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SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND THE DIPLOMACY OF MODERNIZATION:

1966-1979

MAO LIN

(Under the Direction of William Stueck)

ABSTRACT

This dissertation is a study of the relations between the People’s Republic of China and the United States from the la te Johnson adm inistration to th e Carter adm inistration—a time period I call the “long 1970s.” To fully understa nd the development of Sino-American relations during this tim e period, we can not m erely fo cus on the strategic issues between the two countries such as the U S-PRC-USSR triangular diplomacy and ignore other non-strategic issues such as trade and cultural exchanges. Instead, we need to adopt a holistic approach by examining the discourse on China' s modernization, that is , how China' s modernization was perceived and debated by both countries' policy-makers and how the discourse on China' s modernization laid the foundation for improved relations between China and the United States.

INDEX WORDS: US-Foreign Relations-China, Modernization

SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND THE DIPLOMACY OF MODERNIZATION:

1966-1979

MAO LIN

BA, Peking University, China, 1999

MA, Peking University, China, 2002

MA, The University of Georgia, 2004

A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of The University of Georgia in Partial

Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

ATHENS, GEORGIA

2010

Mao Lin

SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND THE DIPLOMACY OF MODERNIZATION:

1966-1979

MAO LIN

Major Professor: William Stueck

Committee: Shane Hamilton Ari Levine Stephen Mihm

Electronic Version Approved:

Maureen Grasso Dean of the Graduate School The University of Georgia August 2010

DEDICATION

TO MY FAMILY

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to thank m y major advisor , Dr. William Stueck, f or his constant he lp and

encouragement during the writing of m y dissertation. I also want to than k other members of my

committee, who provided useful insights from time to time. Finally, I want to thank my families, who have never failed to support my career as a historian.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... v

INTRODUCTION...... 1

CHAPTER

1 Modernization and the New Public Debate over China, 1966-1968 ...... 22

2 Containment Without Isolation: The Johnson Administration's New China Policy,

1966-1968 ...... 59

3 Modernization and China's American Policy,1966-1970 ...... 110

4 Guns and Butter: Toward Sino-American Rapprochement,1969-1972 ...... 154

5 Tacit Ally: Consolidating the U.S.-China Rapprochement, 1972-1976 ...... 215

6 "Seeing is Believing?”—Modernization and U.S.-China Exchanges in the 1970s ...287

7 Traders and Diplomats: Doing Business with China in the 1970s ...... 334

EPILOGUE: Toward Normalization of Sino-American Relations, 1977-1979 ...... 390

REFERENCES ...... 460

Introduction

This dissertation is a study of the relations between the People’s Republic of China and the United States from the la te Johnson adm inistration to th e Carter adm inistration—a time period I call the “long 1970s.” While the study of Sino-American relations during this period is a robust field with a fast g rowing body of literature, a full understanding of the dynamics of U.S.-

China relations has yet to be ach ieved, especially in light of newly released prim ary sources.

Moreover, shifting res earch p aradigms in the field have challenged pr eviously estab lished conclusions and point to new res earch perspectives. Particularly, historians have demonstrated the advantages of reconstructing the policy-m aking environment as the historical actors saw it, adjusting a sole focus on the “triangu lar diplomacy” and its impact on Sino-Am erican relations, and putting analysis within a b road contex tual fram ework. 1 In o ther words, trad itional approaches too closely associated with geopolitical calculations of the Cold W ar itself are no longer deemed as sufficient in explaining Sino-American relations in the “long 1970s.”

The new approaches, h owever, hav e yet to fully estab lish them selves in the field. 2 For scholars of U.S.-China relations in the “long 1970s,” the m ajor tendency is still to focus on

1 These trends reflect a new research paradigm that tries to avert studying Sino-American relations from the dominating Cold War narrative. To date, however, these trends have largely influenced the study of U.S.-China relations during the Truman and Eisenhower periods. For example, see Nancy B. Tucker, Patterns in the Dust: Chinese-American Relations and the Recognition Controversy, 1949-1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983); Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Symposium, “Rethinking the Lost Chance in China,” Diplomatic History 21:1 (Winter 1997): 71-115; Simei Qing, From Allies to Enemies: Visions of Modernity, Identity, and U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1945-1960 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007). For a survey of the field, see Robert J. McMahon, “The Cold War in Asia: The Elusive Synthesis,” in Michael J. Hogan, eds., America in the World: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations since 1941 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 2 Only recently have scholars started to use those new approaches to reexamine U.S.-China relations in the 1960s and 1970s. For example, see Rosemary Foot, The Practice of Power: U.S. Relations with China since 1949 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995); Noam Kochavi, A Conflict Perpetuated: China Policy during the Kennedy Years (Westport, Conn. : Praeger, 2002); Evelyn Goh, Constructing the U.S. Rapprochement with China, 1961-1974: From “Red Menace” to “Tacit Ally” (Cambridge: Cambridge

issues such as deterio rating Sino-Soviet relations, the war in Vietnam, the perceived common

threat from the Soviet Union, Taiwan, arm s control and other highly visibl e items on the agenda

of U.S.-China rapprochem ent, in short, “high politics.” The so-called “triangular diplom acy”—

the three-polar S ino-Soviet-American geopolitical m aneuver in which Am erica gradually sided

with China against the S oviet Union—particularly occupies th e central stage of the scholarship.

Although these strategic concerns contributed to Sino-American rapprochem ent, we can no

longer afford pushing aside issues such as eco nomic and cultural relatio ns between China and

America as “low politics.” Instead, we need to examine both strategic and non-strategic issues to

achieve a f uller understandi ng of the evolution of Sino-Am erican rela tions during the "long

1970s." Hence the title: Guns and Butter.

In general, this dissertation focuses on severa l themes. First, while the evolution of U.S.-

China relations from r approchement to norma lization w as of ten initia ted by politica l and

strategic concerns, the discourse on China’s modernization constituted a m uch broader and

deeper foundation upon which the range of these possible initiatives w as based. 3 Changes in

Sino-American relation s during th e "long 1970 s" di d not take place autom atically because of

cool-headed strategic calculations by both side s. Rather, a key precondition for im proved U.S.-

China relations was the for mation of new percep tions by the two nations toward each other. On

the American side, from 1966 forwa rd, China was gr adually perceived not as an aggressive and

expanding Communist power, but as a nationalist-oriented regi me struggling with its ow n

modernization. The new perception of China high lighted the weakness of the Beijing regim e, which contributed to A merica's decision to es tablish an anti-Soviet alliance of sorts with China.

Meanwhile, China' s f rustrations in its own m odernization provided a leverage for Am erica to

University Press, 2005); James Peck, Washington’s China, The National Security World, The Cold War, and The Origins of Globalism (Amherst & Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 2006). 3 See pp. 13-17 below.

influence Beijing's foreign policies, because im proved relations with America would give China

access to th e world m arket and adv anced technologies, which would benefit China' s economic

development. In fact, som e Chinese leaders ha d similar views. During the "long 1970s," China

also formed new perceptions of America. The United States was no longer regarded as China' s

"number one" enemy; rather, it became a useful ally in China's struggle against the Soviet Union.

Moreover, expanded cultural and economic relations with Am erica, over tim e, started to push

Chinese leaders to reevaluate China' s own mode l of m odernization. In sum , the discourse on

China's m odernization played a crucial role in the forma tion of the two countries' ne w

perceptions toward each other.

Second, this dissertation examines how strategic and non-strategic measures were used as a

whole policy package by both sides to achieve th e U.S.-China rapprochem ent, and eventually,

normalization of relations. Du ring the "long 1970s," Am erica and C hina never pursued a

straightforward anti-Soviet alliance. Instead, both relied on the deve lopment of cultural, trade,

and other non-strategic re lations to buttress the development of strategic relations. Both wanted to show that they were g enuinely interested in improving bilateral relations per se, not just using the other to counterbalance the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, the developm ent of non-strategic relations quickly created its own mom entum. Fo r exam ple, resum ed dire ct trade revived the image of China as a huge and natural market for America, and many Americans were determined to do business with China despite the ups and down s in the two countries' strategic relations. In other words, the developm ent of non-strategic relations not only facil itated the U.S.-China strategic cooperation, but also built a broader and stronger founda tion for the overall bilateral relationship. Thus, we cannot isolate strategic issues from non-strategic issues if we want to have a comprehensive picture of Sino-American relations during the "long 1970s."

Finally, this disser tation exam ines how the discourse on China' s modernization not just

reshaped policy-makers' perceptions, but also guid ed the developm ent of the actual U.S.-China

relations through the "long 1970s." While the purs uit of a Sino-Am erican strategic alliance was

important, it was not the only concern for the two sides. For Americans, a long-term concern was

to "br ing C hina back into the international community." China’s be havior could only be moderated if its stakes in the current international order, as preferred by the “Free World,” could be raised high enough. To achieve this goal, Am erican leaders not only needed to m ake major

strategic changes, but also n eeded to expand econom ic and cultu ral relations with China. If

China's future modernization was reoriented toward the West, then the very nature of the Beijing

regime could be changed. In other words, the an ti-Soviet alliance was only a short-term goal for

American leaders, while the long-term goal was for America to influence China's modernization.

For their part, Chinese leaders were forced to reevaluate China’s own model of modernization in

light of the social and econom ic disasters caused by the Cultural R evolution. F or Chinese

leaders, the new relationship with Am erica was not m erely justif ied on the ground of the

common threat from the Soviet Union. Once the rapprochement with America started, intensified

economic and cultural intercourses with Am erica helped to reduce the Chinese emphasis on

“self-reliance” regard ing econom ic developm ent and China’s own modernization becam e

intertwined with trends in the W est. At the sa me time, some Chinese leaders becam e concerned

about such interactions, as they argued that expanded contact with America would erode China's

Communist system. As a result, they launched campaigns aimed at limiting the scope and depth

of the U.S.-China rapprochem ent, which prev ented the smooth developm ent of Sino-Am erican

relations from time to time.

This dissertation, therefore, proposes to r eexamine Sino-Am erican relations during the

“long 1970s” by focusing on the discourse on C hina’s modernization. Yet this is not a project

using modernization theory to interpret U.S.-C hina relations; rather, I intend to h istoricize and

contextualize China’s modernization as perceived and debated by both sides. To summarize, the

dissertation argues that during the “long 1970s,” the perception of China’s modernization and its

implications for U.S.-China relati ons played a crucial role in sh aping the two countries’ attitude

and policy toward each other. In other word s, we must go beyond the Cold War strateg ic explanations for the changed U.S.-China relations and reconstruct the historical context in which those strategic realignments were made possible.

