Part III Predicate Logic
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Aristotle's Illicit Quantifier Shift: Is He Guilty Or Innocent
Aristos Volume 1 Issue 2 Article 2 9-2015 Aristotle's Illicit Quantifier Shift: Is He Guilty or Innocent Jack Green The University of Notre Dame Australia Follow this and additional works at: https://researchonline.nd.edu.au/aristos Part of the Philosophy Commons, and the Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of Religion Commons Recommended Citation Green, J. (2015). "Aristotle's Illicit Quantifier Shift: Is He Guilty or Innocent," Aristos 1(2),, 1-18. https://doi.org/10.32613/aristos/ 2015.1.2.2 Retrieved from https://researchonline.nd.edu.au/aristos/vol1/iss2/2 This Article is brought to you by ResearchOnline@ND. It has been accepted for inclusion in Aristos by an authorized administrator of ResearchOnline@ND. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Green: Aristotle's Illicit Quantifier Shift: Is He Guilty or Innocent ARISTOTLE’S ILLICIT QUANTIFIER SHIFT: IS HE GUILTY OR INNOCENT? Jack Green 1. Introduction Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (from hereon NE) falters at its very beginning. That is the claim of logicians and philosophers who believe that in the first book of the NE Aristotle mistakenly moves from ‘every action and pursuit aims at some good’ to ‘there is some one good at which all actions and pursuits aim.’1 Yet not everyone is convinced of Aristotle’s seeming blunder.2 In lieu of that, this paper has two purposes. Firstly, it is an attempt to bring some clarity to that debate in the face of divergent opinions of the location of the fallacy; some proposing it lies at I.i.1094a1-3, others at I.ii.1094a18-22, making it difficult to wade through the literature. -
1 Lecture 13: Quantifier Laws1 1. Laws of Quantifier Negation There
Ling 409 lecture notes, Lecture 13 Ling 409 lecture notes, Lecture 13 October 19, 2005 October 19, 2005 Lecture 13: Quantifier Laws1 true or there is at least one individual that makes φ(x) true (or both). Those are also equivalent statements. 1. Laws of Quantifier Negation Laws 2 and 3 suggest a fundamental connection between universal quantification and There are a number of equivalences based on the set-theoretic semantics of predicate logic. conjunction and existential quantification and disjunction: Take for instance a statement of the form (∃x)~ φ(x)2. It asserts that there is at least one individual d which makes ~φ(x) true. That means that d makes ϕ(x) false. That, in turn, (∀x) ψ(x) is true iff ψ(a) and ψ(b) and ψ(c) … (where a, b, c … are the names of the means that (∀x) φ(x) is false, which means that ~(∀x) φ(x) is true. The same reasoning individuals in the domain.) can be applied in the reverse direction and the result is the first quantifier law: ∃ ψ ψ ψ ψ ( x) (x) is true iff (a) or (b) or c) … (where a, b, c … are the names of the (1) Laws of Quantifier Negation individuals in the domain.) Law 1: ~(∀x) φ(x) ⇐⇒ (∃x)~ φ(x) From that point of view, Law 1 resembles a generalized DeMorgan’s Law: (Possible English correspondents: Not everyone passed the test and Someone did not pass (4) ~(ϕ(a) & ϕ(b) & ϕ(c) … ) ⇐⇒ ~ϕ(a) v ~ϕ(b) v ϕ(c) … the test.) (5) Law 4: (∀x) ψ(x) v (∀x)φ(x) ⇒ (∀x)( ψ(x) v φ(x)) ϕ ⇐ ϕ Because of the Law of Double Negation (~~ (x) ⇒ (x)), Law 1 could also be written (6) Law 5: (∃x)( ψ(x) & φ(x)) ⇒ (∃x) ψ(x) & (∃x)φ(x) as follows: These two laws are one-way entailments, NOT equivalences. -
Scope Ambiguity in Syntax and Semantics
Scope Ambiguity in Syntax and Semantics Ling324 Reading: Meaning and Grammar, pg. 142-157 Is Scope Ambiguity Semantically Real? (1) Everyone loves someone. a. Wide scope reading of universal quantifier: ∀x[person(x) →∃y[person(y) ∧ love(x,y)]] b. Wide scope reading of existential quantifier: ∃y[person(y) ∧∀x[person(x) → love(x,y)]] 1 Could one semantic representation handle both the readings? • ∃y∀x reading entails ∀x∃y reading. ∀x∃y describes a more general situation where everyone has someone who s/he loves, and ∃y∀x describes a more specific situation where everyone loves the same person. • Then, couldn’t we say that Everyone loves someone is associated with the semantic representation that describes the more general reading, and the more specific reading obtains under an appropriate context? That is, couldn’t we say that Everyone loves someone is not semantically ambiguous, and its only semantic representation is the following? ∀x[person(x) →∃y[person(y) ∧ love(x,y)]] • After all, this semantic representation reflects the syntax: In syntax, everyone c-commands someone. In semantics, everyone scopes over someone. 2 Arguments for Real Scope Ambiguity • The semantic representation with the scope of quantifiers reflecting the order in which quantifiers occur in a sentence does not always represent the most general reading. (2) a. There was a name tag near every plate. b. A guard is standing in front of every gate. c. A student guide took every visitor to two museums. • Could we stipulate that when interpreting a sentence, no matter which order the quantifiers occur, always assign wide scope to every and narrow scope to some, two, etc.? 3 Arguments for Real Scope Ambiguity (cont.) • But in a negative sentence, ¬∀x∃y reading entails ¬∃y∀x reading. -
