Project No. 2012/302922

European Commission

Mid-term review of the Cocaine Route Programme financed by the EU Instrument for Stability

Final Report

This project is funded by A project implemented by

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June 2013

(5012121)

Table of Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS...... 3 LIST OF ACRONYMS ...... 5 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...... 8 1. INTRODUCTION ...... 13 1.1 Security and Development ...... 13 1.2 The Cocaine Route Programme ...... 13 2.3 The Mid-term Review ...... 15 3. FINDINGS ...... 16 3.1 The Evaluation Questions ...... 16 3.2 Relevance ...... 16 3.3 Design ...... 23 4. EFFECTIVENESS ...... 26 4.1 Delivery of planned benefits and results: fighting against organised crime groups .. 26 4.2 Enhancing the Cooperation Capacity of Law Enforcement and Judicial Authorities at Regional and Trans-Regional Level ...... 27 5. EFFICIENCY ...... 28 5.1 Management arrangements and coordination ...... 28 5.2 Management, planning and implementation ...... 29 5.3 Information management and deadlines ...... 30 5.4 Project management ...... 30 6. IMPACT ...... 32 6.1 Achievement of project objectives: human security ...... 32 6.2 Impact on development benefits ...... 33 6.3 Impact on beneficiary agencies ...... 34 6.4 From network to institution building - AMERIPOL...... 35 6.5 Shifting the focus from organised crime - the challenge of PRELAC...... 36 7. SUSTAINABILITY ...... 37 7.1 Ownership ...... 37 7.2 Policy Support ...... 37 7.3 Institutional capacity ...... 38 7.4 Local perceptions ...... 39 8 COHERENCE ...... 40 8.1 Project Overlaps and Complementarity...... 40 8.1.1 COPOLAD ...... 40 8.1.2 Projects in West Africa ...... 42

3 8.2 Supporting development and EU values ...... 42 9. EC VALUE ADDED - WHAT IS THE ADDED VALUE OF IFS SUPPORT FOR THE CRP?...... 43 9.1 The appropriateness of IfS funding for the CRP against guiding principles...... 43 10. VISIBILITY ...... 47 11. OVERALL ASSESSMENT ...... 47 11.1 Identifying the Threat of Organised Crime ...... 47 11.2 Lessons learnt ...... 48 12. CONCLUSION ...... 51 12.1 Methodological issues ...... 51 12.2 The project design and the IfS ...... 52 12.3 Programme management and coordination ...... 53 12.4 Capacity enhancement for "international cooperation of law enforcement and judicial services" ...... 54 12.5 Judicial component ...... 54 12.6 International cooperation - at regional level ...... 55 12.7 Trans-regional cooperation ...... 55 12.8 The relationship with partners ...... 55 12.9 Coherence with EU policies ...... 56 12.10 Information / analysis ...... 58 13. RECOMMENDATIONS ...... 58 ANNEX 1 – TERMS OF REFERENCE ...... 64 ANNEX 2 – THE EVALUATION TEAM ...... 93 ANNEX 3 – LOGFRAME ...... 96 ANNEX 4 – EVALUATION QUESTIONS AND RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS ...... 101 ANNEX 5 – METHODOLOGY ...... 116 ANNEX 6 – LIST OF INTERVIEWS AND CONSULTATIONS ...... 122 ANNEX 7 – LIST OF DOCUMENTS CONSULTED ...... 131 ANNEX 8 – PROJECT SUMMARIES ...... 135 ANNEX 9 – MISSION REPORT, WEST AFRICA ...... 152 ANNEX 10 – PERFORMANCE OF THE CONTRACTORS ...... 159 ANNEX 11 – DRUG SEIZURES FROM AIRCOP AND SEACOP ...... 163 ANNEX 12 – DRUG OFFENDERS IN THE PRISON POPULATION IN LATIN AMERICA ...... 166 ANNEX 13 – MAPPING OF DRUGS, SECURITY AND JUSTICE-RELATED RELEVANT PROJECTS ...... 168

4 List of Acronyms

AAP Annual Action Programme AD Alternative Development AFRICOM Africa Command AIRCOP Airport Cooperation Programme AIAMP Asociación Ibero Americana de Ministerios Públicos AMERIPOL American Police Community AML Anti-money laundering AUC Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia BKA BundesKriminalAmt BNI Bureau of National Investigation CELAC Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños CENcomm WCO Customs Enforcement Network communication system CENTIF Cellule National de Traitement des informations Financières CFATF Caribbean Financial Action Task Force CFT Counter financing of terrorism CIFAD Centre Interministériel de Formation Anti-drogue CLACIP Comunidad Latinoamérica y del Caribe de Inteligencia Policial COCAIR European Union -funded anti-drug operation COPOLAD Cooperation Programme between Latin America and the European Union on Drugs Policies CORMS Cocaine Route Monitoring Support COSI Committee on Operational Cooperation and International Security CRIMGO Critical Maritime Routes in the Gulf of Guinea CRP Cocaine Route Programme CT Counter Terrorism DEVIDA Comisión Nacional para el Desarrollo y Vida Sin Drogas, in Perudrugpolicyrulingboard DG Directorate General DNFBP Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions DR Demand Reduction DRPPUS Direction Regionale des Produits Petroliers et des Unités (Direction des Douanes du Sénégal) DSA Daily Subsistance Allowance EC European Commission ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States ECPDM European Centre for Development Policy Management EDF European Development Fund EEAS European External Action Service EMDCCA European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction EMPACT European Multidisciplinary Platform against Criminal Threats ERCAIAD Escuela Regional de la Comunidad Americana de Inteligencia Antidrogas ESPAD European School Surevey Project on Alcohol and Drugs ESS External Security Strategy EU European Union EUD European Union Delegation EUROJUST European Union's Judicial Cooperation Unit FARC Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia FATF Financial Action Task Force FIC Financial Intelligence Centre FIU Financial Intelligence Unit

5 FRONTEX European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union FSRB FATF-Style Regional Body GAFISUD Financial Action Task Force of South America GCCP Global Container Control Programme GIABA Groupe Intergouvernemental d’Action contre le Blanchiment d’Argent en Afrique de l’Ouest (Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa) HRP Heroin Route Programme ICT Information Communication Technology IfS Instrument for Stability IMPACS CARICOM Implementation Agency for Crime and Security INTERPOL International Criminal Police Organization ISC Inter Service Consultation I-24/7 INTERPOL global police communications system JAITF Joint Airport Interdiction Task Force JHF Justice and Home Affairs JMCU Joint Maritime Control Units KE Key Expert(s) LAC Latin America and the Caribbean LEA Law Enforcement Agency LO Liaison Officer(s) MDG Millennium Development Goal MIP Multiannual Indicative Programme MIS Maritime Information System MIU Maritime Intelligence Unit MS Member States MTR Mid Term Review NACOB Narcotics Control Board (Ghana) NGO Non-Governmental Organisation NSA Non-State Actors OCRTIS Office Central pour la Répression du Trafic Illicite des Stupéfiants OCTRIDB Office Central de Répression du Trafic Illicite de la Drogue et du Blanchiment ODA Overseas Development Assistance OO Overall objectives OVI Objectively Verifiable Indicator PAC Project Advisory Committee PAJED Programme d'Appui à la réforme du secteur de la Justice et de l'Etat de droit PA-PNJ Programme d'Appui à la Politique Nationale de Justice au Burkina Faso PMAR GoG Piracy, Maritime Awareness and Risks Gulf of Guinea PoE Port of Entry PRADICAN Programa Antidrogas Ilícitas en la Comunidad Andina de Naciones PRELAC Precursor control project in Latin America and the Caribbean QSG Quality Support Group ROSEN UNODC Regional Office for West and Central Africa RSS Regional Security System SEACOP Seaport Cooperation Programme SEDRONAR Secretaría de Programación para la Prevención de la Drog adicción y la Lucha contra el Narcotráfico, in Argentina drugpolicyrulingboard SOCA Serious and Organised Crime Agency TOC Trans-National Organised Crime UNCAC United Nations Convention against Corruption UNCTOC United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime

6 UNODC United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime WA West Africa WACD West Africa Commission on the Impact of Drugs on Governance, Security and Development WAPCO West African Police Chiefs Organisation WAPIS West African Police Information System WCO World Customs Organization

7 Executive Summary

Subject and Objectives The present evaluation is a review of the Cocaine Route Programme (CRP) 2009-2013 funded by the European Union (EU) Instrument for Stability (IfS), Long-term component, Global and trans- regional threats, conducted from November 2012 until June 2013. The CRP has a mandate to support law enforcement agencies and judicial authorities in third countries along the so called 'cocaine route', i.e. from the production countries in Latin America to Europe, via Central America, the Caribbean and West Africa. The overall objective is to enhance their capacity for international cooperation in the fight against international criminal networks, while fully respecting human rights. The budget of the CRP totals €34,916,9731 and has been allocated to eight self-standing projects in Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC): 1) AIRCOP I, II and III (Airport Communication Programme): to build drug-interdiction capacities via Joint Airport Interdiction Task Forces (JAITFs) at selected international airports in West Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean, and promote communication and intelligence sharing through real-time connection to Interpol’s I 24/7 and the WCO CENComm. 2) AML-WA (Anti-money laundering activities in West Africa): to develop AML activities in the non-banking financial businesses and professions; to enhance Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) in Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal and Cape Verde and promote liaison with the international community. 3) SEACOP I, II and III (Seaport Cooperation Programme): to set-up Joint Maritime Control Units (JMCU) in seaports in West Africa and develop regional intelligence and maritime cooperation. 4) WAPIS I and II (West African Police Information System): to support collection and analysis of police information in ECOWAS countries and Mauritania, increase police information exchange regionally and with the rest of the world through Interpol tools and services. 5) AMERIPOL I and II (Law Enforcement & Judicial Cooperation in Latin America): to strengthen exchange of information and intelligence between law enforcement and judicial authorities at regional level in Latin America and with West Africa and the EU. 6) GAFISUD I, II and III (Support to the fight against money laundering in Latin America): to strengthen the investigation and prosecution of money laundering in the non- banking financial sector of GAFISUD member countries (Latin America) and foster international cooperation. 7) PRELAC I and II (Prevention of the diversion of drugs precursors in the LAC region): to strengthen the capacities of national administrative control authorities to prevent the diversion of chemical precursors in 17 countries in Latin and Central America and the Caribbean. 8) CORMS I and II (Cocaine Route Monitoring and Support): to strengthen the trans- regional coordination, coherence and complementarity effect among the various CRP projects and any other relevant initiative, conducted by the EU, MS or other international organisations. The objectives of the evaluation are: (i) to provide an overall independent assessment of the CRP activities according to the five evaluation criteria endorsed by the OECD-DAC (relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact), and to the European Commission (EC) specific evaluation criteria (EC added value and coherence); (ii) to verify, analyse and assess the integration and impact of cross cutting issues in the Programme, with a particular emphasis on human rights and governance aspects; (iii) to assess the overall relevance of the Programme in relation to the objectives of the IfS and the related IfS Strategy and subsequent Multiannual Indicative Programmes (MIPs). In addition, (iv) the review assesses the performance of contractors, (v) the institutional set up of the Programme and (vi) complementarity with other programmes, particularly COPOLAD (“Cooperation Programme between Latin America and the European Union on Anti-drugs policies”) funded by the EU under the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI). The review identifies key lessons and proposes practical recommendations for follow-up actions.

1 For the sake of completeness, this amount includes also 5 MEUR committed under Annual Action Programme 2013 under approval at the time of writing the present report.

Methods The evaluation was based on a structured process consisting of three distinct and well-defined phases, i.e., the desk review, the field phase and the synthesis phase. In the desk review phase, the intervention logic was prepared as a basis for the formulation of nine Evaluation Questions (EQs) that were addressed throughout the analysis. A range of evaluation tools were used, including documentary analysis, interviews and discussions with representatives from the Commission and implementing agencies (Interpol, UNODC, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs). This was followed by field visits to Ghana, Togo, Senegal and Cape Verde in West Africa and Colombia, Peru, Argentina and Trinidad and Tobago in Latin America and the Caribbean. In -depth interviews were held with over 202 stakeholders from different government agencies and departments in beneficiary countries, EU Delegations, Embassies of EU Member States and other donor countries, project implementing agencies, third sector organisations and independent technical experts. Follow-up questionnaires were sent by e-mail to project managers. Findings were presented to stakeholders in Brussels and refined in light of the ensuing discussion as well as feedback on the first draft report.

Conclusions 1) Framework and design The starting point for the CRP is the regular flow of cocaine from Andean producer countries into the EU, possibly the largest global cocaine market today, as well as to other parts of the world. It assumes further, that a considerable portion of this flow is routed via countries in the Caribbean and West Africa. The very diversion of the trafficking routes, the finances involved in organising the trade and the sophistication displayed in overcoming existing defences point towards the involvement of transnational criminal organisations (TCOs). Because of the financial magnitude of this commerce and ready resort to force by the parties involved, the activities of transnational organised crime are believed to be posing a serious threat to human security and state stability along the route. To counter this threat and enhance state capacity in fighting transnational organised crime the programme identifies nodal points where comparatively modest investment can yield significant results.2 A set of actions has therefore been devised to curtail the flow of illicit substances by promoting controls at air and maritime points of entry and through administrative controls of precursor chemicals. A further set of actions is designed to support the flow of information within countries and to facilitate the exchange of information and intelligence within and between regions. The third set of actions aims at intercepting the flow of illegal funds by supporting anti-money laundering agencies and their regional and inter-regional cooperation. The strength of the design lies in the conversion of the theoretical concept of flows into a series of practical measures that are set to grow together over time. It comes with a vision of integrating West African and Latin American partners into an international law enforcement community to combat transnational organised crime. Results of the different projects are complementary, addressing both in and outflow of drugs, the investment of illicit profits and the organisation of trafficking operations. They carry the promise of yielding exponential benefits in participating countries over time. Weaknesses stem largely from discrepancies between the actual outcomes realised by individual projects and the intended programme objectives. In addition there is the continuing fragility of the knowledge base. Little is known about the scale, structure or impact of the West African transit route. The scarcity of evidence blunts the effectiveness of interventions and tempers the commitment of some partners in beneficiary countries. There is, furthermore, the perennial risk that CRP activities come to equate drug control with the fight against organised crime. Neither beneficiaries nor project implementers are always clear that the CRP is not designed to promote public health but protect human security and that the involvement of TCOs in the trade in cocaine is a consequence and not a cause of its prohibition. CRP measures affecting micro-traffickers, coca farmers or drug couriers are sometimes seen as ends in themselves and carry the risk of diverting attentions from the original goal of combating transnational organised crime.

2 Modest in comparison to the value of the cocaine shipment.

9 A number of the projects under the programme have run for several years and commitments are extended in phases reaching up to seven years so far. Combating TCO effectively will require trans-regional cooperation that depends on adequate capacity at regional and national level. It will take long commitment for programme results to be integrated into existing law enforcement structures and for the inter-agency trust to develop, which is a prerequisite for trans regional law enforcement cooperation. Thus, initial commitments under each project must be ensured in the long term with support actions for a period that extends beyond the commitments of the initial phases.

2) Added value of Instrument for Stability The creation of the IfS provides the EU with a facility for combating global security threats that cannot be addressed from different funding envelopes. Actions need to involve beneficiaries from across different regions to be eligible. Organised Crime involvement in drug trafficking is listed as a support priority in the 2012-2013 Multiannual Indicative Programme. In its totality the CRP therefore meets all necessary criteria to qualify for IfS support by facilitating the cooperation of Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) and judicial authorities across West Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean in the fight against organised crime involved in cocaine trafficking. It is also understood that part of this endeavour involves the enhancing of national and regional capacity. There are difficulties, however, with the conception and particularly with the implementation of different Programme components with regard to two particular IfS requirements. It is not (i) clear that all CRP actions are targeting organised crime and (ii) whether they promote trans-regional cooperation. Valuable as the results achieved under different headings may be, they have in several cases strayed away from the original programme objectives and outside the terms of reference of the IfS. As these are run as stand-alone projects by a number of discrete agencies with hands off management approach from the European Commission there have been no opportunities for addressing these shortcomings so far. Furthermore, the narrow focus on project specific objectives has led to a neglect of programme wide goals, from the fight against organised crime to the promotion of good governance and human rights.

3) Project results CRP components SEACOP and AIRCOP have been successful in raising the capacity of beneficiary LEAs in intercepting the flow of cocaine via sea and air vectors to West Africa. Regional cooperation has been enhanced through a series of joint trainings, operations and the supply of communication tools. But the progress in West Africa has not been matched by achievements in Latin America and Caribbean where AIRCOP is still at preliminary stages and SEACOP has not been extended yet, although plans exist for such extension in 2014. Trans-regional cooperation by LEAs remains, therefore, to be realised. Activities by joint investigation teams at both sea and airports remain limited to drug seizures and the arrest of couriers and handlers. Beneficiary agencies do not conduct complex investigations and no in-country follow-up. Organised crime structures remain largely unscathed by these two projects leaving the critical overall objective of the CRP unrealised. Complex investigations require quality information, the collection, processing and analysis of which is the objective of WAPIS. Though it has only just commenced, WAPIS has the advantage of meeting a need that had been identified and was requested by the beneficiaries. Enhancing national and regional data management capacity is a precondition for West African participation in the CRP. As activities include ECOWAS countries as well as Mauritania the added value of IfS funding is evident. The same question can be raised with regard to the AMERIPOL project, which has contributed to the establishment of a regional office in Bogota and a series of national offices across Latin America. There have been only nominal attempts at cooperating with Caribbean and African partners. Even within the region success has been held back because the lack of judicial identity precludes the sharing of classified information. Due to insufficient political oversight several countries including Argentina and Uruguay are not participating in the organisation. Concerns over the lack of accountability to a political body were also raised in a written statement by Ecuador and verbally by Trinidad and Tobago. Policy makers in the region are uneasy about an organisation that fosters solely the interests of law enforcement without accountability to civilian. While not all

10 Latin American countries are beneficiaries of the EU project, their membership is critical if the organisation is to meet its objective of facilitating international cooperation to combat transnational crime. PRELAC has made great strides in promoting regional, and through the inclusion of Caribbean and Central American states, trans-regional cooperation. It has provided a model of European expertise in an area heavily dominated by US agencies. Yet precursor control is also part of the COPOLAD work programme, causing duplication. There is also a third, now completed EU funded project that sought to strengthen precursor control, PRADICAN although it worked only in the Andean Community. Yet, the activities of none of the three projects can effectively link precursor diversion with combating organised crime. Neither have PRELAC’s activities resulted in a reduction of the cocaine production. Sharpening national legislation and promoting the regional exchange of experience in AML measures has made Latin America more hostile for TCOs. Yet, GAFISUD has focused exclusively on Latin and Central America and undertaken no activities for promoting cooperation with either the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) or the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA). Equally, the AML-WA project that has just commenced has a regional remit only.

4) Programme results Preoccupation with project results has prevented teams implementing each project from focusing on the wider objectives of the CRP. In almost every instance, the implementation of trans-regional objectives has come second to regional ones. So trans-regional cooperation is built into AMERIPOL but at activity level it is secondary. And the trans-regional virtues of PRELAC are mentioned already. This is not surprising, given the need for raising national and regional capacity before trans-regional work can commence. Yet, if unaddressed, the projects will continue to miss the main goal of the programme. Indeed, it will then be unlikely to speak of a programme, but instead of a collection of projects. The creation of CORMS has substantially raised awareness of belonging to a common programme. Information is being pooled and communication between projects has been fostered. But the mandate of CORMS foresees only monitoring and therefore prevents constructive coordinating activity. With current resource allocations the project has been unable to add significantly to the knowledge base on drug trafficking and organised crime, in spite of having privileged access to important information. General understanding of organised crime activity has therefore not advanced much. Activities so far have focused on strengthening law enforcement capacity. This is regrettable, because, without strong judicial authorities and prosecutorial agencies arrests do not lead to convictions. It is doubly regrettable against the background of the CORMS Team Leader, as an "anti-mafia" judge. Judicial sector reform is subject to a range of EDF funded cooperation activities in West Africa, but the CRP has not made any links with any of these programmes. Linkages with projects in related fields like drug demand reduction, crime prevention, and human rights are also incidental. Indeed, most projects are run on a stand-alone basis, and Team Leaders (TLs) do not pay much attention to wider programme objectives. Even while there is much improved communications between the different components, the CRP is still better described as a family of projects than a closely integrated programme. Most of the projects have come a long way in raising beneficiary capacities, an important precondition for trans-regional cooperation. Project results and the time scale were always ambitious, but a good momentum has gathered among many beneficiaries and partners, and as awareness is growing and connections are being made, the chances of realising the programme objectives are looking better. A particular opportunity is opening up for strengthening partnerships between LEAs in West Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and to employ CRP facilities and build on its achievements for the promotion of South-South cooperation in training and information exchange.

5) Recommendations (i) Strengthening the coordination mechanism

11 The leadership and coordination powers of CORMS have to be raised for activities to grow into a cohesive programme. The Coordination mechanism must be able to coordinate - it must have a role in managing projects, in ensuring adherence to objectives, to help correct projects steering off course. Projects have to provide information on a timely basis and be subject to regular assessment against workplans and agreed milestones. The coordination mechanism should also work together with project TLs in developing long term plans and strategic goals so as to allow for a better informed role in creating synergies between CRP components and between the CRP and other interventions. The European Commission should take greater advantage of expertise and knowledge in CORMS. For project TLs, but also for EUDs or any other stakeholder CORMS should be a point of reference in terms of reporting or any other communication with regard to the CRP. Working with the Commission and other stakeholders, CORMS should also develop plans for realising CRP objectives and other ways of combating organised crime involvement in drug trafficking. Merger with the parallel Heroin Route Programme, also funded by the IfS under its long term component, should be considered. In order to meet its significantly increased responsibility CORMS need to have an increased complement of fulltime or half time experts, as well as an increase in support staff. It is further recommended that the use of part time KEs active in MS LEAs and ministries be discontinued. Instead, CORMS should have a presence in Brussels (possible via two part time staff with different expertise). As coordinators of the CRP it should also have a more active role in beneficiary countries and with partners. The following recommendations need some form of implementing agency. It is strongly suggested that the enhanced coordination unit envisioned take a lead role. (ii) Exit strategies for projects with national and regional emphasis. With no record of trans-regional activity it is difficult to justify continued funding for GAFISUD under the IfS. As the project has scored significant success it is recommended that some of its activities are transferred to DCI funding envelopes. (iii) Coordinate technical cooperation in the field of precursor control to avoid duplication between PRELAC and COPOLAD. It is therefore recommended that all precursor control activities should be folded into one programme. Nonetheless, future funding under CRP is difficult to justify because administrative precursor controls are only indirectly targeted at TCOs. (iv) Accelerate the expansion of the SEACOP and AIRCOP LAC activities. Provide a platform for trans-regional joint training for joint interdiction teams. (v) Focus on developing trans-regional information exchange mechanisms within projects (AIRCOP, SEACOP) and in wider CRP context, i.e. CORMS steering group meetings, country missions. (vi) Address the regional information exchange component of the AMERIPOL-EU project. There is a need to explore other institutional vehicles one of which may be the Escuela Regional de la Comunidad Americana de Inteligencia Antidrogas (ERCAIAD) that has the political oversight of CICAD and has the approval, acceptance and recognition of all LAC nations. Develop the trans- regional information exchange component working with partners in West Africa (WAPIS or ECOWAS) and the Caribbean (IMPACS). (vii) Develop the criminal investigation capacity of joint teams and / or lead investigating agencies in West Africa. Key objective of combating organised crime depends on better criminal investigation skills among law enforcement. This could become another stand-alone project or be attached to one of the interdiction programmes. The participation by Brazil and Colombia as partners should be explored. (viii) Most projects have neglected judicial cooperation, particularly in West Africa. Links with justice sector projects should be identified to find ways of integrating modules on working with drug cases and addressing corruption. (ix) Monitor the impact of the CRP and other drug control activities on governance and human rights, also with a view on incarceration figures, pre-trial detention, proportionality of penalties, to ensure that the programme promotes governance and human rights goals. (x) Use the access of fresh information on drug trafficking and organised crime to build the knowledge base. Provide analysis on phenomenon and critical review of programme impact.

12 1. Introduction

1.1 Security and Development It is one of the main principles of European Union (EU) policy that internal security cannot be achieved in isolation from the rest of the world and it is therefore important to ensure coherence and complementarity between the internal and external aspects of EU security.3 The need as well as the challenges to bringing together different instruments and capabilities such as the European Development Fund (EDF) and military capabilities of Member States (MS) in the pursuit of security, were noted in the External Security Strategy (ESS).4 In the 2008 Report on its implementation and the 2010 EU Internal Security Strategy it was also recommended to connect anti crime fighting with long-term development objectives. In the strategic thinking underlying actions funded by the EU the relationship between security and development is axiomatic. "As the ESS and the 2005 Consensus on Development have acknowledged, there cannot be sustainable development without peace and security."5 Greater coherence between policies including those tackling the challenges of security, fragility and transition are also emphasized by the Agenda for Change.6 Without security provisions the search for development aspirations as captured in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) is futile. Hence, the "nexus between development and security should inform EU strategies and policies in order to contribute to the coherence of EU external action."7 The Commission as a donor contributes to the implementation of the relevant international legal framework, in particular the 2000 UN Convention on Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC) and its three protocols (respectively on trafficking in human beings, migrant smuggling, and arms trafficking), the 2003 UN Convention on Anti-corruption (UNCAC) and the UN conventions of 1961, 1971 and 1988 related to drugs. Support is also provided to third countries requesting technical assistance in justice and security sector reform. Contracted funds in this domain have increased from 14M in 2001 to 174M in 20098.

1.2 The Cocaine Route Programme The logframe in Annex 2 provides an overview of the objectives, project purpose, results and activities of the Cocaine Route Programme (CRP), funded by the EU under the Instrument for Stability (IfS), Long-term component, Global and Trans-regional threats. With the overall objective of combating organised crime around the trafficking of cocaine from Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), primarily via West Africa (WA), to the EU, the Programme purpose is to enhance regional and trans-regional cooperation capacities of law enforcement, judicial and prosecuting authorities in selected countries of LAC and WA. The programme is built around the concept of flows - of drugs, money and information - and supports a series of activities that aim to enhance the capacity of Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) and judicial authorities in different strategically important domains. Significantly, the Cocaine Route Programme (as well as the parallel Heroin Route Programme) was conceived to address organised crime rather than drugs trafficking as such, with emphasis on criminal networks, and to complement EU MS activities. Its focus falls on enhancing the capacity for international cooperation of law enforcement and judicial services of the beneficiary countries and regional organisations for contributing to the fight against international criminal networks. In the first phase of implementation capacity building activities focussed more on national and regional institutions in Western Africa and Latin America. Trans-regional links are being established gradually between Latin America, the Caribbean and West Africa region.

3 EC, 2010.Communication From The Commission To The European Parliament And The Council. Brussels: European Commission. 4 EC, 2003.The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe p123. Brussels: European Commission. 5 EC, 2008. Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy - Providing Security in a Changing World. Brussels: European Commission. 6 EC, 2011. Communication From The Commission To The European Parliament,The Council, The European Economic And Social Committee And The Committee Of The Regions. Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for Change. 7 EC, 2007. Council Conclusions on Security and Development. Brussels: European Commission. 8 EC, 2011.Thematic Evaluation of the European Commission Support to Justice and Security System Reform. Brussels: DEVCO, Joint Evaluation Unit.

13 Eight separate, self-standing and independently managed projects have been designed to enhance security capacity, promote information sharing and foster inter-agency cooperation. SEACOP has established Joint Maritime Control Units (JMCUs) in five West African countries, while AIRCOP has set up Joint Airport Interdiction Task Forces (JAITFs) in five West African countries. Both projects are establishing systems for sharing information within West Africa, the planned project sites in Latin America and the Caribbean and Europe. In Latin America dedicated units have been or are being created within the police forces of at least four countries to cooperate and share information with partners identified by the EU project and anchored in the Bogota based AMERIPOL agency. These efforts are matched by the West African Police Information System (WAPIS), which was launched in September 2012 to enhance police information management and exchange at regional level. Two further projects supporting Anti Money Laundering activities, GAFISUD and AML-WA, are enhancing the capacity of national Financial Investigation Units in investigating on banking financial services and sharing information at regional and trans-regional level in Latin America and West Africa. Mechanisms for regulation and information on the trade in precursor chemicals used in the production of illegal drugs are shared between states in Latin America and the Caribbean participating in the PRELAC programme. Finally the Monitoring and Support (CORMS) project facilitates communication and synergies between the projects and the team of Key Experts provide technical support. Please see table 1 below for further detail on each of the eight projects.

TABLE 1

Amount - Implementin Geographic Abbreviation Title Period of execution EUR g Agency al Scope PRELAC I Prevention of the 36m (03/09-03/12) 2,070,338 UNODC LAC PRELAC II diversion of drugs 36m (03/12-02/15) 3,000,000 precursors in the LAC region AIRCOP I Airport 36m (01/10-01/13) 2,300,000 UNODC Airports AIRCOP II Communication 36m (12/10-12/13) 2,500,000 with covered: AIRCOP III Programme 36m (ind. 01/14- 3,000,000 Interpol and selected 12/16) WCO with countries in experts West Africa from EU / LAC Member States GAFISUD I Support to the fight 36m (12/09-12/12) 679,500 GAFISUD LAC GAFISUD II against money 24m (12/11-12/13) 1,200,000 GAFISUD III laundering in Latin 36m (ind. 01/14- 1,000,000 America 12/16) SEACOP I Seaport Cooperation 48m (07/10-07/14) 2,999,180 FIIAPP9 West Africa and II Programme with future expansion to selected countries in the LAC SEACOP III Seaport Cooperation 36m (ind. 08/14- 3,000,000 EUMS tbd West Africa Programme 07/17) with expansion to selected countries in the LAC AMERIPOL Law Enforcement & 48m (12/10-12/14) 3,745,000 FIIAPP10 LAC I & II Judicial Cooperation in Latin America AML WA Anti-money laundering (01/13-01/15) 1,800,000 FIIAPP11 Nigeria, West Africa Senegal, Ghana and Cape Verde

9 Consortium members: SOCA (UK), ADETEF (FR), the French Customs Office and the French Maritime Gendarmerie. 10 Consortium members: SOCA (UK), ADETEF (FR), Guardia di Finanza (IT), Policia Judiciaria (ES). 11 Consortium members: ADETEF (FR), CPS (UK), CIVIPOL (FR).

14 WAPIS I West Africa Police (09/12-10/13) 2,200,000 Interpol Nigeria WAPIS II Information System 36 m (ind. 11/13- 3,000,000 (ECOWAS) 10/16) 2012) and Benin, Ghana, Mali, Niger and Mauritania as first five pilot countries CORMS I Cocaine Route 36m (03/11-03/14) 1,000,000 Italian All Monitoring Support Ministry of countries Foreign Affairs12 CORMS II Cocaine Route 36 m (ind. 04/14- 1,000,000 EUMS tbd All Monitoring Support 03/17) countries

Total 34,916,977

2.3 The Mid-term Review The objective of the review is to provide decision-makers in the European Commission, other EU institutions and the wider public with sufficient information to: . Assess programme performance against its objectives; . Identify key lessons and propose practical recommendations for follow-up actions.

In particular, the requested services include: an assessment of the overall relevance of the programme, in particular in relation to the objectives of the Instrument for Stability and the related IfS Strategy and Multiannual Indicative Programmes (MIP). The Review will also assess performance of the contractors, the institutional set up and complementarity with the COPOLAD programme, funded by the EU under the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) in particular as well as other related programmes being implemented or planned. The review should guide the programming process in the field for the upcoming new financial cycle (2014-2020). The approach taken has been to assess the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, sustainability (OECD-DAC criteria), added value and overall coherence (European Commission – EC- criteria) of the Programme in relation to the objectives of the IfS and the related IfS Strategies and MIPs. While most EU instruments are geographically focused, the IfS has a thematic/global approach pertinent for activities against trans-regional organised crime. Within this Instrument special attention is paid to the operation of organised international crime engaged in illicit trafficking. As illustrated above, the Cocaine Route Programme consists of various activities implemented through eight separate projects rather than being an integrated and coherent “programme” as such. The methods used for the review included the reconstruction of the intervention logic of the Programme as a coherent and integrated set of activities and to define Evaluations Questions (EQs) that assess the validity of the programme as well as the actions carried out under each project. The review first assesses the quality of the achievements of the programme so far, and then provides a view on the viability of the “Cocaine Route Programme”. The scope of the evaluation extends geographically to the beneficiary countries in West Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean with field visits to Cape Verde, Ghana, Senegal and Togo in West Africa and Argentina, Colombia, Peru and Trinidad and Tobago in Latin America and the Caribbean. Interviews and field visits took place with stakeholders in LEAs, judicial authorities, other government agencies, as well as with independent experts, implementing agencies and EU and MS officials.13

12 Consortium members: FIIAAP, CIVIPOL, SOCA. 13 A more detailed account of the methodology is provided in the methods section in annex 4.

15 3. Findings

3.1 The Evaluation Questions14

TABLE 2

Evaluation Questions EQ1 Are the programme objectives appropriate for the problems that it was supposed to address and to the physical and policy environment? EQ 2 Is the programme consistent with EU commitments to good practice in development assistance? Does it promote EU values? And, does it comply with EU, rules and regulations? EQ 3 Does the programme address beneficiary country’s needs and priorities? EQ 4 To what extent have the activities of the projects contributed towards achievement of programme objectives? EQ 5 Are programme resources (human, technical and financial) used efficiently to achieve the given outputs? EQ 6 How has programme ensured that there will be lasting results following the termination of EU technical and financial support? Will there be a continuation of activities? EQ 7 Are the project activities coherent with the objectives of EU development policies? EQ 8 To what extent has the sharing of roles between the EC and Member States contributed to optimise the impact of the support? EQ 9 To what extent has the visibility of the EC as a project funder been assured within the project implementation?

3.2 Relevance

Rationale and judgement criteria: Is the programme relevant to EU external (development and security) policies? The Programme assumes a link between organised crime and drug trafficking across three different regions impacting on human security and impedes the development goals of the countries affected. Are the projects relevant, their design coherent and their implementation coordinated for addressing this problem? Does organised crime and drug trafficking provide an obstacle to development? Are the objectives of the programme appropriate for addressing these challenges? 1. Coherence and quality of the programme preparation and design; 2. Relevance in the context of development field 3; Beneficiary country’s needs and priorities are met and promoted 4; Does each CRP component meet the criteria for IfS supported interventions5;. Is the IfS the only source of funding available for supporting projects

3.2.1 Transnational Organized Crime The threat by organised crime is widely regarded as an unintended consequence of globalisation and as a rising threat to global security. Efforts by the international community to meet this challenge include the 2000 UN Convention on Crime (UNTOC) and its three protocols, the 2003 UN Convention on Anti-corruption (UNCAC) as well as the UN drug control conventions of 1961 and1971 and particularly of 1988. Drug trafficking is widely recognised as a core activity of Trans- national Organised Crime (TOC) and poses a trade that some estimate to amount to US 300$bn per annum.15 In Europe, fighting against organised crime has been a policy objective since the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, with a series of instruments and tools adopted by the EU in the area of Justice and Home

14 Judgement criteria and indicators in annex 4. 15 UNODC (2012), World Dug Report,Vienna:UNODC.

16 Affairs (JHA) to harmonize national legislation, creating specialised agencies (i.e. Europol and Eurojust) and promoting police and judicial cooperation. In recent years efforts have been made at converging security and development policies, including sustained support for the international legal framework by providing technical assistance to beneficiary countries. 16 The European Council agreed further on the need to match the ability of organised crime to act globally by facilitating the work of law enforcement across national jurisdictions. It identified this as an area where the Union could add value in the fight against threats that require coordinated action through the systematic exchange of information, widespread use of the Union agencies and investigative tools.17 According to the 2010 EU Internal Security Strategy EU and MS capacity should be employed in the support of third countries and region in the "in the interests of not only the external but also internal security."18

3.2.2 The Instrument for Stability - Legal Basis and Financial Allocations The Instrument for Stability (IfS) Regulation (EC) 1717/2006 of 15 November 2006 creates an instrument that enables the EU to address global security threats across and between regions without being bound to ODA-eligibility to respond to crisis situations.The budget allocated for the 2007-2013 period is € 2,118 million19, and is divided between a short-term component, managed by Service for Foreign Policy Instrument (FPI) and a long-term component managed by the European Commission, Directorate General for Development Cooperation (DEVCO, art. 4.1 and 4.2 of the IfS Regulation) and by the FPI (art. 4.3 of the same Regulation). The long-term component is covered by the Thematic Strategy Paper 2012-2013 prepared by the European External Action Service (EEAS) in consultation with relevant Commission services. It receives a maximum of 27% of total funds and is divided into priority areas: Art. 4.1 – Trafficking, terrorism and organised crime, threats to critical infrastructures and major public health –7% = 138.8M€ /app. 20M€ yearly Art. 4.2 – Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) – 15% Art. 4.3 – Effective crisis response – 5% The legal basis for the Cocaine Route Programme derives from IfS Regulation Article 4.1. (1) “threats to law and order, to the security and safety of individuals, to critical infrastructure and to public health. (a) Strengthening the capacity of law enforcement and judicial and civil authorities involved in the fight against terrorism and organised crime, including illicit trafficking of people, drugs, firearms and explosivematerials and in the effective control of illegal trade and transit, etc. Priority shall be given to trans-regional cooperation involving third countries which have demonstrated a clear political will to address these problems,“…with regard to assistance relating to the problem of drugs, due attention shall be given to international cooperation aimed at promoting best practicesrelating to the reduction of demand, production and harm."20 A staged approach:

16 In addition to the various strategic, legal or operational instruments, the EU also took several measures to address specific forms of organised crime. At the more strategic level: The EU Drug Strategy 2005-2012, with its two Action Plans covering respectively the periods 2005-2008 and 2009-2012, set out detailed actions on how to address drug trafficking. These were further developed in the new EU Drug Strategy 2013-2020. The 2005 EU Action Plan on trafficking in human beings is led by the EU anti trafficking coordinator Myria Vassiliadou promoting best practices, standards and procedures on this issue as well as 2009 “Action-Oriented Paper on strengthening the EU external dimension on action against trafficking in human beings” and the new “EU Strategy towards the Eradication of Trafficking in Human Beings 2012-16” (adopted 19/06/2012) and the 2013 Revised Draft Council Conclusions on an EU Framework for the Provision of Information on the Rights of Victims of Trafficking in Human Beings. The 2003 Commission Communication on Corruption (COM 2003/317 final) also addresses measures on how to prevent and combat corruption linked to organised crime through law enforcement and judicial cooperation. 17 European Council, 2010 The Stockholm Programme. An Open and Secure Europe Serving and Protecting Citizens. 18 EU, 2010. The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe. 19 The actual amount available is however less, being approximately 1.8b. 20 Instrument for Stability (IfS) Regulation (EC) 1717/2006 of 15 November 2006. Bold is of the authors.

17 1. The European External Action Service (EEAS) prepares the IfS Strategy documents (2007-2011 and 2012-2013) in consultation with the European Commission for agreement by EU Member States in the IfS Management Committee.

2. The EEAS prepares Multi Annual Indicative Programmes (2007-2009; 2009-2011 and 2012-2013) in consultation with the European Commission for agreement by the EU MS in the IfS Management Committee.

3. DEVCO develops an Annual Action Programme (AAP) on the basis of IfS Strategy and MIP, in consultation with EEAS and other COM Services (Quality Support Group – QSG – and Inter-service Consultation - ISC) for agreement by the EU MS in the IfS Management Committee.

Since its creation following the Lisbon Treaty (2009), the EEAS has the mandate to contribute and develop European Union common foreign and security policyand this facilitates finding synergies between internal and external policies.21 Coordinated with other EU funded activities, the actions programmed under the IfS should therefore meet external policy, security and development objectives. In the past, security issues were mainly addressed by actions based on Country and Regional Strategy Papers and National and Regional Indicative Programmes with a particular focus on institution and modernizing law enforcement and judiciary. Of particular relevance is the North/South drugs cooperation budget line,22where the trans-regional dimensions are first developed with the concept of "trans-regional drugs routes." Actions have ranged from institution- building to support for operational capabilities with the facilitation of inter-agency cooperation and the improvement of response standards in countries situated along one common drugs trafficking route.23 IfS programmes, including components of the CRP integrate the experience of previous actions. The PRELAC project for instance, continues activities initiated by PRADICAN,24 while the Latin American activities of SEACOP and AIRCOP activities beginning in 2013 can build on related work carried out under COPOLAD.

3.2.3 The Cocaine Route Programme within the IfS The Cocaine Route Programme is designed to facilitate the international cooperation of law enforcement and judicial service of beneficiary countries in the fight against international criminal networks while fully respecting human rights.25 It is based on the realisation that governments can only succeed in combating TOC through the strategic use of available resources. The programme therefore comprises measures along two key dimensions. First, it supports an integrated set of activities along the spectrum of the criminal justice system, from interception, to prosecution, conviction and asset forfeiture. Secondly, it creates linkages between law enforcement, prosecutorial and judicial authorities within and between regions, eventuating in transnational law enforcement communities that share information and coordinate operations.

21 2010 EU Internal Security Strategy. 22 Regulation 2046/97 (Article 1) of 13 October 1997 stipulates the EU North-South cooperation, as regards the fight against drugs. It applies to the projects on drugs funded, among others, by the budget line B7-6310It provided support for projects in the respective fields of demand reduction, supply reduction and institution building. The programme was evaluated in 2002 and grants continued to be made available until 2006. The drugs cooperation budget line has focused on the trans-regional dimension by using the concept of "trans-regional drugs routes". http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/reports/other/951570_en.pdf 23 The Instrument for Stability Strategy Paper 2007-2011. 24 PRADICAN is a DCI project (40 months from 10/2009 to 02/2013) executed jointly by the Andean Community –CAN- with the support of the EU Delegation to Peru and covers Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. The original budget of 3.25M. Euros was reduced to 2.35 M to trengthen the National Drug Observatories; facilitate government-civil society dialogue on the problem of drugs; precursor control; and improve the analytical capacity of the Andean MS relating to drug issues. 25 CRP 2009,Action Fiche 2 for Supporting the fight against organised crime on the cocaine route (phase ii) under priority 2 'Counteracting Global and Trans-regional Threats' of the long-term component of the Instrument for Stability; CRP, 2010 Action Fiche 2 for Supporting the fight against organised crime on the Cocaine Route – Phase III (COCAINE ROUTE III) under the Priority 2 "Counteracting Global and Trans-regional Threats" of the Long-Term Component of the Instrument for Stability; CRP, 2011Action Fiche 3 for Fighting Organised Crime - Priority 2 "Counteracting Global and Trans-regional Threats" of the Long-Term Component of the Instrument for Stability.

18 Critical to the programme is the strengthening of capacity and cooperation of LEAs and judicial authorities at national, regional and, ultimately, trans-regional level. The response strategy for activities under IfS art. 4.1 identifies "the urgent need to adapt the traditional arsenal of legislation and law enforcement" in general, and in particular the promotion of joint investigation teams should be as EU blue prints for international assistance.26 Two CRP components, SEACOP and AIRCOP, are developing such joint teams. Where possible (AMERIPOL, GAFISUD) existing structures are supported in their coordinating functions with regional information systems for regional and trans regional cooperation. In most projects (AIRCOP, AMERIPOL, SEACOP, AML-WA, CORMS), expertise is drawn from public or semi-public organisations in the EU Member States. According to the programme design components fits snugly into the scope and rationale of the IfS. It is therefore expected that activities will continue developing, "including support to regional platforms, development of communication networks, fight against drugs precursors trafficking and development of information/intelligence sharing capacities through the setting up of anti trafficking intelligence and interdiction units on land, maritime and air channels. Activities are also implemented against financial crime."27 Each CRP component is driven by a rationale for regional and trans-regional security sector cooperation fitting the objectives of the IfS, the related IfS strategy and the MIP. Questions arise whether these objectives were realised at project level and the sustainability of results.28 The project achievements, performance of contractors, strengths, weaknesses and areas where there is lack of clarity will be addressed below.

3.2.4 Drug flow, West African displacement and shared responsibility The conceptual tool informing the programme is that of flows of drugs and illicit goods, money and information. This is aligned with the overall objective of the Instrument for Stability, "to reduce illicit trans-regional flows, such as the trafficking of human beings (including child trafficking), firearms, and drugs, as well as to tackle other related international criminal activities (notably financial crime)."29 Reinforced control measures at air and maritime points of entry, as well as improved administrative interventions aim to disrupt the flow of drugs and precursors. Enhanced money laundering capacity disrupts the flow of the proceeds of crime. And better data management systems, communication systems and joint operations promote the exchange of information by law enforcement agencies. Scale and ambition of the programme derive from a persuasive analysis of the problem and have a logical cohesion. But the complexity of the different elements gives rise to challenges when converting a theoretical programme with discrete, thematically distinct components into an integrated set of activities. Further issues pertain to the implementation itself, which will be discussed in detail below. Before assessing programme achievements it is necessary to make some preliminary observations about the way the programme is situated in the EU policy cycle for organised and serious crime, as well as about the international drug trade. The CRP has been designed to meet internal and external security concerns of the EU. Project results broadly foreshadow action on the eight crime priorities adopted by the Council in 2011. The first of the strategic goals listed by the Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation and International Security (COSI)30 was the weakening of Organised Crime Groups (OCGs) active or based in West Africa to traffic cocaine and heroin to and within the EU.31 The European

26 IfS, MIP 2012-13, p11-12. 27 IfS, MIP, 2012-13, p10. 28 A concern with IfS long term component activities - European Centre for Development Policy Management, 2012. 1st Among Equals? The Instrument for Stability and Conflict Prevention and Peace building in the EU’s new financial perspective 1. Briefing Note. Brussels: European Centre for Development Policy Management,http://www.ecdpm.org/Web_ECDPM/Web/Content/Download.nsf/0/A7C7B53C70C7F104C12579FB004FD17 B/$FILE/BN39.pdf. 29 Instrument for Stability Strategy Paper 2007-2011, "The specific objectives are to: identify and address key factors that will contribute to the prevention and disruption of illicit flows; and strengthen regional, sub-regional and international capacity to tackle illicit flows through the promotion of cooperation and action at trans-regional or global level." 30 COSI is an EU Council working group with a mandate to facilitate, promote and strengthen the coordination of EU states operational actions in the field of internal security. 31 Council of the European Union (2011), Council conclusions on setting the EU’s priorities for the fight against organised crime between 2011 and 2013.

19 Multidisciplinary Platform against Criminal Threats (EMPACT) identified West Africa as one of eight priorities in 2011. The Cocaine Route Programme is therefore one of a set of actions towards the realisation of EU policies on organised crime and security. The opportunity for organised crime groups, however, arises from the underlying market demand for substances that have been prohibited in the interest of public health. The crime associated with the supply of these is a consequence, and arguably a cost, of an as yet unevaluated public health policy. While the activities eventuating from that policy have so far failed to eliminate the availability or the consumption of controlled substances in European markets, they have impacted significantly upon structure and configuration of the trade. One of the unintended consequences of counter trafficking measures is the displacement of transit routes, also known "as the balloon effect because squeezing (by tighter controls) one place produces a swelling (namely an increase) in another."32 That a region like West Africa, which is neither a producer nor consumer of cocaine, has become a staging post in the transit route illustrates the workings of displacement. The need for action to mitigate the consequences of trafficking displacement, as well as of the original production and export of drug products destined for European markets, is identified in one of the cross cutting themes of the EU Drug Strategy: international cooperation. The EU external relations in the field of drugs are based on the principles of shared responsibility.33 Actions against the impact of cocaine trafficking therefore have foundation in the anti organised crime strategy and the EU drug strategy.

3.2.5 Linkages and Overlaps with other programmes The Heroin Route Programme A similar, though smaller programme, always funded under the IfS, has paralleled the CRP with the specific purpose of tackling organised crime along the heroin trafficking routes. Objectives and methods similar to those of the CRP and implementing agencies are involved in both programmes. Closer collaboration provides an opportunity for real operational and informational synergies. There can be mutual learning, particularly with regard to creating intelligence sharing platforms, installing communication systems and cross-project cooperation in seaports. There are further opportunities for creating information exchanges between LEAs along the different routes in light of the increasing mobility of organised crime groups. The first phase, implemented by GIZ in partnership with the ECO Secretariat's Anti-Drug & Organised Crime Coordination Unit (ECO-DOCCU) in Teheran, I.C.P.O. Interpol, UNODC and BKA with a budget of € 9,5 million, had several components in support to 1- ECU-DOCCU infrastructure and activities involving all ten ECO countries, 2- Interpol i24/7 police information systems benefiting Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan, 3- UNODC container control programme benefiting Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Iran and Afghanistan and 4- Establishing a network of forensic laboratories benefiting Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan. The second phase has three components, including container control in ports along the Black Sea (€1.8 million; UNODC/WCO); Information networks and platforms (€2,7 million for regional organisations SELEC and CARICC); Trafficking in Human Beings, (€1,5 million). Synergies with EDF and DCI funded Programmes The IfS strategy is concerned that “the fight against drugs also requires a more comprehensive approach including measures addressing drug demand reduction.”34 It is therefore planned to reinforce the capacity of State and non State actors to better respond to the threat of drug trafficking by sharing experience and good practice from the EU, and establishing partnerships with EU agencies such as EMCDDA. There are no provisions for such actions within the CRP. But there http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/jha/122514.pdf fight against organised crime between 2011 and 2013, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/jha/122514.pdf. 32 UNODC, 2008. “Making drug control ‘fit for purpose’: Building on the UNGASS decade” Report by the Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime as a contribution to the review of the twentieth special session of the General Assembly of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs. Vienna: UNODC. 33 EU Drug Strategy 2013-2020. 'shared responsibility' is the recognition that drug consuming and drug producing countries are jointly responsible for the diverse associated problems and need to work together. It is contrast to a preceding paradigm distinguishing “drug-producing countries” of the “South” from the “drug- consuming countries” of the “North”, and the frequent allocation of blame across the divide. 34 IFS Multi-annual Indicative Programme 2012-2013.

20 is a potential for linkages between CRP projects and other EU initiatives, such as the "Cooperation Programme between Latin America and the European Union on Anti-drugs policies" (COPOLAD). Running 04/12/2010 to 04/06/2014 with a €6 million DCI budget its objectives are to improve the coherence, balance and impact of anti-drugs policies in Latin America, and strengthen the process of elaborating anti-drugs policies. It is also designed to improve the dialogue between Latin America and the EU.35 Setting up of a framework of dialogue, exchange and capacity building between the agencies responsible for drug policy-making in LAC and EU countries has been a useful instrument for EU MS when identifying regional needs. There is no regional equivalent in West Africa, but a Nigerian project provides a model for a balanced and integrated approach, as it provides for activities that support building the information base, the involvement of civil society, and demand reduction activities.36There are opportunities for ensuring that the CRP's commitment governance and human rights is translated into actions by linking the project with EU activities. At regional level the EDF supported Justice Reform Project with a focus on Peace, security and stability and a budget of €27 million will commence in 07/2013 with further support for the sector allocated under the 11th EDF. Judicial reform and modernisation projects are also under way in several West African countries. These provide an opportunity for briefing stakeholders on the CRP, on drug control legislation, on the opportunities for targeting organised crime and the risks of human right abuses.

TABLE 3: EDF funded judicial reform projects programmed in West African countries

GUINEA BISSAU: Programme to support the reform of the justice sector – 20 M€, project suspended until the lifting of article 96 on free and faire legislative elections. IVORY COAST: 10th EDF Programme on the Support to justice system and modernization of prison services in Cote d’Ivoire. 18 M€: (on-going) 5 IfS specific objectives: 1. Capacity enhancement of the Ministry of Justice and Human rights (formulation of sector policies, reinvigoration of the inspection services, statistics department, etc); 2. Capacity enhancement of the judiciary (support the Institut National de Formation Judiciare); 3. Improvement of the court system (reorganisation court clerks and information gathering – pilot; 4. Improving access to justice (construction of the tribunal and prison of San Pedro and judicial assistance); 5. Improving detention conditions and facilitating reintegration of detainees (separation of minors and improvement of the quality of feeding system by establishing penitentiary farms). MALI: 15 M€ for justice sector reform and internal security under 10th EDF of Mali. Currently being formulated under DEL supervision. MAURITANIA: Reform of the Justice system and the rule of law (capacity enhancement, technical assistance, support to the judicial function, sensitization of the citizenry, modernization and infrastructure - 4,75 M€ – 9 EDF was completed in June 2012 with the implementation of most of the activities in its final year of execution despite the difficult conditions prevailing in Mauritania at the time, particularly due to a lack of ownership by the Ministry of Justice. A new justice reform project (7 M€) will start during the second semester of 2013 which will contribute to improving investigation techniques particularly with regard to specialized units on terrorism and organized crime, as well as improving the conditions of incarceration.

NIGER: The Programme on Judicial Reform and the Rule of Law (PAJED II, 15,0 M€, 10th EDF), ongoing since last year and which is a continuation of PAJED 1, consists of a justice and security component. The activities of the justice component focus on support to penitentiary reforms, juvenile justice and protection, acces to the justice (establishment of an agency for justice and judicial support), as well as the moralization, training and institutional capacity enhancement for the justice system. THE GAMBIA: Components of 10th EDF Governance Programme (13,5M€) is justice and in particular Access to Justice and Legal Education (4,5M€). The main activities include: academic legal education, information campaigns on justice system, civic rights education, training of future legal practitioners, continuous training for judges and court staff, improvement of case management, elaboration of the methodology to collect relevant jurisprudence and support to the alternative dispute resolution system. SENEGAL: Justice reform project (7,9M€). Major activities include: contribution towards the establishment of judiciary plan in order to improve the geographic proximity and consequently facilitate access to justice; redistribution of competences between the different jurisdictional levels as well as the attribution of new competences regarding civil, penal, commercial and administrative, construction, rehabilitation or

35 For a longer discussion of COPOLAD see section 8 Coherence. 36 Fighting drugs and organised crime in Nigeria, CRIS NG/FED 022-152.

