against Tripoli, the Libyan capital, in reprisal. Qaddafi claimed his adopted daughter was killed in the raid. Now, Qaddafi was fully engaged with his arch enemy. A year later, a Japanese Red Army terrorist, hired by Qaddafi, was apprehended at a rest stop on the New Jersey turnpike with three pipe bombs discovered in his car. According to a February 1989 article in the New York Times, he intended to set them off in a Navy recruiting station in New York City on the first anniversary of the U.S. bombing raid on Tripoli. In 1988, the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 occurred over Lockerbie, Scotland, a flight filled with American students returning home after study abroad, killing all 259 people on board and 11 on the ground. Meticulous forensic examination traced the bomb back to Libya, leading to U.N. economic and political sanctions in 1992, which bit deeply, leading to Libya's economic and political isolation. The Libyan associate minister of justice, who recently defected, has confirmed that it was Qaddafi himself who gave the orders. In 2003, the U.N. Security Council made the lifting of the sanctions contingent on Libya's accepting responsibility for the actions of its officials and payment of up to $2.7 billion in compensation for the victims of the 1988 attack. Libya watchers believe that his son and designated successor Saif al-Islam Qaddafi, who has a Ph.D. from the London School of Economics and was considered more worldly than his father, persuaded the colonel to agree to the compensation and abandon Libya's weapons of mass destruction program. (The question of whether the Ph.D. dissertation was ghostwritten and partially plagiarized is now under investigation.) This decision led to the lifting of the sanctions, ending Libya's diplomatic isolation. It represented a rare example of Qaddafi being able to exercise wisdom in pursuit of Libya's international position. But it did not exhaust his fondness for the United States as adversary. In 2009, Qaddafi found common cause with Venezuela's Hugo Chávez to propose a South Atlantic Treaty Organization to counter NATO.

The recent violence against unarmed civilians has disaffected many within Qaddafi's diplomatic corps and the military. What began as a small stream has now become a virtual river of resignations and defections, perhaps attempting to dissociate themselves from a regime accused by U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon of "serious transgressions of international human rights and humanitarian law." Several senior military officers are now leading the rebel forces, and the former ambassador to India, Ali Assawi, has now become the foreign minister for the new rebel shadow government, the Libyan National Council, which is headed by Qaddafi's former justice minister. Throughout his life and career, Qaddafi has lived out his core psychological value, that of the outsider standing up against superior authority, the Muslim warrior courageously confronting insurmountable odds. A man does not mellow with age, especially a highly narcissistic leader consumed by dreams of glory. Indeed, as a man grows older, he becomes more like himself. But as the stress has mounted, Qaddafi seems increasingly to have lost touch with reality. Having dedicated his life to Libya, his creation, he finds it inconceivable that his people are not all grateful to him, and when he says his people all love him, he believes it. And therefore, anyone contesting his authority must be responding to foreign agents from the United States or al Qaeda. When he says he will fight to the "last drop of his blood," he means it. Qaddafi will not commit suicide nor slink away to a lush exile. When he speaks of "my country," he means it literally. Qaddafi is Libya and a Libya without him at the helm is unimaginable to him. In an article in the Economist magazine from February 2011, he is quoted as having declared that "I was the one who created Libya, and I will be the one to destroy it." The West should take this statement very seriously. Qaddafi is indeed prepared to go down in flames, and the question is how many of his supporters are prepared to fight to "the last drop of blood." http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/03/15/qaddafi_under_seige?print=yes&hid ecomments=yes&page=full

After Tunisia and Egypt: Palestinian Neoliberalism at the Cross-roads vía The Jadaliyya Ezine de Raja Khalidi and Sobhi Samour el 14/03/11

A spectre is haunting the Middle East – the spectre of popular revolts against autocratic governments. Listening to the loud chants from demonstrators in Algiers to Sana’a asserting their political and economic demands, it is clear that exorcising this spectre needs more than just political regime change: they are demanding the change of the system that has produced poverty, unemployment and vast income disparities. These phenomena did not occur spontaneously or as a natural stage of development. Rather, they are among the outcomes of an economic policy model widely adopted in the region over the past decades and shaped by the neoliberal Washington Consensus advocated by the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWI), the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Curiously however, just at the moment when neoliberalism is being rejected by widening popular movements in the region and by developments elsewhere in the global economy, the Palestinian Authority (PA) is stepping up its neoliberal state- building program entitled ‘Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State’. The program was launched by PA Prime Minister Salam Fayyad in 2009 amidst unprecedented internecine political divisions and a historic crisis of legitimacy, indeed survival, of the national liberation movement. While it promises to build ‘good governance’ institutions to garner local and international support for the PA’s statehood plan, a more critical reading reveals that the PA has embarked on a path that seems to be trading off national liberation for neoliberalism. It should be recalled that when the Palestinian national liberation movement emerged in the early 1960s, its primary goal was to liberate the land and the people from Zionist settler colonialism. At its inception, it was an integral part of a broader anti-colonial struggle and the establishment of a just world order. Once in power, however, most of

20 the movements associated with these struggles failed to deliver on their promises, instead allowing neocolonial relations of production and exchange to bolster their own power and secure privileges for the national bourgeoisie and the ‘international investor.’ More recently, the dynamics of such relations have been complemented by the irresistible ‘logic’ of neoliberalism and globalization—striking examples being the African National Congress’s embrace of neoliberalism and the neoliberal ‘shock therapy’ and rise of an oligarchy’ in countries of the former Soviet Union and bloc. Then as now, neocolonialism and neoliberalization followed formal independence or decolonization, and it is on this basis that the Palestinian statehood program represents a farcical idea since it is framed as achieving statehood through neoliberal institution- building under occupation and, therefore, redefines the Palestinian liberation struggle as it has been hitherto known. Regionally as well as globally, the hegemony exerted by neoliberalism is inextricably linked with U.S. economic and political interests and the BWI, which it dominates. In the Middle East, the embrace of neoliberal policies by governments and their elites started in the early 1990s, primarily by North African states, as what they were told would act as an antidote to their failed ‘socialist’ or statist development strategies. These were already being retracted ever since Sadat’s ‘infitah’ policy set the tune in the late 1970s. Egypt, and especially Tunisia, were until recently hailed as ‘top reformers’ by BWI for the speed and depth with which they have implemented neoliberal reforms. In Jordan, the neoliberal agenda was launched with the signing of the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty. More often than not, countries that have implemented neoliberal reforms have experienced rising rates of poverty and unemployment. In most of these countries, this has been accompanied by the rise of a new social class whose fortunes are directly linked to the privatization of state enterprises and liberalization of the economy. More recently, the extreme neoliberal policies imposed during the US occupation of Iraq, from the removal of foreign ownership restrictions and widescale privatization to a 5 percent, uniform tariff regime and some of the lowest taxes in the world, has been aptly described as “state-building in reverse.” The PA’s neoliberal turn thus has to be understood in the context of longstanding efforts to reconfigure Middle Eastern states, their economies, and the region as a whole. It comes in response to the U.S.-sponsored attempt to prop up a ‘moderate’, more pliable, Palestinian leadership, integrate Israel in the wider region, and manage (not resolve) the conflict. Attempts to make the PA embrace neoliberalism existed even before its creation in 1994, in the context of the BWI role and emerging neoliberal thought in the ‘regional economic development working group’ of the pre-Oslo Madrid multilateral negotiations, in which the PLO participated. By 1993, Harvard economists and the World Bank[1], in association with several Palestinian economists, had entered the arena. They recommended a fairly neoliberal set of economic policies for guiding the PA through what was still seen as a five-year transition to independence.In 1999, the Council on Foreign Relations (also with Palestinian expert collaboration) argued that the implementation of good governance reforms, rule of law, and policies ensuring a conducive climate for investment were necessary preconditions for Palestinian independence. In line with the policy pedigree of its main architects, [2] the PA statehood program is replete with the seductive terminology of neoliberalism: plurality, accountability, equal opportunity, the empowerment of ‘citizens’, the protection of social, economic, and political rights, and the state’s efficient provision of services and public goods, Not 21 unsurprisingly, alongside the ‘calm’ of the past five years this has exerted a powerful appeal to the Palestinian middle class and beyond. The program, as well as the 2008 Palestinian Reform and Development Plan (PRDP) it incorporates, rests on four interdependent and mutually reinforcing components: building good governance institutions that emulate the neoliberal blueprint, private sector growth as well as effective service delivery and policing of the Palestinian population. As reflected in the embrace of the security-development nexus by all involved parties, and an allocation of $228 million to the Security Sector Reform and Transformation Program (SSRT) at the Paris Donor Conference in 2007, it is undoubtedly the security component that has been elevated to a vanguard role in achieving Palestinian statehood. Linking (Israeli) security to (Palestinian) development, of course, reinforces the power imbalances between Israel and the PA and makes every Israeli ‘concession’ – from removing a checkpoint to allowing Palestinian exports and imports – contingent upon Palestinian security collaboration. Israel’s own assessment of this security collaboration has been very favorable. Its security establishment has praised the ‘professionalism’ of the EU-supported Palestinian police and security units and welcomed the graduation of new men from the US-trained National Security Force battalions under Lieutenant General Keith Dayton. The new security climate in the West Bank has led to a selective, phased and always reversible easing of some of Israel’s restrictions on Palestinian economic activity and produced – spurred by a significant injection of aid money – a revival of private sector growth. The newly empowered Palestinian capitalist class has been described as a predatory, oligarchic elite whose dominant position has been favored by the PA’s neoliberal program made possible by security collaboration with Israel. The rise of an economic oligarchy is of course a common phenomenon in neoliberal regimes and it comes as no surprise that they have been targeted in the ongoing wave of Arab mass uprisings. The PA is thus not the first government to have resorted to combining neoliberal reforms with a strong-arm security apparatus--Chile under Pinochet provides a telling example to what has been described ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ used to implement radical market reforms and open up the economy for foreign capital. Two supporters of the strategy recently noted in the Wall Street Journal that the PA’s security reform efforts are “the sine qua non for economic expansion . . . and a model for the state-building program in general. Such an affirmation not only turns economic development experience on its head, but also sends a disconcerting message about the price of neoliberal economic growth. In trying to locate ‘real-existing’ Palestinian neoliberalism, the institutional capabilities and limitations of the PA reveal an obvious contradiction. On the one hand, even if the PA would have wanted to pursue an alternative economic strategy, it has relatively little institutional capability to do so. The structural realities of Israel’s occupation, influence of BWI advocacy and tied donor money have contributed to minimal policy space, that is, the freedom to determine economic policies without external constraints being binding. The limited policy space available also means that the PA is deprived of essential policy tools to actually implement the full package of conventional neoliberal policies. This holds not only for a non-existent monetary or trade policy, but also for the absence of significant public assets to be privatized after the ”divestment” by the PLO of its most strategic financial holdings as advised by the IMF since 2001 when the

‘Palestinian Investment Fund’ was established for this purpose. Moreover, the protection and enforcement of well-defined property rights, another perquisite for an ‘investment-friendly’ climate as conceived by neoliberalism, is also sharply inhibited by the structural realities of Israel’s occupation and ongoing land expropriation. On the other hand, the PA attempts to exploit all available policy space to advance a neoliberal agenda. Remarkably then, the PA statehood plan represents at best little more than a strategy for further implementation of a neoliberal framework into policy areas hitherto off-limits within the configuration of Israel’s occupation. The available space the PA can most feasibly exploit to pursue the neoliberal agenda lies primarily in the realm of fiscal policies. The PA has committed itself to reduce its budget deficit and aid dependency, which it hopes to realize through a mixture of public sector pay, hiring freeze and as layoffs, as well as the introduction of pre-paid electricity meters to force households to budget their resources even more stringently. The PA expects that the negative impact of such measures will be compensated by a revival of the Palestinian private sector and its increased contribution to job creation. Another prospect for private sector revival consists in the PA-proposed and donor-financed industrial parks near the Israeli border (often in the separation wall seam zone) to circumvent Israeli closure. The PA hopes that such enclave-style industrial parks, which follow the familiar neoliberal model of cross-border development involving international capital and cheap local labor, will contribute to its export-led growth strategy. The realization of continued private sector growth, in turn, depends on the PA’s ability to effectively police the Palestinian people and its workforce in areas under its “jurisdiction”. Simply stated, because it has no evident strategy for tackling the real ‘external’ obstacles, the PA’s attention has shifted to a range of perceived ‘internal’ obstacles to statehood, and its program is consequently aimed at rooting them out. Seen from this angle, then, the PA statehood program must embed the discourse and practice of neoliberalism in Palestinian society. It is here where the concept of the rule of law, so central in neoliberal rhetoric, proves its instrumental value. Underlying its technical, neutral vocabulary is the desire to escape politics and, indeed, the very political nature of the question of Palestine. The statehood program encourages the perverse idea that citizens may have to acquiesce in occupation but will not be denied the benefits of smoother running traffic, a liberal education curriculum, investor-friendly institutions, efficient public service delivery, and, for the middle class, access to luxury hotel chains and touring theatre performances. The ‘state’ model envisaged by the PA is precisely of the sort that has wrecked already sovereign economies around the world through neoliberal reforms. Predictably, reforms the PA has already implemented to pursue such a model have earned the stamp of approval by the BWI. Yet, both the World Bank and the IMF have reminded the PA that the reform process must continue even though, as both institutions recognize, numerous obstacles posed by Israel undermine the process at all stages. Conversely however, the PA’s obsessive focus on reform might just serve to make occupation less visible to Palestinians, less costly for Israel and donors and even more efficient in the process. Certainly, such a focus resonates well with Israel’s offer of ‘economic peace’. The PA has publicly denounced the Israeli concept of economic peace and acknowledged that institution building cannot alone end the occupation. But the neoliberal ‘state’ being built by the PA and its international backers means that it must rely on Israel to facilitate the statehood agenda. To all intents and purposes that adds up to a co- 23 habitation with economic peace, through effective tolerance of, and cooperation with, the occupying power. The Palestinian leadership needs to take a long, hard look at what peoples in the region are demanding. For the Palestinian people at the center of a region undergoing what might yet turn out to be a revolutionary transformation, this means nothing short of a return to fundamental aims: liberating the land and the people – not creating an anomalous neoliberal enclave within Israel's occupation.

This post draws on an article by the authors published this month in Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. XL, No. 2 (Winter 2011), pp. 1–20, “Neoliberalism as Liberation: The Statehood Program and the Remaking of the Palestinian National Movement”. The views expressed in this post do not represent those of the United Nations secretariate.

[1] World Bank: “Developing the Occupied Territories: An Investment in Peace” (Washington, DC: The World Bank Group, 1993). [2] Prime Minister Fayyad and Palestine Investment Fund CEO Mohamad Mustafa are the most senior, enduring, and public faces of PA economic policy making since 2005, and are former IMF and World Bank representatives, respectively, to the PA. http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/904/after-tunisia-and-egypt_palestinian- neoliberalism-at-the-cross-roads

03/15/2011 05:25 PM Digging too Deep Journalist Arrests a Blow for Press Freedom in Turkey By Daniel Steinvorth The dubious arrests of 10 journalists in Turkey for what the authorities claim is involvement in an anti-government conspiracy has thrown further doubt on the extent of press freedoms in the EU candidate country. In the early morning hours of March 3, Istanbul-based journalist and university lecturer Ahmet Sik awoke to the sound of his doorbell. Fifteen men in dark blue bulletproof vests and black wool caps were standing in front of his apartment -- agents from Turkey's TEM anti-terror unit. "You have half an hour," one of them snapped at Sik, who was still half asleep. "No telephone calls." Then the unit led him away, right through a tight knot of reporters. Nine other journalists received visits from the anti-terror unit on the same day. One of them was Nedim Sener, a reporter with the liberal daily paper Milliyet and one of the country's best-known investigative reporters. A critic of the Turkish government, Sener had been expecting to be arrested for weeks. He had received threats: "You're next, brother. Do you have your bags packed?" Sik and Sener are currently the most prominent victims in a wave of arrests that began four weeks ago, when TEM turned up at the Istanbul offices of Oda-TV, a Web portal. There, too, employees were arrested and the website was temporarily shut down. The message sent was that journalists too eager to take on Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP), the conservative party with Islamist roots currently in power in Turkey, would soon find themselves leading dangerous lives. Calling to Mind McCarthy Witch-Hunts What is going on in Turkey, a country that strives to set an example for the Arab world in terms of democracy and freedom of the press? Why has the country now put 68 journalists behind bars and why do Turkey's press associations describe an atmosphere that calls to mind the era of Joseph McCarthy's Communist witch-hunts? What crimes are these journalists actually being accused of by the government? In Sik and Sener's case, prosecutor Zekeriya Öz himself commented on the case. The journalists' arrests, according to Öz, had nothing to do with articles they wrote, but rather with findings in connection with the so-called Ergenekon case. This case, which a court in Silivri, west of Istanbul, has been hearing for the past two and a half years, concerns a supposed group of conspirators accused of plotting a coup against Erdogan's government. The most spectacular criminal case in Turkey's recent history, it has seen the arrest of more than 200 suspects, including army officers, politicians and professors. Many of these alleged Ergenekon members are considered to be ultranationalists, said to have been waiting for a chance to strike in tandem with like-minded forces within the army, but then caught by the police in the nick of time. 25

The existence of this ominous secret society, though, remains unproven. All three indictments contain gaping holes. And "due to the need for confidentiality," says Öz, the chief prosecutor for the case, it isn't currently possible for him to make the evidence public. That's a statement that doesn't bode well for journalists Sik and Sener. Strategies for Toppling Erdogan The pool of suspects seems to widen inexorably, casting serious doubts on the legitimacy of the Ergenekon case. Many in Turkey wonder if the prime minister might be misusing the investigations as a way to intimidate his opponents. In the case of Sik and Sener, that suspicion seems likely. Sik is one of several journalists who helped expose mafia-like structures within the country's military and political elite. Sik also published "coup diaries" allegedly written by Admiral Özden Örnek, containing reflections on strategies for toppling Erdogan, in the magazine Nokta in 2007. Sener, too, investigated the morass of Turkey's so-called "deep state," an alleged network of politics, justice and organized crime. It was Sener who exposed Turkish security forces' role in the murder of Turkish-Armenian author Hrant Dink. Sik and Sener have both proved themselves opponents of the AKP government, which they accuse of undemocratic activities. "They both took on the Islamists," says Ertugrul Kürkcü, a colleague at an independent Web news portal called Bianet. "They were looking to prove that Erdogan and his people had started using the deep state for their own purposes." Freer than in the US? The AKP may have been especially upset about Sik's research into the Fethullah Gülen movement, an Islamic network he believes has penetrated the country's security apparatus, which in turn further strengthened the conviction on the part of the AKP's opponents that the party has remained truer to its Islamist roots than it pretends. "Journalists who dig too deep always have problems in Turkey," Kürkcü says. Erdogan's critics aren't the only ones affected. Kurdish journalists in particular often run into problems with the Turkish justice system and are threatened with hefty prison sentences if they spread "propaganda" about the banned Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) -- even if the crime consists of no more than using the expressions "Kurdistan" or "guerilla." Where does Erdogan stand on the matter? "Our press is far freer than in the US," the prime minister claimed in a 2009 speech in the United States. "It has never been as free as it is today." Just one year later, the European Union accession candidate Turkey slipped in the press freedom list published annually by the group Reporters without Borders -- to number 138 out of 178 countries. URL: http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,751115,00.html RELATED SPIEGEL ONLINE LINKS: • Courting the Diaspora: Erdogan Hopes Germany's Turks Can Get Him Re-Elected (03/07/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,749389,00.html • Erdogan Urges Turks Not to Assimilate: 'You Are Part of Germany, But Also Part of Our Great Turkey' (02/28/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,748070,00.html

• Thin Evidence: Trial of German-Turkish Author Slammed as 'Revenge' (12/08/2010) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,733447,00.html • The 'Tribune of Anatolia': America's Dark View of Turkish Premier Erdogan (11/30/2010) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,732084,00.html

03/15/2011 06:26 PM Islamism and the Like Button Can Radicalization Via Facebook Be Stopped? By Matthias Bartsch and Holger Stark Arid U., the perpetrator of the attack on US servicemen at the Frankfurt Airport in late February, was a fan of violent computer games and appears to have radicalized via contacts made on the Internet. German officials now want to increase surveillance of social networking sites. When "Abu Reyyan" wrote about the work of the Frankfurt police department on Facebook, his words were full of hate. "Just look at how devious these dogs are," wrote the young Kosovo Albanian, "those rats!" He was inspired to write after police searched the apartment of a Muslim imam in Frankfurt, a man "Abu Reyyan" revered, on Feb. 25. He was outraged by the search. Four days later Arid U., a.k.a. "Abu Reyyan," was standing next to the bus lane in front of door E to Terminal 2 at Frankfurt Airport. He pulled out his mobile phone and dialed a number stored in its memory. The call never went through, because the number he was calling had been out of service for a year, but Arid U. wasn't really trying to call anyone. He was just trying not to be noticed. It was shortly after 3 p.m. A few minutes later Arid U. saw an American military bus pull up, and he saw Nicholas J. Arden, 25, the last in a group of 15 US soldiers walking toward the bus. Arid U. addressed Alden and asked him whether the soldiers were being deployed in Afghanistan. Alden said that they were, and when he turned around to board the bus, Arid U. pulled out a pistol and shot the American in the back of the head. Then he stepped onto the bus and shot the driver, Zachary Ryan Cuddeback, 21, and wounded two other soldiers before his weapon jammed. German police caught and arrested Arid U. as he was trying to flee. After the killings, Arid U. said that he had not intended to kill "any innocent people," but that he was after American soldiers. While working at the airport's international postal center, he had often observed GIs on their way to Afghanistan. He had heard the things they said, and he despised the soldiers. He began to form an image in his mind of an enemy that had to be eliminated, and he was resolved to be as uncompromising as the evil character in "Call of Duty," an ego shooter computer game he liked to play. In the game, the most effective way to kill one's opponent is with a shot to the head. The Frankfurt double murder is the first successful attack by an Islamist on German soil. German police refer to Arid U. as a "homegrown terrorist," while Boris Rhein, the Christian Democratic interior minister in the state of Hesse, where Frankfurt is located, calls it an attack that "came out of nowhere." US President Barack Obama was visibly

27 shaken when he addressed the media, while German Attorney General Monika Harms is looking into the case, which she characterizes as a "threat to NATO troops." But the attack was also the crazed action of a young immigrant who had lost himself in the virtual world of ego shooter games, had developed a passion for weapons and in whom frustration became combined with the ideology of jihad. Like the Winnenden shooter Tim K., Arid U. was having trouble in school and had emotional problems. In the end, all it took was a spark to ignite this explosive mix. The spark, as Arid U. himself claims, was a video he says he saw on the evening before the shootings. He says that after working at the airport postal center until 10:30 p.m., he went home and surfed the Internet. According to Arid U., a link on a Muslim organization's website took him to a video that showed US soldiers raping a Muslim girl, and at that moment he decided to take matters into his own hands. Apparently there was no one who could have reached him or stopped him. During his school years, Arid U. was one of the hundreds of thousands of young men in Germany who are "torn back and forth between two cultures." This is the way Lothar Henning, the principal of the high school in Frankfurt's Sossenheim neighborhood, where Arid grew up, describes him. His family was from Kosovo, but they moved to Germany when Arid was one. In the mid-1990s, the family moved into a three-room apartment in an 11-story building. The strict, conservative father made ends meet by working as a roofer. The family structure was patriarchal and traditional, and the father raised his children to be devout but not deeply religious Muslims. The mother did not wear a headscarf, and the sons wore Western clothing. In school, Arid fluctuated between initial successes and failures. In 2005, he and other members of his class were invited to the Chancellery in Berlin, as a reward for taking part in a competition sponsored by the Federal Youth Council, titled "A World Appropriate for Young People." Arid and three other students gave a presentation on German youth being permitted to obtain drivers' licenses at 16. Only a year later, Arid's parents were summoned to the principal's office. Their son had not passed the final examinations required to graduate from Realschule. As a result, he repeated the 10th grade, and this time his grades were good. In 2007, he was transferred to the Friedrich Dessauer Gymnasium, the pinnacle of Germany's three-tiered high school system. He told his family and friends that he wanted to become an engineer and work in the chemical industry. His performed moderately well in 11th grade. "He wasn't among the best students, nor was he among the worst," says Principal Claudia Hemmling. She remembers him as an inconspicuous and relatively shy boy. Former fellow students describe him as quiet and taciturn, but cooperative. In 2009, Arid U. entered a phase that may have been a turning point. His grades suddenly declined and he started skipping classes. According to his half-year report card, he had missed more than 200 hours of class, and his grades were now at the bottom of the scale. In the second semester, he decided to repeat the 11th grade. In several conversations with the principal, Arid assured her that he intended to graduate. She suspected that he had emotional problems, and at times it seemed to her that he might be suffering from depression. She sent him to the school's guidance counselor, but Arid was unable to pull himself together. He left school in the summer of 2010.

The worse things were going in school, the more Arid fled into the world of violent computer games. In 2009, he registered with an online gaming website whose members were involved in ego shooter games. In this environment, he was no longer Arid U., a loser in real life, but a courageous fighter. And contrary to what the authorities believed shortly after his 2011 killing spree, Islam already played an important role in his life in 2009. The email address he used to register with the gaming website was [email protected], apparently a reference to Albanian Islam, and began calling himself "Abu Rejjan." He later used the name "Abu Reyyan" to open a Facebook account. The name means "Father of the Gates of Heaven." Sometime during the second half of 2010, his virtual identity and his real life merged. He took an online weapons test and the program recommended that he buy a sniper's rifle, the Barret M82. In reality, he chose a somewhat smaller weapon when he purchased the weapon he would eventually use in the shooting, an FN pistol with 14 shots of ammunition, for €1,000. Where he bought the gun is still unclear. During his first interrogation, Arid U. claimed that he had purchased the pistol for "undetermined purposes." When police searched the family apartment after the double murder, they found a 7.65- millimeter Ceska, which they believed belonged to the father. They also found large amounts of marijuana. However, a drug test showed that Arid U. was clean at the time of the murders. For weeks, the would-be killer had developed a web of digital acquaintances in the Islamist community. Within this network, he wrote about jihad and listened to lectures at Dawa FFM, a Frankfurt group he had joined on Facebook on Feb. 25. He was also interested in a group in northern Germany called "Invitation to Paradise," which then- Interior Minister Thomas de Maizière had ordered to be searched in December. Arid U. had "found himself a new world that understood him," says an investigator. How is it possible to detect such a high-speed radicalization, one free of face-to-face contacts, as appears to have been the case? Since the Frankfurt murders, this is the central question law enforcement officials are asking. Last week, German domestic intelligence officials agreed to compile a list of Islamic organizations they suspect of radicalism and that are active in social networks. The goal is to recognize early on whether the next "Abu Reyyan" can be found in social networking sites like Facebook and StudiVZ. It is a balancing act for investigators, who are operating on unclear legal ground. It would be difficult to justify computer surveillance on the Internet in absence of concrete suspicions. To this end, state interior ministries are looking into the possibility of banning a number of organizations, including Dawa FFM. Perhaps there would have been an opportunity to prevent the attack if one of Arid U.'s acquaintances had taken the text message seriously that he allegedly sent months ago. In the message, he wrote that he couldn't come to an event because he was preparing an attack. The acquaintance thought it was a joke. Translated from the German by Christopher Sultan

URL: • http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,750912,00.html

RELATED SPIEGEL ONLINE LINKS: • Reaction to Frankfurt Attack: US Officials Urge Caution after Airport Shooting (03/04/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,749157,00.html • The World from Berlin: 'Germans Have to Distinguish between Muslims and Murderers' (03/04/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,749173,00.html • Facebook Jihad: The Radical Islamist Roots of the Frankfurt Attack (03/03/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,748910,00.html • Fatal Shooting at Frankfurt Airport: German Investigators Suspect Islamist Motives behind Attack (03/03/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,748769,00.html

Libya rebels face last stand as Gaddafi forces zero in on Benghazi Government troops close in on centre of resistance as western powers continue deliberations on whether to aid oppostion Chris McGreal in Benghazi Tuesday 15 March 2011 18.18 GMT

Libyan rebels direct people fleeing Benghazi as government troops move towards the eastern city. Photograph: Patrick Baz/AFP/Getty Images Libya's revolution was facing collapse as Muammar Gaddafi's forces broke through the last major line of resistance before Benghazi, the heart of the uprising and the seat of the rebel administration. Pro-government forces pushed back the rebels in an air and land assault on the town of Ajdabiya, as the regime moved to crush the revolution once and for all before foreign powers could agree measures in support of the uprising, including a no-fly zone. The rebels had pledged a vigorous defence of Ajdabiya but swiftly lost control of large parts of the town, including the strategically important coastal road, although pockets of fighting continued. The regime's advance leaves the road open to Benghazi, 90 miles away, where there was growing alarm as word of the latest military setback spread. "The battle is lost. Gaddafi is throwing everything against us," a rebel officer who gave his name as General Suleiman told Reuters. Last night the revolutionary council, which had promised a fight to the death claimed to be in full control of Ajdabiya, but some Benghazi residents were fleeing to the Egyptian border amid considerable bitterness at the failure of western countries to back vocal support for the rebels with practical help, including a no-fly zone and military equipment to fight Gaddafi's armed forces, some trained by the British army.

The assault came as the US finally joined the UK and France in supporting a draft UN resolution imposing a no-fly zone over Libya. A vote on a draft motion is expected later this week or early next week, which is likely to be too late for the rebels. Libyan state television declared: "The town of Ajdabiya has been cleansed of mercenaries and terrorists linked to the al-Qaida organisation." The setback in Ajdabiya is the latest in a series of reverses that has seen the fortunes of the revolution set back after the initial successes that had many Libyans believing Gaddafi's regime was on the brink of collapse a fortnight ago. Many in Benghazi are now fearful of retribution by the regime's agents and say they have no choice but to fight for their survival. But the rebel army does not appear to have made any significant preparations for the city's defence. The assault on Ajdabiya took on a familiar pattern with Tripoli's forces first bombing then shelling the town. Gaddafi's army then came at the town from two sides. A call went out through mosques and rebel fighters moved to the front but they said they were outgunned and began pulling back. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/15/libya-rebels-last-stand- benghazi?CMP=EMCGT_160311&

March 15, 2011 Libyan Forces Rout Rebels as West’s Effort for No-Flight Zone Stalls By ANTHONY SHADID AJDABIYA, Libya — Behind tanks, heavy artillery and airstrikes, forces loyal to Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi routed a ragtag army of insurgents and would-be revolutionaries who were holding the last defensive line before the rebel capital of Benghazi on Tuesday. Blasts of incoming fire came every few seconds at the edge of this city straddling a strategic highway intersection, where rebels have bulldozed berms and filled hundreds of sandbags around two metal green arches marking the western approaches to the city. As the shelling intensified Tuesday, hundreds of cars packed with children, mattresses, suitcases — anything that could be grabbed and packed in — careened through the streets as residents fled. Long lines of cars could be seen on the highway heading north to Benghazi, about 100 miles away. In Benghazi itself, though, there were no signs of preparations for a vigorous defense, and there were reports on Tuesday night that rebels may have retaken parts of Ajdabiya. Witnesses said that by evening rebel fighters seemed to be patrolling the streets, and there was speculation that loyalist soldiers may have withdrawn to the perimeter after overrunning the city, a pattern they have followed in previous battles. Amid the conflicting reports on Tuesday night, gunfire — apparently celebratory — could be heard throughout Benghazi, where tracer bullets lit up the sky. The barrage here offered a loud and ferocious counterpoint to stalled efforts by Western diplomats to agree on help for the retreating rebels, like a no-flight zone, even as Colonel Qaddafi warned the insurgents on Tuesday that they had only two choices: surrender or flee. With the advances made by loyalists, there is growing consensus in the Obama administration that imposing a no-flight zone over Libya would no longer make much of a difference, a senior official said. Just moving the ships and planes into place to impose an effective no-flight zone, the official said, would take until April, too late to help rebels hunkered down in Benghazi. While administration officials said the United States would not obstruct efforts by other countries to build support for a no-flight zone in the United Nations, President Obama met with his National Security Council on Tuesday to consider a variety of other options to respond to the deteriorating situation. Among those options are jamming Libyan government radio signals and financing the rebel forces with $32 billion in Libyan government and Qaddafi family funds frozen by the United States. That money could be used either for weapons or relief. The meeting broke without a decision, the official said.

“This is another indication of the constant exploration of different options that we have to increase the pressure on the Qaddafi regime as we go forward,” the White House press secretary, Jay Carney, said Tuesday. But in fact, the administration’s options have narrowed with the dwindling viability of a no-flight zone. The White House is considering more aggressive airstrikes, which would make targets of Colonel Qaddafi’s tanks and heavy artillery — an option sometimes referred to as a “no-drive zone.” The United States or its allies could also send military personnel to advise and train the rebels, an official said. But given the lack of consensus behind a no-flight zone, these options are viewed as even less likely. It is also not clear that airstrikes would be more effective than a no- flight zone. “Most of these weapons are no longer stored in ammunition depots; most of them have been dispersed into towns and cities,” said James M. Lindsay, the director of studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. Singling out these weapons individually, he said, greatly increases the chances of civilian casualties. Moreover, senior officials, notably the national security adviser, Thomas E. Donilon, have made it clear that the United States does not view Libya as a vital strategic interest. For the rebels, the battle was strategically critical, because Ajdabiya controls access to the highways that would permit loyalist forces to encircle and besiege Benghazi in a campaign for cities whose names evoke the World War II battles of Rommel and Montgomery. Yet, after swearing in recent days to make a last ditch, do-or-die stand here, the rebels offered little resistance. Within an hour of the opening salvos, they began falling back from the city’s approaches as the shelling came closer to their positions. Some still spoke valiantly about drawing a line in the desert sand, but the superior firepower and numbers of the loyalist troops suggested otherwise. The crash of heavy ordnance almost drowned out the cries of a muezzin from the minaret at a mosque on the frontline: “God is great and to God, praise.”

A billboard from the days before the uprising began in mid-February proclaimed: “Ajdabiya — land of jihad and sacrifice.” By midafternoon, the slogan had taken on an ominous new meaning. “I swear to God I am expecting a battle in the streets. Qaddafi has already shelled us with artillery and planes, and I suspect the army is coming,” said Mohammed Abdullah, a 50-year-old resident among a group of people peering at the sky as a loyalist spotter plane circled the city, illustrating how little restraint the loyalist forces feel about deploying their unchallenged air power as diplomacy falters. By day’s end, however, the loyalist army seemed to be in complete control, its tanks standing outside the gates and its soldiers moving through the town at will during the day. After nightfall they seemed to withdraw, and rebels reappeared to claim control that seemed tenuous. In what might have been a lone break in the dark clouds gathering around the rebels, an opposition Web site reported that a 1970s-era MIG-23 fighter plane and a helicopter from the rebel forces hit at least one government warship as it bombarded Ajdabiya

34 from the sea, Reuters and other news agencies reported. The accounts could not be independently confirmed. The grim news from Ajdabiya was met with anger, anguish and tears by rebel leaders in Benghazi. On Tuesday afternoon, many of them privately acknowledged that an attack on the seat of rebel power was inevitable, if not imminent, and they again pleaded for Western intervention. Iman Bugaighis, a professor who has become a spokeswoman for the rebels, lost her composure as she spoke about the recent death of a friend’s son, who died in battle last week. Her friend’s other son, a doctor, was still missing. Western nations, she said, had “lost any credibility.” “I am not crying out of weakness,” she said. “I’ll stay here until the end. Libyans are brave. We will stand for what we believe in. But we will never forget the people who stood with us and the people who betrayed us.” There were mixed signals about the prospects of Western military help. After a meeting of the Group of 8 foreign ministers in Paris, the French foreign minister, Alain Juppé, said he had been unable to secure agreement on the imposition of a no-flight zone. “If we had used military force last week to neutralize a certain number of airfields and the dozens of airplanes” available to Colonel Qaddafi, “perhaps the reversals suffered by the opposition would not have happened,” he said. “But that is the past.” The United Nations Security Council was discussing a resolution that would authorize a no-flight zone to protect civilians, but its prospects were uncertain at best, diplomats said. In Cairo, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said the United States stood ready to help, though she did not mention a no-flight zone. “We understand the urgency of this,” she said at a news conference in Cairo, where she is visiting before heading on to Tunisia. “And therefore we are upping our humanitarian assistance. We are looking for ways to support the opposition.” In an interview with the Italian newspaper Il Giornale, published on Tuesday, Colonel Qaddafi expressed disappointment with his onetime European partners — particularly Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi of Italy, formerly his closest Western ally — and again depicted his adversaries in Libya as terrorists steered by Al Qaeda. Asked if he was prepared to open a dialogue with them, he replied: “Dialogue with whom? The people are on my side.” As for the rebels, regrouping toward their eastern stronghold in Benghazi as loyalist troops claimed advances, Colonel Qaddafi said: “They have no hope. Their cause is lost. There are only possibilities: to surrender or run away.” Reporting was contributed by Alan Cowell from London; Kareem Fahim from Benghazi, Libya; David D. Kirkpatrick from Tripoli, Libya; and Mark Landler from Washington. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/16/world/africa/16libya.html?nl=todaysheadlines &emc=tha2

Arab Spring Uprisings Lose Momentum as ‘Status Quo’ Fights Back By Henry Meyer - Mar 16, 2011 11:32 AM GMT+0100 Bombs and tear gas are threatening to smother the “Arab Spring” that toppled the leaders of Egypt and Tunisia and promised to spread democracy in the Middle East. Already fighting two wars in Muslim countries, the reluctance of the U.S. and Europe to engage in a third enabled Muammar Qaddafi to turn the tide against Libyan rebels. In Bahrain, security forces today used tear gas to drive protesters from their main rallying point in the capital Manama, two days after Saudi Arabia sent troops to bolster the ruling family. “When the guns are all on one side and being used, that side has a distinct advantage,” said Cliff Kupchan, a senior analyst at Eurasia Group, a New York political-risk consulting firm. “What we’re seeing now is the first really hard pushback from status quo forces since this year’s unrest in the Middle East began.” The crackdown are tempering optimism about an “Arab Spring” spreading through a region that holds more than 60 percent of the world’s known oil reserves. While protests have toppled the regimes of Tunisia’s Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak in the past two months, the west’s reluctance to take action is emboldening other authoritarian regimes to resist the push for more democracy. Oil prices surged to a 2 ½ year high on March 7 as protests sweeping the Arab world turned bloody. Refusing to give into to the popular momentum that toppled Mubarak and Ben Ali, Qaddafi instead turned his guns on his own people. Just 10 days after his capital was surrounded by opposition forces, his troops are now 100 miles (160 kilometers) from Benghazi and more than 400 people have been killed in the eastern part of the country. Lost Opportunity France said an opportunity to overthrow Qaddafi’s 41-year rule had been lost after Germany, Russia and the U.S. failed to back a push for a no-fly zone. “If we had used military force last week to neutralize a number of air strips and a few dozen of their planes, perhaps the opposition’s reversal of fortune wouldn’t have happened,” French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe said yesterday. Divisions between the U.S. and its European allies have enabled the Libyan leader to avert the most serious challenge to his regime, said Shada Islam, a Middle East and Asia expert at the Brussels-based Friends of Europe policy advisory group. “The message being sent to Qaddafi is that Western resolve is weakening and this has emboldened him,” she said. “We’ve been talking about a no-fly zone for three weeks and if we’d acted three weeks ago we wouldn’t be where we are now.” Saudi Supply

Qaddafi’s intensifying campaign comes as Saudi troops, backed up by forces from the United Arab Emirates, move into Bahrain to help stamp out persistent protests led by the Shiite Muslim majority. The island state, like the other U.S.-allied Arab Gulf countries, is ruled by Sunni Muslims. While Libya accounts for just 3.3 percent of global reserves, the risk for investors is that a conflagration on Saudi’s borders will spark concerns about the security of the Gulf state’s reserves, keeping prices high. While democracy in Egypt won’t threaten oil prices, “the situation on the Arabian Peninsula is very different,” said John Winsell Davies, lead fund partner at Moscow- based, Wermuth Asset Management, which manages about $315 million in emerging markets, said by phone. “Our oil-rich vassals in the Persian Gulf are probably sitting on terra firma for now, but with both the Saudis and Iranians now in potential conflict on the streets of Manama, oil prices are firmly supported.” U.S. Rift The price of crude traded at $98 per barrel at 9:01 a.m. in London today. Saudi Arabia holds 20 percent of the world’s oil. Shiites comprise as much as 70 percent of the Bahraini population and many retain cultural and family ties with Iran and Shiites in eastern Saudi Arabia. Bahrain’s ruling family has close links with its neighbor, which holds 20 percent of global oil reserves and is Iran’s main regional rival. The Saudi intervention in Bahrain reflects a rift between the U.S. and its Gulf state allies over their failure to respond to the pressure for change, said Simon Henderson, a Gulf expert at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates told reporters March 12 after meeting Bahraini King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa that “baby steps” towards reform would not be enough. Gates received no indication during that meeting that Saudi forces would deploy 48 hours later, said Marine Corps Colonel Dave Lapan, a Pentagon spokesman. Iranian Bulwark “These states are angry that Washington has let staunch allies such as President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt be forced from power while doing little to push Qaddafi of Libya from his position,” Henderson said. Bahrain is host to the U.S. Fifth Fleet. Gunfire was heard in Bahrain’s capital today and riot police fanned out into the city streets after Pearl Roundabout, the epicenter of month-long protests, was emptied. As Bahrain unrest intensifies, the U.S. is unwilling to risk a violent overthrow of such key allies, said Marina Ottaway, director of the Middle East program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a Washington policy group. A change in regime might disrupt what the U.S. sees as a bulwark against Shiite-led Iran’s attempts to expand its influence in the Persian Gulf, said George Friedman, chief executive officer of Austin, Texas-based intelligence-consulting group, Stratfor. It also could trigger severe unrest among neighboring Saudi Arabia’s Shiite minority in its eastern oil- producing hub. Crackdown

In Yemen, where government forces have killed protesters against President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s rule, there is cooperation with the U.S. in fighting al-Qaeda. “These are countries where we have clear vested interests in the continuation of the current regimes,” said Ottaway. Over the next few years, even if Bahrain succeeds in keeping the lid on unrest, there risks being a long-term radicalization of Shiite youth in Bahrain that could be exploited by Iran, according to Kupchan from Eurasia Group. The crackdown by the region’s authoritarian regimes will only reinforce anger that has built up for decades at high youth unemployment and poverty, said Ottaway from Carnegie. With calls for democracy unlikely to recede and Gulf allies digging in, the Obama administration may be put in an awkward position after publicly backing the reform movements in Egypt and the rebels of Libya. “What the U.S. wants is to see reforms from the top that makes these governments more responsible,” said Ottaway. “So the question is what it is going to do when reform at the top doesn’t take place. A lot of those countries will see a second round at some point.” To contact the reporter on this story: Henry Meyer in Moscow at [email protected]. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-16/arab-spring-uprisings-lose- momentum-as-status-quo-fights-back.html

El borrador de resolución sobre Libia implica a los países árabes en la zona de exclusión

El documento, auspiciado por Reino Unido y Francia, busca sumar apoyos en el Consejo de Seguridad.-Países como Rusia, Alemania y China mantienen sus dudas sobre la eficacia de esta medida

REUTERS | EL PAÍS | Nueva York / Madrid 16/03/2011 Los países partidarios de la imposición de una zona de exclusión aérea sobre Libia buscan vencer las reticencias y sumar apoyos a su borrador de resolución que quieren presentar ante el Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU para que autorice esta misma semana la operación. Los embajadores de Reino Unido y Líbano han presentado el borrador en una reunión a puerta cerrada después de que la Liga Árabe se posicionara el sábado a favor de vigilar el cielo libio para evitar que los aviones del dictador bombardeen las posiciones rebeldes. En el documento, a cuyo contenido ha tenido acceso la agencia Reuters, se asegura que el Consejo "decide establecer una prohibición a todos los vuelos en el espacio aéreo de Libia para proteger a los civiles". Además, el borrador autoriza a los estados a "tomar todas las medidas necesarias para garantizar su puesto en marcha" y asegura que los países que imponen esta prohibición lo hacen en cooperación con la Liga Árabe y con el secretario general de Naciones Unidas, Ban Ki Moon. El esbozo de resolución también abre la puerta a tomar medidas militares más allá de la imposición de la zona de exclusión aérea. El documento autoriza explícitamente a "los miembros de la Liga Árabe y otro estados a tomar todas las medidas necesarias para proteger a los civiles y a objetivos civiles en Libia". Dudas en el Consejo de Seguridad Después de recibir el borrador, los quince estados miembros del Consejo de Seguridad han acordado volver a reunirse este miércoles para analizar "párrafo a párrafo" la resolución, según ha explicado el embajador británico ante la ONU, Mark Lyall Grant. Un portavoz del primer ministro británico David Cameron ha advertido desde Londres que las negociaciones no serán fáciles. "Hay muchos puntos de vista en el Consejo". "Será una negociación difícil", ha vaticinado. La resolución asimismo contempla la expansion de las sanciones ya aprobadas por el Consejo de Seguridad el pasado 26 de febrero -congelación de fondos, prohibición de viajar para miembros del régimen y embargo de armas- para lograr el bloqueo de todas las cuentas afectas al régimen de Gadafi. La Casa Blanca ha asegurado esta madrugada (hora española) que el presidente Barack Obama ha abordado la crisis libia y los esfuerzos para sacar adelante una resolución en la ONU durante una reunión con su equipo de seguridad. Algunos miembros clave del Consejo, entre ellos el propio Estados Unidos y, sobre todo, Rusia y Alemania, han expresado serias duras sobre la eficacia de esa zona de exclusión aérea.

Washington no quiere comprometerse con ninguna acción que implique un despliegue militar o el uso de la fuerza sin la participación de los países árabes. EE UU quiere que sean aviones de Ejércitos árabes los que patrullen esa zona y en un momento dado derriben a cazas libios. El embajador alemán ante La ONU, Peter Wittig, ha asegurado tras la reuinión que su país aún tiene preguntas sin contestar. "Hemos elevado algunas preguntas que creemos que no han sido respondidas del todo, como la participación árabe en esa operación, o si la implementación de esa zona iría contra las intenciones expresadas por la propia Liga Árabe, que ha expresado su deseo de que no haya una intervención extranjera en Libia", ha explicado Wittig. El embajador libanés Nawaf Salam ha asegurado que no existe tal contradicción como apunta su colega alemán. "La intervención extranjera es otra cosa", ha explicado. "Esperamos que (la zona de exclusion) tenga un efecto disuasorio". El embajador chino Li Baodong, presidente del Consejo de Seguridad durante este mes, ha insistido en que "algunos miembros siguen teniendo dudas, y necesitan clarificaciones antes de que se tome una decisión". "Como otros miembros, China espera que nuestro colega libanés nos responda a estos interrogantes mañana", ha dicho Li. Francia, que junto a Reino Unido, auspicia la resolución, ha dicho que espera que el Consejo de Seguridad someta la resolución a votación este miércoles, pero su representante ante la ONU, Gerard Araud, ha expresado dudas al respecto. Antes de la reunion, Araud mostró su impaciencia por la lenta respuesta del Consejo. "Estamos profundamente preocupados por el hecho de que las cosas están empeorando sobre el terreno, las fuerzas de Gadafi avanzan y el consejo sigue sin reaccionar", ha lamentado. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/borrador/resolucion/Libia/implica/paises/a rabes/zona/exclusion/elpepuint/20110316elpepuint_12/Tes

Ola de cambio en el mundo árabe Gadafi comienza el asalto a la capital rebelde Aviones del dictador bombardean el aeropuerto de Bengasi, la capital rebelde, después de tomar el control de la ciudad de Ajdabiya.- Los tanques y la artillería del régimen atacan Misrata, la única ciudad del oeste controlada por los sublevados JUAN MIGUEL MUÑOZ / AGENCIAS | Tobruk (Enviado Especial) 16/03/2011 La confusión domina el panorama bélico en Libia. Pero una certeza emerge de las contradictorias informaciones que difunden la dictadura de Muamar el Gadafi y el Consejo Nacional Libio, el Gobierno de los sublevados con sede en Bengasi: la artillería, la aviación y los buques de las Fuerzas Armadas del tirano bombardean cada jornada que pasa más cerca de la capital de la revuelta. Los peores augurios de los alzados contra Muamar el Gadadi en Libia se han cumplido esta mañana. Aviones de guerra del dictador han iniciado a primera hora el bombardeo de Bengasi, la segunda ciudad más importante del país y el feudo de los sublevados, según ha anunciado el coronel insurgente Faradj el Feyturi. Este mando rebelde, contactado por la cadena catarí Al Yazira, ha asegurado que las bombas cayeron en el aeropuerto de la ciudad, pero no ha precisado si si produjeron víctimas ni daños materiales. La respuesta de los rebeldes, según esta fuente, fue contundente y obligó a los aviones de Gadafi a "emprender la huida". En Misrata, a medio camino entre Trípoli y Sirte, la cuna del dictador, las tropas de Gadafi se están empleando a fondo para doblegar la resistencia de los rebeldes. Testigos del asedio citados por Reuters aseguran que la ciudad sigue bajo mando rebelde pero está sufriendo el asalto de los tanques y la artillería del Ejército libio. Según un residente, las tropas gubernamentales están bombardeando "desde tres posiciones" y están "utilizando armamento pesado, incluidos los carros de combate y la artillería", pero todavía no han conseguido entrar en la ciudad. Otro vecino ha precisado que el ataque comenzó hacia las siete de la mañana (una hora menos en España). Misrata se encuentra a 200 kilómetros al este de Trípoli. La confusión domina el panorama bélico en Libia. Pero una certeza emerge de las contradictorias informaciones que difunden la dictadura de Muamar el Gadafi y el Consejo Nacional Libio, el Gobierno de los sublevados con sede en Bengasi: la artillería, la aviación y los buques de las Fuerzas Armadas del tirano bombardean cada jornada que pasa más cerca de la capital de la revuelta. El liderazgo insurgente insistía en que la ciudad de Ajdabiya, la puerta sur de Bengasi, continuaba en su poder, mientras la televisión oficial aseguraba que había sido "limpiada de terroristas" tras sufrir un severo castigo. En los alrededores de la estratégica Ajdabiya, bien conectada con la frontera egipcia, los combates se prodigaron durante toda la jornada. Ocurriera lo que ocurriera, mandos de los caóticos comandos rebeldes daban la batalla por perdida. Las imágenes retransmitidas por la televisión oficial Libia hicieron que muchos libios afines a Gadafi salieran a las calles de Trípoli a celebrar la victoria sobre los rebeldes, informa Álvaro de Cózar. Si la capital parecía anoche una ciudad fantasma, una imagen muy distinta se veía en la plaza Verde. Allí se congregaron los simpatizantes del dirigente libio con fuegos artíficiales y retratos de su

41 líder. Anuncio de la gran fiesta cuando Bengasi, bastión de los revolucionarios, vuelva a estar bajo control de las tropas de Gadafi. Algo que dan por hecho. Gadafi volvía a aparecer anoche en la televisión oficial libia. "Tenemos la determinación de aplastar a nuestros enemigos", dijo rotundo. "Estamos dispuestos a preservar la unidad de Libia aunque sea con el precio de nuestras vidas", aseguró. "Los colonizadores serán vencidos, América será vencida, Reino Unido será vencido". Un discurso que se produjo en el mismo momento en el que se conocía un borrador del Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU en el que se plantea la posibilidad de aprobar una zona de exclusión aérea en Libia. En otro escenario, ante una multitud de partidarios en el complejo militar de Bab al Azizia, en el centro de Trípoli, Gadafi ha pedido esta noche a su pueblo que se levante en armas para enfrentar una posible intervención militar de Occidente, contestando así a la posibilidad de que la reunión prevista para hoy en la ONU prohíba el vuelo de aviones sobre Libia. "Ahora Francia levanta la cabeza y dice que atacará Libia"; "¿Atacar a Libia? Nosotros seremos los que os atacaremos a vosotros. Os atacamos en Argelia, en Vietnam. ¿Quieren atacarnos? Vengan e inténtenlo", advirtió en tono desafiante. Francia ha sido uno de los países que más a presionado a los miembros del G-8, reunidos ayer en París, y a los otros 14 miembros del Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU para que se adopte dicha medida. El aluvión de declaraciones de uno y otro bando no tiene fin. El general Abdelfatah Yunis, estrecho excamarada del coronel desde los tiempos en que este se hizo con las riendas del país y ahora nombrado jefe de las fuerzas insurrectas, afirmó que dispone de 8.000 hombres de refuerzo, incluidos 3.000 de las fuerzas especiales que han desertado de las filas leales a Gadafi. Y desde el oriente del país añadían otros uniformados que ayer emplearon por primera vez dos cazabombarderos Mig abandonados por el Ejército del Aire tras salir de estampida los pilotos y oficiales en los primeros días de la revuelta. Atacaron, decía el Consejo Nacional, un navío de guerra en el Mediterráneo. Pero su moral va a la baja, y la inquietud atenaza a los civiles en Cirenaica. Al temor a que el dictador perpetre una tropelía se une el miedo al quintacolumnismo. Algunos lugareños de Tobruk dicen que son locos; otros que están drogados. Pero unas decenas de hombres contemplaban ayer sorprendidos cómo deambulaban por el centro de esta ciudad un par de individuos -ataviados con cintas verdes en la frente, el color de la revolución del dictador que tiñe los edificios oficiales- que chillaban a favor de Gadafi. El tirano ha ofrecido una amnistía a los insurrectos que depongan las armas, pero estos no contemplan la rendición como alternativa. Les resulta imposible creer la promesa de un dirigente que se ha labrado un historial tan macabro. Durante días, los portavoces militares vienen advirtiendo de que matarán a los alzados contra el autor del Libro Verde. Es creíble. "Estamos preparados para entregar un millón de armas, o dos, o tres millones. Y otro Vietnam comenzará. Ya no nos importa nada", aseguró Gadafi en uno de sus beligerantes discursos, el 2 de marzo. Un vecino de Zauara, muy cerca de la frontera con Túnez, aseguraba a Reuters que los soldados y esbirros del autócrata han elaborado listas para capturar a los insurrectos de esta ciudad. Buscaban casa por casa. El Consejo Nacional no tiene duda alguna de que el dictador no escribirá el guion del futuro del país árabe. "Los rusos", dice uno de sus portavoces, "no pudieron gobernar Afganistán; Estados Unidos no pudo hacerlo en Vietnam. Gadafi tampoco podrá en Libia".

De momento, y no parece que la situación vaya a dar un vuelco repentino, los insurgentes se repliegan sin remedio. Siguen reclamando la aplicación de una zona de exclusión aérea, una opción que, en caso de que la medida pueda resucitarse, requeriría semanas para ser aplicada. Como sucedió en Irak en la década de los noventa, no es garantía de éxito, ni siquiera en un plazo de meses. Tampoco las sanciones comerciales, la congelación de los fondos soberanos libios -gestionados por Gadafi y sus allegados-, ni la prohibición de viajar al exterior al dictador y sus colaboradores surtirán efecto en breve. Por mucho que los libios se esfuercen por recordar a los gobernantes extranjeros la retahíla de atentados - asesinatos de sus ciudadanos al margen- cometidos en el mundo durante sus 41 años de mandato. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Gadafi/comienza/asalto/capital/rebelde/elp epuint/20110316elpepuint_3/Tes

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/aac17a46-4e66-11e0-98eb- 00144feab49a.html#ixzz1GfmVrL2F G8 rejects push for no-fly zone over Libya By James Blitz and Alex Barker in London, Daniel Dombey in Washington and Peggy Hollinger in Paris Published: March 14 2011 18:35 | Last updated: March 15 2011 12:48 France failed on Tuesday to persuade its Group of Eight partners to support its push for a no-fly zone over Libya, a setback to any chances of swift action to halt Muammer Gaddafi’s advance against rebel forces. A final communiqué for the G8 meeting made no mention of a no-fly zone over the north African nation. It warned, however, that Col Gaddafi faced “dire consequences” if he ignored citizens’ rights, and urged the UN Security Council to increase pressure on him, including via economic measures. EDITOR’S CHOICE: Outlook stark for Libyan oil exports - Mar-15 Activists liberate corner of Libya in London - Mar-14 In Pictures: The Gaddafi mansion occupation - Mar-14 Philip Stephens: What a no-fly zone means - Mar-14 Cameron steps up calls for Libya no-fly zone - Mar-14 In depth: Libya uprising - Mar-14 William Hague, UK foreign minister, said as he left the G8 meeting in Paris that there was “a common appeal to increase the pressure” on the Gaddafi regime. However he acknowledged that “not every nation sees eye-to-eye on issues such as a no-fly zone”. French officials said they were hopeful the meeting had helped pave the way for a UN resolution on military intervention. “We just want to encourage people to take more steps to be more open and positive in New York,” one official said. “To stop the violence we must act and to act we need a legal basis. The only place to get that is in New York at the Security Council. French officials admit that getting a resolution will be difficult given continued Russian and US opposition. However, they are hopeful that steps of some kind will be taken in the next two days. If no resolution was forthcoming, diplomats refused to rule out the possibility that London and Paris could act alone now that the Arab League had called for intervention. David Cameron, UK prime minister, warned on Monday that the “clock is ticking” on Libya and that the time to shape events to counter Col Gaddafi’s regime was running out. Making one of his most impassioned arguments in favour of intervening on the side of the Libyan uprising, Mr Cameron suggested that the “consequences of inaction are worse” than any dangers posed by offering limited military support. But Washington, whose support would be essential, maintains deep reservations about such an action, which many officials say might prove ineffective and risk drawing the US into a war in another Muslim-majority country. The Pentagon is particularly

44 sceptical and the White House says a no-fly zone is a subject for contingency planning, rather than immediate action. Some diplomats add that the UK has been caught between France and the US, with the British military sharing some US doubts about the effectiveness of a no-fly zone, in spite of support for the idea from Mr Cameron. There was also no indication on Monday that Russia and China were softening their opposition to a no-fly zone, while Reçep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkish prime minister, said any Nato military operation would be unhelpful and fraught with risk. “We have seen from other examples that foreign interventions, especially military interventions, only deepen the problem,” said Mr Erdogan, whose country is the only Muslim-majority member of Nato. “We see a Nato military intervention in another country as extremely unbeneficial and, moreover, are concerned that it could create dangerous results.” http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/aac17a46-4e66-11e0-98eb- 00144feab49a.html#axzz1GfkqBAxm

EDITORIAL Cuando Gadafi haya ganado 14 marzo 2011 Decididamente, parece que la "primavera árabe" no ha sentado bien a los dirigentes europeos. Tras haber perdido la oportunidad que planteó la "revolución del jazmín" y tras haber acabado en desastre su reacción ante la revuelta contra Mubarak, han tenido la oportunidad de paliar su error con la revuelta que ha estallado a mediados de febrero en Libia. Sin embargo, han vuelto a perder esta nueva ocasión de imponerse como un bloque de peso en el ámbito internacional e influir en el curso de los acontecimientos. Y siempre por los mismos motivos: por incompetencia, divisiones, tergiversaciones y falta de visión a largo plazo. Incompetencia, porque ya sabían que el efecto dominó era inevitable: todos decían que, tras el tunecino Ben Ali y el egipcio Mubarak, sólo faltaba que cayera Gadafi. Pero no conocían bien la Yamahiriya ni el sistema de poder impuesto hace más de cuarenta años por su líder. Divisiones y tergiversaciones porque, tras haber esperado tres semanas desde el detonante de la revuelta en el este de Libia para tratar en serio la acción de la Unión en el Consejo Europeo "de urgencia" del 11 de marzo, no han logrado ir más allá de la promesa de examinar "todas las opciones necesarias para proteger a la población civil". También han acordado convocar una cumbre tripartita con la Liga Árabe y la Unión Africana "lo antes posible" para "reaccionar ante esta crisis". Exigen a Gadafi que "abandone de inmediato el poder" y ya no consideran a su régimen como "un interlocutor para la UE". En resumen, nada que haga que un dictador se rinda y deje el poder. Durante este tiempo, sobre el terreno, el enfrentamiento parece volverse a favor de Gadafi y ahí es donde la posición de los europeos es delicada y resulta preocupante su falta de visión a largo plazo. Al rechazar la posibilidad de ofrecer una salida "razonable" al dictador libio en el momento en el que se encontraba en dificultades; al rechazar luego la propuesta franco-británica de instaurar una zona de exclusión aérea, es decir, de intervenir militarmente contra Gadafi con la excusa de que no se cumplían las condiciones (ataques indiscriminados contra civiles, una resolución del Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU y el apoyo de los países árabes) y al negarse a ayudar por otros medios al Consejo Nacional de Transición (CNT), los europeos corren el riesgo de ver cómo el coronel consigue sus propósitos. Y de ver cómo se instala a sus puertas lo que Serge Michel ha calificado en Le Temps como una "Corea del Norte próspera en pleno Mediterráneo". Pero al parecer no han previsto ningún "plan B" ante la posibilidad de que Gadafi siga ocupando el poder en Libia. No han sabido jugar la partida.

AUTOR Gian Paolo Accardo es un periodista italo-holandés nacido en Bruselas en 1969. Ha trabajado como redactor en Internazionale y en Courrier International y como corresponsal para la agencia de noticias italiana ApCom. Es redactor jefe adjunto de presseurop.eu y tiene una cuenta en twitter http://www.presseurop.eu/es/content/editorial/546971-cuando-gadafi-haya-ganado

Internacional / EXCLUSIVA MUNDIAL Mustafá Abdel Jalil: «A los europeos les preocupa más el petróleo que las vidas de los libios» El presidente del Consejo Nacional de Libia (gobierno provisional de la revolución) pide que la comunidad internacional «cierre el espacio aéreo y detenga los bombardeos... Nada más» MIKEL AYESTARÁN / ENVIADO ESPECIAL A BAYDA (LIBIA) Día 15/03/2011 - 03.48h

MIKEL AYESTARÁN Mustafá Abdel Jalil Mustafá Abdel Jalil dedica las 24 horas del día a la revolución. Este juez nacido en Bayda, doscientos kilómetros al noreste de Bengasi, es el presidente de la Asamblea Nacional y dirige el movimiento rebelde que desde hace cuatro semanas mantiene contra las cuerdas al régimen de Muamar Gadafi. Casado y padre de ocho hijos, en 2006 fue

47 elegido ministro de Justicia, cargó que abandonó al inicio de la revolución «para unirme al pueblo frente a la masacre del régimen». En voz baja, sin quitarse su inseparable «sanna» (gorro de fieltro) y con el rostro cansado recibe a este periódico en su cuartel general de Bayda, una sencilla habitación de hotel. Cumpliendo con la fama de hombre austero y honesto que no se enriqueció pese a ocupar un cargo de gran responsabilidad, sigue fiel a este establecimiento que desde el primer día abrió sus puertas a Abdel Jalil y a su equipo de colaboradores sin miedo a posibles represalias. Aquí se gestó el nacimiento del Consejo Nacional y desde aquí dirige la batalla contra Gadafi. —¿Está negociando con Gadafi una salida dialogada al conflicto? —No hablo directamente con Gadafi. En la televisión libia salió uno de sus más cercanos colaboradores, un hombre respetable, diciendo que era hora de poner fin a la guerra y nosotros compartimos esa visión porque no queremos que muera más gente, es lo único que tenemos en común hasta ahora. Los hombres del régimen que han contactado con la oposición de momento sólo hablan y nosotros pedimos hechos. Si Gadafi quiere la paz debe poner fin a los bombardeos, entonces creeremos en esas supuestas intenciones de diálogo. Esperamos su aparición en los medios para decir de forma clara y pública que quiere la paz, no por medio de intermediarios. —¿Qué condiciones exigen a Gadafi? —Le damos de plazo hasta el viernes para que abandone el país. Si lo hace no le denunciaremos ante ningún tribunal internacional, aunque la palabra final no está en poder del Consejo Nacional. Serán las familias de los mártires que han perdido la vida durante esta revolución quienes impongan las condiciones. Creo que sus días en Libia han terminado y sólo le queda el exilio en un país extranjero desde el que se debe comprometer a no interferir nunca más en la política interna de Libia. «A Gadafi sólo le queda el exilio en un país extranjero» —¿Será usted la persona que dirija Libia tras la caída del régimen? —Este Consejo tiene fecha de caducidad. En el momento que caiga el régimen tenemos un plazo de seis o siete meses para convocar elecciones. Hasta entonces respetaremos todos los acuerdos internacionales, luego todo quedará en manos de los nuevos gobernantes. Nosotros nos iremos, ninguno de los actuales consejeros seremos candidatos a nada, Libia necesita nuevas caras y no habrá sitio para los políticos del régimen. —¿Cuál es la prioridad para esa nueva Libia? —Redactar una nueva Constitución que garantice un futuro democrático para un país en el que se respeten los derechos humanos y las libertades. —¿Espera el apoyo de la comunidad internacional? —De momento la comunidad internacional, y Europa, están más preocupadas del petróleo que de la vida de los libios. Sólo pedimos que tomen cuanto antes las medidas para cerrar el espacio aéreo y detener los bombardeos, nada más. Cada día que pasa aumenta el número de muertos y Gadafi aprovecha el aire para seguir trayendo mercenarios y armas para proseguir con su masacre. —¿Hasta cuándo se puede alargar la actual situación? —Estamos dispuestos a morir todos y cada uno de nosotros hasta que veamos al país libre de Gadafi. Esto no es una guerra civil, es una guerra por la liberación de un país. Todos

48 sabemos de lo que es capaz Muamar y si no hay presión extranjera arrasará el país hasta quedarse él solo si hace falta. «Libia necesita nuevas caras. No hay sitio para los políticos del régimen» —Usted fue ministro de Justicia del régimen durante cuatro años, ¿por qué decidió unirse a la revuelta? —Trabajé como juez desde 1978 a 2006 y ese año el hijo de Gadafi, Saif al Islam, me eligió como ministro de Justicia porque era urgente acometer una serie de reformas para arreglar los problemas generados por la implantación de la doctrina del Libro Verde en el país. Temas relacionados con expropiaciones, encarcelaciones y demás que poco a poco fuimos corrigiendo con el pago de más de tres mil millones de dinares en forma de indemnizaciones. De verdad que creo que estaba haciendo un buen trabajo, pero luego estalló la revuelta y me di cuenta que debía dejar mi puesto. —¿Qué ocurrió? —Salí a las calles de esta ciudad (Bayda) a protestar de forma pacífica junto a miles de amigos y vecinos que pedían cambios en el sistema. De pronto las fuerzas de seguridad del régimen abrieron fuego de forma indiscriminada. El primer día mataron a quince personas, el segundo abrieron la prisión principal y enviaron a los presos a quemar los tribunales… me di cuenta de que los culpables actuaban con impunidad y respaldo de Trípoli así que presenté mi renuncia y empecé a trabajar con la oposición. —Túnez, Egipto, ahora Libia, ¿qué está ocurriendo en el mundo árabe? —La gente ha despertado. Se alza por su libertad y por la paz y estoy seguro de que con la lucha, al final, el pueblo logrará lo que busca. Son casi las once de la noche. Una furgoneta pick-up y un pequeño Hyundai de color blanco esperan a Mustafá Abdul Jalil a las puertas del hotel para llevarle a una nueva reunión. Se arregla la corbata y, con educación, se despide pidiendo a Dios que les dé fuerza en esta lucha contra el régimen. Su primo y hermano, su escolta privada de confianza, le abren paso en la heladora noche de Bayda. Un joven con una gran metralleta en la mano y el cuerpo cubierto por dos cananas cruzadas en forma de equis cierra la comitiva del líder rebelde que, sin aspavientos, ni una palabra más alta que la otra ha logrado el respeto de todo un pueblo que confía en él en esta «guerra por la liberación» de Libia. El rebelde más buscado La semana pasada Gadafi envió a Bayda a catorce sicarios para acabar con su vida, pero no lograron su objetivo. Es el político más odiado por la dictadura. Tras ejercer de juez entre 1978 y 2006, Abdul Jalil fue elegido por Saif al Islam, hijo del líder, para dirigir el ministerio de Justicia. Natural de Bayda, 200 kilómetros al noreste de Bengasi, durante toda su carrera se ha forjado una reputación de hombre honrado que le ha llevado a convertirse en la referencia del bando rebelde. Durante su etapa en el ministerio fue el primero en reclamar reformas y el único que criticó abiertamente algunas decisiones de Gadafi. El 17 de febrero se convirtió también en el primer alto cargo del régimen en unirse a la revuelta. Desde entonces comenzó a gestar el Comité Nacional que ahora suple al gobierno central en la Libia liberada. Casado y padre de ocho hijos, dos de los cuales viven en el Reino Unido, su seguridad personal la forman un hermano y un primo suyos. Viaja en una humilde furgoneta y vive en estado de alerta permanente porque sabe que su cabeza tiene precio. Pero, estando a su lado, parece increíble que un hombre tan calmado pueda ser ese «líder rebelde» por el que régimen está dispuesto a pagar casi medio millón de dólares. http://www.abc.es/20110310/internacional/abci-entrevista-exclusiva-libia-201103100018.html

March 14, 2011 The Ike Phase By DAVID BROOKS On Jan. 20, 1961, John Kennedy delivered his rousing Inaugural Address. But this speech was preceded, as William Galston of the Brookings Institution has reminded us, by an equally important speech: Dwight Eisenhower’s farewell address. Kennedy’s speech was an idealistic call to action. Eisenhower’s speech was a calm warning against hubris. Kennedy celebrated courage; Eisenhower celebrated prudence. Kennedy asked the country to venture forth. Eisenhower asked the country to maintain its basic sense of balance. While Kennedy gloried in the current moment, Eisenhower warned the country to “avoid the impulse to live only for today, plundering, for our own ease and convenience, the precious resources of tomorrow.” We cannot, he said, “mortgage the material assets of our grandchildren without risking the loss also of their political and spiritual heritage.” Furthermore, Ike warned, the country should never believe that “some spectacular and costly action could become the miraculous solution to all current difficulties.” He reminded the country that government is about finding the right balance — between public and private, civic duties and individual freedom, small communities and big industrial complexes. I suspect that most of us can, in different moods, sympathize with both the Kennedy and the Eisenhower speeches, with both the rousing idealistic call and the prudent words of caution. The Obama administration has tried to emulate both impulses. During the first two years, it hewed to Kennedy’s seize-the-moment style. Now it seems to be copying the Eisenhower mood. The campaign of 2008 was marked by soaring calls for transformation. Now the administration spends much of its time reacting to events and counseling restraint. The Arab masses have seized control of the international agenda with their marches and bravery. The Republicans on Capitol Hill and in Madison, Wis., have seized control of the domestic agenda with calls for spending cuts. The Obama administration has reacted to both of these movements by striking a prudent, middling course. Internationally, the administration has sought a subtle (overly subtle) balance between democracy and stability. Domestically, the president offered a budget so tepid that it effectively ceded center stage. He called for a few cuts but asked people not to get carried away. On Friday, President Obama gave a press conference that perfectly captured his current phase. He acknowledged rising gas prices but had no new energy policy to announce. On Libya, he emphasized the need to deliberate carefully our steps ahead but had no road map to propose. On the federal budget fight, he spoke passionately about the need

50 to reach a compromise. But when given the chance to talk about what it might look like, he rose above the fray and vaguely counseled balance and moderation. It is easy to see why the president should be striking this pose now. Prudence is always a nice trait in a leader, especially in the face of a thorny problem like Libya. At a time when the nation is anxious, Obama is coming across as a cautious and safe pair of hands. The man is clearly not going to do anything rash. Politically, this is a style that seems to appeal to independents. Obama is not going to get sucked into a left-versus-right budget battle and see his presidency get washed away. On budget matters, he seems to be playing rope-a-dope — waiting for the Republicans to propose something courageous and foolhardy like entitlement reform, thus giving him an opening to step in as the bulwark against extremism. It’s likely that he can win the next election simply by force of personality, by overshadowing his opponent. Yet this current cautious pose carries dangers, too. Eisenhower was president at a time when American self-confidence was at its zenith; Americans were content with a president who took small steps. Today, most Americans seem to think their country is seriously off course. They may have less tolerance for a president who leads cautiously from the back. Prudence can sometimes look like weakness. Obama said his cautious reactions to the Libyan revolution amounted to “tightening the noose” around Qaddafi. Yet there is no evidence that Qaddafi is feeling asphyxiated or even discomforted. As he slaughters his opposition, Western caution looks like fecklessness. Prudence is important, but Americans do have an expectation that their president will be the one out front, dominating the agenda, projecting strength and offering vision. All in all, President Obama is an astoundingly complicated person. During the 2008 presidential campaign, and during the first two years of his term, I would have said that his troubling flaw was hubris — his attempts to do everything at once. But he seems to have an amazing capacity to self-observe and adjust. Now I’d say his worrying flaw is passivity. I have no confidence that I can predict what sort of person Obama will be as he runs for re-election in 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/15/opinion/15brooks.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc= tha212&pagewanted=print

03/14/2011 06:23 PM The West's Nightmare Europe's Leaders Fear Libya Could Become Next Afghanistan The Europeans and Americans would like to help the rebels in Libya, but the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan have spurred fears of a military intervention. So far, the only thing the EU has been able to agree on are financial sanctions. In Germany, leaders fear getting sucked in to the civil war. By SPIEGEL Staff There are times when some politicians and diplomats in Europe and the United States wish that someone would die. They wish that a head of state or government would give the order to dispatch a number of aircraft or launch a few missiles. They don't speak openly of this, of course, but they do say these things under their breath. "Why doesn't somebody just shoot him?" they ask. Usually, this hope is directed by Europe toward America. This is again such a time. A number of politicians and diplomats are quietly hoping that they will hear one morning on the radio that Libyan dictator Moammar Gadhafi has died during the night. According to this scenario, the news bulletin will then inform listeners that an American bomber squadron has safely returned to its aircraft carrier in the Mediterranean. The current situation calls to mind former US President Ronald Reagan. He tried to eliminate Gadhafi back in April 1986. At the time, Reagan ordered 36 laser-guided bombs to be dropped on the Bab al-Azizija military compound, Gadhafi's command center in the suburbs of Tripoli. Gadhafi survived. Reagan was derided for the failed mission and sharply criticized for the attempt. Some Western countries view such actions as murder -- and thus unacceptable. When it comes to war and the West, it always boils down to a question of ethics. Now all eyes are directed toward US President Barack Obama. What will he do? He has the arsenal required to make a renewed attempt, but he apparently also has greater scruples. Merkel Skeptical The same holds true for the Europeans. At their summit in Brussels on Friday, European Union leaders called for Gadhafi to immediately resign. Although a military operation has not been ruled out, it has been made contingent on the approval of the United Nations, the Arab League and the African Union. Speaking after the meeting, German Chancellor Angela Merkel underscored that she was highly skeptical about a no-fly zone. The EU is relying on economic sanctions for the time being. This is a nightmarish situation for the West. For years, Europe and America have courted Gadhafi and regarded him as a valuable business partner, without giving so much as a second thought to the suffering of his people. Now a large proportion of this oppressed population is fighting for its freedom, but the West is doing little to halt the advances made by Gadhafi's loyal supporters. The West wants to help, but it remains helpless. In this situation, the countries of the West are damned if they do, damned if they don't. If they only sit back and watch, they tacitly accept that Gadhafi will probably crush the rebellion and take terrible revenge. If they intervene, they will have to be prepared to kill, and innocent people may die. And if they enter into this conflict, they will need a concrete exit strategy.

Iraq and Afghanistan As politicians in Europe and America grapple with the issue of Libya, they are strongly influenced by the disastrous wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Two predominantly Muslim countries have been attacked and occupied, also with the aim of creating a better world according to Western models. But these have not been success stories. The regimes backed by the West have been dubious, to say the least, and the security situation remains precarious. After more than nine years of fighting, war continues to rage in Afghanistan. The negative experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have sown doubt in America and Europe about the morality of these missions. Gadhafi benefits from these misgivings, but that doesn't mean that they are wrong. There is no easy solution for Libya à la Reagan -- whose botched bombing mission didn't solve anything anyway. There is only a long and difficult search for a way to help the country's population, without upsetting the population in Europe, which would like to avoid at all costs another protracted war in a Muslim country. As a preliminary step, the US has severed all ties with the "existing Libyan Embassy" in Washington, but continues to maintain diplomatic relations with Libya. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will travel to northern Africa this week to meet with Gadhafi's rivals. According to the State Department, she has already contacted members of the opposition, both inside and outside of Libya. Obama Rules Out Unilateral Action Military action is also being discussed. US Defense Secretary Robert Gates said at a meeting of NATO defense ministers in Brussels last Thursday: "We agree that we will continue with the planning of all military options." But the Obama administration has ruled out taking unilateral action. White House Chief of Staff Bill Daley recently said: "All options are on the table. But it has to be an international mission." Since a UN resolution currently appears unlikely, NATO is the only organization that comes into question for joint military operations. A high-ranking US government official said in Brussels last Wednesday: "The US believes that NATO is the natural choice for a military operation." But Obama continues to hesitate, and this lack of action is drawing increasing criticism. James Clapper, the US Director of National Intelligence, recently warned a Senate committee that the opposition won't be able to topple the dictator on its own. Republican Senator and former presidential candidate John McCain and independent Senator Joe Lieberman are both criticizing Obama's reluctance to intervene. They say that he has to do more to support the opposition. McCain, for his part, is calling for a no-fly zone. 'Anybody Who Proposes a No-Fly Zone Should Say Who Will Enforce It' That step, however, is highly controversial in Washington. The US military, which has already been stretched thin by its deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq, has remained rather reticent in its comments. Establishing a no-fly zone would be a "challenge," says General James Mattis, the commander of US Central Command. The US military would first have to destroy Libya's air defenses, he says. Until now, the US military has limited its engagement to bolstering its fleet in the Mediterranean and sending ships to the waters off the Libyan coast. For the EU it will be even more difficult to come to a joint position on Libya, although that didn't stop French President Nicolas Sarkozy from unilaterally taking action. Last Thursday, 53

France recognized the Libyan National Transitional Council in Benghazi as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people. Sarkozy says that he intends to dispatch an ambassador there. Furthermore, government officials in Paris say that the French president wants to use targeted air strikes to weaken the Gadhafi regime. The German government was not informed of Sarkozy's plans. German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle was talking with his new French counterpart, Alain Juppé, when he heard about the French proposal. Westerwelle had the impression that Juppé was also unaware of his country's new position. 'We Have to Think This Through' In Berlin, the Chancellery was indignant over the French initiative. At the summit in Brussels, Merkel voiced her clear opposition: "We cannot recognize the transitional council," she told the assembled heads of state and government. "The former justice minister is a member of this body and look at the role he played in the case of the Bulgarian nurses." Indeed, Bulgarian Prime Minister Boyko Borisov has claimed that representatives of the transitional council are linked to the mistreatment of a Palestinian doctor and five Bularian nurses held for nearly eight years under what is widely believed to have been a false conviction on charges of infecting children with HIV at a hospital in Benghazi. In 2007, after long negotiations with the EU, the medical workers were pardoned and returned to Bulgaria. On Friday, Merkel repeated her position in English: "On transitional council, don't recognize." Merkel also clearly expressed her reservations with regard to a no-fly zone: "What is our plan if we create a no-fly zone and it doesn't work? Do we send in ground troops?" she asked before adding: "We have to think this through. Why should we intervene in Libya when we don't intervene elsewhere?" It was a sharp rebuff for Sarkozy. European leaders have little doubt about his motives. French foreign policy in Northern Africa has relied far too long on despots like Tunisia's Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. Sarkozy now intends to rectify the situation. He fears that France could lose its traditional leadership role in the region. Until recently, France and Germany have had their separate areas of responsibility: While Paris looked after the Mediterranean area, Berlin was more oriented toward Eastern Europe. But in internal discussions, Westerwelle has already made it clear that this will no longer be the case. Much to the annoyance of the French, Berlin now also wants to have a greater say in the Mediterranean region. Fears Germany Could Be Drawn In Chancellor Merkel and Foreign Minister Westerwelle agree that nothing good will come from a no-fly zone over Libya. They both fear that Germany could be be drawn into the civil war in this way. The government also knows, though, that economic sanctions are only effective over the long term, so Berlin doesn't want to entirely rule out the option of military intervention. The obstacles are significant, however, since China and Russia are showing little inclination to approve such a mission in the UN Security Council. The German government's hesitant stance also arises from the fact that Germany recently won a non-permanent seat on the Security Council. Although this presents an excellent opportunity for Westerwelle to play a more prominent international role as foreign minister, it also means that Germany will probably have to participate in the mission if the Security

Council approves a no-fly zone. Anyone who claims a leading role in New York must be prepared to assume certain responsibilities. The opposition also supports the German government's position. No one in Berlin is calling for a no-fly zone without a mandate from the Security Council. But there are members of parliament who refuse to simply stand by and watch as Gadhafi massacres his own people. A no-fly zone would entail enormous technical and political problems, argues Kerstin Müller, the foreign policy expert in parliament for Germany's traditionally dovish Green Party. "But if the situation worsens and Gadhafi hunts down people from the air and kills them," she adds, "then the international community will have to seriously consider a no-fly zone area." Before that happens, however, all non-military options must first be exhausted and the risks of escalation carefully weighed up, Müller says. She points out that an increasing number of Libyan opposition figures are calling for the West to intervene. Müller says that there is also an international responsibility to protect people. Philipp Missfelder, the foreign policy expert in parliament for Merkel's conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU), also refuses to rule out a no-fly zone. "If you want to show the regime that you mean business," he argues, "then you have to put a few options on the table." He says that using fighter jets to shoot at demonstrators could definitely be classified as a crime against humanity. Missfelder emphasizes that any intervention would first have to be approved by the Security Council. The chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the German parliament, Ruprecht Polenz (CDU), is also calling for restraint. "What happens if the no-fly zone doesn't work?" he asks. "Then this will immediately be followed by the demand: You have taken the first step, now you have to take the second one." The clearest arguments against a military intervention by the West are presented by Rainer Stinner, the foreign policy expert in parliament for the pro-business Free Democratic Party (FDP), which is Merkel's government coalition partner. "Anyone who proposes a no-fly zone should (also) say who will enforce it," he contends. Such a decision could lead to aerial combat and other fighting, he says. "Should we then send in the German Luftwaffe?" Limited Success of No-Fly Zones The experience of the West with no-fly zones has shown that such measures can quickly lead to combat situations. For instance, without a prior mandate from the Security Council, between 1991 and 2003 the Americans imposed a ban on flying over the Kurdish areas in northern Iraq and the Shiite regions in the south of the country. There were numerous clashes. US fighter jets shelled Iraqi anti-aircraft positions and shot down Iraqi fighters. The no-fly zones enjoyed only limited success. Under the protection of coalition forces, the Kurds in northern Iraq were able to establish an autonomous zone. Since helicopter gunships were excluded at first from the flight ban, however, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein was able to quash Shiite rebellions in the south of the country. There were also military clashes in the no-fly zone that NATO established between 1993 to 1995 during the war in Bosnia. NATO aircraft shot down a number of Serbian fighter jets. Nonetheless, this did not allow NATO to prevent the Srebrenica massacre, where 8,000 Bosnians were killed. Another problem has to do with the issue of who benefits from what type of intervention by the West. Too little is known about the rebels and their objectives. Even diplomats in Tripoli know little about most of the men on the opposition's interim governing council. The only exceptions are Ali Al-Issawi, until recently the Libyan ambassador to India and 55 currently the insurgents' "foreign minister," and Mahmoud Jibril, the former Iraqi planning minister. Last week in Paris and Brussels, both men called for international support. Another Unpopular War? The chairman of the National Transitional Council, former Libyan Justice Minister Mustafa Abdul Jalil, is not a charismatic figure, but on a number of occasions he has publicly interceded on behalf of political prisoners held by Gadhafi's regime. His National Council is hopelessly divided and could only agree on three points: Gadhafi must go, the West should impose a no-fly zone, but Western troops should not fight on the ground. Nobody knows what kind of state these men want to build, or what freedoms it would guarantee. President Hamid Karzai -- intensely pandered to by the West -- has turned out to be a corrupt ruler in Afghanistan. In Libya there is also no solution that would genuinely satisfy the West. There is no clear, promising vision of the future of this country without Gadhafi -- but there is no doubt that it will be disastrous with Gadhafi. Is military deployment the answer? Germany could easily be drawn into another war at a time when the majority of Germans already oppose their country's military presence in Afghanistan. Sometimes politicians have little choice but to grin and bear the burden of their own decisions. URL: http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,750852,00.html RELATED SPIEGEL ONLINE LINKS: • Photo Gallery: The Libya Dilemma http://www.spiegel.de/fotostrecke/fotostrecke-65728.html • Libya: Towns, Tribes, Oil Fields http://www.spiegel.de/flash/0,,25431,00.html • The World from Berlin: Sarkozy's Libya Move 'Shows Testosterone Level, Not Logic' (03/11/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,750344,00.html • Blocking the Dictator's Billions: Germany Freezes Gadhafi's Accounts (03/10/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,750109,00.html • Divided Response to Libyan Crisis: 'The Maneuvering of EU Member States Is a Scandal' (03/07/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,749376,00.html • Debate Builds Steam: West Considers No-Fly Zone for Libya (03/08/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,749678,00.html • Zero Hour in the Middle East: What the Arab World's Past Can Tell Us About Its Future (03/08/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,749537,00.html • A War Built on Four Lies: Why Germany Must End its Deployment in Afghanistan (02/18/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,744866,00.html • From the Archive: Libya Frees Nurses (07/24/2007) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,496168,00.html

03/14/2011 07:12 PM Sanctions vs. Oil EU's Libya Sanctions Unlikely to Wobble Regime The UN and EU have applied additional financial sanctions against Libya, but questions remain over how effective they can actually be. Gadhafi has an estimated $160 billion cash reserves that remain mostly untouched. And the oil industry, where they could hurt the most, remains off limits. By SPIEGEL Staff Germany has rarely moved so swiftly to implement a decision by the European Union's Council of Ministers, the powerful body in Brussels comprised of leaders of the 27 member states. In this case, it even happened before the resolution was entered into the Official Journal of the European Communities. On Friday, a full 48 hours before the official effective date for sanctions against the regime of dictator Moammar Gadhafi, German Economics Minister Rainer Brüderle of the business-friendly Free Democratic Party (FDP) froze all accounts in German banks belonging to Libya's central bank and two other state financial institutions. Brüderle's staff came across impressive sums of money. Libya had far more than €10 billion ($14 billion) distributed among 14 different banks. Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi and his clan will no longer have access to these funds, which had been placed in 193 different accounts, including a balance at Germany's central bank, the Bundesbank, of €1.96 billion. By imposing financial sanctions, the European Union is following the example set by the United Nations and relying on economic pressure to foster a democratic transition in the North African desert state -- and to topple its ruler. "We will maintain and increase the pressure," says German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle (FTP), "until he is out of office." Drop in the Ocean Losing access to these accounts will admittedly make little impression on Gadhafi. The dictator still has sufficient remaining sources of money to buy support from neighboring countries like Chad and from among the clans in his own country. Gadhafi has an estimated $160 billion in cash reserves that he has amassed over the years. Furthermore, it should be easy for him to acquire additional funds from friendly regimes in Venezuela and Belarus. If the EU were to impose sanctions on Libya's oil and gas business, it would probably pose greater difficulties for the dictator. Such a move would directly affect Libya's economy: the country is the EU's third-largest supplier of oil. But the 27 member states failed to push through such a step. The energy sector remains off limits for sanctions, much to the irritation of the Germans. According to the German Foreign Ministry, an attempt was also made to place the state- owned National Oil Corporation (NOC) on the list of sanctioned enterprises. After all, this company is controlled by Gadhafi and it helps him maintain his ability to wage a military campaign against the rebels. However, the German government ran into resistance on this issue from southern Europe. Links to Libya

Italian energy giant ENI plays a major role in the Libyan oil and gas business. Italy imports one-quarter of its crude oil from Libya and natural gas flows through a pipeline to Sicily. Since the unrest began, the company has been pumping only half as much oil and the pipeline connection has been switched off. ENI head Paolo Scaroni allayed concerns, however, when he said that this was only a temporary interruption. Austria's energy company OMV points to long-term supply contracts, many of which were concluded with NOC: "We continue to receive oil from Libya." Over the past few years, a large number of Western energy companies have increased their involvement in Libya, including not only ENI and OMV, but also ExxonMobil, Repsol, Petrobas and Wintershall. These companies don't control their own oil fields, but often work as service providers for NOC and its subsidiaries. By now, European energy companies have evacuated the vast majority of their personnel from the country. Their operations have been placed on standby and they are pressuring Brussels not to place further restrictions on their businesses. One of their arguments is that the situation in the country is still too confusing and sanctions could affect the wrong people. According to the Financial Times, the managers of Agoco -- a large NOC subsidiary with headquarters in Benghazi -- have sided with the rebels. All in all, the international community has only achieved mixed results with sanctions anyway. It has proven to be extremely difficult to enforce and monitor them. "There is always something going on," says Hamburg-based energy expert Steffen Bukold, as witnessed in Iraq under Saddam Hussein. One result of the sanctions will most likely now give Gadhafi serious cause for concern. Russia had planned to deliver military aircraft to Tripoli, including advanced Su-35 jet fighters worth $1.8 billion. But that is not about to happen now that Moscow has changed course and joined the sanctions. Last Wednesday, a Kremlin official said that Russia now sees Gadhafi as a "living political corpse." URL: http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,750798,00.html RELATED SPIEGEL ONLINE LINKS: • The West's Nightmare: Europe's Leaders Fear Libya Could Become Next Afghanistan (03/14/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,750852,00.html • Libya: Towns, Tribes, Oil Fields http://www.spiegel.de/flash/0,,25431,00.html • Blocking the Dictator's Billions: Germany Freezes Gadhafi's Accounts (03/10/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,750109,00.html • Military Option Open: EU Demands Gadhafi Step Down (03/11/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,750432,00.html • Zero Hour in the Middle East: What the Arab World's Past Can Tell Us About Its Future (03/08/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,749537,00.html • Divided Response to Libyan Crisis: 'The Maneuvering of EU Member States Is a Scandal' (03/07/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,749376,00.html

China's premier rejects comparisons with Middle East Wen Jiabao promises to tackle rising prices as Arab-style protests fail to materialise Associated Press Monday 14 March 2011 12.44 GMT

China's premier, Wen Jiabao, at his press conference after the National People's Congress in Beijing. Photograph: Lintao Zhang/Getty Images China's premier has rejected any comparison between his country and the Middle East and north African nations where popular uprisings have toppled long-serving autocrats. In a wide-ranging news conference at the close of the annual legislative session, Wen Jiabao also said the country would tackle rising prices, but was trying to find the right mix between creating jobs and fighting inflation. Handling politically volatile price rises is crucial to maintaining stability in China, where millions spend half their salary or more on food and a yawning gap between rich and poor underscores endemic corruption. Wen did not repeat China's earlier criticisms of the anti-government protests in Tunisia, Egypt and elsewhere as harbingers of chaos, instead drawing a stark contrast between his government and the targeted regimes. "We have followed closely the turbulence in some north African and Middle Eastern countries. We believe it is not right to draw an analogy between China and those countries," Wen said. "I believe the Chinese people have also seen that the Chinese government has taken serious steps to address the challenges and problems in China's economic and social development," he said.

Economic growth averaging 10% over the past two decades has improved living standards and provided jobs for China's population of 1.34 billion, while economic stagnation has fuelled discontent in the Middle East and north Africa. China has also established precedents for leadership handovers that limit party heads to two five-year terms in office, preventing decades-long rule by corrupt despots. The National People's Congress that closed on Monday promised higher social spending, controls on inflation and measures to urgently close the divisive rich-poor gap, betting that rising living standards and better services will dampen growing public expectations for political change. The emphasis comes as the government seems increasingly anxious about online calls of unknown origin urging Chinese people to stage peaceful rallies every Sunday like those in Tunisia and Egypt. Beijing has been smothered under ever-heavier security since the internet messages first appeared more than a month ago, although no protests have taken place. Wen also repeated vague remarks about the need for political reforms to consolidate economic gains, but said the expansion of direct elections for local leaders would be gradual. Chinese people only directly elect village heads, who wield little authority. The congress's speaker, Wu Bangguo, last week again ruled out the possibility of China instituting a multiparty system or a separation of powers as in the west. Wen's comments came after the congress's nearly 3,000 members approved an economic blueprint for the next five years that calls for a shift from rapid economic growth to higher quality, more sustainable development with a greater emphasis on services and broader distribution of wealth. The 12th five-year plan could drive a far-reaching transformation of the world's second- largest economy from the world's low-cost factory floor into an enormous consumer market. The congress also approved a national budget that boosts spending 12.5% this year, with bigger outlays for education, job creation, low-income housing, healthcare, pensions and other social insurance. The budget for police, courts, prosecutors and other domestic security is projected to exceed the usually favoured military budget for the first time in years, climbing 13.8% to £60bn. China's defence budget, the world's second largest after the US, rose 12.7% this year to about 601bn yuan (£57bn). http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/14/china-premier-middle-east

The Arab spring is brighter than ever Crackdowns on protest merely postpone the day of reckoning – Arabs now have a shared, unstoppable drive for freedom

Brian Whitaker Monday 14 March 2011 12.09 GMT

'Even if Gaddafi does succeed in quelling the Libyan uprising, it will be no more than a temporary setback for the wider Arab revolution.' Photograph: Ahmed Jadallah/Reuters "The Arab world's much-heralded collective push toward democracy is now in jeopardy," an article for McClatchy newspapers in the US informed its readers at the weekend. The fact that autocratic regimes in Libya, Bahrain and Yemen are fighting back with lethal force should surprise no one. The more surprising thing is that Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt – two leaders previously regarded as firmly entrenched – were toppled after such a short struggle. Nor does the fightback mean, as the article's headline suggests, that the outlook for democracy is dimming across much of the Middle East. Looking at the region as a whole, the prospects have never been brighter. But there is another – far bigger – problem with this revolution-in-jeopardy analysis. By focusing on "democracy" and the ousting of dictators, it ignores a large part of what the Arab revolt is about. It's the same mistake that George Bush made with his calls for democracy and "regime change" in the Middle East – calls that were directed mainly against the regimes deemed hostile towards the US and paid little attention to the desires of ordinary Arabs.

Arabs don't talk much about democracy as such, and they tend to be cynical about elections. They do talk increasingly about "freedom", though what they mean by it is not quite what Bush meant. They want freedom from corruption and political cronyism, and the freedom to make their own choices – an end to repression and government attempts to control the minutiae of people's lives. Democracy may be one way of working towards that but it is rarely seen as a goal in itself, and while regime change is certainly an important part of the revolt, its younger activists (at least) have their eyes set on changing whole systems, not just the political leaders. The wave of insurrection that broke out in December was sudden but not totally unexpected; the signs of discontent were there for anyone to see and they had been developing for more than a decade. The process actually began in the 1990s when the arrival of satellite television, and especially al-Jazeera, opened the first serious cracks in regimes' monopoly on ideas and information – and that accelerated later with the explosion of the internet. In addition to the problems this more open discourse has created for the regimes, the desire for large families in the Arab countries has caused a youth bulge: the proportion of people aged below 15, for example, is often two or more times what it is in western Europe. Having glimpsed more attractive lifestyles elsewhere, through TV, travel or the internet, their aspirations are higher than in the past; at the same time, their chances of finding a job when they leave school are diminishing. Meanwhile, as the ruling elites have grown old and clung greedily to power, the gap between governments and the governed has widened. It is partly a generational gap but the political elite has also been increasingly regarded as a privileged class whose members were in it purely for themselves and to whom the normal rules, including the rule of law, did not apply. While resentment was growing steadily, the outlets to express it continued to be severely limited. Opposition parties (where allowed) were generally no less discredited than the parties of government and where street protests were feasible, as in Egypt, holding them became a constant cat-and-mouse game with the security forces. The resistance, such as it was, often took the form of isolated – sometimes individual – struggles against authority and its bureaucracy. Along with this resentment and small-scale activism came a sense of hopelessness, a feeling that nothing was ever going to change. But in Tunisia last December the dam finally burst, altering the picture dramatically. Two new elements came into play: an awareness of possibilities and a sense of empowerment. Tunisia signalled that change is possible after all if sufficient numbers of people get together and organise themselves. There are two ways that regimes can respond to this: by cracking down harder (as in Libya), which merely postpones the day of reckoning and may make it worse in the end, or by offering concessions (Morocco, Jordan, Oman), which in due course will lead to further demands. Either way, it's a no-win situation for them. Even if Gaddafi does succeed in quelling the Libyan uprising, it will be no more than a temporary setback for the wider Arab revolution: battles are being fought in too many places and on too many different fronts for anyone to stop it now.

An important factor in this is Arabs' sense of a common identity: they are aware of what is happening in neighbouring countries and draw inspiration from it with regard to their own situation. The sight of grandees from the old regimes in Tunisia and Egypt being arrested on sundry charges of corruption, money laundering and murder gives them hope and encouragement. Similarly, the opening up of free media in those countries is having an effect elsewhere: in Jordan last week, 600 journalists demonstrated against government interference and censorship. This kind of cross-fertilisation (or infection, as the regimes see it) is happening in many areas. Toppling two of the Middle East's tyrants in little more than two months is no mean achievement, and all the other regimes have been severely shaken – even those that claim to be secure. Initially, that raised hopes extraordinarily high and the regimes' fightback has injected a dose of realism. It does not mean the revolution is failing or fizzling out but it does show that many people were expecting too much too soon. The far-reaching changes that the Arab countries need are social as much as political – and that will take time. Even in Tunisia and Egypt there are protracted struggles ahead. But the old regimes cannot survive indefinitely. A few years from now most of them will be gone or transformed beyond recognition. http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/mar/14/arab-spring-protest-crackdown- freedom

Libyan rebels urge west to assassinate Gaddafi as his forces near Benghazi Appeal to be made as G8 foreign ministers consider whether to back French and British calls for a no-fly zone over Libya Chris McGreal in Benghazi Monday 14 March 2011 20.07 GMT

A Libyan rebel fighter heads for the frontline in Ajdarbia in his tank. The town was bombed by Gaddafi’s airforce Photograph: Patrick Baz/AFP/Getty Images Libya's revolutionary leadership is pressing western powers to assassinate Muammar Gaddafi and launch military strikes against his forces to protect rebel-held cities from the threat of bloody assault. Mustafa Gheriani, spokesman for the revolutionary national council in its stronghold of Benghazi, said the appeal was to be made by a delegation meeting the French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, and the US secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, in Paris on Monday, as G8 foreign ministers gathered there to consider whether to back French and British calls for a no-fly zone over Libya. "We are telling the west we want a no-fly zone, we want tactical strikes against those tanks and rockets that are being used against us and we want a strike against Gaddafi's compound," said Gheriani. "This is the message from our delegation in Europe." Asked if that meant that the revolutionary council wanted the west to assassinate Gaddafi, Gheriani replied: "Why not? If he dies, nobody will shed a tear." But with diplomatic wrangling focused on the issue of the no-fly zone, there appeared to be little immediate prospect of a foreign military assault on Gaddafi's forces, let alone an air strike against the Libyan dictator.

The Libyan revolutionary leadership made the appeal as Gaddafi's airforce bombed Ajdarbia, a town of 135,000 people that is the last major obstacle for his forces before Benghazi, the seat of the revolutionary council. Those attacks strengthened the hand of France and Britain in pressing for intervention. Paris said it wants to see a no-fly zone "as fast as possible". The move is backed by the Arab League, which may ease the way to agreement at the UN security council. France and Britain are also expected to push the move at a Nato meeting on Tuesday. But the rebels' appeal is also a recognition that while a no-fly zone would provide a boost to them, their military defeats of recent days have largely been under an onslaught of rockets and shells, and air strikes have been relatively peripheral. A no-fly zone alone may not be enough to prevent the continued advance of Gaddafi's forces toward Benghazi, the revolutionaries' de facto capital. So far no western nation has explicitly supported attacks on Gaddafi's forces separate from enforcing a no-fly zone. The issue is complicated by overwhelming opposition even among the insurgents to foreign forces becoming involved on the ground, in large part because of strong views about the consequences of the invasion of Iraq. The talks are being closely watched in Benghazi and other areas under the control of the revolutionaries where Libyans are increasingly concerned at the direction of the conflict and the west's failure, so far at least, to follow through on calls for Gaddafi to go with action in support of the rebellion. A large French flag hangs on the front of the courthouse used as the revolutionary council's headquarters after Paris recognised the rebel leadership, and the tricolour is often seen on the streets of Benghazi. But Libyans are also increasingly vocal in their criticism of Washington in particular for what is seen as a failure to back up rhetoric against the regime. However, Gheriani said that if the west failed to offer practical help to the revolutionaries to free themselves from Gaddafi's rule it risked frustrated Libyans turning to religious extremists. "The west is missing the point. The revolution was started because people were feeling despair from poverty, from oppression. Their last hope was freedom. If the west takes too long – where people say it's too little, too late – then people become a target for extremists who say the west doesn't care about them," he said. "Most people in this country are moderates and extremists have not been able to penetrate them. But if they get to the point of disillusionment with the west there will be no going back." Although the revolutionary leadership is reluctant to concede that it is enduring significant military setbacks, Gaddafi's forces have driven them from two small towns and back about 150 miles to the edge of Ajdarbia. On Sunday the rebel army fled in the face of a barrage of rockets and shells as Tripoli's army took Brega, a day after seizing the strategic oil centre of Ras Lanuf, 90 miles away. The rebels' military leader, Abdel Fattah Younis, Gaddafi's former interior minister, has promised a vigorous defence of Ajdarbia to block the government's advance on Benghazi, 90 miles along the coastal road.

Younis has said he believes Gadaffi's supply lines are overstretched and his forces demoralised. He also said that street fighting in a town will be a more even contest than facing rocket barrages in largely open desert. But the defences on display on Monday, which included a handful of tanks and armoured vehicles and small artillery guns, did not look strong. The revolutionaries claimed to be back in Brega, but provided no evidence and prevented reporters from travelling towards the town. On Monday Gaddafi's forces also attacked Zuwara, a town of 40,000 people about 60 miles west of Tripoli and near the Tunisian border. Residents described shelling of their neighbourhoods and said armoured vehicles were in the heart of the town. "I can see the tanks from where I am now and they are around 500 metres from the centre of Zuwara," Tarek Abdullah told Reuters by telephone. "There are still clashes but I think soon the whole town will fall into their hands." But the pressure appeared to be off the only major city in the west still held by the rebels, Misrata, 130 miles east of the capital. Tripoli's assault apparently stalled amid claims of a mutiny within the ranks of the besieging government forces. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/14/libyan-rebel-leaders-gaddafi-benghazi

Saudi Arabia polices the region as trouble stirs at home The Saudi regime is stepping up its regional security role, but it is clear that it is not immune from 'contagion' Simon Tisdall Monday 14 March 2011 17.58 GMT Saudi Arabia's decision to send troops into Bahrain to help stabilise the country following violent anti-government demonstrations marks another stage in Riyadh's reluctant emergence as a regional policeman at a time when the Arab world faces unprecedented turmoil. The Saudi move, requested by Bahrain's embattled Sunni Muslim royal family, is motivated primarily by self-interest. If Bahrain, with its majority Shia population, succumbed to an Egyptian-style popular uprising then the regime in Riyadh would fear, rightly, that its oil-rich eastern province, where many Shia live, might be next. But Saudi actions are also influenced by larger geostrategic considerations. One is Riyadh's close military and economic alliance with the US – its defender of last resort – which in effect embraces Bahrain, home to the US fifth fleet. The move by the Gulf Cooperation Council will not have come without prior consultation with Washington. Another crucial consideration is Riyadh's intensifying rivalry with Iran, which has powerful political and religious aspects (Iran is majority Shia Muslim, Saudi Arabia is majority Sunni). The developments in Bahrain follow stepped-up Saudi involvement in other regional flashpoints. They include Lebanon, where King Abdullah tried unsuccessfully last year to persuade Syria and Iranian-sponsored Hezbollah to take a less confrontational line; and Yemen, where Saudi Arabia has supported the government of Ali Abdullah Saleh, an American ally, against Iranian-backed rebels and al-Qaida infiltrators. The Saudis have also been actively involved, with the Obama administration, in international efforts to forge an Israel-Palestine settlement, another regional running sore exploited by Iran. The Saudi peace plan of 2002 remains the most likely basis for ending the Arab-Israeli conflict. Saudi efforts to keep a lid on unrest in the region extend to Oman – like Bahrain, a relatively poor country that acts as a base for the US military. Unprecedented protests there, inspired by Tunisia and Egypt, induced Sultan Qaboos bin Said, who has ruled Oman for 40 years, to announce on Sunday he would cede some legislative powers, double monthly welfare payments and increase pension benefits. Much of the money will come from a $20bn fund created last week by Saudi Arabia and other oil-rich Gulf states to help Bahrain and Oman. But Saudi and US efforts to calm the situation in Yemen appear to have failed so far. In the latest unrest in Sana'a and Aden, two people were killed and dozens injured when police fought protesters demanding an immediate end to President Ali Abdullah Saleh's 32-year rule. Saudi Arabia's growing regional security role is fully understood and underwritten by the Obama administration which, for example, has encouraged Riyadh to pump more oil to make up for the shortfall caused by the Libyan uprising.

But the US continues to try to have it both ways, doggedly pursuing its strategic interests in the region while freely criticising Arab governments that suppress protests that would undercut them. Addressing weekend events in Bahrain and Yemen, the White House was typically holier than thou. "We urge the governments of these countries to show restraint and to respect the universal rights of their people," it said. Robert Gates, the US defence secretary, who visited Bahrain on Friday, also prated preachily about democratic reform. But behind the scenes Obama officials admit in interviews with US media that they have assured Bahrain's royals of their full support if they promise to pursue gradual reform. Gates raised another concern, too – Iran. "There is clear evidence that as the process [of Arab reform] is protracted, particularly in Bahrain, that the Iranians are looking for ways to exploit it and create problems," he said. Gates did not say what the "clear evidence" was. But his view is shared by analysts such as Stratfor's George Friedman. He argued recently that the US withdrawal from Iraq, to be completed in December, and continuing military and institutional weakness in Baghdad, is set to give an enormous boost to Iran's regional influence. Events across the Gulf could compound Iran's advantage, Friedman said (writing before the Saudi decision to move into Bahrain). "If the Saudis intervened in Bahrain, the Iranians would have grounds to justify their own intervention, covert or overt. Iran might also use any violent Bahraini government suppression of demonstrators to justify more open intervention. "In the meantime, the United States, which has about 1,500 military personnel plus embassy staff on the ground in Bahrain, would face the choice of reinforcing or pulling its troops out," he warned. It's clear from the comments of Shia opposition leaders in Bahrain, who say the Saudi intervention amounts to a declaration of war, that not everyone in the Arab world (to put it mildly) welcomes Riyadh playing the role of regional policeman. And even as the Saudi regime steps up its efforts to neutralise regional unrest, the fact that it is not immune itself from the "contagion" was driven home at the weekend when hundreds of family members of people jailed without charge rallied in front of the interior ministry in Riyadh. The highly unusual protest was peaceful. But it followed closely on last Friday's "day of rage", and it was not likely to be the last. Despite these unmistakeable portents, the profound lack of understanding among veteran Saudi leaders about what is happening around them was sharply illustrated by remarks by the interior minister, Prince Nayef bin Abdul-Aziz, the king's half-brother, congratulating the regime on surviving the "day of rage". "I congratulate King Abdullah and his crown prince Sultan for having these kind and loyal subjects," Nayef said. "Some evil people wanted to spread chaos in the kingdom and called for demonstrations that have dishonourable goals." Luckily, he suggested, this deeply nefarious plot had been thwarted. http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/mar/14/saudi-arabia-bahrain-iran-us

Bahrain royal family welcomes Saudi troops to face down violent protests Opposition group says deployment of Saudi troops amounts to declaration of war Simon Tisdall guardian.co.uk, Monday 14 March 2011 13.26 GMT

Police fire teargas and water cannon at protesters in Manama, Bahrain. Photograph: Ammar Rasool/APAimages/Rex Features Saudi Arabia has moved decisively to bolster Bahrain's embattled royal family, sending military forces across the causeway linking the two kingdoms after violent weekend pro-democracy protests by Shia demonstrators all but overwhelmed police. Although the deployment on Monday was at Bahrain's request and came under the guise of the Gulf Co-operation Council, whose other members also sent troops, it marked another stage in Saudi Arabia's reluctant emergence as the key regional policeman, at a time when the Arab world faces unprecedented turmoil. Confirming local media reports, Nabeel al-Hamer, a former Bahrain information minister, said the reinforcements were already in place. "Forces from the Gulf Co-operation Council have arrived in Bahrain to maintain order and security," he said. "GCC forces will arrive in Bahrain today to take part in maintaining law and order," the Gulf Daily News reported. "Their mission will be limited to protecting vital facilities, such as oil, electricity and water installations, and financial and banking facilities." The deployment followed clashes in Bahrain on Sunday that injured dozens of people in what was one of the most violent demonstrations since troops killed seven protesters last month. Responding to demands for more democracy and an end to sectarian discrimination, Crown Prince Sheikh Salman bin Hamad al-Khalifa, has promised national dialogue, enhanced powers for parliament, electoral reform, and a nationwide referendum on any new deal. But opponents, including the largest Shia party, Wefaq, remain sceptical. Wefaq said today it had held talks with the prince about a national dialogue. But it deplored the GCC intervention, reportedly saying a deployment of Saudi troops would be an occupation and amount to a declaration of war. Anticipating further trouble, Britain has advised against all travel to Bahrain and warned British nationals to stay at home until further notice. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/14/bahrain-saudi-troops-violent-protests/print

European Diplomacy’s First Test Giles Merritt 2011-03-14

BRUSSELS – It took eight years of ill-tempered political wrangling to create the European Union’s new diplomatic service, but its fate – and that of its chief, Catherine Ashton – may well be decided over the next few weeks. The Union’s failure so far to respond adequately to the crisis engulfing the Arab world is sharpening knives in foreign ministries across Europe. From the EU’s point of view, the turmoil engulfing the Arab world couldn’t have come at a worse time. The European External Action Service (EEAS), which is meant to enable the EU “to speak with one voice,” was launched only at the end of 2010 and many senior positions remain unfilled. But that is a poor excuse for the EU’s inability to put its stamp on the crisis. Few know better than the Eurocrats of Brussels that the unrest now sweeping across Arab countries was only a matter of time in coming. Back in the 1990’s, EU officials, prompted by Spain, Italy, and France, began to shape a Mediterranean strategy to stimulate trade and investment in the Arab world. Europe already feared that rising youth unemployment in the region would create dangerous instability along Europe’s southern flank. Known as the “Barcelona process,” this initiative proved weak and ineffective, because much of its funding was diverted to Eastern Europe for the EU’s ambitious enlargement drive. Recently, there have been efforts to revive the strategy by renaming it the Union for the Mediterranean, but still with little concrete achievement. In stark contrast to the way that former Soviet-bloc countries have been drawn into the European economy, Arab countries have received little help from the EU, despite the huge challenges they face. Europe’s selfish agricultural policies aggravate poverty in North Africa and the Middle East, where the population doubled to 350 million during the last 30 years and is forecast to more than double again by 2030. Europe’s governments are now much criticized for propping up autocratic Arab regimes, but their real failure has been one of omission: the lack of economic cooperation and development assistance offered to the region. In the past, there was talk in Brussels of helping Arab countries to develop closer mutual trade links. Yet they remain islands of underdevelopment – less than 2% of the five Maghreb countries’ trade is with one another, and much the same is true of the eastern

Mediterranean countries of the Mashreq and of the Gulf states. A determined EU effort to counter Arab fragmentation and tackle problems ranging from acute water scarcity to poor education would pay rich dividends. Indeed, Europe has much to offer the Arab world as it emerges from its political and economic stagnation, but it needs to do so loudly and clearly under the banner of EU leadership. And that, unfortunately, has been in short supply. The focus has been on Europe’s response to the events that began in Tunisia and have since led to the fall of Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak, unrest in Bahrain and Yemen, and now civil conflict in Libya. The European Council, which groups EU heads of government, met in Brussels on March 11, but agreed only to call for Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi’s resignation. No wider plan for encouraging Arab countries to embrace democracy was mooted, still less one that would make EU economic cooperation conditional on political reform. Baroness Ashton’s voice at the recent European Council was characteristically muted. She has so far visited Tunisia and Egypt without declaring an EU policy position that commanded attention. It has been French President Nicolas Sarkozy, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and British Prime Minister David Cameron who have vied for the limelight, leaving Ashton in the shadows. Her style since arriving in Brussels as the EU’s foreignpolicy chief has been distinctly unassuming, but that does not mean that she cannot now show her mettle and seize the initiative. The question of intervening in Libya with a no-fly zone has divided EU leaders, and the Arab League’s decision to back it means that it will have to be taken up by NATO, along with the United Nations. But the EU can make a much more positive and important contribution to the Arab awakening by launching an economic strategy along the lines laid out by Italy’s foreign minister, Franco Frattini, and Britain’s deputy prime minister, Nick Clegg. Ashton’s EEAS could have established a clear lead at a much earlier stage by responding publicly to the spreading Arab unrest. It would have been a good idea, for example, to send EEAS observers to selected countries to assess their political mood and economic needs. But it is certainly not too late to set out a determined new plan for Euro-Arab cooperation. That will not happen if Baroness Ashton remains a low-profile operator. In that case, the EEAS itself could become a casualty of events. It won’t die of course, as international bureaucracies seldom do, but it risks becoming irrelevant, thus robbing Europe of its global voice. Giles Merritt is Editor of Europe's World and heads the Brussels-based think tanks Friends of Europe and Security & Defense Agenda. http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/merritt13/English

Saudi Arabian forces prepare to enter Bahrain after day of clashes Crown Prince of Bahrain expected to invite Saudi support following anti-government demonstrations in capital Ben Quinn The Guardian, Monday 14 March 2011

Saudi Arabian forces were preparing to enter Bahrain after clashes between police and protesters. Photograph: James Lawler Duggan/AFP/Getty Images Saudi forces are preparing to intervene in neighbouring Bahrain, after a day of clashes between police and protesters who mounted the most serious challenge to the island's royal family since demonstrations began a month ago. The Crown Prince of Bahrain is expected to formally invite security forces from Saudi Arabia into his country today, as part of a request for support from other members of the six-member Gulf Co-operation Council. Thousands of demonstrators on Sunday cut off Bahrain's financial centre and drove back police trying to eject them from the capital's central roundabout, while protesters also clashed with government supporters on the campus of the main university. Amid the revolt Bahrain also faces a potential sectarian conflict between the ruling minority of Sunnis Muslims and a majority of Shia Muslims, around 70% of the kingdom's 525,000 residents. The crown prince, Salman bin Hamad al-Khalifa, said in a televised statement that Bahrain had "witnessed tragic events" during a month of unprecedented political unrest. Warning that "the right to security and safety is above all else", he added: "Any legitimate claims must not be made at the expanse of security and stability."