Useful Argumentative Essay Words and Phrases
Useful Argumentative Essay Words and Phrases Examples of Argumentative Language Below are examples of signposts that are used in argumentative essays. Signposts enable the reader to follow our arguments easily. When pointing out opposing arguments (Cons): Opponents of this idea claim/maintain that… Those who disagree/ are against these ideas may say/ assert that… Some people may disagree with this idea, Some people may say that…however… When stating specifically why they think like that: They claim that…since… Reaching the turning point: However, But On the other hand, When refuting the opposing idea, we may use the following strategies: compromise but prove their argument is not powerful enough: - They have a point in thinking like that. - To a certain extent they are right. completely disagree: - After seeing this evidence, there is no way we can agree with this idea. say that their argument is irrelevant to the topic: - Their argument is irrelevant to the topic. Signposting sentences What are signposting sentences? Signposting sentences explain the logic of your argument. They tell the reader what you are going to do at key points in your assignment. They are most useful when used in the following places: In the introduction At the beginning of a paragraph which develops a new idea At the beginning of a paragraph which expands on a previous idea At the beginning of a paragraph which offers a contrasting viewpoint At the end of a paragraph to sum up an idea In the conclusion A table of signposting stems: These should be used as a guide and as a way to get you thinking about how you present the thread of your argument. -
The “Ambiguity” Fallacy
\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\88-5\GWN502.txt unknown Seq: 1 2-SEP-20 11:10 The “Ambiguity” Fallacy Ryan D. Doerfler* ABSTRACT This Essay considers a popular, deceptively simple argument against the lawfulness of Chevron. As it explains, the argument appears to trade on an ambiguity in the term “ambiguity”—and does so in a way that reveals a mis- match between Chevron criticism and the larger jurisprudence of Chevron critics. TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ................................................. 1110 R I. THE ARGUMENT ........................................ 1111 R II. THE AMBIGUITY OF “AMBIGUITY” ..................... 1112 R III. “AMBIGUITY” IN CHEVRON ............................. 1114 R IV. RESOLVING “AMBIGUITY” .............................. 1114 R V. JUDGES AS UMPIRES .................................... 1117 R CONCLUSION ................................................... 1120 R INTRODUCTION Along with other, more complicated arguments, Chevron1 critics offer a simple inference. It starts with the premise, drawn from Mar- bury,2 that courts must interpret statutes independently. To this, critics add, channeling James Madison, that interpreting statutes inevitably requires courts to resolve statutory ambiguity. And from these two seemingly uncontroversial premises, Chevron critics then infer that deferring to an agency’s resolution of some statutory ambiguity would involve an abdication of the judicial role—after all, resolving statutory ambiguity independently is what judges are supposed to do, and defer- ence (as contrasted with respect3) is the opposite of independence. As this Essay explains, this simple inference appears fallacious upon inspection. The reason is that a key term in the inference, “ambi- guity,” is critically ambiguous, and critics seem to slide between one sense of “ambiguity” in the second premise of the argument and an- * Professor of Law, Herbert and Marjorie Fried Research Scholar, The University of Chi- cago Law School. -
4 Quantifiers and Quantified Arguments 4.1 Quantifiers
4 Quantifiers and Quantified Arguments 4.1 Quantifiers Recall from Chapter 3 the definition of a predicate as an assertion con- taining one or more variables such that, if the variables are replaced by objects from a given Universal set U then we obtain a proposition. Let p(x) be a predicate with one variable. Definition If for all x ∈ U, p(x) is true, we write ∀x : p(x). ∀ is called the universal quantifier. Definition If there exists x ∈ U such that p(x) is true, we write ∃x : p(x). ∃ is called the existential quantifier. Note (1) ∀x : p(x) and ∃x : p(x) are propositions and so, in any given example, we will be able to assign truth-values. (2) The definitions can be applied to predicates with two or more vari- ables. So if p(x, y) has two variables we have, for instance, ∀x, ∃y : p(x, y) if “for all x there exists y for which p(x, y) is holds”. (3) Let A and B be two sets in a Universal set U. Recall the definition of A ⊆ B as “every element of A is in B.” This is a “for all” statement so we should be able to symbolize it. We do so by first rewriting the definition as “for all x ∈ U, if x is in A then x is in B, ” which in symbols is ∀x ∈ U : if (x ∈ A) then (x ∈ B) , or ∀x :(x ∈ A) → (x ∈ B) . 1 (4*) Recall that a variable x in a propositional form p(x) is said to be free. -
Lexical Scoping As Universal Quantification
