The Attic Nights of Aulus Gellius
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,.J: - f^^^- \ ^ xxV^Jr^^ EEx Libris K. OGDEN Digitized by tine Internet Arciiive in 2007 with funding from IVIicrosoft Corporation http://www.archive.org/details/atticniglitsofaul02gelliala THE ATTIC NIGHTS O P AULUS GELLIUS TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH, By THE Rev. W. B E L O E, f. s. a. XRANSLAro R OF HERODOTUS, &C. IN THREE VOLUMES. V O L. U. LONDON: I'RINTKn FO. ;. ;0HN50N. ST. p.ul's CHU^CH-VA.o. M Dec XCV. Annex PR £5-. THE ATTIC NIGHTS O F AULUS GELLIUS. BOOK VL Chap, I. The reply of Chryjippus to thoje who denied a Pro* vidence. ' ^r'HE Y who think that the world was not pro- duced on account of the Deity and of man, and deny that human affairs are governed by Providence, think * The beginning of this chapter was wanting in all the editions with which I am acquainted ; but I have reftored it from Laftantius's Epitome of his Divine Inftitutions, Chap. 29. It is a whimfical circumftance enough, that the greater part of this very Epitome ftiould have lain hid till the pre- fent century. St. Jerome, in his Catalogue of Ecclefiailical Writers, fpeaking of Laflaatius, fays, " Habemus ejus In- ftitiitionum Divinarum adverfus gentes libros feptem eitEpi- VOL. II, B tome ; « THE ATTIC NIGHTS think that they urge a 'powerful argument when they offerti that if there were a Providence there would he no evils. For nothings they affirm., can be lefs conftfi^ ent with a Providence, than that in that world, oH account of which the Deity is /aid to have created man, there fhould exijl fo great a number of cala- mities and evils. Chryfippiis, in his foiirth tome cjufdem operis in libro uno axtspaXo* *." Laftantius flourifhed in the fourth century ; before the end of which St. Jerome wrote his Catalogue. But in the year 171 2, Pro- feiTor Pfaffius found a MS. at Turin, that had been com- plete, but by accident had iiuce loft five chapters. To this editipn oar readers are indebted for the fupplement; in con- lideration of which they are requefted favourably to receive, or at leaft to pardon this little digrelfion. In feme manufcripts we are given to underftand, that this book was placed after the feventh,—This can be of no importance.—Many and perplexing are the difputes concern- ing Fate and Providence, among the ancient philofophers each, perhaps, containing fomething to admire and approve, but refembling an unpolifhcd gem, enveloped by extraneous matter, which obfcured and defaced its beauty. The opi- nions of thefe feds will be found accurately detailed in En- field's Hlflory of Philofophy.—On thefe fubjecls, ingenious and pleafing as the inveftigation of them ma^ be, our befl knowledge is the knowledge of ourfelves, and our trucft virtue refignation to the order of Providence. Hope humbly, then—-witli trembling pinions foar. Wait the gre:;t teacher Death, and God adore ! In pride, in reafoning pride, our error lies, All quit their fphere, and rulh into the fldes. * TKe common reading is iK£fi>.*, but a Paris MS. 900 j-eais olJ gives the reading which I have quoted. book ; OP AULUS GELLIUS. 3 kook concerning Providence, difputing againft thefe, obfcrves diat nothing can be more ab- fu'rd or foolifli than their opinion, who think that there can be good, without the exiflencc of evil. For as good is contrary to evi', and it is neceffary that both fhould exift, oppofite to each other, and as it were dependent upon mutual and oppofite exertions, fo there can be no oppofing thing exift, without its particular oppoi- fite. For how could there be a fenfe ofjuftice, if there were no injuftice? or what indeed is juf- tice, but the abfence of injuftice ? In like man- ner what can we imagine of fortitude, but as op- pofed to pufillanimity ? What of temperance, but from intemperance? What would prudence be, but for its oppcfite imprudence ? Why alfo ihould unwife men not require this, that there Ihould exift truth, and not falfehood ? In like manner exift good and evil, happinefs and mi- fery, pain and pleafure. Each, as Plato remarks, is confined to the other by contrary and oppofing vortices *, fo that if you remove one you take away the other. This Chryfippus in the fame book * Fortices.l —This dodlrme is the diftindion of the Car- tefian philofophy, where it was applied to explain the phae- nomena of the heavenly bodies. That it is inadequate to this, is what admits of mathematical proof. Thefe vortices exift in imagination only; the principle which aclaal'y and fatisfaftorily explains thefe phcEnomena is known to have exiftence in nature, and that is gravity. Notes on tlie: fub- ject of this chapter