The crown prince has also promised that national dialogue would look at increasing the power of Bahrain's parliament, and that any deal could be put to nationwide referendum. However, some protesters have pressed their demands further to call for the toppling of the Sunni dynasty. The unrest is being closely watched in Saudi Arabia, where Shia are some 15% of the population. The secretary general of the Gulf Co-operation Council, Abdulrahman bin Hamad al- Attiya, expressed the "full solidarity with Bahrain's leadership and people", adding that "safeguarding security and stability in one country is a collective responsibility". In an apparent reference to Iran, which Gulf Arab ruling elites fear may capitalise on an uprising by Shiites in Bahrain, he also expresssed "strong rejection of any foreign interference in the kingdom's internal affairs, asserting that any acts aiming to destabilise the kingdom and sow dissension between its citizens represent a dangerous encroachment on the whole GCC security and stability." Reports that the Saudi National Guard was poised to enter Bahrain were cited by the Foreign Office, alongside a recent increase in protests, as it changed its advice to advise British citizens against all travel to Bahrain. Earlier on Sunday, police moved in on Pearl roundabout, a site of occupation by members of Bahrain's Shia majority, who are calling for an elected government and equality with Bahrain's Sunnis. Witnesses said security forces surrounded the protesters' tent compound, shooting tear gas and rubber bullets at the activists in the largest effort to clear the field in the middle of the roundabout since a crackdown last month that left four dead after live ammunition was fired. Activists tried to stand their ground yesterday and chanted "Peaceful, peaceful" as the crowd swelled into thousands, with protesters streaming to the roundabout to reinforce the activists' lines, forcing the police to pull back by the early afternoon. At Bahrain University, Shia demonstrators and government supporters held competing protests that descended into violence when plainclothes pro-government backers and security forces forced students blocking the campus main gate to seek refuge in classrooms and lecture halls, the Associated Press reported. The latest demonstrations took place a day after the US defence secretary, Robert Gates, visited Bahrain and said that the Khalifa family must go beyond "baby steps" reform and enact substantial economic and political change. • This article was amended on 14 March 2011. The original referred to Pearl roundabout as a square. This has been corrected. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/14/saudi-arabian-forces-bahrain- protests?INTCMP=ILCNETTXT3487

Ola de cambio en el mundo árabe Marruecos reprime con brutalidad una manifestación Unos 20 heridos en la primera protesta tras el discurso real IGNACIO CEMBRERO - Madrid - 14/03/2011 Los antidisturbios marroquíes reprimieron con brutalidad, según testigos, la primera manifestación pacífica que islamistas e izquierdistas intentaron llevar a cabo, ayer en Casablanca, tras el discurso del rey. Mohamed VI anunció el miércoles una reforma de la Constitución. Los antidisturbios marroquíes reprimieron con brutalidad, según testigos, la primera manifestación pacífica que islamistas e izquierdistas intentaron llevar a cabo, ayer en Casablanca, tras el discurso del rey. Mohamed VI anunció el miércoles una reforma de la Constitución. Las cargas policiales provocaron al menos una veintena de heridos, que acudieron a las urgencias hospitalarias. Entre ellos figura Mohamed Sassi, de 58 años, fundador del Partido Socialista Unificado (PSU), una pequeña formación legal de izquierdas, que fue golpeado ante la sede de su partido. La policía detuvo a 130 manifestantes, según los convocantes. Varios centenares de jóvenes, en su mayoría militantes del movimiento islamista ilegal Justicia y Espiritualidad, se concentraron en la plaza de Correos con la intención de marchar para exigir "una Constitución democrática" y una "monarquía parlamentaria". La manifestación no había sido autorizada y los participantes "atacaron a las fuerzas del orden", según la versión del Ministerio del Interior difundida por la agencia oficial MAP. Los antidisturbios la disolvieron y cuatro agentes resultaron heridos. La concentración apenas se estaba formando cuando la policía cargó, según varios testigos. Decenas de jóvenes -barbudos e izquierdistas- se refugiaron en la cercana sede del PSU, que la policía intentó tomar. La mayoría de los heridos fueron golpeados en las puertas del edificio, donde estaba reunido el buró político del partido para analizar el discurso del monarca. Mohamed VI anunció hace cinco días que encargaba a una comisión de juristas y politólogos la elaboración de enmiendas a la actual Carta Magna que otorguen mayores poderes al primer ministro, en detrimento de los del rey, y que creen potentes instituciones regionales que sirvan para descentralizar el país. La alocución real no ha apaciguado los ánimos de los colectivos que iniciaron las protestas el 20 de febrero. Piden, entre otras cosas, que no sean juristas designados por el soberano los que retoquen la Constitución, sino que una asamblea constituyente redacte una nueva Ley Fundamental. Marruecos vive una efervescencia social y política sin precedentes desde la entronización de Mohamed VI, en 1999.Los jóvenes que convocaron, a través de Facebook, las protestas del mes pasado, han pedido a los marroquíes que se echen de nuevo a la calle el próximo domingo. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Marruecos/reprime/brutalidad/manifestaci on/elpepiint/20110314elpepiint_14/Tes

TRIBUNA: ALAA AL AMERI Libia nos llama. ¡Tomad partido! Los revolucionarios no solo se enfrentan a Muamar el Gadafi, sino a una coalición internacional de regímenes represivos: Argelia, Siria... Hay que crear una zona de exclusión aérea y cortar el acceso al dinero y las armas ALAA AL AMERI 14/03/2011 Los dictadores de la zona se convirtieron en un mal menor que frenaba la amenaza islamista Ahora Gadafi solo es un 'señor de la guerra' que ataca ciudades libres de todo el país La Revolución Libia está en marcha, inspirada por levantamientos en toda la región que demuestran el poder encarnado en un pueblo que ha decidido no tolerar por más tiempo la injusticia y la represión. Al principio, el asombro paralizó a Europa y Estados Unidos: "No lo vimos venir". Hace tiempo que el mundo exterior está desconectado de las ideas, sentimientos y aspiraciones de la sociedad árabe corriente, y sobre todo de sus jóvenes. La mayoría de los retratos occidentales de la calle árabe se basan en indolentes clichés: el odio a "Occidente", la obsesión con Israel y una tendencia innata al extremismo político y religioso. Según los expertos europeos y estadounidenses, "en todas partes", y dejando de lado las diferencias sociales, políticas o históricas, el ejemplo era el del "Irán prerrevolucionario". La Francia de hoy en día apenas se parece a la de finales de la década de 1970, pero para contemplar a todas las sociedades árabes se utilizaba un único y desfasado filtro. Gracias a este relato, los dictadores de la región se convirtieron en un mal menor. Puede que armarlos, comerciar con ellos y pasar por alto sus desmanes fuera desagradable, pero siempre era mejor que su alternativa. Incluso les enviamos jóvenes para torturar. ¿Quién mejor que ellos para ocuparse de esa incomprensible variedad de ser humano? Cegado por esta concepción, el mundo se quedó estupefacto cuando una serie de revoluciones dirigidas por jóvenes versados en cuestiones tecnológicas que demandaban democracia, libertad de expresión y oportunidades económicas recorrió la región. Como máximo, la participación islamista en todos esos levantamientos ha seguido el ritmo marcado por sus auténticos instigadores: jóvenes de ideas pro-occidentales. En realidad, en todos ellos los grupos islamistas han quedado relegados ante el avance y las reivindicaciones de los movimientos juveniles. Sin embargo, en lugar de adaptar sus valoraciones al curso real de los acontecimientos, en Estados Unidos y Europa mucha gente trató al principio de encuadrarlos en los mismos patrones de siempre. En consecuencia, poco puede sorprender que cuando Saif al Islam Gadafi apareció en la televisión libia el 21 de febrero para advertir del posible establecimiento de un "emirato islámico" en Bengasi, sus palabras, citadas por doquier, fueran además seriamente evaluadas por entendidos que con preocupación debatieron las posibles consecuencias que para Europa tendría la caída del régimen de Gadafi. Es famosa la definición de demencia atribuida a Albert Einstein, según la cual esta significa hacer lo mismo una y otra vez pero con la esperanza de obtener resultados distintos. Retorciendo este principio, podríamos decir que no importa lo que las

75 sociedades árabes hagan, ya que en Occidente muchos solo han interpretado de una manera el posible resultado de estos movimientos: la amenaza islamista. Es obligatorio preguntarse: si Kim Jong Un, hijo del dictador norcoreano, hubiera ofrecido sus opiniones acerca de la sociedad norcoreana y sobre las razones que explican que rebelarse contra su padre no sea una buena idea, ¿cuántos periodistas y políticos habrían puesto en peligro su reputación creyéndose lo que dijera? ¿Y ahora qué? Para responder a esta pregunta solo necesitamos observar los acontecimientos sobre el terreno y dejar de lado prejuicios desfasados. Allí donde los Gadafi pronosticaron conflictos tribales se ha producido un esfuerzo coordinado para demostrar la unidad nacional. No es sorprendente: en el contexto de Libia, cuando escuchas la palabra "tribu" solo piensas en "región". En Bengasi y en todas las ciudades liberadas de Libia, los lemas han sido los mismos: "Libia es una y Trípoli su capital", y "Libia es una tribu". En consecuencia, la consigna más eficaz para lograr la unidad nacional la proporcionó Saif-al-Islam con sus siniestras amenazas de guerra civil. El segundo fantasma más preciado del régimen es Al Qaeda. Sin embargo, los que ahora desarrollan un Gobierno transitorio en Libia oriental no han escatimado esfuerzos en subrayar que sus candidatos están libres de vínculos con prácticas extremistas. La razón es sencilla: las reivindicaciones que hay detrás de la Revolución Libia no son ideológicas. En las primeras protestas surgidas en las ciudades orientales ni siquiera apareció el lema ahora familiar de las demás revoluciones árabes: "El pueblo exige la caída del régimen". Más bien se exigía libertad de expresión, democracia, asistencia sanitaria, educación y mejores infraestructuras. Hasta que el régimen, sirviéndose de mercenarios, ataques aéreos y artillería, no lanzó su sangrienta ofensiva contra civiles desarmados, los manifestantes no se centraron en derribar ese mismo régimen, armándose para lograrlo. ¿Qué puede hacer Occidente? Revolucionarios libios de todo el país coinciden en una cosa: la intervención internacional no puede incluir tropas terrestres. La detención de un equipo de las fuerzas especiales británicas cerca de Bengasi demuestra que lo dicen en serio. Sin embargo, han apuntado con igual claridad lo que sí puede hacer la comunidad internacional. Mientras escribo estas líneas se observan prometedores indicios de que algunos países europeos y árabes se están preparando para reconocer oficialmente al Consejo Nacional y Temporal Libio para la Transición. Su llamamiento a la creación de una zona de exclusión aérea debe ser atendido. Sin acceso al espacio aéreo libio, el régimen de Gadafi no podrá reaprovisionarse de armas y mercenarios, ni tampoco bombardear ciudades liberadas. La congelación de los activos personales de la familia Gadafi será irrelevante si no se congelan también otras cuentas libias. La diferencia entre las finanzas personales de Gadafi y la ingente riqueza petrolífera libia no está clara. Debe producirse una auténtica interrupción del flujo de fondos que los Gadafi puedan utilizar para procurarse mercenarios o armamento. Mientras escribo, el petróleo sigue saliendo y el dinero entrando. Los países que permiten la movilización de mercenarios en su territorio deben actuar para detenerla. A este respecto, el silencio y la inacción equivalen al consentimiento. Hay que desenmascarar a quienes más han apoyado los crímenes de Gadafi. Hay pruebas fehacientes de que Argelia le está proporcionando personal, aviones, armas y

76 mercenarios. Dos supervivientes de un avión militar derribado cerca de Misrata resultaron ser pilotos sirios. En consecuencia, los revolucionarios libios no solo se enfrentan a Gadafi, sino a una coalición internacional de regímenes represivos. Esta federación de tiranos debe también enfrentarse a desagradables consecuencias por su cobarde labor de facilitación de los crímenes masivos cometidos en Libia. Los buques estadounidenses y británicos fondeados frente a la costa podrían fácilmente interferir en las comunicaciones de Gadafi, limitando su alcance en todo el país. Las retransmisiones de la televisión estatal, utilizadas para difundir informaciones engañosas, amenazas y odio, deberían también ser interferidas. Entretanto, se podría proporcionar a la oposición, además de pequeñas armas, y sistemas antiaéreos y antitanque, imágenes que dieran cuenta de los movimientos de tropas. El mundo debería también dejar de referirse a Gadafi como el "líder libio". No lo es. Ahora solo es un señor de la guerra que ataca ciudades libres de todo el país y que tiene como rehenes a los habitantes de Trípoli. Parafraseando al senador estadounidense John McCain, podríamos decir que, cuando se habla de una intervención internacional en Libia, de lo que se trata es de elegir: o bien podemos actuar ahora, o bien esperar a que ocurra un desastre mucho mayor. Los libios no olvidarán nuestra elección. El pueblo libio ha señalado una senda que sigue la tradición de las grandes revoluciones democráticas. La cuestión es: ¿nos acordamos lo suficiente de nuestras propias luchas por la democracia como para ayudarles a triunfar? Alaa al Ameri es escritor y economista libio-británico. Traducción de Jesús Cuéllar Menezo. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/opinion/Libia/nos/llama/Tomad/partido/elpepuopi/ 20110314elpepiopi_12/Tes

Jiménez pide al Consejo de Seguridad que imponga la exclusión aérea en Libia La ministra de Exteriores advierte a la ONU de que "no puede dejar a Libia sola" NURIA TESÓN \ MIGUEL GONZÁLEZ - El Cairo - 14/03/2011 "El Consejo de Seguridad tiene que ser sensible a una petición que viene del mundo árabe. Es muy importante en este momento no dejar a Libia sola, necesita una solución cuanto antes". La ministra española de Asuntos Exteriores y Cooperación, Trinidad Jiménez, ha urgido esta mañana al Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU a que apruebe ya una resolución que autorice la imposición de una zona de exclusión de vuelos sobre Libia, tal como le pidió el sábado la Liga Árabe. Es la primera vez que Jiménez hace una declaración tan clara a favor de la intervención directa de la comunidad internacional en Libia. Ayer, la ministra de Exteriores ya concretó que España siempre va a apoyar "la resolución que se adopte y posteriormente cumpliremos nuestras obligaciones en coordinación con nuestros socios y aliados" de la UE y la OTAN. La ministra ha hecho hoy este llamamiento a la ONU tras reunirse en El Cairo con su homólogo egipcio, Nabil El Arabi. Jiménez ha ofrecido a las nuevas autoridades egipcias, inmersas en un proceso de transición cargado de incertidumbres, la experiencia española; mediante la organización de seminarios con políticos y expertos. Hoy en Egipto, como en España hace tres décadas, se enfrentan los partidarios de la ruptura con el régimen de Mubarak con quienes solo quieren reformarlo. Jiménez se mostró convencida de que al final se logrará un consenso entre ambos. La jefa de la diplomacia española ha traído al primer ministro Essam Sharaf un mensaje de apoyo del presidente del Gobierno, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. El Ejecutivo español quiere sellar con Egipto una nueva "asociación estratégica", tanto en el marco bilateral como de la UE, que ayude a la consolidación de un régimen democrático en el país más poblado del mundo árabe. Eso sí, sin poner condiciones, con un trato "entre iguales", según palabras de Jiménez, para evitar cualquier susceptibilidad sobre una posible injerencia externa. Pero lo que más preocupa ahora a las autoridades egipcias es su maltrecha situación económica, con el hundimiento del turismo, una de las principales fuentes de riqueza del país. Por eso, la ministra ha tenido el gesto de pasear por el popular mercado cairota de Jan el Jalili, que ofrecía una imagen insólita casi sin turistas. Ya antes de salir de Madrid, el Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores retiró la recomendación de no viajar a El Cairo, en un intento por animar a los españoles a que vuelvan al país de las pirámides. Aunque no estaba previsto inicialmente, la ministra será recibida esta mañana por Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, jefe del Consejo Supremo de las Fuerzas Armadas y jefe del Estado en funciones tras la dimisión de Mubarak. El papel del Ejército no solo ha sido clave en la revolución egipcia sino que marcará su rumbo inmediato. Por eso, los jóvenes de la coalición del 25 de febrero, a los que la ministra recibió el domingo por la noche, le pidieron que los militares españoles influyan en sus homólogos egipcios para que acepten los principios democráticos.

78 http://www.elpais.com/articulo/espana/Jimenez/pide/Consejo/Seguridad/imponga/exclu sion/aerea/Libia/elpepuint/20110314elpepunac_1/Tes

Jiménez dice que España "cumplirá sus obligaciones" si hay intervención en Libia La titular de Exteriores se reúne en El Cairo con el secretario de la Liga Árabe N. TESÓN / M. GONZÁLEZ - El Cairo - 14/03/2011 "Más vale tarde que nunca", contestó el secretario general de la Liga Árabe, Amr Musa, cuando se le preguntó si el apoyo de su organización a la zona de exclusión aérea sobre Libia no llega demasiado tarde. Pero quizá sea nunca, porque la comunidad internacional se mueve con lentitud, mientras que la maquinaria bélica de Gadafi avanza con rapidez hacia Bengasi. "Más vale tarde que nunca", contestó el secretario general de la Liga Árabe, Amr Musa, cuando se le preguntó si el apoyo de su organización a la zona de exclusión aérea sobre Libia no llega demasiado tarde. Pero quizá sea nunca, porque la comunidad internacional se mueve con la lentitud propia de las negociaciones políticas, mientras que la maquinaria bélica de Gadafi avanza con rapidez hacia Bengasi, capital de la sublevación. Tras reunirse ayer en El Cairo con la ministra española de Asuntos Exteriores, Trinidad Jiménez, Musa dejó claro que lo que acordó el sábado la Liga Árabe fue dirigirse al Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU para pedirle que impida a Gadafi el uso de aviones y helicópteros contra su población. No se trata, en su opinión, de una intervención militar -aunque requiera medios militares e implique la destrucción de las aeronaves que desobedezcan la prohibición-, sino de una operación humanitaria dirigida a frenar el derramamiento de sangre. Aún así, la pelota queda en el tejado del Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU, donde China y Rusia tienen poder de veto. También la ministra española se remitió a las Naciones Unidas y eludió concretar la participación española en el dispositivo que debe imponer la zona de exclusión aérea hasta conocer "los términos en que el Consejo de Seguridad se pronuncia". Eso sí, subrayó: "Desde luego, siempre vamos a apoyar la resolución que se adopte y posteriormente cumpliremos nuestras obligaciones en coordinación con nuestros socios y aliados" de la UE y la OTAN. Es lo más lejos que hasta ahora ha ido un responsable político a la hora de dar por sentada la participación española en la hipotética intervención. Con todo, Jiménez calificó de "valiente" el llamamiento de la Liga Árabe, que atribuyó al empeño personal de Musa, quien pasó por alto los reparos de Siria y Argelia y alegó que la decisión se había tomado, al menos formalmente, por unanimidad. Musa se reunirá hoy con la Alta Representante de la UE, Catherine Ashton, para abordar la convocatoria de una cumbre tripartita entre los 27, la Liga Árabe y la Unión Africana, sobre el conflicto de Libia, como acordaron los mandatarios europeos en Bruselas el pasado viernes.

Jiménez acudió a la sede de la Liga Árabe -en una esquina de la plaza Tahrir, epicentro de la revuelta que derrocó a Mubarak el pasado 11 de febrero- tras entrevistarse con el ex director general de la Organización Internacional de la Energía Atómica Mohamed El Baradei, quien aspira como Musa a la presidencia de Egipto. Ambos se oponen al referéndum para reformar diez artículos de la Constitución egipcia que debería celebrarse el próximo día 19; aunque, como todo el proceso de transición en este país, está en el aire. Pese a sus aspiraciones presidenciales, Musa mantuvo estrechas relaciones con Mubarak. No así los cinco representantes de la Coalición Jóvenes del 25 de enero -un conglomerado heterogéneo, del que forman parte los Hermanos Musulmanes, que actuaron como motor de la revuelta-, a quienes Jiménez recibió anoche en la residencia del embajador español en Egipto. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/espana/Jimenez/dice/Espana/cumplira/obligaciones /hay/intervencion/Libia/elpepuint/20110314elpepinac_11/Tes

TRIBUNA: JOSCHKA FISCHER El despertar de Oriente Próximo JOSCHKA FISCHER 13/03/2011 Cuando la revuelta democrática en Túnez logró derribar al régimen, el mundo reaccionó con asombro. ¿Democracia desde abajo en el mundo árabe? Después del derrocamiento del régimen de 30 años de Mubarak en Egipto, el asombro se convirtió en certeza. Oriente Próximo ha despertado y comenzado a entrar al mundo globalizado del siglo XXI. Hasta ahora, la región (con las excepciones de Israel y Turquía) había estado más o menos en los márgenes del proceso de modernización mundial. Todavía no está claro si se impondrá el despertar democrático del mundo árabe o solo se producirán cambios en las élites de los regímenes autoritarios, si esto conducirá o no a un orden estable. Sin embargo, no hay duda de que ha llegado a su fin la era en que esta vasta región dormía mientras otras se modernizaban. Por supuesto, la revuelta popular continuará. Prácticamente ningún país de la región escapará a ella. Irán, Siria y Arabia Saudí son candidatos, aunque es probable que este último sea el que presente más dificultades. Israel haría bien en prepararse para el cambio de época y llegar a un acuerdo de paz con los palestinos y Siria lo antes posible. Sin embargo, hay pocos indicios de que el Gobierno de Israel posea la visión necesaria para tal empresa. Los problemas son los mismos en casi todas partes: represión política, subdesarrollo económico y altos niveles de pobreza (con la excepción de los Estados petroleros más pequeños), falta de educación, alto desempleo y enormes presiones demográficas debido a una población muy joven y en rápido crecimiento. Por otra parte, la situación se vio agravada por la incompetencia de los regímenes autoritarios de la región, incapaces de ofrecer a sus jóvenes ninguna perspectiva más allá de la represión. Los detonadores fueron las nuevas tecnologías de información de Internet y la televisión por satélite, como Al Jazeera. De hecho, una ironía de la historia es que no fue el poder duro estadounidense -como se usó, por ejemplo, en la guerra de Irak- lo que promovió esta revolución democrática, sino más bien su poder blando -Twitter y Facebook- tan difamado por Bush y sus asesores neocons. Al parecer, Silicon Valley tiene más fuerza que el Pentágono. Estas herramientas digitales norteamericanas se convirtieron en los instrumentos de una revuelta de la juventud árabe y persa por la libertad y la democracia. Ahora bien, cualquiera que sea el parecido de lo ocurrido en la plaza de Tahrir de El Cairo con el Mayo de 1968 y la caída del muro de Berlín, sería prematuro proclamar que ha triunfado la libertad. Dependerá en gran medida de cómo responda Occidente, porque lo que está en juego no es solo el derrocamiento de los tiranos, sino también la profunda transformación y modernización de las sociedades y economías. Se trata de una tarea inmensa. Más aún, en comparación con Europa del Este en 1989, el Oriente Próximo de 2011 carece de estructuras exteriores de estabilización, como la OTAN y la Unión Europea, que podrían influir en las reformas internas a través de la perspectiva futura de ser parte

81 de ellas. Los esfuerzos para esta gran transformación deberán venir de dentro de estas sociedades, y con toda probabilidad eso es pedir demasiado. La transformación de Europa del Este después de 1989 tomó mucho más tiempo y resultó ser mucho más costosa de lo previsto inicialmente. Mucha gente vio su calidad de vida afectada negativamente durante este proceso y los organizadores de la revolución democrática no fueron necesariamente los que pudieron impulsar el desarrollo democrático y económico. Y tenemos además la experiencia de la revolución naranja de Ucrania en 2004, que fracasó años después debido al distanciamiento, la incompetencia y la corrupción de sus dirigentes. En conjunto, estas limitaciones y analogías sugieren que Occidente, especialmente Europa, debería centrarse en la ayuda a largo plazo para el desarrollo democrático y económico de los países renovados de Oriente Próximo, y también en relaciones de estrecha colaboración con todas las fuerzas que apoyen la democratización y modernización. Occidente ya no puede continuar con su realpolitik habitual. Estas tareas requieren generosidad, tanto financiera como de otros tipos (por ejemplo, las oportunidades de viajar fueron de vital importancia en la consolidación de las aspiraciones democráticas de Europa del Este después de 1989) y requieren décadas de persistencia. El éxito será costoso, muy costoso, lo que no será popular en el contexto actual de recesión económica. Pero una democracia que no se traduce en comidas regulares es una democracia condenada al fracaso. La ayuda económica, la apertura de los mercados de la UE y EE UU, los proyectos estratégicos de energía, el asesoramiento jurídico y constitucional y la cooperación entre las universidades se cuentan entre los recursos que Occidente debe proporcionar. Si este amanecer fracasa, habrá una radicalización en toda la región. No hay retorno al statu quo anterior. El genio ha salido de la lámpara. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/opinion/despertar/Oriente/Proximo/elpepiopi/20110313 elpepiopi_5/Tes

In Libya, underground jail a daunting reminder of Moammar Gaddafi's grip By Sudarsan Raghavan Washington Post Staff Writer Sunday, March 13, 2011; 3:52 PM IN BENGHAZI, LIBYA Peering into a subterranean jail, Adil Gnaybor shuddered with fear. Rusted prison bars once covered with earth were now exposed, dug up by rebels who had discovered the secret labyrinth of cells. The space was too small for Gnaybor's 5-foot frame, and a white tube provided the only source of air. "If I go inside there, perhaps I will die," Gnaybor said, staring into the hole. Thousands of Libyans have been arriving here at a complex of palatial homes, known as the Katiba El Fadil bu Omar, where Libyan leader Moammar Gaddafi stayed during visits to this port city. It is here that Gaddafi also had an underground prison. The compound is perhaps the most vivid symbol in eastern Libya of triumph over the Gaddafi regime. His houses have been torched and looted. Graffiti denouncing his regime is spray-painted on nearly every wall. One declared, "Libya will be free." But amid the faded opulence, Libyans expressed fear that their revolution was losing ground on two fronts and could be reversed. For many visitors, the underground jails were not only a chilling reminder of the brutality of Gaddafi's government. They also foreshadowed the terror Gaddafi is capable of inflicting in the future if his forces retake the city, Libya's second largest. "I feel nervous. Look what happened in Zawiyah and in Ras Lanuf," said Gnaybor, 50, referring to two cities - the first in the west, the second in the east - that Gaddafi's forces have retaken over the past two days. "Everywhere we are losing a lot of people." Al-Badri, a 62-year-old who came with his three daughters, said: "I expect anything from Gaddafi. He could bomb Benghazi, even use chemical weapons." He declined to give his full name, for fear that he would be targeted if Gaddafi returned. "What is America waiting for?" he continued. "Until Gaddafi manages to kill all the Libyan people?" Worries in Benghazi Of all the cities that have revolted against Gaddafi, it is Benghazi that most Libyans expect will bear the full brunt of his wrath if he retains his grip on power. Libya's three- week-old populist revolution was born here, and it managed to reach the threshold of Gaddafi's nexus of power in western Libya with its brief takeover of Zawiyah, 30 miles from the capital, Tripoli. Benghazi is also the headquarters of the Libyan National Council, a 31-member body that seeks to replace Gaddafi's regime.

In 1996, an estimated 1,200 prisoners who had protested Gaddafi's rule were killed at Tripoli's Abu Salim prison. Many were from Benghazi. Such memories of savagery helped trigger the uprising. It is difficult to imagine Gaddafi retaking Benghazi without a battle that will almost certainly be bloodier than the clashes that erupted in Zawiyah. On the streets and in the cafes of this city of 700,000, there was a palpable sense of defiance among younger Libyans who have largely fueled the revolt. "Be firm. Be steadfast," said Yusri al-Nadda, a blind preacher dressed in a traditional brown cloak who led prayers Friday. "Steadfastness is a wonderful thing. We need it now." The Katiba, at first glance, appeared to represent a totem of defiance against Gaddafi's rule. On one wall was an image of Gaddafi as a vampire, "bloodsucker" written next to him. Teenagers waved flags of the old monarchy, which Gaddafi toppled in a bloodless coup in 1969. Near the underground jail, a man donned a Gaddafi mask and danced, poking fun at the dictator. No one knows for certain how many prisoners were held here. Most were no doubt opponents of the regime, but others were held for being devout Muslims, whom Gaddafi perceived as extremists linked to al-Qaeda. That so few Libyans seemed to know about the cells speaks to the secrecy of the regime. In fact, all of the visitors interviewed said they had no idea of what lay behind the walls of the complex, which was built in the 1970s. "No one knew this was a prison," said Ahmed, 60, who came with his wife and two daughters. Like other visitors, he was too fearful to give his family name. "This is terrible. I didn't expect to see this. I'm sure many were tortured and killed here." Some Libyans said viewing signs of Gaddafi's ruthlessness gave them more resolve to resist his forces. "This will make them stronger," Muhammed, an engineer, said as he stepped out of a fortified underground bunker. "This will encourage them to take the next step, which will be Tripoli." 'We need action' Osama Shabsha, 30, an oil company worker, said he fled the city of Brega on Thursday after an airstrike by Gaddafi's forces. He angrily denounced the United States and the rest of the world for not helping the rebels oust Gaddafi and usher in a new era of democracy in Libya. "They don't do anything. They just make speeches. We need action," he said. "Gaddafi is in his last days, but we still need help. A no-fly zone will be the best thing. It will energize our fighters to do more." Shabsha said that as he drove from Brega, cars filled with fighters were headed toward the front line. Standing near the hole to the underground prison, he said Gaddafi's forces would never enter Benghazi. "We will fight until the last moment," Shabsha said. "A lot of guys are willing to die. We don't want this regime to continue its evil ways." Other young Libyans were less certain.

"I don't know what is going to happen," Ahmed Ibrahim, 26, said as he peered into a large, gaping hole at what appeared to be a warehouse to hold prisoners. "God help us, because now the picture is not clear." Older Libyans remember how Gaddafi has fought back other militant uprisings during his 41 years in power. On Saturday, rebel commanders conceded that they had lost control of Ras Lanuf and its oil refinery. Mimi, who brought along her two children, was too fearful to criticize Gaddafi. Nor would she express her feelings about what she had witnessed. "I won't condemn anything until he is gone. We're still afraid of his regime," she said. "Everything is possible. He could come back. He has survived for more than 40 years." http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/article/2011/03/12/AR2011031204996.html?wpisrc=nl_headline

March 13, 2011 Fiddling While Libya Burns By ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER PRESIDENT Obama says the noose is tightening around Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi. In fact, it is tightening around the Libyan rebels, as Colonel Qaddafi makes the most of the world’s dithering and steadily retakes rebel-held towns. The United States and Europe are temporizing on a no-flight zone while the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the Gulf Cooperation Council and now the Arab League have all called on the United Nations Security Council to authorize one. Opponents of a no-flight zone have put forth five main arguments, none of which, on close examination, hold up. IT’S NOT IN OUR INTEREST Gen. Wesley K. Clark argues that “Libya doesn’t sell much oil to the United States” and that while Americans “want to support democratic movements in the region,” we are already doing that in Iraq and Afghanistan. Framing this issue in terms of oil is exactly what Arab populations and indeed much of the world expect, which is why they are so cynical about our professions of support for democracy and human rights. Now we have a chance to support a real new beginning in the Muslim world — a new beginning of accountable governments that can provide services and opportunities for their citizens in ways that could dramatically decrease support for terrorist groups and violent extremism. It’s hard to imagine something more in our strategic interest. IT WILL BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE Many thoughtful commentators, including Al Jazeera’s director general, Wadah Khanfar, argue that what is most important about the Arab spring is that it is coming from Arabs themselves. From this perspective, Western military intervention will play right into Colonel Qaddafi’s hands, allowing him to broadcast pictures of Western bombs falling on Arab civilians. But these arguments, while important, must be weighed against the appeals of Libyan opposition fighters for international help, and now, astonishingly, against support for a no-flight zone by some of the same governments that have kept their populations quiescent by holding up the specter of foreign intervention. Assuming that a no-flight zone can be imposed by an international coalition that includes Arab states, we have an opportunity to establish a new narrative of Western support for Arab democrats. IT WON’T WORK The United States ambassador to NATO, Ivo H. Daalder, argues that stopping Colonel Qaddafi’s air force will not be decisive; he will continue to inflict damage with tanks and helicopters, bombing oil refineries and depots on his way to retaking key towns. But the potential effect of a no-flight zone must also be assessed in terms of Colonel Qaddafi’s own calculations about his future. Richard Downie of the Center for Strategic and International Studies argues that although Colonel Qaddafi cultivates a mad-dictator image, he has been a canny survivor and political manipulator for 40 years. He is aware of debates with regard to a no-flight zone and is timing his military campaign accordingly; he is also capable of using his air force just enough to gain strategic advantage, but not enough to trigger a no-flight zone. If the international community lines up against him and is willing to crater his runways and take out his antiaircraft weapons, he might well renew his offer of a negotiated departure.

IF IT DOES WORK, WE DON’T KNOW WHAT WE WILL GET Revolutions are almost always followed by internal divisions among the revolutionaries. We should not expect a rosy, Jeffersonian Libya. But the choice is between uncertainty and the certainty that if Colonel Qaddafi wins, regimes across the region will conclude that force is the way to answer protests. And when Colonel Qaddafi massacres the opposition, young protesters across the Middle East will conclude that when we were asked to support their cause with more than words, we blinked. Americans in turn will read the words of Mr. Obama’s June 2009 speech in Cairo, with its lofty promises to stand for universal human rights, and cringe. LET’S ARM THE REBELS INSTEAD Some commentators who agree with the analysis above say we could better accomplish our goals by providing intelligence and arms to the opposition. That would, of course, be much easier for us. It undoubtedly appeals to Mr. Obama as a neat compromise between the desire to help the protesters and the desire not to overrule his defense secretary’s reluctance to participate in a no- flight zone. However, we would be providing arms not to a disciplined military, but to ragged groups of brave volunteers who barely know how to use the weapons they have. They need action that will change the situation on the ground for Colonel Qaddafi, as well as his calculations. Moreover, by the time arms and intelligence could take effect, it is quite likely that Colonel Qaddafi will have retaken or at least besieged Benghazi, the opposition stronghold. • The United States should immediately ask the Security Council to authorize a no-flight zone and make clear to Russia and China that if they block the resolution, the blood of the Libyan opposition will be on their hands. We should push them at least to abstain, and bring the issue to a vote as soon as possible. If we get a resolution, we should work with the Arab League to assemble an international coalition to impose the no-flight zone. If the Security Council fails to act, then we should recognize the opposition Libyan National Council as the legitimate government, as France has done, and work with the Arab League to give the council any assistance it requests. Any use of force must be carefully and fully debated, but that debate has now been had. It’s been raging for a week, during which almost every Arab country has come on board calling for a no-flight zone and Colonel Qaddafi continues to gain ground. It is time to act. Anne-Marie Slaughter is a professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton. Anne-Marie Slaughter Fiddling While Libya Burns March 13, 2011 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/14/opinion/14slaughter.html?hp

March 13, 2011 At Crossroads, Libya Rebels Vow to Stand or Die By ANTHONY SHADID AJDABIYA, Libya — Military forces loyal to Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi advanced Sunday on this anxious town, a strategic linchpin on the doorstep of the opposition capital Benghazi and within grasp of a highway crucial to recapturing the eastern border and encircling the rebellion with heavy armor and artillery. After another day of headlong retreat, this time from the refinery and port at Brega, one town west of here, the rebels prepared for what some called a last stand at Ajdabiya, taking refuge in military barracks where they stacked ammunition boxes six deep, positioned a handful of tanks and tried to bring order to a jumble of small artillery and antiaircraft guns. Bulldozers built berms three feet high near a pair of green, metal arches that mark the town’s entrance. The fate of Ajdabiya, an eastern town of 120,000 near the Mediterranean coast, may prove decisive in the most violent and chaotic of the uprisings that have upended the Arab world. Under a sky turned gray by a menacing sandstorm, the rebels valiantly vowed victory but acknowledged the deficit posed by their weapons and pleaded for a no-flight zone that seemed a metaphor for any kind of international help. “Our retreat is a tactic,” said Said Zway, 29, a civil-engineer-turned-fighter, at Ajdabiya’s entrance. “We can wait until they impose a no-flight zone. If they don’t, what can we do, my friend? We fight and die. God is with us, God willing.” From its ecstatic beginning, Libya’s uprising has taken a darker turn, as Colonel Qaddafi’s forces have recaptured Zawiyah, near Tripoli, and are now besieging Misurata, a commercial capital and an oasis of rebel control in the west. Officials in Tripoli talk with bluster, and a more sullen mood has settled over Benghazi, where reports of lawlessness grow. The United Nations Security Council this week may take up an Arab League call for a no-flight zone over Libya, a decision that Colonel Qaddafi’s government on Sunday deemed an “unexpected departure” from the league’s charter. The foreign ministers of major industrial nations are expected to consider the topic at a meeting in Paris on Monday. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton is to fly on to Egypt and Tunisia afterward, and is expected to meet with Libyan opposition leaders. But a front line that shifted eastward by the day and plunging morale here threatened to outpace a decision that still faces opposition from Russia and China and lacks the clear support of the United States and Europe. The debate abroad overshadowed the stark reality on the ground — planes alone have not defeated the rebels, but rather a relentless onslaught of tanks, artillery, helicopters and ships at sea has sent rebels hurtling back the past several days from a series of oil towns along Libya’s virtually indefensible coastal plain.

At the front, pleas for foreign help have grown by the day, from demands for a no-flight zone to growing calls for bombing of Libyan ships at sea, military bases and Bab al- Aziziya, the compound in Tripoli that serves as Colonel Qaddafi’s headquarters. “We demand intervention from America, from Britain, from France!” shouted Wanis Kayhani, 42, a fighter waiting in a parked Toyota pickup near the front. “I personally want them to send troops from abroad to stop this dictator. I swear to God almighty!” “No, no, that won’t work!” another fighter shouted. “Whatever it takes,” Mr. Kayhani replied. Libya’s former interior minister, Gen. Abdel Fattah Younes, appeared unexpectedly before reporters in Benghazi on Sunday evening in his role as the new head of the rebel army and promised a vigorous defense of Ajdabiya, calling it a “key” city. Once a close ally of Colonel Qaddafi and head of the country’s special forces, General Younes resigned his post in late February to join the rebels. He said that he had spent days at the front lines and acknowledged that opposition fighters had overextended: they advanced “too far, too fast and did not protect the areas they gained,” he said. Striking an optimistic note, though, he cast the setbacks as a strategic decision. “War is a matter of advance and tactical withdrawal,” he said. “What we are trying to do is lure him into an area where we can even the fight.” The day began with military vehicles, ambulances, cars and pickup trucks loaded with everything from antiaircraft guns to a coat rack fleeing Brega, which rebels held just Saturday. Winds blew sand across the street like drifting snow, as rebel trucks and cars hurtled down both lanes of a two-lane road toward an old sign that read, “Warning ... speeding is the quickest way to die.” There was no traffic going the other way. They regrouped at the entrance to Ajdabiya, where only last week jubilant crowds of many hundreds beckoned convoys of fighters west to Tripoli. “We are going to defend Ajdabiya now, we have to defend Ajdabiya,” said Massoud Bousier, a 36-year-old fighter who fled Brega. “He has a tank and we have a stone. This Kalashnikov,” he said, raising his rifle, “does nothing. This is like a stone.” So far, the strategy of an invigorated, though no less bizarre, Colonel Qaddafi, absolute ruler here for nearly 42 years, has proved clear. With little regard for life, he has pummeled into submission rebel-held towns in his traditional stronghold of the west — Surt and Misurata among them — and deployed to the east forces believed loyal to his sons to recapture strategic oil towns between his birthplace, Surt, and Ajdabiya. Ajdabiya is most strategic for its location, 100 miles from Benghazi and perched on a highway that bypasses eastern Libya’s coastal cities and cuts straight to the border with Egypt, which rebels have lightly defended. It was still unclear whether Colonel Qaddafi would try to take the city in a bloody battle or bypass it en route to Benghazi and the highway. General Younes said he hoped Colonel Qaddafi’s forces would overextend as they advanced, and many rebels speculated that his army was already running short on fuel. Even in regions he controls, his rule remains contested. Women organized a small protest in the capital on Sunday, witnesses said, and a rebel spokesman in Misurata said

30 soldiers had defected from a brigade organized by Colonel Qaddafi’s son Khamis that has besieged the city. But optimism was in short supply on the rebel side, and officials in Tripoli boasted they would quickly and easily, as they put it, liberate Benghazi, where the opposition has formed a state in waiting. “You do not need a full-scale military attack because when we come to them, they just raise their hands and give up,” said Col. Minad Hussein, a military spokesman. At the edge of Ajdabiya, rebels tried to bring military discipline to the throngs of fervent youths who have volunteered to fight. Gates were closed to two makeshift military bases, where hundreds of boxes of ammunition were stacked in a sprawling courtyard. Volunteers filled dozens of sandbags lined behind berms and not yet tied shut. On loudspeakers, rebel leaders urged the curious to leave. “If you don’t have a tank or a heavy weapon, go back home!” one shouted. Rumors swirled — that rebel special forces had encircled government forces in Brega after nightfall, that 8,000 volunteers were coming under cover of night from Benghazi, and that Colonel Qaddafi was deploying mercenaries from Egypt. A fear of the unknown endemic to wartime rippled through a town of dull buildings interspersed with pastels of pink, orange and green. Doctors reported shortages of equipment at the hospital, and residents stocked up on infant formula, medicine and food. “When you start fighting, do you think how it’s going to end?” asked Mr. Zway, the engineer. “You don’t. There is no chance to go back now, believe me. Believe me.” A little ways away, near the bulldozer that build the embankment, a smiling Abdel- Salam Maatouk sat with friends and drank tea boiled on a small fire. “You live how many times?” he asked. “Once. You die how many times? Once.” His friends nodded, as he offered a smiling soliloquy: “We’ll draw the line at Ajdabiya. And then from there to Surt and then to Tripoli. God willing, I’ll be able to shout chants at Martyrs’ Square in Tripoli, and I’ll be able to do that on a day soon.” Maybe it did not really matter whether he could say it tomorrow. He said it today. And as he did, the tea may have tasted a little sweeter and the campfire felt a little warmer. For a moment, the relentless wind that had settled sand on his eyebrows seemed to subside. Kareem Fahim contributed reporting from Benghazi, Libya, and David D. Kirkpatrick from Tripoli, Libya. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/14/world/africa/14libya.html?ref=opinion

COMMENT http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f7df9046-4da9-11e0- 85e4-00144feab49a.html#ixzz1GZFyln6s Face down Gaddafi Published: March 13 2011 20:59 | Last updated: March 13 2011 20:59 As Muammer Gaddafi’s regime gains the upper hand in its struggle against the uprising in Libya, pressure is mounting in the US and in other western countries for governments to intervene with force. Time is short and they need to act soon—lawfully and in concert. Nato governments will discuss options this week. But the international community is still divided. The European Union has failed to back British and French plans for a UN resolution threatening a no-fly zone. China and Russia are also unwilling. The Arab League, on the other hand, has just backed the idea – an “important step”, as the White House rightly called it. EDITOR’S CHOICE: In depth: Libya uprising - Mar-08 Opinion: Europe must back a no-fly zone - Mar-13 Libyan rebels’ chief in plea for support - Mar-13 Gaddafi pounds cities and drives back opposition - Mar-13 Tripoli starts to feel the bite of sanctions - Mar-13 Soft-spoken rebel heard across Libya - Mar-13 Without stronger support from allies, the US is reluctant to choose military intervention. Its reluctance is understandable. It is still fighting two wars in Islamic countries – efforts not widely applauded in the rest of the world, or at home for that matter, however odious the defeated regimes. A no-fly zone, moreover, is not to be undertaken lightly. The problem is not logistical – Barack Obama’s military chiefs, including Robert Gates, defence secretary, are oppressed by existing demands on US forces and are exaggerating the difficulty. The problem is what happens if Col Gaddafi redoubles his brutality and keeps winning. A no-fly zone obliges governments to understand that, should it fail, they will have to take the next step, or else withdraw in disgrace. Despite the risks, a UN-sanctioned no-fly zone should be imposed: the overriding consideration must be to protect Libyans from Col Gaddafi’s ongoing brutality. In executing this policy, the US should be more forceful in asking other countries to come together and act. However, it should not be asked to shoulder more than its fair share of the political burden, and no more than necessary of the military burden. In both regards, Europe should play at least an equal part. On a narrow calculation of interests, after all, it has more at stake. Acting in concert, and now with the support of the Arab League, the US and the EU would make Russian and Chinese resistance to intervention harder to sustain. It is late in the day, but a UN-sanctioned no-fly zone would restrain Col Gaddafi’s regime and might yet tip the balance in favour of the rebels. It needs to happen without further delay. Meanwhile, discussion of military action must not distract governments from bringing new and more forceful non-military sanctions to bear as well. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f7df9046-4da9-11e0-85e4-00144feab49a.html#axzz1GZFV00wB

March 13, 2011 Iraq Then, Libya Now By ROSS DOUTHAT Five years ago, in the darkest days of insurgent violence and Sunni-Shia strife, it seemed as if the Iraq war would shadow American foreign policy for decades, frightening a generation’s worth of statesmen away from using military force. Where there had once been a “Vietnam syndrome,” now there would be an “Iraq syndrome,” inspiring harrowing flashbacks to Baghdad and Falluja in any American politician contemplating an intervention overseas. But in today’s Washington, no such syndrome is in evidence. Indeed, it’s striking how quickly the bipartisan coalition that backed the Iraq invasion has reassembled itself to urge President Obama to use military force against Libya’s Muammar el-Qaddafi. The Iraq war became known as George W. Bush’s war after Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction didn’t turn up, because at that point no liberal wanted to take responsibility for the conflict. But the initial invasion was supported by Democrats as well as Republicans, liberal internationalists as well as neoconservatives — Hillary Clinton as well as John McCain, The New Republic as well as The Weekly Standard. Now a similar chorus is arguing that the United States should intervene directly in Libya’s civil war: with a no-flight zone, certainly, and perhaps with arms for the Libyan rebels and air strikes against Qaddafi’s military as well. As in 2002 and 2003, the case for intervention is being pushed by a broad cross-section of politicians and opinion- makers, from Bill Clinton to Bill Kristol, Fareed Zakaria to Newt Gingrich, John Kerry to Christopher Hitchens. The justifications for military action, too, echo many of the arguments marshaled for toppling Saddam Hussein. America’s credibility is on the line. The Libyan people deserve our support. Deposing Qaddafi will strike a blow for democracy and human rights. It’s a testament to the resilience of American power that we’re hearing these kind of arguments so soon after the bloodiest years of the Iraq war. It’s also a testament to the achievements of the American military: absent the successes of the 2007 troop surge, we’d probably be too busy extricating ourselves from a war-torn Iraq to even contemplate another military intervention in a Muslim nation. But that resilience and those achievements may have set a trap for us, by encouraging the American leadership class to draw relatively narrow lessons from the Iraq war — lessons that only apply to wars premised on faulty W.M.D. intelligence, or wars led by Donald Rumsfeld. In reality, there are lessons from our years of failure in Iraq that can be applied to an air war over Libya as easily as to a full-scale invasion or counterinsurgency. Indeed, they can be applied to any intervention — however limited its aims, multilateral its means, and competent its commanders.

One is that the United States shouldn’t go to war unless it has a plan not only for the initial military action, but also for the day afterward, and the day after that. Another is that the United States shouldn’t go to war without a detailed understanding of the country we’re entering, and the forces we’re likely to empower. Moreover, even with the best-laid plans, warfare is always a uniquely high-risk enterprise — which means that the burden of proof should generally rest with hawks rather than with doves, and seven reasonable-sounding reasons for intervening may not add up to a single convincing case for war. Advocates of a Libyan intervention don’t seem to have internalized these lessons. They have rallied around a no-flight zone as their Plan A for toppling Qaddafi, but most military analysts seem to think that it will fail to do the job, and there’s no consensus on Plan B. Would we escalate to air strikes? Arm the rebels? Sit back and let Qaddafi claim to have outlasted us? If we did supply the rebels, who exactly would be receiving our money and munitions? Libya’s internal politics are opaque, to put it mildly. But here’s one disquieting data point, courtesy of the Center for a New American Security’s : Eastern Libya, the locus of the rebellion, sent more foreign fighters per capita to join the Iraqi insurgency than any other region in the Arab world. And if the civil war dragged on, what then? Twice in the last two decades, in Iraq and the former Yugoslavia, the United States has helped impose a no-flight zone. In both cases, it was just a stepping-stone to further escalation: bombing campaigns, invasion, occupation and nation-building. None of this means that an intervention is never the wisest course of action. But the strategic logic needs to be compelling, the threat to our national interest obvious, the case for war airtight. With Libya, that case has not yet been made. ROSS DOUTHAT Iraq Then, Libya Now March 13, 2011 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/14/opinion/14douthat.html?hp

EDITORIAL

March 13, 2011 Mr. Maliki’s Power Grab Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki of Iraq is drawing the wrong lessons from the upheavals in the Arab world. Inspired by uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, thousands of Iraqis have taken to the streets to criticize their government’s failure to combat corruption, create more jobs or improve electricity and other services. Nearly 20 Iraqis have been killed in clashes with security forces. Instead of taking responsibility, Mr. Maliki charged that the protests were organized by “terrorists.” He ordered the closing of the offices of two political parties that helped lead the demonstrations. His only concessions were vows not to seek a third term in 2014 and to cut his pay in half. That was not persuasive, especially given his many recent power grabs. It has been one year since national elections and three months since Mr. Maliki and the opposition leader Ayad Allawi finally ended their destructive impasse and formed a government. Yet Mr. Maliki has still not filled all his cabinet positions — most notably, he has not named a defense minister or interior minister. Instead, he is personally overseeing the powerful, and often abusive, army and police forces. That concentration of clout is corrosive, especially to a fragile, new democracy. Mr. Maliki needs to quickly appoint competent professionals to run the two institutions and let them do their jobs in a fair, impartial manner. The reported torture and other abuses by security forces must stop now. Mr. Maliki’s thirst for power doesn’t end there. In January, Iraq’s highest court — which is far too cozy with the prime minister — agreed to let him take control of three formerly independent agencies that run the central bank, conduct elections and investigate corruption. (Last week, the court issued a “clarification,” insisting the agencies would remain independent; we’re eager to see if that proves true.) Six months earlier, the court — at Mr. Maliki’s request — ruled that only the prime minister or his cabinet, not members of Parliament, could propose legislation. Democracy requires checks and balances. They are fast disappearing in Iraq. It’s reassuring to see so many young people willing to criticize their government, without picking up guns. Protests have largely called for more freedom and effective government, not the political system’s overthrow. As American troops prepare to withdraw in July, the United States has to keep pressing Iraqis — including with targeted aid — toward a more democratic system, grounded in the rule of law. It needs to encourage other Iraqi leaders to both challenge and work with Mr. Maliki to build a more responsive government. Despite winning the most votes in the last election, Mr. Allawi — whose deal with Mr. Maliki to head a new national strategic policy council appears to have fallen apart — doesn’t work hard enough or spend enough time in Iraq to be an effective opposition leader. Other politicians and Parliament need to step up and play that role. After all that the Iraqi people, and American soldiers, have sacrificed, Iraq’s democracy must not be allowed to falter because of Mr. Maliki’s ambitions or the passivity of other leaders. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/14/opinion/14mon1.html?hp

Middle East

March 13, 2011 Antigovernment Protesters Seal Off Bahrain’s Financial Center By ETHAN BRONNER CAIRO — Thousands of antigovernment protesters in Bahrain blocked access to the financial district in Manama, the capital, on Sunday, preventing workers from getting to their offices and pushing back police officers who tried to disperse them. It was the most serious challenge to the royal family that rules Bahrain since protests began last month. Witnesses said the police used tear gas and fired on the protesters with rubber bullets. “This was a very, very big day,” Mohammed al-Maskati, president of the Bahrain Youth Society for Human Rights, said by telephone from Pearl Square, the epicenter for protests in central Manama. “Now the protesters control these streets. There are walls of rubble keeping out the police and armed groups. People say they will not sleep tonight.” There were also clashes at the campus of the main university, where protesters contended that the security forces were protecting armed vigilantes accused of fomenting tensions between the 70 percent of the population that is Shiite Muslim and the Sunni ruling family and elite. The latest protests occurred a day after Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates stopped in Bahrain and warned the Khalifa family, which has ruled Bahrain for two centuries, that it must go beyond the “baby steps” of reform to meet the economic and political demands sweeping much of the Arab world. The White House issued a statement on Sunday that said the United States strongly condemned violence that had occurred in Bahrain and Yemen, and added, “We urge the government of Bahrain to pursue a peaceful and meaningful dialogue with the opposition rather than resorting to the use of force.” Bahrain, a kingdom on the Persian Gulf, is home to the United States Navy’s Fifth Fleet and is a crucial American ally. The Obama administration has supported the Khalifa family through the unrest, unlike the policy it adopted in seeking to remove the leaders of Libya and, to a lesser extent, Egypt. But the White House has tried to push Bahrain’s government to meet many of the protesters’ demands, worried that Iran, which is overwhelmingly Shiite, could exploit the unhappiness of Shiites in Bahrain. “I expressed the view that we had no evidence that suggested that Iran started any of these popular revolutions or demonstrations across the region,” Mr. Gates told reporters after his visit on Saturday. “But there is clear evidence that as the process is protracted, particularly in Bahrain, that the Iranians are looking for ways to exploit it and create problems.” He added, “Time is not our friend.”

The demonstrations on Sunday occurred on King Faisal Highway at the entrance to Manama’s financial district. In a statement, the government said the violence began when “a group of protesters attacked unarmed police officers, resulting in one police officer being stabbed and another sustaining a serious head injury.” “Police then sought to disperse approximately 350 protesters by using tear gas in order to clear the road,” the government said. “The Ministry of Interior is currently undergoing operations to reopen the King Faisal Highway.” By Sunday evening, witnesses said, the highway remained essentially closed to traffic and was in the hands of demonstrators. “It is like a ghost town with the highway closed and the financial district closed,” Hussein Muhammad, a bookstore owner and activist, said by telephone. “Thousands of people came all morning, and hundreds were injured.” Two demonstrators suffered serious head injuries, witnesses said. Last month, Obama administration officials said that Bahrain’s king, Hamad bin Isa al- Khalifa, listened when President Obama asked him to pull back his security forces after seven people were killed at the start of the protests. The demonstrators have grown frustrated that they have been allowed to hold on to Pearl Square, a traffic circle, but have not achieved their political goals. That is why, they said, they chose to move on the financial center in a country that prizes its business-friendly policies. And there is growing concern that the pro-democracy movement is deteriorating into a Sunni-Shiite split. “We want a new constitution, fair and free elections and a government elected directly by the people,” Mohammad Mattar, an engineer and member of the Waad pro-reform movement, said by telephone. “These are not sectarian demands, but political ones. We want a constitutional monarchy, a clear relationship between the ruling family and society. But the security forces are trying to create a sectarian divide.” Bahrain’s crown prince, Sheik Salman bin Hamad al-Khalifa, meanwhile, renewed a call for national dialogue on Sunday, promising that the talks would address proposals to increase the power of Parliament, Reuters reported. “We have worked actively to establish contacts to learn the views of various sides,” he said in a statement that was read on Bahrain TV, “which shows our commitment to a comprehensive and inclusive national dialogue." Mr. Gates said on Saturday that he told the king and crown prince that change “could be led or it could be imposed.” He added, “Obviously, leading reform and being responsive is the way we’d like to see this move forward.” http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/14/world/middleeast/14bahrain.html?_r=2&smid =tw-nytimesglobal&seid=auto

Ola de cambio en el mundo árabe - Guerra civil en Libia La Liga Árabe respalda imponer una zona de exclusión aérea sobre Libia La organización considera que Gadafi ha perdido legitimidad por sus crímenes ENRIC GONZÁLEZ - Jerusalén - 13/03/2011 La Liga Árabe respaldó ayer el establecimiento de una zona de exclusión aérea sobre Libia "con el acuerdo de todos los países miembros presentes en la reunión de El Cairo", según declaró el ministro de Exteriores de Omán, Youssef bin Alawi bin Abdullah. La Liga Árabe respaldó ayer el establecimiento de una zona de exclusión aérea sobre Libia "con el acuerdo de todos los países miembros presentes en la reunión de El Cairo", según declaró el ministro de Exteriores de Omán, Youssef bin Alawi bin Abdullah. Antes, sin embargo, había trascendido que dos de los países de la organización, Siria y Argelia, habían votado en contra de la intervención militar internacional para impedir que Muamar el Gadafi usara aviones de guerra contra los rebeldes. Siria y Argelia parecían los únicos aliados firmes del régimen en la región, y según los rebeldes ambos países aportaban aviones y armamento al dictador libio. La jefa de la diplomacia estadounidense, Hillary Clinton, había considerado "imprescindible" que se consiguiera el consenso en Oriente Próximo y el norte de África a favor de la exclusión aérea. La Liga Árabe expresó reparos formales ante acciones militares "extranjeras", aunque se declaró dispuesta a aceptar lo que decidiera en el futuro el Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU. Los dos principales aliados árabes de EE UU, Arabia Saudí y Egipto, se declararon rotundamente favorables. Amr Musa, el secretario general saliente de la organización (tenía previsto dejar en breve el cargo para formalizar su candidatura a la presidencia de Egipto), presionó todo lo que pudo a los delegados para que aportaran su voto a lo que calificó de "acción humanitaria". Musa dijo tras la reunión que el Gobierno libio ha perdido la legitimidad por "los graves crímenes y violaciones" que ha cometido. La Liga Árabe decidió también establecer contactos oficiales con el Consejo Nacional Libio de Transición, que representa políticamente a los rebeldes. Previamente, la organización ya había decidido suspender temporalmente a Libia como país miembro. "Ha llegado el momento de que el Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU asuma la responsabilidad que le corresponde", dijo una fuente diplomática a la agencia Efe, en referencia a la necesidad de una resolución que aportara cobertura legal a la zona de exclusión aérea. La adopción de una resolución explícita en la ONU era otra de las precondiciones establecidas por Clinton y por el secretario general de la OTAN, Anders Fogh Rasmussen. Sin embargo Rusia, que posee poder de veto en el Consejo de Seguridad, sigue considerando que una intervención militar internacional sería "inaceptable", en palabras de su ministro de Asuntos Exteriores, Serguei Lavrov. El delegado permanente de Siria ante la Liga Árabe, Yusef Ahmed, que representó a su Gobierno en la reunión, insistió en el respeto a la soberanía libia. "Cualquier decisión que tome la Liga Árabe debe tener en cuenta el absoluto rechazo árabe a cualquier

97 injerencia militar extranjera en Libia, porque supondría una violación de su soberanía y su independencia", dijo Ahmed en el discurso que dio antes de la votación. Además de Siria y Argelia, otros dos miembros, Sudán y Yemen, expresaron serias dudas sobre la conveniencia de la medida. Los representantes de Arabia Saudí y otros países de la península arábiga coincidieron en señalar que era apropiado impedir que Gadafi utilizara aviones de guerra para sofocar la rebelión, dado que su régimen había "perdido toda legitimidad". Abdelhafiz Ghoga, vicepresidente del Consejo Nacional Libio de Transición, criticó a Siria y Argelia. En declaraciones a Al Yazira, aseguró que los rebeldes libios tenían pruebas de que Argelia había fletado vuelos para llevar mercenarios a Trípoli y que Siria había enviado armas a Gadafi. Mientras la Liga Árabe celebraba su reunión, su sede, en el centro de El Cairo, permanecía rodeada de manifestantes egipcios que gritaban contra Gadafi, pedían acciones militares contra él y enarbolaban la bandera tricolor de los rebeldes libios. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Liga/Arabe/respalda/imponer/zona/exclusi on/aerea/Libia/elpepuint/20110313elpepiint_17/Tes

REPORTAJE: VIAJE A ORIENTE PRÓXIMO Demasiado ocupada para la revolución, de momento La sociedad palestina contempla expectante lo que ocurre en Túnez y en Egipto, pero duda sobre los efectos que las nuevas democracias pueden tener en la zona. Y en Israel JOSÉ MARÍA RIDAO 13/03/2011 Cada vez que un ciudadano del Magreb o de Oriente Próximo utiliza el término Intifada, levantamiento, para referirse a las revueltas que han derrocado a Ben Ali en Túnez y a Mubarak en Egipto, y que podrían acabar con el sátrapa libio Muamar el Gadafi, queda flotando la pregunta de cómo influirá esta marea revolucionaria en la situación de los palestinos. Fueron ellos, en efecto, quienes convirtieron esta palabra árabe en una expresión corriente en cualquier lengua. En dos ocasiones, una en 1987 y otra en 2000, los palestinos protagonizaron un levantamiento general contra la ocupación israelí, que dura desde 1967. Ahora, sin embargo, se cuentan entre los ciudadanos de la región que conjugan una desbordante alegría por el estallido de la revolución democrática en el entorno con una insalvable dificultad para traducirla a sus propias realidades. Al principio de las revueltas hubo tímidas manifestaciones en Cisjordania y Gaza que pedían el fin de la división política de los territorios, y que fueron reprimidas por la Autoridad Palestina y por Hamás alegando imprecisas razones de seguridad. La explicación de esta momentánea parálisis se encuentra, en parte, en el hecho de que la sociedad palestina está exhausta tras más de cuatro décadas de ocupación israelí. Existe, sin embargo, otra razón tal vez más relevante que tiene que ver con el aberrante entramado político construido en Cisjordania y Gaza sobre las ruinas de los Acuerdos de Oslo, un referente imprescindible para esa porción de la comunidad internacional que sigue aferrada a la fantasmal existencia del "proceso de paz" y un frustrante recuerdo para los palestinos de a pie. A tenor de los Acuerdos, se convocaron en los territorios unas elecciones que tenían por objetivo dotar de legitimidad democrática a los representantes palestinos que negociarían con los israelíes el fin de la ocupación. Pero Arafat, por un lado, y los sucesivos primeros ministros de Israel, por otro, coincidieron en el propósito de desbordar la limitada tarea prevista para los electos por la vía de convertirlos en una figura extraña, la del Gobierno y el Parlamento de un Estado que, sin embargo, no existe. Como primer presidente de la Autoridad, Arafat creyó que así plantaba la semilla de una futura independencia que alcanzaría de forma paulatina. Israel, por su parte, entendía que la creación de un Gobierno en los territorios ocupados le permitiría ejercer un control indirecto sobre los palestinos, recreando una situación semejante a la de las autoridades colaboracionistas. "Puesto que Oslo ha fracasado", dice Jamal en Ramala, "los israelíes pueden guardarse donde quieran la Autoridad". En opinión de los palestinos, esta es una prolongación de la ocupación, una criatura que solo ha servido para enriquecer a los dirigentes a cambio de una irritante sumisión a los intereses y exigencias de Israel. No es el caso de Hamás, convertido en Gobierno de facto en Gaza: sus líderes hacen gala de austeridad y se presentan, al tiempo, como la única fuerza que planta cara al ocupante. Su victoria electoral en 2006 debe mucho a esta imagen, en gran medida coincidente con la realidad, lo que no impide que los

99 palestinos de Gaza hayan adquirido conciencia del precio que tienen que pagar, sobre todo desde su separación política de Cisjordania. Hamás ofrece resistencia frente a Israel, sin duda, pero a cambio de sacrificar cualquier atisbo de libertad interna. El inhumano bloqueo de Gaza, en contra de lo que imaginan los estrategas israelíes, ni suma ni resta apoyos a Hamás y su proyecto totalitario. Simplemente hace de Israel un Estado aún más aborrecible para los palestinos, lo mismo que el bloqueo y la devastadora Operación Plomo Fundido, saldada con cerca de 1.400 víctimas, de las cuales 350 eran niños y 200 mujeres. En estas condiciones, levantarse contra el Gobierno de Hamás, o contra la Autoridad Palestina en el caso de Cisjordania, no cambia, a ojos de los palestinos, la razón principal de su infortunio: la ocupación, división y sistemática apropiación de su territorio por parte de Israel. "Es como si dos adversarios negociaran sobre la propiedad de una tarta", dice un funcionario internacional en Jerusalén Este, "mientras uno se la va comiendo". Esta parálisis sobre el terreno podría resultar aparente, puesto que es pronto para saber cómo reaccionarán los palestinos. Lo cierto, en cambio, es que las revueltas están ejerciendo una trascendental influencia sobre el pretexto con el que Israel ha justificado hasta ahora sus acciones. Si Túnez y Egipto, y tal vez otros países, evolucionan en el sentido que han reclamado sus ciudadanos, Israel perderá entonces su condición de única democracia de la región y, con ella, la carta blanca que se ha arrogado para defender "los valores de Occidente" por cualquier medio, tanto militares como otros, más sutiles, relacionados con la aprobación y aplicación de normas dirigidas a proseguir la "construcción nacional" de un Estado solo para judíos. "No hago esto ni como israelí ni como judía", dice Dana Golan, una antigua oficial en Hebrón y directora de Breaking the Silence, la organización que denuncia las acciones del ejército en los territorios ocupados a través de testimonios de los soldados que participan en ellas. "Lo hago como ser humano que no puede consentir que se maltrate a otro". Los testimonios están publicados y dan cuenta de detenciones arbitrarias, de palizas, también de muertes. Pero basta someterse a la experiencia de atravesar a pie un check point, según tienen que hacer a diario los palestinos dentro de su propio territorio, para advertir la arbitrariedad y la prepotencia con la que actúa el Ejército israelí. Es viernes, y no hay demasiada afluencia de palestinos al check point de Kalandia, en la carretera entre Jerusalén y Ramala. Se trata de una construcción metálica que interrumpe el trazado del muro levantado por Israel, compuesta por varios corredores estrechos y enrejados de una treintena de metros que acaban en un torno de la altura de una persona. Son los soldados quienes lo accionan desde una cabina blindada y situada al otro lado, en la que controlan los documentos. Un potentísimo altavoz transmite frases ininteligibles que podrían ser órdenes o informaciones, tal es el grado de distorsión del sonido. Aunque existe un sistema de luces rojas y verdes que indican qué corredor está abierto, quien se dispone a pasar no tiene forma de saberlo antes de adentrarse en uno o en otro. Tres jóvenes palestinos que van juntos parecen haber descubierto el que funciona. Entra el primero, y el soldado cierra el torno a continuación, separándolos y obligando a los dos restantes a reiniciar la búsqueda de un paso abierto. Este se encuentra ahora en el extremo opuesto del check point, hacia donde se dirige la pequeña multitud de palestinos que se ha ido congregando, entre ellos una familia de seis miembros, el padre, la madre con un bebé en los brazos y tres niños de corta edad. En esta ocasión es una soldado la que se encuentra en la cabina blindada, y deja pasar a dos de los tres niños, que se ven de pronto solos y aislados del lado israelí. Ante las insistentes

100 advertencias del padre, la soldado deja pasar a la madre, y al intentar seguirla, el tercer niño queda prisionero en el torno, atrapado entre las dos filas de rejas. Tras largos minutos, el mecanismo vuelve a abrirse, liberando al niño y permitiendo que también pase el padre. El registro de sus documentos, lo mismo que el de sus ropas y pertenencias mediante una inspección visual y a través de rayos X, se realiza a gritos, la soldado sin salir nunca de la cabina. El Gobierno israelí ha decidido cambiar el nombre de check points por el de terminales; también privatizar el casi centenar que separa a unas poblaciones cisjordanas de otras, incluyendo ciudades como Belén, Hebrón o Nablús. En esta última está considerando retirar el control, uno de los de peor reputación entre palestinos y observadores extranjeros. Los largos años de ocupación han dejado un balance invisible, aunque muy presente en la conciencia de los palestinos, junto a las evidencias de humillación, miseria, aislamiento y expropiación que implican la construcción del muro y los asentamientos en contra de la legalidad internacional. "El número de palestinos que el ejército ha apresado en Cisjordania y Gaza se aproxima a los 6.000", dice Sahar Francis, de Addameer, una asociación de Ramala que presta atención jurídica a los detenidos tanto por Israel como por la Autoridad. "Desde 2005, cumplen la condena en cárceles israelíes, al desmantelarse los campos de prisioneros en los territorios ocupados". Esta transferencia, contraria a las Convenciones de Ginebra, se basa en el hecho de que Israel no reconoce estar ocupando un territorio que no le pertenece, de manera que priva a los palestinos del derecho de resistencia y, por esta vía, convierte cualquier acción contra su ejército en terrorismo, desde una manifestación pacífica hasta la colocación de una bomba. "La ley para juzgar a los palestinos de los territorios", añade Sahar Francis, "tampoco es clara". Puede ser la otomana previa al Mandato británico, la jordana posterior a 1949, las ordenanzas de seguridad dictadas por el Ejército israelí o, incluso, las normas aprobadas por la Autoridad. Existe además la figura de la detención administrativa, por la que los palestinos pueden ser encarcelados sin juicio por periodos de seis meses renovables. La arbitrariedad es también la norma de la Autoridad, de la que, además, no es posible obtener cifras de detenidos, aunque podrían rondar los 700. Entre las singularidades del sistema penal empleado por el ocupante se encuentra la posibilidad de encarcelar palestinos que, de acuerdo con la legalidad internacional, deberían ser tratados como menores. Ello se debe a que Israel considera que en los territorios ocupados la edad adulta no se alcanza a los 18 años, sino a los 16. En la actualidad, según Addameer, y debido a esta disposición, son cerca de 300 los menores palestinos que cumplen condena en cárceles ordinarias israelíes. La edad de 16 años tiene influencia, por otra parte, en el régimen de visitas, dos de 45 minutos por mes solo para los familiares en primer grado de los detenidos. Pero si los visitantes son varones entre 16 y 35 años, tienen prohibida la entrada en Israel y no pueden llegar hasta las cárceles. De manera excepcional, se les puede autorizar una visita anual, siempre de 45 minutos. Ninguna de estas disposiciones rige, sin embargo, para los aproximadamente 700 prisioneros procedentes de Gaza. Cualquier contacto con sus familiares resulta imposible desde que el Gobierno de Sharon procedió a la "desconexión" y posterior bloqueo de la Franja. Dejando atrás el check point de Kalandia, se remonta una de las numerosas colinas que rodean Jerusalén. La vista de la ciudad, al fondo, es espléndida. A la derecha circula en pruebas un moderno tranvía que une los extremos más alejados de la ciudad, y del que todavía no se sabe si parará en algún barrio palestino de los que atraviesa. Dirigiendo la mirada hacia la izquierda, en cambio, se advierte el brutal contraste entre los

101 asentamientos construidos por Israel y el campo de Shuf'at, que alberga a palestinos refugiados de 1948. Se encuentra en el interior de una bolsa que traza el muro, cerrada por un check point. A pocos metros de la entrada se encuentra el dispensario médico de la UNRWA que dirige el doctor Yawad Eweida, una sumaria construcción con una docena de salas angostas, aunque limpias y bien mantenidas. "Estudié medicina en Bulgaria y pensé en buscar fortuna en otro lugar", dice el doctor Eweida. "Siendo como soy un refugiado, mi deber era volver aquí". Junto a él, otros dos doctores y nueve enfermeras atienden a los 12.000 refugiados del campo. Shuf'at es un perfecto muestrario de las normas aplicadas a la totalidad de la población palestina en Jerusalén Este, que, además de ocupar, Israel se ha anexionado de forma unilateral con el propósito de convertir la ciudad en su "capital eterna e indivisible". La autoridad municipal solo permite a los palestinos levantar nuevas viviendas en el 13% del territorio del Jerusalén ocupado, precisamente en la parte que ya está construida. Ello, unido al hecho de que los permisos de construcción son excepcionalmente caros y difíciles de obtener para los no israelíes, hace que los palestinos se vean abocados a resolver sus acuciantes problemas de vivienda prescindiendo de los requerimientos administrativos. Para cualquier familia palestina, la decisión de construir una casa sin permiso se basa en el cálculo de probabilidades. La orden de demolición, seguida de una pesada multa, puede llegar en pocos días o en varios años, lo mismo que la ejecución. "La ansiedad que esta incertidumbre produce en los palestinos", dice un funcionario internacional que trabaja en relación con el campo, "se resume en el fenómeno que han observado los maestros de las escuelas: los niños cuya familia ha recibido una orden de demolición se llevan sus juguetes al colegio". En estos momentos están pendientes de ejecución 1.500 órdenes. Sobre otras 4.500 viviendas de palestinos planea un expediente de expropiación a través de un procedimiento diferente y recientemente establecido: si las autoridades israelíes concluyen que la actividad económica de un propietario no se encuentra en Jerusalén -por ejemplo, porque su puesto de trabajo está en Ramala-, le privan de su tarjeta de identidad como residente en la ciudad, la única que permite a los palestinos atravesar el muro, y lo convierten entonces en residente forzoso de Cisjordania. Puesto que a partir de ese momento tiene prohibida la entrada en Jerusalén como el resto de los palestinos de los territorios, pierde la propiedad de sus casas y sus bienes. Es pronto, sin duda, para saber cómo reaccionarán los palestinos a la marea de revueltas árabes en demanda de democracia, seguramente porque la realidad en la que viven no permite identificar con claridad contra quién dirigirlas. Pero si la democracia avanza en la región, el problema no será solamente suyo. También Israel tendrá que enfrentarse a las acciones que ha venido llevando a cabo contra ellos con el pretexto de defender "los valores de Occidente", también la democracia. - http://www.elpais.com/articulo/reportajes/Demasiado/ocupada/revolucion/momento/elp epuint/20110313elpdmgrep_3/Tes

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REPORTAJE: Ola de cambio en el mundo árabe - Guerra civil en Libia Ocho claves para entender la crisis libia La revuelta es una guerra civil en el país magrebí más rico y menos poblado IGNACIO CEMBRERO - Madrid - 13/03/2011 Tras Túnez y Egipto, Libia es el tercer país del norte de África que se alza contra el poder desde enero pasado. Estos son los principales factores que atizan la revuelta popular. - ¿Cuál fue el detonante de la sublevación en Libia? La protesta había sido convocada vía Facebook para el 17 de febrero, pero se adelantó espontáneamente dos días a causa de la detención en Bengasi de Fathi Terbil, el abogado de las familias de los 1.200 reos islamistas que fueron ejecutados por las fuerzas de seguridad en 1996 en la cárcel de Abu Salim, cerca de Trípoli. En los años noventa el Grupo Combatiente Islámico Libio puso en pie una guerrilla contra el régimen de Muamar el Gadafi que fue aplastada, y muchos de sus miembros acabaron en esa cárcel de máxima seguridad. - ¿Por qué se sublevó primero el este del país? Libia es un país compuesto de tres grandes regiones -la ubicada en el este se denomina Cirenaica- que fueron federadas por el colonizador italiano. La tribu de warfalla, la más numerosa de Libia y asentada en Cirenaica, se alió con el coronel Gadafi, pero la región, la más rica en hidrocarburos, se "considera ahora excluida del aparato del Estado y del reparto de la renta petrolera", según el investigador francés Luis Martínez. Es, además, la zona más religiosa del país. Los protagonistas de las protestas son jóvenes profesionales, empezando por los abogados, y también los islamistas. - ¿En qué se parece y se diferencia Libia de Túnez y Egipto? Como sus vecinos, Libia es un país árabe, musulmán suní en un 97%. Está gobernado por la más férrea dictadura del norte de África, pero es también el menos poblado, con 6,7 millones de habitantes; el único que acoge inmigrantes (1,2 millones de trabajadores de otros países árabes y subsaharianos) y el más rico gracias a la exportación de hidrocarburos (1,8 millones de barriles al día antes de que estallase el conflicto). Su renta per cápita fue de 10.490 euros en 2009. La española, de 17.930. - ¿Se trata de una guerra civil? La sublevación se ha convertido en una guerra civil, pero con matices. Es ante todo la guerra de unas fuerzas de élite, compuestas por mercenarios subsaharianos, la Guardia Revolucionaria y unidades especiales al mando de los hijos de Gadafi, y, en el otro bando, civiles convertidos en milicianos y entremezclados con los restos del Ejército convencional, mal equipado, que se unió a los insurgentes. Gadafi tiene también el apoyo de civiles, empezando por los de su propia tribu, los gadafa. - ¿Cuánto tiempo durará? La sublevación se propagó rápidamente, pero fue aplastada en algunas ciudades incluida la capital, Trípoli. Otras ciudades que cayeron en manos de los rebeldes, como Zauiya y Ras Lanuf, han sido retomadas por los leales a Gadafi. El número de muertos supera ya los 6.000. La relación de fuerzas es favorable a Gadafi, porque, entre otras cosas, cuenta con una aviación que bombardea a los rebeldes. No parece, sin embargo, que pueda derrotar la rebelión ni que esta pueda tampoco montar una ofensiva sobre Trípoli. De ahí que el conflicto se alargue a menos que algún miembro del entorno inmediato del líder, un guardaespaldas o un familiar, le liquide. La

103 opción del exilio de Gadafi, a Venezuela o a Zimbabue, parece poco probable porque un cambio de régimen en cualquiera de esos dos países podría provocar su entrega a la Corte Penal Internacional, que reclama al dictador y a algunos de sus colaboradores para juzgarles por crímenes contra la humanidad. - ¿Qué puede hacer la comunidad internacional? La resolución 1970 del Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU, del 26 de febrero, impone ya sanciones al régimen de Gadafi, y la Unión Europea consagró, en su cumbre del viernes, al Consejo Nacional Provisional de Transición (CNPT), instalado en Bengasi, como su interlocutor privilegiado. Pero esas medidas apenas tienen consecuencias sobre el terreno. Si, en cambio, los cielos de Libia fuesen declarados zona de exclusión aérea, la aviación de Gadafi ya no podría atacar a los rebeldes so pena de ser derribada. EE UU, Europa y la Liga Árabe son partidarios de decretar esa zona de exclusión, pero desean que una nueva resolución le dé cobertura jurídica. China y Rusia, miembros permanentes del Consejo de Seguridad y, por tanto, con derecho de veto, no son proclives a adoptar tal resolución. - ¿Qué consecuencias tiene el conflicto libio para Europa y el resto de Occidente? La producción diaria de hidrocarburos de Libia ha caído un 80% y el precio del petróleo ha subido desde que estalló la sublevación. Si el país volviese a la calma, las exportaciones no podrían reanudarse al nivel anterior porque algunos terminales han sido dañados o destruidos. El enfrentamiento conlleva una crisis humanitaria. Al menos 250.000 inmigrantes han huido en tres semanas y es probable que muchos subsaharianos lo hagan cuando acabe el conflicto por temor a represalias por haber defendido a Gadafi. Una parte de ellos intentará emigrar clandestinamente a Europa. - ¿Qué consecuencias tiene para las revoluciones árabes? Las revoluciones tunecina y egipcia tardaron menos de un mes en derrocar a los respectivos jefes del Estado. La revuelta libia dura casi un mes y está estancada. Ese parón supone un mazazo psicológico para muchos árabes que esperaban el cambio en un tercer país norteafricano. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/claves/entender/crisis/libia/elpepuint/2011 0313elpepiint_16/Tes

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Ola de cambio en el mundo árabe Guerra civil en Libia Las fuerzas de Gadafi aceleran para asediar Bengasi Los rebeldes acusan a Siria y Argelia de ayudar militarmente al dictador JUAN MIGUEL MUÑOZ (ENVIADO ESPECIAL) - Bengasi - 13/03/2011 "Palmo a palmo, casa a casa, hogar a hogar, callejón a callejón, individuo a individuo". Muamar el Gadafi aseguró en una de sus recientes arengas que limpiaría Libia de rebeldes, que sofocaría la revuelta. Y en efecto, sus brigadas de soldados y mercenarios aceleraban ayer camino de Bengasi, la ciudad donde nació el alzamiento a mediados de febrero. "Palmo a palmo, casa a casa, hogar a hogar, callejón a callejón, individuo a individuo". Muamar el Gadafi aseguró en una de sus recientes arengas que limpiaría Libia de rebeldes, que sofocaría la revuelta. Y en efecto, sus brigadas de soldados y mercenarios aceleraban ayer camino de Bengasi, la ciudad donde nació el alzamiento a mediados de febrero, aprovechando el dominio del aire y su aplastante superioridad en vehículos blindados y artillería. Caía la noche en esta ciudad, que pasa de la depresión a la euforia en cuestión de minutos, cuando saltó la noticia de que la Liga Árabe respaldaba la zona de exclusión aérea sobre Libia. "Nos vamos a comer a los soldados de Gadafi", decía un enfervorecido joven nada más conocer la decisión. No está nada claro que el chaval vaya a satisfacer su apetito tan rápidamente. Las sanciones financieras y el embargo de armas -si no van acompañadas de la delicada intervención militar extranjera- que han impuesto infinidad de países eran un brindis al sol. Porque el dictador dispone de dinero y armamento para aplastar a los insurgentes. Sobre todo si es cierto lo que denunció ayer Abdelhafiz Ghoga, vicepresidente del Consejo Nacional, el Gobierno de los insurrectos: "Argelia y Siria, sintiéndolo mucho, colaboran con Gadafi en contra de nuestro pueblo. Condenamos la posición siria ante nuestra revolución". Ghoga aseguró disponer de pruebas de que el régimen argelino ha fletado vuelos a Trípoli repletos de mercenarios desde el día 18 del mes pasado. Y de que Damasco abastece de pertrechos militares a Trípoli. "Ayudadnos", suplicaban los bengasíes en una pancarta colgada en la plaza de Mahkama, epicentro del alzamiento. Mientras, el Ejército del dictador avanzaba metro a metro hacia Ajdabiya, la ciudad que abre el camino hacia Bengasi. Solo hay arena entre ambas. Si Ajdabiya cayera, el asedio sobre la capital rebelde se precipitaría. Es un lugar estratégico porque desde esta ciudad -a 160 kilómetros al sur de Bengasi- parte una autopista hacia Tobruk, muy cerca de la frontera con Egipto. Y el control de la linde por parte de las tropas de Gadafi asfixiaría la región oriental de Cirenaica, bastión menguante de los insurgentes. No obstante, nadie tiene la certeza de que la prohibición de volar a los aviones de Gadafi revertirá la situación en el campo de batalla. Las fuerzas armadas del déspota seguirán disfrutando, al menos a corto plazo, de una ventaja decisiva. En su arsenal abundan tanques, vehículos blindados, piezas de artillería pesada, y unas brigadas mucho mejor entrenadas que los anárquicos grupos de hombres que han venido haciendo la guerra sin mandos y sin estrategia, solo sobrados de voluntad para empuñar fusiles y para soportar cientos, si no miles, de bajas.

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Los soldados del tirano, por el contrario, sí parecen contar con una estrategia. Han marchado hacia el este pausadamente mientras combatían y arruinaban ciudades en el oeste. Ya en su poder Zauiya, al oeste de Trípoli, ayer comenzaron el asalto a Misrata, 200 kilómetros al este de la capital. Y al mismo tiempo, bombardeaban con más vigor que en jornadas anteriores las poblaciones que median entre Ras Lanuf -zona de las escaramuzas más violentas- y Bengasi. La reacción del dictador a la decisión de la Liga Árabe es una incógnita. Pero conocido que sus militares han arrasado cementerios donde habían sido enterrados muchos rebeldes, que sus tanques han disparado contra edificios de viviendas y que Gadafi ha jurado morir en Libia, es una temeridad augurar que la situación militar vaya a dar un vuelco. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/fuerzas/Gadafi/aceleran/asediar/Bengasi/el pepuint/20110313elpepiint_19/Tes

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UE / NORTE DE ÁFRICA Dinero por democracia PIERRE BRIANÇON 13/03/2011 Que no hayan sido muy buenos no quiere decir que no puedan mejorar. Los Gobiernos europeos tienen, en el mejor de los casos, un historial desigual en el fomento de la democracia en el vecindario más cercano. Tuvieron éxito en Europa del Este tras el derrumbamiento del comunismo, aunque Bielorrusia sigue siendo el punto negro del continente. Pero han tolerado durante mucho tiempo las dictaduras en todo el Mediterráneo con la dudosa excusa de que la estabilidad, cualquiera que fuese su precio, era mejor que los disturbios, cualquiera que fuese su promesa. Ahora, la agitación en el norte de África da la oportunidad a los miembros de la Unión Europea de desempeñar una función económica importante que podría acelerar el nacimiento de unos regímenes más democráticos en Túnez, en Egipto y quizá finalmente en Libia. Deberían tratar de no desperdiciarla. Ya fracasaron antes. Cuando el disparate económico que se infligió a sí mismo acabó por fin con el sistema soviético, las democracias occidentales crearon el Banco Europeo para la Reconstrucción y el Desarrollo (BERD), que se suponía oficialmente que "fomentaría la transición hacia unas economías orientadas al mercado abierto" en los antiguos países comunistas, con la condición de que "se comprometieran a aplicar los principios de la democracia multipartidista, el pluralismo y la economía de mercado". Esto hace que el BERD sea la única organización financiera internacional cuyos estatutos recogen la construcción de la democracia. Cumplió el cometido de apoyar el nacimiento de un sector privado y de apuntalar las instituciones democráticas en lo que por aquel entonces se llamaba Europa del Este. Pero el banco también se involucró con regímenes de Asia Central donde los miembros del aparato comunista se transformaban de la noche a la mañana en dictadores despiadados. Hizo negocios, y los sigue haciendo, con países como Turkmenistán, Uzbekistán, Kazajistán y Azerbaiyán, donde se encarcela y tortura sistemáticamente a los miembros de la oposición, y donde los potentados y sus familias han malversado gran parte de los recursos. Con el norte de África, la UE debería centrarse en las condiciones políticas en vez de económicas a cambio de la ayuda. Y puede tratar de dar un leve empujón al norte de África para encaminarla hacia los mercados competitivos abiertos. Pero también debe guardarse de tratar de imponer una economía de la oferta con mano dura, ya que los anteriores gobernantes seguían, después de todo, unas políticas que guardan un cierto parecido con el viejo consenso de Washington. La prioridad para proporcionar ayuda debería ser el progreso en materia democrática, al menos si la UE quiere que sus consejos económicos sean políticamente creíbles. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/primer/plano/Dinero/democracia/elpepueconeg/2011031 3elpneglse_8/Tes

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108 injerencia militar extranjera en Libia, porque supondría una violación de su soberanía y su independencia", dijo Ahmed en el discurso que dio antes de la votación. Además de Siria y Argelia, otros dos miembros, Sudán y Yemen, expresaron serias dudas sobre la conveniencia de la medida. Los representantes de Arabia Saudí y otros países de la península arábiga coincidieron en señalar que era apropiado impedir que Gadafi utilizara aviones de guerra para sofocar la rebelión, dado que su régimen había "perdido toda legitimidad". Abdelhafiz Ghoga, vicepresidente del Consejo Nacional Libio de Transición, criticó a Siria y Argelia. En declaraciones a Al Yazira, aseguró que los rebeldes libios tenían pruebas de que Argelia había fletado vuelos para llevar mercenarios a Trípoli y que Siria había enviado armas a Gadafi. Mientras la Liga Árabe celebraba su reunión, su sede, en el centro de El Cairo, permanecía rodeada de manifestantes egipcios que gritaban contra Gadafi, pedían acciones militares contra él y enarbolaban la bandera tricolor de los rebeldes libios. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Liga/Arabe/respalda/imponer/zona/exclusi on/aerea/Libia/elpepuint/20110313elpepiint_17/Tes

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Ola de cambio en el mundo árabe - La posición de España Respaldo europeo a las reformas del rey de Marruecos España y Francia impulsan el apoyo a las medidas de apertura de Mohamed VI MIGUEL GONZÁLEZ (ENVIADO ESPECIAL) - Bruselas - 12/03/2011 El Consejo Europeo dio ayer un espaldarazo a las reformas anunciadas el pasado miércoles por el rey de Marruecos, Mohamed VI, de encargar a un comité consultivo la revisión de la Constitución marroquí para recortar sus poderes en favor de los del primer ministro y de un Parlamento salido de unas elecciones "libres y sinceras". El Consejo Europeo dio ayer un espaldarazo a las reformas anunciadas el pasado miércoles por el rey de Marruecos, Mohamed VI. A propuesta del jefe del Gobierno español, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, y del presidente francés, Nicolas Sarkozy, el comunicado final de la cumbre incluyó un párrafo, no previsto inicialmente, en el que se da una "bienvenida calurosa" a la decisión del monarca alauí de encargar a un comité consultivo la revisión de la Constitución marroquí para recortar sus poderes en favor de los del primer ministro y de un Parlamento salido de unas elecciones "libres y sinceras". La propuesta hispano-francesa fue asumida sin reparos por los demás líderes europeos, agobiados por los riesgos que entraña la guerra que desgarra Libia y deseosos de alentar cualquier reforma que venga desde el propio poder y evite nuevos procesos traumáticos. El valor que tienen las palabras de elogio a Marruecos queda patente en el hecho de que la declaración europea solo menciona a otros dos países en términos positivos, Túnez y Egipto, que se encuentran en plena transición tras haber derrocado a sus respectivos dictadores. A pesar de que el anuncio de Mohamed VI suscita muchas incógnitas, no solo porque faltan por concretar algunos aspectos sustanciales sino también porque no es la primera vez que promete reformas que luego no se ponen en práctica, según reconocen fuentes gubernamentales, España apuesta por creerle. El rey Juan Carlos llamó el jueves por la noche a su homólogo marroquí para felicitarle, según reveló la agencia oficial marroquí MAP y confirmó La Zarzuela. También Zapatero se puso en contacto con el primer ministro marroquí, Abbas el Fassi, según fuentes de La Moncloa, que reconocieron que tenían conocimiento previo de las líneas generales del anuncio real, aunque no de sus detalles. Además de pedirles el apoyo para Marruecos, Zapatero informó a los mandatarios europeos sobre su reciente viaje a Túnez, donde se reunió con representantes de la sociedad civil, e intervino en el debate sobre la crisis libia. Frente a la actitud belicosa de Cameron y Sarkozy, el presidente español se alineó con la posición más cauta de la germana Merkel y dejó claro que, a su juicio, no es posible una intervención militar sin el mandato del Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU. El comunicado de la cumbre no lo dice expresamente, pero advierte de que es necesaria "una base legal clara" para cualquier operación militar; lo que, en opinión de Moncloa, solo puede tener una lectura: hace falta el respaldo de la ONU. Zapatero también se opuso a la pretensión de franceses y británicos de reconocer al Consejo Nacional de Transición como único representante legítimo del pueblo libio. El

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Gobierno español, que ya ha establecido contacto directo con las autoridades rebeldes en Bengasi, se apuntó a la fórmula de consenso de otorgarles la condición de "interlocutor político", una condición que se niega al propio Gadafi, de quien se dice que ha perdido "toda legitimidad". Pero eso no significa que se les atribuya una representatividad que está por demostrar. MIGUEL GONZÁLEZ Respaldo europeo a las reformas del rey de Marruecos12/03/2011 http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Respaldo/europeo/reformas/rey/Marruecos /elpepuint/20110312elpepiint_11/Tes Ola de cambio en el mundo árabe - Guerra civil en Libia Las fuerzas de Gadafi avanzan con paso lento pero firme hacia Bengasi Los rebeldes acusan a Siria y Argelia de proporcionar armas y mercenarios al régimen libio.- Las brigadas gubernamentales bombardean las localidades de Brega y Misrata.- La Liga Árabe pedirá a la ONU que imponga la zona de exclusión aérea JUAN MIGUEL MUÑOZ | Enviado especial a Bengasi 12/03/2011 Las fuerzas militares de Gadafi avanzan poco a poco pero con paso firme hacia la ciudad de Bengasi, el bastión rebelde del este, tras consolidar sus posiciones en el oeste. A pesar de las bolsas de milicianos antigubernamentales que puedan quedar en localidades com Ras Lanuf, las tropas del régimen han comenzado a bombardear Brega y Misrata, de camino hacia el municipio crucial de Ajdabiya, el último antes de Bengasi. A la superioridad militar del ejército libio sobre los insurgentes se podría haber añadido apoyo extranjero. El rebelde Consejo Nacional Libio ha denunciado que Siria y Argelia están apoyando a Gadafi con armas y mercenarios. El Consejo también ha reclamado la necesidad de establecer la zona de exclusión aérea, y ya cuenta con el apoyo de la Liga Árabe. El consejo de ministros de Asuntos Exteriores del organismo ha aprobado hoy solicitar al Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU la imposición de una zona de exclusión aérea sobre Libia para evitar que el régimen de Gadafi utilice la aviación contra los rebeldes. La cadena Al Yazira anunció a última hora de la tarde del sábado la muerte de uno de sus cámaras en una emboscada cerca de Bengasi. Ali Hassan Al Jaber fue asesinado en la localidad de Hawari en un ataque del que todavía se desconocen las circunstancias, pero que demuestra que las fuerzas de Gadafi ya rondan demasiado cerca de la capital de los rebeldes. Las fuerzas leales a Gadafi han lanzado hoy un ataque aéreo sobre la ciudad de Misrata, en un intento de retomar el último reducto rebelde del oeste del país, según han indicado a Reuters varios rebeldes y residentes de la ciudad. "Están intentando irrumpir en Misrata, ahora están a unos 10 kilómetros", ha señalado un rebelde. "Escuchamos ruido de artillería. No nos queda otra salida que luchar", ha añadido. Poco antes, los cazas de Gadafi han bombardeado de nuevo la localidad de Brega, a unos 110 kilómetros al este de Ras Lanuf, donde continúan los combates entre las brigadas gadafistas y los milicianos rebeldes, según una fuente de la oposición.

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"Nuestros hombres siguen en, al menos, parte de Ras Lanuf", dijo a Efe el portavoz rebelde, Mustafa Geriani, que indicó que militares profesionales continuaban participando en la defensa de estas localidades, consideradas la principal línea defensiva rebelde, cuyo bastión, Bengasi, está situado a unos 500 kilómetros al este. Algunos residentes han comenzado a abandonar Brega, que ya ha sido bombardeada esta semana por la aviación leal a Muamar al Gadafi, cuyos carros de combate han impuesto su superioridad con apoyo artillero desde mar y tierra. El jefe del rebelde Consejo Nacional Libio, el ex ministro de Justicia Mustafá Abdel Jalil, ha reclamado hoy a la comunidad internacional que imponga la zona de exclusión aérea, y ha lamentado que si esto no se produce "los civiles van a sufrir" víctimas de la violencia del régimen. "Si no hay zona de exclusión aérea y restricciones a los barcos de Gadafi, los civiles libios van a sufrir", ha declarado, en una entrevista a Reuters en la que también ha confirmado que algunos líderes rebeldes están en contactos "para conseguir algunas armas". La vital zona de exclusión Con todo, los soldados de Gadafi no lo tienen fácil. Pese a su superioridad militar - mejor adiestramiento, muchísimo mejor armamento- les cuesta un esfuerzo enorme mantener el control de las poblaciones que conquistan. Los insurgentes son conscientes de lo obsoleto de sus armas y de que hasta la fecha suplen esa carencia con una determinación que difícilmente será suficiente si no reciben mejores pertrechos. Si la guerra se estanca y si la comunidad internacional no impone la zona de exclusión aérea, Gadafi tiene las de ganar. Para resistir la embestida de los rebeldes y aferrarse al poder, el dictador confía en su superioridad militar, en las alianzas tribales, en los mercenarios, y en las ayudas de países africanos -y algunos árabes- . Pero el tirano no ignora que por mucho agasajo que recibiera en las capitales europeas hasta hace bien poco, ahora ha caído en desgracia ante el resto del mundo. Y solo le queda la brutalidad y las amenazas. "Si Libia pierde el apoyo de los países europeos, se verá obligada a retirarse de la alianza contra el terrorismo y cambiará su política hacia Al Qaeda", advirtió Gadafi a través de la agencia oficial Jana. Posible acercamiento a Al Qaeda Gadafi riza el rizo. Porque de cumplir su palabra, el coronel se aliaría con quienes dice que ahora le combaten: Al Qaeda. En el comunicado, emitido por la mañana, antes de que se iniciara la cumbre de la Unión Europea que abordaría el expediente libio, el coronel precisaba su mensaje a Bruselas: "La alianza contra el terrorismo debe respaldar a las autoridades de Libia en su lucha contra Al Qaeda para que el país siga siendo seguro". Evidentemente, no son los partidarios de Osama Bin Laden -aunque algunos puede haber- quienes marchan en camionetas a la zona donde se ha enfangado el frente de batalla, a 350 kilómetros al suroeste de Bengasi. La lectura de tantos analistas es justo la opuesta: la continuidad en el trono de esta clase de gobernantes es el caldo de cultivo propicio para la expansión del fundamentalismo más radical. El coronel también reiteró que dejará de frenar la inmigración de africanos hacia Europa. No solo arremete la camarilla que manejaba Libia contra el viejo continente. El desquiciamiento de uno de sus principales prebostes, Saif al Islam, hijo de Gadafi, debía ser notorio ayer cuando exclamó enrabietado en Trípoli: "¡Qué se jodan los árabes!". Sus partidarios aplaudían cuando a poca distancia los musulmanes apenas pudieron

112 celebrar el rezo del viernes. Fueron dispersados sin contemplaciones por la policía antes de que se pudiera organizar cualquier conato de protesta. Con todo, y pese a la más que segura pérdida de la ciudad de Zauiya, a unos 50 kilómetros al oeste de Trípoli, los sublevados lograron ayer regresar a Ras Lanuf para intentar expulsar a los soldados enemigos de esta ciudad petrolera en la que fue bombardeada una refinería por la aviación del sátrapa, capaz de cualquier barbaridad, a juicio del Consejo Nacional, el Gobierno de facto de los rebeldes. Ayer uno de las dos fragatas con que cuentan los insurgentes, atracadas en el puerto de Bengasi, zarpó a algunas millas de distancia para impedir un eventual ataque de las naves de Gadafi, que anteayer se sumaron a la guerra. Vigilaban para proteger a la multitud, unas 15.000 personas, que participaba en el rezo en la plaza Mahkama, donde se ubica la sede del Consejo. Los jefes de este organismo -reconocido desde ayer como el representante de Libia por la Unión Europea- celebraron la noticia pero confían mucho menos en otros Estados de la región, a los que llaman "hermanos". Hay que escuchar las palabras de trazo grueso de algún portavoz de los rebeldes libios para constatar que su confianza en buena parte de los líderes árabes tiende a cero. Independientemente de lo que decidan en la reunión de la Liga Árabe que hoy se celebra en El Cairo. "No sean cómplices de Gadafi", se leía ayer en una pancarta en la plaza Mahkama. El régimen, por su parte, reaccionó al reconocimiento del Consejo rebelde por parte de la UE rompiendo las relaciones con Francia, que impulsó la medida. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/fuerzas/Gadafi/avanzan/paso/lento/firme/B engasi/elpepuint/20110312elpepuint_11/Tes La policía de Yemen irrumpe en el campamento de la oposición y causa un muerto La carga policial provoca más de 300 heridos en Saná AGENCIAS | Saná 12/03/2011 La policía ha irrumpido esta mañana en el campamento frente a la Universidad de Saná donde miles de personas demandan desde hace semanas el final de la presidencia de Ali Abadalá Saleh, cuyo mandato se extiende ya 32 años, y han causado un muerto y cientos de heridos, según testigos y fuentes médicas citadas por Reuters. Testigos han relatado que cientos de fuerzas de seguridad, blandiendo bates y cuchillos y lanzando gases lacrimógenos, han invadido la zona donde los manifestantes llevan acampados semanas en el centro de la capital yemení, Saná. Médicos han denunciado que la policía les ha impedido entrar en el área para atender a los heridos más críticos. "Creemos que al menos hay 300 heridos", ha explicado un doctor. Otros testigos han explicado que ha habido disparados pero que la policía más tarde se ha replegado. Antes de la intervención policial, los agentes pidieron que se desalojara el lugar mediante el uso de altavoces, pero los militantes de la oposición desoyeron la orden. La mecha que prendió la revuelta en Yemen es la corrupción en el Gobierno y la alta tasa de desempleo en el país, donde el 40% de la población vive con menos de dos dólares al día. 113

El pasado lunes se produjo un choque parecido cuando los manifestantes intentaron colocar más tiendas de campaña en ese mismo sitio, con un saldo de un muerto y medio centenar de heridos. Epicentro de las revueltas Frente a la Universidad de Saná se desarrollan protestas públicas desde mediados de febrero, surgidas al calor de las rebeliones populares de Túnez y Egipto, primero para exigir reformas políticas y posteriormente para exigir el final del régimen de Saleh. Ayer, en la ciudad portuaria de Adén, en el sur de Yemen, al menos tres personas resultaron heridas en otros choques entre opositores y policías cuando los agentes intentaron impedir que cientos de participantes en la protesta irrumpieran en el estadio deportivo "22 de Mayo". Los manifestantes querían retirar del interior del estadio, ubicado en el barrio de Al Mansur, unas grandes fotografías del presidente yemení. Los disturbios de hoy se producen dos días después de que Saleh anunciara que antes de fin de año promoverá cambios en la Constitución para sentar las bases de una democracia parlamentaria y reafirmar la separación de poderes. La oposición considera que estas promesas son demasiado pocas y se dieron a conocer demasiado tarde. Desde el pasado 27 de enero, Yemen ha sido escenario de protestas esporádicas contra el régimen de Saleh, pero las manifestaciones han ganado intensidad desde mediados de febrero. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/policia/Yemen/irrumpe/campamento/oposi cion/causa/muerto/elpepuint/20110312elpepuint_7/Tes

Ola de cambio en el mundo árabe - Tensión en Oriente Próximo Un imponente despliegue policial impide el Día de la Ira en Riad El activismo chií es por ahora el único desafío al régimen de los Al Saud ÁNGELES ESPINOSA (ENVIADA ESPECIAL) - Riad - 12/03/2011 Arabia Saudí superó ayer sin incidentes significativos el temido Día de la Ira que miles de personas habían respaldado en Facebook. Desde primera hora un imponente despliegue de seguridad desincentivaba cualquier intento de manifestarse en Riad. Arabia Saudí superó ayer sin incidentes significativos el temido Día de la Ira que miles de personas habían respaldado en Facebook. Desde primera hora un imponente despliegue de seguridad desincentivaba cualquier intento de manifestarse en Riad. Lo mismo sucedió en Yeddah, la segunda ciudad del país. Solo hubo protestas de cientos de personas en varias localidades, en la Provincia Oriental, la región petrolera donde se concentra la población chií. El activismo de esa comunidad es, hasta ahora, el principal desafío para el régimen de los Al Saud. En la capital, las autoridades se sintieron lo suficientemente seguras como para llevar a los periodistas a los puntos donde se esperaban manifestaciones. "Queremos que vean por ustedes mismos que no hay nada", declaró el brigadier Naser al Qahtany. Decenas de vehículos policiales y centenares de agentes vigilaban. Acababan de concluir las plegarias de mediodía y la mezquita vecina se había vaciado sin incidentes. 114

"¿Cómo quieren que venga la gente si está todo el barrio infestado de policías de uniforme y de paisano?", espeta de repente un hombre a esta corresponsal y otra informadora. ¿Pero quiere usted manifestarse? "Pues claro, queremos democracia y libertad como el resto del mundo; no somos propiedad de la familia real que está robando la riqueza de este país". Se identifica como Jaled Mohamed Obeid al Yahani, de 40 años y profesor de árabe. "Esta noche dormirá en el hotel del príncipe Naif", asegura tras la perorata un funcionario en referencia al ministro del Interior. Ha sido una voz aislada y desesperada. Mientras, en Bahréin y Yemen crece la tensión. La policía bah-reiní disparó granadas lacrimógenas para dispersar a los manifestantes que intentaban alcanzar el palacio real. En Saná, la capital yemení, volvió a repetirse el pulso de movilizaciones anti y pro Ali Abdalá Saleh, mientras que en Adén dos personas resultaron heridas de bala. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/imponente/despliegue/policial/impide/Dia/ Ira/Riad/elpepuint/20110312elpepiint_17/Tes ENTREVISTA: ALMUERZO CON... FATHI CHAMKI "Los tunecinos estábamos hartos de ser tratados como imbéciles" El activista resalta el papel de Facebook en la caída de Ben Ali FERNANDO NAVARRO 12/03/2011 Cuando habla del histórico proceso de cambio en su país, Fathi Chamki, miembro del Consejo Nacional de Protección de la Revolución de Túnez, afirma: "Hay que verlo con ojos tunecinos. No con ojos europeos. Occidente se preocupa por la estabilidad de la región, el terrorismo o la inmigración, pero lo verdaderamente esencial es tener una democracia real". Cuando habla del histórico proceso de cambio en su país, Fathi Chamki, miembro del Consejo Nacional de Protección de la Revolución de Túnez, afirma: "Hay que verlo con ojos tunecinos. No con ojos europeos. Occidente se preocupa por la estabilidad de la región, el terrorismo o la inmigración, pero lo verdaderamente esencial es tener una democracia real". El eco de estas palabras suena contundente cuando se refiere a toda la región árabe y cuando, tras revisar el menú de arriba abajo, su sonrisa se convierte en un gesto de resignación. "¿Hay algo de comida española?", pregunta. El camarero responde: "Solo alcachofas. Es un restaurante árabe". La mirada de este profesor de la Universidad de Túnez, de 56 años, deja entrever cierto descontento. No parece hacerle gracia comer un plato árabe en su breve estancia en España, traído por la fundación CEPS para dar conferencias en universidades. Finalmente, se decanta por tayin de verdura y se resarce con un Ribera del Duero. El vino libanés que ofrece el camarero, mejor para otra ocasión. Nacido en Kairouan, casado y con dos hijos, Chamki es vicepresidente de la Liga tunecina de los Derechos del Hombre, portavoz de la organización ciudadana ATTAC en su país y uno de los activistas más importantes durante las revueltas que acabaron con el derrocamiento de Ben Ali, el 14 de enero, tras 24 años en el poder. "Fue el

115 momento más intenso de toda mi vida. Cuando huyó, volví a nacer", asegura. "Hasta entonces me sentía un hombre humillado". Durante las protestas, Chamki publicó artículos bajo su firma pidiendo la salida del sátrapa. Reconoce que sintió "mucho miedo" por la represión de la policía política del régimen. También explica el trascendental papel de Internet, sobre todo Facebook, para salvar la censura. "Nos dimos cuenta de que éramos un país con un sentimiento y unido contra un enemigo común", afirma este exprisionero político y sindicalista que tiene como fuente de inspiración a Karl Marx. Y da un claro ejemplo: "Cuando estaba en la clandestinidad en los ochenta, en la Organización Comunista Revolucionaria, tardábamos semanas en editar un periódico y encima llegaba a poca gente". En 1976, leyó un artículo en Le Monde Diplomatique sobre las torturas a los estudiantes encarcelados y desde entonces decidió volcar su vida en la lucha por los derechos de los tunecinos. Mientras el olor de las especias invade la charla, dice que el acto del joven Bouazizi, que se prendió fuego en diciembre, fue "la cerilla para una bala de paja que, antes o después, se tenía que disparar". Y enumera, con cada bocado, las causas de la revolución: paro, bajo poder adquisitivo y dignidad. "Estábamos hartos de ser tratados como imbéciles", sentencia al referirse a Ben Ali, quien acumuló grandes riquezas y resolvió otras revueltas ofreciendo pan barato. Con sus ojos tunecinos, mirando fijamente y dando su último sorbo al vino, concluye: "Túnez es como un enfermo de cáncer que se está recuperando, pero necesitamos una soberanía popular. EE UU y la UE tienen ahora que dialogar con un pueblo soberano". Fernando Navarro Entrevista: Almuerzo Con... Fathi Chamki "Los tunecinos estábamos hartos de ser tratados como imbéciles"12/03/2011 http://www.elpais.com/articulo/ultima/tunecinos/estabamos/hartos/ser/tratados/imbecile s/elpepuint/20110312elpepiult_2/Tes

TRIBUNA: ENRIQUE GIL CALVO La 'cuarta ola' democratizadora ENRIQUE GIL CALVO 11/03/2011 El derrumbe del régimen de Gadafi reafirma la percepción, inaugurada con las caídas previas de las dictaduras tunecina y egipcia, de que estaríamos asistiendo al ascenso de la cuarta ola democratizadora, difundida esta vez por efecto dominó entre los sistemas coloniales surgidos de la disolución del antiguo Imperio Otomano. El concepto de ola democratizadora fue acuñado por el politólogo Samuel Huntington, cuyas posiciones ultraconservadoras no le impidieron ejercer considerable influencia por el efectista impacto de sus metáforas retóricas, de entre las que el famoso choque de civilizaciones es sin duda la más polémica. En cambio, su libro La tercera ola (Paidós, 1994) fue bien recibido, pues en él periodizaba en tres grandes ciclos el proceso histórico de institucionalización de la democracia representativa. Cada ciclo se compone de una ola prodemocrática seguida de otra contraola antidemocrática, y su cronología es la siguiente.