The Chronology: Why the “Long 1970s?”

Before further elabo ration, it is necessary to justify th e chronolo gical fram ework

employed here. For historians, the relationship between America and China has its own unique

chronological fram ework, which is funda mentally dom inated by the two countries’ Cold W ar experience. According to this fram ework, Sino-American relations during the Cold War can be

conveniently divided into several sub-periods bounded by landmark events. The establishment of

Communist rule over m ainland China in 1949 a nd the subsequent “who-lost-China” debate

within America became the first set of watershed events. 4 While scholars disagree over whether or not there was a lost opportunity for the Trum an adm inistration to establish a constructive relationship with Communist China, they generally agree that the Korean War shattered any such

4 For Sino-American relations from 1945 to 1950, see Michael Schaller, The U.S. Crusade in China, 1938-1945 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979); Dorothy Borg and Waldo H. Heinrichs, eds. Uncertain Years: Chinese-American Relations, 1947-1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980); Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Patterns in the Dust; June M. Grasso, Truman’s Two-China Policy, 1948-1950 (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1987); Bervin Alexander, The Strange Connection: U.S. Intervention in China, 1944-1972 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1992); Odd Arne Westad, Cold War and Revolution: Soviet- American Revelry and the Origins of the Chinese Civil War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries; Michael H. Hunt, The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

prospect and opened up two decades of Am erica’s containment policy toward China. 5 The two

Taiwan Strait crises, th e rad icalization of Communist China’ s dom estic politics and foreign policies, the emerging Sino-Soviet split, and Am erica’s involvement in Vietnam became other conventional reference points for U.S.-China relations. 6 Although now we know that the

Democratic adm inistrations of the 1960s cons idered changing Am erica’s rigid containm ent policy toward China,7 the improvement of the two nations' relations had to wait until 1972, when

President Richard Nixon shocked the world by vi siting Beijing. W hile the 1972 visit naturally became a major landmark event in Sino-American relations, another turning point occurred when in 1979 the two nations established official diplomatic relations. From then on, the semi-strategic partnership forged after 1972 between America and China lasted until the 1989 Tiananmen event or the end of the Cold War in 1991.8

5 Zhang Shuguang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American Confrontation, 1949-1958 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992). Qiang Zhai, The Dragon, the Lion and the Eagle: Chines-British-American Relations, 1949-1958 (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1994). Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, Xue Litai, Uncertain partners : Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993). William W. Stueck Jr., The Road to Confrontation: American Policy toward China and Korea, 1947-1950 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981). The Korean War: An International History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). Rethinking the Korean War: a new diplomatic and strategic history (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002). Rosemary Foot, The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict, 1950-1953 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985). Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994). Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and The Cold War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992). Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981). 6 Robert D. Accinelli, Crisis and Commitment: United States Policy toward Taiwan, 1950-1955 (Chapel Hill : University of North Carolina Press, 1996). Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States, 1945-1992 (New York : Twayne Publishers, 1994). John W. Carver, The Sino-American Alliance: Nationalist China and American Cold War Strategy in Asia (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997). Victor S. Kaufman, Confronting Communism: U.S. and British Policies toward China (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2001); Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: North Carolina University Press, 2001); Yafeng Xia, Negotiating With The Enemy: U.S.-China Talks During The Cold War, 1949-1972 (Bloomington : Indiana University Press, 2006). 7 See, for example, Noam Kochavi, A Conflict Perpetuated; Michael Lumbers, Piercing the Bamboo Curtain: Tentative Bridge- Building to China during the Johnson Years (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2008). 8 For works dealing with post-1972 U.S.-China relations, see Gerald Segal, eds., The China Factor (London: Groom Helm, 1982); John W. Garver, China’s Decision for Rapprochement with the United States, 1968-1971 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982); Robert G. Sutter, The China Quandary: Domestic Determinants of U.S. China Policy, 1972-1982 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983); Randall E. Stross, Bulls in the China Shop and Other Sino-American Business Encounters (New York: Pantheon Books, 1991); Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China since 1972 (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1992); Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Regan (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, Revised Edition, 1994); Robert S. Ross, Negotiating Cooperation: The United States and China, 1969-1989 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995); Richard Madsen, China and the American Dream: A Moral Inquiry (Berkley: University of California Press, 1995); Gordon C.K. Cheung, Market Liberalism: American Foreign Policy toward China (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 1998); Patrick Tyler, A Great Wall: Six Presidents and China (New York: The Century foundation and Public Affairs, 1999); James Mann, About Face: A History of America's Curious

This conventional chronological fram ework, therefore, might render the year of 1966 an

arbitrary starting point. Yet the request for a new China policy from various sectors of American

society gained its first mom entum in that y ear. In 1966, Congress conducted a series of public hearings on U.S.-China relations, th e first of th eir kind in th e past two d ecades. Leading China scholars and prominent figures of the infor med public joined Congress in urging a new strategy of “containment without isolation” toward China. One concrete result of these efforts was the establishment of the National C ommittee on U.S.-China Relations, an influential non- government organization that qu ickly became the nexus point for further changes in America’s

China policy. Moreover, in 1966 the Johnson adm inistration also began to reevaluate its policy toward China, although the officials did so in a much quieter manner.

Thus when Nixon became president, a momentum for improved Sino-American relations already existed. In addition, the “long 1970s” could be regarded as a transitional period from the last phrase of the Vietnam W ar, when the Cold War consensus began to dissolve and Soviet-

American détente gained popularity, to the “tougher” Reagan administration, when the Cold War conflict was revived and détente ended. During th is period America not only experienced m ajor strategic adjustm ents, but also went through va rious social and cultur al changes. Meanwhile,

China experienced its own social, ideological, and strategic adjustments. The deteriorating Sino-

Soviet relations that resulted in border clashes in 1969 eventually led Mao Zedong and his colleagues to recons ider China’s n ational se curity arr angement. At the sam e time, the f ever generated by the Cultural Revolution greatly w eakened China, and Mao was force d to adopt a more realistic view about China’s domestic and international problems. While the United States

Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999); Jean A. Garrison, Making China Policy: From Nixon to G. W. Bush (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005); S. Mahmud Ali, US-China Cold War Collaboration, 1971-1989 (New York: Routledge, 2005); William C. Kirby, Robert S. Ross, and Gong Li eds., Normalization of U.S.-China Relations: An International History (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005); Margaret MacMillan, Nixon and Mao: The Week That Changed The World (New York: Random House, 2007); Yukinori Komine, Secrecy in U.S. Foreign Policy: Nixon, Kissinger and the Rapprochement with China (Aldershot, England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2008).

was troubled by the W atergate scandal and its afte rmath, China was also absorbed by the power

struggle after the death of Mao a nd other senior leaders. W hen Jimmy Carter took charge of the

White House as an “outsider” and tried to ini tiate a new agenda of Am erican foreign policy,

Deng Xiaoping, the renowned pragmatic Chinese leader, also secured his own power position in

China. Although the new Carter administration did not necessitate a quick and smooth change of

Sino-American relations, the new Chinese government did begin to have a new look on Am erica when Deng declared the ambitious “Reform and Open” policy in 1978. In sum, the “long 1970s” can provide a broader histori cal fra mework for understanding U. S.-China relations than a traditional Cold War chronology allows.

U.S.-China Relations in the “Long 1970s:” A Survey of the Field

The advantages of focusing on the discourse on China’s modernization can be f urther revealed by a closer survey of the current scholarship. As I mentioned briefly at the beginning of this introduction, the strategic dim ensions of U.S.-China relations still dom inate the scholarship.

Among various strategic issues the Sino-Soviet -American triangular diplom acy has to date attracted a major portion of academic attention. For scholars obsesse d with U.S.-China strategic relations, the driving force behi nd those relations was Soviet-A merican détente. Scholars now agree that the Nixon adm inistration formally inaugurated détente—the relaxation of tensions— with the Soviet Union by achieving the SALT I arm s limita tion trea ty large ly on Am erican terms, disengaging America from the Vietnam quagmire, articulating the so-called “Nixon

Doctrine,” and, of course, cr eating a new stage of Sino-Am erican relations. As shrewd politicians and strategists, Nixon and Henry Kissinger, facilitated by the former’s credibility as a stubborn an ti-Communist and the latter’s sens itivity to g eopolitics as well as the dom estic political circum stance of the early 1970s, finally took advantage of the Sino-Soviet split to

establish a system of “triangular diplom acy” in which the United States could play off Moscow

against Beijing. Under this system , although Wash ington sought to im prove relations both with

Moscow and Beijing, the priority was on the impr ovement of Soviet-Am erican relations. Thus

Nixon and Kissinger prim arily used the Sino-A merican rapprochement as leverage to push the

Soviet Union toward détente. W hen Soviet-Am erican détente en tered into stalem ate in the

middle 1970s, Sino-Am erican rapprochement was al so stalled. When the Carte r administration

tried to revive Soviet-Am erican relations, ho wever, its playing of the “China card” did

considerable harm to détente. Besides other factor s that had contributed to the failure of détente,

such as the shutting down of the SALT negotiati ons, the hum an rights issues within the Soviet

Union, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Carter administration blocked the

continuation of détente by choosing to establish for mal diplomatic relations with China despite

Kissinger’s caution that such a m ove m ust never appear to be directed at the Soviet Union. 9

Based on this narrativ e, some scholars further argued that China, while recognizing Am erica’s rationale for U.S.-China rapprochement was to put pressure on th e Soviets, nevertheless decided to play alon g because C hina felt m ore threatened by the Soviet Union than by Am erica. Yet as the anti-Soviet rationale faded awa y, Beijing and W ashington had less and less reason for a stable bilateral relationship. W ithout a binding strategy to anc hor and buffer the relationship, previously suppressed bilateral issues popped up and Sino-American relations from 1972 onward were doomed to be fragile, eventually shattered by the 1989 Tiananmen event.10

To be fair, scholars focusing on the strategic dimensions of U.S.-China relations did not

completely ignore economic, cultural, and other non-strategic issues between the two. Yet to date

there is no published system atic examination of those issues and m ost scholars quickly dism iss

9 For a classic narrative of the “triangular diplomacy” and the “China Card,” see Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, pp. 227- 325, 653-683,758-786. 10 For example, see Harding, A Fragile Relationship; Ross, Negotiating Cooperation.

the non-strategic issues as non-essential an d m erely window dressing to the strategic

relationship. They point out, for example, that the value of Sino-American trade during the 1970s

was low and insignificant, and further expansion of trade relations awaited the norm alization of

Sino-American relations.11 Some further argued that Am ericans who did try to do business with

the Chinese in the 1970s quickly discovered th at there were m any insurm ountable barriers.

