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And Type the TITLE of YOUR WORK in All Caps SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND THE DIPLOMACY OF MODERNIZATION: 1966-1979 by MAO LIN (Under the Direction of William Stueck) ABSTRACT This dissertation is a study of the relations between the People’s Republic of China and the United States from the la te Johnson adm inistration to th e Carter adm inistration—a time period I call the “long 1970s.” To fully understa nd the development of Sino-American relations during this tim e period, we can not m erely fo cus on the strategic issues between the two countries such as the U S-PRC-USSR triangular diplomacy and ignore other non-strategic issues such as trade and cultural exchanges. Instead, we need to adopt a holistic approach by examining the discourse on China' s modernization, that is , how China' s modernization was perceived and debated by both countries' policy-makers and how the discourse on China' s modernization laid the foundation for improved relations between China and the United States. INDEX WORDS: US-Foreign Relations-China, Modernization SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND THE DIPLOMACY OF MODERNIZATION: 1966-1979 by MAO LIN BA, Peking University, China, 1999 MA, Peking University, China, 2002 MA, The University of Georgia, 2004 A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of The University of Georgia in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY ATHENS, GEORGIA 2010 © 2010 Mao Lin All Rights Reserved SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND THE DIPLOMACY OF MODERNIZATION: 1966-1979 by MAO LIN Major Professor: William Stueck Committee: Shane Hamilton Ari Levine Stephen Mihm Electronic Version Approved: Maureen Grasso Dean of the Graduate School The University of Georgia August 2010 DEDICATION TO MY FAMILY iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I wish to thank m y major advisor , Dr. William Stueck, f or his constant he lp and encouragement during the writing of m y dissertation. I also want to than k other members of my committee, who provided useful insights from time to time. Finally, I want to thank my families, who have never failed to support my career as a historian. v TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .............................................................................................................v INTRODUCTION.............................................................................................................................1 CHAPTER 1 Modernization and the New Public Debate over China, 1966-1968 ...........................22 2 Containment Without Isolation: The Johnson Administration's New China Policy, 1966-1968 ....................................................................................................................59 3 Modernization and China's American Policy,1966-1970 ..........................................110 4 Guns and Butter: Toward Sino-American Rapprochement,1969-1972 .....................154 5 Tacit Ally: Consolidating the U.S.-China Rapprochement, 1972-1976 ....................215 6 "Seeing is Believing?”—Modernization and U.S.-China Exchanges in the 1970s ...287 7 Traders and Diplomats: Doing Business with China in the 1970s ............................334 EPILOGUE: Toward Normalization of Sino-American Relations, 1977-1979 ..........................390 REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................460 vi Introduction This dissertation is a study of the relations between the People’s Republic of China and the United States from the la te Johnson adm inistration to th e Carter adm inistration—a time period I call the “long 1970s.” While the study of Sino-American relations during this period is a robust field with a fast g rowing body of literature, a full understanding of the dynamics of U.S.- China relations has yet to be ach ieved, especially in light of newly released prim ary sources. Moreover, shifting res earch p aradigms in the field have challenged pr eviously estab lished conclusions and point to new res earch perspectives. Particularly, historians have demonstrated the advantages of reconstructing the policy-m aking environment as the historical actors saw it, adjusting a sole focus on the “triangu lar diplomacy” and its impact on Sino-Am erican relations, and putting analysis within a b road contex tual fram ework. 1 In o ther words, trad itional approaches too closely associated with geopolitical calculations of the Cold W ar itself are no longer deemed as sufficient in explaining Sino-American relations in the “long 1970s.” The new approaches, h owever, hav e yet to fully estab lish them selves in the field. 2 For scholars of U.S.-China relations in the “long 1970s,” the m ajor tendency is still to focus on 1 These trends reflect a new research paradigm that tries to avert studying Sino-American relations from the dominating Cold War narrative. To date, however, these trends have largely influenced the study of U.S.