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Primera ola de instauración de las democracias liberales primitivas, entre 1828 y 1926, interrumpida por la primera contraola del fascismo de entreguerras, de 1922 a 1942. Segunda ola de democratizaciones impulsadas por el triunfo de los aliados en la II Guerra Mundial, entre 1943 y 1962, a la que siguió la segunda contraola de revoluciones tercermundistas y contrarrevoluciones golpistas de 1958 a 1975. Y tercera ola democratizadora propagada por las transiciones que se produjeron sucesivamente en el sur de Europa, en América Latina y en el este de Europa entre 1974 y 1989, que se quebró por la tercera contraola iniciada en la plaza de Tiananmen y proseguida por las guerras balcánicas, momento en el que Huntington publica su libro. Pues bien, un tiempo después, cuando los anglosajones optaron por invadir Afganistán e Irak para recuperar su hegemonía imperial, tras el golpe simbólico sufrido con los graves atentados de septiembre de 2001, decidieron legitimar su aventura mediante la retórica justificadora de la exportación de la democracia. Y para ello contaron con el concurso de ideólogos como Huntington, que no dudaron en defender la democratización manu militari de Irak como el inicio de una posible cuarta ola democratizadora, esta vez a extender por el Medio Próximo musulmán. Al fin y al cabo, la segunda ola democratizadora también fue impuesta manu militari a Italia, Alemania y Japón, y a pesar de eso la operación tuvo bastante éxito institucional. Por tanto, ¿por qué no habría de salir bien una operación análoga en Oriente Próximo? No obstante, la invasión de Afganistán e Irak no fue el paseo militar esperado, y su resultado ha sido que las democracias allí impuestas por la fuerza son de momento meras fachadas fallidas, que no consiguen ocultar una realidad hobbesiana-en absoluto democrática. De modo que la idea de una cuarta ola pronto fue abandonada. Pero todo ha cambiado ahora, cuando primero Túnez, después Egipto y ahora Libia están experimentando sendos procesos revolucionarios claramente prodemocráticos, que están significando la caída de sus respectivos regímenes dictatoriales. Por lo tanto, ahora parece que esta vez va en serio, pues por fin está naciendo y cobrando impulso la cuarta ola democratizadora. ¿Cuál es el principal motor del cambio que impulsa la propagación transnacional de una oleada democratizadora? ¿Por qué se difunde con preferencia a ciertos países vecinos más que a otros? Sin despreciar otros factores evidentes, como las transformaciones económicas y sociales, el efecto demostración transmitido por los medios masivos o la exigencia democratizadora del entorno internacional, que tan eficaces fueron para impulsar la tercera ola, Huntington optó por destacar la influencia prioritaria y para él decisiva del factor religioso. Por eso llamó ola católica a la que democratizó a partir de 1975 primero la península Ibérica, después el continente sudamericano y por fin Polonia. Y de ser acertada esta interpretación idealista, deberíamos pensar que ahora es el islam, tras el catolicismo, el que se estaría democratizando. Ahora bien, ¿no le estaremos dando una importancia excesiva a la religión? ¿Seguro que acertó Huntington al hacer del factor religioso el más decisivo de todos? ¿Y si la religión no hace más que manifestar ritualmente la influencia de otros factores, como son las divisorias culturales y geográficas heredadas de la historia? ¿Cómo explicar que esta cuarta ola se propague sobre ciertas áreas musulmanas con preferencia sobre otras que se resisten a dejarse contagiar? ¿Cuáles son los factores epidemiológicos que favorecen la difusión del virus democratizador? Hasta ahora, la rebelión ha prendido con rapidez en una zona muy delimitada (Túnez, Libia, Egipto) cuyas características comunes son las siguientes: religión musulmana suní, cultura árabe dominante, pertenencia al Imperio Otomano durante siglos y 117 experiencia colonial reciente bajo dominio europeo. En cambio, en los países en que la rebelión no ha logrado cobrar el mismo vigor, aunque también sean árabes y musulmanes, faltan sin embargo el tercer y cuarto factor: la dominación otomana y la experiencia colonial europea. ¿No serán, por tanto, estas dos últimas características las que canalicen en mayor medida la propagación de la epidemia democratizadora? Y de entre ambas, ¿no será la influencia otomana la que predomine sobre la europea? De ser esto así, cabría plantear la hipótesis de que, una vez fracasado el modelo iraní, el éxito actual del modelo turco es el más determinante para explicar el contagio de esta cuarta ola, que por tanto no sería tanto una ola islámica o una ola árabe como una ola otomana. Con ello me refiero al área cultural delimitada por las posesiones históricas del Imperio Otomano, con capital en Estambul desde 1453 hasta 1923. Un espacio geográfico institucional que por el este alcanzó el actual Irak sin penetrar en Irán, mientras por el oeste magrebí solo llegó hasta Túnez, sin dominar Argelia ni menos Marruecos. Y de ser cierta esta interpretación, Siria, Líbano, Jordania, Palestina, Yemen, Omán e incluso Arabia Saudí serían más susceptibles de contagio, pero no tanto el resto del área arábigo-musulmana. De todas formas, lo que sí explica bien esta hipótesis de continuidad histórica del factor otomano es la creciente influencia política que el actual régimen turco (una democracia de tercera ola hoy plenamente homologable y consolidada, con liderazgo del islamismo moderado) ejerce sobre todos los países dominados en el pasado por la hegemonía cultural y política de Estambul. En cualquier caso, si es que llega a florecer y consolidarse, habrá que felicitarse de que por fin se produzca esta cuarta ola de democratización, ya sea islámica, panárabe u otomana. Con ello ascenderá otro peldaño la democratización de la democratización: un lujo hasta 1945 solo al alcance de la élite WASP del planeta, del que las demás poblaciones occidentales (las clases medias del globo terráqueo) no empezamos a disfrutar más que hace un tercio de siglo con la tercera ola. Ya es hora, pues, de que el resto de poblaciones, las clases bajas de la globalización, comiencen a participar también de la democracia, para culminar por fin el ideal de la igualdad política a escala global: hoy se incorporan las masas egipcias, y esperemos que también puedan hacerlo pronto las chinas. Pero esta democratización global también nos deja un punto de melancolía, pues cuando ahora los recién llegados se entusiasman con la celebración de su libertad, nosotros, los occidentales, cada vez más defraudados, nos lamentamos por la ínfima calidad de nuestras democracias defectivas. Por eso, en contraste, ¡qué envidiable nos parece su efervescencia cívica pendiente de estrenar! http://www.elpais.com/articulo/opinion/cuarta/ola/democratizadora/elpepiopi/20110311 elpepiopi_4/Tes

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EUROPA Y EL MUNDO

LIBIA Sarkozy empuja a la UE hacia la guerra 11 marzo 2011

Mientras los jefes de Estado y de Gobierno de la UE se reúnen en Bruselas para celebrar una cumbre extraordinaria sobre la crisis en Libia, “Sarkozy y Cameron piden a la UE que reconozca a la cúpula rebelde”, anuncia El País. El pasado 10 de marzo, el presidente francés y el primer ministro británico remitieron una carta conjunta al presidente del Consejo Europeo, Herman Van Rompuy, en la que expresan su apoyo a los esfuerzos del Consejo Nacional Provisional de Transición (CNT), con sede en Bengasi, para “preparar un Gobierno representativo y responsable”. El presidente francés incluso ha ido más lejos, y ha reconocido al CNT como “legítimo representante del pueblo libio” y ha recomendado ataques aéreos en Libia. “Francia, totalmente ausente del plano diplomático desde el inicio de las revoluciones árabes, pretende ser ahora el país que obligue tanto a Europa como a la comunidad internacional a asumir sus responsabilidades morales y humanitarias en Libia”, comenta Libération, que recoge en portada que Sarkozy “saca pecho”. Sus opiniones han dejado pasmados a “nuestros socios europeos, que habrían preferido adoptar una postura común sobre una crisis que exige soluciones colectivas tanto en los planos militar, jurídico y diplomático”, señala el diario francés. “Pero Nicolas Sarkozy quiere ser a toda costa el primero en desenvainar para, por fin, ponerse de nuevo el disfraz de presidente voluntarista que arregla los problemas del mundo”. De hecho, constata El País, “a la UE le aterra la posibilidad de verse implicada de lleno en el conflicto”. Y aún peor, lamenta Le Soir, el reconocimiento del CNT por parte de Francia se realizó “sin la mínima consulta europea” y mientras que “los países de la Unión habían previsto todo un dispositivo para debatir la situación libia”. Resultado: “un daño colateral y no menor: a la Europa política ya le ha pasado factura la guerra de Libia. Sin duda, su pronóstico vital no se ha visto comprometido, pero la credibilidad de la Unión Europea como actor de la escena mundial ha mermado considerablemente”. http://www.presseurop.eu/es/content/news-brief/543991-sarkozy-empuja-la-ue-hacia-la-guerra

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03/11/2011 06:20 PM Military Option Open EU Demands Gadhafi Step Down At a special meeting on Libya in Brussels on Friday, EU leaders demanded that Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi step down. They kept open the possibility of military action against the dictator's regime, but insisted such a move would require the support of the Arab League and United Nations. European Union leaders on Friday demanded that Moammar Gadhafi step down and kept all options, including military intervention, open in dealing with the Libyan leader. Belgian Prime Minister Yves Leterme said at a press conference following a special EU meeting on Libya that military action would need the support of the Arab League and the UN Security Council. Officials also called for a special summit on the issue with the Arab League and the African Union. No concrete dates for such a meeting were established, but the president of the European Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso, said the meeting should take place "very soon." The 27 European leaders held a special meeting Friday to discuss the conflict in Libya. It was a rare move for the European Union to demand that a head of state step down, and the issue was heavily debated in Brussels. Italy, in particular, sees Libya as an important trading partner and had defended the Libyan regime for a long time. German Chancellor Angela Merkel made her own appeal before the meeting for the Libyan leader to step down. "It should be made very clear that someone who wages a war against his own people cannot be a dialogue partner for the EU," she said in Brussels. 'Crazy Move' EU delegates threw political support behind the Libyan opposition Friday, but did not give them diplomatic recognition, a controversial move made the day before by French President Nicolas Sarkozy. Sarkozy told a press conference in Brussels that EU leaders had agreed to back the creation of humanitarian aid zones, including in Libya. Other EU nations, among them Germany, argued that only states should get diplomatic recognition. The Associated Press reported that Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte said: "I find it a crazy move by France. To jump ahead and say 'I will recognize a transitional government,' in the face of any diplomatic practice, is not the solution for Libya.'" German government officials took the position Friday that they wanted to see what the Arab League decides to do before they officially recognize the rebels trying to overthrow Libya's leader. Germany's new defense minister, Thomas de Maizière, said in Brussels that "the situation right now in Libya does not justify a military intervention by NATO." German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle also urged caution Friday in relation to the discussion about a possible no-fly zone over Libya. "If it doesn't work, do we go further, with land forces?" he said, according to Reuters.

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URL: • http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,750432,00.html RELATED SPIEGEL ONLINE LINKS: • The World from Berlin: Sarkozy's Libya Move 'Shows Testosterone Level, Not Logic' (03/11/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,750344,00.html • Endgame for Europe's Currency Reform: Is Euro Summit First Step Toward Economic Government? (03/11/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,750298,00.html • Blocking the Dictator's Billions: Germany Freezes Gadhafi's Accounts (03/10/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,750109,00.html • Zero Hour in the Middle East: What the Arab World's Past Can Tell Us About Its Future (03/08/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,749537,00.html

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AMERICA2 IN A NEW WORLD ¿Obama de Arabia? Christopher Hill

2011-03-11

DENVER -- Desde 1989 no había visto el mundo semejante vendaval tan arrasador en pro de la libertad y la democracia, cuyas ardientes pasiones están barriendo una región vasta y antigua y con una necesidad urgentísima de reforma. Desde el Magreb hasta la península Arábiga, pasando por el Levante, la historia árabe está en movimiento. Una nueva generación de dirigentes parece a punto de tomar el poder. Momentos así son particularmente difíciles para las autoridades extranjeras, que no deben quitar ojo del mundo tal como es, pero tampoco de como podría ser en el futuro. Al intentar hacer eso precisamente, el Presidente de los Estados Unidos, Barack Obama, ha sido objeto de arengas sobre la necesidad de “colocarse en el bando correcto de la Historia” o, por citar a Bob Dylan, “apartarse del nuevo [camino], si no se puede echar una mano”. Estos tiempos son, en efecto, delicados y cambiantes para los Estados Unidos, en particular en un momento en el que los americanos esperan que su Presidente sea el encargado por antonomasia de expresar sus emociones. Del modo como Obama administre las peticiones de la izquierda y de la derecha para que actúe podría muy bien depender el clima en el que el proceso, que es propiedad de los árabes y está gestionado por ellos, se desarrolle al final. Mientras avanza por entre una crisis tras otra en el mundo árabe, el gobierno de Obama haría bien en seguir algunas orientaciones que no cambian con cada ciclo de noticias. En primer lugar, una cosa es permanecer en el bando correcto de la Historia y otra muy distinta es la de que los EE.UU. estén inspirando, si no dirigiendo, las rebeliones árabes. A veces resulta difícil eludir esa impresión: en gran parte de la región, se ven los medios

122 de comunicación de los EE.UU. como un brazo de unos Estados Unidos supuestamente omnipotentes. Por eso, cuando las crónicas de los corresponsales de los EE.UU. rayan en la animación (cosa que ocurre con bastante frecuencia), se da rienda suelta a la impresión de que este país está dirigiendo los acontecimientos. Así, pues, constituye una prueba de prudencia que Obama no esté dirigiendo el tráfico en la crise du jour. Hay momentos en los que es mejor que un Presidente de los EE.UU. permanezca al margen, aunque pueda parecer ausente y no comprometido. Éste es uno de esos momentos. En segundo lugar, los americanos se enorgullecen con frecuencia de adoptar una actitud transaccional para con el mundo, pero lo que está sucediendo en el mundo árabe no es una serie de transacciones; es un cambio cultural tectónico de actitudes generacionales, relaciones entre los sexos y tensiones urbano-rurales. La de la democracia frente a la dictadura es, desde luego, una de las líneas de falla, pero también lo es, como sabemos por lo que ocurre en Baréin y Arabia Saudí, la divisoria entre chiíes y suníes, que se ha prolongado durante 1.300 años. Las políticas concebidas para una no son necesariamente las apropiadas para la otra. Es esencial un análisis minucioso de lo que está ocurriendo en el terreno, pero puede resultar difícil en una cámara de resonancia de iconos culturales mundializados. Mientras que a muchos americanos les gustaría creer que se han trazado las líneas divisorias entre quienes están en Tweeter y quienes no, quienes están en Facebook y quienes no, es más probable que otras identidades expliquen lo que esta sucediendo. Naturalmente, a nadie le gusta referirse al “tribalismo” o a un conflicto entre “clanes”, pero esos elementos de identidad desempeñan con frecuencia un papel decisivo en la disposición de la gente a salir a la calle. En realidad, el aura de incorrección política que rodea esos términos refleja la falta de un principio organizativo similar en las sociedades contemporáneas mundializadas, pero ésa no es una razón para excluir semejantes categorías de análisis en los casos en que sean aplicables. En tercer lugar, existe al menos una motivación en las rebeliones árabes que es omnipresente también en la política occidental: el deseo de olvidar los hechos, los riesgos y el futuro y simplemente expulsar a los bribones. Vemos reflejado ese sentimiento en el lema que ha llegado a ser omnipresente en la región: “El pueblo quiere derribar el régimen”. En efecto, algunos de esos bribones están, por decirlo suavemente, totalmente caducos. En algunos casos, sus compinches y ellos han robado gran parte de la riqueza nacional. ¿Quién puede decir que deba tenerse menos en cuenta esa motivación que la de quienes luchan por la democracia? Hay mucho que respetar en la actitud de “expulsar a los bribones”. Lamentablemente, no siempre propicia una mayor democracia. Por último, el gobierno de Obama debe tener presente que en algunos países el orden antiguo será substituido rápidamente. Sin embargo, con el tiempo los cambios podrían equivaler a menos de lo esperado y podría crear, en realidad, una situación peor que el status quo ante (pensemos en las revoluciones francesa, bolchevique e iraní). Naturalmente, en otros países el resultado podría ser mucho más prometedor (la Revolución americana, la Europa oriental en 1989). Algunos procesos históricos, por rápidamente que se desencadenen acabarán fallando. Un dictador que no ha demostrado preocupación por su pueblo puede dar muestras de mucho talento, en realidad, para aferrarse al poder. En esas circunstancias, habrá

123 inevitablemente peticiones a Occidente –es decir, a los EE.UU. – para que derribe al tirano militarmente. A la hora de abordar esas decisiones, los encargados de la adopción de decisiones deben respirar profundamente y preguntarse en primer lugar cómo se impuso el tirano. Cuando las fuerzas encabezadas por los EE.UU. derrocaron a Sadam Husein en 2003, hubo demasiado pocos intentos de entender cómo pudo un tirano campesino tomar el poder y conservarlo durante tanto tiempo. ¿Cómo es que manipuló las relaciones entre suníes y chiíes o gestionó las complejidades del sistema tribal del Iraq tan bien? Naturalmente, el terror fue la base de la actitud de Sadam, pero también lo fue una comprensión de la política interior y de los procesos sociales. Los EE.UU., que ya se encuentran en el noveno año de una intervención que les ha costado más de un billón de dólares y la pérdida de miles de vidas americanas e iraquíes, habrían hecho bien en entender esos procesos con igual minuciosidad. No cabe duda de que los EE.UU. deben aplicar esas enseñanzas al reaccionar ante el surgimiento de un nuevo –pero no necesariamente recién democratizado– mundo árabe. Christopher R. Hill, ex Secretario de Estado Adjunto de los Estados Unidos para el Asia Oriental, fue embajador de los EE.UU. en el Iraq, Corea del Sur, Macedonia y Polonia, enviado especial de los EE.UU. para Kosovo, negociador de los acuerdos de paz de Dayton y jefe de la delegación de los EE.UU. para las negociaciones con Corea del Norte en el período 2005-2009. Ahora es decano de la Escuela Korbel de Estudios Internacionales de la Universidad de Denver. http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/hill3/Spanish

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2011-03-11 A No-Fly Zone for Libya

WASHINGTON, DC – Leaders around the world are vigorously debating the advisability of establishing a no-fly zone to stop the violence unfolding in Libya. Some cite Bosnia, where NATO took too long to protect civilian populations in the mid- 1990’s, as a reason to act. Others remember Rwanda, where President Bill Clinton later expressed regret for not acting to save innocent lives. But the stakes in Libya today are more appropriately underscored by the tragedy in southern Iraq in the waning days of the Persian Gulf War 20 years ago. As coalition forces were routing the Iraqi army in February 1991, President George H.W. Bush encouraged the Iraqi people to “take matters into their hands to force Saddam Hussein the dictator to step aside.” When Iraqi Shiites, Kurds, and Marsh Arabs rebelled against Hussein, they believed that American forces would protect them against their brutal dictator’s superior firepower. Instead, when Iraqi attack helicopters and elite troops began butchering their own people, coalition forces were ordered to stand down. The world watched as thousands of Iraqis were slaughtered. The situation in Libya today is not identical. Inspired by events in Tunisia and Egypt, the Libyan people rose up spontaneously against four decades of repression by Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi. Still, the specter that haunts me is the same – ordinary people facing off against an autocrat’s airpower and well-armed soldiers, counting on the free world to protect them against massacre after we have applauded and bolstered their bravery with our words. So far, Qaddafi’s forces have relied on airpower selectively. But Qaddafi is shrewd. My fear is that he is either choosing to bleed the opposition to death, rather than invite global action with a broad massacre, or waiting for the world to prove itself unwilling to act – at which point he might well begin killing civilians in large numbers. We cannot wait for that to happen. We need to take concrete steps now so that we are prepared to implement a no-fly zone immediately if Qaddafi starts using his airpower to 125 kill large numbers of civilians. Diplomacy is urgently needed to build broad support for a no-fly zone. The most important imprimatur should come from the United Nations, where debate should begin immediately over a resolution authorizing a no-fly zone. China and Russia have expressed reservations. If the Security Council fails to authorize action, those of us determined to protect Libyan civilians will face a more difficult choice should the violence escalate. So our diplomatic efforts must extend beyond the UN. The support of NATO and the African Union are important. To avoid the perception of NATO or the US attacking another Muslim country, the backing of the Arab world is also needed. On that front, there are promising signs. The six Arab countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council have called for a UN-imposed no-fly zone. The Arab League has endorsed a similar proposal. Muslim countries in particular should support preparations for intervention if the violence spirals out of control. Qaddafi cannot be allowed to think that he can massacre his people with impunity. And he cannot be free to make those attacks more lethal by using his airpower. If the UN cannot approve a resolution for implementing a no-fly zone, then the US and its allies in NATO and the Arab world must be prepared to prevent a massacre like the one that occurred in Srebrenica in 1995, when more than 8,000 Bosnian men and boys were slaughtered. Of course, imposing a no-fly zone would not be a panacea. It probably would not tip the balance if the situation in Libya deteriorates into a full-scale civil war. But a no-fly zone would eliminate airstrikes and save civilian lives. It is a tool that we should be ready to use if the situation warrants it, and it would signal to the opposition that it is not alone. Before that decision is reached, the international community needs to provide humanitarian assistance and medical supplies to the rebels in eastern Libya. We must not allow them to be starved into submission. The one option that should not be on the table is US ground troops; no one wants to see US forces bogged down in another war, especially in another Muslim country. And, as President Barack Obama has said, the Libyan people must not be deprived of full ownership of their struggle for freedom, and Qaddafi must not be given a useful foil and scapegoat. Perhaps the mere threat of a no-fly zone will keep Qaddafi’s pilots from using their helicopters and fighter jets to kill their own people. If it does not, we should make clear that we will lead the free world to avoid the senseless slaughter of any more Libyan citizens by a madman bent on maintaining power. The US and the world community should also make clear – as we did in Bosnia and Kosovo – that we are taking a united stand against a thug who is killing Muslims. John Kerry, a US Senator from Massachusetts, is Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/kerry1/English

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TRIBUNA: SAMI NAÏR

SAMI NAÏR El gran retorno de Egipto10/03/2011 SAMI NAÏR 10/03/2011 Este país volverá a ser una potencia si se convierte en ejemplo democrático para todo el mundo árabe Lo mejor contra la inseguridad es la democracia, no la dictadura Si Egipto se convierte en una democracia -y nada está decidido de momento-, su ejemplo se propagará como un reguero de pólvora por el mundo árabe. Aunque la situación no cambie inmediatamente en estos países, el modelo egipcio tendrá el efecto de una pesadilla sobre los dirigentes de los Estados feudales, monárquicos y dictatoriales. Los intelectuales, los responsables políticos y los actores de la sociedad civil son conscientes de esta nueva situación. Hoy, todos los observadores relevantes en El Cairo aseguran, gracias a la libertad de expresión y al debate de ideas, que una nueva etapa histórica ha nacido en la región, y que el papel de Egipto será determinante. Fue la pequeña e inesperada Túnez la que despertó a Egipto, pero es Egipto quien ha pasado el testigo tunecino a los libios. La carrera no se detendrá aquí. Las élites egipcias son plenamente conscientes del debilitamiento que se produjo en el mundo árabe después de la marginación de su país, ocurrida por la ruptura de la unidad del frente árabe tras la paz separada con Israel en los años setenta. Egipto fue excluido de la Liga Árabe por haber roto este frente, pero Sadat trató de disimular esta marginación recurriendo a un nacionalismo egipcio lleno de resentimiento hacia el mundo árabe. Mubarak acentuó aún más ese resentimiento, e hizo del islamismo el principal peligro interno, justificando así el estado de excepción e instaurando una dictadura policial ciegamente sostenida por Occidente. La actitud de Egipto durante los últimos 20 años, tanto en relación con la cuestión palestino-israelí como en relación con las dos guerras americanas contra Irak, acabó de reducir a cero la influencia egipcia en la región. El país, sometido por EE UU, reducido por los israelíes al papel de cartero en las relaciones con sus vecinos, reforzado por los europeos a la condición de auxiliar de su incapacidad política en Oriente Próximo, tocó el fondo de la impotencia y de la mendicidad financiera en los años noventa y 2000. En el resto del mundo árabe afloraba con frecuencia una suerte de menosprecio hacia Egipto. ¿No veíamos a los egipcios canjear descaradamente su "apoyo" a las potencias occidentales y a Arabia Saudí, a cambio de dinero contante y sonante? ¿No escondía una traición terrible el hecho de que el ejército egipcio recibiera, para pagar sus salarios y su tren de vida, más de 1,3 mil millones de dólares al año de EE UU, sabiendo que no podía obtenerse ningún puesto de alto mando de este Ejército si se manifestaba alguna veleidad de independencia respecto a EE UU? Esta situación dramática favorecía principalmente al clan mafioso de los Mubarak y sus clientes dentro del país. Las élites políticas democráticas, como por otra parte las religiosase incluso las militares, se sentían profundamente humilladas. En realidad, la separación del resto del mundo árabe nunca fue digerida. Egipto no podía contar de verdad a no ser que fuera la voz de los árabes. Todo esto vuelve hoy en los debates; el balance de este periodo siniestro se hace día tras día porque el retorno de Egipto al corazón del mundo árabe es inevitable, tanto más

127 necesario cuanto que se produce en el curso de una extraordinaria revolución democrática. Los debates en curso en la sociedad civil egipcia ponen así de manifiesto varias lecciones. Existe, en primer lugar, la convicción de que los pretextos utilizados por los dirigentes para mantenerse en el poder -el miedo al integrismo islámico y accesoriamente el conflicto con Israel- y los utilizados por sus aliados occidentales para apoyarles y seguir vendiéndoles armas, no han servido más que para reforzar esas dictaduras y aumentar la miseria y las desigualdades en el país. En ese despertar nacional, la cuestión interior condiciona la exterior. La mejor arma contra la inseguridad es la democracia, no la dictadura. Y Egipto solo volverá a convertirse en una potencia de peso si es capaz de servir de ejemplo democrático al resto del mundo árabe. Luego está el hecho de que la revolución egipcia no es el resultado de una mera movilización política, sino la expresión de una reacción telúrica de la conciencia, esta vez árabe, ante el acontecimiento simbólico provocado por el joven tunecino Mohamed Buazzizi, que ha hecho vibrar a las masas egipcias más que la opresión impuesta a los iraquíes o a los palestinos. ¿No prefirió inmolarse antes que seguir sufriendo la humillación que todos los ciudadanos árabes sufren bajo la dictadura de dirigentes árabes? Esto es lo que inflamó la calle egipcia y eso significa, antes que nada, que hay todavía un sentimiento de solidaridad panárabe que ni el nacionalismo mezquino de los dirigentes ni el islamismo obtuso y totalitario de los integristas han logrado sofocar esos últimos 30 años. Pero a pesar de que en ciertas manifestaciones se vieran retratos de Nasser, ese espíritu no implica un retorno al viejo nacionalismo árabe, porque lo que emergió con la revolución de la plaza Tahrir es una nueva generación de egipcios más decidida, menos ideologizada y más realista que las del pasado. Una generación más concernida por la extensión universal de las libertades democráticas que por la exportación de un modelo revolucionario. El mundo árabe debe recomponerse a través de este sistema de valores. Y no es casualidad que en todas partes -en Túnez, en Yemen, en Argelia, en Marruecos, en Jordania, en Palestina, en la península Arábiga- sea la misma generación la que ha cogido por sorpresa a las viejas oposiciones, notablemente debilitadas por los regímenes dictatoriales. Esta revolución árabe que muchos egipcios desean ansiosamente debe surgir de las profundidades de las mismas sociedades afectadas, y no ser exportada, como en los años cincuenta del siglo pasado, en la época del nasserismo. Si estos últimos 30 años han sido testigo de la conversión de Egipto en una sucursal de la estrategia elaborada por Washington, Riad y Tel Aviv, hemos visto al contrario a Irán erigirse en ejemplo regional y, más recientemente, a Turquía, especialmente sobre el conflicto israelo-palestino. Otra prueba de que cuando Egipto está ausente, ninguna otra nación es capaz de darle al mundo árabe una voz significativa. Pero lo que aquí también llama la atención es el realismo con que se percibe esta cuestión en los debates: la dictadura, de Sadat a Mubarak, tuvo al menos el mérito de situar el conflicto israelo- palestino en el terreno de la paz y no de la guerra. Ninguna voz importante se alza hoy para cuestionar esta paz con el Estado hebreo. Es un logro. En cambio, lo novedoso es la idea de que Egipto debe reencontrar sus márgenes de maniobra diplomáticos y mostrarse más firme en la resolución pacífica de este conflicto. Y, en este punto, la actitud de Israel será decisiva. Si prevalece el realismo en Tel Aviv, la paz tendrá posibilidades, si no, muchos temen no poder controlar la reacción de la opinión pública egipcia.

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Por último, se planteará también la cuestión de un eje de las democracias árabes. Egipto volverá a encontrarse, bajo unas nuevas condiciones, con el viejo conflicto por el liderazgo que, en la época de Nasser, le opuso a su principal competidor en la escena árabe: Arabia Saudí. Y esta es la gran incógnita. La respuesta dependerá de la evolución interna de las relaciones de fuerza entre el Ejército y los partidos políticos que están naciendo y que van a dirigir el país. Pero, pase lo que pase, nada más será como antes, cuando Egipto vegetaba a la sombra de una dictadura corrompida.

Sami Naïr es profesor invitado de la Universidad Pablo de Olavide de Sevilla. Traducción de M. Sampons.

SAMI NAÏR El gran retorno de Egipto10/03/2011 http://www.elpais.com/articulo/opinion/gran/retorno/Egipto/elpepiopi/20110310elpepio pi_4/Tes

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March 10, 2011 Obama Seeks a Course of Pragmatism in the Middle East By MARK LANDLER and HELENE COOPER WASHINGTON — In the Middle East crisis, as on other issues, there are two Barack Obamas: the transformative historical figure and the pragmatic American president. Three months after a Tunisian fruit vendor set himself aflame and ignited a political firestorm across the Arab world, the president is trumping the trailblazer. With the spread of antigovernment protests from North Africa to the strategic, oil-rich Persian Gulf, President Obama has adopted a policy of restraint. He has concluded that his administration must shape its response country by country, aides say, recognizing a stark reality that American national security interests weigh as heavily as idealistic impulses. That explains why Mr. Obama has dialed down the vocal support he gave demonstrators in Cairo to a more modulated call for peaceful protest and respect for universal rights elsewhere. This emphasis on pragmatism over idealism has left Mr. Obama vulnerable to criticism that he is losing the battle for the hearts and minds of the Arab street protesters. Some say he is failing to bind the United States to the historic change under way in the Middle East the way that Ronald Reagan forever cemented himself in history books to the end of the cold war with his famous call to tear down the Berlin Wall. “It’s tempting, and it would be easy, to go out day after day with cathartic statements that make us feel good,” said Benjamin J. Rhodes, the deputy national security adviser, who wrote Mr. Obama’s soaring speech in Cairo to the Islamic world in 2009. “But ultimately, what’s most important is achieving outcomes that are consistent with our values, because if we don’t, those statements will be long forgotten.” On Thursday, Mr. Obama’s national security adviser, Thomas E. Donilon, deflected calls for more aggressive action in Libya, telling reporters what American officials have been saying privately for days: despite pleas from Libyan rebels for military assistance, the United States will not, at least for now, put its pilots in harm’s way by enforcing a no-flight zone over the country. Not only is intervention risky, officials said, but they also fear that in some cases, it could be counterproductive, provoking a backlash against the United States for meddling in what is a homegrown political movement. A senior administration official acknowledged the irony of Mr. Obama’s dilemma; he is, after all, the first black president, whose election was hailed on the Arab street, where many protesters identify their own struggles with the civil rights movement. “There is a desire for Obama — not the American president, but Obama — to speak to their aspirations,” the official said, speaking on condition of anonymity. But, he added, “his first job is to be the American president.”

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So Mr. Obama has thrown his weight behind attempts by the royal family of Bahrain, the home of the Navy’s Fifth Fleet, to survive, although protesters say their demands have not been met. He has said little about political grievances in Saudi Arabia, a major oil supplier, where there were reports on Thursday of a violent dispersal of Shiite protesters. And he has limited White House critiques of Yemen, where the government is helping the United States root out a terrorist threat, even after that government opened fire on demonstrators. The more cautious approach contrasts sharply with Mr. Obama’s response in North Africa, where he abandoned a 30-year alliance with Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and has demanded the resignation of Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi in Libya. But Mr. Obama is balancing his idealistic instincts against his reluctance to use military action in Libya, where the United States does not have a vital strategic interest. Mr. Donilon noted that the administration needed to keep its focus on the broader region, where allies like Egypt loom large. The time is coming, administration officials said, for Mr. Obama to make another major speech taking stock of the upheaval. But its central message is not yet set, and there is likely to be lively debate about questions like whether the president should admit American complicity in propping up undemocratic governments in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and elsewhere. “I don’t honestly think it would change much,” said a second senior official, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss internal deliberations. “It isn’t going to change the perception of the United States one way or the other. What will continue to affect the perception of the United States is what we do now.” The White House will send Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton to Egypt and Tunisia next week, where officials said she would congratulate the protesters for sweeping out their leaders peacefully and offer aid to revive the nations’ economies. She had planned to stop in Riyadh, the Saudi capital, but canceled, officials said, because King Abdullah is too ill to meet her. This underscores one of the difficulties the United States faces in dealing with Saudi Arabia, a crucial ally that is run by an aging, infirm ruling family that has refused to open the political system. Instead, the king tried to mollify his people by doling out $36 billion worth of pay raises, unemployment checks and housing subsidies. Bahrain poses a different problem. There, King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa has pledged to enter a dialogue with the protestors, after having unleashed its security forces on them. Officials said Mr. Obama persuaded King Hamad to pull back his forces, which they said won the United States goodwill from the mostly Shiite demonstrators. But the talks have failed to get off the ground, and now some Shiites feel the Americans have sided against them. “There is a sense among many Bahraini reformers that the U.S. is a bit too eager to praise progress toward dialogue and reform that has not yet happened, and that the premature praise is easing pressure on the government,” said Tom Malinowski, the head of the Washington office of Human Rights Watch. “Striking a very balanced, and in many ways, neutral approach is recognized by many people in the region as not being with them, or on their side,” said J. Scott Mastic, the head of Middle East and North Africa for the International Republican Institute. “It’s very important that we be seen as supporting the demands of the people in the region.”

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How Mr. Obama manages to do that while also balancing American interests is a question that officials acknowledge will plague this historic president for months to come. Mr. Obama has told people that it would be so much easier to be the president of China. As one official put it, “No one is scrutinizing Hu Jintao’s words in Tahrir Square.” Elisabeth Bumiller and Stephen Castle contributed reporting from Brussels, Steven Erlanger and Alan Cowell from Paris and Judy Dempsey from Berlin. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/11/world/africa/11policy.html?_r=1&nl=todaysheadli nes&emc=tha2

Africa

March 10, 2011 U.S. Escalates Pressure on Libya Amid Mixed Signals By DAVID E. SANGER WASHINGTON — The White House announced a five-point program on Thursday of steps to isolate Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi and ultimately drive him from power, all stopping well short of military action, but distanced itself from the assessment of the nation’s top intelligence chief, who said Thursday that “over the longer term” Colonel Qaddafi’s superior firepower “will prevail” over the opposition. The steps that the White House announced include a partial embrace of the opposition movement as well as threats to track and prosecute, in international courts, loyalists to Mr. Qaddafi who commit atrocities. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said she would meet with Libyan opposition leaders next week, and President Obama’s national security adviser made it clear that Washington was looking for ways to aid the Libyan leader’s opponents. “We’re coordinating directly with them to provide assistance,” said the adviser, Thomas E. Donilon, though the United States has stopped short of recognizing them as the legitimate government of Libya. The help, he added, consisted of humanitarian aid and advice on how to organize an opposition government. But on a day when military momentum moved back toward Mr. Qaddafi’s forces, it was not evident that the efforts the White House announced would be enough to ensure an end to Mr. Qaddafi’s 41-year-long rule, or even to slow the pace of his attacks. In Brussels, NATO deferred until at least next week any decision on establishing a no- flight zone over Libya, amid hesitations in Washington and several European capitals over being drawn into a civil war in a country the West does not consider critical to its security. Both Mrs. Clinton, speaking in Washington, and Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, in Brussels, warned about the potential dangers of American military involvement, unless it was authorized by the United Nations and unless neighboring countries joined in the effort.

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“It’s not enough for them to just cheer us on,” one senior administration official said Thursday. “They have to put some skin in the game. The president has made clear it can’t just be us.” The White House campaign to convince both Colonel Qaddafi’s loyalists and NATO allies that the Libyan dictator’s days are numbered were undercut by a military assessment given earlier in the day by the director of national intelligence, James R. Clapper. Responding to questions, Mr. Clapper told members of the Senate Armed Services Committee that Colonel Qaddafi had a potentially decisive advantage in arms and equipment that would make itself felt as the conflict wore on. “This is kind of a stalemate back and forth,” he said, “but I think over the longer term that the regime will prevail.” Mr. Clapper also offered another scenario, one in which the country is split into two or three ministates, reverting to the way it was before Colonel Qaddafi’s rule. “You could end up with a situation where Qaddafi would have Tripoli and its environs, and then Benghazi and its environs could be under another ministate,” he said. The White House was clearly taken aback by the assessment that Mr. Qaddafi could prevail, and Mr. Donilon, talking to reporters a few hours later, suggested that Mr. Clapper was addressing the question too narrowly. “If you did a static and one-dimensional assessment of just looking at order of battle and mercenaries,” Mr. Donilon said, one could conclude that the Libyan leader would hang on. But he said that he took a “dynamic” and “multidimensional” view, which he said would lead “to a different conclusion about how this is going to go forward.” “The lost legitimacy matters,” he said. “Motivation matters. Incentives matter.” He said Colonel Qaddafi’s “resources are being cut off,” and ultimately that would undercut his hold on power. A senior administration official, driving home the difference in an e-mail on Thursday evening, wrote, “The president does not think that Qaddafi will prevail.” Such differing assessments rarely surface in public in the midst of a crisis, although in the early days of the Egypt uprising there were conflicting assessments of the stability of President Hosni Mubarak’s government. Mr. Clapper’s job, created in the wake of the Sept. 11 attacks, was intended to conduct exactly the kind of all-source analysis that Mr. Donilon talked about. But the White House said later Thursday that it retained full confidence in Mr. Clapper. One prominent Republican senator, however, said that the intelligence director should lose his job. Senator Lindsey Graham of South Carolina, a member of the Armed Services Committee, said in a statement that Mr. Clapper’s assessment “will make the situation more difficult for those opposing Qaddafi,” adding, “It also undercuts our national efforts to bring about the desired result of Libya moving from dictator to democracy.” In Brussels, meanwhile, NATO all but rejected a no-flight zone over Libya and agreed only to reposition warships in the region and plan for humanitarian aid. Mr. Gates, who has been resistant to a no-flight zone, said in a news briefing after a two-hour meeting of NATO defense ministers that planning for a possible no-flight zone would continue, “but that’s the extent of it.”

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Both Mr. Gates and the NATO secretary general, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, stressed that NATO would agree to a no-flight zone only with “a clear legal basis” — in short, authorization from the United Nations. Both also said in nearly identical statements that NATO would not take military action unless there was “a demonstrable need” and strong support from neighboring Arab nations. Europe is also riven by disagreements on how to force Mr. Qaddafi out. When France stepped ahead of the rest of the military alliance on Thursday morning to become the first country to recognize the rebel leadership in Benghazi, Britain took exception. In comments at the European Union in Brussels, Britain’s foreign secretary, William Hague, said that the Libyan rebels “are legitimate people to talk to, of course, but we recognize states rather than groups within states.” Mrs. Clinton held her first meeting with one of Colonel Qaddafi’s opponents later on Thursday when she met at the State Department with Libya’s ambassador to the United States, Ali Suleiman Aujali. Mr. Aujali previously announced that he no longer recognized the Libyan government, leaving him in a diplomatic limbo after Libya’s foreign ministry effectively fired him in a fax sent to the State Department. Mark Mazzetti contributed reporting from Washington, and Elisabeth Bumiller from Brussels. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/11/world/africa/11diplomacy.html?ref=africa

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March 10, 2011 Saudi Police Open Fire to Break Up a Protest By NADA BAKRI BEIRUT, Lebanon — Saudi police officers opened fire at a protest march in a restive, oil-rich province on Thursday, wounding at least three people, according to witnesses and a Saudi government official. The crackdown came a day before a planned “day of rage” throughout the country that officials have said they will not tolerate. Witnesses described the small protest march in the eastern city of Qatif as peaceful, but an Interior Ministry spokesman said demonstrators had attacked the police before the officers began firing, Reuters reported. The spokesman said that the police fired over the protesters’ heads, but that three people were injured in the melee, including a police officer. Some residents agreed that the police had shot above people’s heads. The clash with protesters in Qatif, located in a heavily Shiite region, underscored longstanding tensions in Saudi society: there is a sense among the Shiite minority that it is discriminated against by a government practicing a zealous form of Sunni orthodoxy. Mohammad Zaki al-Khabbaz, a human rights activist in Qatif who was reached by telephone, said that security forces fired tear gas and shot in the air trying to disperse the crowd. He said an official at a nearby hospital reported that two protesters had been wounded, one in the leg and one in the arm. Mr. Khabbaz said he was told that they were not allowed to receive any visitors. Another resident in Qatif who watched the march, Abdulwahab al-Oraid, said it was not clear why the police opened fire at what appeared to be a peaceful demonstration that started with 100 people and later grew to about 300. “There is a fear of Friday’s protests,” Mr. Oraid said. “We think this is a message: ‘Don’t protest in any Shiite areas on Friday.’ ” Witnesses were unclear whether the police fired rubber bullets intended for crowd control or other kinds of ammunition. A video posted online, which was said to be from Qatif, showed a group of young men chanting “The people want the release of the prisoners” and “Our protest is peaceful; Sunni and Shiites are brothers; we will never betray this country.” A few moments later, popping sounds are heard in the distance and protesters stop marching. Saudi Arabia has witnessed several small demonstrations in recent days and several protesters have been arrested, according to human rights activists. Residents across the kingdom said that the government had beefed up its security presence on the streets and closed access to major squares in big cities where protesters were expected to gather

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Friday. So far, 30,000 people have posted on a Facebook site dedicated to demonstrations, saying they would attend. “Streets are packed with police vehicles,” said Mohamad al-Qahtani, a human rights activist in Riyadh, the capital. “I have never seen anything like this. It says that the regime fears its people.” Residents in Riyadh reported that they had received text messages warning them against participating in Friday’s protest. The “day of rage” is modeled after other protests in the past two months in the Middle East and North Africa that have toppled leaders in Egypt and Tunisia. Tensions have been especially high in Saudi Arabia since protests began in Bahrain, an island nation connected to Saudi Arabia’s east’s coast by a bridge. Bahrain, a majority Shiite country, is governed by a Sunni monarch and protests there have been led by Shiites who say they suffer discrimination. Last month, the Saudi monarch, King Abdullah, announced a $10 billion increase in welfare spending to help young people marry, buy homes and open businesses, in what was seen as an attempt to head off unrest. Robert F. Worth contributed reporting from Washington. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/11/world/middleeast/11saudi.html?ref=africa

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U.S. to send aid team to eastern Libya; Clinton to meet rebel representatives By Karen DeYoung and Edward Cody Washington Post Staff Writers Friday, March 11, 2011; 12:00 AM The White House announced Thursday that it will send a government aid team into rebel-held parts of Libya and Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said she will meet next week with representatives of the transition council, moves that edged the Obama administration closer to the formal Libyan opposition. But the administration stopped far short of recognizing the council as Libya's legitimate government and continued to wrestle with how to achieve its goals of pushing Moammar Gaddafi from power while ensuring that something better far replaces him. The White House rejected criticism from some lawmakers that its response has been too slow to fast-moving events on the ground. On Thursday, Gaddafi loyalists routed opposition fighters from Ras Lanuf, a strategic oil port the rebels had held for a week, and said they had retaken the town of Zawiyah, 27 miles west of Tripoli. Gaddafi's son Saif al-Islam triumphantly proclaimed to a crowd in the capital that forces loyal to his father would continue to reverse the rebels' gains. "Hear it now. I have only two words for our brothers and sisters in the east: We're coming," he said. Thomas E. Donilon, President Obama's national security adviser, told reporters in a briefing that the United States and its partners had "taken a range of steps . . . to squeeze Gaddafi, isolate him, really turn him into a pariah." "So I think it really is important in any analysis or writing that's done on this that those steps not be underestimated," Donilon said, adding that "half of the population of Libya is no longer under regime control." Although U.S. relief teams have been working along Libya's border in Tunisia and Egypt, he said, "we're prepared to send diplomats to Benghazi to engage the opposition inside Libya." "This will be helpful to our understanding of the situation on the ground," Donilon said, and will "allow us to facilitate humanitarian assistance." At the same time, he said, "a range of options are on the table at NATO." NATO defense ministers, meeting in Brussels, authorized the repositioning of allied warships closer to Libya to strengthen surveillance of the fighting there and to better monitor a U.N. arms embargo against Gaddafi's forces. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates made it clear, however, that the NATO ships would not be authorized to take any military action without a new U.N. Security Council resolution. Gates said NATO planners will continue to look into what would be necessary to impose a no-fly zone on Gaddafi's air force. But he indicated that no more specific preparations were underway. "That's the extent of it as far as a no-fly zone is concerned," Gates told reporters.

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The limited NATO actions added to an impression that members of the U.S.-led alliance, at least for the moment, seek to threaten Gaddafi with gestures while holding back from more concrete measures until they can muster legal authority. The United States and its European allies think the case for military action would be strengthened at the United Nations if the Arab League agrees to back intervention when it meets Saturday to discuss Libya. Libyan "bombing attacks that the world could see and understand, and it could be verified, on civilian and populated areas . . . would massively strengthen the case for the introduction of a no-fly zone," British Foreign Secretary William Hague told the BBC. "Of course, it may involve many other nations, if it happens, other than NATO," he said. But "the demand is mounting in the Arab world. That is very important, it's absolutely crucial, in bringing a no-fly zone into being." Donilon said that any military action would require "not just rhetorical support" from the region. A European official said that no one expected Arab nations to send aircraft to patrol Libya but that it would help if some Arab governments would provide token support by, for example, sending senior military officials to participate in a command- and -control facility. The case made by U.S. lawmakers who favor more immediate aggressive action appeared to be bolstered by testimony from James R. Clapper Jr., the director of national intelligence, who told the Senate Armed Services Committee that Gaddafi was likely to "prevail" over the rebels without foreign intervention or some other major change. "I think, frankly, they're in for a tough row," Clapper said of the opposition in response to a question from Sen. Joseph I. Lieberman (I-Conn.). "I do believe that Gaddafi is in this for the long haul. I don't think he has any intention . . . of leaving." Donilon, when asked whether Clapper's assessment diverged from that of the White House, said the intelligence chief had offered a "static" assessment of the weaponry and forces arrayed on both sides, without taking into account the "dynamic" of Gaddafi's international isolation and other pressures being brought to bear against him. "I'm one of those who believes that absent international authorization, the United States acting alone would be stepping into a situation whose consequences are unforeseeable," Clinton said in testimony before a House appropriations subcommittee. "And I know that's the way our military feels." "It's easy for people to say do this, do that, and then they turn and say, okay, U.S., go do it. You use your assets. You use, you know, your men and women; you go out and do it and then you take the consequences if something bad happens," she said. Clinton said she would meet with Libyan opposition figures when she travels next week to Tunisia and Egypt as the most senior administration figure to visit those countries since their entrenched governments were ousted earlier this year by largely peaceful protests. "We are attempting and working overtime to figure out who are the people that are now claiming to be the opposition," she said, "because we know that there are some with whom we want to be allied and others with whom we would not."

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The State Department declined to specify with whom Clinton would meet, but Donilon said they would be the same Libyan opposition figures currently traveling in Europe: council representatives Mahmoud Jibril and Ali al-Essawi. French President Nicolas Sarkozy met with them Thursday at the Elysee Palace, a measure depicted as a gesture of support for the rebellion. French officials said they would soon send an ambassador to Benghazi, the center of the anti-Gaddafi movement, to establish regular contact with the rebel organization. Essawi said the council planned to send a representative to Europe. Preceding a meeting of the 27 European Union heads of state Friday, Sarkozy and British Prime Minister David Cameron sent a letter calling on the bloc to "send the clear political signal that we consider the Council to be valid political interlocutors, and an important voice for the Libyan people in this phase." Cody reported from Brussels. Staff writers Craig Whitlock and William Branigin contributed to this report. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/article/2011/03/10/AR2011031006555.html?wpisrc=nl_headline

10/03/2011 à 13h05 Kadhafi menace Sarkozy de la révélation d'un «grave secret» Après la reconnaissance officielle de l'opposition libyenne par la France, le régime du dictateur tente de faire peur au Président français.

Nicolas Sarkozy et Mouammar Kadhafi le 12 décembre 2007. (© AFP Stephane de Sakutin)

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Le régime libyen a affirmé jeudi, via son agence officielle, que la révélation d'un "grave secret" allait entraîner la chute du président français Nicolas Sarkozy, peu après la reconnaissance par Paris du Conseil national de l'opposition comme représentant du peuple libyen. L'agence officielle libyenne Jana a annoncé avoir "appris qu'un grave secret va entraîner la chute de Sarkozy, voire son jugement en lien avec le financement de sa campagne électorale". Cette annonce, reprise par la télévision officielle, est survenue peu après la reconnaissance par Paris du Conseil national de transition libyen, qui réunit l'opposition au régime du colonel Mouammar Kadhafi, comme le seul "représentant légitime du peuple libyen" et sa décision d'envoyer prochainement un ambassadeur à Benghazi. (Source AFP) http://www.liberation.fr/monde/01012324835-kadhafi-menace-sarkozy-de-la- revelation-d-un-grave-secret

16/03/2011 à 11h15 «Il faut que Sarkozy rende l’argent qu’il a accepté de la Libye pour financer sa campagne» Saïf Al-Islam Kadhafi, le fils du dictateur libyen, affirme avoir financé la campagne du président français et promet de mater la révolte dans les jours à venir Dans une interview diffusée sur Euronews mercredi, Saïf Al-Islam Kadhafi, un des fils du dirigeant libyen, a déclaré que le régime lybien avait financé la campagne électorale de Nicolas Sarkozy. L'annonce fait suite au 10 mars dernier, où le régime lybien avait promis de révéler «un grave secret [qui entrainerait] la chute de Sarkozy» après que la France ait officiellement reconnu l'opposition libyenne. http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xhmn82_libye-entretien-avec-saif-al-islam- kadhafi_news Libye : entretien avec Saïf Al-Islam Kadhafi par euronews-fr «Il faut que Sarkozy rende l’argent qu’il a accepté de la Libye pour financer sa campagne électorale, a déclaré Saïf Al-Islam Kadhafi. C’est nous qui avons financé sa campagne, et nous en avons la preuve. Nous sommes prêts à tout révéler. La première chose que l’on demande à ce clown, c’est de rendre l’argent au peuple libyen. Nous lui avons accordé une aide afin qu’il œuvre pour le peuple libyen, mais il nous a déçu. Rendez-nous notre argent. Nous avons tous les détails, les comptes bancaires, les documents, et les opérations de transfert. Nous révélerons tout prochainement.» Quant à la révolte qui secoue actuellement le pays, Saïf Al-Islam Kadhafi a assuré que «dans quarante- huit heures tout sera fini.» «Les opérations militaires sont finies, a-t-il ajouté. Nos forces sont presque à Benghazi.» L'armée libyenne a annoncé dans un communiqué une opération imminente contre Benghazi, deuxième ville du pays, tombée dans les mains des insurgés quelques jours après le début de la révolte le 15 février. Mercredi matin, les journalistes de l'AFP sur place décrivaient une ambiance «calme». Liberation.fr http://www.liberation.fr/monde/01012325901-il-faut-que-sarkozy-rende-l-argent-qu-il- a-accepte-de-la-libye-pour-financer-sa-campagne

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Posted at 6:00 AM ET, 03/10/2011 Peter King's claim about radical Muslim imams: Is it true? By Glenn Kessler

"The only real testimony we have on it was actually from Sheikh Kabbani, who was a Muslim leader during the Clinton Administration, he testified, this is back in 1999 and 2000, before the State Department that he thought over 80 percent of the mosques in this country are controlled by radical Imams. Certainly from what I've seen and dealings I've had, that number seems accurate." --Rep. Peter King, Jan. 24, 2011 Rep. Peter King (R-N.Y.), chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee, plans to hold controversial hearings Thursday on Islamic radicalism. King jokes that these hearings may make him famous "for a week," but he has already become well known for an assertion he once made that "80 to 85 percent" of the mosques in the United States are controlled by radical imams.

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King now dismisses the comment as inconsequential, saying in an interview that he has no idea if the estimate is correct. "I don't think it matters that much" because, according to Islamic leaders King said he has spoken with, imams do not have as much influence among the faithful as do priests or rabbis and because a relatively small percentage of American Muslims attend mosques. "This is not that important to me," he said, adding: "I do think there is an inordinate amount of radical influence in mosques." King added that he believes he made this comment on his own only once, and since then has simply responded to questions when interviewers raise it, such as in the quote above, when Raymond Arroyo, a guest host on radio's "Laura Ingraham Show," brought it up. Nevertheless, this has become one of the most recognizable quotes associated with King. It has been repeated often in news reports about the upcoming hearings, so a casual listener might think there is a basis in fact. Let's look at the roots of this figure. The Facts This all started with a State Department forum in early 1999 on Islamic extremism that attracted virtually no media attention. That is, until a few months later, when virtually every major Muslim organization in the United States issued a joint statement condemning the remarks by Sheikh Hisham Kabbani as "unsubstantiated allegations that could have a profoundly negative impact on ordinary American Muslims." With the passage of 12 years, Kabbani's comments -- made more than two years before the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks -- look both remarkably prescient and somewhat off the wall. Kabbani, who practices Sufism, warned that "there are 5000 suicide bombers being trained by [Osama] bin Laden in Afghanistan who are ready to move to any part of the world and explode themselves." But Kabbani also said that bin Laden's organization had been "able to buy more than 20 atomic nuclear heads from some of the mafia in the ex-Soviet Union, in the republics of the ex-Soviet Union, and they traded it for $30 million and 2 tons of opium." He added that they were breaking up "these atomic warheads into smaller partitions, like small chips, to be put in any suitcase." As part of this discourse, Kabbani said that "Muslims, in general, are peace-loving and tolerant" but that 80 percent of the mosques in the United States are "being run by the extremist ideology, but not acting as a militant movement." Kabbani offered no evidence to support this assertion and has provided little evidence since. In 2001, he told The New York Times that he had visited 114 mosques in the United States and "ninety of them were mostly exposed, and I say exposed, to extreme or radical ideology" -- through speeches, books and board members. "He said that a telltale sign of an extremist mosque was a focus on the Palestinian struggle," the Times reported. In the interview, King said he did not rely just on Kabbani's statement but also on testimony before a Senate panel in 2003 by Stephen Schwartz, a Muslim convert who at the time was affiliated with the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. Schwartz has been a prominent opponent of Wahhabi Islam -- a strict sect of Islam described by

142 some as extremist -- and he testified, "Shia and other non-Wahhabi Muslim community leaders estimate that 80 percent of American mosques -- out of a total ranging between an official estimate of 1,200 and an unofficial figure of 4-6,000 -- are under Wahhabi control." Schwartz did not identify these community leaders, though before this appearance he had previously attributed this estimate to Kabbani's statement at the State Department. In an email, he said he "heard it from Kabbani but also heard it from the leaders of the main Shia mosques in the U.S." and that having attended services in the U.S. and other Western countries he believes "Sunni mosques in the U.S. are still, in 2011, overwhelmingly dominated by fundamentalists." He added: "Fixing a quantitative level is difficult but 75-80 percent still seems right to me." Meanwhile, there have been efforts to actually measure the sentiment in American mosques. University of Kentucky professor Ihsan Bagby in 2004 published a study of Detroit mosques that concluded that approximately 93 percent of mosque participants endorse both community and political involvement and more than 87 percent of mosque leaders support participation in the political process. Most were registered to vote and "because of these moderate views, mosque participants cannot be described as isolationists, rejecters of American society or extremists." (Some conservatives have noted that the study also found strong support for universal health care, affirmative action and Islamic law in Muslim-majority nations, as well as deep concern about immorality in the United States.) King said he was unaware of the Detroit study. The Pinocchio Test The persistence of this "80 percent" statistic is mystifying. It is based largely on a single observation by one Muslim cleric 12 years ago, who has offered no evidence to make his claim. The one other possible source is the personal observations of Schwartz but as far as we can tell it has not been confirmed by any documented study. The Fact Checker was inclined to award King quite a few Pinocchios before he came to the phone and essentially took it back. But he has a responsibility to clear the air and say that, in the absence of other evidence, he no longer thinks this 12-year-old "fact" has any relevance. He says that he was not planning to bring up this statistic in his hearing, but the very public platform he has Thursday morning would be a good place to clear the air. In the quote above, King correctly noted that there was a single source and that it dates back to 1999. But then he went on to say the "number seems accurate," lending credence to the figure and giving a misleading impression that there is more to back it up.

Two Pinocchios (About our rating scale). Follow the Fact Checker Glenn Kessler Peter King's claim about radical Muslim imams: Is it true? 03/10/2011 http://voices.washingtonpost.com/fact- checker/2011/03/peter_kings_claim_about_radica.html?tid=wp_featuredstories

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COMMENT http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/17c7e73a-4b54-11e0-b2c2- 00144feab49a.html#ixzz1GICWaRXO Abeer Allam and Roula Khalaf Middle East: Gas leak in the house By Abeer Allam and Roula Khalaf Published: March 10 2011 22:08 | Last updated: March 10 2011 22:08

On the streets: defying a national ban on protests, Shia in Qatif brandish placards that highlight the plight of jailed demonstrators. Among majority Sunni, many also now want political change

The Riyadh International Book Fair, which closes on Friday, has become a symbol of subtle social change in Saudi Arabia, a show of openness to foreign cultures where men and women – unusually for the kingdom – mingle in the same space as they browse newly published works. Now in its sixth year, it is billed as the Middle East’s largest annual cultural event. But when the information minister, the liberal Abdelaziz Khojah, opened the fair at the start of the month at an exhibition hall in the capital, a group of young bearded men stormed the venue. They ordered women, each already covered from head to toe in a loose black abaya, to hide their figures even more and chastised them for having gone out in public in the first place. Picking on Mr Khojah too, they accused him of “westernising the country”. The official religious squads, or mutawa’a, which had seen their wings clipped lately after a string of well-publicised abuses, denied that the men belonged to their

144 organisation, claiming the young men were independent moral guardians of society. Some of them were later arrested but released after intervention from conservative clerics who, like many Saudis, now turn to the internet to spread their message. They launched a Facebook group and used Twitter to press for their freedom. EDITOR’S CHOICE: Bahraini youth to march on king’s court - Mar-10 Editorial Comment: Saudi Arabia’s Day of Rage - Mar-10 Egypt acts to tackle security breakdown - Mar-10 Moroccan king announces referendum on reform - Mar-11 Oil price surges on Saudi protest fears - Mar-10 Yemen protesters reject Saleh concessions - Mar-10 Among more liberal Saudis, the incident provoked a broader question: was this a message from elements in the royal family, designed to remind Saudis mesmerised by the Egyptian and Tunisian revolts that curtailing the powers of their monarchy and pressing for democracy could bring to the fore more radical Islamist forces? “What happened in the book fair is a show of force of the ‘other reform demands’,” says Abdelaziz al-Qassim, a lawyer and political analyst. “It is the same language used by various Arab governments to say, ‘it is either us or the radicals’.’’ As the Arab spring sweeps the region, the prospect of the revolutionary spirit catching on in Saudi Arabia has excited segments of its population and troubled its rulers. It has also affected perceptions of Saudi stability abroad, with more analysts and consultancies now considering Saudi Arabia not to be immune from the upheavals. But if the Egyptian revolution that forced out Hosni Mubarak as Egypt’s president confounded the US and Europe, any hint of change in Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest oil producer and a heavyweight in the Islamic world, would be seen as an earthquake. Few people inside or outside the kingdom are predicting imminent turmoil. But analysts and diplomats are warning that without significant political reform – including within the sprawling and spendthrift royal family, composed of about 7,000 princes who make up the House of Saud – the kingdom’s stability cannot be taken for granted. Oiler of the wheels Saudi Arabia is the de facto central bank of the oil market, thanks to its unmatched ability to produce more crude at short notice to offset a shortfall elsewhere, writes Javier Blas. The speed with which the kingdom last month raised output to 9m barrels a day, to bridge the gap left by strife-torn Libya, highlights its role in stabilising global oil prices. As a matter of policy, the kingdom maintains 1.5m-2m b/d of idle capacity that can be brought into production at any time, officials say. That cushions the global economy against crippling price jumps similar to those of the 1970s and 1980s. In a country where any form of assembly is banned, the number of protesters until now has been in the low hundreds, a far cry from the masses that have taken to the streets in other Arab countries. Yet the signs of a growing mood for change have scared off investors, driving the Saudi stock market to a 22-month low. Even if King Abdullah, 86, staves off a popular challenge in his remaining years, failing to embrace a more inclusive political system would leave behind an accumulation of frustrations that could erupt in the face of his successors – the two most immediate of whom are also both ageing and ailing but lacking the popular support on which the king 145 can still count. “Egypt has changed the mood,” says Mohsen al-Awaji, a political activist. “Now, people want a manifesto for freedom, dignity and jobs.” . . . King Abdullah returned on February 23 from three months of medical treatment abroad to a radically changed Middle East. Saudis had watched with awe as Tunisian and Egyptian protesters toppled two of the strongest regimes in the Arab world and many welcomed what they hoped to be the Egyptian effect on Saudi Arabia. When Saudis now discuss politics, they often tend to speak of “after or before Egypt’’, to emphasise that the world has changed and the ceiling for Arab societies’ demands has risen. The king was greeted with three petitions from democracy activists, calling for a constitutional monarchy and an end to corruption. A group of protesters staged a rare rally in front of Riyadh’s al- Rajhi mosque a week ago, chanting slogans against the government. Another group on Facebook called for an Egyptian-inspired “Friday of rage” on March 11 to press peacefully for reform, and attracted a few hundred online supporters. And on Thursday night police moved against 300 protestors in the oil-rich eastern city of Qatif, firing shots to disperse the crowd and leaving three injured. The uprising in nearby Bahrain, where a Sunni minority rules over a largely Shia population, also encouraged a more vocal tone among Saudi Arabia’s own Shias, who account for an estimated 10 per cent of the population. Several rallies were held to demand the release of prisoners held without trial since the 1996 bombing of a US military complex in Khobar, a coastal city in the kingdom’s oil-rich Eastern Province. “The whole region is changing and other governments have taken serious steps,” says Jafar al-Shayeb, a Shia activist. “But reforms are not only about the Shia – all of Saudi Arabia wants reform.’’ The regime’s response, however, has so far been neither consistent nor in line with expectations. On his arrival from Morocco, where he was convalescing after two operations to his back in New York, the king announced a SR135bn ($36bn) package of social investment to improve housing, education and other services. Although a welcome relief in a country where per capita income at $16,600 a year is still below that of its oil producing neighbours in the Gulf,

146 and youth unemployment exceeds 30 per cent, it was a throwback to the days when people were content to give their rulers a free hand in government so long as they were well kept. The initiative has seemingly failed to acknowledge that the popular wish might now be for political change and accountability. Along with the incentives offered with one hand, the regime waved the stick with the other. A teacher who dared to post a YouTube video calling for the ousting of the al-Sauds, describing them as a corrupt bunch who squandered the wealth of the nation, was arrested. His tribe later apologised to the king. A Shia cleric who called for a constitutional monarchy was also detained, provoking further protests in Qatif and al-Ahsa in the Eastern Province to demand his release. He was freed on Sunday. Four of a group of nine activists who had announced the founding of a political party were also arrested. Two were released only after signing a pledge not to attempt the same move again. Sheikh Salman al-Ouda, a cleric who signed one of the petitions for reform and had been arguing that protests against unjust rulers are not against Islam, meanwhile had his popular television show on Saudi-owned MBC suspended. Western and local observers say the ruling family is nonetheless discussing ideas for political reform. Since he took over in 2005, Abdullah has championed a measure of social liberalisation, easing some of the draconian restrictions on women, spending vast amounts on education and judiciary reforms and allowing greater space for expression. But his attitude towards political change has always been cool. . . . Under pressure from the US, the kingdom held a partial municipal election in 2005 in which women could not vote. It turned out to be a one-off experiment. Other modest moves that back then had been expected to follow – including elections for half of the Shoura Council, a consultative body with no legislative power – are now said to be back on the cards. “The reformers in the family know that for them to continue they need to reform now,” says one Saudi analyst. “Years ago, the king said the reform agenda was his agenda, but nothing happened. Had the reforms started back then, we would have avoided the pressure today.” Abdullah al-Malki, a university professor in Jeddah, says several youth groups have been holding weekly meetings in the country’s socially more open second city, debating the meaning of reform: “Young people do not want to change the regime – they want to redefine the relationship with the regime. They do not want to be treated as subjects but as citizens who participate in building the country. They do not have fears or red lines.” The argument against shaking the political system has long been that the kingdom, united by the royal family only 79 years ago, is a complex society, with deep divisions between liberals and conservatives, between Sunni and Shia, between rival regions and tribes. Signs of these divisions emerged in recent weeks as many Sunni Saudis dismissed the uprising in Bahrain and accused Saudi Shia of being Iranian agents when they too started staging protests. Moreover, the influence of liberals, even among the youth, who dream of a western- style democracy, is difficult to gauge in what is a largely closed political system. Until now, they have been thought of as a minority; conservatives backed by the powerful clerical establishment were seen as a more influential force. The history of Saudi Arabia 147 has indeed been that reforms are dictated from the top and are often only grudgingly accepted by the conservative society. But while the impact of political change could be much riskier for Saudi Arabia and the outside world than in other Arab countries, the regime faces a growing consensus over what people want – a more accountable, representative system in which the royal family does not monopolise power. The third petition recently sent to the king was signed by 330 people and included liberals, conservatives, Islamists and women. Mr al-Qassim, the lawyer, says Saudis have been subjected to an intensive course in civil and democratic rights in recent weeks and they are not about to forget the lesson. “The gas has leaked into the house already; the situation will either explode or be dealt with wisely through reforms,” he says. “This is the first time that liberals, Islamists, technocrats, atheists put their name on one list and agree on one thing – reform.” ...... Unrest in Bahrain: A split between sects on an island where flowers are met by guns Located less than 30km across a windswept causeway from Saudi Arabia’s oil-rich Eastern Province, the tiny island kingdom of Bahrain – an offshore banking haven and a liberal bolt-hole for fun-starved Saudis – has become a study in the future of Gulf monarchies, whose ageing rulers control almost half of the world’s oil, writes Simeon Kerr. Back in the 1990s, in response to riots by a Shia majority claiming discrimination, the ruling Sunni al-Khalifa family began a process of political reform. This radical experiment culminated in parliamentary elections in 2002. A slow move to constitutional monarchy under King Hamad captured the interest of Saudi royals seeking a road towards more democracy in their own conservative kingdom. But last month’s violent shift in Bahrain’s political tectonics has created alarm among Gulf autocracies. The island’s majority Shia have long been the most restive population of any Gulf state. Their frustration at the pace of reform and what they see as a sham parliament has been galvanised by the success of the youth movements in Tunisia and Egypt. On February 14, the police cracked down on largely peaceful “day of rage” pro- democracy Shia-led rallies focused at Pearl roundabout in the capital, Manama. A series of demonstrations then ballooned into the greatest threat to the Gulf’s absolute monarchs since the anti-colonial revolutions of the 1960s as the army opened fire on flower-wielding protesters. Since then, Sheikh Salman, the crown prince, has been struggling to establish a national dialogue. The growing sectarian breach has sounded geopolitical alarm bells. Government supporters murmur about influence from Shia Iran, knowing this will worry Saudi Arabia and the US, which maintains its Fifth Fleet in Bahrain’s capital. Fearing the collapse of an ally and a victory for the Islamic Republic, America turned its initial criticism of the crackdown on the pro-democracy movement to support for the regime. For its part, the Shia opposition has been attempting to avoid sectarian rhetoric and denies Iranian influence. The roots of the pan-Arab “youthquake” lie in economic disparity, yet the goal is political change and accountability. The Bahraini opposition’s minimum demand is the

148 removal of prime minister Khalifa bin Salman, the king’s uncle. He is accused of treating the country as a personal fiefdom during his four decades in office. Battle lines are drawn between a relatively disadvantaged population and rulers desperate to cling to the privilege conveyed by family ties, which typifies the Gulf. Sunnis have better access to government jobs. Their numbers have been boosted by the policy of granting nationality to foreign co-religionists. Emboldened by calls at Pearl roundabout for an end to monarchy, radical Shia groups are calling for the formation of a republic following two centuries of al-Khalifa rule. Pro-government gangs, stirred by large rallies of their own and cyber-hatred, are tooling up for a fight. “The country is on a razor’s edge – the outcomes could either be very good or very bad, especially if sectarianism increases and groups try to polarise the situation,” says Jean- François Seznec of Georgetown University, a Gulf specialist. A path towards true democracy would send ripples of populism around a region whose monarchs have helped keep the oil market stable for decades. Concessions could anger a Saudi Arabia concerned about instability among its own Shia minority, and may lead it to urge the use of force. But ignoring their demands risks thousands of disaffected youths marching to meet the army’s bullets. The collapse of dialogue could thus trigger a descent into civil war, fanning sectarian flames across the region and inviting external interference. Finding common ground will challenge even the crown prince’s charm and intellect. His hardline relatives, who led last month’s crackdown, wait on the sidelines. The days ahead will not only determine Bahrain’s future but also demonstrate whether the old monarchs of the Gulf can adapt to the demands of their newly empowered young societies. Abeer Allam and Roula Khalaf Middle East: Gas leak in the house March 10 2011 22:08 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/17c7e73a-4b54-11e0-b2c2- 00144feab49a.html#axzz1GIBXrLiy

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COMMENT & ANALYSIS http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/25a97d14- 4b54-11e0-b2c2-00144feab49a.html#ixzz1GIEFs6ra Time to embrace the Arab world By Philip Stephens Published: March 10 2011 21:39 | Last updated: March 10 2011 21:39

I was in Istanbul the other day. The dominant emotion among Turkey’s elites in the wake of the Arab uprisings is elation. The contrast with the mood in Old Europe is palpable. In the chancelleries of the European Union applause for the opposition movements still jostles with foreboding. EDITOR’S CHOICE: Humanitarian crisis tests EU’s policy - Mar-03 Editorial: EU and the Arab awakening - Mar-09 UN seeks $160m to help refugees - Mar-07 Opinion: Let’s boycott and sabotage Gaddafi - Mar-09 US model for freezing Libya funds - Mar- 09 Libya’s main oil terminal ablaze after raid - Mar-09 Ministers in Reçep Tayyip Erdogan’s government are careful to disclaim suggestions that Turkey sees itself as “model” for the Middle East in its marriage of Islam and secular democracy. Conscious that memories of Ottoman rule are still fresh in many Arabs’ minds, they choose their words carefully. But, as I discovered at a conference of policymakers convened by Italy’s Aspen Institute, the mixture of pride and ambition is unmistakable. To say that Turkey was not a model, I heard one senior Turkish minister remark, was not to deny that it saw itself as an “inspiration” for the region. Only the other day Abdullah Gul, Turkey’s president, and Ahmet Davutoglu, the foreign minister, were in Cairo offering advice to those planning to contest the Egyptian elections. The EU’s considered response to the revolutions is due at a meeting of its 27 leaders in Brussels on Friday. The summit’s urgent concern is Libya. But the democratic awakening in the region also demands a deeper response. The Middle East now presents a profound and public test of Europe’s intent towards the Muslim world.

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There is little the EU can do to help oust Muammer Gaddafi, though the leaders must at the very least impose comprehensive sanctions. Calls for armed intervention are growing as the Libyan leader deploys tanks and fighter jets against his people. But, as Hillary Clinton said this week, any such action requires consent reaching well beyond the US and the EU. As a liberal internationalist – someone who believes that the international community has a responsibility to uphold basic human rights, I share the interventionist instinct. Leaders such as Britain’s David Cameron are to be applauded for discarding the so- called realism that said the Arab world was not fit for democracy. Yet the case for deploying the west’s military might, in what now looks like a civil war, is not unequivocal. As important as the summit’s words on Libya is the message the leaders send to the region. Pro-democracy movements cannot hope for Brussels to dispatch envoys carrying suitcases of cash with no strings attached. They can and should expect European governments to send a powerful signal of intent. The moral impulse and the political and economic imperatives here are aligned. This is happening in Europe’s backyard. Europeans, more than anyone else, need the revolutions to succeed to safeguard their own security and prosperity. Sad to say, such enlightened self-interest, however, has not been a commodity in abundant supply. The private discourse in European capitals has been more about threats than opportunities. Will a soaring oil price provoke a new recession; will chaos in north Africa see migrants in their millions cross the Mediterranean; how would southern Europe’s farmers and textile producers cope with the opening up of their markets to Arab products? Parallels with Europe’s response to the fall of the Berlin Wall are necessarily inexact. It is also often forgotten that the response to the collapse of communism was faltering. Britain’s Margaret Thatcher and France’s François Mitterrand plotted at first against German unification. For all that, this is a moment for Europe as important as any since 1989 – a test of whether the continent understands that its future cannot be detached from events in its near-neighbourhood. Those who took to the streets in Tunis and Cairo – and those elsewhere who hope to emulate them – are watching closely to see whether Europe matches words with deeds. A first step for the 27 is to put in place a strategy that combines urgent assistance with a long-term commitment: a package to convince those reaching for democracy that Europe will not lose interest once the immediate crisis has passed. One obvious starting point is the scrapping of the moribund Union for the Mediterranean in favour of an institution tailored to offer practical assistance and expertise in democratic institution-building to support political transition. On the economic side, the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development could usefully channel new funding to the region. A better medium-term option would be to draw on the expertise of these institutions to create a new Middle East investment bank, leveraging resources from the Gulf states and others to add to the EU’s own resources and expertise.

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Whatever the precise design of assistance, the imperative is that Europe demonstrates that it will be there for the long haul – that it will not lose interest once the immediate crises have passed. The difference is between a Europe that sees the revolutions as a problem to be managed and one eager to embrace new Arab partners. The Turkish politicians I met in Istanbul are understandably sceptical of the Union’s intent. I say understandably because for the past five years Turkey has been engaged in accession negotiations with the EU. During that period, the prospect of it ever joining the Union has receded rather than advanced. Last month the EU refused even to open talks about easing the stringent visa regime applied to Turkish nationals. Turkey, it should be said, is not always its own best advocate. Mr Erdogan’s Islamist AK party has lately been too careless of the secular democratic legacy of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Riding high in the polls ahead of this summer’s general election, the government has cracked down on the press and has been using the courts to cow opponents. Kemal Kilicdaroglu, the leader of the opposition Republic People’s party, notes the irony of such policies at a moment when the Arab world is embracing democracy. For all that, as it looks eastward to Turkey and south to the Maghreb, Europe has to confront its own demons. It is time to shake hands with Muslim democracies. Europe meets the Arab awakening http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/25a97d14-4b54-11e0-b2c2- 00144feab49a.html#axzz1GIBXrLiy

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RGE's Wednesday Note - Jasmine Dreams in China? – By Adam Wolfe miércoles 09/03/2011 9:03

The “days of rage” sweeping through the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have raised questions about the possibility of a similar movement erupting in China. At a glance, the ingredients for uprising appear to be present. Online calls for a “Jasmine Revolution” in China resulted in a massive staging of security forces at the planned protest sites, which could be taken as a sign of the Communist Party’s insecure grip on power. Like several of the MENA governments, China’s ruling elite is plagued by corruption and is preparing for a transfer of power. Inequality has devolved to Sub- Saharan levels, and the political system provides few outlets for popular grievances to be aired. However, China is unlikely to face a popular uprising for six reasons, discussed in more depth in our latest China Monthly.

First, and most importantly, China’s party rule implies that a larger segment of the population is represented by or dependent on the government than in the MENA region’s autocratic systems. While the vast majority of the population has little say in how China is run, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) cannot maintain its rule by providing private goods only to a narrow segment of the population. Instead, the CCP provides a mix of private and public goods to its 80 million members and those other elites who might otherwise challenge its rule. Instead of forming a restive middle class, those who have managed to move up the income ladder largely have become the CCP’s support base. Additionally, the CCP has institutionalized the transfer of power between generations, a process seen as more legitimate than the geriatric MENA leaders’ attempts to transfer power to their sons.

Second, China has maintained strong economic growth throughout the reform period, with few spells of high inflation. Strong growth increases the incentives for rulers to maintain power (as it makes political monopoly more valuable) and decreases the threat to their power by legitimizing their rule. A monetary overhang and demand-side pressures are driving China’s inflation higher this year, but the Party will do everything it can on the supply side to contain inflation expectations.

Third, while official corruption plagues China, it appears highly decentralized. It is local officials who confiscate land from citizens for development, ignore environmental regulations to boost industrial output and benefit from a judicial system that remains incapable of challenging their authority. This dynamic explains the apparent mismatch between survey data that suggest Chinese citizens are largely satisfied with national conditions and the tens of thousands of protests and mass incidents reported each year.

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Fourth, while unemployment among college graduates and a skewed sex ratio are problems in China, there is no youth bulge to provide the tinder for an uprising along the lines of those in the MENA region. As China’s bountiful labor force has begun to disappear in the coastal export hubs, a significant portion of the young population has enjoyed brighter future prospects and wage hikes.

Fifth, from the “Great Firewall” to the systematic arrest of any potential opposition leaders, the CCP has been successful in disrupting strategic coordination among potential adversaries. This year, China will spend RMB624 billion (US$95 billion) on internal security, more than it plans to spend on its military. Human Rights Watch’s Nicholas Bequelin reported that since calls for a Jasmine Revolution first appeared on microblogs, China’s security forces have “rounded up, detained, or placed under house arrest more than 100 people nationwide.” The CCP’s panoptic monitoring of online forums requires activists to either use VPN services that only a relatively rich, urban segment of the population can access or disguise their complaints in coded language that limits the message to a narrow demographic already initiated into the cause.

Finally, there is no strong voice for reform within the CCP along the lines of Hu Yaobing, Zhou Ziyang or Bao Tong in the 1980s. In 2010, Premier Wen Jiabao made several public calls for political reform that raised hopes among Western commentators and Chinese liberals that Wen’s bleeding heart was shining through in his final years in the Zhongnanhai. However, political reform was not on the agenda at the Fifth Plenary Session of the 17th Central Committee in October 2010, and Wen’s comments did not depart significantly from standard CCP messaging on gradual intra-Party political reforms.

Still, each of the silver clouds listed above has a black lining: Party rule means decentralized power that opens opportunities for corruption, strong growth creates the incentives and the means for an opposition group to challenge CCP rule and China’s demographics may eventually create problems for the CCP’s leadership. Perhaps the most important threat to the CCP’s legitimacy in the medium term will be the slowing of Chinese economic growth. Demographics and malinvestment will soon bite into China’s potential growth, and dithering on financial-sector reforms raises the prospect of a sharp contraction in the medium term. In the past, it has taken anemic growth and fiscal woes to topple Communist governments. The Party’s emphasis on economic progress over political reform is likely to continue, which could allow the clouds on the horizon to darken further.

Roubini Global Economics [[email protected]]; en nombre de; Roubini Global Economics [[email protected]]

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Rep. Peter King's Muslim hearing: Plenty of drama, less substance By David A. Fahrenthold and Michelle Boorstein Washington Post Staff Writers Thursday, March 10, 2011; 11:27 PM One half of the Muslim contingent in Congress paused, his voice high and breaking. He tugged at his glasses. He held up a finger and gathered himself. Rep. Keith Ellison (D-Minn.), one of two Muslims in the House, was trying to tell a story about a Muslim paramedic who died responding to the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. "Mr. Hamdani bravely sacrificed his life," Ellison said, and his voice cracked again, "â Š. . . to try to help others on 9/11." On Thursday, Ellison was an unusual witness in his own chamber, testifying about his religion in a committee hearing that examined radicalization among American Muslims. Eventually, Ellison gave up trying to compose himself and told the rest of the story in the quavering pitch of a man about to cry. "Mohammad Salman Hamdani was a fellow American," Ellison said, "who gave his life for other Americans." Ellison's testimony was the emotional peak of a dramatic, long-awaited hearing, in which Congress was in the spotlight as much as Islam. During more than four hours of testimony, there were other moments of touching depth: Two men told personal stories of seeing loved ones seduced by Islamic extremism. Abdirizak Bihi, a Somali American from Minnesota, described how a nephew turned radical and left to fight with an Islamic militia in Somalia. He said religious leaders had discouraged him from going to the authorities, warning that "you will have eternal fire and hell" for betraying Islam. But, this being Capitol Hill, there also were moments of pure theater and genuine acrimony. A freshman Republican asked the Los Angeles County sheriff if he had been hoodwinked into trusting a Muslim advocacy group that some regard with suspicion. And Democrats used much of the hearing to angrily bash the idea of holding a hearing at all. "It has already been classified as a way to demonize and castigate a whole broad base of human beings," said Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee (D-Tex.). She waved a copy of the Constitution and said the hearing might be a violation of laws prohibiting religious discrimination: "This hearing today is playing right now into al-Qaeda, around the world." The hearing was called by Rep. Peter T. King (R-N.Y.), the chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee. Congress has previously examined the problem of homegrown radicals, but this time was different. The hearing came after a series of high-profile incidents linked to American Muslims, including a mass shooting at Fort Hood, Tex., in 2009 and an attempted bombing in 155

Times Square last year. And it came at a time when conservatives have been bolder about attacks on Islam and Muslims generally - not just the religion's extremists. In this environment, King's committee set out to study "The Extent of Radicalization in the American Muslim Community and that Community's Response." King did not repeat some of his most controversial statements about Muslims, including an allegation that the vast majority of U.S. mosques are run by radicals. But in his opening statement, he said al-Qaeda had sought to recruit Americans for terrorist attacks and cited a public opinion poll that showed support for suicide bombings among a small fraction of Muslim men. "The overwhelming majority of Muslim Americans are outstanding Americans," King said. "But there are realities we cannot ignore." Seven witnesses Even so, the hearing raised more questions than it answered. The seven witnesses included no leaders of large Muslim groups and no national law enforcement officials. Instead, the committee heard narrow but powerful stories, like that of Melvin Bledsoe. Bledsoe, with thick-rimmed glasses and a Memphis drawl, described his son Carlos as staffers put photos of him on a stand. One showed a sweetly smiling young boy in a red basketball uniform. Another showed a young man in a tuxedo. Then Bledsoe described his son's conversion to radical Islam in college: He took down a photo of the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. He released a dog into the woods, he said, because Islam regards the animals as unclean. There were no pictures from this phase of his son's life, when he took the name Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad. Bledsoe's son eventually traveled to Yemen and then returned to the United States and allegedly opened fire on a military recruiting station in Arkansas. A soldier died in the attack. Radical extremism "is a big elephant in the room, " Bledsoe said. "Our society continues not to see it." Bihi then told the story of his nephew and of Bihi's difficulties getting mosque leaders to help track him down. During questions from Rep. Dan Lungren (R-Calif.), Bihi said he had been told that going to the authorities would mean winding up in prison at Guantanamo Bay, or worse. "If you do that, you're going to be responsible for the eradication of all mosques and Islamic society in North America," Bihi said he was told. "Would you call that intimidation?" Lungren responded. "Intimidation in its purest form," Bihi said. Potential turning point Beforehand, the hearing had been seen as a potential turning point in the political conversation about Islam. What signals would King and other send about the way Americans should talk about the religion and its American adherents? The answer was a muddle. King and others heaped praise on Muslims as a whole, saying that the vast majority are patriotic and law-abiding.

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But many Muslim institutions came in for criticism. A particular target was the Council on American-Islamic Relations, one of the country's largest Muslim advocacy groups. After Los Angeles County Sheriff Leroy Baca mentioned his dealings with the group, Rep. Chip Cravaack (R-Minn.) challenged him. "You're dealing with a terrorist organization," said Cravaack, a former Navy and airline pilot. He cited what he said was evidence to that effect from the FBI. "They might be using you, sir." Baca, who praised the cooperation of California Muslim groups, said he had seen no evidence that CAIR was a terrorist group. "If the FBI has something to charge CAIR with, bring those charges forth and charge them in court," Baca said, triggering something like a group gasp in the packed hearing room. "We don't play around with criminals in my world. If CAIR is an organization that's a, quote, 'criminal organization,' prosecute them." After the hearing, Ellison said his breakdown had been uncharacteristic: He could not remember another such emotional moment in public. But he had met Hamdani's mother just before his testimony, he said. He then became emotional thinking about how, after Hamdani's death, there were rumors that the paramedic had been involved in the attacks - instead of a victim of them. "Something about meeting his mother caught me off guard," Ellison said later. "Here's an American guy, in every way. And, even in death, he still has to struggle to not be known as 'just one of the Muslims.' " Rep. Peter King's Muslim hearing: Plenty of drama, less substance March 10, 2011; 11:27 PM http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/article/2011/03/10/AR2011031002045.html?wpisrc=nl_pmheadline

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03/10/2011 12:59 PM Blocking the Dictator's Billions Germany Freezes Gadhafi's Accounts The international community is moving to break Moammar Gadhafi's power. In Germany, Finance Minister Rainer Brüderle has ordered the freezing of assets held in the country by the Libyan regime worth billions. The move comes as calls mount in Europe for further sanctions. The German government is taking steps to increase pressure on Libyan dictator Moammar Gadhafi to step down. On Thursday, German Economics Minister Rainer Brüderle of the business-friendly Free Democratic Party (FDP) issued an order to freeze access to Libyan bank accounts. The decision will affect around 193 accounts at 14 financial institutions based in Germany, as well as the account of the Libyan Central Bank at Germany's central bank, the Bundesbank. According to the Finance Ministry, the decision will freeze billions of euros of assets. "The measures taken are a clear reaction to developments in Libya," a statement from the Finance Ministry read. "The brutal oppression of Libyans' right to freedom can no longer be financed with money that has been placed in German banks." The immediate freezing of Libyan assets appears to be part of a planned tightening of financial sanctions against Libya. Media reports suggest the government may have moved swiftly out of fear that representatives of the Libyan regime could have sought to pull money out of Germany before expected additional sanctions are applied at the European Union level. In addition to the Libyan central bank, Brüderle's decision applies to the Libya Africa Investment Portfolio, which includes around $70 billion in state funds from the Libyan Foreign Bank and the Libyan Investment Authority. Britain and Germany Call for Joint EU Position Germany and Britain have both called for tougher sanctions. Ahead of two meetings in Brussels on Thursday -- one of NATO defense ministers, the other of EU foreign ministers --- German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle and British Foreign Secretary William Hague wrote a joint letter to EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton, calling for a unified European front. "The EU should agree to an ambitious, clear response with a series of concrete actions both for the short and longer term," reads the letter according to the BBC and the UK's Press Association. Gadhafi, the letter adds, "has to step aside to allow for a true democratic transformation of the country." The ministers have called for a joint EU statement rejecting cooperation with Gadhafi's regime. But the demands are reportedly not tied to a suspension of diplomatic relations. For now, diplomats are just seeking further ways to "isolate" Gadhafi. The letter also says the upheaval on the southern edge of the Mediterranean presents Europe with a "challenge and opportunity on a scale matching the revolutions of 1989" in Eastern Europe. But it warns that the EU must find tailored solutions for each country. "Our vision is a comprehensive partnership of equals between the peoples of Europe and its neighborhood, underpinned by deeper and wider economic integration," the letter says. "We can achieve this by a custom-made cooperation of the European Union

158 with those that want this partnership and see in it an opportunity to support the changes they want themselves." An emergency summit on Libya of all EU heads of government is planned for Friday. The draft of a closing statement suggests that leaders of the 27-member bloc will call for Gadhafi's immediate resignation. dsl -- with dpa and other wires URL:http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,750109,00.html RELATED SPIEGEL ONLINE LINKS: Zero Hour in the Middle East: What the Arab World's Past Can Tell Us About Its Future (03/08/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,749537,00.html Debate Builds Steam: West Considers No-Fly Zone for Libya (03/08/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,749678,00.html Divided Response to Libyan Crisis: 'The Maneuvering of EU Member States Is a Scandal' (03/07/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,749376,00.html

03/10/2011 03:59 PM The World from Berlin 'More Realism Would Do No Harm' The European Union as well as NATO are meeting this week to discuss the notion of a no-fly zone in Libya. Offering protection from Gadhafi's jets for the rebels may sound noble, but German commentators on Thursday are skeptical. A no-fly zone, they argue, would mean nothing short of war. The uprising in Libya against Moammar Gadhafi's faltering regime has stalled, and this week both the European Union and NATO will meet to discuss what the international community can do. German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle recently warned that a much-discussed no-fly zone is feasible but might grow into "military deployment" -- which nevertheless marks a cautious shift in tone from the end of February, when he said Berlin had ruled out all support for any military adventure. On Wednesday the EU's chief diplomat, Catherine Ashton, gave a speech in Brussels promising to "work to support the emergence of a new Libya." She announced new sanctions against the Gadhafi regime, including a freeze on Libyan state assets (as opposed just to the personal bank accounts of regime figures). But she stopped short of recognizing the rebels in Benghazi as legitimate representatives of the Libyan people, and she didn't use the phrase "no-fly zone" at all. Instead, she promised more humanitarian aid. Envoys from Libyan rebel groups as well as Gadhafi's government have meanwhile arrived in Paris, ahead of Friday's emergency EU summit on Libya. Mahmud Gebril, a former Gadhafi minister now helping to lead the resistance, has urged the EU to "paralyze" the Libyan air force and recognize the rebels diplomatically. But Gadhafi himself is still very much alive. He tried to warn off interlopers on Wednesday by saying on state TV, "The colonialist countries are hatching a plot to humiliate the Libyan people, reduce them to slavery and control the oil." The West is obviously in a hurry to do something. It just isn't clear what. But as NATO holds a summit in Brussels on Thursday to discuss the no-fly zone, opinion has moved firmly against the idea in the German press. The Financial Times Deutschland argues:

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"The call for a no-fly zone derives from gut feeling. One wants to do something because of the horrible violence as well as the obvious divide between good (the opposition) and evil (Moammar Gadhafi)." "This gut feeling is understandable … But the gut is a poor counsellor. A military intervention in Libya -- a no-fly zone can be called nothing else -- presents unforeseeable risks and would possibly harm the Libyan people more than help." The center-right Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung writes: "Some of the debate over a no-fly zone in Libya has been conducted with astonishing frivolity, especially in Germany. Following the statements of several German politicians, not least the foreign minister (Westerwelle), one might have the mistaken idea that it would involve a limited engagement just to protect everyday Libyans, requiring no more than a green light from the UN and the Arab League. It's a rich position for a political class that rarely trusts itself to call war by its true name." "That a fresh attack by Western powers against a Muslim nation would not go down well on the Arab street has apparently, in the meantime, occurred to several people in the Chancellery." "Further sanctions against Gadhafi now being prepared may not wholly miss their targets. (The West) should also make clear to the rebels that a peaceful resolution is preferable. That might sound unsatisfactory in light of all the bloodshed; but the many failed Western interventions over the last few years would suggest that invasions don't always ease the suffering of ordinary people." The left-leaning Berliner Zeitung writes: "The speech in Brussels (by Catherine Ashton) shows above all the EU's powerlessness in foreign affairs. Crises like the one in Libya overwhelm the EU structurally. The situation there changes every hour, but the EU needs days or weeks to develop a common position. Ten days passed before the first sanctions were set against the Gadhafi clan -- plenty of time to clear out European accounts. Tomorrow EU leaders will meet for an emergency summit and discuss the idea of a no-fly zone. Even if they arrive at a powerful 'maybe,' without American support and a minimum of tolerance by the Russians and Chinese (on the UN Security Council), nothing will happen. Gadhafi could go on bombing for weeks. The EU in 2011 would like to be big and strong. In fact its parochialism has only grown more prominent." The center-left Süddeutsche Zeitung writes: "The Libyan rebels, supposedly, want a no-fly zone, but who exactly speaks for whom? The political situation is impossible to grasp; the military situation, too. American generals have warned about a 'complex' state of affairs which could make the imposition of a no-fly zone far more complicated than it was in Iraq. In any case (the no-fly zone) would be the first step toward outright intervention. But such an intervention must follow a long chain of efforts to de-escalate." "Hard sanctions have just been imposed on the regime, and they need time to work before any further steps can be taken. More realism in this debate would do no harm." -- Michael Scott Moore URL: http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,750146,00.html

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Ideas Can Overthrow Regimes by Robert P. Murphy on March 10, 2011 The political upheaval in the Middle East underscores one of the most profound aspects of Ludwig von Mises's worldview: all governments ultimately rely on the consent of the governed. Although the claim at first sounds preposterous — who could possibly argue that a dictatorship is subject to the will of the people? — there is an important sense in which it is true. Mises's insight has ramifications for choosing methods in the struggle for liberty, and it shows the critical importance of educating the masses in sound doctrines. Mises on Might and Ideology. In his magnum opus, Human Action, Mises explains the connection between might and ideology: A durable system of government must rest upon an ideology acknowledged by the majority. The "real" factor, the "real forces" that are the foundation of government and convey to the rulers the power to use violence against renitent minority groups are essentially ideological, moral, and spiritual. Rulers who failed to recognize this first principle of government and, relying upon the alleged irresistibility of their armed troops, disdained the spirit and ideas have finally been overthrown by the assault of their adversaries. The interpretation of might as a "real" factor not dependent upon ideologies, quite common to many political and historical books, is erroneous. … He who interprets might as physical or "real" power to carry on and considers violent action as the very foundation of government, sees conditions from the narrow point of view of subordinate officers in charge of sections of an army or police force. … However, things are different for the head of the government. He must aim at preservation of the morale of the armed forces and of the loyalty of the rest of the population. For these moral factors are the only "real" elements upon which continuance of his mastery rests. His power dwindles if the ideology that supports it loses force. With this foundation, Mises later in the book draws a connection between governments and the approval of the masses: [Classical] liberalism realizes that the rulers, who are always a minority, cannot lastingly remain in office if not supported by the consent of the majority of those ruled. Whatever the system of government may be, the foundation upon which it is built and rests is always the opinion of those ruled that to obey and to be loyal to this government better serves their own interests than insurrection and the establishment of another regime. The majority has the power to do away with an unpopular government and uses this power whenever it becomes convinced that its own welfare requires it. Even Dictators Rest on Ideology: Many people scoff when they first hear Mises's claims. Surely there is a sense in which a dictator, who violently suppresses all opposition, rules through force and not consent? Yet the actual behavior of dictators proves the deep truth in Mises's analysis. For example, the very mark of a closed, totalitarian society is that the media are all controlled by the government. Even graffiti challenging the regime is very quickly removed, far more quickly than authorities would clean up something comparable in a relatively open society. The schools serve as indoctrination camps, teaching the next 161 generation about the virtues of the regime. Finally, the supreme ruler might spend hours every week giving long-winded speeches, not explaining how many guns and secret police agents are at his disposal, but on the contrary explaining how fortunate the people are to be taken care of by such a wise and benevolent leader. "It is ultimately ideas that determine which way the soldiers point their guns." These tell-tale signs of a dictatorship all reinforce Mises's observation: the regime can only last if it maintains the illusion that it is beneficial to the masses. Mere physical strength is not sufficient, because it is ultimately ideas that determine which way the soldiers and police point their guns. We can interpret events in the Middle East through this prism. To understand why Mubarak was toppled relatively easily, in contrast to the bloodshed in Libya, we need to push the analysis deeper and ask why Mubarak lost the support of the army, whereas Gaddafi maintained loyalty on the part of a sizable number of subordinates who were willing to kill and be killed on his behalf. As Mises explained, such an analysis of "power politics" doesn't primarily concern military statistics on troop strength. Instead, the analysis would focus on the prevailing ideologies animating both the armed forces and the general public who were rising up against the regime. Lessons for Liberty: Looking through a Misesian lens, there are two important lessons we can draw from the turmoil in the Middle East. First, we see that it is possible to topple a hated regime without resorting to a civil war. Although American commentators are bickering over just how peaceful the Egyptian mobs were, it is undeniable that few people, even six months ago, would have predicted that Mubarak's implosion would occur so spontaneously and with such little loss of life. The second lesson is the importance of having a sound ideology, so that the masses have a shared vision of how a free society works and what is needed to maintain it. Everyone the world over longs for freedom, and no one enjoys living under a brutal dictatorship. But if Egyptians believe that the historical success of the United States came from its periodic elections — as opposed to its relative respect for the institution of private property — then they are in for a rude awakening. Both lessons underscore the critical importance of educating for liberty. If enough people understand freedom and withdraw their consent, an oppressive regime will topple under its own weight, as Étienne de la Boétie described so eloquently. Yet to put something durable and superior in the old regime's place, the common man must also know more than mere slogans like "liberty" and "democracy." It's not necessary that the majority become formally trained in political science and economics, but it is necessary that "conventional wisdom" is indeed wise on such matters. Unfortunately, too many "freedom fighters" around the world seem to think the problem with oppressive governments is the specific personalities at the top, as opposed to the institutions themselves. Conclusion. Educational institutions such as the Mises Institute (including the online Mises Academy) have always been in the business of educating for liberty, and with the Internet their outreach is truly global. If the human striving for freedom is ever to be realized, a necessary first step will be promoting a sound ideology. http://us1.campaign- archive1.com/?u=bf16b152ccc444bdbbcc229e4&id=cab4564dae&e=8e3ddd0757

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Africa March 10, 2011 Libyan Rebels Flee Strategic Town Under Heavy Attack By ANTHONY SHADID and DAVID D. KIRKPATRICK RAS LANUF, Libya — Rebel fighters fled this strategic refinery town on Thursday under ferocious rocket attacks and airstrikes by forces loyal to the Libyan leader, Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi. The rout capped several days of fighting as bold plans of a westward drive to Tripoli by the undermanned and ill-equipped rebel army were dashed by the superior Qaddafi forces, which are seeking to retake several eastern oil cities that had slipped from the government’s control in the first days of the uprising. Heavy shelling here seemed to presage a final assault by government troops. Under a steadily escalating barrage, hundreds of rebel fighters in dozens of trucks mounted with heavy weapons retreated east along the coastal road. In a chaotic scene at a checkpoint five miles east of town, fighters shot anti-aircraft guns randomly and ineffectually into the sky while arguing whether to flee or to try to establish a new defensive front. As NATO member nations met in Brussels to discuss military options for Libya, the rebels cursed the United States and its allies for failing to impose a no-flight zone. Morale among the fighters seemed to be weakening, even as Agence-France Presse reported that the French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, had recognized the opposition Libyan National Council and was said to be prepared to propose airstrikes on Colonel Qaddafi’s command headquarters. “There is no comparison between our weapons and theirs,” said Mohammed al-Houni, a 25-year-old economics student. “They’re trained, they’re organized. They got their training in the Soviet Union or someplace. It’s tough these days, but we still have God.” Explosions rocked a mosque and a hospital that workers abandoned in the early afternoon, leaving behind only the body of a man in civilian clothes who they said had been shot in the head by a sniper. The blast near the mosque sent clouds of dust over dozens of worshipers at noon prayers. Sirens howled, anti-aircraft gunners blazed away at clear skies and two ambulances speeding from the hospital crashed into each other. Rumors ran through crowds of fighters, residents and medics that the bombardment had been unleashed by naval vessels off shore, but no such ships could be seen in the blue Mediterranean waters, and other fighters said the barrage had consisted mainly of surface-to-surface missiles. From a minaret, the mosque’s loudspeaker, which has not been silenced by the bombardment, carried the words of a cleric chanting: “When you side with God, God will support you.” But the amplified promise competed with staccato ground fire and the boom of an explosion. At least one person was killed, doctors said as they evacuated wounded from the hospital.

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For days, Ras Lanuf — the frontline between loyalist and rebel forces — has been fiercely contested at a time when NATO officials in Brussels are pondering whether to impose a no-flight zone over Libyan air space. There were also new reports of loyalist air strikes much further east towards the rebel headquarters of Benghazi. One government airstrike seemed aimed at an insurgent checkpoint on the eastern approaches of Ras Lanuf, but bombings were also reported at a checkpoint in the town of Brega, about a hundred miles to the east of here. If confirmed, the attacks on Brega would suggest that loyalist forces were ranging further towards Benghazi, possibly attacking rebel supply lines. On Wednesday, the budding opposition army fired back with missile fusillades and rocket-propelled grenades to the west of Ras Lanuf. Backed by their heavy weaponry, the rebels managed to advance on foot for a few miles to the west, witnesses said, until the fighters were frozen by fire from government mortars and heavy machine guns and forced to retreat in trucks. At least five rebels died in the fighting. In the western half of the country, elite government troops continued to pound the besieged rebel-held city of Zawiyah, only 30 miles from Tripoli, the capital and Colonel Qaddafi’s stronghold. While the government claims to have subdued opposition in Zawiyah there has been no independent corroboration of that assertion and reporters are barred from even approaching the town. The rebels have held out against a withering assault by Colonel Qaddafi’s forces, including snipers and tanks in close-quarters urban combat. Witnesses in the city have reported heavy damage to buildings from tank shelling around the city’s central Martyrs’ Square, the scene of heavy fighting in recent days. Government tanks lined the square on Thursday, the witnesses said, but there was still fighting in the streets. Throughout the uprising, the government has gone to great lengths to appear open to independent reporting by the international news media. However, as the fighting has intensified, reports have surfaced of intimidation of journalists by Libyan security services. On Thursday, it emerged that correspondents for British and Brazilian newspapers who were traveling together to the embattled city of Zawiyah had been detained on Sunday and were still in custody. Their release was said to be imminent. On Wednesday, the BBC said that three of its editorial employees had been seized by sedcurity forces and beaten and terrorized with mock executions. Besides tightening the leash on reporters, the government has made numerous ham- handed efforts to distort their coverage. On Wednesday, Libyan state television broadcast scenes of what it said was a wild celebration by Qaddafi loyalists cheering, pumping fists and waving green flags. But the scene was later determined to have been shot on a highway outside the capital. On Wednesday night, the government brought vans of foreign journalists to a sports field miles from the center of town at midnight, where about 200 young men protected by a heavy military guard cheered for Colonel Qaddafi and set off fireworks. The rally ended about an hour later when the Qaddafi forces began handing out bags of rice, cartons of olive oil, cases of soda and boxes of other groceries, apparently in payment for participation in the rally. After The apparent rout of the rebel forces in Ras Lanuf and the evident superiority of Colonel Qaddafi’s forces and their willingness to use airstrikes to press their advantage, 164 seemed to confront Western nations meeting at NATO headquarters in Brussels on Thursday with an ever more insistent choice between aiding the rebels, perhaps with a no-flight zone, or standing by as Colonel Qaddafi reasserts his grip on the country. The urgency of the issue was underscored in Washington on Thursday where the United States top intelligence officer, James Clapper, said that Colonel Qaddafi “appears to be hunkering down for the duration.” Moreover, Mr. Clapper added, the government’s advantage in military and logistical resources would ensure that, “over longer term, that the regime will prevail." European countries like Britain and France seem to favor a no-flight zone, while the United States defense secretary, Robert M. Gates, has underscored the difficulties of imposing such a ban, though he has seemed to soften his resistance in recent days. Britain and France are working on a United Nations resolution to authorize a no-flight zone, although it was unclear whether such a measure could gain the necessary votes of Russia and China in the Security Council. At an appearance in Congress, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton cautioned on Thursday against any rush to impose a no-flight zone over Libya, particularly without broad international backing. "Absent international authorization, the United States acting alone would be stepping into a situation the consequences of which would be unforeseeable," Mrs. Clinton told a House Appropriations subcommittee. Past no-flight zones have had mixed results, she said. The one over Iraq “did not prevent Saddam Hussein from slaughtering people on the ground and it did not get him out of office,” she said. Nor, she added, did a no-flight zone in Bosnia drive the Serbian leader, Slobodan Milosovic, from power “until we had troops on the ground,” according to news wire accounts. Mrs. Clinton will be traveling next week to two countries flanking Libya — Egypt and Tunisia — and plans to meet with members of the Libyan opposition in what will be the highest-level contacts between American officials and the forces opposing Col. Qaddafi. Anthony Shadid reported from Ras Lanuf, Libya, David D. Kirkpatrick from Tripoli, Libya, and Brian Knowlton in Washington. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/11/world/africa/11libya.html?_r=1&hp

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10/03/2011 à 10h04

Monde arabe, l'appel de la liberté

Après la Tunisie et l'Egypte, la Libye, le Yémen, Bahreïn vacillent sous la pression du peuple. La France est le premier pays à reconnaître officiellement l'opposition libyenne Heure par heure monde Arabe Pour Paris, l'opposition est «la seule représentante légitime du peuple libyen». La ville de Zawiyah est aux mains des forces de Kadhafi. Par LIBÃ‰RATION.FR

Des rebelles devant une terminal pétrolier touché par des bombardements à Ras Lanouf, le 9 mars. (Asmaa Waguih / Reuters) L'Essentiel: •En Libye, la bataille est aussi diplomatique entre Kadhafi et l'opposition. Les deux partis ont envoyé des émissaires en Europe. L'opposition veut convaincre l'UE et l'Otan d'établir une zone d'exclusion aérienne. La France a reconnu le Conseil national de transition, comme le seul "représentant légitime du peuple libyen». •Ce jeudi matin se tient à Bruxelles une réunion des ministres européens des Affaires étrangères sur la Libye et une rencontre de l'Otan.

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•Signe de sa faiblesse sur le terrain ces derniers jours, l'opposition aurait perdu Zawiyah, une ville proche de Tripoli. Kadhafi bombarde, comme chaque jour, Ras Lanouf. •Au Yémen, la situation politique est dans l'impasse. •Relire la synthèse de la journée d'hier. 12h30, Maroc. Les réformes démocratiques annoncées mercredi soir par le roi Mohammed VI du Maroc ont un "sens historique" et "semblent avoir une portée importante", affirme jeudi le secrétaire d'Etat espagnol aux Affaires étrangères, Juan Antonio Yanez-Barnuevo. 12h15, Libye. La France annonce qu'elle a reconnu le Conseil national de transition (CNT) libyen, qui réunit l'opposition au régime du colonel Kadhafi, comme le seul "représentant légitime du peuple libyen". Elle enverra prochainement à Benghazi un ambassadeur. Berlin sceptique. Le secrétaire d'Etat allemand aux Affaires étrangères, Werner Hoyer, se montre lui sceptique quant à une reconnaissance du Conseil national de transition (CNT). "Je considère (que) la situation (est) encore trop confuse pour décider comment on doit procéder", dit-il au quotidien Frankurfer Rundschau. Même si le gouvernement actuel est "discrédité", les structures d'un gouvernement de transition "ne sont pas encore claires", ajoute-t- il Werner Hoyer. 12 heures, Egypte. Le nouveau ministre de l'Intérieur égyptien Mansour al- Issaoui promet que les lignes téléphoniques privées ne seront plus mises sur écoutes sans autorisation, révélant l'étendue du contrôle exercé sur la société sous le régime autoritaire du président Hosni Moubarak. "L'ère de la mise sur écoutes de lignes de téléphone privées est révolue", indique- t-il dans une interview à une chaîne de télévision privée dont des extraits ont été publiés jeudi par l'agence officielle Mena. 11h45, Libye. Deux obus sont tombés sur le centre de la cité pétrolière libyenne de Ras Lanouf, tenue par la rébellion. Auparavant, les attaques aériennes se concentrés sur les installations pétrolières à l'extérieur de la ville. 11h30, Libye. Des journalistes de la BBC ont été molestés à Zawiyah. Les journalistes anglais ont été arrêtés alors qu'ils tentaient de rendre compte de la situation dans la ville de Zawiyah, qui serait jeudi soir retombée aux mains des forces de Kadhafi.

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Déténus lundi pendant 21h, ils ont été frappés par les forces spéciales, mais «beaucoup moins que les autres prisonniers qui étaient là». Accusés d'espionnage, «nous étions tous convaincus que nous allions mourir», expliquent- ils. Ils sont finalement de retour sain et sauf en Grande-Bretagne. --->Lire l'article et voir le témoignage vidéo de la BBC, ici. 11h15, Libye. Le président du Comité international de la Croix-Rouge (CICR), Jakob Kellenberger, indique ce jeudi se préparer au "pire" en Libye, évoquant une "guerre civile".

(Une distribution d'eau dans le camp de Ras Jedir en Tunisie, le 9 mars, Pascal Rossignol/Reuters) 11 heures, Libye. Paris reconnaît le Conseil national de transition (CNT) comme "représentant légitime". 10h45, Libye. La ville de Zawiyah à 40 km à l'ouest de Tripoli est jeudi sous le contrôle des forces fidèles au colonel Mouammar Kadhafi, après plusieurs jours de violents affrontements avec les insurgés, indique à l'AFP un habitant de la ville joint par téléphone. "La ville est actuellement sous le contrôle de l'armée", indique à l'AFP ce témoin sous couvert de l'anonymat. "Les combats ont cessé hier soir. Aujourd'hui, la situation était calme. J'en ai profité pour quitter la ville avec ma famille. Je me dirige actuellement vers Jedayem", une petite localité à 3 km à l'ouest de Zawiyah, sur la route menant à Tripoli. "Les téléphones sont coupés à Zawiyah. Il n'y a aucun moyen de communiquer. Nous avons préféré quitter la ville", ajoute-t-il. 10h30, Arabie Saoudite. Ce pays va-t-il à son tour se soulever? Une «journée de colère» est prévue vendredi. Le régime est nerveux, les saoudiens espèrent enfin des réformes. Lire le décryptage d'Elodie Auffray, sur Libération.fr.

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(Une centaine de personnes ont manifesté le 9 mars dans la ville chiite de Qatif, réclamant la libération de prisonniers, Reuters). 10h15, Yémen. L'opposition parlementaire yéménite rejette l'initiative du président Ali Abdallah Saleh qui a promis de profondes réformes politiques, la jugeant "dépassée" selon son porte-parole.

(Des manifestants devant l'université de Sanaa, le 9 mars, Khaled Abdullah Ali Al Mahdi / Reuters) "L'initiative du président est dépassée, elle constitue l'acte de décès du régime politique dont les manifestants réclament la fin", déclare Mohammad al-Sabri, le porte-parole de l'opposition parlementaire. 10 heures, Libye. Un avion de chasse de l'armée libyenne mène un raid contre des positions rebelles à l'est de Ras Lanouf, ville pétrolière stratégique tenue par les insurgés, selon un journaliste de l'AFP sur place.

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(Des rebelles devant le terminal pétrolier de Al-Sedr à Ras Lanouf, après que ce dernier a été touché par un bombardement, le 9 mars, REUTERS/Asmaa Waguih) 9h30, Libye. Un émissaire du dirigeant libyen Mouammar Kadhafi arrive matin à Athènes où il doit rencontrer le secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires étrangères, Dimitris Dollis, pour des entretiens juste avant le sommet européen de Bruxelles. Le Premier ministre grec, Georges Papandréou, dont le pays entretient depuis longtemps des relations privilégiées avec la Libye, a eu une conversation téléphonique mardi soir avec Mouammar Kadhafi à l'initiative de ce dernier. 9heures. De la Mauritanie à l'Iran, la carte des pays qui peuvent basculer, consultez notre carte interactive.

8heures, Libye. L'Inde annonce qu'elle s'apprête à achever l'évacuation de ses ressortissants ayant demandé à quitter la Libye, les derniers rotations aériennes sont prévues dans la journée. Environ 85% des 18.000 Indiens travaillant en Libye, soit 15.000 personnes, auront été évacués, les 3.000 restants ayant choisi de rester dans le pays. 170

Dans la nuit de mercredi à jeudi, Maroc. Le roi Mohammed VI du Maroc a annoncé mercredi soir d'importantes réformes démocratiques allant notamment vers un renforcement du Premier ministre et l'"élargissement des libertés individuelles", dans son premier discours à la nation depuis les manifestations du 20 février. "Nous avons décidé d'entreprendre une réforme constitutionnelle globale", a déclaré le souverain, soulignant son "engagement ferme de donner une forte impulsion à la dynamique réformatrice profonde (...) en cours". http://www.liberation.fr/monde-arabe,100011 Cuadro de indicadores de desarrollo humano

PAÍS Clasif.:IDH Tasa escolar. s/Niv. Pob. Población (000) Tunez 81 76,2 2,55% 10.374 Egipto 101 76,4 <2% 84.474 Libia n.d. n.d n.d 6.500 Argelia 84 73,6 n.d. 35.423 Marruecos 114 61 2,5% 32.381 Mauritania 136 50,6 21,16% 3.366 Sudán 154 39,9 n.d. 43.192 Siria 111 84,7 n.d. 22.505 Jordania 82 91,1 n.d. 6.472 Arabia S. 55 78,5 n.d. 26.246 Yemen 133 54,4 17,53% 24.256 Omán n.d 68,2 n.d. 2.905 Bahrein 39 90,4 n.d. 807 Kuwait 47 72,6 n.d. 3.051 Irán 70 82,3 <2% 75.078 Media TOTAL pond. (pob) 99/169 71 377.030

El país promedio se encuentra al comienzo de la quinta decila (y del tercer quintil) de la distribución de países por IDH (de menor a mayor) http://labs.liberation.fr/organograms/monde-infographie-2011-fev-23-regimes-autoritaires-mediterranee

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March 9, 2011 The Case for a No-Fly Zone By NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF “This is a pretty easy problem, for crying out loud.” For all the hand-wringing in Washington about a no-fly zone over Libya, that’s the verdict of Gen. Merrill McPeak, a former Air Force chief of staff. He flew more than 6,000 hours, half in fighter aircraft, and helped oversee no-fly zones in Iraq and the Adriatic, and he’s currently mystified by what he calls the “wailing and gnashing of teeth” about imposing such a zone on Libya. I called General McPeak to get his take on a no-fly zone, and he was deliciously blunt: “I can’t imagine an easier military problem,” he said. “If we can’t impose a no-fly zone over a not even third-rate military power like Libya, then we ought to take a hell of a lot of our military budget and spend it on something usable.” He continued: “Just flying a few jets across the top of the friendlies would probably be enough to ground the Libyan Air Force, which is the objective.” General McPeak added that there would be no need to maintain 24/7 coverage over Libya. As long as the Libyan Air Force knew that there was some risk of interception, its pilots would be much less motivated to drop bombs and more inclined to defect. “If we can’t do this, what can we do?” he asked, adding: “I think it would have a real impact. It might change their calculation of who might come out on top. Just the mere announcement of this might have an impact.” Along with a no-fly zone, another important step would be to use American military aircraft to jam Libyan state television and radio propaganda and Libyan military communications. General McPeak said such jamming would be “dead easy.” As he acknowledged, any intervention also has unforeseeable risks, and, frankly, it’s a good thing when a president counts to 10 before taking military action. But I hope that President Obama isn’t counting to a googolplex. The secretary of defense, Robert Gates, has said that a no-fly zone would be “a big operation in a big country” and would begin with an attack on Libyan air defense systems. But General McPeak said that the no-fly zone would be imposed over those parts of the country that Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi doesn’t control. That may remove the need to take out air defense systems pre-emptively, he said. And, in any case, he noted that the United States operated a no-fly zone over Iraq for more than a decade without systematically eradicating all Iraqi air defense systems in that time. If the Obama administration has exaggerated the risks of a no-fly zone, it seems to have downplayed the risks of continued passivity. There is some risk that this ends up like the abortive uprisings in Hungary in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, or in southern Iraq in 1991. 172

The tide in Libya seems to have shifted, with the Qaddafi forces reimposing control over Tripoli and much of western Libya. Now Colonel Qaddafi is systematically using his air power to gain ground even in the east. As the International Institute for Strategic Studies, an arms analysis group in London, noted this week, “The major advantage of the pro-regime forces at the moment is their ability to deploy air power.” I’m chilled by a conversation I just had by phone with a Libyan friend with military connections who has been candid in the past. In our latest conversation, he sounded as if our conversation was being closely monitored, and he praised Colonel Qaddafi to the skies. I can’t tell whether he believed that or had a gun pointed to his head. Either way, his new tone is an indication that the government has the upper hand now in Tripoli. Senator John Kerry, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, told me that he tends to favor a no-fly zone — along with the jamming of communications — as soon as is practical. “The last thing you want is a 20-year debate on who lost this moment for the Libyan people,” Mr. Kerry noted. I was a strong opponent of the Iraq war, but this feels different. We would not have to send any ground troops to Libya, and a no-fly zone would be executed at the request of Libyan rebel forces and at the “demand” of six Arab countries in the gulf. The Arab League may endorse the no-fly zone as well, and, ideally, Egypt and Tunisia would contribute bases and planes or perhaps provide search-and-rescue capabilities. “I don’t think its particularly constructive for our long-term strategic interests, as well as for our values, to say Qaddafi has to go,” Senator Kerry told me, “and then allow a delusional, megalomaniacal, out-of-touch leader to use mercenaries to kill his people.” So let’s remember the risks of inaction — and not psych ourselves out. For crying out loud.

