Cypriot Perceptions of Turkey
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TESEV Foreign Policy Programme Cypriot Perceptions of Turkey Rebecca Bryant, Christalla Yakinthou Cypriot Perceptions of Turkey Rebecca Bryant - Christalla Yakinthou Bankalar Caddesi Minerva Han, No:2, Kat: 3 34420 Karaköy ‹stanbul T +90 212 292 89 03 F +90 212 292 90 46 www.tesev.org.tr ISBN:978-605-5332-25-9 FOREIGN POLICY PROGRAMME Cypriot Perceptions of Turkey Rebecca Bryant, Christalla Yakinthou Cypriot Perceptions of Turkey Bankalar Cad. Minerva Han Türkiye Ekonomik ve No: 2 Kat: 3 Sosyal Etüdler Vakf› Karaköy 34420, İstanbul Turkish Economic and Tel: +90 212 292 89 03 PBX Social Studies Foundation Fax: +90 212 292 90 46 Dış Politika Program› [email protected] Foreign Policy Programme www.tesev.org.tr Authors: Design: Myra Rebecca Bryant Publication Identity Design: Rauf Kösemen Christalla Yakinthou Page Layout: Gülderen Rençber Erbaş Coordination: Sibel Doğan Pre-print Coordination: Nergis Korkmaz Printed by: İmak Ofset Basım Yayın San. ve Tic. Ltd. Şti. Atatürk Cad. Göl Sok. No : 1 Yenibosna Bahçelievler/İSTANBUL-TÜRKİYE Tel: 0212 656 49 97 Copies: 500 TESEV PUBLICATIONS ISBN 978-605-5332-25-9 Copyright © August 2012 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced electronically or mechanically (photocopy, storage of records or information, etc.) without the permission of the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. The viewpoints in this report belong to the authors, and they may not necessarily concur partially or wholly with TESEV’s viewpoints as a foundation. TESEV Foreign Policy Programme would like to thank the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung in Cyprus and Turkey, the Open Society Foundation-Turkey and TESEV High Advisory Board for their support towards the preparation and publication of this report. Contents PREFACE, 5 INTRODUCTION, 9 VIEWING TURKEY FROM NORTH CYPRUS TODAY, 13 I. A paternal protectorate, 16 II. The current conjuncture, 19 III. Improving the relationship, 41 IV. Current negotiations and a potential “Plan B”, 50 V. Imagining the future, 59 VI. Conclusion, 61 VIEWING TURKEY FROM SOUTH CYPRUS TODAY, 63 I. Who is Turkey?, 68 II. What are the most pressing Greek Cypriot concerns?, 75 III. The negotiation process and perceptions of Turkey, 78 IV. Imagining the future, 84 V. Conclusion, 87 CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS, 89 Conclusions, 91 Policy Recommendations, 94 NOTE ON METHODS, 99 AUTHOR INFORMATION, 103 4 Preface TESEV Foreign Policy Programme This study aims to understand the nature of the take note. But more than this, those that act on behalf increasingly tense relations between Turkey and the of the international community should find plenty of Turkish Cypriots as well as Greek Cypriots’ feelings important results. about Turkey. Initiated and commissioned by TESEV While we want to highlight a few of the report’s Foreign Policy Programme, it was conducted by two findings here, we have left the majority for the very competent researchers. following pages. But before doing so, we would like to The perceptions on both sides of the island are once again note that the work of this report is down to presented through in-depth interviews with 30 the two able researchers, Rebecca Bryant and opinion formers from the north and 20 from south. It Christalla Yakinthou. Of course, without the draws a portrait of how both communities see Turkey contributions of Enis Erdem Aydın, Jonathan Levack that we at TESEV believe will be useful to decision and Sabiha Senyücel as well as the support of the makers in Turkey. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung in Cyprus and Turkey and the Open Society Foundation Turkey this report would not Especially, the thoughts of Turkish Cypriots deserve have been possible. cautious review. When looking at all the results objectively, it appears Turkey has an image problem in HIGHLIGHTS: the island’s north. • Turkish Cypriots demand sovereign equality from Whereas the Turkish Cypriots demand sovereign the government of Turkey. equality and the respect of Ankara as a state, as • The Greek Cypriots would like to see Turkey as a detailed in the following sections, not all their neighbour who is more constructive and wish to demands are consistent. Nor would it be possible to have functioning relations with Turkey. meet them all. • Turkish Cypriots are aware of their own governan- However, the inconsistency in demands should not be ce and management problems and need for an excuse not to hear the call for equality. As well as reform. going beyond recognition and seeing the Turkish • Greek Cypriots are more concerned with the Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) as an equal collapse of the economy of Greece, rather than the sovereign state, Ankara needs to solve a range of role of Turkey on the future of the island. problems including the status of the armed forces and Both sides admire the economic performance and its links