Governmentality and Counter-Conduct in Authoritarian Regime
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The London School of Economics and Political Science Social Policy, State Legitimacy and Strategic Actors: Governmentality and Counter-conduct in Authoritarian Regime YAN WANG A thesis submitted to the Department of Sociology of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, March 2020 1 Declaration I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. I declare that my thesis consists of <85,141> words excluding references and appendices. Statement of conjoint work I confirm that Chapter 4 was jointly co-authored with Professor Xufeng ZHU (Tsinghua University) and I contributed 60% of this work. Statement of use of third party for editorial help I can confirm that my thesis was copy edited for conventions of language, spelling and grammar by Eve Richards ([email protected]). 2 Abstract Far from acting defensively to preserve the social relations and red ideologies that originally gave it power, the Chinese Communist Party is leading a social and economic transformation that could be expected to lead to direct challenges to its authority. The surprising degree of change in the Chinese socio-economic transformation and the fact that this transformation has been going on for forty years now and has not yet resulted in fundamental challenges subverting its rule have inspired my study. The overarching theoretical enquiry in my dissertation resonates with one of the most important theoretical questions in political sociology: how does the state maintain compliance from the governed in periods of rapid social and economic transformation, and how does the logic of its governmentality change along with its priorities? My work is built on the Weberian and Gramscian tradition of understanding state rule and highlights the individual’s rationale of “believing” and “consent”, but also takes account of the Foucaudian “governmentality” the state uses to maintain its rule and investigates the underlined rationality. Empirically, I take advantage of the pension changes among China’s social welfare reforms, decipher a two-way story of statecraft in authoritarian regimes and explore whether there may be room for cognitional counter-conduct from the public. My work demonstrates that the Chinese state works through benefit allocation, propaganda, experimentation with policy and many other approaches, in order to shape public expectations and justify its rule. However, the state’s well-designed statecraft needs to enable individuals to make sense of their experience and must resonate with their “common sense”. Individuals can update their knowledge from personal interest, information from government policies, signals from current society (their peers) to decide whether to stay loyal or choose non-compliance. In a situation when active counter-conduct such as resistance is not possible, individuals may choose cognitional rebellion and falsify their public compliance. 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ------------------------------------------------------------------- 11 Generating compliance: governmentality ---------------------------------------------------------------- 13 Theoretical setup and context -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 14 Relational power: the modern state’s legitimation issue and its governmentality ------------- 14 Challenges brought by transitional scenarios and the state’s toolkit ----------------------------- 16 Dealing with the people: governmentality that generates compliance ---------------------------------------------- 19 Coercion or consent: why coercion alone cannot do the work ------------------------------------- 20 Generating compliance: a two-actors model and the state’s options ----------------------------- 22 Constraints, choices, and state-individual interaction in transitional situations --------------- 26 Structure of the dissertation -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 28 Chapter 2: Review of the literature ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 29 Chapter 3: Revealing the governmentality by the case of pension reforms --------------------------------------- 30 Chapter 4: Evaluating the effectiveness of statecraft with a sub-reform ------------------------------------------ 32 Chapter 5: Note the cognitional counter-conduct of the public ---------------------------------------------------- 34 CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW --------------------------------------------------------- 36 Section 1 Why legitimacy matters and how the existence of the public shapes statecraft? ------ 36 Understanding state power: “legitimacy” and “governmentality” ------------------------------------------------- 36 A Weberian conceptualization of legitimacy and consent ------------------------------------------ 36 Sources of authority and state rationality --------------------------------------------------------------- 38 The Foucauldian state: Governmentality of the modern state ------------------------------------- 39 Legitimacy and governmentality in non-democratic and transitional countries --------------------------------- 41 Importance of ideological legitimacy, censorship and technological statecraft ---------------- 41 Performance-based legitimacy and welfare provision in non-democratic regimes ------------ 42 Transitional state and potential legitimation crisis -------------------------------------------------- 45 Section 2: Transitional State Socialism and authoritarian resilience: why did the dramatic social change in China not incur a regime failure? --------------------------------------------------------------- 47 Transitional state socialism in general and in China: similarities and differences ---------------------------- 47 Current transitional theories: market transition and societal transition ----------------------------------------- 50 Transitional scenario in the social welfare area: the communist legacy and privatized social rights -------- 53 Authoritarian resilience: why did the dramatic change not cause a regime failure? --------------------------- 56 Section 3 Individual subjectivity: “being shaped” and “counter-conduct” ------------------------- 58 State power and the population as the state’s strength -------------------------------------------------------------- 58 The circular “state strength” and a capillary model of power -------------------------------------- 58 Being shaped: how individuals incorporate policy changes ---------------------------------------- 60 4 Counter-conduct and cognitional rebellion ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 61 “Counter-conduct”: why and how it is possible ------------------------------------------------------ 61 What’s in people’s toolkit? Participation, everyday life resistance and counter common sense --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 62 CHAPTER 3 WHO DESERVES SOCIAL BENEFITS AND HOW? DIFFERENTIATION AND KNOWLEDGE CONSTRUCTION AS STATECRAFT IN PENSION REFORMS -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 68 How do entitlements differ: differentiation in benefit entitlement -------------------------------------------------- 70 How does persuasion help: domesticating your ideas ---------------------------------------------------------------- 72 Who gets what and how: population-based governance ---------------------------------------------- 74 Changes in policy reform: what does timeline tell us ----------------------------------------------------------------- 76 Generosity and coverage: what the statistical evidence tells us ------------------------------------------------------ 82 Pension plan for Government Employees (PGE) and Public Institution Employees (PPIE)83 Pension plan for Enterprise Employees (PEE) ------------------------------------------------------- 86 Pension plan for Urban Non-salaried Residents (PUR) and Rural Residents (PRR) --------- 88 Who deserves benefits and why: constructed truth and knowledge --------------------------------- 91 Data cleaning and an exploration on topics -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 94 Mind the time: Pension reform as instruments ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 100 The politics of redistribution: what is fair and just ----------------------------------------------------------------- 108 Redistribution among different social groups -------------------------------------------------------- 108 Redistribution between different generations -------------------------------------------------------- 115 The state-individual relationship: what should the citizens expect from the state? --------------------------- 118 Unfolding the locus of responsibility: topic-based promotions -----------------------------------