Therefore, there m ust h ave been so mething els e tha t su stained Am erican com panies’ inte rest

about China. One thing identifi ed by scholars was the exotic feelings toward China that

somehow made th is co untry un ique in the imag inations o f the Am erican peop le. The naked

economic stakes in Chin a had been s ugar-coated with the traditional American moral standards,

since trad e had been regarded as a vehicle of bringing Christia nity an d civiliz ation to China.

Therefore, the reopening of Sino-Am erican relations in the 1970s quickly revived this tradition, and the American people became more and more sympathetic toward China as long as the latter seemed to be on a road toward a lib eral and democratic society.12 But above all, m yths were to

be shattered, a byproduct of th e declining anti-Soviet rationa le. As one scholar argued, “In

general, [Am erican] econom ic relations with th e PRC have rem ained largely of secondary

importance in the evolution of U.S. China policy. The initial decisions by Mao Zedong and Zhou

Enlai in Peking and Nixon and Kissinger in Washi ngton to im prove bilateral relations were

motivated by strategic and political—not econom ic—factors, even though both sides used the

lever of trade policy to demonstrate their good intentions to one another.”13

The current scholarship, therefore, tends to stress Sino-American strategic relations while

downplaying the significance of non-strategic relations. A lthough the Cold W ar triangular

11 For example, see Alexander Eckstein, “China’s Trade Policy and Sino-American Relations”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 54, October, 1975. 12 See, for example, Stross, Bulls in the China Shop; Madsen, China and the American Dream. 13 Sutter, The China Quandar, p. 127.

diplomacy was crucial in shaping U.S.-China relations in the “long 1970s,” a m onofocal

emphasis on the strategic dim ensions can not yield a full analysis of U.S.-China relations. Nor can the obs ession with stra tegic iss ues be f ully ju stified by histor ical r ecords. In g eneral, th e current scholarship leaves several unanswered questions.

First, the new strategic relationship betw een America and China forged by the Ni xon-

Kissinger team has been largely explained by scholars from the perspective of realpolitik, that is,

Beijing and W ashington decided to cooperate with each other because the changed power

balance of the international system in the 1970s made the Soviet Union a potential hegem on.

While this realist approach has considerable explanatory power, it can not explain the tim ing of

the strategic realignment between America and Ch ina. Changes in the inte rnational system do

not automatically produce changes in a nation’s polic ies. In other words, while the realist model

can explain why there was a need for im proved U.S.-China relations, it can not explain how those new relations were constructed. Cold-blooded geo-strategic calculations could not change a two-decade stagnant U.S.-China relationsh ip overnight. Especially with in America, the Nixon-

Kissinger change of policy toward China wa s actually based upon a dom estic consensus reestablished in the late Johnson years, which articulated a broad understanding that China could not be isolated and ignored anym ore and would be better dealt with directly. Within China, to a lesser deg ree, Chinese leaders also had to rees tablish perceptions of A merica, as their hostile propaganda against America at home in the past two decades demanded serious justifications for the new relationship with China’s Number One enemy. In sum, the realist model is not sufficient to explain how Sino-American relations changed during the “long 1970s.”

Furthermore, the realist approach can not ev en sufficiently explai n why the triangular

diplomacy was forged. In fact, the Nixon-Kissinge r team faced several options of coping with

the changed global pow er balance in the 1970s, two of which were actually em ployed by the

previous adm inistrations. First, A merica could have stayed outside th e Sino-Sov iet sp lit and

allowed the two Communist powers to weak en each o ther further. In fact, th is “d o-nothing”

policy was em ployed by the Kennedy and Johnson adm inistrations.14 Second, Am erica could have sided with the Soviet Unio n against China. After all, China emerged from the Sino-Soviet split as a power m ore aggressive and m ore radical toward the W est, and the Sov iet Union even proposed joint actions w ith America to contain China. 15 Thus triangular diplom acy was neither the only nor the necessary option for the Nixon ad ministration. Why America eventually decided to choose this approach therefore dem ands more analysis. In addition, a careful reading of historical records reveals that in practi ce, Am ericans on the ground—both officials and non- officials—usually drifted away fr om the stated goals of triangular diplomacy, that is, instead of trying to improve Soviet-American relations through playing the “China Card,” Americans often sided with the Chinese against the Soviets. While some observers blamed the fierce maotai or the roasted Beijing Duck16 for Americans’ gullibility, a deeper and broader reading of the historical

context is obviously required.

In sum , in order to fully understand Sino-Am erican relations in the “long 1970s,” we

must carefully exam ine the two cou ntries’ ever-s hifting perceptions and conceptualizations of

each other, as those perception s and conceptu alizations profoundly shaped the m aking of Sino-

American relations in th e “long 1970s.” To do so will require a research perimeter broader than

the traditional geo-strategic approach.

14 For example, see Lumbers, Piercing the Bamboo Curtain. 15 For example, see Gordon H. Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972 (Stanford, CA.: Stanford University Press, 1990). 16 Americans—officials and non-officials—who visited China in the 1970s were usually treated to lavish banquets with maotai, the most famous wine in China and the roasted Beijing Duck, which usually included several delicate courses. Almost all American visitors recalled the two items later favorably, although the wine was too strong for some of them. As a result, these two items became the symbol of the Chinese hospitality, which also suggested that Americans were so overwhelmed by the Chinese hospitality that they eventually conceded at the negotiation table more than they should.

The Discourse on Modernization and U.S-China Relations in the “Long 1970s”

One way t o reconstruct the perceptions and conceptualizations tha t constitute d th e

broader historical context of U. S.-China relations is to examine the tw o sides’ deliberations on

modernization: theories and m odels of m odernization in genera l and China’s m odernization in particular. The discourse on m odernization is no t imposed onto this hist ory by scholars; rather, the histo rical acto rs th emselves employed that discourse to m ake sense of Sino-Am erican relations in the “long 19 70s.” In addition, the discourse of modernization was used in a holistic way, that is, it was adopted as a com prehensive fram ework to understand and conceptualize

U.S.-China relations.

It is well kn own that th eories of modernization dominated the soc ial sciences in Am erica from the late 1950s through the 1960s. Assum ing a di chotomy of “the traditional society” and

“the modern society,” modernization theory gr adually became a m ainstream paradigm through which the econom ic, political, and social changes in the postcolonial world were exam ined. In general, m odernization theory proposed a uni versal pattern of “developm ent,” defined by

“progressive” changes in industr ialized economy, political institu tions, and social and cultu ral structures. Moreover, m any scholars now agree that m odernization theory shap ed the bas ic worldview of m any Am erican foreign policy-m akers during the 1960s. W alt W . Rostow, for example, becam e a stan dard sym bol of a m odernization th eorist who could m aneuver freely between the academic world and o fficialdom in Washington. By outlining a un iversal path of progressive change based on the historical ex perience of the “W est,” m odernization theo ry helped American leaders to conceptualize the problems of decolonization and industrialization in

the so -called “Third W orld” and g uided Am erican e conomic aid, tr ade policy, a nd m ilitary intervention in postcolonial regions.17

Modernization theory, furthermore, redefined the ongoing C old War as a total com petition between th e Am erican (West) m odel of m odernization and the Soviet (Communist) m odel of modernization.18 To be sure, the Cold W ar was r egarded from the very beginning as necessary for defending the “Am erican way of life.” Yet mode rnization theory h elped to cry stallize the

America-led struggle against Co mmunism and replaced the som etimes e motional rhetoric of fighting the “Red m enace” with a dispass ionate scientific fram ework. M odernization theo rists acknowledged that “bo th the United States a nd the USSR represen t[ed] politically m odern societies”19 and regarded the two countr ies as two different models of achieving “over-all social integration in m odern industrial societies.” 20 However, to explain how the Soviet Union could become “ modern,” they insisted that Communism was a false form of modernization, m erely replacing backwardness and colonial form s of o ppression with newer “t otalitarian” ones. Th e only true path of m odernization, therefore, was one that evolved along the liberal model of the

West without violent revolutions. As Rostow ar gued, Communism was “a kind of disease which can befall a trans itional society if it f ails to or ganize effectively those elem ents within it which

17 For the development of modernization theory and its impact on American foreign policy, see Robert Packenham, Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Science (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973); Jeffery Alexander, Fin de Siècle Social Theory: Relativism, Reduction, and the Problem of Reason (New York: Verso, 1995); Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Gilbert Rist, The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith (New York: Zed Books, 1997); Yasushi Yamanouchi eds., Total War and “Modernization” (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998); Michael Latham, Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and “Nation Building” in he Kennedy Era (Durham, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Christian Appy eds., Cold War Constructions: The Political Culture of United States Imperialism, 1945-1966 (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2000); Kimber Charles Pearce, Rostow, Kennedy, and the Rhetoric of Foreign Aid (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2001); Nils Gilman, Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 2003); David Engerman eds., Staging Growth: Modernization, Development, and the Global Cold War ( Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003); Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Time (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Melvyn P. Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War (New York: Hill & Wang, 2007). For the most recent examples, see the forum on modernization in Diplomatic History (Vol. 33, No. 3), June 2009. 18 See, for example, Westad The Global Cold War; Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind. 19 Robert Ward, “Political Modernization and Political Culture in Japan,” World Politics (Vol. 15, No. 4), 1963. p. 750. 20 Francis Sutton, “Social Theory and Comparative Politics,” in Harry Eckstein eds., Comparative Politics: A Reader (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), p. 79.

are prepared to get on with the job of modernization.”21 Thus Arthur Schlesinger Jr. claimed that the crusade against Communism “represented a very American effort to persuade the developing countries to base their revolutions on Locke rather than on Marx.”22

The rise of modernization theory inevitably influenced Americans’ thinking about China. In

fact, for many Americans, modernization theory was a more sophisticated and scientific version

of the old “special relationship” between Am erica and Chin a that cou ld be traced back to the

Open Door notes. That “special relationship” once dictated that America had a special mission in

China: to he lp China m ove from a tr aditional society into a modern one. 23 As the often-quoted

American Senator Kenn eth Wherry said in 1940, “[America] will lift Shanghai up and up, ever

up, until it is just like Kansas City.” 24 After 1949, however, Mao Zedong m ade it clear that the

Chinese Communists would not turn Shanghai into Kansas City. Thus the Chinese Communist

revolution cam e as a shock for m any Am ericans because it was hard for them to accept that

China would abandon the American road toward modernization. Inevitably, during the 1950s and

1960s, Am erica’s “China-watchers” paid close attentio n to the social, ec onomic, and cultural

developments in mainland China. Once modernization theory was created, it was easily adopted

by the “China-watchers” as a scientific way of understanding contem porary China. During the

1970s, when m any Americans visited China, they frequently referred to concepts, ideas, and

theories of modernization to m ake sense what they experienced in China. The expanded contact

between the two countries only m ade the disc ourse on m odernization a m ore popular way of

comprehending China.