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/10/opinion/10kristof.html?ref=opinion

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Africa

March 9, 2011 Hoard of Cash Lets Qaddafi Extend Fight Against Rebels By JAMES RISEN and ERIC LICHTBLAU WASHINGTON — The Libyan leader Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi has “tens of billions” in cash secretly hidden away in Tripoli, allowing him to prolong his fight against rebel forces despite an international freeze on many of the Libyan government’s assets, according to American and other intelligence officials. Colonel Qaddafi has control over the huge cash deposits, which have been stored at the Libyan Central Bank and other banks around the Libyan capital in recent years, the officials said. Since the protests and fighting erupted, some of the money may have been moved into Colonel Qaddafi’s Tripoli compound, Bab Al Azizia, according to one person with ties to the Libyan government. While United States intelligence officials said they could not confirm such a move, one official said that Colonel Qaddafi “likely has tens of billions in cash that he can access inside Libya.” The money — in Libyan dinars, United States dollars and possibly other foreign currencies — allows Colonel Qaddafi to pay his troops, African mercenaries and political supporters in the face of a determined uprising, said the intelligence officials, speaking on the condition of anonymity. The huge cash reserves have, at least temporarily, diminished the impact of economic sanctions on Colonel Qaddafi and his government. The possibility that he could resist the rebellion in his country for a sustained period could place greater pressure for action on the Obama administration and European leaders, who had hoped that the Libyan leader would be forced from power quickly. President Obama’s national security team met at the White House on Wednesday to discuss how to oust the Libyan leader, including the possible imposition of a no-flight zone, but made no decisions, according to the White House press secretary, Jay Carney. The United States has relied so far on imposing financial pain on the Qaddafi government, freezing nearly $32 billion of Libya’s assets, according to Treasury Department officials. The United Nations and the European Union have imposed separate sanctions and have frozen assets as well. But those actions have been limited to funds in the international banking system and to business investments outside of Libya. Inside the country, the intelligence officials said, Colonel Qaddafi has amassed a huge rainy day fund of cash. Kenneth Barden, a lawyer who specializes in Middle East financing and advises financial institutions on ways to guard against money laundering, said there were indications that Colonel Qaddafi had moved billions of dollars in assets just days or

174 weeks before the outbreak of violence in Tripoli, apparently to protect his family wealth from global sanctions. “The money that is kept in Qaddafi’s name is probably small,” Mr. Barden said, “but he’s got a lot in the names of family members and close associates.” But Colonel Qaddafi probably began hoarding liquid assets far earlier, officials said. He has built up Libya’s cash reserves in the years since the West began lifting economic sanctions on his government in 2004, following his decision to renounce unconventional weapons and cooperate with the United States in the fight against Al Qaeda. That led to a flood of Western investment in the Libyan oil and natural gas industries, and access to international oil and financial markets. Colonel Qaddafi, however, apparently feared that sanctions would someday be reimposed and secretly began setting aside cash in Tripoli that could not be seized by Western banks, according to the officials. He used the Libyan Central Bank, which he controls, and private banks in the city. He also directed that many government transactions, including some sales on the international oil spot market, be conducted in cash. “He learned to keep cash around,” said the person with ties to Libyan government officials, who asked to remain anonymous for fear of putting them in jeopardy. The reserves are likely to prove even more critical to Colonel Qaddafi as the government’s revenues dwindle from oil production. With the unrest, Libya is pumping just 300,000 to 400,000 barrels of oil a day, down sharply from its typical production of 1.8 million barrels a day, according to Holly Pattenden, head of oil and gas analysis at the Business Monitor International in London. The current levels would be worth about $30 million to $40 million a day, but export markets are now virtually closed to the country, as international banks refuse to provide letters of credit for oil company shipments, according to Greg Priddy, a global oil analyst with the Eurasia Group in Washington. “I don’t think they are deriving a lot of income from the export market right now,” Mr. Priddy said. “The international banks don’t want to touch it.” Still, several small Libyan refineries remain open, and Mr. Priddy said they were probably refining oil for the domestic market and fuel for Colonel Qaddafi’s military operations. With other sources of income drying up, the Libyan leader is heavily dependent on his pile of cash, and apparently spending it to stay in power. He is making cash payments to political supporters in Tripoli to retain their loyalty, while also buying the services of African mercenaries. The person close to the government estimated that 3,000 to 4,000 mercenaries from Mali, Niger and a rebel group operating in Darfur, Sudan, the Justice and Equality Movement, have been hired by the Libyan government for at least $1,000 a day apiece. United States intelligence officials said they could not confirm those numbers or amount of payments. Intelligence officials and other experts credit Colonel Qaddafi with becoming very adept at hiding his money, and said it had often been difficult to distinguish between the assets of the Libyan government, including its $70 billion sovereign wealth fund, and the Qaddafi family’s assets. Mr. Qaddafi’s history of financial dealings indicate that he has “surreptitious accounts and unaccounted sums that are significant enough to give him security even if the world 175 caves in on him,” said David Aufhauser, a top Treasury Department official in President George W. Bush’s administration. Justice Department documents show that Libya had worked with Swiss banks to launder international banking transactions for years, with “hundreds” of senior Libyan officials allowed to surreptitiously move money. Tim Niblock, an expert on Libya and professor at the University of Exeter in Britain, said he believed that Colonel Qaddafi had hidden cash as far back as the 1990s. He said that it was part of a larger effort by the Libyan leader to protect his money from both the international community and his domestic foes. “He’s always aware that he faces problems from outside and within,” Professor Niblock said. “It would be quite foolish for him to not amass money for an eventuality like this.” Helene Cooper contributed reporting from Washington, and David Rohde from New York. Barclay Walsh contributed research from Washington. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/10/world/africa/10qaddafi.html?_r=1&nl=todayshead lines&emc=tha2

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March 9, 2011 Give Peaceful Resistance a Chance By ERICA CHENOWETH Middletown, Conn.

Jonathan Twingl THE rebellion in Libya stands out among the recent unrest in the Middle East for its widespread violence: unlike the protesters in Tunisia or Egypt, those in Libya quickly gave up pursuing nonviolent change and became an armed rebellion. And while the fighting in Libya is far from over, it’s not too early to ask a critical question: which is more effective as a force for change, violent or nonviolent resistance? Unfortunately for the Libyan rebels, research shows that nonviolent resistance is much more likely to produce results, while violent resistance runs a greater risk of backfiring. Consider the Philippines. Although insurgencies attempted to overthrow Ferdinand Marcos during the 1970s and 1980s, they failed to attract broad support. When the regime did fall in 1986, it was at the hands of the People Power movement, a nonviolent pro-democracy campaign that boasted more than two million followers, including laborers, youth activists and Catholic clergy. Indeed, a study I recently conducted with Maria J. Stephan, now a strategic planner at the State Department, compared the outcomes of hundreds of violent insurgencies with those of major nonviolent resistance campaigns from 1900 to 2006; we found that over 50 percent of the nonviolent movements succeeded, compared with about 25 percent of the violent insurgencies.

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Why? For one thing, people don’t have to give up their jobs, leave their families or agree to kill anyone to participate in a nonviolent campaign. That means such movements tend to draw a wider range of participants, which gives them more access to members of the regime, including security forces and economic elites, who often sympathize with or are even relatives of protesters. What’s more, oppressive regimes need the loyalty of their personnel to carry out their orders. Violent resistance tends to reinforce that loyalty, while civil resistance undermines it. When security forces refuse orders to, say, fire on peaceful protesters, regimes must accommodate the opposition or give up power — precisely what happened in Egypt. This is why the Egyptian president, Hosni Mubarak, took such great pains to use armed thugs to try to provoke the Egyptian demonstrators into using violence, after which he could have rallied the military behind him. But where Mr. Mubarak failed, Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi succeeded: what began as peaceful movement became, after a few days of brutal crackdown by his corps of foreign militiamen, an armed but disorganized rebel fighting force. A widely supported popular revolution has been reduced to a smaller group of armed rebels attempting to overthrow a brutal dictator. These rebels are at a major disadvantage, and are unlikely to succeed without direct foreign intervention. If the other uprisings across the Middle East remain nonviolent, however, we should be optimistic about the prospects for democracy there. That’s because, with a few exceptions — most notably Iran — nonviolent revolutions tend to lead to democracy. Although the change is not immediate, our data show that from 1900 to 2006, 35 percent to 40 percent of authoritarian regimes that faced major nonviolent uprisings had become democracies five years after the campaign ended, even if the campaigns failed to cause immediate regime change. For the nonviolent campaigns that succeeded, the figure increases to well over 50 percent. The good guys don’t always win, but their chances increase greatly when they play their cards well. Nonviolent resistance is about finding and exploiting points of leverage in one’s own society. Every dictatorship has vulnerabilities, and every society can find them. Erica Chenoweth, an assistant professor of government at Wesleyan University, is the co-author of the forthcoming “Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict.” http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/10/opinion/10chenoweth.html?nl=todaysheadlines&e mc=tha212

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March 9, 2011 Libya Calling By HISHAM MATAR London WATCHING events unfold in Tunisia and Egypt last month, the Libyan dictatorship became nervous. Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi’s regime promised no-interest loans and free housing, and released several political prisoners, including my two uncles and two cousins, who had been held for 21 years. They had been arrested in March 1990, in the same week that my father, the political dissident Jaballa Matar, was kidnapped from his home in Cairo and taken to Libya. Like him, they were tortured and wrongfully imprisoned without trial. In 1996, my father was moved; news of him stopped. To this day, he is among the “disappeared” who have vanished into Colonel Qaddafi’s prison system. I spoke to Uncle Mahmoud, my father’s youngest brother, minutes after his release. He was being driven home to Ajdabiya, my paternal family’s hometown. He was keen to demonstrate that, regardless of what the regime had done to him, he was still very present. “So what’s this I hear about you being short-listed for the Booker Prize?” was one of the first things he said. We laughed. “And do you remember an interview you gave once, four or five years ago, to a woman at the BBC Arabic World Service? Well, I heard that. I was beside a radio and listened to every word.” Then he began to tease me. “When are we going to see another novel? Come on, stop being lazy.” For a few minutes, every sentence he spoke started with, “Do you remember?” Shortly after we hung up I began to miss his voice all over again. I waited half an hour and called him back. Fourteen days later Libya erupted. People did what was never before possible: they gathered on the streets and spoke their minds. The mobile phone networks were disrupted and I was unable to contact my uncle. I knew that Ajdabiya was among the first, if not the first, to liberate itself from government forces. The flag that was displayed in my father’s old study — the red, black and green of the pre-Qaddafi Libya — was flying high in Ajdabiya. It was reported that Colonel Qaddafi’s forces had, on more than one occasion, tried to recapture the town. Intense battles were fought, and every time the rebels seemed to prevail. But I was still unable to reach my relatives there. A couple of days ago I finally got through to one of my cousins. “We are all O.K.,” he said. Then he told me what I feared but expected: “I am fighting with the rebels. All the young of the family are fighting. Mum is worried sick and doesn’t want us to go outside. But how are we to win our freedom if we stay at home?”

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Relatives, some as young as 16, who only days ago ran businesses or held jobs, attended high school or college, are now facing a well-equipped army made up mainly of foreign mercenaries. The Qaddafi forces have tanks and airplanes. All that my cousins have are old hunting rifles and captured artillery. Some rebels are using slingshots, knives and sticks. After the people of Ajdabiya secured the city, they sent men to help nearby towns. My cousin was involved in the heavy fighting that has taken place in Ras Lanuf, a few hours west. “Treachery, cousin, treachery,” he said when I asked what he had seen. “Qaddafi’s army forced the women and children out into the streets and placed snipers on the rooftops. Whenever we tried to approach, they shot at the civilians.” He went on to describe the horror of seeing a child shot in the head with a 14.5- millimeter round: “The skull exploded like a pomegranate.” Then bombs fell from the sky. • Amazingly, the rebels have held on to some parts of Ras Lanuf, although fighting there remains fierce. And the courage and humanity of Libyans has been extraordinary: I’ve been told of foreign mercenaries captured in Benghazi who were fed and given access to doctors, then taken to the courthouse, with their passports in their hands, asked to choose a lawyer and told they were going to be put on trial. I am convinced the rebels will win. But there are practical things the international community can and must do to help. I have been talking to doctors, fighters, men and women all over the country: in Zawiya, Zintan and Misrata in the west, and Benghazi, Bayda and Ajdabiya in the east. They have all told me of severe shortages of medical supplies and essential foods like flour and baby formula. We must get these materials to rebel-held territories. The rebels also hope that the international community will soon set up a no-flight zone to prevent Colonel Qaddafi from bombing his own people and importing mercenaries from abroad. Nonetheless, fighters are adamant they can win this themselves. They don’t need or want foreign troops on the ground. They do, however, need better weapons. And Philippe Sands, a law professor at University College London, told me that the recently adopted United Nations Security Council resolution that imposes an arms embargo on Libya needs to be amended so that the rebels can get the equipment they need to “level the playing field” and “properly protect themselves.” Throughout the uprisings, protesters have been carrying the pictures of those Libyans who, over nearly half a century of Colonel Qaddafi’s rule, have disappeared or died calling for justice. The men in these photos, like my father, were carving with their bare hands the early steps to this revolution, while countries like Britain, Italy and the United States were treating Colonel Qaddafi with the respect due an international statesman. Libyans will have their own revolution. But the international community, which helped fortify Colonel Qaddafi’s dictatorship and now has a great moral responsibility to our new nation, must act to assist the uprising and limit the soaring loss of innocent life. Hisham Matar is the author of the novel “In the Country of Men.” http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/10/opinion/10matar.html?ref=opinion

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Books March 9, 2011 A Resistance Hero Fires Up the French By ELAINE SCIOLINO PARIS — As a hero of the French Resistance, Stéphane Hessel was in exile with Charles de Gaulle in London, imprisoned in concentration camps, waterboarded in Nazi torture sessions and saved from hanging by swapping identities with an inmate who had died of typhus.

Charles Platiau/Reuters Stéphane Hessel at a pro-Palestinian rally. He is wearing a Phrygian cap, an icon of the French Revolution. Now, at 93, he is the author of a best seller that has become a publishing phenomenon in France. It is not the story of his life (he wrote his autobiography years ago), but a thin, impressionistic pamphlet called “Indignez-Vous!,” held together by two staples and released by a two-person publishing house run out of the attic of their home. It urges young people to revive the ideal of resistance to the Nazis by peacefully resisting the “international dictatorship of the financial markets” and defending the “values of modern democracy.” In particular Mr. Hessel protests France’s treatment of illegal immigrants, the influence on the media by the rich, cuts to the social welfare system, French educational reforms and, most strongly, Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians.

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“When something outrages you, as Nazism did me, that is when you become a militant, strong and engaged,” he writes. “You join the movement of history, and the great current of history continues to flow only thanks to each and every one of us.” Since its publication in October “Indignez-Vous!” has sold almost 1.5 million copies in France and has been translated into Spanish, Italian, Portuguese and Greek. Editions are planned in Slovenian, Korean, Japanese, Swedish and other languages. In the United States, The Nation magazine published the entire English text last month. On Tuesday the British edition went on sale under the title “Time for Outrage!” with a foreword by Charles Glass, an American journalist in Europe who published it under his recently created imprint for Quartet Books. Sylvie Crossman, a former correspondent for Le Monde, and her partner, Jean-Pierre Barou, who originally published the book, said they hoped to line up an American publisher — and a movie star like Sean Penn or George Clooney to write a new foreword. At about 4,000 words “Indignez-Vous!” can hardly be called a book. Its French edition is 29 pages, including explanatory footnotes, an illustration and just 14 pages of text. But the timing was right. It came out a year and half before the hotly anticipated presidential election here, with the French already loudly talking politics and considering alternatives to Nicolas Sarkozy, who is now at his lowest level in approval ratings. The book’s short length and low price (it sells for about $4) made it a popular Christmas gift among left-leaning intellectuals, parents struggling to inject political activism into their children and just about anyone else who needed an extra stocking stuffer. “Christmas came at the right moment — couldn’t have been better,” said Mr. Hessel, a courtly, gentle man who wore a three-piece pin-stripe suit and a stiffly starched white shirt from another era during an interview in his Paris apartment. “I have many friends who tell me, ‘I’ve bought 10 copies because I want to give them to 5 of my children and 5 of my friends.” A deeper reason, perhaps, is that more than the book’s emotional ramblings, the French have embraced Mr. Hessel as one of the last living heroes of the darkest era of the 20th century, as if to tell themselves that they too can be like him. “It’s, ‘Ah, yes, he’s the old man who has been in the Resistance and who has joined General de Gaulle,’ ” he said in superb English. “So obviously that was part of the success, I quite agree. If it had been written by a young man, it would probably not have had the same impact.” The book was an accident. Inspired by a speech Mr. Hessel gave in 2008 to commemorate the Resistance, Ms. Crossman proposed publishing a pamphlet based on his thinking. After three interviews with Mr. Hessel she whipped his words into a text. He did a bit of editing, and voilà, 8,000 copies were printed by Ms. Crossman and Mr. Barou’s publishing house, Indigène. The only advertising was word of mouth. Mr. Hessel confesses that although the ideas and content are his, Ms. Crossman did the writing. “My contribution was oral,” he said, adding: “She used her words. It is true that it is her language.” The book has been a windfall for Indigène, which usually publishes books on subjects like Chinese medicine and American Indians that sell no more than a thousand or so copies apiece.

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Mr. Hessel asked for no royalties from Ms. Crossman and Mr. Barou, just a promise that they give his share of the proceeds to his favorite causes. The book has been criticized for offering no prescription for action, just attacks on the status quo. “Nothing would be less French than apathy and indifference,” Prime Minister François Fillon said about the book. “But indignation for indignation’s sake is not a way of thinking.” Luc Ferry, the philosopher and a former education minister, lectured Mr. Hessel in an open letter that indignation is the last passion needed in France at the moment. “This sentiment is one that is applied only to others, never to oneself, and real morality starts with demands one makes on oneself,” he wrote. Mr. Hessel’s work also has been faulted for lacking literary value. “The book, or pamphlet, is rather poorly written,” a columnist wrote in the British newspaper The Independent. “It is repetitive, unoriginal, simplistic and frustratingly short.” More serious is that the book has been branded anti-Semitic by some French intellectuals for its attack on Israel, in particular that country’s 2008 incursion into Gaza. The book describes Gaza, which Mr. Hessel visited with his wife in 2009, as “an open-sky prison for a million and a half Palestinians,” and says that “for Jews themselves to perpetuate war crimes is intolerable.”

The British edition of the pamphlet.

On his Facebook page Pierre-André Taguieff, an expert in the history of French anti- Semitism, wrote: “Certainly he could have ended his life in a more dignified way, instead of inciting hatred against Israel, thus adding his voice to the worst of anti-Jews. Even old age doesn’t make someone impermeable to vanity, or kill the appetite for applause.” Mr. Hessel denies that he is anti-Semitic or anti-Israel. “I feel that I am completely in solidarity with Jews in the world, because I know what it is to be a Jew,” he said. “I’ve seen what it is, I am myself of Jewish origin, and therefore I can only be fully in support of the idea that the Jews, after all they’ve suffered, need a country

183 where they are at home. I shouted my joy when Israel was founded. I said, ‘At last!’ ” When a handful of protesters branded him a racist during a speech he gave in the Paris suburb of Montreuil last week, he said that he told them: “My love for Israel is stronger than yours. But I want it to be an honest country.” Other critics have pointed out the book’s outrage does not mention human rights offenses in places like North Korea, Myanmar, China and Iran. Since Mr. Hessel is widely respected as an honorable man without vanity or guile, the book has refocused attention on his extraordinary life. He was born in Berlin to a Jewish father and a Protestant mother and was baptized so that he could attend school. The family immigrated to Paris when he was 7. With her husband’s consent his mother had a longstanding affair with Henri-Pierre Roché, the writer and art dealer. The relationship became the inspiration for Mr. Roché’s first novel and later for François Truffaut’s classic French New Wave film “Jules and Jim.” The young Stéphane character was the little girl in the film. After the Nazi invasion of France, Mr. Hessel fled to England and then flew secretly into occupied France as a Resistance officer. Captured by the Gestapo, he spent time in concentration camps. Asked how he survived torture, he said, “The third time of waterboarding, I said, ‘Now, I’ll tell you.’ And I told them a lie of course.” He added: “One survives torture. So many people unfortunately have been tortured. But it’s not a thing to recommend.” After the war he worked as a junior official for the fledgling United Nations in New York, where he participated in the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. He held diplomatic posts in Vietnam, Algeria and Switzerland. Named ambassador for life, he still carries a diplomatic passport. This week another French publisher will release another slim volume, this time a series of interviews with Mr. Hessel, titled “Engagez-Vous!” (“Get Involved!”). In it he appeals to his readers to save the environment and to embrace the positive. He also emphasizes the importance of good luck in life. “Luck can always intervene,” he says in the book, adding: “I’ve been tremendously lucky. I went through things that turned out wrong, and I got myself out of them. So I project this luck onto history. History can bring luck: this is what we can call optimism.” http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/10/books/stephane-hessel-93-calls-for-time-of- outrage-in-france.html?src=recg

11 sep 2008

Stéphane Hessel : "Nous pouvons faire honte à ceux qui ne respectent pas les droits de l'Homme" C'est un immense plaisir pour moi de vous présenter aujourd'hui un podcast d'un homme qui a traversé le siècle en ne cessant jamais son combat en faveur des droits de 184 l'Homme et des libertés. Son visage est connu du grand public pour son rôle de médiateur dans l'affaire des sans-papiers de l'Eglise St Bernard il y a une dizaine d'années, mais Stéphane Hessel a vécu mille vies, dont il parle dans son dernier livre Citoyen du monde, conversation (Fayard). Ambassadeur de France, né Allemand en 1917, il est une de ces consciences du siècle qui nous sont précieuses. Stéphane Hessel a fait partie, en 1948, des rédacteurs de la Déclaration Universelle des Droits de l'Homme. Sur cette déclaration, j'ai donné un entretien à l'Hebdo des socialistes à paraître cette semaine, vous pouvez le lire en cliquant sur l'image ci- dessous.

Mehdi Ouraoui http://desmotsetdebats.blogs.liberation.fr/discours/2008/09/stphane-hessel.html

Livres5 11/11/2010 à 00h00 Stéphane Hessel Plat de résistance Réagir Par ERIC LORET Stéphane Hessel Indignez-vous ! Indigène éditions, 32 pp., 3 €. Bon début en bouche. Indignez-vous, chez Indigène. Une maison d’édition fondée à Montpellier en 1996 par Sylvie Crossman et Jean-Pierre Barou. Mais Indigènes depuis quatre ans, c’est aussi, on se le rappelle, un film politique de Rachid Bouchareb, dénonçant l’ingratitude colonialiste. La paronymie publicitaire «indigne»/ «indigène» est en outre belle comme le «I like Ike» dépiauté par Roman Jakobson, et l’injonction fait son effet. L’humain étant un être panurgien, on se précipite sur le livre comme Alice sur le cake qui portait l’inscription «Mangez-moi». D’ailleurs, si l’on demande Indignez-vous ! de Stéphane Hessel dans une librairie, le vendeur vous désigne la pile sur la caisse et, aussitôt qu’on en a saisi un exemplaire, le client suivant fait de même, par curiosité. C’est un livre mince, Hessel n’est pas la moitié d’un inconnu et l’objet ne pèse que trois euros, ce qui est une raison suffisante en soi pour l’acheter : à ce prix, on a l’impression que c’est cadeau. Puis ça s’ouvre bien : «93 ans. C’est un peu la toute dernière étape. La fin n’est plus bien loin.» Comme dirait Diderot en citant Virgile : Jam proximus ardet Ucalegon. C’est ce qu’on appelle un argument d’autorité. Stéphane Hessel est vieux, donc sage, vous ne voudriez tout de même pas lui faire de la peine en lui désobéissant, non ? En plus, il a une statue du commandeur dans sa manche, au long nez, casquée d’un chapeau

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étoilé : «De Londres où j’avais rejoint le général de Gaulle en mars 1941…» Critiquer le gouvernement actuel et sa politique sans se faire taxer d’antisarkozysme primaire, ce n’est pas facile. Avoir de l’expérience, la Résistance et De Gaulle de son côté est un plus, comme dirait mon voisin. Hessel gueule donc pour «une société dont nous soyions fiers : pas cette société des sans-papiers, des expulsions, des soupçons à l’égard des immigrés, pas cette société où l’on remet en cause les retraites, les acquis de la Sécurité sociale, pas cette société où les médias sont entre les mains des nantis, toutes choses que nous aurions refusé de cautionner si nous avions été les véritables héritiers du Conseil national de la Résistance.» Voilà un programme qui, s’il n’est pas celui de l’UMP, est du moins populaire par les temps qui courent. Le livre est en tête des ventes tous azimuts au classement Datalib. Pour ceux qui ignoreraient qui est Stéphane Hessel, il faut d’abord dire qu’il est la petite fille de Jules et Jim . En effet, les personnages Catherine et Franz, dans le roman de Henri-Pierre Roché, sont respectivement inspirés de sa mère et de son père. Plus sérieusement, c’est surtout un des rédacteurs de la Déclaration universelle des droits de l’homme de 1948. Ulmien, ayant sauté sur les genoux de Calder et de Duchamp, résistant torturé, envoyé à Buchenwald, rescapé par miracle, Hessel devient diplomate après la guerre, en particulier ambassadeur de France aux Nations unies. On connaît ses positions pour l’indépendance de l’Algérie. En 1962, il est le premier président de l’Aftam (Association de formation des travailleurs africains et malgaches). En 1996, on le retrouve chef de file des médiateurs pour les sans-papiers de Saint-Bernard, et en 2006, il signe l’appel contre «cette agression abominable menée au nom d’Israël contre des Libanais et des Palestiniens, agression paranoïaque qui provoque en retour des tirs meurtriers contre des civils israéliens». Il prônera le boycott. On retrouve peu ou prou ces partis pris dans Indignez-vous !, y compris en faveur des Palestiniens. Hessel en appelle à chacun, pour qu’il se trouve un «motif d’indignation» afin de résister. Même si cela est moins évident aujourd’hui qu’autrefois, puisqu’il a bien vu que le renversement perpétuel des valeurs régit ce qui reste de la politique, elle-même à moitié disparue sous l’économie : «Il n’est pas toujours facile de distinguer entre tous les courants qui nous gouvernent. Nous n’avons plus affaire à une petite élite dont nous comprenons clairement les agissements.» Néanmoins, écrit-il, on peut identifier deux grands défis. Le premier est la lutte contre l’accroissement de l’écart entre riches et pauvres dans le monde. Le second consiste à garder toujours les buts que s’étaient fixés la Déclaration de 1948. Hessel en rappelle l’article 15, spécial déchéance de la nationalité («Tout individu a droit à une nationalité»), et l’article 22, appelant à une répartition juste des richesses : «Toute personne, en tant que membre de la société, a droit à la sécurité sociale ; elle est fondée à obtenir la satisfaction des droits économiques, sociaux et culturels indispensables à sa dignité et au libre développement de sa personnalité, grâce à l’effort national et à la coopération internationale, compte tenu de l’organisation et des ressources de chaque pays.» A un moment, Hessel écrit même que si «on ne peut pas excuser les terroristes qui jettent les bombes, on peut les comprendre». Il plaide néanmoins pour la non-violence et une «insurrection pacifique». Moyennant quoi, il ne finira pas illico en prison, contrairement à Coupat. http://www.liberation.fr/livres/01012301577-stephane-hessel

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Politiques 30/12/2010 à 00h00 Repères. Stéphane Hessel «Le motif de base de la Résistance était l’indignation. Nous, vétérans des mouvements de résistance […], nous appelons les jeunes générations à faire vivre, transmettre, l’héritage de la Résistance et de ses idéaux. Nous leur disons : prenez le relais, indignez-vous !» Page 11. 10 c’est le nombre d’impressions de l’ouvrage depuis sa sortie, portant à 850 000 le nombre d’exemplaires imprimés, pour plus de 500 000 vendus. «Pour nous, résister, c’était ne pas accepter l’occupation allemande, la défaite. C’était […] simple, comme ce qui a suivi, la décolonisation. Puis la guerre d’Algérie. Il fallait que l’Algérie devienne indépendante […]. Ma longue vie m’a donné une succession de raisons de m’indigner.» Page 12. «Je suis retourné à Gaza, en 2009. […] Le terrorisme est inacceptable, mais il faut reconnaître que lorsqu’on est occupé avec des moyens militaires infiniment supérieurs aux vôtres, la réaction populaire ne peut pas être que non-violente.» Page 17. Les éditions Indigène ont été fondées à Montpellier en 1996 par deux anciens journalistes, Jean-Pierre Barou, ex-militant de la Gauche prolétarienne, qui a participé à la fondation de Libération avant de devenir éditeur au Seuil, et Sylvie Crossman, spécialiste de Henry Miller, qui a ensuite écrit pour le Monde. La maison entend notamment favoriser le dialogue avec les sociétés «premières» (Aborigènes, Inuits, Navajo, Hopi, Maoris, Tibétains…). Indignez-vous ! est son premier best-seller. http://www.liberation.fr/politiques/01012310690-reperes

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30/12/2010 à 00h00 «Indignez-vous» les uns les autres Critique Plus de 500 000 petits livres de Stéphane Hessel, 93 ans, ont déjà été vendus. Un appel à l’engagement social et politique au nom de l’émotion suscitée par les injustices. Par ERIC AESCHIMANN

Stéphane Hessel à Paris, hier. (Jérôme Bonnet) C’est un couple autour de la soixantaine, style enseignants à la retraite, qui arrive en toute hâte à l’heure de la fermeture : «Vous avez le livre de Stéphane Hessel ? - Il y en a une pile, là.» Gros soupir de soulagement : visiblement, ils y tenaient. C’est un autre libraire qui raconte que certains clients achètent en gros : «J’en prends dix, je vais l’offrir à tous mes amis.» C’est cette dame qui s’enquiert à la caisse : «L’argent est reversé à quelle association ?» Sorti il y a deux mois, Indignez-vous ! de Stéphane Hessel connaît un succès foudroyant : 500 000 exemplaires vendus, dix impressions et des demandes de traduction du monde entier, de la Turquie au Brésil, de la Pologne au Japon. Communion. S’agissant d’une brochure d’une vingtaine de pages à 3 euros, l’affaire relève moins d’une recette éditoriale miracle que du phénomène de société. A la façon d’une chanson qu’on fredonne, d’un film qu’on recommande à ses amis, Indignez-vous ! cristallise l’air du temps. L’acheter, c’est un acte militant, un geste de communion, la participation à une émotion collective. L’enjeu, pour une société épuisée par les yo-yo de la finance mondiale et ses effets sociaux, c’est de trouver des mots pour dire ce qu’elle ressent. Lorsque Hessel écrit : «L’actuelle dictature internationale des marchés financiers […] menace la paix et la démocratie», il exprime un sentiment largement répandu avec l’autorité de son histoire personnelle (lire page 4). Depuis l’affaissement de l’altermondialisme, une vaste frange de l’opinion cherche le moyen de faire savoir qu’elle ne veut pas vivre dans un monde où les

188 uns s’enrichissent au même rythme que les autres s’appauvrissent. Ils viennent d’en trouver un. «Ces dernières semaines, les gens achètent des livres militants», note un libraire. Alors que la gauche s’interroge sur son candidat et sur son programme, l’«Indignez-vous-mania» est un fait politique qu’elle ne pourra pas ne pas prendre en compte. Hessel le sait bien qui, soucieux de garder la maîtrise du mouvement qu’il vient de déclencher, faisait savoir hier à Libération que, dans la perspective de 2012, il soutenait «à fond»Martine Aubry. Si son lectorat rassemble divers activistes de la gauche, de RESF aux fonctionnaires désobéisseurs, de Mélenchon au NPA, lui s’inscrit clairement dans l’héritage social-démocrate. Du reste, dans son texte, Hessel reste très modéré. S’il établit une comparaison avec la Résistance, c’est pour nuancer aussitôt : «Les raisons de s’indigner peuvent paraître aujourd’hui moins nettes, ou le monde trop complexe. Qui commande, qui décide ? Il n’est pas toujours facile de distinguer entre tous les courants qui nous gouvernent. Nous n’avons plus affaire à une petite élite dont nous comprenons clairement les agissements. C’est un vaste monde, dont nous sentons bien qu’il est interdépendant.» Et, tout en se plaçant sous l’autorité du programme économique du Conseil national de la Résistance, il ne prétend pas connaître les remèdes : «Les propositions qui figurent dans ce texte et les défis que je désigne ne sont pas très originaux en eux-mêmes», reconnaît-il dans les Inrocks. Émotion. Reste le titre, Indignez-vous ! slogan efficace mais ambigu. L’indignation est la clé de l’engagement, répète Hessel, gommant les autres motifs pouvant conduire à l’action politique : une prise de conscience, une décision rationnelle, le désir de servir, l’amour de la justice ou de la vérité… Avec son appel à l’indignation, Hessel, à son corps défendant, se met au diapason d’une époque dédiée au spectacle de l’émotion. La philosophe Hannah Arendt en avait déjà analysé les dangers lorsqu’elle montrait combien la «politique de la pitié», basée sur l’émotion devant la misère d’autrui, pouvait nuire à une véritable «politique de justice». Une «politique de l’indignation» n’encourrait- elle pas le même risque ? Et l’indignation est-elle en soi une valeur ? Il y eut une époque où les avant-gardes artistiques et les contestataires rêvaient de choquer le bourgeois : s’indigner était alors un réflexe de droite. De la Vieille Dame indigne, nouvelle de Bertolt Brecht, nous voilà passés au «vieux monsieur indigné». L’engouement suscité par le livre de Stéphane Hessel atteste d’un puissant désir d’engagement dans l’opinion. Mais, maintenant qu’elle est devenue une valeur de gauche et qu’elle s’offre en cadeau de Noël, l’indignation doit trouver son contenu. http://www.liberation.fr/politiques/01012310687-indignez-vous-les-uns-les-autres

• sur le sujet : «Indignezvous» les uns les autres «Un appel à la réflexion, pas un programme politique» «Il dit que l’indignation est nécessaire, mais pas suffisante» Un succès manifeste en librairie Repères. Stéphane Hessel Lectorat électorat Stéphane Hessel et le diocèse de Toulouse s'indignent de conserve

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Politiques 30/12/2010 à 00h00 Hessel, l’essence de l’histoire Portrait Le diplomate a traversé les grands moments du XXe siècle. Par ERIC AESCHIMANN Stéphane Hessel publie Indignez-vous ! au soir d’une vie fabuleuse, qui couvre presque toute l’histoire du XXe siècle et porte témoignage de l’ouverture d’esprit propre à la culture européenne d’avant-guerre. Né en 1917 à Berlin dans une famille juive (mais partiellement convertie au luthéranisme), il arrive en France en 1925. Sa mère, peintre, sera le modèle du personnage de Catherine dans Jules et Jim, l’histoire d’une femme aimée par deux amis que François Truffaut portera à l’écran en s’inspirant du roman autobiographique d’Henri-Pierre Roché. Son père, lui, traduit Proust en allemand avec son ami, le philosophe Walter Benjamin. Naturalisé en 1937, reçu à Normale Sup en 1939, Stéphane Hessel suit les cours de Merleau-Ponty et lit Sartre. Mobilisé, prisonnier, il s’évade et rejoint le général De Gaulle à Londres. Envoyé en France en 1944, il est arrêté et déporté à Buchenwald, où il maquille son identité pour échapper à la pendaison. Il s’évade encore, est rattrapé, saute d’un train, rejoint les troupes américaines… A la Libération, il rejoint le secrétariat général de l’ONU et est associé à la rédaction de la Déclaration universelle des droits de l’homme. Elevé à la dignité d’«ambassadeur de France» par la gauche en 1981, il consacre sa retraite à militer pour les sans-papiers (il fut le médiateur lors de l’occupation de l’église Saint-Bernard) et, plus récemment, pour les Palestiniens, en s’associant notamment à la campagne de boycott des produits israéliens. Ce qui lui a valu, en novembre, une violente attaque de l’historien néoconservateur Pierre-André Taguieff. Promu grand-officier de la Légion d’honneur en 2006, Stéphane Hessel a des allures de vieux monsieur à l’ancienne. Affable, séducteur, d’une extrême courtoisie, il n’aime rien tant que se lever en fin de repas pour réciter du Baudelaire ou du Verlaine (il en connaît par cœur des centaines de vers). Mais il ne méconnaît pas non plus les joies de la politique : il a soutenu Michel Rocard en 1985, s’est présenté l’année dernière en position inéligible sur les listes d’Europe Ecologie, tout en restant membre du PS - aujourd’hui, il soutient à fond Martine Aubry, dont il est un ami. http://www.liberation.fr/politiques/01012310691-hessel-l-essence-de-l-histoire

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Sectarian clashes in Egypt challenge revolutionary idealism By Richard Leiby Washington Post Staff Writer Thursday, March 10, 2011; 3:27 AM CAIRO - On the banks of the Nile, in the middle of a roiling protest Wednesday by hundreds of chanting Christians, a man raised a Koran in one hand and a wooden cross in the other. "I came here because we don't want sectarian strife," said Ahmed Moustafa, a 37-year-old Muslim. "Muslims and Christians are united." But such idealism might be waning as Egyptians confront the worst outbreak of religious violence since Hosni Mubarak was swept out of power Feb. 11. The deaths of 13 people in clashes in Cairo between Muslims and Christians late Tuesday have prompted calls for religious tolerance and raised the prospect of a deepening sectarian divide after a post-revolution honeymoon period. Street battles broke out after Coptic Christians set up roadblocks in major arteries to protest the destruction of one of their churches. Security is scant in this metropolis of 18 million, where the military-controlled government is still groping to find a way to tamp down crime with no functioning police force. Although clashes between Muslims and Christians are not new in Egypt, they often take place far from the capital. That the overnight violence continued for hours near the heart of Cairo is bound to add to concerns among Christians that weeks of tumult in Egypt have left them particularly vulnerable in a country that is overwhelmingly Muslim. The prospect that political Islamists might gain strength in Egypt is seen among Copts as particularly worrying, after three decades in which many had come to regard Mubarak's secular regime as a kind of protector. Some witnesses said the Egyptian army had stood by for as long as four hours without intervening in the fighting. Officials said that all of those who were killed died of gunshot wounds and that 140 others were injured. Copts said that all of the victims were Christian adherents, but other reports said that as many as five Muslims were killed. A top Coptic leader, Father Saleeb Metta Sawiris, said Wednesday that church officials were seeking to defuse the conflict and prevent escalation. Thousands of Copts have been protesting here in recent days in various locations to demand the rebuilding of a destroyed church in the provincial town of Sol, south of the city; punishment of the perpetrators; and overall better treatment. The Copts are a largely Orthodox Christian group and make up about 10 percent of Egypt's 80 million people; they have long complained of discrimination, and many are consigned to menial jobs. The church was destroyed last week by arson and, some said, hammer-wielding Muslims. It happened after fighting between Copts and Muslims left two dead after a

191 feud between the families of a Christian man and a Muslim woman who were having a romantic relationship. The year began with religious violence - 21 people died when a suicide bomber blew himself up as Copt worshipers left a church after midnight on New Year's in Alexandria. On Wednesday, soldiers manned downtown checkpoints and carried out cursory pat- downs for weapons as hundreds of demonstrators streamed into a rally in front of the state TV building on the Nile, where Copts say they will stay until their church is rebuilt as promised by the transitional government. "We're fed up with promises. We want action," said Osama Ezet, 45, who delivers goods on a donkey-drawn cart. The deaths led to pleas for tolerance from religious and civic leaders. "I call upon Muslims and Christians to avoid incitement and to place more weight on national love," Amr Khaled, an Islamic cleric, said in a phone call to a popular Egyptian TV program. Meanwhile, leaders of youth and political factions urged followers to join a protest Friday under the slogan "No to sectarian strife." "I am surprised at the high number of people killed in the clash," said Mustafa Kamel El Sayed, a political science professor at Cairo University and a longtime democracy advocate. "The murders are disturbing. . . . It is important for all the political figures to take action on this situation." For some, the deaths might have served as a wake-up call, as did an episode Tuesday when a planned women's rights march devolved into a melee in which several women were sexually assaulted by men in Tahrir Square, site of the largely peaceful democratic uprising. On Wednesday, stone-throwing erupted in the square in clashes between those who continue to use it as a staging ground to air grievances and those who want all demonstrations to stop. "Unfortunately, our armed forces are not trained to do police operations," El Sayed said. "The army will not be the solution, but I think their presence could be greater to deter people." Later, local media reported that club-wielding soldiers dispersed protesters and dismantled the tent city they'd erected there. Special correspondents Muhammad Mansour and Sherine Bayoumi contributed to this report. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/article/2011/03/09/AR2011030904546_pf.html

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On Libya, Obama willing to let allies take the lead By Scott Wilson Washington Post Staff Writer Thursday, March 10, 2011; 12:21 AM President Obama is content to let other nations publicly lead the search for solutions to the Libyan conflict, his advisers say, a stance that reflects the more humble tone he has sought to bring to U.S. foreign policy but one that also opens him to criticism that he is a weak leader. The tactic is anathema to many conservatives and worries some liberal interventionists, who believe that only overt American authority can assemble an effective opposition to brutal authoritarian governments such as that of Libyan leader Moammar Gaddafi. Although Obama sees advantages in keeping Washington in the background, especially in a region where the United States is held in such low regard, he has exposed himself to Republican charges that he is absent at a time of crisis. Conservatives say his one-of- the-team approach could also signal a decline in American fortitude after nearly a decade of war. Since the uprising began, Obama has devoted just one set of public remarks solely to the situation in Libya, where fighting has reached a harsh stalemate. European nations have taken the lead in drafting a no-fly zone resolution, and Obama has yet to say whether he favors one. He followed France in calling for Gaddafi's ouster. At a Wednesday meeting of Obama's senior national security officials, little support emerged for the immediate imposition of a no-fly zone, according to an administration official who spoke on condition of anonymity to describe internal deliberations. Jamming Libyan government communications and deploying U.S. naval assets to help deliver humanitarian aid were among the most favored near-term options, the official said, adding that "at any time facts on the ground could change, but the intelligence assessment now dispels the idea that a no-fly zone is the key here." Obama's caution has been dictated in part by the challenge in dealing with one of the world's most hermetic countries and the fluid situation on the ground. The administration knows little about Libya's well-armed rebels, cannot predict the political system that might replace Gaddafi's bizarre rule, and faces an array of military options to stop the fighting. Obama's advisers say his low public profile masks the administration's active private diplomacy, which has helped produce strong financial sanctions against Gaddafi's inner circle, and the central U.S. role in military planning underway at NATO, whose defense ministers meet Thursday to consider next steps. "This is the Obama conception of the U.S. role in the world - to work through multilateral organizations and bilateral relationships to make sure that the steps we are taking are amplified," said Ben Rhodes, the deputy national security adviser for

193 strategic communications. "Maybe this is a different conception of U.S. leadership. But we believe leadership should galvanize an international response, not rely on a unilateral U.S. response." For decades, U.S. presidents have been pressed to choose between intervening in foreign crises or ignoring them. Both paths have led to political risks for recent presidents, whose records are influencing Obama's response to the violence in Libya. Anthony H. Cordesman, who holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said that "there's always going to be a demand for the United States to take immediate action, but it is not always the right thing to do." "Unfortunately, as president, ultimately your reasons don't matter," he said. "It's whether you succeed or fail that does." Bill Clinton was criticized for standing by during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and waiting for years to use force in the Balkans. He finally did so in Kosovo without a U.N. Security Council resolution, a case that is being examined by European countries and the Obama administration as they decide how to proceed in Libya. George W. Bush took that unilateral approach even further following the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. The Bush administration failed to secure a Security Council resolution before the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and generally found international institutions more confining than useful in addressing America's post-Sept. 11 problems. Obama, by contrast, is closely consulting his European counterparts and at times following their lead. French President Nicolas Sarkozy was the first leader of a major country to call for Gaddafi's ouster. Obama did so the next day in a phone call with German Chancellor Angela Merkel and spoke his position publicly five days later, clearly aligning the United States with Libya's opposition. "Having called on Gaddafi to leave, I think it would be hard for the administration to back away from the crisis if that goal remains unmet," said Tom Malinowski, the Washington director of Human Rights Watch, who said doing so would risk sending a message to other autocrats that they can use violence to maintain power. How Obama intends to use American power to achieve that goal has yet to be determined. Britain and France are drafting the no-fly zone resolution for possible consideration by the Security Council. But it remains unclear where Obama stands on the issue, which has only mixed support on Capitol Hill. Sen. John F. Kerry (D-Mass.), the Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman whose public statements often reflect administration policy,called Sunday for a no-fly zone, but White House Chief of Staff William Daley criticized advocates of the idea for referring to a no-fly zone as if it were a "video game." Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates has also stressed the difficulties in carrying out such an operation. "That seems to me to indicate an administration that has not yet made up its mind on what to do in Libya," said Elliott Abrams, who was a National Security Council director under Bush. He called Daley's comments "derisive." Obama inherited a pair of wars in Muslim countries, and his advisers argue that direct U.S. involvement in a third would do more harm than good to Libya's popular uprising.

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Abrams, who participated in the White House working group on Egypt assembled last year, said he "understands the point." "But I think they overdo it," he said. "I think they are being too timid here. And they are running the risk that there will be a bloodbath tomorrow and, by then, it will be too late for them to help the opposition." Senior administration officials say that regardless of whether the U.S. role is characterized as leading or following, it has been part of a swift international response to the Libyan crisis. The Security Council has imposed sanctions on Gaddafi's regime and referred Libya's case to the International Criminal Court. The Arab League and African Union, traditionally hesitant to rebuke a member, have done so in the case of Libya. "Remaining in the background and letting the Europeans take the lead can help build consensus with such countries as Russia and China," Cordesman said, referring to two veto-wielding Security Council members often suspicious of U.S. motives."If we'd presented a sudden initiative, you might have seen it be far more difficult for others to act in support of it." Given the United States' troubled history with Libya's erratic leader, a senior administration official said, the White House decided early that "what would be more persuasive to Gaddafi is not just the United States saying something, but having the United States, the European Union, the Arab League, the African Union, the United Nations all saying the same things that essentially left him nowhere to turn for legitimacy or support." "That's been done, essentially," the official said, adding, "It's not as if we're not on the side of change." http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/article/2011/03/09/AR2011030905672.html?wpisrc=nl_headline

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LIBÉRATION.FR Monde arabe, l'appel de la liberté Après la Tunisie et l'Egypte, la Libye, le Yémen, Bahreïn vacillent sous la pression du peuple Monde 09/03/2011 à 08h25 (mise à jour à 19h17) Des émissaires de Kadhafi en route vers Le Caire, Bruxelles et Lisbonne 292 réactions

Le colonel Kadhafi à la télévision libyenne le 9 mars 2011. (© AFP -) •Kadhafi menace l'Occident et multiplie les interviews. Dans le même temps, des émissaires à lui sont en route vers Le Caire et Bruxelles. •Ses forces pilonnent Ras Lanouf, à l'est du pays. •Les Etats-Unis et l'UE soutiennent ouvertement l'opposition. Le Parlement européen veut qu'elle soit reconnue officiellement. •Sarkozy va recevoir des émissaires du Conseil de Transition (l'opposition), jeudi. •Suivez les dernières évolutions avec une série de comptes Twitter sélectionnés par Libération. La situation, point par point. Sur le plan diplomatique •Un avion est arrivé au Caire avec un envoyé du gouvernement libyen, d'autres émissaires "seraient en route pour Bruxelles", déclare à la presse le chef de la

196 diplomatie italienne, Franco Frattini, à l'issue d'une intervention à la Chambre des députés à Rome. "Ce qui est sûr c'est qu'un avion a atterri au Caire. D'autres avions seraient en route pour Bruxelles", ajoute-t-il. Le ministre indiqueé que l'avion arrivé au Caire transportait "des émissaires de Kadhafi porteurs d'une lettre du colonel (Kadhafi) au gouvernement égyptien" à remettre à la Ligue arabe. Un émissaire du dirigeant libyen Mouammar Kadhafi est également en route ce mercredi pour le Portugal, pour y rencontrer le chef de la diplomatie portugaise Luis Amado. •Les Occidentaux, notamment les Etats-Unis, la France et la Grande-Bretagne continuent d'examiner les moyens de mettre un terme à la répression sanglante de l'insurrection. La mise en place d'une zone d'exclusion aérienne au dessus de la Libye est l'hypothèse privilégiée.

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Les Etats-Unis ont annoncé qu'ils préféraient que ce soit l'Otan, et non une coalition de pays, qui conduise les opérations si l'ONU donnait son feu vert à l'imposition d'une zone d'exclusion aérienne au-dessus de la Libye, indique mercredi un haut responsable américain. Au contraire, la France est prête à envisager une opération militaire sous le parapluie de l'ONU, mais elle veut en écarter l'Otan, à l'image trop agressive dans le monde arabe. •Nicolas Sarkozy recevra jeudi à 10H00 deux émissaires du Conseil national libyen de transition (CNLT), qui regroupe l'opposition au régime du colonel Mouammar Kadhafi, annonce mercredi la présidence de la République. •Les six pays arabes les plus riches du Golfe ont apporté leur soutien à une zone d'exclusion aérienne en Libye, mais leur rôle dans une telle opération reste incertain malgré la taille de leurs budgets militaires. •Le Parlement européen demande ce mercredi à l'Union européenne de reconnaître le Conseil national de transition (CNT) constitué par l'opposition au colonel Mouammar Kadhafi et de soutenir l'instauration d'une zone d'exclusion aérienne.

(Catherine Ashton, haut représentant de l'Union pour les affaires étrangères, au Parlement européen, le 9 mars, Vincent Kessler / Reuters) Les chefs des grands groupes politiques du Parlement européen se sont prononcés en ce sens, mais avec des nuances, au cours d'un débat sur la situation humanitaire en Libye en présence de la chef de la diplomatie de l'UE Catherine Ashton, deux jours avant un sommet des dirigeants de l'UE à Bruxelles. La chef de la diplomatie européenne Catherine Ashton a elle jeté ce mercredi un froid au Parlement européen en refusant de soutenir la reconnaissance du Conseil national de transition (CNT) constitué par l'opposition au colonel Mouammar Kadhafi.

"C'est au Conseil des chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement de prendre cette décision", a-t- elle affirmé à l'issue du débat. Sur le plan militaire

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(Des rebelles libyens regardent l'incendie d'un oléoduc près de Ras Lanouf le 9 mars 2011. AFP, Marco Longari) L'opposition en difficulté. De très nombreux combattants rebelles libyens, amassés dans des dizaines de véhicules, se sont repliés vers l'intérieur de la ville pétrolière de Ras Lanouf. Une énorme explosion a été entendu ce mercredi après-midi près d'une raffinerie située aux abords de la ville, après un raid aérien. L'on voit des flammes hautes de plusieurs centaines de mètres, indique un journaliste de l'AFP. Un oléoduc aurait été touché. Selon l'opposition plusieurs installations pétrolières ont été bombardées. Le bruit des tirs d'obus et de fortes explosions vient d'une zone à l'ouest de la ville pétrolière de Ras Lanouf contrôlée par les rebelles, les opposants ayant été empêchés dans leur tentative d'occuper la ville de Ben Jaouad à quelques 30 km plus à l'ouest. Ben Jaouad a été reprise dimanche par les forces loyales au colonel Kadhafi.Des avions survolent également le secteur mais sans lancer de raids. Les rebelles au dernier barrage du côté ouest de Ras Lanouf refusent de laisser passer les journalistes pour des "raisons de sécurité". " A l'Ouest. "Les révolutionnaires contrôlent le centre de Zawiyah et les forces de Kadhafi sont autour. C'est du 50-50" selon Rachid, un Marocain de 48 ans, qui est arrivé mercredi de la ville libyenne de Zawiyah et vient juste de passer côté tunisien avec sa femme et ses quatre filles. Zawiyah, à 40 km à l'ouest de Tripoli et 150 de la frontière tunisienne, est le bastion des insurgés le plus proche de la capitale

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Sur le plan du «Kadhafi show» Le leader multiplie les apparitions télévisées pour défendre sa cause. Il a ainsi accusé les Occidentaux, notamment la France, de mener «un complot colonialiste» contre son pays, dans un entretien diffusé mercredi matin par LCI. Interrogé sur les positions des Occidentaux, et notamment de Paris, qui ont apporté leur soutien aux insurgés, le colonel, dont les propos étaient traduits en français, a répondu: «Ils veulent coloniser la Libye à nouveau. C'est un complot colonaliste.» Egalement interrogé sur le fait de savoir s'il envisageait des «mesures de représailles» contre la France, le dirigeant libyen s'est borné à lancer un laconique «on verra», tout en se disant confiant sur de futures «visites» en Europe une fois que «tout cela sera terminé».

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(Kadhafi, lors de son entretien avec la télé turque, Reuters) Dans un entretien à la chaîne publique turque TRT il a également affirmé que si le réseau extrémiste Al-Qaeda s'empare de son pays, la région tout entière jusqu'en Israël sera la proie du chaos. Par ailleurs, un avion civil appartenant au leader libyen Mouammar Kadhafi, mais dont les passagers à bord ne sont pas connus, a survolé mercredi en fin de matinée l'espace aérien grec en route vers l'Egypte. "Un avion civil de Kadhafi a survolé la zone de contrôle aérien grecque entre 11h24 locales (09H24 GMT) et 11H34 (09H34 GMT), on ne connaît pas les passagers de cet avion", a indiqué à l'AFP une source du ministère grec de la Défense. Sur le plan humanitaire

(Un réfugié dans un camp en Tunisie, Yannis Behrakis / Reuters) Alors que près de 200.000 personnes ont fui les combats en Libye, l'ONU a chargé l'ex- ministre jordanien des Affaires étrangères Abdel Ilah Khatib d'entreprendre des "consultations urgentes" avec Tripoli sur la crise humanitaire.

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•Un convoi de camions du Programme alimentaire mondial (PAM) transportant 70 tonnes de barres de dattes est arrivé mercredi en Libye et se dirigeait vers Benghazi à l'est du pays où il devait approvisionner des entrepôts, selon une porte-parole de l'agence de l'ONU. "Le convoi est arrivé vers 17H30 heure de Paris en Libye et est actuellement escorté vers les entrepôts de Benghazi", déclare-t-elle à l'AFP en marge d'une conférence de presse conjointe entre le ministre français de l'Agriculture Bruno Lemaire et la directrice du PAM Josette Sheeran à Paris. http://www.liberation.fr/monde/01012324563-kadhafi-accuse-les-occidentaux-de- complot-colonialiste

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U.S. funding tech firms that help Mideast dissidents evade government censors By Ian Shapira Washington Post Staff Writer Wednesday, March 9, 2011; 10:48 PM The Obama administration may not be lending arms to dissidents in the Middle East, but it is offering aid in another critical way: helping them surf the Web anonymously as they seek to overthrow their governments. Federal agencies - such as the State Department, the Defense Department and the Broadcasting Board of Governors - have been funding a handful of technology firms that allow people to get online without being tracked or to visit news or social media sites that governments have blocked. Many of these little-known organizations - such as the Tor Project and UltraReach- are unabashedly supportive of the activists in the Middle East. But the United States' backing of these firms has the potential to put the government in an awkward diplomatic position, not only with the countries where uprisings are active, but also with economic partners such as Saudi Arabia and China, which are known to block Web sites they deem dangerous. The technology comes with its own perils: Some of the tools may not always conceal the users' identities. Autocratic foreign governments are constantly updating their censorship and monitoring technology. And, of course, the software can be handy for terrorists seeking to communicate in clandestine ways. In Egypt, Mohammad Hamama, a 24-year-old computer programmer, said he learned about the Tor Project's software in January through chatter on Twitter. He downloaded the software and checked on friends protesting in Cairo's Tahrir Square. Still, he worries about the technology's safety. "I wanted to make sure my Twitter friends were okay during the protests," he said in a phone interview. "But I didn't feel safe at all. I don't know what the government was using to track us down. I was just hoping the Tor browser would be good for me to tweet some things, but I managed to get away without being tracked." The technology that is now taking off in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya through word of mouth began as tools of digital disobedience elsewhere. In general, these programs work by redirecting users' Web traffic to servers outside their country. That makes it more difficult to identify the users while giving them access to blocked sites. "What began as an effort to tear down firewalls in China has become something with extraordinary potential throughout the world," said Michael Horowitz, a Reagan administration official who serves as an adviser to UltraReach. "When UltraReach started getting hits in Egypt, the company had no idea how the people there found out about it. But they feel like they can't cut them off now - the company feels like it has a responsibility. But for every dollar that gets spent by companies like UltraReach, there's $10,000 spent by the governments to protect the firewalls."

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Federal agencies have funded these companies through grants and contracts. By late spring, the State Department is expected to begin doling out even more money - about $30 million - to technology firms and human rights groups to help and train people to shatter firewalls and surf the Web without being tracked. Daniel B. Baer, deputy assistant secretary in the State Department, said his bureau is moving as quickly as possible to appropriate the money. More than 60 nonprofit groups and other organizations have applied for awards, which range from $500,000 to $8 million. The department, he said, is unequivocal in its support of a free Internet and the rights of protesters in the Middle East as well as other regions where governments restrict Web use or monitor dissident movements. The department supports about a dozen Web circumvention technologies; the top three attract nearly 2 million unique users a month. "Right now, there's a healthy focus on the Middle East," Baer said, adding that the United States' support for these organizations - laid out in prominent speeches by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton - should come as no surprise to other nations. "I am sure there are certain folks in the governments of these places that would prefer we didn't fund these technologies - just as they would prefer we don't advocate for human rights in general - but it's our long-standing policy to advocate for Internet freedom." Recently, some members of Congress have accused the State Department of being too slow in giving out the money. They have also argued that the department should transfer a large chunk of the funds to the Broadcasting Board of Governors and give it more say in who gets the money. The BBG oversees the Voice of America news service and works closely with several firms that specialize in Web circumvention tools. Many of these U.S.-backed technology organizations are reporting huge increases in the number of people using their tools in Arab states undergoing political upheaval. The Tor Project, a nonprofit organization that gets money from the State and Defense departments, has seen far more people use its product during the Middle East uprisings. The number of daily sessions jumped from 250 in December to about 2500 in February in Egypt, from 500 to about 900 in Tunisia and from 25 to nearly 300 in Libya. Andrew Lewman, the organization's executive director, said he helps U.S. and European governments understand how to use Tor for intelligence gathering, and human rights and journalism organizations for free speech. But, he said, he is less generous with restrictive regimes. "We will always side with people who support access to information. We've helped protesters, journalists, law enforcement and intelligence agencies," Lewman said. He added that he had turned down requests from Middle East governments that wanted to conduct surveillance on their citizens. UltraReach, which last month began receiving portions of an $800,000 federal grant, has seen the use of its product UltraSurf explode in the Middle East. Horowitz, the company's adviser, said there were nearly 8 million page views from Egyptians using UltraSurf in January, right before Internet access was shut down. In Libya, 4 million Web pages were viewed using UltraSurf in March, he said. Some of the most popular Web sites that dissidents are visiting with UltraSurf: Gravatar.com, which gives Web users avatars or images that identify them when they post comments on Web sites; Megaupload.com; Yahoo; Facebook; and MSN.com. A Canadian company, Psiphon, which has a contract with the BBG to help disseminate Voice of America and other U.S. news services in Iran, China and the former Soviet Union,

204 said it also has seen traffic upticks in the Middle East, although its focus is elsewhere in the world. "We have about 8,000 log-ins in Egypt, and we weren't even promoting in that region. That's compared to about 40,000 to 50,000 log-ins in Iran," said Rafal Rohozinski, Psiphon's chief executive. He cautioned that it is difficult to know how many individuals used his service and that no technology is completely safe. The products, he added, "may protect your privacy, but they aren't invisible on the Internet." So dissidents, he said, "could be making themselves more detectable effectively sending a signature that can be seen by regimes." Meanwhile, in Silicon Valley, AnchorFree, which makes money by splashing banner ads atop every Web page accessed through its Hotspot Shield application, says it steers clear of choosing political sides, even though it has contracted with the BBG in the past. The company reports that each month, 9 million people worldwide use the tool to visit about 2 billion Web pages. The firm, founded by two 20-somethings and co-owned by a former MCI chairman, says that it also has been a main artery for millions of users in the Middle East to get onto Facebook, Google and Twitter. "We didn't start this company to go against any government," said David Gorodyansky, AnchorFree's chief executive and co-founder. "We're a typical Silicon Valley company, a bunch of young guys with a lot of crazy ideas, and here we are impacting millions of people in the Middle East and helping revolutions in Tunisia and Libya. We didn't set out to do this, but we really think it's cool we're doing this." Staff writer Mary Beth Sheridan contributed to this report. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/story/2011/03/09/ST2011030906538.html?sid=ST2011030906538 Hiding in plain sight Middle East dissidents who communicate using social media have software and other online tools to hide their transmission locations and evade government censors. Usage of one of these software services, Hotspot Shield, spiked in Egypt and Libya after political uprisings occurred.

SOURCE: AnchorFree | The Washington Post - Mar. 10, 2011 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/graphic/2011/03/09/GR2011030906416.html?sid=ST2011030906538

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Rep. Peter King's Muslim hearings: A key moment in an angry conversation By David A. Fahrenthold and Michelle Boorstein Washington Post Staff Writers Wednesday, March 9, 2011; 10:56 PM It won't be on the official agenda. It might not even be asked out loud. But it may be the most important question during a congressional hearing Thursday on homegrown Islamic terrorists. How should America talk about Muslim Americans? Even in the tense months after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, public discussions of Islamic extremists were usually accompanied by a careful disclaimer that a peaceful religion had been hijacked. But fueled by the Fort Hood massacre, controversy over a proposed Islamic center near Ground Zero and a series of high-profile arrests of homegrown terrorists, conservatives in particular have grown increasingly bold in criticizing Islam itself. They have objected to mosques, banned sharia (Islamic law) and attacked passages in the Koran. On Thursday, the discussion about Muslims' place - and Muslims' obligations - in American society will move to Capitol Hill. The hearing, called by Rep. Peter T. King (R-N.Y.), could be a key moment in one of the country's angriest conversations. "You can say things about this particular religion which you cannot say about any other religion in the United States of America," said Akbar Ahmed, a professor at American University. Ahmed said the hearings could either encourage or defuse a growing sense of suspicion aimed at Muslims. "We were blind to it. And now that it's surfaced, and it's out there, I think we're at a very dangerous moment in American history," he said. "It's like a boil, and it needs to be pricked." King's hearing will start Thursday morning in the high-arched, chandeliered hearing room of the House Committee on Homeland Security. The title is "The Extent of Radicalization in the American Muslim Community and That Community's Response." It's not the first time Congress has tackled the subject of homegrown terrorism. Sen. Joseph I. Lieberman (I-Conn.) held 14 such hearings between 2006 and 2009, and then- Rep. Jane Harman (D-Calif.) held six. Public opinion about Muslims hasn't changed much in recent years. In the fall, a Washington Post-ABC News poll asked whether mainstream Islam "encourages violence." Among all respondents, 31 percent said yes, slightly less than the recent high of 34 percent in 2003. What's different now is the tone of the discussion - in Congress and across the country. In Lieberman's hearings, most witnesses preceded their comments by saying that the problem was not Islam itself. That was an echo of what President George W. Bush said

206 just days after 9/11, when he went to a D.C. mosque and declared, "Islam is peace." The president's remark and others that followed had the effect of constraining criticism. But now King has opened the door for less-restrained commentary with his own comments about American Muslims and their mosques. There are "too many mosques in the country," he has said, and he has alleged that nearly all of them are run by radical extremists. On Tuesday, King told Fox News that he "will not back down whatsoever" in the face of criticism that he is demonizing American Muslims. "The threat analysis is that the danger comes from this small segment within the Muslim American community," King said. "And, unfortunately, not enough leaders in the Muslim community are willing to face up to that." A string of incidents Across the country, the discussion about Muslims and terrorism has grown harsher over the past 18 months. The sharp turn began in November 2009 with the apprehension of an Army psychiatrist who is Muslim after a shooting rampage that claimed 13 lives at Fort Hood, Tex. Then a Muslim immigrant from Pakistan, Faisal Shahzad, was convicted of an attempted car bombing in May in Times Square. Both said they were driven by their concept of Islam. A Congressional Research Service report says there were 22 arrests of violent jihad suspects from May 2009 to November 2010, compared with 21 in the previous seven years. Another report, from a University of North Carolina professor, used different methodology to identify 120 cases that involved a threat from a Muslim American since Sept. 11, 2001. In 48 of them, he found, the initial tip came from another member of the Muslim community. In the summer, a proposal for an Islamic community center near Ground Zero stirred bitter opposition. The pastor of a tiny church in Florida garnered international attention when he threatened to burn a pile of Korans on the anniversary of Sept. 11. Oklahoma changed its constitution to "protect" it from sharia, although that change has been challenged in court. This month, hundreds of protesters gathered outside a fundraiser for an Islamic group in Yorba Linda, Calif., to complain about two speakers at the event. Both men, protesters said, were sympathetic to radical causes in the past. Afterward, the Council on American-Islamic Relations released a video clip that showed protesters shouting "USA! USA!" as women in head scarves walked by. In another, a man yelled, "Muhammad was a pervert!" Now, at this tense moment, comes King's hearing, which House Republican leaders support. It has also been hailed by an increasingly vocal cadre of conservatives. Lieberman, in a telephone interview this week, said the questions King is raising about cooperation with law enforcement "are important ones, and real ones." Frank J. Cilluffo, head of the Homeland Security Policy Institute at George Washington University and a former special assistant to Bush, said the hearings are worthwhile.

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"From my perspective, there is an opportunity to be able to discuss in an open kind of way: Who is being radicalized? Why? What potential indicators are [there]? How can communities be better prepared to police themselves?" he said.

Muslims, others rally ahead of hearings on Capitol Hill Protesters in New York rally ahead of congressional hearings to be led by Republican Rep. Peter King on "Islamic radicalization" in the United States. The witnesses But the list of hearing witnesses makes it appear that a full answer to these questions is unlikely to come Thursday. Two of those testifying have deeply personal stories about radicalization in America. One saw his son, a Muslim convert, arrested in a shooting that killed a U.S. soldier at a recruiting station in Arkansas. Another, a Somali American, saw a nephew turn radical: He joined Islamic militants in Somalia and was killed there. Another witness will be Zuhdi Jasser, a Muslim doctor from Arizona who has offered a critique of the Muslim community from within. Jasser has said Muslim Americans should alter what he calls a "culture of separatism" and a feeling of persecution. King did not invite the leaders of any of the country's large Muslim organizations. And, despite his questions about Muslims' cooperation with investigators, he did not call anyone from law enforcement. Democrats on the committee have called Leroy Baca, the sheriff of Los Angeles County. In the past, Baca has praised Muslim groups in his area for their help. Rep. Keith Ellison (D-Minn.), one of two Muslim members of Congress, also will testify. In a sense, Muslim activists say, the day's most important witness might be King himself. His questions and his tone could become signposts for others about how Islam is viewed by those in power. "The danger is, people who already have a negative view of Muslims or Islam will use this as a verification that they are correct in their views," said Robert Marro, who heads the government relations committee at the All Dulles Area Muslim Society, a Sterling mosque. "People think, 'If they're holding hearings, these people must be guilty. There must be fire if there is smoke.' "

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Hedieh Mirahmadi, a Muslim activist who works to promote moderate Islam, said she also saw a chance for a useful dialogue that might reveal lessons for both Muslims and other Americans. "If it's truly inquisitive, if it's a sincere desire to find out the information on what is going wrong in the community, to me that's not a problem," she said. Staff writer Felicia Sonmez contributed to this report. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/story/2011/03/09/ST2011030906538.html?sid=ST2011030906538

03/09/2011 06:54 PM Dirty Document Trove Did Mubarak's Secret Service Order Terror Attacks? By Yassin Musharbash and Volkhard Windfuhr Alarmed Egyptians rescued dozens of documents held by Egypt's state security service and posted them on the Internet after intelligence officials apparently tried to burn them. If the documents are real, the Egyptian Interior Ministry appears to have ordered the 2005 terror attacks on Sharm el-Sheik. CAIRO/BERLIN -- Egypt's state security apparatus was quite literally a state within a state -- omnipresent, brutal, equipped with immense resources, and uncontrollable. Some of its crimes may now be coming to light. Over the weekend, Egyptian citizens secured secret documents from state security headquarters in Cairo. Shortly before, a fire had broken out in the building. Many in the opposition that helped to topple the Mubarak regime believe it was an arson attack aimed at destroying sensitive files. Since then, dozens of documents have been posted online. Some appear to be authentic, while others clearly appear to be fakes. Verification of the files is very difficult and manipulation cannot be ruled out. Some of the documents hint at scandalous dealings. Particularly sensitive are two alleged memos dating from 2005 on what appears to be the letterhead of a "secret political department" of Egypt's Interior Ministry. The documents suggest the regime of fallen President Hosni Mubarak may have ordered the deadly terror attacks in the Red Sea resort city Sharm el-Sheikh on the Sinai peninsula in July 2005. 'Zero Hour' in Sharm el-Sheik Dated June 7, 2005, the purported secret document states: "Yesterday at 2:30 p.m., we met with Mohammad H., Osama M., Rafit M. and Siad A and agreed on all the points of the plans for the implementation of Assignment 231 of January 29, 2005. We agreed to focus on three vehicles equipped with explosives, in the area around Naama Bay, so that the first would explode at the entrance to the Mövenpick Hotel, the second … near the hotel and the third in Mövenpick Village, which all belong to Mr. Hussain Salim … We agreed that the zero hour should be on the morning of July 23, 2005."

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Attacks really did take place on that morning, at 1:15 a.m., at almost precisely the locations cited in the document, and resulting in more than 80 deaths. A previously unknown al-Qaida splinter group claimed responsibility for the attack at the resort, which is extremely popular with European tourists. Another ostensible memo relating to "Assignment 231," appears to provide the context for the act. It allegedly reports that a business dispute had broken out between Gamal Mubarak, the son of President Hosni Mubarak, and hotelier Hassain Salim. Opposition Speaks of 'Mubarak's Gestapo' Was the Egyptian regime unscrupulous enough to instigate mass murder in order to support the private goals of the president's family? For now, the veracity of the document has not been proven. The fact that the circumstances of the attack and the alleged guidelines in the memo fit together so well could be seen as an indicator for either scenario: that the document was forged, or that it is real. Nevertheless, it would be extremely unusual for a secret service to put an assignment like this in writing. On the other hand, though, who would fabricate a document like that -- why, and on whose behalf? It appears that only state security service insiders, with the help of historians, will be able differentiate between the real and forged documents -- and that work might have to come at a much later date. This uncertainty also applies to the remaining findings, that nevertheless were published. But, in part, they are clearly more plausible. "Mubarak's Gestapo," the name given by the opposition press for the secret service, was involved in criminal activities on all levels. One example was the sham parliamentary elections in 2010. In those elections, the ruling party, National Democratic Party (NDP), emerged with 97 percent of the vote; attempts to defamethe Mubarak opponent Mohammed ElBaradei and candidates running for president was achieved; carefully planned physical intimidation of well- known opponents to the regime was carried out, as was the safeguarding of illegal transactions involving influential politicians on the ministerial level. According to preliminary information, it appears high-ranking government officials with close proximity to Mubarak's son Gamal used the power of the secret service for their own purposes. The illegal, but most profitable, usurpation of state-owned land and the lucrative misappropriation of potentially fertile land along the desert highways between Cairo and Alexandria and Cairo and the Suez Canal -- that were supposed to be used to advance urgently needed expansions to agricultural farmland -- all of that would not have been possible without the "cooperation" of the feared agency of oppression. Work Begins in Dealing with Past First in Alexandria, then in the large cities along the Nile Delta, such as Damanhur and Kafr el-Sheik, and in the regional capitals, fearless demonstrators succeeded in occupying the branch offices of the secret service, and secured numerous documents detailing the machinations and crimes of the hated agency. It will only be possible to determine the size of the spoils after a difficult period of stock-taking -- not least of which because the officers responsible either had the compromising documents burned or shredded, often at the last minute. Given the scope of the spying against the country's residents, with the use of the most modern bugging systems and bestial torture, the military's ruling council, as the country's highest authority, moved to dissolve the state security apparatus after Mubarak's forced resignation. 210

The army has also requested that Egyptians return documents or, at least, not publish them. Indeed, lists are circulating with names of supposed informants that have not been blacked out -- a development that could have devastating consequences for those in question. Even opponents of the Mubarak regime are dicussing the ethics of publishing such documents -- and some are pleading for caution. What began more than two decades ago far away in in Germany, with the dissolution of the East German Stasi secret police and reunification, now appears to be starting in Egypt. The country is beginning to come to terms with its difficult history under the Mubarak regime.

URL: • http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,749989,00.html RELATED SPIEGEL ONLINE LINKS: • Zero Hour in the Middle East: What the Arab World's Past Can Tell Us About Its Future (03/08/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,749537,00.html • The 18th Day: A Great Victory for the Egyptian People (02/14/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,745392,00.html • Protesters Defeat Mubarak: The West Loses Its Favorite Tyrant (02/11/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,745104,00.html

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03/09/2011 Debating Muslims Is Islam an Intrinsic Part of Germany?

New German Interior Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich said recently that Islam is not historically part of Germany. Many in the country agree with him. But is he right? SPIEGEL ONLINE presents competing viewpoints from Matthias Matussek and Yassin Musharbash.

NO MatthiasMatussek YES Yassin Musharbash Why Germany's New Interior Minister Has It Right about Islam in Germany By Matthias Matussek German Interior Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich, of course, has it right. Soon after his appointment to Chancellor Angela Merkel's cabinet last week, he came out with it: Islam is not part of Germany. It is a position which corresponds nicely with what Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan told Turks living in Germany at an appearance last week in Düsseldorf. Once again, Erdogan warned his countrymen about the dangers of assimilation. His appeal was aimed at those who do not belong and at those who do not want to belong, of which there are quite a few. Friedrich's statement was matter-of-fact. But reactions to them have relied on a familiar mix of vociferous outrage and political blackmail -- and avoidance of the real issue at hand. That, in fact, is the real scandal here. The minister's exact words were: "That Islam is part of Germany is a fact that cannot be proven by history." He was making an historical argument. But instead of counterarguments, we're being force fed lessons on intercultural etiquette. Renate

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Künast, co-head of the Green Party, accused Friedrich of "shattering porcelain!" Her party colleague Cem Özdemir added that Friedrich has a "crude understanding of German society." Could it not be that the two have a crude understanding of political debate? Lamya Kaddor, the head of the Liberal Islam Association, immediately puffed out her feathers. For her, it would seem, it was a question of honor. She called the minister's comment a "slap in the face of Muslims," and said Friedrich's comments were "politically and historically inaccurate." How, exactly, did he err? She didn't say. Kenan Kolat, head of the Turkish Community in Germany, did what he does best: make threats. "If the interior minister is looking for a fight," he said, "he will get one." In other words: If you call me intolerant one more time, you're going to get it! No one, so far, has directly responded to what the minister said. The German public is still waiting for some indication as to how Friedrich's comment was inaccurate. There is surely no shortage of evidence documenting the development a Muslim-Christian- German identity. As the starting date of that marvelous friendship, should we perhaps take Sept. 12, 1683, the final day in the Battle of Vienna and the Turks’ two-month siege of the city, a day which saw Christian countries in the Occident tremble in fear of what a defeat could bring? Or was it the Rococo-style coffee services that delighted us -- or perhaps Mozart's lighthearted tale of "Il Seraglio," with its exotic scenes of harems, jailors, racy bodices and the kind-hearted Pasha Selim? Or, instead, are we really thinking of the bad-tempered subcultures, the veiled women in German cities, the inflammatory speeches of the Shariah proponents in Mönchengladbach, Duisburg's predominantly Turkish Marxloh district and the numerous Islamic cultural associations currently under observation by Germany's domestic intelligence service? Let's put it this way: Even though I have some Muslim friends, Islam is not historically an intrinsic part of Germany. It is not part of our historical-religious DNA, which -- despite all the naysayers -- continues to be Christian. The President's Rhetorical Mt. Everest The debate about Islam's role in Germany was triggered by German President Christian Wulff's speech last October marking the 20th anniversary of German reunification. He called for reconciliation and decreed that "Islam has also come to be a part of Germany." At the time, Germany was consumed with the scandal surrounding German politician and now-former central banker Thilo Sarrazin and his incendiary book criticizing Germany's immigration policy and the benefits of multiculturalism. The statement was meant to be the final word in the debate. Instead, it merely opened the Pandora's Box of religious identities. The comment was part of a three-pronged definition of German identity. He got off to a bumpy start by saying: "Without a doubt, Christianity is a part of Germany." Fair enough, even in these times marked by an ever-increasing number of people leaving the church. It was nice of him to remind us. Then he said: "Without a doubt, Judaism is a part of Germany." Hmmm. That’s perhaps fudging things a bit and somewhat problematic in the way it brushes over the past.

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Then, while climbing this steep mountain face, the president combined the two, saying: "That is our Judeo-Christian history." He grabbed the next hold, checked to make sure it was secure and prepared to assault the summit. And then he went for it: "But Islam has also come to be part of Germany." In response, two-thirds of Germans said "nope," "not exactly" and "which Islam are you talking about?" Is he talking about the Islam of the 14th-century Persian poet Hafez, whom Goethe liked so much? Or was he referring the Islam of gender oppression, fundamentalism and bombs? During a speech in Ankara a short time later, Wulff flipped the argument and declared that Christianity was naturally also part of Turkey. Since the speech had been handed out beforehand, he spoke to a half-empty room. Most of those in attendance merely shook their heads. Which planet, one wonders, does Wulff live on? Skepticism Mixed with Hope It's amusing to talk about Islam because, whenever you do so, you must always pretend you are treading on eggshells lest you provoke your adversaries into behaving exactly as you describe them. It's been just a little over a week since these same pages discussed the recent book by German journalist Patrick Bahners, "The Scaremongers: The German Fear of Islam." Bahners does not blame Islamist suicide bombers and Shariah propagandists for creating a climate of fear, but those who warn about them, such as Holland's Ayaan Hirsi Ali, who had to go into hiding as a result, or Ralph Giordano, the Holocaust survivor. Thomas Steinfeld, writing in the center-left daily Süddeutsche Zeitung, was taken by Bahners' courage. "He analyzes and thinks ... How great that he exists," Steinfeld wrote. Just a few days later, an Islamist shot two American airmen dead outside of Frankfurt Airport. And the Turkish prime minister admonishes Turks in Germany against too much assimilation. Who exactly is responsible for the climate of fear? We are all happy about the Arab Revolution, about young Tunisians, Egyptians and Libyans chasing their dictators away and risking their lives for Western values, such as democracy, enlightenment and freedom of opinion. One can, however, still be concerned by the dangers presented by Islamism, no matter what Bahners, Steinfeld and Wulff might say. In Tunis, a mob of Islamists has already torched the red-light district. In Egypt, a majority of the population supports stoning adulterers, cutting off the hands of thieves and executing those who abandon Islam -- and that was BEFORE the revolution. In Jordan, Yemen, Morocco, Bahrain and the Gaza Strip, there are strong and, most importantly, well-organized Islamist groups that either enjoy popular support or are well on their way to doing so. None of this is new. We have known the risks since 1979, when the Ayatollah Khomeini took the place of the corrupt Shah regime and suffocated aspirations for freedom and human rights while turning Iran into a gloomy theocratic state. No, Islam is not an intrinsic part of Germany. http://www.spiegel.de/international/zeitgeist/0,1518,749967,00.html#ref=nlint By Yassin Musharbash

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Islam has long been a part of Germany. Simply ignoring that fact does nobody any good. Is Islam an intrinsic part of Germany? Newly appointed Interior Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich doesn't think so. "That Islam is part of Germany is a fact that cannot be proven by history," he said. But at what point does something "historically" belong to "Germany" at all? Frederick William I, the king of Prussia and elector of Brandenburg, had the first mosque on German soil erected in Potsdam in 1732 for 20 Turkish garrison soldiers the Duke of Courland had given him as a present. By 1762, the Prussian army had its own Muslim corps. In 1798, the first Muslim cemetery was established in Berlin. In 1807, German Muslims fought against Napoleon under the Prussian flag. All of those events took place long before Germany existed as a single state. Muslims, of course, have not made nearly as great a mark on German society, politics and intellectual history as Jews have. It is also true that most Muslims living in Germany today are the sons and daughters of guest workers and refugees rather than being the descendents of the Prussian Muslims. Islam-skeptics in Germany, though, are uninterested in such details. In reality, they don't want any historical proof that counters their own views. Their argument, similar to that of SPIEGEL editor and Friedrich defender Matthias Matussek, is that Islam "is not part of our historical-religious DNA, which ... continues to be Christian." That, though, is not an argument. It's a trap. It means that, even had Islam been present in Germany for 1,400 years, it still couldn't be part of Germany because it isn't Christian. Islam won't disappear from Germany if you exclude it linguistically. Neither will it be any more present if you embrace it conceptually. It is simply there and has been for a long time. Its adherents are not going to abandon their faith or disappear. To assume otherwise is irrational. You can't exclude millions of German Muslims because they're affiliated with a religious faith you don't like. They play a role in shaping our shared everyday existence; they are very much a part of Germany. In recent years, German President Christian Wulff and former Interior Minister Wolfgang Schäuble have launched efforts, timid though they may be, to bridge the gap. As such, Friedrich's first comments on Islam in his new position seem like an about face. His comments have caused offense and fostered resentment. That is unnecessary, and helps no one. It may be that one doesn't view Muslims as belonging to the Christian West. But the German interior minister isn't responsible for the Christian West. He's responsible for Germany. And everything that belongs to it 03/09/2011 http://www.spiegel.de/international/zeitgeist/0,1518,749967,00.html#ref=nlint

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EUROPA EN EL MUNDO

FONDOS EUROPEOS El Este y el Sur se pelean por el dinero 9 marzo 2011 DE STANDAARD BRUSELAS

Vlahovic La UE prepara un programa de apoyo económico y político a los países en transición de África del norte, pero algunos Estados miembros insisten en que no se olvide a los países del este de Europa, y particularmente al Cáucaso. Evita Neefs ¿Quién tiene más derecho a recibir fondos europeos? ¿Los revolucionarios árabes o los oponentes en Europa Oriental? Este debate divide profundamente a los Estados miembros del este y del sur de la Unión Europea. Al final de esta semana, los Veintisiete van a esforzarse por apaciguar la disputa. La reciente propuesta de seis países del sur de Europa de transferir el apoyo financiero a los países vecinos del este de la UE hacia los de la orilla sur del Mediterráneo ha producido una gran agitación en las capitales de Europa Central. Francia, España, Grecia, Eslovenia, Chipre y Malta estiman que "no está justificado" que Egipto apenas reciba 1,80 euros por habitante del presupuesto de la UE dedicado al apoyo de los países vecinos y que Túnez sólo obtenga 7 euros, mientras que Moldavia no obtiene menos de 25 euros. Por no mencionar que las cajas para ayudar al Sur están prácticamente vacías. Los conflictos en el este y en el sur son igualmente importantes Los Estados miembros del sur de la UE son los que soportan la mayor carga de los flujos de refugiados que provocan las revoluciones árabes. Tal y como resaltan los países meridionales y sus partidarios, los acontecimientos que han tenido lugar en esos países son de una gran importancia para Europa. En Europa Central, donde se rebaten las cifras presentadas por los meridionales, responden que es lo mismo que ocurre en nuestras fronteras del este. Los países de Europa Central destacan que varios "conflictos latentes" en el flanco oriental de Europa mantienen una tensión constante. Además, con ocasión del Global Security Forum (Foro Mundial de Seguridad) en Bratislava a comienzos de marzo, ha quedado patente que el temor hacia Rusia sigue predominando en los Estados miembros de la UE que antes fueron comunistas. La guerra entre Rusia y Georgia por Osetia del Sur en 2008 produjo en la zona un gran trauma. "Y ahora el Alto Karabaj está a punto de explotar", teme Oksana Antonenko del Instituto Internacional de Estudios Estratégicos en Londres. Incluso ve en esta región signos precursores como en la época de los conflictos de Osetia del Sur. Por otro lado, los regímenes de Asia Central son especialmente frágiles. "En la región acechan grandes peligros, sobre todo cuando las tropas estadounidenses salgan de Afganistán. Soy muy pesimista al respecto", afirma. Durante el Foro, los ministros de Exteriores de Georgia y de Moldavia han alabado los méritos de un apoyo europeo a favor de la modernización 216 de sus países. Y el ministro húngaro de Exteriores, Janos Martonyi, ya ha lanzado una reprimenda a sus homólogos de Europa meridional: "El apoyo al Sur no debe realizarse en detrimento de la ayuda al Este". La pauta para la reunión del 10 de marzo ha quedado clara. Stefan Füle, comisario europeo encargado de la Política Europea de Vecindad, ha intentado calmar a los países de Europa Central: "Nadie sostiene que la UE tenga que concentrar todos sus esfuerzos en el Sur. No. Nuestro compromiso con respecto al Este no ha cambiado". El presupuesto existente no permite transferir fácilmente fondos de un lugar a otro. "Sin embargo, hemos logrado encontrar 17 millones de euros complementarios para Túnez. Por otro lado, estamos estudiando cómo puede emplearse con más eficacia la suma existente de 80 millones de euros para el periodo de 2007 a 2013. Para Egipto aún no se ha llegado a una conclusión. Pero junto a las instituciones monetarias, buscamos un nuevo enfoque", declaró Stefan Füle. ¿Qué objetivo tiene la Política Europea de Vecindad? Sin embargo, la Política Europea de Vecindad no sólo se enfrenta a retos financieros. Presenta dos polos cuyo enfoque es bastante diferente. En el mundo árabe, se ha apoyado a una serie de regímenes para garantizar que el petróleo no faltara y los que han tentado a la suerte se han mantenido en el exterior. En los países del este, se ha establecido una cooperación sobre todo con la sociedad civil y la oposición política. Dicho esto, la región del este, debido al retroceso de la democracia en países como Bielorrusia, comienza a parecerse cada vez más a los países del sur antes de que estallaran las revoluciones. Hace poco, Stefan Füle presentó formalmente sus excusas por el apoyo europeo a los dictadores durante años. Por lo tanto, en el futuro, será necesario que las cosas cambien. La Política Europea de Vecindad es un instrumento para conseguir un objetivo. Pero ¿cuál es ese objetivo? De momento, no está muy claro, reconocía Stefan Füle. ¿La adhesión a la UE? ¿El acceso al mercado europeo? ¿O simplemente garantizar que los vecinos no suponen una amenaza para la UE? Además, una vez que se realice la evaluación, los fondos otorgados dentro del contexto de la nueva Política Europea de Vecindad deberán atribuirse de un modo distinto. "Debemos establecer objetivos extremadamente claros, como el respeto del Estado de derecho, la democracia, una buena administración o una ayuda para luchar contra el terrorismo. Cuanto más se acerque el socio a estos objetivos, más ayudas obtendrá". El nuevo eslogan de la política de Europa con respecto a sus vecinos cercanos sería entonces "Más por más". DEMOCRACIA La UE presenta su plan para el Norte de África El 8 de marzo, el presidente de la Comisión Europea José Manuel Barroso, presentó "un plan de 6.000 millones de euros para la democratización del Norte de África", informa El País. El diario destaca que Bruselas propone "un enfoque democratizador" de sus relaciones con los países de la costa sur del Mediterráneo y considera que Europa se ha visto "moralmente forzada a hacer expiación" por su connivencia con los regímenes autoritarios de la región. El instrumento para lograr esta ambición es la Asociación para la Democracia y la Prosperidad Compartida, cuya puesta en marcha se debatirá el 11 de marzo durante la cumbre europea. Se prevé un presupuesto de 6.000 millones de euros, adelantados por el Banco Europeo de Inversiones (BEI), así como la ampliación al

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Mediterráneo de las actividades del Banco Europeo de Reconstrucción y Desarrollo (BERD). "Las ayudas estarán relacionadas con la solidez de los avances en derechos humanos y democracia", precisa El País. El Este y el Sur se pelean por el dinero9 marzo 2011 DE STANDAARD BRUSELAS http://www.presseurop.eu/es/content/article/538541-el-este-y-el-sur-se-pelean-por-el- dinero Ola de cambio en el mundo árabe - La posición europea La UE aportará 6.000 millones a la democratización del Norte de África Bruselas propone una nueva relación para potenciar los derechos básicos RICARDO MARTÍNEZ DE RITUERTO - Bruselas - 09/03/2011 Moralmente forzada a hacer expiación por su contrastada connivencia con los regímenes autoritarios y corruptos del Mediterráneo meridional, la Unión Europea se propone dar un nuevo enfoque democratizador a la relación con esos vecinos. El instrumento será una Asociación para la Democracia y la Prosperidad Compartida aprobada ayer por la Comisión y glosada por José Manuel Durão Barroso como un catalizador para la transformación democrática de la región. El plan, con 6.000 millones de euros en juego, será discutido el viernes por los líderes europeos, de quienes se espera que incidan en la condicionalidad del apoyo: las ayudas estarán relacionadas con la solidez de los avances en derechos humanos y democracia. A la hora en que algunos países árabes se alzan contra sus opresores, la UE se mira en el espejo y se avergüenza. Las tan aireadas cláusulas de respeto a los derechos fundamentales contenidas en cada acuerdo de colaboración suscritos con esos países, y muchos otros en otras latitudes, eran papel mojado cuando entraban en conflicto con potenciales negocios. Ante los cambios históricos que está viendo la región, "la UE tiene que adoptar la clara y estratégica opción de apoyar la búsqueda de los principios y valores que tanto aprecia, aun reconociendo las dificultades", señala desde su comienzo el documento de 16 páginas que dibuja el contenido de la nueva asociación, "innovadora y ambiciosa" y volcada en "apoyar plenamente los deseos de los pueblos de la vecindad". Las grandes líneas de actuación cubren desde la intervención inmediata (como los 30 millones de ayuda humanitaria y los 17 ya probados para sostener la transición democrática en Túnez) a actuaciones de calado y a largo plazo como potenciar el diálogo político, incrementar el apoyo a la sociedad civil, flexibilizar los movimientos de personas (desde estudiantes de Erasmus Mundus a investigadores y profesionales), liberalizar el acceso a los mercados (incluidos los de productos agrícolas y pesqueros de Túnez y Marruecos, que inquietan a los agricultores andaluces) o cooperar en el campo de la energía, en especial las renovables. Para promover el desarrollo económico y la creación de empleo con que estabilizar sociedades y evitar emigraciones, la Comisión insta a que el Banco Europeo de Inversiones ponga a disposición de la región 6.000 millones de euros en los próximos tres años y que el estatuto del Banco Europeo de Reconstrucción y Desarrollo, nacido

218 para cubrir las necesidades de la Europa central y oriental tras la caída del Muro, extienda al Mediterráneo su área de actuación. "Habrá que pensar en un enfoque basado en incentivos con una mayor diferenciación entre países", señala el plan aprobado por la Comisión. "Los que avancen más y más rápido en las reformas contarán con mayor apoyo de la UE". En este vertiente de la condicionalidad abundará el Consejo Europeo del viernes, del que se espera que deje reducidas las 16 páginas del plan de la Comisión a unos cuantos párrafos de alto significado político. Mientas piensa en la nueva relación con los vecinos, la Unión no pierde de vista la situación en Libia. Ayer se acordó incluir a la Autoridad Libia de Inversión, el vehículo del régimen para actuar en el exterior, y entidades anejas en la lista europea de sanciones, lo que supone que todos sus activos y operaciones quedarán congelados desde el viernes en toda la UE. Entre sus inversiones figuran un 7,5% en el club de fútbol de la Juventus o el 3% en Pearson, editor del Financial Times. Como preparación para la cumbre del viernes y la reunión previa de mañana de los ministros europeos de Exteriores, la UE envió el domingo una misión técnica a Trípoli, encabezada por Agostino Miozzo, un responsable de situaciones de crisis, para evaluar la situación sobre el terreno y las necesidades de los europeos que allí quedan, unos 1.300 de los que 200 están a la espera de salir. En su limitada visita a la capital, la delegación percibió normalidad de vida cotidiana, sin violencia, bombardeos ni disparos. Embajadores de los ocho países que aún mantienen legaciones en Trípoli dijeron no tener noticia de bombardeos sobre civiles ni del uso de mercenarios, aunque sí sabían de violaciones de derechos humanos cuya responsabilidad no estaban en condiciones de discernir. El director general para Europa del Ministerio de Exteriores libio, Ahmed Jarrod, y los embajadores pidieron a Miozzo que la ONU envíe cuanto antes una comisión investigadora independiente para determinar exactamente lo ocurrido. Michael Mann, portavoz de Catherine Ashton, coordinadora de la política exterior comunitaria, subrayó ayer que las decisiones políticas europeas se toman en Bruselas y que la última palabra sobre Libia la tiene el Consejo Europeo. "La posición oficial del presidente Barroso sigue siendo la misma: Gadafi tiene que marcharse", señaló Mann. Principales medidas - La ayuda prevista para el norte de África hasta 2013 asciende a 6.000 millones de euros, incluyendo 240 millones para Túnez y 445 para Egipto. - 30 millones se destinarán a asistencia humanitaria. - Túnez podrá recibir 17 millones como ayuda para organizar elecciones. - La UE podrá gastarse 25 millones más en control de fronteras y apoyo a los refugiados. - La asistencia estará condicionada a que los países progresen en materia de derechos humanos y democracia interna. Tendrán que demostrar "compromiso con elecciones libres y justas". http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/UE/aportara/6000/millones/democratizaci on/Norte/Africa/elpepiint/20110309elpepiint_6/Tes

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http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/cf3f1f9e-49b2-11e0-acf0- 00144feab49a.html#ixzz1G7ZS8vMe Libya ‘transitional’ council tries to cope By Andrew England in Brega Published: March 9 2011 03:29 | Last updated: March 9 2011 03:29 In Brega, a small town close to the eastern frontline of Libya’s escalating conflict, young men sit in pick-up trucks or hang around anti-aircraft guns waiting to move forward, while shots are fired into the air for no apparent reason. When a group of the volunteer fighters are asked who is giving them orders, Ahmed Musad smiles. “My own brain ... God is in charge,” he says. “Libyans are in charge of themselves right now, anybody but Muammer Gaddafi.” EDITOR’S CHOICE: Tripoli calls for atrocities inquiry - Mar-08 Cameron praises ‘excellent’ foreign secretary - Mar-09 In depth: Libya uprising - Mar-08 Eni CEO defends decision to stay in Libya - Mar-09 In pictures: Libyan fighting - Mar-07 US weighs no-fly zone options - Mar-09 Some 300 miles to the east, opposition officials scurry around the scruffy corridors of Benghazi’s courthouse, trying to organise an administration to guide the military campaign, reach out to the international community and begin the process of putting in place structures that they hope will lead Libya to democracy if the regime falls. The two scenes represent the different faces of the revolt against Col Gaddafi, with both often appearing chaotic – young men with little training rushing into battle and civilians packing the courthouse, sometimes engaging in heated debates and often struggling to provide information desired by a watchful international community and an expectant local population. The task of bringing order and leading the opposition has fallen on a fledgling “transitional national council”. It held its third meeting on Tuesday during which it discussed military developments, engagement with the outside world, reports from other cities and rumours that Col Gaddafi had sent envoys to open dialogue with the opposition. Led by Mustafa Abdul Jalil, a former justice minister, the council claims to be the legitimate representative of Libya and is seeking international recognition. It is to meet every day in the opposition stronghold of Benghazi, but even that can prove a challenge. Fathi Baja, a council member, said a number of the body’s 30 members did not turn up, since they were busy with local committees in other towns and cities, while the names of many have not been announced for security reasons and some members are besieged in westerns cities such as Zawiya and Misurata. Officials acknowledge that at times they appear disorganised, but point out that the uprising began spontaneously in a closed country where political activity was suppressed and civil society groups were virtually non-existent.

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The educated elite taking the leadership roles also knows it has to keep in tune with the mood of the street, particularly the youth who led the uprising. Already this has seen a subtle shift in language over the council’s request for international support. Initially, council members said they wanted a no-fly zone and UN-backed air strikes against regime bases, while rejecting the idea of foreign troops on the ground. The calls for a no-fly zone remain clear, but whether the council is still publicly calling for air strikes – opposed by many, including fighters in Brega – appears more ambiguous. “It’s a very sensitive question for Libyans. People in the council in general agree on one thing – air strikes are more than welcome,” Mr Baja says. But “they [officials] started to play with words because it’s very sensitive so when they say it to people, they put it with some cover”. Pressure on the council is likely to increase the longer the crisis continues. “There is pressure on the national council from the street, they ask about these points every day. ‘Are you talking to the United Nations, did you ask for help?’ They think we are not doing that,” Mr Baja says. “Now we are concentrating on mechanisms for the work itself.” New structures are being put in place, and two men have been given the task of communicating the council’s message to the outside world. They are Mahmoud Jebril, who had been involved in a project to bring reforms to Libya before the uprising, and Ali Aziz al-Eisawi, a former ambassador to India. They met officials at the European Parliament on Tuesday. But many of the names have little recognition in a nation were Col Gaddafi’s cult of personality has dominated. One reason why Mr Abdul Jalil was chosen to head the council was because he is well-known across the country,and in spite of his affiliation to the regime, he is seen as someone who is “clean” and regularly criticised the government. “These faces are coming up so fast. At one point we will have CVs for all these people but at this point in time we are just trying to run a government,” says Mustafa Gheriani, an opposition spokesman. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/cf3f1f9e-49b2-11e0-acf0- 00144feab49a,dwp_uuid=6efcd0b0-39bb-11e0-8dba- 00144feabdc0.html#axzz1G0gtKHbK

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U.S., Europe considering naval operations to deliver humanitarian aid to Libya By Karen DeYoung Washington Post Staff Writer Wednesday, March 9, 2011; 12:39 AM The United States and its European allies are considering the use of naval assets to deliver humanitarian aid to Libya and to block arms shipments to the government of Moammar Gaddafi, even as they weigh the legality of imposing a no-fly zone without United Nations authorization, according to U.S. and European officials. NATO military officials began briefing governments Tuesday night on a range of options that will be presented to defense ministers in Brussels on Thursday. The Obama administration, NATO and other international organizations are united in their belief that any military intervention in Libya would require some international backing. But with a U.N. mandate far from assured, those considering some form of intervention - including the United States, Britain, France and Italy - are looking for alternative support, officials said. Officials, saying international support could come from regional blocs, noted that NATO's air attacks on Serbia in 1999 came without U.N. backing. "If you have [support from] the Arab League, the African Union, NATO and potentially the European Union, you have every country within 5,000 miles of Libya," a NATO official said. "That gives you a certain level of legitimacy." The intense international deliberations came as troops loyal to Gaddafi continued to besiege the rebel-held city of Zawiyah, 27 miles west of Tripoli, for a fifth day on Tuesday, with rebel officials there citing a mounting toll - dozens dead and hundreds wounded, including women and children. In Ras Lanuf, about 400 miles east of the capital, Gaddafi loyalists were engaged in fierce fighting with rebels who had hoped to march on Sirte, Gaddafi's home town and a strategically vital city still under tight government control. Gaddafi made a surprise appearance at a hotel hosting foreign correspondents in Tripoli, arriving just before midnight, the Associated Press reported. He raised his fist in the air as he walked from his car to the hotel, then went into a room for about an hour to give exclusive television interviews before leaving without speaking to reporters waiting outside. As they weighed the prospect of intervention, the Obama administration and European governments continued efforts to size up the Libyan opposition. "We feel that we don't really understand who they are yet," said a senior European diplomat who, like other officials interviewed, spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss closely held

222 deliberations. "They are more fractured and complicated and less well-coordinated than we would like." France and Italy said they were in direct conversations with some opposition figures, and the State Department said it had held face-to-face meetings and telephone conversations in Rome and Cairo with members of the Benghazi-based National Transitional Council. "We're talking to others beyond the membership of this council," State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley said. "Eventually, you know, within Libya a formal opposition will emerge. We're watching to see how that develops." The administration has chosen not to step out in front in advocating military intervention, even as it has come under criticism by some congressional leaders who have pressed for a more robust response. U.S. military planners and those from other NATO governments have prepared a range of alternatives, including the establishment of an air and/or naval bridge to carry humanitarian supplies or escort civilian ships into Benghazi and other rebel-held areas, as well as close-in naval patrols along the Libyan coast to monitor an existing arms embargo. The proposed naval actions would not require a U.N. resolution. But governments are divided on both the advisability and the legality of a no-fly zone. Russia and China, with the power to veto a Security Council resolution, have indicated opposition. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, in an interview with Britain's Sky News on Tuesday, indicated that support from regional blocs might help win passage of a U.N. resolution. In NATO, Germany has said it does not support a no-fly zone. NATO operates by consensus, and an operation would not be approved if any member chose to speak out against it. In conversations this week with his U.S. and British counterparts, Italian Foreign Minister Franco Frattini said Italy would make its air bases available for no-fly operations if they were supported by NATO, the E.U. and the Arab League, another European diplomat said. None of those organizations has yet declared unqualified support for any outside military action. The Gulf Cooperation Council, the six-member association of the Persian Gulf Arab states, voiced its backing Monday. The French Foreign Ministry said Monday that Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa had voiced support for a no- fly zone during a meeting Monday in Paris, but the league has not declared itself, and some members, led by Syria and Algeria, are said to be opposed. The Arab, European and African organizations have each scheduled separate meetings on the Libyan crisis this week, along with Thursday's NATO gathering. "We need some signal from the region that the action was welcome," one of the European diplomats said. The Obama administration itself is divided on the utility of a no-fly zone. "A no-fly zone is the robust man's option," one administration official said. "But what is it going to do to the balance of power in Libya?" With the Libyan government's assault concentrated on ground rather than air power, "it doesn't change it internally so it favors the rebels. It doesn't do much humanitarian good." 223

"It makes us feel good," the official said, and has some symbolic value in potentially frightening Gaddafi into giving up. "But what . . . if it doesn't work? Are you prepared to take the next step? We haven't had that debate yet, in part because we thought it was going to happen really quickly." NATO maintained a no-fly zone over the disputed province of Kosovo for three years, while numerous atrocities occurred below, before sending its bombers to Serbia. In Libya, an imminent humanitarian catastrophe would be the best legal basis, short of a U.N. resolution, for a no-fly zone or other intervention, U.S. and European officials said. But such judgments are inherently subjective, said one official. "This is the question," he said. "How many people being killed constitutes sufficient grounds?" On Tuesday, witnesses in Zawiyah said the city, suffering from severe shortages of medicine and food, was coming under heavy mortar fire. "They are not yet rolling in with tanks like yesterday, but they are shelling us from a distance of three to four kilometers," said Mohamed Magid, an opposition spokesman in Zawiyah who spoke by satellite phone. Phone, Internet and electricity services had been cut in the city, he said. "They are hitting civilian buildings. There are civilian casualties. . . . We need help." In a news conference in Benghazi, the opposition council denied widespread reports that Gaddafi had offered, through a third party, to give up power if he was allowed to leave the country. "There is no such proposal," said Abdul Hafidh Gogha, a council spokesman. "We have not been contacted. There is no emissary." "We do expect the international community to impose a no-fly zone over Libya," Gogha said. Staff writer Colum Lynch at the United Nations, correspondent Anthony Faiola and special correspondent Samuel Sockol in Tunis, and staff writer Steve Hendrix in Benghazi contributed to this report. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/article/2011/03/08/AR2011030805868.html?wpisrc=nl_headline

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http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6ea2c8b0-49bd-11e0-acf0-6 00144feab49a.html#ixzz1G7UsoLmp How to read the second Arab awakening By Richard Haass Published: March 8 2011 22:14 | Last updated: March 8 2011 22:14 It is nearly 75 years since George Antonius wrote of the first “Arab awakening”, one reflecting an outbreak of nationalist sentiment against European masters. What we are currently witnessing could prove to be a second such awakening; one neither generated by, nor aimed at Israel and the US, but a home-grown phenomenon that targets unresponsive, repressive leaders. We cannot be sure, however, whether what we are seeing is a genuine democratic revolution. In some countries, protests will fizzle out. In others they could become chaotic, especially if oppositions splinter having achieved the one objective on which they agree: the ousting of the existing regime; Egypt and Tunisia both come to mind here. EDITOR’S CHOICE: Feeling of paralysis grips nervous capital - Mar-08 US weighs no-fly zone options - Mar-09 Libyan central bank chief surfaces - Mar-08 In depth: Libya uprising - Mar-08 Spotlight turns on stakes in Arab banks - Mar-08 Video: Stalemate in Libya - Mar-08 Or repression could rule the day, if governments show resolve and are willing (and able) to crack down with impunity. This might prove to be the case in Libya, but even then the cycle of challenge to authority could begin anew. In all cases generalisations should be resisted. Each country is different, while references to a wave of change are simplistic. A range of political outcomes are likely to be reached, taking divergent paths. We can say a few things with confidence. Genuine monarchies in the region appear to be more acceptable to their citizens than dynastic autocracies, especially in those instances – Egypt, Libya and Yemen – where leaders were, or have been, ruling for decades. This bodes well for Morocco, Jordan and, most importantly, for oil-rich Saudi Arabia. But it is less true for Bahrain, whose ruling family hails from that society’s minority. Pressures will nonetheless still grow on these monarchies to become more constitutional, and less monarchical. In Saudi Arabia, King Abdullah’s personal popularity and reputation as a reformer (by Saudi standards, at least) may matter as much over time as his ability to placate his population with increased subsidies and cash transfers. His potential successors would also be wise to keep this in mind. Outsiders, even powerful ones like the US are currently limited in what they can accomplish, in part because they are limited in what they can know and understand. They must tread with caution, and be mindful that it is easier to punish friends than enemies, or those from whom they are already estranged. There is more than a little irony in the fact that the international community has so far been much tougher on

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Egypt and Bahrain than on Syria or Iran. Officials in the US and Europe should instead step up their public calls for significant political reform in these highly controlled unfriendly countries, as well as channel help to legitimate opposition movements. Reform movements across the region, however, now face a dilemma over strategy. Put simply, it takes two to make a revolution non-violent. Non-violence succeeded in Egypt because the army was not prepared to sacrifice its legitimacy to save Hosni Mubarak. This approach has not succeeded in Iran, and may not, so long as the regime can count on the loyalty of its thugs. Non-violence is a valuable tactic, but to succeed it requires a police and military that avoids repression. Overall, we must be realistic about what to expect from a small degree of democratisation. Immature or partial democracies are vulnerable to being hijacked by populists or extreme nationalists. A Middle East more influenced by public opinion could well be less willing to work against terrorism, or on behalf of peace with Israel. It is likely to be no more of a partner when it comes to providing oil at reasonable prices. A fuller form of democracy may be the desired alternative, but it is also the most difficult to bring about. The region’s nations lack the traditional prerequisites – including a large and growing middle class, a real (and not oil-inflated) per capita gross domestic product above $3,000, and a developed civil society of truly independent institutions. What is more, bad situations can get worse as well as better. As Jeane Kirkpatrick pointed out in her seminal 1979 article “Dictatorships and Double Standards,” traditional authoritarian governments are actually less repressive than revolutionary autocracies, and are also “more susceptible of liberalisation”. Anarchy, civil war, harsh police states, sectarianism, and severe Islamic rule are all potential alternatives to the sort of authoritarian regimes that have recently dominated the region. All of these outcomes are possible; none is likely to lead to greater freedom. It is essential to bear in mind that ousting regimes is the least difficult part of the challenge. Iraq, which after Saddam suffered through years of civil strife and now experiences what can generously be described as dysfunctionality, is a textbook case. Signs of strain are already appearing in Egypt (both between the army and the “street” and within the opposition) over the pace, sequencing and substance of reform. Democratic revolution is a tall order; often we are left with change that is less than revolutionary, and politics that are less than democratic. The writer is president of the Council on Foreign Relations. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6ea2c8b0-49bd-11e0-acf0- 00144feab49a,dwp_uuid=6efcd0b0-39bb-11e0-8dba- 00144feabdc0.html#axzz1G0gtKHbK

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http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ee446538-49d1-11e0-acf0-7 00144feab49a.html#ixzz1G7WTPOjK Feeling of paralysis grips nervous capital By Michael Peel in Tripoli Published: March 8 2011 22:40 | Last updated: March 8 2011 22:40 At an army checkpoint near Tripoli’s Green Square, the commanding officer had an idea for what to do when yet another Libyan official turned out to be unavailable: go to the national museum in the nearby 16th-century Red Castle instead. Within minutes, Salah Alajab, the curator, had materialised and was holding forth on the lessons his institution offered for the crisis that has gripped the country since an uprising began last month against Muammer Gaddafi’s 41-year rule. EDITOR’S CHOICE: Libyan central bank chief surfaces - Mar-08 Gaddafi ‘bombs the hell’ out of city - Mar-09 US weighs no-fly zone options - Mar-09 In depth: Libya uprising - Mar-08 Spotlight turns on stakes in Arab banks - Mar-08 Video: Stalemate in Libya - Mar-08 “From this fortification, we can see Libya faced many conspiracies throughout time,” he mused, at the foot of stairs to an open-air exhibit featuring a fountain encircled by mean-looking entwined snakes. “We hope all the people work together to solve this problem, and find the right solution to save their lives and build their future.” The surreal vignette is a small example of the strangeness, heightened during this time of conflict, of a city long noted for the odd happenings and unsettling atmosphere overseen by a ruthless four-decade-old regime. With people more scared than usual to talk and communications controlled even more tightly by the authorities, Tripoli is filled by nervousness, supposition, and waiting – and the occasional unexpected event. For all its cosmopolitan population and superficially open Mediterranean feel, Libya long ago became one of the world’s most closed societies under Colonel Gaddafi, the world’s longest-ruling autocrat. Freedom House, the US civil liberties group, ranks the country in the same bracket as Burma and North Korea. The civil conflict has added another dimension to the fear and repression. The regime has buttressed its armed offensive against the opposition with a spree of night-time disappearances that Human Rights Watch says have targeted people sending information out of the country. The lives of people who want to tell what is happening in Libya have been made even harder by disruptions to phone and electronic communications. One business worker, asked when the internet might return to normal, said: “Maybe soon. We never know. Inshallah.”