21 expansion of some of the tribunals/courts in the small towns; promoting IT and digitalisation of the justice system. BURKINA FASO: Support for a national policy on justice in Burkina Faso (PA-PNJ) under the 10th EDF (9,5 M€). The PA-PNJ aims to enhance capacity of the Justice Ministry of Burkina Faso within the framework of PNJ 2010-2019, in line with SCADD (Stratégie de Croissance accélérée et de développement durable), global reference to development of the country, validated by all technical and financial partners.

€ 16,5 million from the 10th EDF have also been allocated to"Support to ECOWAS Regional Action Plan on illicit drug trafficking, related organised crime and drug abuse in West Africa” (the so-called Praia Plan).37 It includes capacity building for national enforcement and judicial authorities to combat transnational organised crime and improved sub-regional, regional and international cooperation. A major component includes “Measures against money laundering" and includes four activities designed on a national basis. There are, in addition, two IfS funded projects supporting critical infrastructures protection. The Administrative Arrangement on the Pilot Project on Piracy, Maritime Awareness and Risks II, Gulf of Guinea, (PMAR GoG) running 12/10-06/13 with a € 1million budget is designed to improve their maritime domain awareness, CRIMGO - Critical Maritime Routes in the Gulf of Guinea. Fighting piracy and armed robbery against ships in the Gulf of Guinea running 01/13-01/16 with a budget of €4,500,000 is supporting selected countries in the Gulf of Guinea to develop the capacity for regional cooperation in coast guard and maritime law enforcement functions. Linking the CRP with these other security and justice sector reform projects creates opportunities for synergies and for ensuring that good governance and human rights are promoted. This is important because building up the repressive apparatus in states with patchy human rights records and where corruption is pervasive carries risks. At the moment there are neither indicators nor mechanisms for measuring the impact of activities on human rights or governance. These are shortcomings that in the next phase can be addressed by the coordinating mechanism (CORMS). Overlaps with EDF and DCI funded Programmes There are clear overlaps between the CRP and activities under other instruments. In particular: COPOLAD activities 4.4 on (i) precursor control overlap with PRELAC and (ii) on capacity building for LEAs investigating maritime and air trafficking overlap with SEACOP and AIRCOP.38 Praia Plan (i) AML activities will overlap with the IfS AML-WA and (ii) activities in thematic areas 2 and 3 such as reinforcing law enforcement and improving information exchange implemented by UNODC will overlap with WAPIS, AIRCOP and SEACOP.

3.2.6 The CRP in the context of security concerns of beneficiary countries In Latin America the governments of Colombia and Peru continue to engage in military campaigns against insurgents who derive funds from involvement with drug production and trafficking with the EU possibly the largest consumer market. For them the CRP is supporting national security.39 In Mexico and several Central American countries organised crime groups are posing a serious threat to state stability and are undermining human security. In the Caribbean region crime, particularly violent crime, and the interconnection of the trade in drugs and small arms is recognized as a development impediment.40 For the past twenty years the Caribbean has been an important transit route for cocaine exports to Europe. Far less is known about the scale and the structure of drug trafficking through West Africa. Though there have been seizures and arrests of couriers going back to the 1980s41 concern among senior

37 2008-2011 ECOWAS Regional Action Plan to address the Growing Problem of Illicit Drug Trafficking, Organized Crimes and Drug Abuse in West Africa. There have been delays in implementation but the Financing Agreement is expected to be signed in the autumn 2013 with UNODC as implementation agency for the results 2, 3 and 4. 38 https://www.copolad.eu/en/componente4/actividades/capacitacion-para-refuerzo-de-cooperacion-policial. 39 DEVIDA, 2012. National Drug Control Strategy 2012-2016. Lima, Peru: Comisón Nacional para el Desarrollo y Vida Sin Drogas. p7. 40 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the World Bank 2007 report Crime, Violence, and Development: Trends, Costs, and Policy Options in the Caribbean; REVIEW OF THE CARICOM Action Plan for Social Development and Crime Prevention 2010 Endorsed by 12th Council for Human and Social Development October 2010.

22 policy makers is more recent. A regional initiative was launched on 31/01/2013 by former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan in Ghana to analyse the link between organised crime and drug trafficking.42 Activities under the CRP are therefore addressing security concerns that have been identified at regional and national level in beneficiary states. There are differences in opinion on the scale and configuration of the threat as well as on the kind of response best suited to address it. The CRP is an opportunity to provide critical support for LEA capacity, information and knowledge base and policy making.

3.3 Design 3.3.1 Assessment of local absorption and implementation capacity and flexibility to circumstance There are considerable differences in the organisational capacity of countries participating in the programme. Institutions in some of the West African countries are very weak while several South American countries are donors and sources of technical assistance in their own right. In Latin America it was possible to channel funds for AML activities through GAFISUD, a regional organisation. In West Africa the relationship between the AML-WA project and GIABA is yet to be clarified. Strengthening of a regional organisation has been one of the main results for the AMERIPOL project. It is unlikely that the Colombian government would have provided the offices that the agency occupies today had it not been for the CRP. At national level the different projects have contributed significantly to enhancing capacity. Individual officers and their agencies have benefitted in West Africa (training by AIRCOP and SEACOP) and in Latin America (training by GAFISUD, AMERIPOL and PRELAC). Resources were used effectively by targeting of specialised agencies in response to national needs. GAFISUD has assisted national FIUs with mutual evaluations so countries can come of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) black lists. PRELAC precursor training has improved administrative and border controls and regional information exchange. In West Africa AIRCOP created JAITFs at airports where controls were haphazard before. In some places local partners are struggling to absorb support from multiple donors. In Accra the lead agency NACOB is receiving support from Italian, UK and US agencies as well as AIRCOP. It took time to find an appropriate facility at Accra airport from which the AIRCOP joint team could operate. A different problem occurred in Senegal, where the agency tasked with drug control before project commencement found itself marginalised by the coming of AIRCOP.43 The CRP component addressing the maritime vector overlapped with the UNODC run Global Container Control Programme. Training was provided for officers including some already working on the GCCP because of staff shortages. It was reported that initially UNODC staff and national agencies in some of the countries regarded SEACOP as a competitor. The AIRCOP manager used similar language to describe his reception at Accra airport where SOCA has been running operation Westbridge for several years. Rivalry between donor agencies working in a CRP beneficiary country has not been considered as a risk and should be factored in as a lesson learnt for future interventions. This is particular relevant because law enforcement agencies in beneficiary have limited absorption capacity, hence the need to coordinate interventions. In both cases project management proved adaptable in negotiating compromises, though the question of capacity constraints in West African seaports, and over investment in control at Accra airport remain.44 There are questions, however, over the capacity of the LEAs involved in the joint teams at both air and seaports. In Ghana NACOB is recruiting university graduates and has raised salaries. But training, organisational strategies, standard operating procedures remain underdeveloped. Heads of agencies are exposed to political pressure and senior officers are liable to be replaced after

41 Klein, Axel, (1994) "Trapped in the Traffick: the growing problems of drug consumption in Lagos", The Journal of Modern African Studies, 23 (4). 42 http://www.wacommissionondrugs.org/?page_id=717. 43 The Office central pour la répression du traffic illicite des stupéfiants (OCRTIS) already had a team at the airport which was subsumed under the JAITF and retains the mandate for conducting investigation once a seizure has been made. But relations with the JAITF are poor and in the opinion of the OCRTIS chief the JAITF team is reactive, unimaginative and idle. 44 It was reported that Westbridge and the US DEA were running teams at the airport. AIRCOP was in the process of setting up a third team.

23 changes of government. Both SEACOP and AIRCOP have tried to manage these vulnerabilities by extending their relationship. AIRCOP has a permanent representative in West Africa, which allows for building relationships.45 Both projects make use of mentors recruited from EU LEAs or consultants. They have proved useful in providing on the job training and for creating links between LEAs in beneficiary countries and in EU MS. Two points for consideration ensue from these activities. Relying on officers from MS LEAs tilts activities invariably towards prioritising cooperation between beneficiary and a particular MS. Neglect for the EU dimension and possible the interests of other MS are captured by a member of a West African EUD reporting that SEACOP KEs would report to the UK High Commission before they would come to the EUD. Projects may consider making KEs aware of the EU wide dimension of the project. Ensuring that the CRP promotes good governance and human rights is currently falling in between the lines of responsibility. In part this is a consequence of the lack of cohesion of the programme. Individual project managers focus on specific objectives and operations, while the coordinating mechanism with a weak mandate and its reliance on part time KEs does not have the strength or vision to provide leadership on these issues. Beneficiaries are mainly LEAs and judicial authorities with different priorities.

3.3.2 Stakeholder identification / participation and consultation The process of consultation with beneficiaries varied considerably between different projects and different countries. One of the problems was that decisions arrived by policy makers were not being effectively communicated to the officers involved in project implementation. This can cause confusion, resentment or a sense of not being involved in project planning. In Togo for instance, the Director General of OCTRIDB (Office Central de Répression du Trafic Illicite de la Drogue et du Blanchiment) the agency responsible for implementing both SEACOP and AIRCOP, had not received any prior warning even though consultations had taken place. For SEACOP he mentioned that at the time of the review he had no idea "of the direction of the project." The SEACOP experts did hold discussions with a wide range of stakeholders during the scoping visit in 2011, including OCTRIBD according to the programme agenda. Yet, the report does mention the need to meet with "Heads of Agencies to confirm formal high level agreement for the proposed creation of the JMCU."46 There were further talks with OCTRIBD and other agencies during the training in December 2012. Given the strong opinion among beneficiaries’ ways for improving communications may be considered for future activities. Involving agency and department heads early on in the process may help avoid difficulties at later stages. The sense of having projects imposed was also conveyed by a senior police officer in Colombia: "there is never any consultation and we are the people who are supposed to implement the programme." This was said only four months after the AIRCOP assessment mission to Bogota airport had been carried out in November 2012.47 There is therefore a question of involving beneficiaries at all levels and building a shared sense of purpose. Team Leaders have to balance the practicalities of managing a complex project with the needs for stakeholder involvement. Restricting steering group meetings to donor agencies, as AIRCOP does at present, may have logistical and financial benefits but to ensure buy in from national partners and continuity of project activities beneficiaries must be involved and get a sense of ownership by inclusion in strategic discussions. Across the programme there is no evidence that in the process of implementation executing agencies, local governments or national stakeholders have considered how activities could impact on vulnerable populations, particularly women, the poor or people with little access to legal protection. Inadequate provisions have been made, for instance, for body searches of female suspects by an all male JAITF team at Dakar airport. In none of the countries visited are trafficking suspects provided with legal representation. All of the countries have high incidents of corruption, which can lead to both the evasion of parties guilty of offences and the framing of vulnerable

45 Seacop is considering following suit in the next phase. 46 Communication from SEACOP expert Paul Studely. The Scoping Mission report (SEACOP, 2011) is ambiguous. The appendix includes a visit to OCTRIDB as part of the programme. 47 As the mission report does not contain a list of people met it is possible that the officer was not included. UNODC, 2012. AIRPORT Assessment Report El Dorado Airport, Bogota, Colombia José María Córova Airport, Medellín, Colombia.

24 people. There are no measures in any of the projects to review the conduct of officers, to build oversight mechanisms and raise agency accountability.

3.3.3 Coordination arrangements The lack of an overarching vision poses a threat to the wider CRP. There are two particular risks to divert the programme from its central objective of fighting organised crime. Individual projects can divert their attention from setting up networks to building institutions. The second is a shift from fighting organised crime with anti drug trafficking measures to fighting drugs per se. That would entail that drug seizures and arrests become the purpose of operations rather than means to an end. It would enable law enforcement to appear productive by generating activity by arresting small operators, including drug users. At present AIRCOP activity is impacting on micro traffickers only. With no follow up investigations into supply networks and financing this carries the risk of leaving organised crime structures intact. The programme is designed to facilitate multilevel interventions to tackle larger criminal operations. But the coordination remains haphazard because it is entirely voluntary and episodic. The formation of CORMS has gone some way to creating awareness among project managers and beneficiaries. It has also provided a platform for exchange and coordination. But without a stronger mandate the project cannot make stronger coordination arrangements. Further, as every project with the exception of CORMS is focused on law enforcement activities, there are no mechanisms for identifying and reporting abuses of position, violations of human rights and the spread of corruption. There are no linkages with either civil society organisations or political bodies to create awareness and democratic oversight over project activities and their various consequences. That these issue have not been raised earlier is partly a consequence of the lack of institutional memory, owing to the high turn over of task managers at the Commission, as well as the lack of integration between individual projects. With the creation of CORMS and regular Steering Group meetings and the collation of project information much has been done to address coordination and memory. This platform also has the potential for addressing the governance and human rights issues in the programme.

3.3.4 Risks and assumptions and Objective Verifiable Indicators (OVIs) The programme documents rightly identify political instability, trust, resource availability in beneficiary countries as risks to the programme without suggesting mitigating actions. There is no discussion of corruption and the misuse of power by government officials and law enforcement personnel in states with poor governance records. Monitoring mechanisms should be developed in the next phase. There is no recognition of the risk of rivalry between implementing agencies and duplication with other programmes. Evidence for West African involvement in cocaine trafficking is disputed. The scenarios are based on information from occasional (and falling) seizures, sting operations and informers. Estimates of the impact on the regional economy are based on cocaine wholesale prices in consumer markets, rather than the transit fees. Local consumption levels of cocaine remain low in all West African countries. Neither the scale, nor the dynamics of the cocaine trade is well understood, and the lack of systematic research efforts is as striking as the coincidence of data source with funding recipient. Most information about the West African drug trafficking phenomenon comes from UNODC, the agency that receives substantial project funding to address it.48 There are further weaknesses in both the assumptions and risks at project level. The CORMS project confuses risks and assumptions for the CRP with those for the CORMS project and therefore fails to realize the problems arising from its weak mandate and the use of KEs who are managed by agencies involved in the executing of CRP projects. This is clearly in conflict with an objective and critical monitoring function.49

48 (UNODC), 2008. Drug Trafficking as a Security Threat in West Africa; UNODC, 2007. Cocaine Trafficking in West Africa: The Threat to Stability and Development (with Special Reference to Guinea-Bissau); UNODC, 2005. Crime and Development in Africa; UNODC, 2005 Transnational Organized Crime in the West African Region. 49 CORMS, TRs, 2010, page 8 "7.2 Risks. Diplomatic tensions may occur between some beneficiary countries. The target of the project is undermined by national and regional interagency rivalry and lack of confidence between participants."

25 There are also problems with the way some of the project objectives are phrased and indicators set against these. For instance, PRELAC specific objectives are vaguely phrased as 'strengthening' and 'enhancing'.50 In AIRCOP for example, the OVIs are adequate at result level but do not provide for a qualitative assessment of the project objectives, as they simply list outputs but not outcomes.51

4. Effectiveness

Rationale and judgement criteria: To assess the effect of the programme and the separate activities in contributing to the wider policy or sector objectives (as summarised in the CRP's Overall Objective) 1. The project has contributed to reducing the capacity of organised crime groups to operate along the LA-WA-EU route 2. Has the cooperation between LEAs and judicial authorities been improved at regional and trans-regional level?

4.1 Delivery of planned benefits and results: fighting against organised crime groups The reinforcement of defences at airports put into place by AIRCOP is well conceived for targeting drug importation, interrupting flows and arresting couriers. There is a risk, however that this becomes the sole preoccupation of the JAITFs and contrary to the original objectives, with its clear focus on fighting organised crime. While organized crime groups may dispatch groups of couriers on the assumption that some will get through, some couriers are opportunists or small operators. In West Africa where operations end after the arrest, couriers can become scapegoats and a smokescreen that allows the trade to continue. The different approach to policing in Colombia was underlined by informants at Bogota airport who said that the arrest of the courier was the beginning of investigations, leading ideally to multiple arrests and asset forfeiture. In seaports, by contrast, random searches are of limited use as the size of ships makes it so difficult to find concealed cargo. The sheer volume of containers passing through ports like Takoradi, Lome or Lagos, on the other hand, reduce the probability of detection to the point where random checks may no longer prove a deterrent. In both ports and airports effective law enforcement depends therefore on the management and analysis of information. The need is recognised by SEACOP which is in the process of training JMCUs in intelligence management. The project vision is for the different JMCUs to generate their own intelligence and share with partners in other countries. Drug consignments despatched by ship are usually of such a magnitude that seizure in port can inflict significant damage on crime groups. This is not the case with airport seizures. Arrestees may be opportunists working with small quantities and little organisational back up, or dispensable 'mules' and with little information. Secondly, organised crime groups may employ large numbers in so called 'shotgun missions',52 but arrests recorded by AIRCOP are not anything near high enough to impact on organised crime. In order to be effective against organised crime both projects need to develop intelligence and investigation skills of joint teams (JAITFs and JMCUs) and other LEAs in beneficiary countries. Air vector controls need to be boosted by controlled delivery missions, where couriers, greeters and recruiters are identified and placed under surveillance so that entire organisations can be dismantled and king pins identified. So far progress is incipient in West Africa.

50 PRELAC, DoA, 2008 p.8, "1. To strengthen the capacities of national administrative control authorities of selected countries within the region to prevent the diversion of precursors; 2. To enhance the cooperation between these countries thanks to a better knowledge of each other system and the overall trends in precursors diversion in the region through enhanced exchange of information." 51 "An OO is defined but no PP [project purpose], which is assumed to be by this mission the creation of the JAITF, as this is the means through which the project contributes to the OO. .... OVIs are adequate at result level but not at objectives' level, since they do not provide the sense of progress in the establishment of the JAITF and in building capacity at the airport, beyond checking the creation of the JAITF, the adaptation of CENComm, access to 1-24/7 (INTERPOL's internal communication system) or number of trainings and drug seizure made." AIRCOP ROM Report, 2011. 52 So called because enough will get through and find the target.

26 The training by Brazilian technical experts in Cape Verde organised by AIRCOP is a promising example of how experience can be exchanged. There is ample scope for building on this to raise the capacity in investigations and intelligence management. The CRP is designed so that information exchange leads to seizures and arrests at the front end is complemented by into financial assets. Once again, CRP can draw on experience of Colombia, Peru and Cape Verde to demonstrate how financial investigations can be coupled with criminal investigations to dismantle organised crime groups and result in asset seizures.

4.2 Enhancing the Cooperation Capacity of Law Enforcement and Judicial Authorities at Regional and Trans-Regional Level In Latin America the CRP was able to provide a seamless continuation of activities that had been initiated by PRADICAN, and which responded to several perceived needs. First, it provided an administrative approach to complement the paramilitary anti drug activities pursued by the US. Secondly, it addressed the different legal frameworks on precursor control prevailing in the region. The government of Colombia was for instance concerned about the trade of precursor chemicals into the coca producing Putumayo province from Peru. PRELAC I and PRELAC II were able to organise a series of workshops bringing together members from the government agencies concerned, where control issues could be discussed and efforts be taken towards standardization. IT support has helped countries migrate information from existing data systems to the INCB Pre Export Notification system. It has further promoted regional cooperation by promoting threat assessment methodologies developed, tested and applied by Ecuador. The system is currently being adopted by Uruguay and Costa Rica. The project has therefore achieved regional integration and promoted linkages across Latin America and the Caribbean. The EU AMERIPOL project has also succeeded in creating a training platform and supporting an institutional platform for regional law enforcement cooperation. In the absence of a secure communication system and database, communication between LEAs in the region remains sporadic. The AMERIPOL-EU project has however, contributed to the building of trust, forging partnerships and infrastructure via the creation of National AMERIPOL Units in several countries. Regional training has also been the driver for cross border cooperation in SEACOP. It is via personal relationships that information is passed between JMCUs in Togo and Ghana for example. Otherwise attaining Objective 3, "Develop regional intelligence and maritime cooperation and support the set up of a regional intelligence and maritime coordination centre", remains elusive. But the creation of JMCUs has put into place an essential precondition for the realisation of that goal. In the meantime, it provides counterparts for the LO platforms at Accra and Dakar to engage with. AIRCOP training has also provided a mechanism for creating relationships between partner agencies in West Africa. It has also installed the CENcomm system allowing for real time communication between Dakar, Praia, Lome and Cotonou. It is not clear, however, if these channels remain open after the departure of mentors or end of joint training operations like COCAIR.53 At Dakar airport only the Chief of the JAITF (a custom officer) had access whereas in Praia the entire team did. AIRCOP has also advanced trans-regional dimension by facilitating the provision of training by Brazilian officers in Cape Verde. This helped expanding the project to Praia to Boa Vista, Sal and Sao Vicente. Regional cooperation was strongly supported by the EU funded training for GAFISUD. As a consequence of the project Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay and Ecuador were able to improve compliance with recommendation 26 of the FATF 40 + 9 recommendations, pertaining to the work of FIUs. Legal reforms have also been incorporated into the frameworks of Argentina, Bolivia and Paraguay. Paraguay is coming off the FATF black list and Bolivia is scheduled for an onsite visit. Enhancing the supervisory and investigatory capacity of AML agencies is helping countries become hostile environments for organized crime. To that extent, the preventative function of the project has therefore been effective. But there is also a strong sense of direction towards a more proactive approach to financial investigations, particularly in Colombia, which may result in the more aggressive pursuit of criminal investigations. Yet the complexity of such investigations remains daunting and requires a long term approach.

53 At one site visit the officer's password had lapsed suggesting he had not accessed the system for 6 weeks.

27 As for the trans-regional cooperation of LEAs and/or judicial authorities it simply is too early in the programme to report any successes. Capacity building at national and regional level, have been a precondition for achieving the overall objective. It is highly unlikely to happen without continued support. TABLE 4: Colombia FIU activity 2011-12

Cases considered Forwarded to the Fiscalia54 Prosecutions Convictions 247 67 7 1

5. Efficiency

Rationale and judgement criteria: The components of programme and the interventions delivered, should have produced the best effects in terms of achievement of the project objectives. To identify constraining and facilitating institutional factors for efficient programme delivery The programme resources (human, technical and financial) are used efficiently to achieve the outputs

5.1 Management arrangements and coordination The CRP design of self standing projects that will be linked up progressively, to create trans- regional synergies to tackle organised crime on the cocaine route55 is persuasive and builds on experience. Programme activities have been selected by learning lessons from previous projects that recognise the need for regional and trans-regional networks and the value of cooperation platforms.56 The project results, by intercepting shipments at air and sea vectors through raising capacity and promoting information exchange complemented by financial investigation and judicial cooperation, have a logical coherence and promise to realise the objective of tackling organised crime. The realisation of complementarity and close cooperation between projects does require attention, because each is already grappling with practical challenges. Furthermore, each is managed as a self standing project and subject to different contractual arrangement. These include a standard contribution agreement with UNODC for PRELAC and AIRCOP and Interpol implementing WAPIS; centralised direct management through a service contract with a Member State organisation for SEACOP, AMERIPOL, CORMS and AML-WA or through the direct award of grants for GAFISUD. There are tangible benefits in employing agencies with regional or thematic expertise. But it also leads to a fragmentation of activities, a loss of common purpose and a missed opportunity in making efficiency gains in the management of the programme. It is particularly pertinent in the case of CORMS, a project set up to monitor and facilitate synergies between the other programme components, but which in itself consumes a proportion of its funds for project management.57 The creation of CORMS signals the post hoc realisation of the need for closer integration. Arguably, wider benefits could have been gained from keeping programme activities under one managerial roof. There is still a chance for scoping visits, awareness raising and training to be coordinated as demonstrated by the recent participation of a Ghanian officer (trained under AIRCOP) in an AMERIPOL training. Unfortunately the weak mandate prevents CORMS from coordinating proactively, as it has no leverage with projects. This 'light touch' was chosen deliberately for fear of 'entrusting inappropriate powers to project experts and (ii) creating yet another 'coordinating initiative to the already many existing'.58 Hence, it is difficult to assess CORMS on outcomes that it has no mandate to actively pursue. Synergies can only be found by coordinating activities. This is difficult when projects are self standing as managers have little incentive to cooperate or even exchange information. At the

54 PublicProsecutor's office. 55 CRP III; Action Fiche, 2011 please make this note consistent with the others. 56 Of EU law enforcement liaison officers. These exist in Accra, Dakar and one has just been formed in Bogota. 57 23% if we assume that the key role of the junior expert is project management and administrative support. The budget provides no further breakdown. 58 TRs, Cocaine Route Monitoring and Support, p. 7.

28 same time the CORMS team are called upon to provide component managers with 'updated information', 'expert advice on possible synergies', and make suggestion for 'adjusting actions 'in response to new developments. The challenge for the programme has been therefore, to coordinate from the back. To confuse matters further, the team's roles are divided between short term experts with technical expertise, and a “full time coordinator" whose difficult task it is to coordinate the supporting services of these experts working in the non-coordinating, synergy creating component of the 'programme'. By way of compensation, perhaps, the CORMS consortium includes FIIAPP, CIVIPOL and SOCA, organisations that are directly or indirectly involved in the execution of other CRP components. Each provides for a fixed number of days the services of experts, law enforcement officers and officials working in EU MS government agencies. The advantage of this deployment lies in creating direct relationships between executing agencies in the EU and beneficiary countries. Advice provided by CORMS is therefore current and up to date. But for the KEs themselves this can lead to conflicts of interest in the allocation of their time. Furthermore, for each expert recruited from service for a MS government agency, a bias towards the interests of their home country is inevitable. Indeed, it was observed by one Liaison Officer that the CRP in West Africa seemed to be subsidizing the operations of British and French security sector activities in their former colonies. The main beneficiaries of the work in the two West African liaison officer platforms, Accra and Dakar, for example, were Britain and France. EU project funds were supporting activities of French and British agencies, which focused mainly on protecting their respective countries. They may choose to share or to pass on information relevant to partner agencies in other EU MS but on a voluntary basis. Secondly, postcolonial ties, migration and intermarriage implicated Britain and France in the criminal trends of West Africa, but for the rest of the EU this was negligible. This argument has been supported with trace analysis on cocaine seizures in Belgium and anecdotal information from Spain, which show a risible proportion having been transited through West Africa.59 On the other hand, the rising volume of seizures over the past decade does suggest that the West Africa is increasingly involved in trafficking. Moreover, whether cocaine passes on to Europe, feeds into local market or is shipped elsewhere, the impact on the criminal economy and the threat to human security in West Africa are profound. Secondly, social and economic developments within the EU mean that colonial ties are not the sole predictor for migration flows. Dutch police forces, for instance, have been working in Cape Verde because the large Cape Verdean community in the Netherlands has been used as a springboard by some drug trafficking organisations. Much is to be said for a European project, but the use of national officers with different priorities is something the programme needs to be aware of. The part time commitment of KEs has the potential of helping coordinate joint activities between MS, beneficiaries and the CRP. Technical expertise from the KEs could also be a direct support to beneficiary agencies. At least they might be able to critically assess project achievements in related areas. But most KEs do not have an overview of the CRP and of the activities undertaken by the different projects so cannot contribute to finding 'synergies' outside their specific area. On country visits they accompany the CORMS TL to meet counterparts though most fall outside their area of expertise. Thirdly, even when on mission, KEs may not be able to leave their duties behind and only give part time attention to the project. Moreover, the KEs did not seem sufficiently aware of the details of other CRP projects or activities by other donors to be able to create synergies. In summary, given the level of salary costs involved, it seems not the most efficient use of resources. Finally, the actual function of the KEs is not defined. They are not working towards specific tasks and there are no tangible outputs. It makes it difficult to evaluate their contribution or distinguish between high or low achievements.

5.2 Management, planning and implementation Each of the programme components has had to contend with a range of organisational challenges in a very complex field. There have been a number of issues that could, arguably, have been foreseen. Rivalries between established programmes such as UNODC-GCCP and SOCA one the

59 Information from Mr Patrick Zanders, Representative of BENELUX police in Senegal.

29 one hand, and incoming CRP projects SEACOP and AIRCOP could, perhaps, have been pre- empted. But both projects have worked well in an environment that can be challenging and have established a presence at sea and airports. It could be argued that SEACOP's achievements have been grafted onto the GCCP as they are using similar facilities and there is in several countries an overlap between the personnel who are trained and employed in the teams that search ships and those that search containers. But this is not in itself problematic, as SEACOP has added capacity to an existing nucleus of professionals dedicated to port security. There is an issue with the capacity of beneficiary countries unable to field teams large enough to carry out both duties. But training exercises and the provision of equipment has been delivered in time and to good effect. In similarly difficult and sometimes conflicted circumstances, AIRCOP has also been able to set up, get training delivered and provide equipment to beneficiaries in good time. It has been able to organise together with the World Customs Organisation (WCO) three COCAIR exercises.60 Yet while there has been swift progress in West Africa there has been little movement beyond assessment missions in Latin America. It is made clear by the refusal of Brazil to participate in the project in its original form that activities developed for West Africa, have to be reformulated for Latin America.61The AIRCOP manager for the LAC operation has therefore spend time preparing the project. The principle of adaptation to beneficiary need is entirely justified, but it also leaves the MTR team with nothing to evaluate. Project identification and project formulation missions for the AML-WA project took two years, meaning activities could only commence after the West African field missions had been completed.62 As a consequence, the AML activities supported by the CRP in Latin America are much further advanced and there has been not yet opportunity for trans-regional cooperation, networking and information exchange.63 GIABA, the ECOWAS institution responsible for AML in West Africa was disappointed for not being selected as implementing agency.

5.3 Information management and deadlines The activity of CORMS, with its website, newsletter and missions has inculcated an awareness of the need for better communication among projects. Yet there are issues about whether reports should first be sent to the Commission Task Manager or to CORMS team. Sometimes projects forget to send information altogether to CORMS. But all projects are reporting in a timely fashion to the Commission.

5.4 Project management According to the Paris Principles of Aid Effectiveness beneficiaries should "take the lead in coordinating aid at all levels."64 The EU is further committed to "channel 50 % of government-to- government assistance through country systems."65 GAFISUD, however, is the only project that is managed by a regional organisation, while UNODC manages 12,524,260 of CRP funds. This leaves regional and national organisations without the financial benefits and the experience of programme management. While there were reasons that the AML-WA was not contracted to GIABA there are questions about ownership and the distribution of benefits. It was reported that organisational arrangements were also responsible for the delay in implementation of the Praia Plan because West African countries wanted it to be managed by ECOWAS. These tensions between beneficiaries and the Commission may have implications for programme sustainability.

60 COCAIR is joint EU-WCO week long operation against the trafficking of illicit drugs at 30 international airports in West and Central Africa. It was first launched in 2008 by the WCO with UNODC support. Since inception AIRCOP participated in 2010 and 2011. 61 CORMS Brazil Field Mission Report December 2011 "Cooperation in Brazil and in the Ibero-american region is one of the biggest challenges that we face, mainly because of the lack of a legal basis on this subject. All agreed that Brazil does not need EU investment in equipment." 62 Expert Mission on Money Laundering in West Africa (IFS/2010/258-966),7th-19th February, 2010. 63 While there is a presumption of rapid disbursement for activities funded under the short term component of the IFS different assumptions govern the long term component. 64 2011 Paris Principles of Aid Effectiveness (2005). 65 European Consensus on Development, paragraph 32.

30 TABLE 5: Implementing Agencies – Cocaine Route Programme and related funding in EUR (AAP 2008 – 2012

Implementing FIIAPP& UNODC Interpol GAFISUD IMFA& agency / Partners66 partners67 Project AIRCOP 2,300,000 2,500,000 3,000,000 AMERIPOL 3,745,000 AML-WA 1,800,000 CORMS 1,000,000 GAFISUD 679,500 1,200,000 PRELAC 2,070,338 3,000,000 SEACOP 2,999,180 WAPIS 2,200,000 3,000,000 total 8,544,180 12,870,338 5,200,000 1,879,500 1,000,000 Source: MTR TOR

GAFISUD, IMFA & 1,879,500 Partners, 1,000,000

UNODC, FIIAPP & 12,870,338 Partners, 8,544,180

INTERPOL, 5,200,000

Please see footnotes 66 and 67 on the partner agencies in the FIIAPP and IMFA led consortia

66 For SEACOP: SOCA (UK), ADETEF (FR), the French Customs Office and the French Maritime Gendarmerie. For AMERIPOL: SOCA (UK), ADETEF (FR), Guardia di Finanza (IT), Policia Judiciaria (ES). For AML WA - Crown Prosecution Service (UK), Adetef (Fr) and Civi.Pol Conseil (Fr). 67 FIIAPP, Civipol (Fr) and SOCA (UK).

31 TABLE 6 – Implementing Agencies Heroin Route Programme and related funding in EUR (AAP 2008-2012)68

FIIAPP & UNODC Interpol ECO/DOCCU BKA ICPMD GIZ Partners

2,700,000 3,681,076 2,135,920 776,021 1,558,588 1,500,000 3,148,393 Source: GIZ

FIIAPP & Partners, GIZ, 3,148,393 2,700,000

ICPMD, 1,500,000 UNODC, 3,681,076

BKA, 1,558,588

ECO/DOCCU, Interpol, 776,021 2,135,920

6. Impact

Rationale and judgement criteria: The security focus of the intervention raises the need for scrutiny for development criteria, and the promotion of key issues that inform all EU interventions. Discrepancies between donors and beneficiaries need to be identified and bridged. Design of the interventions (projects) is consistent with EC policies and development assistance priorities.

6.1 Achievement of project objectives: human security The ultimate objective of the CRP, as well as all activities under the IfS, to improve the security of the people and the governance of beneficiary countries is difficult to assess in the absence of indicators and baseline studies.69 The programme's effect on reducing organised crime groups has already been discussed. The establishment of trans-national networks of LEAs and judiciary authorities does, however, have a preventative value that is difficult to quantify. Raising the likelihood of detection at national points of entry will have a deterrent effect as will closer scrutiny of suspicious transactions in the financial industry. Tighter restrictions on the trade in precursor chemicals are removing the opportunity for crime. For the moment, however, the full measurable impact of CRP activity falls on low level operators, couriers at airports, and the drivers handling import consignments in the ports. In the absence of

68 A substantial part of the two programmes is managed by the same number of organisations. 69 There are no reliable studies on the volume of cocaine flowing through West Africa and there are no indicators for measuring the effectiveness of interventions aimed at dismantling organised crime.

32 investigations the arrest of the drug couriers remains the chief outcome of all activity in West Africa. This is due in part to the culture of policing and the lack of capacity in beneficiary countries. But it also owes to the (i) neglect of investigative skills and capacities of LEAs even though this is part of the AIRCOP work programme and one of the expected results that has not been achieved to date;70 (ii) the fact that information sharing is not informed by a complex investigative mindset, but simply concerns suspect carriers of drugs; (iii) the absence of a judicial/prosecutorial authority component. It also has to be stressed that LEA activity does not necessarily produce greater public safety or help to improve governance in countries where corruption is high. There is always a risk that enhanced capacity, greater police powers and a renewed focus on drugs may result in greater harassment of citizens by predatory law enforcement officers.71 None of the projects show any awareness of this risk, not to speak of any mitigating action. The UK Serious and Organised Crime Agency working in the Caribbean and Ghana, on the other hand, provides salary 'uplifts' for national LEA staff working on joint projects. The US DEA, which works closely with agencies in Ghana, Peru and Colombia, provides salaries, benefits including the option of Green Cards and submits all candidates to background checks and polygraph tests. Part of the rationale for joint teams, according to acting DG of the Ghana Police service was surveillance, because "drug barons can easily corrupt officers." To reduce the likelihood of that, the Narcotic Control Board of Ghana has raised salary levels to approximately US$800 per month for agents with university degrees. Officers recruited into the joint teams at Points of Entry (POEs) controlled by SEACOP and AIRCOP receive no such benefits. Indeed in Senegal and Togo, the salary differentials between customs officers and members of the National and Judicial Police were cause of resentment. It was also reported that customs officers employed on the Senegal JAITF were resentful for missing the opportunity to benefit from revenue collection duties when assigned to work on the joint teams which focus more on drug searches and seizures.

6.2 Impact on development benefits The programme is still to improve the knowledge base on the West African drugs economy and continues to work with untested assumptions. These include, for instance, that drugs money destabilizes domestic economies by lowering the return on assets, increasing the cost of capital, and destroying business value. Enterprises set up to launder criminal earnings compete with bona fide companies in the same field. Yet the creation of business fronts is a response to Anti Money Laundering legislation and enforcement, in their absence earnings from drug trafficking can feed into the economy like any other cash flow. They may have an inflationary effect, but that is no different to any other form of capital influx. In Cape Verde and Trinidad and Tobago senior government officers said that the inflow of drugs money had helped cushion the national economy from the financial crises. In producer countries drug cultivation, be this coca in Peru and Colombia, and cannabis in West Africa, is tied up with rural livelihoods. According to UNODC, most Peruvian farmers work fields of between a quarter of a hectare to two hectares, and harvest crops during the school holidays. In this country neither organised crime nor insurgent groups are known to be involved in the first phase of production. In Latin America organised crime groups take over from the second phase, when coca base is turned into coca paste.72 The production of coca leaf and coca paste remains an activity of the rural poor, with organised crime acts as purchaser and market regulator. In Colombia, precursor controls are depriving peasants of the added value. They are increasingly selling leaf to organised crime groups that find it easier to obtain precursors or even export the

70 The training that has been provided so far is insufficient to meet the need of West African LEAs. Investigation was one of several topics covered in the dedicated INTERPOL training organised in Abidjan on 12 November 2012. on the use of I 24/7. Seizure investigations are also one of the objectives of mentorship training. The Dakar LO platform is also trying to work more closely with the Senegal JAITF in supporting OCTRIS investigations. Communication from AIRCOP TL. 71 Across West Africa, for instance, police and other LEAs, routinely set up road blocks to 'tax' motorists on the pretext of traffic or other violations. 72 Studies have established the following averages for leaf to paste to base to Cocaine: between 170 and 190 kilos of dried leaf is required to produce 1 kilo of coca paste. On average a kilo of paste after purification will yield between 850 and 900 grams of coca base. Finally, given that technically the molecule of Cocaine is slightly heavier than that of base, a kilo of base can yield one kilo of Cocaine. These are averages for the region and may vary from country to country.

33 base itself. One of the unintended consequences of precursor control is to strengthen the hand of organised crime in their dealings with the peasant producers. Reducing the profitability of coca production may impact on coca production as long as alternative income sources are provided. It is therefore worrying that in Peru the government agency responsible, Devida, reported its intention of reallocating EU funds provided for Alternative Development / Demand Reduction to pay for supply side interventions.73 The current preoccupation with project specific objectives has obscured the need for overall assessment of programme impact. At present neither CORMS nor the Commission measure the impact of project activities in terms of tackling trans-national organised crime nor in the contribution that activities make towards governance or human rights. While the MTR provides an overview of project impact at present, it is important to apprise TLs of the need to work towards common, overall objectives. Project TLs and beneficiaries especially in West Africa are working with only poor understanding of the organised crime groups involved, the overall impact their activity is having on the region and the challenge that drug related criminal activity presents to achieving development goals. Hence the difficulty in judging progress against overall objectives of creating trans regional synergies to tackle organised crime groups74 or the purpose of the IfS in securing development goals by countering trans regional threats to security. There is some gathering of information on these issues by CORMS but not as yet much analysis. But all CRP components that were underway in 2013 were making considerable contributions towards enhancing the capacity of national beneficiaries.

6.3 Impact on beneficiary agencies Enhancing capacity of law enforcement officers does invariably entail working with institutions in beneficiary countries. Before transnational law enforcement cooperation can be promoted, the agencies in which the agents are based need to have to be brought to a level where they can support the activities of the agents involved. Given the disparity in capacity and resource availability between the countries involved in the CRP the requirements for institutional support vary considerably. Weak institutional capacity in West Africa explains implementation by international organisations or those from EU MS. Yet, project activity will contribute to the consolidation and development of institutions. It is anticipated that AML-WA will reinforce the capacity of the financial investigators and analysts in the FIUs in the participating member States. The WAPIS project will similarly support police, gendarmerie, customs, immigration and national security services in the pilot countries. But those gains are limited because of the strict focus on project objectives not on the needs of beneficiary organisations. The formation of joint teams at strategic POEs is effective in combating drug flows while at the same time providing training for the individual seconded officers. But the LEAs from which officers are recruited do not benefit much. As a consequence, West African LEAs continue to work with inadequate organisational strategies, Standard Operating Procedures, and training programmes. The potential for achieving positive institutional outcomes is clear from Cape Verde, where the project has prompted regular planning meetings between the different LEAs to which UNODC has on occasion contributed. The CRP provides an opportunity for constructive engagement with beneficiary LEAs over the midterm. The need for supporting institutions is recognised as a good entry point for strengthening regional capacity, but remains neglected by the CRP.75 It is feasible for the CRP to concentrate programme on POEs and investigative competencies but also devote some resource to the development of beneficiary institutions. It is clear that the training by SEACOP has considerably raised capacity of customs and police services in the ports. In Tema, Lome and Dakar there are active teams working from an office

73 According to the EUD the EU provides 32 MEURO in budget support from 2007-13 envelope, which is still in inter-service consultation. Funds are intended to support four strategic strands of the national strategy, one on interdictions, three on demand reduction and alternative development. While DEVIDA can determine how funds are spent towards these results it was not supposed to recommit allocated funds to different results. 74 Cocaine Route Programme 2, Action Fiche which action fiche? 75 IfS, Action Fiche for Fighting Organised Crime - Priority 2 "Counteracting Global and Trans-regional Threats" of the Long- Term Component of the Instrument for Stability p5.

34 furnished and equipped by the project. But the supporting interventions cover only the specific objectives of the project, which overlap with those of beneficiary institutions and officers, but leave some problems unaddressed. There is, first of all, the question of passing on skills and know-how learnt on the project. While project documents and MOUs with beneficiary governments stipulate that trainees stay in post for a number of years, this fails to address the capacity gap in the longer term. Without an active on the job training programmes and training of trainers, projects depend on continuing support. Training and follow up with mentoring is a useful device over the project cycle but does not address capacity gaps arising from the inevitable departure of staff trained in the first phase of the project. SEACOP and AIRCOP provide high quality training for beneficiary country officers that are tailored to the requirement of the project. Some, but by no means all, of these skills will be transferrable and upgrade activities across the agency. Training takes no account of the needs of beneficiary agencies and is driven entirely by the project. Beneficiaries merely allocate staff to training as offered. Dependence on training by development partners may encourage lassitude among recipients. The Ghana Economic and Organised Crime Office for instance has no training curriculum, no training plan and no training needs analysis. In many African agencies donors provide most if not all of the basic training of project teams. The opportunity for a closer engagement with the developmental needs of the national agencies that support the project teams has not been taken so far. The programme risks, therefore, to raise skills and professional capacity of dedicated units at the expense of the wider organisation. Where this is tied to higher rewards and little control over personnel selection, it can lead to the deployment of unsuitable staff. It was reported that the police in Senegal, for instance, contributed senior officers who were unsuitable for the physically demanding work involved in SEACOP activities, to collect the benefits from training such as the Daily Subsistence Allowance (DSAs).

6.4 From network to institution building - AMERIPOL Important though it is that project beneficiaries are anchored in well performing organisations, the building of institution is not foreseen in the CRP. The objective of AMERIPOL pertains to strengthening regional and trans-regional information exchange and to improve capacity of LEAs and prosecutors to carry out complex investigations. All is carried out with a view to assist partner countries in tackling transnational organised crime networks. These objectives have been pursued with a number of training events, including two on criminal investigations and three on financial investigations.76 But much of the focus of the project has shifted from network creation to building up AMERIPOL. There is much benefit in creating a platform, particularly one that is generously supported by the Colombian National Police-CNP. From the onset the CNP has covered the operating costs (staff, public utilities and incidental expenses) and a dedicated building. The project has helped with furniture and equipment. National Units have been set up in Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia, Panama, and Peru (with project funding) as well as Mexico and the Dominican Republic (outside the project). There is every reason to believe that the institution would not be where it is today without the project. The executing agency or rather the TL, are working towards shaping AMERIPOL into an American equivalent of Europol, which also began as an information sharing network on drug trafficking.77 This may be a providential side effect of the AMERIPOL project and worth supporting in its own right. The drift from capacity enhancement to institution building carries the risk of participating in political processes well beyond mandate, such as the TL's attendance of the International Conference of Foreign Ministers and Heads of National Specialized Agencies to fight the World Drug Problem in Lima.78 But more critically is the actual status of AMERIPOL, which does not have a legal

76 1st Course on Criminal Intelligence Analysis – Ecuador (21 - 25 November 2011). 1st Inter-institutional Seminar for Police and Public Prosecutors (no dates given) Meeting of the Heads of UNA, Medellín (4-5 June 2012) Meeting of the Heads of UNA, Panamá (22 - 26 October 2012) Training for public prosecutors , Madrid (12-16 November 2012) Training for public prosecutors, Bogota (26-30 November, 2012) 2nd Course on Criminal Intelligence Analysis - Bolivia (03 - 14 December 2012). 77 Communication from the AMERIPOL TL 78 "The primary idea conveyed during the conference was to renew the participating countries’ firm commitment and support in international fight against drugs, and achieve the results established in the Political Declaration and Plan of action of the 2009 United Nations on international cooperation and shared responsibility to face the world drug problem." FIIAPP, 2012

35 personality, meaning that the agents in the national units do not have the authority to pass classified information. Officials from the Ministry of National Security (MNS) in Argentina expressed their concern at the lack of political control of the agency. At the moment, they said, it was a 'club for police chiefs'. Concern over the lack of status, was echoed by an officer from the MNS in Trinidad and Tobago. Argentina, Uruguay and Venezuela have therefore decided not to participate. These governments, furthermore, object to the participation of US agencies in a Latin American organisation. As it stands, AMERIPOL is a regional institution with limited membership and competencies that are inadequate for the purpose of the CRP. It seems that to date the key tasks remain incomplete. There are no training manuals of standardized course programmes, no complex investigations have been carried out as a consequence of project intervention and after 18 months of work the information system is still to be presented in its pilot version.

6.5 Shifting the focus from organised crime - the challenge of PRELAC The fight against organised crime includes preventative actions that create a hostile environment for criminal organisations. CRP projects on both AML and precursor control have a preventative as well as a repressive function. With all preventative measures evaluating results is difficult, particularly in the absence of baseline studies allowing for comparison between the status post and ante project commencement. Assessments can be made on the efficiency of project deliverables and attainment of results, but this is often insufficient with measuring the achievement of objectives. In the case of PRELAC the problem is exacerbated by weakly formulated OOs, OVIs and assumptions.79 The project does provide an opportunity for applying European expertise in a region dominated by the US, has certainly delivered a range of outcomes, and was recognised by some, but not all, beneficiary countries in the region. The project approach of involving private sector operators in a constructive dialogue has certainly had resonance. In Peru relations between the chemical industry and drug control officials had been strained because, reportedly, the former were accusing the latter of treating them 'like criminals'. In Colombia control measures cause extra costs and long delays to chemical industry operators. Some of the controls are now regarded as unnecessary and the Ministry of Justice is working with industry representatives to reduce the number of controlled chemicals from 40 to 13. In Argentina precursor control inspired a new vision, to shift from going after street sales and micro trafficking to attack production, and not "concentrate solely on the people you can sacrifice."80 It was considered pertinent for Argentina, a country with a large precursor industry and an importer of coca leafs. Yet, the experience of Colombia, the country with the know-how and most comprehensive system of precursor control was that while they scored the largest precursor seizure rates in the region it was not having any impact on cocaine production.81 The reasons for this according to experts interviewed were: (i) innovations by clandestine chemists; perversely, the controls imposed had at times prompted innovations leading to greater production efficiencies, (ii) the difficulties in controlling substances with multiple purpose, as for instance gasoline or cement. According to UNODC, there was no suggestion of transnational organised crime involvement in precursor importation at this point. There were no instances of mislabelling, for example. European successes in controlling precursors used in producing synthetic drugs may be hard to replicate in Latin America where the process of cocaine from coca leafs is fundamentally different.82 There are suggestions that in Colombia, as coca farmers find it harder to access precursor chemicals,

AMERIPOL, 6 Months Progress Report. Confirming a political commitment seems to stray well beyond the competence of a project consultant and a long way from the fight against organised crime. 79 Specific Objectives are 'strengthening controls' and 'enhancing cooperation'. The Independent Evaluation report noted "OVIs are not quantified and hence, do not allow objective measurement of the project’s achievements." UNODC, 2012. Final Evaluation, Prevención del Desvío de los Precursores Químicos en AméricaLatina y el Caribe, PRELAC. Ramón Tejeiro Vidal, Senior evaluator and Gabriela Vallejo. 80 Interviews 19/03/2013 Buenos Aires SEDRONAR. 81 Colombia accounted for over 80 % of the potassium permanganate seized worldwide (about 26.5 tonnes) (INCB, 2012 INCB Precursors and chemicals frequently used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances: 2011, International Narcotics Control Board United Nations, New York, available online at: http://www.incb.org/documents/PRECURSORS/TECHNICAL_REPORTS/2011/PARTITION/ENGLISH/PreRep2011_E.pdf. 82 The complexity of cocaine precursor control is discussed in EMCDDA/Europol (2013) EU Drugs Markets - a Strategic Analysis. Lisbon, European Monitoring Centre on Drugs and Drug Addiction.

36 organised crime groups that buy up the coca or coca paste are raising the profit margins on the trade in chemicals. Greater attention to precursor control has increased the number of seizures resulting in large quantities of dangerous chemicals being stored in precarious conditions. In Guatemala 300 tons phenyl acetic acid are being kept in unsuitable conditions. In Paraguay barrels of sulphuric acid in chemicals are being kept in an open courtyard in 40 degrees heat with 400 people working in the immediate vicinity. We have similar reports even from Colombia. The risks posed by the manufacture of cocaine need to be weighed against those arising from the explosion or leakage of volatile and poisonous chemicals.

7. Sustainability

Rationale and judgement criteria: Does the programme address beneficiary country’s needs and priorities? Will these continue to be addressed after termination of support?

Beneficiary country’s needs and priorities are met and promoted

7.1 Ownership Given the complexity of CRP there are considerable variations in the response of beneficiaries to the different components. With regard to SEACOP, for example, the Directeur Général des Douanes in Senegal said that the customs service had both been consulted and benefited from the training events but activities were unlikely to continue without EU support. There was no perceived local benefit as the cocaine was going to Europe.83 A different sense of detachment was apparent in Togo where the head of one of the agencies had received no information on the projects and had no idea where they were going.84 In Ghana on the other hand, SEACOP was considered a "good project." The NACOB officer in charge said: "Maybe the project has come from Europe but we benefit, it is good for us." It was in response to a Ghanaian request that activities were extended from Tema to Takoradi. In Cape Verde SEACOP and AIRCOP are well established operationally and institutionally. Joint teams had been trained and were active in Praia and Mindelo air- and seaports. The two projects have given impetus to a formal process of inter-agency working with regular meetings at director level. Concerns about operational effectiveness were voiced, however, by LOs at the Accra platform. According to one SOCA officer "Westbridge has been here for seven years and we still need to hold hands at every operation." In the view of a US officer Ghana was 10-15 years away from where they had to be. One of the obstacles to optimizing capacity enhancement was the Ghanaian LEA's lack of functional independence from the government of the day. It meant that with each change of government a number of agency staff were being replaced by new appointments, who often did not have the required experience or technical competence. While the joint teams at West African Points of Entry are likely to continue in some form after the end of the programme the quality of their performance depends on continuing project support. In Latin America the channeling of support through regional institutions like GAFISUD and AMERIPOL has been important in securing national and regional buy in. Precursor control by contrast was first managed by a regional organisation and then by UNODC. As SEACOP and AIRCOP are rolled out in LAC, countries like Colombia and Brazil with their own technical assistance programmes are likely to become involved as partnership of CRP.

7.2 Policy Support There is vocal support at the highest policy level for actions against organised crime and links with trafficking. The African Union has just completed a Plan of Action on Drug Control, 2013–17 (AU Plan) with the aim to "reverse the current trends of drug abuse and trafficking, organised crime,

83 Interview Senegal, 11/02/2013. 84 Director General of OCTRIDB (Office Central de Répression du Trafic Illicite de la Drogue et du Blanchiment). see 3.3.2.

37 corruption, terrorism and related challenges to socio-economic development and human security."85 At regional level the Kofi Annan Initiative to Tackle Drug Trafficking was launched in February 2013 and the ECOWAS Regional Action Plan to Address the Growing Problem of Illicit Drug Trafficking, Organised Crime and Drug Abuse in West Africa, was approved in 2008 with approximately €18 million of EU commitment in support. Following the declaration, ECOWAS member states delayed ratification, however, so that by the end of 2012 activities had yet to start. The objections of West African states to the suggestion that the programme be managed by UNODC rather than ECOWAS, and the display of mistrust during discussion of project location, let some EU staff doubt the region's commitment to the substantive objective of drug and crime control. While the flurry of activity is indicative of concern these efforts "often lack practical plans for implementation that can be monitored, that prioritize a clear set of actions, and are driven more by the availability of funds than by a pragmatic prioritization according to need."86 At national level responses are even more varied and characterised by resource shortage and very different perceptions of the threat level and the opportunities available to government agencies. In both Togo and Senegal senior law enforcement officers pointed to the prominence of 'English speaking' West Africans involved in trafficking. The team was not aware of any strategic documents, studies or measures taken in response to drug trafficking organised crime. This was in contrast to Ghana where there was concern that trafficking networks had developed "from small structures into sophisticated and globalized international business networks, which are well integrated into the international cocaine trade."87 The Ghanaian government in conjunction with UNODC has developed a plan with several components aimed at strengthening the legal framework and law enforcement. "The main goal within this pillar is to increase the investigative capacity of law enforcement agencies...[with] specific emphasis on making law enforcement agencies respond more proactively to organised crime by moving to an intelligence-led approach of investigating and by promoting closer operational and strategic coordination among law enforcement agencies."88 Several informants expressed concern over the power of organised crime group and the relative lack of preparation by Ghanaian agencies. The CRP was welcomed at providing resource and enhancing capacity. Drugs, their link with crime, and in Peru and Colombia with insurgents and organised crime groups (Sendero Luminoso and Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia FARC, Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, AUC) are high on the policy agenda. In Peru particularly, the increase in coca cultivation has prompted a shift towards a more repressive supply side interventions. But in other countries the policy debate has moved in a different direction. There have been challenges to current drug policy approaches by current and former heads of states from, inter alia, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala and Mexico. At the 2012 OAS summit at Cartagena it was agreed that the Inter American Drug Abuse Commission should conduct an evaluation of drug policies with a view to offer a set of alternative policy scenarios. So far the CRP has not used this opportunity to provide EU scientific expertise or policy experience. This is regrettable, as the experience of countries like Portugal has been of particular interest to Latin American counterparts both in terms of public health and in the management of criminal justice resources.