21 Walter W. Rostow, The Stage of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1960), p. 164. 22 Arthur Schlesinger Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 589. 23 See, for example, Michael Hunt, The Making of A Special Relationship: The United States and China to 1914 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983); Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987). 24 Quoted in Eric F. Goldman, The Crucial Decade: America, 1945-1955 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1956), pp.116-117.

Meanwhile, Chinese le aders a lso used the d iscourse on m odernization to justif y the

Communist revolution, as they argued that their revoluti on was the only way for China to

become a strong, independent, and modern nation. Of course, the Chinese were not deliberating

modernization theories created in America. In fact, they rejected those theories as excuses for

American “imperialism ” in the Thir d W orld. By doing so, Beijing ref used to adm it that the

United States and the West had a m onopoly ove r m odernity. In other words, the Chinese

Communist revolution was another, and better, way for China to modernize itself. “The bas ic

goal of our great people’s revolutio n is to free China’s power of production from the shackles of

imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism so that our econom y can rapidly develop by

socialist planning,” the Chinese prem ier Zhou En lai declared in 1954. “If we can not establish

modern industry, m odern agriculture, m odern transportation, and m odern national defense, then

the goal of our revolution can not be achieved.” 25 During the 1950s, China’s m odernization

effort largely relied on the Soviet model as the sector of heavy industry became the priority in

the national econom ic system . In the 1960s, Chin a’s growing isolation, caused by Am erica’s

containment policy, the withdrawal of Soviet advisors and econom ic aid, and the Cultural

Revolution, forced Beijing to articu late so -called “self-reliance” as a p rimary way to achieve

modernization. During the 1970s, however, im proved Sino-American relations helped Beijing to

drift away from “self-relian ce.” In 1975, Chi na officially es tablished the so-called “Four

Modernizations”—the building of m odern i ndustry, m odern agriculture, m odern national

defense, and m odern science and technology—a s a basic national policy. Meanwhile, Chinese

delegates who visited Am erica reported back their observations of Am erican society by

25 CCP Central Institute of Historical Documents: Zhou Enlai Xuanji (Selected Work of Zhou Enlai) Vol. 2 (Beijing: Renmin, 1984), pp 132-145.

frequently referring to how China’s modernization could learn from the American experience. In sum, the discourse on modernization was also central in China’s perception of the United States.

Therefore, by exa mining the discourse on m odernization, we can achieve a better understanding of America and China’s perceptions of each other in the “long 1 970s.” The interactions between the Chinese vision of m odernity and the American model of modernization generated the historical context within whic h the two countries’ strategic relations were embedded.

Chapters and Organization

This dissertation is divided into eight chapters. Chapter one discusses how, between 1966 and 1968, Am erica’s prominent China scholars and key m embers of Congress—a group I call the “a cademic-legislative com plex”—articulated a new im age of China as a “frustrated modernizer.” Arguing against the Right-wing, which insisted that China rem ained an expansionist Communist power and Am erica’s containment policy m ust not be changed, and against the Left-wing, which declared that China’s politico-econom ic m odel constituted a genuine alternative model of modernization in its own right, this “academic-legislative complex” established the mainstream perception that the Beijing regime was more nationalist-oriented and less Communist-oriented and the basic goal of Be ijing was to modernize China. The mainstream perception asserted that since China’s effort of modernization was failing and Chinese leaders would be forced to reevaluate their dom estic and foreign polices, W ashington should adopt a new strategy of “containm ent without isolation” to induce a m ore accommodating stance from

Beijing.

Chapter two examines the Johnson administration’s own reevaluation of its China policy.

Between 1966 and 1968, the Johnson adm inistration, partially under pressures from the public

and partially out of its own initiatives, also s tarted to ree xamine Americ a’s Chin a policy. In

doing so, American officials established a perception of China similar with the one articulated by

the “a cademic-legislative com plex.” As a re sult, po licy m akers cam e to believe tha t th e

“containment without isolation” strategy, including a relaxed trade em bargo against China and

expanded cultural contact, would moderate C hina’s behavior and lure China away from i ts

revolutionary fever. Although the late Johnson year s failed to produce any significant change in

U.S.-China relations because Beijing refused to reciprocate the small steps taken by Washington

to improve bilateral relations, the perception of China as a “frust rated modernizer” reshaped the

bureaucratic environm ent within A merica and laid the foundation for later breakthroughs in

U.S.-China relations under Nixon.

Chapter three discusses China’s own ideas about its m odernization by focusing on the development of the Cultural Revolution in th e late 1960s. The Cultural Revolution, among other things, was a radical expression of the Chinese perceptions of modernity. It cast the Chinese

Communist revolution as an effort to build a ne w society from the devastation of a collap sing civilization. By introducing the so -called “self-reliance” model of development, Chinese leaders sharply con trasted Chin a’s own road toward m odernization with the r oad repres ented by the

United States. In doing so, the relationship between Am erica and China was not m erely perceived as a Cold War power struggle, but also as a contest between two m odels of modernization. The perception of America through the lens of modernization discourse produced two trends. On the one hand, the strong sense of China’s unique m odernity prevented an early shift in Beijing’s policy toward W ashington. On the other hand, Chinese l eaders were confident that a rapprochement between the two countries would happen s ooner or later because Am erica,

whose model of development relied heavily on foreign markets, could not afford isolating China

forever.

Chapter four analyzes the developm ent of the U.S.-China rapprochement between 1969

and 1972. The Nixon administration and the Beijing regime decided to improve relations in light

of the perceived common threat from the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, leaders in both countries did not want to pursue the Sino-Am erican rapprochem ent as a shor t-term strategic expedient.

Instead, they tried to develop relations in va rious areas and relied heavily on non-strategic measures to achieve their strategic goals. Fo r Nixon and Kissinger, the im age of China as a

"frustrated modernizer" highlight ed China's weakness, which convi nced them that China would genuinely pursue a detente with Am erican out of need. For Chinese leaders, their vision of modernity also shaped their approach toward America. They regarded the Nixon administration's decision to im prove relations as proof that America recognized the validity of China's developmental m odel. As a result, Chinese le aders be lieved that th ey could ne gotiate with

America from a position of strength.

Chapter five exam ines the develop ment of Sino-Am erican relations between 1972 and

1976. After Nixon' s visit, Am erica and China, in Kissinger's words, becam e "tacit allies." The two sides discovered that they sh ared similar strategic views, and they were willin g to cou nter the Soviet Union together. However, from late 1973 forward, various factors, including

American domestic politics and the "Second Cultura l Revolution" in C hina, contributed to the stalemate of the U.S.-China rapp rochement. But the two sides m anaged to preserve the alliance, as Am erican and Chinese leaders continued to identify comm on interests. The discourse on

China's modernization once again played a crucial role during this tim e period, as it provided a way for both sides to measure the other's intentions.

Chapter six discusses cu ltural, educational, and other "non-official" exchanges betw een

America and China. During the 1970s, m any Americans visited China as private citizens and a smaller number of “unofficial” Chinese delegates visited America. Those ordinary citizens were engaged in various activities: cultural exchanges, educational activities, scientific exchanges, and so forth. To comprehend what they experienced during these bilateral exchanges, the participants overwhelmingly referred to concepts, ideas, and theories of modernization. A dom inating theme of the first stage of U.S.-China bilateral ex change was th e conf lict between two m odels of modernization, as both side tried to convince the other that theirs articulated a better future for

China. From 1975 for ward, however, the Chinese became less-obsessed with their own m odel, and they started to reevaluate their model. In sum, by examining those exchanges, we can further understand how the discourse of modernization sh aped America and China’s perception of each other.

Chapter seven exam ines the developm ent of bilateral trade duri ng the 1970s. Once the

U.S.-China rapprochement was initiated, direct bilateral trade was quickly resum ed and China again was perceived as a natu ral m arket for Am erica. Howe ver, during the early 1970s,

American b usiness peo ple discov ered that the Chinese m odel of m odernization created m any barriers for the rapid growth of trade. As a result, Am ericans tried to push their Chinese counterparts toward doing business in the "Am erican way." From 1975 forward, the Chinese did start to adhere to Am erican rules and practices regarding trade. Furthermore, changes in China' s domestic politics made Chinese leaders attach more importance to trade with America. In short, the discourse on China' s m odernization shaped the bas ic trajectory of Sino-Am erican trade during the 1970s.

Chapter eig ht, an epilo gue, exam ines how normalization of U.S.-China relations was

finally achieved under the Carter adm inistration. W hile strategic concer ns continued to be

important during the Carter years to sustain the Sino-Am erican alliance, both sides decided that

normalization would be the next st ep if such an alliance was to con tinue. Meanwhile, the death

of Mao Zedong, the end of the Cultural Revoluti on, and the rise of Deng Xiaoping pushed China

into a new historical era. Econom ic development again became China's top concern, and the old

Maoist m odel of m odernization was abandoned. T hus, Carter and his a dvisors believed that normalization would create an ev en better opportunity for Am erica to influence China' s development.

In sum , during the “long 1970s” the discourse on China’s m odernization and its implications for U.S.-China relations constituted the basic historical context of the developm ent of Sino-American relations. By analyzing that discourse, we can ach ieve a full and better understanding of the dynam ics of U. S.-China relations and identify the origins of issues that

became prominent for both sides in the post-Cold War world.