University of Pennsylvania ScholarlyCommons Technical Reports (CIS) Department of Computer & Information Science March 1989 Lexical Scoping as Universal Quantification Dale Miller University of Pennsylvania Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/cis_reports Recommended Citation Dale Miller, "Lexical Scoping as Universal Quantification", . March 1989. University of Pennsylvania Department of Computer and Information Science Technical Report No. MS-CIS-89-23. This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/cis_reports/785 For more information, please contact [email protected]. Lexical Scoping as Universal Quantification Abstract A universally quantified goal can be interpreted intensionally, that is, the goal ∀x.G(x) succeeds if for some new constant c, the goal G(c) succeeds. The constant c is, in a sense, given a scope: it is introduced to solve this goal and is "discharged" after the goal succeeds or fails. This interpretation is similar to the interpretation of implicational goals: the goal D ⊃ G should succeed if when D is assumed, the goal G succeeds. The assumption D is discharged after G succeeds or fails. An interpreter for a logic programming language containing both universal quantifiers and implications in goals and the body of clauses is described. In its non-deterministic form, this interpreter is sound and complete for intuitionistic logic. Universal quantification can provide lexical scoping of individual, function, and predicate constants. Several examples are presented to show how such scoping can be used to provide a Prolog-like language with facilities for local definition of programs, local declarations in modules, abstract data types, and encapsulation of state. -
Some Common Fallacies of Argument Evading the Issue: You Avoid the Central Point of an Argument, Instead Drawing Attention to a Minor (Or Side) Issue
Some Common Fallacies of Argument Evading the Issue: You avoid the central point of an argument, instead drawing attention to a minor (or side) issue. ex. You've put through a proposal that will cut overall loan benefits for students and drastically raise interest rates, but then you focus on how the system will be set up to process loan applications for students more quickly. Ad hominem: Here you attack a person's character, physical appearance, or personal habits instead of addressing the central issues of an argument. You focus on the person's personality, rather than on his/her ideas, evidence, or arguments. This type of attack sometimes comes in the form of character assassination (especially in politics). You must be sure that character is, in fact, a relevant issue. ex. How can we elect John Smith as the new CEO of our department store when he has been through 4 messy divorces due to his infidelity? Ad populum: This type of argument uses illegitimate emotional appeal, drawing on people's emotions, prejudices, and stereotypes. The emotion evoked here is not supported by sufficient, reliable, and trustworthy sources. Ex. We shouldn't develop our shopping mall here in East Vancouver because there is a rather large immigrant population in the area. There will be too much loitering, shoplifting, crime, and drug use. Complex or Loaded Question: Offers only two options to answer a question that may require a more complex answer. Such questions are worded so that any answer will implicate an opponent. Ex. At what point did you stop cheating on your wife? Setting up a Straw Person: Here you address the weakest point of an opponent's argument, instead of focusing on a main issue. -
Sets, Propositional Logic, Predicates, and Quantifiers
COMP 182 Algorithmic Thinking Sets, Propositional Logic, Luay Nakhleh Computer Science Predicates, and Quantifiers Rice University !1 Reading Material ❖ Chapter 1, Sections 1, 4, 5 ❖ Chapter 2, Sections 1, 2 !2 ❖ Mathematics is about statements that are either true or false. ❖ Such statements are called propositions. ❖ We use logic to describe them, and proof techniques to prove whether they are true or false. !3 Propositions ❖ 5>7 ❖ The square root of 2 is irrational. ❖ A graph is bipartite if and only if it doesn’t have a cycle of odd length. ❖ For n>1, the sum of the numbers 1,2,3,…,n is n2. !4 Propositions? ❖ E=mc2 ❖ The sun rises from the East every day. ❖ All species on Earth evolved from a common ancestor. ❖ God does not exist. ❖ Everyone eventually dies. !5 ❖ And some of you might already be wondering: “If I wanted to study mathematics, I would have majored in Math. I came here to study computer science.” !6 ❖ Computer Science is mathematics, but we almost exclusively focus on aspects of mathematics that relate to computation (that can be implemented in software and/or hardware). !7 ❖Logic is the language of computer science and, mathematics is the computer scientist’s most essential toolbox. !8 Examples of “CS-relevant” Math ❖ Algorithm A correctly solves problem P. ❖ Algorithm A has a worst-case running time of O(n3). ❖ Problem P has no solution. ❖ Using comparison between two elements as the basic operation, we cannot sort a list of n elements in less than O(n log n) time. ❖ Problem A is NP-Complete. -
Is 'Argument' Subject to the Product/Process Ambiguity?