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The web near-blackout adds to the sense of a city paralysed, with information as crudely obscured as the anti-Gaddafi graffiti that has been painted over by regime supporters on walls all over town. At the mall beneath the Libyan Investment Authority, the copy of the International Herald Tribune [and the Financial Times] on the news-stand was dated February 16 – the day after the uprising against Col Gaddafi began. The front-page picture of the Tripoli Post was of the fireworks in Cairo to celebrate the fall last month of the Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak. Many people, including some in government, have stayed away from their offices, others do not pick up their phones and those who do are often too afraid to talk. One official who took a call declared the situation to be “stabilising”, but, when asked if he would elaborate on his view, replied simply: “That would be difficult.” Daily life in Tripoli continues with a kind of normality, albeit with an at times strained and slightly desperate tinge. Next to the museum entrance, a young boy was trying to catch his dinner in a makeshift trap made of a cardboard box propped up by a mineral water bottle tied to a string that he held in his hand. “Pigeon, 100 per cent!” he said, making a flapping motion with his hands. The colonel himself may be appearing only sparingly in public but he remains an all- pervasive presence in posters around the city – despite his long-standing insistence that he is not a president and just an ordinary Libyan. He appears in a variety of sometimes unusual settings: in one, the sun shines behind him, in another he clutches the hand of Silvio Berlusconi, the Italian prime minister. By mid-afternoon, the red carpet had been rolled out for Col Gaddafi at the Rixos hotel in central Tripoli, where scores of foreign journalists were gathered for the promised visit. A government official warned that anybody who went to the roof to watch the leader’s arrival would be shot dead. Then it was time for another long Libyan wait, this time for a mercurial ruler who is both creator and embodiment of a country where, more than ever, the disconcerting and the disturbing have become routine. Col Gaddafi finally arrived at the hotel at 1130pm local time. Dressed in a beige head- wrap and accompanied by a female bodyguard in a red beret, he pumped his fist as he walked past a small group of chanting supporters and a scrum of journalists. He didn’t speak before disappearing into a curtained-off area for a television interview. As a doctor in a Tripoli bread queue put it with a shrug: “No information. It’s a psychological state.” http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ee446538-49d1-11e0-acf0- 00144feab49a,dwp_uuid=6efcd0b0-39bb-11e0-8dba- 00144feabdc0.html#axzz1G0gtKHbK

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http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3991d8de-49b6-11e0-acf0-7 00144feab49a.html#ixzz1G7WrRbzC Libyan central bank chief surfaces By Roula Khalaf in London Published: March 8 2011 19:15 | Last updated: March 8 2011 23:00 The whereabouts of the governor of Libya’s central bank, the man who holds the key to the Gaddafi regime’s finances, have confounded officials, diplomats and bankers who have been desperate to find him over the past two weeks. Farhat Omar Bengdara has spent much of the time since the outbreak of the uprising against Muammer Gaddafi outside Libya but it is has been unclear whether he supported the regime or was co-operating with the opposition. Late on Tuesday night the governor finally surfaced: in an e-mail sent to the Financial Times, he said he had been informed that the secretary of planning and finance had been appointed as acting governor and confirmed that he had been in Istanbul. But he insisted that he was doing his job, and that it was easier to conduct business abroad than in Tripoli. The statement, however, did not shed much light on the governor’s loyalties. He said he would resign after the crisis but also that he had been working hard over the past two weeks to explain the central bank’s position and clarify the effect of the international effort to freeze Libyan assets. Blocking central bank funds could lead to a humanitarian disaster, he said, including a reminder that he had always operated in line with regulations and had modernised the Libyan banking system. Bankers and opposition figures have been scrambling to decipher Mr Bengdara’s loyalties, as they assume he is one of few officials with authority to shift funds at a time when sanctions are tightening the squeeze on Col Gaddafi and his family. UniCredit, in which Libya has a stake, have been in contact with the governor, who is a vice-chairman at the Italian bank, after spending a week trying to track him down. A European diplomat said he heard the governor had been in Switzerland and had abandoned the regime. At the central bank in Tripoli, security guards and receptionists said three days running this week that the governor was away. On Tuesday officials said he was in town but out of the office. The 45-year-old Mr Bengdara, who holds a master’s degree in economics from Sheffield university in the UK, comes from a family in Benghazi, a city in the east of Libya that has been the centre of the rebellion. But Libyan opposition figures abroad say he is too closely tied to the regime and recall that in his younger years he was a member of the revolutionary committees charged with quashing dissent. The fate of Mr Bengdara has attracted much attention but bankers say he was already on his way out before the crisis. Since taking over at the central bank in 2006 (he was deputy governor before that), he was considered something of a reformer, opening up

229 the banking sector to foreign capital, tightening supervision and setting up a clearing system. But he was seen to have won his job thanks to Seif-al-Islam, the Gaddafi son and apparent heir who had championed a more liberal economic system. Additional reporting by Michael Peel in Tripoli, Andrew England in Benghazi and Guy Dinmore in Rome http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3991d8de-49b6-11e0-acf0- 00144feab49a,dwp_uuid=6efcd0b0-39bb-11e0-8dba- 00144feabdc0.html#axzz1G0gtKHbK

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3a876bd8-49ab-11e0-acf0-7 00144feab49a.html#ixzz1G7XfIuHh Spotlight turns on stakes in Arab banks By Roula Khalaf in London, Simeon Kerr in Dubai and Robin Wigglesworth in Manama Published: March 8 2011 17:59 | Last updated: March 8 2011 17:59 The Libyan regime’s diversification of business interests in the Middle East, particularly in banking, broadens the financial options of Muammer Gaddafi as he battles rebels on the ground and financial sanctions in the US and Europe. Only two months before Libyans revolted against their repressive ruler, the regime further diversified its asset portfolio into friendlier Arab jurisdictions. EDITOR’S CHOICE Tripoli calls for atrocities inquiry ‐ Mar‐08 Westminster questions Hague’s future ‐ Mar‐08 In depth: Libya uprising ‐ Mar‐08 Libya ‘transitional’ council tries to cope ‐ Mar‐09 Eni CEO defends decision to stay in Libya ‐ Mar‐09 In pictures: Libyan fighting ‐ Mar‐07 The Libyan Investment Authority, the $65bn sovereign wealth fund, for many years has had vast holdings in the Middle East. Its Lafico subsidiary owns hotels in Morocco and Jordan, and large shares in companies ranging from agriculture to pharmaceuticals. But as attempts to block financing to the regime gain momentum in western capitals, the spotlight is turning to the regime’s stakes in banks in the region. According to Zawya, the information provider, the government has stakes in a dozen banks in the Arab world, including 99.5 per cent of the Lebanon-based north Africa Commercial Bank and 50 per cent of Tunisia’s Banque Arabe Tuniso-Libyenne de Développement et de Commerce Extérieur. Smaller stakes are held in banks in Algeria, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt. In December, Libya’s central bank increased its stake in Bahrain-based Arab Banking Corporation, a wholesale conventional bank, to 59.3 per cent, after buying out the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, the emirate’s sovereign wealth fund. The remaining shares are split between the Kuwait Investment Authority, with 29.6 per cent, and the public. Libya recently boosted its stake in First Energy Bank, an Islamic bank also based in Manama. The Libyan Investment Authority has about 16 per cent of the bank, up from

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10 per cent last year. Mohammed Shokri Ghanem, son of Shokri Ghanem, head of Libya’s state-run National Oil Company, is acting chief executive of First Energy. ABC says it is continuing its normal operations. UN sanctions have focused on the Gaddafi family and US sanctions do not extend to banks under other countries’ laws. “Neither ABC nor any of its subsidiaries is subject to asset freezes as a result of developments in Libya,” said the bank said. First Energy could not be reached for comment. The increased investments in Bahrain-based banks come amid buying interest in regional real estate. Bankers say the Libyan Investment Authority was considering investments in Dubai last year, including in distressed property. One businessman said he was recently approached by a UK company to purchase real estate in Bahrain. After due diligence, the company said its client represented people close to the Libyan government. Bankers say ABC is the main vehicle for the Libyans’ trading activities and has a custodian role with the Libyan Investment Authority, whose top executive, Mohammed Layas, is also chairman of ABC. But some people familiar with ABC say that, mindful of its reputation, it could have imposed discrete limitations on withdrawals from any Gaddafi family member irrespective of the sanctions. ABC’s behaviour could depend on instruction from Farhat Omar Bengdara, the Libyan central bank governor. Bankers who have been in touch with the central bank say Mr Bengdara is out of Libya but whether he remains loyal to the regime is unclear. A US Treasury official said the sanctions exemption from which ABC was benefiting was not intended to allow it to act as a conduit for funds to sanctioned parties, such as the central bank of Libya or the Libyan Investment Authority. “To the extent we’re seeing that type of behaviour, we will be moving very quickly to stop it,” said the official. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3a876bd8-49ab-11e0-acf0- 00144feab49a,dwp_uuid=6efcd0b0-39bb-11e0-8dba- 00144feabdc0.html#axzz1G0gtKHbK

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Africa March 8, 2011

Opposition in Libya Struggles to Form a United Front By ANTHONY SHADID and KAREEM FAHIM BENGHAZI, Libya — In less than three weeks, an inchoate opposition in Libya, one of the world’s most isolated countries, has cobbled together the semblance of a transitional government, fielded a ragtag rebel army and portrayed itself to the West and Libyans as an alternative to Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi’s four decades of freakish rule. But events this week have tested the viability of an opposition that has yet to coalesce, even as it solicits help from abroad to topple Colonel Qaddafi. Rebels were dealt military setbacks in Zawiyah and Ras Lanuf on Tuesday, part of a strengthening government counteroffensive. Meanwhile, the opposition council’s leaders contradicted one another publicly. The opposition’s calls for foreign aid have amplified divisions over intervention. And provisional leaders warn that a humanitarian crisis may loom as people’s needs overwhelm fledgling local governments. “I am Libya,” Colonel Qaddafi boasted after the uprising erupted. It was standard fare for one of the world’s most outrageous leaders — megalomania so pronounced that it sounded like parody. It underlined, though, the greatest and perhaps fatal obstacle facing the rebels here — forging a substitute to Colonel Qaddafi in a state that he embodied. “We’ve found ourselves in a vacuum,” Mustafa Gheriani, an acting spokesman for the provisional leadership, said Tuesday in Benghazi, the rebel capital. “Instead of worrying about establishing a transitional government, all we worry about are the needs — security, what people require, where the uprising is going. Things are moving too fast.” “This is all that’s left,” he said, lifting his cellphone, “and we can only receive calls.” The question of the opposition’s capabilities is likely to prove decisive to the fate of the rebellion, which appears outmatched by government forces and troubled by tribal divisions that the government, reverting to form, has sought to exploit. Rebel forces are fired more by enthusiasm than experience. The political leadership has virtually begged the international community to recognize it, but it has yet to marshal opposition forces abroad or impose its authority in regions it nominally controls. Organizers acknowledge the chaos but contend that there is no one else to talk to. “We require support, whether it’s military or otherwise, we require help,” Abdel-Hafidh Ghoga, the deputy leader of the provisional leadership, told a news conference in Benghazi. “The international community has to assume its duty at this point.” While the mood remains ebullient in parts of eastern Libya, largely because few believe that Colonel Qaddafi can reconquer a region that long seethed under his rule, it is more sullen in Benghazi, a Mediterranean port and Libya’s second largest city.

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At the courthouse that has served as a government headquarters, bedlam reigned Tuesday, as gusts of wind slammed doors shut and shattered a window. Nationalist music blared over hurried conversations that unfolded beneath cartoons lampooning Colonel Qaddafi. Security has begun to deteriorate, with gunfire echoing in the distance, some robberies and assailants’ throwing a grenade at a hotel housing foreign journalists. At the front, three and a half hours away, rebels sought to recover from a government offensive that forced them from Bin Jawwad and sent them reeling toward Ras Lanuf, a strategic refinery town. The government also appeared to deal setbacks to the rebels in Zawiyah, a rebel-held town near Tripoli, and Misratah, a strategic coastal city. With momentum seeming to shift, the rebels face the prospect of being outgunned and outnumbered in what increasingly looks like a mismatched civil war. “They don’t understand,” said Sami Tujan, an officer trying, unsuccessfully, to command rebels near a checkpoint. “They’re a big target.” The rebels won their initial battles with an assortment of aging but effective weapons, and a seemingly plentiful supply of ammunition, including some from North Korea and Russia. On the beds of Toyota pickup trucks, many of the soldiers mounted an old Soviet heavy machine gun, which they referred to by the 14.5-millimeter rounds it fires. The guns are bundled together and used as antiaircraft weapons, and may have been responsible for downing a government warplane earlier this week near Ras Lanuf. Men holding rocket-propelled grenade launchers complete the patchwork rebel air-defense system. At the front lines at Ras Lanuf, the opposition forces relied on more rudimentary tracking methods to spot planes: a lanky man standing on top of a large dump truck with a pair of binoculars, along with hundreds of sets of ears of eager volunteers. Even then, the government’s Soviet-made planes mostly operated with impunity. Government forces have also marshaled artillery, better tanks and helicopters that the rebels cannot match. On Tuesday, as government forces gathered near Ras Lanuf, rebels strategized and argued among themselves, complaining that they did not have enough rocket-propelled grenades and that a spy was among them. Logistics, namely resupplying the front, has proved to be a challenge for the rebels. So has leadership. Small units of men who said they belonged to specialized branches of Libya’s army joined the fight, including members of special forces units and paratroopers. Some senior officers are also seen at the front, but many of the rebels are bankers, policemen and the unemployed, who have formed enthusiastic but somewhat hapless brigades. “Apart from a few mechanized units in Benghazi and Tobruk, and a few armored battalions near Bayda, rebel-controlled areas lack any substantial hardware with which to take on the pro-Qaddafi stronghold of Tripoli,” said a report on Tuesday by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies. “The pro-Qaddafi regions are also well garrisoned with artillery, antiaircraft and mechanized formations,” it added. After government authority collapsed in much of eastern Libya, residents set up what they call local councils of varying numbers of representatives — three in Darnah, six in Bayda. Theoretically, each is supposed to send a representative to Benghazi, where the 233 opposition has set up a group called the Provisional Transitional National Council of Libya, a kind of state in waiting. Composed of 30 representatives, it is led by Mustafa Abdel-Jalil, a former justice minister and perhaps the sole figure who enjoys national support. Its authority remains tentative, a point acknowledged by those involved. “We didn’t have any authority, of course; we just gave ourselves authority,” said Iman Bugaighis, a spokeswoman for the council. “Nobody has any political experience.” The council has barely begun to address the major choices the rebels need to make: whether to support foreign intervention and whether to negotiate in any way with the government. The council has pleaded for a no-flight zone, still being debated by the West, but rebel leaders in Darnah warned that they would oppose any foreign interference with arms. In his news conference, Mr. Ghoga ruled out any talks with the government, though Mr. Abdel-Jalil, theoretically his superior, told an Arabic satellite channel that if Colonel Qaddafi left in 72 hours, no one would pursue him. “How do we talk about something that hasn’t been proposed?” Mr. Ghoga asked. Opposition leaders also differ on whether to formally declare a transitional government, underlining fears that it may lay the groundwork for Libya’s partition. Two of its representatives met European officials on Tuesday, but the council has yet to unite with disparate, divided opposition groups abroad, activists say. “There is no communication between opposition groups and no leadership for the opposition,” said Adem Arqiq, an exiled Muslim Brotherhood member in Dublin. “There are opposition groups in Europe, in the United States and in some Arab countries, but each works for himself. There were efforts to unify them, but they failed.” For days, convoys of aid, many from Islamic relief organizations, have barreled across the Egyptian border, helping stanch shortages, in a remarkable show of organization and solidarity. Mr. Gheriani estimated that Benghazi had six months of supplies, and the United Nations was sending more aid to the port. But in the hinterland, where local councils are still struggling to reconstitute bureaucracies that collapsed last month, some worry a crisis is approaching. “No one knows how long supplies will last — a week, two weeks,” said Ahmed Boughrara, an engineer and organizer in Bayda. “Then it’s going to be a huge crisis.” Some have expressed a more lurking concern: that in a protracted fight, it may grow difficult to maintain the unity that the opposition has sought to bridge religious and tribal divides. “The longer this conflict lasts, the more people are going to be radicalized,” said Ibrahim el-Gadi, a hydrogeologist in Darnah, whose son was wounded in a fight with government forces. “We are not now, but it will be so if this conflict doesn’t finish.” David D. Kirkpatrick contributed reporting from Tripoli, Libya, and Nada Bakri from Beirut, Lebanon. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/09/world/africa/09rebels.html?nl=todaysheadlines&e mc=tha2&pagewanted=print

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Editorial

March 8, 2011 Washington’s Options on Libya The Obama administration is throwing out so many conflicting messages on Libya that they are blunting any potential pressure on the Libyan regime and weakening American credibility. It’s dangerous to make threats if you’re not prepared to follow through. All of the public hand-wringing has made it even worse. President Obama was talking tough again on Monday, warning that the West is considering all options, including military intervention. Just a day before, his chief of staff, William Daley, complained that “lots of people throw around phrases like no-fly zone; they talk about it as though it’s just a video game.” A few days earlier, Defense Secretary Robert Gates said a no-fly zone could require a huge, prolonged operation, an argument challenged by some military planners. We are not eager to see the United States involved in another conflict in the Muslim world. Sending in American troops would be a disaster. But some way must be found to support Libya’s uprising and stop Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi from slaughtering his people. On Tuesday, his forces appeared to be gaining momentum as they again turned warplanes against the opposition. Even with overwhelming air superiority, preventing Libyan warplanes from flying would entail some risk for American and NATO pilots. And what happens if Colonel Qaddafi holds on? Will the United States and its allies continue to patrol the skies? When the United States, Britain and France imposed an air cap over Iraq after the 1991 gulf war, they grounded airplanes and helicopters and stopped the massacres of Kurds in the north and Shiites in the south. It went on for 12 years. The United States must not act on its own. As Mr. Obama and his team weigh the military options, they also need to be working diplomatic channels hard to see if they can rally a strong international endorsement. Britain and France are drafting a United Nations Security Council resolution calling for a no-flight zone. Whether it can pass is unclear. Russia said it opposes military action; China has been cool to the proposal. NATO is consulting all week on Libya, with defense ministers planning to meet in Brussels on Thursday. Turkey and some other allies are balking at a no-flight zone. A credible endorsement from the Arab world seems absolutely essential. For too long Arab leaders have privately urged the United States to act — against Saddam Hussein, against Iran — while denouncing American action in public. On Monday, the Gulf Cooperation Council demanded that the Security Council impose a no-flight zone. Arab League foreign ministers should follow suit when they meet in an emergency session on Saturday. Egypt and some other member states have the military resources to participate.

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There is more that the United States and its allies can do right now. NATO has expanded its air surveillance over Libya from 10 hours to 24 hours a day to gather information on Libyan troop movements. It should find a way to share relevant information with the rebels. Without firing a shot, it can sow confusion among Libyan forces by jamming their communications. All of the big states need to agree on ways to enforce the United Nations-imposed arms embargo. The United States and its partners have taken important steps to pressure Colonel Qaddafi and his cronies to cede power, including an assets freeze and a travel ban. We doubt that Colonel Qaddafi will ever get the message. But with enough pressure, his cronies and his military might abandon him — to save their own skins. The courageous protesters who overthrew Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia have inspired the world and left autocrats fearful — just look at China. It would be a disaster if Colonel Qaddafi managed to cling to power by butchering his own people. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/09/opinion/09wed1.html?ref=africa&pagewanted=pri nt

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03/08/2011 10:20 AM Historian Tom Segev on the Arab Revolutions 'The Ideal Opportunity to Solve the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict' In a SPIEGEL interview, Israeli historian Tom Segev, 65, discusses the importance of the Arab revolutions for his country, how they could present a chance for Israel to improve its relations with its neighbors and why a revolution in Jordan might help to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. SPIEGEL: What do people in Israel think about the Arab revolutions? Tom Segev: Ever since our country came into existence, we have always assumed that we are better than the Arabs. But now we are noticing that these are no longer backward people. Suddenly we are confronted with a new situation -- the fact that the Arab world maybe thinks just as democratically as we do, perhaps even more democratically. Where does this leave us? After all, we're supposed to be the only democracy in the Middle East! SPIEGEL: Will Israel have to measure its achievements against those of its neighbors in the future? Segev: Yes. And while we see democracy coming to the Arab world, democracy is getting weaker in Israel. We have a foreign minister whose party can be compared with far-right movements in Europe. Democracy is in jeopardy in Israel, and this threat is greater than the external threat. SPIEGEL: In Israel, one senses more concern than enthusiasm over the uprisings. Segev: Like most Israelis, I know very little about the Arabs. We just look down on them and see them as a threat. We have absolutely no experience with a democratic country in our vicinity. Is it good or bad for us? I am convinced that democracy isn't just good for the people in those countries, but for Israel as well. SPIEGEL: Many already see the peace with Egypt coming to an end. What do you think? Segev: Don't forget that the peace treaties with Egypt and later with Jordan have already survived several tests: two wars with Lebanon, two Palestinian uprisings, the attack on Gaza, the murder of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. The peace, as fragile as it is, has become self-evident. SPIEGEL: Many Egyptians hate Israel, and one of the first things the new leadership did was to allow Iranian warships to sail through the Suez Canal. Segev: I thought it was interesting to see that Israel did not play a role in this revolution. The man on Cairo's Tahrir Square doesn't want anything from me, but he does want something from his government. That's a good sign. We (Israelis) always think that we're at the center of everything. It's true that we didn't make peace with Egypt and Jordan, but with two men, President Sadat and King Hussein. It is possible that we will have to restructure the peace and our relations (so that they are) between one people and another.

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SPIEGEL: Those people include the Muslim Brotherhood, a powerful Islamic political group which could soon be part of the government in Egypt. Doesn't this scare you? Segev: They terrify me, but I don't see how they can be more dangerous in a democracy than in a dictatorship. In fact, it's probably the other way around. What I do fear is that there will not be a real democracy in Egypt. Who says that the people are strong enough to assert themselves? Is the democratic spirit really that strong? SPIEGEL: How should Israel change its policies now? Should it resume peace negotiations, for example with Syria? Segev: We could have made peace with Syrian dictator Bashar Assad a long time ago. It didn't happen, because Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu doesn't want to give up the Golan (Heights). SPIEGEL: Will the revolutions also increase pressure to end the occupation of the West Bank? Segev: If the region truly becomes democratic, an undemocratic bit of earth would remain here. It's hard to imagine that the world, especially the Arab world, would tolerate this. Netanyahu adheres to his old position: He doesn't want a Palestinian state, and he doesn't want to give up the settlements and the occupied territories. Pressure from abroad is the only way to change anything. SPIEGEL: Will the Palestinians also revolt? There have already been several demonstrations in Ramallah, where there is growing dissatisfaction with an increasingly authoritarian leadership. Segev: I hope that the Palestinians don't make the mistake of unleashing a new intifada. They've tried it twice before, and the consequences were bad for both sides. But I don't think the forces are there (that could carry out) an uprising against the leadership. The people that could initiate it are in Israeli prisons. And what could they hope to achieve? In the end, they're too weak to end the Israeli occupation. SPIEGEL: The Palestinians have close ties to Jordan, where there have also been protests. Are you worried that the monarchy could collapse? Segev: It's still relatively calm there, but we shouldn't assume that it will remain that way. The Jordanian interior minister recently called a soldier who shot seven Israeli girls in 1997 a hero. At the time, after that terrorist attack, King Hussein himself came to Israel and begged the families for forgiveness. But now there is a rift in our relationship. SPIEGEL: If there was a revolution in Jordan, would it pose a threat to Israel? Segev: No, on the contrary. If the corrupt Jordanian monarchy were overthrown, it would be the ideal opportunity to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, because the West Bank and Jordan could then be united. There is already a Palestinian majority in Jordan, and there is enough room for everyone there. That would be the best revolution I could imagine. Interview conducted by Juliane von Mittelstaedt

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URL: Historian Tom Segev on the Arab Revolutions 'The Ideal Opportunity to Solve the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict'03/08/2011 10:20 AM http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,749503,00.html RELATED SPIEGEL ONLINE LINKS: • Divided Response to Libyan Crisis: 'The Maneuvering of EU Member States Is a Scandal' (03/07/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,749376,00.html • A Courthouse in Benghazi: The Nerve Center of the Libyan Revolution (03/04/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,749227,00.html • Fear of Freedom: Democracy Virus Has Dictators Fretting (03/01/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,748354,00.html • Rift in German-Israeli Association: German Politicians Under Fire for Criticizing Israel (02/23/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,746932,00.html • Islam's Spiritual 'Dear Abby': The Voice of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood (02/15/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,745526,00.html • Concerns about the Muslim Brotherhood: Israel Fears Regime Change in Egypt (01/28/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,742186,00.html

03/08/2011 04:01 PM Tunisia's Steep Path to Democracy Righting the Wrongs of the Ben Ali Regime By Mathieu von Rohr Having liberated themselves from 23 years of dictatorship, Tunisians are finding the first steps toward democracy difficult. They must first come to terms with Tunisia's history of government suppression and violence. Taoufik Bouderbala lacks everything -- computers, even a contract -- but he does have a monumental task. He's expected to bring a sense of justice back to his country. Bouderbala, a small 68-year-old man with a moustache, chairs the "Commission for the Determination of Crime-Related Facts," charged with righting certain wrongs of the regime of dictator Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, whom Tunisians toppled on January 14. In his office building, Bouderbala is besieged from all sides by petitioners telling him stories about beatings by government security forces or attacks by militias armed with knives. He barks at them about the work he needs to get done; he tries to rebuff them in a friendly way. At last he says, "None of these people have any documentation; they don't have anything. But they still want money. It's unbelievable! Unbelievable!" Then he disappears into his office.

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Bouderbala's commission is one of three to be set up since the regime collapsed. One will usher in political reforms, another will uncover the corruption of the former ruling clan. But Bouderbala's commission must investigate the violence inflicted on demonstrators before Ben Ali fell. The mandate is to find people who committed the violence and to compensate the wounded, or the families of the dead. Hopes for Justice, or a 'Sham'? So the commission plays the roles of prosecutor and judge at the same time. But it can't call witnesses or hand down decisions; it also has no budget. Bouderbala brushes these concerns away. "Whenever I need money, I can just go ask the prime minister for it," he says. "Maybe we can work with the prosecutor's office if we need to call someone in for questioning." All three commissions are housed in a white high-rise in downtown Tunis, in what until recently was a bank's headquarters. The lines form outside at around 6 a.m., and everyone has a story to tell. Habib Ramuni, 60, came from his hometown of Thala, in one of the country's poorest corners, some 230 kilometers (143 miles) away. He holds a folder of documents and a copy of the penal code. A corrupt group of people whose members hold all the powerful positions in Thala stole a 10-hectare (25-acre) piece of property from him, he says, and had him arrested. Rumani says officials have cheated people out of their property all over the country. He adds that things haven't changed a bit in Thala, even after January 14. Almost everyone in line has similar stories. They don't trust the commissions. Rumani says that since he had no property diagrams or deeds, the only thing the anti-corruption commission gave him was a written acknowledgement that his statement had been taken. "It's a sham," he says. "These are just phantom commissions." A Painful Transition Tunisia is the country that set the Arab revolutions in motion, but it's been stuck in paralysis ever since. No progress is being made with reforms. Citizens and demonstrators have been camping out in front of the prime minister's residence since February 26. The controversial transitional government of Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi collapsed on the following day. Ghannouchi had already served as prime minister under Ben Ali, so he he wasn't trusted, and almost all the other ministers handed in their resignations soon afterwards. The new prime minister is 84-year-old Beji Caid-Essebsi, who is old enough to have served not only under Ben Ali, but also under his predecessor, Habib Bourguiba. During the 48 hours before Ghannouchi resigned, downtown Tunis was full of scenes resembling those of a civil war. Rioters hurled stones at police, started fires and looted stores. National guardsmen first shot into the air but then turned their guns on the crowds, killing at least four. It didn't take long for conspiracy theories to start making the rounds. Some held that the security forces had paid the youths to make havoc. Some even claimed that General Rachid Ammar, the head of Tunisia's army, had incited the violence so he could ultimately seize power for himself. Events in Tunisia over the last few weeks have shown how painful it can be to move to a new state and a new system. As if the country didn't already have enough difficulties, a refugee crisis on its border with Libya has threatened its already precarious stability. 240

By the middle of last week, more than 80,000 refugees had arrived in the border town of Ras Jdir. Most were Egyptians and Tunisians who had been chased down, robbed or beaten by Gadhafi's thugs. Unlike some of their friends, though, they escaped with their lives. Each day, 10,000 cross the border, most of them starving and on foot. Although Western governments have pledged assistance and the Red Cross has built refugee camps, the fragile Tunisian state is overwhelmed by the scale of the crisis. Half of the army is now stationed on the border. But that has meant a complete withdrawal from other locations -- and the army is the only state institution trusted by most of the population. Watching the Watchers The country needs a new constitution and a new political system. But for now, the old system remains in force. The other, perhaps more difficult task will be throwing light on the grave injustices of the Ben Ali era. The regime spied on and suppressed the population; it had political opponents tortured. Regime insiders hoarded all the riches they could get their hands on. The archives of the state security apparatus, housed in the basement of the interior ministry, have yet to be opened. There are thousands of cases of torture, which no one has yet investigated. At the moment it seems unlikely that the cordial Taoufik Bouderbala and his commission can bring two decades of horror to light. If the country doesn't come to terms with its past, it will be almost impossible to continue towards democracy. But the country may simply not be ready. In today's Tunisia, no one trusts anybody. Bouderbala headed the human rights league under Ben Ali. Sihem Bensedringe, a journalist and human rights advocate belonging to the opposition, says that, in this role, Bouderbala "helped Ben Ali shut down critical organizations." It remains unclear whether he was a collaborator, or merely less than courageous. Abdelfattah Amor, the 68-year-old lawyer who heads the commission charged with investigating corruption from his third-floor office, is familiar with these sorts of doubts. Two weeks ago he ordered officials on his commission to open the safes of Ben Ali's palace in Tunis' Sidi Bou Said district. Television images showed waist-high piles of €500 notes, as well as gold and diamonds. While Amor presented Ben Ali's treasures, though, he wore an expensive watch. It wasn't long before people started voicing suspicions about him on Facebook. Coming to Terms with a Violent Past Just a few kilometers away, prominent human rights lawyer Radhia Nasraoui sits in her office in a small, two-room apartment in downtown Tunis. For decades the petite woman has defended Tunisians persecuted for political reasons, victims of official caprice and violence. She's paid a price for her career. The regime had the state security apparatus follow her. Her passport was revoked. She stopped receiving mail a long time ago. Ben Ali had her husband, a spokesman for the outlawed Tunisian Workers' Communist Party (PCOT), thrown in jail. These days, the same papers which until recently labeled opposition figures "prostitutes" have asked to interview her. "Check it out," she says. "They're even printing photographs of me. This truly is a revolution."

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People who were particularly badly abused by the old regime tend to meet in Nasraoui's waiting room. The thin 41-year-old man, for example, is Abdel Latif Bouhijla. State security officials arrested him in 1995 for belonging to an Islamist splinter group. They tortured him for months, ripped his fingernails out and repeatedly held his head under water. After studying in France, Oder Naoufel Meddeb returned to Tunisia and made a business transaction with the justice minister at the time. When the latter refused to pay, Meddeb wrote an open letter in protest. The act landed him in prison for five years, four of which he spent in isolation. He wasn't allowed to have books or write letters, and his fiancée broke up with him after state security officials pressured her. Nasraoui says it's extremely urgent to resolve cases like these. But she doesn't think that doing so is the job of a commission. Instead, she wants a special tribunal, a court. Bouhijla, the man who was tortured, has told her that even if he doesn't receive compensation, he at least wants his civil rights, his passport and his dignity back. Meddeb, the businessman, went to the commission in the white high-rise with a file full of documents. He handed them in on the second floor, and they went up to the commission on the third floor. He was handed a receipt. His says it felt good. Translated from the German by Josh Ward URL: • http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,749406,00.html RELATED SPIEGEL ONLINE LINKS: • Photo Gallery: The Incomplete Revolution http://www.spiegel.de/fotostrecke/fotostrecke-65408.html • An Opportunity for Europe: Tunisia Should Be EU's 'Highest Strategic Priority' (01/25/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,741558,00.html • Intoxicated by Freedom: Reinventing Tunisia at Record Speed (01/24/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,741278,00.html • Televising the Revolution: Tunisia's Sudden Press Freedom (01/21/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,740820,00.html

03/08/2011 01:38 PM Debate Builds Steam West Considers No-Fly Zone for Libya How long will Gadhafi bomb rebels in Libya unhindered? NATO has warned the dictator that the West will not "stand by" if systematic strikes continue. Western governments are still mulling plans for a no-fly zone -- but Berlin and others are reserved, and all agree that a United Nations mandate is required. Destroyed buildings, desert battles, mounting numbers of dead and injured: Each day fresh news emerges of heavy fighting in Libya. Col. Moammar Gadhafi's troops are

242 conducting air strikes not only on opposition fighters, but also against civilians, threatening a humanitarian catastrophe. The rebels are calling for foreign powers to impose a no-fly zone to stop the attacks. It's a debate that many governments would prefer to avoid if possible, but the longer Gadhafi dispatches his fighter jets against the rebels, the greater the pressure in Western capitals becomes for a flight ban. That option is now being debated with increasing intensity by Arab governments, the European Union and the United States. Great Britain and France are even trying to build support for a United Nations mandate for military intervention. A draft resolution for a no-fly zone could be introduced as early as this week at the UN Security Council in New York, a diplomat in New York told the Associated Press. The Security Council is to meet on Friday after a special Libya summit with heads of EU governments in Brussels. But diplomatic sources do not believe that the EU will move this week on a no-fly zone, instead focusing on further financial sanctions against Libyans. Before London and Paris can present thier arguments in New York, they must also win over the support of important partners including Germany, Russia and China. German diplomatic sources said that Paris and London haven't yet presented anything concrete. It could well be that veto-wielding China and Russia refuse to go along with a resolution in the Security Council. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has rejected the idea. "We don't see foreign intervention, (particularly) the military one, as a means of solving the crisis," he said, according to Russia's state-controlled RIA Novosti news agency. "The Libyans have to solve their problems by themselves." 'Germany Will Not Be Able to Eschew Its Responsibility' In Germany, the start of the debate over a no-fly zone and possible German participation has been a cautious one. The first member of Chancellor Angela Merkel's coalition government to speak publicly on the issue has been Phillip Missfelder, the foreign policy expert in parliament for the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU). "Germany should agree to the creation of such a zone in the UN Security Council," he told SPIEGEL ONLINE. He also didn't rule out the possibility of German military participation. "If the zone is agreed to, Germany will not be able to eschew its responsibility as a member of the Security Council," he said. At the same time, Germany would only be able to make a limited contribution, he added. "Anyone pushing to become a permanent member of the Security Council, must also be prepared to take on additional responsiblity within the framework of the UN -- militarily as well." However, he added, the question remains what kind of reception the debate will get from German society given the country's difficult deployment in Afghanistan. The German government continues to view a no-fly zone skeptically. Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle is not generally opposed to the option, but the reserve he has shown for some days now cannot be ignored. The Foreign Ministry has stated that Westerwelle's concern is that could a no-fly zone, could spiral into a "military deployment," and the risks must be considered very carefully. Westerwelle has warned that the debate must be conducted responsibly and in a "considered" manner. The statements offer indirect evidence of a growing domestic policy discussion. 'Considerable Consequences' In recent days, Westerwelle provided a solid image of what might be required. The Libyan's air defenses would have to be neutralized. "That would require a military intervention that would have considerable consequences," he said. "That's why it could

243 only be considered if the United Nations mandated it and if the region expressly wants this." Westerwelle, who is also Merkel's deputy chancellor, said the Arab League must also expressly agree to a no-fly zone. The body has considered the possibility of imposing its own no-fly zone in recent days, with the aid of the African Union, but that has been viewed largely as a symbolic gesture. In the past, the Arab League hasn't exactly been known for its effectiveness or might. Still, the West can't afford to ignore its position on the issue given the newfound self-confidence in the Arab World. Arab League spokesman Hesham Youssef told the Associated Press on Monday, without implying blanket support, that a no-fly zone "is something we do not object to." Nevertheless, Westerwelle is concerned that an intervention by the US and its Western allies might give backing to a Gadhafi propaganda line that has so far found little traction -- that the insurgency is being driven by the West. The head of the opposition Green Party in parliament, Jürgen Tritten, also called for level-headedness in the debate over a no-fly zone. "This is not a harmless affair," Jürgen Trittin told SPIEGEL ONLINE in an interview published on Tuesday. "The precondition for it would be massive air strikes to eliminate Libya's air defenses." Tritten warned: "Anyone who desires such an air war in Libya would be well advised to consider consequences, including all the collateral damage." US President Barack Obama has so far appeared to be listening primarily to the skeptics. In recent days, the Pentagon has issued clear warnings about the risks of an intervention. US Defense Secretary Robert Gates has noted that "a no-fly zone begins with an attack on Libya to destroy the air defenses" before any regular patrols could take place. Airports would also have to be bombed, he said, to render their runways unusable. And the Pentagon is seeking to avoid creating any new battle fronts in the Middle East. The US troops are already overburdened and the military has identified no clear national interest for Washington in Libya. "It would be premature to send a bunch of weapons to a post office box in eastern Libya," White House spokesman Jay Carney said in Washington on Monday. But Washington hasn't ruled out the possibility of weapons deliveries, and Obama himself on Monday said the "violence that's been taking place and perpetrated by the government in Libya" was "unacceptable." He said, "we send a very clear message to the Libyan people that we will stand with them in the face of unwarranted violence." 'It's a Complex Situation' Another question being asked in Western capitals is a practical one: What use is a no-fly zone and patrols over Libyan airspace if Gadhafi can stamp out the opposition with ground troops alone? Should jets fly above as a massacre is conducted below? "It is a very complex situation," government sources in Berlin told SPIEGEL ONLINE. In Washington, a powerful alliance of senators has formed demanding that Obama make a more concerted effort in North Africa. Former Presidential candidates John Kerry and John McCain as well as former vice presidential candidate Joseph Lieberman have all issued pleas for a flight ban. "We have to try and help those who are offering an alternative future to Libya," Lieberman said. Democrat Kerry, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and also a man who enjoys great respect in Obama's party, has called for the bombing of Libya's airports. And McCain has been beating the drum for an intervention on behalf of the Republicans.

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Their argument for helping the rebels is that any successor government would be better than the Gadhafi regime. Kerry and Co. have also pointed out how the US looked the other way as mass murder was committed in the 1990s in Rwanda and Bosnia -- events that remain open wounds in US foreign policy today. Considering Consequences Meanwhile, NATO is also making the first preparations for a possible flight ban. On Monday, NATO General Secretary Anders Fogh Rasmussen reiterated that the alliance would only take responsibility for a no-fly zone if the UN issued a request. But he added that NATO and the international community could not "stand by" if Gadhafi persists. "If these systematic attacks against the Libyan people continue," he told a press conference ahead of a two-day conference of NATO's 28 defense ministers on Thursday and Friday, "it may amount to crimes against humanity. Then, many people around the world would be tempted to do something to prevent this massacre." He cautioned that a no-fly zone would be a comprehensive measure that would demand the deployment of considerable military resources. But he has asked military officials within the alliance to "conduct prudent planning for any eventuality," he said. NATO has already started around-the-clock monitoring of Libyan air space using AWACS reconnaissance aircraft, the US ambassador to NATO, Ivo Daalder, said. Previously, AWACS aircraft had only been deployed in the area for 10 hours each day. On Monday, the EU dispatched a team of diplomats to Libya under the leadership of Italian crisis minister Agostino Miozzo on a fact-finding mission to prepare for a special summit this Friday. The team is expected to report back on the country's humanitarian and evacuation needs. Miozzo said that approximately 1,300 Europeans are still believed to be in Libya. dsl -- with reporting by Carsten Volkery and Severin Weiland URL: • http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,749678,00.html RELATED SPIEGEL ONLINE LINKS: • Historian Tom Segev on the Arab Revolutions: 'The Ideal Opportunity to Solve the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict' (03/08/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,749503,00.html • Divided Response to Libyan Crisis: 'The Maneuvering of EU Member States Is a Scandal' (03/07/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,749376,00.html • 'We Just Want Our Freedom': Fear Reigns in Tripoli as Gadhafi's Thugs Roam Streets (03/04/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,749216,00.html • A Courthouse in Benghazi: The Nerve Center of the Libyan Revolution (03/04/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,749227,00.html

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03/08/2011 05:53 PM Zero Hour in the Middle East What the Arab World's Past Can Tell Us About Its Future By Bernhard Zand The world is looking on with fascination and fear as the Arab world goes through the political transformation of the century. But will the region's future be marked by democratic peace or civil war? Four past upheavals contain lessons for what comes next. "The riches, power, and honour of a monarch arise only from the riches, strength, and reputation of his subjects. For no king can be rich, nor glorious, nor secure, whose subjects are either poor or contemptible." THOMAS HOBBES, "LEVIATHAN" The Arab Revolution

DER SPIEGEL Graphic: Middle East conflicts since 1945

It's hard to think of a more peaceful place in the Middle East than the calm and orderly port town of Sohar in Oman, where hibiscus bushes bloom year-round and residents relax over water pipes and tea. All of this was true until Sunday, Feb. 27, when 2,000

246 men staged a protest at a large roundabout. The police shot and killed at least one protester. He and his fellow protesters had demanded higher wages and complained about rampant corruption in the government of Sultan Qaboos bin Said, 70. Until Thursday, Feb. 24, Qatif, an oasis city in Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province, was distinguished mainly by palm trees, sand and -- ever since the world's largest oil field was discovered there 60 years ago -- oil. But then a group of Shiites took to the streets to demand the release of three of their fellow Shiites. King Abdullah bin Abd al-Aziz, 86, had never experienced anything quite like it in his realm. Benghazi in Cyrenaica, the verdant, remote eastern region of Libya, is about a 1,000- kilometer drive along the coastal road from the capital Tripoli. Colonel Moammar Gadhafi ruled the region for 41 years. Until two weeks ago, that is, when men drove through the city, dressed, like in a Carnival parade, as Gadhafi. "Libya is free," they chanted. "God is great." It seems today that the reign of this Middle Eastern dictator, at least, will end in 2011. Former US Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz called Gadhafi a "dead man walking," and the Kremlin spoke of a "walking political corpse." Completely Unpredictable Their predictions may still prove premature, however. If the events of the last few weeks, from Tunis to Cairo, from Bahrain to Benghazi, have proved one thing, it is that political events are entirely unpredictable. No one anticipated that the self-immolation of unemployed fruit vendor Mohammed Bouazizi in a small Tunisian city would lead to the overthrow of the most powerful ruler in the Middle East in Cairo only a few weeks later. But what comes next, after the ouster of former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak? And what will come after Gadhafi's possible downfall? Will Libya turn into a "giant Somalia," as US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has warned? Will major oil producer Saudi Arabia descend into chaos? Where will the new freedoms take the Arab world? The Middle East has dominated global politics for decades, to a degree disproportionate to its geographic size and population. Reports of war, violence and terror between North Africa and the Persian Gulf have become background noise in the lives of an entire generation. The region has experienced well over a dozen international wars, numerous civil wars and military coups, and thousands of terrorist attacks and political assassinations since 1945 alone. If these conflicts had unfolded in another corner of the world, the West would probably have done little more than quietly express its regrets. But the conflicts of the Middle East occur in a region that sits on top of close to 60 percent of the world's oil and more than 40 percent of its natural gas reserves. Israel's security is an important factor in the foreign policy of countries like the United States and Germany, and almost all countries in the international community are united in their concern over a possible war over Iran's nuclear program. When the Middle East burns, the West simply cannot afford to express its regrets and look the other way. Back to Year Zero Eight weeks after the beginning of the most recent wave of unrest in North Africa, the calendars have been set back to year zero in this region, which is of such central importance for world peace and the global economy. Europe's neighboring region is on 247 the verge of a new beginning. Until now, the West had reached agreements with most Arab leaders that were designed primarily to ensure stability and to protect the oil market. Are these agreements now invalid? No one can look into the future. But perhaps a look at the past, at the 100-year record of the modern Middle East, can enable us to draw conclusions as to what this part of the world, and the West, could now face. This examination begins in the first area where today's rebels liberated themselves from Gadhafi's control, namely Cyrenaica. A hundred years ago, in the fall of 1911, a major in the Ottoman army arrived at the gates of Benghazi. As he wrote to a friend, he had come from Istanbul to recapture the "warm and friendly borderlands of the fatherland." For more than 400 years, the Ottomans had controlled North Africa, Syria and Palestine, Mesopotamia all the way to the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea to Aden, and the Nile to the Sudanese border. But the French captured Algeria and Tunisia, and in 1882 Egypt fell to the British. Now the Italians had landed in Libya. Like the British and the French, they too sought to establish colonies in Africa. In those days, what easier target could there have been than a province of the ailing Ottoman Empire, the sick man on the Bosporus? End of an Empire Major Mustafa Kemal, with his 150 Turkish officers and 8,000 Arab soldiers, managed to fend off his enemies for months and keep an invading army of 15,000 Italians from penetrating past the Libyan coast. But soon he realized that it was a battle he could not win. The empire's border regions were slowly crumbling away, not just in Africa, but also in the Balkans, along the Danube and in the Caucasus. Tripolitania was a lost cause. It had been "pointless" to even attempt to fight the Italians, he wrote before returning to Istanbul. Major Kemal sensed that the loss of Istanbul's last African province not only marked the beginning of the end of an empire, but also the end of an era. He sensed that something new was on the horizon, something in which he would play a key role. But he still didn't know what this new thing was. We know what it was today, namely a century in which the entire Middle East would turn into a battlefield among political, ideological and religious forces, a hothouse of global politics. In those 100 years, countries would be established that didn't work. Arbitrary borders would be drawn, and rulers would be installed who hated their people as much as the people hated them. Wars and civil wars would break out and dictators would be murdered. Only two countries in the region would find their way to democracy, namely Israel, which was founded in 1948, and the country that Major Kemal, who later came to be known as Atatürk, would build: Turkey. And while other countries and regions entered the modern age in the midst of equally catastrophic circumstances, like Europe, for example, which overcame its animosities in the ensuing decades, South America, which achieved a modicum of stability, and China, which eventually surpassed Western nations in productivity, most countries of the Middle East and North Africa remained frozen in despotism, stagnation and hopelessness. Not even the discovery of oil reserves that would soon prove to be the world's largest could change the status quo. On the contrary, the uneven distribution of oil wealth only made the contradictions more pronounced, and in many cases the blessings of oil proved to be a curse.

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Demons of the Middle East Near the end of the 100 years that began with Major Kemal's trip to Libya, the demons of the Middle East suddenly surfaced around the world. Al-Qaida came onto the global stage, a terrorist organization that came from the heart of the Arab world and yet was capable of operating with unprecedented global reach. On Sept. 11, 2001, it finally became clear that the Middle East had given birth to a monster. But the terrorism of al-Qaida isn't the last word in the Middle East, nor is 9/11 the end of history. Ten years after the attacks on New York and Washington, an uprising has gripped the Arab world that no one saw coming. It began in Tunisia and spread to Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen and Jordan. As if liberated from an icy prison of fear, people are now rising up against their rulers, people the West had perceived as members of either fanatical religious groups or masses lethargically resigned to their fate. Now these people are taking to the streets, with not a trace of lethargy or religious fanaticism, from Morocco to the seemingly peaceful Sultanate of Oman, from wealthy Saudi Arabia to Iraq, which the United States supposedly liberated eight years ago, to demand what they are entitled to: justice, a share of power, prosperity and freedom. The Arab world, which seemed to have barricaded itself into the panic room of world history as it successively suffered all the afflictions of modernity, has finally regained its voice. And the West, instead of celebrating what it has demanded for years, is standing on the sidelines with its mouth agape, fascinated, and yet speechless and fearful. Can it be blamed? Can the Arabs do more than overthrow governments? Are they also capable of democracy? Doesn't what is now happening in Libya vindicate those who have been issuing warnings since the revolution began? Hundreds, probably thousands have died in the last two weeks between Benghazi and Tripoli. The possible collapse of the Gadhafi regime illustrates the failings of Arab autocrats and the injuries they have inflicted on their people. Their legacy is one of failure. Badly Educated and Unproductive Few other regions that the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) examines in its regular Human Development Reports have done so poorly in so many ways as the Arab world. The education system is miserable and the illiteracy rate extremely high in most countries in the Arab League. Almost half of the adult population cannot read or write in Mauritania, Morocco and Yemen, while illiteracy rates are at 28, 30 and 38 percent, respectively, in Egypt, Algeria and Sudan. Until a few years ago, even sub- Saharan Africa had more Internet connections than the Arab world. Few regions are as unproductive. All the Arab states together, with their combined population of 350 million, produce less in economic terms than Italy's 60 million people. Only 3 percent of the Libyan population works in the oil sector, which, until recently, accounted for more than 60 percent of the gross domestic product. What exactly did the rest of the population do? Official youth unemployment is at 26 percent in a rich oil-producing country like Saudi Arabia, while the unofficial rate in the countries of North Africa's Maghreb region lies at 70 percent. One-third of the people of Mauritania and Yemen, and one-fifth of Egyptians, live on less than $2 a day.

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The Arab world isn't poor. But no region of the world has treated its resources -- and half of its labor force, namely women -- as negligently. Only about 5 percent of members of parliaments in the region stretching from Morocco to Bahrain are female. And while more than 16,000 international patent applications were filed in South Korea alone between 1980 and 1999, only 77 were filed in Egypt in the same period. In no Arab country, with the exception of Lebanon with its proportional democracy, are there significant signs of an emerging civil society. Nowhere is there a democratic tradition which could provide a basis for those who plan to govern in the wake of the revolutions of recent weeks, not to mention those revolutions that could still be to come. "Fasten your seatbelts," New York Times columnist and former Middle East correspondent Thomas Friedman recently warned. The journey on which the Arab world is currently embarking is "not going to be a joy ride," Friedman wrote, but "a long and rocky road." The body politic of the Middle East is ailing in many ways and has never functioned under democratic conditions. Is it even capable of doing so? And if so, what can the world, and the West, do to promote the process? To use a clinical metaphor: The medical file of the Middle East includes four serious infections. Three of them were brought in from the outside, and one is undoubtedly endogenous. The first goes by a name that has become shopworn in the West but remains very much alive in the Arab world today: imperialism. Shaking Off the Ottoman Yoke In early 1915, when it was becoming clear that the Ottoman Empire would not survive World War I, politicians in London and Paris hit upon the idea of dividing up what was left of the empire. The British and French plan targeted the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire. The plan fit in well with the desire of influential tribal leaders and notables to shake off the Ottoman yoke. In July 1915, the British high commissioner in Egypt began a correspondence with Hussein Bin Ali, the sharif of the holy city of Mecca. On Oct. 24, he agreed that Great Britain was prepared "to recognize the independence of the Arabs in the regions within the borders the sharif has proposed." In June 1916, the great Arab revolts against the Ottomans were set to begin. The revolts were militarily inspired and immortalized in poetic form by the British archeologist and secret agent T.E. Lawrence, famously known as Lawrence of Arabia, in his book "Seven Pillars of Wisdom." The revolt, Lawrence wrote in an intelligence memo in January 1916, would be "beneficial to us, because it matches with our immediate aims, the break up of the Islamic bloc and the defeat and disruption of the Ottoman Empire, and because the states (Sharif Hussein) would set up to succeed the Turks would be … harmless to ourselves … The Arabs are even less stable than the Turks. If properly handled they would remain in a state of political mosaic, a tissue of small jealous principalities incapable of political cohesion." Founding Documents At the same time, however, and without informing the Arabs who were being encouraged to revolt, the British were negotiating the future of the Ottoman-Arab provinces on two other fronts. Under a secret agreement that the British diplomat Mark 250

Sykes negotiated with his French counterpart François Georges-Picot, London and Paris divided up the expected spoils in such a way that the regions surrounding Beirut, Damascus and Mosul were to go to France, while the British would control the Arab Gulf coast, Palestine and the provinces of Baghdad and Basra. In another document, which was signed by then British Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour, the British government guaranteed the Zionist Federation "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people." The Sykes-Picot Agreement and the Balfour Declaration, signed in 1916 and 1917 respectively, are the two founding documents of the modern Middle East. They served as the basis for five states -- Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan and Israel -- and the eternal non-state of Palestine. The existence of those has remained a source of division and unrest to this day. The Arabs, who would not discover the exact wording of the documents until after World War I, still consider them to be documents of betrayal even today. In the eyes of many Arabs, the borders they created, and the dynasties the British and French installed within these borders, have always lacked legitimacy. Most of all, however, the West's meddling in the creation of the modern Middle East established a pattern of perception that became an obsession, even more so than in other regions with an imperialistic past: the trauma of the conspiracy. For many Arabs, the fact that most Arab countries, as T.E. Lawrence predicted, have remained "small, jealous principalities," is not a result of their own incompetence but of the arbitrariness of the British and French. They blame the West for having created artificial states, countries like Lebanon and Iraq that are ethnically and religiously divided and which remain virtually ungovernable to this day, and for the fact that the Hashemite dynasty installed by the British failed in Syria and then Iraq, and only survives today in Jordan. Lack of Involvement The upshot of this era, from today's perspective, is that the imperialist birth defects of the Middle East seem to have been overcome. So far, none of the rebels and protesters has thought of blaming the rebellion of 2011 on the West, as Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh has done, or on al-Qaida, as Gadhafi has done. These revolutions belong to the Arab peoples, and the West does well to respect that fact, irrespective of whether its lack of involvement is voluntary or simply because it wasn't prepared for this historic opportunity. The Arabs have recaptured a piece of the self-confidence they had lost as a result of oppression. Does this mean that the United States and Europe should do nothing and simply wait to see what opportunity history will dole out next? Hardly. They should, for example, rethink their relationship with Turkey, a country that found its way to democracy by itself and became a model for many populations in the region. It could be useful for Europe to establish stronger ties with this country, despite the difficulties involved. But most of all, Washington, London, Paris and Berlin have a political option, even an obligation, which is so obvious that apparently almost no one notices it any more. Unique Opportunity There has never been a more favorable time to make peace in Palestine. Israel, taken by surprise by the revolution in Egypt and justifiably concerned about its security, has no choice but to recognize the two-state solution if it hopes to remain both a Jewish and a democratic nation. 251

And what of the Palestinian leadership, just as antiquated and removed from the people as its now-toppled patron Mubarak? What task does it have now, if not to found a country that everyone has known for decades would emerge as the conclusion of a successful peace process? And whoever takes the reins of power from the regimes in Israel's Arab neighbors that have been or have yet to be toppled, will be grateful, in the best case, for a resolution of the Palestinian question or, in the worst case, will no longer have an opportunity to use the burdensome legacy of the Middle East conflict to shape policy. For the West, this step is the one score from its imperialist past that hasn't been settled between it and the Arab world: the creation of an Arab country in the region of the former Ottoman Palestine, within the borders of 1967, which the world recognized under UN Resolution 242. The Age of Tyrants For the past three weeks, the Arab-language version of the Internet encyclopedia Wikipedia has included two entries under the term "Egyptian revolution": the revolution of July 23, 1952 and that of January 25, 2011. The first date still marks the Egyptian national holiday, but it's only a matter of time before January 25 replaces it. At that point, the July revolution of 1952 will be history -- but it is a piece of history without which the "Day of Rage," when it all began in Egypt five weeks ago, is impossible to understand. With the coup d'état staged by the "Free Officers' Movement" around Gamal Abdel Nasser in July 1952, the police and military state established itself in the Arab world, marking the beginning of those brutal regimes from which the peoples of the region are now liberating themselves. It is the second severe infection to afflict this part of the world in 60 years. The clique surrounding King Farouk I, an overweight, alcoholic gambler who the Egyptian officers drove into exile in Italy, was as corrupt and incapable as the other monarchs and presidents that had remained in place following the colonial era and the quasi-colonial periods under the British and French mandates -- from Baghdad to Tripoli to Damascus. Disgusted by the weakness of these regimes vis-a-vis the former colonial powers and an increasingly strong Israel, the charismatic Nasser made an example of Egypt. He built a nationalist, pan-Arab country, which he ruled with an increasingly iron fist. He nationalized businesses, beginning with large companies followed by ever smaller ones, and in doing so drove out the Armenian and Greek minorities that had become entrenched in the business community. Even though it was officially part of the Non- Aligned Movement, Egypt came under the influence of the Soviet Union in the early 1960s. Reverance for Nasser Nasser brutally persecuted political foes and the members of the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood. He had his intelligence agents infiltrate neighboring countries that did not favor his social model, countries like Saudi Arabia and Jordan, both with strong tribal influences. He supported other countries that fought against his enemies, like Syria and the Yemen Arab Republic, with military operations that were generally catastrophic failures.

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But ambitious officers in other Arab countries were impressed by Nasser's example. Many future autocrats and tyrants in the Middle East, like Saddam Hussein in Iraq, Gadhafi in Libya and Saleh in Yemen, though not always in agreement with each other, consistently revered the Egyptian leader. The coup by the Free Officers' Movement in Cairo was followed by palace revolts in Baghdad (1958), Sana'a (1962) and Tripoli (1969). The regimes that came into power in these countries resembled Nasser's. They were pan-Arab, nationalist police states where the opposition was quickly brought into line. The Arab individual was broken in the torture prisons of Egypt, Iraq, Syria and Libya. The consequences of the damage done to Arab human dignity in these places would only emerge decades later. "America's tragedy on September 11 was born in the prisons of Egypt," US author Lawrence Wright wrote in his book "The Looming Tower: Al- Qaeda and the Road to 9/11." Nasser created the prototype of the repressive police state, against which the youth of the Arab world is revolting today. Even the rulers on the Persian Gulf, once his worst enemies, structured their police forces on the basis of his model. Corrupt Gangster Countries Nasser's political legacy also has implications for the potential outcome of the Arab revolutions. The West would be wrong to follow the example set by former US President George W. Bush in Iraq and treat the pitiful remnants of these regimes like it did the totalitarian systems in European history, supporting the dissolution of their government and party apparatuses, as Bush did in Iraq in 2003. Figures like Mubarak, former Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali or Gadhafi should not be compared with men like Hitler and Stalin, as Libyan author Hisham Matar said this week, but with criminals like Al Capone. They are leaving behind corrupt gangster countries and poorly organized societies that require the reeducation of millions. Their political parties lost their ideological core decades ago, if they even had one to begin with. Membership in the various government parties was never more than a vehicle to obtain at least the small benefits these organizations offered in a bleak system. It would be a mistake to punish every former party member. Especially problematic for the post-revolutionary Middle East is the legacy of the personality cult Nasser implanted into the Arab world: the orientation of the entire system toward individual figures whose likenesses are depicted in a depressing spectacle from Mauritania to Muscat, in the form of thousands upon thousands of billboards, posters and ostentatious statues. This even applies to countries with bloated bureaucracies, like Egypt and Tunisia, but especially to nations like Libya and Yemen, where there is virtually no governmental or administrative system beyond the leader's circle. These countries probably stand the worst chance of stabilizing in the foreseeable future, because men like Gadhafi and Yemeni President Saleh will not even leave behind the basic framework of a power structure that someone else would be capable of filling. These countries could benefit the most from direct intervention by the West to prevent a Somalia-like governmental collapse, be it humanitarian aid from the international community, assistance with the establishment of a civil society or even military intervention.

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Embracing the Military Only one of Nasser's legacies could prove to be of value in the current upheavals in the Arab world: the militarization of many Arab societies and the tradition of the strong army. As poorly prepared for war as Egypt and Tunisia presumably were, during the revolution the military leadership in both countries behaved prudently and intelligently, not allowing themselves to be misused to suppress the revolt. This gives hope to some countries that could still face radical change. Like Egypt and Tunisia, Syria, Morocco and Algeria also have compulsory military service, and their generals will think long and hard before ordering their soldiers to shoot at protesters. The situation is different in countries like Libya, whose dictator has apparently also used foreign mercenaries to crush popular resistance, and in Gulf states like Bahrain or Saudi Arabia, whose rulers maintain tribal militias or private armies, which are also partly made up of foreigners. It is not yet clear whether the levelheadedness of the Egyptian and Tunisian military leadership will also survive a severe supply crisis, one that could erupt at any moment. It also remains to be seen whether the generals in Cairo follow the Turkish example by returning to their barracks and transferring power to a civilian leadership. The United States will presumably tolerate the armies of the Middle East, but Europe too may be forced to accept the idea that a military order is sometimes better than no order at all -- and that even Nasser's totalitarian state may have left behind a tool that could help Egypt survive a difficult transition period. Goodbye Communists, Hello Militant Islamists The West was on significantly better terms with Nasser's successor, Anwar al-Sadat. This was partly a result of his polished manners, but also of the visionary strength with which, in the early 1970s, he embarked on a path to signing a peace treaty with Israel that left the Arabs their dignity. Most of all, however, it was a result of the Cold War. Sadat threw out the Soviet military advisors Nasser had brought in. He reconciled Egypt with the Western nations from which Nasser had distanced himself. Finally, he released the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood from prison, at least the ones Nasser had not had executed yet. It was a broad trend in the 1970s and early 1980s, expressly supported by the West, to strengthen Islamist forces in the region to weaken communist parties or countries and organizations, like the PLO, that were aligned with Moscow. In retrospect, it is clear that the consequences of this strategy were catastrophic. It triggered the third and sickness to afflict the Middle East and, ultimately, the West: militant Islamism. Be it Sadat in Egypt, former President Muhammad Zia ul-Haq in Pakistan, former Prime Minister Turgut Özal in Turkey or Saudi Arabia's Wahhabite establishment, or even Israel in the Palestinian territories and the United States in Afghanistan -- in the Cold War everyone pursued the principle that the enemy of my enemy is my friend. Everyone was welcome, as long as he was against the communists. Unintended Consequences The intended consequences of this policy included the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan and the demise of the Soviet empire. Its unintended consequences, however, include the terrorist attacks on and after Sept. 11, 2001, as well as the broad Islamization of Arab

254 societies, which has prompted many to greet the revolutions of 2011 with so much trepidation. Is this fear justified? Will Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and the countries that could follow in their footsteps take the same path Iran took in 1979? The events of recent weeks have shown, at least initially, that not one of the countries affected to date has seen even the slightest evidence of a figure emerging who could be compared with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the man who expedited, and ultimately hijacked, the Iranian revolution of 1978 and 1979. On the contrary. Even in Egypt, the cradle of political Islam, the Muslim Brotherhood only joined the uprising after prolonged hesitation. So far, none of its representatives has called for a ban on alcohol, a requirement that women wear veils or an uprising in the entire Islamic world. In Bahrain where, as was the case in Iran in 1979, it is primarily Shiites who are demonstrating against the regime, their leader, Sheikh Ali Salman, has made it clear that he does not believe in Khomeini's principle of "Velayat-e faqih," or "rule of the Islamic jurists." Instead, he insists that he and his fellow Shiites, who feel discriminated against by the Sunni regime, only want reforms and a share of power. Nevertheless, last Tuesday the stream of protesters in Manama became divided for the first time. Men and women marched separately. A Distorted Focus on the Islamist Threat Most notably absent from the revolutions of 2011 has been the voice of al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden. Not a word has been heard from the prince of darkness, a man who has shown little reluctance to speak up in recent years. Although bin Laden's deputy, Egyptian cleric Ayman al-Zawahiri, has commented on the Arab uprisings, his harangue was drowned out by the cheers of the rebels. It appears that al-Qaida was as caught off- guard by the Arab popular uprisings as the Arab autocrats themselves. This doesn't mean that international Jihadism, not to mention political Islam as a whole, is finished. Extremely poor and structurally weak countries are in grave danger, especially those like Yemen, where radical Islamist movements are deeply rooted. In Yemen this week, the prominent cleric Abdul Majeed al-Zindani, the "Red Sheikh" and a mentor of Osama bin Laden, joined the uprising and demanded the creation of an "Islamic state." Even countries like Tunisia and Egypt are not immune to an Islamist landslide. But equally absurd and reckless is the opposite claim, namely that the revolutions of 2011 are bound to end in a clean sweep for the Islamists. The West's fixation on the Islamist threat since the 9/11 attacks distorts its view of the fourth and probably most acute sickness that has afflicted the Middle East, the conditions that triggered the current wave of uprisings in the first place: poverty and social injustice, and the inability of Middle Eastern regimes to find a response to the economic consequences of globalization. A Marshall Plan for the Arab World? "Nasserism is dead, Baathism has failed and militant Islam is approaching its bloody end. Long live Arab capitalism!" Egyptian author Youssef Ibrahim proclaimed six years ago. He was sitting in his apartment in Dubai, gazing out at the construction sites in a

255 city that, like no other, symbolized the entrepreneurial spirit that had taken hold in the Arab world at the time. The boom, triggered in part by rising oil prices following the Iraq war, had attracted hundreds of thousands of Egyptians, Moroccans, Palestinians and Lebanese to the Gulf. Many were young men like IT specialist Wael Ghonim who, as a Google employee, was to play a key role in the Egyptian revolution. When they returned home, they brought two things with them: their hard-earned income as engineers, bookkeepers and hotel administrators, and a new worldview devoid of the narrow-mindedness and limitations of their native countries. "For years, all that guest workers brought home from Saudi Arabia were religious robes and fanatical ideologies," said Youssef Ibrahim. "But from Dubai they bring home blue jeans for their wives, tank tops, mobile phones and the knowledge of how to make money." It took the sluggish regimes in the Western part of the Arab world a while to adjust to the changes. But then it all happened it very quickly. Especially the ruling elites who, as in Egypt and Tunisia, had divided up their countries' key industries amongst themselves, wanted to cash in on the economic upturn. Within a few years, the stock markets in cities like Cairo, Amman and Tunis were booming. Lots of money was being made in the upper echelons of society, but none of it trickled down to the lower classes. Neoliberalism had reached the Middle East. It was Reaganomics under palm trees. A Nice View Men like steel tycoon Ahmed Ezz, a close friend of Mubarak's son Gamal, who has since been arrested, built skyscrapers on the banks of the Nile that could compete with the towers of Dubai and Doha. All the workers in the socialist-run government businesses had was a nice view. "How is it that everyone who has protection at the top can get a great job without any effort," young doctor Rana Khalifa asked at the time, "while I have to slave away in the emergency room for a base salary of €30, and should be happy to have found work in the first place?" A feeling of fundamental social injustice began to spread. It would prove to be precisely the same feeling that drove young Tunisian Mohammed Bouazizi to set himself on fire on Dec. 17, 2010. It was a deep rage that had been building for years that triggered the Arab revolutions. Indeed, the most urgent question of the hour is not whether the Islamists or secular parties come to power in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and later perhaps Syria and Jordan. The most urgent question is: Who will solve the enormous economic problems of these countries, and who will close the gaping prosperity divide? More than half of the population in the Maghreb countries is younger than 30. Who will create the 700,000 jobs that are needed in Egypt alone to provide wages and food for the students graduating from school in a single year? It is obvious that the countries of the Middle East cannot perform this task alone, no matter who is in charge. In addition to the rich oil-producing countries, the West, and particularly neighboring Europe, should step up to the plate. When the United States looked to the devastated old continent after World War II, it recognized the historic challenge that lay ahead. It wasn't enough that the fascist regimes had been defeated. The Europeans needed help to prevent new wars, civil wars and refugee crises from developing. To tackle the challenge, Washington created the Marshall Plan, the biggest civil aid program of all time. In 1948, the US Congress 256 approved a four-year budget of $13 billion for the program. It was the foundation on which a peaceful and secure continent would be built. Clever Americans are thinking in terms of similarly large, even massive terms today. New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman, for example, proposes using the radical changes in the Middle East as an opportunity to finally free the West and the Arab world from the curse of oil. Thoroughly European Perspective It sounds like a paradoxical idea. How is the Arab world to survive if it loses almost its only resource? Taken a step further, however, what Friedman proposes reveals a completely different and thoroughly European perspective. Two years ago, at the instigation of the Club of Rome, a consortium of German, French, Italian and British companies founded a giant infrastructure project called Desertec. The goal of what is probably today's most ambitious energy project is the construction of solar thermal power plants in the Middle East and North Africa that would produce electricity for the region and, in the long term, meet Europe's energy needs, as well. Precise cost estimates have been made for the project. The German Aerospace Center anticipates a total investment of €400 billion by 2050 -- Europe's Marshall Plan for North Africa. Prince Hassan Bin Talal, the uncle of Jordan's King Abdullah II, calls for a project of similar dimensions, a regional fund to which the super-rich sheikhs of the Gulf, among others, would contribute. Alms, says the prince, are part of the cultural bedrock of Islam. The fund would promote uniform development of the entire region, which is precisely what the Marshall Plan achieved in Western Europe after World War II. Politics and Billions The prince also hopes to borrow another concept from Europe. Just as Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet founded the European Coal and Steel Community, the nucleus of European unity which ultimately grew into today's European Union, a multinational institution needs to be established in the region that would address its water and energy supply. But these are all future projects. More pressing is the concern over who will provide immediate assistance and who can help the new leaders survive their first few weeks in power. When German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle traveled to Tunisia a few days after the revolution, he promised the country €3.2 million to prepare its first elections. It was a moving gesture, given the challenges Tunisia's new leadership faces. And it was also a misunderstanding. It is no longer a matter of gestures and millions in the Middle East. Instead, it is a matter of politics -- and billions. Translated from the German by Christopher Sultan

URL:

• http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,749537,00.html

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RELATED SPIEGEL ONLINE LINKS: • Photo Gallery: A Century of Conflicts in the Middle East http://www.spiegel.de/fotostrecke/fotostrecke-65448.html • Debate Builds Steam: West Considers No-Fly Zone for Libya (03/08/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,749678,00.html • Historian Tom Segev on the Arab Revolutions: 'The Ideal Opportunity to Solve the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict' (03/08/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,749503,00.html • Divided Response to Libyan Crisis: 'The Maneuvering of EU Member States Is a Scandal' (03/07/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,749376,00.html • A Courthouse in Benghazi: The Nerve Center of the Libyan Revolution (03/04/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,749227,00.html • Fear of Freedom: Democracy Virus Has Dictators Fretting (03/01/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,748354,00.html • Europe's Favorite Dictators: The EU Has Failed the Arab World (02/28/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,748074,00.html • Saudi Arabia's Billion Dollar Question: Can Oil Money Buy Political Stability? (03/01/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,748089,00.html RELATED INTERNET LINKS • Thomas Friedman on Arab revolution http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/23/opinion/23friedman.html SPIEGEL ONLINE is not liable for the content of external web pages.

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EUROPA Y EL MUNDO BIELORRUSIA Lukashenko, “nuestro” despiadado dictador 8 marzo 2011 THE INDEPENDENT LONDRES

adam_kesher2000 Mientras Europa mira hacia las revoluciones de los países árabes, otro dictador en el este del continente reprime a la oposición con toda tranquilidad. Pero algunas voces están comenzando a ser escuchadas. Jerome Taylor La sede del KGB en el centro de Minsk es conocida por los locales como “Amerikanka”. Nadie sabe exactamente por qué el enorme complejo recibe ese nombre, pero lo que sí sabe todo el mundo en Bielorrusia es que no es un buen lugar donde ir a parar. Con sus columnas corintias y sus paredes pintadas de amarillo chillón, el edificio parece inofensivo desde fuera. Pero, en realidad, es una auténtica jaula para los últimos prisioneros de conciencia de Europa y el epicentro de la brutal represión llevada a cabo por el último dictador del continente. Alexander Lukashenko, el presidente de Bielorrusia, ha dirigido el país con mano de hierro desde que la república alcanzase su independencia de la Unión Soviética en 1994. Sin embargo, en los dos últimos meses las fuerzas de seguridad del país persiguen a los opositores con una ferocidad propia de la época soviética. "Una parodia de la justicia" Prácticamente todos los candidatos a la presidencia que osaron hacer frente a Lukaschenko en las fraudulentas elecciones del pasado diciembre han acabado en la cárcel o bajo arresto domiciliario. Aunque se han realizado múltiples acusaciones por 259 torturas, a los candidatos se les ha presionado para que se denuncien unos a otros a través de declaraciones por vídeo. Algunos de ellos han cedido a las presiones, pero la mayoría no lo ha hecho y se enfrenta ahora a varios años de cárcel por haber osado participar en los comicios. Cinco abogados representantes de los prisioneros han sido eliminados de la vida pública y más de 700 ciudadanos de a pie han sido detenidos en lo que Human Rights Watch califica como una “parodia de la justicia”. Los juicios propagandísticos —en un país en el que a la policía secreta aún se le llama la KGB— no han hecho más que empezar. La semana pasada Alexander Otroshchenkov, un agente de prensa de un destacado político de la oposición, fue conducido a una sala judicial en forma de celda y se le impuso una pena de cuatro años de prisión en una cárcel de máxima seguridad tras un juicio rápido que duró apenas unas horas. Los fiscales acusaron a Otroshchenkov y a otras dos personas de vandalismo durante las masivas protestas en Minsk durante la noche de las elecciones presidenciales. El hombre de 30 años admitió haber estado en las protestas, a las que se esperaba que asistiesen unas 30.000 personas, pero negó haber causado ningún daño. El supuesto “acto de vandalismo” que llevó a Otroshchenkov a una condena de cuatro años de prisión fue “golpear una barrera de madera”. Opositores incomunicados en Amerikanka Los juicios continuarán durante los próximos días y semanas. Otras 18 personas, incluidos siete candidatos presidenciales que participaron en los comicios contra Lukaschenko, están acusados por la organización de disturbios masivos —un crimen que está penado con hasta 15 años de cárcel. Ales Mikhalevich es uno de ellos. Durante dos meses este abogado reconvertido en político opositor al régimen estuvo pudriéndose en Amerikanka después de que los agentes de KGB echasen su puerta abajo y le detuviesen el día después de las protestas electorales en Minsk. Mikhalevich, de 35 años y padre de dos niños, fue puesto en libertad el 19 de febrero, pero sólo después de firmar una declaración mediante la que se comprometía a cooperar con el KGB y a no contarle a nadie lo ocurrido. La semana pasada Mikhalevich hizo un gesto heroico. El lunes se las arregló para escarpar de sus vigilantes y viajar a una conferencia de prensa donde, ante un nutrido grupo de periodistas, rompió el documento que había firmado con el KGB y explicó de forma detallada las torturas a las que él y sus compañeros reclusos afirman haber sido sometidos. “Soy consciente de que antes de que acabe el día podría volver a encontrarme en el centro de detención del KGB”, dijo. “Pero haré todo lo que esté en mis manos para hacer desaparecer para siempre ese campo de concentración situado en el centro de Minsk”. A Andrei Sannikov le han mantenido lejos de la luz pública durante 10 semanas. Es uno de los dos candidatos presidenciales que permanecen incomunicados en Amerikanka (el otro es Nicolai Statkevich). Sannikov, un ex diplomático de 54 años, es uno de los líderes opositores más destacados. Fue detenido durante las protestas del 19 de diciembre y golpeado por la policía antidisturbios cuando volvía hacia la plaza de la Independencia. Su mujer, la periodista de investigación Irina Khalip, permanece bajo arresto domiciliario, mientras dos hombres del KGB vigilan su piso. “Las condiciones en las que está mi hermano son horribles”, ha explicado su hermana Irina Bogdanova, que se trasladó a Gran Bretaña en los años 90. “Mantienen la temperatura de la celda entre los 8 y 10 grados y sólo puede ver a su abogado durante los interrogatorios”.

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Es necesaria una postura más firme con Bielorrusia Vladimir Nekláev ni siquiera estaba en la Plaza de la Independencia cuando un grupo de policías antidisturbios le agredió a él y a sus seguidores. El candidato a las presidenciales se dirigía con un equipo de sonido hacia la plaza cuando varios policías vestidos con chaquetas de cuero negro cargaron contras ellos, según los testigos. Nekláev fue brutalmente golpeado y trasladado al hospital, pero ni sus heridas impidieron que le detuviesen. A este poeta de 64 años le arrastraron de la cama del hospital en una manta los agentes de KGB y le llevaron a Amerikanka. “Los hombres no llevaba ninguna identificación”, explica por teléfono su hija Eva Nekláev desde Finlandia. “Ni siquiera le dijeron que estaba detenido, simplemente le sacaron del hospital con una manta. Pasaron ocho días antes de que recibiéramos alguna noticia sobre su paradero”. Muchas de las personas detenidas y posteriormente puestas en libertad en los dos últimos meses han abandonado el país. Natalia Koliada trabaja para el Teatro Libre de Minsk, una compañía de artistas que arriesga su vida cada vez que representan piezas sin pasar por la censura en teatros “underground”. Fue encarcelada durante las protestas en la Plaza de la Independencia pero la pusieron en libertad por fallos en el proceso legal. Su familia esperó hasta la medianoche de fin de año para cruzar la frontera hacia Rusia, logrando pasar sin que los guardias fronterizos borrachos les viesen. Koliada urge a Europa y a Gran Bretaña a que adopten una postura más firme con Bielorrusia: “Minsk está a tan sólo dos hora de vuelo de Londres. El Gobierno del Reino Unido debe dar alguna señal a los bielorrusos para que sepan que no están solos. No tenemos gas, no tenemos petróleo, no tenemos ningún bien geoestratégico que pueda interesar a países como Gran Bretaña. Pero sí tenemos una población. Por favor, no esperen hasta que esas personas sean asesinadas en la calles”. TESTIMONIO Dos semanas en la cárcel bielorrusa “Una sórdida celda con un váter sucio a la izquierda y un enorme palet de madera enfrente. Ni rastro de colchón ni de almohadas. Paredes amarillentas y sucias y un hedor espantoso. Por la mañana, te despiertas temblando de frío”: Andrzej Poczobut, corresponsal de Gazeta Wyborcza y activista de la minoría polaca en Bielorrusia describe así las condiciones en la famosa prisión de Akrescina en Minsk, donde se encarcelan a todos los opositores bielorrusos. La vida tras los barrotes es de lo más lúgubre: “despertar a las 6.00, barrido de la celda, a las 8.00 desayuno consistente en un mendrugo de pan y algo parecido a té servido en tazas de aluminio que abrasan las manos, de la época de Khrushchev; almuerzo a las 16.00, cena a las 19.00, dos horas más tarde, inspección y ya ha pasado otro día... Sólo de vez en cuando ocurre algo inesperado. “El último que salga se lleva una patada en el trasero...”, escucho en el pasillo. Un guarda aburrido hasta la saciedad acaba de decidir que se realizará una inspección extraordinaria de la celda”, recuerda Poczobut, que fue liberado finalmente el 25 de febrero tras 14 días en prisión. Insiste en que no le torturaron “hombres tristes del KGB” sólo porque el presidente polaco Bronisław Komorowski y el presidente del Parlamento Europeo intercedieron en su nombre. Esta vez tuvo suerte. http://www.presseurop.eu/es/content/article/535991-lukashenko-nuestro-despiadado- dictador

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TRIBUNA: JUAN GOYTISOLO Las últimas horas del déspota JUAN GOYTISOLO 08/03/2011 Qué pasa por la mente de un dictador en los últimos días, horas y minutos que preceden a su caída e inesperadamente le hunden en el muladar de la historia? ¿Cómo asimila el inimaginable pero real espectáculo de su amado pueblo vociferando contra él y quemando o pisoteando con furia su ubicuo retrato? El tema es fascinante y si fuera un autor joven, con el potencial creativo intacto, trataría de expresarlo mediante un monólogo interior que mezclaría tiempos y espacios, imágenes de pasadas glorias y de presente hostil: desfiles victoriosos, tribunas de honor, recepciones palaciegas, besos lanzados al pueblo exultante de dicha, embriaguez de un poder sin límites y por consiguiente sin otro final plausible que el de una apoteosis en el lecho de muerte, rodeado de los suyos y de jefes de Estado en medio de expresiones de dolor y de llanto, ¡todo ello abolido de golpe por lo que Marx denominaba astucias de la historia! La idea me tentó durante el derrocamiento y ejecución de los Ceausescu y me acucia de nuevo en ese vendaval de libertad que sacude a los países árabes y derriba como títeres de feria a sus dictadores y sátrapas. No ya a la manera biográfica de excelentes novelas como Yo el Supremo o La Fiesta del Chivo, sino del vértigo de un presente atemporal que discurre entre escabrosidades, remolinos y saltos de agua. El paso brusco de un matrimonio Ben Ali-Trabelsi todo mieles a la imagen desencajada del déspota en sus últimas apariciones ante la cámara, o del faraón benévolo en la plenitud de su magnificencia a la del viejo titubeante empujado a la escalerilla del avión que va a transportarlo a su inseguro destierro, invitan a una creatividad visual que puede transmutarse en literatura mediante el juego de la alternancia: los grandes sillones de respaldo dorado y terciopelo grana, diseñados, se diría, para el grato reposo de nalgas presidenciales o soberanas en contraposición con las chozas misérrimas del pueblo que supuestamente reverencia a quienes se acomodan en ellos; la sonrisa fija, sin destinatario preciso, de un Ben Ali momificado, con corbata y peluquín abrillantado en acorde perfecto, seguida de un plano del agonizante Mohamed Buazizi tendido en el lecho del hospital tras su inmolación crística abren para todo creador un campo de posibilidades casi infinitas. Pero es el cambio gradual del joven coronel libio que dio el golpe de Estado contra la monarquía hace 42 años en el mascarón grotesco que incitaba a sus últimos fieles a exterminar a las "ratas" en sus escondrijos y levantaba el puño con rabia el que más y mejor se presta a un soliloquio en la vena del Ulises joyciano: el de un tirano asediado por recuerdos de su ensalzamiento a líder mundial y a quien sus pares, sedientos de petróleo, recibían con sonrisas y abrazos, en un stream of conciousness cuya corriente impetuosa mezclaría atropelladamente sus delirios de rey de África, los cadáveres ahorcados de centenares de opositores, las mazmorras subterráneas de su palacio de Bengasi, las declaraciones de amor a su pueblo, la transformación de la gran república de las masas popular y democrática en patrimonio familiar de él y sus hijos. La acronía del relato y el recurso a la gramática transformativa para transitar de una estructura oracional a otra serían el cauce de esta reproducción aleatoria de las vivencias confusas del autoproclamado Padre de los Libios: el terror a las hechiceras de Macbeth y a los

262 complós de sus amados súbditos, el fundido de su jaima instalada en el corazón de las capitales europeas y sus celdas de tortura, del juicio siniestro de las enfermeras búlgaras y el rostro radiante de su cuidadora ucrania. El desafío creativo exigirá mucho esfuerzo y trabajo pero no dudo de que un día u otro algún novelista árabe lo acometerá. Entretanto, y mientras se desconoce aún el final previsiblemente sangriento del coronel libio, deberemos contentarnos con los culebrones que tanto gustan en los países árabes y no árabes. ¿Quién encarnará el papel de la expeluquera aupada al rango de reina y señora de Túnez? ¿Acudirá al banco a sacar el dinero que atesora despeinada, convulsa y con el rostro deshecho? ¿Habrá una escena de reproches recíprocos entre ella y el ya achacoso marido? ¿Qué actores desempeñarán la función de mafiosos del todopoderoso clan Trabelsi? ¿Escucharemos sus gritos de cólera en el momento de la estampida? ¿Los veremos, mordiéndose las uñas de despecho, en su deshonroso exilio? Y, si de Túnez pasamos a El Cairo, imaginamos ya la telenovela del próximo Ramadán. La ambiciosa señora Mubarak acusando de ineptitud a su marido, el hijo bueno o menos ladrón arremetiendo contra la cleptocracia instaurada por su madre y su hermano Gamal; los fieles que intentan cambiar de chaqueta a última hora y se hunden con el barco; el rostro incrédulo del que se creyó rey de por vida y ve hundida su obra y secuestrados sus bienes en el extremo sur del Sinaí bíblico. Un acontecimiento histórico de la magnitud del que hoy vive el mundo árabe hallará un día el creador que con serenidad y maestría dé cuenta de él a los lectores futuros. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/opinion/ultimas/horas/despota/elpepiopi/20110308elpep iopi_5/Tes

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FOREIGNERS Not So Fast Before the U.S. intervenes in Libya, we must understand why the Arab world is not asking for our help. By Anne Applebaum Posted Monday, March 7, 2011, at 8:08 PM ET

I'm listening hard, but I just can't hear the "voices around the world" who my colleague Charles Krauthammer said last week are "calling for U.S. intervention to help bring down Moammar Gaddafi." It's true that John Bolton, former U.N. ambassador and current Fox News contributor, has declared that "strong American words (and actions) were amply warranted" in Libya. It's also true that a clutch of American politicians and writers have come out in favor of a similarly muscular response as well. But outside America's borders, all is silence. Certainly nobody in the Arab world is clamoring for American military intervention, or indeed any American intervention: Egyptian democrats are even wary of taking our development money. ("Help from America can be misunderstood," one would-be Egyptian politician delicately explained a few days ago to the Washington Post.) Nobody in Asia, and nobody in Europe, is calling for the Marines to be sent back to the shores of Tripoli, either. The French, feeling guilty for having failed to support (or even forsee) the revolution in Tunisia, have sent humanitarian aid to Benghazi—but have simultaneously argued against military involvement. The British have already bungled their first solo attempt to see what could be done. On Saturday, a British Special Forces team and an MI6 officer touched down near Benghazi, intending simply to make contact with the rebels. They were promptly arrested, handcuffed, interrogated, and sent out of the country. The last thing the rebels want, apparently, is the stigma of contact with foreigners. Why the Arab anxiety about American and Western help? Why the reluctance among our allies? The answer can be summed up in a single word: Iraq. Far from setting "an example for the entire region," as Krauthammer puts it, Iraq serves as a dire warning: Beware, for this could be the fate of your country. When the U.S. military entered Iraq, we knew nothing about the Iraqi opposition, except what we'd heard from a couple of exiles. Our soldiers didn't speak Arabic and hadn't been told what to do once they got to Baghdad. Incompetence led to chaos, which begat violence: Tens of thousands of people died in an eight-year civil war. Although a fragile democracy has now emerged, this isn't an example anyone, anywhere, wants to follow. It's not hard to understand why Libyans and others might fear a repeat performance. In truth, the time to contact the Libyan opposition was a year ago—or five years ago— back when Tony Blair was shaking hands with Qaddafi inside desert tents and Western oil companies were going in to do business. But the British didn't. We didn't, either. Now we don't even know who they are. Various colonels have emerged as "spokesman" for the rebels—but for all of the rebels? Or just some of the rebels? News reports cite

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"secondhand reports through rebel networks" as sources; in other words, somebody told somebody else what's going on. As the failed British escapade shows, the spies don't know any better. We should enforce sanctions in Libya, offer humanitarian aid, and put in place a no-fly zone to be activated if the rebels really begin to lose. But at the moment, even if our military had unlimited funding—which it doesn't—the Pentagon is not equipped to launch democracy in Libya. That is a job for our underfunded international radio networks, especially the ones that broadcast in Arabic; for independent institutions like the National Endowment for Democracy; for groups that train judges and journalists. It will take time before we even have the contacts to set up such programs in Libya. We should start making them right now. It's nice to be on the right side of history, and I'm not surprised that George W. Bush's remaining supporters now feel good about the "freedom agenda" that he sometimes advocated and sometimes forgot while in office. But being right, even morally right, isn't everything. It is also important to be competent, to be consistent, and to be knowledgeable. It's important for your soldiers and diplomats to speak the language of the people you want to influence. It's important to understand the ethnic and tribal divisions of the place you hope to assist. Let's not repeat past mistakes: Before sending in the 101st Airborne, we should find out what people on the ground want and need. Because right now, I don't hear them clamoring for us to come. They are afraid of what American "assistance" might do to their country. Anne Applebaum is a Washington Post and Slate columnist. Her most recent book is Gulag: A History. Article URL: http://www.slate.com/id/2287546/

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Facebook and Twitter are just places revolutionaries go Cyber-utopians who believe the Arab spring has been driven by social networks ignore the real-world activism underpinning them

Evgeny Morozov Monday 7 March 2011 15.31 GMT

Tahrir Square … 'The current fascination with technology-driven accounts of political change in the Middle East is likely to subside.' Photograph: APAimages / Rex Features Tweets were sent. Dictators were toppled. Internet = democracy. QED. Sadly, this is the level of nuance in most popular accounts of the internet's contribution to the recent unrest in the Middle East. It's been extremely entertaining to watch cyber-utopians – adherents of the view that digital tools of social networking such as Facebook and Twitter can summon up social revolutions out of the ether – trip over one another in an effort to put another nail in the coffin of cyber-realism, the position I've recently advanced in my book The Net Delusion. In my book, I argue that these digital tools are simply, well, tools, and social change continues to involve many painstaking, longer-term efforts to engage with political institutions and reform movements. Since the internet's cheerleaders can't bury cyber-realism any more than they can secede from history, they've had to design their own straw-man interpretation of the cyber- realist position, equating it with a view that the internet doesn't matter. This is a caricature of the cyber-realist worldview that doesn't really square with parts of my book that very explicitly state – here is just one quote – that "the internet is more important and disruptive than [its greatest advocates] have previously theorised". Or take the ongoing persecution of Malcolm Gladwell, who is increasingly painted as some kind of a neo-Luddite. In an online chat that Gladwell did for the New Yorker's website shortly after his infamous attack on the notion of "Twitter Revolution" was published last October, he explicitly stated (no less than three times) that the internet can be an effective tool for political change when used by grassroots organisations (as

266 opposed to atomised individuals). Thus, simply showing that the internet was used to publicise, and even organise protests in the Middle East does nothing to counter his argument (which, by the way, I do not entirely endorse). To refute it, cyber-utopians would need to establish that there was no coordination of these protests by networks of grassroots activists – with leaders and hierarchies – who have forged strong ties (online or offline or both) prior to the protests. What we have seen so far suggests otherwise. True, the principal organisers of Egypt's Facebook movement may not be revolutionary leaders in the conventional understanding of the term. (And how could they be, given the grim track-record that former president Hosni Mubarak compiled – with Washington's complicity – in dispatching such leaders?) However, they did exercise leadership and acted strategically – even going into hiding a few days before the actual protests – just as leaders of a revolutionary cell would. The collaborations between Tunisian and Egyptian cyber-activists – so widely celebrated in the press – were not virtual, either. In the space of a week in May 2009, I crashed two (independently organised) workshops in Cairo, where bloggers, techies, and activists from both countries were present in person, sharing tips on how to engage in advocacy and circumvent censorship; one of the attendees was the Tunisian blogger Slim Amamou, who went on to become Tunisia's minister of sport and youth. One of these events was funded by the US government and the other by George Soros's Open Society Foundations (with which I'm affiliated). There were many more events like this – not just in Cairo, but also in Beirut and Dubai. Most of them were never publicised, since the security of many participants was at risk, but they effectively belie the idea that the recent protests were organised by random people doing random things online. Those who believe that these networks were purely virtual and spontaneous are ignorant of the recent history of cyber-activism in the Middle East – to say nothing of the support that it's received, sometimes successful but most often not, from western governments, foundations and corporations. In September 2010, to take just one recent example, Google brought a dozen bloggers from the region to the freedom of expression conference the company convened in Budapest. Tracing the evolution of these activist networks would require more than just studying their Facebook profiles; it would demand painstaking investigative work – on the phone and in the archives – that cannot happen overnight. One reason we keep talking about the role of Twitter and Facebook is that the immediate aftermath of the Middle Eastern spring has left us so little else to talk about; thoroughgoing political analysis of the causes of these revolutions won't be available for a few years. This points us to the real reason why so many cyber-utopians got angry with Gladwell: in a follow-up blog post to his article that appeared as the crowds were still occupying Tahrir Square, he dared to suggest that the grievances that pushed protesters into the streets deserve far more attention than the tools by which they chose to organise. This was akin to spitting in the faces of the digerati – or, perhaps worse still, on their iPads – and they reacted accordingly. And yet Gladwell was probably right: today, the role of the telegraph in the 1917 Bolshevik revolution – just like the role of the tape-recorder in the 1979 Iranian revolution and of the fax machine in the 1989 revolutions – is of interest to a handful of academics and virtually no one else. The fetishism of technology is at its strongest immediately after a revolution but tends to subside shortly afterward.

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In his 1993 bestseller The Magic Lantern, Timothy Garton Ash, one of the most acute observers of the 1989 revolutions, proclaimed that "in Europe at the end of the 20th century, all revolutions are telerevolutions" – but in retrospect, the role of television in those events seems like a very minor point. Will history consign Twitter and Facebook to much the same fate 20 years down the road? In all likelihood, yes. The current fascination with technology-driven accounts of political change in the Middle East is likely to subside, for a number of reasons. First of all, while the recent round of uprisings may seem spontaneous to western observers – and therefore as magically disruptive as a rush-hour flash mob in San Francisco – the actual history of popular regime change tends to diminish the central role commonly ascribed to technology. By emphasising the liberating role of the tools and downplaying the role of human agency, such accounts make Americans feel proud of their own contribution to events in the Middle East. After all, the argument goes, such a spontaneous uprising wouldn't have succeeded before Facebook was around – so Silicon Valley deserves a lion's share of the credit. If, of course, the uprising was not spontaneous and its leaders chose Facebook simply because that's where everybody is, it's a far less glamorous story. Second, social media – by the very virtue of being "social" – lends itself to glib, pundit- style overestimations of its own importance. In 1989, the fax-machine industry didn't employ an army of lobbyists – and fax users didn't feel the same level of attachment to these clunky machines as today's Facebook users feel toward their all-powerful social network. Perhaps the outsize revolutionary claims for social media now circulating throughout the west are only a manifestation of western guilt for wasting so much time on social media: after all, if it helps to spread democracy in the Middle East, it can't be all that bad to while away the hours "poking" your friends and playing FarmVille. But the recent history of technology strongly suggests that today's vogue for Facebook and Twitter will fade as online audiences migrate to new services. Already, tech enthusiasts are blushing at the memory of the serious academic conferences once devoted to the MySpace revolution. Third, the people who serve as our immediate sources about the protests may simply be too excited to provide a balanced view. Could it be that the Google sales executive Wael Ghonim – probably the first revolutionary with an MBA – who has emerged as the public face of Egypt's uprising, vowing to publish his own book about "Revolution 2.0", is slightly overstating the role of technology, while also downplaying his own role in the lead-up to the protests? After all, the world has yet to meet a Soviet dissident who doesn't think it was the fax machine that toppled the Politburo – or a former employee of Radio Free Europe or Voice of America who doesn't think it was western radio broadcasting that brought down the Berlin Wall. This is not to suggest that neither of these communications devices played a role in these decades-old uprisings – but it is to note that the people directly involved may not have the most dispassionate appraisals of how these watershed events occurred. If they don't want to condemn themselves to a future of tedious bar-room arguments with the grizzled, and somewhat cranky holdouts from the 1989 fax glory days, or the true believers of the Radio Free Europe Revolution, then today's cyber-utopians need to log off their Facebook accounts and try a little harder. http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/mar/07/facebook-twitter-revolutionaries-cyber- utopians?INTCMP=ILCNETTXT3487

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MIX&REMIX Bienvenidos 7 marzo 2011 L'HEBDO LAUSANA

VIÑETISTA Mix & Remix, cuyo verdadero nombre es Philippe Becquelin, trabaja como caricaturista en la prensa y en la televisión suiza. Nacido en 1958, colabora con el semanario suizo L'Hebdo, el periódico satírico francés Siné Hebdo, e igualmente con la Televisión... Riesgo de una llegada masiva de refugiados La hipocresía europea

"Desanimemos, por lo menos, a los analfabetos" Con respecto a las revueltas populares en los países árabes, los líderes europeos oscilan entre el apoyo a la oposición y el nerviosismo por la llegada de inmigrantes a sus costas. http://www.presseurop.eu/es/content/picture/532021-bienvenidos

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EDITORIAL Es hora de decidir 7 marzo 2011 Ya se ha escrito prácticamente todo sobre Europa y su incomodidad ante las revoluciones árabes. Que ha apoyado demasiado a los dictadores para comprender ahora las aspiraciones a la libertad de los pueblos; que tan sólo analiza los acontecimientos desde el punto de vista de la inmigración y del terrorismo; que cierra la puerta a los pueblos de África del Norte en lugar de pensar en cómo ayudarles; que es incapaz de definir una postura común y expresarla con claridad… En resumen, que desaprovecha una ocasión histórica para influir en unos acontecimientos de dimensión mundial. Es verdad que la UE ha adoptado sanciones contra el régimen del coronel Gadafi. También lo es que Estados Unidos, por mencionar únicamente a la potencia más próxima a los europeos, ha dado muestras de dudas y torpezas. Es cierto que los diplomáticos europeos están actuando en Bruselas, en Nueva York y también en Túnez, en El Cairo o en Trípoli y que la situación requiere clarividencia y prudencia. Pero, en una región a la que está estrechamente ligada desde la Antigüedad, Europa aún no ha dado muestras de que podía estar a la altura de los acontecimientos y actuar en lugar de reaccionar. Esta semana será importante. El 11 de marzo, los jefes de Estado y de gobierno se reunirán en Bruselas en un Consejo de Europa extraordinario dedicado a Libia. En todas las capitales, se preguntan si es necesario intervenir militarmente o humanitariamente. Pero también será necesario definir una estrategia a largo plazo para el desarrollo económico y político del conjunto de la región europeo-mediterránea. Después de esta cumbre tendrá lugar otra reunión clave: la dedicada al futuro de la moneda única. En dicha reunión, reservada a los 17 dirigentes de la eurozona, se tratará el refuerzo del Fondo de Estabilización Financiera y el Pacto de Competitividad propuesto por Alemania y Francia, mientras los rumores del plan de rescate para Portugal son cada vez más insistentes. Durante el Consejo del 25 marzo se tomarán las decisiones definitivas. En una tesis publicada hace 80 años, el historiador belga Henri Pirenne explicaba que "Carlomagno sin Mahoma es inconcebible". Es decir, que sin la expansión musulmana en una gran parte de las costas del Mediterráneo, la Europa post-romana no se habría visto obligada a centrarse en el Norte del continente para desarrollar en dicha zona nuevas rutas comerciales internas y fundar un nuevo conjunto político. Puesto que Europa ya no encontraba su lugar alrededor del Mare Nostrum, el rey de los francos fundó el Sacro Imperio Romano Germánico. Hoy, en pleno cambio político en el Norte de África, la Unión Europea se encuentra obligada a volver a definir sus mecanismos económicos, monetarios y fiscales. Los dos fenómenos son independientes y, sin embargo, están estrechamente relacionados. Porque si bien Carlomagno podía dar la espalda al Mediterráneo, los dirigentes europeos actuales no pueden quedarse al margen de la integración inevitable de los países árabes en una economía y una sociedad globalizada en la que Europa pierde cada vez más relevancia. Angela Merkel y Nicolas Sarkozy sin duda no podrán imponer su Pacto de Competitividad a sus socios, pero todos deberán encontrar los medios para que la UE salga de la fragilidad y de la incertidumbre que la paralizan desde hace ya un año. Por lo tanto, el 11 de marzo será necesario empezar a encontrar las formas de reforzar la economía, de restablecer la confianza y de trazar las líneas de una auténtica ambición internacional. http://www.presseurop.eu/es/content/editorial/531451-es-hora-de-decidir

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03/07/2011 08:47 AM Divided Response to Libyan Crisis 'The Maneuvering of EU Member States Is a Scandal' In a SPIEGEL ONLINE interview, Martin Schulz, head of the Socialist group in the European Parliament, sharply criticized the way EU member states are putting national interests first over Libya. He called upon the German government to accept refugees from North Africa and warned that military intervention in Libya may be needed as a last resort. SPIEGEL ONLINE: The situation in Libya is escalating from day to day, amid growing fears of civil war. What should the West do now? Martin Schulz: The sanctions against (Libyan leader) Moammar Gadhafi approved by the United Nations Security Council should be implemented as soon as possible. His access to funds needs to be cut off, because he is apparently trying to buy mercenaries. We have to try to isolate Gadhafi. SPIEGEL ONLINE: Gadhafi doesn't even shy away from bombing his own people. Doesn't this raise the question of whether the West should intervene militarily? Schulz: Gadhafi's methods are brutal. But we have to choose carefully between an emotional reaction, which is understandable, and decisions that could lead to a protracted war. All of the measures that can be taken within the context of the Charter of the United Nations must be considered. I am deliberately emphasizing the word "all" there -- in other words, including the military option. But that's only possible with the involvement of the Security Council and the Arab countries. SPIEGEL ONLINE: Why? Schulz: Military intervention without their involvement could even have the effect of strengthening Gadhafi. We recently experienced how the rebels react when foreign soldiers enter the country, when they promptly detained a British special forces unit. It's clear that whatever measures are taken will have to be coordinated with the Arab League and the African Union. SPIEGEL ONLINE: The international community has been discussing a no-fly zone for days, but so far nothing has happened. Where does this hesitancy come from? Schulz: A no-fly zone is one way to rein in Gadhafi. It certainly makes sense, if it can be implemented. But it isn't entirely uncomplicated. I agree with the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's view that this would be a highly risky proposition. SPIEGEL ONLINE: As was already the case with Egypt, the European Union is not taking a clear position. Has Europe failed, just as the Middle East is on the brink of a new era? Schulz: I would appreciate it if people would use more precise language in this regard. People are always chiding "the EU," but the institutions in Brussels are taking action. The parliament is providing money and the European Commission has tripled humanitarian aid. The European Union isn't the problem.

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SPIEGEL ONLINE: What is? Schulz: The member states are the problem. They are pursuing interests that are sometimes widely divergent. I'm sick of these constant attacks on "the EU." The real scandal is the never-ending maneuvering of the member states. France has historic interests, and so does Britain. But Germany's game isn't any better. The German foreign minister sings the praises of the revolution, while the chancellor says: No refugees, please. None of this is credible. SPIEGEL ONLINE: Why can't the EU leadership convince the member states to support a common policy? Schulz: The EU does what it can. It provides money, and High Representative for Foreign Affairs Catherine Ashton is in the region. But why, exactly, are all the European Union's foreign ministers also traveling to the region, and, on top of that, saying different things? This nonsense merely creates the impression that the Europeans are not particularly credible or unified. SPIEGEL ONLINE: What else can the European Union do? Schulz: What's completely lacking is a long-term plan to foster civil society, both in Libya and also where it is currently coming into existence, namely in Egypt and Tunisia. That should be the EU's top priority. These (civil society) bodies need money and advisers. We need to train election monitors and send them to these countries. Europe's security will be enormously enhanced if we win this fight and strengthen secular, civil society. SPIEGEL ONLINE: Did Europe tolerate the Gadhafi regime for too long? Schulz: It's hard to answer that question. We all tolerated Gadhafi, both the EU and the United States. One could criticize this as amoral, but it was also realpolitik. He renounced terrorism, which meant that one continuous source of insecurity had been pacified for the time being. And, of course, enormous energy-related interests were part of the motive behind the cooperation with Gadhafi. SPIEGEL ONLINE: The unrest in Libya has been going on for several weeks now, but Gadhafi is still there. Do you still think that the regime can be overthrown? Schulz: I don't know how strong Gadhafi is at this point. He's a dictator who is surrounded by militias that are apparently well-trained and well-equipped. Parts of his army have abandoned him, but that doesn't seem to be enough to bring him down quickly. I think that the outcome of this power struggle is still completely open. SPIEGEL ONLINE: Large numbers of refugees are to be expected. The situation in Egypt showed how Europe reacts: It isolates itself. Is that the right signal? Schulz: No. We have to do everything possible to prevent people from becoming refugees in the first place. There are large numbers of young people in these countries, and they are needed there. They'll stay if they have a future there, which is why it's necessary to spend a lot of money now to help these people -- through economic cooperation, educational cooperation and investment in infrastructure and civil society. Billions are needed in this regard. SPIEGEL ONLINE: But there will still be refugees. Schulz: Yes. And we can't let them drown in the Mediterranean. We have to take them in.

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SPIEGEL ONLINE: Does that include Germany? Schulz: Naturally Germany, like other countries, also has to accept refugees. The southern EU countries can't do this alone. We can't sit there and welcome -- and even encourage -- revolutions in the world while banishing the results from our doorstep. That position is simply unsustainable. What we need is a quota to effectively distribute refugees among all 27 member states. Not to mention Switzerland, by the way, which constantly benefits from the EU and the dictators' funds. It could also easily accept some refugees. Interview conducted by Veit Medick

URL: • http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,749376,00.html RELATED SPIEGEL ONLINE LINKS: • Photo Gallery: Libya Slides into Civil War http://www.spiegel.de/fotostrecke/fotostrecke-65406.html • A Courthouse in Benghazi: The Nerve Center of the Libyan Revolution (03/04/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,749227,00.html • 'We Just Want Our Freedom': Fear Reigns in Tripoli as Gadhafi's Thugs Roam Streets (03/04/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,749216,00.html • Vengence from the Skies: Libyan Air Force Could Be Gadhafi's Trump Card (03/04/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,749121,00.html • The World from Berlin: 'Time Is On Gadhafi's Side' (03/03/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,748863,00.html • Opposition Carries on Fight against Gadhafi: 'If the Americans Come, They Would Steal our Revolution' (03/03/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,748832,00.html RELATED INTERNET LINKS • The Guardian: SAS and MI6 officers released by Libya's rebel commanders http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/07/sas-mi6-released-libya-rebels SPIEGEL ONLINE is not liable for the content of external web pages.

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03/07/2011 01:55 PM Courting the Diaspora Erdogan Hopes Germany's Turks Can Get Him Re-Elected By Özlem Gezer, Maximilian Popp and Holger Stark Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan is running for re-election in June, and is hoping that Germany's large Turkish community can help him secure the votes he needs. But his request for electoral help from the German government has ruffled feathers. The campaign speech in Düsseldorf made headlines in Germany. Newspapers described it as a "sermon of hate" and warned of "new divisions" in society. But the election campaigner wasn't even running for office in Germany: It was Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan who caused all the fuss. The heated reaction was due to comments that Erdogan made during his Sunday, Feb. 27 speech. He said that Turkish, not German, must be the first language of the children of Turkish parents. "You are my citizens!" he told the crowd. On the day after the scandal erupted, Erdogan met with Thomas de Maizière, who was still the German interior minister at the time (he has since been appointed Germany's defense minister). De Maizière had carefully studied Erdogan's speech on Monday afternoon, in his car, on his way to the CeBit consumer electronics trade show in Hanover (Turkey was the fair's partner country this year). He knew that the Turkish prime minister likes to polarize, so he decided to remain calm. He gently corrected Erdogan, without loudly contradicting him. "We want the children to learn German, at the latest when they start attending school," said de Maizière. "Whether or not they learn Turkish is their own private matter." Request for Help But during their discussion over dinner, the guest from Ankara appeared no longer particularly interested in the language proficiency of young Turkish-Germans. In his Düsseldorf speech, he had set his sights on a far greater subject: the parliamentary elections in Turkey this coming June. Erdogan has asked the German government for help -- he wants to make it possible for his fellow Turks to vote in Germany. Erdogan is a high roller and a populist, and there is one thing that he now wants more than anything else: to be re-elected. Between 1.1 and 1.3 million Turks living in Germany are eligible to vote in Turkish elections. Germany is effectively the fourth largest Turkish electoral district after Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir. This June, Erdogan wants to see ballot boxes placed in the Turkish Embassy and Turkish consulates in Germany. De Maizière agreed, at least in principle, to provide support, and has tentatively promised police protection. Swedes, Iraqis and Australians are already able to vote in their embassies. The German government had previously rejected all requests from Turkish politicians -- out of fear of attacks. Erdogan has a highly efficient campaigning machine. In Germany's densely populated Ruhr region, supporters of his Islamic conservative ruling AKP party put up posters in

274 all major cities. The Union of European Turkish Democrats, the AKP's unofficial foreign representative, distributed thousands of free tickets for the Düsseldorf rally in mosques, associations and Turkish supermarkets. Not to be outdone, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, Erdogan's challenger from the opposition CHP party, also plans to hold an appearance in Germany this month. Immigrants with a Turkish passport used to travel to Istanbul and Ankara to vote at the airport. In Cologne, for example, a local Turkish electrical engineer organized election trips to Turkey for many years. In his neighborhood he campaigned for the far-right Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and invited supporters to eat meals at his home. It used to be that Turkish-Germans supported a range of parties, but these days nearly all votes go to the AKP, says the engineer: "Erdogan has the community under control." Out of Touch with Modern Turkey Erdogan's success in Germany reveals a great deal about the sensitivities of Turkish immigrants -- and about the extent of integration in the country. There are commissioners for foreigners, Islam conferences, integration courses and endless debate on the issue, yet Germany has never really understood its immigrants. Who are these people who turn out in their thousands to cheer for a foreign head of government? Many of the women in Düsseldorf wear headscarves while the men are clad in knitted sweaters that are reminiscent of the first generation of guest workers in Germany. They moved to the country decades ago, but never really adapted to the new world. They cling to their traditional lifestyle, where the men are macho and the women marry young. Furthermore, they pass on this cliché to their children, leading many young Turks to feel ill at ease in Germany, even those who are third-generation immigrants. It is precisely this group that the Turkish prime minister addresses in his tirades. But the reality of life back in the homeland has long since overtaken the immigrants' worldview. Turkey is more modern than many immigrants remember it. They notice it when they fly back to the old country. When they arrive in Turkey, they bitterly complain about increasingly loose family ties and the anonymity of big cities. The Turks call these returnees Almancilar, a word coined from the Turkish words Alman (German) and yabanci (foreigner). They are not particularly well liked and are generally seen as backward and arrogant. Turkish-Germans often have it just as rough in Istanbul as in Berlin or Frankfurt: There is no place where they really feel at home. Erdogan maintains that he can help change that. He conveys a sense of pride to the immigrants, along with a feeling that they have missed all too often in Germany in the past: a sense of belonging. Speaking in Cologne three years ago, he condemned assimilation as "a crime against humanity." The tone of his speech in Düsseldorf was more moderate, but the message was the same: Don't become like the Germans. Big Brother Is Looking Out for You But Erdogan's approach locks the immigrants into their Turkish-ness. His speech is "a slap in the face to people who are working for integration," says Heinz Buschkowsky, the straight-talking mayor of Neukölln, a Berlin district with a large foreign population. "I am here to look after your vested interests," Erdogan told his audience in Düsseldorf. His supporters respond with unconditional loyalty. Safiye, 53, has been living in Germany for 33 years, but she speaks hardly a word of German. She is proud of the prime minister, she says. "He looks after us. I love him." After Erdogan's speech she had tears in her eyes. 275

Erdogan's appearances abroad are directed not so much at immigrants in Germany as at voters in Turkey. Recent WikiLeaks disclosures have damaged the prime minister's image. In Germany, though, he can play his favorite role, acting the part of the abi, the big brother who looks after things wherever he is needed in the world. That includes Libya, for instance, where he recently had Turkish nationals evacuated back home, as well as Germany. 'Easy Points' German politicians are critical of Erdogan's approach. Martin Schulz, the chairman of the Socialist group in the European Parliament, accuse Erdogan of trying "to score easy points in the election campaign." He says that it is "scandalous that this man is now presenting his pan-Turkish world view in Germany for the second time." Even politicians with Turkish origins like German lawmaker Serkan Tören of the pro- business Free Democratic Party (FDP) see Erdogan's "campaign show" as counterproductive: It does nothing to help the integration of Turkish immigrants into German society, Tören says. "We ourselves are the only people who can solve the integration problem," argues Kenan Kolat, chairman of the Turkish community in Germany. "This can't be achieved by any foreign politician." Translated from the German by Paul Cohen URL: Özlem Gezer, Maximilian Popp and Holger Stark Erdogan Hopes Germany's Turks Can Get Him Re-Elected 03/07/2011 01:55 PM http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,749389,00.html RELATED SPIEGEL ONLINE LINKS: • The German Debate: 'The Best Place for Language Acquisition Is Kindergarten' (03/07/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,749442,00.html • The World from Berlin: 'Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan Wants to Be the Father' (03/01/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,748379,00.html • Erdogan Urges Turks Not to Assimilate: 'You Are Part of Germany, But Also Part of Our Great Turkey' (02/28/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,748070,00.html • The 'Tribune of Anatolia': America's Dark View of Turkish Premier Erdogan (11/30/2010) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,732084,00.html

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03/04/2011 11:01 PM A Courthouse in Benghazi The Nerve Center of the Libyan Revolution By Clemens Höges in Benghazi, Libya Though the revolution against Libyan dictator Moammar Gadhafi has no set leader, rebels in Benghazi have set up a provisional government in a courthouse. Here, a justice-obsessed lawyer, a beverage vendor and a computer expert are among those who have become the heart, head and voice of a country intent on change. The old general is crying, his cheeks trembling. His eyes are red from weeping. Then he buries his face in his hands. Brigadier General Abdulhadi Arafa is one of the most powerful men in Benghazi, in the entire rebel-held eastern part of Libya, in fact. The 64- year-old officer commands 2,000 members of a special-forces unit. And he did everything right a week and a half ago when, after 41 years of service, he decided to refuse to obey Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi. When the revolt began, he ordered his officers to stay in their barracks, lock the gates and not take any action against the protesters. Their men were not to shoot at anyone unless they were shot at themselves. The general has four sons and four daughters, who are all about the same age as the protesters marching outside. Thoughts of his children made it easier for him to decide that these youths represented the very Libyan people he had once sworn an oath to protect. He is crying, he says, because Gadhafi is a criminal for having ordered his men to shoot at his own people and even at children. But this isn't something General Arafa couldn't have known before. Perhaps he is also weeping out of regret, for having spent decades serving a man who commits murder and seems to have only a tenuous grasp on reality. He has come to the courthouse across from the beach in Benghazi to pick up new orders from his new masters, of which there are now quite a few. A Unique Experiment in Democracy The Libyan revolt erupted in Benghazi, the country's second-largest city, in front of this very courthouse. Rebels from all over the country have now set up their headquarters in the austere-looking building facing the Mediterranean. The new rebel government, established last Saturday, consists of a committee and subcommittees to administer the city and surrounding region. It's meant to be a provisional government born out of the need to have someone in charge, someone to give orders and instructions. The 13-member committee includes lawyers, professors and teachers. Representatives of committees from cities in southern Libya are in a hallway, searching for people they might know. They want to join the rebel leaders in Benghazi. Gadhafi's renegade former justice minister has proposed creating a real transitional government for the entire country based here in Benghazi. A national transitional

277 council also wants to coordinate the rebels in other captured cities from its courthouse headquarters. What's happening here in Benghazi is an anarchistic experiment unique among the rebellions in the Arab world. In Egypt, by contrast, the military has temporarily assumed power and, in Tunisia, the structures of the former regime continue to function. Celebrating Freedom Crowds of hundreds and sometimes thousands gather in front of the Benghazi courthouse every day. As the waves crash against the shore and ocean spray fills the air, they walk along the coast road singing, dancing and praying, celebrating what they've accomplished and their newfound freedom until late at night. On Wednesday, a rumor suddenly started circulating that a unit loyal to Gadhafi had attacked Brega, a key Libyan oil port 200 kilometers (125 miles) southwest of Benghazi, and that six men had been killed. When they heard the news, some of the young men in front of the courthouse started shouting, jumped into their pickup trucks and sped away. Brega seemed to offer an opportunity for them to test their strength. Inside the courthouse, Khalid al-Saji is standing on a bench in a courtroom, leaning forward to make himself heard above the commotion. Saji, a lawyer with sharp features and thinning hair, is one of the 14 men who inadvertently launched the revolt. When the revolt started, he was chairman of the Libyan bar association, and now he's a member of the judicial subcommittee. Though this is no longer used as a courtroom, he is wearing the robe he always wears in court. Draped over his shoulders is the rebel's red, black and green flag. The flag's colors are the same as those on the flag of the Kingdom of Libya that existed until 1969. That year, when the king went abroad for medical treatment, a colonel named Moammar Gadhafi overthrew the government in a coup. Drivers now use Gadhafi's green flags to wipe dirt from their windshields. The Spark of Revolution Saji has a lot of experience with the dictator's arbitrary behavior and with laws that did not apply to everyone. He himself has been arrested and detained, often for days or weeks at a time, for having filed suits against the government. Though such actions were theoretically permitted, Saji rarely won his cases. On Feb. 6, Saji and three colleagues drove to Tripoli, where they had an argument with Gadhafi in person in his tent. The men had come to discuss two demands, one minor and one far more significant. Although their terms had expired, the members of the board of the country's bar association who were loyal to Gadhafi had refused to step down from their positions. They were able to refuse because Gadhafi and those close to him could ignore the rules and break laws with impunity. Saji was now demanding that the board members who had been newly elected be allowed to enter into office. "Gadhafi talked to us because the uprising in Tunisia had made him nervous," Saji says. He eventually promised to appoint the newly elected board members. Then Saji and his colleagues got up the nerve to address their larger concern: They wanted a constitution that would require Gadhafi to also obey the law. They spoke and argued with Gadhafi, trying to convince him that he needed to institute some reforms if he wanted to keep his people calm. "But when we were leaving the tent," Saji recounts, "he said he wouldn't make any announcements until he felt the time was right."