7.3 Institutional capacity There are strong variations in the capacity of institutions in different countries. In Peru, DEVIDA is not only taking ownership of and aligning itself with CRP projects like PRELAC and AMERIPOL, but also challenging the use of international and EU-MS based agencies for managing projects. According to one senior staff member "international organisations work to their own objectives" which are not identical with those of the beneficiary nation. In the past USAID Alternative Development projects had been implemented by UNODC with minimal coordination with DEVIDA, creating competition between Alternative Development (AD) and social development programmes of the government. The director of DEVIDA therefore suggested that in future all AD, but also

85 AU Plan of Action on Drug Control and Crime Prevention 2008–13, Addis Ababa: AU, 2007. 86 Shaw, Mark and Reitano, Tuesday. 2013. The evolution of Organised Crime in Africa. Institute of Security Studies, Paper 244. 87 Government of Ghana (GOG) and UNODC, 2012, National Integrated Programme To Fight Transnational Organized Crime and to Strengthen the Criminal Justice System2012-2016, p.16. 88 GOG and UNODC, 2012, National Integrated Programme To Fight Transnational Organized Crime and to Strengthen the Criminal Justice System 2012-2016, p.104.

38 PRELAC, AMERIPOL and GAFISUD should be coordinated by them. It is not clear that this is in itself desirable, given that DEVIDA is has already used EU funds for law enforcement activities that were earmarked (and agreed) for Demand Reduction (DR) and AD activities. Nor is it clear that the agency has a higher managerial capacity or access to expertise than the international organisations or EU MS agencies. But it does suggest that there is organisational ambition and a suspicion of international agencies "who always have their own agenda."89 The Peruvian FIU, by contrast, was content with GAFISUD training and networking. They appreciated the fact that GAFISUD was receptive to suggestions, conducted training, needs analysis, and that it had a rotating presidency. It was also supported that the rivalries that had affected GAFISUD in 2008 had been settled, and that the EU project had helped it move forward. Contributions from member states will keep the organisation running after the EU project has completed, but it is unlikely that either the regional training programme or the information exchange will continue. It is probable that the strong network of FIUs in Latin America will increasingly work with each other. By contrast no country pays membership contributions to AMERIPOL at best they support the local NAU and assign permanent observers in Bogota. Apparently even the participation of Mexico and Brazil is contingent on the EU project. Given that the organisation does not as yet have a legal personality there is a risk of financial and political support dissipating once EU funding comes to an end.

7.4 Local perceptions The lively drug policy debate in Latin America is indicative of a plurality of opinions on the issue. There is recognition that the rise of organised crime is in part a consequence of drug control measures introduced with a public health objective. There is broad support for alternative approaches among policy makers, civil society organisations and the media. In addition, the anomalous classification of coca leaf and coca leaf products that are widely consumed and culturally embedded, but treated as schedule 1 substances by the international drug control conventions, causes dismay.90 The CRP does not take cognizance of this complex and conflicted policy field, but falls in with those sections that support the legal status quo. The very difficulty in contemplating an alternative approach signals some of the dilemmas for development policy becoming involved in drug control supply side interventions. But it could be argued that project TLs opposition to policy alternatives is contrary to the overall objective of the CRP, as drug related organised crime is a consequence of drug prohibition in the context of strong demand.91 A second public concern relevant to the programme is corruption and abuse of office. It is remarkable given the importance of the issue in the public eye how little it figures as a risk factor in the CRP. Coinciding with the team visit to Argentina the police chief of Santa Fe province was charged with drug trafficking.92 In Peru, Vladimioro Montesinos the head the security services during the 1990s was involved in trafficking drugs and guns. Independent experts speculate that one of the reasons for Peru's low seizure rate is the involvement of the navy in cocaine trafficking. In Colombia retired police General Mauricio Santoyo, former chief of staff at the presidential palace during the Uribe Administration is on trial for aiding the AUC terrorist organisation. He accepted this charge under the condition that money laundering and drug trafficking charges be dropped. In Colombia his assets have been seized and he is being accused of illegal enrichment. In the Caribbean corruption is also perceived at street level. According to one report, many young Trinidadians "believe that between 30 and 40% of the members of the Police Service are corrupt."93 Of the countries visited six are ranked as highly corrupt in the TPI corruption indicator.94

89 DEVIDA officer interviewed 15/03/2013. 90 In 2011 the government of Bolivia repudiated the 1961 Single Convention on Drugs, to re-accede this year with a reservation on the status of the coca leaf. 91 Hence the call by high-level groups, such as the Global Commission on Drug Policy, emphasize for an approach in which drug use is treated as a public health issue and consumption reduced through evidence-based prevention campaigns. OAS, 2013. The Drug Problem in the Americas, p13. 92 Argentina Independent, 22 March 2013 http://www.argentinaindependent.com/ currentaffairs/newsfromargentina/ former- santa-fe-police-chief-prosecuted-for-drug-trafficking/-http://www.argentinaindependent.com/currentaffairs/ newsfromargentina/former-santa-fe-police-chief-prosecuted-for-dr. 93 Ryan, Selwyn, 2012. No time to Quit: Engaging Youth at Risk, Executive Report of the Committee on Young Males and Crime in Trinidad and Tobago. http://www.ttparliament.org/documents/2197.pdf.

39 These high levels of public distrust are matched, however by concern over unregulated drug use and distribution. In many Caribbean countries gang culture is believed to revolve around drugs, while in Latin America the involvement of the insurgents with cocaine is widely known. In West Africa there is some concern about drug use and attendant crime, but to what extent this is a response to experience or government 'awareness' campaigns is not clear, as prevalence levels remain low. In a situation of low levels of public health, with basic problems like access to clean water, malaria or maternal health,95 illicit drugs are a minor issue. While drug related crime has risen on the policy agenda it has once again to be put into context in countries affected by Islamic terrorists (Mali, Niger, Nigeria), civil war (Ivory Coast), post war recovery (Liberia, Sierra Leone) and secessionist movements (Nigeria, Senegal). In Cape Verde, though, a country with much lower levels of corruption than on the continent, drug consumption (and unemployment) are seen as the main drivers of crime, and drug trafficking as the biggest threat to security.96 Hence there is general support for action to eliminating illicit drug markets in LAC and parts of West Africa, though sections of the public have different ideas about how this should be done. Support for the rule of law is tempered everywhere by distrust of law enforcement agencies and the courts.

8 Coherence

8.1 Project Overlaps and Complementarity

Rationale and judgement criteria: Are the project activities coherent with the objectives of EU development policies, and do they support, reinforce or duplicate the activities of other programmes? Is there consultation and coordination with other programmes? Does the programme contribute to the promotion of EU values?

The EU Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) has identified drugs as one of the areas for EU support for 2007-2013. Several EU National Strategy Papers, National Indicative Programmes (NIP), Regional Strategy Papers and Indicative Programmes (RIP) for Latin America identify drugs as a focal sector. Drugs are also mentioned in the European Commission proposal for the new DCI 2014-20. Extending regional coverage to Caribbean countries, currently covered by the EDF is also proposed. There is furthermore, an EU-CELAC Coordination and Cooperation Mechanism on drugs, with regular high level and technical level meetings. Drug control, then, has become a regular, cross cutting issue in development assistance. The field is divided into supply and demand reduction sectors. While the EU is committed to pursuing a balanced approach the CRP is entirely supply side focused and therefore needs to be seen alongside other activities. These can be complementary, particularly where they support demand reduction and knowledge base activities. But there are also risks that comprehensive programmes duplicate activities or at the least, provide unrealised opportunities for cooperation. There are comprehensive, multi component programmes in Latin America that are particularly relevant.

8.1.1 COPOLAD According to the EU Drug Strategy and its Action Plans (2005-2008 and 2009-2012), the twofold approach of dealing simultaneously with Drug Demand Reduction (DDR (prevention, treatment and rehabilitation) and Supply Reduction (law enforcement and alternative development) was also to be reflected in EU development activities. In line with this strategy, the Commission has funded two regional programmes in support of the EU-LAC (now CELAC) drug mechanism: "Cooperation Programme between Latín America and the European Union on Anti-drugs policies" (COPOLAD)

94 Out of a list of 174 countries and a total score of 80: Trinidad (rank 80, score 39), Peru (83/38), Colombia (94/36), Senegal 94/36) Argentina 102/ 35), Togo (128/30), Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index 2012. 95 In Nigeria, the UN’s World Health Organisation says one in every 13 women die during childbirth, making it the country with the second highest rate of maternal mortality in the world. 96 UNODC, 2006, Study on Crime and Corruption in Cape Verde. UNODC: Praia, Cape Verde.

40 and "Programa Antidrogas Ilícitas en la Comunidad Andina de Naciones” (PRADICAN). PRADICAN was DCI funded (40M €, 10/2009 to 02/2013) and executed by the Andean Community (CAN). COPOLAD is DCI funded with budget of 6M € and implemented by a consortium of EU and Latin American MS, led by FIIAPP. Activities began on 04/12/2010 and are foreseen to last until 04/06/2014 (42 months). Its objectives are to: . contribute to improving the coherence, balance and impact of anti-drugs policies in Latin America, . strengthen capacities and encourage the process of elaborating anti-drugs policies in its different stages in Latin American countries by improving the dialogue and reinforcing the cooperation of the national agencies and other actors responsible for global and anti-drugs policies in LA and the EU COPOLAD has been strategically divided into four components: 1. Consolidation of the EU-CELAC Anti-Drugs Coordination and Cooperation Mechanism; 2. Consolidation of the national Observatories of Latin American countries; 3. Capacity-building in the reduction of demand;

4. Capacity-building in the reduction of supply. Setting up of a framework of dialogue, exchange and capacity building between the agencies responsible for drug policy-making in LAC and EU countries has helped identify regional needs. The attempts to support a network of Drug Observatories has been met with the reality of variable capacity both financially and technically among beneficiaries which has limited the dissemination of information, coordination and cooperation efforts. It must be recognized that COPOLAD has maintained constant contact with the relevant national authorities and that the project has been a forum for the discussions in the fields of DDR and SSR. With regard to objectives 2 and 3 the COPOLAD programme has been complementary of the CRP and helped pursue the EU policy objective of balancing supply and demand reduction interventions. Moreover, by improving the information base on the volume of domestic drug markets, and through the enhancing of transferrable technical skills, COPOLAD is directly supportive of CRP activities. Gathering information on price and purity of cocaine at retail level is valuable for the strategic assessment of trafficking flows and organised crime activity, without compromising either researchers or the integrity of DR practitioners. Activities under component 4 on the other hand, run the risk of duplicating those of the CRP. COPOLAD organised a conference in the Dominican Republic on port security, which was valuable for participants from across the LAC region. Yet, with the advent of SEACOP and a more targeted approach to raising capacity of frontline services it is difficult to see how duplication is to be avoided. While COPOLAD may be addressing a different audience and raise awareness at a higher administrative level, it could equally be argued that the bottom up approach of SEACOP, starting with training of law enforcement officers and feeding the information through the CRP steering committees and the CORMS website and news letters has the same effect. With regard to precursor control, it is difficult to justify activities run by COPOLAD when the EU is already funding a dedicated precursor control programme, PRELAC, with a good record of achievement across Latin America and the Caribbean. Valuable as COPOLAD organised workshops on precursor controls may have been, the fact that PRELAC experts played a prominent role in these underlines the risk of duplication. Given the level of cooperation between the two programmes on the issue, it would appear attractive to fold COPOLAD's precursor control activities into PRELAC. Informants across the regions also reported misgivings with the high level activities under objective 1. One informant said that there was no vision only declarations about the problem, and that an opportunity was missed to provide a counterweight to US influence. There was neither continuity nor impact, though at least with the inception of COLOPAD the outcomes were put on the website. Since both PRADICAN and COPOLAD are due to be evaluated, the contribution of objectives 1 and 4 may be assessed in the context of the CRP, to avoid the potential of duplication and maximize synergies and complementarities in future programming.

41 8.1.2 Projects in West Africa The objectives of the CRP components in West Africa are reinforcing activities planned under the EU support to ECOWAS Regional Action Plan to address the Growing Problem of Illicit Drug Trafficking, Organized Crimes and Drug Abuse in West Africa, which aims to enhance capacity to monitor, coordinate and harmonize drug policies and approaches. It also links with a number of national programmes, including the €3M Multi-donor budget support to the Ghana Police Service – Enhance the capacity of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) in the application of science to crime prevention and detection, the € 36M Support to fight drugs and organised crime in Nigeria and budget support from NIPs for Benin and Cape Verde for the Security and Stability pillar of the Special Partnership Action Plan. Neither at programme nor at project level has there been much communication between project managers or beneficiaries so far. This should be considered for the next phase.

8.2 Supporting development and EU values The CRP is designed to support general EU development cooperation goals, including the promotion of good governance and the rule of law. It is based on the premise that security is a precondition for development, and therefore supports a number of activities that strengthen the operational capacity of law enforcement, and the investigative and prosecutorial capacity of the state authorities. In previous sections we have discussed the tensions between the repressive actions that are supported by the programme, the untested assumptions that these may contribute towards strengthening the rule of law rather than the interest of the office holders, and the lack of oversight by democratic authorities or civil society. For project countries the importance of paying close attention to human rights and democracy is highlighted in strategy papers. With regard to Colombia, "there are continued violations of the right to life, integrity, personal freedom and safety, and privacy, the fundamental freedoms of movement, residence, opinion and expression and the fundamental rights of labour, association and collective bargaining".97 There is little attention in the activities of the CRP to the effect activities may have on these cross cutting issues. Without such a perspective there is the risk of programme resources being used to address symptoms, as for example in Peru, where DEVIDA is intensifying its coca eradication and using EU funds allocated for alternative development to fund supply side interventions. Yet the Country Strategy Paper states that "all conflict situations seem to share three common structural roots: exclusion, poverty and inequality affecting a large part of the population; institutional weakness and consequent lack of instruments to cope with any crisis."98 Pushing farmers further into poverty may backfire on both drug production and security. Because of the fragmented approach of the CRP and the limited supervision by the Commission Task Manager on micro-level implementation, full consideration of cross cutting issues might be jeopardised. In this regard, CORMS would be better placed to monitor the impact of CRP activities on human rights, looking for instance at incarceration rates and patterns in beneficiary states, the adherence to due process in prosecution cases, and the rate at which arrests are followed up and lead to prosecutions of quality targets. Complementarity with other initiatives the EU is funding in the sector of security and justice reform, on human rights, etc, might also limit these risks, but opportunities for synergies and exchange of information should be actively exploited. The programme also affords an opportunity to comment on the proportionality of penalties for drug offences, on judicial processes, and on corruption. It could furthermore monitor the impact of activities under the CRP or related projects on vulnerable groups such as women, ethnic minorities, migrants, or the rural or urban poor. This is relevant given the high proportion of females and foreign nationals convicted for trafficking in many of the beneficiary countries. It is emphasized in the Action Fiche III for the CRP that "care will be taken towards law enforcement agencies' respect of human rights."99 At CRP project level this is yet to be realised. It is of particular pertinence for AIRCOP where operations impact directly on the public. When turning to cross cutting issues one ROM report glosses over the issue with the claim that supporting law

97 Colombia, Country Strategy Paper, p 11. 98 Peru, Country Strategy Paper, p 17. 99 Action Fiche 3 for Fighting Organised Crime - Priority 2 "Counteracting Global and Trans-regional Threats" of the Long- Term Component of the Instrument for Stability, AAP, 2012.

42 enforcement activities against drug trafficking and organised crime will improve the lives of citizens.100 This is particularly concerning in the light of the large number of females involved in micro trafficking. The investigative shortcomings already noted reduce both project effectiveness in the fight against organised crime and raise human rights and gender issues. The focus on seizures sidesteps the issue of coercion and overlap with human trafficking, while the social needs of dependents remain unaddressed. With UNODC not showing much interest in these issues, there is an opportunity for expanding the brief of the monitoring project.

9. EC value added - What is the added value of IfS support for the CRP?

Rationale IfS funding is designed to add value to activities that meet specific criteria. Does the CRP meet those criteria and is there added value in continued support from the IfS? Is the IfS the only source of funding available for supporting projects? Does each CRP component meet the criteria for IfS supported interventions?

The CRP is based on a tangible need of confronting transnational organised crime. Individual MS have already developed international programmes often, but not exclusively, in former colonies. There are two platforms of Liaison Officers in Accra and Dakar to counter various threats including drug trafficking arising from West Africa. An additional platform was set up in 2013 in Bogota. In Togo and Senegal, French customs and police officers are embedded in national institutions. SOCA has long experience in running air and seaport interdiction projects with national partner agencies in Ghana and the Caribbean. Since 2012, these activities are being extended to other West African countries. The MTR team arrived in Lome just after the SOCA Air bridge team had completed an operation. There were no seizures but the opportunity to work together was appreciated by the Togolese authorities. SOCA has also stationed LOs in South America. For instance, the LO in Lima is one of the KEs for CORMS creating a link between the operations of MS and the CRP. In Cape Verde Portuguese LEAs are providing training at every level of law enforcement. Other MS countries including Benelux (joint command), Germany and Spain maintain networks of LOs and different police forces run operations. In 2011 the Dutch police worked with Cape Verde police in a joint operation against Cape Verdean networks based in the Netherlands. While informal cooperation between LOs is good, and such ties extended to other states like the US or South Africa, officers are duty bound only to protecting the interests of their own country. Only the European Commission has the vision and mandate to design a mechanism for protecting the needs of the entire EU. But in the absence of executing agencies to call upon, it has to rely on MS for implementation. Creating linkages between LEAs has practical advantages but also problems relating to national bias and the marginalisation of the EU. The experience from the Ghana EUD has already been mentioned, where SEACOP KEs prioritized reporting to the UK High Commission. Yet, the ambitious vision, breadth of activities, linkages with other EU projects, and scale of operations of the CRP is providing the activities of MS with a potential multiplier effect. It has the potential to vastly enhance the projection of security efforts by EU MS and particularly, in supporting bilateral efforts at capacity building in beneficiary states.

9.1 The appropriateness of IfS funding for the CRP against guiding principles101 The CRP addresses an issue that is of importance to the EU and partners. There is a growing concern over the threat posed to state stability and human security by organised crime and drug trafficking is one of the main sources of revenue for organized crime groups. State actors in West Africa and LAC have realised the need for international cooperation and technical assistance. On the assumption that security is a precondition for development, the EU as the largest global donor is providing a growing proportion of its cooperation budget to projects designed to enhance

100 ROM report, AIRCOP, 19/03/2011. 101 Instrument for Stability Thematic Strategy Paper 2012-2013, p.5-7.

43 security. Some of these funds come from the IfS, specially created to facilitate rapid disbursal and not bound by DAC criteria, and containing three elements. First, it ensures rapid and flexible first responses to situations of political crisis or natural disasters, including to initiatives that pre-empt them, in line with Article 3. Second, its crisis preparedness component Article 4(3) to strengthen the pre- and post-crisis capacity of state and non-state actors, international, regional and sub-regional organisations by promoting the development of conflict prevention, peace-building and early recovery capacities. And third, it addresses global and trans- regional threats, while also supporting actions relating to the non-proliferation of CBRNs, consistent with Articles 4(1) and 4(2). The EC Regulation 1717/2006 creating the Instrument states indeed that it is applicable “in the context of stable conditions for the implementation of Community cooperation policies in third countries, to help build capacity both to address specific global and trans-regional threats having a destabilizing effect and to ensure preparedness to address pre- and post-crisis situations.”102 The CRP with its diverse, interconnected elements and trans-regional scope meets these preconditions. It is designed to counter an identified threat of organised crime in WA and LAC by tackling the cross-regional flow of illicit commodities. The programme is ineligible for other EU funding envelopes restricted to either national or regional programmes and therefore unable to support activities that span multiple regions. The IfS provides added value because it is not restricted to the geographical coverage of other funding provisions. In addition, IfS programme can include emerging countries (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Peru) that are ineligible for funding from development instruments. Activities funded under the programme are complementary to activities that have been supported as part of development cooperation. In West Africa the CRP activities complement the capacity building measures planned under the ECOWAS drug action plan (Praia Plan) at regional level and support given to key institutions at national level (Fighting drugs and organised crime in Nigeria, CRIS NG/FED 022-152). In Latin America the regional and trans-regional projects of the CRP complement support for drug control activities funded from different envelopes (COPOLAD, PRADICAN). Particularly the support for national observatories has helped develop scientific tools for assessing underlying issues and promote evidence based policy making.103 In Cape Verde the responses by CRP trained joined teams were assisted by information on drug importation trends from EU funded epidemiological studies (ESPAD).104 The cooperation between CRP projects and the liaison officer platforms in Accra, Dakar and Bogota have achieved complementarity with the activities of MS. As the CRP projects are coming on stream there is an increasing need to promote coherence with other EU funded interventions and avoid duplication. Some of activities foreseen under the Praia Plan come (joint teams, air and seaport controls, FIUs) approximate what is being achieved under the CRP. There are direct overlaps in Latin America, where COPOLAD has run a seminar on Precursor control in 2012 with another seminar planned in 2013.105 While this did help to create links between for instance the Argentinean SEDRONAR agency and PRELAC106 better coordination is needed to avoid the duplication of EU funded activities. With SEACOP and AIRCOP becoming operational in Latin America there is a strong argument for winding down all of COPOLAD funded strand 4 (SR). The CRP is strategically located at the intersection of the internal and external dimensions of EU security. By recruiting KEs from MS services projects (AIRCOP, AMERIPOL, AML-WA, SEACOP, PRELAC) have created an organic linkage between the CRP and LEAs in the EU. Through CORMS the programme is now participating in meetings of the FONTANOT group. The CORMS website and news letter are making information available to stakeholders from the internal security domain. There are ample opportunities for closer integration into internal security mechanisms, particularly on information, analysis and networking, and for coordination with other international

102 Regulation (Ec) No 1717/2006 Of The European Parliament And Of The Council of 15 November 2006 establishing an Instrument for Stability. 103 Informants in Argentina and Colombia discussed the importance of being able to understand drug distribution and consumption trends on the basis of good data and analysis which had been supported by COPOLAD training. 104 Including the use of oxycontin, a synthetic opioid imported by Cape Verdean migrants to the US. 105 It appears that PRELAC was invited but not involved in the planning. 106 Argentina is concerned about its precursor industry and interested in developing administrative controls.

44 agencies and partners. These connections and the formation of a community of LEAs across EU, WA and LAC was part of the original rationale leading to the creation of the CRP.107 In essence the CRP consists of a series of capacity building measures that will enable beneficiaries to better combat transnational organised crime. Key institutions at national and international level have been identified and mechanisms to build up capacity elaborated (joint teams, communication tools, joint trainings). Beneficiaries have received comprehensive support in terms of training and equipment and are getting continuous mentoring. As a result they are in much better position to respond to organised crime threats. The programme contains instances of projects that were developed so as to maximize areas of European expertise (PRELAC) and others which respond to requests by beneficiaries (WAPIS). The combination not only ensures that resources are well targeted but holds out a promise of sustainability through the buy-in of beneficiaries. The most persuasive argument for supporting the CRP out of the IfS is, however, the trans-regional perspective of the programme. Yet, not all components pursue trans-regional cooperation with the same rigour as they pursue regional goals. In the case of GAFISUD-EU project this reluctance may stem from the regional remit of the implementing organisation. The TL of GAFISUD explained that he wanted to strengthen regional structures before embarking on trans-regional activity. Secondly, in many of the project documents trans-regional components are not as clearly phrased as other results.108 Furthermore, there are some projects such as WAPIS and AML-WA with no trans- regional component at all. Finally, there are programmes like PRELAC that do work across different regions, but are not directly tackling either illicit trafficking or organised crime.

9.1.1 Project Review (i) AIRCOP - building up JAITFs at national level in West Africa; now expanding to LA; has created regional communication networks and is in the planning to create trans-regional networks; has held regional and trans-regional training sessions. (ii) SEACOP - building up JMCUs at national level in West Africa; now expanding to LAC; some way towards fostering a regional information and intelligence exchange, with a view towards trans-regional network. (iii) WAPIS - designed to create national information systems feeding into a regional centre; no trans-regional activity. (iv) AML-WA - designed to support AML activities in the DNFBPs sectors in Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal and Cape Verde and promote regional liaison with the international community. (v) GAFISUD - supporting AML and judicial cooperation in GAFISUD members (LA), and designed to foster cooperation with CFATF and GIABA. Good progress on the first two objectives, none at all on the last. (vi) AMERIPOL - improve international cooperation amongst Latin American and Caribbean law enforcement and prosecuting authorities in fighting transnational crime; no exchange with West African LEAs and judicial authorities achieved. (vii) PRELAC - enhance capacity of national authorities to prevent the diversion of precursors in Latin America and the Caribbean. The trans-regional dimension varies between different projects. Developing trans-regional information exchanges is an important component for AIRCOP and SEACOP, though there has been little development so far. This is understandable, as the project had to lay the groundwork at national and regional level in West Africa, and because operations in LAC have not come on stream yet. For the two AML components the trans-regional aspect is not central. Both in design and in execution the focus has fallen on promoting regional priorities. It seems that GAFISUD has used

107 Interview with officials from EEAS. 108 For instance, GAFISUD summary of activities state "investigate future possible collaborations along the cocaine route, in particular West Africa, with potential partners such as GIABA or ECOWAS"; GAFISUD, "Support to the fight against money laundering in Latin America and the Caribbean." DoA, p5; AMERIPOL lists " Strengthening exchange of information and intelligence at regional and trans-regional level especially with West Africa and EU" as a specific objective, but makes no further mention of West Africa and how this is to be achieved in the results section. All activities are LA focused.

45 the project to further its core objectives of strengthening the AML defences of the regional financial system rather than promoting trans regional cooperation in the fight against organised crime. WAPIS and AMERIPOL focus on building or supporting regional information exchanges. While the association of various Caribbean police forces opens the AMERIPOL project to the possibility of trans-regional cooperation this seems tokenistic. Within the compass of the EU project there has been so far no involvement of agencies from the Caribbean. In essence both AMERIPOL and WAPIS are regional projects, with a focus on building regional structures. The trans regional cooperation between LEAs and judicial authorities envisioned in CRP documents and underlying justification for the programme has not been achieved as yet. The build up of activity in West Africa by AIRCOP and SEACOP has not been matched by activity in LAC. Steps have been taken to remedy this and facilitate the trans-regional cooperation of key stakeholders. There are promising developments but activities that have not taken place yet cannot be assessed. AML-WA and WAPIS are components promoting 'capacity building' in third countries as a precondition for achieving the trans-regional objectives of the CRP. But when viewed as independent projects their exclusively regional concerns render them ineligible for IfS funding. As there is now a regional programme (ECOWAS Anti Drug Programme) addressing database development and support for FIUs it becomes difficult justifying continuing funding under the IfS as "Community assistance under this Regulation shall be complementary to that provided for under related Community instruments for external assistance. It shall be provided only to the extent that an adequate and effective response cannot be provided under those instruments.”109 PRELAC and AMERIPOL both have trans-regional strands and objectives. PRELAC provides training and information exchange for stakeholders from Latin America and the Caribbean regions. The activities were welcomed by stakeholders in Trinidad as providing an opportunity to learn from Latin America and creating linkages with the region. There is also discussion in Trinidad of strengthening links between IMPACS and AMERIPOL as a way of building up cooperation between LEAs across the regions, but these plans have not progressed far. No Caribbean liaison officers have been attached to AMERIPOL as yet, there are no regular meetings and no joint training events. AMERIPOL to all intents and purposes remains a regional project falling short of its trans-regional objectives and intentions. Strengthening links with West Africa is a specific objective yet with the exception of a Ghanaian officer participating in an Ameripol training programme no concrete activities have been yet formulated to produce any results in that direction. Summary The fact that the CRP was designed to address trans-national threats by promoting trans-regional cooperation does not mean that every component comprises trans-regional activities. As capacity building in third country is valid criteria for IfS support this regional focus does not render the projects ineligible provided that (i) they work towards greater objectives as part of a coordinated trans-regional programme, and (ii) there are no other funding alternatives. In the case of AML-WA and WAPIS there clearly is a funding alternative to make continued support from the IfS redundant. It is irrelevant how West African FIUs and law enforcement databases are supported. There is a need, however, that activities of regional, thematic and IfS funded programmes are coordinated. For the CRP to create trans-regional LEA cooperation it needs to work more closely with other EU funded projects that work in the same thematic field. It will take a much stronger coordination unit (CORMS) to ensure cooperation between regional projects once these have slipped out of the CRP and become integrated in other programmes. It also needs to be underlined that trans-regional LEA cooperation lies at the heart of the CRP and does depend on capacity and cooperation of national and regional beneficiaries. Maintaining these relationships will in all likelihood be more difficult if projects do not come under the CRP purview and budget. Transferring responsibility for the achievement of particular results from the CRP to other programmes anticipates the final exit strategy. Though the CRP will by necessity require a mid- term commitment it is intended to set up self sustaining structures in national and regional

109 Article 2 Regulation (EC) No 1717/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 November 2006 establishing an Instrument for Stability.

46 organisations. Identifying exit strategies first from the IfS and later from regional or thematic EU funding envelopes constitutes a key role for programme managers.

10. Visibility

Rationale To assess if implementing agencies of the programme have ensured EC visibility in accordance with EU Visibility Guidelines while implementing the components, organizing the trainings, workshops, study tours, steering committee meetings. Visibility has been ensured satisfactorily by programme implementing agencies?

In most of the meetings held in beneficiary countries during the MTR the CRP had to be explained. We noted that in Bogota and Lima where the review team attended several meetings in conjunction with the CORMS country visit, the CORMS TL would read out a prepared statement introducing the CRP. It is not clear whether stakeholders always understood the relevance of CORMS. On one occasion the meeting was overshadowed by a KE’s intervention, which appeared to be representing the interests of the MS. Most interlocutors were more familiar with individual projects than with the programme. Regionally, greater brand recognition was given to AIRCOP and SEACOP in Africa and to PRELAC in LAC. Visibility and coherent identity are closely related, and the efforts by CORMS in raising awareness with the Newsletter and through steering group meetings are having some effect. The involvement of the EUDs is varied. Some projects invite EUD staff to attend and open training events (PRELAC, AMERIPOL, AIRCOP, WAPIS), others have little or no communication. EUDs remain an untapped resource, which given the level of country expertise and awareness of other donor commitments is a wasted opportunity. The UNODC has a much higher profile and is often perceived as donor, in spite of the inclusion of EU symbols in project logos. There is a sense of organisational ownership of projects like AIRCOP, which is at odds with the ambitions of the EU. EU visibility is very high in AMERIPOL and GAFISUD. Both organisations recognise the importance of EU support and advertise the connection. The connection is welcomed in some quarters and preferred to links with other donors. Interlocutors in Argentina and Ghana underlined how they regarded the EU as a friend and as a preferred partner.

11. Overall assessment

11.1 Identifying the Threat of Organised Crime The CRP has identified a problem that is widely recognised as urgent by stakeholders in the EU and in beneficiary countries. The organisations involved in illicit trafficking are undermining the authority of governments and in so doing threaten the security and well being of wider populations. The work of law enforcement and judicial authorities is territorially restricted to each respective nation state. Criminal organisations, on the other hand, are mobile, and use national differences to their advantage. They work in many ways like any commercial enterprise, maximising profits by taking advantage of variations in supply and demand in different markets, and by taking the past of least resistance in transporting their goods. One of the most widely traded products is cocaine, a mainstay of organised crime and a major revenue source for organised crime groups and insurgents in Peru and Colombia. As coca products stem from the band of Andean countries, while poppy cultivation is concentrated in Afghanistan, there are geographical focal points along the supply side of the chain. But the growth of demand and the intricacy of routing patterns for transporting these goods to market have turned cocaine and heroin trafficking into global operations. Add to this the spread of synthetic drugs like methamphetamine, which is reportedly being manufactured in West Africa for export to the Far East, and the global scale becomes evident. National authorities combating the drug trade, as well as the crime and instability that follow in its wake, benefit from cooperation and the sharing of information across national boundaries. Formal channels are often so cumbersome and slow that they impede investigations and deter cross

47 border policing. Finding ways to facilitate the flow of information remains a key objective of police authorities and is a motivator behind the formation of networks and organisations like AMERIPOL and the Interpol network in Africa. The arrests of fugitive traffickers resulting from the chance encounter of senior police officers at PRELAC training events demonstrate the operational benefits that can accrue from bringing international police officers together.110 At global (objective) and at project level the CRP constitutes a response to the needs of beneficiaries. West African authorities have long been concerned about weaknesses in their LEAs and the four programmes are designed to address strategic areas. But consultation could have been more extensive. In LAC some of the activities follow from previous programmes, while other aspects have run into problems. Much seems to revolve around what kind of arrangement is being proposed. It seems that Brazil, Colombia and Argentina want to be partners, not beneficiaries. These are issues that transcend the scope of any project manager. It is a pity however, for the potential of a multi-partner project not to be realised for failure of finding the right process.

11.2 Lessons learnt (i) Coordination and leadership The CRP, using a conceptual scheme of commodity flow drawn from the models underpinning the IfS has identified key areas for intervention where the limited resources available can be most effectively invested. The projects while self contained and independent, are designed to grow together over the course of the programme and deliver multiplying and reinforcing benefits. Improved coordination efforts supported by the CORMS project, a belated addition to the programme, are intended to reinforce that process. All projects follow a similar trajectory involving not necessarily in that sequence: (i) support for capacity at national level (ii) promoting regional cooperation; (iii) facilitating trans-regional cooperation. Working with regional organisations like GAFISUD, AMERIPOL, the West African Interpol network but also with UNODC has the advantage of gaining access to the right partners and credibility in partner countries. A positive side-effect is that these institutions are in turn strengthened by those programmes. But there are also costs from a programme that has eschewed concentrated management. In the absence of strong leadership there are no mechanisms for preserving the integrity of programme objectives and ensuring that projects activities pursue the programme vision. There is to all intents and purposes no overview of programme achievements, but also no effort to review and reflect. While the different projects generate activity and are now, via CORMS, providing data, there is little effort at analysis. This is a serious omission undermining the programme in general and in detail. We noted the poor understanding of organised criminal activity in West Africa. The knowledge base is much richer in Latin America, with a growing understanding of the industrial processes of drug production, of the criminal organisations and the political economy of rural coca producers. But here interlocutors comment on the need for more precise and incisive information. The CRP however, has become so focused on project objectives that it does not even realise its own informational needs. (ii) Fragmentation and drift Fragmentation of project management, and the design of projects towards specific and unrelated objectives, has resulted in such a lack of coherence between projects that it is difficult to speak of the CRP as a unitary programme. At inception each project was planning its activities without reference to any other parts of the programme. Since the formation of CORMS communication is much improved with regular opportunities for discussion at steering committee meetings, the distribution of information and country visits. Project TLs have had the chance to exchange views and invitations have been extended to attend different trainings. Future SCs should broaden the opportunity for discussion and become more workshop like, to give TLs the chance to explore and

110 "In one case, the project facilitated the meeting between top officials of Peru's anti-drug police and the Federal Police of Brazil leading to the arrest in Brazil of a fugitive Peruvian drug kingpin; in another case, operational information was shared between the police forces of Ecuador and Peru leading to a seizure of cocaine and capturing members from a Mexican cartel. A similar situation happened between the police forces of Bolivia and Brazil. According to the Police forces, the same kind of coordination through official channels would have taken much longer and probably the advantage of the opportunity would have been lost and perhaps the cases would not have been resolved" PRELAC 2nd Interim Report, Jan-Dec, 2010, p.5.

48 review rather than simply report back on achievements. The current open forum, with attendance by staff from the Commission discourages TLs from exhibiting anything other than success and may lead to overly positive interpretations of results. The attempts to create synergies are not found, there has been little by way of sharing resources, running joint activities or even combined awareness raising activities. On future occasions WAPIS, SEACOP and AIRCOP may want to consider running joint trainings on intelligence sharing, using information systems and developing criminal investigations. Equally there may be an opportunity for AMERIPOL and GAFISUD to combine workshops for international collaboration among the judiciary and prosecuting authorities. There are also opportunities for joint activities with other projects, particularly with the UNODC run GCCP. Since the EU is a funder of some GCCP activities111 it is strongly recommended that this be explored. Yet, it seems unlikely that this can be realised without leadership. As each project works towards its own objective it is not easy to maintain the vision of the programme and there is a risk that the overall objectives are being traded for more immediate and concrete results. This is most apparent in two trends; first the development of AIRCOP into an anti-drug operation instead of an action for fighting organised crime. Equipping JAITFs at West African (and LAC) airports is of course the primary objective of AIRCOP. One tangible achievement of the project are functioning teams operating at Benin, Dakar, Lome and Praia (as well as Mindelho and Sal). Communications systems have been installed and are used on occasion. With stronger profiling and interrogations skills these teams are much better prepared for controlling the inflow of passengers than before the programme and are operating out of well furnished operation rooms. But if the investigative skills are not developed, the investment of 4.8 million Euros stands for seizing 32kg of cocaine seems hardly justifiable. Airport controls will continue, generating activity and sending a trickle of arrestees into the West African prisons system, but at this rate they are unlikely to impact on organised crime. Arguably this is not the rationale for AIRCOP,112 but an exclusive focus on project objectives misses the point of the CRP. Raising airport interdiction capacities is not a thematic concern for the IfS, unless it forms part of a broader set of actions against transnational organised crime. AIRCOP does support transnational LEA cooperation through the development of the communication system. It has even scored a seizure following the exchange of information between Togolese and Beninoise JAITF teams in February 2013. Yet even intelligence sharing at regional level is likely to impact primarily on micro trafficking and the arrest of couriers without investigative follow-up.113 In other words, the organised crime structures remain untouched even while the projects generate arrests and seizures. From interviews at regional headquarters in Dakar there is no indication of corrective action being taken by UNODC, the implementing agency. The joint teams at airports, and the national authorities in beneficiary countries also had no plans under way to develop their investigative capacities. The AIRCOP project is therefore raising capacity in intercepting drug couriers but not at dismantling criminal organisations. What is more concerning is that some of the national counterparts are liable to regard this as satisfactory because they help to meet other concerns, including for instance improving the image of the nation.114 The very name of the "Cocaine Route Programme," it has been pointed out, reinforces the idea that anti drug activity is the ultimate end. The need for stronger links to the agencies that conduct post-seizure investigations applies equally to SEACOP. The exponential difference in volume of consignments sent along the maritime vector presupposes a much more organised and better resourced drug trafficking organisation. The JMCU team at Tema, for instance, made a seizure of 200kg of cocaine just a week after a SEACOP training course. Further seizures by West African units include prescription medicines, counterfeit goods (including medicines) and protected species (CV). Each of these cases would

111 In the HRP for instances. 112 AIRCOP, DoA, p. 10 "The Overall Objective is to build drug-interdiction capacities at international airports in Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean. In doing so, the project will establish Joint Airport Interdiction Task Forces (JAITF) and connect them to international law enforcement databases and communication networks to enable the transmission in real time to other international airports of operational information aimed at intercepting illicit shipments. The project will also promote intelligence and information sharing between services at national and international level as well as an intelligence- led approach to countering drug trafficking." 113 The operation led to the arrest of a Thai national carrying 2.75 kg of methamphetamine AIRCOP Newsletter 6. 114 See for instance the contribution of Nigerian Drug Law Enforcement Agency, Lagos Airport Commander Hamza Umar Final Report of Transatlantic Symposium on Dismantling Transnational Illicit Networks (Lisbon, 2011).

49 merit upstream investigation but the focus of the project at present is on vessel searches in port and at anchor. There is no doubt that technical ability is a prerequisite for active anti crime activity, but it is very limited if it becomes an end in itself. There are other areas where project collaboration can be promoted by improving links between project managers and European Liaison officers. PRELAC training events could for instance involve the LOs more closely. The French LO in Peru has for instance provided training with UNODC support, which could be expanded. There are furthermore possibilities for exploring cross- fertilization among project events by for instance having AMERIPOL collaborate with PRELAC on joined trainings for judges. Yet it is important that the desire for collaboration does not dilute project specificity and the requirements of each component. (iii) Intelligence based interventions and displacement There is a case to be made for both AIRCOP and SEACOP having a preventative effect and therefore raising the cost of business for organised crime. Particularly once regional information sharing networks get up and running, and the joint teams begin to work with information from other parts of the world. At the moment, however, these networks are rudimentary. Joint training events have established working relationships and a sense of trust between different individuals (i.e. heads of JMCUs in Ghana and Togo), but this is a fragile network dependant on individuals and ongoing project support. There is an expectation that SEACOP intelligence will improve with future training, continuous mentoring and experience. Yet, the very success of these activities is likely to require programme expansion and adjustment to compensate for the probable displacement effect. First, there is a strong likelihood of illicit consignments being diverted to other ports along the West African coast. For instance, as no activities have taken place in Gambia and Guinea Bissau these countries may become more attractive to traffickers.115 Shipments along the maritime vector may be routed via Nigeria and Cameroon as they do not form part of SEACOP. Secondly, there could be a change in methods, for instance the pre-arrival transfer of consignments from cargo ships onto pirogues. All along the West African coast the traffic of small passenger vessels is lively, with boats touching shore on the long open beaches of, miles from the nearest police post. These routes are difficult to control and also vital for coastal communities. Possible future phases of the project have to factor in displacement effects as the consequence (and proof of success) of previous activities, and develop a system of surveillance and information gathering among the fishing communities along the coast. (iv) Transnational intelligence networks The core idea underlying the CRP is the promotion of trans-regional intelligence to foster the fight against trans-national organised crime. There are no indications that this has been achieved. There has been the occasional passing of information from the Americas leading to action in West Africa, but the sources were usually from MS or US intelligence networks. There are no mechanisms, no facilities and no relationships of trust to facilitate the exchange of information. Heavy start up costs and delays in implementation are partly responsible for this omission. WAPIS has only just commenced but should (i) establish national centres for data collection, (ii) a web of regional information exchange, and (iii) a culture of trust between regional players and LOs. But for the moment there is no indication that LAC LEAs are in communication with their West African counterparts. Regrettably, this absence extends also to the AML activities. GAFISUD has made no efforts to establish any kind of rapport with either GIABA or CFATF even when opportunities for joint training arose (in Central America). It appears then that a European link is still required. Over time a different set of relationships and a new culture of trust may evolved. According to NACOB they regularly receive information on Ghanaian travellers departing from Brazilian airports from the Brazilian authorities. But in the absence of liaison officers and more developed mechanisms information exchanges will remain basic. Interviews with members of the Accra platform suggested that most significant seizures made in recent years in West Africa followed from tip offs by European and US sources using their informant network in the LAC region. For the remainder of the CRP at least a European interface is if not a precondition then at least a facilitator for LAC-WA information exchange. (v) Programme impact on beneficiary institutions

115 There are valid reasons in each case; activities in Gambia have been delayed for security reasons while cooperation with Guinea Bissau was suspended following an EU Council decision. This has no bearing on the activity of TOC.

50 In South America information sharing networks have benefitted from well developed organisational infrastructure. There are already several networks in place but the project choice (identified in the scoping report) was AMERIPOL. Working with that institution there has been progress in establishing national units, but so far neither the database nor the exchange of information has progressed much. It seems that the project has drifted away from the original objective and has become absorbed by the ambition of creating an American equivalent of Europol. But this vision is not shared by all beneficiaries and has already run into opposition. AMERIPOL116 does not present a platform from which information can be exchanged between LAC and WA, and contacts with West Africa are negligible. It seems, then, that the project is falling short of both specific objectives. The CRP is in many regards a tale of two continents. While there were several organisations to collaborate with in Latin America, in West Africa there are none. Hence, it was possible to channel the AML activities through GAFISUD, the regional organisation in South America, but it was decided to work with EU MS organisations in WA rather than directly with GIABA.117The LEAs from which agents recruited to the joint teams at port and airports or the WAPIS information units have a long list of developmental needs. Supporting the development of these agencies could also be seen as an opportunity for interventions. Though CRP support is provided as part of the long term component of the IfS, project cycle objectives will be difficult to achieve if the timescale is not extended. Combating TCO effectively will require trans-regional cooperation that in turn depends on adequate capacity at regional and national level. The project cycle with commitments of 2x36 months, or 48 months (AMERIPOL) were optimistically short considering the complexity of the programmes, as it may well take a 10 year commitment for programme results to be integrated into existing law enforcement structures and for the inter-agency trust to develop that is a prerequisite for trans regional law enforcement cooperation. (vi) Impact on fighting organised crime This is the underlying rationale of the CRP and other programmes funded under the IfS. Yet, there are numerous difficulties beginning with the definition of TOC, how they operate in different areas of the CRP and what kinds of threat they pose. Poor information about the actual phenomenon this programme is seeking to redress - or protect against - makes it even more difficult when postulating a causal relationship between a loosely connected set of activities. While it is possible to comment on trends in seizures and arrests, the flow of information or mutual legal assistance between CRP countries, this does not provide a metric for assessing the success against organised crime. One of the objectives of the CRP should be to create a better understanding of the crime threat among key stakeholders. Individual projects should be reminded that the programme focus is on dismantling transnational organised crime, and for judicial authorities to take action against the conditions in which organised crime can flourish. Finally, there is a need for baseline data and typologies particularly in West Africa.

12. Conclusion

12.1 Methodological issues The judgements are based on the exhaustive analysis of information to the best of the abilities of the consultants. The programme is very complex and the political, economic, cultural and technical contexts of each country included are very different. Key informants could not always be accessed,118 and some of the people involved in the conceptual work leading up to the programme were not interviewed. Questions arose in the middle of the field mission that should have been asked in previous interviews. One of the most serious omissions is not having been able to meet with FIIAPP, the managing agency for AMERIPOL, AML-WA, but also COPOLAD, and a consortium partner of CORMS. It has therefore not been possible to get a detailed view by the

116 AMERIPOL’s TL explained that the data base being designed through the Spanish police will be a strategic and not an operational system, that it will be ready by the 3rd quarter of 2013 and that one of the drawbacks in the implementation and development has been EU’s procurement policies which limit suppliers (only hardware not built in China and the US can be considered). The Pilot version of the system will be run in six countries with operational NAUs. 117 The West African equivalent. A new EDF project will work directly with GIABA. 118 AMERIPOL TL in Bogota, JAITF team at Lome airport.

51 executing agency of the developments at AMERIPOL and the actual duplications of and potential synergies between COPOLAD/CRP and AML-WA and GAFISUD. While there was a possibility of following up by email and phone the opportunity of the moment is lost. This is inevitable, as the narrative unfolds in the process of mission and document review. Finally the wealth of data, from project documents, to informant interviews and contextual information has to be filtered and analysed. Most of the people interviewed during the field missions were in organisations that were directly involved in combating crime, including drug related crime. In none of the countries did was the team able to visit prisons, neighbourhoods with high rates of drug use, or regions of coca or cannabis cultivation. We did not consult with drug users or with coca farmers who are affected by the programme and also stakeholders. Many of the officials and law enforcement officers consulted stood to gain from the extension of the programme. Some of the international agencies are entirely dependent on the existence of drug related crime as an international issue. It is possible that where livelihoods are tied up with programme support, interpretations are coloured by organisational interest. Attempts were made to mitigate this bias by interviewing independent experts.

12.2 The project design and the IfS The conception of the CRP is entirely in keeping with the stipulations of the IfS. The different projects form part of a whole designed to combat trans-national organised crime by promoting trans-regional cooperation. A number of projects were put into place to address support and enhance capacity of beneficiary country LEAs at strategic points. The identified components were intended to grow together into an integrated structure over time. It does not appear, however, that the vision was adhered to during programme implementation. Imprecise formulation of activities and results, and the urgent demands of the more immediate objectives focused executing agencies on national and regional outcomes. Most projects have therefore experienced slippage from the trans-regional overall objective, to the point where the entire programme is at risk of fragmenting into a series of self-contained, regional activities. In some cases projects have no trans-regional components at all. Continued eligibility for IfS assistance because they provide 'capacity building in third countries' is tenuous when alternative funding envelopes are available. There is a risk that the withdrawal of IfS support will lead to the termination of activities before these could achieve sustainable capacity enhancements. Without continued EU funding the achievements of some components of the CRP in building up capacity at national and regional level in West Africa and Latin America could well be dissipated. It is unlikely for example that joint law enforcement teams at ports and airports or AMERIPOL NAUs would operate with the same vigour. Such waste is regrettable, particularly as most of the stakeholders interviewed are aware that institutional change can only be achieved over time. This is particularly relevant for law enforcement, where a culture of trust has to be slowly nurtured. From the outset, then, it was clear that the CRP could only work if funds were committed for a longer period (5-10 years).119 Jeopardising project gains in building up local and regional capacity will furthermore undermine the strategic objective of promoting trans-regional cooperation. Strong national and regional LEA and judiciary authorities are a precondition for trans-regional coordination. LEAs from, say EU MS or North America need to have capable and functioning agencies they can partner with for information exchange and joint operations. Fighting trans-national organised crime along the transcontinental itineraries used by drug traffickers for example will remain an elusive goal unless there are national partners for law enforcement to work with. There is then a tension between the trans-regional objectives of the CRP as an IfS funded programme and the capacity support measures required to put some of the beneficiaries in a position where they can engage at a trans-regional level. The value of the IfS is that it can address precisely those national/regional capacity shortcomings and raise agencies to the next level. The communication system installed by AIRCOP allowing JAITFs to communicate with partners in the

119 This view was expressed by many of the TLs and KEs with experience of law enforcement cooperation and also of senior officers in agencies in West Africa. Mentoring was mentioned as one of the methods for maintaining constructive relationship.

52 region and Europe is an example. It will be possible to expand the communication system to link West Africa with LAC partners in the next phase. It is this as yet untapped potential of West African - LAC cooperation that constitutes the main promise of an as yet incipient CRP. The programme components were designed to raise capacity to a point where cooperation was feasible, and to provide mechanisms for making it happen. There is a real opportunity in CRP activities evolving into a platform for South-South cooperation. PRELAC has already facilitated the exchange of experience in precursor controls between different LAC countries. Another example would be the use of Brazilian experts for training Cape Verdean officers by AIRCOP. As AIRCOP and SEACOP become operational in LAC there will be more opportunities for Brazilian and Colombian expertise to be shared with West African partners. It will also provide an opportunity to extend the programme to Central America in partnership with Colombia and Brazil. Members of a Ghanaian JAITF team has recently participated in a training organised by AMERIPOL, providing a first instance of successful cross continent and cross project cooperation in training delivery. But where projects do not have a viable trans-regional dimension and other funding sources are available, support from the IfS does not provide added value. A better way forward is to use regional or thematic envelopes for building up national and regional capacities and maintain coordination and exchange with the CRP. For instance, the development of West African databases pioneered by WAPIS with IfS funding could be continued under the ECOWAS Praia Plan funded out of the regional envelope. Once a regional intelligence centre has been established in West Africa could be then IfS support could be considered to link it to the Latin American information centre supported by the AMERIPOL-EU project, as well as with the networks created by SEACOP and AIRCOP. It is not easy to pinpoint responsibility for the shortfalls in achieving trans-regional cooperation. The lack of programme wide leadership allowed projects to focus on proximate objectives. Both GAFISUD and AMERIPOL-EU are illustrative in having prioritized regional goals to the neglect of trans-regional once. The poor phrasing of project results did not help, but there was also little by way of guidance from programme management in creating links and ensuring that trans-regional overall objectives were adhered to.

12.3 Programme management and coordination There is no programme management and coordination to speak of so far. There has been a high turnover of task managers in Brussels, to deprive the CRP of both institutional memory and vision. CORMS, which was created as monitoring unit after the programme had started has done much to raise the CRPs profile and create an internal sense of purpose. The steering group meetings have succeeded in creating synergies in terms of information exchange and even a joint training. But the work of the CORMS team is hampered by its weak mandate, where it is supposed to create synergies but not to coordinate. As a result, the programme continues to be run as a selection of projects each of which may or may not cooperate according to preference. Projects have been contracted out to different agencies. By and large they are being delivered efficiently, but there are several missed opportunities in not having concentrated the management of all activities in a single unit. The advantage of objective detachment that is gained from a separate coordinating unit has been dissipated by staffing it with KEs from agencies that work in the implementation of projects. CORMS, therefore lacks some of the critical distance to project implementing agencies that would befit the more evaluative of the monitoring functions. KEs, have further problems as they are working only for a limited number of days with specific timeframes. Much of that time is spent on meetings, internal coordination and country visits, where KEs accompany the TL. Where they have contact with beneficiary it is not always clear what their role is - monitors or visiting experts giving advice? Individual experts are steeped in their own subject areas but have too little understanding of the other CRP projects (or other EU and MS activities) to effectively create synergies. Moreover, CORMS has no facility for collecting the information from these visits to feed into analytical situation reports. At present mission reports are records of discussions and viewpoints collected on field visits. This is a useful starting point for comparison with other information sources and for thematic analysis of the evidence used by interlocutors to substantiate their claims. This is an opportunity for CORMS to deepen the understanding of the organised crime threats and the effectiveness of interventions.