-China relations during the Truman and Eisenhower periods. For example, see Nancy B. Tucker, Patterns in the Dust: Chinese-American Relations and the Recognition Controversy, 1949-1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983); Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Symposium, “Rethinking the Lost Chance in China,” Diplomatic History 21:1 (Winter 1997): 71-115; Simei Qing, From Allies to Enemies: Visions of Modernity, Identity, and U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1945-1960 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007). For a survey of the field, see Robert J. McMahon, “The Cold War in Asia: The Elusive Synthesis,” in Michael J. Hogan, eds., America in the World: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations since 1941 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 2 Only recently have scholars started to use those new approaches to reexamine U.S.-China relations in the 1960s and 1970s. For example, see Rosemary Foot, The Practice of Power: U.S. Relations with China since 1949 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995); Noam Kochavi, A Conflict Perpetuated: China Policy during the Kennedy Years (Westport, Conn. : Praeger, 2002); Evelyn Goh, Constructing the U.S. Rapprochement with China, 1961-1974: From “Red Menace” to “Tacit Ally” (Cambridge: Cambridge 1 issues such as deterio rating Sino-Soviet relations, the war in Vietnam, the perceived common threat from the Soviet Union, Taiwan, arm s control and other highly visibl e items on the agenda of U.S.-China rapprochem ent, in short, “high politics.” The so-called “triangular diplom acy”— the three-polar S ino-Soviet-American geopolitical m aneuver in which Am erica gradually sided with China against the S oviet Union—particularly occupies th e central stage of the scholarship. Although these strategic concerns contributed to Sino-American rapprochem ent, we can no longer afford pushing aside issues such as eco nomic and cultural relatio ns between China and America as “low politics.” Instead, we need to examine both strategic and non-strategic issues to achieve a f uller understandi ng of the evolution of Sino-Am erican rela tions during the "long 1970s." Hence the title: Guns and Butter. In general, this dissertation focuses on severa l themes. First, while the evolution of U.S.- China relations from r approchement to norma lization w as of ten initia ted by politica l and strategic concerns, the discourse on China’s modernization constituted a m uch broader and deeper foundation upon which the range of these possible initiatives w as based. 3 Changes in Sino-American relation s during th e "long 1970 s" di d not take place autom atically because of cool-headed strategic calculations by both side s. Rather, a key precondition for im proved U.S.- China relations was the for mation of new percep tions by the two nations toward each other. On the American side, from 1966 forwa rd, China was gr adually perceived not as an aggressive and expanding Communist power, but as a nationalist-oriented regi me struggling with its ow n modernization. The new perception of China high lighted the weakness of the Beijing regim e, which contributed to A merica's decision to es tablish an anti-Soviet alliance of sorts with China. Meanwhile, China' s f rustrations in its own m odernization provided a leverage for Am erica to University Press, 2005); James Peck, Washington’s China, The National Security World, The Cold War, and The Origins of Globalism (Amherst & Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 2006). 3 See pp. 13-17 below. 2 influence Beijing's foreign policies, because im proved relations with America would give China access to th e world m arket and adv anced technologies, which would benefit China' s economic development. In fact, som e Chinese leaders ha d similar views. During the "long 1970s," China also formed new perceptions of America. The United States was no longer regarded as China' s "number one" enemy; rather, it became a useful ally in China's struggle against the Soviet Union. Moreover, expanded cultural and economic relations with Am erica, over tim e, started to push Chinese leaders to reevaluate China' s own mode l of m odernization. In sum , the discourse on China's m odernization played a crucial role in the forma tion of the two countries' ne w perceptions toward each other. Second, this dissertation examines how strategic and non-strategic measures were used as a whole policy package by both sides to achieve th e U.S.-China rapprochem ent, and eventually, normalization of relations. Du ring the "long 1970s," Am erica and C hina never pursued a straightforward anti-Soviet alliance. Instead, both relied on the deve lopment of cultural, trade, and other non-strategic re lations to buttress the development of strategic relations. Both wanted to show that they were g enuinely interested in improving bilateral relations per se, not just using the other to counterbalance the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, the developm ent of non-strategic relations quickly created its own mom entum. Fo r exam ple, resum ed dire ct trade revived the image of China as a huge and natural market for America, and many Americans were determined to do business with China despite the ups and down s in the two countries' strategic relations.
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