Chapter 1

Modernization and the New Public Debate over China, 1966-1968

The rapprochement between the People’s Republic of China and the United States in the

1970s dramatically reshaped the international system . The developm ent of a sem i-strategic partnership between the two Cold War adversaries not only contributed to the rise and fall of détente and the so-called Sino-Soviet-Am erican triangular diplomacy associated with it, but also profoundly affected the internal relationships of each Cold War camp. President Richard Nixon

claimed a lion’s share o f the credit regard ing the “opening” of China when he boasted that his

historic vis it to Beijing was “a week that cha nged the world.” Inde ed, the era of U.S.-China détente has been clo sely associated with Ni xon and his chief foreig n policy advisor Henry

Kissinger. Yet moves toward easing tensions between Washington and Beijing were evident well before Nixon’s presidency. While scholars are debating who—Nixon or Kissinger—deserved the credit as the original architect of America’s new China policy, they te nd to downplay the les s fruitful yet im portant changes of China polic y under Lynden B. Johns on. Only recently have scholars started to pay more attention to the Johnson ad ministration’s China policy. 1 Indeed, as

James Thomson, an experienced China hand who served under both Kennedy and Johnson, later

recalled: “[i]t is no denigration of the Nixon-Ki ssinger achievement to suggest that the China

policy initiatives of 1969-72 did no t in fact spring full-blow n from the Republican presidency.

1 See, for example, Evelyn Goh, Constructing the U.S. Rapprochement with China, 1961-1974 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Michael Lumbers, Piercing the Bamboo Curtain: Tentative Bridge-Building to China during the Johnson Years (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2008).

Some seeds were sown in the prev ious decade, and their o rigins and f ate may wel l deserve a

chapter, or at least an extended footnote, in the history of the Sino-American relationship.”2

The year 1966, as discussed in the introduction, is a legitim ate starting point for exam ining

America’s new initiatives towa rd China. Although the infor med public and som e m idlevel officials in the State Departm ent under the Kenn edy administration speculated about changes in

America’s China policy, Kennedy him self preferred to delay any decisi on until his second term.

Combined Cold War and domestic political pressures deterred the Kennedy adm inistration from changing its China policy. 3 During 1966, however, a revival of pub lic and official interest in

searching for a new China policy occurred, larg ely induced by the escalation of the war in

Vietnam. Between 1966 and 1968, a new public debate over China emerged, involving, on a

much larger scale, the foreign policy public, key m embers of Congress, and eventually officials

in the Johnson administration. This new public debate, first initiated by what I call an “academic-

legislative complex”—legislators and China/East Asia scho lars who worked toge ther to in itiate

the new public debate, helped to reconstruct Am erica’s perception of Ch ina through a discourse

on m odernization. As a result, the dom inating im age of China in America was transform ed.

China was now regarded m ore as a “fru strated m odernizer” than as a “revolu tionary

menace.”4Moreover, this image of “frustrated modernizer” was forged while its supporters were

fighting against alternative per ceptions of China both from the conservatives and, to a m uch

lesser degree, from t he New Left. Once the “frustrated m odernizer” im age was firm ly established, however, it started to pave the way for breakthroughs in actual policies.

2 James C. Thomson, Jr, “On the Making of U.S. China Policy, 1961-9: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics,” China Quarterly 50 (1972), p 220. 3 For a detailed discussion, see Noam Kochavi, A Conflict Perpetuated: China Policy During the Kennedy Years (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002). 4 These two perceptions will be discussed in detail later.

Setting the Stage: The Historical Context and the New Public Debate over China

In March, 1966, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a series of public hearings on

U.S.-China relations, presided over by its chairman Senator J. William Fulbright. Those hearings relied heavily on China scholars as witnesses. The Fulbright hearings both constituted a highlight of the new public debate over Chin a and sustained that debate in the f ollowing years. To f ully understand why an intensified se arch for a new China policy was revived in 1966 and why that search was first initiated and carried on by an “academic-legislative complex,” we need to briefly examine the historical circum stances that led to Fulbright’s hearings . Generally speaking, the legacy of America’s containment policy toward China, the escalation of the war in Vietnam, and the rise of a Congress more aggressive toward the executive branch regarding foreign policy constituted the historical background for America’s China policy in 1966.

That the K ennedy adm inistration reexamined but even tually failed to change A merica’s policy towa rd China sa id a lot abo ut the his torical context of U.S.-Chi na relations during the early 1960s. In fact, som e factor s that deterred Kennedy from changing course also plagued

America’s China policy during the early Johns on years. One important factor was the

“revolutionary m enace” im age forged during th e Trum an-Eisenhower years of China as an irrational, aggressive Comm unist power. As long as this im age dom inated Am erica’s imagination, it would be hard to suggest any change in Am erica’s containment policy toward

China. Although som e m embers of the Kennedy t eam—the so-called revisionists—tried t o readjust this perception, the 1962 Sino-Indian bord er war reinforced the vindication of the view of China as a pred atory power. According to No am Kochavi, th e revisi onist camp virtually disappeared after the S ino-Indian war and did not resu rface until th e second half of 1963. 5

President Kennedy himself eventually held firm to the “view of the Chinese Communist regime

5 Kochavi, A Conflict Perpetuated, pp. 153-154.

as repugnant, unitarily bent on expansion, a nd posing an unacceptable challenge to the

international order and the norm s that sustain it.” 6 Under the early Johnson adm inistration, the

Vietnam War further destroyed hopes of i mproved U.S.-China relations. As I argued elsewhere, the Johnson administration escalated the war in Vietnam to protect Am erica’s global credibility

as the leader and defender of the non-communist world in the face of the threat posed by China’s

“wars of national liberation” strategy in Vietnam. Under this situation, Beijing emerged from the

Sino-Soviet split as the more aggressive and belligerent Communist regime.7

Besides the perception of China as a menace, domestic politics was another factor af fecting

America’s China policy, perhaps a m ore important one to shrewd Democrats like Kennedy and

Johnson. Given the narrow m argin of Kennedy’s election, the difficulties he experienced with

Congress, and the still vivid m emory of De mocratic trials a nd troubles during the “who lost

China” debate, it was understandab le that he was hesitant about changes in Am erica’s China

policy. The so-called “China Lobby”—a group of ha rd-line anti-Communists, supplicants of the

Chinese Nationalist regime, and former missionaries centered on the Time/Life empire of Henry

Luce—was especially active in b locking any c hanges in W ashington’s policy to ward Beijing.8

Roger Hilsman, Kenne dy’s Assistant Secretary of State for Far East Affairs, rec alled how “in

Congress, the stalwarts of the China Lobby…mustered thei r forces and quietly let it be known that they intended to destroy Kennedy’s foreign aid program with crippling am endments unless the administration abandoned its plan to recognize Mongolia.” 9 Kennedy’s Under-S ecretary of

State Chester Bowles also recalled that the China Lobby’s “effective lobbying m ade any

6 Ibid., p. 244. 7 Mao Lin, “China and the Escalation of the Vietnam War: The First Years of the Johnson administration,” Journal of Cold War Studies, Spring, 2009. 8 See Ross Y. Koen The China Lobby in American Politics (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1960); Joseph Keeley, The China Lobby Man: The Story of Alfred Kohlberg (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1969); Stanley D. Bachrack, The Committee of One Million: “China Lobby” Politics, 1953-1971 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976). 9 Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation (Garden City,, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1967), p. 307. The recognition of Mongolia was part of the Kennedy team’s new initiatives toward China.

reappraisal of our relationships with Chiang Kai-shek and the mainland a matter so controversial

that only a f ew foolhardy souls within the gove rnment, like myself, dared even to discuss it.” 10

For Johnson, the fear of a backlash from the Right-wing groups and its potential impact on his

Great Society not only pushed him to stand firm in Vietnam, but also m ade unlikely changes in

America’s China policy. During a conversation w ith Senator Richard Ru ssell after France decided to recognize C hina, for exam ple, Russ ell pointed out that “the tim e’s going to come when we’re going to have to recognize Red China.” “Politica lly, right now, it’s poison, of course.” Johnson answered coolly. 11 Johnson’s political instinct was accurate. A May 1964

Gallup Poll showed that 56 percent of the public now agreed that Beijing was the chief danger to

lasting world peace, up 9 percent from the previous March.12

Moreover, officials within the State Department had other reasons to resist a quick change

of course. The ghost of the Korean War, the linge ring impact of the Red Scare, and the m emory

of those “C hina hands” victim ized by McCart hyism all m ade those who wanted a radical

departure from the current con tainment policy toward Beijing think twice before any bold

action.13 Moreover, for some American officials the image of China as a “revolutionary menace” came with a personal to uch. For ex ample, Dean Ru sk, who served as Secretary of State und er

Kennedy and Johnson, recalled that when China was “lost” to Communism in 1949, he felt like a

“jilted lover”, asking him self, how could the C hinese people have turned against us? As one of the first American officials who was informed of the breakout of the Korean War, Rusk admitted

10 Chester Bowles, Promises to Keep (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 393. 11 Conversation between LBJ and Richard Russell, 15 January 1964, in Michael R. Beschloss, Taking Charge: the Johnson White House Tapes, 1963-1964 (New York: Simon & Schuster,1997), p. 162. 12 “Special Report on American Opinion”, Washington Post, 30 November 1964. 13 For the impact of Red Scare on the making of America’s China policy, see E. J. Kahn, Jr., The China Hands: America’s Foreign Service officers and What Befell Them (New York: Viking, 1975); Paul Gordon Lauren, eds., The China Hands’ Legacy: Ethics and Diplomacy (Boulder : Westview Press, 1987).

that the war “hardened American attitudes toward Peking; it certainly hardened mine.”14 The fact that most people und erestimated the prospect of Chinese in tervention in the Korean War only reinforced Rusk’s belief that Beijing was a da ngerous enemy, a belief that was magnified by the breakout of the Sino-Indian border clash right in the middle of the Cuba missile crisis. After this brief Sino-India W ar that “totally caught us off guard,” Rusk, as well as other senior Am erican officials, further regarded China as “a real menace in Asia.”15

In sum, these com bined pressures ev entually blocked the developm ent of a new course of

America’s China policy during the early 1960s. The cau tious attitude of American officials also

helped to explain why between 1966 and 1968 th e new public debate over China was conducted

loudly among the inform ed public while the Jo hnson administration maintained a low pitched

stance on this issue. Nonetheless, during 1966, several new developm ents converged to

overcome the obstacles toward a new public debate over China.