53 In their current form, the visits while useful in promoting both the CRP and CORMS, do not seem to achieve regional and trans-regional coordination among stakeholders. Hemmed in by its mandate, CORMS is not sufficiently pro-active in identifying opportunities so as to recommend actions that will ensure synergies between CRP projects, and/or with bilateral MS initiatives. While the information sharing has improved CORMS is still excluded from COSI and EMPACT. The link between external and home security is therefore weak.

12.4 Capacity enhancement for "international cooperation of law enforcement and judicial services" It was realised from the outset that the different CRP components work on different time scales. The needs that were identified at West African air and seaports, for instance, were "requiring immediate support."120 It was expected that the interventions would yield results in improved security almost immediately. On the other hand, concrete results from programmes supporting for instance AML capacity or LEA cooperation could only be expected in the midterm. Yet all contain two distinctive elements: a) improved sharing of information; b) international cooperation. There is an opportunity for the programme to contribute to the organisational development of West African law enforcement agencies. LEAs in many of the West African CRP countries are poorly resourced, inadequately trained and have little institutional support. Raising capacity at national level by forming, training, equipping and then mentoring joint teams at air and seaports has been one of the main activities and achievements.121 The principle of raising national capacity as a pre-condition for international cooperation has therefore been established in the programme. While progress has been good it has to go further if the units are to play a role in the combat against organised crime. Investigation skills remain rudimentary, and because of project focus (and programme name) the teams on the ground appear content with the seizure of drugs. Not only is there no follow up, but in some countries there is no data record, no data management and no database. The LEAs from which officers are recruited are also underperforming. Levels of training are low, motivation often poor and corruption is rife.122 In many cases, this can be related to low salary levels and poor organisational development. Agencies often work without strategy documents, have no training curriculum and no standard operating procedures (SOPs).

12.5 Judicial component While there is mention in CRP project documents about working with the judiciary yet none of the West African projects have any judicial cooperation components. There are provisions in AML-WA to include prosecutors and judges in training on money laundering together with police and other institutions, but there are no dedicated programmes. Moreover, there are no activities for strengthening the judiciary. Once again, the CRP has not made linkages with governance support programmes funded by other EU envelopes. The LAC projects are more developed in this sense and do integrate the judicial component. Both AMERIPOL and GAFISUD have organised training programmes for prosecutors. The only project that has focused directly on the judiciary is AMERIPOL which has organized four training events, two solely for prosecutors and two for both LEA and prosecutors. The first of these seek to create an environment where prosecutors can share experiences and establish personal and professional relations that will in the future allow information exchange at an informal level. The second developed two criminal intelligence courses that allowed LA officers and prosecutors to meet in the class room which facilitated an understanding of national differences when LEA act and prosecutors extend their instructions. There are no indications that these training events had, at this point, led to any international cooperation.

120 Action Fiche of the Annual Action Programme 2009 describing the first phase of the Cocaine Route Programme (CRP). 121 Chapter 3, section 6.1. on NACOB and salary uplift. 122 See annex on Dakar the visit to the joint team at airport.

54 12.6 International cooperation - at regional level In GAFISUD, PRELAC and AMERIPOL judges and prosecutors have participated in training exercises, but there is no evidence so far that they have cooperated in investigations. Unfortunately the AMERIPOL programme has not been able to foster the formal exchange of information because of the lacking legal mandate of the AMERIPOL organization.123 Good cooperation, however, has resulted from joint training sessions, even on unrelated issues. Informal networks between police officers, who met on joint training, have generated confidence and proven a most effective method. In West Africa there has been communication between JMCUs, also following meetings at training exercises. The COCAIR124 operations have been valuable in forging partnerships and cooperation between agencies across West Africa. The planned maritime information network, however, is still under development, and WAPIS and AML-WA have just commenced.

12.7 Trans-regional cooperation This is the underlying raison d’être of the CRP, to create LEA networks that mirror the cooperation of organised crime groups trafficking cocaine from LAC to the EU via WA.125 The overall objective of the CRP is to “enhance the capacity for international cooperation" of LEAs and judicial authorities. Trans-regional cooperation is also stated as a specific objective in several of the CRP components. AIRCOP and SEACOP are built on a vision of specialised teams linked by secure communication technology, connected to international databases and sharing and analysing information. According to the AIRCOP DoA there is no information exchange between authorities at airports in Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean. The project therefore sets out to raise capacity by developing international cooperation with the use of a secure real-time communication system and access to international databases.126 Cooperation with MAOC(N) and Initiatives such as the French Customs maritime activity in Senegal and the UK intelligence course in Ghana, inter alia, are bilateral Member States initiatives are results aspired to by SEACOP.127 Project document for AMERIPOL assumes that "training and operations should see the gradual involvement of West African representatives." GAFISUD in its second phase objectives established that it should "investigate future possible collaborations along the cocaine route, in particular West Africa, with potential partners such as GIABA or ECOWAS."128 Yet so far the trans-regional element in most projects remains to be realised. Only PRELAC has achieved a series of trans-regional training exercises, but as these involve Latin American and Caribbean beneficiaries only they do not address the trans-Atlantic trafficking problem which lies at the origin of the CRP. In fact there were only two training exercises129 where WA and LAC beneficiaries have been involved jointly. Without a major reappraisal of how the programme is being delivered and who should be involved, this most important of project objectives will not be realised.

12.8 The relationship with partners CRP projects have on occasion run into local difficulties, usually the product of perceived rivalries. SEACOP particularly was greeted with misgivings by the older established UNODC managed Global Container Control Project. Since the projects are complementary - with one targeting containers the other vessels - and the staff that is being trained drawn from the same pool of officers this is surprising and unnecessary. It may originate in a sense of entitlement by an agency

123 Chapter 3 section 6.4. 124 see appendix for seizure data and explanations. 125 "It is in particular the lack of regional and interregional cooperation between Latin America, Caribbean (LAC) and West Africa (WA) which allows organized crime to continue to operate in these countries. "CRP Action Fiche 2009, p2. 126 AIRCOP 2011, DoA p.5. 127 SEACOP, 2009, TORs p6. 128 EC, "Support to the fight against money laundering in Latin America and the Caribbean" Annex 1, Description of the action for GAFISUD II which began operations in 2013. 129 Both AIRCOP training - one where Brazilian trainers were working in Cape Verde, the other involved a Ghanaian officers participating in an AMERIPOL training.

55 that has become accustomed to implementing international Technical Assistance in the crime and drugs field for European funders. In the different setting of Accra airport the TL for AIRCOP was given an equally frosty reception by the incumbent SOCA team working operation Westbridge. In his words, they regarded the project as a rival, for EU funds, operational space at the airport and access to the Ghanaian beneficiary agencies.130 In both cases initial hostility has been turned into healthy working relationships. The secondment of KEs who are currently in active employment at EU MS agencies on a part time basis has advantages and drawbacks. It provides a real time actual link between law enforcement in beneficiary countries and the EU. The drawback is that these KEs, as officers of their government are preoccupied, even if unconsciously, with their respective national concerns.131 This perennial problem may have to be factored into the programme, or may require work with KEs early on. A briefing on responsibilities and reporting lines may suffice.132 The linkage between the CRP and other EU programmes, particularly with regard to Justice and Home Affairs is weak. There is also a need to strengthen cooperation with other activities, such as White Flow133 and the activities by national agencies of MS. This should again be driven by programme management as the CORMS mandate 'to facilitate synergies' remains too weak. Countries like the UK, France and Spain have extensive networks of their own LEAs, and are funding operations that have been running for decades. But the concern of LEAs from MS is strictly with the interests of their state. And none have the vision or the resource of a project like the CRP. In any case, the programme in design, if not as yet in execution, is making a valuable contribution to enhancing the security of beneficiaries and indirectly to the EU.

12.9 Coherence with EU policies The CRP is a drug supply reduction programme aimed entirely at intercepting of cocaine flows and dismantling the organised crime groups involved. To meet the stated ambition of EU drugs policies to pursue a 'balanced approach' it therefore has to be combined with other interventions providing drug treatment and prevention. Some of this is provided by projects funded out of other envelopes in Latin America (COPOLAD), Caribbean and Nigeria, but not in most of the West African beneficiaries. Enhancing the capacity of LEAs inevitably impacts on issues of civil and human rights. One of the principles of the Agenda for Change is that good governance and the rule of law are prerequisites for development. Yet, enhancing the law enforcement capacities will not result in improved governance if it is not followed up by improved judicial systems, political oversight and public accountability. There is a risk that law enforcement enhancement may simply lead to the arrest of more low level drug offenders without either dismantling organised crime or improving governance. Arrest statistics so far indicate a number of couriers being apprehended with small amounts of drugs. There is no further investigation to identify principals or financiers. In many of the countries involved arrestees spend very long periods in pre-trial detention.134 Sentences for drug offences in many countries are not proportionate to either the level of involvement or the benefit that offenders were to gain from involvement. In some Latin American countries penalties for drug trafficking are more severe than for murder.135 In West African countries penalties are also very high, a review of punishments meted out to drug offenders is one

130 This is not without irony, as UNODC is the implementing agency for both AIRCOP and the GCCP. The UNODC AIRCOP team therefore was at the receiving end of the very same hostility in Accra that their colleagues running the GCCP extended to the SEACOP team in Takoradi. 131 Section 3, section 9 review the numbering of sessions. 132 To avoid KEs working on the CRP reporting first to their national embassies and then to the EUD. 133 Project White flow – project designed to boost intelligence exchange on South American-produced cocaine smuggled into Europe via West Africa. Project White flow aims to gather identification material on mid- to upper-level cocaine traffickers linked to Africa and to better disseminate this data among INTERPOL’s member countries. 134 In almost half of African countries a majority of the prison population are pre-trial/remand prisoners. International Centre for Prison Studies, 2008World Pre-trial/Remand Imprisonment List. In Nigeria for instance prisoners wait for an average of 3 years for cases to come to court. Virginia Comolli, Institute of International Strategic Studies personal communication. 135 Centro de Estudios de Derecho, Justicia y Sociedad, Dejusticia, 2013, Dejusticia Working Paper 1 Addicted to punishment: The disproportionality of drug laws in Latin America. Bogota, Colombia: Centro de Estudios de Derecho, Justicia y Sociedad, Dejusticia.

56 of the topics considered by the current Kofi Annan Initiative.136 At present the CRP has no facility for engaging in a policy dialogue with partners on processes or penalties for managing drug related offences. Yet the benefits of a more nuanced system of tariffs for drug offences is recognised by UNODC, as it provides prosecutors and judges with flexibility. But such adjustments to current penal codes would require time and effort and was therefore not one of the office's priorities.137 The potential problem arising for the CRP is that the interventions derive from the principle of EU development funding "that the objectives of development, democracy, human rights, good governance and security are intertwined",138 and that therefore EU support should focus development cooperation in support of actions that promote them. Yet by strengthening the repressive capacities of states in situations where democratic structures are fragile, the programme is unlikely to prompt beneficiaries to focus on "results-oriented reforms with a commitment to human rights, democracy and the rule of law." There is an implicit tendency identified in an earlier AIRCOP ROM report to assume that any anti-drug intervention proposes human rights. "Regarding human rights issues, combating drug-trafficking has by itself a positive impact on the security of the local population and the decrease of the availability of drugs in the recipient countries, e.g. in Europe. Moreover, further support to the law enforcement agencies against drug-trafficking and the connected organised crime will improve the lives of the citizens in the countries affected. However, it is not very clear at this stage how the project will promote the respect to the basic rights of the arrested and accused individuals connected with drug-trafficking."139 This unsupported assumption allows implementing partners to avoid having to account for their activities in terms of results. It means that the output, in this case the arrest of a courier, is presented as the outcome, in terms of improving public safety. First of all these measures might infringe deeply on the rights and wellbeing of suspects implicated in law enforcement operations. In countries with slow justice systems and deplorable prison conditions any set of measures resulting in an increase of people being imprisoned has to ensure that measures are targeted and punishments proportional. Because there is so little by way of investigation into drug trafficking organizations in West Africa the resulting arrest of couriers suggests that targeting has to be improved. In the absence of coordination with judicial reform projects funded by the EU in beneficiary countries the treatment and subsequent punishments for alleged offenders arrested in CRP funded activities can in some countries be severe and disproportionate. These are issues that need to be addressed in the next phase to ensure first that the programme really does promote human rights and good governance but also to keep the focus on organized crime. The second problematic dimension relates to the general problem with corruption, which is endemic across many of the countries (see section 7.2).140 Given the potential earnings from any level of involvement in drug trafficking against salary levels in public service particularly in Africa, the implication of law enforcement officers, public officials and politicians is a constant threat. There are serious questions whether any set of measures can impact in a meaningful way on the flow of drugs which should be considered as part of this review. Where market demand persists a well-functioning economy will facilitate the supply, and in the absence of regulation corruption will ensue. CRP activities need to ensure that measures are taken by beneficiaries to prevent the abuse of position by the newly empowered teams and agencies. This will require more attentions strict oversight, adherence to standard operating procedures and proper documentation of the processing of arrestees. It also means regular information on activities to civil society organizations, particularly those working on human rights issues.

136 Kofi Annan Commission Terms of Reference Commission on the Impact of Drug Trafficking on Governance, Security, and Development in West Africa "It will also seek to inform and advise political leaders and the general public on effective and humane ways to tackle dependency without resort to incarceration or criminalization of users." 137 Interview at UNODC regional office, Dakar 13/02/2013. 138 EC, 2011. Communication From The Commission To The European Parliament,The Council, The European Economic And Social Committee And The Committee Of The Regions. Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for Changep.3 139 ROM report, AIRCOP, 19/03/2011". 140 In addition to the TPI reports we were also told about corruption problems by implementing agencies with long term experience in the region.

57 12.10 Information / analysis CORMS has developed an online repository where all CRP documents are deposited by executing agencies. Up to now compliance has been erratic, with some of the projects slow in providing updates, others protecting their information and CORMS lacking the personnel to analyse the data. There is also a question to what extend implementing agencies that see themselves as centres of excellence and derive benefits from their own analysis are willing to share information in general. In Lima the team was shown a recent study on cocaine processing that UNODC was unwilling to share more widely. There are questions of balancing intellectual property with the interests of providing a wider community of policy makers and law enforcement with the benefits of information and analysis. According to its ToRs updates and in depth analysis on organised crime, drug trafficking and money laundering trends is one of the expected results of CORMS.141 The assumption was that the activities themselves would generate valuable information on these phenomena. Furthermore, the CORMS team would in the course of their activities come across valuable information sources. CORMS mission reports already provide a record of meetings and collect the opinions of informants. They present informant views on trends and developments and form a good basis for critical analysis. So far they have refrained from challenging the conclusions drawn by informants or pointing to unsupported assumptions. There are opportunities for pushing towards a more critical analysis and combining different information sources. Overdue reliance on stakeholders tends to tilt the information towards conservative opinions that refrain from posing critical questions about sources, impact and results. CORMS could add further value by combining different information sources into complex and thematic analysis for the benefit of CRP and other stakeholders. Activities are constrained by the TL having to double as a web master. It seems an odd use of expertise of a senior judge with considerable experience in combating organised crime.

13. Recommendations

Project coordination and management For the projects to grow into a coherent set of activities in line with the programme objectives, overall management and coordination of activities need to be strengthened. The record of the first phase, with the high turnover of Task Managers counts against locating programme management at the Commission.142 One option for guaranteeing management continuity, as well as for capacity, competence and mandate of the management of the CRP could be contracted out to the UNODC or even Interpol. One of several problems here is the conflict of interest as both are already project implementing agencies (AIRCOP, PRELAC, WAPIS). It might therefore be preferable to select an agency which is not currently involved but has experience in managing security sector reform, such as GIZ or DfID. Alternatively, project management could be located to another institution altogether, or perhaps a consortium, such as Europol/EMCDDA. Advantages would include tying in the operational and scientific expertise of centres of excellence. Yet straying from analysis into implementation of supply side drug control would stretch the EMCDDA's mandate and might reflect negatively on its primary function.143 Europol might be in a better position, particularly if supported on technical issues by the EMCDDA. The advantages of such an arrangement include the further integration of European institutions with counterparts in the beneficiary countries. It would facilitate the mobilization of technical expertise in key areas. But it would provide another rupture in an already fragmented programme. There will be start up costs to working in West Africa and LAC, and neither organisation has capacity in development issues.

Recommendation 1. Strengthening CORMS (or any other coordinating unit)

141 CORMS, TORS, 6(a). 142 See section 3.3.1. 143 Drug control measures are controversial, and the standing of scientists working in epidemiology, social science or pharmacology is compromised if their agency is overtly associated with repressive measures.

58 (i) The least disruptive and most promising solution lies in the expansion of the CORMS mandate, an expansion in capacity, the re-arrangement of its human resources, and the involvement of the EUDs at national level. It is therefore proposed that the CORMS mandate be strengthened to include CRP coordination. An official mechanism should be established for every project to be reporting to CORMS regularly, and CORMS should send reports with comments and recommendations on to the Task Manager at the Commission. CORMS would be monitoring project performance and adherence to objectives. It would have the authority to demand information and to make suggestions on implementation. It would conduct regular gap analysis for projects, pointing to achievements and shortcomings, to help identify bottle necks and find solutions from within the programme. CORMS should also monitor that project milestones, if these are defined for the next phase, are reached, and to account for shortfalls. (ii) The current arrangement using KEs from MS LEAs is unsatisfactory and resources should be recommitted to hire 3 FT or 6 PT experts. These need not be based at the CORMS offices, but should enable CORMS to have a stronger presence in Brussels and liaise more closely with DEVCO and EEAS units with a stake in regional security issues. They should also be working more closely with agencies like Europol, MAOC and FRONTEX. But also with scientific organisations like EMCDDA, research institutes, civil society organisations and political bodies. One of their key functions should be to collect and collate information from the different projects and agencies and law enforcement communities in the EU with counterparts in beneficiary countries supported by the programme. Experts should conduct independent missions to support projects, help integrate and create cooperation between CRP projects, and with CRP and other interventions. This requires that experts are familiar with EU activities, with MS activities, have experience in LAC and WA according to the region assigned and have an overview of drug policy and crime control. (iii) Programme documentation is currently descriptive. CORMS experts should review project information and work these into situation reports. This could range from description of project achievements, to identifying gaps, be these operational or in the knowledge base, to delivering analysis. The CRP, as a collection of specialised sector activities is generating a unique insight into the world of drug trafficking, organised crime and policy. This information should be utilized and shared with participating projects. They should contribute to the knowledge base on organised crime and trafficking by collecting concrete information of incidents and cases from CRP and related programmes and ask critical questions. It could make a contribution to understanding of TOC configuration and linkages. It could also use programme data to reflect on impact of measures, be this precursor control or alternative development. (iv) CORMS status has to be changed. First, there needs to be an established mechanism for approval of activities for the cycle in question and the delegation of authority. To facilitate flexibility decisions on mission travel, conference attendance for the team etc. should be made by TL without recourse to Commission as long as such expenditure says within agreed budget. Secondly, the Commission and the EEAS have to facilitate the participation of CORMS in activities organised by COSI so that the CRP can be linked up with internal security. (v) CORMS should continue to be accountable to a Steering committee comprising TLs of all composite projects as well as the Commission. The CORMS work programme should be set on a bi-annual basis, and mechanisms to be established to independently evaluate the activities. Staff should work towards defined outputs. (vi) It should be considered for additional projects - such as the proposed training in criminal investigation or in institutional support for West African LEAs to be managed by CORMS. Particularly where these are too small to merit an independent project and too much at variance with existing projects. (vii) The CORMS consortium should include only agencies (or personnel) that are not involved in the managing of any CRP projects. Job descriptions should be drafted for those to manage the projects. This means finding replacements for FIIAPP, CIVIPOL and SOCA as these all contribute experts for other CRP projects. (viii) In each country in which CRP activities take place the EUD should organise a project advisory committee involving national stakeholders, KEs from CRP projects and CORMS. The PAC should be briefed on every event or at least this information made readily available, should provide a forum where national beneficiaries can express concerns, and provide an interface for national

59 agencies, the EUD and the CRP. It would also provide an opportunity to link the beneficiaries with the wider CRP, and at the same time provide an opportunity where project activities are coordinated with other EU or related activities in country. (ix) CORMS should provide expertise on activities against organised crime, drug control, and drugs and development issues to the Commission. It could also provide this expertise to the European Union Delegations with a drug project portfolio and to the European Parliament.

Recommendation 2. Expanding the Technical Expertise on drug and crime control in development Widen the terms of reference of the programme. The preoccupation with a single commodity is at best accidental and misleading. The focus should shift from cocaine to illicit commodities. The focus on cocaine and heroin owes to the significance of these products in the criminal economy. Yet the very premise of both CRP and HRP is that organised crime groups are nimble and operate across regions. It is therefore contrary to this presupposition to divide the programmes along hemispheric lines. There should be a single programme coordinating a set of projects with different foci. The advantage this has is to create the working relationships between LEAs, databases and experience to facilitate trans-regional cooperation. Such a merger would be complex due to the differences in some of the aspects of trafficking along the two routes. Yet at European level similar organisations are involved in the importation. It may be useful to start with closer collaboration at this end through information sharing and analysis. It could be envisaged to gradually increase CORMS responsibilities for HRP and to match this with acommensurate rise in resources. It would require staff with experience pertinent to the HRP to join the CORMS team. There is an opportunity to gather and analyse the experience of the CRP and HRP but also other Security Sector Reform projects. At the moment experience is often dissipated or remains with individuals. The cohesion of the CRP, its vision and the existence of a coordinating unit create the opportunity to provide the Commission and the EEAS with a source of expertise on drug control and organised crime. It further allows for experience from EU funded interventions to be turned into proprietary intellectual property to inform policies and negotiations, including EU-LAC negotiations or the aborted EU-US partnerships. To avoid creating another structure it is therefore recommended that such “technical unit” be integrated into the Coordinating Mechanism. It is further recommended that this is reviewed every 24 months and that the commitment to the coordinating mechanism is on a different time scale to that made to the programme beneficiaries. The rationale for this is that while at present there is an urgent need for coordinating CRP activities, the need for a coordinating steer may diminish over time as the projects grow together, in accordance with the original vision behind the programme. Equally, the insights from analysing of impact and related information may become integrated into the programme and no longer require a dedicated unit. In the interest of keeping the project light and efficient a review of both the “technical unit” and the coordinating mechanism is recommended.

Recommendation 3. Project commitment to a 5-10 years cycle The projects have so far been planned for multiple periods of 12 months. The ambitions of the programme are difficult to realise with such short time frames. What the CRP entails is promoting law enforcement cooperation based on trust. This takes a time to build and has to be anchored in functioning institutions. Programme planning should take a mid-term view and set a number of milestones and review points for each project (monitored by CORMS).

Recommendation 4. Prepare for exit strategies and focus on trans-regional actions & PRELAC CORMS, the coordinating unit, or the Commission task manager should find an exit strategy by identifying funding envelopes at regional, national or thematic level for current CRP activities. It should furthermore reconfigure which aspects of the projects should continue with IfS funding, and develop new projects as needs are identified and apply for funding. None of the current projects are sustainable without external support, though they leave a legacy in enhanced capacity and

60 legislative frameworks. CORMS should begin working with beneficiary governments to mainstream projects and allocate funding from internal sources. It should also work with DEVCO and DCI to transit programmes to regional and national funding envelopes. This is particularly relevant for projects that have no trans-regional dimensions. Review of PRELAC: this well managed project has made a significant contribution to the public/private partnership in drug control. It is also a promising template for the control of hazardous substances used in illegal mining. Valuable though it may be, the project seems an anomalous recipient of IfS funding because the project impact does not seem to debilitate organised crime.144 There is also a significant overlap with COPOLAD strand 4 activities which needs to be equalised. Given the level of cooperation between the two programmes on the issue, all precursor controlled activities should be folded into one programme. As a consequence of precursor control, seizures of hazardous chemicals are piling up in unsuitable storage facilities at different Latin American PoEs. A study on disposal of these chemicals is urgently needed and should be commissioned either by PRELAC, COPOLAD or in its new capacity as an information processing and analysis centre by CORMS.

Recommendation 5. Revise the CRP relationship with institutions in beneficiary countries & AMERIPOL (i) The brief of the CRP has been building up LEA capacity, but not institutions. Arguably, functioning institutions at national level are a precondition for cooperation at regional level, hence raising such capacity would fall into the IfS mandate.145 It is recommended that part of the CRP be to support the organisational development of law enforcement agencies in Benin, Ghana, Togo and Senegal by improving standard operating procedures, organisational strategies, training needs of agencies pertinent to the programme.146 This could be undertaken as an independent piece of work managed by CORMS, provided it gets a stronger mandate and resource, or be integrated into SEACOP or AIRCOP. (ii) AMERIPOL-EU: The stated ambition of the AMERIPOL project is to form a Latin American equivalent of Europol. However worthy in itself, this deviates from the original project objectives. Moreover, there are significant obstacles to this ambition, particularly the lack of political oversight and the fact that the organisation does not have a legal personality.147. Partly as a result, the project has failed to realise the primary purpose of encouraging systematic information sharing within the region and between the region and West Africa. AMERIPOL-EU should review the options for realising its two specific objectives - to strengthen the information exchange regionally and trans-regionally, which is the second objective. The first of these, the ambition to build AMERIPOL regional information exchange platform is still unfulfilled. It is clear that there are political rivalries manifested in several rival systems being created simultaneously: MERCOSUR148 is a regional rivalry for leadership, Argentina and the regional Interpol office want to create a system called SISME; an idea of creating UNAPOL is rapidly being developed by the UNASUR nation149, and finally there is CICAD’s SIRENA project150 (see annex 8). At this point it is important that the alternatives information systems currently under construction are considered. While all these systems have shortcomings a critical assessment should be made by the CRP. AMERIPOL must overcome the issue associated with judicial recognition, political oversight and regional rivalries so as to develop the trans-regional information exchange component working with partners in West Africa (WAPIS or ECOWAS) and the Caribbean (IMPACS).

144 As discussed in section 3.6.5 it only seems to strengthen organised crime groups in the cocaine production. 145 See 3.2.3 and 6.1.2. 146 See 3.6.3 and the Africa Mission report p. 12 on the handling of drug seizures at Dakar airport. 147 Se 3.6.4; this precludes NAUs from exchanging classified information, one of the basic raison d’être for the entire CRP. 148 MERCOSUR is an economic integration organization with 5 members and 5 observers. Only deals with South America. 149 UNASUR is a political union of Latin American Nations plus Guyana and Surinam the UNAPOL project is in its infancy and has yet to be approved. 150 CICAD is the drug office of the OAS it is developing the SIRENA project as part of its LE activities which include a training regional intelligence school which specializes in drug trafficking - ERCAIAD - which until 2016 will operate from Colombian National Police installations in Bogota. Being it under the OAS CICAD covers all LAC, but also includes the US.

61 The second grand objective of AMERIPOL, the creation of a regional training program for LE personnel and prosecutors has also met with obstacles. As mentioned above, AMERIPOL’s future is closely associated with the comprehensive solution of the issues mentioned. If these issues are not solved the project is advised to deposit the training component in an OAS supervised specialized school, Escuela Regional de la Comunidad Americana de Inteligencia Antidrogas (ERCAIAD) that has the political oversight of CICAD and has the approval, acceptance and recognition of all LAC nations and is currently working out of Colombian National Police installations in Bogota. There should also be a regular exchange with WAPIS and with the Dakar and Accra LO platforms to facilitate the flow of information across the Atlantic.

Recommendation 6. Extension to LAC SEACOP: The planned extension of SEACOP to the Caribbean and Latin America provides and opportunity to bring Latin American LEAs as partners into the project. For instance, the Colombian police already runs an extensive technical cooperation programme with beneficiaries in Central America and Africa. They should be integrated as trainers and where appropriate mentors. The CRP should encourage the exchange of LOs between countries participating in SEACOP. There are further benefits from joint trainings for LEAs from the Caribbean and West Africa. In West Africa further efforts should be made to strengthen cooperation between the GCCP and SEACOP. SEACOP should also consider stationing an expert in West Africa ready to provide hands on support to the JMCUs and other stakeholders. AIRCOP: Latin America should learn the lessons from past trainings and scoping missions and be sensitive to the capacities and ambitions of Latin American partners.151 Brazil and Colombia should be included in CRP activities as partners not beneficiaries. In both countries airport control agencies should be integrated into the project communication networks with WA. The most threatened countries of the region are in Central America. Both projects should be extended to Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador in partnership with Colombia and Brazil.

Recommendation 7. Training focus on criminal investigations In West Africa activities by teams involved in both vector projects have led to seizures and arrests. These have not led to much follow up or upstream investigation. It is recommended to provide in conjunction with MS LEAs, particularly those with a presence in the region, a targeted training programme in advanced criminal ad anti-money laundering investigation skills. As an alternative, criminal investigations could be inserted into the AIRCOP training programme. There is the opportunity for a trade-off between qualitative depth in a number of identified key countries, and geographic programme extension. The investigative training programme should be implemented in close cooperation with WAPIS, AIRCOP, AML-WA and SEACOP.

Recommendation 8.Focus on trans-regional information exchange The programme has to develop new and better ways of encouraging the key objective of the CRP by (i) accelerating trans-regional information exchange mechanisms within projects (AIRCOP, SEACOP) and (ii) by facilitating the process in the wider CRP context, i.e. CORMS steering group meetings, country missions. It should also push for the involvement of partners in LAC, including IMPACS, national governments, national agencies in regular events with West African partners to facilitate both the development of networks and institutional connections.

Recommendation 9. Develop judiciary component in West Africa In West Africa the judiciary aspect needs strengthening. Judges and prosecutors have to be provided with training on organized crime, anti-money laundering and counter-financing of terrorism issues and reforms of court processes need to be accelerated. At this point the chances

151 See 3.4.2 - Brazil provided trainers for Cape Verde.

62 of international or trans-regional judiciary cooperation are remote, and any proposed activity ineligible for IfS funding. It is therefore recommended that the CRP (CORMS, Commission task manager) work closely with EU projects on Justice sector reform to ensure that drug control and organised crime issues are incorporated. This involves training of judges in drug cases and financial investigations, but also a review of sentencing guidelines to ensure proportionality, due process and the reduction of pre trial detention for suspects. CORMS should monitor the impact of CRP and other drug control measure on composition of prison populations in beneficiary countries.

Recommendation 10. Linkage with Civil Society and Political Authorities The CRP needs to become involved with civil society organisations to establish awareness of organised crime threats, to gain larger public support for the programme and to ensure there is media scrutiny of LEAs and courts. This should be particularly effective to fight corruption, ensure compliance with human rights, and steer the project towards governance issues. The programme should also support parliamentary committees that have oversight functions over security services and engage constructively with drug policy discussion in LAC keeping in mind that the purpose of the programme is to fight organised crime. These activities are clearly ineligible for IfS funding as they are purely on a national basis, but they are critical to ensure that CRP objectives with regard to governance and human rights are realised. Once again, it will require liaison with other programmes funded under national and regional envelopes. CORMS or task manager should work with DEVCO partners in including information on drug control measures in the development of civil society projects at national or regional level.

63 Annex 1 – Terms of Reference

SPECIFIC TERMS OF REFERENCE

Mid Term Review of the Cocaine Route Programme financed by the Instrument for Stability

1. BACKGROUND 1.1 The Fight against Organised Crime in EU Policies Transnational organized crime is considered a major threat to human security, affecting the social, economic, political and cultural development of societies worldwide. It is a multi-faceted phenomenon and has manifested itself in different activities, among others, drug trafficking, trafficking in human beings, trafficking in firearms, smuggling of migrants, illicit production and trade of falsified medicines, cybercrime, money laundering, etc. At global level, the EU supports, and is in most cases itself a party to, the relevant UN conventions, in particular the 2000 UN Convention on Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC) and its three protocols (respectively on trafficking in human beings, migrant smuggling, and arms trafficking), the 2003 UN Convention on Anti-corruption (UNCAC) and the UN conventions of 1961, 1971 and 1988 related to drugs. These conventions, which have been signed and/or ratified by most states in the world, establish a set of legal obligations for each signatory with regard to prevention measures, the definition of criminal offences, sanctions, information exchange, special investigation measures, mutual assistance, extradition, asset recovery, etc. The Commission as a donor contributes to the implementation of this international legal framework by providing support to countries which request technical assistance in this field. What is more, the fight against organised crime has been one of the objectives of the EU since the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, with a series of instruments and tools adopted by the EU in the area of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) with a view to harmonising national legislation, creating specialised agencies (such as Europol and Eurojust) and promoting police and judicial cooperation. The 2003 European Security Strategy also recognises organised crime as one of the key challenges faced by the EU and the international community, which it is necessary to tackle through enhanced international cooperation. The 2010 Commission Communication on an EU Internal Security Strategy describes in detail further actions and recommendations on how the EU should contribute to strengthen the fight against organised crime. The transnational and trans-regional nature of organised crime require that internal EU efforts to fight organised crime be linked to and complemented with efforts in other regions of the world, and connected with long-term development objectives, as noted in the 2003 EU External Security Strategy as well as in the 2008 Report on its implementation and in the 2010 EU Internal Security Strategy. In addition to the various strategic, legal or operational instruments adopted by the EU which contribute to the fight against organised crime in general, the EU also took several measures to address specific forms of organised crime. At the more strategic level, it seems worthwhile to mention in particular:  The EU Drug Strategy 2005-2012, with its two Action Plans covering respectively the periods 2005-2008 and 2009-2012, set out detailed actions on how to address drug trafficking;  The 2005 EU Action Plan on trafficking in human beings promoting best practices, standards and procedures on this issue; and  The 2003 Commission Communication on Corruption also addresses measures on how to prevent and combat corruption linked to organised crime through law enforcement and judicial cooperation.

64 Amongst the multifaceted components of organised crime, illicit drugs are a major threat to the health and safety of individuals and societies in the EU and a threat to public order and living conditions worldwide. Drug traffickers’ routes and methods for smuggling or for laundering the proceeds of illicit trafficking in drugs are constantly evolving to escape controls and seizures. Two main drug routes are used to channel drugs into the EU: (i) the "cocaine route" from Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) via West Africa (WA); and (ii) the "heroin route" from Afghanistan. 1.2 The Cocaine Route Programme The Cocaine Route Programme (as well as the parallel Heroin Route Programme) was conceived to address organised crime rather than drugs trafficking. The issue is not only to tackle drugs trafficking as the same criminal networks are exploiting all sources of illicit profits to get the highest benefit from their functional networks (source/production, trade/transit/logistics, financing, market development, corruption, criminalisation of States, money-laundering etc.). Since 2007, 23.2 million euro has been committed along the Cocaine Route. EU actions along the Cocaine Route cover 36 countries of which half in Africa, essentially West-Africa, 5 in the Caribbean countries and the rest in Latin and Central America. The Cocaine Route Programme focuses on enhancing the capacity for international cooperation of law enforcement and judicial services of the involved countries and regional organisations for contributing to the fight against international criminal networks. In the first phases of implementation the interventions focussed more on Western Africa where the threat has appeared more recently and the gap in capacity is very high. Trans-regional links will be gradually established with Latin America and the Caribbean, as the West Africa region could benefit from the experiences already developed there. The Programme also strengthens the already existing capacities in Latin America and the Caribbean to fight against organised crime, and seek establishment of links with West Africa. Drugs are smuggled from Latin America via the Caribbean region towards West Africa, also as transit and storage area and then to Europe mostly by sea and air routes, but also land routes through the Sahel. This explains the origin of the projects AIRCOP and SEACOP. These are implemented in close cooperation with other on-going initiatives such as the UNODC Container Control Programme and the West African Coast Initiative. In order to invest the profits of their illicit activities and avoid having their assets seized by the government, drug traffickers must transform the monetary proceeds from their criminal activity into revenue from apparently legal sources. For that reason it is important to guarantee that the countries of origin, transit and destination have criminalized money laundering and instituted appropriate regulations to deter money laundering and make it easier to detect and seize the assets of criminal activity. This explains the origin of the ongoing project GAFISUD - and a new money laundering project in West Africa, GIABA, which will be launched soon. Drug production and consequently trafficking as well as enrichment depend on the availability of chemical precursors. In most cases the precursors are obtained through licit trade. The situation in Latin America and the Caribbean concerning the production and trafficking of drugs is in constant flux with new challenges appearing such as the substitution and recycling of precursors previously considered irreplaceable, and the inadequate sanctions at the penal level. This explains the origin of the ongoing project PRELAC. West Africa police is lacking modern means to collect, centralize, share, analyze crucial police information related to crime, serious organized crime and drugs trafficking. This explains the origin of the ongoing project WAPIS. The lack of regional and interregional cooperation between Latin American and Caribbean countries on law enforcement and judicial cooperation justified the launching of the project called AMERIPOL. Finally, an overarching contract has been signed to enhance synergies and avoid duplication of efforts between the different components of the programme and this is called CORMS. The budget breakdown of the programme is as follows:

Period of Amount (EU Abbreviation Title Partner(s) Geographical Scope execution Contribution)

Prevention of the 36m (03/09-03/12) 1,724,260 diversion of drugs Peru, Mexico, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Trinidad and PRELAC I & II UNODC precursors in the Tobago, Venezuela and Jamaica. LAC region 36m (03/12-02/15) 3,000,000 36m (01/10-01/13) 2,300,000 UNODC + Interpol and Airports covered: Brazil (Sao Paulo, partner), Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Airport AIRCOP I & II 36m (12/10-12/13) WCO with Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Togo, Argentina, Benin, Cameroon, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Communication 2,500,000 & III experts from Jamaica, Kenya, Venezuela, South Africa (Johannesburg, associate), Ethiopia (Addis Ababa, Programme 36m (to be EU Member associate) and possibly Gambia 3,000,000 launched) States

Support to the fight 679,500 GAFISUD I & against money 36m (12/09-12/12) Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, México, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay GAFISUD II laundering in Latin 24m (12/11-12/13) and selected Caribbean states America 1,200,000 Seaport Cooperation Senegal, Ghana, and Cape Verde in phase I; for phase II: Sierra Leone, Togo, Benin, SEACOP I & II 48m (07/10-07/14) 2,999,180 FFIAP Programme Guinea-Bissau and Gambia Law Enforcement & AMERIPOL I & Colombia, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru and Panama, Martinique, Venezuela, Barbados, Judicial Cooperation 48m (12/10-12/14) 3,745,000 FFIAP II Trinidad and Tobago and Argentina in Latin America Italian Cocaine Route Ministry of Peru, Mexico, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Trinidad and CORMS 36m (03/11-03/14) 1,000,000 Monitoring Support Foreign Tobago, Venezuela and Jamaica. Affairs Anti-money To be GIABA laundering West To be launched 1,800,000 Nigeria, Senegal, Ghana and Cape Verde decided Africa West Africa Police 2,200,000 WAPIS To be launched Interpol Nigeria, Benin, Ghana, Mali, Niger and Mauritania Cape Information System 3,000,000 TOTAL 29,147,940.00

1.3 PRELAC I and II (Prevention of the diversion of drugs precursors in the LAC region) The Overall Objective of this component is to contribute to the fight against the manufacture of drugs and its trafficking in Latin America and the Caribbean by assisting the region in struggling against the diversion of precursors from the licit trade. The Specific Objectives are:  PRELAC I: To strengthen the capacities of national administrative control authorities of selected countries within the region to prevent the diversion of precursors; to enhance the cooperation between these countries thanks to a better knowledge of each other's system and the overall trends in precursors diversion in the region through enhanced exchange of information.  PRELAC II: Same as PRELAC I but stronger focus on the role of private sector (i.e., enhance the inter-agency cooperation through a culture of collaboration with private sector operators) + wider geographical scope to cover the whole LAC region. Countries covered: Peru, Mexico, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela and Jamaica. 1.4 AIRCOP The Overall Objective of this component is to build drug-interdiction capacities at selected international airports in West Africa, Morocco and Brazil. The Specific Objectives are:  Establishing Joint Airport Interdiction Task Forces (JAITF);  Connecting JAITF to international law enforcement databases and communication networks to enable the transmission in real time to other international airports of operational information aimed at intercepting illicit shipments;  Promoting intelligence and information sharing between services at national and international level as well as an intelligence-led approach to countering drug trafficking. In AIRCOP II the scope was widened to include control on parcels and to cover a larger number of airports. 1.5 GAFISUD The Overall Objective of this component is to support the fight against organised crime on the cocaine route. The Specific Objectives are:  GAFISUD I: strengthening the investigation and prosecution of money laundering, especially in the non-banking financial sector; fostering international cooperation.  GAFISUD II: strengthening existing capacities and procedures in the field asset laundering investigation in the GAFISUD member countries; strengthening administrative and judicial cooperation, and law enforcement in the GAFISUD member countries; fostering cooperation lines to fight asset laundering and formalizing agreements with countries and/or regional groups defined as the priority (GAFIC, GIABA). 1.6 SEACOP The Overall Objective of this component is to build capacities and strengthen international cooperation in the fight against maritime trafficking and associated criminal networks in West Africa. The Specific Objectives are:  Supporting the set-up of specialist intelligence and investigation units located in seaports or sensitive coastal areas;  Reinforcing seaport capacities and support the set-up of Joint Maritime Control Units (JMCU);

67  Developing regional intelligence and maritime cooperation and support the set-up of a regional intelligence and maritime coordination centre;  Organising regional training and explore the feasibility of a regional training facility;  Exploring the feasibility of setting up a regional maritime information system. 1.7 AMERIPOL The Overall Objective of this component is to enhance the capacity for international cooperation of law enforcement, judicial and prosecuting authorities of the partner countries in tackling transnational organised crime networks. The Specific Objectives are:  Strengthening exchange of information and intelligence at regional and trans-regional level especially with West Africa and EU;  Improving prosecutors’ and law enforcement agencies’ capability to carry out complex investigations at regional and trans-regional level. 1.8 CORMS The Overall Objective of this component is to increase the coherence of EU action under the Cocaine Route programme. The Specific Objectives are to strengthen the trans-regional coordination, coherence and complementarity effect among the various projects contained in the Cocaine Route Programme, both within the programme itself (internal coherence) and with respect to any other relevant initiative, conducted by the EU, MS or other international organisations (external coherence). 1.9 GIABA Not yet commenced. 1.10 WAPIS Not yet commenced. Another urgent need and a prerequisite in the fight against organized crime identified by a feasibility study for the recently launched WAPIS (West African Police Information System) project regards police information management systems in WA and the Sahel. Since the spring of 2011, the countries in the Sahel region have been directly confronted with the impact of the crisis in North Africa, including in Libya, which is further affecting the stability of the region and increasing insecurity. The security challenges are numerous, such as the extension of the terrorist threat, illegal immigration, transnational organized crime, weapons dissemination, terrorists acting increasingly in partnership with organized crime, striving to increase their illegal revenue through kidnapping and drugs trafficking. So far, Sahel and West African countries are lacking inter alia basic modern means to collect, centralize, share and analyze crucial police information related to crime, trafficking of drugs, human beings, forced child labor, arms, terrorism and consequently serious organized crime in general. Criminal information, the key element of efficient modern policing, is therefore not properly collected or exchanged in a coordinated and sustainable way within the region or internationally. Terrorist activities in the Sahel region can thus grow more easily, impacting directly the whole West African region. 1.11 COPOLAD COPOLAD is a programme funded under the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) that is not a part of this review. The programme does however cover several aspects also covered through the CRP and as such, the review shall include an assessment as outlined below under Requested Services. For that purpose, COPOLAD is briefly outlined here. The overall objective of COPOLAD is to contribute to improving the coherence, balance and impact of anti-drugs policies in Latin America. The specific objective is to strengthen capacities and encourage the process of elaborating anti-drugs policies in its different stages in Latin American countries by improving the dialogue and reinforcing the cooperation of the national agencies and

68 other actors responsible for global and sector anti-drugs policies in the countries of Latin America and the EU. COPOLAD includes four components:  Consolidation of the EU-LAC Anti-Drugs Coordination and Cooperation Mechanism;  Consolidation of the national Observatories of Latin American countries;  Capacity-building in the reduction of demand;  Capacity-building in the reduction of supply.

2. DESCRIPTION OF THE ASSIGNMENT 2.1 Global Objective The Mid Term Review will review the overall performance so far of the Programme. 2.2 Specific Objective This Mid Term Review will provide the decision-makers in the European Commission, other EU institutions and the wider public with sufficient information to:  Make an overall independent assessment about the past performance of the programme, paying particular attention to the implementation of the programme actions against its objectives;  Identify key lessons and propose practical recommendations for follow-up actions. The Mid Term Review will base its conclusions on a review of the performance of operations so far, both as originally set within the specific Financing Decisions as well as defined by the specific annual budgets and work programmes. 2.3 Requested Services, issues to be studied and expected results The consultants shall verify, analyse and assess in necessary detail the issues outlined in Annex II "Layout, structure of the Final Report". The list of issues is not intended to be exhaustive. The questions/issues refer to the five evaluation criteria endorsed by the OECD-DAC (relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact), and to the EC-specific evaluation criteria (EC added value and coherence). Further reference should be made to the materials mentioned in section - ‘Methodology’ of these Terms of Reference. The consultants are requested to verify, analyse and assess the integration and impact of cross cutting issues in the programme, with a particular emphasis on human rights and governance aspects. The consultants are required to use their professional judgement and experience to review all relevant factors and to bring these to the attention of the European Commission. A specific task of the team leader is to identify and answer evaluation questions, as well as to formulate conclusions and recommendations in relation to the purpose of the Mid-Term Review exercise. They shall as a minimum include:  Validating and refining the proposed methodological approach to the Mid-Term Review;  Preparing a detailed inventory of activities through a mapping of all activities planned and implemented by the Programme during the Review period;  Presenting/reconstructing intervention logics for each of the projects of the Programme;  Collecting and analysing the relevant necessary data to answer the evaluation questions regarding the selected evaluation criteria in relation to the evaluation activities;  Identifying a set of evaluation questions; appropriate judgement criteria for each question; relevant quantitative and qualitative indicators for each criteria to be validated by the Reference Group; giving answers to all evaluation questions, and provide robust and useable conclusions and recommendations to improve the implementation of the programme and/or any future activities in this area.

69  Presenting preliminary findings and recommendations for comments from the Reference Group.  Presenting findings and recommendations in a final Review according to the requirements listed below.  Presenting findings and recommendations to the Reference Group. In particular, the requested services will include:  An assessment of the overall relevance of the programme, in particular in relation to the objectives of the IfS and the related IfS Strategy and MIP.  An assessment of the performance of the contractors in the provision of the required experts and in fulfilling the contractual terms of reference;  A review of the institutional set up for the programme.  An assessment of the complementarity with the COPOLAD programme in particular as well as other related programmes being implemented or planned. 2.4 Approach and methodology The Mid-Term Review is managed by DEVCO/D5. A Reference Group will be established including as a minimum DEVCO/D5, EEAS and DG JUST. Additional members could be foreseen. Their main functions are:  To aggregate and summarise the views of the Commission services and other bodies involved, and to act as an interface between the consultants and the services, thereby supplementing bilateral contacts;  To ensure that the review team has access to and has consulted all relevant information sources and documents related to the project/programme;  To validate the evaluation Questions;  To discuss and comment on notes and reports delivered by the review team. Comments by individual group members are compiled into a single document by the review manager and subsequently transmitted to the review team;  To assist in feedback of the findings, conclusions, lessons and recommendations from the Mid- Term review. For detailed information on the role of the reference group see the following link: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/europeaid/evaluation/methodology/methods/mth_stg_en.htm For methodological guidance refer to the EuropeAid's evaluation methodology website http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/evaluation/methodology/index_en.htm - where guidance is available for both evaluation managers (Commission staff) and evaluation teams (consultants) as well as to 'Aid Delivery Methods', Volume 1 ‘Project Cycle Management Guidelines (EuropeAid, March 2004): http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/multimedia/publications/publications/manuals-tools/t101_en.htm. In general, the approach should be developed and implemented as presented below (for further details consult the methodology website above mentioned). 2.5 Quality of the Final Review Report The quality of the final report will be assessed by the review manager using a quality assessment grid (see annex III). The explanation on how to fill this grid is available on the following link: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/europeaid/evaluation/methodology/guidelines/gui_qal_flr_trg_en.htm

3. EXPERTS PROFILE This review is to be carried out by a team with advanced knowledge, and experience in at least the following fields:  Strong professional experience in evaluation, with particular reference to EC-funded projects/programmes, and familiarity with the methodological approach set by the European Commission;

70  Sound and proven experience in evaluation methods and techniques, preferably in developing countries, including at the programme and policy level plus relevant field experience. Ability to assess and communicate best practices;  In-depth knowledge of organised crime related issues especially in Latin American, Caribbean and African countries;  In-depth understanding of EU external policies and practices. Appropriate experience across the range of instruments, programmes and types of external co-operation, and access to knowledge on the relevant regions;  To carry out the study, the consultant must be familiar with the Instrument for Stability as well as the relevant EU policy and strategic documents regarding security;  The team must possess excellent drafting skills. The review team will be composed of 3 experts with the following profiles and qualifications: Expert I Team Leader (Senior) 64 working days Expert II Law Enforcement (Senior) 62 working days Expert III Criminal Justice (Senior) 62 working days Expertise is required in the field of development work in relation to public administration, law enforcement, criminal justice, counter-terrorism, justice and security sector reform, criminal justice and media, broader rule of law, human rights and gender issues. The team must have a combined coverage of the aspects above (law enforcement and criminal justice) while also covering associated issues such as money laundering, chemical precursors etc. linked to drugs. Education All experts should hold a Master Degrees (or equivalent) in one or more of the following fields: social or political sciences, law, public administration or any other relevant discipline. If an expert does not hold a Master Degree, then 15 years of experience in the areas mentioned below are required. General professional experience Ten years professional experience is required in the field of development work in relation to public administration, law enforcement, criminal justice and justice and security sector reform. Experience and / or understanding of criminal justice and media and of broader rule of law, human rights and gender issues is required. At least one of the experts should have extensive experience in institutional and capacity building of the security and / or judicial sector, sound criminal justice background and specific experience in / on criminal justice with a focus on organised crime. The aforementioned areas must be covered by any of the experts to ensure that the team of experts can provide collectively the required expertise. It is not expected that all experts have experience in all of the areas specified before but a broad experience in the aforementioned areas or a good pooling of experience between experts is required. Specific professional experience (i) at least one of the experts should have 5 years working experience with EU policies, programmes and procedures in one or more of the following areas: justice and security sector reform, democratisation, support to law enforcement and criminal justice institutions, institutional capacity-building, organised crime; (ii) working experience with European law enforcement and / or judicial institutions and / or with Eurojust and Europol will be an advantage; (iii) working experience with EU or other donor policies and funding modalities in the area of public administration, law enforcement, criminal justice, organised crime, justice and security sector reform, institution and capacity building in particular in the covered regions/countries;

71 (iv) excellent knowledge of other donors' policies in the area of public administration in relation to law enforcement, organised crime, counter-terrorism, justice and security sector reform and institution and capacity building; (v) working experience in cooperating with donors, international organisations, public administrations and civil society in the sector; (vi) proven familiarity with human rights and gender sensitive approach to development and with the development-security nexus. The aforementioned requirements for specific professional experience areas must be covered by any of the experts to ensure that the team of experts can provide collectively the required expertise. It is not expected that all experts have all required expertise above but a broad experience in the aforementioned areas or a good pooling of experience between experts will be highly appreciated. Language and skills (i) All experts should have full working knowledge of English and excellent report writing, good communication and networking skills, adaptability and social awareness, ability to work under pressure and to meet strict deadlines and ability to work at senior level; (ii) At least one of the team members must have excellent command of spoken and written French; (iii) At least one of the team members must have excellent command of spoken and written Spanish. The composition of the team of experts should be balanced to enable complete coverage of the different aspects of project review (review methods and techniques) as set out in these terms of reference, including cross-cutting issues (environmental sustainability, gender equity, good governance and human rights). Civil servants and other agents of the public administration of the beneficiary countries, regardless of their administrative situation, shall not be recruited as experts in contracts financed by the EU in the beneficiary country unless the prior written approval has been granted by the European Union. It is to be noted that experts that have been involved in the identification or implementation of projects that in the framework of the Programme should be excluded from the review in order to avoid potential conflicts of interest. The consultant is reminded to utilise the standard model CV which can be found using the following link: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/work/framework-contract/commission2011/index_en.htm Please note the requirement to specify in the CV, the proposed role in the project, the category and the name of the firm in the consortium the particular expert is contracted by. In accordance with the general Terms of Reference of the Framework Contract, the Contracting Authority may decide to organise telephone interviews with the proposed experts (or at least the team leader). These interviews would take place in the two weeks following the reception of all the offers. The offers should therefore indicate the dates and hours when the proposed experts could be available during this period for a telephone interview of about 30 minutes, as well as the phone number(s) where they could be reached.

