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Strategizing and Managing Coopetition: Sharing, Protecting And Strategizing and Managing coopetition : Sharing, protecting and/or capturing knowledge Sea Matilda Bez To cite this version: Sea Matilda Bez. Strategizing and Managing coopetition : Sharing, protecting and/or capturing knowledge. Economics and Finance. Université Montpellier, 2017. English. NNT : 2017MONTD005. tel-01695545 HAL Id: tel-01695545 https://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-01695545 Submitted on 29 Jan 2018 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents entific research documents, whether they are pub- scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, lished or not. The documents may come from émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de teaching and research institutions in France or recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires abroad, or from public or private research centers. publics ou privés. THÈSE POUR OBTENIR LE GRADE DE DOCTEUR DE L’UNIVERSITÉ DE M ONTPELLIER En Science de Gestion École doctorale EDEG – Economie et Gestion ED 231 Unité de recherche Montpellier Recherche en Management - EA 4557 Strategizing and Managing coopetition Sharing, protecting and/or capturing knowledge Présentée par Sea Matilda Bez Le 22 novembre 2017 Sous la direction de Frédéric Le Roy et Stéphanie Dameron Devant le jury composé de Philippe Baumard, Professeur des Universités, Cnam de Paris Rapporteur Stéphanie Dameron, Professeur des Universités, Université Paris Dauphine PSL Directrice de thèse Hervé Dumez, Directeur de Recherche CNRS, École Polytechnique Rapporteur Anne-Sophie Fernandez, Maître de Conférences HDR, Université de Montpellier Suffragant Devi Gnyawali, Full Professor, Virginia Tech, USA Suffragant Frédéric Le Roy, Professeur des Universités, Université de Montpellier Directeur de thèse Gérald Naro, Professeur des Universités, Université de Montpellier Président du jury The University of Montpellier doesn’t give any endorsement or approval to the views expressed in this thesis. These opinions should be considered as specific to the author L’Université de Montpellier n’entend donner aucune approbation ni improbation aux opinions émises dans cette thèse. Ces opinions doivent être considérées comme propres à leur auteur “Make the most of the useful knowledge out there” Henry Chesbrough, Video Interview, Open Innovation between competitors, Labex, 2017 Strategizing and Managing Coopetition Sharing, protecting and/or capturing knowledge Sea Matilda Bez Montpellier, 2017 MRM – Montpellier Recherche Management Institut de Montpellier Management – Université de Montpellier Espace Richter Rue Vendémiaire 34960 Montpellier FRANCE Acknowledges / Remerciements ACKNOWLEDGES / REMERCIEMENTS La thèse est souvent assimilée à un travail long et solitaire. Or, la réalité est tout autre. La construction des idées d’une thèse se base sur l’interaction avec les autres. Les idées défendues dans cette thèse sont le résultat de toutes les discussions passionnées engagées avec mes directeurs de thèse, mes collègues de travail, les professionnels et mon entourage. Je tiens donc à remercier toutes ces personnes avec lesquelles j’ai un jour discuté et qui m’ont permis d’approfondir mes réflexions. Mes remerciements pourront paraître longs mais à mes yeux, ils resteront trop courts et je viendrai vous rencontrer individuellement pour vous remercier. Je tiens à adresser mes premiers remerciements à mes directeurs de thèse, les professeurs Stéphanie Dameron et Frédéric Le Roy. Leur encadrement différent mais très complémentaire a joué un rôle primordial dans l’aboutissement de ce projet. Je remercie le professeur Frédéric Le Roy pour son soutien et pour les opportunités qui m’ont été offertes. Du mémoire de master aux dernières versions de ma thèse, il a toujours contribué à structurer ma pensée par des questionnements constructifs me permettant d’aller de l’avant. Ses questionnements avaient pour but de, non seulement faire avancer ma thèse, mais surtout de me permettre de devenir progressivement un chercheur autonome capable d’avoir et d’assumer des idées originales. De plus, je le remercie pour la disponibilité dont il a fait preuve et la confiance qu’il m’a accordé e à de multiples reprises. Il m’a fait bénéfici er d’un véritable parrainage dans le monde international de la recherche . Au-delà d’un travail d’encadrement, il m’a aussi transmis une passion pour la recherche. Je lui en suis profondément reconnaissante. Je remercie le professeur Stéphanie Dameron. Elle a été plus qu’essentielle dans la réalisation de cette thèse. Elle m’a encouragée à poursuivre une réflexion plus profonde et rigoureuse sur les mécanismes existant sous le terme de coopétition. Ses conseils ont mûri dans mon esprit doucement mais sûrement durant les quatre années de thèse. La rédaction de la thèse a été le moment où j’ai enfin commencé à prendre de la hauteur sur mon sujet en puisant dans