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On Feb. 15, the families of the victims of a 1996 massacre demonstrated in Benghazi. That year, Gadhafi's thugs had mowed down 1,200 revolting prison inmates -- the protesters' relatives -- with assault rifles. Two days later, a small group of attorneys led by Saji demonstrated for more human rights in front of the courthouse. As the hours passed, they were joined by more and more people. The uprising had begun. Soon the first shots were fired. Then the rebels set fire to Gadhafi's palace and the secret police building next to the courthouse, where regime opponents had once been tortured. The revolt soon spread to other cities. Growing Pains of a Revolution Young men in ragged uniforms are now driving up to the Benghazi courthouse, hooting and honking their horns, as if the antiaircraft guns on their truck beds were parts of parade floats. They seem oblivious to the fact that hundreds of people have already died in this revolution. Children are crawling on top of tanks parked along the seaside boulevard while loudspeakers drone in the background. There is chaos in the courthouse, where small groups are standing around, pushing together benches and getting into heated debates. Newspapers are being printed and slogans designed. In one room, boy scouts are cutting up chickens and dropping them into large aluminum pots on gas burners. The hundreds of people who have been debating here for days need to eat, even if the meal consists of nothing more than chicken and rice prepared by a group of boy scouts. Of course, the committee was not popularly elected because an election would have been impossible to organize. Instead, courthouse discussions yielded a list of names that most people could support. Still, they say they want democracy. A man is standing on the front stairway, shouting that he doesn't feel represented by this committee. Others try to calm him down by explaining that the committee first has to address the simple but important issues, such as making sure that the electricity stays on and that the hundreds of young people now directing traffic are replaced by something more permanent. Gadhafi's police officers have run away or taken refuge in their home to wait things out until the rage of the masses has subsided. Someone will eventually have to collect all the weapons that were stolen in the city, all the guns and hand grenades that protesters looted from the abandoned barracks. The military officers have set up their own committee as well. They will have to plan how to defend the city if forces loyal to Gadhafi decide to strike back, though hardly anyone thinks this is something they need to worry about seriously. Having come to power in a putsch himself, Gadhafi knows full well that every dictator has to fear his own army. For this reason, he had already weakened the military and strengthened his militias. But as the military units he once neglected are now joining the protestors, his policies are coming home to roost. A Desire to Go It Alone Within a few days, the rebels managed to seize control of the majority of the country. But now, if things are ever going to return to normal, they first have to figure out how to govern. The committee serving as the provisional rebel government doesn't have any offices or staff members, relying instead on cell phones and inexperienced volunteers. Under these circumstances, the rebels need the help of the Gadhafi loyalists who know the basics about keeping a city and a country running, such as how to access the city's funds.

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"Gadhafi insults us as Islamists and drug addicts, which are mutually exclusive. He claims we want to split up the country, which also isn't true," says Mohammed Ghunim, a plump, agile man with laugh lines around his eyes. Since he is a good speaker and knows English, Ghunim has been put in charge of producing flyers, coming up with slogans and explaining the rebels' demands to journalists. This is a revolt by normal people, he says, and no one is controlling them. But, he adds, no one can deprive them of it, either. A large sign posted at the harbor, not far from the court, reads: "No Intervention -- The Libyan People Can Do It by Itself." "We don't want NATO or the United States here in Libya," Ghunim explains. "If they help -- and, of course, we know they can beat Gadhafi -- they'll want to stay in Libya to help us. Thanks, but we don't want that at all. We don't want to become another Iraq, and we don't want to be dependent -- on anyone." That said, Ghunim adds, many people here would like to see American bombs being dropped on Tripoli and against Gadhafi. As of late Wednesday, the rebels had not reached a decision on whether they favored such an intervention, but most of the committee members felt it would be a good idea, according to Ghunim. They would welcome limited air strikes, he stresses, but not ground operations on Libyan soil. A no- fly zone would also be helpful, he says, "because it would hamper Gadhafi." Ghunim believes a no-fly zone would be hard to enforce because the West's bombers would first have to knock out all of the government's anti-aircraft positions. Still, he's quick to point out that he isn't a soldier, so he's not even sure if that's possible. Instead, he's just the owner of a small beverage company in Benghazi that produces orange juice from concentrate he imports from Austria. "We want laws that apply to everyone," he says. "We want to be able to live and be free. That's all." Saji, the lawyer, says it's much too early to draft a constitution, but he does say he's been thinking about it for a long time. The constitution of the former kingdom isn't bad, he adds. Of course, the passages that involve the king would have to be removed, but he says the rest could be used as a basic framework. Saji points out, however, that the entire population would have to be involved in a debate over a new constitution. According to the plan of the rebels in Benghazi, once Tripoli has been captured, a large committee will be formed to set up a transitional government and organize the first elections. Unlikely Heroes On the top floor of the courthouse, the man who just might be the most important person in the revolution is just getting up from a stack of old mattresses. He blinks his eyes as the noon sun shines through holes in the curtains. He has been here for many days and nights, getting too little sleep and drinking too much coffee. Mohammed Nabbous asks what day it is, and it turns out that today is his 28th birthday. There are no slogans written on the walls here like the ones in the hallways downstairs. Instead, the walls are covered with words and numbers like "Channel," "Username" and "ip 62.32.46.100." Nabbous barks into his microphone: "My upload is zero! What's wrong?" There are cables hanging from the equipment in the room, and a pair of pliers and a small screwdriver are lying on the table in front of him. Gadhafi had shut down the Internet in Libya, and it wasn't until Monday that some lines were up and running again. Nevertheless, Nabbous was able to use a satellite to send the

280 rebels' message to the rest of the world. "Gadhafi can't shut this down," Nabbous says. "He'd have to drop a bomb to stop me." Images taken by cameras within the courthouse are running across the screen behind him. The satellite sends them directly to the Internet via livestream.com. Nabbous is providing the images to television stations around the world. And when protesters come under fire in Tripoli and call Nabbous, he holds his cell phone up to the microphone so that the sounds of gunfire and screams can be broadcast live online. Photo Gallery of Body Parts Nabbous uses a laptop to store the horrific images taken by the rebels. Since it would look like propaganda, little of this material can be published. For example, one shaky video show a soldier executing a protester. The material also includes a photo gallery of individual body parts. Facebook -- the second-most important tool of the revolution after Twitter -- is running on another computer. By constantly posting new messages, fans are lending momentum to the revolution. This is exactly what they did in Tunisia and Egypt -- and exactly why Gadhafi wanted to shut down the Internet. But Nabbous, who once owned a small computer company, almost always finds a way. When the rebels took control of the courthouse, he brought all of his equipment to the building without hesitation. "We wouldn't have existed without this stuff here," he says. Translated from the German by Christopher Sultan

URL: • http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,749227,00.html RELATED SPIEGEL ONLINE LINKS: • 'We Just Want Our Freedom': Fear Reigns in Tripoli as Gadhafi's Thugs Roam Streets (03/04/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,749216,00.html • Vengence from the Skies: Libyan Air Force Could Be Gadhafi's Trump Card (03/04/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,749121,00.html • Failed Evacuation Attempt: Three Dutch Marines Held By Libyan Forces (03/03/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,748831,00.html • The World from Berlin: 'Time Is On Gadhafi's Side' (03/03/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,748863,00.html • Photo Gallery: Warships and Refugees http://www.spiegel.de/fotostrecke/fotostrecke-65311.html • Opposition Carries on Fight against Gadhafi: 'If the Americans Come, They Would Steal our Revolution' (03/03/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,748832,00.html

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03/04/2011 11:01 PM 'We Just Want Our Freedom' Fear Reigns in Tripoli as Gadhafi's Thugs Roam Streets By Caroline Poiron in Tripoli In Tripoli, Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi's thugs are in control of the streets as anti-government demonstrators stay holed up in their houses out of fear. But the protests are not over yet, and tensions remain dangerously high. The traces of the revolution had already been washed away by the next day. The large square in Tajoura, a suburb in the eastern part of Tripoli, is in the hands of Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi and his militias once more. The green flag, a symbol of his power, is flying again. Less than 24 hours earlier, on March 1, hundreds of Libyans had protested against the dictator, destroying images of Gadhafi and spraying US President's Barack Obama's campaign slogan, "Yes, we can!" onto walls. Now the houses surrounding the square have been freshly painted, mainly in red and green, and the graffiti is gone. The words "Freedom for Libya" and "Down with Gadhafi" had been painted on one wall. The demonstrators of Tajoura had danced, shouted and sung songs here, constantly chanting that a cemetery would be the best place for the dictator. For a short time, Tajoura looked like a liberated city. Before that, the residents of Tajoura had buried young Abd al-Hafid al-Musrathi, who had been shot dead after Friday prayers. Thousands came to the funeral to support the boy's family. The men wept and chanted "Gadhafi out." They were not afraid to talk to foreign journalists. Mohammed, a young man, reported that at least 20 people were killed and 300 had gone missing in the last few days alone. An old man said that his son had been "simply gone" for three days now, and that he had received no news from him and had no idea where he could be. "We're Not Terrorists" Another man, who said his name was Asud, described how they came to get his friend at night. "Suddenly the police were at his door. They dragged him out of the apartment and beat him. And then they asked him why exactly he had a mobile phone." What happens to these people? Where is Gadhafi having his opponents taken? These questions are on the minds of everyone in the streets of Tripoli. Asud said he also knows about a woman they shot at home, when she was alone. "We're not terrorists," he said, "and we're not al-Qaida." The wounded are no longer being taken to the hospitals, because opposition members have already been shot there. The city's residents are now quietly holed up in their homes. On the day of the protests, a car drove by with a picture of Gadhafi pasted to the windshield. The crowd immediately surrounded the vehicle and tore off the picture. The car was in flames seconds later. That was on Tuesday.

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Promises of Cash A day later, Gadhafi's thugs -- his military, his police and his mercenaries -- were back on every corner, making sure that people did not congregate and that no groups were formed. They were also preventing bystanders from noting anything down, apparently convinced that if there were no journalists there could be no witnesses to the crimes of the regime. Gadhafi, the self-styled revolutionary leader and "king of the kings of Africa," hasn't given up yet. Large parts of the armed forces are still loyal to him. He could strike in Tripoli, or its outskirts, at any time. He is now sending text messages to his supporters. He has promised 500 Libyan dinars (€287, or $396) to every family that supports him. People are standing in line to be paid their money. This is apparently the only idea the billionaire dictator still has: to buy back his control of Libya. As night falls, security forces are marauding through the narrow streets of Tajoura once again. Local residents, fearful of being killed, have locked themselves into their houses and apartments. The square is abandoned at night, but in the daytime, despite the constant presence of Gadhafi's henchmen, the same words can be heard again and again, even in Tripoli: "We just want our freedom." Translated from the German by Christopher Sultan

URL: • http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,749216,00.html RELATED SPIEGEL ONLINE LINKS: • Vengence from the Skies: Libyan Air Force Could Be Gadhafi's Trump Card (03/04/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,749121,00.html • Failed Evacuation Attempt: Three Dutch Marines Held By Libyan Forces (03/03/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,748831,00.html • The World from Berlin: 'Time Is On Gadhafi's Side' (03/03/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,748863,00.html • Opposition Carries on Fight against Gadhafi: 'If the Americans Come, They Would Steal our Revolution' (03/03/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,748832,00.html • Libyan Revolution: With No End to Fighting, International Pressure Grows on Gadhafi (03/02/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,748586,00.html

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03/07/2011 03:19 PM The World from Berlin 'A Lesson from the Right-Wing Populists' Book' Germany's new interior minister touched off controversy within hours of taking office when he said that Islam did not historically "belong" to Germany, causing Muslim groups to react furiously. On Monday, editorialists wonder whether the comments were inspired by upcoming elections. Hans-Peter Friedrich only assumed the office of German interior minister last week. But he didn't waste much time before sparking off an emotive debate. "To say that Islam belongs in Germany is not a fact supported by history," the politician, who belongs to the conservative Bavarian party the Christian Social Union, said in his first press conference as minister. The comment was a repeat of earlier criticism he had made of an October 2010 statement by German President Christian Wulff, who famously said that "Islam also belongs to Germany." Representatives of Germany Muslim population were outraged. Lamya Kaddor, chairwoman of the Liberal-Islamic Union in Germany, called Friedrich's remarks a "slap in the face of Muslims." Over the weekend, Friedrich moved to limit the damage, saying that he aimed to bring "society together and not polarize it." But most German editorial writers on Monday reject the politician's outspoken stance. Some said his remarks were a strategic move to corner a slice of the immigration- skeptic vote, ahead of a big election year in Germany. The center-left Süddeutsche Zeitung writes: "Islam doesn't belong in Germany? The mistake lies in the word 'belongs'. Although Islam's influence over German history was slim, you cannot say that Islam is not a part of the country now, with more than 2,000 mosques in Germany. To separate Muslims from Islam, as Friedrich does, makes as much sense as to say that Germany wants to be a world champion exporter but does not accept globalization." "But the experienced politician's selection of such harsh words at the start of his new job as minister was clearly a calculated move. He can use his new office to lure all those sympathizers of (Islam critic) Thilo Sarrazin and other citizens who are suspicious of Islam, binding them to the conservatives. As a politician from the CSU who has previously aired similar sentiments, he is more convincing than his predecessor Thomas de Maizière (a member of Merkel's Christian Democratic Union, the CSU's sister party). In 2011, the so-called super election year (when a total of seven state elections are being held), that fact should not be underestimated." The conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung writes: "It would benefit the debate to finally stop using phrases like that used by the president. Islam's expansion across Central Europe is a turning point which is too important to be summed up in a 'belong/doesn't belong' dichotomy. Whoever supports the integration of Muslims in Germany -- and who would dare to express support for the alternative? -- 284 should be interested in incorporating Islam into the law governing the relationship between church and state. If a legal format can be found which is attractive to both parties, then maybe people will no longer need to pay grudging lip service (to the idea)." The left-leaning Berlin daily Tagesspiegel writes: "Now Hans-Peter Friedrich has said that history does not 'support' that Islam belongs to Germany. He is right. Germans would be what they are now, even without Islam. German President Christian Wulff, on the other hand, said in his speech to mark the anniversary of German reunification that 'Islam now belongs to Germany.' Wulff is also right. No one can dispute that millions of Muslims live in Germany and influence the culture of the country." "But the two sentences do not contradict one another. Neither Friedrich nor Wulff included a value judgement in their statements, such as: 'It is good that Islam historically did not belong/now belongs to Germany.' In that way, the current heated controversy reveals itself to be a storm in a teacup." The left-leaning Frankfurter Rundschau writes: "The new interior minister is not a right-wing extremist but he should be careful which political tools he adopts." "He did not address his comment to a history seminar, but rather to a press conference to mark his assumption of his new office. If he does not realize which prejudice he is playing to, he would be a very poor politician. He tried to make amends for his remarks by referring to his own Turkish relations (he has a Turkish sister in-law) and the fact he regularly participates in fast-breaking meals (during Ramadan). It is as if he has taken a lesson from the right-wing populists' textbook." -- Jess Smee URL: http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,749449,00.html RELATED SPIEGEL ONLINE LINKS: • The World from Berlin: 'Germans Have to Distinguish between Muslims and Murderers' (03/04/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,749173,00.html • Merkel's Cabinet Restructuring: Bavarian Party Wins Despite Loss of Guttenberg (03/02/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,748691,00.html • Debating Integration: Competing Views on Germany's Immigrants (02/25/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,747239,00.html • The World from Berlin: 'Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan Wants to Be the Father' (03/01/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,748379,00.html • The World from Berlin: Merkel's Rhetoric in Integration Debate is 'Inexcusable' (10/18/2010) http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,723702,00.html • The World From Berlin: 'Integration Is the Second German Unification' (10/04/2010) http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,721119,00.html

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March 7, 2011 Libyan Closure By ROGER COHEN LONDON — There’s a video of Dr. Alia Brahimi of the London School of Economics greeting Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi as “Brother Leader” at the school three months ago, and presenting him with an L.S.E. cap — a tradition, she says, that started when the cap was handed to Nelson Mandela. It may be possible to sink to greater depths but right now I can’t think how. Sir Howard Davies, the director of the L.S.E., had the decency to resign over the school’s financial links to Qaddafi and his own misjudgments. If only the L.S.E. were an isolated case. The Arab Spring is also a Western Winter. I’m glad the United States and Europe have gotten behind the Bahrain-to-Benghazi awakening. But I’ve not heard enough self-criticism. Hearings should be held in the U.S. Congress and throughout Western legislatures on these questions: How did we back, use and encourage the brutality of Arab dictators over so many years? To what degree did that cynical encouragement of despots foster the very jihadist rage Western societies sought to curb? The West has long known what the likes of Qaddafi and Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak did. Hisham Matar, the acclaimed Libyan novelist, has a new novel out called “Anatomy of a Disappearance.” His father, Jaballa, disappeared in 1990, abducted from his Cairo apartment by Egyptian security agents who handed him over to Libya. For more than a decade there has been no trace of this cultured man, a former diplomat last seen in Tripoli’s notorious Abu Salim prison. His crime was belief in democracy and freedom. He has vanished leaving a fine novelist aching for closure, demanding — if his father is dead — “to know how, where and when it happened.” There you have the Cairo-Tripoli axis. They were useful, Mubarak and Qaddafi, for intelligence and renditions and a cold Israeli peace in the case of the Egyptian; for oil and gas in the case of the Libyan. They were also killers. Disappear is a transitive verb for dictators. That’s what they do to foes, disappear them in the night for questioning that becomes a nameless forever. No law governs these captives’ fate. They vanish — and then they are tossed into mass graves. Qaddafi massacred over 1,000 political prisoners at Abu Salim in June 1996. Was Jaballa Matar among them? It’s important to have names. The skulls in the sand were once sentient beings who screamed for justice.

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The entire Western world has been complicit in the pain of Hisham Matar, whose first novel “In the Country of Men” was shortlisted for the Man Booker Prize. The West has embraced every Arab dictator now being toppled by the people they starved of rights and life itself. Matar told The New Yorker this was “an appropriate moment for Americans to reflect on how they have for three decades allowed their elected officials to support a dictatorship as ruthless as Mubarak’s. To ask, for example, what are the reasons that have motivated the current vice president of the United States to say, as recently as Jan. 27, that Mubarak is no dictator.” I think Joseph Biden might answer that question. There are many reasons I oppose a Western military intervention in Libya: the bitter experience of Iraq; the importance of these Arab liberation movements being homegrown; the ease of going in and difficulty of getting out; the accusations of Western pursuit of oil that will poison the terrain; the fact that two Western wars in Muslim countries are enough. But the deepest reason is the moral bankruptcy of the West with respect to the Arab world. Arabs have no need of U.S. or European soldiers as they seek the freedom that America and the European Union were content to deny them. Qaddafi can be undermined without Western military intervention. He cannot prevail: Some officer will eventually make that plain. Timothy Garton Ash, in his book “Facts are Subversive,” quotes the Polish poet Czeslaw Milosz who wrote: Do not feel safe. The poet remembers. You may kill him — another will be born. Deeds and words shall be recorded. Yes, the poet remembers, and Qaddafi’s deeds — his crimes — will be recorded. One day we will know what befell Jaballa Matar and the numberless dead. I just watched Mohamed Al-Daradji’s powerful movie, “Son of Babylon,” in which an Iraqi Kurdish woman looks in vain for her son, disappeared in 1991 by Saddam Hussein. At one point she says, “I’ve been searching the prisons and now I’m searching the graves.” Let’s put names to the dead, dates to the crimes, and details to our complicity. I know the world is unjust: Nobody made a big fuss about Dr. Brahimi’s words three months ago. All the more reason to be severe in assessing lessons learned. In his new novel, Matar’s chief protagonist observes, “There are times when my father’s absence is as heavy as a child sitting on my chest.” He searches — “Everything and everyone, existence itself, has become an evocation, a possibility for resemblance.” The foul Libyan regime that knows the answer must fall for the truth to be known. Closure time has come. You can follow Roger Cohen on Twitter at twitter.com/nytimescohen . ROGER COHEN Libyan Closure March 7, 2011 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/08/opinion/08iht- edcohen08.html?_r=1&nl=todaysheadlines&emc=tha212

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March 7, 2011 Flailing After Muslims By BOB HERBERT It has often been the case in America that specific religions, races and ethnic groups have been singled out for discrimination, demonization, incarceration and worse. But there have always been people willing to stand up boldly and courageously against such injustice. Their efforts are needed again now. Representative Peter King, a Republican from Long Island, appears to harbor a fierce unhappiness with the Muslim community in the United States. As the chairman of the powerful Homeland Security Committee, Congressman King has all the clout he needs to act on his displeasure. On Thursday, he plans to open the first of a series of committee hearings into the threat of homegrown Islamic terrorism and the bogus allegation that American Muslims have failed to cooperate with law enforcement efforts to foil terrorist plots. “There is a real threat to the country from the Muslim community,” he said, “and the only way to get to the bottom of it is to investigate what is happening.” That kind of sweeping statement from a major government official about a religious minority — soon to be backed up by the intimidating aura of Congressional hearings — can only serve to further demonize a group of Americans already being pummeled by bigotry and vicious stereotyping. Rabbi Marc Schneier, the president of the Foundation for Ethnic Understanding, was among some 500 people at a rally in Times Square on Sunday that was called to protest Mr. King’s hearings. “To single out Muslim-Americans as the source of homegrown terrorism,” he said, “and not examine all forms of violence motivated by extremist belief — that, my friends, is an injustice.” To focus an investigative spotlight on an entire religious or ethnic community is a violation of everything America is supposed to stand for. But that does not seem to concern Mr. King. “The threat is coming from the Muslim community,” he told The Times. “The radicalization attempts are directed at the Muslim community. Why should I investigate other communities?” The great danger of these hearings, in addition to undermining fundamental American values, is that for no good reason — nearly a decade after the terrible attacks of Sept. 11, 2001 — they will intensify the already overheated anti-Muslim feeling in the U.S. There is nothing wrong with the relentless investigation of terrorism. That’s essential. But that is not the same as singling out, stereotyping and harassing an entire community. On Monday, I spoke by phone with Colleen Kelly, a nurse practitioner from the Bronx whose brother, William Kelly Jr., was killed in the attack on the World Trade Center. She belongs to a group called September 11th Families for Peaceful Tomorrows and is

288 opposed to Mr. King’s hearings. “I was trying to figure out why he’s doing this,” she said, “and I haven’t come up with a good answer.” She recalled how people were stigmatized in the early years of the AIDS epidemic and the way that stigmas become the focus of attention and get in the way of the efforts really needed to avert tragedy. Mr. King’s contention that Muslims are not cooperating with law enforcement is just wrong. According to the Triangle Center on Terrorism and Homeland Security, an independent research group affiliated with Duke University and the University of North Carolina, 48 of the 120 Muslims suspected of plotting terror attacks in the U.S. since Sept. 11, 2001, were turned in by fellow Muslims. In some cases, they were turned in by parents or other relatives. What are we doing? Do we want to demonize innocent people and trample on America’s precious freedom of religion? Or do we want to stop terrorism? There is no real rhyme or reason to Congressman King’s incoherent flailing after Muslims. Witch hunts, after all, are about seeing what kind of ugliness might fortuitously turn up. Mr. King was able to concoct the anti-Muslim ugliness in his 2004 novel, “Vale of Tears,” in which New York is hit yet again by terrorists and, surprise, the hero of the piece is a congressman from Long Island. But this is real life, and the congressman’s fantasies should not apply. America should be better than this. We’ve had all the requisite lessons: Joe McCarthy, the House Un-American Activities Committee, the demonization of blacks and Jews, the internment of Japanese-Americans, and on and on and on. It’s such a tired and ugly refrain. When I asked Colleen Kelly why she spoke up, she said it was because of her great love for her country. “I love being an American, and I really try to be thankful for all the gifts that come with that,” she said. But with gifts and privileges come responsibilities. The planned hearings into the Muslim community struck Ms. Kelly as something too far outside “the basic principles that I knew and felt to be important to me as a citizen of this country.” BOB HERBERT Flailing After Muslims March 7, 2011 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/08/opinion/08herbert.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc =tha212

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http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ce4771f8-48f5-11e0-af8c- 00144feab49a.html#ixzz1G0ht9LNJ Fiction is a route to political truth By Gideon Rachman Published: March 7 2011 22:34 | Last updated: March 7 2011 22:34

If you want to understand 19th-century Russia would you do better to read a history book, or to read War and Peace? The history would give you the facts. But the Tolstoy might provide a more profound understanding. EDITOR’S CHOICE: Michael Skapinker: Companies need to draw a line in the sand - Mar-07 Editorial Comment: A right royal mess - Mar-07 Hague defends ‘farcical’ Libya mission - Mar-07 Pressure grows on Obama to provide assistance - Mar-07 Philip Stephens: A lucrative business in washing reputations - Mar-07 Anti-regime forces release UK troops - Mar-06 Even when it comes to contemporary politics, fiction can sometimes provide a sharper insight than non-fiction. Hisham Matar’s taut and haunting novel, In The Country of Men, conveys the cruelty of Muammer Gaddafi’s Libya far more effectively than any newspaper. In recent years, western journalists have been tempted to treat Colonel Gaddafi as a dictator out of a comic opera – with his ludicrous uniforms, ranting speeches and what a WikiLeaks cable described as his “voluptuous Ukrainian nurse”. Reading In The Country of Men is a sharp reminder that Col Gaddafi’s Libya is a tragedy, not a comedy. It captures the suffocating fear of living under the Libyan dictatorship: the betrayals, the arrests, the torture, the warping of human relationships. Mr Matar’s father, a Libyan dissident and former diplomat, disappeared in Cairo in 1990, and may still be alive inside Gaddafi’s prisons. His son’s novel was published in 2006 and short-listed for the Booker Prize, Britain’s top literary award.

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The fact that the book is set in 1979 is a sad reminder of how long Libya has suffered. One of the doomed democracy activists, plotting against the regime, insists: “It is our obligation to call injustice by its name.” The rebels who rose up in Benghazi and elsewhere must be saying and thinking similar things. Mr Matar himself is watching events from London, where he has just published a new novel, Anatomy of a Disappearance. The ability of fiction to convey injustice with a unique emotional power means that novels can change history. Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin stoked indignation about slavery in the years just before the American civil war. Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich became the defining account of the cruelty of the Soviet gulag. So what novels should the politically interested tourist pack today? If Mr Matar is the writer who has done most to convey the reality of Col Gaddafi’s Libya, then Alaa Al Aswany, the author of The Yacoubian Building (published in 2002) is the novelist who best captured the bubbling frustrations of Hosni Mubarak’s Egypt. While Mr Matar’s novel is tragic, Dr Aswany’s work is often darkly funny. But it paints a portrait of a country where people who try to advance through honest effort are thwarted and humiliated, while the corrupt and politically connected advance. Reading The Yacoubian Building, it is not hard to understand why Tahrir Square filled with angry young people, demanding change. Before reading In The Country of Men, the “political” novel that made the biggest impression on me this year was J.M. Coetzee’s Disgrace, which I read while visiting South Africa. Mr Coetzee is both a source of pride and irritation in his native land. He is a Nobel Prize-winner; but he is also an exile and an Afrikaner, whose work presents a bleak portrait of the “new South Africa”. Disgrace is a work of art, rather than a political tract – so it is wrong to draw a direct lesson from it. Even so, the novel does skewer some aspects of modern South Africa – in particular the paralysing fear of crime and the hold that political correctness has on its newly reformed universities. A novel that made me rethink some of my assumptions about modern India was Aravind Adiga’s The White Tiger. Like many foreign journalists I was attached to a few clichés about the country: booming economy, world’s largest democracy, fine tradition of the rule of law. Mr Adiga’s book reveals the brutality, lawlessness and exploitation of the poor than often lie behind these glossy slogans. It does what fiction can often do much more effectively than journalism – dramatise the stories of the powerless. Fiction’s ability to give a voice to the voiceless explains why it sometimes needs a novel to convey why Egypt and Libya were on the point of revolution, or to help explain why India is still afflicted by Maoist rebellions, in spite of growth rates of 8-9 per cent a year. Knowing this, I sometimes ask friends overseas what decent novels have recently been published in their part of the world. A Russian colleague recently informed me that the country of Tolstoy and Chekhov is no longer producing great literature. Putin’s Russia is, apparently, stronger on crime thrillers. Colleagues in China have told me to watch out for A Civil Servant’s Notebook by Wang Xiaofang, which will be published in English later this year. Mr Wang is a former civil servant whose racy potboilers chronicling official corruption have proved hugely popular at home. The issues raised are also relevant to the many foreign businessmen who have to work in a Chinese

291 system they barely understand – but that demands moral compromises that can be avoided at home. That is a story whose moral extends beyond China. One hopes that some of the naive professors and not-so-naive businessmen who rushed to do business with Col Gaddafi would have hesitated if they had first read In The Country of Men. Sometimes fiction can be the best route to the facts. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ce4771f8-48f5-11e0-af8c- 00144feab49a.html#axzz1G0gtKHbK

COMMENT http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d0684dea-48f5-11e0-af8c- 00144feab49a.html#ixzz1G0iZMIEA Companies need to draw a line in the sand By Michael Skapinker Published: March 7 2011 20:25 | Last updated: March 7 2011 20:25 Tony Blair, the London School of Economics, Vodafone. Revolutions in the Middle East are forcing many to account for relationships with dictators whose powers are now shaken or shattered. Few organisations of any reach are immune. If you did business only with democracies much of the world would be closed to you. I, it turned out, was partly employed by Muammer Gaddafi. The Libyan Investment Authority had accumulated a 3.27 per cent stake in Pearson, which owns the Financial Times. Following the recent UN sanctions resolution and the UK government order against Libya, Pearson froze the shares and announced it would not pay dividends to the fund. EDITOR’S CHOICE: Gideon Rachman: Fiction is a route to political truth - Mar-07 Editorial Comment: A right royal mess - Mar-07 Hague defends ‘farcical’ Libya mission - Mar-07 Pressure grows on Obama to provide assistance - Mar-07 Philip Stephens: A lucrative business in washing reputations - Mar-07 Anti-regime forces release UK troops - Mar-06 Dame Marjorie Scardino, Pearson’s chief executive, said it was “pretty abhorrent” that the Libyan authority had been able to buy the stake but added: “We don’t choose our shareholders, they choose us, so there is a very limited amount of things we can do.” That is true. Publicly listed companies cannot select their shareholders and businesses often can’t choose their customers, especially if they are in consumer industries. If repressive rulers want to buy your cars or mobile phones, it is hard to stop them. Even when you can choose your customers – if you are, say, a road or railway builder or a supplier of machinery to a local factory – there are often plausible arguments for doing business in nasty places. Economic development and better communications often drive political reform. Local employers may pay less than you. If you don’t do the business, someone less savoury will.

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But how far do you go? Do you train professionals and public employees, as the LSE agreed to do in Libya? The principled line says not; the pragmatic (and not necessarily unprincipled) one says it is fine as long as you use the opportunity to persuade your students of democracy’s virtues. You could argue that, at the very least, companies should not become agents of repression themselves. When Beijing demanded that Google censor its content in China, the company (motto: “Don’t be evil”) decided to comply on the grounds that it was better to give the Chinese people something rather than nothing. Last year, having had enough, it decided to offer Chinese users the option of using an uncensored site in Hong Kong. There have been consequences; in the wake of the move, Google’s market share in China fell but Beijing did renew its internet content provider licence. More serious was the case of Yahoo. In 2007, the internet company reached an out-of- court settlement with the families of two pro-democracy Chinese journalists after they were both jailed for 10 years. Yahoo, which later apologised, had identified their online activities to the authorities. When this year’s revolt against Hosni Mubarak’s regime reached its height, Vodafone, the UK mobile phone operator, struggled with the consequences. Instructed by the Egyptian government to shut down its network, an essential tool for the protesters, it complied. Once service was restored, the regime used the network to send out propaganda messages. Vodafone defended itself, saying it had protested to the Egyptian government at having to convey its announcements, adding: “These messages are not scripted by any of the mobile network operators. We have made clear that all messages should be transparent and clearly attributable to the originator.” Vodafone said that if it had not shut down the network, the authorities could have done so themselves – and it would then have taken longer to restore the service. Vodafone was also worried about the safety of its Egyptian employees if it had not complied. The last point is a particularly serious one. But with the regime tottering, and for the sake of Vodafone’s reputation, wouldn’t it have been better to have let the government shut down the network itself? Few companies always get it right. The battle for corporate principle is one you fight every day but it is easier when you have a firm idea of the line your company will not cross. Every organisation needs its own sense of where that line is. It might be that it will never be complicit in torture or act in a way that will put regime opponents at risk or, as Vodafone argued, that it will put its employees’ safety first. One thing all organisations doing business with bad people should ask is this: how will we explain ourselves if the regime falls? Because the lesson of recent weeks is that you may have to. The desire for freedom is universal and no dictatorship, anywhere, is impregnable. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d0684dea-48f5-11e0-af8c- 00144feab49a.html#axzz1G0gtKHbK

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http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d81be182-48ff-11e0-af8c- 00144feab49a.html#ixzz1G0gxqFvJ China presses case for Libya sanctions By Daniel Dombey in Washington and Peter Spiegel in Brussels Published: March 7 2011 21:21 | Last updated: March 7 2011 23:46 China has stressed the need to implement sanctions agreed at the United Nations against Libya and has not opposed plans to implement a no-fly zone over the oil-rich country. Beijing said on Tuesday it would urge countries “to settle the conflict and calm the situation through dialogue and other peaceful means”, according to Jiang Yu, a foreign ministry spokeswoman. EDITOR’S CHOICE Gaddafi battles to retake oil terminal - Mar-08; Gideon Rachman: Fiction a route to political truth - Mar-07 In pictures: Libyan fighting - Mar- 07 In depth: Middle East protests - Feb-27 UN seeks $160m to help refugees - Mar-07 Diplomats put focus on rebel leadership - Mar-07 The announcement is likely to encourage western planners who are stepping up preparations for a no-fly zone. Ivo Daalder, US ambassador to Nato, said on Monday the alliance could impose such a measure by the end of the week, although he added that the US would also seek a UN security council resolution. Ms Jiang said Chinese support in the security council for action beyond sanctions “depends on whether it helps Libya to return to stability as soon as possible”. She added: “In the decision-making process, we believe, Libya’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence should be respected,” Britain and France have already started work on a draft UN resolution but are expected to put it forward only if conditions on the ground worsen. Mr Daalder also said on Monday that Nato would use its fleet of Awacs aircraft to provide 24-hour surveillance of air, ground and sea movements in and near Libya. Previously, they flew for 10 hours a day. He added that Nato military planners would finish work on possibilities for a no-fly zone over the next day or so, ahead of a gathering of the alliance’s defence ministers on Thursday. “We could be in a position to make a decision,” he said of the meeting. “I have no idea whether we, in fact, would make a decision.” The new push on a no-fly zone, an idea that last week faced considerable resistance both internationally and from the US military, follows mounting concern in Washington and elsewhere that Muammer Gaddafi may be making headway against rebels. But Mr Daalder cautioned that while a no-fly zone could be effective against Libyan fighter jets, it would have limited impact against helicopters or ground forces, arguing that Colonel Gaddafi’s air attacks had declined in recent days. 294

“Even if it were to be established, it isn’t really going to impact what is happening there today,” he said. “That doesn’t mean we shouldn’t look at it.” President Barack Obama has instructed officials to ensure the US has “full capacity to act” if the situation deteriorated into a bigger humanitarian crisis. William Hague, Britain’s foreign secretary, said any UN resolution on a no-fly zone would make clear “the need for regional support, a clear trigger for such a resolution and an appropriate legal basis”. On Monday the six Persian Gulf states of the Gulf Cooperation Council called on the UN to impose a no-fly zone to protect civilians, the group’s secretary-general, Abdul Rahman Al Attiyah, said in Abu Dhabi after a meeting. Russia and China, both of which wield vetoes, are likely to oppose any such move. Even within Nato, which operates on the basis of consensus, Turkey has spelt out its opposition to a no-fly zone. But Mr Obama, who on Monday highlighted Nato’s work on “potential military options”, is facing bipartisan pressure from Congress to help the rebels. Administration officials point out that a UN arms embargo makes supplying the rebels with weapons illegal. But congressional aides say Mr Obama’s demand that Col Gaddafi leave office means the US must do much more. The Senate has unanimously called for further UN action, including possibly a no-fly zone. Along with other members of Congress, John Kerry, chairman of the Senate foreign relations committee, has called on the US to “prepare a no-fly zone in conjunction with our allies” to increase pressure on Tripoli. Additional reporting by Alex Barker in London and Harvey Morris at the United Nations Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2011. You may share using our article tools. Please don't cut articles from FT.com and redistribute by email or post to the web. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d81be182-48ff-11e0-af8c- 00144feab49a.html#axzz1G0gtKHbK

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Martes, 8/3/2011, 12:18 h Los internautas preguntan a Enric González Enric González

Enric González Revueltas en el mundo islámico Martes, 08 de Marzo de 2011 de 11:30 a 12:30 2011 puede considerarse ya como el año de las revueltas, por el movimiento iniciado en el mundo árabe e islámico en lucha por la dignidad y la democracia. Enric González, corresponsal de EL PAÍS en Jerusalén y uno de los periodistas que ha cubierto la revolución en Egipto, donde se encuentra en estos momentos, está charlando EN DIRECTO con los lectores sobre este movimiento cívico y sus posibles consecuencias. Esta revolución es por dignidad - Blog Fronteras Movedizas Ahora en directo Morgan 1. 08/03/2011 - 11:39h. ¿Cree que es conveniente que EEUU intervenga unilateralmente en Libia? Mi conexión con Internet es tan poco fiable como las promesas de Gadafi. Espero que la cosa vaya funcionando. No, no creo conveniente una intervención unilateral. Tampoco una intervención directa de la OTAN. Lo que estamos viendo es feo, pero podríamos afearlo aún más.

Alexis 2. 08/03/2011 - 11:41h. Hola muy buenas tardes ¿Considera que la mano de Bin Laden está, de alguna manera, detrás de todo esto, como dicen algunos? Muchas Gracias Absolutamente no.

María Die Rote 3. 08/03/2011 - 11:44h.

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Las revoluciones por la dignidad son absolutamente necesarias, pero ¿qué ocurre después con los desplazados y los permanentemente empobrecidos? Los permanentemente empobrecidos los tenemos ya. Y los desplazados son inevitables de una forma u otra. Usted se refiere probablemente a los desplazados libios. La población egipcia crece a un ritmo cercano a los dos millones anuales y la economía egipcia, por mucho que mejore, no puede mantener en condiciones dignas a esa población. Muchos egipcios están desplazados en su propia casa.

Alicia 4. 08/03/2011 - 11:46h. Teniendo en cuenta que el régimen colaboracionista de Mubarak con Israel ha caído, ¿crees que pronto veremos al nuevo presidente egipcio levantando el bloqueo ilegal a Gaza? ¿Qué otras consecuencias podría conllevar la democratización de Egipto a sus vecinos palestinos? Respondo a esta pregunta por segunda vez; temo que antes ha habido algún problema. Espero que el levantamiento del bloqueo egipcio ocurra mucho antes de la elección presidencial. Eso aliviaría la situación de los palestinos de Gaza, pero no creo que la cambiara sustancialmente.

María Cruz 5. 08/03/2011 - 11:50h. Ahora que está en Oriente Próximo ¿ha cambiado su opinión sobre el conflicto palestino-israelí? Uno intenta aprender cada día. Mi opinión no ha cambiado de una forma radical, pero sí se ha modificado. Ahora me siento más predispuesto a tolerar los errores palestinos y menos predispuesto a tolerar los errores israelíes. Contemplar la injusticia de forma cotidiana tiene sus efectos. Israel tiene derecho a existir en paz. Ocurre, sin embargo, que tiene que poner algo más de su parte. carlos 6. 08/03/2011 - 11:51h. Hola, ¿no ha habido demasiado optimismo en las primeras semanas de la revuelta? No entiendo cómo Obama, Merkel y cia salen a dar ánimos sabiendo que los rebeldes solo tienen 4 fusiles. Demasiado optimismo, demasiada confusión, demasiado interés en el petróleo. Quienes ahora abominan de Gadafi le abrazaban hace muy poco tiempo.

Diego 7. 08/03/2011 - 11:53h. Buenos días. ¿De verdad se puede equiparar estas revueltas con lo que supuso la revolución francesa para el mundo occidental?y si es así ¿avista algún Napoleón? Son cosas completamente distintas. Francia era uno de los países más avanzados del mundo. Eso no puede decirse de ningún país árabe. Aquí se intenta sobre todo recuperar el tiempo perdido.

Mujeres 8. 08/03/2011 - 11:56h. Hoy que es el Día de la Mujer, ¿cuál es su experiencia con las mujeres árabes? ¿qué opinión tiene de su papel en la sociedad? La posición de la mujer empieza a mejorar en las grandes ciudades egipcias. También en algunos ámbitos palestinos. Sólo empieza. Falta mucho. En el ámbito rural falta todo. Por eso resultaba casi embriagador el ambiente en la plaza de Tahrir: porque mostraba cómo podrían llegar a ser las cosas.

Alicia 9. 08/03/2011 - 12:00h. ¿Ha cambiado su concepción del mundo árabe desde que se iniciaron estas revueltas?

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No especialmente. Lo que está cambiando es la percepción que el mundo árabe tiene de sí mismo.

Paul Atraides 10. 08/03/2011 - 12:04h. ¿Se puede hablar de dictaduras o, más bien, de democracias "de baja intensidad" durante los mandatos de los presidentes Ben Ali en Túnez y Mubarak en Egipto? En Túnez y Egipto no existía ningún tipo de democracia. Egipto vive ahora bajo una absoluta dictadura militar y han mejorado algo las perspectivas, lo que da una idea de la situación anterior.

Carlos 11. 08/03/2011 - 12:09h. Si no estás de acuerdo con una intervención armada en Libia para detener a Gaddafi, ¿Qué medidas alternativas podrían tomarse? Garcias Enric Lo malo de los problemas que se dejan pudrir durante décadas es que carecen de solución rápida. Si redujéramos nuestra adicción al petróleo haríamos ya mucho. La cuestión básica es: ¿qué credibilidad tenemos (los de siempre, los países consumidores) para intervenir? Hay que ayudar a los refugiados, hay que aplicar presión diplomática y comercial y hay que tener un estómago fuerte para contemplar el colapso de lo que hemos ayudado a crear.

Rosaisais 12. 08/03/2011 - 12:11h. ¿Cree que estas revueltas puedan llegar a Jordania y Siria? Creo que sí. El régimen sirio es responsable de la matanza de Hama, en 1982, y resulta indefendible se mire como se mire. Ojalá las cosas cambien en Siria. En Jordania hay tensiones, pero la vida allí parece mucho más soportable.

Harpo 13. 08/03/2011 - 12:13h. Hola Enric, visto desde fuera parece que estamos ante un momento historico, desde dentro, ¿crees que los ciudadanos sienten también el "peso" de la historia o más bien sobreviven y ven los acontecimiento con cierta distancia como algo más de lo cotidiano? Muchas gracias. Segundo intento con esta pregunta. Los egipcios sienten un enorme orgullo por lo que han hecho y están haciendo, tras muchísimo tiempo, siglos, de humillación continua. Eso no es un peso, sino un impulso. La trascendencia de lo que ocurre se percibe en todas partes.

Jose 14. 08/03/2011 - 12:20h. ¿Qué posición están adoptando los líderes islámicos ante las revueltas? ¿De prudente espera o de activismo en primera fila de las revueltas? Me parece que los líderes islámicos están tan desconcertados como el resto del mundo.

María José 15. 08/03/2011 - 12:22h. ¿Qué tiene que decir sobre el papel de Internet y las redes sociales en estas revoluciones? A la vista de cómo funciona hoy Internet, parece aún más milagroso que unos cuantos cientos de jóvenes egipcios pudieran organizar la manifestación del 25 de enero a través de las redes sociales.

Víctor 16. 08/03/2011 - 12:25h. ¿Qué cree que piensan los árabes de la (no) reacción de Occidente?

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En general, creo que los árabes sólo esperan de Occidente que deje de interferir, que no se incline de forma tan humilde ante los intereses de Israel, que piense que en los países petroleros viven personas.

Pepe1964 17. 08/03/2011 - 12:26h. ¿Cómo viven y qué sentirán los israelitas con todo este "mayo francés" en el mundo islámico? Esta pregunta reaparece continuamente. Disculpen si la contesto demasiadas veces. Hay israelíes que ven este "mayo" con tanta esperanza como los árabes. La casta militar y política que domina el país siente un claro temor ante los cambios en el entorno.

María 18. 08/03/2011 - 12:28h. ¿Qué poso le deja la revolución egipcia, que ha estado cubriendo? He visto pocos acontecimientos tan hermosos. Habrá complicaciones, quizá desastres, pero lo ocurrido es imborrable.

Jonathan 19. 08/03/2011 - 12:30h. ¿Cuál cree que será el siguiente país árabe en unirse a las revoluciones? Ni idea. Pero creo que esto es una onda de largo alcance. Durará años. Puede parecer que el impulso se apaga y reiniciarse al cabo de meses.

Mensaje de despedida Espero que haya llegado alguna respuesta. Las condiciones no han sido las mejores. Muchas gracias por la paciencia, y hasta la próxima. http://www.elpais.com/edigitales/entrevista.html?encuentro=7771

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Ola de cambio en el mundo árabe - Guerra civil en Libia El temor a la derrota inquieta a Bengasi Los bombardeos y el avance terrestre de las fuerzas de Gadafi rebajan la euforia en las filas opositoras - La falta de suministros es notoria en las ciudades sublevadas JUAN MIGUEL MUÑOZ (ENVIADO ESPECIAL) - Bengasi - 08/03/2011 El devenir de la guerra en Libia es imprevisible y puede enfangarse por un sinfín de circunstancias políticas y militares. Pero los acontecimientos desde el domingo han suscitado evidente temor entre los 670.000 vecinos de Bengasi, la capital de la revuelta en la oriental región de Cirenaica, porque la aviación y los soldados de Muamar el Gadafi lograron frenar el avance rebelde. El devenir de la guerra en Libia es imprevisible y puede enfangarse por un sinfín de circunstancias políticas y militares. Pero los acontecimientos desde el domingo han suscitado evidente temor entre los 670.000 vecinos de Bengasi, la capital de la revuelta en la oriental región de Cirenaica, porque la aviación y los soldados de Muamar el Gadafi lograron frenar el avance rebelde. Inquieta sobremanera a los dirigentes políticos de la insurgencia que el dictador ordene el bombardeo de instalaciones petroleras de un país que exportaba 1,7 millones de barriles de crudo al día y que vive sumido en el caos. Los cazas libios bombardearon ayer por segunda vez las inmediaciones del puerto petrolífero de Ras Lanuf, en el este del país y bajo precario control de los rebeldes. "Había un avión, disparó dos cohetes y no hubo muertos", indicó Mojtar Dobrug, un combatiente rebelde que fue testigo del bombardeo, a la agencia Reuters. La aviación también atacó las inmediaciones de puestos de control de los sublevados en Ajdabiya, más cerca de Bengasi. Mientras se intensifican los ataques aéreos, los buques petroleros apenas pueden atracar para cargar sus depósitos; los alimentos llegan a Libia oriental por la frontera con Egipto, pero cierta escasez de productos es notoria porque el país ha paralizado casi toda actividad económica; los bancos apenas funcionan y las colas para extraer dinero son cotidianas. Aunque la zona dominada por los insurrectos y el Consejo Nacional cuenta con tres grandes puertos (Bengasi, Tobruk y Darna), los cargueros no arriban a sus muelles. Las autoridades en Bengasi claman por un reconocimiento inmediato y formal de su legitimidad. Aún sin éxito. "Occidente tiene que moverse o este lunático hará algo en los campos petrolíferos. Es como un lobo herido. Si los países occidentales no lanzan ataques aéreos contra las tropas de Gadafi puede dejar los pozos inoperativos durante mucho tiempo", declaraba a este diario Mustafá Gheriani, portavoz del Consejo Nacional libio, un Gobierno provisional que está desbordado por la situación. "Si la comunidad internacional no establece una zona de exclusión aérea, Gadafi no va a rendirse", añadió Gheriani, que admitió la imposibilidad de reabrir el aeropuerto de Bengasi porque no hay compañía dispuesta hacerse cargo de los seguros aéreos. El domingo, los militares y mercenarios de Gadafi detuvieron el ímpetu de los 17.000 insurrectos que luchan en la zona de Ras Lanuf y Bin Jauad, a unos 400 kilómetros de Bengasi y a 600 de Trípoli. Y esa noche grupos de jóvenes discutían dos alternativas: o partir al frente o permanecer para defender Bengasi. Los insurgentes son todo voluntad.

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Pero la anarquía es también una de sus señas de identidad. Ni tienen táctica, ni jefes que pongan orden, ni potencia de fuego frente a unos uniformados que dominan a su antojo el espacio aéreo. Así que la guerra se empantanó ayer en las cercanías de Ras Lanuf, sede de enormes instalaciones petroleras. Las terminales de esta pequeña ciudad y de la cercana Brega fueron cerrados. Anoche, decenas de familias abandonaron estos pueblos para buscar refugio en Bengasi. La euforia inicial de una rápida victoria sobre las fuerzas del dictador comienza a desvanecerse. Tras 41 años de abusos, brutal represión, y arbitrariedades -Gadafi mandó arrancar hace años un gran árbol en una plaza de Bengasi porque era un símbolo de esta ciudad siempre rebelde-, nadie acaba de fiarse. En esta capital todas las puertas metálicas de los comercios son verdes, el color de la todavía bandera del país, el color de la revolución que derrocó al rey Idris en 1969. Solo unos pocos se han atrevido a añadir las bandas roja y negra a esas puertas para convertirlas en la enseña que hacen ondear los insurrectos. Pero el sátrapa también da muestras de nerviosismo. Ayer amenazó con desatar una avalancha de inmigración de africanos hacia Europa y su hijo Saadi advirtió de una horrible guerra si su padre abandona el poder. Nadie intuye qué se propone con la iniciativa que planteó ayer. Yadallah Azous al Talhi -ex primer ministro en los años ochenta y una personalidad que goza de respeto en el Consejo Nacional- ofreció un diálogo nacional para poner fin al derramamiento de sangre. ¿Se puede interpretar esta iniciativa como una señal de debilidad o desesperación? Con el dictador libio es de ilusos aventurar respuestas. Pero tenía que saber Gadafi que la respuesta iba a ser la que fue. Solo se negociará, afirmó el Consejo Nacional, sobre la base de que el tirano abandona el poder. De momento, se niega a arrojar la toalla. El déspota tunecino Zine el Abidine Ben Ali aguantó 29 días tras iniciarse las protestas. Mubarak soportó la presión 18 días desde la manifestación del 25 de enero. Gadafi ya resiste tres semanas. Aunque su aislamiento -incluso la Liga Árabe respaldó ayer la zona de exclusión aérea- es creciente en todos los planos. Inmigrantes africanos citados por Reuters aseguran que son perseguidos por los uniformados de Gadafi para obligarlos a combatir. Son recompensados con cientos de dólares. Si este reclutamiento forzoso es cierto, puede deducirse que el dictador afronta un problema: su capacidad de fuego es infinitamente mayor, pero carece de los suficientes soldados y mercenarios para luchar en todos los frentes en un país tan enorme -1,8 millones de kilómetros cuadrados- como despoblado: poco más de seis millones de habitantes, de los que dos eran trabajadores extranjeros. La situación de los insurrectos es la opuesta: sobran hombres, pero su armamento es escuálido. Gheriani trató de quitar hierro a la volátil coyuntura. "Hemos extraído lecciones de la revolución egipcia. También ellos lograron ciertas reivindicaciones, y después se tomaron un respiro. Gadafi desplaza sus tropas de una ciudad a otra. Tiene tanques y aviones, pero no suficientes soldados en tierra. Nuestra gente está preocupada porque los milicianos apenas tienen entrenamiento". http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/temor/derrota/inquieta/Bengasi/elpepiint/2 0110308elpepiint_1/Tes

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Ola de cambio en el mundo árabe - Las repercusiones en Europa La OTAN se prepara para poder intervenir en Libia El secretario general advierte de que la Alianza solo actuará si cuenta con mandato del Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU RICARDO MARTÍNEZ DE RITUERTO - Bruselas - 08/03/2011

La OTAN está preparándose para cualquier contingencia en Libia y para responder a cualquier demanda de actuación que le plantee la comunidad internacional, pero ahora mismo "no tiene intención de intervenir en Libia", asegura solemnemente el secretario general de la Alianza, Anders Fogh Rasmussen. La OTAN está preparándose para cualquier contingencia en Libia y para responder a cualquier demanda de actuación que le plantee la comunidad internacional, pero ahora mismo "no tiene intención de intervenir en Libia", asegura solemnemente el secretario general de la Alianza, Anders Fogh Rasmussen. "Trabajamos con la hipótesis de que un papel operativo lo será de acuerdo y en atención a un mandato del Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas". En no menos de cinco ocasiones repitió ayer Rasmussen que la OTAN solo intervendrá en Libia a instancias del Consejo de Seguridad. Si en la vertiente militar prima el esperar y ver, la UE se propone ampliar de inmediato la lista de sanciones al régimen del coronel Muamar el Gadafi para incluir a la Autoridad Libia de Inversiones, un fondo soberano con unos 70.000 millones de euros muy activo en Europa. Rasmussen recurrió ayer a fuertes calificativos para describir la situación en Libia, pero supeditó todo el potencial militar aliado a la voluntad de la comunidad internacional, de la ONU en primer lugar, pero también en coordinación con la UE, la Liga Árabe y la Unión Africana.

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"No me puedo imaginar que la comunidad internacional vaya a asistir pasivamente si Gadafi sigue atacando a su pueblo", declaró Rasmussen para humanizar su frío discurso de estricta observancia del derecho internacional. Y habló del "dilema" en que se encuentra la comunidad internacional: "Mucha gente parece pedir que se haga algo, pero somos muy sensibles ante lo que podría ser percibido como una intervención militar extranjera". Fuentes aliadas notan la fractura en la Alianza entre los partidarios de actuar, aunque solo sea para imponer una zona de exclusión aérea, encabezados por Estados Unidos y Reino Unido, y quienes recelan o se oponen, como Alemania o Turquía. Rasmussen considera que imponer "una zona de exclusión aérea sería claramente una operación militar, muy compleja y que implicaría un amplio abanico de recursos". Además, "no creemos que los sucesos constituyan una amenaza directa para la OTAN". La Alianza se mueve con pies de plomo en esta crisis, para no hacer saltar por los aires la trabajosa y delicada relación de confianza que lleva años intentando construir con siete países del Diálogo Mediterráneo (Argelia, Egipto, Israel, Jordania, Mauritania, Marruecos y Túnez) y cuatro del Golfo (Bahréin, Catar, Emiratos Árabes Unidos y Kuwait). De ahí el énfasis de Rasmussen en los contactos que mantiene para tratar de la situación con la Liga Árabe y con la Unión Africana. En cualquier caso, los responsables militares de la OTAN han recibido instrucciones de "planificar para todas las eventualidades, para estar preparados si se nos pide una actuación", enfatizó el secretario general. Qué enfoque dar a la crisis será debatido el jueves por los ministros de Defensa de la OTAN, el mismo día que los titulares de Exteriores de la Unión hablarán también en Bruselas sobre qué papel deben jugar los Veintisiete en el nuevo Mediterráneo meridional. Los jefes de las diplomacias europeas debatirán sobre la Asociación para la Democracia y la Prosperidad Compartida que hoy presentarán José Manuel Durão Barroso, presidente de la Comisión, y Catherine Ashton, coordinadora de la política exterior europea. El documento propone habilitar a través del Banco Europeo de Inversiones 6.000 millones de euros en los próximos tres años y sugiere que el Banco Europeo de Reconstrucción y Desarrollo amplíe su campo de actuación de la Europa central y oriental a la orilla sur del Mediterráneo. El documento servirá de base para la discusión y posterior declaración del Consejo Europeo extraordinario del viernes. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Gadafi/retoma/bombardeos/Libia/elpepuin t/20110308elpepuint_1/Tes Ola de cambio en el mundo árabe Guerra civil en Libia China aboga por el diálogo antes que cualquier intervención militar en Libia El ministro de Exteriores espera "un acuerdo de ambas partes para el restablecimiento de la paz".- La Organización de la Conferencia Islámica apoya la creación de una zona de exclusión aérea AGENCIAS - Pekín / Londres - 08/03/2011

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Mientras la OTAN se prepara para poder intervenir en Libia, China ha vuelto a mostrar su rechazo a cualquier intervención militar. Según ha asegurado hoy el Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, Jiang Yu, Pekín es reacio a actuar en el país magrebí y espera "un acuerdo de ambas partes para el restablecimiento de la paz". A pesar de haber condenado la violencia utilizada por el régimen de Muamar al Gadafi para sofocar las revueltas, el Gobierno chino confía en una restauración "de la estabilidad y el orden de manera pacífica". "La comunidad internacional debe apoyar la resolución 1970 (del Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU) y apostar por el diálogo y la paz como forma de resolver conflictos, así como garantizar el retorno de la estabilidad y el fin de la violencia", ha añadido. La postura de China es decisiva en esta cuestión puesto que Pekín cuenta con derecho a veto en el Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU, por lo que podría bloquear cualquier intervención. Reino Unido y Francia trabajan actualmente en la elaboración de un proyecto de resolución en el Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas para establecer una zona de exclusión área sobre Libia. La iniciativa franco-británica, en caso de seguir adelante, afronta un clima hostil en el seno del Consejo de Naciones Unidas, ya que además de China, también Rusia rechaza la intervención militar y EE UU tiene reticencias en implicarse militarmente en el conflicto libio. El Consejo de Seguridad impuso el pasado 26 de febrero sanciones económicas al régimen del dictador libio, Muamar el Gadafi, y pidió a la Corte Penal Internacional (CPI) que investigue la posible comisión de crímenes contra la Humanidad durante la represión de las protestas populares contra el Gobierno de Trípoli. La portavoz chino ha añadido que lo que debe primar en la actual situación libia es "asegurar la integridad de los ciudadanos, los cuales deben ser escuchados y respetados". A favor de la exclusión aérea La debilidad de los rebeldes ha acelerado los planes de intervención militar. Estados Unidos busca el apoyo de la ONU. A este bando se ha sumado el secretario general de la Organización de la Conferencia Islámica, Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu. El representante de la Conferencia Islámica ha "unido su voz a las voces que piden la creación de una zona de exclusión aérea en Libia", según informa la BBC. Durante una reunión de emergencia en Arabia Saudí de este organismo que agrupa a 56 países, Ihsanoglu ha pedido que "el Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU cumpla con sus obligaciones en esta materia". Por su parte, el Gobierno japonés ha aprobado este martes un paquete de sanciones contra el Gobierno libio, que incluyen la congelación de bienes y la prohibición de entrada a los máximos dirigentes del régimen, en conformidad con la resolución 1970 del Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU, según informó la agencia estatal de noticias, Kiodo. El Ejecutivo de Naoto Kan ha decidido, con efecto inmediato, congelar los bienes de Gadafi, y de otros cinco dirigentes, así como vetar la entrada en Japón de estos y de otros diez responsables del régimen. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/China/aboga/dialogo/cualquier/intervencio n/militar/Libia/elpepiint/20110308elpepuint_6/Tes

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U.S. offers aid for Egyptian democracy, but quietly By Kathy Lally and Mary Beth Sheridan Sunday, March 6, 2011; A14 CAIRO - For years, the United States tried to offer democracy-building help here but was thwarted by an Egyptian government that was committed to the opposite. Now that the old prohibitions have been swept away by revolution, Egyptians are desperate to build their democracy, and quickly. The United States has expertise to offer and money to help, but it must proceed more carefully than ever among a people wary of U.S. intentions. "Help from America can be misunderstood," said Tarek el-Malt, a spokesman for the al- Wasat political party, which has no real headquarters, no way to reach voters and no plans to ask for U.S. assistance. A high-powered delegation of U.S. officials visited Cairo last month to find ways to support the revolution. They, along with diplomatic and development officials, have been working quietly, meeting with residents, activists and the leadership, and asking how best to spend the $150 million that Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton has said would soon be available to help shore up the economy and provide technical assistance in the move toward democracy. By the time the U.S. delegation departed, no Egyptian pro-democracy organizations had asked for assistance. Egyptians are deeply ambivalent about help from America. State-run media have encouraged anti-foreign feelings, and most U.S. aid in the past has gone to the military, which many Egyptians have interpreted as unambivalent U.S. support for a regime that oppressed them. In an Internet exchange with Clinton on Feb. 23, Egyptian young people asked hard questions about U.S. support for the regime at the expense of the people. "We consistently spoke out for democracy," she said, suggesting that many of those conversations were private. A history of influence American organizations, among them the International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute, have worked here for years, despite the determined opposition of the Egyptian government. Both say the relationships they have built will make civic groups receptive to their offers of political expertise, such as training parties on honing a message and observers on monitoring elections. Neither organization has ever been granted official permission to operate here, although they have been asking the Egyptian government since 2006. Feeling stymied, the IRI circumvented the barrier over the past few years by taking aspiring politicians and activists, now numbering 1,000, to training seminars in nearby

305 countries or organizing tours for them to the United States. Participants were invariably punished for participating, pilloried in the media through campaigns organized by the government. Last year, the IRI invited promising candidates for parliament to its sessions. The elections turned out as rigged as ever and almost none of the candidates got on the ballot. The NDI worked quietly inside the country, connecting with civic groups and offering them basic information, such as manuals on how to run a political campaign. Secret police were - and still are - posted outside the NDI office. Staff members have been regularly called in for interrogation and telephoned, threateningly, at home and late at night. Long newspaper articles derided them as insincere democrats, here to make money and corrupt the young people. "NDI underwent 51/2 years of harassment and stuck to it," said Leslie Campbell, regional director for the Middle East and North Africa, who was in Cairo recently. "I feel the partners we stuck by are grateful now." Even government agencies, such as the U.S. Agency for International Development, ran into stiff resistance. One USAID-financed program sought to provide civic education to Egyptian schoolchildren. But the Egyptian government balked, returning 60,000 unopened books to the sponsoring organization, according to a 2009 report by the inspector general for USAID. The United States has spent an average of $2 billion a year here since 1979, viewed as a reward to Egypt for peace with Israel. More than half has gone to military assistance, requiring Egypt to buy American-made equipment. The protesters who stood for democracy in Tahrir Square were shot at with American bullets, gassed with American tear gas and bound by American handcuffs. Targeting aid Many Egyptians who favor U.S. aid say it should be targeted at the economy and channeled through private organizations rather than the bureaucracy, which is widely accused of corruption. "Aid should not be used to support power. It should instead be used as an opportunity for real friendship," said Ahmed el-Naggar, editor in chief of the Economic Strategy Trends Report published by the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies. "It should be unconditional, because it otherwise risks being associated with policies rather than with popular needs." Most of the $150 million available now, from earlier unspent funds for the country, is intended for economic assistance, including job creation, job training and education. But advocates for democracy programs say that those must be a priority. Historically, most non-military U.S. aid has gone to the economy. Beginning in 1979, $815 million a year was devoted to infrastructure. Where raw sewage once ran in the streets of Cairo, treatment systems were built. Irrigation systems came to the countryside. In recent years, nonmilitary U.S. aid was spread among economic, education, health and democracy initiatives. Aid for such areas dropped from about $450 million in 2007 to

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$250 million in 2011, and the Obama administration has been criticized for reducing pro-democracy assistance. "We're in a different place now. There is a firm commitment by this administration to provide assistance in real time to make the democratic transition real and successful," said Mike Posner, assistant secretary of state for democracy and human rights. The immediate priority of U.S. pro-democracy funds, said Dan Brumberg, a Middle East democracy specialist at the U.S. Institute of Peace, should be to support the development of political parties. "Political scientists generally agree, when the window of opportunity for parties opens up, it has to be addressed pretty quickly," he said. "It closes as well." Sheridan reported from Washington. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/article/2011/03/05/AR2011030503569_pf.html

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MOISÉS NAÍM Ola de cambio en el mundo árabe Muamar, Hugo y Dani MOISÉS NAÍM 06/03/2011 ¿Quién hubiese imaginado que Muamar el Gadafi pasaría a la historia como el gran creador de consenso internacional? No es fácil poner de acuerdo a las 192 naciones del planeta. Gadafi lo ha logrado. El mundo entero ha denunciado al dictador libio por masacrar a civiles inocentes. El mundo entero, excepto dos jefes de Estado: Hugo Chávez y Daniel Ortega; el eje de los despistados. Hasta la Liga Árabe le ha retirado el apoyo a Gadafi. Pero Hugo y Dani, no. Seguramente los convenció Fidel Castro, quien mantiene que la violencia en Libia es culpa de la OTAN, y no de Gadafi. En esto, el dictador libio discrepa de su colega, el exdictador cubano. Según Gadafi, detrás de los disturbios en su país está Al Qaeda. Esta diferencia plantea un problema para Hugo y Dani. Quizás, y para evitar tener que tomar partido por Fidel o por Muamar, concluirán que la desestabilización de Libia es una operación conjunta de la OTAN y Al Qaeda. Pero quien definitivamente no está de acuerdo con el eje de los despistados es otro de sus aliados: Mahmud Ahmadineyad. "Es difícil imaginar que exista una persona que pueda matar y bombardear a su propia gente. Esto es muy feo... Los exhorto a escuchar a su pueblo y reflexionar sobre sus demandas. La gente debe ser libre y tener poder de decisión sobre su futuro. Todo el mundo está en shock con lo que está pasando en Libia... deben hacer caso al pueblo", declaró el indignado líder iraní. Este es otro candidato al eje de los despistados. Pero por una razón distinta: el pobre Ahmadineyad no parece haberse enterado de que, al mismo tiempo que hacía estas declaraciones, su Gobierno estaba reprimiendo salvajemente a sus opositores -de nuevo-. Cuando descubra que no hay mucha diferencia entre él y Gadafi seguramente tendrá un shock tan profundo como el que le produjo ver la manera en la que el libio trata a su pueblo. Las tensiones entre Gadafi y Ahmadineyad no son nuevas, y una reveladora manifestación de ellas es que el líder iraní nunca recibió el Premio Gadafi de los Derechos Humanos. Este premio, creado en 1988, se otorga anualmente a quienes "hayan colaborado de forma sublime en la prestación de servicios humanos destacados o en la realización de labores gloriosas en defensa de los derechos humanos" (sic). A Hugo le tocó en 2004 y a Dani en 2009. Unos años después, Chávez correspondió al reconocimiento del libio obsequiándole una réplica de la espada de El Libertador, explicando además que "Muamar el Gadafi es para los libios lo que Simón Bolívar es para los venezolanos". Casi nada. El presidente venezolano no es el único que ha distinguido al líder libio en el campo de los derechos humanos. El 4 de enero de este año, el Consejo de Derechos Humanos, órgano de Naciones Unidas, publicó su informe sobre Libia. El texto no contiene ni un asomo de crítica al Gobierno de Gadafi y más bien resalta que "varias delegaciones expresaron su reconocimiento al compromiso del país con la defensa de los derechos humanos...". La delegación de Brasil, por ejemplo, enfatizó "el progreso social y económico de Libia y reconoció sus esfuerzos con respecto a personas con discapacidades". Myanmar compartió estos conceptos. Por su parte, "Bielorrusia notó con satisfacción que Libia suscribía todos los tratados internacionales sobre derechos humanos y cooperaba con los organismos de dichos tratados".

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La resolución de la Asamblea General de Naciones Unidas que creó el Consejo de Derechos Humanos establece que, al votar por los países que aspiren a formar parte del mismo, "se debe tomar en cuenta su contribución a la promoción y protección de los derechos humanos". Libia fue elegida con el apoyo de 155 países. Pero ni siquiera este baluarte de la hipocresía internacional pudo mantener a Libia en su seno. Así, el Consejo de Derechos Humanos de la ONU, después de largas deliberaciones, concluyó que la contribución de la Libia de Gadafi a los derechos humanos había caído por debajo de los estándares aceptables y la expulsó. Pero Hugo y Dani no abandonan a sus amigos. "No voy a condenar a Gadafi... a mí no me consta que sea un asesino", dijo el presidente de Venezuela. Y al oír esto me vino a la mente la vieja frase de George Orwell: "El lenguaje político... está diseñado para que las mentiras suenen a verdades y que el asesinato sea respetable". No; los despistados no son ellos. Son quienes les creen. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Muamar/Hugo/Dani/elpepiint/20110306el pepiint_9/Tes

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Ola de cambio en el mundo árabe - Rebelión contra las autocracias Esta revolución es por dignidad La época del miedo ha terminado.- Las sociedades árabes aspiran a la libertad que les han negado unos dictadores ajenos a las aspiraciones de libertad de unas sociedades mayoritariamente jóvenes ENRIC GONZÁLEZ - El Cairo - 06/03/2011 Estamos en el principio. Pero afecta a tal volumen de personas y territorio, entraña tantos posibles cambios políticos y geoestratégicos, tanto impacto potencial en la economía mundial, tanto desconcierto en las diplomacias, que cuesta imaginar que el siglo XXI depare muchos acontecimientos de este calado. Estamos en el principio. Pero afecta a tal volumen de personas y territorio, entraña tantos posibles cambios políticos y geoestratégicos, tanto impacto potencial en la economía mundial, tanto desconcierto en las diplomacias, que cuesta imaginar que el siglo XXI depare muchos acontecimientos de este calado. Llamar a lo que está ocurriendo "revolución árabe" resulta reductivo, porque puede acabar afectando a países no árabes como Irán. También es reductivo explicar la revolución por factores económicos, aunque existan. Las revoluciones se hacen por ideas y sentimientos, y la de ahora se alza como emblema la dignidad humana. No es casual que el detonante fuera un suceso poderosamente metafórico. La historia de Mohamed Buaziz y su carrito de frutas ha dado la vuelta al mundo. El carrito de Buaziz, un joven de 26 años residente en Sidi Buzid (Túnez), fue confiscado por la policía. Ya le había ocurrido otras veces y con un pequeño soborno podía resolverlo. Pero cuando fue a quejarse, una funcionaria, Fadia Hamdi, le escupió a la cara. Eso, la humillación, fue lo que Buaziz no pudo soportar. Ese mismo día, 17 de diciembre de 2010, se prendió fuego. La desgracia de Buaziz conmovió a sus vecinos y provocó una primera manifestación. La indignación se extendió rápidamente al país entero. Conviene resaltar aquí otro factor esencial e innovador de la revolución: Internet y las redes sociales. Cuando casi ningún medio informativo internacional había recogido aún la inmolación del frutero y las incipientes revueltas tunecinas, muchos jóvenes en un país tan lejano como Jordania habían adoptado ya la foto de Buaziz como avatar. La cadena de televisión catarí Al Yazira recogió el suceso porque uno de sus periodistas se enteró a través de Facebook. Gracias al ciberespacio, los jóvenes árabes ignoraban las fronteras nacionales. El caso de Buaziz fue de inmediato asumido como propio por los vecinos argelinos. Y por los egipcios, muy sensibles desde el verano anterior. El 6 de junio de 2010, Jaled Said, de 28 años, fue detenido en Alejandría por dos policías de paisano que le golpearon hasta matarle, ante testigos. Varios jóvenes profesionales, bajo la cobertura del Premio Nobel de la Paz y dirigente opositor Mohamed el Baradei, crearon en Facebook un grupo llamado "Todos somos Jaled Said". En pocos días, el grupo congregó a cientos de miles de personas y se convirtió en el principal foco de oposición al régimen de Hosni Mubarak. La llama prendió de forma fulminante. A principios de enero, grandes manifestaciones agitaban las principales ciudades de Túnez y Argelia. En Egipto, mientras, la revolución

310 se preparaba con minuciosidad. Wael Ghoneim, ejecutivo comercial de Google y uno de los creadores de "Todos somos Jaled Said", contó semanas más tarde que él y sus compañeros dedicaron las primeras semanas de enero a ensayar manifestaciones en barrios periféricos, estudiando convocatorias inmediatas y formas de despistar a la policía. Las revueltas magrebíes fueron generalmente interpretadas como protestas económicas. El presidente tunecino Zine El Abidine Ben Ali creyó que con una visita al hospital donde yacía el agonizante Buaziz (fallecido el 5 de enero) y con algunos subsidios para abaratar los alimentos bastaría para calmar los ánimos. Llevaba 24 años en el poder, había saqueado impunemente el país y estaba habituado a las llamadas revueltas del pan. Como el resto de los dictadores de la región, como los dirigentes y la opinión pública de los países más desarrollados, creía que la represión y el pan barato constituían formas infalibles de someter a las poblaciones árabes, ajenas a otra aspiración que ir sobreviviendo y sin capacidad para vivir en democracia. Ese es otro elemento importantísimo: la propia sociedad árabe se sentía indigna y humillada. Tras la descolonización, no había conocido otra cosa que derrotas frente a Israel, dictaduras bochornosas, represión, atraso social, miedo. Y desprecio, mucho desprecio por parte del resto del mundo. Aparentemente, lo único que importaba de los árabes era el petróleo, el gas y la "estabilidad" bajo regímenes tan infames como mimados por Europa y Estados Unidos. Aunque resulte obvio, hay que recordar además que la islamofobia existe. Especialmente tras los atentados del 11 de septiembre de 2001, los musulmanes quedaron bajo sospecha permanente. Un árabe medio no es más religioso que un estadounidense medio, pero su religión se asocia con el integrismo y el terrorismo. En la ecuación occidental, lo que no era una dictadura "moderada" (eufemismo de sumisión a Washington), era Al Qaeda o subversión proiraní. El cóctel de humillaciones, internas y externas, contenía todos los ingredientes. Ahora, en 2011, el 68% de los árabes tienen menos de 30 años. Esta inmensa generación de muchachos y muchachas no conoció acontecimientos como la descolonización o la Guerra de los Seis Días, pero gracias a la televisión por satélite siempre estuvo en contacto con la cultura occidental. Vivieron el desastre de la invasión de Irak pero, además de sentir una intensa solidaridad con el sufrimiento de los iraquíes, quedaron marcados por una imagen de 2003: la de Sadam Husein, dictador todopoderoso, detenido en el sótano donde se ocultaba de forma miserable. Ese impacto visual les enseñó lo frágil que puede ser un tirano. "No tenemos miedo", gritaban los manifestantes en Túnez. Ben Ali no logró que el Ejército asumiera tareas represivas. En sociedades tan estáticas como las árabes, donde la educación y el trabajo raramente sirven para prosperar porque lo que cuenta es pertenecer a la élite del poder o arrimarse a ella, el Ejército constituye el principal ascensor social. Entre los mandos militares abunda la gente de procedencia humilde. Eso, unido al servicio militar obligatorio, por el que cada familia tiene a alguien de uniforme, explica en gran medida el respeto mutuo entre Ejército y sociedad civil. También es cierto que los generales suelen optar por despedir a un dictador acabado antes que arriesgar sus privilegios en batallas inciertas. Por eso algunos dictadores prefieren tropas mercenarias, caso de Libia, o ejércitos pequeños e ineficientes, caso de Arabia Saudí. Después de poner limitaciones adicionales al uso de Internet, después de cerrar escuelas y universidades, después de prometer que bajaría el pan y que no se presentaría a la

311 reelección como presidente, Ben Ali no consiguió otra cosa que el recrudecimiento de las protestas y una inequívoca señal de despedida por parte de los militares. El 14 de enero cargó todo el dinero que cupo en las maletas y escapó a Arabia Saudí. Para entonces, los jóvenes egipcios ya habían fijado la fecha de la insurrección: el martes 25 de enero, festivo porque era, irónicamente, el Día de la Policía. La magnitud de las manifestaciones del 25 de enero en El Cairo, Alejandría y otras ciudades sorprendió a los propios organizadores. Mientras la televisión pública emitía películas y programas sobre gloriosas hazañas policiales, la policía cargaba contra la multitud. Hubo cuatro muertos y más de 500 detenidos. La espita de la furia estaba abierta. Para el viernes 28 se convocó una Jornada de la Ira que resultó asombrosa. Ese 28 de enero quedó claro que la caída de Mubarak era sólo cuestión de tiempo. Quizá nunca, en tiempos modernos, se registró una batalla tan dura y multitudinaria entre policía y manifestantes. Al caer la tarde, la policía había agotado ya los gases lacrimógenos y las balas de goma y empezaba a disparar fuego real. Mubarak ordenó al Ejército que interviniera y el jefe supremo de los militares, su viejo amigo el mariscal Mohamed Tantaui, respondió negativamente. La policía se retiró y las ciudades, bajo nubes de gas y sacudidas por tiroteos ocasionales, quedaron en manos de la gente. Mubarak recurrió a los trucos clásicos del manual del dictador árabe. Bloqueó los teléfonos móviles e Internet. Prometió que su hijo Gamal, multimillonario y heredero designado, no se presentaría a las elecciones presidenciales. Prometió que tampoco se presentaría él. Subió el sueldo de los funcionarios. Delegó "poderes de negociación" en un nuevo vicepresidente, Omar Suleimán, jefe de los servicios secretos, y cambió al primer ministro. Bajo mano, reconvirtió a la policía política en bandas de saqueadores y matones, con la esperanza de que los egipcios se horrorizaran ante el caos y le aceptaran como mal menor. El 11 de febrero, Hosni Mubarak, el hombre que desde 1981 garantizaba la "estabilidad" en Oriente Próximo y cooperaba en lo que hiciera falta con Israel, el presidente que en 2004 prometió que seguiría en el cargo mientras respirara, el gran amigo de Occidente, dimitió y escapó a escondidas a su residencia de Sharm el Sheij, junto al mar Rojo. Dejó a sus espaldas más de 300 cadáveres. El Ejército asumió el poder y garantizó que organizaría una rápida transición a la democracia. Hasta ahora, aunque mantiene el estado de excepción, no ha defraudado a los egipcios. Lo que más sorprendió a la opinión pública internacional fue que en la plaza de Tahrir se mezclaran hombres y mujeres, laicos y religiosos, jóvenes y ancianos, en una convivencia armónica. Que a nadie se le ocurriera quemar una bandera estadounidense. Que apostaran por la resistencia pacífica. Que pidieran cosas como libertad, democracia y justicia. Los tópicos fallaban uno a uno. Muchos siguen queriendo ver tras la revolución egipcia la amenaza de los Hermanos Musulmanes, la más influyente organización islámica en el planeta. Puede ser que acaben asumiendo el poder, pero su partido, Libertad y Justicia, ya está amenazado por dos escisiones, una juvenil y otra progresista, y su ideología básica es más conservadora y tolerante de lo que piensan los recelosos. La caída de Mubarak fue la señal definitiva: los árabes podían alzar la cabeza, conquistar la dignidad y asumir su propio destino. Para desmentir que el despertar árabe tuviera raíces exclusivamente económicas, el 14 de febrero, a través de Facebook, chiíes

312 y suníes del rico emirato de Bahréin convirtieron céntrica la plaza de la Perla en símbolo de su rechazo al absoluto control de la dinastía Al Jalifa sobre la política del emirato. Son de la familia Al Jalifa: el rey, el jefe del Gobierno (40 años en el poder) y 11 ministros. El 24 de febrero, el Gobierno argelino dio el primer paso atrás ante la presión popular y acabó con 19 años de estado de excepción. El 26 de febrero comenzaron las manifestaciones en Omán, un pequeño reino que junto al vecino de enfrente, Irán, domina el vital estrecho de Ormuz. El mismo día, bautizado como Jornada de la Ira panárabe, hubo manifestaciones en Jordania, donde el rey Abdalá ya había tomado medidas preventivas (cambio de Gobierno, subvenciones a alimentos y gasolina), y en Irak, donde la policía mató a 12 personas. En Yemen, un país pobre, dividido y al borde del abismo, las protestas contra el dictador prooccidental Ali Abdalá Saleh (32 años en el poder) habían comenzado ya el 27 de enero. En Siria, paradigma de régimen represivo, en Arabia Saudí y en Irán, los conatos de revuelta han sido sofocados por el momento. Queda Libia, donde otro dictador anciano, decidido a que el país entero le acompañe en su caída, pelea contra la Historia. De los sucesos de Libia, los más violentos hasta ahora en la cadena de "intifadas", se informa en otras páginas. La gran revolución por la dignidad árabe no ha hecho más que empezar. ENRIC GONZÁLEZ Esta revolución es por dignidad06/03/2011 http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/revolucion/dignidad/elpepuint/20110306el pepiint_1/Tes

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March 6, 2011 U.S. Senators Call for No-Flight Zone Over Libya By JOSEPH BERGER Despite skepticism from Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, three influential United States senators from both political parties on Sunday called for the United States to consider carving out a no-flight zone in Libya to prevent Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi from massacring the rebels trying to overthrow him. But the Obama administration continued to resist such appeals. “Lots of people throw around phrases like no-fly zone — they talk about it as though it’s just a video game,” William M. Daley, the new White House chief of staff, said in at appearance on NBC’s “Meet the Press” television news program. Senator John Kerry, the Massachusetts Democrat who chairs the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, challenged Mr. Gates’s admonition that establishing a no-flight zone required the United States to attack Libya’s antiaircraft installations and other air defenses. “Well, that’s actually not the only option for what one could do ," Mr. Kerry said, in what sounded like a rebuke to a cabinet member, on CBS’s “Face the Nation.” “One could crater the airports and the runways and leave them incapable of using them for a period of time.” Senator Kerry pointed out that Libya’s air force is small and that the United States would consider trying to ground Libyan planes only if Mr. Qaddafi uses his air force “as a means of massacring large number of civilians.” He also said that establishing a no- flight zone would not require a long-term American or Western commitment, as was the case in Iraq and Bosnia. Mr. Kerry’s support for a no-flight zone was echoed by two Republicans who spoke on the Sunday television news shows — Senator Mitch McConnell of Kentucky, the Senate minority leader, and Senator John McCain of Arizona, the Republican presidential candidate in 2008. Mr. Gates, the Obama administration’s most prominent Republican, testified Wednesday about the risks of a no-flight zone before the House Appropriations Committee just as Libyan forces loyal to Colonel Qaddafi were bombing insurgents outside Tripoli. He said such a strategy would require “a big operation in a big country” and scoffed at “loose talk about some of these military options.” “Let’s just call a spade a spade,” Mr. Gates said last week. “A no-fly zone begins with an attack on Libya to destroy the air defenses. That’s the way you do a no-fly zone. And then you can fly planes around the country and not worry about our guys being shot down. But that’s the way it starts.”

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Mr. Daley took pains Sunday to support Mr. Gates, saying Mr. Gates “knows the difficulty of war and the challenges.” And while President Obama said last week that Colonel Qaddafi had to go, Mr. Daley, when pressed, would not say that removing the Libyan strongman was vital to the interests of the United States — a threshold that the Obama administration would presumably want to meet if it ordered military intervention. “It’s in our interest as human beings,” Mr. Daley said. Mr. Kerry urged Western powers not only to provide humanitarian aid but to turn over $30 billion in frozen Libyan assets to the insurgents. He also said he assumes that weapons supplied by the West “are going to find their way over there in the course of the next weeks.” Senator McConnell said a no-flight zone was “worth considering,” and he urged the administration to explore other options like “aiding and arming the insurgents.” But he cautioned that the United States was “not sure who the insurgents are,” so it “ought to make sure who we’re dealing with here.” He too said he did not believe Libya was “vital to our interests,” but said that the United States “ought to look for ways of being helpful to those seeking to overthrow dictators, short of sending our own personnel.” Mr. McCain, speaking on ABC’s “This Week with Christiane Amanpour,” was asked about Mr. Gates’s skepticism and said, “we can’t risk allowing Qaddafi to massacre people from the air.” He said sending in ground forces would not be appropriate, “certainly not at this time.” But taking measures like a no-flight zone, humanitarian aid and offers of intelligence would send a signal to those around Colonel Qaddafi “to depart a sinking ship.” Mr. Qaddafi would not change his outlook, Mr. McCain said, because “he’s insane.” Sheryl Gay Stolberg contributed reporting from Washington. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/07/world/middleeast/07nofly.html?ref=middleeast

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March 6, 2011 A Libyan Leader at War With Rebels, and Reality By DAVID D. KIRKPATRICK TRIPOLI, Libya — Residents here were awakened before dawn on Sunday by the sound of artillery and gunfire in the streets. When they tuned into state television broadcasts, they heard stunning news: the Libyan military had routed the rebels seeking to oust Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi. The gunfire, they were told, was in celebration. “Before I turned on the television I was very worried and very scared,” said Noura al- Said, 17, a student who went to celebrate in Green Square in central Tripoli. “But it was the best news I had ever heard. We had taken the whole country back!” But Sunday was just another day spent through the looking glass of the oil-financed and omnipresent cult of personality that Colonel Qaddafi has spent 41 years building in Libya. Few of the claims by the Libyan state media lined up with the facts — there was no decisive victory by his forces — and the heavy firing in Tripoli on Sunday morning was never persuasively explained. But accuracy and logic have never been the tenets of Colonel Qaddafi’s governing philosophy, and their absence is especially conspicuous now, as rebels pose the greatest challenge to his four decades of enigmatic rule. Not a day passes in Tripoli without some improbable claim by Colonel Qaddafi or the top officials around him: there are no rebels or protesters in Libya; the people who are demonstrating have been drugged by Al Qaeda; no shots have been fired to suppress dissent. Yet a segment of the Libyan population appears to admire his defiant promotion of his world view, and confusion and obfuscation help explain how he keeps his rivals off balance. Foreign news organizations were reporting, based on firsthand observations, that rebel forces were under fire but remained in control of the eastern half of the country, as well as many pockets in the west. The government’s main victory over the weekend appeared to be driving the rebels from the town of Bin Jawwad, which they had taken Saturday night. And both sides continued to prepare for a decisive battle in the Qaddafi stronghold of Surt. But many Tripoli residents seemed happy to ignore such reports on Sunday and chose to accept Colonel Qaddafi’s narrative — that his loyalists were at the gates of the rebels’ headquarters in the eastern city of Benghazi, or were in control of it already, or had captured the rebels’ top leader. For more than four hours, Qaddafi supporters fired triumphant bursts of machine gun fire into the air from cars and among crowds in the downtown area. As many as 2,000 of them waved bright green flags and bandannas — and, in many cases, guns — as they

316 rallied in Green Square, and several hundred of the pro-Qaddafi demonstrators were still at it at sunset. Many of the people in Green Square lashed out at the Arabic news channels Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya, calling them liars that had confused and inflamed Libya’s young people. The crowd’s fist-pumping ardor was a testament to the strength of the mythology of epic heroism that Colonel Qaddafi has instilled since he seized power at the age of 27. He did it in part by making sure that his was virtually the only voice in public life. News reports try not to refer to other top government officials, or even soccer players, by name, ensuring that Colonel Qaddafi is virtually the only public figure in Libya. Colonel Qaddafi has also built a persona, in particular as a revolutionary still tilting at distant colonial powers, that in some ways resonates with Libyans who remember their bitter experiences under Italian rule. His personal mythology has helped him stay on top of a fractious, tribal and deeply divided society for longer than any other living leader in North Africa or the Middle East. “He may have been mad,” said Prof. Diederick Vandewalle, of Dartmouth, a Libya specialist. “But there was certainly a method.” It is hard to know what combination of fear, opportunism and sincere adoration drives supporters to attend the Qaddafi rallies that have erupted across Tripoli this week — the manic crowds chanting “God and Muammar and Libya, enough.” But the cult of Qaddafi began to take shape in 1975, just six years after the bloodless coup that brought him to power, when he published the Green Book, a grandiose and quasi-coherent work of a Stalin who aspired to become a Marx. Government institutes were set up for its exegesis. A generation of Libyans grew up studying it as a great work of social and political theory. Tabletlike statues of its three volumes were erected in seemingly every town. And in keeping with its precepts, Colonel Qaddafi eventually gave up any official title in the Libyan government, giving rise to one of the prime examples of Libyan doublespeak. While everyone in Libya regards Colonel Qaddafi as the all-powerful ruler behind every decision of state, he often answers critics calling on him to surrender power by saying it is too late — he already has. After he led the revolution, he said in a speech last week, “I went back to my tent.” Behind his aloof and flamboyant public image, though, Colonel Qaddafi has remained not only in charge but intimately involved in even minor details of the Libyan government. Cables from the United States Embassy in Tripoli that were published by WikiLeaks reported that he personally managed the cases of high-profile political prisoners, and even dictated the response to a specific travel request from the embassy. He personally vets every Libyan government contract worth more than $200 million and examines many of much less value as well, the cables said. He doles out “plum contracts” to loyalists who can extract various fees for themselves, in part to buy their support, the cables said. He also displayed a mastery of details involved in complicated transactions, like an attempt to revive an aborted 1970s deal to buy C-130 cargo planes from the United States. “Al-Qadhafi’s mastery of tactical maneuvering has kept him in power for nearly 40 years; however, the unholy alliance of corruption and cult-of-personality politics 317 on which the system has been based is ultimately limiting,” Ambassador Gene Cretz wrote in one cable, adding, “The reality is that no potential successor currently enjoys sufficient credibility in his own right to maintain that delicate equilibrium.” What’s more, Colonel Qaddafi maintains a strong interest in American books about public affairs. In one cable, the embassy reported that Colonel Qaddafi assigned trusted aides to prepare Arabic summaries of Fareed Zakaria’s “The Post-American World,” Thomas Friedman’s “The World Is Flat 3.0,” George Soros’s “The Age of Fallibility: Consequences of the War on Terror” and President Obama’s “The Audacity of Hope.” Another of Zakaria’s books, “The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad,” was said to be a Qaddafi favorite. At least until his brutal efforts to crush the Libyan uprising drew reprimands from Washington, Colonel Qaddafi seemed to be a big Obama fan. The Libyan leader repeatedly sought to meet with the new American president, the embassy reported, and wrote him a gushing note “on behalf of all Africa” and “in the name of all Arab leaders as I am their dean.” “The black man is not less competent than the white man,” Colonel Qaddafi told Mr. Obama. “I salute the American people who have chosen you in these historical elections for such a high position, so that you may lead the change that you have promised them.” Since the uprising began Feb. 16, Colonel Qaddafi has repeated a series of wildly false assertions. In a speech to the Libyan General People’s Congress, for example, he declared there had been no demonstrations against him and that he was beloved by all the Libyan people. He blamed the protests on drugs distributed by Osama bin Laden, and he has insisted that a radical Islamist emir had taken over a city in the east, imposed Islamic law and begun daily executions of those who violated it. But in the same speech, he demonstrated the peculiar bond he maintains with his most fervent supporters. At several points during the three-hour address, he paused to ask the audience for help with his memory — the name of a certain newspaper, for example, or a reminder to return to the subject of the drugs. His audience readily obliged. His canniness is hard to gauge, but certainly some of his predictions have proved to be farsighted. In his first response to the uprising, long before the rebels had armed themselves, he declared the unrest was sure to become a civil war. And he warned that such strife would invite Western interference; he can now point to American warships off the coast, reports of British Special Forces in eastern Libya and a debate about Western airstrikes to enforce a no-flight zone. At other times he has appeared to put perhaps too much trust in his own propaganda. His government invited some 130 foreign journalists to Tripoli last week and promptly bused them to areas where anti-Qaddafi protesters have burned buildings or taken over towns. Perhaps Libyan officials expected the reporters to corroborate the government’s view that the insurgents were violent Islamic extremists. But there was no evidence of an Islamist connection, and the rebels described far greater violence from Colonel Qaddafi’s forces. By Friday, the government appeared to be struggling to ride herd on the journalists.

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What started the gunfire in Tripoli early Sunday could not be determined. Protesters suggested that there had been a fight between members of his security forces, since they are the only ones with guns in the capital. But the heavy celebratory gunfire that continued for four hours — and occurred again sporadically throughout the day — was an effective show of force to anyone who might have thought to challenge Colonel Qaddafi. At the hotel housing the visiting journalists, government employees and hotel staff members could be seen hugging and even crying over the state media’s news of the government victories. And near twilight at Green Square, many in the crowd of several hundred were pushing forward to tell journalists how happy they were. “The cities that were in control of the gangs — they were set free!” said Souad Monsour, a 19-year-old student. “People from everywhere are here to celebrate.” Muhammad Said, 38, interrupted. “All the bloodshed in Libya has been because of Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya,” he said, echoing Colonel Qaddafi. “These bad channels are confusing people and turning them into trouble.” Discerning friends from enemies can be difficult in a police state. One young man at the Qaddafi rally had been seen at an antigovernment protest the day before. His true allegiance was unclear. Several of those at the rally insisted, as Colonel Qaddafi has, that the rebels were organized by Al Qaeda. One supporter, Adle el-Ageli, wanted to talk about the Libyan leader: “Muammar is a hawk. He is unique. There is no alternative to him.” And if the state media reports of great victories prove false on Monday? Ms. Said would not answer directly: “I have a big trust in Muammar Qaddafi.” Moises Saman contributed reporting. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/07/world/middleeast/07qaddafi.html?_r=1&nl=to daysheadlines&emc=tha2

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Africa

March 6, 2011 Free of Qaddafi, a City Tries to Build a New Order By ANTHONY SHADID BAYDA, Libya — The signs in Bayda still read the Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab State of the Masses. It was never much of a state, nor did the people have much say. Now two weeks after its liberation, residents of this highland town have the task of making it so, a challenge that may prove pivotal to the course of Libya’s revolt. Far from the front, in mood and reality, Bayda, an eastern city that was one of the first to embrace the anti-Qaddafi revolution, has now also embraced the work of what might follow: building a state on a landscape riven by divisions of tribe, piety and class in a country whose leader spent four decades in power dismantling anything that might contest his rule. The new police chief has less than a third of his officers and worries that vigilantes might not surrender their weapons. He has no prison. Hundreds have volunteered for work, but on Sunday, many sat under a tent watching the news channel Al Jazeera. With revolutionary fervor, and a resurgence of pride in running their own lives, residents have set up a slew of committees to impose order, distribute charity and run schools, but even its own members admit they have more enthusiasm than experience. That it has gone as well as it has is a testament to the strength of the society in a place like Bayda, where Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi conquered but could not divide. “Our task isn’t easy,” said Mahmoud Bousalloum, a graduate student and one of the committees’ organizers. “We don’t have parties, we don’t have a constitution, we don’t have political organizations, we don’t have an effective civil society. We have to create a completely new state and we have to do it in the middle of a war and revolution.” A city of roughly 250,000, Bayda spills across a plateau in northeast Libya called the Green Mountain, which takes its name from the pine, juniper and wild olives that are native here. It was one of the first cities to fall after two youths were killed in a clash on Feb. 16, and the graffiti of the moment still washes over walls and government buildings. The slogans borrow from the revolts in Egypt and Tunisia, but are more personal. There is no call for the overthrow of the government; only Colonel Qaddafi is mentioned, as lackey, tyrant and the man with really bad hair. The graffiti also hints at the anxiety in a city where tribal elders still hold sway and religious currents have cultivated a following. “No to destruction and violence, no to corruption and tribalism,” reads one. “There’s no difference between East and West, we’re all Libyan,” intones another. For decades, Bayda was run by the pretenses of Colonel Qaddafi’s Green Book, his supposed blueprint for a revolutionary state. There were Popular Committees that

320 carried out the orders of the Popular Conference, but as Tawfiq Bughrara, a cleric here put it, “The head of it didn’t have the power to pick up a glass and set it back down.” In reality, power was exercised by the security forces — internal security, external security and military intelligence — along with a more traditional police agency known as the security directorate. The loathed and feared head of internal security was Ali Saad al-Majaab, who residents say sought protection from his tribe soon after the uprising began. Then there was Colonel Qaddafi’s second wife, Safiya Farqash, who was born in Bayda and whose family, from the city’s largest tribe, Birasa, acted as mediators between the city and the colonel himself. Her uncle, Jarah, long ran Bayda’s sole army battalion. “No one in charge did anything without their permission,” Mr. Bughrara said. At the height of Egypt’s uprising, Cairo exploded in fervor as popular committees sprung up to police neighborhoods and volunteers picked up trash and painted fences. It was largely symbolic, since the Egyptian military and bureaucracy remained intact. There was never that much bureaucracy in Bayda, where residents had to travel 750 miles to the capital, Tripoli, for something as simple as a housing loan or a business permit. Days after authority collapsed, residents set up a local council. They said they avoided terms like popular and revolutionary because they smacked of Colonel Qaddafi’s statements. Of its six members, one is from a group called the Youth of February 17, the date people have given the uprising here. Two others are Muslim clerics, one a professor of agriculture and another a businessman. It is led by Mustafa Abdel-Jalil, a former justice minister from Bayda acclaimed as a transitional leader who is now in Benghazi. Answering to it are impromptu committees for everything from security to education, though schools remain closed here. Underneath a tent in Bayda’s downtown, organizers added more names to a list of 750 volunteers, who identified themselves as everything from students to a tank gunner. Detachments have tried to collect trash every morning. Others have organized aid from Egyptian relief convoys crossing the border. Even the volunteers, though, seemed overwhelmed at the task of running a city. Most of them on this day sipped tea, chatted and watched a television set up at the tent. “We’re in a transition and in that, there’s going to be chaos,” said Mr. Bughrara’s brother, Ahmed, an engineer. “But what we had before was organized chaos.” As he spoke, another volunteer interrupted. “We’re still waiting for Tripoli to be liberated,” he shouted. In the aftermath of the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, there was anger at the occupation tinged with shame that destinies in the hands of a dictator were now determined by an invader. The experiences in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya have unleashed a far different energy, indigenous narratives written with the pride of people running their own lives. The only shame hinted at in Bayda was that residents had consented so long to the rule of a man seemingly unhinged, where the political system had become a capricious exercise in absurdity. (Videos traded in the tent portrayed Colonel Qaddafi as a barking dog.)

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“We’re no longer patient,” said Othman Suleiman, a 42-year-old day laborer. “What did patience get us in the end? It got us a regime of gangs and thieves.” As in Cairo and the rest of Egypt, politics seemed to dominate every conversation in Bayda, with everyone quick to offer an opinion, an analysis or, more often, a rumor. “There’s a report that Qaddafi took Tobruk,” said Khaled Mustafa, a volunteer. “It’s rumors,” answered Walid Ibrahim, who was helping take down names. “Just turn off your phone and quit watching his television station. It’s a world war of lies.” The scene was more grim at what constitutes the Bayda police station, a former tax office that avoided the burning and looting that befell 30 other government buildings, mainly security offices and police stations. Past a lobby warmed by a space heater and littered with overflowing ashtrays was the office of Maj. Mustafa Muftah, a former deputy police commander and now head of the security committee. He spoke with the clipped answers that tend toward clichés of a man accustomed to answering to himself. “This stuff happens in every revolution,” he said with a wave of his hand. But when asked about a city suffused with arms, he turned vulnerable for a moment. Only a third of the city’s police officers were still at work, he said, and hundreds of volunteers, essentially anyone with a gun, were only nominally under his control. The jail had been stormed, and most of its 700 prisoners were still at large. He said he needed at least six months to bring authority to a city that spent days getting rid of it. “I’m anxious,” he admitted. But, he added hopefully, “I trust the people here.” There was a sense of optimism, too, at the city park next to the Bilal mosque, colored in shades of brown. At dusk, scores of children played on merry-go-rounds and swings. A traffic policeman on the road outside joked with a driver inching into the intersection. “Don’t ignore me,” he scolded, smiling. Not even a drizzle seemed to diminish the feeling that one order was ending and another, however ambiguous, was under way. “This is the first time people have breathed freedom,” said Idris Abdullah, whose three children, Marwa, Shahid and Anis, tumbled down a slide, laughing. “It’s a blessing, and I say that without any exaggeration. Look at me. I can inhale deeply.” Ibrahim Badawy contributed reporting. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/07/world/africa/07rebels.html?nl=todaysheadline s&emc=tha2

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Ola de cambio en el mundo árabe - Guerra civil en Libia Obama: "Gadafi tiene que dejar el poder" EE UU no descarta la opción militar si se deteriora la situación humanitaria - El régimen bombardea posiciones de los rebeldes en el este del país A. CAÑO / J. M. MUÑOZ - Washington / Bengasi - 04/03/2011 Barack Obama advirtió ayer que Estados Unidos "debe tener plena capacidad para actuar y hacerlo rápidamente" si la situación en Libia llega a deteriorarse de tal forma que exista la amenaza de una catástrofe humana, e informó de que había dado órdenes al Pentágono para estudiar las opciones militares adecuadas, incluida la declaración de una zona de exclusión aérea. Barack Obama advirtió ayer que Estados Unidos "debe tener plena capacidad para actuar y hacerlo rápidamente" si la situación en Libia llega a deteriorarse de tal forma que exista la amenaza de una catástrofe humana, e informó de que había dado órdenes al Pentágono para estudiar las opciones militares adecuadas, incluida la declaración de una zona de exclusión aérea, para responder al intento de Muamar el Gadafi de prolongar su régimen por la fuerza. "No quiero ser ambiguo: el coronel Gadafi tiene que dejar el poder e irse", declaró el presidente norteamericano. "Gadafi tiene que irse", insistió, "quienes le rodean tienen que responder de sus crímenes y las aspiraciones del pueblo libio tienen que ser satisfechas". Es un mensaje que trata de resaltar, al mismo tiempo, la soledad absoluta del dictador libio, el riesgo que corren sus colaboradores si no lo abandonan y la intención de Obama de mantenerse en el lado correcto de la historia, con quienes luchan por la libertad, procurando evitar que el posible uso de medios militares sea interpretado como una intervención indeseable. En una conferencia de prensa junto al presidente de México, Rafael Calderón, el presidente norteamericano destacó que, tal como se están desarrollando los acontecimientos en Libia, "existe el riesgo de un estancamiento que podría ser sangriento". Frente a eso, "no quiero que nos quedemos quietos", dijo. "Existe una amplia gama de opciones, militares y no militares, que estamos examinando, y tomaremos las decisiones adecuadas basadas en lo que sea mejor para el pueblo libio, de acuerdo con la comunidad internacional y minimizando en lo posible el daño a civiles inocentes en el proceso". Obama insistió en varias ocasiones en que intentará actuar de acuerdo con sus aliados, pero no hizo mención expresa a la necesidad de una resolución del Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU, como se ha venido diciendo hasta ahora, ni descartó de forma contundente una acción unilateral. Aunque Obama anunció también un inmediato despliegue de aviones militares para responder a necesidades esenciales de los refugiados extranjeros de Libia, sus declaraciones han reactivado súbitamente el debate sobre una intervención militar internacional en Libia, que parecía ralentizado después de que el secretario de Defensa norteamericano, Robert Gates, recordara el miércoles que la declaración de un espacio de exclusión aérea exigiría destruir previamente los sistemas antiaéreos de ese país, que es lo mismo que decir que es necesario primero atacar Libia.

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Mientras tanto, el país norteafricano vivió ayer nuevos enfrentamientos. Las ciudades de Brega y Ajdabiya, en el vértice oriental del golfo de Sirte, son el frente de combate en el que Gadafi intenta por todos los medios, sin éxito hasta la fecha, impedir el avance de los rebeldes. La aviación bombardeó ayer el aeropuerto de la primera ciudad y posiciones de los sublevados en la segunda. Pero los mercenarios del dictador tuvieron que retroceder hasta Ras Lanuf, sede de una importante terminal petrolera donde los mercenarios de Gadafi todavía son fuertes. Brega repelió el miércoles el ataque que lanzaron los esbirros africanos y asiáticos de Gadafi; unos 40 kilómetros más al oeste, Al Ugayla es también tierra rebelde, según afirmaban vecinos de esta ciudad. Palmo a palmo, los sublevados se aproximan a la todavía lejana Sirte, cuna del tirano y el gran baluarte de su poder aparte de Trípoli. Pero a medio camino entre los 350 kilómetros que separan Brega y Sirte todavía tendrán que conquistar Ras Lanuf. Y costará un mundo derrotar a los mercenarios en Sirte, salvo que se produzca una deserción entre los organismos paramilitares de Gadafi, bien adiestrados y pertrechados por el autócrata durante años. No hay noticias, sin embargo, de fisuras en los comités revolucionarios, compuestos por unos 20.000 hombres; ni tampoco en la Brigada 32, dirigida por Jamis el Gadafi y que protege a su padre en su residencia tripolitana de Bab el Azizia, ni se sabe de escisiones en los servicios de espionaje militar. Lo que sí se puede conocer con cierta exactitud es que Gadafi, sin control ya sobre la mayoría de las 13 bases aéreas de Libia, ha provocado los mayores daños y destrozos desde el aire. Esta es la razón por la que el Consejo Nacional, una suerte de Gobierno de transición, pidió anteayer a la comunidad internacional que establezca una zona de exclusión aérea. La aviación libia llegó a tener casi 200 aviones de combate, principalmente de fabricación rusa. "Ahora solo dispone de entre 20 y 25 cazabombarderos", aseguró a este diario el coronel de aviación Jamal Mansur Zuayeh, convertido en un rebelde más. Parece imposible frenar el ímpetu de miles de jóvenes, y hombres de edades más avanzadas, que arden en deseos de engrosar las filas de los rebeldes para luchar en una primera línea que se mueve muy despacio, entre otros motivos por la pésima preparación, si es que han tenido alguna, de los novatos combatientes. Los mandos que organizan el nuevo Ejército tratan de hacer acopio de las armas que poseen infinidad de ciudadanos en sus casas después del asalto a varios arsenales, y rechazan entregarlas a quienes las requieren para sumarse a la lucha. Pese a ello no resulta excesivamente difícil conseguirlas, aunque frecuentemente se trata de viejos fusiles. Ayer se distribuían en Bengasi panfletos de un grupo llamado Unión de Jóvenes de Libia, que ha convocado para hoy una marcha de vehículos hacia Sirte. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Obama/Gadafi/tiene/dejar/poder/elpepiint/ 20110304elpepiint_1/Tes?print=1

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03/04/2011 04:15 PM Vengence from the Skies Libyan Air Force Could Be Gadhafi's Trump Card By Ulrike Putz in Beirut Libyan dictator Moammar Gadhafi has always paid special attention to his air force, staffing it with his most loyal followers and supplying it with the best training and equipment. The recent bombing raids in Brega might just be a small foretaste of the overwhelming punch his air power can deliver. Although a large part of Libya's army has defected and joined the rebel forces, its air force appears to have remained almost completely loyal to Moammar Gadhafi. Indeed, it is one of the main factors still propping up the regime and the most serious threat to the insurgents who control the eastern part of the country. Libya's air force is made up of roughly 18,000 men and women, most of whom are staunch supporters of the regime. The elite military branch recruited from followers who were 100 percent loyal to the regime, and members of Gadhafi's Gadhadfa tribe and its closely allied Magariha tribe were given preference during the selection process for recruits. They have shown a blind obedience to their commander in chief. Only a handful of pilots and officers have switched sides to join the opposition. In return for their loyalty, Gadhafi has always made sure that members of the air force received the best training and equipment. The fighter wing is reportedly made up of roughly 100 MiG-21 and MiG-23 fighter jets as well as 15 Mirage F-1 and 40 SU-22 planes. The arms depots are thought to be filled to the rafters with munitions. The planes' missiles are from the arsenals of the former Soviet Union or of more recent Russian makes, according to a report by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies. The report also states that Libya's air-defense system is very well equipped. As Lieutenant-General David Deptula, who recently retired from his position as an air force expert at the Pentagon, told Britain's The Economist, if the West decides to impose a no-fly zone over Libya, the country's surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) could present a serious danger to Allied jets. The planes in the Libyan air force are stationed at 13 bases spread throughout the country. The bases are also home to Russian Mi-25 attack helicopters, which can be a deadly weapon both in open country and in urban combat. Rebel forces advancing on Tripoli, the capital city, should expect to encounter massive firepower from these helicopters. In the end, however, the really decisive factor in the battle might turn out to be the large number of military transport aircraft that Gadhafi purchased from Russian and American manufacturers. In just a few hours' time, the seven squadrons of helicopters and transport planes can ferry government units and reinforcements to scenes of fighting anywhere within the country. The rebel army forming in the eastern part of the country also has almost nothing to counter them with. Although it has a handful of bombers that defecting pilots landed in enemy territory, the only thing it has to supply and transport its own forces are trucks and civilian vehicles.