to the police. • democratization process in Turkey. Whereas Greek The island’s perceptions of Turkey also bring new Cypriots see Turkey’s growing economy as a perspectives for decision makers in Ankara. But the potential opportunity, Turkish Cypriots are more concerned with the implications of developing a research’s findings are not to the benefit of Turkey 5 alone. Policymakers on both sides of the island should ‘Turkey-dependent’ economy. • The presence of Turkey’s military forces at current levels is an issue for both sides, though for different reasons. • Both sides believe Turkey can take certain steps to move towards a solution, Turkish Cypriots in addition emphasize a lack of will among Greek Cypriots. • Neither side is hopeful that a solution will be reached in the short term. 6 Thanks and acknowledgements The authors would like to extend thanks to the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, as well as to the following people for their generous support during the process of writing this report: Mensur Akgün, Enis Erdem Aydın, Robin Burrow, Hubert Faustmann, Sabiha Senyücel Gündoğar, Mete Hatay, Erol Kaymak, and Jonathan Levack. A special thanks goes to Murat Yaman for transcribing the Turkish-language interviewees. We would also like to extend particular gratitude to all of our interviewees, who generously took time out of their busy schedules to share with us their perspectives. 7 8 Introduction When the Republic of Cyprus’ (RoC) projected Council have predicted that negotiations would stumble on for of the European Union (EU) presidency was first many more years, as all sides in the process lost hope tentatively announced in 2004, the RoC had a and became more concerned with domestic problems booming economy and appeared to be one of the EU’s that seemed to portend an uncertain future. most stable and dynamic new members. Greek The context for this report is a decade of rapid and Cypriots had defeated a plan to reunify the island in a unpredictable change in an island that in the previous referendum only one week before their scheduled EU almost thirty years had seemed mired in an accession, at least in part because their president at unchanging status quo. After the Greek-sponsored the time, Tasos Papadopoulos, had argued that their coup d’etat and Turkish military intervention of 1974, EU membership would be an important bargaining Cyprus’ territorial division resulted in the ethnic tool against a Turkey seeking entry. This, in turn, was homogenisation of its two sides and the to have enabled them to negotiate a better plan that establishment of separate lives for Greek Cypriots and would have been to Greek Cypriot advantage. At that Turkish Cypriots on either side of a UN-controlled moment, Greece appeared to be a strong partner, buffer zone. While for the previous decade, following Turkey was in the first throes of Justice and the intercommunal clashes of 1963-64, Turkish Development Party (AKP)-led reforms, and Turkish Cypriots had desired Turkey’s military intervention in Cypriots were deflated by the referendum decision, the island, that intervention with overwhelming force which left them outside the EU. in the summer of 1974 and the subsequent At that time, no one could have predicted a Greek displacement of approximately one third of the Greek financial collapse that would send shock waves Cypriot population meant that Turkey became a through the Cypriot economy, or the rapid rise of defining element of the Greek Cypriot social and Turkey as an economic and regional power. No one political imaginary in the following decades. And could have predicted a new offshore race for natural while Greek Cypriots came to know Turkey only resources, or changing alliances in which Turkey would through what they learned in school and in the media, abandon its long-time friend, Israel, which in turn Turkish Cypriots came to know Turkey more closely would seek a partnership with the Republic of Cyprus. than they had before, and found that the Turkey with No one could have predicted the explosion of whose fate they were now entangled was not the confiscated ammunitions at a naval base near Turkey of their imaginations, the one that they had Limassol in 2011 that would bring waves of protest learned about from their own textbooks, films, and against RoC President Dimitris Christofias, whom novels. It was a Turkey that was experiencing political many held responsible for the negligence that resulted turmoil and economic instability, and for Turkish in thirteen deaths. No one could have predicted Cypriots it became reliable only to the extent that Turkish Cypriot protests against Turkish austerity Cyprus remained, over the following decades, an measures, or the movements for good governance and important Turkish ‘national cause.’ Although Turkish 9 democratisation that would emerge. No one could Cypriots declared their own state in 1983, it remained unrecognised by any country besides Turkey, pushing as reflected at the wider social level.