4. LOCATION AND DURATION 4.1 Starting period and foreseen finishing date of assignment . The assignment is tentatively scheduled to take place commencing around in November with completion in July 2013; . It is expected that the assignment will be carried out over a period of maximum 8 months; . Please note that the 8 months correspond to the total duration of the assignment which includes a period for the provision of comments on the draft report. The effective period of performance is outlined below;

72 . Upon receipt of consolidated comments from the various stakeholders, the Consultant shall incorporate these comments into the final report to be forwarded to the EC not later than two weeks after receipt of the comments; . Saturday and Sunday can be included as working days if requested by the consultant. The review team will be requested to travel to Brussels where the European Commission headquarters are located, to at least 9 locations in LAC and West Africa as well as several other destinations in Europe as outlined below (to be determined). 4.2 Management and steering of the Review 4.2.1 Desk Phase The Desk phase will include an initial kick off meeting in Brussels with the Reference Group followed by collection of documents with the Review Manager and other stakeholders based there, such as EC representatives (DG DEVCO, etc.) and the EEAS. In the inception stage of the Desk Phase, the relevant programming documents should be reviewed, as well as documents shaping the wider strategy/policy framework. An inception report will be produced. The review team will then create a logical framework framing the review exercise. On the basis of the information collected the review team should:  Prepare the logical framework;  Comment on the issues and propose a set of evaluation questions together with explanation comments;  Develop evaluation questions into provisional indicators, analysis strategy, sub-questions and information sources;  Propose the work plan for the finalisation of the first phase;  Confirm the final time schedule. In the Desk Phase, the review team should also carry out the following tasks:  Review systematically the relevant available documents;  Present an indicative methodology to the overall assessment of the programme;  Interview the programme management, EC services and other key partners;  Present each evaluation question stating the information already gathered and their limitations;  Provide a first partial answer to the question, identify the issues still to be covered and the assumptions still to be tested, and describe a full method to answer the question;  Identify and present the list of tools to be applied in the Field Phase;  List all preparatory steps already taken for the Field Phase. At the end of the Desk phase a comprehensive Desk report shall be prepared. 5 working days per expert (incl. travel) should be foreseen for the first mission to Brussels. Furthermore, a total of 21 additional working days for all experts are allocated for the Desk phase at the place of origin of the respective team members. In total 36 working days are consequently allocated to the Desk phase of this assignment of which 15 days are foreseen be spent in Brussels. 4.2.2 Field phase During the field phase, it is foreseen that the team of experts will spend a total of 80 working days on mission in a number of African, Caribbean and Latin American countries. Specifically, for calculation purposes, it is tentatively foreseen that the team will conduct one (or max. two) missions to West Africa and one to the Caribbean and Latin America region. It is foreseen that approximately 9 countries will be visited and that each team of two experts travelling will spend approximately three-five days incl. travel for each country (some of which will obviously be combined). For this purpose, an international travel allocation for travel to three regions (two

73 experts on each trip) should be included in the budget, including per diem of 80 working days. Tentatively, it is foreseen that the experts will travel as follows:

Region Countries (preliminary proposal Number of days (incl. Total number of - to be defined) travel) working days (incl. travel)

West Africa Senegal, Ghana, Cape 5 countries, 4 working 40 Verde, Togo, Mali days each per expert

Caribbean Trinidad& Tobago 1 country, 5 working 10 days each per expert

Latin America Brazil, Argentina (GAFISUD), 3 countries, 5 working 30 Colombia (AMERIPOL) days each per expert

The experts will normally be expected to travel in teams of two. The final destinations will be defined in the Desk Phase. For the purposes of the budget, a maximum 112 calendar days can consequently be included under reimbursable costs for per diem in these countries. It is assumed that LAC missions will be covered in a single mission, while West Africa will be covered in max. two missions, minimising the number of travel days required. In addition, a number of travels (6 working days total) should be included for European destinations (e.g. Rome, Vienna, London, Madrid, Lisbon). In addition, a total of 6 working days at the place of origin of the team can be included for preparation of the field missions. DEVCO and/or the EEAS may accompany the Review team on some field missions if possible. The Programme main stakeholders, cooperating agencies and beneficiaries should be contacted, interviewed and involved to a suitable extent to cross-check or validate findings, as well as to obtain their relevant inputs. Moreover, the regional initiatives should be taken into account to provide full coverage. The field phase should start upon approval of the desk phase report by the review manager. The review team should submit its work plan with an indicative list of people to be interviewed, surveys to be undertaken, dates of visit, itinerary, and name of team members in charge. The review team will take necessary measures to ensure adequate contact and consultation with, and involvement of, the different stakeholders. The evaluators will also work closely together with the competent government authorities and agencies during their entire assignment. The review team will use the most reliable and appropriate sources of information and will harmonise data from different sources to allow ready interpretation. The work plan has to be applied in a way that is flexible enough to accommodate for any last- minute difficulties in the field. If any significant deviation from the agreed work plan or schedule is perceived as creating a risk for the quality of the review, these should be immediately discussed with the review manager. At the end of the field phase, the review team has to summarise its field works, discuss the reliability and coverage of data collection, and present its preliminary findings in a meeting with the Reference Group in the form of a power point presentation or similar. Thus, a mission to Brussels is also foreseen during the field phase (2 working days per expert (incl. travel)). In total 98 working days are consequently allocated to the Field phase of this assignment of which 80 days are foreseen be spent in African and LAC countries, 6 in Brussels, 6 in various European destinations and 6 at the place of origin of experts. 4.2.3 Synthesis phase This phase is mainly devoted to the preparation of the draft final report. The report (as well as previous and further reports and notes) must match quality standards. The text of the report should be illustrated, as appropriate, with maps, graphs and tables; a map of the programmes area(s) of intervention is required (to be attached as Annex) as well as detailed graphic presentations of the

74 spread of activities geographically and thematically. The consultants will make sure that their assessments are objective and balanced, affirmations accurate and verifiable, and recommendations realistic. During the synthesis phase, the team should foresee 30 working days at the place of origin of the team to be split between the three experts for the preparation of a draft report. The draft report will be presented in a meeting in Brussels with relevant stakeholders. Two working days each (incl. travel) should be foreseen for this mission. The purpose of the seminar is to present the draft final report to the main stakeholders, to check the factual basis of the review, and to discuss the draft findings, conclusions and recommendations. If the review manager considers the report of sufficient quality, he/she will circulate it for comments to the Reference Group members, and convene a meeting in the presence of the review team. On the basis of comments expressed by the Reference Group members, and collected by the review manager, the review team has to write a new version of the report. Comments requesting methodological quality improvements should be taken into account, except where there is a demonstrated impossibility, in which case full justification should be provided by the review team. Comments on the substance of the report may be either accepted or rejected. In the latter instance, the review team is to motivate and explain the reasons in writing. Following receipt of comments the team should foresee a total of 12 working days at the place of origin of the team to be split between the three experts to finalise the report. In total 48 working days are consequently allocated to the Synthesis phase of this assignment of which 6 days are foreseen be spent in Brussels. 4.2.4 Presentation On finalisation and approval of the final report, the team shall be available to conduct one presentation of their findings in Brussels to audiences to be defined in consultation with the European Commission. For this purpose, one mission to Brussels is foreseen (2 working days per expert (incl. travel)). 4.3 Indicative Work plan and timetable Based on the above, a total of 188 working days to be split between the three experts is foreseen under this contract as outlined in the table below.

Location/ Phase Desk Field Synthesis Presentation Total

Place of origin 21 6 42 - 69

Brussels 15 6 6 6 331

WA/LAC - 80 - - 802

Other Europe - 6 - - 6

Total 36 98 48 6 188

1 Equivalent to 33 calendar days for purposes of per diem (no weekends foreseen) 2 Equivalent to 112 calendar days for purposes of per diem The Consultant is free to propose the split between the expert's input dependant on the skills and experience of each team member. The Consultant is free to propose any alternative implementation schedule during the first mission (inception report) including allowing for a reallocation of missions and reports to fit a reviewed work plan which must be approved by the European Commission. The dates mentioned in the table may be changed with the agreement of all parties concerned.

Review Phases Notes and Reports Dates Meetings/Communications

75 and Stages

Preparatory phase

Launch FWC September 2012

Offers October 2012

Signature of the contract November 2012

Desk Phase

Structuring Stage Short presentation of the End November 2012 RG Meeting (kick– approach and team off/inception meeting)

Presentation of inception December 2012 report

Presentation of Draft Desk January 2012 Report

Final Desk Report February 2013

Desk Study Deskwork presentation February 2013 RG Meeting

Field Phase

Field missions February- March 2013

Field work presentation March 2013 RG Meeting

Synthesis phase

1st draft Final report April 2013 RG Meeting

Revised draft Final report May 2013

Final Report June 2013 English version

Final Report June 2013 French and Spanish version

5. REPORTING 5.1 List of deliverables and meetings The main key deliverables are: The inception report, desk report, the field presentation, and; the final report. All reports shall be prepared in English. On the basis of the information collected and analysed, the Consultants will propose evaluation questions and prepare explanatory comments for each. The choice of the questions determines the subsequent phases of information and data collection, as well as the elaboration of the methods of analysis. 5.2 Inception report After commencing the assignment, the Consultant proceeds to the structuring stage leading to the production of an inception report, which presents the draft evaluation questions and describes the main lines of the methodological design including the indicators to be used, the strategy of analysis and a detailed work plan for the next stage. The inception report contains the following elements:

76 . the intervention logics; . the draft evaluation questions; . a limited number of appropriate judgment criteria per evaluation question; . a limited number of quantitative and/or qualitative indicators related to each judgment criterion; . a proposal containing suitable working methods to collect data and information, including information coming from the country itself and other donors in the country; . a first outline of the strategy and the methods used to analyse the collected data and information indicating any limitations; . a chain of reasoning for answering the question; . a concise description of the operations related to the evaluation questions; . a detailed work plan for the next stage; . mapping: an exhaustive list of all the activities covered during the period and an exhaustive list of all activities examined during the desk phase, bearing in mind that activities analysed in the desk phase and the field phase have to be representative. A meeting will be held with the Reference Group to discuss and validate: . The Review regulatory framework, its context, main users and expected uses; . The Review central scope; . The intervention logic according to official documents; . The evaluation questions; . Explanatory comments associated to each evaluation questions, the judgement criteria and first indicators. Upon validation by the Reference Group, the questions and judgement criteria become part of the ToR. The report will also confirm the final work plan and schedule. Any comments made on the contents of the inception report will be incorporated in the desk report below. 5.3 Desk report Following submission of the inception report the Consultants proceed to the final stage of the desk phase. At the end of this phase, the Consultants will prepare a desk phase presentation setting out the results of this phase of the review including all the following listed elements: . the questions with the agreed judgement criteria and its quantitative and qualitative indicators; . the first elements of answer to the questions when available and the hypotheses to be tested in the field; . progress in the gathering of data. The complementary data needed for the analysis and to be collected in the field have to be identified; . methodological design, including tools ready to be applied in the field phase: (i) suitable methods of data collection within the country indicating any limitations, describing how the data should be cross-checked and specifying the sources, (ii) appropriate methods for all future data collection and to analyse the information, again indicating any limitations of those methods; . a work plan for the field phase: a list with brief descriptions of activities, projects and programmes for in-depth analysis in the field. The consultants must explain the value added of the particular visits. 5.4 Field reporting The fieldwork shall be undertaken on the basis set out during the desk phase. The work plan and schedule of the mission are agreed in advance with the relevant services concerned. Fieldwork will be organised in close coordination with the European Commission and the EU Delegations in the involved countries. If during the course of the fieldwork it appears necessary to deviate from the

77 agreed approach and/or schedule, the Consultants must ask the approval of the Review Manager before any changes may be applied. At the conclusion of the field study the Consultants shall present the preliminary findings of the Review to the Reference Group in the form of a power point presentation or similar. 5.5 Final report The Consultants will submit the draft final report (not longer than approximately 50 pages) in conformity with the structure set out in annex II. Comments from the Reference Group and the Review Manager must be taken into consideration. The Consultants may either accept or reject the comments but in case of rejection they must justify (in writing) the reasons for rejection (the comments and the Consultants’ responses are annexed to the report). If the Consultants do not want to include these in the report, they must explain the reasons why in a separate document. If the Review manager considers the report to be of sufficient quality, he/she will circulate it for comments to the Reference Group. The Reference Group will convene to discuss it in the presence of the review team. The final report will include an executive summary of not more than 5 pages. The presentation (Power point) will be prepared and revised in accordance with the final report. The main text of the final version of the report, which shall be drafted in English, will need to be translated into French and Spanish by the contractor. If the result of the translation is not appropriate, the contractor will need to include requested modifications. The final report will have to be sent electronically and in hard copies to EC (10 copies) and EEAS (10 copies). The Review manager makes a formal judgement on the quality of the Review (cf. annex III). The consultant shall, with all submissions, provide a copy of all documents in electronic format in MS Word 7; Excel or Powerpoint format. The report is to be disseminated under the full responsibility of the Commission.

6. ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION This contract shall be a global price contract. The maximum budget cannot exceed € 220.000. As stated in the Global ToR of the Framework Contract, the Contractor will make available appropriate management and backstopping mechanisms, quality control systems, secretariat and any other support staff (editors, proof readers etc.) that it considers necessary in order to implement the Contract. The support team will provide all necessary logistical support both prior and during the assignment to allow experts to concentrate on their primary responsibilities. Regarding the specific assignment, secretariat/office renting costs both at the consultants' home base and during missions to Brussels, which may include rental, communications (fax, phone, mail, internet, courier etc.), report production and secretarial services both in the consultants' home base and during missions to Brussels are considered an overhead included within the fee rates of experts. Experts shall be fully equipped with portable computers, necessary software and portable printer including paper necessary for printing reports and other documentation.

78 ANNEX I: KEY DOCUMENTS FOR THE REVIEW Indicative list to be adapted/ expanded where appropriate:  Legal texts and political commitments pertaining to the project / programme  Project identification study  Project feasibility study  Project financing agreement and addenda  Contract with CDE and subsequent addenda  Project’s Global and Annual Operational Plans  Project’s quarterly and annual progress reports, and technical reports  EC’s Result Oriented Monitoring Reports, and eventual other external and internal monitoring reports of the project  Project’s mid-term review report and eventual other relevant review/evaluations audit reports. The review team should not repeat the points already covered by such documents but use them and go beyond them.  [add other sources of information , e.g. base-line surveys, specific studies or analyses of specific issues/groups, relevant country, sector, thematic and project evaluations, whenever available, works/supplies/services contracts, etc.]. Note: The review team has to retrieve any other document worth analysing, through its interviews with people who are or have been involved in the design, management and supervision of the project / programme. Informants are to be sought in the EC services, implementing body and / or public service in the partner countries.

79 ANNEX 1: KEY DOCUMENTATION (not an exhaustive list) European Union  Regulation (EC) no 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code).  Updated EU Schengen Catalogue on External borders control, Return and Readmission, Brussels, 19 March 2009.  Practical Handbook for Border Guards  Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third country nationals  Council Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004 of 13 December 2004 on standards for security features and biometrics in passports and travel documents issued by Member States  Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union  European Consensus on Development  EU concept on Security System Reform  EU Stockholm programme  EU Internal Security Strategy  EU External Security Strategy and 2008 Report on its implementation  EU Drug Strategy 2005-2012 and its Action Plans 2005-2008 and 2009-2012 International  2000 UN Convention on Transnational organised crime (and its three protocols)  2003 UN Convention on Anticorruption  UN drug-related conventions of 1961, 1971 and 1988 Programming and Monitoring Tools Guidelines for Integrated Border Management in European Commission External Cooperation (2010) Guidelines on Technical Cooperation (2009) Reference Document on EU support to Justice Reform (2010/2012)

80 ANNEX II: LAYOUT, STRUCTURE OF THE FINAL REPORT The final report should not be longer than approximately 50 pages. Additional information on overall context, programme or aspects of methodology and analysis should be confined to annexes. The cover page of the report shall carry the following text: ‘’This mid-term review is supported and guided by the European Commission and presented by [name of consulting firm]. The report does not necessarily reflect the views and opinions of the European Commission’’. The main sections of the review report are as follows: 1. Executive Summary A tightly-drafted, to-the-point and free-standing Executive Summary is an essential component. It should be short, no more than five pages. It should focus mainly on the key purpose or issues of the review, outline the main analytical points, and clearly indicate the main conclusions, lessons learned and specific recommendations. Cross-references should be made to the corresponding page or paragraph numbers in the main text that follows. 2. Introduction A description of the project/programme and the review, providing the reader with sufficient methodological explanations to gauge the credibility of the conclusions and to acknowledge limitations or weaknesses, where relevant. 3. Answered questions/ Findings A chapter presenting the evaluation questions and conclusive answers, together with evidence and reasoning. The organization of the report should be made around the responses to the Evaluation questions which are systematically covering the DAC evaluation criteria: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability, plus coherence and added value specific to the Commission. In such an approach, the criteria will be translated into specific questions. These questions are intended to give a more precise and accessible form to the review criteria and to articulate the key issues of concern to stakeholders, thus optimising the focus and utility of the review. This annex proposes an indicative list of issues which deserve to be studied in a project/programme review. The review should focus on a limited number of precise issues/questions. It should ensure that there is a balance of evaluation criteria. Further guidance on evaluation questions for some sector - health, education, transports, rural development, water and sanitation - is available on the following link http://www.cc.cec/EUROPEAID/intranet/index_en.cfm The appropriate evaluation questions and sub questions, based on this set of issues, should be elaborated for each project/ programme review case. 3.1 Problems and needs (Relevance) The extent to which the objectives of the development intervention (projects/ programme) are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, global priorities and partners' and EC's policies. The analysis of relevance will focus on the following questions in relation to the design of the project:  the extent to which stated objectives correctly address the identified problems and social needs  the extent to which the nature of the problems originally identified have changed  the extent to which objectives have been updated in order to adapt to changes in the context  Adequate assessment of local absorption capacity  Adequate assessment of local implementation capacity

81  Degree of flexibility and adaptability to facilitate rapid responses to changes in circumstances.;  the quality of the identification of key stakeholders and target groups (including gender analysis and analysis of vulnerable groups) and of institutional capacity issues;  stakeholder participation in the design and in the management/implementation of the project, the level of local ownership, and issues of absorption capacity;  the quality of the analysis of strategic options, of the justification of the recommended implementation strategy, and of management and coordination arrangements;  the analysis of assumptions and risks has been valid;  the recommended monitoring and evaluation arrangements have been appropriate; Quality of design (relevance, but also a precondition for most other evaluation criteria)  Clarity and internal consistency of the stated objectives  Appropriateness of the objectively-verifiable indicators of achievement (OVIs) as in the logical framework  Realism in the choice and quantity of inputs (financial, human and administrative resources)  Appropriateness of initial consultation with, and participation by local key stakeholders  Ownership of the project/programme. 3.2 Achievement of purpose (Effectiveness) The effectiveness criterion, concerns how far the project’s results were attained, and the project’s specific objective(s) achieved, or are expected to be achieved. The analysis of Effectiveness will therefore focus on such issues as:  whether the planned benefits have been delivered and received, as perceived by all key stakeholders (including women and men and specific vulnerable groups);  whether actual results match the performance targets set out initially  whether intended beneficiaries participated in the intervention  in institutional reform projects, whether behavioural patterns have changed in the beneficiary organisations or groups at various levels; and how far the changed institutional arrangements and characteristics have produced the planned improvements (e.g. in communications, productivity, ability to generate actions which lead to economic and social development);  if the assumptions and risk assessments at results level turned out to be inadequate or invalid, or unforeseen external factors intervened, how flexibly management has adapted to ensure that the results would still achieve the purpose; and how well has it been supported in this by key stakeholders including Government, Commission (HQ and locally), etc.;  whether the balance of responsibilities between the various stakeholders was appropriate, which accompanying measures have been taken by the partner authorities;  how unintended results have affected the benefits received positively or negatively and could have been foreseen and managed;  whether any shortcomings were due to a failure to take account of cross-cutting or overarching issues such as gender, environment and poverty during implementation;  the extent to which the intended results could have been achieved at a higher level of quantity / quality by changing for example: a) Responsiveness and flexibility of project management b) Monitoring of risks and external factors c) Balance of responsibilities between the various stakeholders d) Accompanying measures taken or to be taken by the partner authorities.

82 3.3 Sound management and value for money (Efficiency) The efficiency criterion concerns how well the various activities transformed the available resources into the intended results (sometimes referred to as outputs), in terms of quantity, quality and timeliness. Comparison should be made against what was planned. The assessment of Efficiency will therefore focus on such issues as:  the quality of day-to-day management, for example in: a. operational work planning and implementation (input delivery, activity management and delivery of outputs),and management of the budget (including cost control and whether an inadequate budget was a factor); b. management of personnel, information, property, etc, c. whether management of risk has been adequate, i.e. whether flexibility has been demonstrated in response to changes in circumstances; d. relations/coordination with local authorities, institutions, beneficiaries, other donors; e. the quality of information management and reporting, and the extent to which key stakeholders have been kept adequately informed of project activities (including beneficiaries/target groups); f. respect for deadlines.  extent to which the costs of the project have been justified by the benefits whether or not expressed in monetary terms in comparison with similar projects or known alternative approaches, taking account of contextual differences and eliminating market distortions.  partner country contributions from local institutions and government (e.g offices, experts, reports, tax exemption, as set out in the LogFrame resource schedule), target beneficiaries and other local parties: have they been provided as planned?  Commission HQ/Delegation inputs (e.g. procurement, training, contracting, either direct or via consultants/bureaux): have they been provided as planned?  technical assistance: how well did it help to provide appropriate solutions and develop local capacities to define and produce results?  quality of monitoring: its existence (or not), accuracy and flexibility, and the use made of it; adequacy of baseline information;  did any unplanned outputs arise from the activities so far? 3.4 Achievement of wider effects Impact The term impact denotes the relationship between the project’s specific and overall objectives. At Impact level the final or ex-post evaluation will make an analysis of the following aspects:  extent to which the objectives of the project have been achieved as intended in particular the project planned overall objective.  whether the effects of the project: a) have been facilitated/constrained by external factors b) have produced any unintended or unexpected impacts, and if so how have these affected the overall impact. c) have been facilitated/constrained by project/programme management, by co-ordination arrangements, by the participation of relevant stakeholders d) have contributed to economic and social development e) have contributed to poverty reduction f) have made a difference in terms of cross-cutting issues like gender equality, environment, good governance, conflict prevention etc. g) were spread between economic growth, salaries and wages, foreign exchange, and budget.

83 3.5 Likely continuation of achieved results (Sustainability) The sustainability criterion relates to whether the positive outcomes of the project and the flow of benefits are likely to continue after external funding ends or non funding support interventions (such as: policy dialogue, coordination). The Mid-Term Review will make an assessment of the prospects for the sustainability of benefits on basis of the following issues:  the ownership of objectives and achievements, e.g. how far all stakeholders were consulted on the objectives from the outset, and whether they agreed with them and continue to remain in agreement;  policy support and the responsibility of the beneficiary institutions, e.g. how far donor policy and national policy are corresponding, the potential effects of any policy changes; how far the relevant national, sectoral and budgetary policies and priorities are affecting the project positively or adversely; and the level of support from governmental, public, business and civil society organizations.  institutional capacity, e.g. of the Government (e.g. through policy and budgetary support) and counterpart institutions; the extent to which the project is embedded in local institutional structures; if it involved creating a new institution, how far good relations with existing institutions have been established; whether the institution appears likely to be capable of continuing the flow of benefits after the project ends (is it well-led, with adequate and trained staff, sufficient budget and equipment?); whether counterparts have been properly prepared for taking over, technically, financially and managerially;  the adequacy of the project budget for its purpose particularly phasing out prospects;  socio-cultural factors, e.g. whether the project is in tune with local perceptions of needs and of ways of producing and sharing benefits; whether it respects local power- structures, status systems and beliefs, and if it sought to change any of those, how well-accepted are the changes both by the target group and by others; how well it is based on an analysis of such factors, including target group/ beneficiary participation in design and implementation; and the quality of relations between the external project staff and local communities.  financial sustainability, e.g. whether the products or services being provided are affordable for the intended beneficiaries and are likely to remained so after funding will end; whether enough funds are available to cover all costs (including recurrent costs), and continued to do so after funding will end; and economic sustainability, i.e. how well do the benefits (returns) compare to those on similar undertakings once market distortions are eliminated.  technical (technology) issues, e.g. whether (i) the technology, knowledge, process or service introduced or provided fits in with existing needs, culture, traditions, skills or knowledge; (ii) alternative technologies are being considered, where possible; and (iii) the degree in which the beneficiaries have been able to adapt to and maintain the technology acquired without further assistance.  wherever relevant, cross-cutting issues such as gender equity, environmental impact and good governance; were appropriately accounted for and managed from the outset of the project. 3.6 Mutual reinforcement (coherence) The extent to which activities undertaken allow the European Commission to achieve its development policy objectives without internal contradiction or without contradiction with other Community policies. Extent to which they complement partner country's policies and other donors' interventions. Considering other related activities undertaken by Government or other donors, at the same level or at a higher level:  likeliness that results and impacts will mutually reinforce one another  likeliness that results and impacts will duplicate or conflict with one another Connection to higher level policies (coherence) Extent to which the project/programme (its objectives, targeted beneficiaries, timing, etc .):

84  is consistent with, and supportive of, the policy and programme framework within which the project is placed, in particular the EC’s Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme, and the Partner Government’s development policy and sector policies  is likely to contribute to / contradict other EC policies  is in line with evolving strategies of the EC and its partners 3.7 EC value added Connection to the interventions of Member States. Extent to which the project/programme (its objectives, targeted beneficiaries, timing, etc.)  is complementary to the intervention of EU Member States in the region/country/area  is co-ordinated with the intervention of EU Member States in the region/country/area  is creating actual synergy (or duplication) with the intervention of EU Member States  involves concerted efforts by EU Member States and the EC to optimise synergies and avoid duplication. 4. Visibility The consultants will make an assessment of the project’s strategy and activities in the field of visibility, information and communication, the results obtained and the impact achieved with these actions in both the beneficiary country and the European Union countries. 5. Overall assessment A chapter synthesising all answers to evaluation questions into an overall assessment of the project/programme. The detailed structure of the overall assessment should be refined during the evaluation process. The relevant chapter has to articulate all the findings, conclusions and lessons in a way that reflects their importance and facilitates the reading. The structure should not follow the evaluation questions, the logical framework or the seven evaluation criteria. 6. Conclusions and Recommendations 6.1 Conclusions This chapter introduces the conclusions relative to each question. The conclusions should be organised in clusters in the chapter in order to provide an overview of the assessed subject. Note: The chapter should not follow the order of the questions or that of the evaluation criteria (effectiveness, efficiency, coherence, etc.) It should features references to the findings (responses to the evaluation questions) or to annexes showing how the conclusions derive from data, interpretations, and analysis and judgement criteria. The report should include a self-assessment of the methodological limits that may restrain the range or use of certain conclusions. The conclusion chapter features not only the successes observed but also the issues requiring further thought on modifications or a different course of action. The review team presents its conclusions in a balanced way, without systematically favouring the negative or the positive conclusions. A paragraph or sub-chapter should pick up the 3 or 4 major conclusions organised by order of importance, while avoiding being repetitive. This practice allows better communicating the evaluation messages that are addressed to the Commission. If possible, the review report identifies one or more transferable lessons, which are highlighted in the executive summary and presented in appropriate seminars or meetings so that they can be capitalised on and transferred. 6.2 Recommendations They are intended to improve or reform the project/ programme in the framework of the cycle under way, or to prepare the design of a new intervention for the next cycle.

85 Note: The recommendations must be related to the conclusions without replicating them. A recommendation derives directly from one or more conclusions. The ultimate value of a review depends on the quality and credibility of the recommendations offered. Recommendations should therefore be as realistic, operational and pragmatic as possible; that is, they should take careful account of the circumstances currently prevailing in the context of the project, and of the resources available to implement them both locally and in the Commission. They could concern policy, organisational and operational aspects for both the national implementing partners and for the Commission; the pre-conditions that might be attached to decisions on the financing of similar projects; and general issues arising from the evaluation in relation to, for example, policies, technologies, instruments, institutional development, and regional, country or sectoral strategies. Recommendations must be clustered and prioritised, carefully targeted to the appropriate audiences at all levels, especially within the Commission structure (the project/programme manager and the review manager will often be able to advise here). Annexes to the report The report should include the following annexes:  the Terms of Reference of the review;  the names of the evaluators and their companies (CVs should be shown, but summarised and limited to one page per person);  detailed review method including: options taken, difficulties encountered and limitations. Detail of tools and analyses;  logical Framework matrices (original and improved/updated);  map of project area, if relevant;  list of persons/organisations consulted;  literature and documentation consulted;  other technical annexes (e.g. statistical analyses, tables of contents and figures).

86 ANNEX 4: OUTLINE STRUCTURE OF THE FINAL REVIEW REPORT Length: The overall length of the final review report should not be greater than 60 pages (including the executive summary). Additional information on overall context, programme or aspects of methodology and analysis should be confined to annexes.

1. Executive Summary Length: 5 pages maximum This executive summary must produce the following information: 1.1 – Purpose of the review; 1.2 – Background to the review; 1.3 – Methodology; 1.4 – Analysis and main findings for each Evaluative Question; short overall assessment; 1.5 – Main conclusions;* 1.6 – Main recommendations.* * Conclusions and recommendations must be ranked and prioritised according to their relevance to the review and their importance, and they should also be cross-referenced back to the key findings. Length-wise, the parts dedicated to the conclusions and recommendations should represent about 40 % of the executive summary 2. Introduction Length: 5 pages 2.1. Synthesis of the Commission’s Strategy and Programmes: their objectives, how they are prioritised and ordered, their logic both internally (i.e. the existence – or not – of a logical link between the Commission policies and instruments and expected impacts) and externally (i.e. Within the context of the needs of the country, government policies, and the programmes of other donors); the implicit assumptions and risk factors; the intended impacts of the Commission’s interventions.* 2.2. Context: brief analysis of the political, economic, social and cultural dimensions, as well as the needs, potential for and main constraints.* 2.3. Purpose of the Review: presentation of the evaluative questions * Only the main points of these sections should be developed within the report. More detailed treatment should be confined to annexes. 3. Methodology Length: 10 pages In order to answer the evaluative questions a number of methodological instruments must be presented by the consultants: 3.1. Judgement Criteria: which should have been selected (for each evaluation question) and agreed upon by the steering group; 3.2. Indicators: attached to each judgement criterion. This in turn will determine the scope and methods of data collection; 3.3. Data and Information Collection: can consist of literature review, interviews, questionnaires, case studies, etc. The consultants will indicate any limitations and will describe how the data should be cross-checked to validate the analysis. 3.4. Methods of Analysis: of the data and information obtained for each evaluation question (again indicating any eventual limitations); 3.5. Methods of Judgement

87 4. Main Findings and Analysis Length: 20 to 30 pages 4.1. Answers to each Evaluative Question, indicating findings and conclusions for each; 4.2. Overall assessment of the Commission Strategy. This assessment should cover:  Relevance to needs and overall context, including development priorities and co-ordination with other donors;  Actual Impacts: established, compared to intended impacts, as well as unforeseen impacts or deadweight/substitution effects;  Effectiveness in terms of how far the intended results were achieved;  Efficiency: in terms of how far funding, personnel, regulatory, administrative, time and other resource considerations contributed or hindered the achievement of results;  Sustainability: whether the results can be maintained over time.  Commission value added 5. A Full Set of Conclusions and Recommendations Length: 10 pages A Full set of Conclusions* and Recommendations* (i) for each evaluation question; (ii) as an overall judgement. (As an introduction to this chapter a short mention of the main objectives of the country programmes and whether they have been achieved). *All conclusions should be cross-referenced back by paragraph to the appropriate findings. Recommendations must be ranked and prioritised according to their relevance and importance to the purpose of the Review (also they shall be cross-referenced back by paragraph to the appropriate conclusions). Annexes should include logical diagrams of Commission strategies; judgement criteria forms; list of the projects and programmes specifically considered; project assessment fiches; list of people met; list of documentation; Terms of Reference; and any other information used for the review. Power point presentation with 4 slides for each evaluation question illustrating in a synthetic and schematic way the evaluation process: 1st slide) logical diagram with the evaluation question, 2nd slide) judgment criteria, indicators and target level, 3rd slide) findings and their limitations, and 4th slide) conclusions and recommendations.

88 ANNEX III: QUALITY ASSESSMENT GRID The quality of the final report will be assessed by the review manager using the following quality assessment grid where the rates have the following meaning: 1 = unacceptable = criteria mostly not fulfilled or totally absent 2 = weak = criteria partially fulfilled 3 = good = criteria mostly fulfilled 4 = very good = criteria entirely fulfilled 5 = excellent = criteria entirely fulfilled in a clear and original way

Concerning the criteria and sub-criteria below, the review report is rated: 1 2 3 4 5

1. Meeting needs: a) Does the report precisely describe what is evaluated, including the intervention logic in the form of a logical framework? b) Does the report clearly cover the requested period of time, as well as the target groups and socio-geographical areas linked to the project / programme? c) Has the evolution of the project / programme been taken into account in the review process? d) Does the review deal with and respond to all ToR requests. If not, are justifications given?

2. Appropriate design a) Does the report explain how the review design takes stock of the rationale of the project / programme, cause-effect relationships, impacts, policy context, stakeholders' interests, etc.? b) Is the review method clearly and adequately described in enough detail? c) Are there well-defined indicators selected in order to provide evidence about the project / programme and its context? d) Does the report point out the limitations, risks and potential biases associated with the review method?

3. Reliable data a) Is the data collection approach explained and is it coherent with the overall review design? b) Are the sources of information clearly identified in the report? c) Are the data collection tools (samples, focus groups, etc.) applied in accordance with standards? d) Have the collected data been cross-checked? e) Have data collection limitations and biases been explained and discussed?

89 Concerning the criteria and sub-criteria below, the review report is rated: 1 2 3 4 5

4. Sound analysis a) Is the analysis based on the collected data? b) Is the analysis clearly focused on the most relevant cause/effect assumptions underlying the intervention logic? c) Is the context adequately taken into account in the analysis? d) Are inputs from the most important stakeholders used in a balanced way? e) Are the limitations of the analysis identified, discussed and presented in the report, as well as the contradictions with available knowledge, if there are any?

5. Credible findings a) Are the findings derived from the data and analyses? b) Is the generalisability of findings discussed? c) Are interpretations and extrapolations justified and supported by sound arguments?

6. Valid conclusions a) Are the conclusions coherent and logically linked to the findings? b) Does the report reach overall conclusions on each of the five DAC criteria? c) Are conclusions free of personal or partisan considerations?

7.Useful recommendations a) Are recommendations coherent with conclusions? b) Are recommendations operational, realistic and sufficiently explicit to provide guidance for taking action? c) Do the recommendations cater for the different target stakeholders of the review? d) Where necessary, have the recommendations been clustered and prioritised?

8. Clear report a) Does the report include a relevant and concise executive summary? b) Is the report well structured and adapted to its various audiences? c) Are specialised concepts clearly defined and not used more than necessary? Is there a list of acronyms?

90 Concerning the criteria and sub-criteria below, the review report is rated: 1 2 3 4 5 d) Is the length of the various chapters and annexes well balanced?

Considering the 8 previous criteria, what is the overall quality of the report?

91 ANNEX IV: PRINCIPLES REGARDING THE DRAFTING OF EVALUATION QUESTIONS Main principles to follow when asking evaluations questions (EQ) (1) Limit the total number of EQ to 10 for each review. (2) In each review, more than half of EQ should cover specific actions and look at the chain of results.

issues, which should be covered as far as possible in a transversal way, introducing for example specific judgement criteria in some EQs. (3) Within the chain of results, the EQs should focus at the levels of results (outcomes) and specific impacts. iming at global impact levels; and

chosen (outcomes or specific impacts). (4) EQ should be focused and addressing only one level in the chain of results. o wide questions where sub-questions are needed (questions à tiroirs); and

and specific impacts in the same EQ.) (5) The 7 evaluation criteria should not be present in the wordings of the EQ. (6) General concepts such as sustainable development, governance, reinforcement, etc. should be avoided. (7) Each key word of the question must be addressed in the answer.

er cannot be yes or no; and

(8) EQ must be accompanied by a limited number of judgement criteria; some of them dealing with cross cutting and some key issues (see point 2 above). (9) A short explanatory comment should specify the meaning and the scope of the question.

92 Annex 2 – The Evaluation Team

Axel Klein, Team Leader Education 1998 Ph.D. in Social Anthropology, SOAS, University of London. “Fishing without formality. An economic anthropology of the Ewe on the Lagos – Badagry Seabeach” 1988 B.Sc. in Anthropology, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London Profile Specialist in drug policy and criminal justice reform in a development context. Long standing experience in the evaluation of complex programmes and guidance for policy makers and practitioners Present position Lecturer in the Anthropology of Conflict, Criminal Justice and Policy, Visiting Professor: Centre for Drugs and Alcohol Studies, University of Aarhus, Denmark Relevant Positions 2003-2005 Director of the International Group, Drug Scope, London 2002-2003 Head of UK Focal Point, European Monitoring Centre on Drugs and Drug Addiction 2001-2002 Research Officer, Institute for Drug Dependence 2000-2001 European Commission Drugs and Crime Control Office, Barbados 1995-1998 Senior Research Officer, Institute for African Alternatives Project Experience Nov 2011-Nov 2012 Expert, AU Plan of Action on Drug Control and Crime Prevention (Uganda; AU) April-June 2011 Programming for Social Sector Development under 10th EDF for CARIFORUM (Caribbean, Central America: EU-CARICOM) Jan-March 2011 Formulation of the support to fight drugs and organised crime project in Nigeria 10thEDF EUROPEAID/127054/C/SV/multi LOT N° 7:(Nigeria; EU) Oct 2009 - Mar 2010 Team Leader, “Training of prisons officers on safety in Prison Settings” (Egypt UNODC) Aug - Oct 2009 Evaluation of: -CMBH83 “Developing Community based Drug Abuse Counselling, UNODC Treatment Services in Cambodia RAS/AD/RAS/I09"Strengthening Comprehensive HIV/AIDS Prevention Care for Drug Abusers in Custodial Settings" RAS/I13 Improving Access for Young People with ATS Abuse Memberships Evaluator for the Research Executive Agency – Security Sector; Member of Royal Anthropological Institute, European Society of Social Researchers on Drugs, Royal African Society; International Association of Addiction Journal Editors Other Positions of Responsibility Editor for Drugs and Alcohol Today; Trustee of Transform Drug Policy Foundation Publications Klein, Axel. Drugs and the World. London: Reaktion. 2008; Klein, Axel, (ed.) Caribbean Drugs: From Criminalization to Harm Reduction. Zed. 2004; Tobias Debiel and Axel Klein (eds.). Fragile Peace: State Failure, Violence and Development in Crisis Regions. London: Zed. 2002

Sergio Uribe Ramírez Education Master in Arts, Johns Hopkins University Ciencias Políticas, Universidad de los Andes Professional Profile Professional life dedicated to the design, execution and supervision of development and of technical cooperation and research projects. During the last 14 years have been dedicated to the study and analysis of the phenomenon of law enforcement issues and illicit drug in Colombia; focused on both trafficking and cultivation. In order to undertake this actively participated in the formulation of policies to combat drug trafficking and programs in the agricultural sector in Colombia and at a international level. From 1999-2010 directed the Colombian National Team that, in close cooperation with the Colombian National Police, evaluated coca and poppy cultivations and processing in the country; simultaneously, between December of 1999 and May 2002 was a member of the International Narcotics Control Board-INCB. This agency is in charge of overseeing the member countries´ compliance with the UN conventions that regulate controlled substances, illicit drugs and precursors. As a member of the INCB participated in fact finding missions to countries in Central Asia, Oceania, Europe, Central and South America During the 1990s as an independent consultant (10 years) worked with today’s equivalent of UNODC, UNOPS, UNDP and the Colombian government in policy formulation and research studies on drug and cultivation in Colombia (coca, marihuana and poppy) as well as in drug policy supply reduction strategies, formulation, design and evaluation of alternative development (then crop substitution) projects; Consultant to UNDP, the World Bank/FAO, IICA, and the IADB in evaluation, formulation and execution of projects in areas as diverse as: Strengthening of the planning offices of the agricultural ministries in Argentina, Costa Rica and Colombia; design, execution and supervision of social programs at the Plan Nacional de Rehabilitación-PNR for the office of the president on Colombia; at the Colombian Ministry of Agriculture managed price control of agricultural inputs (fertilizers, insecticides and herbicides) in Colombia, and as consultant to the IDB evaluated a loan to the city of Bogota for the area know as Ciudad Bolivar; was assigned the evaluation of investments in the road system of that project Finally, as staff at the IDB (9 years) I was responsible for managing all regional technical cooperation projects that emanated from the Social and Economic Division and, later, was assigned all technical cooperation projects in Honduras and Panama. At a regional level managed projects such as the marginal cost pricing programme for public utilities in Bank member counties, additionally, was caretaker of smaller projects- intermodal transportation systems as well as projects for countries with little institutional management capacity (ex. Haiti, Honduras) and nonconventional energy. In Honduras and Panama supervised project in the mining sector, literacy, and strengthening of their statistical offices.

Stella A. Attakpah Education MSc (Security and Risk Management) Leicester University UK. Professional Profile Has more than 15 years dedicated to crime and fraud prevention, notably fight against money laundering and financing of Terrorism in West Africa. During her duties as Programme Officer responsible for AML/CFT, she has worked with the member States of ECOWAS to research on the techniques and mechanisms used for laundering proceeds from Corruption; Drugs Trafficking; and the financing of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW). Ms Attakpah’s recent activities include providing training for law enforcement officers in West Africa on the link between organised crime, laundering the proceeds of criminal activities and proliferation financing at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Centre in Accra, Ghana since May 2009. From 2008 through 2010 she served as a facilitator during Regional Workshops on Counter

94 terrorism financing (West and North Africa - 2008; and Eastern and Southern Africa - 2010) organized by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, National Defence University, NY, USA. Ms Attakpah contributions on the typologies of money laundering in West Africa, has informed policy planning and development in the ECOWAS member States. Other activities carried out by Ms. Attakpah have been on development of national anti-money laundering and counter-financing of terrorism Strategies and Action Plans for the 15 West African countries. Ms. Attakpah, as a member of the FATF Evaluation/Assessment Team, has also carried out AML/CFT assessment missions to Cape Verde – 2007 and to Togo -2010, to assess the level of compliance in those countries as regards measures put in place by the countries to curb organized criminality particularly laundering proceeds from human trafficking, corruption and drugs trafficking, and the financing of terrorism. Ms. Attakpah has been responsible for Technical Assistance programme for the West African countries. She has proven experience with EU funding project and with EDF procedures. Was member of an Institution cum capacity building team that carried out the 10th EDF Formulation Mission” on Peace Security and Stability in West Africa and the ECOWAS Commission in 2011.

95 Annex 3 – Logframe

Deconstructed Logframe of the Cocaine Route Programme financed by the Instrument for Stability Table 1 INTERVENTION LOGIC OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE SOURCES AND MEANS OF ASSUMPTIONS and RISKS INDICATORS VERIFICATION Overall Objective  Reduction of violent crimes  Homicide and violence levels  Transnational Organised Crime groups are To fight illicit trafficking  Stable and controlled democratic  Observation of political active along cocaine trafficking vectors and trans-national process processes / elections  Crime groups vulnerable along stages - drug organised crime, while  Institutionalization of judicial  Corruption perception indices production, transportation, asset disposal fully respecting human procedures and process  Legislative framework  Transnational criminal organizations pose a rights, to improve threat to states and human security human security and stability. Project Purpose  Joint inter service team active at  Project reports  LEAs require trans-national/ regional To enhance the POEs along vector  Cocaine seizures, arrests cooperation mechanisms to tackle org crime regional and trans-  Collaboration of LEAs and JAs at and convictions  Skills of LEAs and Judiciary need raising for regional cooperation trans-national and regional level  Mechanisms of LEA/JA criminal investigation capacities of law  Intelligence led investigations into information exchange at  Disparity in the institutional strength of both enforcement, judicial high quality targets international level LEA/JA amongst beneficiary countries. and prosecuting  Recorded asset seizures authorities in selected countries of LAC and  Data bases WA Result 1:  Joint investigation units in place at  Project reports  Officers are trained and remain in post Enhanced joint air and sea ports  Evaluation reports  Services are working together interdiction capacities  High level of skills and on-going  Legislative framework  Teams receive political support and internal of LEAs, judicial, training process  Administrative procedures funding prosecuting and civil  LEAs/JA trained and in post  Continuing support from EU is provided authorities in targeted  Mentoring in place  National judiciary and LEA do not agree that countries to interrupt  Equipment maintained and TOC is the source of drug flows. the flow of drugs (and functioning illicit trafficking)  Legislation adapted  Administrative procedures Result 2: Strengthening  Regular formal information  Project reports  Political support for regional and trans regional of the information base exchanges of LEAs/JAs within  WA/LAC integrated into cooperation - and information region and between regions platforms - Fontanot, Interpol  Level of confidence in partner agencies sharing at regional and  Informal networks LEA/JA  Reports of operations trans-regional level -for  Joint operations

96 LEAs, judicial and  Creation of a secure information prosecuting authorities system for LEAs involved in the fight against organised crime in targeted countries Result 3:  Strengthening of Legislation  FATF  Data base is developed and utilize Reinforcement of Anti complying with international  Court records Money Laundering and standards  Proceedings from AML asset seizure  AML investigations investigations capacities for  Asset seizures and Confiscations concerned local authorities in targeted countries

97 Deconstructed Logframe of the Cocaine Route Programme financed by the Instrument for Stability Table 2 OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE SOURCES AND MEANS OF INTERVENTION LOGIC ASSUMPTIONS and RISKS INDICATORS VERIFICATION Component 1 Building drug-  Operational staff at selected airports  MOUs  Adaption by WCO of CENcomm interdiction capacities in trained and equipped.  Project documentation communication system to create selected international airports  Project Implementation and Review  Site visits a real-time secure in West Africa and Latin Mechanisms are established  Informant interviews communication system between America and the Caribbean.  JAITF connected to relevant  Seizure data selected airports viable (Airport Communication International Databases 24/7 and  Number of accesses to  Beneficiaries have or can recruit Programme - AIRCOP) CENcomm Interpol and CENcomm qualified personnel for on-site databases training, mentoring, and joint operations Component 2 To strengthen  Operational staff at selected  Project documentation  The risk of the project being cooperation in contrasting seaports trained and for equipped  Site visits undermined by national and maritime trafficking in West  Improved co-operation between  Informant interviews regional interagency rivalry Africa, Latin America and the maritime authorities  Seizure data  IT infrastructure may not be good Caribbean ("Seaport  Improved maritime information and enough to support the national Cooperation Project" –SEACOP intelligence capacities. and regional compatibility and I) connectivity.  JMCU and MIU’s set up, operating

effectively and co-operating regionally Component 3 To contribute to  MoUswith AMERIPOL; AMERIPOL  MOUs  AMERIPOL has legal authority to strengthen cooperation of law Units created.  Project documentation facilitate regional and inter enforcement, judicial and  GAP analysis performed  Site visits regional information exchange prosecuting authorities of Latin  National Units operational:  Informant interviews  Civilian oversight does not exist America and Caribbean  Judicial authorities trained  Legal document countries and the EU in tackling trans-regional  Information/ intelligence exchange organised crime ("AMERIPOL)  Training curricula, (ii) exchange programmes (mentor and training courses), (iii) handbooks for coordinated, (iv) integrated capacity/ programmes for inter-institutional and international investigations and judicial procedures Component 4 To support the 1. Improved the coordinated action in  Project documentation  The political willingness of fight against money laundering GAFISUD countries  FATF beneficiary countries still prevails. and financial crime in Latin 2. Capacity of national FIUs  Legislation  Political willingness of beneficiary

98 America and Caribbean enhanced  Informant interviews countries to translate the countries ("GAFISUD) 3. Cooperation guide-lines to fight  National FIUs proposal into tangible reforms asset laundering and formal agreements with the priority countries and/or regional groups (GAFIC). Component 5 To strengthen the 1. Projects monitoring;  Monitoring reports  Projects cooperate voluntarily to trans-regional coordination, 2. Liaison between national actors  Reports, newsletter, create synergies coherence and complementary involved website  Projects management share effect among the various 3. Information gateway on the national  Attending meetings vision of CRP projects contained in the and regional initiatives  Informant interviews  weak mandate frustrates Cocaine Route Programme 4. Experience exchange - LAC, WA and coordinating function ("CORMS"). EU counterparts  Projects are working to their own 5. Steering Committees and annual objectives meetings for CRP project TLs Component 6 To contribute to 1. The development of precursor  Web based system of  Precursors used in the the fight against the drug information sharing on regional exchange of information production of cocaine originated manufacture and trafficking by level is supported  Regulatory arrangements in the diversion from legal assisting the LAC region 2. The concept of interagency- with private sector activities. against the diversion of cooperation is promoted  Legislation  TOC controls market of precursors from the licit trade 3. Capacity to prevent precursor  National data systems precursors in growing/processing (PRELAC). diversion in LAC region is  Precursor seizures regions. strengthened  Informant interviews  The substitution of precursors 4. The involvement of the private  (controlled for not controlled) in sector is enhanced the processing of cocaine is not 5. Stronger relationship between viable. private sector and administrative  The private industry will assume control authorities the costs of controls 6. Legal and regulatory control  No mechanism for disposal of mechanisms harmonized in each hazardous chemicals country Improved effectiveness of customs Component 7 To promote the 1. AML activities in the non-banking  Project documentation  Governments remain committed fight against money laundering financial and Designated Non-  FATF to AML in West Africa. Financial Businesses and  Legislation  Sufficient trust to share Professions (DNFBPs)  National FIUs information between agencies FIUs strengthened and with counterparts in other countries  People trained remain in post;  Long term capacity building and progress is not impeded by

99 officials complicit in ML. Component 8 To fight 2. Police information management at  regional data model  ECOWAS has competence, (organized) crime and threats national level in the 15 ECOWAS compatible with capacity and political will to from terrorism through the countries & Mauritania; INTERPOL implement creation of a regional police 1. Regional police information  Training plan and syllabus  Trained personnel will remain in information system (WAPIS) exchange  ECOWAS rules on info post Link between region and the rest of the sharing  National information collection is world through Interpol tools and  Teams in place impeded by inter-agency rivalry services.

100 Annex 4 – Evaluation Questions and research instruments

Coverage of evaluation criteria and key issues by EQ

EQ1 EQ2 EQ3 EQ4 EQ5 EQ6 EQ7 EQ8 EQ9

Relevance x x x

Efficiency x

Effectiveness x

Impact x

Sustainability x x

EC Value added x

Coherence x x

Visibility x

Annex 4a – Evaluation questions

Is the programme relevant to EU external (development and security) policies? Rationale: The Programme assumes a link between organised crime and drug trafficking across three different regions impacting on human security EQ1 and impedes the development goals of the countries affected. Are the projects relevant, their design coherent and their implementation coordinated for addressing this problem? Does organised crime and drug trafficking provide an obstacle to development? Are the objectives of the programme appropriate for addressing these challenges?

Judgement Coherence and quality of the programme preparation and design Criteria 1.1

Indicator 1- is there internal logic and coherence to the project design Indicators Indicator 2 - are the separate projects coordinated with each other Indicator 3 - do the separate projects designed to reinforce each other

Judgement Relevance in the context of development field Criteria 1.2

Indicator 1- can it be demonstrated that organised proves development impediment Indicators Indicator 2- does drug trafficking pose a threat to development, governance and human security

Is the programme consistent with EU commitments to good practice in development assistance? Does it promote EU values? And, does it comply with EU, rules and regulations? EQ2 Rationale: The security focus of the intervention raises the need for scrutiny for development criteria, and the promotion of key issues that inform all EU interventions. Discrepancies between donors and beneficiaries need to be identified and bridged.

101 Judgement Design of the interventions (projects) is consistent with EC policies and Criteria 2 development assistance priorities

Indicator 1- The programme is in line with development assistance priorities (aid effectiveness, priority areas) Indicator 2- The programme is in line with the execution and implementation Indicators rules and regulations of EU Indicator 3- The programme promotes EU values in the drugs and development fields, including a balanced approach, the promotion of gender equality and human rights.

Does the programme address beneficiary country’s needs and priorities?

EQ 3 Rationale- has the programme been imposed or has it evolved out of a process of consultation. Is the problem also recognised by key stakeholders in the beneficiary countries?

Judgement JC 1 Beneficiary country’s needs and priorities are met and promoted Criteria 3.1

Indicator 1- Regional and trans-regional initiatives addressing the identified problems Indicators Indicator 2- National policies and strategies addressing the identified problems Indicator 3- Policy makers and professionals share concerns and programme objectives

To what extent have the activities of the projects contributed towards achievement of programme objectives? EQ 4 Rationale: To assess the effect of the programme and the separate activities in contributing to the wider policy or sector objectives (as summarised in the CRP's Overall Objective)

Judgement The project has contributed to reducing the capacity of organised crime groups to Criteria 4.1 operate along the LA-WA-EU route

Indicator 1-dismantling of organised crime groups and prosecution and conviction of high value criminal operators Indicators Indicator 2-forfeiture of assets of organised criminals Indicator 3-drug seizures

Judgement Has the cooperation between LEAs and judicial authorities been improved at Criteria 4.2 regional and trans-regional level?

Indicator 1- increase in regional cooperation Indicators Indicator 2- increase in trans-regional cooperation

Are programme resources (human, technical and financial) used efficiently to achieve the given outputs? EQ 5 Rationale: The components of programme and the interventions delivered, should have produced the best effects in terms of achievement of the project objectives. To

102 identify constraining and facilitating institutional factors for efficient programme delivery

Judgement The programme resources (human, technical and financial) are used efficiently to Criteria 6.1 achieve the outputs

Indicator 1-balance of expenditure between different inputs and management costs Indicator 2-the cost of training and equipment delivered against project results Indicators Indicator 3-measures taken to ensure inputs are delivered at good value in comparative terms Indicator 4-targeting training and equipment provision to ensure results

How has programme ensured that there will be lasting results following the termination of EU technical and financial support. Will there be a continuation of EQ 6 activities? Rationale:Did the project design include a viable exit strategy or is the continuation of activities dependent on external financial and technical support

Judgement Is there national/regional ownership of project objectives and achievements by policy Criteria 7.1 makers and agency heads?