Among those new developments, the war in Vietnam served as a powerful propeller behind

changing public opinion toward a reexam ination of America’s China policy. Since the latter half

of 1965 American public’s concerns about fighti ng a war with China in Vietnam continued to

grow. The release of Lin Biao’s “L ong Live the Victory of the People’s W ar” in Septem ber,

196516 was perceived by the press as showing that “a clear elem ent of irrationality, of craziness,

of paranoia, exists in C ommunist China’s v iew of the world .”17 In Vietn am, such an irration al

China might just start a war with Am erica. “Reluctantly and apprehensively,” observed the New

York Times, “Comm unist China and the United States are dr ifting toward a m ilitary

14 Dean Rusk, As I Saw It (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990), 158, 284. 15 Dean Rusk Oral History, January 1986, Rusk on China, Transcript wwwww, Dean Rusk Oral History Collection, Richard B. Russell Library, the University of Georgia Library, Athens, GA. 16 Marshall Lin Biao was then a top ranking Chinese leader. His speech on September 3, 1965, “Long Live the Victory of the People’s War” was regarded as a comprehensive statement of China’s strategies of revolution. For the full text, see Lin Biao, Long Live the Victory of People’s War! (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1965). 17 Stewart Alsop, “The Mind of Mao,” 15 January 1966, Saturday Evening Post.

confrontation over Vietnam .”18 The highlighted danger of war with China suddenly awakened

the American public to the deadlocked U.S.-China relations. As a result, the Washington Post

declared, “for the first tim e since the McCarth y-Dulles era m ore than a decade ag o, a Great

Debate on China is beginning to appear across the country.”19

Besides provoking a call from the American public for reexamining U.S. China policy, the

escalation of the Vietnam W ar also produced a nother important change: an aroused Congress

aggressively seeking to reset the agenda of America’s foreign policy.20 From January 28 through

February 18, 1966, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held public hearings on the war in

Vietnam. While these hearings were regarded as “the m ost searching public review of U.S.

wartime policy,” 21 it quickly became clear that “certa in China experts in our Governm ent

[believe] th at the Chin ese lead ers expect to b e at war with the United States w ithin a y ear and…some of our officials also expect war w ith China.” 22 In fact, Senator J William Fulbright, chairman of the Foreign Relations Comm ittee, t ogether with other key m embers of Congress, were eager to aim directly at the “root probl em” of the war—U.S.-China relations. Fulbright concluded that the key to peac e in Vietnam wa s Comm unist Chin a. B eijing’s radical foreign policy, he argued, was partially caused by Am erica’s containment policy, for China feared th e prospect of being isolated by both superpowers in the wake of the Sino-Soviet split. The only way to deal with China was to reex amine America’s China policy and move toward a “general

18 30 January 1966, New York Times (hereafter NYT). 19 “China is On Our Tongues,” 27 February 1966, Washington Post (hereafter WP). 20 For the changed relations between Congress and the White House regarding foreign policy in the wake of Vietnam, see Richard A. Melanson, Reconstructing Consensus: American Foreign Policy since the Vietnam War (New York : St. Martin’s Press, 1991); Robert David Johnson, Congress and the Cold War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Joseph A. Fry, Debating Vietnam: Fulbright, Stennis, and Their Senate Hearings (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing, 2006). There is also a growing body of literature on individual members of Congress who were key figures of this legislative-executive realignment. For example, see Randall Bennett Woods, Fulbright: A Biography (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Don Oberdorfer, Senator Mansfield (Washington & London: Smithsonian Books, 2003). For a survey of Congress and U.S.- China relations, see Guangqiu Xu, Congress and the U.S.-China Relationship, 1949-1979 (Akron, OH.: University of Akron Press, 2007). 21 Newsweek, 21 February 1966. 22 NYT, 7 March 1966.

accommodation” with Beijing. Realizing the influence of the old im age of China as a

“revolutionary menace,” Fulbright decided that th e old myths must be shattered first and the

American people m ust be reeducated about C hina. Therefore, Fulbright started to prepare for public hearings on U.S.-China relations.23

Another developm ent further contributed to the call for reexam ining Am erica’s China

policy. Instead of firing scattered shots, sim ilar-minded China scholars and other prom inent

figures of the informed public started to organize their efforts. The most important result was the

establishment of the National Comm ittee on U .S.-China Relations in June, 1966. Although the

National Committee was founded t hree months after the Fulbright hearings, its pre-foundation

activities greatly facilitated the rise of public awareness of the need to search for a new course of

U.S.-China relations.

In December, 1964, Cecil Thom as, a Quaker wh o was deeply involved in the estab lishment

of the National Comm ittee on U.S.-China Rela tions, organized a one-day conferen ce en titled

“An Institute on China Today” at th e University of California at Berkeley. This conf erence was

jointly organized by the W orld Af fairs Council, the departm ent of political sc ience of UC

Berkeley, and the Am erican Friends Service Committee (AFSC). Robert Scalapino, an Asia

specialist at UC Berkeley, became the co-organizer of the conference. Among the speakers were

prominent public figures such as Henry Luce, m embers of C ongress, and State Departm ent

officials. The conference attracted more than a thousand people and w as reported in the press.

Yet the fact that such a conference was called was clearly m ore im portant than the spec ific

exchanges among the participants. 24 Encouraged by the success of the Berkeley co nference,

23 Congressional Record (hereafter CR), Senate, 1 March 1966, pp. 4377-85. 24 Robert Mang, “Origins of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations,” in Archives of the National Committee on United States China Relations, New York City (hereafter NCUSCR). The National Committee has not processed its archives yet, so there are no box or folder numbers.

Thomas and Scalapino organized another conference in Washington D.C. In order to prepare for this conference, Thom as spent three m onths traveling—meeting with scholars, discussing with potential sponsors, and so on. The result was a conference with a heavy political tone. As Robert

Mang recorded, the National Conference on United St ates and China, w hich was h eld in April,

1965, “was truly a political dem onstration of the first order.” 25 The second conference was even

more widely reported in the press, and as a re sult, m ore supporters for changes in Am erica’s

China policy started to speak out.

In sum, by 1966 shifting public opinion, the ne w activism of Congress, and the collective

efforts f rom the inf ormed public h elped to set the stage f or a new public deba te over China.

Gradually, the call for changes in Am erica’s China policy becam e stronger and stronger. Of course, the old image of China proved slow to die, as discussed later in this chapter. But the new

trends made the open discussion of a new China policy less of a political liability.

Setting the Tone: The Discourse on China’s Modernization

As mentioned above, the AFSC wa s deeply invo lved in the pre-foundation activities of the

National Committee on U.S.-China Relations. This was not surprising. In fact, AFSC wa s

perhaps the earliest non-governm ent organization that pushed for a new China policy. In

September, 1964, it organized a working party to study China polic y and the result was

published early in 1965. Communist China em erged from this study as an eager modernizer, a

country that “within a generation…has absorbed much of modern technology and has gained the

status of a great power.” From 1900 onward “efforts…to reform, to modernize, and to make their

country adequate to the Western challenge largely failed” and “the Chinese Communists felt that

they had to make up for these failures.” Since China and the modern West will “meet in a single

channel,” the study thus recomm ended ne w Am erican policies toward China, including

25 Mang, “Origins of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations,” NCUSCR.

recognizing the Beijing governm ent, admitting China into the United N ations, and estab lishing

normal economic relations—measures that would be regarded as radical even in 1966.26

The language used in the AFSC r eport suggest ed the general pattern later adopted by members of the “academ ic-legislative complex” when they argued for a new China policy. In order to push for a change in America’s conta inment polic y toward China, they f irst tr ied to reshape its image. As a result, m odernization theory became the primary vehicle through which the Beijing regim e was cast in a new light as a “frustrated m odernizer.” Indeed, during the

1960s, America’s China scholars collectively reorie nted the field toward m odernization theory.

According to James Peck, then a young China scholar who published a survey article of the field in 1969, Am erica’s “China-watchers” tended to place Chinese histo ry in the so-called “im pact- response” model, that is, modern Chinese history came to be narrated mainly as a response to the challenge of m odernity posed by the W est. Peck, who was a ssociated with th e lef t-wing organization, the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars (CCAS), was highl y critical of this model. He argued that m ost China schola rs em braced the W estern liberal m odel of modernization and regarded the Chinese Communist revolution as a doomed effort to modernize

China. These scholars, Peck said, regarded America as “the non-imp erial guardian of the independence of Asian nations against Communi sm, the benevolent, well-intentioned supporter of their efforts to moderniz e their societies through non- violent m ethods.” To Peck, modernization theory served to justify Am erica’s involvem ent in the Far East, which became more and more prob lematic in th e shadow of the Vietnam War. 27 Peck’s article triggered an

exchange with John F. Fairbank, the dean of America’s China scholars. F airbank rejected Peck’s

idea th at th e China sch olars we re apologis ts f or Am erica’s Cold W ar policy in Asia, but h e

26 AFSC, A New China Policy: Some Quaker Proposals (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), pp. 2-5. 27 James Peck, “ The Roots of Rhetoric: The Professional Ideology of America’s China Watchers,” Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars (Vol. 2, No. 1), 1969, pp. 59-72.

concurred that m odernization theory had becom e a popular trend in the fi eld. P eck’s article,

however, did not do full justice to the whole field. 28

The Fairbank-Peck exchange revealed severa l interesting things about Am erica’s China studies in the 1960s. First, it showed that mode rnization theory indeed penetrated the field

deeply. 29 The Chinese Communist revolution was now examined in the context of China’s effort

to modernize itself. Peck’s article, with its po litical charges filtered, still showed that a Western

style modernization was regarded by m ainstream scholars as a “norm al” future for China. Since

America regarded itself as the chief sponsor of such a m odernization, by im plication America

must try to goad China back ont o the right track. Second, Fairba nk’s response showed that the

image of China as a “fru strated modernizer”—the perception forged by m ainstream scholarship

including F airbank himself—was partially a response to the ch allenge from the Left. Peck

suggested that modernization theory was an effort to discredit Communism, thus allowing “little

tolerance f or revo lutionary so lutions to As ia’s problems.” Fairbank rejected Peck’s idea th at

“modernization” and “revolutionary Marxism ” were genuine alternatives for China since

“Marxism-Leninism as a theory is only one of the m any theories of modernization, in the broad sense of explaining what has happened in m odern times.”30 Therefore, Fairbank’s countercharge

could be regarded as an effort to refute the idealization of the Chinese revolution by the Left.

Lastly, the Fairbank-Peck exchange revealed the close relationship be tween scholarship and

current policy. Both—and especially Fairbank—deni ed that scholarship should influence policy.

But in fact, between 1966 and 1968 China scholars did try to in fluence America’s China policy.

As one research project spons ored by the Ford Foundation conc luded, during the 1960s “there

28 Fairbank-Peck Exchange, Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars (Vol. 2, No. 3), 1970, pp. 51-71. 29 This was further confirmed by later and less politically-loaded surveys. For example, see Paul A. Cohen, Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984). 30 Fairbank-Peck Exchange.

are form er governm ent officers who are prepar ed to testify that the views of Chi na

scholars…have had a major role in shifting offi cial views toward a new way of looking at the

China problem. Many of the so-called establishm ent scholars have urged changes in Am erican

policy.” 31 One m ajor way for those scholars to in fluence official po licy was through close

cooperation with the U.S. Congress. In fact, the “frustrated m odernizer” im age proposed by

mainstream China scholars cam e to be shared by key m embers of Congress. Fulbright’s own

thinking about China, for example, was clearly influenced by those scholars.