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Testing an Outgunned Enemy For the moment, however, Gadhafi has held back from sending his elite troops into the fight. Granted, on Thursday, his warplanes bombed the eastern port city of Brega for the second day in a row. But that is only a small taste of what the Libyan air force is capable of. Experts see Gadhafi's apparent decision to hold his pilots back in a reserve capacity as a tactical maneuver. "There have been no large massacres, air power is being used in a calculated way and he is launching probing attacks," Shashank Joshi, a military specialist at London-based think tank the Royal United Services Institute, told the New York Times. Even if Gadhafi has appeared somewhat mentally unstable during his recent televised appearances, Joshi believes Gadhafi's tactical maneuvers do not show "the decision-making of a man totally out of touch with reality." For now, it is also unclear just how many of the 45,000 ground troops have defected to the opposition. The fact that entire regiments have apparently deserted in eastern Libya appears to have been something that Gadhafi correctly anticipated. Gadhafi has never trusted his army, because it was primarily made up of conscripts, many of whom belonged to tribes opposed to his own. "Gadhafi has retained significant elements of the army and lost the elements he was always afraid he could lose, those affiliated with tribes he had targeted," George Joffé, an expert on North Africa at Cambridge University, told the New York Times. Having come to power himself through a military coup in 1969, Gadhafi has surely calculated that he could one day face a putsch himself. As a hedge against the danger of an uprising, Gadhafi has always made a point of providing regiments in the notoriously rebellious east with poorer training and older equipment. What's more, he has supposedly also built up a parallel army consisting of up to 20,000 mercenaries from sub-Saharan Africa. Libya could now be facing civil war. If Gadhafi should decide to continue fighting, the rebels' chances of victory are slim, argues Yehudit Ronen, a Libya expert at Israel's Bar- Ilan University. "The anti-Gadhafi alliance can only rely on the soldiers who have defected," Ronen says. Even if these soldiers were reinforced by volunteers, she adds, they would be facing an almost invincible enemy: the air force and the mercenaries, who have nothing to lose. Ronen predicts that the fighting will last a long time and that, afterwards, Libya "will no longer be like it once was." URL: http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,749121,00.html RELATED SPIEGEL ONLINE LINKS: • Failed Evacuation Attempt: Three Dutch Marines Held By Libyan Forces (03/03/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,748831,00.html • The World from Berlin: 'Time Is On Gadhafi's Side' (03/03/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,748863,00.html • Photo Gallery: Warships and Refugees http://www.spiegel.de/fotostrecke/fotostrecke-65311.html • Opposition Carries on Fight against Gadhafi: 'If the Americans Come, They Would Steal our Revolution' (03/03/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,748832,00.html

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• Libyan Revolution: With No End to Fighting, International Pressure Grows on Gadhafi (03/02/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,748586,00.html • Europe's Favorite Dictators: The EU Has Failed the Arab World (02/28/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,748074,00.html RELATED INTERNET LINKS • The Economist on Libyan air defenses http://www.economist.com/node/18291539?story_id=18291539 • The New York Times on Gadhafi's air force http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/02/world/africa/02tribes.html?_r=1&scp=2&s q=joshi&st=cse. Ola de cambio en el mundo árabe - Guerra civil en Libia Las unidades de élite siguen leales Las deserciones se producen entre las tropas mal armadas del Ejército regular.- El dictador cuenta con los cuerpos especiales, la aviación y grupos paramilitares ANDREA RIZZI - Madrid - 04/03/2011 Mientras Libia avanza hacia la guerra civil, los bandos militarmente enfrentados se van definiendo. Amplios sectores de las Fuerzas Armadas se han unido a los rebeldes o simplemente han disuelto filas. Sin embargo, según coinciden los analistas, se trata de unidades marginales y mal armadas de un Ejército deliberadamente debilitado por el régimen durante décadas. Mientras Libia avanza hacia la guerra civil, los bandos militarmente enfrentados se van definiendo. Amplios sectores de las Fuerzas Armadas se han unido a los rebeldes o simplemente han disuelto filas. Sin embargo, según coinciden los analistas, se trata de unidades marginales y mal armadas de un Ejército deliberadamente debilitado por el régimen durante décadas. Al contrario, las mejores unidades parecen seguir leales al dictador. Entre ellas destacan la Brigada 32, dirigida por Jamis el Gadafi (quinto hijo del tirano); sectores consistentes de la aviación; formaciones paramilitares comparativamente bien entrenadas como la Guardia Revolucionaria o la Legión Islámica Panafricana, y grupos de expertos mercenarios. "Las fuerzas que han desertado son las fuerzas que el régimen esperaba que desertarían", comenta en conversación telefónica Shashank Joshi, analista del Royal United Services Institute e investigador de la Universidad de Harvard experto en la materia. "Esto significa que se trata de las unidades más débiles y peor equipadas. Las mejores fuerzas en términos de armamento, organización y liderazgo siguen leales al régimen, como la Brigada 32". Muamar el Gadafi trabajó cuidadosamente a lo largo de su dictadura para evitar la consolidación de centros de contrapoder. El Ejército con escaso presupuesto, fragmentado por rivalidades tribales, mal entrenado y peor coordinado? fue una de las víctimas de esa política. Las unidades de élite, en cambio, repletas de miembros de las tribus más leales a Gadafi y bien pagados mercenarios, recibieron buen equipamiento y mejor formación. "La Brigada 32, por ejemplo, ha sido dotada con buen material bélico de compañías occidentales y recibió entrenamiento de fuerzas especiales británicas", afirma Joshi. El

327 diario británico The Daily Telegraph publicó hace unos días un documento secreto en el que el Gobierno de Tony Blair se comprometía a entrenar a fuerzas libias. "En la práctica, el Ejército regular libio ha sido disuelto hace años. Lo único que de verdad funciona son las unidades especiales", confirma, en conversación telefónica, el exiliado libio Othman Ben Sasi, informa Ignacio Cembrero. En perspectiva, es preocupante constatar que los arsenales libios están repletos de armamento de producción soviética, aunque en gran mayoría obsoleto. Un informe publicado en 2010 por el Center for Strategic and International Studies califica de "militarmente absurda" la ratio entre armamento y tropa. Varios de los bombardeos lanzados por el régimen en estos días iban dirigidos precisamente a depósitos militares para evitar que los rebeldes accedieran a los arsenales. A pesar de ello, las fuerzas rebeldes han tenido acceso a fusiles Kaláshnikov y lanzagranadas portátiles. Pero el material pesado, como los tanques y el grueso de los aparatos aéreos, han quedado bajo el control del régimen. Los bombardeos de estos días dan pie a consideraciones interesantes. "Gadafi ha demostrado estar en condiciones de ordenar a la fuerza aérea despegar y abrir fuego", considera Joshi. "Pero los bombardeos han sido escasos e imprecisos. Puede ser una decisión premeditada, puede ser una prueba de ineficacia o puede que los pilotos no quieran disparar contra los rebeldes en zonas pobladas. Lo cierto es que Gadafi retiene mejores fuerzas que los rebeldes, pero ninguno de los dos bandos parece en condiciones de lanzar ataques decisivos. En este estado de cosas, es previsible que el estancamiento continúe. De hecho, los bandos están consolidando sus fuerzas". El número de combatientes disponibles en cada bando permanece sin esclarecerse. Un cable de la diplomacia de Estados Unidos, filtrado por Wikileaks, consideraba antes de la revuelta que entre la Brigada 32 y otras unidades de élite leales el régimen contaba con unos 10.000 militares. Sea cual fuere la proporción numérica de fuerzas, los rebeldes cuentan con la ventaja del apoyo presumiblemente mayoritario de la población, y la desventaja de las graves dificultades logísticas impuestas por las dimensiones de Libia, un país casi cuatro veces mayor que España. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/unidades/elite/siguen/leales/elpepiint/2011 0304elpepiint_3/Tes?print=1 Ola de cambio en el mundo árabe - Guerra civil en Libia El coronel recluta tuaregs en su defensa Unos 800, procedentes de Malí y Níger, se han alistado en las últimas semanas I. CEMBRERO - Madrid - 04/03/2011 Muamar el Gadafi resiste la sublevación con esas tropas de élite, mezcla de libios fieles de Tripolitania y de mercenarios subsaharianos, pero necesita más hombres para hacer frente a los embates. De ahí que esté intentando reclutarlos entre aquellos con los que tejió lazos durante sus más de 40 años de ejercicio del poder. "Ha lanzado llamamientos a los tuaregs a través de varios cauces, pero no sabemos cuál ha sido la respuesta", explica Othman Ben Sasi, exiliado libio en París.

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Unos 800 tuaregs se han apuntado, en su mayoría afincados en Malí y en Níger, señala, por su parte, el corresponsal en Bamako de la agencia France Presse, que cita fuentes de los servicios de seguridad de Malí. Asegura incluso que el régimen de Gadafi ha abierto una discreta "oficina de reclutamiento en un hotel" de esa ciudad perteneciente a una compañía libia. Otros puestos de alistamiento están situados en las áreas habitadas por los tuaregs. Repartidos por el Sahel, esa franja de desierto que cruza África desde Sudán a Mauritania, los tuaregs, también llamados hombres azules a causa de sus ropajes, son 1,5 millones. La mayoría reside en el norte de Malí y de Níger, aunque también hay comunidades en Burkina Faso, Argelia y Libia. "Los tuaregs han sido, a veces, alentados a sumarse a la defensa de Gadafi por sus propios familiares en Libia, donde no se les considera extranjeros cualquiera que sea el lugar donde nacieron", señala Ben Sasi. Hay unos 70.000 tuaregs en Libia, sobre todo en el área meridional de Ghat. Un buen puñado de ellos son militares fieles a Gadafi —en los años setenta la Legión Islámica de Gadafi enroló a 5.000 tuaregs— y entre ellos hay incluso un general con mando en el sur. Este pueblo bereber ha protagonizado varias rebeliones en Malí y Níger entre 1990 y finales de la década pasada, y tiene experiencia en el manejo de las armas. Sus gentes, a las que Gadafi nunca maltrató, son además paupérrimas. De ahí que los hombres jóvenes y maduros sean fáciles de reclutar a cambio de la promesa de sueldos fabulosos —no menos de 300 dólares al día— y de la entrega de armas modernas. "Cada vez que tomo la palabra advierto lo que acabará sucediendo", afirma el exiliado Ben Sasi. "Cuando sea derrotado Gadafi muchos libios querrán ajustar cuentas con los subsaharianos, que son recién llegados a Libia, y con los tuaregs, que poseen hondas raíces", advierte. En el norte de Malí el éxodo de combatientes también preocupa, pero por otras razones. "Todo esto me da miedo, porque algún día volverán con las armas y desestabilizarán todo el Sahel", vaticina Abdu Salam Ag Assalat, presidente de la asamblea regional de Kidal (Malí septentrional). http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/coronel/recluta/tuaregs/defensa/elpepiint/2 0110304elpepiint_2/Tes?print=1

España promueve una intervención de la OTAN en Libia Chacón afirma que la Alianza Atlántica espera a que la ONU avale una operación "con fines humanitarios" IÑIGO ADURIZ MADRID 04/03/2011 01:00 Actualizado: 04/03/2011 02:23 El Gobierno apoya y promueve una intervención militar de la OTAN en Libia inminente y de "carácter humanitario". Así lo anunció ayer la ministra de Defensa, Carme Chacón, 329 que quiso aclarar que esa operación de la Alianza Alántica deberá contar con el beneplácito del Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU. Los aliados mantendrán una reunión la próxima semana, en la cual "el primer punto del día" será la delicada situación que vive el pueblo libio, explicó Chacón durante una visita al Instituto Tecnológico Militar de La Marañosa, en Madrid. De cara a ese encuentro, la titular de Defensa señaló que tanto España como otros países socios de la OTAN "han dejado claro" que su deseo es que, "de forma rápida", la ONU "pudiera avalar cualquier intervención que con fines humanitarios pudiera llevarse a cabo" en Libia. "Los esfuerzos se están concentrando", insistió, "en que Naciones Unidas pueda llevar a cabo esa resolución que permita avanzar a organizaciones como la Alianza". El PP reclama al PSOE «la misma claridad» con otras "injerencias" Esa previsible intervención contaría con el respaldo del PP. Su portavoz de Exteriores, Gustavo de Arístegui, aseguró, en declaraciones a este diario, que "por supuesto" que el partido apoyaría un despliegue humanitario de la OTAN. Sin embargo, el portavoz conservador utilizó este asunto para lanzar una nueva crítica a los socialistas. "Me gustaría que el PSOE tuviera una posición coherente respecto a las injerencias humanitarias", advirtió. En su opinión, en otros casos "como en el de Kosovo", el Gobierno "ha sido más ambiguo" a la hora de apoyar una intervención militar. Arístegui exigió a los socialistas "que cuando gobierne el PP y el Ejecutivo exija una injerencia humanitaria, el PSOE mantenga la misma claridad" que en el caso libio. La formación que en ningún caso dará su visto bueno a esa intervención en Libia será Izquierda Unida. Su único diputado en el Congreso, Gaspar Llamazares, consideró que la voluntad expresada ayer por el Gobierno "es una locura casi mayor que el propio régimen de Gadafi". IU ve la propuesta como "una locura casi mayor que el régimen de Gadafi" "No acepto ese eufemismo de intervención humanitaria", advirtió Llamazares, que aseguró que tras esa calificación "puede esconderse una intención de intervenir en el país por tierra o por aire". A su juicio, se deben mantener "los mecanismos de embargo" al régimen libio, pero IU no aceptará "lo que en términos internacionales se llama imposición de la paz". Su grupo solicitará la comparecencia de la ministra de Defensa en la Cámara Baja para que explique "sin ambigüedades" a qué se refiere con su respaldo explícito a una intervención de la OTAN. Medios aéreos y navales: Chacón también explicó ayer que el Gobierno pondrá "todos los medios aéreos y navales necesarios" para realizar cualquier tipo de evacuación. Ayer mismo, la Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional envió a la Djerba en la frontera entre Libia y Túnez un avión para evacuar a los ciudadanos egipcios allí atrapados. Ese MD82 se convertirá en una especie de puente aéreo entre la mencionada localidad tunecina y El Cairo, y prevé trasladar a 4.000 personas a lo largo de una semana. Chacón, por otro lado, aseguró ayer no tener constancia de que el movimiento de tropas de EEUU ante una posible intervención en Libia haya puesto en alerta las bases de uso conjunto de Rota (Cádiz) y Morón (Sevilla).

330 http://www.publico.es/internacional/364424/espana-promueve-una-intervencion-de-la- otan-en-libia JOSÉ IGNACIO TORREBLANCA Ola de cambio en el mundo árabe - Guerra civil en Libia Intervenir en Libia JOSÉ IGNACIO TORREBLANCA 04/03/2011 Lo cuenta uno de los protagonistas de la anécdota, que prefiere preservar el anonimato. Duda sobre si es el año 1977 o 1978, pero recuerda una jaima a las afueras de Trípoli. Dos jóvenes opositores al franquismo han ido a Libia a buscar apoyo para uno de los múltiples partidos políticos que intentaban jugar un papel relevante en el posfranquismo. La espera ha sido larga, pues había una larga fila de peticionarios, representantes de todos los movimientos revolucionarios del mundo, en busca de apoyo para su causa. Pero el viaje ha merecido la pena, pues al fin han podido ver a Gadafi. El coronel les ha escuchado en silencio mientras exponían su caso, y al terminar la audiencia, sin mediar palabra, les han pasado a una sala donde el contacto libio que les ha servido de interlocutor les ha preguntado a bocajarro: "¿Qué quieren: armas o dinero?". "Solo dinero, gracias", han respondido apresuradamente, asustados ante la franqueza de la oferta. Lo prometido es deuda, pues unos meses más tarde, en la Embajada libia en Madrid, se les hace entrega de un maletín con una importante cantidad de dinero en efectivo. La anécdota pone sobre la mesa el principio de no-injerencia en los asuntos internos de otros países, que Gadafi reclama para su régimen, pese a no haberlo respetado en toda su vida, como prueban las 280 víctimas del atentado al avión de Pan Am que se estrelló en Lockerbie en 1988 y los 3 muertos y 229 heridos en la explosión en la discoteca La Belle en Berlín dos años antes, cuya autoría está fehacientemente atribuida a Trípoli. ¿Ha llegado, o está a punto de llegar, el momento de devolver el favor a los libios y enviar armas o dinero, lo que ellos pidan? Si se hiciera, no sería la primera vez, desde luego. En 1994, el embajador de EE UU en Zagreb informaba al Gobierno croata de que "no tenía instrucciones respecto al uso de su territorio para el tránsito de armas hacia Bosnia", un eufemismo mediante el que Bill Clinton daba luz verde para que los bosnios violaran el embargo de armas que pesaba sobre ellos. Que Clinton diera la autorización a sabiendas de que las armas provenían de Irán, su archienemigo, y además lo hiciera a espaldas del Congreso, demuestra que los renglones de la historia solo aparecen rectos en las páginas que escriben los historiadores, nunca en las decisiones de los políticos que la hacen. Es cierto que, como se ha recordado estos días, la democracia no se puede imponer con bombardeos desde 10.000 metros de altura, pero viendo a la fuerza aérea de Gadafi y a sus mercenarios intentar retomar las posiciones de unos rebeldes muy pobremente armados, es obligatorio preguntarse cuál es nuestro grado de indiferencia respecto a un eventual triunfo de Gadafi. Si la situación en Libia sigue igual de estancada, algún tipo de actuación militar será inevitable. Esta podrá tomar múltiples formas, desde la designación de zonas seguras en las fronteras para la atención y evacuación de refugiados hasta la creación de corredores humanitarios para atender a la población civil. Incluso si, como ha pedido el comité revolucionario de Bengasi, se presta cobertura aérea a la oposición para impedir que los aviones y helicópteros de Gadafi les

331 hostiguen o se sigue la doctrina Clinton sobre la falta de instrucciones respecto a los tránsitos de armas, esto requeriría desplegar en tierra pequeños equipos de apoyo. Con razón, y para que nadie se llame a engaño, el secretario de Defensa estadounidense ha señalado que la imposición de una zona de exclusión aérea es un acto de guerra en tanto en cuanto requiere destruir las defensas aéreas de Gadafi. Lógicamente, Estados Unidos no quiere dar ese paso sin cobertura de la ONU, pero China y Rusia no van a dar esa autorización a no ser que Gadafi ponga en marcha una matanza masiva de civiles. Quedan la Liga Árabe y la Unión Africana, que podrían legitimar una intervención militar, pero les pesa el precedente que se podría crear. Por tanto, quien quiera esperar a que brille la legalidad internacional antes de actuar que vaya apagando la televisión porque lo que podría ver en ella (a Gadafi retomando el poder o una guerra civil como la de Somalia, con cientos de miles de desplazados y miseria por doquier) no le va a gustar nada. Como tantas otras veces, todo lo que se debería hacer no se puede hacer, y todo lo que se puede hacer sirve de poco. Pero bien visto, eso significa que las posibilidades de actuación son inmensas, así que no descartemos nada. [email protected] http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Intervenir/Libia/elpepiint/20110304elpepii nt_8/Tes

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comment Business blog

[email protected] Libya and the risks of business-like universities March 4, 2011 4:06 am by John Gapper Howard Davies’ resignation as director of the London School of Economics over the university’s ties with the Libyan regime is a warning to other UK universities trying to close their funding gaps with outside donations. Sir Howard was admirably clear on Thursday about the reason for his departure: “There were risks involved in taking funding from sources associated with Libya, and they should have been weighed more heavily in the balance. Also, I made a personal error of judgment in accepting the British government’s invitation to be an economic envoy, and the consequent Libyan invitation to advise their sovereign wealth fund.” Libya is a particularly dubious case but, as UK universities are pushed to become more business-like to compensate for cuts in government funding and pressures not to raise student fees too rapidly, many are seeking other sources of cash. The LSE case is reminiscent of the fuss in 1996 over Wafic Said’s donation to found the Said Business School at Oxford University. Although Mr Said’s links with Saudi Arabia caused controversy, that donation went through. As they accept more private funding and donations, many UK universities look enviously at US colleges, some of which have much larger endowments and thus face less intense funding pressures. Many US universities rely heavily on donations from former students who have become rich. Carnegie-Mellon University, for example, renamed its business school the Tepper School when David Tepper, the hedge fund manager, donated $55m. However, some of the richest people in the UK are billionaires from the Middle East and countries including Russia. The LSE case illustrates the risks of taking donations from outside sources without checking them very carefully. Libya and the risks of business-like universities March 4, 2011 4:06 am http://blogs.ft.com/businessblog/2011/03/libya-and-the-risks-of-business-like- universities/

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http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/016ad9d4-45e1-11e0-acd8- 00144feab49a.html#ixzz1Fd8eK35B Openness can help lift the curse of resources By George Soros Published: March 3 2011 22:13 | Last updated: March 3 2011 22:13 The natural resources sector has the potential to generate billions of dollars in revenues that can be used for poverty reduction and sound investment. For decades, however, management secrecy has allowed corruption to thrive in countries such as Angola, Cambodia and Guinea. According to Nigeria’s own corruption agency, up to $400bn of oil money has been stolen or wasted over the past 50 years. And in Libya, in particular, we now see a population rising against rulers whose control has been financed by the immense revenues they manage, and mismanage, in secret. Ending this problem and letting new democracies flourish will, of course, not be easy. The resource curse undermines the investment climate, raises costs for companies, threatens energy and mineral security, and consigns millions of citizens in resource-rich countries to poverty. But evidence suggests that transparency in extractive industries can play an important role. EDITOR’S CHOICE: Bahrain and Oman aid mooted - Mar-03 S&P says turmoil could still spread - Mar-03 Humanitarian crisis tests EU’s policy - Mar-03 Egypt’s military appoints new prime minister - Mar-03 Saleh is pressed to agree exit strategy - Mar-03 Arab monarchs nervously watch Morocco - Mar-02 In 2002, I helped to launch the Publish What You Pay coalition, a global network of civil society organisations that has advocated for better management of oil, gas and mining revenues, and worked to ensure monies received are invested in schools, hospitals and poverty reduction. The coalition recruits oil companies, which then pledge to reveal what they pay to the governments and leaders of the states in which they operate, allowing them to be held accountable. In Liberia, this approach has seen moves towards new transparency standards, including openness on payments and contract terms – amazing progress in a country better known for former president Charles Taylor’s macabre violence and blood diamonds. There are further positive signs from the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, an alliance to improve standards of transparency on a voluntary basis. Azerbaijan’s credit rating improved in part because it played a constructive role in the initiative. This week, after the first democratically held elections in its history, Guinea rejoined the initiative too, because its leaders know that with EITI membership comes a better investment climate. Now, governments that regulate stock markets are going one necessary and long- awaited step further, in establishing mandatory listing rules. In July 2010, the US passed the Dodd-Frank Act, which requires all oil, mining and gas companies registered in the US to report payments to foreign governments, both by country and by project. 334

Companies as diverse as PetroChina, BHP Billiton and BP will have to comply. Similarly, Hong Kong recently improved the disclosure of its companies’ payments as a condition of listing on its exchange. The French and UK governments have also indicated support for new European oil and mining rules. EU revenue transparency legislation could build on US plans to move towards a new global transparency standard. The London Stock Exchange is one of the world’s most important financial markets, hosting more than £1,000bn worth of oil, gas and mining capital. It should follow others’ lead and change its rules too. All of these measures hold great promise. Africa is the new frontier for investors in the natural resources sector, holding a 10th of the world’s oil reserves, 40 per cent of its gold and significant reserves of other minerals vital for modern industrial economies. The Middle East, meanwhile, could soon develop a string of prosperous democracies. Those promoting greater transparency in the natural resources industries are helping to reinforce powerful historical forces, which will unlock transformational sums of money to improve the lives of millions of people in some of the most fragile countries in the world. The writer is chairman of Soros Fund Management LLC and founder of the Open Society Foundations http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/016ad9d4-45e1-11e0-acd8- 00144feab49a.html#axzz1FYdfpr8S

COMMENT http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/02d02356-45e1-11e0-acd8- 00144feab49a.html#ixzz1Fd5NpBFd Five pointers for the Middle East By Philip Stephens Published: March 3 2011 22:35 | Last updated: March 3 2011 22:35 Anyone who imagines that the Arab uprisings herald a short or smooth transition to democracy should take a glance at the western Balkans. Two decades after the fall of communism, the wounds have yet to heal in the former Yugoslavia. This in spite of a vast panoply of economic and political incentives proffered by the US and Europe. The crisis in Libya as Muammer Gaddafi clings to power will not be the only violent rupture as despots begin to fall in the Middle East. Nor will the eventual removal of the Libyan leader map an easy path to liberal democracy and economic prosperity in societies so long imprisoned by authoritarianism. EDITOR’S CHOICE: Opinion: A weakened Libya can avoid civil war - Mar-02 Gaddafi forces resume attacks on east - Mar-03 Gaddafi warns US and Nato of ‘bloody war’ - Mar-02 Court to investigate Gaddafi allegations - Mar-02 Alarm over plans for Libya no-fly zone - Mar-02 Libya rebels repel regime attacks - Mar-01 Building the infrastructure of freedom and the rule of law will be a painstaking and painful business. The one prediction that can be made with some certainty is that the revolutions will be punctuated by protracted periods of chaos.

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This is not a reason for anyone to throw up their hands in despair; nor for those of a “realist” foreign policy inclination to bemoan the passing of the age of autocrats. It does demand recognition that there are no quick fixes. Patience and perseverance will be at a premium. Sadly, we inhabit a world in which yesterday is usually deemed too late. The big challenge is to develop a framework of assistance that will survive short-term shocks. This requires some points of reference. The west could start with five basic signposts for the long road ahead. Celebrate the uprisings It will seem obvious to most people that the world should be loudly cheering this historic advance for freedom and democracy. But too many still hold on to the pernicious idea that Arabs are unready for, or undeserving of, democracy; that, alone in the world, the Middle East’s choice is between autocracies and Islamist extremism. As it happens, the jihadis of al-Qaeda have so far been the big strategic losers from recent events. There has been no burning of US flags on the streets of Cairo; no visible clamour in Tunisia or Libya against imperialists. The demands instead have been from a new generation seeking freedom and human dignity – values never high among Osama bin Laden’s priorities. All the more reason for outsiders to be unshakeable in their support for the advance of political pluralism. Interfere only in extremis The revolutions belong to the peoples of the region. When figures such as Tony Blair talk about “managing” the transition, alarm bells ring. The US and Europe carry too much historical baggage in this part of the world. The line not to be crossed is that between the offer of generous support and unsolicited efforts to meddle in democratic choices. If elections sometimes yield uncomfortable outcomes, so be it. This caution should apply to present events in Libya. Those who want rid of Mr Gaddafi now have all the right instincts. If he wages war on his own people, the UN must live up to its responsibility to protect. But the US and Europe should not unilaterally extend intervention beyond humanitarian assistance. No time for penny-pinching Military caution should be matched by economic generosity. The US and Europe should take a lead in mobilising resources so that democracy takes root in countries that eject authoritarian rulers. Call it a Marshall Plan if you like, but in any event the assistance must be on a scale equal to the challenge and the opportunity. For Europe to plead poverty and hide behind its public debt problems would be an unconscionable betrayal of its own as well as the Middle East’s future. There are big incentives available in addition to money. Trade and investment concessions should be given to governments ready to open up their societies. Immigration rules should be loosened for states in transition. On both counts Europe should be out in front. The European Union should also put to use its extensive experience in democratic institution-building. Further down the track, it should hold out the offer of strategic partnerships with new democracies. Nato should do likewise.

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Work with the rest America’s power and Europe’s proximity bestow particular responsibilities. But if the revolutions belong to the peoples of the region, the international response must not be seen as the property of the west. The world’s rising states (and yes that includes China) have a big stake in peaceful change. Turkey, the region’s only Islamic democracy, has a particular role and interest. The net should be spread widely. If the west’s political response to the revolutions is to secure international legitimacy, it must win the backing of the UN Security Council. Economic and development assistance should be top agenda items for the Group of 20 nations. Understand the stakes Political leaders will doubtless think of endless reasons to hesitate as the uprisings unfold. They will worry about the risk of disruption to oil supplies, about the threat that jihadis are regrouping, about increased migration and about the constraints imposed by their own fiscal deficits. The temptations to temporise will be enormous. The stakes are too high for that. On the one side lies the huge prize of a democratised and prosperous Middle East sharing universal values and pushing back against violent extremism. Arab democrats would challenge Iran’s ayatollahs. With the right investment, the Maghreb states could follow the economic path blazed a couple of decades ago by the Asian tigers. Conversely, if things go badly wrong for want of sufficient help, the costs, human and economic, will be many times higher than any western investment in success. Economic decline, soaring oil prices, radicalised populations and an uncontrolled tide of migration are all high on the list. So am I optimistic that the world will rise to this challenge? Not really. Barack Obama gives a good speech but, as far as the Middle East goes, the US presidential resolve has hitherto fallen short of the rhetoric. In Europe we have so far seen posturing from a bunch of politicians more comfortable in complacency. Sometimes, though, political leaders are made by the moment. Let’s hope that now is one of those sometimes. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/02d02356-45e1-11e0-acd8- 00144feab49a.html#axzz1FYdfpr8S

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March 3, 2011 Go to Jerusalem By ROGER COHEN WASHINGTON — Go to Jerusalem, Mr. President. Israel is anxious. It preferred the old Middle Eastern order. It could count on the despots, like Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak, to suppress the jihadists, reject Iran, and play the Israeli-Palestinian game along lines that created a permanent temporariness ever more favorable to Israeli power. Israelis are doubly worried. They wonder, Mr. President, if you like them in a heart-to- heart way. You’ve been to Cairo, you’ve been to Istanbul, so what’s wrong with Jerusalem? Why won’t you come and kvetch with us, President Obama, and feel our pain? Israelis are triply worried. Elections are unpredictable — just look at Gaza — and now they may be held across the Arab world! There’s the Muslim Brotherhood talking a good line but nursing menace. And what if Jordan goes, too? “America is Israel’s insurance company and right now we need the C.E.O. to come and tell us, ‘You are not alone,”’ Daniel Ben-Simon, a Knesset member who recently left the Labor Party told me. “We especially need that because Israeli policy is not just a tragedy, it’s almost criminal.” That’s right on both fronts. A great opportunity could be squandered as the Arab Spring unfurls. I find all the Israeli anxiety troubling for moral and strategic reasons. The moral reason is simple: What could be closer to the hearts of Jews than the sight of peoples fighting to throw off oppression and gain their dignity and freedom? If Israel has come to such a pass that these noble struggles from Benghazi to Bahrain leave it not just cold but troubled, then what has become of the soul of the Jewish state? The Middle East’s most vibrant democracy is missing the upside of the birth of new ones. First, when Arabs can legally assemble in places other than mosques, radical Islamism is dealt a blow. Second, American double-standards in backing the likes of Mubarak long gave demagogic ammunition to Israel’s enemies, chiefly Iran. Third, subjugated peoples are angry peoples easily manipulated, whereas the empowered focus on improving their own lives, not conflict elsewhere. Fourth, accountability in Arab governance began right next door in the West Bank with Salam Fayyad’s program: Israel should get ahead of the democratizing wave by embracing that development rather than pooh-poohing it. There’s no reason to think Arab liberation stops at Palestine’s door. The Arab awakening is not yet about Israel — I never heard the word “Israel” during two weeks in Cairo — but that could change if another skirmish erupts. Nothing would

338 radicalize regional sentiment, now focused on building rather than destroying, as quickly. So the overwhelming American, European, Israeli and Arab interest lies in breaking the volatile Israeli-Palestinian deadlock. But how? A little thing happened between the Egyptian and Libyan crises. The United States vetoed a United Nations Security Council resolution condemning Israeli settlement building in the West Bank. This was, I hear, an agonizing decision for Obama in that it amounted to a veto of his own sentiments, almost his words. He has said the United States does “not accept the legitimacy” of the settlements, which should stop. America’s main allies — including Britain, France and Germany — voted in favor. Of course it’s Obama who’s facing an election next year where censure of Israel would cost him. Obama, I was told, tried everything to get the Palestinians to withdraw the resolution. He offered the Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, a package including a Quartet statement committing to using the 1967 borders as the basis for a resolution. The United States, unlike the European Union, has never been quite that far. But Abbas, feeling vulnerable, demurred — and the U.S. veto ensued. That was a Palestinian mistake — a tactical thrill at the expense of strategic gain. The Palestinians are in urgent need of a coherent negotiating team. Israel is in urgent need of direction. An altercation followed the vote between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and German Chancellor Angela Merkel. He asked how Germany could chastise Israel and she expressed outrage at Israeli stalling. When Germany, Israel’s second-closest ally, gets exercised, exasperation is running high. There’s exasperation here, too. Obama’s word is on the line. He said last year that by the time of the U.N. General Assembly in September, “We can have an agreement that will lead to a new member of the United Nations — an independent, sovereign state of Palestine living in peace with Israel.” September is six months from now. I’d hoped there was an Israeli quid pro quo for that self-contradicting U.S. veto, a diplomatic nadir. There isn’t. Now Israel’s talking about “interim agreements” again. That won’t fly. Palestinians know by now who gains from permanent temporariness. Palestine wants sovereignty. Israel wants security. Those are non-negotiable demands. Only an Obama gamble can break the logjam by September. He should go to Jerusalem in May and address the Knesset. He should spell out all the ways America will guarantee Israel’s security. He must coax Israel from the siege mentality that blinds it to the opportunities multiplying around it. He can spread the love. A new Middle East deserves more than an old Israel. You can follow Roger Cohen on Twitter at twitter.com/nytimescohen . http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/04/opinion/04iht-edcohen04.html?hp

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March 3, 2011 Huntington’s Clash Revisited By DAVID BROOKS Samuel Huntington was one of America’s greatest political scientists. In 1993, he published a sensational essay in Foreign Affairs called “The Clash of Civilizations?” The essay, which became a book, argued that the post-cold war would be marked by civilizational conflict. Human beings, Huntington wrote, are divided along cultural lines — Western, Islamic, Hindu and so on. There is no universal civilization. Instead, there are these cultural blocks, each within its own distinct set of values. The Islamic civilization, he wrote, is the most troublesome. People in the Arab world do not share the general suppositions of the Western world. Their primary attachment is to their religion, not to their nation-state. Their culture is inhospitable to certain liberal ideals, like pluralism, individualism and democracy. Huntington correctly foresaw that the Arab strongman regimes were fragile and were threatened by the masses of unemployed young men. He thought these regimes could fall, but he did not believe that the nations would modernize in a Western direction. Amid the tumult of regime change, the rebels would selectively borrow tools from the West, but their borrowing would be refracted through their own beliefs. They would follow their own trajectory and not become more Western. The Muslim world has bloody borders, he continued. There are wars and tensions where the Muslim world comes into conflict with other civilizations. Even if decrepit regimes fell, he suggested, there would still be a fundamental clash of civilizations between Islam and the West. The Western nations would do well to keep their distance from Muslim affairs. The more the two civilizations intermingle, the worse the tensions will be. Huntington’s thesis set off a furious debate. But with the historic changes sweeping through the Arab world, it’s illuminating to go back and read his argument today. In retrospect, I’d say that Huntington committed the Fundamental Attribution Error. That is, he ascribed to traits qualities that are actually determined by context. He argued that people in Arab lands are intrinsically not nationalistic. He argued that they do not hunger for pluralism and democracy in the way these things are understood in the West. But it now appears as though they were simply living in circumstances that did not allow that patriotism or those spiritual hungers to come to the surface. It now appears that people in these nations, like people in all nations, have multiple authentic selves. In some circumstances, one set of identities manifests itself, but when those circumstances change, other equally authentic identities and desires get activated. For most of the past few decades, people in Arab nations were living under regimes that rule by fear. In these circumstances, most people shared the conspiracy mongering and

340 the political passivity that these regimes encouraged. But when the fear lessened, and the opportunity for change arose, different aspirations were energized. Over the past weeks, we’ve seen Arab people ferociously attached to their national identities. We’ve seen them willing to risk their lives for pluralism, openness and democracy. I’d say Huntington was also wrong in the way he defined culture. In some ways, each of us is like every person on earth; in some ways, each of us is like the members of our culture and group; and, in some ways, each of us is unique. Huntington minimized the power of universal political values and exaggerated the influence of distinct cultural values. It’s easy to see why he did this. He was arguing against global elites who sometimes refuse to acknowledge the power of culture at all. But it seems clear that many people in Arab nations do share a universal hunger for liberty. They feel the presence of universal human rights and feel insulted when they are not accorded them. Culture is important, but underneath cultural differences there are these universal aspirations for dignity, for political systems that listen to, respond to and respect the will of the people. Finally, I’d say Huntington misunderstood the nature of historical change. In his book, he describes transformations that move along linear, projectable trajectories. But that’s not how things work in times of tumult. Instead, one person moves a step. Then the next person moves a step. Pretty soon, millions are caught up in a contagion, activating passions they had but dimly perceived just weeks before. They get swept up in momentums that have no central authority and that, nonetheless, exercise a sweeping influence on those caught up in their tides. I write all this not to denigrate the great Huntington. He may still be proved right. The Arab world may modernize on its own separate path. But his mistakes illuminate useful truths: that all people share certain aspirations and that history is wide open. The tumult of events can transform the traits and qualities that seemed, even to great experts, etched in stone. DAVID BROOKS Huntington’s Clash Revisited March 3, 2011 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/04/opinion/04brooks.html?hp

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http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/cf630c12-4460-11e0-931d- 00144feab49a.html#ixzz1Fd7KKbRI Clinton calls for Gaddafi to face Lockerbie trial By Daniel Dombey in Washington Published: March 2 2011 00:22 | Last updated: March 2 2011 00:22 Hillary Clinton, US secretary of state, said Muammer Gaddafi should be prosecuted for the Lockerbie bombing, in comments that broke with the west’s focus on the convicted bomber rather than on the regime whose orders he followed. Mrs Clinton said the US would move quickly, adding that the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, in which 270 people died, was one of many charges that could be levied against Colonel Gaddafi in the International Criminal Court, to which he was referred by the UN Security Council at the weekend. EDITOR’S CHOICE: Alarm over plans for Libya no-fly zone - Mar-02 Desperation as thousands dash for exit - Mar-01 Opinion: Sup with tyrants, but use a long spoon - Mar-01 Italy poised to freeze Libyan shareholdings - Mar-01 Global Insight: Autocrats miss the point - Mar-01 Western Libya towns brace for attacks - Mar-01 “Because there have been statements made in the last days by what are now former members of the Libyan government fingering Gaddafi, making it clear that the order came from the very top, I think we do need to move expeditiously,” Mrs Clinton said. She told the House of Representatives foreign affairs committee that she would consult with Robert Mueller, FBI director, and Eric Holder, attorney-general. The ICC referral is based on alleged war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide committed by Col Gaddafi this year. The Swedish newspaper Expressen last week quoted Mustafa Abdel-Jalil, who recently resigned as Libya’s justice minister, as saying: “I have proof that Gaddafi gave the order about Lockerbie.” Mr Abdel Jalil said Col Gaddafi gave the order to Abdel Basset al-Megrahi, the only man convicted for the bombing of the flight over Lockerbie, in Scotland, who was freed by Scottish authorities on compassionate grounds in 2009, despite US protests. As part of its then-rapprochement with the west, Libya gave $1.5bn to settle outstanding terrorism claims in 2008 and George W. Bush signed legislation as president rendering Libya immune from related suits in US courts. Mrs Clinton was speaking after being handed a letter by the families of Lockerbie victims who urged Barack Obama, the president, to reactivate the criminal investigation of flight 103 given the existence of witnesses with proof “leading to the apprehension and prosecution of Gaddafi and his henchmen”.

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The letter urged the US to take statements from the former Libyan ambassadors to the US and the UN, who have both resigned in response to Col Gaddafi’s crackdown, but remain in the US. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/cf630c12-4460-11e0-931d- 00144feab49a.html#axzz1FYdfpr8S

CARTOON

GADO En la cama con Gadafi

4 marzo 2011 DAILY NATION NAIROBI

VIÑETISTA Godfrey "Gado" Mwampembwa es un dibujante nacido en Tanzania en 1969. Arquitecto de formación, trabajó en publicaciones tanzanas como Daily News, Business Times y The Express, antes de entrar en el grupo de prensa keniata Nation Media Group, que publica... Frente a la represión de la revuelta popular en Libia, los occidentales elevan la voz contra su ex socio. De izquierda a derecha, José Manuel Barroso: "!La situación en Libia es inaceptable¡"; Nicolas Sarkozy: "De una u otra forma, tiene que hablar¡"; Barack Obama: "¡Gadafi debe irse inmediatamente¡";David Cameron: "¡Sí, y vamos a congelar sus bienes!"; Angela Merkel: "¡Debemos aplicar sanciones!"; Silvio Berlusconi: "Gadafi debe irse o utilizaremos la fuerza militar..." Esquina inferior derecha: "¿Y quién tomará su lugar?"

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03/03/2011 03:23 PM The World from Berlin 'Time Is On Gadhafi's Side' The West has no stomach for military intervention in Libya, but also no clear ideas about ending the crisis before it becomes a full-fledged civil war. German commentators argue that the international community needs to act quickly. As violence in Libya continues with no end in sight, the debate about a possible military intervention by the West has heated up. But the international community is cautious about getting dragged into the conflict, which threatens to turn into a prolonged civil war. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has said the US is concerned about Libya "descending into chaos and becoming a giant Somalia." On Thursday, there were reports that rebels fighting dictator Moammar Gadhadfi had called on the international community to impose a no-fly zone over the country. That followed a rebel demand on Wednesday for UN-backed air strikes against foreign mercenaries who are supposedly fighting for Gadhafi. NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said on Thursday that the alliance is engaged in "prudent planning for all eventualities," despite having no intention of interfering in Libya. Western diplomats told the Associated Press that some NATO members were drawing up contingency plans for a no-fly zone, should the international community decide on such a step. Getting a no-fly zone approved by the UN Security Council would be tough, given that Russia -- a veto-holding permanent member -- has already opposed such a move. On Wednesday, too, US Defense Secretary Robert Gates also called for an end to "loose talk" about military intervention, saying that a no-fly zone would also entail a military attack on Libya. 'No Impunity' The West has already taken a number of non-military measures. The UN Security Council has imposed sanctions on the Gadhafi regime, as have a number of European countries, including Germany. Libya has also been suspended from the UN Human Rights Council, which met in Geneva earlier this week. On Thursday, the International Criminal Court announced it was launching an investigation into Gadhafi and his close associates, including some of his sons, over possible crimes against humanity. The ICC's prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, said there would be "no impunity in Libya." Meanwhile Gadhafi shows no sign of wanting to relinquish control. His forces struck back at rebels in the east of the country again on Thursday, following attacks on Wednesday. Further air strikes on the rebel-held towns of Brega, an important oil- exporting port, and Adjabiya were reported Thursday. On Wednesday, rebels had succeeded in beating back a government offensive. German commentators take a look at the West's response on Thursday. The left-leaning Die Tageszeitung writes: "Those who hoped that the political upheaval in Libya would follow a similar straightforward pattern as in Tunisia and Egypt now face being proved wrong. Gadhafi has regained his composure militarily and is using his remaining power to start a

344 campaign of revenge against the revolutionaries. … It is not Tunisia that is currently the model for Libya's future. Instead, it threatens to become a Somalia on the Mediterranean." "In Libya, the most important thing now is to oust Gadhafi from power. While the international community agonizes over aid for refugees and new ways to increase the pressure on Gadhafi, people are dying every day, and the fear and despair of Libyans is increasing. The faster a decision is taken against Gadhafi, the better. Anyone wanting to help Libya must find a way to eliminate Gadhafi." The center-right Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung writes: "It is easy to ridicule the achievements of the United Nations. The Security Council quickly imposed sanctions against Gadhafi's regime. But do the diplomats intend to stop the dictator with fine print? Will the colonel surrender in the final battle for Tripoli because the world has imposed a travel ban on him, blocked his foreign bank accounts and threatened to prosecute him in the International Criminal Court?" "But the UN is an organization that represents the world as it is, not the world as it should be. In the struggle to find compromises, democrats have to deal with autocrats, raw material producers with consumers, and freedom-lovers with sponsors of terror." "Nevertheless, the international organization acted wisely last week. After a week of UN diplomacy, Gadhafi has now received a clear message that no one in the world sees him as a brave anti-imperialist, resisting the West and offering hope to the oppressed of the Global South. Gadhafi … is isolated. In Geneva, not even Cuba voted against the resolution to suspend Libya from the UN Human Rights Council." The center-left Süddeutsche Zeitung writes: "Colonel Gadhafi strikes back. With an attack on the oil and port city of Brega, the Libyan dictator has shown that he means his vicious threats against the insurgents." "The insurgents are poorly organized. They have yet to deploy troops, even though they have seized large quantities of weapons and many army officers have switched sides. Either the rebels are in disagreement or they are incapable of organization. The present situation does not, however, require endless debates in citizens' committees. Rather, it needs readiness for military action. … Time is on Gadhafi's side." -- David Gordon Smith URL: http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,748863,00.html RELATED SPIEGEL ONLINE LINKS: • Failed Evacuation Attempt: Three Dutch Marines Held By Libyan Forces (03/03/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,748831,00.html • Opposition Carries on Fight against Gadhafi: 'If the Americans Come, They Would Steal our Revolution' (03/03/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,748832,00.html • Libyan Revolution: With No End to Fighting, International Pressure Grows on Gadhafi (03/02/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,748586,00.html • Fear of Freedom: Democracy Virus Has Dictators Fretting (03/01/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,748354,00.html

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03/03/2011 12:44 PM Opposition Carries on Fight against Gadhafi. 'If the Americans Come, They Would Steal our Revolution' By Jonathan Stock in Ajdabiya, Libya Far from raising the white flag, Gadhafi's troops are continuing to fight against the opposition in eastern Libya in order to maintain control of the country's crucial oil facilities along the Bay of Sirt. Opposition fighters claim they have driven back their attackers, but the battle is far from finished. Yusuf helped to transport the explosives from old bombs to the front as the opposition fought to take control of Benghazi in eastern Libya. Today, the young man, with his dark curls of hair, is wearing a beret with a red star on it. The men fighting along with him call him "Chifarris," an apparent reference to Che Guevara. The 23-year-old's mother came to Libya from Germany 30 years ago, and his forefathers fought against their Italian occupiers in the North African country. "Whatever happens will happen," he says of the current battle against dictator Moammar Gadhafi. At the green west gate to the Bedouin city of Ajdabiya, Yunus waits, indecisively, along with hundreds of other fighters, for a decision on whether or not they will continue forward with their drive. They cover their eyes to protect them from the desert sand and peer towards Brega to the west, where the pipelines from the Defa oil fields run to the Sirt Oil Company's refinery, the second largest in oil-rich Libya. That's where fighters supporting Gadhafi arrived in the morning, supported by airplanes and heavy artillary. Nobody knows exactly what is happening there now, or whether the fighting is still continuing. Just beyond Brega begins western Libya, parts of which are still under Gadhafi's control. The men have set up a 107-millimeter rocket launcher, a 36-year-old model manufactured in Korea. Standing behind it is Asman Bueghi, a man wearing a blue camouflage suit. He is ready to fire at anything that approaches them along the road. "If we die, then we are all going to die," he says, grabbing a rocket and posing with it for a photo. The rockets have a maximum range of 7 kilometers (4.3 miles). Bueghi says he has always been a soldier and that he will always be one. "We are a good country," he says. Set in the sand next to him are green wooden boxes labelled with explosives warnings. Further ahead, a French M8 cannon is in place, with a smiling pensioner watching over it. Beyond that, all one can see is the vast desert. A teenager makes his way through the crowd carrying a sword. "It's the only weapon I have," he says, stretching it up high. "Me, god and my heart," he says, holding his hand to his chest. Ambulances drive by from the front, transporting the first of the injured. The hospital in Brega was apparently too small for them. "Move, move," the passenger in the front seat hollers, waving his arms out the window in order to disperse the crowd gathered along the road. 346

Mazdas, Nissans and Toyotas can all be seen driving in the other direction to deliver supplies to the front. Fighters with cloth covering parts of their faces, to protect against the sand, hold their Kalashnikovs high and bang them into the air. Fear? No, we're not afraid, say the fighters. But many of them call out "pray for us!" 'Anyone with a Car Should Chase the Murderers' At the hospital in Brega, one can hear the dull thump of detonations. Yusuf says it is enemy fire. The hallways are full of people who have come to help. Even pharmacists have donned turquoise doctor's smocks. One young man lying on a bed is getting a wound on his hand bandaged and shrapnel has struck his thumb. "For Libya," he calls out, creating a victory symbol with his forefinger and middle finger on his uninjured hand. One of the helpers plays an unsteady video on his mobile phone of a fighter who was hit in the neck. The man is no longer in the hospital. There is a trail of blood droplets on the sidewalk outside the hospital leading to a small building about 20 meters away. It is the hospital's morgue and inside lie three bodies, the feet of the man in the middle are wrapped together with white bandages. It is a tiny facility; a fourth body lies on a stretcher on the floor covered with a lab coat, its face still covered with sand, dried sweat and blood. It was 5:00 a.m. when the Gadhafi loyalists approached in 50 vehicles from the direction of Sirt, the neighboring town to the west, say family members of the hospitalized rebels. They occupied the oil refinery, the airport and the port, they say. But the fighters from Ajdabiya were able to push them back. "Anyone with a car should chase the murderers," the driver of an ambulance calls into his radio. Particularly those with four-wheel drive, he adds, given that the pro-Gadhafi forces fled into the desert. Two ambulances head out to collect the rest of the dead. Shortly before they arrive at the refinery, they come across a group of rebels. They captured and killed one of the pro-Gadhafi fighters, who lies dead on the ground, his face in the dirt. The rebels claim that he is a mercenary from Mauritania. They are playing around with the corpse, waving with his shoes and dragging him on the ground. One of the fighters playfully aims his Kalashnikov at the dead man and his comrades jump out of the way. Then the body is picked up and put in the ambulance. 'Gadhafi Wants the Oil' Yusuf Sultan, who works at the refinery, climbs into the bed of one of the pick-up trucks and points to the two pipelines that travel 200 kilometers through the desert. "It's the oil," he says. "Gadhafi wants the oil. That's a good sign; it means he is running out." So far, there have been at least five people killed and 20 wounded in the battle, says Nasser El Suhbi, an anaesthesiologist and emergency room doctor who came from Benghazi to pick up the most seriously wounded. Suhbi says that Benghazi, the most important city in the part of Libya no longer under Gadhafi's control, can only take on the worst cases. Some 80 percent of the country's nurses, most of whom came from the Philippines, have left Libya and there is a shortage of medical supplies, particularly anaesthetics. "Maybe there is enough for another month," Suhbi says. The doctor isn't just worried about hospital supplies. Outside, a group of people are shooting joyously into the air. "They should be saving their bullets," Suhbi says.

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On the return trip, the new radio station from eastern Libya is playing. "This is the voice of free Libya," the moderator says and addresses the city of Sirt directly, the town from which the mercenaries are thought to have approached. "I call on you, the sons of Sirt, you children of Libya! Do not obey the tyrant Gadhafi! You know that he is crazy and that he kills everybody. We love you, we are all one family. You have fought many battles with us. Fight with us again! Rise up!" Yusuf leans out of the window and yells "victory!" At the same time, two jets are attacking Brega and drop bombs near an ambulance there, as a Danish photographer reports later. But even if Gadhafi should continue his attacks on the rebels, Yusuf and his comrades say they don't want to see Western troops in Libya. A no-fly zone, he says, would be fine. "But if the Americans come," he says, "they would steal our revolution."

URL: • http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,748832,00.html RELATED SPIEGEL ONLINE LINKS: • Photo Gallery: The Dictator Strikes Back http://www.spiegel.de/fotostrecke/fotostrecke-65309.html • Libyan Revolution: With No End to Fighting, International Pressure Grows on Gadhafi (03/02/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,748586,00.html • Author Hisham Matar on the Revolution in Libya: 'Libyans Are Rediscovering What It Means to Be a People' (03/01/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,748210,00.html • Europe's Favorite Dictators: The EU Has Failed the Arab World (02/28/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,748074,00.html

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http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b81f44e8-45e2-11e0-acd8- 00144feab49a.html#ixzz1Fd97iHTe Bahrain and Oman aid mooted By Simeon Kerr and Robin Wigglesworth Published: March 3 2011 22:22 | Last updated: March 3 2011 22:22 The Arab Gulf states are mulling a large aid package for Bahrain and Oman as they seek to keep a lid on growing unrest by increasing public spending, officials say. The six-member Gulf Co-operation Council is holding talks on distributing funds to the two troubled states that have more modest oil and gas resources than the other members: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. EDITOR’S CHOICE: Opinion: Openness can help lift the curse of resources - Mar-03 S&P says turmoil could still spread - Mar-03 Humanitarian crisis tests EU’s policy - Mar-03 Egypt’s military appoints new prime minister - Mar-03 Saleh is pressed to agree exit strategy - Mar-03 Arab monarchs nervously watch Morocco - Mar-02 Officials and politicians in Bahrain confirmed that talks were ongoing over the aid package, which aims to ease social unrest that has damaged the economy of Bahrain and affected the industrial port of Sohar. “Discussions are taking place,” said a spokesperson for the government of Bahrain. This week, a Kuwaiti newspaper said the Marshall Plan-style package would seek to raise living standards in Bahrain and Oman. The plan would include initiatives in housing and employment opportunities. The paper reported it could also see the GCC labour markets provide priorities to Bahrainis and Omanis. “There are talks now to help Bahrain financially – we hear that it could be BD4bn ($10.6bn),” says Jawad Fairooz, a Bahraini opposition politician. Earlier, a group of the country’s leading businessmen urged the government to solve the political crisis quickly as the toll on the economy mounts. Some of them are expected to go as far as recommending that the crown prince transform the island kingdom into the Gulf’s first constitutional monarchy, a key demand for the opposition and the paramount one for protesters Selected representatives of Bahrain’s biggest merchant families and companies, split roughly evenly between the Shia and Sunni Muslim communities, have engaged in a week-long discussion with politicians, aiming to resolve a crisis that has hammered the country’s economy. “We will recommend a charter committee to write a new constitution and make Bahrain a constitutional monarchy,” said Hadi al-Alawi, a prominent Shia merchant. “We need a charter written by the people and agreed with the government, not the one-sided charter we have now.”

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On Thursday, the group of almost 100 powerful merchants and bankers elected a chairman, former education minister Ali Fakhro, who has been asked to select another five members of a committee in consultation with the broader business group. This six-strong committee will then present recommendations to Bahrain’s powerful crown prince, Sheikh Salman bin Hamad al-Khalifa, who has been charged by the ruling family to fix the political crisis that has brought the country to the brink of civil war. “We businessmen will represent all Bahrainis, and will to an extent fight to get their rights,” said Ali al-Musalam, a member of a Sunni merchant family. “I can agree to some of their [the protesters’] demands, but we cannot do it all right now.” Any recommendation by powerful commercial groups that Bahrain take steps towards a constitutional monarchy would increase pressure on the royal family to relinquish some of its powers. The ongoing demonstrations focused on Pearl roundabout in downtown Manama, the capital, have severely damaged commerce in Bahrain, one of the few Gulf countries with a vibrant private sector. Bankers say cash deposits are dropping, with one saying a significant amount of Saudi money has been pulled out of the system. ●The Bahraini crisis deepened Thursday night as clashes broke out between Shia and Sunni. Scores of people were involved in fights with knives and swords, witnesses said, raising the threat of sectarian violence as anti-government protests enter their third week. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b81f44e8-45e2-11e0-acd8- 00144feab49a.html#axzz1FYdfpr8S

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http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d51b85e8-44fc-11e0-80e7- 00144feab49a.html#ixzz1Fd6HfvBN Global powers weigh cost of military response By Roula Khalaf and James Blitz in London Published: March 2 2011 18:50 | Last updated: March 2 2011 18:50 Anti-regime protesters in the Arab world have been particularly proud of their ability to make history without resorting to violence and, as importantly, without soliciting foreign help. But the young masses are now confronting a complex Libyan crisis and a dictator in Tripoli determined to transform these perceptions and shatter the image of the revolutions. EDITOR’S CHOICE: Libyan rebels call for US bomb attacks - Mar-02 Alarm over plans for Libya no-fly zone - Mar-02 Desperation as thousands dash for exit - Mar-01 Evacuation boost for Greek ferry operators - Mar-02 Clinton calls for Gaddafi to face Lockerbie trial - Mar-02 An ‘honoured guest’ of Omani army - Mar-01 As Muammer Gaddafi goes on the offensive in a standoff that risks developing into a protracted civil war, his opponents in the liberated east of the country have turned into armed rebels. They are calling for international air strikes against regime military bases and for a no-fly zone to prevent the colonel from deploying his jets and helicopter gunships. So far, however, world powers appear more willing to issue threats than commit military might to help unseat Col Gaddafi. In a show of force, the US has deployed ships in the Mediterranean and emphasised its active “consideration” of a no-fly zone. But, in spite of calls for such a step from figures including John McCain, the Republican senator, US commanders with forces already stretched in Afghanistan and the Gulf are wary of further engagement. Western officials say governments are trying to strike a balance between ensuring sufficient humanitarian support in the event of thousands of more Libyan deaths and avoiding being dragged into a conflict that could once again raise the spectre of heavy-handed US intervention in the Middle East. There is no doubt that in terms of capabilities, the US and Europe have a variety of options for intervention in a country on the southern shores of the Mediterranean. A no-fly zone, for example, is a practical possibility given Libya’s proximity to Nato and US bases across southern Europe. Yet Libya is also a vast territory and that makes policing its airspace both financially and strategically challenging.

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Western officials say a no-fly zone would first require offensive military action against the regime’s air defences – Libya retains about 216 surface-to-air missiles – which could result in civilian deaths. Air strikes could play into the hands of the Libyan dictator, who thrived for decades on confronting the west. “It [air strikes] would have the effect of galvanising Gaddafi, allowing him to portray himself instantly as victim of US and western aggression, rather than an internal revolt. That is precisely the outcome we don’t want,” says one UK official. The option of arming the opposition in the east – a proposal raised by the UK’s David Cameron this week – is also fraught with risk. “The problem here is that you have to ask yourself who would you be arming,” says James Hackett of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. “You are probably dealing with a range of different tribes and communities that have very different agendas once Gaddafi goes.” The political ramifications of intervention are also significant, particularly as the memory of the US invasion of Iraq is still fresh in both American and Arab minds. The Arab League on Wednesday insisted on the rejection of “any foreign military intervention” in Libya. Russia’s opposition to a no-fly zone means it would not be covered by a United Nations Security Council resolution. The opposition of France and Turkey, meanwhile, leaves the US and UK leading and policing the no-fly zone, rather than Nato. “A US-led intervention would transform perceptions,” says the British official. “It would once again make the upheaval in the Middle East into a story of US intervention, akin to the Iraq debacle.” Shashank Joshi, analyst at London’s Royal United Services Institute, says the US and UK might have to fall back on covert operations to support anti-regime forces, including through reconnaissance flights and communications assistance. “Those cautioning against western intervention have good points...but the key is to keep it low key,” he says. “Even if the rebels are not a cohesive force, there are pockets of organisation at a local level that can be points of interface for western [special] operations.” Other analysts say the US and UK could be forced into more robust military action if Col Gaddafi inflicts heavy casualties on the ground, provoking international outrage and putting pressure on governments to act. in Washington Dombey Daniel reporting by Additional http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d51b85e8-44fc-11e0-80e7- 00144feab49a.html#axzz1FYdfpr8S

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TRIBUNA: ILAN PAPPÉ Israel: idéntica cartografía, geografía variable ILAN PAPPÉ 03/03/2011 Israel cree que el triunfo de las revoluciones de Túnez y de Egipto le supone una muy mala cosa. Que la televisión muestre a ciudadanos árabes educados y no islamistas,que en perfecto inglés exponen sus articuladas opiniones sobre la democracia sin recurrir a la retórica antioccidental, no puede serle, desde luego, sino una muy mala cosa. Y si además los ejércitos de esos dos países se abstienen de matar a tiros a los manifestantes, entonces... bueno, entonces la cosa se pone todavía peor, porque hace que su política de ocupación de Cisjordania y Gaza, además del apartheid ejercido sobre las poblaciones de esos territorios, se parezca demasiado a las políticas de los dictadores árabes. En su primer, y hasta ahora único, mensaje sensato enviado por Netanyahu a sus ministros, les rogaba no comentar en público los acontecimientos que estan teniendo lugar en Egipto. Oyéndole se diría que, por un instante, Israel hubiera decidido cambiar su papel de vecino ocupante por el de simple visitante. Parece ser que hasta Netanyahu se sintió abochornado por los comentarios de Aviv Kochavi, general en jefe del Servicio de Inteligencia Militar. Y es que, hace apenas dos semanas, este dijo, nada menos que en la Kneset, que el régimen de Mubarak seguía siendo tan sólido y tan resistente como lo había sido siempre. Pero Netanyahu tampoco pudo mantener la boca cerrada y, cuando la abrió, los demás le imitaron. Sus comentarios fueron de tal calibre que, a su lado, los redactores y presentadores de Fox News casi recuerdan a los pacifistas y hippies de los años sesenta. El mensaje de Israel es muy simple: la revolución de Egipto -que es la que le pilla más cerca- es una revolución de tipo iraní promovida por Al Yazira y consentida estúpidamente por Barack Obama, que cada día se parece más a Jimmy Carter. Encabezando la difusión de este "inteligente" análisis figuran los antiguos embajadores israelíes en Egipto, frustrados por haber tenido que pasar todo el tiempo de su mandato sin hacer prácticamente nada, encerrados en un apartamento cairota sin muchos lujos. Ahora, sin embargo, han entrado en erupción con la fuerza de un Etna imparable: "Lo que está sucediendo en Egipto es algo malo, pero que muy malo para todos los judíos", afirmaba Zvi Mazael en el Canal Uno de la televisión israelí el pasado 28 de enero. En Israel, si alguien dice "malo para los judíos" los demás entienden enseguida que es malo para los israelíes y también, puesto que es malo para Israel, es malo para todos los judíos del mundo (y esto en contra de todas las evidencias en sentido contrario desde que se fundó el Estado de Israel). Lo cierto es que lo verdaderamente malo para Israel son las comparaciones, porque, independientemente de cómo vaya a terminar todo esto, los acontecimientos actuales en el mundo árabe dejan al descubierto, como nunca antes, todas sus mentiras y falsas pretensiones. Egipto ha estado viviendo una Intifada pacífica en la que laúnica violencia existente ha procedido de los más leales a Mubarak. Hasta ahora, el Ejército no ha disparado allí un tiro, pero, en cambio, el ministro del Interior, en los primeros siete días de protestas, se 353 empleó a fondo para aplastar las manifestaciones, por lo que fue expulsado del Gobierno y será, con toda seguridad, llevado ante los tribunales. Hoy sabemos que era solo una táctica destinada a ganar tiempo para que los manifestantes se fueran a casa. Pero es que algo así nunca ha sucedido en Israel, un país donde todos los generales que en su día ordenaron disparar contra los palestinos, o a los judíos contrarios a la ocupación, son los mismos que compiten ahora por el puesto de general en jefe. Uno de ellos, Fair Naveh, ordenó en 2008 acabar con cualquier palestino sospechoso, incluso en el caso de que no se resistiera al arresto. Ese hombre nunca irá a la cárcel, pero Anat Kamm, la joven periodista que descubrió estas órdenes, se enfrenta ahora a una condena de nueve años por pasárselas a Haaretz, que las hizo públicas. Resumiendo: ningún militar o político israelí pasará un solo día en la cárcel por haber ordenado a las tropas que disparen sobre manifestantes desarmados, civiles inocentes, mujeres, hombres y niños. Pero, claro, la luz que emanan los acontecimientos de Túnez o Egipto es tan fuerte que alcanza a iluminar perfectamente los más oscuros rincones de la "única democracia" de Oriente Próximo. Así que, por supuesto, los árabes democráticos y no violentos (sean o no religiosos) no pueden ser sino algo "malo" para Israel. Aunque quizá este tipo de árabes ha estado ahí todo el rato y no solo en Egipto sino también en Palestina. En ese sentido, la insistencia de los especialistas israelíes en que el tratado de paz con Egipto está en peligro es solo una maniobra de distracción. Lo único que está en riesgo ahora es la pretensión de Israel de ser un islote occidental estable y civilizado, rodeado por un mar de fanáticos islamistas. Lo verdaderamente "malo" para Israel es que la cartografía siga siendo la misma, pero la geografía cambie, que siga siendo un islote, un islote de bárbaros y fanáticos rodeado por un mar de nuevos Estados igualitarios y democráticos. Hace mucho tiempo que la imagen de Israel como Estado democrático se ha borrado de las mentes de una gran parte de la sociedad democrática occidental ¿Qué repercusiones podría tener este hecho en las especiales relaciones que mantiene con Estados Unidos? El tiempo lo dirá. De momento las voces nacidas en la plaza Tahrir advierten que las falsas mitologías de la "única democracia de Oriente Medio", núcleo duro del fundamentalismo cristiano (mucho más siniestro y corrupto que el de los Hermanos Musulmanes), de la altamente rentable industria armamentística, del neo-conservadurismo y de las brutales maniobras de los lobbies, no podrán garantizar por siempre las relaciones especiales entre Israel y Estados Unidos. Incluso manteniéndose por algún tiempo, es probable que la ayuda del amigo americano no sea suficiente para mantener un Estado judío étnicamente racista en un mundo árabe en plena transformación. Y, sí, después de todo, puede que a medio plazo estas buenas noticias no lo sean tanto para los judíos de Israel. Estar rodeados por gentes que dan la bienvenida a la libertad, la justicia social y espiritual, cuyos barcos surcarán las aguas, unas veces del mar en calma, otras de mar gruesa, de la tradición y la modernidad, el capitalismo agresivo y la supervivencia cotidiana, no será fácil. Ahora, sin embargo, hay una mayor esperanza de que cambios parecidos puedan darse en Palestina. Y ello con el fin de que el siglo -ahora ya más de un siglo- de sionismo termine de una vez y se logre la reconciliación entre los palestinos víctimas de políticas criminales y la comunidad judía.

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Una reconciliación que ha de ser justa -o no será-, construida sobre la base de su derecho al retorno, así como de los derechos humanos, sociales y políticos -hasta ahora negados-, por los que también el pueblo de Egipto ha luchado valientemente durante las semanas de enero en que el mundo concentró su mirada en la plaza de Tahrir. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/opinion/Israel/identica/cartografia/geografia/variable/elp epuopi/20110303elpepiopi_4/Tes

Riz Khan - The music of revolution

Rock star and activist Yusuf Islam talks about this latest song inspired by the popular uprisings in the Arab world.

-Yusuf Islam, que cuando se llamaba Cat Stevens cantaba Morning has Broken, habla en el programa de Riz Khan, que ofrece la última canción de Yusuf inspirada las revueltas: My People. http://blogs.elpais.com/aguas-internacionales/2011/03/3-de-marzo-miedo-a-la- demoracia.html

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L8V_btPmoqQ&feature=player_embedded#at=55

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COMMENT & ANALYSIS http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/40ee5c2a- 450a-11e0-80e7-00144feab49a.html#ixzz1FYhYtM85 Lying low no longer an option for Beijing By David Pilling Published: March 2 2011 22:04 | Last updated: March 2 2011 22:04 People are starting to grasp how China is shaping the world. Its ravenous appetites for oil, iron ore, coal, copper, bauxite and countless other minerals are invigorating economies from Australia to Chile. Its huge carbon emissions are altering the debate about climate change. Its ever-shinier collection of military hardware is worrying generals in Taipei, Hanoi and Washington. Less understood, however, is the way that China, ever more integrated into the global economy, is itself being shaped by the world. That was evident this week in Libya. So far, Beijing has scrambled to evacuate 32,000 of the 35,000 Chinese working in the oil, rail, telecommunications and construction industries. In addition to 20 civilian aircraft, it sent four military transport planes to rescue thousands of stranded workers in what the Shanghai Daily said was the first deployment of the air force in such an operation. It also dispatched a 4,000-ton missile frigate, the Xuzhou, to waters off Libya, 5,500 miles from its own capital. EDITOR’S CHOICE: Chinese companies struggle to find workers - Feb-21 Rising Chinese wages pose relocation risk - Feb-15 Love you and leave you - Feb-04 Shenzhen workers feel shift in dynamics - Jan-05 Linda Jakobson, programme director on China and global security at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, says the Libyan deployment marks a profound shift. It puts China on a par with the US, the UK and other advanced nations that can protect citizens far from home. One could view Beijing’s rescue effort as a display of its rippling power. But equally, it is evidence that, as China is sucked more deeply into the affairs of distant – and sometimes unstable – lands, its ability to stay out of trouble is diminishing by the day. Chinese foreign policy experts have long been worried about the vulnerability of increasing numbers of foreign nationals abroad. In 2007, 16 Chinese oil workers were kidnapped in Nigeria and nine were killed by rebels in Ethiopia. Before that, Beijing watched nervously in the aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami as governments of various nations, including Sweden, were criticised over their rescue efforts. In that crisis, China sent a cargo ship. The US dispatched the Seventh Fleet. The question of how to protect Chinese citizens abroad goes well beyond Libya. According to La Chinafrique, a book by French journalists Serge Michel and Michel Beuret, there are 50,000 Chinese workers in Nigeria, 20,000-50,000 in Sudan, 40,000 in Zambia, 30,000 in Angola, 20,000 in Algeria and thousands more scattered throughout Africa. Now Chinese state-owned companies are pressing into South America, another resource-rich region far from home.

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China has been bolstering its consular security, building up its intelligence-gathering capacity and training its military in evacuation drills. But the big question, says Jonathan Holslag, head of research at the Brussels Institute of Contemporary Chinese Studies, is whether Beijing will feel compelled to try to shape the political realities of the countries in which its companies operate. It may be years before China has the military capacity, or indeed the will, to embark on such a course. Any overt action would contravene its self-proclaimed doctrine of non- intervention and sully its narrative of a peaceful rise. Shi Yinhong, professor of international relations at Beijing’s Renmin University, plays down the possibility. “China doesn’t have the knowledge or the resources to prop up authoritarian governments in faraway places.” Events in Libya do demonstrate Beijing’s ability to reach across the globe. But equally, they also suggest China is being buffeted by events. Last weekend, Beijing, one suspects unwillingly, took the unprecedented step of voting for a UN Security Council resolution referring Muammer Gaddafi to the International Criminal Court. Like the US, China does not recognise the court’s jurisdiction. “This decision must have been a very difficult one for Beijing and something of a milestone in China’s passage to becoming a more fully fledged and participating member of the international community,” says Orville Schell, head of the Asia Society’s Center on US-China Relations. But as Bill Emmott, former editor of The Economist, points out in a Times opinion piece, backing the ICC – however reluctantly – exposes a tender flank. The suggestion that national leaders be judged by international norms undermines its non- interventionist doctrine, a sacred cow of foreign policy. Worse, it raises awkward questions about its own use of force at home. “In effect,” Mr Emmott writes, “China has just voted to refer Colonel Gaddafi to the ICC for having acted against his opponents in pretty much the same way as it did in 1989 with the Tiananmen Square revolt.” Ms Jakobson, who will shortly join Australia’s Lowy Institute, a think-tank, says the parallels between events in Libya and those in China in 1989 are precisely what induced Beijing to go along with the international consensus. “It doesn’t want to be the nail that sticks up. It wants to deflect attention and keep a low profile,” she says. But if events this week proved anything, it is that the days of China keeping its head down are over. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/40ee5c2a-450a-11e0-80e7- 00144feab49a.html#axzz1FYdfpr8S

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http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/403b2920-450a-11e0-80e7-1 00144feab49a.html#ixzz1FYj2QAW9 Why the world needs virtuous autocrats By Robert Kaplan Published: March 2 2011 20:28 | Last updated: March 2 2011 20:28 Analysis is built on distinctions. And in these times of upheaval in the Arab world, distinctions are being lost. All autocrats are not bad, as some neoconservatives are proclaiming, and should not be overthrown. The moral differences between one dictator and another are as vast as those between dictators and democrats. There is such a thing as a benevolent dictator – and we should not turn our back on all those that remain. Vision, perceived legitimacy, the existence of a social contract and the ability to make society more institutionally complex – and thus ready for more freedom – are the distinguishing characteristics of good dictators. Libya’s Muammer Gaddafi, for example, is not remotely in the same category as Oman’s Sultan Qaboos bin Sa’id, whose kingdom has seen violent youth demonstrations in recent days. Egypt’s former Brezhnevite dictator Hosni Mubarak should not be compared to Jordan’s energetic King Abdullah. EDITOR’S CHOICE: Arab monarchs nervously watch Morocco - Mar-02 Yemeni opposition offers transition plan - Mar-02 Editorial: West of Kabul - Mar-02 UAE offers poorer emirates $1.5bn - Mar-02 Court to investigate Gaddafi allegations - Mar-02 Tehran parliament takes tough line - Mar-02 Oman’s Sultan Qaboos has built roads and schools throughout the rural interior, advanced the status of women and protected the environment. He governs with a vision similar to that of many erstwhile Asian dictators such as China’s Deng Xiaoping, Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew and Malaysia’s more problematic Mahathir Mohamad, who lifted their societies out of poverty and made them aspiring middle-class dynamos. Like the monarchs of Jordan, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates, Sultan Qaboos’s legitimacy is also built on royal tradition – which cannot be said of the security heavies of north African police states, who utterly lacked tradition and were equally void of vision. This legitimacy depends on a social contract that treats the population as citizens rather than subjects, and has as its primary goal the economic and social advancement of society. China’s leaders know they must generate at least 7 per cent economic growth per year to avoid widespread unrest. Yet even if they do, the social contract peters out as the society advances: citizens, and especially the young, demand political freedoms to go along with their economic liberty. For this reason the restive youth of China and Oman are different from those of north Africa. They have been conditioned to expect more and more from their rulers: thus when their rulers cannot quite deliver, they rebel. In Tunisia and Egypt the youth have rebelled because they have been conditioned to accept less and less, and have waited patiently for a moment of weakness in the palace in order to unleash their fury.

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Libya, of course, represents a level of megalomania and social pulverisation straight out of antiquity that has few recent parallels. Colonel Gaddafi built no institutions, whereas benevolent despots do. In the Gulf states ministries work. In Tunisia and Egypt they work, albeit not as well. In Libya they barely exist. As the late Harvard professor Samuel Huntington noted in the 1960s, the more complex a society is, the more institutions are needed to govern it. The dictator’s job should be to make society more hierarchically complex, so that various economic classes emerge and citizens can climb from one level to the next. Development and the advancement of personal freedoms do this. But the very success of a benevolent dictator – his abjuration of tyranny – indicates his own eventual downfall. Political freedoms must accompany a certain level of social complexity. A dictator’s only respite from tragedy at the end of a successful reign is to see his people move beyond his rule without chaos ensuing. He is unlikely to get credit in his lifetime. It is only now being recognised in Indonesia that the long-standing late dictator Suharto helped to prepare his country for a decade of successful democracy. He was corrupt, but his rule was not without benefit for his people. Sultan Qaboos must realise that in advancing Oman’s social complexity as he has, the crowning jewel of his rule would be a modicum of real democracy. If he can appease the demonstrators by doing that, he could emerge as the Arab world’s Lee, who brought Singapore from African levels of development into the first world. At a moment of democratic upheaval, such a thought seems out of fashion. But as the present rapture passes, it will become apparent that defeating tyranny is about much more than holding elections. The writer is a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, and author of ‘Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power’ http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/403b2920-450a-11e0-80e7- 00144feab49a.html#axzz1FYdfpr8S

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http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/18533d14-44f9-11e0-80e7- 00144feab49a.html#ixzz1FYkE6Ywl Arab monarchs nervously watch Morocco By Victor Mallet in Madrid Published: March 2 2011 18:29 | Last updated: March 2 2011 18:29 How safe are Arab monarchies? The fact that this year’s revolutionary turmoil has so far been focused on the republics at the centre of the Arab world has led to some brave assumptions about the stability of the kingdoms on its eastern and western fringes. Protests in the sultanate of Oman and in the kingdoms of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Jordan and Morocco have shown that monarchies are not immune to the winds of change, even if their rulers are ostensibly not as despised by their subjects as the current and former authoritarian rulers of Libya, Tunisia and Egypt. EDITOR’S CHOICE: Yemeni opposition offers transition plan - Mar-02 Editorial: West of Kabul - Mar-02 Opinion: Why the world needs virtuous autocrats - Mar-02 UAE offers poor states $1.5bn - Mar-02 Court to investigate Gaddafi allegations - Mar- 02 Tehran parliament takes tough line - Mar-02 But in Morocco at least, there is still a misguided hope among royalists and some foreign observers that traditional regal and Muslim religious credentials, an Arab version of the “divine right of kings”, will indefinitely protect King Mohammed VI from popular outrage at economic injustice and the absence of real democracy. “Of course things are different in Morocco. It’s a country that has undertaken reforms,” was the verdict of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, prime minister of Spain, the Arab world’s nearest neighbour in the European Union. The argument that the hereditary Moroccan king automatically commands respect, in part because he is said to be descended from the Prophet Mohammed and styles himself “commander of the faithful”, is not entirely baseless. It is also true that Morocco is, or was until the recent revolutions, less oppressive than most of its Arab partners. Many Moroccans – from immigrants in Spain to hotel workers in Tangiers and professionals in the capital Rabat – reflexively and respectfully refer to their king when seeking to explain the differences between Morocco and revolutionary Libya or Tunisia. Demonstrations across Morocco on February 20 were not so much a day of rage, according to one foreign diplomat, as “a day of mild annoyance”. Demands for radical change are nevertheless multiplying at a speed that must be frightening for a 47-year-old king who was praised as a reformist after he inherited the throne from his father Hassan II in 1999 but is now accused – in the heady climate of freedom prevailing in the Middle East – of repression and delay. The February demonstrations marked the first time that people could recall in which Moroccan marchers failed to carry pictures of the king to show their loyalty. Ominously

360 echoing the complaints of Tunisians against the now deposed Zein al-Abidine Ben Ali and the greed of his family, the protesters criticised the palace’s business dealings, singling out Mohammed Mounir Majidi, the head of the king’s private secretariat, and mocking the royal holding company. “For Morocco, the usual message is that it is not like other countries,” says Mohammed Salmi, a university professor and senior member of the influential Islamist “Justice and Charity” movement. “But they said the same in Egypt about Tunisia. Dictatorship is everywhere, human rights are suppressed everywhere in the Arab world ... Morocco is not an exception.” He complains of prisoner torture, arbitrary detention, curbs on the media, economic difficulties and the fact that Moroccans are subject to the “medieval concepts” on which the current constitution is based. It turns out that Arab monarchs, like Arab dictators, face the dangerous combination of an urban underclass of unemployed young men and of middle-class professionals dissatisfied with the infantile nature of pseudo-democratic politics in which parliaments have no real power. They also confront two formidable organising powers open to a regime’s opponents: the Islamist movement and the internet. It was on Facebook, the social networking site, that young Moroccans organised last month’s rally. Said Benjebli, a 32-year-old blogger and chairman of the Moroccan Bloggers’ Association, says he had despaired of change and given up writing for six months when the Tunisian revolution erupted and gave him “new life”. For Mr Benjebli, Morocco’s future depends on whether the king can bring himself to talk directly to his 31m people about the reforms they want. “If he stays aloof, the level of demands will increase and then people will want a republic. There is not much time to save the monarchy.” Opponents of the Moroccan regime – the current Alawite dynasty goes back to the 17th century – sometimes say they have nothing against the person of the king; they just want him to agree to a constitutional monarchy like those of the UK or Spain. Yet, the abandonment of near-absolute power by the monarch of the westernmost Arab land would constitute a revolution as dramatic as those happening to the east. And the king has given no sign that he is ready to take the plunge into full democracy. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/18533d14-44f9-11e0-80e7- 00144feab49a.html#axzz1FYdfpr8S

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http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/27989d86-4513-11e0-80e7- 00144feab49a.html#ixzz1FYkmXZTQ Yemeni opposition offers Saleh a transition plan By Abigail Fielding-Smith and Noah Browning in Sana’a Published: March 2 2011 21:40 | Last updated: March 2 2011 23:41 Representatives from mainstream opposition parties have presented President Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen with a plan for the transition of power. EDITOR’S CHOICE: Arab monarchs nervously watch Morocco - Mar-02 Editorial: West of Kabul - Mar-02 Opinion: Why the world needs virtuous autocrats - Mar-02 UAE offers poorer emirates $1.5bn - Mar-02 Court to investigate Gaddafi allegations - Mar-02 Tehran parliament takes tough line - Mar-02 Mohammed al-Mutawakil, chairman of the opposition parties’ umbrella group, said on Wednesday that the transfer of power should take place by the end of the year. The parties were also asking for a guarantee of the right to peaceful protest and an investigation into security forces’ use of violence against protesters, more than 20 of whom are reported to have been killed in recent weeks. A government official contacted by the Financial Times would not confirm the contents of the offer but said a proposal, negotiated between religious scholars, sheikhs and opposition parties, had been “well received” by the ruling party. This week, opposition parties rejected the offer of a national unity government by the president and joined protesters calling for the end of his regime. A statement by the White House on Wednesday encouraged opposition parties to enter into dialogue, and revealed that Mr Saleh had apologised to John Brennan, the White House’s counter-terrorism adviser, for “misunderstandings” arising from a speech earlier in which he blamed the US and Israel for fomenting unrest in the Arab world. In an indication of US nervousness over Yemen, which Washington views as crucial in its battle against al-Qaeda, Hillary Clinton, US secretary of state, said: “It is not at all clear what is going to happen to President Saleh and his ruling party.” The mood among protesters on the streets, however, was that Mr Saleh should leave immediately, as interest groups, powerful individuals and others try to position themselves for when the unrest is over. One leading group whose members are showing signs of realigning themselves is the clerical establishment. The mainstream bodies representing the clergy have traditionally been loyal to Mr Saleh, and many of their members are seen as having been co-opted by him, according to Gregory Johnsen, a Yemen expert. Mr Saleh has been calling on that loyalty, holding meetings extensively with religious scholars. But on Tuesday, Sheikh Abdul Majid al-Zindani, leader of one of the main groups of scholars, addressed protesters opposed to the regime.

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Ahmed Sheikh al-Hashed, an independent member of parliament, said: “Religious scholars always stand by those with power, but as the popular protests strengthen, they will start to change their position. “This has already begun, as some of their most important members have changed sides.” Other influential clerics, such as Muhammad al-Muayad, had already given support to the protesters when Mr Zindani left the president’s side. Although these clerics are seen as radical by the west because of their foreign policy positions, they are not extreme within the spectrum of Yemeni society, according to Mr Johnsen. “Not only do they have gravitas but they have an independent voice,” he said. Some observers, however, cautioned against expecting an exodus of clerics to join the protesters. “Those who are mainstream will stick with the president,” said Abdulghani al-Iryani, an analyst. Adel al-Suradi, a member of the information committee set up by youth groups occupying the area around Sana’a University, says it is important the youth movement reaches out to the clerical establishment. “We will write a letter to the religious scholars. Religion is very important here in Yemen. Not a lot of people are educated. We need normal people from the lower classes.” Other students are more sceptical. “Perhaps al-Zindani or other religious authorities can play a mediating role between the youth here and the president, but they don’t speak for us,” said Mohammed al-Zanzabi, a member of the students’ media committee. Madian Ahmed Saif, another committee member, said: “We are a youth movement. It doesn’t matter to us what the religious scholars do: we are trying to make a revolution.” http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/27989d86-4513-11e0-80e7- 00144feab49a.html#axzz1FYdfpr8S

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La legión negra de Gadafi El dictador cuenta con 6.000 mercenarios subsaharianos para defender su régimen ANDRÉS PÉREZ CORRESPONSAL 03/03/2011 07:00

Dos libios detienen a tres africanos, supuestos mercenarios pagados para reprimir las revueltas. - AP Transformaremos el país en un "mar de sangre", pero "no tocaremos los pozos de petróleo, porque pertenecen al pueblo". Las frases fueron pronunciadas por el padre, Muamar, y por su hijo, Saif al Islam. Y la secuencia debe ser entendida así: Gadafi confía en 20.000 mercenarios extranjeros y en 3.000 miembros de fuerzas especiales entrenados y coordinados por altos exgenerales extranjeros, para aplastar la revolución democrática. Unas fuerzas que financia con los ingresos petroleros. Desde el mismo momento en que el clan Gadafi optó por aplastar la revolución con medios militares, empezaron a afluir los testimonios sobre el uso de mercenarios. Yusuf, un egipcio que escapó de Trípoli, dijo: "Vi a mercenarios subsaharianos por las calles. Los libios cuentan que el régimen les paga 10.000 dólares para que ataquen a los manifestantes". A esos testimonios han venido a sumarse lo que empiezan a recopilar los expertos de la ONU. José Luis Gómez del Prado, presidente del grupo de trabajo de la ONU sobre el uso de mercenarios como medio para impedir el ejercicio del derecho a la autodeterminación de los pueblos, explica: "Tenemos informes que indican que hay extranjeros armados" entre las fuerzas represivas. La mayoría estaba en Libia desde hace años y formaba un "Ejército durmiente" Según Alí Zeidan, responsable de la Liga Libia de Derechos Humanos, Gadafi ha desplegado a "6.000 mercenarios en todo el país, unos 3.000 de ellos en Trípoli". Se trata, en su mayoría, de personas surgidas de toda aquella galaxia que fueran, en su día, los ejércitos revolucionarios internacionales a los que Gadafi confiaba su seguro ascenso al trono de "rey de los reyes ancestrales africanos". La mayoría de esos 6.000 mercenarios se encontraban en Libia desde hace años, en campos de entrenamiento. Era un "Ejército durmiente", principalmente de chadianos, nigerinos, malienses, sudaneses y zimbabuenses. Según la Liga Libia de Derechos Humanos, los oficiales superiores cobran unos 7.000 dólares al día, los de grado medio, unos 2.000, y un soldado raso, 300.

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Zeidan considera que Gadafi está tratando ahora de traer aún más mercenarios, el máximo posible del total de 20.000 del "Ejército de reserva" que todavía tendría esparcidos por todo el continente. Entran ahí en juego las alianzas pasadas de Gadafi, en Níger, Malí, Chad, Zimbabue, Sierra Leona y Liberia. La prensa anglosajona está insistiendo en que, por ejemplo, miles de combatientes irregulares del Chad estarían afluyendo con armas para aplastar a la población civil libia. Los soldados vienen sobre todo de Chad, Níger, Malí, Sudán y Zimbabue El riesgo es real y la posibilidad de que ocurra en proporciones inquietantes también. De ahí que el Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU, en su resolución sobre Libia del sábado, incluyera una prohibición del envío de mercenarios. Por eso, las ONG están aumentando las presiones sobre la Corte Penal Internacional para señalar que cualquier jefe de Estado africano que autorice el envío de mercenarios a Libia podría ser cómplice de crímenes contra la humanidad. Sin embargo, hay que andar con cuidado. Libia es un país con un 20% de población extranjera, masivamente subsahariana y sin papeles. "Esta gente tiene hambre, les falta de todo, no tienen alternativa, y si el poder les exige que disparen contra la población y les ofrece 50 dólares, están obligados a hacerlo. Si no, se llevan un tiro en la cabeza", explica Zeidan. Para el activista, los rebeldes han confundido a simples inmigrantes desperdigados con mercenarios. Cosa que hace más urgente que nunca lo que la Federación Internacional de Derechos Humanos llama "no una injerencia, sino ejercer el deber de protección de la población" en Libia. Exmilitares occidentales Las televisiones que utilizan la terrible figura del mercenario pasan bajo un completo manto de silencio el otro capítulo del problema. Gadafi también se apoya en un cuerpo de unos 3.000 miembros de fuerzas especiales que cuentan "con el mejor entrenamiento, armamento y equipos", explica Gómez del Prado. Y quien dice mejor, dice occidental. "Hace dos años, se reveló que el Ministerio de Defensa alemán había bloqueado un contrato de una Compañía Militar Privada con esas fuerzas", añade. La firma militar privada francesa Geos reconoce que tiene operaciones en Libia. "Son precisamente los países occidentales los que votan contra los trabajos de nuestro grupo" sobre mercenarios en la ONU, explica Gómez del Prado.

Las ONG temen que se confunda a simples inmigrantes con combatientes Alí Zeidan, de la Liga Libia de Derechos Humanos, explica que si Gadafi puede financiar a sus 20.000 combatientes extranjeros rasos en reserva, y el entrenamiento y armamento de élite internacional de sus 3.000 milicianos, es porque "el aparato represivo se lleva el 60% de los ingresos petroleros". British Petroleum anunció la semana pasada en un comunicado que prosigue sus prospecciones offshore en sus concesiones en Libia. Royal Dutch Shell hizo lo propio. La italiana Eni fue aún más lejos: ni siquiera suspende sus operaciones en tierra. En el punto nueve de la resolución del Consejo de Seguridad del sábado se prohíbe explícitamente el uso de mercenarios. Pero remite a una lista de excepciones que pueden ser entendidas como una autorización del uso de Compañías Militares Privadas, tanto por una posible operación militar internacional como por las compañías petroleras. La resolución no decreta, sea cual sea el final del conflicto, un embargo sobre el petróleo libio. http://www.publico.es/internacional/364166/la-legion-negra-de-gadafi/version-imprimible

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Exteriores enviará hoy una aeronave para evacuar refugiados egipcios de Libia Exteriores pretende trasladar 4.000 refugiados egipcios desde Djerba a El Cairo y enviar ayuda humanitaria a Benghazi PUBLICO.ES / AGENCIAS Madrid 02/03/2011 22:51 Actualizado: 03/03/2011 02:36

Miles de refugiados esperan en el paso fronterizo de Ras el Jedir (Túnez) hoy, miércoles 2 de marzo de 2011.EFE NOTICIAS RELACIONADAS • España retira a sus diplomáticos de Libia • EE.UU. envía dos buques de guerra con 2.000 marines a Libia • La Haya abre la investigación sobre los crímenes de guerra en Libia • Gadafi amenaza con "miles de muertos" si EEUU o la OTAN entran en Libia • Salen de Libia los últimos cinco trabajadores españoles • ACNUR alerta de una crisis humanitaria en el paso fronterizo entre Libia y Túnez El Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación ha informado en un comunicado que mandará este jueves un avión para evacuar y trasladar a refugiados egipcios desde la frontera entre Libia y Túnez a El Cairo en distintas tandas. El avión fletado por la Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo (Aecid) saldrá al mediodía desde la base militar de Torrejón de Ardoz en Madrid, donde acudirá la ministra de Asuntos Exteriores y Cooperación, Trinidad Jiménez, para asistir al despegue. El objetivo es que la aeronave realice tres rotaciones diarias entre la isla tunecina de Djerba y El Cairo. En Djerba está el aeropuerto más cercano a la frontera oriental de Libia con Túnez, por cuyo paso de Ras el Jedir están huyendo miles de refugiados, principalmente egipcios, de los enfrentamientos entre partidarios y opositores del líder libio, Muamar el Gadafi.

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El avión está alquilado durante una semana desde el jueves y la intención es trasladar a El Cairo hasta 4.000 egipcios, según las fuentes, quienes han añadido que por el momento es más seguro la vía aérea que la marítima. Ayuda humanitaria Además, el Gobierno enviará este jueves también otra aeronave con tres toneladas de ayuda humanitaria a Benghazi, la segunda ciudad más importante de Libia. Se trata de medicamentos para afectados por enfermedades crónicas, como la diabetes o la hipertensión, así como con leche en polvo para bebés.

Se trata de medicamentos para enfermos crónicos Bengazhi es la ciudad en la que estalló el pasado 16 de febrero una revuelta contra Gadafi que se ha extendido por todo el país y en la que cientos de civiles murieron a manos de las fuerzas de seguridad. Hoy está liberada y controlada por comités populares. El presidente del Gobierno, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, anunció este miércoles en Túnez que España movilizaría aviones y barcos para trasladar a los refugiados que llegan desde Libia. Estas medidas responden al llamamiento de las organizaciones humanitarias ante el riesgo de que pueda haber una catástrofe por la acumulación de refugiados y la falta de medios para atenderlos, y a una petición de ayuda a la comunidad internacional del Gobierno egipcio. http://www.publico.es/espana/364175/exteriores-enviara-hoy-una-aeronave-para-evacuar- refugiados-egipcios-de-libia/version-imprimible

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HACHFELD

Rainer Hachfeld Golden memories2 March 2011 NEUES DEUTSCHLAND BERLIN

2 March 2011 NEUES DEUTSCHLAND BERLIN

CARTOONIST

Born in Ludwigshafen in 1939, Rainer Hachfeld is a German playwright and political cartoonist. Having studied art in Berlin, he began his career as a caricaturist in Spandauer Volksblatt in 1966, and then in EXTRA-Blatt. He has also contributed to Stern and Der Abend. Since 1990, he has worked with...

As Colonel Gaddafi's regime totters, several European leaders, notably Nicolas Sarkozy and Silvio Berlusconi, are finding it difficult to erase the memory of their close ties to the Libyan dictator. http://www.presseurop.eu/en/content/picture/522851-golden-memories 368

CARTOON

BURKI The promised land 28 February 2011 24 HEURES LAUSANNE

CARTOONIST Raymond Burki (b. 1949) is a Swiss cartoonist. His works are published in the Lausanne daily 24 heures.

In the aftermath of the uprisings in North Africa, hundreds of migrants are landing on the shores of Southern Europe. EU member states fear a massive refugee crisis. http://www.presseurop.eu/en/content/picture/519121-promised-land

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March 2, 2011 Libya’s Patient Revolutionaries By MOHAMMAD AL-ASFAR Benghazi, Libya NOTHING is impossible in this life. We can discuss any subject calmly. We only need good intentions. The “are you for me or against me?” narrative is useless. I’m neither for you, nor against you, nor even in the middle. If I take a position, then I am not being a writer. I am near you, but you can’t see me. I can’t see you either, even as you bleed into my heart. I’m not concerned with observing where people stand on the issues. I’m concerned only with observing the serious little girl who lost her one uncle in a massacre at a Libyan prison. “Where’s Uncle, Daddy?” “He’s traveling.” “Will he be back soon?” “He’ll be back soon, my darling, and bring you a lovely revolution.” “And why doesn’t he call us?” “He has no phone credits, but he’ll charge his phone card and call us soon, my love.” “Give me his number. I’ll call him. I have a phone card.” “Dial any number between 1 and 1200, and he’ll reply.” The serious child tells me that she called him, and that a voice on the phone told her that he was off at Friday prayers. “So I slept and dreamed, Daddy,” she says. “That a tall man in a white robe walked around the tomb of Omar al-Mukhtar in Benghazi, then he got on his white horse and flew up into the sky; he waved at me, Daddy, and threw me a fragrant flower. When I woke up, I didn’t find it planted in my heart, but the slightly salty scent of Benghazi — of Libya — is still there; take my hand, Daddy, and smell it, to make sure. I won’t ever wash my hand again. I want the scent to stay with me forever.” I told my daughter: “Wash your hands. The smell won’t go. Water washes only dirt away.” • The revolution in my country is aflame, and has achieved considerable success, internally and internationally. Each time a city is liberated, makeshift institutions to manage everyday life and defend freedom arise, and more members of the former regime’s leadership, whether they are political, cultural or business figures, join in.

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Our flag is no longer a solid green field; the one we carry now is red, black and green with a crescent and star in the middle. The colors are a reminder of the darkness and colonization we have suffered in our history. For decades, we lived in terror, surrounded by spies and informants, facing the risk of imprisonment or “disappearance” at any moment. No one could intervene on your behalf; there were no real courts, no human rights, nothing. Everything before this revolution was dedicated to enriching the tyrant and his family. Everything was for their benefit: the army, the police, water, culture, education, hotels, restaurants, the flag. Even sex was regulated: many people couldn’t marry until the regime organized a mass wedding or they were “gifted” a bedroom for the wedding night. Fifteen years ago, in a single night, the tyrant and his mercenaries murdered 1,200 people at the Abu Salim prison in Tripoli, where political prisoners are held. The bodies were piled in a mass unmarked grave — prisoners from all over Libya, of all ages, killed without even a symbolic trial. My only brother was one of them. I wrote about the massacre in my first novel. And my second. And my third. And I was not the only one who couldn’t forget. The brutality of that summer evening was one of the sparks that ignited this revolution. The families of those victims began the current protests, here in Benghazi, and were soon joined by the young men of the revolution. Now, despite the violence of the regime all around us, those cities that have been liberated are buoyant with joy; we have tasted freedom. The fear, terror, tension and nervousness that had characterized Libyans has vanished; old disputes have dissipated. Everyone wants to help, undaunted by rain and hunger. This revolution has transformed Libyans, has made us feel that there is a thing called freedom that must be won, and that one should not enjoy it alone, at the expense of others’ happiness, toil or lives. I have barely any time to write: I’m spending my days among the crowds. I would rather live the revolution now than write it — it’s still fresh, newborn, untainted by additions and blind custom. It is a Libyan-flavored revolution, a mixture of spice and salt and light that smells like the blessings that come from the lanterns of saints. For years, I have run into old friends only occasionally, at the Friday market or at funerals, weddings and sporting events. Now, I meet with many of my childhood friends in the streets and alleyways of the revolution. The walls have become murals, decorated with new slogans chanting the glories of the revolution and its martyrs, and denouncing tyrants and their terrorist ways. These phrases are full of terrible grammatical and spelling errors, but are nevertheless honest and artistic. They were born with the birth of freedom and life, and these graffiti should never be painted over. They should be kept there until the sun’s rays fade them, although I doubt that the sun would erase such eternal markings. I don’t want to speak of the massacres that have been committed in the last weeks by the regime: the world has been listening to and watching images of these brutal, gut- wrenching crimes. I want instead to speak of the people who have won, who have defeated death. The martyrs of this revolution have not just been young men and

371 women; there have been martyrs of all ages, of all educational levels, of all social classes. Libya has risen in its entirety. We are not copying anyone, but we must admit to having been inspired by the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt. We cannot know happiness as long as the tyrant remains; how could we possibly visit Tunisians and Egyptians unless we can hold our heads as high as theirs, as high as those of all the free people of the world? Libyans have been patient for a long time, but our patience was not cowardice. We waited for the moment of true inspiration, and now that it has come and the time is right, we have achieved our goal, with a courage and motivation that has astonished the world. Our revolution is a revolution of the people, people who can no longer stand the stench of tyranny, who cannot be healed by handouts. The pressure reached its limit. So the people erupted and proclaimed their desire for a better life. And they were met with the murderous glare of a tyrant, and not with mere tear gas but with live bullets and tanks and aircraft and missile fire. So we called ourselves the “grandchildren of Omar al-Mukhtar,” in homage to the resistance leader who was martyred in 1931 for telling the Italian occupiers that the Libyan people would not surrender, and would either win or die. And we persevered, we endured and we won. Now, it seems, the country is beautiful. Its women are lovelier than ever, their smiles are sweeter and their hearts are full of song. Even the sick have been healed; their disease was caused by the blight of dictatorship. The people of the entire world are with us. And even before we had their support, we had their respect for our revolution, which has not been marred by looting or vandalism. Our goal is clear: to bring down a fascist regime that made us as a nation unwelcome in the world. We will transform Libya into a beacon of civilization and science and culture, a meritocracy where each person will earn his or her position, regardless of ideology or tribe. We will work as transparently as we can, and we will make the world trust us, and help us. Everyone here is convinced that Libya’s liberty has already been won, and that now we must work toward its safety. The revolution now needs talent, not loyalty. The Libyan people are now brothers of mankind. We can speak freely to those in the Arab world and elsewhere whom we have longed to meet, and can embrace them without fear. Our lives as Libyans have been troublesome: for those of us lucky enough to travel, everywhere we faced an accusatory finger — for the disappearance of the Lebanese Shiite cleric Musa al-Sadr on a trip to Libya in 1978; for the Lockerbie bombing in 1988 and the downing of a French airline over Niger the next year. But now we have shown the world that the blame for these acts does not lie with the Libyan people, but with the heinous dictatorship. • Long ago, I promised a little girl that my only brother would return. He did, and he brought with him a revolution. Mohammad al-Asfar is a novelist. This essay was translated by Ghenwa Hayek from the Arabic. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/03/opinion/03asfar.html?_r=1&nl=todaysheadlin es&emc=tha212

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TURQUÍA Basta de bromas 2 marzo 2011 FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU

El primer ministro turcoTayyip Erdogan en el Parlamento. Ankara. AFP El primer ministro turco, en su visita a Alemania a finales de febrero, ha dado muestras de la creciente seguridad de su país. Turquía, en pleno crecimiento y considerada como un ejemplo para los países árabes, ya no necesita tanto a una Europa a la que, sin embargo, aún desea unirse, afirma Frankfurter Rundschau. Gerd Höhler Recep Tayyip Erdogan, en su función de primer ministro, representa a todos los turcos, incluso a los que tienen la nacionalidad alemana desde hace dos generaciones. Desde esta perspectiva pronunció un discurso en Düsseldorf [el 27 de febrero] ante 10.000 inmigrantes de origen turco. Durante una concentración similar organizada hace tres años en Colonia, el primer ministro suscitó una gran polémica al calificar la "asimilación" como un "crimen contra la humanidad". El primer ministro retomó textualmente dicha fórmula en Düsseldorf, pero esta vez añadió una aclaración: "Estoy a favor de la integración". No obstante, durante su recorrido por Alemania, el primer ministro turco ha dado muestras de poseer una percepción parcial de la realidad. Ha recalcado que nadie puede ignorar los derechos de las minorías: los kurdos de Turquía se preguntarán por qué esto no se aplica a ellos. Todos tienen derecho a vivir su fe, ha declarado: un derecho que sin embargo no se les concede a los cristianos de Turquía. Tayyip Erdogan ha reprochado a las potencias occidentales que guardaran silencio ante la situación en Túnez, Egipto y Libia: el mismo Erdogan que se niega a aplicar sanciones contra el régimen de Gadafi, por los intereses económicos de Turquía. Las contradicciones de Erdogan son muestra de seguridad El primer ministro turco piensa que puede permitirse estas contradicciones. Turquía da muestras de una creciente seguridad. Bruselas ya lo ha experimentado. Durante una serie de intensas negociaciones, los diplomáticos de la UE habían concertado un acuerdo con Ankara, por el cual Turquía se comprometía a hacerse cargo de los 373 inmigrantes clandestinos que entraran en la UE por su territorio. Pero ahora Ankara declara que Turquía no firmará ni aplicará el acuerdo en cuestión, a menos que la Unión Europea suprima el visado obligatorio para los turcos. Y por si fuera poco, Turquía abre sus fronteras: desde que deja entrar sin visado a sirios, jordanos, marroquíes y argelinos, cientos de inmigrantes clandestinos originarios de estos países llegan todos los días a Grecia pasando por Turquía. De este modo Ankara presiona a la UE sobre la cuestión de los visados. Turquía ya no se arrodilla ante los europeos, sino que alardea. Esta nueva seguridad se basa en una potencia económica en pleno auge. Hace 10 años, Turquía estaba al borde de la bancarrota. Hoy, ocupa un destacado puesto 17 en la clasificación de las grandes potencias económicas. Si formara parte de la UE, estaría en la séptima posición. Y tener peso económico equivale a tener peso político. Turquía adopta poco a poco la función de potencia regional. Como descendientes de los otomanos, que reinaron sobre la región durante siglos, es cierto que los turcos no suscitan únicamente simpatía en el mundo árabe. Pero muchos árabes ven actualmente en Turquía un modelo, por su ascenso económico, pero sobre todo porque es la prueba de que el islam y la democracia no son incompatibles, aunque puede que la democracia turca no sea perfecta desde el punto de vista europeo. "El sueño rosa de Europa" se ha esfumado Mientras Turquía vuelve su mirada cada vez más hacia Oriente, muchos se preguntan cuáles serán las consecuencias para el futuro europeo del país. Es cierto que Erdogan y Ahmet Davutoglu, su ministro de Exteriores, repiten hasta la saciedad que la entrada en la UE sigue siendo su prioridad. Pero la adhesión da la impresión más bien de ser una figura impuesta. Desde que Turquía llamara a la puerta de la UE, hace ya medio siglo, el país ha cambiado. Ya no son "simples solicitantes", como declaró hace poco Tayyip Erdogan. En su fuero interno, muchos turcos se alejan de Europa: el 38% aún se muestra a favor de la entrada en la UE, en contraposición al 66% de hace 3 años. El escritor Orhan Pamuk estima que "el sueño rosa de Europa en el que todos creían" se ha esfumado, quizás porque Turquía no es tan pobre como antes, quizás porque ya no está gobernada por un ejército, sino que posee una sociedad civil enérgica. La Turquía de Erdogan parece seguir cada vez más su propio camino. Un camino que no parece llevar hasta la Unión Europea. DESDE TURQUÍA Hay que ponerse duros con la UE El primer ministro turco Erdogan declaró en Düsseldorf el 27 de febrero, ante la canciller alemana Angela Merkel, que "Si no quieren que Turquía se una, deberían decirlo abiertamente… y entonces nos ocuparíamos de nuestros asuntos y no les molestaríamos más. No tengo una agenda oculta y hablo abiertamente... No se anden con rodeos... Dejémonos de evasivas entre ambas partes". "El discurso duro de Turquía hacia la Unión Europea, considerado como una forma del Gobierno para recobrar el apoyo político en su país, también puede socavar la confianza pública en la idea de unirse al bloque", escribe Hürriyet. “En lugar de subsanar las difíciles relaciones y esperar a que mejoren las perspectivas políticas actuales, al hacer afirmaciones asertivas que dificultan aún más las relaciones no está contribuyendo a lograr el objetivo buscado [de pertenencia a la UE]”, afirma el experto en la UE Sinan Ülgen, al que cita el diario turco.

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Hürriyet añade que "algunos observadores creen que estas declaraciones, además de constituir una táctica política interna de cara a las elecciones generales del 12 de junio, también podrían allanar el camino para que Turquía abandone en un futuro el intento de entrar en la UE". "Turquía, a la que la UE siempre ha considerado una alumna no apta para la adhesión, ahora es un país que puede desarrollar estrategias y que se considera un modelo en Oriente Próximo. Esto podría aportar tanto al Gobierno como al público turco una ventaja para enfrentarse a la UE en el próximo periodo", afirma Ceren Mutuş, otro experto en la UE. Tal y como recuerda Hürriyet, "Se han abierto trece capítulos en las negociaciones de adhesión de Turquía". París bloquea la apertura de cinco capítulos, mientras que Bruselas congela ocho capítulos como respuesta al incumplimiento por parte de Ankara de abrir sus puertos. "Con esto sólo quedan tres capítulos sobre los que las autoridades turcas afirman que no implican ninguna 'carga política', pero Ankara se ha mostrado reacia a cumplir los criterios necesarios para abrir los capítulos de competencia, política social y contrataciones públicas". Gerd Höhler Basta de bromas, FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU 2 marzo 2011 http://www.presseurop.eu/es/content/article/523071-basta-de-bromas TURKEY No more Mr. Nice Guy 2 March 2011 FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU FRANKFURT

Grrr. Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan at the parliament in Ankara. AFP | The Turkish prime minister is in Germany parading the self-confidence of his country. Encouraged by a booming economy and increasingly becoming a role model for emerging Arab democracies, Turkey is finding the EU increasingly unnecessary, writes the Frankfurter Rundschau. Gerd Höhler Recep Tayyip Erdogan is in his parade-ground costume: Prime Minister of all Turks – even if they do already have second-generation German nationality. This was the Erdogan who addressed 10,000 immigrants of Turkish origin in Dusseldorf. In a similar mass rally in Cologne three years ago, the Premier stirred up controversy when he called "assimilation" a "crime against humanity". The sentence was dropped in verbatim once more, but a touch of clarification was added: "I say ‘Yes’ to integration."

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During his tour of Germany, however, the Turkish Prime Minister has shown a selective perception of reality. No one should ignore the rights of minorities, urged Erdogan; yet the Kurds in Turkey will be asking why this does not apply to them. Everyone has the right to live his faith, he postulated; but that right is not extended to Christians in Turkey. Erdogan accused the Western powers of remaining silent over Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, yet rejects sanctions against the Gaddafi regime as harmful to Turkish business interests. A country with economic punch and political muscle Erdogan believes he can afford these contradictions. His country’s self-confidence seems to be growing, and this is particularly obvious in Brussels. In wearily drawn-out talks with Ankara, EU diplomats had negotiated an agreement under which Turkey committed to take back illegal immigrants who had crossed Turkish territory to get to the EU. But now, says Ankara, Turkey will neither sign nor enforce the agreement unless the EU waives visa requirements for Turks. For good measure, Turkey is opening up its borders. As Syrians, Jordanians, Moroccans and Algerians can enter Turkey without a visa, hundreds of illegal migrants from these countries are crossing Turkey every day to get to Greece. And the EU is feeling that deliberate pressure. Turkey no longer bows down to the Europeans; rather, it crows. The new self- confidence of the country is based on its growing economic clout. While Turkey teetered on the brink of bankruptcy just a decade ago, today it’s the 17th largest economy in the world. If the country belonged to the EU, it would be number seven. The country that has economic punch also has political muscle, and Turkey is beginning to wield it in its backyard. As descendants of the Ottomans, who ruled the region for centuries, the Turks are not entirely welcome in the Arab world. Nonetheless, many Arabs see in today’s Turkey a role model – thanks to its economic rise, but more because the country shows that Islam and democracy are not incompatible, even if Turkish democracy may be imperfect from a Europe perspective. Rose-tinted European dream has faded Turkey is increasingly looking to the east, and many are wondering what this means for the country’s views on Europe. Erdogan has not yet grown tired of insisting that EU accession remains a priority. But it’s beginning to sound more like a duty. Since Turkey first knocked on the door of Europe half a century ago the country has changed. Today it no longer stands at the gates as “nothing but a humble supplicant", Erdogan said recently. Inside the country many Turks are saying farewell to the European idea. While 38 percent still support EU membership, that’s down from 66 percent three years ago. The "rose-tinted European dream, believed in by all,” has faded, the writer Orhan Pamuk believes – perhaps because Turkey is no longer as poor as it once was, and perhaps because it is no longer ruled by an army but by a strong civil society. The country is increasingly walking its own path. And it doesn’t look as though it leads to the EU. FROM TURKEY Talking tough with the EU Speaking in Düsseldorf on 27 February, in the presence of German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Turkish Prime minister Erdogan said that “If they do not want Turkey in, they 376 should say this openly … and then we will mind our own business and will not bother them. I do not have a hidden agenda and I do speak clearly ... Don’t stall us ... Let’s not stall each other.” "Turkey’s tough language toward the European Union, seen as a way for the government to rally domestic political support, may also erode public confidence in the idea of joining the bloc", writes Turkish daily Hürriyet. “Instead of repairing the difficult relations and waiting for the political outlook of today to improve, making assertive statements that put relations into further difficulty does not serve the intended goal [of EU membership],” says EU expert Sinan Ülgen quoted by the Turkish daily. Hürriyet adds that "some observers believe that such statements, in addition to being a domestic political tactic ahead of the June 12 general elections, could also pave the way for Turkey to abandon the EU bid in the future." “Turkey, always deemed by the EU as an unqualified student, is today a country that can develop strategies and is held up as a role model in the Middle East. This could give both the government and the Turkish public the upper hand to face off against the EU in the coming period,” says another EU expert, Ceren Mutuş. "Thirteen chapters have been opened in Turkey’s accession negotiations", recalls Hürriyet. Paris is blocking the opening of five chapters, while Brussels has frozen eight chapters in response to Ankara’s failure to open its ports. This leaves only three chapters that Turkish officials say do not carry any “political baggage”, but Ankara has been reluctant to fulfill the benchmarks required to open the competition, social policy and public procurement chapters." http://www.presseurop.eu/en/content/article/522021-no-more-mr-nice-guy

03/01/2011 03:59 PM The World from Berlin 'Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan Wants to Be the Father' Comments made by Turkey's prime minister to the country's diaspora living in Germany have angered some conservatives. Recep Tayyip Erdogan says immigrant children should learn Turkish first and then German. Newspaper commentators remain deeply divided over the prime minister's visit. In a country that is home to nearly 3 million people of Turkish descent, any time the leader of Turkey visits Germany, the details of his trip are followed very closely. Three years ago, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan angered German politicians when he stated during a speech in a concert arena in Cologne that assimilation is a "crime against humanity." The message to Turks living in Germany was that they are Turkish first and German second, even if they were born here. And in a country that has only begun to address the issue of the integration of its large immigrant population in recent years, it is the kind of heated message that isn't welcomed by politicians. A repeat of it in a year that has seen the publication of a best- selling, anti-Muslim tract by politican Thilo Sarrazin -- which for a brief period poisoned the debate on integration in Germany -- could reopen the sensitive subject. The atmosphere surrounding Erdogan's Sunday visit could have grown tense quickly, but on Sunday and Monday reactions remained relatively muted.