Indicator 1- funding commitments are being made out of national budgets to continue activities Indicator 2- Structures and teams created or supported by the programme are Indicators embedded in local institutional structures Indicator 3- Structures and teams created or supported by the programme are technically self sufficient to continue working without external assistance

Are the project activities coherent with the objectives of EU development policies, and do they support, reinforce or duplicate the activities of other programmes? EQ 7 Rationale: programme objectives need to be harmonised across different initiatives. Security sector programmes need to conform to EU values on governance and human rights.

Judgement Is there consultation and coordination with other programmes? Criteria 8.1

Indicator 1 - coordination and integration of project activities and objectives Indicators Indicator 2 - consultation and planning with other projects

Judgement Does the programme contribute to the promotion of EU values? Criteria 8.2

Indicator 1 - safeguards have been put in place to monitor activity by LEAs involved in the fight against drugs and organised crime Indicators Indicator 2 - measures put into place to mitigate the risk of corruption by LEAs and policy makers

103 What is the added value of IfS support for the CRP? EQ 8 Rationale IFS funding is designed to add value to activities that meet specific criteria

Judgement Is the IFS the only source of funding available for supporting projects Criteria 9.1

Indicator 1- EU funding envelopes that support similar projects Indicators Indicator 2- Similar activities funded by EU MS or other donors

Judgement Does each CRP component meet the criteria for IFS supported interventions Criteria 9.2

Indicator 1- are the project activities trans-regional Indicators Indicator 2- are project activities directed against organised crime

To what extent has the visibility of the EC as a project funder been assured within the project implementation? EQ 9 Rationale: To assess if implementing agencies of the programme have ensured EC visibility in accordance with EU Visibility Guidelines while implementing the components, organizing the trainings, workshops, study tours, steering committee meetings.

Judgement EC visibility has been ensured satisfactorily by programme implementing agencies Criteria 10

Indicator 1 Number of special notepads, pens, folders, stickers for equipment with logos and phrase - “This project is funded by the EU” printed and used Indicators Indicator 2 number of events organised Indicator 3 Number of interviewees are aware on EC contribution and role

104

Annex 4b – Questionnaires GAFISUD

Result 1 Existing money laundering investigation capacities and processes in GAFISUD´s country members are strengthened

1.1 Please explain how the analysis of responsible units for the investigation and methods or techniques used was undertaken.

1.2 Please detail how legal reforms to correct detected failures were promoted.

1.3 Please list training activities (seminars, internships) to strengthen capacities in patrimonial investigation and special investigative techniques organised by the programme.

1.4 How were best practices for the members of the Group developed? Targeting particularly joint investigation (interservices), special investigative techniques and protocols.

1.5 How was financial investigation expertise developed (relevant IT tools, trainings, access to necessary information) so as to comply with upcoming New FATF Recommendations 26- 27-28 and 40.

Result 2 Administrative, judicial and enforcement cooperation between GAFISUD´s country members is reinforced

2.1 Please document the analysis of the legal capacity of FIUs to comply with the FATF (Financial Action Task Force on Money-Laundering) recommendations regarding cooperation with counterparts, and support legal reforms to improve it.

2.2 Please explain the exchange programmes and shared databases to develop effective channels for the exchange of administrative information and strengthen links between police units.

2.3 How did the project promote the flexibility in the exchange of relevant information, the use of controlled delivery and the use of joint investigations teams between police units respecting each national legal framework

2.4 How did the project analyse the international judicial cooperation in national legal frameworks regarding its compliance with the FATF recommendations and its effectiveness, detecting and stimulating best practices.

2.5 How did the project exchange and coordination training programmes for judges, public prosecutors and Central Authorities for judicial international cooperation

Result 3 Proprietary countries and/or regional group(s) of the FSRBs (CFATF, GIABA) to establish lines of cooperation are identified and relationships are formalized

3.1 How did the project establish priority countries and/or regional group(s) for international cooperation?

3.2 Were formal channels for exchange with the chosen regional group(s) developed?

105 3.3 Did you establish cooperation priorities based on a risk analysis.

3.4 How did the project help to agree and implement plans tending to develop lines for administrative, judicial and enforcement cooperation.

PRELAC

Result 1 The development of precursor information sharing on regional level is supported

1.1 How did the project encourage consistent implementation and comprehensive use of the National Drug Control System and the active use of INCB's PEN online system;

1.2 Were installation of a permanent information and advocacy platform supported that will maintain prominent the issue of precursor control on the national and regional agenda; formal channels for exchange with the chosen regional group(s) developed

1.3 Did the project support improvement of the quality of intelligence data.

Result 2 The concept of interagency - cooperation is integrated as a key strategic principle within the beneficiary states and at regional level

2.1 Please give examples of the support for regular meetings of national judicial authorities, competent control authorities and law enforcement to advance coordination on specific precursor issues;

2.2 How did the project encourage, where appropriate, cooperation agreements;

2.3 Were the number of multidisciplinary law enforcement operations increased that involved police, customs and special control services;

2.4 Is there a Compendium and reference guide of PRELAC beneficiaries available online.

Result 3 Capacity to prevent precursor diversion in LAC region is strengthened

3.1 Did the project further assess and take advantage of available training modules (E- Learning, UNODC training DVD, CICAD module, EUROPOL lab training, etc.);

3.2 Please evidence the joint training for custom agents, specialized police forces and other front line operators and task forces to investigate and detect diversion schemes;

3.3 Please list training activities (seminars, internships) to strengthen capacities in patrimonial investigation and special investigative techniques organised by the programme

3.4 Was there support for the plan of Peru to establish a regional centre of excellence on precursor control and Chile to promote a network of prosecutors specialized in precursors.

Result 4 The involvement of the private sector is enhanced

4.1 How did the project promote greater degree of involvement of Chambers of commerce,

106 national industrial associations to streamline relevant policies;

4.2 Did the project support joint workshops and good practices based training among European and LAC Chambers of commerce, national industrial associations;

4.3 Please show how shared responsibility to increase awareness, voluntary reporting and control of non controlled precursor chemicals, pharmaceutical products among the control authorities and the private sector operators was promoted;

4.4 Please explain the organising best practices workshops or seminars between the industry and the competent authorities and promoting the already existing awareness raising tools such as: EU Guidelines for Operators, INCB's Code of Practice and e-learning

AMERIPOL

Result 1 To improve international cooperation amongst LA law enforcement authorities

1.1 Please explain the strategy that has been adopted to reach this objective.

1.2 Please detail what is the current situation of AMERIPOL, how many countries have recognized it as a legal police association?

1.3 Please explain how AMERIPOL is financed, is there a quota system? Does each country assume the costs of its national?

1.4 Since the project has financed a number of training events can you enumerate (in chronological order) these? Please present a synthesis of the events content, number of PARTICIPANTS (no trainers), nationalities, city/country where the event was held, expected results.

Result 2 Strengthening the exchange of information at a regional and trans-regional level specially with Western Africa

2.1 Please document the current situation of the information system being developed.

2.2 Please explain how the AMERIPOL system will differ from other regional information platforms developed or being developed. (SISME the Interpol-MERCOSUR initiative and SIRENA a OAS/CICAD initiative)

2.3 What steps have been taken to begin to facilitate AMERIPOL’s access to regional and trans-regional information systems? How many regional or trans-regional organizations have signed MOUs with AMERIPOL?

Result 3 Improve prosecutor’s and law enforcement agencies’ capacity to carry out complex investigations at a regional and trans-regional level

3.1 How does AMERIPOL, a Police entity define training necessities of prosecutors in a very diverse judiciary environment?

3.2 Who selects prosecutors that are to participate in training exercises?

107 3.3 Has the project developed the printed materials that will allow the promulgation of the experience of the courses and seminars

3.4 Is there an effort to develop a curriculum to orient future trainers and or that can facilitate trained prosecutors to promulgate the knowledge acquired in the AMERIPOL-EU sponsored events?

108 CORMS

Overall Objective: to increase internal and external coherence of the EU actions under the Cocaine Route Programme and a better coordination of field initiatives

relevance effectiveness efficiency impact sustainability coherence added value

Activity 1 How is mapping Were sufficient What is the What How will What Explain Mapping effective for resources in the impact of unintended activities cooperation was realising project allocated? mapping? consequences? continue there with other Explain objective? Were they well once EU, MS. partner relevance of spent Programme country actions? mapping to funding project? ceases?

Activity 2 Explain How is the web Were sufficient What is the ditto ditto ditto Web tool relevance of the tool effective for resources in impact of the web tool to realising the project web tool? What project? objective? allocated? unintended Were they well consequences? spent?

Activity 3 Explain How is the Were sufficient What is the ditto ditto ditto Newsletter relevance of the newsletter resources in impact of the newsletter to effective for the project newsletter? project? realising allocated? What objective? Were they well unintended spent? consequences?

Activity 4 Explain How are Were sufficient What is the ditto ditto ditto Meetings with relevance of meetings resources in impact of stakeholders meetings to effective for the project meetings? project? realising allocated? What objective? Were they well unintended spent? consequences?

109 Annex 4c – Questions to Guide Interviews with Project Managers

Administrative and Background information 1. When did this project initiate activities at its administrative venue (year and month)? 2. How many people work directly for the project? Of these how many are paid with EU funds, how many are paid and/or assigned by the host government and or beneficiaries? Divide these into technical, administrative and clerical staff. 3. The venue out of which the project operates belongs to the executing agency? Is rented by the host government/executing agency? Has been given to the project by the host government. 4. The equipment (OFFICE, VEHICLES AND OTHERS) used by the project has been supplied by the host government? Has been purchased for the project with EU funds? 5. The costs of public services (ELECTRICITY, WATER and others) at the venue are paid by the project or are covered by the host government. Project Execution 1. Do you consider that the activities foreseen in the project document are enough to complete the objectives? Why/why not? 2. What type of activities is the project developing? Training (formal in class and on the job), consultancy and specialized advisory (evaluations, formulation of policy papers, handbooks, instruction manuals, and others), and setting up information exchange channels. (see table)

Number of Number of Number consultants/ Brief description events participants advisors

Formal training

Informal training

Evaluations

Policy papers

Handbooks

Instruction manuals

Other

Information sharing systems

Information sharing trips

Information sharing conferences 152 /

Information sharing meetings

3. Have budget rules and regulations hampered the execution of the project? Explain

152 This refers to specialized conferences and/or video conferences and the use of modern technology for this purpose.

110 4. Has the host government and/or other beneficiaries co-financed these activities?

Number of Brief description events

Formal training venues

Logistics support for events

Cost sharing for informal training

Cost sharing for publications

Cost sharing in operation of project

Other

5. Has host government and other regional beneficiaries expressed their desire to assume the cost of maintaining the project/programme once EU financial support is withdrawn? 6. Has your office proposed Brussels a strategy for the eventual withdraw of EU from project? Do you visualize a time frame for this? Do you consider the region capable of sustaining the project and its objectives?

111 Unit – (Name of department/unit/Section…) ------What is the legal basis of your Unit/Division/Institution? (Protocols; Strategic Plans; Action Plans; Regulations, Policies, etc.) If you have a law/regulation, do you have an implementation mechanism? If yes please indicate. What are the Core functions of your Project/Unit/Division? (Mandate, etc…) Challenges in your actions in response to organized crime in country (ref the objectives of establishment including cooperation with national, regional, international partners). Response Strategies/techniques used (dates/period) How many staff members are in the Project/Unit/Division? (Organizational structure/chart – planned and actual) Who do you report to? (to establish whether there is interference/undue influence in carrying out mandate) Are there enough qualified staff to carry out core functions of the Unit/Division? (include recruitment challenges) Is the Unit/Division adequately resourced (human, material/technical, physical, financial) to deal with its core functions? (please name your division/unit) . Human . Technical . Physical . Financial Do all staff working in and /or attached to the Unit/Division/ have sufficient technical

112 skills to undertake their roles effectively:  In understanding transnational organized crime/piracy/maritime security/ counter-terrorism / Small Arms Light Weapons, Narcotics trafficking, money laundering, human trafficking and the other organized…  IT skills where these affect their roles Do you have an inter-agency coordination/cooperation unit? If yes which dedicated unit is responsible for inter agency cooperation/coordination and what are the core functions. How many staff capacity building programs have so far been undertaken. (please provide titles and dates/duration of such programs/workshops…) What other capacity building programs are essential for the conduct of your core activities? Independence, autonomy (including financial and decision making), undue influence or interference in the work of the Project/Unit/Division/ How much is your annual budget? Please provide some information about the annual budget allocation and expenditure 2010 2011 2012 since the inception of this office in 2010? Requested budget (this is to establish absorption capacity of the Project/unit/division) Annual Budget Allocation Annual budge expenditure

Which Agencies do you consider as your strategic (primary and secondary) partners in carrying out your functions Inter-Agency Co-operation. Are there regular inter-Agency meetings to discuss issues of mutual concern? (Please provide names of agencies, dates and minutes of

113 such meetings if possible) Intra-departmental coordination. How do you coordinate your activities with the various units within the project? Adequate co-ordination among customs, immigration and other related authorities that have activities that fall within your jurisdiction.(pls provide names of agencies)

Crosscutting Issues (civil society, gender, youth, media, etc.) STATISTICS Type of Detections Arrests Prosecutions Remarks Please provide the following statistics on criminal Ongoing = O | concluded organized criminal activities in the country: activity = C How many cases of the tabled crimes 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 were detected before and after establishment of the Drug project/unit/division/department? How may Trafficking arrests and how many prosecutions Human between 2010 to date? trafficking SALW trafficking Terrorism Hijacking of nationals Hijacking of foreign nationals Armed robbery Money laundering Corruption 419 frauds/ extortion Financial fraud

114 Over and under invoicing Counterfeitin g Trafficking in children Trafficking in human parts Other e.g. illegal oil bunkering, etc. (please indicate)

Other Statistics as a result of establishment of office (money laundering, Amount in $ equiv. Frozen Assets $ Confiscated Assets $ Remarks terrorist financing cases etc) Amounts involved; 2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011 Frozen assets; Confiscated assets; etc Money laundering Terrorist Financing Other organized crime

Please include any other information that you think is important for this assessment.

115 Annex 5 – Methodology

1. Judgement criteria The CRP is a complex, multi-project, trans-regional Programme that involves multiple activities affecting several target groups. The CRP has as its objective “… to fight cocaine trafficking and trans-national organized crime while fully respecting human rights, to improve human security…” To fulfil said objectives it must work on enhancing LEA, judicial and prosecuting authorities in selected countries along the Cocaine Route in LAC and WA. The difficulty for the MTR team of the CRP is that none of projects currently under execution are stand-alone, all are being considered for second and even third interventions or cycles. What is clear to the MTR team is that individual projects have not had their MTRs and that each began its operations at different moments in time because of which the results they can offer are very dissimilar when measured with the Programme objectives as well as to each project’s purpose. The MTR Team set out to answer 9 evaluation questions structured within these limitations. The CRP attempts to address the trans-national crime issue assuming that the projects that compose the Programme are working towards a common objective that these projects reinforce each other and there is some level of cooperation between the projects. This would indicate that there is a CRP and that synergies exist amongst the projects. The different components/projects of the CRP are being executed by agencies that have diverse background and competence. As an example in WA the WAPIS project’s information system development is in the hands of INTERPOL but in LAC the project that will also develop a system for LEAs is run by FIIAPP whose expertise in this field is not comparable to that of INTERPOL. This forced the MTR team to spotlight on managers, beneficiaries and stakeholder’s opinion of the objectives of the programme. Here the main issue addressed was whether the CRP is aimed at fighting crime or drugs. Within this, the MTR team had to review data on arrests, prosecutions, seizures and related statistics that reflected results against TOC. The judgement criteria that led to formulating the intervention questions attempted to define how information exchange, joint operations and trust and confidence building was addressed through the CRP projects. To do so prosecutions and convictions as well anti money laundering operations and complex investigations should increase in number. During the field visits to beneficiaries in both Africa and Latin America these issues were addressed with local authorities. The CRP, according to the intervention logic designed should, through its individual components or as a group, impact violence and disorder, foment good governance and enhance LEA in beneficiary countries. For this the reviewed analyzed institution building in the beneficiary countries and the benefits that the Programme had in those countries. The CRP, as all activities fomented under EU instruments, seek to be sustainable in the long run. The criteria MTR recognized this and looked at the commitment of the beneficiaries to the activities fomented by the Programme. To do so it created questions that first analyzed if the different components were the result of discussions between the EU and policy makers in the beneficiary countries, the commitment of beneficiaries to policies fomented through the projects as expressed by agencies in beneficiary states. The dissemination of project activities, training, joint operations, and the promotion of EU values and practices all were integrated to the evaluation questions. In designing the Programme IfS identified eight different projects that cover diverse target groups: Law enforcement, private sector (precursor control), the financial sector, and the intelligence community, all of these sectors are assumed to be working in harmony. To ensure synergies amongst these CORMS was created; said project has a mission of ensuring that projects coordinate/complement activities but no authority to ensure that its recommendations are followed by the multiple executing agencies.

116 2. Indicators The evaluation questions were formulated based on the premise that the original CRP was conceived in light of the principle of flow of actions, information, and results. To do so they must address the concepts of value added, design, impact, efficiency, EU visibility and sustainability. The CRP is to fight against TOC and to measure it the methodology called for the analysis of information that reflects project activities and the impact (if any) against TOC, indicators of this are: . Cases against organized crime identified, sent to or/to be sent to the justice system as a result of the activities of any of the projects financed by the CRP; . Statistical data that displays variations that could be associated directly with the CRP’s activities (decrease of the estimated world supply of cocaine, purity of cocaine seized in the streets of the major European markets, rise in price of cocaine on the streets of Europe); . Cocaine and cash seizures at airports amongst passengers, in airplanes and in cargo that moves by air along the countries in the CRP; . Cocaine and cash seized in ships that connect the countries of the Programme and these with European ports; . Identification of suspicious movement of assets through the banking and non- banking sector, and many other elements (persons jailed, accused and convicted of trafficking in source, transit and countries of destination of drugs).

Statistics required for this review are available (consolidated and final) for years prior to 2011 when the CRP was conceived (based on 2008 data) and only in exceptional cases was more recent data is available. These limitations for the MTR team were overcome via short missions to four countries in LAC and the same number in WA. The shortcomings of statistical data were replaced by personal interviews with prosecutors, LEAs in the selected countries and information collected (in interviews and through questioners) from TL of each of the projects analyzed. The indicators collected with both personal and written interviews were. . Understanding of project managers of the objectives of the CRP, . Results delivered by projects and the coordination between projects, . Coordination between projects, . Information and reports that individual LEAs have on TOC activities, . Participation of personnel in diverse training events, quality of contacts established in through these events and information sharing as of these personal contacts, . Investigations originating through contacts generated by the different projects, . Impact and public perception of LEAs as of activities associated with CRP projects, . Country strategy and GAP analysis papers registered in the CORMS data base, . Changes to national legislation originated in project recommendation, . Countries taken off the black list of FATF.

More indicators were compiled as presented in the desk report yet they were not always useful for the MTR.

3. Data collection Data collection was based on the design of a series of questioners and guidelines applied at all levels (TL, institution, beneficiary countries) with diverse objectives (guidelines for interviews and written requests to executing agencies). These followed the principals and guidelines set in the questions presented in the Desk Report. To addressed basic issues the MTR analyzed existing information that covered the Action Fiche at the conception of the project, the contracts with the executing agencies, the six month reports that each project presents, the final reports (when applicable), and any other information found during the different stages of the Review. Eight short missions to selected countries, preferably where projects are based, were conducted; the purpose to interview team leader, staff and host country officials. Discussions with host country officials covered not only the project but also tried to inquire about other CRP projects and their impact in the fight against TOC. The interviews were instrumental in forming the MTR’s team positions on issues such as EU visibility, value added of

117 the project in the host country, the regional impact, the efficiency and sustainability as well as the integration of the CRP to EU development strategies as advocated and practiced by the Delegations. The MTR team visited and interviewed authorities in four countries per region to complement the limited statistical data with human informants. A number of countries identified in the TORs were changed following consultation with the Task Manager to better reflect the activities of the programme and provide the relevant information for the MTR. While it would have been informative to include countries like Ecuador and Brazil in Latin America, it was suggested to and accepted by IfS (Inception and Desk Reports) that it would be more important to visit Colombia, Argentina and Peru as these are hosts to the three projects being executed in LAC. Trinidad and Tobago was the only country visited in the Caribbean, it plays host to the CARICOM security agency IMPACS, the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force-CFATF and has been considered and a future beneficiary of the AIRCOP and possibly the SEACOP projects. The rational behind the countries visited in the Americas was:  Argentina is the host country the project GAFISUD-EU. Additionally it has one of the largest and most complex chemical industries in LA and is where the most important Colombian traffickers have been captured during the last two years.  Colombia is the host nation the police organization known as AMERIPOL which is one of the beneficiaries of CRP. This country is also the major producer of Coca leaf, base and cocaine in the world.  Peru is where UNODC has the delegation that executes PRELAC. During the last three years, according to UNODC, coca cultivation has been on the raise.  Trinidad and Tobago as mentioned above hosts the oldest Financial Action Task Force in the region and base to the CARICOM security agency IMPACS. It is the most important of the island countries of the Caribbean. In West Africa, the countries the field missions sought to achieve a mix of Luso, Franco and Anglophone countries. All four have taken part in the SEACOP and AIRCOP programmes. It would have been beneficial to also visit Nigeria, and Guinea Bissau but this could not be fitted into the timeframe. Mali had been included in the original ToR but, because of the political situation during the first quarter of 2013, this mission was cancelled. In West Africa countries visited were:  Cape Verde In this country the execution of the AIRCOP and SEACOP projects has pressed forward. Parallel the country sits on both the maritime shipping and air routes between South America, West Africa and Europe. CV happens to be the one country with direct flights from three islands (Praia, Sal and Mindelo) to Brazil, influenced its selection both for the MTR and for projects implementation.  Senegal hosts GIABA which is the anti-money laundering FATF agency for West Africa. Located on the West Coast of Africa it is vulnerable to use by criminal organizations for the maritime trafficking of both drugs and illegal immigrants to Europe.  Ghana located in the Gulf of Guinea is therefore vulnerable to use by drug cartels. It has 539 km of coastline and is bordered by Cote d’Ivoire to the west.  Togo with weak LE in the countries it is deemed that an enhanced LE and judiciary would help curb the flow of cocaine towards Europe by air and/or by sea. Some statistical information on these eight was compiled (2007-2012 when possible) base on official numbers published by the governments and or international agencies. Nonetheless, official data plus human information both coincide (official data and interview of government official), thus MTR Team included in their visits/interviews with representatives of the civil society in each country visited. The idea of including private consultants and/or NGOs amongst those interviewed helped the mission understand the internal situation in each country; verify the strength (acceptability) of the statistical data and the position of the governments with respect to the CRP and its components. The analysis of the Programme as conceived in the evaluation questions was also applied to the individual projects. The rationale that allowed the Team to developed the questions was base on the premise that, when IfS conceived the CRP, it identified that TOC is an obstacle to development and that each of the eight projects, individually, deals with one or more of the challenges that TOC

118 poses nationally, regionally and trans-regionally. Methodologically each project must prove that its intervention if effectively dealing obstacle posed by organized crime through drug trafficking. Statistical indicators that can help understand the impact of the CRP for the 2007-2012 years updated only in a limited number of countries even in those visited data was none existent. The lack of data that can be both indicative of the objectives and directly related to CRP projects drove the MTR team to attempt to understand the efficiency of the intervention through personal interviews. EU good practice policies were an underlining theme in all interviews where the MTR leader addressed the issue directly with executing agencies, national counterparts and with local authorities. The objective to try to find proof that executing agencies are committed to these practices the project execution, that they have been transmitted to local counter parts and that beneficiaries are aware that EU interventions consider the good practice issue paramount. Indicators of this philosophy should also be reflected in the periodical reports submitted by executing agencies and TL of individual projects. The answers submitted to queries presented during interviews and the written response to questioners submitted after the missions (see Annex) should also reflect the importance of EU good practices in the everyday activities of the Executing agencies.

4. Methods of analysis Interviews of beneficiaries in host countries were based on a pre-established list of possible issues/questions. During the country visits it became evident that the Programme name COCAINE ROUTE PROGRAMME posed the greatest obstacle for the MTR team’s work, at meetings with non-LEAs government officials the MTR team was forced to explain the purpose of the mission and the objective of the CRP, i.e., trans-national organized crime. In spite of this the conversations often tendered to concentrate almost exclusively on drugs. This presented a constraint for the analysis both the statistical and complications during the interviews. The mandate under which IfS operates make reaction quick but execution time of the projects short 24 to 36 months and exceptionally 48. The MTR looked at this strategy and objectives to assess the efficiency and viability of that type of intervention in the context of the CRP. The CRP, where the objective is to contribute to positive actions against TOC, is, at least, in theory not viable in the short-term framework given to IfS interventions. To evaluate the validity of this hypothesis an analysis of the following CRP objectives had to be undertaken: . Enhance LE capability; . Increase the capacity of judicial and prosecuting authorities; . Transfer of skills; . Create information systems; . Adopt investigative techniques, and . creation of the confidence needed to ensure intelligence sharing

These issues are at the core of the CRP itself and, as mentioned when discussing Data Collection, the main difficulty that arises is the lack of statistical information and the need to base the CRP on interviews in only eight countries. Simultaneously, the MTR understands that the complexity of the CRP mission itself explains why the projects are, for the most part, in their second and even third stage of execution. To analyze the different objectives of the Programme the MTR evaluation had to turn basically to data compiled through interviews of Executing agencies via the TL in each project, government agencies in selected countries, the opinions expressed by MS agencies such as SOCA and specialized international LEAs (Interpol regional office for LA). As a complement to these sources there was the review of the documentation furnished through CORMS (project execution data) and other sources on background information identified through the ToR, the information compiled during missions to eight countries in LAC and WA, and interviews with executing agencies, project host Governments, and NGOs. Additionally in the cases of Brazil, Ecuador and Uruguay, in LA especial petitions were sent out to clarify those governments’ position with respect to the AMERIPOL project as well as to the CRP.

119 In addition to the above mentioned research tools the MTR has concentrated in scrutinizing the information to ensure that the CRP complies with EU good practices, promotion of gender equality and human rights by executing agencies and by the beneficiaries. Furthermore EU good practices include that all projects and programs should be the result of a consultation process with eventual beneficiaries. For the CRP a fact finding mission visited the regions to identify their needs and that of regional organizations to define if the IfS facility should intervene. These teams formulated recommendations and from theses the CRP emerged as a complex, multi-project, trans-regional. Through interviews the MTR attempted to trace the consultation process that the mission had with beneficiaries. The purpose, to define if during the planning, individual components/projects beneficiaries had any input into the design of strategies. The MTR also attempts to define what are the beneficiaries, policy makers and professional’s concerns of the projects individually and the Programme as a strategy. The analysis looked at efficiency, technology transfer, enhancing of institutional capabilities and creation of networks all fundamental to improve Law Enforcement activities. The objectives of the CRP are best served when there is effective use of the human, technical and financial both by executing agencies and by beneficiaries the Review analyzes this. The MTR with interviews sought to confirm if personnel trained under EU projects is still working in the field for which they had been prepared. Also, the selection process of the candidates financed with EU funds was scrutinized when interviewing executing agencies. The EU as a federation of States finances activities such as IfS yet member states individually also commit funds in individual projects (SOCA’s presence and support to some LE agencies) and within the EU there are other facilities that finance specific projects (in LAC we have PRADICAN and COPOLAD).Additionally, there are other Governments that are actively involved in financing activities that may coincide with the CRP such is the case of US Government agencies and in LE even the Colombian Narcotics Police.153

5. Methods of Judgement The MTR Team fulfilled its task through research of the documents that constitute the history of the projects and the history of the CRP. It must be noted that most projects have had a short life and there is little, in terms of statistics that may give testament to the CRP’s efficiency. The available data will create a base from which future evaluation can begin. The development of a logframe for the CRP will facilitate this review and set the bases for the future. There are limits to the availability of statistical data that can be related to actions of the CRP and its projects. Nonetheless the little data available allows the evaluation team to say that there is no evidence of a disruption in the cocaine markets in Europe since the CRP began (street price and purity) have remained stable during the first few years of the current decade. Additionally it is clear that, since the 2009, UNODC reports no statistical linkage can be made between LA and West Africa and no additional information has been found about significant cocaine seizures between Africa and Europe. The limits imposed by the lack of statistical data forces the MRT to formulate recommendation based its experience and knowledge of the regions thus many of its recommendation will reflect judgement calls that can only be partially confirmed statistically and with interview in the eight countries visited. The best that the Team can do, for this report, is infer benefits such as the creation of the Joint teams at airports and Ports in selected countries and the possibility of communicating between LEA in the two sub-regions but not between the regions. To ensure that the MTR collected beneficiary governments’ concept of the EU’s CRP the following constituted a guide when interviewing the main drug agency in each country: i. Was your agency, ministry or government office consulted when the EU was formulating the CRP and/or any of its components? ii. Do you know the objectives of the programme?

153 During the interview they claimed to have trained more than 50.000 police officers from the Americas and Afghanistan during the last 5 years. This Colombian police unit, according to the Agencia Presidencia de Cooperación APC has an autonomous TC budget of around us$5.000.000 per year this to cover training of other Police forces. Most training is done in the beneficiary country through special courses.

120 iii. Do you see the objectives as relevant within the regional context? iv. The execution of the CRP becomes operational through its projects and the main objective is to fight TOC, do you consider that this objective can be reached with these projects? Do you feel that EU aid is instrumental to foment regional cooperation in this field? Will the objectives be sustainable in time?

121 Annex 6 – List of Interviews and consultations

Date Name Function Organisation National Expert, General Secretariat of the 1 Didier Dochain webmaster Fontanot Council of the EU 18/12/2012 website Jesper Steen 2 Head of Sector DG DEVCO B5 Pedersen 3 Valerie Miranda Programme Manager DG DEVCO B5 EEAS Transregional 4 Philippe Percier Policy Officer Threats Security and sanctions International Relations 5 Alvaro Bordallo Officer, West Africa EEAS Division Policy Officer, America 6 Javier Fuentes Leja Department - Regional EEAS Affairs 7 Per Brixen Ghana Desk Officer EEAS Desk Officer Senegal and 8 Karolina Stasiak EEAS 19/12/2012 Gambia Head of Sector Regional Programmes 9 Patrick Doelle DG DEVCO G2 Latin America & Caribbean Copolad Regional Programmes 10 Gisela Spreitzhofer DG DEVCO G2 Latin America & Caribbean EEAS Crisis Response Senior Policy Officer- 11 Pierre Cleostrate and Operational Planning and Operations Coordination External Relations, Drug 12 Mirna Zelic Pokaz DG Just Policy Coordination Unit Interpol, Project Manager 13 Philip Baeten Interpol Wapis Katrin Bolz, Wapis, events 14 Katrin Bolz and communications, Interpol 20/12/2012 workshop preparation 15 Isabelle Milone Wapis, finance officer Interpol 16 Marc Vanhulle Aircop, Project Manager UNODC, Dakar Representative, Chief of 17 Martina Hanke Office,Liaison UNODC _ UNODC EU Liaison Officer, CORMS 18 Sapna Banga SOCA National Expert 19 21/12/12 Tim Manhire Seacop Project Manager FIIAPP Regional Facilitator, 20 Paul Studley FIIAPP Seacop 21 Javier Montano Duran Programme Officer, Africa UNODC, Vienna 22 Elisabet Sundstroem Programme Oficer, Africa UNODC, Vienna Progoramme Management 23 Ian Munro UNODC, Vienna Officer, Africa 10/01/2013 Senior Porgramme 24 Ketil Ottersen Coordinator, Anti- UNODC, Vienna Trafficking Section Dakar (via Video 25 AIRCOP Team UNODC, Dakar Conference) TOGO Procureur de la Palais de Justice, 1 28/01/13 M. Essolisam Poyodi République Parquet de 1er Instance 2 Aworou Komlan Magistrat, Ministère de la Justice

122 Date Name Function Organisation Missite Secrétaire Général de la Justice Garde des Sceaux, Innocent Kossivi Magistrate Directeur de 3 Ministre de la Justice Egbetonbyo Cabinet Ministère de la Justice Ministre de la Justice 4 M'Dakena Atara Former Procureur Général Cour d'appel de Lomé DG de l'OCTRIDB (Office Lt-col.Awizoba Central de Répression du Ministère de la Sécurité & 5 Egoulou Trafic Illicite de la Drogue Protection Civile et du Blanchiment) Chef de l'Unité Mixte de 6 Lt Awi Essossimna Contrôle des conteneurs, Port Lome Secrétaire Permanent Commandant Kossi Ministère de la Sécurité & 7 Comite National Anti- Amayi Protection Civile Drogue Chargé de Programme Sylvain Schulze Gouvernance 8 Patrick Spirlet Chef Délégation EU European Commission Stéphanie Meert Chef Section Opérationnelle DG de la Gendarmerie Gendarmerie Nationale 9 29/01/2013 Kossi Akpovi Nationale Ministère de la Défense Gendarmerie Nationale, 10 Assiah Hodabolo Chef de Cabinet Ministère de la Défense M. KodzoAdzedze DG 11 des Douanes Douanes Togolaises togolaises Unité Mixte de Contrôle 12 SEACOP Team des conteneurs, Port Lome Port Lome M. Aquiteme 29/01/2013 Président CENTIF (Cellule And Team (Secretary 13 nationale de traitement CENTI - Togo General ; Analyste ; IT des infos financières) officer) Inspecteur des Douanes, 14 Dotse Koffie Tsogbe Directeur des Enquêtes Financières DG Aviation Civile 15 M. Latta Gnama Direction de l'Aviation Aviation Civile, Togo Civile, Commissaire Principal de Yao-Videm Antoine Police, Directeur de 16 30/1/2013 Kouleossi Renseignement Financier et de la Stratégie DG Police Nationale Têko K. Koudouovoh DC Police Judiciaire 17 Direction Générale de la Police Nationale Commissaire Divisionnaire de la Police, Directeur 18 Messou Dedji Central de la Police Judiciaire Commissaire Divisionnaire 19 Yoma Pissan, de Police Directeur Criminel Attaché de sécurité 20 Christophe Briez Ambassade de France intérieure Coordinateur des projets 21 Philippe Brosset de Gendarmerie 31/01/2013 22 Joseph Weiss Ambassadeur Ambassade d'Allemagne 23 Noriko Horiuchi Regional Security Officer USA Embassy

123 Date Name Function Organisation Michael Coker Economics Officer GHANA European Delegation 1 European Delegation 24/01/2013 and AIRCOP Team 2 Landy Tei SEACOP Team Leader Tema Port 3 25/01/2013 Accra Platform Team of LOs UK, FR, DE, SP, USA Economic And Organised 4 Mr B. Mortey Akpadzi Executive Director Crime Office Mr. Agblor National Police 5 31/01/2013 Director CID and Deputy Headquarters, Accra National Police 6 Interpol Officers Interpol Office Headquarters Accra Mr Larry Gbevlo-Lartey Esq. National Security 7 Castle-Annex Accra And Team of Security Coordinator Advisors 1/2/2013 Financial Intelligence 8 M. S Thompson Essel Chief Executive Officer Centre, Ghana 9 Mr Yaw Sarpong Executive Secretary Narcotics Control Board 10 Mr S. Blankson Director of Operations Narcotics Control Board 11 2/02/2013 Mr. Benjamine Ndego Director of Operations Standard Chart, Accra SENEGAL Douane Française 1 11/-02/2013 Stéphane Du Bois Inspecteur des Douanes SEACOP Expert Mouhamadou Makhtar 2 11/02/2013 Cisse Directeur général Douanes Sénégalaise And Team M. Amadou Gaby Diop 3 11/02/2013 and UMCC, Dakar Port UMCC, Dakar Port JMCU Team Attaché Douanier Philippe Haan 4 11/02/2013 Commissaire Div, Attaché French Embassy Jean-Luc Peduzzi, de Sécurité Intérieur Responsable SEACOP 5 Amadou G. Diop Douane Sénégalaise Team Ingénieur informaticien Chef de projet 6 12/02/2013 REGIMARE TEAM REGIMARE, Douanes Sénégalaise AILESAFRQIUES, PASSAT Ambassadeur Dominique Dellicour Chargé des questions 7 12/02/2013 Stéphanie Masure EU délégation politiques Ricardo Alvarez Chargé des programmes Director, Research and Umaru Muazu Evaluation Babacar Ndiaye Director, Admin and 8 13/02/2013 Abdullahi Zungum Finance GIABA Jeffrey O. Isima Principal Research and Abdullahi Zungum Planning Officer Special Assistant to DG Coordinator Bureaux de Julien Garsany Programme 9 13/02/2013 Ludovic d'Hoore Regional Advisor AML UNODC Office, Dakar Marc Vanhulle AIRCOP Project Coordinator Commissaire de Police, Police l'Air et des 10 13/02/2013 Mamadou Thiandoum Directeur de la Police l'Air Frontières et des Frontières Directeur des Affaires 11 14/02/2013 M. Ndongo Fall Ministère de la Justice Criminelles et des Grâces

124 Date Name Function Organisation 12 Abdullahi Ba Deputy Director Platform of international 13 14/02/2013 Dakar Platform Team of Liaison Officers liaison officers Dakar South African Embassy 14 Mr N.S. Mokhine Counsellor Member of the Dakar Platform 15 14/02/2013 Seydou Bocar Yague, Directeur Police Judiciaire 16 15/02/2013 JAIFT Team CAAT Airport 17 Jean Claude Hipolite consultant for Aircop Airport Directeur de l'Office M. C. Keita and central pour la répression 18 15/02/2013 Deputy (Director of du trafic illicite des opérations) stupéfiants (OCRTIS) CAPE VERDE Seccao 1 Severine Arnal Political/cooperacao Delegacao da uniao 18/02/2013 Europeia na Republica Segunda Secretaria 2 Ewa Tomaszewska cabo assuntos politicos Unidade de Informacao Kylly Samhaa Almada Director 3 18/02/2013 finaceira (FIU – Cape Jair Ramos Analyst/Investigator Verde) Conselheiro para a 4 18/02/2013 Atonio FJ Machado Cooperacao Portuguesa cooperacao 5 19/02/2013 Eloisa Borges Coordinator/Sociologist CCCD Carlos Alexandre 6 19/02/2013 National Director Policia Judiciaria Montiero Reis National Programme 7 Omaru Djalo Abreu Officer United Nations Office on 19/02/2013 Programme Management 8 Ian Munro Drugs and Crime officer 9 Javier Montano Duran Programme Officer Direcao Nacional 10 19/02/2013 Paula Carvalho Official de Ligacao da policia Judiciaria 11 Rui Jorge Brito de Pina Inspector Chef Policia Judiciaria Departmento De 20/02/2013 12 Andre Semedo Director Investigacao Criminal Do Mindelo COLOMBIA Colombian National Police Coronel William Valero Jefe de Área Puertos y 1 Colombia Police Torres Aeropuertos International Affairs Chief, 2 Mayor Carlos Martínez head of Europol National Colombia Police Unit, CLACIP Interpol Colombia National 3 Capitán Rosa Riaño Colombia Police Unit Interpol Colombia National 4 09/03/2013 TT Efraín Muñoz Colombia Police Unit Capitán John Edgar Intelligence, Narcotics 5 Colombia Police Corral Police DIRAN 6 Capitán Darío Peña International office DIRAN Colombia Police TT Jesús Alberto 7 Intelligence DIRAN Colombia Police Becerra 8 PP Milton Hernández Intelligence DIRAN Colombia Police 9 ST Anzisar Bedoya AMERIPOL NAU Colombia Police Colombia, Ministry of Justice Justice Ministry, Julián David Wilches 10 11/03/2013 Drug Policy Director Viceministerio de Política Guzmán Criminal

125 Date Name Function Organisation Directora. Dirección de Justice Ministry, 11 Marcella Abadia Política Criminal y Justicia Viceministerio de Política Restaurativa Criminal Advisor to the office of de Justice Ministry, 12 Astrid Fuja Política Criminal y Justicia Viceministerio de Política Restaurativa Criminal Colombia, Fiscaliza Nacional de la Nación FGN Fiscalía General de la Nación 13 Ruth Murcia FGN Dirección de Asuntos Internacionales Dirección de Asuntos 14 Liliana Romero FGN Internacionales Director, Unidad Nacional Antinarcóticos y de 15 11/03/2013 Juan Carlos Acevedo FGN Interdicción Marítima UNAIM 16 Gustavo Sandoval UNAIM FGN Director, Unidad Nacional para la Extinción del 17 Julian Quintero Derecho de Dominio y FGN contra el lavado de Activos Colombia, Fiscaliza Nacional de la Nación Director General Unidad Luis Edmundo Suárez 18 de Información y Análisis Ministry of Finance Soto, Financiero Subdirector de Análisis 19 Oscar Moratto Ministry of Finance Operaciones Subdirector de Análisis 20 Javier Gutiérrez Ministry of Finance 12/03/2013 Estratégico 21 Andrés Rodrigues Asesor Dirección Jurídico Ministry of Finance Asesor Dirección Asuntos 22 Camila Castellanos Ministry of Finance Internacionales Claudia Andrea Asesor Dirección Asuntos 23 Ministry of Finance Soraca Internacionales Colombia, Sociedad de Activos Especiales SAE Sociedad de Activos 24 Irma Guevara Gerente General Especiales SAE Ministry of 12/03/2013 Finance 25 Mauricio Solorzano Gerente Jurídico SAE 26 Eliana Albor Jefe Oficina de Planeación SAE Colombia, Civil Society 27 12/03/2013 Ricardo Vargas Sociologist Universidad de Javeriana Colombia, Civil AMERIPOL 28 ST Anzisar Bedoya AMERIPOL NAU Oficial de enlace de la Carlos Goncalves 29 Policía Federal de Brasil 13/03/2013 Silva Colombia Police en AMERIPOL Agregada Adjunta de la 30 Ivonne Villa Nava Policía Federal de Mexico Colombia, EUD Jefe de cooperación 31 Ivo Hoefkens Técnica 13/03/2013 EUD Oficial de Cooperación 32 Velerie Jordan Técnica PERU DEVIDA/PRELAC Contra-almirante, Asesor 1 14/03/2013 Jorge Valencia de Control de Oferta DEVIDA DEVIDA

126 Date Name Function Organisation UNODC representative 2 Flavio Mirella UNODC Peru Technical Coordinator 3 Hector Wong UNODC PRELAC 4 Umberto Chinos UNODC/PRELAC UNODC DEVIDA/SUNAT/PRODUCE Asesor de Control de 5 Jorge Valencia DEVIDA Oferta DEVIDA Marco Antonio Carrion General FAP (r), Dirección 6 DEVIDA Rondon de Asuntos Técnicos Superintendencia Nacional de Aduanas y de 7 Marcos García Injoque Administración Tributaria, SUNAT 14/03/2013 Intendente de Insumos Químicos y Fiscalizados Gustavo Antonio Intendente Nacional de 8 SUNAT Romero Murga Fiscalización Aduanera Ministerio de la Producción Asesor del 9 Roque Castro Inga PRODUCE Vice Ministerio de Industrias PRODUCE DEVIDA/Ministerio Público/DIRANDRO Asesor de Control de 10 Jorge Valencia DEVIDA Oferta DEVIDA Marco Antonio Carrion General FAP (r), Dirección 11 DEVIDA Rondon de Asuntos Técnicos Dirección del la Policía 12 14/03/2013 Colonel Hector Loayza Antinarcóticos DINANDRO, JefeDINANDRO, del estado Mayor 13 Cesar Vivanco Intelligence Unit, AML DIRANDRO 14 Victor Hugo Tuesta and anti precursors DIRANDRO 15 Percy Pizarro Intelligence unit DIRANDRO 16 Juan Carlos Ramirez Ministerio Público Public prosecutor's office EUD 17 15/03/2013 Pierre-Henri Helleputte Technical Cooperation EUD DEVIDA Executive President of 18 Carmen Masias Claux DEVIDA DEVIDA 19 Yalile Martínez Beltrán Jefa del Área de Asesores DEVIDA 15/03/2013 Asesor de Control de 20 Jorge Valencia DEVIDA Oferta DEVIDA Marco Antonio Carrion General FAP (r), Dirección 21 DEVIDA Rondon de Asuntos Técnicos DEVIDA/CONTRALAFT 22 Jorge Valencia Contra admirante ® DEVIDA Comisión Ejecutiva Multisectorial contra el Anna Vicente Castro Secretaria de la Lavado de Activos y el 23 Unidad coordinación Financiamiento del Terrorismo- CONTRALAFT 24 15/03/2013 David Fontes UIF-SBS 25 Alfredo Trillo UIF-SBS 26 Eduardo Casavilca UIF-SBS Consejo Directivo de la Comisión Nacional de 27 María del Pilar Sosa Bienes Incautados CONABI Policía Nacional de Perú PNP 28 16/03/2013 Capitan Jose Alberto Dirección Inteligencia PNP

127 Date Name Function Organisation Gutiérrez García División Brigadire Ramberto Dirección Inteligencia 29 PNP Cheves Verona Division 30 Ronald Vidal Cabesa Technician first Class PNP 31 Cayotopa Chaves Technician first Class PNP Mayor Hugo Division de Seguridad 32 PNP Huamanqui Quispe Aeroportuaria Capitan Luis Zuta Division de Seguridad 33 PNP Chingai Luis Aeroportuaria Capitan Jorge 34 AMERIPOL. PNP Hernández Dias ARGENTINA SEDRONAR Secretaría de Programación para la Coordinator de Prevención de la Cooperación y 1 19/03/2013 Gustavo A. Segnana Drogadicción y la Lucha Financiamiento contra Narcotráfico, International Precedencia de la Nación SEDRONAR GAFISUD and EU project Team leader GAFISUD- 2 Ricardo Gil GAFISUD EU Secretario Ejecutivo 3 Esteban Fullin GAFISUD GAFISUD 19/03/2013 Secretario Ejecutivo 4 Marconi Costa Melo GAFISUD Adjunto GAFISUD Asistente Técnico 5 Andrea Garzon GAFISUD GAFISUD EUD 6 20/03/2013 Henning Reimann Primer Secretario EUD AMERIPOL Expert AMERIPOL expert, Italian 7 20/03/2013 Fabrizio Santini Guardia Financia embassy Fiscalía Antilavado PROSELAC 8 21/03/2013 Frederico Di Pasquale Fiscales Fiscalia Antilavado INTERCAMBIOS – NGO 9 Graziela Touzé, Lic Presidente Intercambio, NGO 21/03/2013 10 Pablo Cymerman; Relaciones Institutionales Intercambio, NGO INTERPOL Assistant Director, Head of Rafael Peña- 11 Regional Bureau for South Interpol Hernandez 21/03/2013 America Oficina Regional de 12 Gabriela Chamorro Secretary to Director INTERPOL FIU Vocal del Consejo Asesor Dra. María Laura 13 de la Unidad FIU Gómez deInformación Financiera Coordinación- 14 Ab. Juan Cruz Ponce Asesor jurídico FIU Representación 22/03/2013 Nacional-FIU Comisión Nacional de 15 Dr. Juan Carlos Otero Oficial de cumplimiento Valores Banco Central República 16 Dr. Daniel Robledo Oficial de cumplimiento Argentina SEDRONAR Coordinator de Secretaría de 17 19/03/2013 Gustavo A. Segnana Cooperación y Programación para la Financiamiento Prevención de la

128 Date Name Function Organisation International Drogadicción y la Lucha contra Narcotráfico, Precedencia de la Nación SEDRONAR 18 Alejandra Cuasnicu Researcher SEDRONAR Ministerio de Seguridad Marianne Foglia Advisor on International 19 Ministry of Security 22/03/2013 Affairs, Cabinet Minister Advisor on International 20 Sol Purita, Ministry of Security Affairs, Cabinet Minister Private Consultant 21 22/03/2013 Sebastian Ovejero Security consultant TRINIDAD & TOBAGO EUD 1 Daniela Tramacere, Charge d'Affairs EUD 26/03/2013 2 Paula McLean EUD Ministry of national Security Ministry of National 3 Keith de Freitas ; Strategic Services Agency Security 4 Jenny Thompson International Affairs Unit MNS 5 Margaret St.George SSA MNS 6 Kieth Defritas SSA MNS 7 Andrew Sookram. SSA MNS 8 Adrian Pantin SSA MNS 9 26/03/2013 Karin Davidson SSA MNS 10 Della Harripaul SSA MNS Desery Jordan- 11 National Drug Council MNS Whiskey Organized Crime & 12 Lloyd Mc Alpin Narcotics Firearms Bureau MNS OCNFB 13 Noel Cobett. OCNFB MNS 14 Bertrand Alleyne OCNFB MNS CARICOM-IMPACS Earl Harris, Assistant Director, 15 IMPACS Strategic Services Director RIFC Regional 16 Haydon Exeter, Interim IMPACS Intelligence Fusion Centre Joint Regional 26/03/2013 17 Captain, Mike Jones Communication Centre, IMPACS Barbados 18 Captain Danielle Jones IMPACS Murphy Price 19 IMPACS

NGO 20 26/03/2013 Steve Richards Director Research House NGO Public Prosecutor’s Office Director of Public Office of the Director of 21 27/03/2013 Roger Gaspard Prosecutions Public Prosecutions (DPP) Port Authority of Trinidad and Tobago 22 27/03/2013 Kelvin Birch and Team Port Police, ASP Port Authority Caribbean Financial Action Task Force CFATF 23 28/03/2013 Calvin Wilson Executive Director, CFATF Ministry of Justice Director Research and 24 28/03/2013 Rishi Maraj Ministry of Justice Planning EUD Mission Debriefing 25 28/03/2013 Daniela Tramacere, Charge d'Affairs EUD

129 Date Name Function Organisation 26 Paula McLean EUD Airport Authority of Trinidad and Tobago Mr. Kenth Quash, and Deputy General Manager 27 Airport Authority 28/03/2013 team Security 28 Bertrand Alleyne OCNFB MNS

130 Annex 7 – List of documents consulted

1. 20101029 Logframe AMERIPOL 2. Action Fiche 2 for Supporting the fight against organised crime on the cocaine route (phase II) under priority 2 'Counteracting Global and Trans-regional Threats' of the long-term component of the Instrument for Stability – 2009 3. Action Fiche 2 for Supporting the fight against organised crime on the cocaine route (phase II) under priority 2 'Counteracting Global and Trans-regional Threats' of the long-term component of the Instrument for Stability – 2010 4. Action Fiche 2 For Supporting The Fight Against Organised Crime On The Cocaine Route (Phase II) Under Priority 2 'Counteracting Global And Trans-Regional Threats' Of The Long-Term Component Of The Instrument For Stability – 2011 5. Action Fiche 3 for Fighting Organised Crime - Priority 2 "Counteracting Global and Trans- regional Threats" of the Long-Term Component of the Instrument for Stability 6. Action Fiche 5 for "Prevention of the diversion of drugs precursors in the Latin American and Caribbean region" under priority 2 'Counteracting Global and Trans-regional Threats' of the long-term component of the Instrument for Stability - 2008 7. Addendum No. 1 to service Contract no. IFS/2010/260-644 8. AIRCOP – Request for approval for non-substantial Change to IFS financing decision Annual Action Plan (AAP) 2009 – Priority 2 (CRIS IFS 2009/021-558) 9. AIRCOP I – Budget 10. AIRCOP I – Project Synopsis 11. AIRCOP I ROM – 993803 – Relevance and Quality of Project design – Background Conclusion Sheet – Ongoing Project 12. AIRCOP I ROM – 993809 13. AIRCOP I ROM – 993810 14. AIRCOP I Special Conditions – signed 15. AIRCOP II – Latin America and the Caribbean - In-country Implementation Status overview (Excel sheet) 16. AIRCOP II – Budget 17. AIRCOP II – Contract IfS/2010/259-552 18. AMERIPOL – Addendum 1 to Service Contract IFS/2010/258-971 19. AMERIPOL – Addendum 2 to Service Contract IFS/2010/258-971 20. AMERIPOL – Buenas practicas policiales, un modelo de intervención efectivo y transparente para las Américas 21. AMERIPOL – Budget 22. AMERIPOL – CLACIP Catalogo de los logotipos de Cocaína 2010-2011 23. AMERIPOL – Service Contract 258-971 24. AMERIPOL – La Verdadera Dimensión de las Drogas 25. AMERIPOL – Manual de seguridad de la información 26. AMERIPOL – Addendum 1 to Service Contract IFS/2010/258-971 27. AMERIPOL – Addendum 2 to Service Contract IFS/2010/258-971 28. AMERIPOL – Budget 29. AMERIPOL – Service Contract 258-971 30. Annex 1 – “Support to the fight against money laundering in Latin America and the Caribbean” Description of the action 31. Annex 3 – Budget GAFISUD I 32. ANNEX I – CTR 276-299 33. ANNEX II – Terms of Reference CORMS 34. Annex II – Terms of Reference CORMS IFS/2011/260-644 35. Annex II – Terms of Reference - CORMS (Cocaine Route Monitoring and Support) 36. Annex II – Terms of Reference AMERIPOL 37. Annex III – GAFISU II – Sources of funding 38. Annex III – CTR 245-728 Organization and Methodology: SEACOP Phase I 39. Annex III – Organisation and Methodology Final: Seaport Cooperation Programme 40. Annex VI – Interim Narrative Report 41. Cocaine Route and Monitoring Support Project – CORMS IfS/2011/260-644 – Inception Report