des théories extérieures de la coopétition. Sans elle, j e n’aurai s pas établi de liens avec ses théories. Je ne la remercierai jamais assez. Je la remercie également car elle m’a fait confiance en ouvrant les portes de la Chaire IESO. J’ai appris énormément à ses côtés et grâce au travail réalisé sur certains projets de la Chaire IESO. Merci à Anne-Sophie Fernandez qui a également joué un rôle de premier plan durant ce travail doctoral, grâce à ses précieux conseils, mais aussi par les nombreux projets que nous iv Acknowledges / Remerciements avons menés ensemble en parallèle de la thèse. Par ailleurs, je la remercie d’avoir accepté d’être dans ce jury de thèse. Son regard sur mon sujet me tenait à cœur car elle a soutenu, à ma connaissance, la première thèse sur le management de la coopétition. Je tiens aussi à remercier Devi Gnyawali qui m’a accueillie en séjour de recherche à Virginia Tech aux Etats-Unis et qui m’a aidé à développer de n ouvelles méthodes de travail afin de préciser mon sujet de thèse. Je le remercie tout particulièrement car il a accepté de faire le déplacement depuis les Etats-Unis pour pouvoir assister en tant que membre du jury à cette soutenance. Un grand merci à Philippe Baumard, Hervé Dumez et Gérald Naro qui me font l’honneur de participer à mon jury de thèse, et plus particulièrement au professeur Philippe Baumard et au directeur de recherche CNRS Hervé Dumez qui ont accepté la lourde tâche de rapporteur. Ce travail n’aurait pas non plus pu se faire sans l’excellent accueil de tous les professionnels que j’ai r encontrés. Je préserverai bien sûr leur anonymat et leur adresse ma sincère reconnaissance, car sans eux la thèse n’aurait pas pu exister. Je remercie aussi les membres du groupe de recherche en stratégie du laboratoire MRM de l’ université de Montpellier a insi que les membres du laboratoire M&O de l’université de Paris - Dauphine. Assister et participer activement à leurs réunions m’a permis de bénéficier de retours très enrichissants sur les concepts clé en management, en stratégie et plus généralement sur la façon de conduire rigoureusement des recherches. Je tiens aussi à remercier l’AEGIS pou r leurs ateliers d’écriture. Evidemment, ce travail n’aurait pas pu se faire sans l’Institut de Montpellier Management qui m’a soutenu e en attribuant deux contrats d’A TER, qui a financé une partie de mes séjours de recherche, et surtout qui a apporté un environnement de travail de qualité et bienveillant. J’en profite pour remercier tout le personnel de l’Institut de Montpellier Management doctorants, professeurs, administratifs pour leur accueil et l’ambiance agréable . De plus, je souhaite remercier le Labex Entreprendre de l’université de Montpellier, la chaire IESO de la fondation Paris-Dauphine , l’ École Doctorale Économie et Gestion (EDEG) et la FNEGE pour leur soutien financier et pour les séminaires qu’ils ont organisé s. Je remercie aussi le minist ère de l’Education qui m’a financé t rois années de contrat doctoral, ainsi que l’école normale supérieur e qui m’a formé et ensuite soutenu dans l’attri bution des contrats doctoraux. De même, je remercie Stéphanie Dameron et Pierre Romelaer pour la « formation par la recherche » reçue dans le master 101 de l’université Paris -Dauphine. Je v Acknowledges / Remerciements remercie également les professeurs Xavier Lecocq et Isabelle Martine z pour l’organisation d u CEFAG, programme clé pour comprendre les rouages d’une thèse et de la recherche en général. La thèse m’a conduit à faire multiples rencontres marquantes. Je tiens à remercier profondément toutes les personnes du bureau 426 et 427 de l’Institut de Montpellier Management, le bureau des doctorants à Dauphine, la promotion CEFAG des « Choupineurs » et les maitres de conférences et les professeurs du 4eme étage de l’Institut de Montpellier Management. Au-delà d’être mes collègues, j e me suis liée d’ amitié avec eux. Grâce à eux, venir au travail a toujours été un moment de plaisir. J’espère profondément continuer à les rencontrer lors de conférences et à maintenir ces liens d’amitié hors du cadre professionnel. Je ne pourrais conclure cette page sans témoigner toute mon affection à mes ami(e)s pour leur compréhension et leur soutien, et notamment à Marie, Lucie et Julie (ma jumelle de thèse), Héloïse, les deux Margot, s ans oublier «la coloc cachanaise » et « les macadoma ». J’adresse tous mes remerciements à ma famille et tout particulièrement à mes parents, mon « fréro ». Je les remercie pour leur confiance sans faille et leurs encouragements. Je remercie aussi Chantal qui fera bientôt officiellement partie de ma famille. Elle a toujours été présente et m’a soutenue avec bienveillance dans ce projet. Je lui en suis très reconnaissante. Enfin, un immense merci à mon futur époux Aymeric. Je lui dédie cette thèse car il est mon pilier. Il m’a permis de réaliser cette thèse et de me redonner un cap à chaque fois que j’ en ai eu besoin.
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