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During a speech before around 10,000 people of Turkish descent in Düsseldorf, Erdogan once again raised the subject of assimilation. "Yes, integrate yourselves into German society but don't assimilate yourselves. No one has the right to deprive us of our culture an our identity," Erdogan said. His visit has been perceived as a stop in his campaign for re-election in a vote scheduled for the summer. Most German politicians seemed to have very few misgivings about the content of the Turkish leader's speech. But one line did manage to spark a political debate on Monday and Tuesday. "Our children must learn German," Erdogan said, "but they must first learn good Turkish." Speaking at the opening of the CeBit technology trade fair in Hanover, which Erdogan also attended, German Chancellor Angela Merkel joined the debate by saying that the German language remains essential for the successful integration of the Turkish community in Germany. "We want our fellow Turkish citizens to truly have success," she said. Foreign Minister: Kids Should Learn German First But other politicians in Merkel's goverment were more critical. "Children who grow up in Germany must learn German as the very first thing," said Foreign Minister and Vice- Chancellor Guido Westerwelle of the business-friendly Free Democratic Party (FDP). Germany's federal commissioner for integration, Maria Böhmer, of Merkel's conservative Christian Democratic Union party, agreed. "The language of the country in which one remains over time must be given precedence," she told the Passauer Neue Presse newspaper. At least one prominent member of Merkel's party, however, backed Erdogan. Ruprecht Polenz, the chairman of the federal parliament's foreign affairs committee, said he could "recognize nothing worthy of criticism" in Erdogan's speech. Erdogan, he pointed out, had called on his compatriots living in Germany to focus more on education and careers. Besides, Polenz added, "many linguistics experts claim that a person must first get a grasp on their mother tongue before adopting that of the country in which they live." On Tuesday, German editorialists are divided by Erdogan's speech, with commentaries often following the paper's political colors. The left-wing Die Tageszeitung writes: "Those who are bothered by the fact that Turkish politicians also conduct their election campaigns in Germany, should consider the fact that 1.6 million people living in Germany possess Turkish citizenship. And those who want these people to identify more strongly with Germany need to do more than just instruct them about how important the German language is. ... They need to be offered something tangible. But what has the German government offered them in the past three years? Has it made it easier for Turks to become German citizens? Has it introduced dual citizenship or the right for Turks to vote in local elections? No." "Erdogan, on the other hand, has promised all Turks who want to become German citizens a 'blue card,' that will ensure them special privileges in Turkey. This sort of 'dual citizenship light' could make it a lot easier for many Turks to decide to become naturalized German citizens." The tabloid Bild writes:

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"Erdogan is a demagogue, a nationalist. And he hammered his message, which is as simple as it is fatal, into the heads of 10,000 people: You are and will remain Turkish -- never forget that. By saying that, though, he is torpedoing efforts to integrate close to 3 million people with Turkish roots in Germany that cost German taxpayers millions of euros each year. Efforts to ensure that their children learn German right from the beginning so that they later have opportunities to get a job or a traineeship. But Erdogan doesn't care about that. He's in the middle of an election back home and any means to campaign is fine by him. That is shabby and irresponsible!" The conservative Die Welt writes: "In order to knit together the Turkish community, Erdogan painted a picture of the spectre of a steadily growing xenophobia. And he knows exactly what kind of effect such rhetoric has. The higher the wall of Turkophobia in Germany is perceived to be, the less prepared the Turks will be to integrate -- a step many don't want to take anyway. It's a simple recipe for Erdogan: If they don't want us, then we also don't want to be a part of this society. Mr. Erdogan from Ankara has merely given his compatriots excuses. But his methods are premodern and have something feudalistic to them. He views Turks living in Germany as a large yet weak group incapable of helping itself -- one that needs the oversized Turkish state to ensure that its views are heard. Erdogan doesn't speak to his compatriots as citizens, but as pupils." The center-left Süddeutsche Zeitung writes: "How nice: Suddenly everyone is stepping in to take care of Turkish children who grow up in Germany." "On the one side, you have (Erdogan) one who wants to make sure they can first speak good Turkish. On the other, you have (Chancellor Angela Merkel's) conservatives, who want them to speak error-free German first. Why shouldn't they learn to speak both, their mother tongue and German, just as the French and Italians living in Germany are allowed to do? And as many educators advise? Because Turks are different: They are the subject of distrust (in Germany)." The center-right Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung writes: "Erdogan's appearance creates the impression that Turks living Germany are in danger of becoming a persecuted minority. He again spoke of the threat of forced assimilation and Islamophobia that can be compared to anti-Semitism. Does Erdogan even know what he is talking about? As little as the rally had to do with the realities of German integration policies, it did show a man who divides the world into a good and bad that his is unable to even differentiate between at home. The methods and ways that Erdogan's party deals with Christians in Turkey approximate what he is trying to accuse Germany of doing." "Erdogan showed what he feels about (integration) with his advice to Turkish immigrants that their children first learn 'good Turkish' in order to avoid assimilation. Erdogan doesn't seem at all bothered by the fact that this would create disadvantages for his compatriots, because only those who do not rule out assimilation can integrate. At the end of the day, he wants to remain the father -- and his children should remain children." The center-left Berlin daily Der Tagesspiegel writes:

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"The sometimes shrill reactions (to Erdogan's speech) overshadow the fact that the message coming out of this visit could not be any further removed from his arrogant appearance in Cologne three years ago. ... Already during his visit to Berlin last October, Erdogan not only distanced himself from some of the statements he made in Cologne, but also offered the German government his help on the issue of integration. Integration, he said, is the precondition for 'peaceful coexistence.'" "Berlin is dealing with a government in Ankara that is modernizing itself with a view to desired future EU membership, one that respects the rules of democracy and has also shown impressive economic growth. In the coming years, Turkey will continue to increase its position as a regional power, and its development could serve as a model for the compatibility of Islam and democracy. That applies even more so following revolutions in North Africa that have seen several Islamic countries seek their own path into the future." "Germany needs Turkey as a partner in its integration policies. And it needs Turkey as a strategically important member of the EU." -- Daryl Lindsey

URL: 'Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan Wants to Be the Father'03/01/2011 03:59 PM http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,748379,00.html RELATED SPIEGEL ONLINE LINKS: • Erdogan Urges Turks Not to Assimilate: 'You Are Part of Germany, But Also Part of Our Great Turkey' (02/28/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,748070,00.html • Debating Integration: Competing Views on Germany's Immigrants (02/25/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,747239,00.html • Turkish Immigration to Germany: A Sorry History of Self-Deception and Wasted Opportunities (09/07/2010) http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,716067,00.html • The World From Berlin: Erdogan's Visit Leaves German Conservatives Fuming (02/12/2008) http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,534724,00.html • Cologne's Turkish Spectacle: Erdogan's One-Man Show (02/11/2008) http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,534519,00.html

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03/02/20119 12:31 PM Libyan Revolution With No End to Fighting, International Pressure Grows on Gadhafi The international pressure on Libya continues to build. European countries are freezing Libyan assets and drawing up plans for a possible no-fly zone over the country, while the US is moving warships into the Mediterranean. Meanwhile, Libyan government sources have denied reports of government-backed attacks in the rebel-held east. The outcome of the ongoing rebellion in Libya still seems far from clear, with international pressure building amid reports of counter-attacks by forces loyal to leader Moammar Gadhafi. Fighting continued in Libya Wednesday, with reports of "random bombing" in the oil- exporting town of Marsa El Brega in the rebel-held eastern part of the country. Arab satellite television Al Arabiya reported that 14 people had been killed there after a counter-attack by Gadhafi's forces. Picture This: Pieing the President 03/02/2011

As anti-government protests in Yemen continue, one demonstrator in the capital Sana'a baked up a unique way to demand the resignation of President Ali Abdullah Saleh on Wednesday.

The Libyan government denied reports of such government-backed attacks in eastern Libya, however. Government oil officials told the Associated Press Wednesday that oil exports from that part of the country are proceeding "normally," and that funds from the sale of the oil will be deposited in the country's accounts, even if the country is sanctioned by the international community. German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle welcomed the decision Tuesday by the United Nations to suspend Libya's membership in the UN Human Rights Council. "Those who damage human rights in such a terrible way have no place on the human rights council of the United Nations," Westerwelle said Wednesday in Berlin.

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Two US warships, the amphibious assault ships USS Kearsarge and USS Ponce, made their way into Egypt's Suez Canal Wednesday, on their way to the Mediterranean. US Defense Secretary Robert Gates said Tuesday he had ordered two ships into the Mediterranean, but that military action in Libya must be carefully weighed because of wider implications for the region. Drafting Plans for a No-Fly Zone Meanwhile, diplomats in Brussels said plans are being drafted in the event that the UN Security Council decides to impose an air embargo over Libya. Officials told the Associated Press that some possible models would be the no-fly zone imposed by NATO over Bosnia in 1993, which had a mandate from the Security Council, and NATO's air war over Kosovo in 1999. NATO has made clear that a no-fly zone over Libya could only take place with a UN Security Council mandate. Russia, which holds a veto as a permanent member of the council, has ruled that out. In Italy, which has been flooded with immigrants from Tunisia in recent weeks following the revolution there, and which relies heavily on imports of foreign oil, including from Libya, government officials were watching developments there closely. When asked if Italy feared Gadhafi might do something desperate, such as bomb oil fields, Italy's Industry Minister Paolo Romani said on Italian television that there was a "real possibility" that Gadhafi might make a "last-ditch attempt to free himself from the siege that he finds himself in." France and Britain have called for an emergency EU summit on Libya, which could take place as early as next week. A French government spokesman said Tuesday that humanitarian aid to the North African country should be the priority over a military ouster of the Libyan leader. Austria and Germany also moved Tuesday to freeze assets belonging to Gadhafi family members and other top Libyan officials, following in the footsteps of Switzerland, Britain and the European Union, which has already issued travel bans and an asset freeze against them. On Tuesday, Germany's government blocked a bank account belonging to one of Gadhafi's sons, which was reported to hold €2 million ($2.8 million). mbw -- with wires URL: http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,748586,00.html RELATED SPIEGEL ONLINE LINKS: • Photo Gallery: International Pressure on Gadhafi Grows http://www.spiegel.de/fotostrecke/fotostrecke-65259.html • Fear of Freedom: Democracy Virus Has Dictators Fretting (03/01/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,748354,00.html • Europe's Favorite Dictators: The EU Has Failed the Arab World (02/28/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,748074,00.html • Author Hisham Matar on the Revolution in Libya: 'Libyans Are Rediscovering What It Means to Be a People' (03/01/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,748210,00.html • The World from Berlin: Gadhafi will 'Fight Until the Last Bullet is Fired' (02/28/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,748122,00.html • 'He Is no Longer One of Us': Post-Gadhafi Era Begins in Eastern Libya (02/28/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,748033,00.html

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• The Battle for Al-Bayda: Fighting for Freedom against Tanks, Mercenaries and Bombs (02/26/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,747909,00.html • Kissing the Hand of the Dictator: What Libya's Troubles Mean for Its Italian Allies (02/25/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,747745,00.html

EUROPE & THE WORLD

EGYPT The revolution that came from Serbia 2 March 2011 SVENSKA DAGBLADET STOCKHOLM

Demonstrator with the drapeau 6 April Youth Movement Flag. Cairo, April 2010. AP-SIPA | Some of the members of the April 6 Youth Movement, which spearheaded the Egyptian revolution, were trained by members of Otpor!, a Serbian-based group that was responsible for the fall of the Milosevic regime in 2000. Tomas Lundin The organisation dubbed by some commentators as "Revolution Ltd" has trained activists and non-violent resistants who have struggled to overthrow most of the world’s dictatorial regimes. Its methods have served as "weapons" almost everywhere: from the Rose Revolution in Georgia [2003] to the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan [2005], and more recently in the revolt that has swept across the Arab world. "Yes, it’s true. We did train members of the April 6 Youth Movement in Egypt," remarks Srdja Popovic, who now runs the Center for Applied Nonviolent Action and Strategies (CANVAS) in Belgrade, whose senior members are veterans of the Otpor! civil resistance movement. However, Srdja Popovic has no intention of hogging the limelight and appears exasperated when we ask him if Otpor! is an exporter of revolutions. "We do not descend on countries with revolution in a suitcase. It is their revolution and the foreign consultants should not take credit for it. These people risked their lives for freedom, and their victory is 100% of their own making. No question about it!"

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Always the emphasis on non-violence Srdja Popovic is long-standing authority on civil disobedience and non-violent resistance. In 1998, when he was a 25-year old biology student, he and a dozen of his friends founded Otpor!. At the time, Milosevic had been in power for almost ten years and was preparing to wage war Kosovo. In a student canteen in Belgrade University, they devised a plan for a new resistance movement, inspired by Mahatma Gandhi and the campaign against apartheid, with a fresh and trendy image that even succeeded in attracting their apolitical peers. Highly imaginative initiatives, which brought them increasing attention in the media, became their signature. As always the emphasis was on non-violence: they challenged and ridiculed the regime, but confronted soldiers and police carrying flowers. Otpor! had understood that Milosevic would fall when he could no longer rely on the unquestioning support of the police and the army. "They were the methods and the message that we are now teaching to activists in other countries," explains Srdja Popovic. "In our courses, we ask them to identify the pillars of the regime. Then we tell them: 'Do not attack them, because that will only lead to violence. Try to win them over to your side'". People power is the decisive factor From the start of the uprising against Hosni Mubarak, members of the April 6 Youth Movement brandishing the Otpor! symbol of a clenched white fist on a black background were a visible presence in Tahrir Square and the streets of Cairo. In an interview with Al-Jazeera, one of their number, 22-year-old blogger Mohammed Adel explained: "I was in Serbia where I learned about the organisation of non-violent demonstrations and the best methods to counter security service brutality." When he returned to Egypt at the end of 2009, he brought with him a guide to subversive activities, which he distributed to other members of the April 6 and Kefaya movements. A little more than a year later, this document was put to good use. Srdja Popovic affirms that "people power" is the decisive factor. No two revolutions are the same, but there is an arsenal of tools that can be put to use everywhere. For the Serbian activist, "Every regime, even the most repressive ones, can be over thrown by non-violent means."

Tomas Lundin The revolution that came from Serbia 2 March 2011 SVENSKA DAGBLADET STOCKHOLM http://www.presseurop.eu/en/content/article/523241-revolution-came-serbia http://www.presseurop.eu/en

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EUROPE ABROAD

NORTH AFRICA Europe's new frontier 1 March 2011 LA STAMPA TURIN

Future EU citizen? A Tunisian fleeing Libya for his home country, at the Ras Jdir border post, 23 february. AFP | Thirty years ago nobody could have foreseen the process that brought the Warsaw Pact countries into the European Union. Now that the same is happening to Arab nations, the EU must offer them the same opportunity to strengthen democracy: the true prospect of membership. Bill Emmott The resistance of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi to accepting either the moral or the practical logic of his situation, holed up in Tripoli and with more than half of his country (measured by population) in opposition hands, should surprise no one. During his more than 40 years in power in Libya he has never shown either a strong moral or practical instinct, except for preserving his own power. Nevertheless, the long-term surprise that will occur because of the events in Egypt, Tunisia and now Libya is one that casts us far into the future. It is the consequence for the European Union of the now possible, even likely, spread of a democratic revolution across a wide swathe of North Africa and the Middle East. We should be patient in assessing how far that revolution will go, just as we were in the first months after the Berlin Wall fell in 1989. But also, like then, it will pay to plan and think ahead. The evolution of the EU has consisted of a series of ideas that seemed far-fetched when they were first proposed but which later came to seem inevitable. The next such idea is likely to be the expansion of the EU to encompass the southern coast of the Mediterranean. No one now expects such a development; given that France, Germany and several other EU countries cannot even accept the idea of membership for Turkey, which is already a democracy.

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EU membership for some North African countries? But think back to the early 1990s: it quickly became clear that Western Europe had a huge interest in fostering the stability, friendliness and economic development of its neighbouring former Soviet satellites, which it did in a long, slow process that culminated in full EU membership for ten of them well over a decade later. Not all the former Soviet satellites became democracies, and not all have now joined the EU. The same will probably apply in North Africa and the Middle East. Still, just think about the parallels between the fall of the Soviet Union, in the EU’s eastern borderlands, and the fall of Arab dictatorships on the southern coast of the Mediterranean. As after 1989, the huge interest and historic opportunity that today’s Arab awakening offers to Europe will become clearer and clearer, in the next months and years, for both good and ill. America has tricky military issues in the region, and will be held responsible for what does, or doesn’t, happen in Palestine. Europe, as after 1989, mainly has economic and cultural links to offer, which are more positive. European countries are already the biggest trading partners for most North African states; Italy is a leader in its oil and gas links with Libya and Algeria for example. The logic of those links, along with fears of instability and mass migration, can point in only one long-term direction: membership of the EU of some sort for some North African countries. We have something very valuable to offer More likely than full membership, as we understand it today, is a new sort of union in which there are several forms of membership. That is already true today, with only some of the 27 EU members being part of the euro, or of the Schengen passport-free zone. So a new formula will need to be found to offer economic integration, including eventual open trading access and the single market, to democratic countries in North Africa, probably stopping short of full free movement of labour. All this will mean that the European Union itself will have to again change its name: it can become the European and Mediterranean Union. Without such a proposal, such a long-term vision, what will Europe have to offer the new North African democracies, as and when they emerge? A little aid, and a few university places: that is all. Yet, as after the Berlin Wall fell, we have something very valuable to offer, as an incentive for democratic reform: the chance to join us. It sounds difficult, even before you start to mention Islam. Don’t forget, however, that this development would also make economic and political sense for Europe. Mediterranean, in its Latin root, means middle of the earth, after all, not some kind of southern frontier or barrier. It was the centre of our world for centuries. It is part of Europe’s neighbourhood. These extracts from Bill Emmot's article are the copyright of La Stampa, 2011. FROM CENTRAL EUROPE Eastern partnership sacrificed for the Med While Europe is focused on the crisis sweeping through the Arab world, foreign policy in areas other than the Mediterranean has been forced to take a back seat. Writing in Lidové noviny, Luboš Palata argues that the very existence of the EU’s Eastern Partnership project is now under threat. It was done so discreetly that hardly anyone noticed. Only a day or two ago, Hungary cancelled one of the two key 386 events of its EU presidency: the Eastern Partnership summit which was supposed to take place at Gödöllő Palace, not far from Budapest. By way of explanation, it was announced that the 27 May, the date set for the event, created a scheduling conflict for Nicolas Sarkozy, who had also planned a G8 meeting for the same day. “Of all the issues to be addressed by the Hungarian EU Presidency, only the question of the Roms remains on the agenda. All the others seem to have evaporated,” notes a diplomat from one of Hungary’s neighbours. According to well-informed sources, the cancellation was prompted by embarrassment over the evolution of the political situation in Eastern Europe. The Republic of Azerbaijan, which is awash with oil, is still run by the Aliyev dynasty. Belarus has reaffirmed its status as a hardline dictatorship. Armenia is continuing to imprison a number of opposition leaders, and last but not least, a large area of territory belonging to two of the regions most deserving countries, Georgia and Moldova, is controlled by pro-Moscow puppet regimes. To date, progress in the drive to address these issues has been more symbolic than real. “As it stands, Western Europe is focusing all of its attention on North Africa,” affirms Petr Mareš, the Czech special envoy for the Eastern Partnership. In recent years, the EU has invested in the region within the framework of the Union for the Mediterranean — a project that is in direct competition with the Eastern Partnership. Now that the 2013 budget is being drafted, funding for further development of the project may be axed. “In view of the dynamics of the situation in the Mediterranean, there is a strong likelihood that that the Eastern Partnership will be sacrificed,” writes Mareš. http://www.presseurop.eu/en/content/article/521091-europes-new-frontier

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02 de marzo de 2011 Mauricio Merino México no es Egipto ni Libia

Mauricio Merino es doctor en Ciencia Política por la Universidad Complutense de Madrid. Ha escrito y coordinado varios libros y e... Hoy me preguntaron a bocajarro si en México podría suceder algo parecido a lo que están viviendo Túnez, Egipto o Libia. No dudé ni un segundo en responder que eso no era posible, pues de ninguna manera cabía formular una comparación como esa: México no es una dictadura, no tiene raíces islámicas, carece de tradición bélica y sus condiciones políticas son totalmente distintas a las del grupo de países árabes que decidió liberarse de los regímenes que los estaban ahogando. Todo eso, además de su situación geopolítica y de la pluralidad democrática que hoy forma parte de su paisaje político. Pero después lo pensé un poco mejor y caí en cuenta de que quizás hay otras razones más relevantes para seguir respondiendo, de todos modos, que no, que en México no cabe imaginar una movilización social de la magnitud que hemos visto en aquellos países porque nuestros problemas son de naturaleza muy diferente a los que han puesto en movimiento al norte de África. Nosotros avanzamos a la democracia electoral desde hace varios años y mucho antes, a principios del siglo XX, derrocamos al último dictador. No vivimos episodios equivalentes a los que estamos atestiguando en Egipto y en el Magreb, porque tras la derrota de Díaz tuvimos cerca de 70 años de un régimen autoritario en el que los líderes máximos fueron cambiando por turnos y que, con el tiempo, se fue liberando hasta desembocar en una transición basada en los votos, que tuvo como destino un nuevo régimen de partidos. En términos estrictamente políticos, nosotros estamos al otro lado del río. Con todo, en este otro lado los problemas no son menores. Pero no concibo una movilización tan amplia, poderosa y consensual como la de aquellos países árabes porque tampoco logro imaginar una causa que sea capaz de despertar las conciencias de la gran mayoría de los mexicanos al mismo tiempo, en la misma dirección de propósitos y con la misma convicción compartida. Lo que veo es, más bien, que al transitar hacia la democracia política del modo en que lo hemos hecho —sin haber roto con el pasado, sin haber renovado nuestra clase política, sin haber refundado nuestras instituciones— no sólo trajimos los vicios, la cultura y las prácticas de corrupción, de simulación y de privilegio de las que veníamos huyendo, sino que acrecentamos la ruptura y la fragmentación de la sociedad. En lugar de acercarnos a una causa común, la democracia capturada por las grandes empresas, los medios y los partidos nos ha segmentado aún más.

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Ni siquiera hemos conseguido articular una agenda común en torno de los problemas más evidentes. La pobreza, que salta a la vista como el primero de todos, es disputada como arma de uso político por los partidos y los gobiernos, mientras que los programas sociales siguen construyendo clientelas. En lugar de unirla, esos programas fragmentan cada vez más a la sociedad. Y no sorprende que las prácticas solidarias, comunitarias y altruistas de las que nos habíamos sentido orgullosos en varios momentos críticos — como en el terremoto de 1985— hoy estén cediendo su sitio ante el egoísmo y la violencia de todo cuño. Ya que no podemos salvarnos todos, que se salve quien pueda. Tampoco hay un enemigo común, pues desgraciadamente el crimen organizado no está formado por una gavilla de delincuentes, sino que se ha incrustado en la desigualdad, la pobreza y la desesperanza de miles de mexicanos. Y aunque se diga un millón de veces, un millón de veces seguirá siendo falso que podremos recuperar la seguridad pública y el respeto a la ley con pura violencia. Por el contrario, lo que estamos viendo crecer con angustia es el encierro de los pacíficos, tan incapaces de defenderse como de seguir confiando en los otros. El miedo divide tanto o más que la pobreza y la marginación. Y encima, nos hemos plagado de corrupción. Esa captura ilegítima de las facultades y de las cosas que nos pertenecen a todos, pero que se llevan a casa unos cuantos, mientras ocultan y clausuran hasta la posibilidad de confiar en una causa común. Eso también segmenta a la sociedad e impide suponer siquiera que podríamos movernos juntos, con los mismos propósitos. Eso que alguna vez hicimos para recuperar el sentido y la majestad de los votos, hoy parecería una empresa imposible. En efecto, no somos Egipto ni Libia. Pero hay algo tan digno y prometedor en esa movilización colectiva que, a pesar de todo, no puede dejar de verse con una mezcla de simpatía y esperanza. Hay algo envidiable en el ejemplo de voluntad de esos pueblos, que nosotros estamos perdiendo. Profesor investigador del CIDE http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/editoriales/51886.html

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¿Siria es el próximo dominó?

Ribal Al- Assad 2011-03-02

LONDRES – Desaparecidos los regímenes tunecino y egipcio y en momentos en que las protestas callejeras crean disturbios en ciudades desde Algiers hasta Teherán, mucha gente hoy se pregunta cuál será la próxima pieza del dominó en caer. Siria, cuya dictadura secular y militarizada es la que más se parece a los regímenes caídos de Túnez y Egipto, tal vez no sea la próxima en la fila, pero de todas maneras parece estar acercándose a un punto crítico. Por supuesto, la vieja “teoría del dominó” en las relaciones internacionales era sólo una manera cruda de enfatizar que las diferentes partes de una región están vinculadas entre sí. Para el mundo árabe de hoy, una metáfora mejor podría ser un tablero de ajedrez, en el que hasta la eliminación de un peón inevitablemente altera las relaciones entre las demás piezas. Hoy, mientras las protestas aumentan y se multiplican, el gobierno de todo estado árabe en Oriente Medio y el norte de África probablemente crea que, si lo dejan con sus propios recursos, puede contener el disenso interno. En Siria, parece inevitable que la protesta pronto pueda quebrar la frágil inmovilidad política del régimen. La mayoría de los sirios enfrentan situaciones económicas y sociales extremadamente difíciles, como un alto desempleo, alzas en los precios de los alimentos, limitaciones a la libertad personal y una corrupción endémica. Estos factores no difieren de aquellos que llevaron a la gente a las calles en el norte de África y Oriente Medio. Lo que comenzó como manifestaciones por las condiciones de vida se convirtió en demandas generalizadas de libertad y democracia. El régimen de Damasco teme un malestar similar, como debería ser. La mejor manera de evitar una confrontación entre el pueblo y las fuerzas de seguridad es un proceso de reforma genuina que lleve a elecciones y a un gobierno de unidad nacional. La inercia arraigada del actual régimen, sin embargo, parece descartar cualquier maniobra en esa dirección. Por el contrario, las autoridades de Siria están ofreciendo incentivos para asegurar que los electores clave acaten las normas –computadoras portátiles para los maestros, subsidios para los trabajadores del sector público y una retórica reformistas vacía-. Pero la situación actual requiere medidas mucho más serias. Levantar el estado de emergencia que rige desde 1963 –dándole amplios poderes al régimen y a sus servicios de seguridad- sería un paso tanto simbólico como tangible en la dirección correcta. 390

A menos que las autoridades de Siria, como los otros líderes del mundo árabe, empiecen a entender que la libertad es un derecho humano fundamental, hasta la paciencia de la gente más inactiva puede desgastarse de manera peligrosa. Los altos precios de los alimentos pueden haber servido como un disparador en el norte de África, pero la velocidad con la que los manifestantes viraron su atención hacia la reforma política atrapó a todos por sorpresa. Regresar este genio a su botella sería prácticamente imposible sin un derramamiento de sangre del tipo que hoy estamos presenciando en algunas partes del mundo árabe. De manera que los líderes sirios saben que deben responder –de ahí la agenda de reforma poco entusiasta que diseñaron recientemente-. Pero intentar resolver las quejas populares arraigadas con un lenguaje florido y un ramo de subsidios es como intentar apagar un incendio forestal con una pistola de agua. Los problemas de Siria son tan serios que las soluciones deben ser sustanciales. Hasta ahora, las autoridades de Siria se basaron en su retórica anti-Israel y anti-Occidente para protegerse. Pero en las protestas de Túnez y El Cairo rara vez se escucharon reclamos por el conflicto palestino-israelí. Es más, en los últimos años, cuando los aviones israelíes atacaron blancos en Siria, no hubo ninguna respuesta del régimen –tampoco cuando aviones israelíes volaron sobre el palacio presidencial. El régimen sostiene que forma parte de la “resistencia” con su socio Irán. Sin embargo, los cables de WikiLeaks muestran que el liderazgo sirio le pidió al régimen iraní que no contara con él en ninguna guerra con Israel porque es demasiado débil. De modo que el régimen está cometiendo un error fatal si piensa que sus viejas tácticas destinadas a confundir le seguirán brindando inmunidad. Por el contrario, con una población joven y bien educada incapaz de encontrar un trabajo apropiado, el régimen creó su propio cuadro de potenciales manifestantes, que son conscientes de que está utilizando eslóganes vacíos para mantener el estado de emergencia y quedarse en el poder. El pueblo sirio es fuerte, paciente, resistente e ingenioso. Los lazos familiares y sociales se mantienen fuertes sólidos a la adversidad. Cuando los alimentos escasean, la gente comparte. Cuando el régimen se pone estricto con Internet, la gente usa servidores proxy. Pero no deberían tener que conformarse. No deberían tener que arriesgar su seguridad cuando buscan involucrase con el mundo online. Nadie quiere ver las calles de Damasco consumidas en la protesta, o que surja una confrontación violenta entre los manifestantes y las fuerzas de seguridad. Lo que el pueblo sirio quiere es un diálogo significativo con el régimen. El régimen debe entender que, a pesar de sus mejores esfuerzos, los sirios han estado observando los acontecimientos en la región con tanto interés como el resto del mundo. El pueblo de Siria puede no sentir predilección por la violencia, pero una vez que se está en presencia del nacimiento de la libertad, no es fácil de olvidar –ni de acallar con dádivas estatales y declaraciones vacuas de un liderazgo distante y aislado. La gente dijo que el Muro de Berlín no se caería. Dijo que Mubarak no renunciaría. Y todavía algunos sostienen que Siria no puede cambiar. Pero Siria cambiará y yo, al igual que mis compatriotas, rezo para que cuando se produzca el cambio, sea pacifico y armonioso. Ribal Al-Assad es director de la Organización para la Democracia y la Libertad en Siria. Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2011.www.project-syndicate.org http://www.project- syndicate.org/commentary/assad1/Spanish

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Justicia mundial e intervención militar Peter Singer 2011-03-01

MELBOURNE – El mundo ha contemplado horrorizado la utilización por el coronel Muamar el Gadafi de su ejército para atacar a quienes protestan y se oponen a su gobierno y ha matado a centenares o posiblemente miles de civiles desarmados. Muchos de sus propios hombres se han negado a disparar contra su propio pueblo y se han pasado al bando de los rebeldes o han volado con sus aviones a la cercana Malta, por lo que Gadafi ha llamado a mercenarios de países vecinos, dispuestos a obedecer sus órdenes. Los dirigentes del mundo se han apresurado a condenar las acciones de Gadafi. El 26 de febrero, el Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas votó unánimemente la imposición de un embargo de armas a Libia y la remisión del caso de la violencia del régimen al Tribunal Penal Internacional para el posible procesamiento de los responsables e instó a los Estados Miembros a que congelaran los activos de Gadafi y de su familia. Es la primera vez que el Consejo de Seguridad ha remitido por unanimidad una situación que entraña violaciones de los derechos humanos al Tribunal Penal Internacional y es digno de destacar que países que no son miembros del Tribunal – incluidos los Estados Unidos, Rusia y China– apoyarán esa decisión. Así, pues, se puede considerar esa resolución otro paso más hacia la creación de un sistema mundial de justicia con capacidad para castigar a quienes cometen violaciones flagrantes de los derechos humanos, independientemente de su condición política o jurídica en su país. Sin embargo, en otro sentido la resolución del Consejo de Seguridad ha sido decepcionante. La situación en Libia pasó a ser una prueba de la seriedad con que la comunidad internacional se toma la idea del deber de proteger al pueblo contra sus gobernantes. Se trata de una idea antigua, pero su forma moderna echa sus raíces en la trágica falta de intervención contra el genocidio de Ruanda en 1994. Según las conclusiones de una investigación posterior de las Naciones Unidas, tan sólo 2.500

392 militares adecuadamente capacitados podrían haber impedido la matanza de 800.000 tutsis. El ex Presidente Bill Clinton ha dicho que el error cometido durante su presidencia y que más lamenta fue el de no instar a la intervención en Ruanda. Kofi Annan, que entonces era Secretario General Adjunto de Operaciones de Mantenimiento de la Paz, calificó la situación en las NN.UU. en aquel momento de parálisis “terrible y humillante”. Cuando Annan pasó a ser Secretario General, instó a que se formularan principios que indicasen cuándo está justificado que la comunidad internacional intervenga para impedir violaciones flagrantes de los derechos humanos. A ese respecto, el Gobierno del Canadá creó una Comisión Internacional de Intervención y Soberanía de los Estados, que recomendó que se considerara justificada la intervención militar, como medida extraordinaria, en los casos en que estuviera habiendo –o fuese inminente– una pérdida de vidas en masa causada por acciones deliberadas del Estado o la negativa o la dejación del Estado a la hora de actuar. La Asamblea General de las NN.UU. hizo suyos esos principios en su Cumbre Mundial especial celebrada en 2005 y volvió a examinarlos en 2009 y una mayoría abrumadora de Estados los apoyó. Ese principio cuadra con la situación actual en Libia. Sin embargo, en la resolución del Consejo de Seguridad no hay referencia alguna a la posibilidad de una intervención militar y ni siquiera a la imposición de una zona de exclusión aérea sobre Libia a fin de impedir que Gadafi utilice aviones para atacar a quienes protestan. Un organismo particularmente interesado en transformar la idea del deber de proteger en un motivo para la intervención es el Centro Mundial en pro del Deber de Proteger de la Universidad de la Ciudad de Nueva York, que ha pedido a los miembros de las NN.UU. que cumplan compromisos que contrajeron en 2005 y hagan realidad el deber de proteger en el caso de Libia. Insta a que se examine la posibilidad de adoptar diversas medidas, varias de las cuales iban incluidas en la resolución del Consejo de Seguridad, pero también una zona de exclusión aérea. Además de sostener que el deber de proteger puede justificar la intervención militar, la Comisión Internacional sobre Intervención y Soberanía de los Estados recomendó un conjunto de principios cautelares. Por ejemplo, la intervención militar debe ser el último recurso y, además, debe haber pocas probabilidades de que sus consecuencias sean peores que las de la inacción. Corresponde juzgar a los expertos si las características específicas de la situación en Libia se ajustan a los principios cautelares. Nadie quiere otra guerra prolongada como las del Iraq y del Afganistán, pero Libia no es el Iraq ni el Afganistán: su población representa sólo una quinta parte de la de cualquiera de esos dos países y hay un potente movimiento popular en pro de una forma democrática de gobierno. Suponiendo que las fuerzas militares extranjeras neutralizaran rápidamente a las tropas de Gadafi, podrían abandonar Libia rápidamente y dejar que su pueblo decidiera su futuro. En el momento de escribir este artículo, puede que haya razones para creer que otras sanciones o amenazas, exceptuada la intervención militar, vayan a ser suficientes para disuadir un mayor derramamiento de sangre. Tal vez los rebeldes y las sanciones puedan derrocar Gadafi sin ayuda y sin gran pérdida de vidas. Tampoco está claro si una intervención militar causaría más muertes que las que evitaría.

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Pero esas son las preguntas que debe hacerse la comunidad internacional y que el Consejo de Seguridad debería estar debatiendo, para que el principio del deber de proteger y sus posibles consecuencias para la intervención militar lleguen a formar parte de nuestra concepción de los requisitos del derecho internacional y de la ética mundial. Peter Singer es profesor de Bioética en la Universidad de Princeton y profesor laureado en la Universidad de Melbourne. Su libro más reciente es The Life You Can Save (La vida que podéis salvar”). http://www.project- syndicate.org/commentary/singer72/Spanish

Yemeni parties join demonstrators on streets as Saleh blames West for unrest By Portia Walker Tuesday, March 1, 2011; 8:23 PM SANAA, YEMEN - Tens of thousands of people, including a controversial preacher, turned out in cities across Yemen on Tuesday as opposition parties joined demonstrators in rejecting embattled President Ali Abdullah Saleh's offer to form a unity government. Saleh, in a speech to the faculty and others at Sanaa University, accused the United States and Israel of orchestrating the unrest sweeping through the region. "There is an operation room in Tel Aviv with the aim of destabilizing the Arab world," the longtime ruler said. "It is all run by the White House." The allegation, presented without evidence, appeared to reflect growing desperation on the part of a leader who has long enjoyed U.S. support, and it drew a swift rebuttal from the Obama administration. "The protests in Yemen are not the product of external conspiracies," State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley said in a message on Twitter. "President Saleh knows better." Saleh, whose country received $300 million in U.S. aid last year, is seen by Washington as a key ally against the Arabian Peninsula's ambitious branch of al-Qaeda. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton went to Yemen in January, the first visit by an incumbent in the post since 1990. Among the demonstrators here Tuesday was Sheik Abdul Majid al-Zindani, an influential cleric who had hitherto maintained close ties with Saleh despite being a leading member of the opposition Islamist al-Islah party. The United States and United Nations list Zindani as a terrorist, citing his suspected links to al-Qaeda. Zindani's presence at the demonstration, where he gave an address, raised fears that the popular - and until now, secular - revolution could be hijacked by Islamists and political parties. Ahmed Abdulrahman, 24, a student taking part in the Tuesday demonstrations, sounded confident that would not happen. "This revolution is for us, for all people, not for the parties," he said. "It's not important what they do. We began this, and we're going to complete it ourselves."

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Earlier in the day, however, the prominent Yemeni journalist Nasser Arrabyee said in an interview: "The young people are not the main players here. It's the clerics and tribes that are." Some key tribal leaders openly sided with the demonstrators over the weekend, while others announced support for Saleh. The president has made several concessions, including pledges to step down when his current term ends in 2013 and not transfer power to his son. But the offer to form a unity government within 24 hours - a gesture he has made and reneged on in the past - did little to placate the demonstrators. "The people are fed up with dialogue," said Najrabi, 24, a teacher who gave just one name. "We just don't trust him anymore." Opposition parties had designated Tuesday a "day of rage" and urged their members to join the youth-led demonstrations. The crowds were reportedly among the largest since the unrest began Feb. 11, and participants appeared jubilant. "I feel like everybody has finally woken up after sleeping for 33 years," said Ibrahim Haider, a 19-year-old student. [Read about the southern Yemeni city of Taiz, a cradle of the country's rebellion.] Gregory Johnsen, a Yemen expert at Princeton University, said that although Saleh has survived numerous crises in more than three decades of rule, "he doesn't appear to realize that the ground has shifted significantly beneath his feet." Last week, 10 members of parliament from the ruling General People's Congress party resigned, and a key tribal leader, Hussein al-Ahmar, pledged support for the anti- government demonstrators. The lawmakers say they were angered by the violence directed against the demonstrators, which Amnesty International estimates has killed 27 people. On Monday evening, thousands of anti-government demonstrators had gathered at a camp set up outside the gates of Sanaa University, the epicenter of protests here. Silhouetted against the walls of their tents, groups of men sat chewing the stimulant khat and reading newspapers. In the crowds outside, a bearded sheik shook hands with two young men in modern clothing. Another carried an infant on his shoulders, wrapped in a Yemeni flag. Demonstrators held handmade signs written in Arabic and English. One read, "We want democracy and freedom. Go out!" Another echoed the chant of the demonstrators in Tunisia and Egypt: "The people want the downfall of the regime." Earlier, the opposition movement had been divided, with mostly young protesters calling for Saleh to step down and his political opponents calling for reforms and concessions but not regime change. The decision to support the youth protesters this week could indicate a more unified opposition to Saleh but also leave the opposition coalition in a precarious position, observers said. "If they do not engage in dialogue, the situation might deteriorate into serious conflict," Yemeni political analyst Abdul-Ghani al-Iryani said. "On the other hand, if they engage

395 in negotiations, they fear that they will undermine the youth movement and lose their standing with it and still come out with nothing." Walker is a special correspondent. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/article/2011/03/01/AR2011030102703.html?wpisrc=nl_pmheadline

March 1, 2011 This Is Just the Start By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN Future historians will long puzzle over how the self-immolation of a Tunisian street vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi, in protest over the confiscation of his fruit stand, managed to trigger popular uprisings across the Arab/Muslim world. We know the big causes — tyranny, rising food prices, youth unemployment and social media. But since being in Egypt, I’ve been putting together my own back-of-the-envelope guess list of what I’d call the “not-so-obvious forces” that fed this mass revolt. Here it is: THE OBAMA FACTOR Americans have never fully appreciated what a radical thing we did — in the eyes of the rest of the world — in electing an African-American with the middle name Hussein as president. I’m convinced that listening to Obama’s 2009 Cairo speech — not the words, but the man — were more than a few young Arabs who were saying to themselves: “Hmmm, let’s see. He’s young. I’m young. He’s dark- skinned. I’m dark-skinned. His middle name is Hussein. My name is Hussein. His grandfather is a Muslim. My grandfather is a Muslim. He is president of the United States. And I’m an unemployed young Arab with no vote and no voice in my future.” I’d put that in my mix of forces fueling these revolts. GOOGLE EARTH While Facebook has gotten all the face time in Egypt, Tunisia and Bahrain, don’t forget Google Earth, which began roiling Bahraini politics in 2006. A big issue in Bahrain, particularly among Shiite men who want to get married and build homes, is the unequal distribution of land. On Nov. 27, 2006, on the eve of parliamentary elections in Bahrain, The Washington Post ran this report from there: “Mahmood, who lives in a house with his parents, four siblings and their children, said he became even more frustrated when he looked up Bahrain on Google Earth and saw vast tracts of empty land, while tens of thousands of mainly poor Shiites were squashed together in small, dense areas. ‘We are 17 people crowded in one small house, like many people in the southern district,’ he said. ‘And you see on Google how many palaces there are and how the al-Khalifas [the Sunni ruling family] have the rest of the country to themselves.’ Bahraini activists have encouraged people to take a look at the country on Google Earth, and they have set up a special user group whose members have access to more than 40 images of royal palaces.” ISRAEL The Arab TV network Al Jazeera has a big team covering Israel today. Here are some of the stories they have been beaming into the Arab world: Israel’s previous prime minister, Ehud Olmert, had to resign because he was accused of illicitly taking envelopes stuffed with money from a Jewish-American backer. An Israeli court recently 396 convicted Israel’s former president Moshe Katsav on two counts of rape, based on accusations by former employees. And just a few weeks ago, Israel, at the last second, rescinded the appointment of Maj. Gen. Yoav Galant as the army’s new chief of staff after Israeli environmentalists spurred a government investigation that concluded General Galant had seized public land near his home. (You can see his house on Google Maps!) This surely got a few laughs in Egypt where land sales to fat cats and cronies of the regime that have resulted in huge overnight profits have been the talk of Cairo this past year. When you live right next to a country that is bringing to justice its top leaders for corruption and you live in a country where many of the top leaders are corrupt, well, you notice. THE BEIJING OLYMPICS China and Egypt were both great civilizations subjected to imperialism and were both dirt poor back in the 1950s, with China even poorer than Egypt, Edward Goldberg, who teaches business strategy, wrote in The Globalist. But, today, China has built the world’s second-largest economy, and Egypt is still living on foreign aid. What do you think young Egyptians thought when they watched the dazzling opening ceremony of the 2008 Beijing Olympics? China’s Olympics were another wake-up call — “in a way that America or the West could never be” — telling young Egyptians that something was very wrong with their country, argued Goldberg. THE FAYYAD FACTOR Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad introduced a new form of government in the Arab world in the last three years, something I’ve dubbed “Fayyadism.” It said: judge me on my performance, on how I deliver government services and collect the garbage and create jobs — not simply on how I “resist” the West or Israel. Every Arab could relate to this. Chinese had to give up freedom but got economic growth and decent government in return. Arabs had to give up freedom and got the Arab-Israeli conflict and unemployment in return. Add it all up and what does it say? It says you have a very powerful convergence of forces driving a broad movement for change. It says we’re just at the start of something huge. And it says that if we don’t have a more serious energy policy, the difference between a good day and bad day for America from here on will hinge on how the 86- year-old king of Saudi Arabia manages all this change. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/02/opinion/02friedman.html?_r=1&nl=todaysheadlin es&emc=tha212&pagewanted=print

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03/01/2011 04:26 PM Fear of Freedom Democracy Virus Has Dictators Fretting By Erich Follath First it was Ben Ali in Tunisia, then Mubarak in Egypt. Now Libya's Gadhafi is under pressure. From Cuba to China, dictators are watching events in the Arab world with alarm, with full knowledge that ideas are spreading to their populations via the Internet -- and that they could be next.

It's safe to say that Moammar Gadhafi has flamboyant taste. His clothing is always dazzling and extravagant, from his canary-yellow, blood red or pristine white tunics to his purple cashmere scarves and ochre socks. His collection of sunglasses looks as if it had been dreamed up by some eccentric avant-garde designer. The revolutionary leader once even wore a crown of sorts when he had himself symbolically celebrated as Africa's "king of kings" before assembled potentates in Tripoli. His flamboyance also extends to other areas. For example, his "Green Book," distributed to millions in the country and required reading for schoolchildren, university students, civil servants and people in the military, is expected to be understood as an important piece of writing and as a "universal theory." Gadhafi himself put it this way: "The Green Book presents the ultimate solution to the problem of the instrument of government, and indicates for the masses the path upon which they can advance from the age of dictatorship to that of genuine democracy." His Excellency Moammar Gadhafi, 68, Brother Leader and Guide of the Revolution, a megalomaniacal, ruthless and brutal dictator who was long a pariah before becoming the West's partner, is undoubtedly a unique figure in international politics. 'Psychopath' and 'Mad Dog' He is terrifying. In the past, he provided financial support to practically every terrorist organization around, from the Basque ETA to the Irish IRA to the

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Palestinian Abu Nidal group. He had his own intelligence agents hunt down American soldiers at the "La Belle" nightclub in Berlin. Then he renounced all violence in 2003, abandoning weapons of mass destruction and offering his services as a partner to the West, supposedly as a reformed man. He is extravagant. He appears with his powerful-looking female bodyguards and, on foreign visits from Paris to New York, insists on staying in the Bedouin tent he has brought along, sometimes accompanied by one of his eight children. But he is always in the company of a Ukrainian nurse the American ambassador famously described in a diplomatic cable published by WikiLeaks as a "voluptuous blonde." Or rather, he was: The nurse reportedly flew home to Ukraine on Sunday. He is erratic. He speaks for five times as long as the time he has been allotted before the United Nations General Assembly and tears up the UN charter at the podium. In addition to making reasonable suggestions, such as changing the composition of the Security Council, he seeks to convince the world that Israel was responsible for the assassination of former US President John F. Kennedy and describes current US President Barack Obama as "our son." "The guy is a psychopath," the late Egyptian President Anwar Sadat once said. He predicted in 1978 that Gadhafi would see an early death at the hands of an assassin. But Sadat, a winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, was wrong: He, not the Libyan, was the one who would be assassinated. Former US President Ronald Reagan called Gadhafi the "mad dog of the Middle East" and ordered his main base, the Bab al-Azizia military barracks in Tripoli, to be bombed in 1986. The Libyan dictator's adopted daughter was killed, but Gadhafi escaped unscathed. The Clown among the Major Powers This man has ruled Libya for almost 42 years. Since he and a group of young officers ousted former King Idris in a military coup, Gadhafi has seen eight American presidents and six German chancellors come and go. He once wore a single white glove to a summit meeting of the Arab League. The eccentric leader explained that he wanted to be sure not to "become infected" when shaking the hands of leaders who had already had contact with Israeli officials. All that was missing was a chimpanzee on his shoulder to make Gadhafi the Michael Jackson of the Arab world. Gadhafi, with his fantasy uniforms and shrill remarks, has often been dismissed as a class clown among the major powers, being seen merely as someone who engages in extraordinarily bizarre behavior. But this does not do justice to his role. In his early days as a revolutionary leader, he was a sort of Arab Ché Guevara for many leftists. His convictions that education should be free and should be mandatory for girls, that people should not be allowed to earn money from housing and that the masses were capable of governing themselves through "people's committees" -- all of this sounded fascinating, at least on paper. Gadhafi is the ruler of a country with more than 3 percent of the world's oil reserves, and until recently he was cooperating with the European Union to stem the tide of refugees from North Africa to Europe. Though not the West's favorite partner, he has been one with whom deals could be made, and someone whom it was best not to "disturb," as his "friend," Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, recently put it.

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Is it even possible to say that he is the ruler of this country anymore, now that rebels have captured large parts of Libya? And what happens if Gadhafi remains holed up in the capital with his brutal mercenaries, ordering those members of his air force still loyal to him to pick off civilians as if they were rabbits and sending out his thugs to loot and murder? Will the world be forced to intervene to prevent genocide, a second Rwanda or Cambodia, by imposing economic sanctions and militarily enforcing no-fly zones? Winds of Change The winds of change began blowing in the Arab world eight weeks ago. What started as a fresh breeze became a storm and has now turned into a hurricane, one that promises to upset and sweep away everything that existed before it. Ironically, all of this is happening in a region whose problems have remained unsolved for decades, whose societies appeared to be frozen in time. The popular uprisings forced Tunisian kleptocrat Zine El Abidine Ben Ali into exile and the Egyptian "Pharaoh" Hosni Mubarak to step down. A class of committed and fearless young revolutionaries had successfully tried out the power of the street. They denounced the corruption of their rulers, demanded jobs and called for democratic freedoms. Almost as astonishingly, they were not chanting any anti-American slogans and hardly any anti-Israeli ones. And the Islamists, so feared by the West and portrayed as bogeymen by the autocrats (who liked to cultivate the image of being the only bulwark against fundamentalist chaos), were at most just riding along on the bandwagon. The revolution in Libya, where demonstrations began less than two weeks ago and where rebels soon captured the eastern part of the country and the second-largest city Benghazi, is not entirely the same as the other Arab youth and democracy movements. In this former Italian colony, no one knows how much the revolution owes to traditional tribal rivalries and how much to Libyans' hatred of the Gadhafi clan and its excesses. And there has been more bloodshed in Libya -- a lot more. It is clear, however, that the colonel's children long ago abandoned all ideals of the early period of his rule and have shamelessly enriched themselves or simply squandered government funds. One son paid millions to have pop singer Mariah Carey perform on his vacation island in the Caribbean and, a year later, threw what was likely an even more expensive party, featuring top stars Beyoncé and Usher. Despite press censorship, the news about such escapades quickly spread among Internet-savvy Libyan youth who, in addition to witnessing the Gadhafi clan's excesses, have to deal with a decaying healthcare system and a lack of professional opportunities. 'Stay Up All Night' Gadhafi made several bizarre appearances within the last week. First, on Monday night, he appeared before a television crew while standing in the door of his version of the Popemobile. He held up an umbrella and said that he would like to join the pro-Gadhafi demonstrators on Tripoli's central Green Square, but that it was raining too heavily. Hours later, he gave a dramatic address to the people from a venue he had apparently chosen for its symbolic value: the palace the Americans had once bombed. Gadhafi ranted against the "dirty rats" protesting against him in the streets, announced that he would cleanse the country "house by house," and characterized the brutal actions 400 of the Chinese authorities on Tiananmen Square in 1989 as reasonable. In his blind rage, the revolutionary leader went so far as to threaten to kill anyone who did not abide by the Libyan constitution -- apparently forgetting that Libya does not have a constitution. Giving up was out of the question for him, he shouted, adding that he would become a martyr if necessary and vowing he would fight "to my last drop of blood." On Thursday, Gadhafi, who holds an honorary doctorate from Serbia's Megatrend University, issued another bizarre statement, speaking this time by phone and broadcast on government TV. Terrorist leader Osama bin Laden was the true cause of the Libyan crisis, Gadhafi postulated, adding that the protestors were high on drugs. His advice to his countrymen: "If you want to kill each other, go ahead." Gadhafi's third outrageous appearance in a fateful week happened late Friday afternoon, when he appeared in person on the central square in the capital. Speaking to a few hundred supporters, and dressed in a plain hunting outfit and a fur hat with earflaps, he said threateningly that his government would arm everyone in the country if necessary. "We will continue to fight, we will defeat them. We will die here on the dear soil of Libya." He called on the youth of the county to "stay up all night" and dance and sing, adding "Moammar Gadhafi is one of you." Twilight of a Despot The twilight of the Libyan despot is painful and, because of Libya's unique structures, a special, more violent case in the Arab world. Nevertheless, it is part of the larger revolution that has seized the entire Middle East and could even spread beyond its boundaries. The most optimistic analysis comes from -- of all places -- Israel, the country that has been the most skeptical about the current changes in the Middle East and whose prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, together with Saudi Arabian King Abdullah, has put the highest value on a frozen stability in the region. "It is difficult to be a dictator when we live in a transparent world," said Israeli President Shimon Peres, pointing out that this new transparency comes from Facebook and other Internet platforms, the instruments of the democracy movement. In an address to the Spanish parliament in Madrid, he said that Israel is "happy to witness this democratic revolution which is taking place in the Arab world," adding that the process is irreversible. Have we finally arrived, perhaps not at the "end of history" that some had prematurely predicted after the collapse of the Soviet Union, but at least at the end of the reigns of a host of brutal rulers? Is there a recurring pattern for how best to overthrow governments -- instructions for a peaceful revolution, so to speak -- that applies everywhere from Serbia in 2000, to Georgia in 2003 and Ukraine in 2004, and now to Tunisia and Egypt? A Shy Revolutionary If the young revolutionaries from Kiev to Cairo are to be believed, the answers to those questions can be found with an 83-year-old man who lives in a modest house near Boston. Gene Sharp, who was profiled in a 2005 SPIEGEL story, is the guru of a global network of freedom activists. The former Harvard professor wrote the bible of freedom that was recently used by Egyptian bloggers like Ahmed Mahir.

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The thin volume is titled: "From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation." Sharp, an admirer of Mahatma Gandhi, lists "198 methods of nonviolent action." He insists that his principles have nothing to do with pacifism. Instead, they are based on the analysis of power in a dictatorship and how it can be broken -- namely by citizens refusing obedience at all levels of state power, including its institutions. Sharp also points out, however, that it isn't enough to topple a dictator: Once he has been ousted, everything possible must be done to prevent a new one from replacing him. Following the euphoria of liberation, the democratic successes achieved in Ukraine and Georgia were largely frittered away. Sharp, who modestly gives all the credit to the courageous protesters, says that the same risk applies in Egypt and Tunisia. Nonviolent resistance worked in the overthrow of former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic, in the Orange Revolution in Ukraine and the Rose Revolution in Georgia, because the system was rotten, a civil society was in the making and the autocrats refrained from using excessive violence. But can the same recipe work with despots who are prepared to commit murder? Only the Strong Survive The Obama administration has discovered a pattern in the current maelstrom of upheavals in the Middle East. In the words of the New York Times: "The region's monarchs are likely to survive; its presidents are more likely to fall." The advantage the royal families have is that they can replace the governments they have installed, and they are more flexible and willing to compromise. The White House is apparently confident that countries like Morocco, Jordan and Bahrain will be able to reform themselves. In Bahrain, however, where a Sunni monarch rules an impoverished Shiite majority that makes up two-thirds of the country's population, the American optimism could prove to be premature. Although the ruler withdrew the military's tanks from the square where protestors had gathered in the capital Manama, it was only after shots had been fired and seven people died. In the Gulf emirate, where America's Fifth Fleet is based, more concessions to the protestors will be needed than monetary gifts and the release of political prisoners. The same holds true in neighboring Saudi Arabia, the country with the world's largest oil reserves, should the wave of unrest spread there. Washington already appears to have written off one of its former strategic partners: Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh, 68, who has been in office for more than 32 years. Saleh, who runs the country with near-dictatorial powers, declared in February that he would not run for reelection in 2013. Though meant as a major concession, the announcement only challenged the regime opponents to stage even angrier protests. Saleh is the type of politician that former US President Franklin D. Roosevelt famously referred to as "a son of a bitch, but our son of a bitch" -- he may be a brutal dictator to his people, but he is useful to the United States in its war on terror. This almost cultish worship of stability has routinely failed in international politics: among right-wing politicians, who assumed that military dictatorships could remain a reliable bulwark against communism and then found themselves confronted with their liberal successors; and among leftist politicians who tended to see Eastern European dissidents as troublemakers and not comrades-in-arms, and were then astonished to find

402 that leaders like Poland's Lech Walesa and Czechoslovakia's Vaclav Havel were not gradually changing the old order but sweeping it away instead. And why shouldn't the revolutionary recipes now being applied in the Middle East be effective in other parts of the world? What should prevent dissatisfied youth in Africa, Asia, Latin America or even Europe from expressing their anger? SPIEGEL presents an overview of a changed world, with a special emphasis on countries with revolutionary potential.

IRAN Members of parliament loyal to the regime in the theocracy had just visited their wrath upon opposition leaders Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karoubi, demanding "death to the traitors!" And now this: Religious leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, on the one side, and the two "traitors," on the other, are in agreement. They wholeheartedly support what is happening in Egypt and called upon Gadhafi to meet the demands of his people. Of course, they do so from different perspectives, and with opposite conclusions. Khamenei sees a "sign of Islamic awakening" in North Africa, while the Iranian president is convinced that "we will soon experience a new Middle East without Americans and without the Zionist regime" (a reference to Israel). Both men completely ignore the fact that religious motives did not play a significant role in Tunis, Cairo or Tripoli, and that the protesters were interested, not in expressing anti-Western outrage, but in securing democratic freedoms -- in other words, all of the things that the mullah- led regime denies its own citizens. As the leaked US embassy cables revealed, Mubarak had called the Iranians "big, fat liars." Now Ahmadinejad was striking back, speaking with relish of what he called the end of the "good-for-nothings" in the region. The Iranian opposition can feel encouraged by the people power of Tahrir Square and the struggle against an apparently all-powerful regime in Tripoli. Indeed, civil rights activists have organized new demonstrations in Tehran in recent days. Unlike in Cairo, however, the Iranian authorities did not exercise restraint and struck back with full force, just as they did in the past. In light of events in Tunis, Cairo and Tripoli, the Iranian regime could very well be more concerned than it purports to be. The opposition, despite having acquired new momentum, faces an irresolvable dilemma, however: It will be nearly impossible to unseat the religious dictatorship, with its ruthless militia members, through civil disobedience and gentle pressure of the sort advocated by Gandhi and Sharp. The opposition faces a terrible choice: To continue opposing the regime with small- scale action, or to confront it head-on with mass demonstrations -- and all the bloody risks associated with such protests.

CUBA The grand old revolutionary is still stating his opinion regularly, including on the matter of Libya. "You can agree with Gadhafi or not, but I have absolutely no doubt that the United States has no interest whatsoever in peace in Libya, and that it will not hesitate to give NATO orders to invade this oil-rich country," Fidel Castro, 84, writes in the 403 party newspaper Gramma. He doesn't believe, Castro adds, that Gadhafi will abandon "his responsibility" and leave his country. His brother Raul, 80, who succeeded Fidel as president three years ago, has made no comments on the situation in the Middle East. The Internet-savvy Cuban youth, who are mainly critical of the regime, are watching the demise of dictators across the Atlantic with fascination, however. "If Obama were to lift the embargo now, the Castro regime would be in trouble. Then the brothers could no longer capitalize on the American bogeyman, and we would have an easier time of it with our revolution," says a civil rights activist in Havana who doesn't want to be named.

ZIMBABWE Robert Mugabe, 87, a former hero of the liberation movement who transformed himself into one of Africa's worst despots, has set up a regime of terror in his country. Thousands of regime critics and members of minority tribes have already fallen victim to his thugs, and his persecution of white farmers is no less brutal. With the population focused on the daily struggle to survive, the political opposition has all but disappeared, the press has been forced into line and the government television station has removed all revolutionary images from its broadcasts. Nevertheless, the North Africa struggle for self-determination has set off a spark among Zimbabweans. Using the Internet, a group of union leaders organized a workshop that 46 activists attended. The title of the workshop was: "Revolt in Egypt and Tunisia: What lessons can be learnt by Zimbabwe and Africa?" Mugabe had the authorities stop the meeting in the capital Harare and arrested everyone present. They could now be convicted of high treason. The changes in North Africa are also being closely followed elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa. "Two coconuts have fallen, but there are still many left to harvest!" protestors chanted in the Sudanese capital Khartoum, cleverly circumventing the censors and yet clearly conveying their message. President Omar al-Bashir, 66, who was seemingly unimpressed by a 2009 warrant for his arrest issued by the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity, now seems shaken. He does not plan to run for another term. Meanwhile other African dictators, like Idriss Déby in Chad and Teodoro Obiang in Equatorial Guinea, chose to support Libya's hard-pressed Gadhafi, even calling him with messages of encouragement. Last week, they still seemed to believe it was highly unlikely that the man who had always promoted himself as a unifier of the continent could truly be brought down. Although sub-Saharan Africa is at least as much of a social powder keg as North Africa, its potentates can feel more secure. Twitter and Facebook are not widespread, the middle class is smaller, and the majority is too poor and weak to organize. In addition, ethnic fragmentation and a lack of nationalistic sentiment tend to create lethargy. Fear of Upheaval in China BELARUS Since his rigged reelection and the ensuing demonstrations, which he used as an excuse to arrest all major opposition politicians, "Europe's last dictator," as Alexander

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Lukashenko, 56, is often called, has reacted even more sensitively than before to potential threats. Although he did not specifically mention the uprisings in the Middle East, he did make it clear in a speech how he intends to react. Should "circumstances arise that threaten the nation," he said, he would not hesitate to deploy tanks. In other words, Lukashenko has no intention of making any compromises and is threatening his people with a bloodbath, should there be an uprising against him. It is unclear, however, why the dictator is reacting with such panic and pulling out the heavy guns: All domestic and foreign experts agree that he is firmly in control of Belarus.

NORTH KOREA The dictatorship ruled by Kim Jong Il, 70, is probably the world's most sealed-off country -- an advantage in times of revolutionary upheavals in other parts of the world. Images of the protests in the Middle East are not being shown on North Korean state television. If the Kim dictatorship falls, it will not be as a result of the Egyptian freedom virus, but because of the military's conviction that the successor chosen by the country's seriously ill leader, his son Kim Jong Un, 28, is not up to the task. Another possibility is that China, Pyongyang's only major ally, could drop its support for the ruling family.

CHINA Beijing seems surprisingly daunted by the revolutions in the Middle East, with its senior political bodies meeting almost around the clock. The Communist Party apparently fears a spillover of revolutionary ideas and the emergence of a strong people-power movement that could threaten the party's leadership. The Chinese authorities have been censoring the Internet since the Egyptian revolt began. The state-owned media either suppressed reports by jubilant young people on Cairo's Tahrir Square in the wake of Mubarak's ouster or subjected reporting to strict official guidelines. "The media covering the riots must only use the reports provided by (the official news agency) Xinhua," reads a directive issued by the information office of the Chinese State Council. Commenting on the events in Libya, the Foreign Ministry said that it was "extremely concerned" and hoped for a rapid "return to social stability." The Chinese have their own code word for stability, something they value above everything else: "harmony." Despite the "Great Firewall," as Internet censorship is known in the People's Republic, regime critics abroad managed to send a Twitter message to China two weeks ago. They announced, in a reference to the uprising in Tunisia, a "Jasmine revolution." They called on Chinese to "go for a walk" at 2 p.m. every Sunday at specific locations in major cities and, in doing so, demand, in a nonviolent way, the departure of the Communist Party from the "stage of history." On the Sunday before last, a few hundred people heeded the call in Beijing. Fewer did so in Shanghai. Assuming that the state security agency had deployed many plainclothes agents, it's possible that the informants even outnumbered the demonstrators. But on the previous day, the authorities had already arrested a large number of civil rights activists, applying a level of brutality that was unusual even for the Chinese. Some 22 years after

405 the failed uprising in Tiananmen Square, the Internet-based revolution seemed to have arrived in China. Chen Jiping, the Communist Party official responsible for law and order, sees China surrounded by "hostile" forces that are "waving the banner of defending rights to meddle in domestic conflicts and maliciously create all kinds of incidents." According to Chen, "The schemes of some hostile Western forces attempting to westernize and split us are intensifying." He proposed even tighter security measures to combat the problem. China's form of government is hardly a classic or military dictatorship, and certainly not a dictatorship of the proletariat. Instead, it is a Marxist-Leninist single-party dictatorship with capitalist elements that offers rudimentary personal freedoms, provided they are not used against the party. There are also signs of an emerging civil society in the country. Perhaps this is precisely why Hu Jintao, the 68-year-old president and Communist Party leader, fears nothing more than social conflicts. At a meeting of all key leadership figures a few days ago, it became clear how attentively the leadership is monitoring the revolutionary events in the Middle East. It is important to "correctly assess the characteristics of the changed situation" and draw the necessary conclusions, Hu said, without naming Egypt, "namely to improve living conditions, strengthen social management and search for new paths." In other words, Hu was saying, the Chinese government should try every possible approach to avoiding conflict -- except political liberalization. China has excellent ties to countries with authoritarian governments, including Sudan and Angola in Africa and Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan in Central Asia. Like Saudi Arabia, which is on good terms with Beijing, these countries are among the most important energy suppliers to the giant country, which is dependent on oil imports. Political turmoil in these partner countries would be a nightmare for Beijing, because only a global economy that functions "harmoniously" enables Beijing to achieve the growth rates it needs to provide jobs for its well-trained young people and, at least for the foreseeable future, keep them from becoming more politically active. Otherwise, China, like the rest of the world, is keeping an anxious eye on Libya, a country that former Italian dictator Benito Mussolini once contemptuously referred to as a "big box of sand," and which lost tens of thousands of people during the three decades of brutal Italian colonial rule.

Looming Power Vacuum It is still unclear whether Gadhafi will be able to stage a major counteroffensive, or counterrevolution. A number of major cities are in rebel hands, and international pressure is increasing. But Gadhafi, like a weakened boxer forced into a corner, still seems capable of a bloody showdown. Everything seems possible. Gadhafi could cling to power. He might commit suicide or be captured by regime opponents and possibly brought to trial before the International Criminal Court in The Hague. Perhaps he will benefit from the fact that his only daughter, Aisha, studied law and, as a member of former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein's legal defense team, acquired relevant -- albeit not very promising -- experience.

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What could come after Gadhafi? Who could succeed the man who, despite his many human rights violations, somehow managed to have his country voted onto the United Nations Human Rights Council in May 2010? Who could follow the man who once said: "How should I behave, as the only healthy person in this sick world?" After making the statement, he laughed and, for a moment, resembled Jack Nicholson's character in "One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest." "All the prevailing systems of government in the world today will remain undemocratic, unless they adopt (my) method," he writes boastfully in his "Green Book." But the People's Congresses with which Gadhafi sought to guarantee "control of the people by the people" have become more and more farcical in recent years. Important decisions were always made by the revolutionary leader, who delegated responsibility to his protégés and provided them, as well as his clan, with generous benefits. Despite the country's high oil revenues, there was less and less money left over for the middle class and the "masses," even for the army that was so critical to his survival and for the leaders of rival clans who had grown used to generous payments. 'Zero Hour' A fall of the dictator would inevitably bring down his family as well. "It'll be zero hour for Libya after Gadhafi. His sons will not be able to hold their ground in key positions," says Lahcen Achy, a North Africa expert with the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut. Saif al-Islam, Gadhafi's relatively moderate, second-eldest son, was long seen as a candidate to succeed his father, one who would have been acceptable to the West. But it is hardly conceivable that he could still play a role after having threatened, on state television, to unleash "rivers of blood" if the protests did not subside, and after having announced that he had no other plans but to "live and die in Libya." Gadhafi deliberately thwarted the development of democratic institutions. He had no need for parties or trade unions in his system, which was tailored to his needs, and he also had several different intelligence services working against each other. There is no general military staff in the classical sense, meaning that a competing center of power could not develop. As a result, the Libyan army cannot serve as a stabilizing factor, as the military is now doing in Egypt -- despite the risk that it could decide not to relinquish power and delay democratization. If a power vacuum develops in Libya, traditional structures could be decisive. They already seem to be playing a significant role in the liberated parts of the eastern coastal region known as Cyrenaica. The tribal elders could at least prevent the country from descending into anarchy during a transitional period. But this also entails the risk of fragmentation of the country. Lack of Influence Experts doubt whether Libyan politicians living in exile will be able to exert any influence in a post-Gadhafi era. They are largely unknown in the country. Their most prominent representative is Ibrahim Sahad, a diplomat who defected in the 1970s and formed the London-based National Front for the Salvation of Libya. Candidates for a transitional government could be found among the politicians and diplomats who turned their backs on the regime in recent weeks and campaigned for the democratization of the country. Whether former Interior Minister Abdul Fattah Younis, whom Gadhafi vowed to track down and kill, could be such a transitional candidate seems unlikely, given

407 his many years of close ties to the ruling clan. It will depend on whether Younis manages to convince the rebels that his disavowal of the dictator and his willingness to be part of a democratic new beginning are genuine. But the development of a civil society and its institutions will take time, more so than in Tunisia and Egypt, where such structures already exist. At least Libya can rely on its substantial oil revenues to fund such a transition. The ruler for life is apparently convinced that his rule can only be followed by chaos. When asked what his legacy would be, the egomaniac offered no visions of the future for his country, but merely said: "It will be written in the history books that I liberated my people and changed the world in a decisive way. I created Libya, and I can also destroy it." Gadhafi's Deathly Prose Like Saddam Hussein and other dictators, Gadhafi has also tried his hand at writing, and in doing so has revealed his idea of the end of everything. He hasn't completed a planned novel about the heroic struggle of the Libyan people against their Italian occupiers. The work is to be called "Death and Resurrection," Gadhafi confided to his Italian biographer Mirella Bianco. No one has seen the manuscript, but it is probably tucked away in a palace drawer or in a safe in one of Gadhafi's tents. Gadhafi has already published a small book of stories with the cryptic title, "The Village, The Village, The Earth, The Earth and the Suicide of the Astronaut." In the work, the son of the Libyan desert contemplates the advantages of rural life. "How wonderful is the village. Leave the city quickly, that cemetery of social commitment," Gadhafi writes. He also addresses the subject of death and its "diabolical blood thirst," which, of course, can also be a form of salvation. Then he turns to a different topic and shows that he has the makings of a prophet. He criticizes the "tyranny of the masses, which have a tendency to send their leaders into the desert." Translated from the German by Christopher Sultan URL:http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,748354,00.html RELATED SPIEGEL ONLINE LINKS: • Photo Gallery: Desperate Despots http://www.spiegel.de/fotostrecke/fotostrecke-65211.html • Author Hisham Matar on the Revolution in Libya: 'Libyans Are Rediscovering What It Means to Be a People' (03/01/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,748210,00.html • Saudi Arabia's Billion Dollar Question: Can Oil Money Buy Political Stability? (03/01/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,748089,00.html • Europe's Favorite Dictators: The EU Has Failed the Arab World (02/28/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,748074,00.html • 'He Is no Longer One of Us': Post-Gadhafi Era Begins in Eastern Libya (02/28/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,748033,00.html • The Battle for Al-Bayda: Fighting for Freedom against Tanks, Mercenaries and Bombs (02/26/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,747909,00.html

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03/01/2011 11:00 AM Author Hisham Matar on the Revolution in Libya 'Libyans Are Rediscovering What It Means to Be a People' Libyan author Hisham Matar's father was been imprisoned for years by Moammar Gadhafi's regime. Matar spoke to SPIEGEL ONLINE about the future of his country, Europe's role in supporting Gadhafi's dictatorship and the need for truth and reconciliation in Libya if the despot falls. SPIEGEL ONLINE: When the protests in Libya started, you set up a sort of newsroom in your London flat. What are you doing there? Hisham Matar: It's a network of friends, Libyans in exile. We make dozens of calls a day to Libya. We are trying to collect, corroborate and publish eyewitness accounts. I have found doctors to be particularly good sources: They are used to keeping a certain emotional detachment. SPIEGEL ONLINE: How is the mood among your friends? Matar: In the first days, there was great deal of anxiety about what would happen. When things started moving so quickly, the aspirations and hopes went up. Now, the only question that remains is: How long will it take, until Gadhafi gives up -- and how many more people have to die. SPIEGEL ONLINE: At what point did you become certain that this would be the end of Gadhafi? Matar: I felt it on Saturday a week ago, when Benghazi was completely under the control of the demonstrators. It was a turning point, because it is the capital of the east and this has traditionally been the most politically active part of the country. SPIEGEL ONLINE: Your family fled Libya when you were 15 years old. You moved to Cairo, then you went to college in London. Your father, a diplomat and entrepreneur, was kidnapped and imprisoned by Gadhafi's men in 1990. What role does Gadhafi play in your life? Matar: He has stolen my father from me, he has imprisoned my relatives, he has killed many of my friends. He is my enemy. But more importantly than my personal grievances, he has held back the whole country and forced the Libyan people to live in a permanent state of madness. He represents a kind of nightmare for Libya from which I am just waking up. SPIEGEL ONLINE: A nightmare that seemed to never end ... Matar: Everybody was surprised by the events, even the people who spend their whole life studying Libya. But once the protests started, it was surprising how unsurprising it really was. I sense it in the voices of the Libyans I have known all my life. They sound different, their necks free from being tied. Gadhafi was the person under whom we have all suffered. We are all united by our suffering under him.

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SPIEGEL ONLINE: What did you think when you saw Western governments in 2003 declaring Gadhafi a partner and charming him ever since? Matar: I felt very sick. After all we are not talking about a poor African country that urgently needs the Libyan money and overlooks the dictatorship. We are talking about Europe and the United States, the richest countries on earth. When they start to overlook those things, it shakes your faith in humanity. SPIEGEL ONLINE: Has the West extended the lifespan of the dictatorship? Matar: I have no doubt about that. But that makes this revolution even more remarkable. Not only was there this ruthless dictator with all the money in the world, but on top of that he had international approval. And we still did it. That gives us a deep sense of confidence. SPIEGEL ONLINE: Will you go back to Libya to play a role in the new democracy? Matar: I don't know. I am a writer, and artists enrich their society by being loyal to their art, not to politics. As a citizen I might find a way to play a role. I am looking very much forward to the day that I see my country and my people again. SPIEGEL ONLINE: Do you think your father is still alive? Matar: I am hopeful. Once the revolution is complete, my brother and I will be looking for him. But right now we cannot do anything. For many Libyans, there is a national story and a personal story to these events. And the personal one has to wait. SPIEGEL ONLINE: What will happen next? Matar: What gives me hope is the way people are conducting themselves. They were very quick in building committees, looking after the management of supplies and infrastructure. When the demonstrators captured 18 mercenaries in Benghazi, they fed them and gave them clothes, they gave them medical assistance, they put their passports on tables, they called a lawyer ... SPIEGEL ONLINE: ... instead of taking revenge. Matar: These are the things that make me very hopeful. This revolution is not about the removal of Gadhafi, that is just one of the stories. What is going on here is Libyans rediscovering what it means to be a people and a society. Revolutions aren't about negative things. You can't do a revolution which is just about removing, wiping out, getting rid of somebody. It has to be about what you want to create. The Libyans are trying to live up to an ideal that they have been dreaming about for a long time. Gadhafi's removal is just a means to an end. SPIEGEL ONLINE: What happens once he's gone? Matar: The DNA of the future Libya must be the revolution. The nature of the revolution is peaceful, nobody is holding up ideological or religious banners. It's about freedom, living in dignity and security. Libya is an exceptionally moderate country, it is open to the world. SPIEGEL ONLINE: What should happen to the supporters and accomplices of the regime? Matar: There must be accountability. But revenge doesn't lead to justice. I have never desired revenge, not even from the people who tortured my father. I am relieved to hear other people who have suffered a lot say it was a terrible regime but we mustn't paint

410 everybody with the same brush. Libya will need to engage in a long healing process, driven by the desire that this doesn't happen again. We have already seen the protesters welcoming the diplomats who broke with Gadhafi in the past days. We all know how long they have supported him, but there has been very little criticism. SPIEGEL ONLINE: Do you think a truth commission would be a possible solution? Matar: Yes, I have already spoken to friends in South Africa about that. We need the depth of intellectual and psychological engagement with this national madness that Germany has shown after Hitler. Gadhafi is not Hitler, but the comparison with the German example helps us to understand our reality. It is different from the Italian experience, where they got rid of Mussolini, put some people on trial and moved on. There was never a genuine confrontation with the Italian psychosis. SPIEGEL ONLINE: In your novel "In the Country of Men" you wrote about a family under the Gadhafi regime. When can we expect your book about the revolution? Matar: Art responds very slowly to political events. Ask me again in 20 years. Interview conducted by Carsten Volkery

URL: • http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,748210,00.html RELATED SPIEGEL ONLINE LINKS: • Photo Gallery: Gadhafi's Waning Power http://www.spiegel.de/fotostrecke/fotostrecke-65177.html • Europe's Favorite Dictators: The EU Has Failed the Arab World (02/28/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,748074,00.html • 'He Is no Longer One of Us': Post-Gadhafi Era Begins in Eastern Libya (02/28/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,748033,00.html • The Battle for Al-Bayda: Fighting for Freedom against Tanks, Mercenaries and Bombs (02/26/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,747909,00.html

ABOUT HISHAM MATAR Corbis Hisham Matar, born in New York in 1970, is one of Libya's most successful writers. He became famous internationally with his novel "In the Country of Men," which was shortlisted for the 2006 Man Booker Prize. His father is the Libyan dissident Jaballa Matar, who has been imprisoned since 1990, and whose release is the focus of a campaign by Desmond Tutu (see www.freematar.org). Matar, who has British and American citizenship, lives with his family in London.

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03/01/2011 08:57 AM Saudi Arabia's Billion Dollar Question Can Oil Money Buy Political Stability? By Bernhard Zand The slightest uncertainty about the stability of Saudi Arabia, one of the world's biggest oil producers, is enough to make the markets nervous. Now analysts and politicians around the world are waiting anxiously to see if the wave of unrest in the Arab world will spread to the kingdom. Abdullah bin Abdul-Aziz, the 86-year-old king of Saudi Arabia who also holds the title Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, was suffering from back pain last fall. He apparently had a slipped disk. As is usually the case when a leading member of the house of Saud needs to see a doctor, he and his entourage boarded three jumbo jets and headed to the West -- specifically, to New York, where the VIP wing of New York-Presbyterian Hospital was already reserved for him. The news of his departure was enough to trigger a moment of deliberation in the world of geostrategists and oil speculators. After all, Saudi Arabia pumps about 9 million barrels of crude oil a day, or one-ninth of world production. The kingdom is the only oil exporter with what is known as swing capacity, or the ability to single-handedly offset the loss of production in any other OPEC country, thereby temporarily stabilizing the oil price. In addition, Saudi Arabia, a state that is a few years younger than its geriatric king, is on the verge of a major dynastic change. Until now, all of the men who have ruled the country since the death of its founder Ibn Saud in 1953 have been his sons. Even the youngest of those sons is now 65. It is only a question of time before the line of succession goes to the second generation -- and a question of which of the roughly 20 sons still alive has enough power to turn his own sons into kings. Uneasy Recuperation In early December, doctors in New York removed a blood clot in Abdullah's back. In late January he traveled to Morocco to stay in his brother's palace near Agadir, as he usually does when he needs to recuperate. But as it turned out, it would not be a relaxing stay. A week earlier, the Tunisians had ousted their president, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, and the Egyptian revolution began two days later. For two torturous weeks King Abdullah watched as his friend Hosni Mubarak, the now-deposed Egyptian president, struggled in vain to remain in power. Revolts in Bahrain, Yemen and Libya followed. The Arab world to which Abdullah had returned was no longer the same one it had been a few weeks earlier, when he left for New York. When Abdullah arrived in the Saudi capital Riyadh last Wednesday, it was no longer just geostrategists and oil speculators who were asking themselves whether Saudi Arabia could be next. It is the billion-dollar question of the Arab revolution -- literally. That is roughly the sum the kingdom earns every day at the current oil price of about $114 (€83) a barrel. 412

Until its revolution began, Libya was producing about 1.6 million barrels a day. The mere idea that Libyan production might no longer be available to the oil market in the future drove up the price of oil by $10 a barrel last week. Deeply Conservative What, then, happens if the revolutionary virus infects Saudi Arabia? Is this even a realistic threat? Despite its pre-modern, antiquated system of government, the kingdom is considered to be one of the most stable countries in the Arab world. The overwhelming majority of the population is strongly influenced by tribal loyalties that have developed over centuries, and by a deeply conservative worldview derived from Wahhabism, one of the strictest schools of Islam. So far, the leadership has allowed no more modernization than the bare minimum that is required for the state to function. It is mainly the half of the population without rights that suffers as a result, namely women. However, this archaic social contract is supported by Saudi Arabia's enormous wealth, which the rulers distribute with patriarchal skill. Real poverty of the sort that prevails in neighboring Yemen and which fueled revolutionary fervor in Egypt is not widespread in Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, the composure with which Abdullah departed for New York in November has given way to deep uncertainty. Shortly before setting foot on Saudi soil again on Wednesday, when he arrived from Agadir, he had his government announce that he was increasing the amount the government spends to help young Saudi Arabians buy houses, start families and establish businesses, from about €9 billion to €17 billion. He also said that wages for government employees were to be increased by 15 percent to offset increases in the cost of living. None of his predecessors had ever shown such a sudden burst of generosity. Apparently the mere perusal of his flight route from Morocco to Saudi Arabia, over Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, was enough to make the king realize how much his country, all differences aside, resembles the countries in turmoil below. Lust for Life Jeddah and Riyadh are home to just as many young people who are keen to enjoy life as Tunis and Cairo. They are equally avid tweeters and share their experiences on Facebook just as enthusiastically as their Egyptian and Tunisian contemporaries. And, as in much of the Arab world, Saudi Arabia's leadership is remarkably old compared with its young population. The average age of a cabinet minister in Riyadh is 65. Corruption among the elite is also rampant in Saudi Arabia. The excesses of the Saudi royal family, which has grown to include almost 7,000 members, are less visible under Abdullah's reign than under that of his flamboyant predecessor King Fahd. Nevertheless, no young, politically interested Saudi Arabian can fail to notice that every car dealership, every gas station and every five-star hotel is a source of income for at least one member of the royal family. Some of the frustrations that led to the undoing of former Tunisian President Ben Ali and former Egyptian President Mubarak could have an even more drastic impact in Saudi Arabia's comparatively affluent society. It is precisely because young Saudis are relatively well educated, mobile and have widespread access to Western television and the Internet that many perceive unemployment and the bigotry and narrow focus of the Wahhabi regime as particularly oppressive. 413

Even in Saudi Arabia, blessed as it is with prosperity, the first signs of protest are now emerging. Last week, several hundred dissatisfied Shiites took to the streets near the city of Qatif, and in Riyadh 40 intellectuals presented the king with an open letter demanding political reforms. The first revolutionary Facebook pages have already appeared, with one of them openly calling for the overthrow of the regime and a "Revolution of Longing" to begin on March 11. 'Time Bomb' In an interview with SPIEGEL several years ago, Prince Al-Waleed bin Talal, a multi- billionaire, described the fact that many young Saudi Arabians had no work as a "time bomb." They are not unemployed because there are no jobs, but because most work is performed by foreign migrant workers. Last Thursday Al-Waleed, who is a nephew of the king, issued an even stronger warning. In an opinion piece in the New York Times, he wrote: "Unless many Arab governments adopt radically different policies, their countries will very likely experience more political and civil unrest." The facts, Walid added, are undeniable, with youth unemployment at 20 percent or more in most Arab countries, the standard of living of the middle classes declining under rising inflation, and a widening "gap between the haves and the have-nots." A few days earlier, Prince Al-Waleed's father, Talal bin Abdul-Aziz, put things even more directly. The population, said Talal bin Abdul-Aziz, a half-brother of King Abdullah who is known for his straight talking, want more than handouts. Instead, they are demanding political reforms and a share of power. If the king does not fulfill this hope, he added, "it will be very dangerous for our country." The kingdom is facing more than just a billion-dollar question. It is being confronted with the question of whether it is possible to buy stability. Translated from the German by Christopher Sultan URL:http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,748089,00.html RELATED SPIEGEL ONLINE LINKS: • Europe's Favorite Dictators: The EU Has Failed the Arab World (02/28/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,748074,00.html • The World from Berlin: Gadhafi will 'Fight Until the Last Bullet is Fired' (02/28/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,748122,00.html • 'He Is no Longer One of Us': Post-Gadhafi Era Begins in Eastern Libya (02/28/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,748033,00.html • Flashpoint in the Gulf: Tiny Bahrain Poses Big Headache for the West (02/22/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,746735,00.html RELATED INTERNET LINKS • New York Times: A Saudi Prince's Plea for Reform http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/25/opinion/25alsaud.html?src=twrhp

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COMMENT & ANALYSIS http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7b6f9f2c-4441- 11e0-931d-00144feab49a.html#ixzz1Fd2j2gML Arab freedom is worth a short shock By Martin Wolf Published: March 1 2011 22:06 | Last updated: March 1 2011 22:06

What might the Arab uprising mean for the world? No one knows the answer to this question. But this should not prevent one from making a guess at the range of uncertainty. EDITOR’S CHOICE: Opinion: Sup with tyrants, but use a long spoon - Mar-01 An ‘honoured guest’ of Omani army - Mar-01 Global Insight: Autocrats miss the point - Mar-01 Iran cracks down on protesters - Mar-01 Egypt sets constitutional referendum date - Mar-01 Yemen’s president blames US for protests - Mar-01 As an economist, I find one aspect of these events peculiarly heartening: they demonstrate that the forecasting ability of experts on politics is at least as limited as that of economists. All such events are inherently unforecastable. This is not because they are “unknown unknowns”. They are rather “known unknowns”: thus we know that many countries are vulnerable to such upheavals, but no one knows when or even whether such an event might occur. We do not even know the probabilities of such events. As Hamlet says, “the readiness is all”. What, then, can we say about the political consequences? One conclusion is that the notion of an “Arab exception” to the appeal of freedom of expression and political participation is dead. Yet we also know that the road from repression to stable democracy in poor countries with weak institutions and histories of repression is long and hard. The difficulties of post-Ceauçescu Romania, in spite of its engagement with the European Union, indicate the scale of the task. Beyond this, a big question is how far the unrest might spread, not only within the Arab world, but also outside it. The assumption had been that the ability of oil exporters to spread wealth internally would protect them. After Bahrain and, still more, Libya, this is no longer convincing. Geographic and cultural distance from the epicentre should give some protection, as should economic dynamism and competent governance. But these events show how universal is the yearning for a political voice. The idea

415 of cultural immunity to these allegedly western ideals looks less credible. This wave may dissipate; others will follow. Now turn to the economic consequences. So long as oil producers were immune, these could be deemed minimal in the short run and modest in the long run. Even Egypt’s economy is smaller, at market prices, than that of the Czech Republic. But, it appears, oil producers are not immune after all. As a result, oil prices rose above $114 a barrel on Tuesday, 64 per cent higher than in May 2010. For those with memories of past shocks, this is a worrying omen. The question is: just how worried should we be? As Gavyn Davies noted in an excellent comment on FT.com last week: “Each of the last five major downturns in global economic activity has been immediately preceded by a major spike in oil prices.” Sometimes those spikes were triggered by supply shocks, as in the 1970s. Sometimes they were triggered by demand surges, as in 2008. But the outcome was always unhappy. Stephen King of HSBC also waxed pessimistic: “Regular as clockwork, increases in oil prices of more than 100 per cent lead to declining GDP.”

An oil shock has complex economic effects: it transfers income from consumers to producers; it lowers overall spending, as consumers normally cut their spending more quickly than producers increase theirs; it shifts spending away from other goods and services; it makes net oil exporting countries richer and net oil importers poorer; it raises the price level; it lowers real wages and the profitability of energy-using industries; and it reduces supply as capacity becomes uneconomic. Some effects are quite immediate – the impact on the price level, for example. Some are inherently long term and so depend on the durability of the shock – the impact on capacity being an example. In addition, some effects are direct and others depend on policy responses. What can we say about all such impacts, at this early juncture? Mr Davies notes that, at current prices, a jump in prices of $20 a barrel would raise spending on oil by about 1 per cent of world spending on all products. Over the past 10 months, however, prices have risen by $40. That would make the effect close to 2 per cent of world output – enough to trigger a noticeable global slowdown, at least in the short run. On balance, as

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Mr Davies notes, the impact on emerging economies, which are more energy-intensive than the advanced countries, would be larger. The US, with its wasteful energy policies, is also far more vulnerable than its peers. Beyond that, much would depend on the durability of the price spike and on the policy responses. If the recent jump proved short-lived, the economic effect would be reversed. Among important questions is how far such unrest affects other producers, particularly Saudi Arabia. For now, the latter can replace lost Libyan production: Libya’s output – some 2 per cent of the world’s total – is less than Saudi Arabia’s excess capacity. Moreover, any reduction in output even in directly affected countries should be brief, provided capacity is undamaged: governments of oil exporting countries want revenues. Democratic governments might need the revenues more than despots. The more spenders believe the shock is short term, the more inclined they will be to dip into their savings. Hitherto, energy-importing emerging economies suffered from a limited ability to borrow, inadequate currency reserves and weak external positions. When emerging economies borrowed in the late 1970s, to finance oil imports, they finished up with a massive debt crisis in the 1980s. This should be true no longer. They, too, can spend through a brief shock. In addition, so long as inflation expectations remain in check, central banks need not engage in pre-emptive tightening. In this respect, the high-income countries are in rather better shape than emerging countries, where inflation is a bigger danger and inflation expectations less well anchored. We end, then, where we began, with a high level of uncertainty. We know that the political upheaval is highly significant, probably a historic watershed. We know, too, that the oil shock may be quite important, albeit very far from catastrophic and possibly rather brief. Overall, then, the long-run political implications seem much more significant than the economic ones. But such optimism about the short-term economic effects depends, in part, on the assumption that the further spread of unrest is now contained. That would also depend on the continuation of the bad old bargain: repression as the price for stability in oil supply. It is an attractive bargain to consumers. But is it morally desirable or even politically sustainable in the long run? http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7b6f9f2c-4441-11e0-931d- 00144feab49a.html#axzz1FYdfpr8S

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COMMENT http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/76a8ca18-4441-11e0-931d- 00144feab49a.html#ixzz1Fd46RoIS Sit with dictators but sup with a long spoon By Jeremy Greenstock Published: March 1 2011 23:27 | Last updated: March 1 2011 23:27 Britain rightly took credit for persuading Libya to give up its weapons programme. As a result, and not least because of its reserves of oil and gas, we forged a closer relationship to create opportunities for business. America did the same: Exxon’s interests played a part in removing sanctions on the regime. Now such actions look unfortunate, and there is a strong case for the west supping with a much longer spoon with regimes that deny their peoples freedom and individual rights. Most advanced democracies are trading nations and have hit a period when their economies need all the help they can get. This explains why David Cameron, the UK prime minister, has given a high priority to business in foreign policy. Even so the corpus of norms and standards in international law and human rights must be upheld as a fortress against greed, abuse and self-interest. So while remaining hard-headed about our push for competitiveness, we must be clear about its limits – and reframe policy with a greater focus on the long-term consequences of equivocal relationships. EDITOR’S CHOICE: Alarm over plans for Libya no-fly zone - Mar-02 Desperation as thousands dash for exit - Mar-01 Clinton calls for Gaddafi to face Lockerbie trial - Mar-02 Italy poised to freeze Libyan shareholdings - Mar-01 Global Insight: Autocrats miss the point - Mar-01 Western Libya towns brace for attacks - Mar-01 So which dictators should we deal with? Those that blatantly deny rights are not only morally unacceptable but will eventually generate a political explosion. North Korea is therefore manifestly out of bounds, as were Iraq under Saddam Hussein and Liberia under Charles Taylor. Iran, Burma and Zimbabwe have all rightly earned pariah status. Yet isolating or punishing regimes because of their oppression can make the lives of their peoples harder. The moment at which we are compelled to intervene physically is also widely disputed – as we discovered in Bosnia, Iraq and now Libya. To clarify what now looks quite a muddled approach, the principles that underlie our policies should be redrawn in a number of directions. First, beware of a government that has lost legitimacy in the eyes of its people. In today’s aware world the street knows it need no longer tolerate being robbed of freedom or wealth. But do not miss the nuances. An element of popular consent puts China and Saudi Arabia (for all their difficulties) in a different category from Iran, Syria or Yemen. Second, uphold international law firmly. There are problems here with internal situations, because the UN charter exempts domestic affairs from international attention, unless the Security Council decides international peace is threatened. But nowadays it

418 often is. Muammer Gaddafi’s brutality may generate close to a million refugees as well as thousands of deaths. So we should press harder, on the back of recent events, for a consensus on action to preserve peace. Third, allow business to do its job unless formal sanctions are in operation. But open companies’ eyes to long-term risks, and let them take the decisions. And be especially cautious over arms sales: it was surprising that the UK allowed Libya to buy weapons that could easily be used for internal repression. Fourth, expect foreign affairs departments to stay in sight of doubtful regimes. Good analysis of looming trouble, and of opportunities to forestall an explosion, serves both the national and the collective interest. Those countries, such as the UK, with membership of most of the relevant international institutions should be more proactive in applying pressure on regimes that are heading for trouble, and sharper in warning them of the possible consequences in terms of trade, bank accounts and other material areas. Fifth, let’s not be too ashamed of selective moral fervour. Powers have to deal with other powers as they are; and undiluted righteousness can be expensive for globally connected and commercial nations. But our interests can be served by connecting human rights norms to longer-term stability. Governments should now be erring more on the strategic than the tactical side. These changed principles would lead us to rethink some of our existing relationships. One increasingly blatant example is Palestine. Somehow the US and Europe find themselves supporting a virtual dictatorship in Ramallah, with a worsening human rights record, while also condoning Israel’s occupation and appropriation of Palestinian lands, when the explosive potential of stagnation in the peace process needs quite different treatment. Jordan, on the other hand, deserves more direct sympathy as the victim of circumstances created by outsiders. The voice of the majority has to be respected and we – both government and public – have to learn to ride the rapids. We live in a complex world, in which ordinary people can generate increasingly catalytic power. The west now must change its approach to create a system that works better, but with the tolerance to bear the pain along the way. We are otherwise at the mercy of the geopolitical weather. The writer was UK ambassador to the UN from 1998-2003. He is chairman of the UN Association of the UK http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/76a8ca18-4441-11e0-931d- 00144feab49a.html#axzz1FYdfpr8S

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http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1a215c70-442c-11e0-931d- 00144feab49a.html#ixzz1Fd4gUHnk Autocratic leaders miss the point By Roula Khalaf in London Published: March 1 2011 17:58 | Last updated: March 1 2011 17:58 A day after a wave of Arab protests washed up on the shores of the sleepy Gulf state of Oman, Sultan Qaboos bin Said al-Said rushed in a raft of pledges. As protesters flowed into a central roundabout in the northern city of Sohar, in an attempt to emulate their Bahraini neighbours’ in Manama and Cairo’s protest centre of Tahrir Square, the sultan promised 50,000 new jobs and $400 a month in unemployment benefits. EDITOR’S CHOICE: Opinion: Sup with tyrants, but use a long spoon - Mar-01 An ‘honoured guest’ of Omani army - Mar-01 Iran cracks down on protesters - Mar-01 Martin Wolf: Arab freedom is worth a short shock - Mar-01 Egypt sets constitutional referendum date - Mar-01 Yemen’s president blames US for protests - Mar-01 The Omani sultan of 40 years thus joined the growing group of anxious Arab leaders scrambling to placate a frustrated youth with financial handouts and economic promises. He was following Kuwait and, most dramatically, Saudi Arabia, which last week announced a $36bn package of housing loans, unemployment benefits and pay rises. Autocratic leaders are trying to insulate themselves from a raging storm that is hitting hard and indiscriminately. Countries that were seen as potential trouble spots a few weeks ago – Algeria, for example – have so far escaped sustained mass protests, while more quiescent lands such as Oman have not. And monarchies were said to be less threatened than republics until Bahrain was swept by a Shia uprising and protests erupted in Morocco. Nervous at the prospect of a domestic explosion of youth anger – that could, as Libya is now showing, also combine with punishing sanctions from western allies – Arab rulers still standing are hoping to pay their way out of trouble. The bad news is that their strategies are missing the point of the unrest. If there is a single message from the revolts it is that for the first time in decades Arabs are clamouring for political rights and accountable government – not only social benefits. True, in some cases, the protesters’ demands on the surface are for more jobs and higher wages, but behind these calls linger deeper grievances over bad governance and the accumulation of economic power around ruling elites. Even in the United Arab Emirates, where a small population has been largely pampered, political activists are demanding greater democratisation. Remarkably, not a single leader in the region is putting forward a creative political strategy to address the discontent, opting instead for half-measures designed to safeguard the very systems public opinion is rejecting.

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In Saudi Arabia, the financial handouts were followed by the reported arrest of a Shia cleric in the eastern province after he called, in a Friday sermon, for a constitutional monarchy and an end to corruption. Meanwhile, in countries where rulers have taken political steps, the moves have been too small and hesitant. Jordan’s king, for example, dismissed his cabinet and mandated a new one to produce a blueprint for political reform when the monarchy is the holder of real power and the only institution that can decide to share it. Algeria lifted its 19-year state of emergency, as the opposition has been demanding, but it diluted the impact by maintaining a ban on protests. The UAE’s political concessions were more timid. The government merely promised to widen the electoral college that chooses representatives to the consultative federal national council. Even the most desperate rulers are resisting genuine reform. Yemen’s Ali Abdallah Saleh has conceded that neither he nor his son would run in the 2013 elections. But the minimum demands of the street are for a dilution in the powers of the president and a clean-up at the top, where positions are dominated by the president’s family. As for Bahrain, the ruling al-Khalifas have managed to win a pause in the Shia rebellion against their Sunni-dominated regime, as the influence of the reformist wing of the family secured an end to a bloody security crackdown, the release of political prisoners and a cabinet reshuffle. Bahraini leaders hopefully are not under the illusion that the majority Shia population will vacate the Pearl roundabout and end the protests without real institutional change and a power-sharing deal under a constitutional monarchy. Many autocrats might be simply incapable of reform. But as protests spread from country to country, responding credibly and rapidly to a devastating mood for change is looking like the only effective strategy for survival. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1a215c70-442c-11e0-931d- 00144feab49a.html#axzz1FYdfpr8S

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http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d67e07da-4420-11e0-931d-1 00144feab49a.html#ixzz1Fd4zj1Lg Egypt sets constitutional referendum date By Heba Saleh in Cairo Published: March 1 2011 17:01 | Last updated: March 1 2011 17:01 Egypt’s new military rulers have decided provisionally to hold a referendum on constitutional changes on March 19, ahead of parliamentary elections slated for June and a presidential poll in August. A legal panel appointed by the military has recommended a package of 10 constitutional amendments that include setting a two-term limit for presidents and removing restrictions that made it almost impossible for independent candidates to compete. EDITOR’S CHOICE: Egypt military uneasy over business ties - Feb-28 Egypt’s brutal ministry faces reckoning - Feb-28 Egyptian workers strike for change - Feb-23 Egyptian state media face reversal of fortune - Feb-21 Pressure grows over Mubarak funds - Feb-20 Egypt reopens for business - Feb-20 The Supreme Military Council, which has been running the country since Hosni Mubarak was ousted as president on February 11, insists it has to hand over power to an elected civilian authority within six months. The tight schedule, however, has been criticised by the young activists who led the revolt because they say it does not give new political forces sufficient time to organise. They say the schedule will favour remnants of Mr Mubarak’s National Democratic party, which may have been discredited in public eyes, but still controls all local councils around the country. “If elections are held hastily the NDP will gain a large proportion of the seats and the revolution will be overturned,” said Shady el-Ghazali Harb, one of the young leaders of the revolution. Analysts say that in rural areas clans and big families, which traditionally presented candidates under the banner of the NDP, are likely to remain decisive in the coming election given the absence of viable opposition forces. Mr Ghazali Harb and other youth activists met members of the military earlier this week and said the officers were determined to stick to their schedule. He said the council’s position was that it had promised it would not hold power for more than six months and it did not want to be seen to be going back on its word. “We are telling them they don’t have to extend the transition,” said Mr Ghazali Harb. “We want them to appoint a provisional presidential council or at least to hold the presidential election before the parliamentary election.”

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So far there have been no changes to the rules governing the formation of political parties, so it is not certain that new parties will be established in time for the election. Critics also say that even if new parties were to be given an immediate green light, they would still require more time to gather supporters across the country. Apart from the NDP, the only other force which stands to benefit from early elections is the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamist group which was officially banned, but which has run candidates in previous parliamentary elections as independents. The Brotherhood is regarded as the most organised political force in the country, but it has promised not to seek a majority in parliament or to present a presidential candidate this time. Life in Egypt’s capital is still not back to normal. New tents have been pitched by protesters in Tahrir Square, the centre of the revolt against Mr Mubarak, schools remain closed, and the reopening of the stock exchange, which was scheduled for Tuesday, was delayed again, until Sunday. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d67e07da-4420-11e0-931d- 00144feab49a.html#axzz1FYdfpr8S

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Ola de cambio en el mundo árabe - La diplomacia Urge resolver el conflicto israelí-palestino IGNACIO SOTELO 01/03/2011 El filósofo israelí Avishai Margalit, en declaraciones a La Vanguardia del 8 de febrero, señala que "los servicios y fuerzas de seguridad del Estado constituyen la columna vertebral y la última garantía de los autoritarismos árabes", pero olvida mencionar que algo parecido ocurre en Israel, un Estado obsesionado con la seguridad por razones obvias, en el que los servicios secretos y las Fuerzas Armadas ejercen una enorme influencia. Es tópico muy extendido calificar a Israel de la única democracia de Oriente Próximo, pese a que discrimine a los propios ciudadanos no judíos y en la Cisjordania ocupada mantenga sometida a la población palestina y asediada en la franja de Gaza. No hará falta insistir en que en una democracia todos los ciudadanos deben tener los mismos derechos, sin que religión, lengua o raza puedan establecer apartheid alguno. Si evocamos el ideal republicano de Kant, una democracia se caracterizaría además por convivir en igualdad y libertad con todos los pueblos, sin oprimir a ninguno. Cierto que en determinados sectores han gozado de prestigio sociedades militaristas que, para garantizar la propia seguridad ante los pueblos que han subyugado, se ven obligadas a imponer un estricto control social y una férrea disciplina interna que restringen a mínimos los derechos individuales. El ejemplo más conocido, y filosóficamente más discutido en nuestra tradición cultural, es sin duda Esparta, que en la crisis social del siglo VIII a. C., en vez de fundar nuevas colonias donde colocar a la población sobrante, esta ciudad Estado, que excepcionalmente vivía de espaldas al mar, prefirió conquistar a sus vecinos, los mesenios. Prolongar indefinidamente su superioridad militar obligó a trastocar instituciones y modos de vida, hasta el punto de que sus ciudadanos tuviesen que renunciar a su individualidad, y al congelar con ello su desarrollo cultural, a la postre resultaron víctimas de su afán de dominación. Aunque no quepa predecir el sesgo que tomarán las actuales revueltas populares en los países árabes, seguro que afectarán a la posición hegemónica de Estados Unidos, la Unión Europea y sobre todo a la de Israel. Así como la caída del muro de Berlín transformó a Europa y con ella al mundo, el hundimiento de dictaduras asentadas en los servicios y fuerzas de seguridad (no es el caso de Libia, hasta ahora la primera gran potencia petrolera en el ojo del huracán) cambiará por completo el norte de África y Oriente Próximo, y con ellos, el mundo entero. A pesar del discurso de El Cairo del presidente Obama, Estados Unidos no se ha mostrado muy diligente en el apoyo a las aspiraciones democráticas de la juventud rebelde, capitaneada por las clases medias. Paralizada por los intereses y prejuicios de las dos antiguas metrópolis en la región, la UE ha corroborado una vez más su inexistencia en el escenario internacional. Como no podía ser de otra manera, todos, incluyendo a Israel, han aplaudido con la boca chica una democratización que en el fondo temen por las consecuencias imprevisibles que conlleva. El poderoso apuesta por el statu quo. Lo verdaderamente grave es que Estados Unidos y sus aliados europeos carezcan de una política alternativa, a la espera de cómo se desarrollen los acontecimientos. Ahora bien, antes que intentar encarrilar de acorde con nuestros intereses los procesos de 424 democratización de los países árabes, que mostrarán sin duda dinámicas muy distintas, urge con la mayor celeridad desactivar el conflicto israelí-palestino, de modo que en un mundo árabe reconstituido no se emponzoñe aún más. Israel es un Estado que se quiere judío y que cada vez se acerca más a una teocracia, y la mayor amenaza del mundo árabe proviene de que, en Estados todavía por cuajar, a una identidad nacional laica se imponga al final una religiosa islámica. Al tratarse de un choque de religiones, dejado en manos de las partes enfrentadas el conflicto es irresoluble. El Estado moderno sobre el que se levanta nuestro modelo de democracia es uno secularizado; en Oriente Próximo, en cambio, contienden dos religiones, con lo que difícilmente cabría una solución negociada. Pues bien, antes de que calen más las dos identidades religiosas, es preciso obligar desde fuera a las partes a una solución laica y equitativa con vocación de durar. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Urge/resolver/conflicto/israeli- palestino/elpepiint/20110301elpepiint_6/Tes?print=1

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Moussa to run for president, will announce election platform soon Magdi el-Gallad Rania Badawi Tue, 01/03/2011 - 10:50 Secretary-General of the Arab League Amr Moussa said he will run for the Egyptian presidency. In an interview with Al-Masry Al-Youm, he said, "I am ready to nominate myself for the presidency. I see this as a duty and responsibility," adding that there is a demand for him to run. Moussa said that he is currently putting together his election platform, which will be announced when appropriate. He said it will result from deliberations and proactive thinking with a group of thinkers, and the ideas will be discussed with larger groups in the near future. "In the new era, the door is open for everyone to participate. And that new era begins with empowerment and opening the door to genuine competition." The presidential election should precede the parliamentary poll, Moussa said, for this would give an opportunity for political parties to attract supporters and voters. "I believe the Egyptian system should be a presidential and not a parliamentary one in the current stage." Independent legal experts in Egypt have called for transforming the political system to a parliamentary republic when drafting the new Constitution, so the president will no longer have sweeping powers. A parliamentary republic entrusts power to a government of ministers from the party with a parliamentary majority, with the presidency a largely symbolic post. Moussa said "The coming president of Egypt, whoever he is, must, in my opinion, stay for one term only ... to lead the process of reform and put the country on the road to stability." He emphasized the need to for the new president to form an association to draw up a new Constitution for Egypt. Magdi el-Gallad Rania Badawi Moussa to run for president, will announce election platform soon 01/03/2011 - 10:50 http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/node/335453

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YEMEN: UN TERRENO FÉRTIL PARA AL QAEDA Febrero-marzo 2009 [3] Edward Burke [4] La inestabilidad y el avance de los yihadistas en Yemen deberían preocupar a la Administración Obama y al resto de los países de la Península Arábiga. Una nueva generación de combatientes islamistas yemeníes, que se ha radicalizado en la guerra de Irak, toma cada día más fuerza.

AFP/Getty Images

El vecino pobre: Arabia Saudí, Emiratos Árabes Unidos, Qatar y los demás Estados del Golfo tendrían que ayudar a Yemen por el bien de la seguridad regional.

Mientras el presidente Obama reflexiona sobre el destino de los presos que permanecen en la bahía de Guantánamo, una de sus decisiones más difíciles será qué hacer con los 94 yemeníes allí encarcelados. Los planes estadounidenses de repatriación se están complicando por el incremento de las actividades de Al Qaeda en Yemen y las dudas sobre la capacidad de su Gobierno de garantizar que los prisioneros liberados no van a llevar a cabo actividades terroristas. Un factor que ha contribuido a subrayar los peligros existentes es una reciente grabación en la que uno de los líderes de Al Qaeda, Ayman al Zawahiri, elogiaba "el despertar yihadista en Yemen, que pretende liberar la Península Arábiga". Esta declaración se produce tras los llamamientos de un antiguo preso saudí

427 en Guantánamo, Said Ali Jabir al Shehri, a que los combatientes de la red de Bin Laden "viajen a la tierra del apoyo y la preparación, la tierra de la yihad y el martirio, el Yemen de la sabiduría y la fe". La amenaza es grave; es evidente que las células de Al Qaeda consideran las áreas tribales de dicho país como un lugar en el que reagruparse y planear futuros atentados. Así lo corroboran varios documentos obtenidos por las fuerzas de seguridad yemeníes que revelan planes detallados para realizar atentados en la zona. La condición de refugio de la actividad yihadista de Yemen viene de antiguo. El propio Al Zawahiri pasó un período allí durante los 90, y el principal estratega de Al Qaeda, Abu Musab al Suri, un ciudadano español de origen sirio, ha dicho que este país es un “pilar fundamental” de la yihad por "los factores religiosos y económicos que existen allí". La organización es además muy consciente de la importancia estratégica de Yemen por su situación en el estrecho de Bab al Mandab, un punto fundamental del Mar Rojo, y su proximidad a Arabia Saudí y los Estados del Golfo. Las armas son baratas y abundantes, y sirven de estímulo a un lucrativo comercio con Somalia; se calcula que hay entre seis y nueve millones de armas de pequeño calibre en el país, con una población de 22 millones de habitantes. Existen varios motivos importantes por los que este Estado es un refugio y un terreno fértil para Al Qaeda. La pobreza, desde luego, tiene mucho que ver; es el país más pobre, con mucho, del mundo árabe. Casi la mitad de sus habitantes vive con menos de dos dólares al día y la escasez crónica de alimentos se ha visto exacerbada por el cultivo generalizado de qat, un narcótico estimulante suave. Mientras tanto, la producción de petróleo está disminuyendo rápidamente, con graves consecuencias para un Gobierno cuyo presupuesto depende en un 70% de los ingresos de los recursos energéticos. A medida que disminuyan los ingresos del crudo, y con la previsión de que la población se duplique en 20 años, parece probable que las tensiones acaben con el delicado sistema de alianzas tribales establecido por el presidente Alí Abdulá Saleh. No obstante, sería un error pensar que la pobreza y la debilidad del Estado son los únicos factores que han contribuido al aumento de la actividad terrorista en Yemen. El Gobierno ha llevado a cabo una estrategia ambivalente y, a veces, casi contradictoria respecto a los grupos extremistas dentro de sus fronteras. La alianza formada entre Alí Abdulá Saleh y los veteranos yihadistas de la guerra afgana de los 80 fue fundamental para lograr la victoria sobre el antiguo régimen marxista en el sur del país. El presidente nombró a un destacado dirigente islamista radical, el jeque Abdul Majid al Zindani, para formar parte del Consejo Presidencial entre 1993 y 1997. Con posterioridad se acusó a Al Zindani de reclutar a miembros de Al Qaeda a través de su institución religiosa en Sanaa, la Universidad al Iman, y se le incluyó en una lista de patrocinadores del terrorismo de la ONU. Pese a ello, Saleh mantiene una relación ambigua con Al Zindani y sus seguidores, y todavía en 2007 el Gobierno empleó a algunos de ellos en su guerra contra los rebeldes chiíes del norte del país. Además de una tendencia alarmante a que los miembros del movimiento se fuguen de prisión, se cree que la institución estatal creada para rehabilitar a yihadistas encarcelados, el Comité para el Diálogo Religioso, ha conseguido la puesta en libertad de miembros de Al Qaeda que, sin renunciar a sus actividades, se comprometen a no llevar a cabo futuros atentados dentro de Yemen. Un ejemplo es el ex guardaespaldas de Osama bin Laden que asegura haber establecido un centro de investigaciones sobre la yihad en Sanaa con apoyo del Ejecutivo.

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El pragmatismo del presidente Saleh, La experiencia de la lucha en Irak que le ha hecho buscar un modus ha radicalizado a una nueva vivendi con los movimientos generación de combatientes integristas, no ha impedido un islamistas yemeníes incremento de la violencia por parte de grupos que aseguran representar a Al

Qaeda. Lo que ha cambiado es que varios yihadistas jóvenes se han alejado de los dirigentes de la generación afgana y pretenden derrocar al Gobierno y establecer un Estado islámico. Se trata, en definitiva, de una consecuencia no deseada de la guerra de Irak, durante la que el Ejecutivo yemení hizo la vista gorda a la labor de reclutamiento de jóvenes para ir a luchar allí; se calcula que, en el período más intenso de insurgencia, había unos 1.200 yemeníes combatiendo en Irak. En 2006, el jefe de las Fuerzas Centrales de Seguridad elogió públicamente el éxito de los rebeldes suníes iraquíes que habían logrado matar a soldados estadounidenses. La experiencia de la lucha en Irak ha radicalizado a una nueva generación de combatientes islamistas yemeníes, responsables de la reciente oleada de atentados en su país. Algunos miembros de la generación mayor de yihadistas, los afganos, aseguran que son ellos quienes representan a Al Qaeda en Yemen, pero se han visto rebatidos por las recientes condenas de la organización terrorista hacia el presidente yemení y otros dirigentes del movimiento. A principios de este año, Al Zawahiri acusó al presidente Saleh de ser un "agente de los cruzados". Al Suri, antes de ser capturado en Pakistán en 2005, condenó a los veteranos yihadistas aliados con el presidente Saleh y los llamó ulama’ al Sultan (los clérigos del sultán). Estos pronunciamientos son una base importante de legitimidad para la generación iraquí de Al Qaeda en Yemen. La bomba que estalló en la embajada estadounidense en Sanaa en septiembre de 2008 sirvió para recordar sin reservas a los gobiernos occidentales cuáles son los peligros de confiarse demasiado en Yemen. Es evidente que, en el pasado, Estados Unidos y Europa han ejercido un abandono estratégico del país. Entre 2005 y 2006, pese a que el Gobierno de Bush dijo que era un “terreno clave” en la guerra contra el terror, el importe total de la ayuda al desarrollo concedida por EE UU fue de sólo 18,5 millones de euros. Sin embargo, la solución a los problemas de este país árabe no está sólo en Washington o en las capitales europeas, demasiado distraídos por los enormes déficits actuales y las guerras en Afganistán e Irak. La estabilidad a largo plazo de Yemen sólo será posible con la colaboración de Arabia Saudí, Emiratos Árabes Unidos, Qatar y los demás Estados del Golfo, cuya influencia financiera y experiencia económica pueden ayudar a sacar al país de una crisis cada vez más profunda. Si esos Estados aceptaran una estrategia de aumento masivo de la ayuda al desarrollo, estarían llevando a cabo no sólo un acto caritativo y solidario con un vecino más pobre, sino una acción fundamental para la seguridad de la región. Arabia Saudí está levantando a toda prisa una sofisticada verja en su frontera con Yemen. Esa barrera es un obstáculo táctico para los yihadistas de la zona, pero no una estrategia para hacer frente a la amenaza creciente de un nuevo bastión de Al Qaeda en la Península Arábiga. Aunque el riesgo de que algunos presos yemeníes de Guantánamo regresen a las actividades terroristas al ser repatriados es muy real, Obama no va a tener más remedio que enviarlos a su país por las sucesivas violaciones del derecho internacional cometidas durante su encarcelamiento por la Administración Bush. Después de llegar a esa incómoda conclusión, el presidente estadounidense debería

429 tomar la decisión de considerar Yemen como una de sus prioridades fundamentales en Oriente Medio.

Artículos relacionados Índice del terrorismo. [5] Combatir a Al Qaeda en el Sahel. [6] Amparo Tortosa Cómo (no) reconocer a un terrorista. [7] Malcolm Nance La nueva generación de terroristas. [8] Marc Sageman Terroristas sucicidas: los guerreros de la clase media. [9] Randall Collins

Source URL: http://www.fp-es.org/yemen-un-terreno-fertil-para-al-qaeda Links: [1] http://www.fp-es.org/temas/terrorismo [2] http://www.fp-es.org/regiones/oriente-medio [3] http://www.fp-es.org/febrero-marzo-2009 [4] http://www.fp-es.org/autor/edward-burke [5] http://www.fp-es.org/indice-del-terrorismo-0 [6] http://www.fp-es.org/combatir-a-al-qaeda-en-el-sahel [7] http://www.fp-es.org/como-no-reconocer-a-un-terrorista [8] http://www.fp-es.org/la-nueva-generacion-de-terroristas [9] http://www.fp-es.org/terroristas-suicidas-los-guerreros-de-la-clase-media http://www.fp-es.org/print/2059

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