might be extended to an infinite length and B Q. 4 THE ATTIC NIGHTS book examinesj inveftigates, and thinks it an im- portant fiibjecft of enquiry, whether the impcr- feftions of men are according to nature j that is, whether the fame nature and Providence which formed this univerfe and the race of men, created alfo the defedis and diforders to which men are fubjcd:. He thinks that it was not the firft de- fign of Providence to make men obnoxious to diforders, for this never could be confillent with the Author of nature, and the Greater of all good things. But as, he continues, he produced and formed many and great things, moft convenient and ufeful, there are other kindred inconveni- ences, adhering to the things which he .created. Thefe he fays were not produced by nature, but by certain necelTary confequences, which he de- nominates xxTX irapoixoXHha-iv. —Thus he remarks, when nature creates the bodies of men, a more fubtle caufe, and the very ufefulnefs of his work, required that the head Ihould be compofed of certain very minute and very delicate bones j but another external inconvenience attached to this ufefulnefs in fomewhat of more importance, that the head was lefs fubftantially defended, and was liable to be broken by blows and flight refiftances. —In like manner diforders and ficknefs are obtained whilft health is produced. And thus it is, he remarked, that when, by the and I fhould certainly 'have /indulged myfelf with fome greater latitude, did I not fear to ejfceed tie limits pre- scribed me. purpofe : OF AULUS GELLIUS. 5 purpofe of nature, virtue is created for man, defefts are alfo at the fame time produced by a contrary affinity. Chap. II. How thefame per/on proved the power and necejjity of Fatei andyet that we poffiffed a free will and free agency, CHR YSIPPUS, the prince of the Stoics, defines Fate, which the Greeks call 7r£7r/)W]W£V5i or £*/;iapjw,£m, nearly in this manner Fate, fays he, is a certain immutable and eternal feries * All the ancient" philofophers held different opinions with refpeft to fate or neceffity; which opinions are too well known to be recapitulated here.—The definition of fate here given by Chryfippus, is thus alluded to by Virgi!, ^n. iii. ver. 374. Nam te majoribus ire per altuih Aufpiciis, manifefta fides; fie fata deum rex SoTtitar, /ohitque vices: is vertitur ordo. Many elegant and pertinent illuftrations of the fubjedts here difcuffed might be introduced from Pope's EfTay on Man ; but as there is every where fuch a general fimilarity, feleftion becomes difficult, and it feems better to refer the reader generally to that poem ; to the critical and philofo- B 3 phical 6 THE ATTIC NIGHTS feries and chain of things, moving and inter- weaving itfelf in a fixed and eftablilhed order of events, with which it is fitted and connected. The very words of Chryfippus I have fubjoined, as well as my memory would fuffer me, that if any one fhall think this my interpretation obfcure, he may refer to the words themfelves. In his fourth book on Providence he fays, that Fate is a phyfical -harmony of all things from eternity, each following the other, and that this combina- tion ftill necefTarily and invariably exifts. The afferters of other fyftems and opinions objedt to this definition, thus : If Chryfippus, fay they, thinks that all things are influenced and go- verned by Fate, and that the a6tion and order of Fate cannot be affeded or changed, the faults and errors of men ought not to be cenfured, nor im- puted to them or their inclinations, but to a cer- tain urgency and neceffity which arifes from Fate, which is the millrcfs and arbitrefs of all things, from whofe agency whatever happens muft of ne- cefTity happen. That therefore the punilhment of crimes is unjuftly appointed by the laws, if men phlcal Commentary upon it, publiflied by Dr. Warburton; as well as tp Enfield's Hiftory of Philofophy, The fubjeft will, I think, allow me fomewhat to enliven the chapter, by relating an anecdote of Zeno : H(j deteft- ed his flave in fome aft of theft, and ordered him to be flogged.—The fellow having in mind the dogmas of his jnafter, exclaimed. It was fated that I fhould commit this theft.—And that you fhould be flogged, replied Zeno. do OF AULUS GELLIUS. 7 do not voluntarily commit, but arc impelled to them by Fate. Againft fuch opinions Chry- fippus argues with great fubtlety and acutenefs. But the fubitance of all that he has replied on this fubjefb is nearly this : Although it be fo, fays he, that all things are neceflarily connefted and compelled by Fate, yet the powers of our minds are no farther fubjeft to this Fate, than as they have certain properties and qualities.