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by University of Richmond University of Richmond UR Scholarship Repository Philosophy Faculty Publications Philosophy 2011 Is ‘argument’ subject to the product/process ambiguity? G. C. Goddu University of Richmond, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/philosophy-faculty- publications Part of the Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Goddu, G. C. "Is ‘argument’ Subject to the Product/process Ambiguity?" Informal Logic 31, no. 2 (2011): 75-88. This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Is ‘argument’ subject to the product/process ambiguity? G.C. GODDU Department of Philosophy University of Richmond Richmond, VA 23173 U.S.A. [email protected] Abstract: The product/process dis- Resumé: La distinction proces- tinction with regards to “argument” sus/produit appliquée aux arguments has a longstanding history and foun- joue un rôle de fondement de la dational role in argumentation the- théorie de l’argumentation depuis ory. I shall argue that, regardless of longtemps. Quelle que soit one’s chosen ontology of arguments, l’ontologie des arguments qu’on arguments are not the product of adopte, je soutiens que les argu- some process of arguing. Hence, ments ne sont pas le produit d’un appeal to the distinction is distorting processus d’argumentation. Donc the very organizational foundations l’usage de cette distinction déforme of argumentation theory and should le fondement organisationnel de la be abandoned. -
CHAPTER 1 the Main Subject of Mathematical Logic Is Mathematical
CHAPTER 1 Logic The main subject of Mathematical Logic is mathematical proof. In this chapter we deal with the basics of formalizing such proofs and analysing their structure. The system we pick for the representation of proofs is natu- ral deduction as in Gentzen (1935). Our reasons for this choice are twofold. First, as the name says this is a natural notion of formal proof, which means that the way proofs are represented corresponds very much to the way a careful mathematician writing out all details of an argument would go any- way. Second, formal proofs in natural deduction are closely related (via the Curry-Howard correspondence) to terms in typed lambda calculus. This provides us not only with a compact notation for logical derivations (which otherwise tend to become somewhat unmanageable tree-like structures), but also opens up a route to applying the computational techniques which un- derpin lambda calculus. An essential point for Mathematical Logic is to fix the formal language to be used. We take implication ! and the universal quantifier 8 as basic. Then the logic rules correspond precisely to lambda calculus. The additional connectives (i.e., the existential quantifier 9, disjunction _ and conjunction ^) will be added via axioms. Later we will see that these axioms are deter- mined by particular inductive definitions. In addition to the use of inductive definitions as a unifying concept, another reason for that change of empha- sis will be that it fits more readily with the more computational viewpoint adopted there. This chapter does not simply introduce basic proof theory, but in addi- tion there is an underlying theme: to bring out the constructive content of logic, particularly in regard to the relationship between minimal and classical logic. -
Discrete Mathematics, Chapter 1.4-1.5: Predicate Logic
Discrete Mathematics, Chapter 1.4-1.5: Predicate Logic Richard Mayr University of Edinburgh, UK Richard Mayr (University of Edinburgh, UK) Discrete Mathematics. Chapter 1.4-1.5 1 / 23 Outline 1 Predicates 2 Quantifiers 3 Equivalences 4 Nested Quantifiers Richard Mayr (University of Edinburgh, UK) Discrete Mathematics. Chapter 1.4-1.5 2 / 23 Propositional Logic is not enough Suppose we have: “All men are mortal.” “Socrates is a man”. Does it follow that “Socrates is mortal” ? This cannot be expressed in propositional logic. We need a language to talk about objects, their properties and their relations. Richard Mayr (University of Edinburgh, UK) Discrete Mathematics. Chapter 1.4-1.5 3 / 23 Predicate Logic Extend propositional logic by the following new features. Variables: x; y; z;::: Predicates (i.e., propositional functions): P(x); Q(x); R(y); M(x; y);::: . Quantifiers: 8; 9. Propositional functions are a generalization of propositions. Can contain variables and predicates, e.g., P(x). Variables stand for (and can be replaced by) elements from their domain. Richard Mayr (University of Edinburgh, UK) Discrete Mathematics. Chapter 1.4-1.5 4 / 23 Propositional Functions Propositional functions become propositions (and thus have truth values) when all their variables are either I replaced by a value from their domain, or I bound by a quantifier P(x) denotes the value of propositional function P at x. The domain is often denoted by U (the universe). Example: Let P(x) denote “x > 5” and U be the integers. Then I P(8) is true. I P(5) is false.