131 42. Cocaine Route and Monitoring Support Project –CORMS- Six-monthly progress report :14 March – 13 September 2011 43. Cocaine Route Programme Newsletter nr. 2 – September 2012 44. Cocaine Route Programme: Newsletter nr. 1 – April 2012 45. Colombia Countrty Strategy Paper 46. Commission Implementing Decision of 19.3.2012 - Adopting the Thematic Strategy Paper 2012-2013 for assistance in the context of stable conditions for cooperation under the Instrument for Stability 47. Copy of situation AIRCOP dd 231012 48. CORMS - ANNEX III: Organisation & Methodology 49. CORMS - Second Six-monthly Progress Report September 2011 – March 2012 50. CORMS - Third Six-monthly Progress Report March 2012- September 2012 51. CORMS Budget breakdown IFS/2011/260644 52. CORMS Second Six-monthly Progress Report March 2012- September 2012 53. CORMS Second Six-monthly Progress Report September 2011 – March 2012 54. CORMS Six-monthly progress report 14 March – 13 September 2011 55. Council of the European Union 20011, Council conclusions on setting the EU's priorities for the fight against organised crime between 2011 and 2013 56. Dirección Antinarcótica, Policía Nacional de Colombia, Portafolio de Servicios 2012 57. DEVIDA, 2012. National Drug Control Strategy 2012-2016. Lima, Peru Comisón Nacional para el Desarrollo y Vida Sin Drogas 58. ECOWAS Heads of State and Government. Declaration on the Prevention of /drug Abuse, Illicit Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime in West Africa 59. ECPDM 2012. 1st among Equals? The Instrument for Stability and Conflict Prevention and Peace building in the EU's new financial perspective - Briefing Note. Brussels. European Centre for Development Policy Management 60. EU 2005 Action Plan on trafficking in human beings promoting best practices 61. EU 2010. The EU Internal Security strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe 62. EU Drug Strategy 2005-2012; And 2013-2020 63. European Commission - The Instrument for Stability Strategy Paper 2007-2011 64. European Community Contribution Agreement with and International Organisation: IFS/2008/170-366 65. European Council, 2010. The Stockholm Programme. An open and Secure Europe Serving and Protecting Citizens 66. European Union Contribution Agreement with an international Organisation: IfS/2012/289- 049 (the “Agreement”) 67. Fighting drugs and organised crime in Nigeria, CRIS NG/FED 68. FIIAPP 6-Month Progress Report – AMERIPOL 69. GAFISUD – Addendum No 1 to Grant Contract No IFS/2009/228-069 70. GAFISUD Action Plan (Proposal May 2010) 71. GAFISUD I – Annex to the contract – The Action 72. GAFISUD I Grant Contract – External Actions of the EU IfS/2009/228-069 73. GAFISUD II – Annex II General Conditions applicable to European Union-financed grant contracts for external actions 74. GAFISUD II – Grant Contract – External Actions of the EU IFS/2011/278-229 75. GAFISUD II – The Action 76. GAFISUD II Annex III – Budget for the Action 77. GIABA – Terms of Reference - Anti-money laundering activities in West Africa (Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal) & Cape Verde 78. IFS Multi-annual Indicative Programme 2012-2013 79. INTERCAMBIOS Encarcelamientos por delitos relacionados con estupefacientes en Argentina 80. INTERPOL Policía Nacional de Colombia, Portafolio de Servicios, 2011 81. Instrument for Stability (IfS) indicative Programme 2007-2008 82. Instrument for Stability (IfS) indicative Programme 2009-2011 83. Instrument for Stability (Long-term component) IfS/2008/170-366 – PRELAC 84. Instrument for Stability (Long-term component) IfS/2009/226-525 AIRCOP Contribution agreement –Annex 1 - AIRCOP-I DoA

132 85. Instrument for Stability (Long-term component) IfS/2010/ 259-552 AIRCOP Contribution agreement –Annex 1 – AIRCOP II DoA 86. Logframe SEACOP Programme: Proposed Actions – SEACOP Beneficiary Countries 87. Logical Framework 1 GAFISUD 88. Mid-term Review of the Heroine Route Programme financed by the Instrument for Stability Inception Report 89. Observatorio Argentino de Drogas Estudio Nacional sobre consumo de sustancias psicoactivas y su relación con la comisión de delitos en población privada de la libertad- Argentina 2009 90. Observatorio Argentino de Drogas Muertes relacionadas al consumo de drogas Analisis de Necropsias 91. Observatorio Argentino de Drogas La medicalizacion de la vida cotidiana 92. PRELAC I – Addendum 3 to contribution agreement No. IFS/2008/170-366 93. PRELAC I – Addendum No 1 to Contribution Agreement No. IFS/2008/170-366 94. PRELAC I – Addendum No 1 to Contribution Agreement No. IFS/2008/170-366 + Budget 95. PRELAC I – Annex iii Budget for the Action 96. PRELAC I – Background conclusion sheet – Ongoing projects: Relevance and Quality of Project Design 97. PRELAC I – Project synopsis 98. PRELAC I – Logframe 99. PRELAC I – IfS/2008/170-366 – Contribution agreement – Annex 1: Description of the Action 100. PRELAC II – Activity Update Report (March – September 2012) 101. PRELAC II – DoA 102. PRELAC II – ANNEX II –IFS/2012/286-049 – General Conditions applicable to European Union contribution agreements with international organisations 103. PRELAC III – ANNEX II IfS/2012/286-049 – BIDGET PRELAC II in Euros 104. Regulation (EC) No 1717/2006 Of The European Parliament and of The Council of 15 November 2006 establishing an Instrument for Stability 105. SEACOP – Monitoring Report – MR-143441.01 – 25/11/2011 106. SEACOP – Monitoring Report – MR-143441.02 – 25/11/2011 107. SEACOP – Monitoring Report – MR-143441.03 – 25/11/2011 108. SEACOP – Monitoring Report – MR-143441.04 – 25/11/2011 109. SEACOP – Fourth Technical Report (13/01/2012-12/07/2012) 110. SEACOP I – Addendum No. 1 to Service Contract No IFS/2010/245-728 111. SEACOP I – Service Contract No 2010/245-728 (signed) 112. SEACOP I Addendum 1 to Service Contract No. IFS/2010/245-728 113. SEACOP I Addendum 2 to Service Contract No. IFS/2010/245-728 114. SEACOP I Addendum to Service Contract No. IFS/2010/245-728 115. SEACOP I Annex I: General conditions for service contracts for external actions financed by the EU or by the EDF 116. SEACOP I Budget 117. SEACOP I Change in Budget 118. SEACOP I ROM – Project Synopsis 119. SEACOP I ROM – Relevance and Quality of Project Design 25/11/2011 120. SEACOP II Budget 121. SEACOP Organisation and Methodology 122. SEACOP Terms of Reference 123. SEDRONAR Info Drogas Año 2012 No. 1 124. SEDRONAR Plan Federal de prevención integral de la drogodependencia y de control del trafico ilícito de drogas 2012-2017 125. Service Contract No. IFS/2011/260-644 for European Union External Actions financed from the EU general budget 126. Support to the fight against money laundering in Latin America and the Caribbean (GAFISUD) I: Annex 1 : Description of the action 127. The 2003 Commission Communication on Corruption 128. The Instrument for Stability Strategy Paper 2007-2011 129. UNODC - January – PRELAC Activity Update Report April 2011 130. UNODC - Prevention of the Diversion of Precursor Chemicals in Latin America and the Caribbean January - December 2010 - PRELAC 2nd Interim Report

133 131. UNODC 2007, Cocaine Trafficking in West Africa: The threat to stability and development 132. UNODC and the World Bank 2007 report. Crime, Violence, and Development: Trends, Costs, and Policy options in the Caribbean 133. UNODC, 2006, Study on Crime and Corruption in Cape Verde 134. UNODC, 2008 "Making drug control 'fit for purpose': Building on the UNGASS decade". Report by the Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime as a contribution to the review of the twentieth special session of the General Assembly of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs. 135. UNODC, 2008. Drug Trafficking as a Security Threat in West Africa 136. UNODC, Annual Progress Report (APR) Period covered by the report: January – December 2011 137. WAPIS – Annex I – The Action

134 Annex 8 – Project summaries

AMERIPOL Summary of activities and achievements

1. Overall objectives The project, as designed, seeks to enhance the capacity for international cooperation of law enforcement, judicial and prosecuting authorities to fight drug trafficking, organized crime. In order to do so it focuses on improving international cooperation amongst Latin American law enforcement and prosecuting authorities in fighting transnational crime. To achieve this the project planned strengthen the exchange of information and intelligence at regional and trans-regional level especially with Western Africa and the EU and to improve prosecutors’ and law enforcement agencies’ capacity to carry out complex investigations at a regional and trans-regional level. AMERIPOL was conceived to fight terrorism, organized crime, war crimes, drug and arms trafficking, exploitation of and trafficking in human beings, money laundering, child pornography, white-collar crimes, computer related crimes, intellectual property crimes and corruption. It brings together 19 Member States and 18 permanent observers from beyond the region (observers amongst others include: Europol, Interpol, DEA, Cuerpo Nacional de Policia and Guardia Civil of Spain, Guardia di Finanza, the Duch National Police and Carabinieri of Italy, est.). Finally, the mission of AMERIPOL is promoting and strengthening regional police cooperation in scientific and technical matters, training; improving and increasing intelligence exchange; promoting sustained criminal investigation and legal assistance. To meet with these objectives internally AMERIPOL has four divisions: (1) Technical-Scientific Coordination; (2) Intelligence Coordination; (3) Judicial Investigation and Assistance Coordination; (4) Training and Doctrine. The AMERIPOL-EU project is directed to strengthening all four areas in that the creation of the information system will be a cross cutting tool for the operation of the institution. Additionally the project was designed to allow AMERIPOL to standardize and design training courses and seminars in the fields of intelligence, promoting criminal investigations and cooperation between LEA and prosecuting authorities.

2. Execution of project The project became operational on March 17th 2011, after the inception meeting held in Brussels. The headquarters of the project is Bogota, specifically at the venue of the permanent General Secretariat of AMERIPOL, a three storey building facilitated by the Colombian National Police- CNP. From the onset the CNP has assumed the operating costs (staff, public utilities and incidentals) of the AMERIPOL although EU funds were used to refurbish part of the infrastructure and to outfit the Colombian National AMERIPOL Unit –NAU- as well as the Secretariat with modern computers. Finally, the Executing agency sees its mission as creating the foundations for a EUROPOL type organization. AMERIPOL was created as the product of the goodwill of the police forces, which in 2007, signed the document that brought it to life. AMERIPOL has no legal personality which means that no member country will be able to contribute with dues for its upkeep. Finally, there is an issue of political oversight of the organization; AMERIPOL only has police chiefs in its board of directors. AMERIPOL is conscientious of the issue that this raises at a political level and is actively seeking solutions: The possibility of putting this police organization under an existing regional political umbrellas such as UNASUR, MERCOSUR and even the OAS have been suggested by some countries154, and the alternative of adopting the formula of INTERPOL treaties have been considered. Yet it appears that within the year the TL and the Secretariat will present to the

154 For instance Brazil, Ecuador and Uruguay suggested the creation of a EUROPOL type institution must have civilian oversight and the creation of the Consejo de Seguridad Ciudadana del mecanismo regional of UNASUR will present, at its next meeting, an initiative to create UNAPOL based on the same principals of AMERIPOL but with civilian supervision of the organization. Argentina is focused on MERCOSUR or any organization where the US is not present and Colombia and AMERIPOL suggest that it constitute a new International organization. The problem with the UNAPOL proposition is that it only brings together the 10 LA nations and excludes CA and the Caribbean.

135 Reunión de Ministros en Materia de Seguridad Pública MISPA, a proposition for a NEW International treaty be signed in which AMERIPOL will become an Inter-American Organization. Project execution is in the hands of FIIAPP of the Spanish foreign Ministry and the Team Leader – TL- is a Spanish Police officer who is also fluent in Portuguese and French. During 2011 and 2012 the TL has organized gap analysis missions to determine the strengths and weaknesses of the countries of the AMERIPOL-EU project. Today it is clear, although listed as one of the original beneficiaries of the project, Argentina will not join AMERIPOL for which it must be excluded from the beneficiaries, and that NAU are operating in Brazil, Bolivia (will receive project funding), Ecuador, Colombia, Panama, and Peru (will receive project funding).In Mexico and the Dominican Republic have created their own NAU but they are not part of the project. The project has advanced in creating the information system (pilot for the time being) that will meet the following criteria: . The nature of AMERIPOL calls for a strategic and not an operational data base system. . To reduce costs the initial system would be developed using software of public domain, no software licenses were to be bought at this stage. . In its initial phase the information system would be limited to 22 variables identified by the team leader, NAUs and LEAs. . The information system developers would take into consideration the INTERPOL and EUROPOL information systems so as to minimize training of personnel in the future, and ensure compatibility between the AMERIPOL one and those systems. . Each of the six nations through their NAU, would assume the responsibility of inputting the data and the AMERIPOL Secretariat would be given the responsibility of cross checking all the data and generating alerts/reports. This means that access of the beneficiaries to the data base would be limited to the information that they have introduced at least in this initial stage. . A pilot information system will be developed (operational second semester 2013), implemented and validated in the six beneficiary nations. AMERIPOL-EU has also organized 7 training events: . I Curso de Análisis de Inteligencia Criminal - Ecuador (21 - 25 November 2011) . 1º Seminario interinstitucional para Policías y Fiscales (no dates given) . Reunión Jefes de UNAs, Medellín(4-5 June 2012) . Reunión de Jefes de UNAS, Panamá (22 - 26 October 2012) . Pasantía para fiscales, Madrid (12-16 November 2012) . Pasantía para Fiscales, Bogota (26-30 November, 2012) . II Curso de Análisis de Inteligencia Criminal - Bolivia (03 - 14 December 2012)

3. Conclusions and recommendations The MTR Team has analyzed the situation of the AMERIPOL-EU project concluding that: . Although the ToR of the project do not call for institution building the TL, the executing agency and the AMERIPOL Secretariat at some point concluded that AMERIPOL-EU would have to create the institution to operate. Thus EU funds have been dedicated to supplying furniture and computers to NAUs as part of the project. The MTR Team could better understand the decision of using project funds for institution building if AMERIPOL had solved its legal personality issue. In none of its member states does AMERIPOL exist as such, for this reason it is clear that the long-term existence of the organization and its NAUs is in danger. Without judicial umbrella data sharing through an AMERIPOL information system will not be viable, and training programs will most likely die without EU financing. . There is no written proof that AMERIPOL has developed training manuals and/or has prepared standardized course programmes in any of the areas thus far developed. . The MTR team found no complex investigations that have been carried out as a consequence of project intervention. This may be related to the legal limitations imposed on parties (see no.1)

136 . After 18 months of work the information system is still to be presented in its pilot version. Analysis of this must wait until the end of the second semester of 2013. What is very clear is that at a regional level there are rivalries in this area: SISME a data base - to be financed by the regional economic integration organization known as MERCOSUR155/- that was presented to the MTR mission by the Interpol regional office in Buenos Aires as a fully operational system it is NOT operational. At best it will begin to be developed after the Ministers sign the agreement with Interpol for its development and will only cover the transit of people, weapon registers, and vehicles; it will operate at land borders crossings, and it has nothing to do with Organized Crime. The other rival system SIRENA to be developed by OAS/CICAD but will only deal with illicit drugs from cultivation to processing but not with TOC. The objective of this data base is the training of police and judiciary in supply reduction. Finally, behind the rivalries there is an independent variable, the participation of USG police agencies in AMERIPOL, Argentina, Bolivia, Uruguay and Venezuela are opposed to that government’s participation in a Latin American organization. . Brazil, Ecuador and Uruguay agree that an organization where the continent’s police forces come together to share experience and expertise is necessary. This recognition has driven them to drive forward a proposition that will be presented at the next meeting of the Consejo de Seguridad Ciudadana del Mecanismo Regional UNASUR to create what they will call UNAPOL. This institution could solve the issue of civilian oversight, however, for the CRP the fact that it is limited in scope, it excludes Central America, Mexico and the Caribbean, it may not be the solution to the problem. . There is one regional institution that all countries seem to accept as serious, none politically oriented or dominated, that is present in all of LAC, CICAD. The inclusion of CICAD as a party in the AMERIPOL project raises more questions than answers: Why has CICAD, although associated with the OAS, been so successful in the region? Is there a possibility that AMERIPOL be recognized by CICAD so that it can work as a OAS organization? Would the US LEAs exclude themselves from such organization?156 Can the EU work with an organization that works under the OAS umbrella? . Outside of the participation of two representatives each of Barbados and Trinidad & Tobago at the 1º Seminario interinstitucional para Policías y Fiscales held in 2012 in Lima there is no evidence that the project has attempted to expand its reach to other regions. There is no evidence of contacts with West Africa. In sum the MTR Team recommends that all feature financing be contingent on a solution of the legal personality issue and that IfS define if the long-term objective is the creation of a EUROPOL type organization in LAC, this is the objective of the executing agency and the TL. Once these issues are addressed and solved all project activity issues will fall in line.

155 MERCOSUR members are Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay (at present suspended), Uruguay and Venezuela. SISME as an information system will include none MERCOSUR members, Bolivia and Chile. 156 Uruguay is very clear that AMERIPOL with US participation is unacceptable all solutions are in the exclusion of LEAs from that country.

137 GAFISUD Summary of activities and achievements

1. Overall objectives GAFISUD was created in December of 2000 with 9 member countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay during the decade of existence it has incorporated three more members; Mexico (2006), Costa Rica y Panama (2010). Its Secretariat operates from Buenos Aires, it is an active member of GAFI/FATF and has as its mission to ensure member states compliance with the 40 FATF recommendations, training of MS personnel and promote al lead the process of mutual evaluations in the region. More specifically as all FATF regional groups, GAFISUD seek to prevent financing of terrorism, through the implementation of FATF’s 40 recommendations and the creation of a regional system to prevent asset laundering. To do so it has defined its specific objectives, to strengthen the investigation and prosecution of money laundering, especially in the non-banking financial sector, and to foster international cooperation. GAFISUD-EU II which initiated activities during the last months of 2012, but really came into being as of its physical independence of the GAFISUD offices in the first semester of 2013, will if focused on improving GAFISUD’s actions in the fight against organized crime. To do so it will strengthen investigation and prosecution of money laundering with emphasis in the non/banking sector; strengthen administrative and judicial cooperation among member states, and promote cooperation lines (money and asset laundering) though formal agreements priority countries and regional groups (GAFIC, GIABA). For this purpose project staff has increased and now operates in separate offices. GAFISUD as an organization is composed of a director, his second and a technical assistant plus three general support staff to attend the needs of the 12 member states. Personnel that must manage: gap analysis, working groups, mutual evaluations, answer MS queries on the 40 recommendations, organize training events, supervise the asset recovery network, administer the office and deal with special programs.

2. Execution of project The GAFISUD-EU I, began its intervention on April 1 2010157. To achieve its objectives the EU project was initially staffed by a Team Leader and two project consultants who worked out of the GAFISUD offices. Activities of this project have covered money laundering investigations capacities of GAFISUD-MS, legal reforms where failures were detected, regional and national training events (seminars, conferences, workshops, meetings, etc.), ensuring best practices amongst MS and improving financial investigation capabilities of GAFISUD-MS. To undertake the work the TL opted for prioritizing his activities based on risk-base analysis which focused on the non banking financial sector in the twelve countries and culminated in the selection of seven priority subsectors, based on the level of associated risk, the type of weakness detected, and the incidence in GAFISUD member countries. Once this was solved work focused on four subsectors; Foreign Exchange Market, Remittances, Valuables Transport Services and Other non banking credit institutions and/or financial mediation. The MTR did not find any written report on these accomplishments. Legal reforms are the second objective of the project. Both GAFISUD and the project must limit their intervention in this to identifying the weakness in each country and suggesting reform. Some countries, such as Bolivia have received and applied the recommendation and have succeeded in being taken out of the FATF list; others have been slow in reacting and cannot be taken out of the list. Training has been the most prolific of the activities under the EU project. Several principals guide this activity, on the one hand some events are of a regional nature others are national, but

157 As of July of 2010 Panama and Costa Rica joined GAFISUD increasing the MS to 12 and as of December of 2012 Cuba also joined the organization becoming the 13th state.

138 regardless their nature GAFISUD-EU reserves the selection criteria for those individuals to be financed with project funds. The courses/training events/meetings financed by the project were: Training for national stakeholders from all GAFISUD member states . 09/2010 X Training Seminar for GAFISUD National Evaluations, Lima. . 10/2010 III Conference on GAFISUD National Typologies, Puntarenas-Costa Rica . 10/2010 First Advanced Workshop for GAFISUD Evaluators, Panama City. . 08/2011 Workshop on the Prevention of Money Laundering in the Transport of Valuables Sub Sector, Santa Cruz de la Sierra-Bolivia. . 08/2011 Second Advanced Workshop for GAFISUD Evaluators, Montevideo. . 04/2012 Coordination Meeting with National Focal Points on the Non-Banking Financial Sector, Santiago. . 05/2012 First Meeting on GAFISUD Joint Typologies and the Egmont Americas Group, Quito. . 06/2012 Seminar on the Adoption of New International Standards, Buenos Aires. . 09/2012 New International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, Cartagena, Colombia . 11/2012 Risk Analysis Workshop, Puntarenas-Costa Rica . 03/2013 XII Meeting of GAFISUD´s Asset Recovery Network (RRAG) Focal Points, Bogota. Training designed for those member states included in GAFI´s list . 09/2011 Seminar on “Paradigms on the Fight against the laundering of Illicit Proceeds, Terrorist Financing, and Predicate Offenses”, Santa Cruz de la Sierra-Bolivia . 09/2011 Sub-regional Workshop on Terrorist Financing and the Investigation of Cross border Financial Crimes, Asuncion-Paraguay . 06/2012: “Seminar on the Investigation of Money Laundering and Predicate Offenses according to GAFI´s New Recommendations”, Montevideo-Uruguay . 07/2012 New Problems in the Combat against Money Laundering, Buenos Aires-Argentina . 09/2012 Basic Aspects of the Laundering of Illicit Proceeds and Terrorist Financing, Santa Cruz de la Sierra-Bolivia . 09/2012 Investigating Money Laundering, Buenos Aires-Argentina . 10/2012 Training Course aimed at Judges in the Combat against the Laundering of Illicit Proceeds and Terrorist Financing, Santa Cruz de la Sierra-Bolivia . 11/2012 “First Meeting on the Oversight of Popular and Solidarity Economy”, Quito, Ecuador The activities that ensured best practices amongst MS and improving financial investigation capabilities of GAFISUD-MS were best served with specialized seminars where the issue of the information was paramount, legal limitations discussed and personal ties were established which in turn constitute the building block for confidence amongst FIUs in the region. The project has enhanced relations which will prove their value as investigations requirements surge at the regional level. Through these contacts some of the results have been: . Agreement on criteria for improving information delivery, . The identification of training requirements, . Preparation of national to join teams in mutual evaluations, this happened in Bolivia and Ecuador, . Regional typologies were defined with MS personnel evaluated by the Operational Support Group and eventually presented to the FATF Working group, . Mutual evaluation teams have reached agreement on criteria to measure the quality of the evaluations. 3. Conclusions and recommendations Although GAFISUD has some limitation, the project has, for the most part, fulfilled its objectives thus far. The executing agency, GAFISUD, is grossly under staffed (6 persons to manage 12 countries) thus the EU project is becoming a support programme for the agency. By comparison the CFATF is staffed by 14 professionals to attend the needs of 30 member states proportionally this seems to be the same yet the issue here is that the GNP of say Colombia is as large as all the CFATF member countries combined thus the complexity of the analysis is more demanding. GAFISUD’s financial income is generated through country quotas which are based on the GNP of each member state, Brazil, Mexico and Colombia are the largest economies in the region (together the sum much more than a trillion dollars) which leads to conclude that the quota system may be underestimated, or that the exchange rate problems of Argentina affect GAFISUD’s finances.

139 GAFISUD–EU II calls for the project to lead that organization’s trans-regional contacts with CFATF and GIABA but there is a problem given that the Team Leader has very limited language skills and follows what the MTR considers a very conservative line not wanting to initiate activities in one area without having finished other activity. This creates delays in trans-regional communications and difficulties in reporting, the MTR requested copy of the Final report of GAFISUD-UE I and was told that it was being translated.

140 PRELAC Summary of activities and achievements

1. Overall objectives The PRELAC project is a continuation of an Andean Community of Nations –CAN- project that dates back to 2003 and which ended in 2006. This EU funded project known as PRECAN had limited objectives including an information system for CAN. Activities were affected by Venezuela’s withdrawal from the organisation, but it succeeded in laying the foundation for the current Policy on Control and Oversight of Chemical Substances used in the Production of Cocaine and Heroin. At the end of this project precursor control continued in the Andean Nations. Simultaneously, UNODC, which had participated in PRECAN, formulated and presented the EU a new programme with a more regional scope. In 2009 PRELAC was financed. Its duration was initially to last for 36 months, with 12 countries from LAC participating in activities that covered the full spectrum of relate LE Activities, that is: Immigration, prosecution, police and administrative controls, education and training, research and information gathering cooperation with the private sector. In 2012 once the first PRELAC project came to an end a second phase was financed which will also have a 36 month duration, in this second stage the program seeks to improve the effectiveness of the measures and information systems designed by the project. PRELAC set its goals on two specific objectives: . To strengthen the capacity of national administrative control authorities to prevent diversion of precursors. In order to reach this objective it was defined that it was necessary to strengthen relationships between private operators and control authorities as well as the research capacity of supervisory authorities, parallel to this the efficiency and effectiveness of customs had to be improves. . Enhance the cooperation between countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Ecuador Guatemala, Jamaica, Peru, Panama, Paraguay, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela) through the exchange of information. For this the project as to develop the structure of the network and base line definition, develop a Web based interchange system and seek way to harmonize laws and control mechanisms. Both precursor control projects have had UNODC intervention for precursor control that agency has a dedicated staff at the Lime office in Peru. It consists of four professionals (chemical engineers, admin officers) plus the necessary and clerical staff who run the project. Locally the project is seen as a UN run project and the EU is only in the background coming to light when financing events publication, training events and other public activities. As an example, when financing training seminars UNODC allows beneficiaries to send who they may wish yet if they require EU financing is required strict guidelines are applied to potential beneficiaries. 2. Execution of project Project execution is based on the design of activities that will facilitate beneficiaries international and domestic precursor control mechanisms. To do so policies that create associations between preventive strategies in the administration of precursors and law enforcement had to be fomented and strengthen in the region. The project developed actions and obtained results as follows:  Precursor information system; The use/implementation of the National Drug Control System –NDS- as well as the INCB’s PEN online system are the bases for the actions in this field. Additionally there has been support for countries where the PRECAN system is to be integrated to the NDS.  Interagency cooperation as a fundamental principal within beneficiary states and at a regional level: Precursor control and interdiction seem to have fused together giving policies in this field that single interdiction orientation. The lack of an integrated approach where prevention and control (private and public actors together) and interdiction (LEAs) come together has undermined efforts; the PRELAC project has filled this gap and become a bridge through which this may be solved. To this end PRELAC created a network of focal point of key shareholders, this network replaced a steering committee which had little acceptance amongst beneficiaries.

141  Strengthening to prevent diversion: This has taken on many faces, one is the fruits comes out of the training events undertaken by the project; a second relates to the better understanding that countries have of each other’s dilemmas in the precursor control field; a third relates to the south-south cooperation that the project spurred amongst beneficiaries, and a fourth is associated to the incorporation of the private sector into the field of precursor control and the need that they assume, in part, some of the costs of these activities.  Private sector integrated into control mechanisms: The project has visited beneficiaries where especial one to three day seminars where held focussing on the private sector. Although the initial projection of unifying a regional legal frame work for controls has proven difficult and has been abandoned, at a national level each country has been able to enter into constructive dialog with the private sector. In some cases this has been more constructive than in others but the process continues. Training has been the backbone of PRELAC’s activities and, although difficult to separate the number of EU financed participants what is clear is; as was mentioned UNODC has consulted with EU experts in the field for the development of these and other project activities: the almost 30 training events (national, regional and inter-regional) organized under the project have been attended by more than 800 participants from the 16 beneficiary nations, these events have planted the seed for national, regional and inter-regional cooperation. 3. Conclusions and recommendations Some of the projects of the CRP are unsustainable without external support, though they have, throughout the years developed a capacity amongst beneficiaries that has contributed to improve drug control curtailing the actions of TOC. This is the case of PRELAC. Although the MTR team does not necessarily agree with the theoretical justifications that brought on its creation and that have guided its actions, it is clear that its efficient execution and well managed activities have had an impact in the LAC nations where it has operated. The fact that the project is well managed and that it has had a positive impact on individual nations is important but from the perspective of the IfS it is more important and relevant to see through verifiable data that would demonstrate whether the project has had an effect on the supply of cocaine throughout the world and more particularly in Europe. Additionally, it is necessary to demonstrate that the activity being addressed by the project is associated to TOC and finally that the investment of nearly 10 years of work with LEAs throughout the Andean nations158, has established joint state and private sector mechanisms to permanently monitor the commerce of precursors. It is difficult to gather empirical information that can attribute to the precursor control programme the reduction in the supply of cocaine. What can be said is that the three nations that account for more than 95% of the coca cultivated in the world have reduced the number of hectares under cultivation159. This should have reduced the potential production of cocaine yet the same report testified that the potential production has increased by no less than 20% and that the purity of cocaine in the streets of the 14 most important markets of Western Europe remains more or less constant. These numbers published by the same UN agency that administers the project are self-defeating in that it is very clear that the impact of precursor control is in efficient. Additionally during the MTR mission in all three countries authorities were asked (including the UNODC team in Lima) if there was any evidence of TOC organizations behind precursor diversion, the answer was always negative. To add to the situation of the cocaine market in Peru it is argued by authorities (PNP, DEVIDA, SUNAT and Prosecutors) that most of the coca that leaves that country leaves as base to

158 These include the three mayor coca growing nations Bolivia, Colombia and Peru account for no less than 95% of the coca cultivated in the world. This number is acceptable to most academic since there is an unknown number of hectares in Brazil, Ecuador and possibly in Panama and other tropical nations that have not been identified. It is clear that most equatorial Africa is potentially viable for coca cultivation. 159 The World Drug Report 2012 has established that these three countries cultivation has fallen from 210.000 in 2000 to 149.200 hectares in 2010. Nonetheless, the same report establishes that potential production of cocaine has risen by 20%. Parallel to this the report clearly shows that purity in the European markets ahs remained the same throughout the decade. Pages 35 to 38.

142 be converted into HCL in other nations (privately they argued the same was true in Bolivia)160, only in Colombia do they still admit to having facilities to process cocaine161. The cumulative knowledge compiled from statistical data and the interviews leads the MTR team to recommend that the PRELAC be phased out during the next 4 years and in order to do so the responsibility of articulating precursor control should be given to a LA agency that could be find its political backing in CICAD or UNASUR but that could be finances with funds from all countries so that it can continue its training programme, integrating industry into the control programme and developing the necessary data bases to control imports as well as intra regional trade of precursor. It is recommended that the agency/corporation or office to be created for this purpose be based in Lima since here there is a critical mass of technicians well trained under the UNODC-EU who have the advantage of having the contacts necessary for the coordination of activities. As mentioned initially PRELAC has been a well-managed project that has made a significant contribution to the public/private partnership in drug control. It is also a promising template for the control of hazardous substances used in illegal mining and other activities. This project can be a good example on control efforts that the HRP could use to develop strategies to control heroin processing. As a consequence of PRELAC’s success the seizures of hazardous chemicals is causing problems for many countries where these are piling up in unsuitable storage facilities at different PoEs and in cities throughout Central and South America (no reports on the situation in the Caribbean). This is a case where CORMS could begin to apply the recommendations of the MTR by commissioning a study the identify the current situation of these seized chemicals ad formulating a medium to long- term strategy to deal with them while assuring minimal environmental impact and ensuring the health of the population that lives near the warehouses/deposits where they are stored.

160 According to a an information system run by Dr. Jaime Garcia of Consutores de los Andes the Peru data is confirmed since lab destruction data show that the largest number of HCL labs was in 2011 with 19 this is hardly comparable to the more than 1500 base labs destroyed that same year. 161 In that same year in Colombia 200HCL labs were destroyed. NOCD Monitoreo de cultivos ilícitos en Colombia 2012.

143 SEACOP Summary of activities and achievements

1. Overall Objective The overall objective is to build capacities and strengthen international cooperation in the fight against maritime trafficking and associated criminal networks in West Africa162.  Support the set-up of specialist intelligence and investigation units located in seaports or sensitive coastal areas;  Reinforce seaport capacities and supporting the set-up of JMCUs; Develop regional intelligence and maritime cooperation and supporting the set-up of a regional intelligence and maritime coordination centre;  Organize regional training and exploring the feasibility of a ‘Regional Training Facility’;  Explore the feasibility of setting up a regional maritime information system.

The SEACOP project is within the objectives of the CRP in that it seeks to develop beneficiary countries capacitated to disrupt the shipment of cocaine and that may manifest themselves through the seaports. The intelligence gathering and investigative components of the project are directed at ensuring that information on organized criminal activities through the ports are adequately managed while the setting up of the maritime intelligence units will enable the flow of information between the different countries and beyond.

2. Project Execution SEACOP is pitched onto the existing UNODC GCCP in the beneficiary countries for convenience and practicality. Three countries initially selected for the first phase of the programme, namely Cape Verde, Senegal and Ghana. Gambia, Togo, Benin, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau are scheduled to be part of the second phase of the project, however Togo joined half way through the project phase and the political situation in Guinea Bissau has made it impossible to carry out the project in that country. SEACOP also falls in line with the ECOWAS Regional Action Plan against drugs and crime (2008- 2011)163. On a related issue the West African Cooperative Security Initiative (WACSI)164, falls in line with ECOWAS Vision 2020, which seeks “to create a borderless, peaceful, prosperous; and cohesive region, built on good governance where people have the capacity to access and harness its enormous resources through the creation of opportunities for sustainable development and environmental preservation165”. Between 2011 and 2012, SEACOP has been able to achieve: . The establishment of the joint maritime control units (JMCU) and capacity enhancement of the teams in the countries visited by the MTR Team (Ghana, Togo, Senegal and Cape Verde); . Training of teams on intelligence gathering in Ghana, Senegal and Cape Verde; . Procurement and delivery of equipment to the joint units in Cape Verde, Ghana and Senegal Even though the project has developed, taught and fomented specific investigation techniques to the JMCUs these have only developed a limited capacity to apply them. Their current operations are based on intelligence received and shared which lead to arrests. Investigation per se has been left to the national drug law enforcement bodies in each of the countries, e.g. NACOB in Ghana, the Judiciary police in Cape Verde, OCRTIS in Senegal, and the ORETIDB in Togo. The JMCUs are currently at the main ports of beneficiary countries. However, in response to controls organized crime tends to focus their activities in the smaller by high-risk fishing ports dotted all along the coast line of the beneficiary countries. Mounting of surveillance in these high-

162 ToR of the Mid Term Review of the CRP 163 Council of the European Union (12 April 2012), Report of the Cocaine Route 078380/EU XXIV.GP 164 A regional initiative implemented by the US State Department with DEA, Africom and USAID 165 www.ecowas.org

144 risk areas is important, currently JMCUs have no operational manuals and no clear distribution of responsibilities when it relates to these high-risk areas. Outside the WCO information network to which the JMCUs have access, the various teams are able to contact each other through informal and unsecure email or phone systems between the countries. The MTR noted that the Customs officers in the joint teams in most of the countries are the only ones using the WCO information network with the exception of Cape Verde where the entire team has been given access to the system. With regard to the establishment of the National maritime information systems (MIS), the Senegalese Customs Service with the assistance of France, seems to be the only team with an established IT platform essentially for maritime tracking purposes. Senegal is hoping that this initiative will lead to the formation of a West African Regional Maritime system for ECOWAS member countries on demand. Some countries in the region have already signed MOUs with the Senegalese Customs Authorities to have access to the system. This initiative is worth building upon. 3. Conclusion and recommendations The MTR concludes that: . In order for a successful implementation of the project in line with the objectives of the CRP, it is essential that the project team be capacitated to carry out appropriate in-depth investigations following seizures and arrests. . There is need for the establishment of a standard operating procedure (SOP) based on best practice, for all beneficiary countries. . There is need for the production of SOP manuals and handbooks for all relevant personnel of the JMCU. . Training for relevant officers on the content and use of the SOP is essential in order to provide the team with adequate information on what to be done and when; . There is need for envisaging counter-measures to address displacement to other smaller but high-risk fishing ports. . There is need to critically examine the already existing training facility in the region when considering the possibility of establishing a maritime training centre (e.g. Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire). . There is need to take into account the specificities of the countries and the existing IT platform in Senegal, in order to build a system that may be compatible and user friendly. . There is need to organize joint training between the implementing partners e.g. FIIAPP – UNODC capacity enhancement activities. It is the opinion of the MTR that future activities will focus on the above considering joint investigations operations (West Africa EU and LAC) as well as parallel investigations (AIRCOP, SEACOP and AML). It is also essential that the various teams be mandated to carry out proactive investigations in order to respond to the objectives of the CRP through inter-regional cooperation of both Judiciary and LE operatives.

145 AIRCOP Summary of activities and achievements

1. Overall Objective The Overall Objective is to build drug-interdiction capacities at selected international airports in West Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean. In doing so, the project will establish Joint Airport Interdiction Task Forces (JAITF) and connect them to international law enforcement databases and communication networks to enable the transmission in real time to other international airports of operational information aimed at intercepting illicit shipments. The project will also promote intelligence and information sharing between services at national and international level as well as an intelligence-led approach to countering drug trafficking The DoA describes AIRCOP West Africa as a particularly challenging project because it intends to "bring together different law enforcement agencies and associate the private sector (airlines)" in order to tackle "both drug trafficking and organized crime".166 The efforts of the project so far have focused on achieving the first two of these objectives. Law enforcement agencies have been brought together into JAITFs in all the countries visited as well as several others. Working at different levels of effectiveness, these teams focus on intercepting illegal drugs. The project objectives and results are well defined, but there are no adequate OVIs at objectives' level. They do not move beyond the achievement of project outputs - creation of the JAITF, the adaptation of CENComm (communication system of the World Customs Organisation to the national Customs), access to I-24/7 (INTERPOL's internal communication system) and trainings. The only operational outcome is the number of drug seizures made, a measure that is notoriously liable to misinterpretation and besides, beyond the control of AIRCOP stricto sensu. The project provides assistance but does not lead operations. 2. Project Execution AIRCOP 1 was initially planned to start 01/01/2010 and to end 01/01/2013, but unexpected deterioration in the security situation in several countries including Nigeria led to a delay and the suspension of activities in Guinea Bissau and Mali. An 18 month no cost project extension was therefore requested and granted. As Morocco and Brazil have decided not to participate in the programme only 5 out of the 10 countries foreseen in phase 1 and 2 are involved. The project is managed from the UNODC Dakar office where the coordinator and two consultants are based. Being located in the region was said to have several advantages, like 'having a feel' for the reality and the issues of working in Africa. Travel to other project countries is not always made easier by working out of Dakar, as not all African capitals are connected, which often necessitates a routing via Europe. Good progress has been made in the five countries (out of 10) where project activities are going ahead MOUs have been signed with relevant ministries, focal points have been appointed, coordinating missions have been conducted and a team of project coordinator supported by two experts is in place. Expertise for specific tasks can be contracted on a short term basis. The project has just begun in Ghana as suitable offices were only found after the review team visited. The country plays host to the Accra platform for various European and North American law enforcement agencies who meet regularly to share information and at times coordinate operations. Attending the LO the team had the opportunity to assess the quality of the working relationships and the open nature of discussion and exchange. Ghana is also the location for the US In Togo the team is composed of 17 officers recruited from the police, Office Central de Répression du Trafic Illicite de la Drogue et du Blanchiment (OCTRIBD), Gendarmerie, Customs. They have office with furniture and computer; have problems with I/24 and no secure communication system. They have three scanners in operation, one each for incoming and departing passengers and one for cargo. Challenges for Cape Verde are that there are three international airports linked with European airports, while the capital of Praia, also has flight connections with Boston and Fortaleza, Brazil.At present the only JAITF is working out of Praia. They have excellent, office facilities, all team

166EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Instrument for Stability (Long-term component), IfS/2009/226-525 AIRCOP, Contribution agreement –Annex 1, Description of the action

146 members have access to CENcomm communication facilities and staff have undergone several trainings. The assumption that national authorities will recognize the added value of Joint Airport Interdiction Task Forces and provide adequate staff numbers does not address the risk of managing the transfer of functions from existing agencies involved in counter drug trafficking (OCTRIS, Senegal), and in managing expectation of officers seconded from other agencies. This relates to incentives, particularly for custom officers as the JAITFs provide scarce income earning opportunities compared to other postings. The risks of coordinating inter-institutional cooperation is recognized but no particular action has been designed to address it. 3. Conclusions and recommendations Project documents refer to Interpol operations of WHITE FLOW aimed at gathering data on upper- level cocaine traffickers through better dissemination of data.167 The JAITFs are identified as a mechanism for information sharing, and there are instances of horizontal (Europe-Africa) and vertical (Africa-Africa) information exchanges leading to arrests of traffickers. But as operation come to an end with the seizure no successes have been scored against organised crime. So far, no efforts have been made, nor has the need for complex, long term investigations into organisations, investors and beneficiaries of trafficking operations been effectively communicated. The efficacy in meeting programme objectives could be raised if the investigative skills were improved and investigation became an established modus operandi of West African LEAs. Such skills are cursorily mentioned as part of a monitoring activity - 2.2.1 in the Description of the Action. But there have been no efforts so far to extend training and interagency cooperation beyond the search of passenger and cargos. As the project has not been up and running for long, and is still struggling with obstacles in some countries, it may address this in the later stages. It should also be mentioned that the focus on passenger flights leaves out the cargo planes using small airfields. It is, however, such unscheduled flights that are used by organised crime groups and have been associated with the most spectacular seizures. As for human rights and gender perspectives, there is no consideration of these in project activities The 2011 ROM report168 observes that human rights and governance are not sufficiently taken into account. Of particular concern is the lack of attention to the treatment of suspects (searches in Senegal in remote offices), the processing of detainees (no SOP for the handling of seizures). The treatment of arrestees, their access to legal counsel, and particularly the length of pre-trial detention receives no attention. Project governance, in particular communication to policy makers and public and mechanisms for accountability are underdeveloped.

167 IfS/2010/ 259-552, AIRCOP, Contribution agreement –Annex 1, Description of the action. 168 Aircop ROM, MR-138961.03.

147 AML - WA Summary of activities and achievements

The AML component of the Programme had not commenced at the point of the Mid Term Review, hence comments can only be made on design and context. GIABA as the organizer of the FIU forum (similar to the CARINS network), has information readily available on all the FIUs in the region. This mid-term review aims to evaluate the results achieved and progress made so far in the implementation of the project which are as indicated in the ToR of the MTR of the CRP: 1. Overall Objective The overall objective of the project is to promote the fight against money laundering in West Africa.169 In order to achieve this overall objective, the project sets out to achieve the following results as listed in the ToR: . R.1: Increased knowledge of the current AML situation in the non-banking financial sector and DNFBPs in all four countries; . R.2: Enhanced access to information for analysts of the FIUs relevant to AML in Ghana, Senegal and Cape Verde; . R.3: Increased information and intelligence and analytical capacities of the national FIUs in Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal and Cape Verde to investigate and analyse at national level and to exchange information with counterparts at regional level; . R.4: Increased investigation expertise of national financial investigation units compliant with FATF Recommendations 26-27-28 and 40; . R.5: Enhanced exchange of information and operational cooperation of national FIUs in Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal and Cape Verde with other countries in general and on asset recovery issues with members of the CARIN/ARINSA/RRAG network. GIABA is the regional body responsible for anti-money laundering and counter financing of terrorism issues in West Africa. It is an associate member of the FATF with an international role to play in ensuring that the 15 +1170 member States comply to international norms and standards. At the same time, GIABA is an ECOWAS institution with a regional role to play in assuming a regulatory role of protecting national economies from ML. The first round of mutual evaluations of the member countries have taken place and the results published on the GIABA website. Most of the countries fall within the non-compliant and partially compliant ratings as per the FATF methodology. Ghana was recently assisted by GIABA to be taken off the FATF “grey list”. Nigeria, which had been on the “black list” in 2005 /2006 was also assisted by GIABA to get off the list. In 2012 however, Nigeria found itself back on the “black list” for not respecting the timetable set for it in order to meet the requirements. GIABA has been following up closely in ensuring that its members do not get onto the FATF list of countries and territories that do not comply with the standards. The FIUs of Nigeria and Senegal are the most advanced FIUs in the region, and Ghana to a certain extent after hiring the requisite staff recently. Among these four countries, the Nigeria Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) has been offering mentorship to the Anglophone countries in the region while the Senegal Cellule nationale des informations financiers (CENTIF), has been instrumental in providing mentorship and training opportunities for the francophone FIUs (CENTIF) Having said this, it is essential to note that all the FIUs except the NFIU have challenges in data collection and record keeping. The Cape Verde FIU, the least developed is still expecting to set up a secure server. GIABA has started installing an AML/CFT software to help the beneficiary countries manage data collection and analysis. Until countries like Cape Verde are able to install their server, this cannot be done. Senegal and Nigeria have so far made efforts to sensitize the non-financial sector and have conducted workshops and seminars between 2008 through 2012, for the private sector non- financial institutions, lawyers, accountants and notaries. The challenge now is the reporting regime

169 Service Contract IFS/2012/299-418 - Instrument For Stability, Cocaine Route Anti-money laundering activities in West Africa (Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal) & Cape Verde. Annex II ToR. 170 15 ECOWAS member states and Sao Tome and Principe not an ECOWAS member but which is now a full member of GIABA.

148 between the FIUs and the designated non-financial businesses and professions -DNFBPs (e.g. Insurance companies, Association of accountants, Lawyers, Notaries, Real Estates, etc).

149

WAPIS West African Police Information Systems Summary of activities and achievements The need for integrating national and regional LEA information has been discussed by West African police forces for many years, and was raised at an Interpol organised meeting in Brussels in 2009. The project is therefore a direct response to the request from the beneficiaries. Even though not much had happened by the time of the on-site visit of the MTR, some activities under the first phase of the project had started including setting the timeframe; and scoping missions to a few of the pilot countries (Mauritania and Cote d’Ivoire) between September 2012 and February 2013. The project is therefore a response to a direct response by beneficiaries. This mid-term review aims to evaluate the results achieved and progress made so far in the implementation of the project which are as indicated in the ToR of the MTR of the CRP: 1. Overall Objective The vision behind the Project WAPIS is the sustainable development of a police/custom system in order: . To fight organized crime and threats from terrorism through the creation of a regional police information system (WAPIS) in order. . To facilitate the collection, centralization, management, sharing and analysis of police information on a national level in the 15 ECOWAS countries & Mauritania; . To increase the police information exchange between countries from the region and set up the needed environment on regional level; . To establish the link between countries of the region and the rest of the world through Interpol tools and service There is need to highlight here that the ECOWAS Protocol on free movement of goods and persons in the community zone has generally posed a challenge to the competent authorities with regards to the free movement of illicit commodities as well as potential terrorists in the region. Persons fleeing from one conflict to more peaceful areas in the region, move with their small arms and light weapons (SALW) from one troubled country to a potentially troubled one. A successful implementation of this project will help arrest suspects who flee from one country after committing a crime and being “wanted” in that country, to settle in another country of the region.

150 Cocaine Route Monitoring and Support Summary of activities and achievements

1. Overall Objective The Cocaine Route Monitoring and Support Project is implemented by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Direzione Generale per la Cooperazione allo Sviluppo, with the support of three consortium partners the Fundación Internacional y para Iberoamérica de Administración y Políticas Públicas (“FIAPP”); CIVIPOL and Serious Organised Crime Agency (“SOCA”). The TL and project manager are located in the MInistry of Foreign Affairs in Rome and the different consortium members provide Key Experts with technical expertise. The project works to the following objectives:  To strengthen regional and trans-regional coordination among stakeholders;  To ensure appropriate, consistent and complementary synergies between the different projects of the Cocaine Route Programme;  To enhance the coherence of the EU’s field action with bilateral initiatives of Member States;  To monitor and to facilitate the information sharing between the EU and similar initiatives of other international or regional organization in order to reduce overlapping. 2. Project Execution The project has set up a coordinating unit with two full time officers and a number of Key Experts and Non Key Experts from within agencies and ministries in EU MS who work for a specified number of days for CORMS. The team has conducted a number of country missions, organised steering committees and has developed a website acting as the repository for programme documentation and background information. Relationships with project team leaders and a regular exchange of information has been established. 3. Conclusions and recommendations The location of the project at the Italian MFA has a number of advantages, including access to high ranking Italian officials in Rome, and the support of Italian embassies for project missions in the field. In its current configuration the project human resources are inadequately used as there is insufficient support, leaving the TL to act as web master and the project manager to administer much of the project. The role of the KEs has advantages of connecting the project with EU agencies, but it does not provide an adequate return on funds invested. Many of the experts are already overstretched and cannot dedicate as much time to their CORMS tasks as is required. There is furthermore a conflict of interest in having agencies that are executing parts of the CRP also working in the monitoring project. Significant changes to the organisation and set up of the CORMS project are therefore recommended.

151 Annex 9 – Mission Report, West Africa

Ghana, Togo, 23/01 - 02/02, Senegal, Cape Verde 11/02 - 23/02

1) Drug trafficking The emergence of the West African route as a conduit for Latin American cocaine towards European markets can be traced to the early 2000s. While there were reports of Nigerian traffickers going back to the 1980s the seizure of multiple kilo consignments in containers, on board of cargo ships, and the use of airplanes was a novel phenomenon, with cocaine seizures rising from under 1 metric ton per year in the 1998-2002 period to 15 metric tons in 2006. In the period 2005-2007 detection and seizures of cocaine bound for Europe via West Africa mounted to 33 tons171. The increased detection of trafficking activity and the involvement of Latin American organised crime groups were highlighted by some commentators as a growing and unrecognised threat to the political stability of the region with profound implications for Europe172. Such warnings were supported by a 46%173 rise of cocaine seizures in Europe over that period that had transited via West Africa. Different agencies in the law enforcement and criminal justice community arrived at different assessments:  EUROPOL 250 metric tons.  INTERPOL 300 metric tons.  The U.S. Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement estimates that approximately 70% of European demand of about 350 metric tons per year, or 245 metric tons, was being trafficked through Africa or African waters.  The international narcotics control board (INCB) reports that approximately 200 to 300 metric tons are smuggled into Europe each year.  UNODC, data on seizures of cocaine in Europe for which a place of provenance had been established indicated that 22% of seized cocaine in Europe in 2007 passed through Africa, up from 5% in 2004. By the end of the decade a consensus had formed in the law enforcement community that the threat from WA cocaine shipments was serious for both continents. It is this calculus of cocaine shipment volume, the consequent organized criminal activities on the smuggling routes and the attendant risk analysis that forms the rationale for four projects (partial or entire) along the CRP (AIRCOP, SEACOP, AML/WA and WAPIS). Many of the Liaison Officers stationed in both Accra and Dakar still regard the threat as significant. The view of the UK Serious Organized Crime Office (SOCA), for instance, is that there are regular movements of sizeable cocaine shipments from WA and that this poses a threat to the region and to Europe174. But there are voices of dissent from this analysis. Both Belgian and Spanish LOs argued that the amount of cocaine seized in their respective jurisdictions through WA was negligible. In 2011, of the 20,000 kg of cocaine seized in Spain (constituting about 40% of all EU seizures) less than 1% of cocaine came from WA175.According to a study conducted by Belgian law enforcement only 1% of cocaine seizures in Belgium have West African provenance. Questions have also been raised about the methodology, as for instance in the case of a large Nigerian seizure of 14.2 tons of cocaine in 2006 (CRS, 2012). There is a discussion about what happens to the presumed South American shipments when they reach Western Africa. It is possible, but un-evidenced, that they supply regional markets. Alternatively they are moved on, perhaps, as suggested by the South African LO in Dakar, to

171 UNODC, 2008, Drug Trafficking as a Security Threat in West Africa; UNODC, 2007, The Threat to Stability and Development. 172 UNODC, Crime and Development in Africa, June 2005; UNODC, Transnational Organized Crime in the West African Region, 2005; UNODC, “Transnational Trafficking and the Rule of Law in West Africa: A Threat Assessment,” 2009; Oxford Analytica, “West Africa: Reports Underestimate Trafficking Impact,” August 10, 2009; Ellis, Stephen “West Africa’s International Drug Trade,” African Affairs, 108:431, April 2009. 173 UNODC, 2008, Drug Trafficking as a Security Threat in West Africa. 174 SOCA LO, Dakar14, 02/2013. 175 Spanish LO, Darkar, 14/02/2013.