A strong supporter of Johnson’s Vietnam polic y before the war’s escalation, by 1966

Fulbright had become one of the most prominent critics of the war. In The Arrogance of Power,

published in 1966, Fulbright argued that Am erica m ust reexam ine the lim it of its power and

reconstruct its f oreign polic ies. To him , th e war in Vietnam was a result of Am erica’s

misunderstanding of China: “Ch ina is not judged to be agg ressive because of her actions; sh e is

presumed to be aggressive because she is communist.” 32 Revolutions, Fulbright argued, shared a

common thing: “their principal purpose in any case is to modernize rather than democratize and

they a re more in terested in m aterial resu lts than in ab stract ideas.” 33 Thus the Chines e

Communist Revolution was the latest stage of the Chinese effort to m odernize their country and

to become equal with the West. The best way to deal with the threat po sed by Chin a’s radical

ideology, Fulbright argued, was not to pursue a rigid containm ent policy but to bring China into

the in ternational community. If America could show friendship to C hina, it could m oderate

Chinese behavior and could make the Chinese rea lize that a healthy relationship with the W est

was the best way to develop their society. T hus Fulbright proposed building bridges between

31 John Lindbeck, Understanding China: An Assessment of American Scholarly Resources, A Report to the Ford Foundation (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), p. 93. 32 J. William Fulbright, The Arrogance of Power (New York: Vintage Books, 1966), p. 152, Italics original. 33 Ibid., p. 69

America and China by ending the e mbargo on tr ade in non-strategic item s, recognizing the

Beijing governm ent de facto, and ending Am erican opposition to the seating of Communist

China in the United Nations. 34

Fulbright’s new thinking on China, in a sense, was a brief summary of the new “fr ustrated

modernizer” i mage constructed by m ainstream Ch ina scholars. Fulbright cam e to support this

“frustrated modernizer” im age partially b ecause of his own thinking in the past 35, and partially

because of the influence from mainstream China scho lars. In The Arrogance of Power, he acknowledged that his thought on China was infl uenced by the China experts w ho testified during the March, 1966 congressional hearings on China. According to this new image of China, the major characteristic of the Beijing governme nt was no longer that of a Moscow-dom inated, radical Communist regim e determined to spre ad revolutions beyond its borders. Comm unist it still was, but the Chinese regime now became a “frustrated modernizer;” that is, the Communist revolution as a m odel of m odernization was failing, due to political setbacks aboard and economic disasters at hom e.36 As a result, the Chinese leadership wou ld be forced to rem old their basic polices, a trend that might be encouraged by a new American policy.

Beginning from 1966, t herefore, a new public st age was prepared for more enlightened

discussions on America’s China policy and a discourse on modernization became the dominating

framework for those discussions. In the next se ction, I will exam ine the March 1966 Fulbright

hearings in detail, for it was during those hear ings that th e “frustrated modernizer” image was

fully articulated.

34 Ibid, pp. 139-173. 35 See, for example, J. William Fulbright, Bridges East and West (Dallas: Southern Methodist University, 1965). 36 Fulbright quoted, among other Chinese setbacks, the 1965 Indonesian coup which seriously damaged the Chinese-backed Indonesian Communist Party, and the Great Leap Forward which caused wide-spread famines in China, as examples of the loss of credibility of the Chinese politico-economic model.

The Rise of “Frustrated Modernizer” Image

Between March 8 and March 30, 1966, Fulbright arranged public hearings to organize the initiatives for a new China policy. “The immediate purpose of these hearings,” Fulbright said, “is educational.” He believed that Am erica m ust reexam ine the China problem . 37 Altogeth er

fourteen witnesses testified before F ulbright’s committee, all of whom were regarded as either

prominent China scholars or experts on Am erica’s China policy. 38 The f irst to te stify was A.

Doak Barnett, a Chin a schola r f rom Colum bia University. He proposed a new strategy of

“containment but not isolation,” which would in clude ending the trade embargo on non-strategic

goods and encouraging Am erican businessm en to explore trade contacts . Barnett argued that such unilateral Am erican moves would not be inte rpreted as a sign al of weakness; rather, these moves would help to relax the tensions between America and China and would be welcom ed by

American allies. 39 Barnett’s proposal quickly got front-page coverage in the New York Times.40

As it turned out, this new strategy of “containmen t without isolation” em erged as t he majority opinion of the witnesses. Moreover, this strategy was based primarily on the new image of China as a “frustrated m odernizer.” Thus a careful exam ination of the testimonies will reveal the main components of that image.

Yet one thing needs to be m ade clear f irst: the major target of the “f rustrated modernizer” image was t he old im age of China as a “revolu tionary menace.” In oth er words, th e hard-line

China polic y f rom the Right wa s a m ajor obstacle for a new China policy. In general, the

“revolutionary menace” image, which was largel y forged during the Tru man-Eisenhower years,

37 Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings: U.S. Policy with Respect to Mainland China (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 1. 38 The witnesses were: A. Doak Barnett (Columbia University), Alexander Eckstein (University of Michigan), John Fairbank (Harvard University), Samuel Griffith (retired General), Morton Halperin (Harvard University), Harold Hinton (George Washington University), Walter Judd (former member of the House), John Lindbeck (Harvard University), Hans Morgenthau (University of Chicago), David Rowe (Yale University), Benjamin Schwartz (Harvard University), Robert Scalapino (UC Berkley), George Taylor (University of Washington), and Donald Zagoria (Columbia University). 39 Testimony of Barnett, Hearings: U.S. Policy with Respect to Mainland China, pp. 3-96. 40 “China Experts Urges U.S. to Ease Policy,” 9 March 1966, NYT.

had four m ajor propositions. First, the Comm unist regime in Chin a was not Chinese; rather, i t

was “subservient to Moscow a nd international communism ” and therefore did not m eet the

criterion of “sovereign indepe ndence.” Second, this “alien m inority rule” would soon collapse

since Chinese people w ould not tolerate their c ountry to be “occupied.” Third, the Nationalist

government on Taiwan was the only legitimate and sovereign govern ment of all C hina. Finally,

America must maintain a total economic embargo against Beijing, refuse to extend recognition to

Beijing, and oppose the admission of Beijing into the United Nations. Communist expansionism

must be contained and the comm itment to Ta iwan m ust be honored. 41 This “revo lutionary

menace” image remained essentially the sam e for the Right well into th e 1960s, with one m ore

addition: the Sino-Soviet split was a hoax created by the internat ional Communist conspiracy to

fool the West.42

To attack this “revo lutionary m enace,” th erefore, the “frustrated m odernizer” im age first

argued that the Communist government in China was indeed Chinese and it was unlikely that the

Beijing regime would collapse soon . Barnett arg ued that the succe ssful seizure of power by the

Communists was because of the support of Chin ese peasants and th e anti-im perialist (bo th

Western and Japanese im perialism) stance of the Comm unist party. F ar from being an alien minority rule, the Communist regime was a radical way for China to modernize itself. Thus “the regime is not a passing phenom enon” and Am erica “should clearly and explicitly acknowledge the Chinese Communist regim e as the de f acto Governm ent of the Chi na m ainland.” 43 J ohn

Fairbank also regarded the Beijing regim e as Chinese since “in actual fact, as the ruler of China,

he [Mao Zedong] is m uch more the successor o f the emperors who ruled at Peking until 1912. ”

41 See Walter P. McConaughy, “China in the Shadow of Communism,” 11 January 1954, Department of State Bulletin (hereafter DSB) 30 No. 759 pp. 39-42; John Dulles, “Statement on China,” 1 April 1957, DSB 36 No. 927,pp. 531-532; John Dulles, “Our Policies Toward Communism in China,” 15 July 1957, DSB 37 No. 942, pp. 91-95. 42 See Forrest David and Robert A. Hunter, The Red China Lobby (New York: Fleet Publishing Corporation, 1963). 43 Testimony of Barnett, Hearings: U.S. Policy with Respect to Mainland China, pp. 4-8.

Communism, he argued, “offers a devil-theory to explain…how ‘capita list im perialism’

combined with ‘feudal reaction’ to attach, betray, and exploit the Chinese people and distort their otherwise normal development toward ‘capitalism.’” In sum, the promise to save China from this situation co nstituted the power f oundation of the Chinese Communist regim e. Thus Am erica must now deal with th is fact seriously.44 For others, the Sino-Soviet split was another piece of

evidence that showed Beijing was m ore nati onalistic than Am ericans had thought. John

Lindbeck, for example, argued that the Sino-Soviet split was deep enough to prove that national

interests grounded in Chinese history weighted more than the need to prom ote international

communism in the minds of Chinese leaders.45

Clearly, the proposition that th e Beijing regime was Chinese by nature w as sustained on the ground that the Chinese communists were trying to m odernize China—a dream pursued by the

Chinese ev er sin ce the “opening” o f China. The next step, therefore, wa s to evaluate Chin a’s modernization under C ommunist rule. Here, the w itnesses unanim ously ag reed that Beijing’s modernization effort so far was a disaster. Ba rnett pointed out that since 1958 the Great Leap

Forward and comm une program had “produced an econo mic crisis o f major proportions in

China.”46 Alexander Eckstein concluded that “agricultural stagnation and a sudden radicalization

of econom ic policy based on a highly unrealistic assessm ent of the econom y’s capabilities

produced an acute cris is” in Chin a and Chinese l eaders would be forced to reevaluate China’s developmental strategies, such as r elocating d omestic res ources or reopening tr ade with th e

West.47

44 Testimony of John Fairbank, ibid., pp. 98-106. 45 Testimony of John Lindbeck, ibid., pp. 202-204. 46 Testimony of Barnett, ibid., pp. 8-10. 47 Testimony of Alexander Eckstein, ibid., pp 329-333.