152 Southern Africa where some spills over into a growing local market, with the bulk moving along the East African flank towards Europe. Scepticism about the significance of the WA route may be a response to declining cocaine seizures from WA, as much as a reaction to earlier claims. Relevant for our observations is the lack of a robust data base. Judgements are usually made on the back of operational information, which is subject to significant swings occasioned by one-off multi ton seizures. But there is little understanding of the size and dynamics of West African markets, of linkages between domestic and international product flows, and the relationship between and respective roles of domestic, regional and international groups. As for the current scale and significance of the route the view of Europol is that while there has been a decrease since 2009 in seizures of cocaine from WA as well as in the region "This is more likely to reflect a change in trafficking methods and/or routes than an effective shrinking of cocaine flows towards the region " (Europol, 2013:45). Many West African LEAs and agency heads in the countries visited are convinced of there being a considerable flow, but are lacking the data to evidence this. In some cases this is accompanied by a caveat that the flows are in transit, not for local consumption, and that the fight against is a gesture of international solidarity. One agency head in Senegal was clear that "drug consumption is not our problem it is your problem".176

2) Organised crime groups One of the least understood and most under researched topic areas is the actual structure and configuration of organised crime groups in West Africa. Officials in Ghana, Senegal and Togo said that Nigerians and Lebanese were involved in trafficking and laundering. In Senegal and Togo the traffickers are attributed to 'anglophone' West Africans or Lebanese. This may be due to the absence of proper investigations in the region which make it difficult to link individual smugglers to a syndicate or organized group of some sort. While such projection of culpability onto foreigners and minorities may in some instances be tinged with ethnic prejudice it also points towards two important phenomena. The role of the Lebanese diaspora in facilitating both the flow of cocaine and the laundering of proceeds, and the emerging role of Nigerian groups as trans-regional players with connections and capacity in both LAC and Europe. Descriptions of internal operation of either set of groups are yet to be identified by the intelligence community in the region. In the meantime, analysts have provided some general observations. WA Organised Crime Groups are described loose groups, often held by ethnic ties rather than as tightly structured, hierarchical cartels.177 This type of structure allows for the division of tasks to occur in such a way that new recruits, personal acquaintances or relatives of original associates, hardly know the employers they are really working for. Recruits do not know how their tasks relate to assignments given to other members of the network. Employment offered is generally limited to the project without any expectation of continuity. There are no permanent links to the structure and links often disappear upon completion of the given project. Secrecy and total loyalty to the group involved in the venture is ensured by use of clan, tribe, religious and rituals. Their genesis has been traced to falling terms of trade for African commodity exports and the need for diversification going back to the 1980s. Since then they have been facilitated by the inclusion of Africa into global trading networks including illegal ones. While these roughly delineated groups provide some of the essential trading services, much of the cocaine trafficking continues to involve external partners. The 'extraversion' that has been identified by some analysis as a key feature in the 'criminalisation' of the African state178 applies also to the drug trade as produce has to be sourced and sold overseas. The involvement of Colombians particularly in Guinea Bissau has been widely documented, but informants also mentioned European (Italian, French) as well as Asian and Lebanese groups who were active in Senegal.

176 Interview Dakar 11/02/2013. 177 Mazzitelli, Antonio 2007, international Affairs, 83 (6) 1075:6 ‘transnational organised crime in Africa: the additional challenge’. 178 Bayard.

153 The level of involvement and penetration varies significantly in the circumstances. In the main, however, (Guinea Bissau (GB) may be an exception) these external groups provide only trading services and are not involved in local operations. It should be noted that informants in Senegal and Ghana were concerned about Guinea Bissau acting as a springboard for criminal groups to infiltrate governments in neighbouring countries. While it is difficult to describe the organised crime groups operating in WA, we have some insight into the way the trafficking is organised. Drug traffickers are often connected to senior politicians and high-ranking government officials who facilitate their criminal activities. They may use their authority to ensure the safe passage of consignments across border, may abuse diplomatic immunity for export, and will pressurize law enforcement and the judiciary to halt investigations. One new development is that Nigerian groups with the international contacts may be providing the 'external links' previously supplied by Latin American and European groups. Nigerian and Lebanese groups are said to be providing money laundering services for a fee. In Senegal and Cape Verde it was also suggested that there were links with Italian organised crime groups.179

3) Capacity raising of LEAs, prosecution and judicial authorities The thematic division into raising capacity for LEAs, prosecution and judicial authorities, enhancing the information base and AML activities, carry both potential for programme success and a series of risks which have to be managed. First, the need for enhancing the capacity of LEAs, prosecution and judicial authorities are borne out by mission interviews and field visits. There is an urgent need to raise capacity along the entire chain of anti crime activity from intelligence collection to criminal and fiscal investigation to prosecution to the disposal of offenders (though this last point was not explored in the field visits). West African states face a number of security threats from jihadist groups (AQUIM, Boko Haram, Ansaru), secessionist militant groups in the Casamance, Senegal and MEND in the Niger Delta involved trafficking (mainly cannabis), kidnappings and piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. Many countries have to fight against the infiltration of governments by organised crime groups (Guinea Bissau) and the corruption of some policy makers and officials at all levels in key government agencies. The resulting erosion of state capacity to uphold law and order has profound implications for human security, social and economic development. Moving from problem identification to delivering targeted interventions poses a range of challenges, however, pertaining to: the selection of partners, formulating appropriate interventions, the transfer of ownership to beneficiaries, and a commitment to partnering over a period longer than the project cycle. Building capacity in the judicial and security sector will only yield fruits if governments stand behind efforts to combat criminal networks. This requires an ongoing policy dialogue and careful monitoring of project delivery. In terms of implementation it means there are two main dimensions, training and skill transfer and institution building. At present the programme focuses entirely on training and the transfer of know how through mentoring, and the provision of equipment. The needs of partner institutions remain unaddressed and should be considered as a point of intervention for future work. The key dimension, however, is the lack of information that hampers operations, the formulation of a long term strategy and even the sober analysis and policy dialogue. In part this is addressed by programme activities in raising the intelligence gathering skills (Seacop, Aircop) and in fiscal investigations (AML/WA). The envisaged construction of regional and trans regional information sharing mechanisms will also address operational needs and provide the raw data for strategy and policy development. These latter two items require additional work, however, and are not currently included in the programme. Without these basic tools the discussion is open to speculative distortions that help neither of the partners involved. Instances of this are the current estimations of the scale of the West African drugs economy. Multiplying the estimated flow by European street value allows for dramatic projections - US2 billion180 - but are inappropriate for the purpose of assessing impact on West Africa. A more realistic, though equally speculative, denominator would be the regional whole sale price, with cocaine for instance trading at an estimated US$ 14-16,000 in Guinea Bissau,181 suggesting a

179 Interviews Senegal, 13/02/2013 Senegal, Cape Verde, 22/02/2013. 180 UNODC, 2008, Cocaine Trafficking in West Africa. 181 Consensus figure from the ILU in Dakar and supported by informants in Senegal and Cape Verde.

154 volume of several hundred million dollars. There is an urgent need to account for and monitor these capital flows.

4) Issues arising in Project Implementation (i) Senegal – JAITF at Dakar airport Space at airports is scarce and expensive and the project has not always been able to secure adequate offices. In Dakar it has been possible to secure adequate and well located office facilities. The office is well furnished and the staff of fifteen who are working in two shifts are provided with computers, drug testing kits, urine testing kits, and a pair of scales. The team has participated in several trainings, has received mentoring and is close to the UNODC regional offices. Yet in spite of this investment, the performance is poor, on the occasion of the field visit staff were expressing discontent to the review team, the morale is low and the results are negligible. Disappointment with the performance of the JAITF was also expressed by the head of l'Office central pour la répression du trafic illicite des stupéfiants (OCRTIS), the police drug crime unit. Problems can be traced back to the beginning of the project. Before the formation of the JAITF OCRTIS was already working at the airport. According to the AIRCOP coordinator the agency and customs greeted the suggestion of forming joint teams (Police, Customs, Gendarmerie) with hostility. For the purpose of the evaluation, replacing an existing, national anti drug trafficking team throws project purpose and relevance into question, particularly if there is no commitment for maintaining support over the long term. If after the end of phase 3 the office is closed and the unit disbanded the anti trafficking measures at Dakar will be left in a worse condition than before the project commenced. There is also a question about consultation with relevant national stakeholders and with the lack of adaptability. Why for instance, was the set up not maintained, particularly since OCRTIS retains the investigation powers for any drug arrest? It is possible that the gains from inter-agency cooperation and intelligence sharing are outweighed by the loss of follow through of investigations. OCTRIS officers continue to lead the project but the leadership rotates every two years. Custom officers were also resistant to coming on board the project. It was suggested that they have better opportunities for securing financial benefits at land borders. Apparently, the customs officers seconded to the team had been appointed without a clear briefing and were therefore resentful. To a point this could be corroborated by observations from the visit when several officers complained to the evaluators about the lack of financial incentives and were asking "what are you bringing for us". It was said that the possibility of bonuses had been discussed by policy makers, but had not progressed any further. When raised with UNODC the response was allegedly that it was not part of their project design to provide material rewards and that this should come from the government. The question of rewards raises several problems for the project. Joint teams find it difficult to motivate particularly customs officers who in Togo, Senegal and Ghana were all reported to be receiving unofficial income from working at ports and borders. Yet, if seizures were to be rewarded any such bonus would have to be paid to all team members including police officers and Gendarmerie. This in turn would create new inequalities within agencies, as for example, between police officers working at the airport and those working in the city or the interior. And if the scheme were to be extended beyond it would be both expensive and open the possibility of abuse. Ironically the customs service in Senegal is the best paid part of the joint team. While doing the same work as their colleagues they receive higher salaries, which is once again, a source of irritation for police and gendarmes. Harmonizing salaries for the Joint Teams was never part of the programme, nor was this foreseen as a risk for the project. Customs officers do, at present, share a greater responsibility as they have access to the WCO CENcomm communication system. Working the airport The office was fully staffed at the time the evaluation team visited at 10:30 am, even though no flight was expected until 15:00. Most of the officers were online, one spent the better part of two hours on a succession of evidently private telephone calls. In Senegal only two airlines have agreed to provide passenger lists (Senegalese Airlines, Emirates). An even for station managers of the different airlines had been organised by the project at the civil aviation centre, but local decisions to cooperate more closely had been overruled in Europe.

155 No effort was being made to information gap by gathering information from travel agencies or by working with immigration services. For example, information on visas issues and letters of invitation are held by immigration services for visa issue at the airport, and provide advance warning of foreign nationals about to enter the country. Passenger landing cards could be collected and analyzed once the plane had landed, and past records could be used to establish patterns and to trace the movement of individual passengers. But the modus operandi of the JAITF was to wait for a plane to land and look at the passengers. Without prior information, with no analysis, the sole form of 'profiling' was a visual inspection and the lookout for signs of nervousness, sweating, etc. Once a target was identified a search of luggage was conducted in the office. The officers could also have a kit to analyze urine samples for cocaine traces to identify swallowers. Information from each interview was written down in a log book. One of the officers was making efforts to transcribe these interview notes but had not gotten further than November 2011. The team was unable to report how many searches had been conducted over any period of time or how many arrests had been made. There was no system for collecting information and no expectation to report on their activities. The information that was contained in the log was descriptive of process and some observations on nationality, port of embarkation and luggage, but the statements of the suspects were not recorded. Nor was the information analyzed or used to identify patterns or passengers. The record seemed less of a tool for investigation than for the supervision of officers. In other regards the process appeared haphazard, with no safe storage facilities for seized evidence, no functioning set of scales to weigh the seizure, no holding cell for suspects and no protocol on transferring the seized drugs. It seemed almost as if the team was not expecting to make any arrests. Not surprisingly the record of achievement was pretty risible. In the absence of records on performance over previous years, we had to rely on verbal information on 6 arrests and seizures. Two of these were made by OCTRIS, two were the result of joint efforts by OCTRIS-JAITF, and two by JAITF alone. The statistics provided by the French Customs liaison officer, however, suggest that there was only one seizure in 2012. 2012 statistics on drug seizures

Unit Cocaine Indian Hemp Origin Means of Transportation weight value weight (kg) val (kg)

DR SUD 297,1 17826000 Guinée-Bissau road

DR 1328,35 79701000 Gambie Mali road CENTRE

DRS-EST 353,9 19434000 Mali Guinée road

DR NORD 29,2 1752000 Mali road

DRO 8,33 416500000 0 0 Guinée Bissau air

DRPPUS 0,05 2500000 1388 83280000 Mali road

TOTAL 8,38 419000000 3442 201993000

Source: French embassy It seems that communications system has not been fully developed as yet. There are a number of problems beyond the control of the project coordinator, such as allowing access to the system to non customs officers. In Senegal, therefore, only one officer who came from customs had a computer with access to the CENcomm system. While he did use the system other officers were not involved. The duties of the JAITF begin and end at the airport. They have no mandate and no interest in follow up investigation. Once an arrest is made seized drugs and the suspect are handed over to

156 OCTRIS who transfer both to the head quarters. A the airport there were facilities for the safe storage of seized drugs, nor was there a protocol for handing over suspect and seizure to agents from OCTRIS head quarters. Lacking Standard Operating Procedures the system is open to abuse and leakage. Issues arising in Project Implementation (ii ) Inter agency rivalry in Ghana Ghana plays host to the Accra platform for various European and North American law enforcement agencies who meet regularly to share information and at times coordinate operations. Attending the LO the team had the opportunity to assess the quality of the working relationships and the open nature of discussion and exchange. Ghana is also the location for the US Most importantly, Ghana is the place where the most effective example of technical cooperation in anti trafficking is taking place, the operation Westbridge run jointly by NACOB and SOCA. According the AIRCOP manager the initial reaction was negative, his project seen 'as a competitor' but since then a cordial working relationship has been established. Moreover, the mandate for SOCA is strictly confined to averting crime threats to the UK. While the SOCA team cooperates with French, German and US counterparts this exchange is on a voluntary basis. It was suggested at the EUD to integrate Westbridge into the AIRCOP structure to cover wider EU interests, but at this point there is no intention by SOCA to undertake any changes. Several SOCA officers are working at the airport, ostensibly to train and mentor Ghanaian counterparts but on occasion overstepping their mandate and becoming operational themselves, which according to the head of NACOB can lead to friction with some Ghanaian officers. The UK team has extended support to other areas of intervention and other crimes - scanners have been provided to the postal services and have weeded out drug parcels, false passports and letter involved in advanced fee fraud. But the focus remains on trafficking by drug couriers. With such an effective operation in place providing training for Ghanaian anti trafficking officers, equipment, mentoring, and providing regular intelligence it is difficult to see what role is left to AIRCOP. With the US Drug Enforcement Administration also having established a base it seems that the Accra airport is a bit overcrowded. Nor it is clear what the added value of AIRCOP is. Indeed, the absorption capacity of Ghanaian partners may be stretched, particularly as in spite of the efforts of the platform to coordinate duplication does occur. The refusal by the Airport authority to provide a suitable office is therefore to some extent understandable. Conclusion The project is based on a set of assumptions - (i) the trans regional operation of organised crime which therefore has to be met by trans regional cooperation of LEAs and judicial authorities. The project provides an organisational and technological infrastructure and mechanisms for the exchange of information at regional and trans-regional level. The objective is highly relevant and realistic. But the time frame of the current programme is inadequate for such an ambitious undertaking. It is strongly recommended that programme support is committed over a long period. IFS Objectives of the project are consistent with the EC Instrument for Stability's Strategy Paper covering the period 2007-2011, in which the combat against global and trans-regional threat is set as a priority IFS. It also contributes to the 2008-2011 ECOWAS Regional Action Plan to address the Growing Problem of Illicit Drug Trafficking, Organised Crimes and Drug Abuse in West Africa. Trafficking by drug couriers is a continuous problem for African and European LEAs. UNODC and INTERPOL databases show that between 2004 and 2008, more than 1,360 couriers were intercepted on flights from West Africa to Europe. But it is not clear if the focus on first passengers and then cargo is an effective method of combating organised crime. According to UNODC document, "The use of couriers on commercial air flights is a favourite of West African drug trafficking networks worldwide. Many players have diversified formal and informal business interests, and use drugs as a way of acquiring start-up capital, often moving on to less hazardous activities at the first opportunity. Entry is open to anyone able to source...[and]... preponderance of low level players favours low cost trafficking techniques, such as commercial air couriers and parcel post."182 According to one of the LOs in Dakar the "swallowers and carriers" who are targeted by airport interdiction are not part of organised crime groups."183The view is supported by senior LEA officers

182 UNODC, 2012, Ghana-National Indicative Programme, -p.17 183 Dakar, LO platform,14/02/2013

157 in Cape Verde who attribute trafficking to networks in the diaspora taking advantage of contacts and connections, but not serious organised crime groups. It should also be mentioned that the focus on passenger flights leaves out the cargo planes using small airfields. It is, however, such unscheduled flights that are used by organised crime groups and have been associated with the most spectacular seizures. Communication between the different partners of the AIRCOP networks remains at best sporadic. The vertical integration of the information flow is reflected in the WCO developed communication system that has been installed in some of the countries. Messages are sent from the African beneficiary to Brussels where the server is located and then relayed to the other African destination. Using CENComm, AIRCOP has established a communication networks but access is limited. In Senegal only one customs officer had access, while in Cape Verde the entire team from all three services at Praia airport had access. Ghana is not yet operational and no information could be obtained for Togo. Nor have any of the foreseen operations been organised. The last COCAIR operation was run by WCO before the AIRCOP commenced and cannot be attributed to the project. The importance of the European connection was also underlined by the LOs in Accra and Dakar. While the perspective is of course liable to be bias, it was claimed that most seizures are the product of information provided by UK, US or French intelligence sources. This means the project has not yet been able to create horizontal integration of information flows between African JAITFs. As it stands at the moment, JAITFs respond to information from Europe or the US. In some countries, it was said it has been useful to have a partner agency or focal point who to convey information to. But in Senegal for instance such a FP was in existence even before the project. The effectiveness of the JAITF as a mechanism for information exchange is yet to be proven and will probably improve as more countries come on board. The limitation to a small number of players at this point holds back the relevance of the entire system. Representatives from MS interviewed at the Accra ILU also claimed that passing on information was not in itself sufficient. For information to lead to a seizure still required LO involvement. It is not possible to comment on this, and seizures have been made in CV for instance, without MS involvement. Conclusion By linking up the three thematic areas the programme can potentially exceed the sum of their component parts. There is a possibility of realising multiplier benefits well beyond the capacity of each project. Conceptually the extension of activities across the different thematic areas is both cogent and given the availability of skills in the EU realistic. To ensure that the programme also enhances governance and human rights closer monitoring of impact and performance is required. The managing organisation, UNODC, is working assiduously towards enhancing capacities of WA states in combating organised crime, but there is no matching commitment towards safeguarding the rights of African citizens from excesses, inefficiencies and miscarriages of justices. Having worked with governments to raise penalties for an array of different offences the agency has spent none of its considerable capital to ensure proportionality in sentencing, the reduction of PTD or to avert prison overcrowding, and work towards the accountability of security agencies. It would be commendable if this could be addressed in the next phase. Success depends largely on the coherence of activities by maintaining the vision and driving towards long term ends, through coordination and continuous adaptation. Critical is quality of delivery of the individual projects and their integration in the wider programme structure. It will also need to be complemented by a number of activities to raise (i) criminal investigation skills of LEAs, (ii) develop judicial and prosecutorial competence (iii) raise evidence base and channel information into policy and public discourse (iv) institutional strengthening of partner agencies.

158 Annex 10 – Performance of the Contractors

The different projects are being implemented by different agencies. In some cases they are single agencies, in others consortia involving a number of organisations. Some organisations participate in more than one project. The performance of contractors may vary between the different projects, depending on the technical details specific to the task, the relationship with partners and the individuals involved.

FIIAPP (AMERIPOL,SEACOP and AML/WA)

The executing agency for AMERIPOL is FIIAPP a Spanish government owned technical cooperation company that assigned a member of the Spanish Police TL to the project. The objective of the AMERIPOL project is clearly in the Law Enforcement realm, the project specific objectives are to: Improve prosecutors’ and law enforcement and law enforcement agencies’ capacity to carry out complex investigations at a regional and trans-regional level; and strengthening the exchange of information and intelligence at regional and trans-regional level especially with Western Africa and the EU. The first of these two has been translated and executed via training events field in which FIIAPP excels the second, information systems, may be a field where FIIAPP has worked in the past but there are other agencies better equipped to develop LEA oriented data bases/information systems, for instance Interpol selected to lead on the WAPIS project in West in Africa for the CRP. As far as effectiveness of the agency in the execution of the project, it is clear issues surrounding the beneficiary affect the execution of the project and influences the evaluation of FIIAPP. The difficulties that surround AMERIPOL are twofold: the lack of a judicial personality and the lack of a political oversight. These two have created a situation in which the TL has at times had to assume the role of ambassador of the AMERIPOL organisation in an effort to sell the project to national authorities. Additionally the project has had to assume the role of institution building sine when it began the only thing that existed was the name. Fortunately, the TL has found the cooperation of the CNP, which has invested heavily in AMERIPOL, has given the organization a building (estimated at 2 million dollars, has assigned personnel and has assumed the cost of public utilities and others for the installations). But, as several countries are apprehensive over AMERIPOL’s hemispheric role the efficiency and the impact of the project is questionable. AMERIPOL is not recognized as a regional LEA and sustainability is highly questionable. It must be stated that all the risks foreseen in the original project document have occurred and hampered the execution of the same; it is not clear how these problems are being managed: • Diplomatic tension may occur between some beneficiary counties. • Target of project is undermined by national and regional interagency rivalry and lack of confidence between participants. • IT infrastructure may not be good enough to support national and regional compatibility and connectivity. • Differing legislative and judicial systems may impede close collaboration and intelligence sharing.

As far as SEACOP is concerned FIIAPP has utilized key experts from France, Portugal and the UK to ensure that project objectives are achieved. The specific objectives at the national/multinational level are: support the set of specialist intelligence and investigation units located in seaports or sensitive coastal areas; and to reinforce seaport capacities and support the set up of JMCUs. Additionally, the project has specified functions:  Development regional intelligence and maritime cooperation and support the set up of a regional intelligence and maritime coordination centre;  Organise regional training and explore the feasibility of a regional training facility, and  Explore the feasibility of setting up a regional maritime information system. To meet it s obligations FIIAP has appealed to the use of key experts, has been productive in that FIIAPP has taken into consideration the language divide of the regions in which it is engaged and provided are fluent in English, French, Portuguese and/or Spanish according to the country’s need. While this is a good idea, the experts do not have the same weight as a UN or EU body in

159 connecting with high-level government officials. As an example in Senegal MOUs, which were signed on the suggestion of KE, only involved relevant agencies (at the level of Directors General) rather than at Ministerial level, this lack of vision undermined the impact of the project because of the lack of political influence. This notwithstanding, in general there has been a visibly good connection between the experts and their counterparts in the beneficiary countries. The EC may wish to provide support to the contractor to explore the possibility of resident experts in the LAC and the West Africa region; this would have a two-fold impact on project execution, reduce costs (Europe to LAC or West Africa is expensive) and influence favorably on the projects’ response to actions requested. Working from afar with and with no permanent on site presence has been part of the reason the project recorded delays. There are difficulties working in West Africa as an example in the Casamance region where SEACOP Zinguinchor is supposed to be based Kidnapping of foreign experts have been reported during the last months/weeks. SEACOP has also found some resistance from the UNODC sponsored GCCP, which initially saw SEACOP as a competing and not a complementary programme, yet between agencies this issue has been sorted out.

UNODC (PRELAC AND AIRCOP)

UNODC is the executing agency for two of the CRP projects PRELAC and AIRCOP. The first of these, PRELAC, is a project which deals with precursor control in LAC. Efforts in this field began in 2003 when the Andean Nations Community-CAN- (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru- at that time Venezuela was also a member but has since withdrawn from this economic integration group). Then CAN/UNODC proposed to the EU and executed with a project known as PRECAN, which operated in the four CAN nations, it came to a close in 2006, under said project UNODC was able to set up and office of highly trained personnel specialized in the precursor field. In 2007, based on the expertise and experience of PRECAN, in UNODC proposed the EU that activities be extended to LAC and formulated what is today know as PRELAC. Currently PRELAC II is ending and PRELAC III is initiating activities. The objectives of the PRELAC at this moment are: To further strengthen the capacities of national administrative control authorities of beneficiary countries within the region to prevent the diversion of precursors both at international and domestic level and to enhance the inter-agency cooperation through a culture of collaboration with private sector operators. Both objectives being met by the executing agency with great success there is no doubt that the problem of precursor diversion is being adequately managed. The MTR team focused its analysis of the PRELAC project inquired about the impact and sustainability of the activities managed by UNODC. The MTR looked for elements that justify the IfS intervention around the precursor issue especially in the light of the seven years of activities and financing; the link between precursors and TOC, its regional and trans-regional connotations. Since the project documents stated one of the key objectives/justifications of the project as being; to contribute to enhancing the control and cooperation arrangements within the LAC region to prevent the diversion of precursors as an integral part of the LAC region’s efforts to curb the manufacture of drugs and its trafficking in Latin America and the Caribbean, the MTR Team looked for evidence of this being fulfilled reached. Data published by EMCDDA shows little or no change in the purity and price of cocaine sold on the streets of mayor European cities. The implementation of the project foresaw a series of risks which have at times made themselves present but have not interfered overall with the project execution since they have been resolved efficiently by both countries and beneficiaries: • That compatibility would be reached in terms of the data base management systems of individual member states and the PRELAC system. • That the private sector opts for not cooperating with the project. • That costs to the private sector affect its cost structure and thus that to other industries. The fact that UNODC’s management of the project is commendable has little to do with the lack of evidence that the activities of the project seem to have little or no relation with supply reduction per se. On a related issue, that of sustainability there has been no effort by beneficiaries or UNODC to explore how to ensure that the control mechanisms developed are applied permanently by beneficiary nations if the project was to lose financing.

160 With regard to AIRCOP, UNODC as a contractor has advocated the need for interventions in drug trafficking in West Africa since the early 2000s. The AIRCOP project initially had a five months delay in initiating activities. The overall project objective focuses on building drug-interdiction capacities at selected international airports in Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean. The projects activities started on 30/03/2010, administrative actions had started within the time frame. The project had not factored in the complexity of the West African terrain: lack of operational capacities; the lengthy and heavy procedures for signing agreements and MOUs; the absence of reliable and secure electronic messaging systems (for quick response and actions required); institutional turf fighting and protection between the relevant LE agencies were beyond the control of the contractor causing delays. In meeting these challenges UNODC has the advantage of having a presence in the region and can call on and meet with high-level government officials. While the agency has 'brand-recognition' among partners like Africom, SOCA and so on, there is also a sense of rivalry with other contractors. In Ghana, in spite of extensive negotiations, the executing agency of Westbridge regarded AIRCOP as a rival and is not as cooperative as could be. In turn, UNODC run projects like the GCCP have not extended full cooperation with other EU projects like SEACOP. There is in UNODC, according to some informants, a sense of entitlement to project implementation. There is also a sense of rivalry between national or regional authorities in different countries who resent project management contracts going to UNODC. While national agencies may guarantee a greater level of ownership it may not result in the same project efficiency. UNODC does pursue questions of governance issues and human rights with the same vigor as technical cooperation in enhancing LEA capacity. Activities in LAC have been delayed for reasons that were not entirely clear. It seems that there was a difficulty in finding a TL with regional expertise.

GAFISUD

The executing agency for this project is GAFISUD which with project funds contracted the team leader who during the first phase of the project worked with an assistant out of the GAFISUD headquarters in Buenos Aires. As one of the regional FATF agencies this Latin American branch and the IfS project have as objective: Improving the coordinated action of the GAFISUD countries in their fight against organized crime to fulfill this, the project concentrated on three areas that will allow GAFISUD MS to more efficiently control money and assets of organized crime. More specifically the project concentrates on: Strengthening the existing asset laundering investigation capacities and procedures in the GAFISUD member countries; strengthening the administrative, judicial and legal cooperation among the GAFISUD member countries and promoting cooperation lines to fight asset laundering and formalizing agreements with the priority countries and/or regional groups (GAFIC, GIABA). During its first phase the IfS project fulfilled its objectives; it contributed to the design and execution of training events that benefited MS.. Training of MS personnel fomented the investigation capacities and procedures, administrative, judicial and legal cooperation and aided GAFISUD in its mission of ensuring that its MS comply with the 40 recommendations of the FATF, Bolivia has been taken out of the black list. Under GAFISUD II the TL now counts with a staff of three and has moved out of the GAFISUD offices although they are still in the same building. With this increase in staff it is hoped that the third objective of promoting cooperation lines as well as more contact with regional groups can be achieves. By giving the TL separate offices the project is more independent and the aspect of budget support is lost. Nonetheless, it is evident that GAFISUD is a weak organization (three permanent staff plus the same number of secretaries and administrative personnel to supervise and aid 11 countries). The long-term survival of GAFISUD is in principal ensured with country quotas (based on the GDP of each MS) nonetheless exchange rate differentials and economic turmoil hamper GAFISUD’s operating capacity. Finally, although when created the Argentinean government had granted diplomatic status to the foreign personnel that was to work at GAFISUD it does not apply this rule today. The risks projected for this project as stated below have all interfered with the execution but have been adequately attended to by the TL.

161 • Diverse economic situations may induce economic policies that affect commitments. • The availability of financial information may encourage governments to use it as a tool for internal political gains. • Political interference in technical decisions.

CORMS

The Cocaine Route Monitoring and Support Project is implemented by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Direzione Generale per la Cooperazione allo Sviluppo, with the support of three consortium partners the Fundación Internacional y para Iberoamérica de Administración y Políticas Públicas (“ FIAPP”); CIVIPOL and Serious Organised Crime Agency (“SOCA”). The TL and project manager are located in the MInistry of Foreign Affairs in Rome and the different consortium members provide Key Experts with technical expertise. The project works to the following objectives:  To strengthen regional and trans-regional coordination among stakeholders;  To ensure appropriate, consistent and complementary synergies between the different projects of the Cocaine Route Programme;  To enhance the coherence of the EU’s field action with bilateral initiatives of Member States;  To monitor and to facilitate the information sharing between the EU and similar initiatives of other international or regional organization in order to reduce overlapping.

So far the location of the project at the MFA has helped secure support of Italian government agencies. But the project has not been as visible and active in Brussels as it should be in order to better connect with other EU funded activities. Better integration with other programmes is particularly relevant as the CRP lies at the intersection of the EU's development, external and internal security strategies. There should therefore be more communication with relevant stakeholders and a higher visibility of CRP projects. Yet it is not clear whether such changes are recognised by the current consortia and whether they can be made. Glaring inefficiencies in the allocation of resources are tolerated within the current set up because there are no internal oversight mechanisms. As remarked elsewhere, IT support for the project is minimal and the contribution of KE from consortium partners does not always deliver value for money. There are no clear job descriptions, no work plans, no outputs and no strategic plan. There are no indications that the consortium has a proactive role that would be conducive for the required coordinating function, but simply administers the work of the respective KEs. On an individual basis the KEs do make valuable contributions to the programme, but their expertise is not fully optimized because of the lack of strategic direction. A strengthening of the mandate and an expansion of the analytic functions of the coordinating mechanism will require a review of the consortia arrangements and the role of KEs. The low visibility of the project could be greatly improved if the current part time KEs were replaced with a smaller number of more dedicated professionals. As all the projects have now began there is a strong argument to reinforce the analytical and development specific expertise in the team, as law enforcement know how is already embedded in the individual projects.

162 Annex 11 – Drug Seizures from AIRCOP and SEACOP

SEACOP

Date Location

January 2013 Cape Verde During a training course and under the guidance of SEACOP trainers and using the EU provided equipment, The team conducted a deep search of a container and found 1000 kg of sea cucumbers (“pepino do mar”) and 750 kg of sea shells (“búzios”) hidden within the licit cargo. They were illegally caught in CV territorial waters and the container was to be sent to Vietnam.

June 2012 Tema 4 tonnes of Tramadol seized by SEACOP trained personnel

29/01/13 Tema 200 kilos of cocaine seized by JMCU staff the week following a SEACOP training course. (SOCA Intel) Two Nigerians arrested and charged

12/04/13 Takoradi 1 (one) kilo cocaine seized by JMCU trained staff in second hand clothes from Panama. One Ghanaian arrested

AIRCOP

Quantity/kg Arrests

cocaine 32.32 15.00

cannabis 0.50 1.00

methamphetamine 1,413.50 4.00

163 counterfeit medecines 1,396.00 2.00

JAITF Cape Verde

Date Substance Weight Arrests

19/07/2011 Cocaine 4.08 2 couriers

25/07/2011 Cannabis 0.35

02/12/2011 Cannabis 0.15 1 person

04/12/2011 Cocaine 2.23 1 courier

05/12/2011 Cocaine 1.04 1 courier

07/11/2011 Cocaine 0.20 1 courier

07/11/2011 Cocaine 0.90 1 courier

05/09/2011 Cocaine 9.03 1 courier and a meeter

12/12/2011 Cocaine 2.09 1 courier

16/03/2012 Cocaine 2.24 1 courier

28/04/2012 Cocaine 0.20 1 courier

12/10/2012 Cocaine 2.03 1 courier

JAITF Lome

164 Date Substance Weight Arrests

04/08/2012 methamphetamine 3.00 1 courier

09/09/2012 methamphetamine 3.00 1 courier

09/09/2012 methamphetamine 4.30 1 courier

19/09/2012 methamphetamine 3.00 1 courier

13-14/11/2012 methamphetamine 1,396.00 2 couriers

18/11/2012 methamphetamine 4.20 1 courier

JAITF Dakar

Date Substance Weight Arrests

12/06/2012 Cocaine 1.48 1 courier

21/07/2012 Cocaine 1.3 1 courier

09/09/2012 Cocaine 3 1 courier

26/12/2012 Cocaine 2.5 1 courier

165 Annex 12 – Drug offenders in the prison population in Latin America

Bolivia "The number of drug offense prisoners and their proportion of the overall incarcerated population has begun to decline only in recent years, dropping from 47 percent in 2005 to 31 percent in 2009." p.24

Year Total number of Number of prisoners Traffickers as prisoners jailed for trafficking percentage of total prison population

2005 6592 3113 47.2

2006 7147 3089 43.2

2007 7273 2870 39.4

2008 8073 2467 30.5 Source: TNO/WOLA, 2010. System Overload Drug Laws and Prisons in Latin America

Brazil

Year Total number of Number of prisoners Traffickers as prisoners jailed for trafficking percentage of total prison population

2005 361,402 32,880 9.10%

2006 383,480 47,472 12.38%

2007 422,590 65,494 15.50%

2008 451,219 77,371 17.50%

2009 473,626 91,037 19.22% Source: TNO/WOLA, 2010. System Overload Drug Laws and Prisons in Latin America

166 Colombia

Year Total number of Number of prisoners for Drug related offences prisoners drug related offences as percentage of total prison population

2003 62,277 11,454 18.3

2004 68,020 12,904 18.9

2005 66,829 12,151 18.1

2006 60,021 9,799 16.3

2007 63,603 10,313 16.2

2008 69,979 11,808 16.8

2009 75,992 12,616 16.6 Source: TNO/WOLA, 2010. System Overload Drug Laws and Prisons in Latin America

167 Annex 13 – Mapping of drugs, security and justice-related relevant projects

MAPPING FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

Geographical EU Start End Responsible CRIS Number Programme Title Implementing partner Remarks area Contribution date date service Securing travel documents, improving Bolivia border management 0.85 M € and sustaining migrant return Programa regional de General Secretariat of EU Delegation Central America 5 0 M € Seguridad Fronteriza SICA to Nicaragua Fortalecimiento del Sector Justicia para la EU Delegation ALA/016831 Colombia Reducción de la 10.5 M € 2004 2011 Various to Colombia Impunidad en Colombia Institutional Strengthening and EU Delegation ALA/2003/04353 Panama Modernization of the 6.319 M € 2005 2009 Various to Nicaragua Judiciary in the Republic of Panama Apoyo a la Nueva Estrategia de Desarrollo Alternativo Vice ministerio de Coca EU Delegation ALA/2004/16688 Bolivia de Bolivia mediante el 13.0 M € 05/2005 12/2011 y Desarrollo Integral to Bolivia Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Alternativo (FONADAL) Apoyo a la Comunidad andina en Andean General Secretariat of EU to ALA/2005/17652 el área de las drogas 2.55 M € 04/2006 05/2011 Community CAN Delegation Peru sintéticas (DROSICAN) Agencia Presidencial para la Acción Social y EU Delegation ALA/2006/17668 Colombia Peace Laboratory III 24.2 M € 2006 2012 Cooperación to Colombia Internacional Apoyo al Control Consejo Nacional de EU Delegation DCI/2007/19010 Bolivia 10.0 M € 2008 2012 Social de la lucha contro el trafico to Bolivia

168 Geographical EU Start End Responsible CRIS Number Programme Title Implementing partner Remarks area Contribution date date service Producción de Coca ilícito de drogas Apoyo al Plan de Ministerio de Desarrollo EU Delegation DCI/2007/19027 Bolivia Desarrollo Integral de 26.0 M € 2007 2012 rural to Bolivia Coca PRADICAN - Apoyo a Andean la Comunidad Andina General Secretariat of EU to DCI/2008/019670 3.25 M € 2009 2013 Community en la lucha contra las CAN Delegation Peru Drogas Ilícitas Apoyo a la Implementación del Oficina Nacional EU Delegation DCI/2008/019739 Venezuela Plan Nacional 3.3 M € 2008 2014 Antidrogas to Venezuela Antidrogas 2008-2013 – DROGASTOP Agencia Presidencial Regional para la Acción Social y EU Delegation DCI/2008/20155 Colombia development for 26.0 M € 2008 2013 Cooperación to Colombia peace and stability Internacional Dialogue on the policies/Consolidati Cooperation between on of the national Consortium of EU and Latin American LA and EU on Anti- observatories/Build DCI/2009/021556 6.0 M € 11/2010 11/2014 LAC States led by DEVCO G2 Region drugs Policies ing capacity in Spain (COPOLAD) reduction in demand/Training in reduction of supply Support to the implementation of the International Commission Against EU Delegation DCI/2009/021613 Guatemala Impunity in 2.0 M € 2009 2011 UNDP to Guatemala Guatemala (Comisión Internacional contra la Impunidad en Guatemala – CICIG) Drug alternativement Peruvian Drug Agency EU to DCI/2009/22032 Peru development in Satipo 8.0 M € 2012 2016 (DEVIDA) Delegation Peru region Programme to EU Delegation DCI/2010/021929 Guatemala 20.0 M € 2010 2014 various Support Security and to Guatemala

169 Geographical EU Start End Responsible CRIS Number Programme Title Implementing partner Remarks area Contribution date date service Justice in Guatemala EU Delegation DCI/2010/022248 Colombia New Peace Territories 30.4 M € 2010 2014 various to Colombia Criminal Justice EU Delegation DCI/2010/022249 Colombia 7.5 M € 2011 2014 Republica de Colombia System to Colombia Republica Oriental de EU Delegation DCI/2010/022498 Uruguay Penal system reform 5.0 M € 2012 2013 Uruguay to Uruguay until Security Sector from 2014 (no EU Delegation DCI/2010/022-703 Costa Rica 13.0 M € Sector Budget Support Reform Programme 2011 contract to Costa Rica yet) Support to the institutional strengthening of the EU Delegation DCI/2010/21936 Bolivia National Council for 9.0 M € 2011 2015 CONALTID to Bolivia the Fight against Illicit Trafficking of Drugs (CONALTID) DCI- Programme d'appui EU Delegation Honduras 7.642 M € 2009 2014 various ALA/2007/19235 au secteur de sécurité to Honduras Support to the International Commission Against Impunity in DCI- EU Delegation Guatemala Guatemala (CICIG) in 2.5 M € 2010 2011 UNDP ALA/2010/022399 to Guatemala the framework of the Programme to Support Security and Justice in Guatemala Stronger evidence for DCI- EU Delegation Nicaragua an improved access 5.35 M € 2011 2014 various ALA/2010/21140 to Nicaragua to Criminal Justice Regional Agencia Presidencial development for para la Acción Social y EU Delegation DCO/2009/021573 Colombia 10.5 M € 2011 2014 peace and stability Cooperación to Colombia (phase II) Internacional Law Enforcement and Latin America, DRG/2006/126659 Intelligence 0.8 M € 02/2007 02/2010 UNODC DEVCO B5 West Africa Cooperation against

170 Geographical EU Start End Responsible CRIS Number Programme Title Implementing partner Remarks area Contribution date date service Cocaine Trafficking from Latin America to West Africa Improving drug treatment, rehabilitation and Latin America, harm reduction: DRG/2006/126777 1.4 M € 01/2007 02/2010 CICAD DEVCO B5 Caribbean European, Latin American and Caribbean cities in partnership Two components of this programme relate to drugs: 1. CARICOM fight against illegal Caribbean Integration drugs (1.2M€) 2. Caribbean EU Delegation FED/2006/18475 Support Programme 40.5 M € 01/2007 12/2010 IMPACS Institutional Region to Guyana (9th EDF) Support to the Implementation Agency for Crime and Security/IMPACS (800000€) Organisation Appui au Secteur de EU Delegation FED/2006/20683 Haiti 3.0 M € 2006 2010 Internationale De La la Justice toHaiti Francophonie Capacity Building and Institutional Support FED/2007/020776/ Caribbean Caribbean Court of EU Delegation for the Caribbean 1.315 M € 2007 2012 2 Region Justice to Guyana Court of Justice (Caribbean Region) Security Reform EU Delegation FED/2008/21025 Jamaica 33.0 M € 2009 2014 Sector Budget Support sector programme to Jamaica Safety and Security Saint Kitts and Federation of Saint Kitts EU Delegation FED/2010/22231 Improvement 5.625 M € 2013 2014 Nevis and Nevis toBarbados Programme IfS 2009/228-069 GAFISUD Support to the fight GAFISUD I & II 1.875 M € 2009 2013 GAFISUD DEVCO B5 IfS/2011/278-299 Member States against ML in LAC

171 Geographical EU Start End Responsible CRIS Number Programme Title Implementing partner Remarks area Contribution date date service (LAC) Supporting the fight against the illicit Central and DEVCO B5 accumulation and IFS/2008/020460 Latin America 1.0 M € 2008 2011 UNDP (Delegation trafficking in firearms region Nicaragua) in Central and Latin America region Prevention of the diversion of drugs Latin American precursors in the Latin IFS/2008/170366 and Caribbean 2.193 M € 2009 2012 UNODC DEVCO B5 American and region Caribbean region (PRELAC) Fundación Internacional y para Iberoamérica de Administración y Selected Políticas Públicas IfS/2009- LE and Judicial countries in the AMERIPOL 3.745 M € 2010 2014 (FIIAPP) in consortium DEVCO B5 2010/258971 Cooperation in LA LAC with SOCA (UK), ADETEF (FR), Guardia di Finanza (IT), Policia Judiciaria (ES) Latin American IFS/2012/286049 and Caribbean PRELAC II 3.0 M € 2012 2015 UNODC DEVCO B5 region Promoting Transnational Partnerships - Preventing and MIGR/2008/15313 Brazil, Italy and Responding to 0.496 M € 04/2011 05/2011 ICMPD DEVCO B3 7 Portugal Trafficking in Human Beings from Brazil to EU Member States

Promoting the Project is about implementation of the human trafficking MIGR/2008/15378 Global Protocol to Prevent, 3.0 M € 03/2009 02/2011 UNODC DEVCO D3 at a global scale 5 Suppress and Punish yet countries such Trafficking in Persons, as Brazil Colombia,

172 Geographical EU Start End Responsible CRIS Number Programme Title Implementing partner Remarks area Contribution date date service especially Women Dominican and Children, and the Republic and Protocol against Nigeria have Smuggling of actively Migrants participated in defusing its message. Additionally the project seeks to link money laundering with human traffic and TOC.

173 MAPPING FOR WEST AFRICA

Geographical EU Start End Responsible CRIS Number Programme Title Implementing partner Remarks area Contribution date date service Signed 9th April 2012 by the ECOWAS Commission; Promotion of free Strengthen the ECOWAS th movement of capacity of actors to 10 EDF Commission and ECOWAS funds, Spain persons, rights of 28.0 M € 2011 2015 (14 M € EDF) have a harmonised FED/2012/023123 ECOWAS + EU entry, residence and implementation Member States establishment procedure for the implementation of the Protocol and other relevant texts relating to migration Assistance to ECOWAS member States, Exploratory phase with particolar on potential focus on those th activities in the field EU Delegation AF to be decided, 10 EDF with weak FIUs 3.0 M € of fights against to Senegal currently in ISC (Liberia, Guinea money laundering in Conakry, West Africa Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau and Niger) Programme de protection, réhabilitation et réinsertion des EU Delegation DCI- Guinea Bissau enfants victimes 0.6 M € 02/2009 08/2012 NGO Acting For Life to Guinea HUM/2008/171411 et/ou vulnérables Bissau face à la traite et à l’exploitation sexuelle en GB Appui aux Elections EU Delegation FED/2005/017760 Burkina Faso 7.9 M € 2006 2010 UNDP and various 2005 to Ivory Coast

174 Geographical EU Start End Responsible CRIS Number Programme Title Implementing partner Remarks area Contribution date date service PAOSED (Programme d’Appui EU Delegation FED/2006/018299 Guinea Bissau aux organes de 6.0 M € 2006 2012 various to Guinea souveraineté et de Bissau l’état de droit) Projet Réhabilitation FED/2006/018346 Guinea et Développement 12.0 M € (PRD) Contribute to the normalisation of the ème social, economic 4 Programme National Ministries + and political d’urgence de EU Delegation FED/2006/018521 Ivory Coast 113.0 M € 2007 2012 support from UNICEF, situation. Support réhabilitation post to Ivory Coast UNDP, NGOs for governance, crise – 2006 health, transport, vocational training + CSO Support to the Ghana Police Service – Enhance the capacity of the Multi-donor budget Criminal support group (thematic EU Delegation FED/2006/018689 Ghana Investigation 3.0 M € 2011 2013 group chaired by EU + to Ghana Department (CID) in Denmark the application of science to crime prevention and detection UNDP + donor Projet d'appui aux coordination group EU Delegation FED/2006/020746 Guinea Conakry élections législatives 9.9 M € 2007 2011 (Germany, Spain, to Guinea (PAEL) France, UK, USA, Conakry Japan) Projet d’appui à la réforme de la justice EU Delegation FED/2007/020764 Togo 8.8 M € 2008 2013 various et de la promotion in Togo des droits de

175 Geographical EU Start End Responsible CRIS Number Programme Title Implementing partner Remarks area Contribution date date service l’homme – PAJDH

PARSS Appui à la EU Delegation Stand-by situation (Art. FED/2007/020842/1 Guinea Bissau Reforme du Secteur 7.6 M € 2008 2013 to Guinea 96) Sécuritaire Bissau

Projet d'Appui EU Delegation FED/2007/020843 Togo 6.8 M € 2007 2012 Transtec Institutionnel-PAI in Togo

Contribute to the Appui aux EU Delegation consolidation of FED/2007/020856/1 Guinea Bissau prochaines élections 3.5 M € 2010 2012 UNDP & B&S to Guinea democracy and législatives Bissau democratic procedures Support to the PALOP - African 2009/11 Electoral EU Delegation GB lead + FED/2009/021324 Lusophone Cycles of the 6.1 M € 2010 2013 UNDP to Guinea lusophone countries countries PALOP/TL Bissau Countries

Projet d'appui à la FED/2009/021378 Benin réforme de la justice 4.5 M € 2011 2014 various EU Delegation PARJ to Benin

Appui à la réforme et modernisation du National Ministries and EU Delegation FED/2009/021384/1 Ivory Coast système judiciaire et 18.0 M € 2011 2015 Agencies to Ivory Coast pénitentiaire en Côte d’Ivoire Budget Support to the Special Budget support group Partnership UE- WB, AfDB, Austria, EU Delegation FED/2009/021707 Benin (NIP) 11.0 M € 2009 2014 Cape Verde. Spain, The Netherlands, to Benin Indicators are Portugal focused on the

176 Geographical EU Start End Responsible CRIS Number Programme Title Implementing partner Remarks area Contribution date date service Security and Stability pillar of the Special Partnership Action Plan

Budget Support to the Special Partnership UE- Cape Verde. Indicators are Government of Cape EU Delegation FED/2009/021707 Cape Verde 11.5 M € 2009 2014 focused on the Verde to Cape Verde Security and Stability pillar of the Special Partnership Action Plan Projet d'appui aux EU Delegation FED/2009/021816 Togo processus sectoriels 9.0 M € 2009 2013 UNDP to Togo - PAPE Support to Independent Governance UNDP, National EU Delegation FED/2010/022225 Ghana 7.0 M € 2011 2014 Institutions involved Ministries and others to Ghana in the electoral process EU support to ECOWAS Region ECOWAS drug EU Delegation FED/2010/022263 16.5 M € to be launched (EDF – RIP) Action Plan (EU- to Nigeria EDAP) Support to fight Promote good FED/2010/022512 Nigeria drugs and organised 36.0 M € 2012 2017 UNODC governance and crime in Nigeria security (Planned) Mitigate the conflict in the Niger Delta by Niger Delta Support Delegation to addressing the main FED/2010/022910 Nigeria 0.2 M € 2012 2017 UNICEF and others Programme Nigeria causes of conflict and unrest in Formulation

177 Geographical EU Start End Responsible CRIS Number Programme Title Implementing partner Remarks area Contribution date date service EU support to ECOWAS Region FED/2011/023123 ECOWAS Migration 26.0 M € 2013 2018 IOM Delegation to Formulation (EDF – RIP) policy Nigeria

Projet d'Appui à la FED/2012/024565 Togo Formation de la 3.0 M € to be launched Police (PAFP)

Build drug Selected interdiction task countries in West UNODC (with Interpol, IfS/2009/226525 AIRCOP I 2.3 M € 2010 06-2014 DEVCO B5 forces at selected Africa and the WCO) airposts in LAC LAC countries Build drug Selected interdiction task countries in West UNODC (with Interpol, IfS/2010/259552 AIRCOP II 2.9 M € 2010 2013 DEVCO B5 forces at selected Africa and the WCO) airposts in LAC LAC countries Build drug Selected interdiction task countries in West forces at selected AIRCOP III 3.0 M € 2013 2016 UNODC DEVCO B5 Africa and the airposts in LAC LAC countries – to be launched Fundación Internacional y para Strengthen Iberoamérica de cooperation in Cape Verde, Administración y contrasting maritime Senegal, Ghana Políticas Públicas trafficking and Guinea-Bissau, IFS/2010/245728 SEACOP I and II 2.99 M € 2010 2013 (FIIAPP) in consortium DEVCO B5 supporting capacity Togo, Sierra with SOCA (UK), building in the fight Leone, Benin, ADETEF (FR), the against international The Gambia French Customs Office, criminal networks in the Maritime West Africa Gendarmerie of France Italian Minister of Strengthen trans- IfS/2011/260644 Globa l(WA+LAC) CORMS 1.0 M € 2011 2014 Foreign Affairs in DEVCO B5 regional consortium with FIIAPP coordination and

178 Geographical EU Start End Responsible CRIS Number Programme Title Implementing partner Remarks area Contribution date date service (ES), CIVI.POL (FR) cohesion of EU and SOCA (UK) programme under the CRP The West African Police Information System aims to facilitate the collection, management, ECOWAS MS sharing and and Mauritania analysis of police (Benin, Ghana, IfS/2012/293625 WAPIS I 2.2 M € 2012 2013 Interpol DEVCO B5 information at a Mauritania, Mali national and and Niger as first regional level to 5 pilot countries) more effectively combat drug trafficking, illegal immigration, money laundering and weapons trafficking. The West African Police Information System aims to facilitate the collection, management, ECOWAS MS sharing and and Mauritania analysis of police (Benin, Ghana, WAPIS II 3.0 M € 2013 2016 Interpol DEVCO B5 information at a Mauritania, Mali national and and Niger as first regional level to 5 pilot countries) more effectively combat drug trafficking, illegal immigration, money laundering and weapons trafficking.

179 Geographical EU Start End Responsible CRIS Number Programme Title Implementing partner Remarks area Contribution date date service FIIAPP in consortium To promote the fight Ghana, Nigeria, Anti money with CPS (UK), against money IFS/2012/299418 Senegal, Cape laundering West 1.8 M € 2013- 2015 DEVCO B5 ADETEF (FR), laundering in West Verde Africa (AML-WA) CIVI>POL (FR) Africa Countering transnational illicit arms trafficking through the Selected implementation of countries in West IFS/2010/259204 the United Nations 2.3 M € 2011 2014 UNODC DEVCO B5 Africa and the Convention Against LAC Transnational Organized Crime and its Firearms Protocol Implementation by Creation of a Interpol, once the centralized pilot has been Selected database for tracing completed, a countries in West IFS/2010/259335 and tracking of 0.7 M € 2011 2013 INTERPOL DEVCO B5 release of the Africa and the stolen and lost database will be LAC firearms - SLARM undertaken across PHASE 1 the 188 member countries. Administrative Arrangement on the Pilot Project on Piracy, Maritime IFS/2010/258808 Gulf of Guinea 2010 2013 JRC DEVCO B5 Awareness and 1.0 M € Risks II (Gulf of Guinea) - PMAR GoG Fighting piracy and armed robbery Gulf of Guinea France IFS/2011/301386 Gulf of Guinea against ships in the 4.5 M € 2013 2016 DEVCO B5 Expertise Internationale Gulf of Guinea - CRIMGO

180 Geographical EU Start End Responsible CRIS Number Programme Title Implementing partner Remarks area Contribution date date service

CIVIPOL (FR) in consortium with FIIAPP (ES), OCAM (BE), Sahel (Mali, CT Sahel Mise en IFS/2011/276791 6.7 M € 2011 2014 DEVCO B5 Mauritania, Niger) Œuvre Commando Generale dell'Arma dei Carabinieri (IT), AEI (AT). Support to border management: EDF (PAJED II: justice FED/2012/296635 Niger operationalisation of reform in Niger) 19 border posts in Niger Promote the GFA Consulting Group participation of civil Projet d'appui à la (for civil society society in Société Civile et à la EU Delegation TG/FED/22569 Togo 6.0 M € 2011 2014 component) and UNDP development, réconciliation to Togo Togo (for reconciliation democratisation and nationale component) national reconciliation

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