Moreover, China’s failure in econ omic deve lopment put seriou s lim its on its f oreign

policies. Here the attention wa s turned to China’s support fo r “W ars of National Liberation”

abroad and m any witnesses dism issed the possib ility that China would carry out its belligerent rhetoric in reality. Lindbeck, for exam ple, regarded the recently is sued speech by L in Biao on

“Wars of National Liberation” as an effort to shore up B eijing’s ideology at hom e. “It was

addressed p rimarily to a dom estic audience, ” Lindbeck argued; “it was a statem ent of

reassurance to the Chinese people that the great vision of the transformation of the world had not

come to an end.” 48 General Sam uel Griffith pointed out tha t the Chinese military faced m any

problems and suffered from low m orale, and it was unlike ly for the Chinese lead ers to launch

military adventures aboard. 49 Barnett noticed that Lin Biao actually emphasized “self-reliance”

in his speech, that is, revolutions in the Third World should not rely on concrete external support,

a position that belied China’s agg ressive rhetoric. 50 Hans Morgenthau further dism issed “the

image of Chinese arm ies being poised at their borders and ready to ma rch across Asia as the

hordes of Genghis Khan did” sin ce “traditionally, especially inso far as China’s neighbors to the

west and so uthwest are concerned, China has n ot primarily relied upon military expansion [to

achieve its goals].” 51 In sum , a dire ct m ilitary threat from China was unlike ly, sin ce Chines e

leaders were able to rationally measure the limit of their power.

If Chinese leaders were cap able of rational behavior, then their fr ustrated effort of modernization would have im portant implications for Am erican policy. As Barne tt pointed out, the Chinese leadersh ip was divided between th e “technical bureaucrats or m anagers” and “th e specialists in power, politics, a nd ideology.” Thus Am erica’s policy must try to achieve a shift

48 Testimony of Lindbeck, ibid., pp. 196-197. 49 Testimony of Samuel Griffith, ibid., pp. 272-281. 50 Testimony of Barnett, ibid., P. 26. 51 Testimony of Hans Morgenthau, ibid., pp. 551-557.

within Chin a “in f avor of tec hnical bureaucrats prom oting rela tively m oderate policies.” The

new strategy of “containm ent without isolatio n” could help to achieve this goal by pushing

Beijing to realize that accomm odation with the W est was the b est s trategy for China’s

modernization.52 Fairbank concluded that a new American policy “must lead the rulers of China gradually into different channels of experience until by degrees they reshape their picture of th e world and their p lace in it.…In p ractice this means getting Peking into a multitude of activitie s abroad.” 53

In sum , the strategy of “containm ent without isolation” w as based on the new im age of

China as a “frustrated modernizer.” For those who supported this strategy, it entailed three broad

approaches: unofficial cultural c ontact with China, a relax ed trade embargo against China, and

some methods of dealin g with the issues of re cognition and U.N. adm ission without sacrificing

Taiwan. But no one proposed a straightforward recognition of Beijing and no one argued for a

hastened adm ission of Beijing into the U.N. Instead, the supporte rs of the new s trategy still

maintained that China must be contained, only the em phasis now w as on “no isolation.”

Obviously, the “revolutionary menace” image was still influential.

Yet Fulbright’s hearings quickly built a m omentum for a relaxed Am erican policy toward

China. On July 5, 1966, Senator Henry M. J ackson, a key figure on the Arm ed Services

Committee, for exam ple, openly called for the de velopment of “a livab le relationship with th e

Chinese Communists.” He urged th e public to realize the lim itation of Am erican power, since

“the United States cann ot take r esponsibility f or every uprising or revolt.” China had already

“met with one reverse after another in their efforts to mold revolutions in their way in Asia and

Africa and Latin Am erica” and “Russia and Ch ina have com e clos e to a breaking point.”

52 Testimony of Barnett, ibid., p. 8. 53 Testimony of Fairbank, ibid., pp.106-107.

Therefore, Jackson argued that Am erica should develop a new relationship with China both to

end the war in Vietnam and to build a better in ternational system. 54 A staff paper drafted for

Jackson, moreover, specifically argued that “the United States should end its total trade embargo with Communist China and perm it the im portation and exportation of non-strategic m aterials.”

By doing so, the paper continued, America could have “another channel for opening up contacts” with China, “remove a disadvantage in which United States businessmen and farmers have been placed with respect to com petitors abroad”—s ince both West European countries and Japan already developed trade relations with China—acquire “some leverage in negotiating other items with China,” and regain access to “a num ber of m aterials not available in ample supply elsewhere.” 55

Senator Mike Mansfield, the powerful m ajority leader in the Senate, was another con sistent

supporter of a new China policy. Mansfield, who served in China in the 1920s as an Am erican

marine and who taught Chinese history before being elected to Congress, had a long-tim e interest in the Middle Kingdom . Although he appeared to support Johnson’s Vietnam policy in public, in private he conferred consistently with Johnson trying to end the war. Yet on June 16,

1966, Mansfield openly urged the Johnson administ ration to negotiate and end of the war by

talking to Beijing. “T he two questions—peace in Vietn am and peace with China—are very

closely interrelated, if not, inde ed, inseparable,” he claimed. He then reminded his audience that

another war with China was a real possibility, a nd America would need to “restore some bridges

to China” and “lower our rigi d self-im posed travel and othe r b arriers which th e Executive

Branch is now doing.” “What is needed m ost,” he continued, “is an initiative for a direct contact

54 Henry M. Jackson, “The End of the Beginning,” Speech given on 5 July 1966, in Henry M. Jackson Papers (hereinafter HMJ), Accession Number (hereafter AN) 3560-6, Box 17, Special Collections, University of Washington Libraries, Seattle, WA. 55 Position Paper, 25 March 1966, Box 66, AN 3560-6, HMJ.

between the Peking governm ent and our own governm ent.”56Mansfield soon followed his own

words. In March, 1967, he asked Johnson’s perm ission to go to China. “I frankly doubt that the

Chinese would adm it you,” Johnson quickly responded, but “if you are able to carry out your

plans, your trip could prove m ost useful.” 57 On April 29, Mansfield delivered a m emo personally to Johnson, arguing that “t he road to settlem ent with Ha noi now very likely runs by

way of Peking rather than Moscow .” He con tinued to push the idea of visiting China and told

Johnson that he hoped to talk directly with the Chinese Prem ier Zhou Enlai. 58 According to

Mansfield, Johnson read the m emo i mmediately a nd shared his fear of a war with China in

Vietnam. 59 But the idea of a China visit went nowh ere due to the strong opposition from the

State Department.60 Probably having anticipated this outcome, Mansfield continued to push for a

change in the U.S. China policy. In a speech on March 29, 1968, Mansfield rem inded his audience of the old “China trad e” days and questioned Am erica’s trade embargo against China.

“Of all the great m aritime nations, the United States alone clings to a tota l trade embargo with

China. Moreover, we are also the only nation in the world which makes an effort to enforce what can best be described as a kind of secondary boycott of re-exported Chinese products.” He pointed out that “these policies have had little visible econom ic impact, but they have had the most serious political repercussi ons.” The trade em bargo not onl y helped perpetuate Chinese hostility but also caused friction among Am erican allies. Mansfield thus proposed a change in policy, which would not only help end the Viet nam War but also help “the potentials of

[Chinese] culture…to be realized.” After all, he concluded, “the peace of Asia and the world will

56 Mike Mansfield, “Vietnam and China,” speech given on 16 June 1966, in Mike Mansfield Archives (hereinafter MMA), Series 22, Box 79, K. Ross Toole Archives, Mike and Maureen Mansfield Library, University of Montana, Missoula, MT. 57 Memo for Walter W. Rostow, 18 March 1967, National Security Files (NSF), Name Files, Box 6, Lynden B. Johnson Library (hereafter LBJL), Austin, TX. 58 Memo from Mansfield to LBJ, “Vietnam,” 29 April 1967, Ibid. 59 Memo for Mansfield, 1 May 1967, Series 22, Box 105, MMA. 60 Memo from Rostow to LBJ, 30 April 1967, NSF, Name Files, Box 6, LBJL.

depend on China…not because China is Communi st but because China is Chin a—among the

largest countries in the wo rld and the m ost populous.” 61 “It was a damned good speech,”

Johnson’s aide Frank Valeo later recalled: “a nd very courageous considering the general

atmosphere. He didn’t get but one single negative comment on it.” 62

From 1966 onward, a group of highly articulate China scholars and m embers of Congress managed to popularize the im age of China as a “frustrated m odernizer.” Avoiding the tough issues of recognition and U.N. adm ission when possible, this “acad emic-legislative com plex” nevertheless urged various kinds of contacts with China, among which trade quickly becam e the most promising approach. Yet the o ld “revolutionary menace” image proved hard to die as th e

China Lobby would not give up without a fight.

Counterattack from the Right: A Losing Battle

On March 9, 1966, the sam e New York Times article that covered Barnett’s testimony also carried in its last three paragraphs som e re marks from Wa lter S. Robe rtson. Robertson, who served as Assistant Secretary of State for Fa r Eastern Affairs under Eisenhower, warned against any change in America’s China policy.63 In fact, his warning was quoted directly from testimony

he gave before the House Comm ittee on Foreign Affairs on March 8, the sa me day that Barnett

testified before the Fulbright’s committee.64

That Roberson was testifying before the Ho use comm ittee was pa rt of the strategy,

conceived b y Marv in L iebman, the secretary and chief organizer of The Commi ttee of One

Million65, for fighting against any change in China policy. As head of the key organization of the

61 Mike Mansfield, “China: Retrospect and Prospect,” speech given on 29 March 1968, Series 21, Box 44, MMA. 62 Interview with Frank Valeo, 9 October 1998, Box 5, Don Oberdorfer Research Materials, K. Ross Toole Archives, Mike and Maureen Mansfield Library, University of Montana, Missoula, MT. 63 “China Experts Urges U.S. to Ease Policy,” 9 March 1966, NYT. 64 House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings: United States Policy Toward Asia (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966). 65 The full title is The Committee of One Million Against the Admission of Communist China to the United Nations.

so-called anti-Comm unist, pr o-Nationalist “C hina Lobby,” 66 Liebm an had contacted the

congressional body in January 1966 after it announced it would hold hearings regarding

American p olicy towar d Asia and Comm unist China. Th e comm ittee’s cha irman, Clem ent

Zablocki, agreed to let five witnesses recommended by L iebman, including Roberson, testify

before his committee.67 Although the House hearings were quickly overshadowed by the Senate hearings, Liebman still had m ore cards to p lay, for Walter Judd and George Taylo r also were to testify before Fulbright’s committee.

Judd, the former congressman who had long been identified as a key mem ber of the China

Lobby, argued against any change in Am erica’s China policy. To Judd, the strategy of

“containment without isolation” was appeasement, which would only lead to m ore aggressions

from China. Moreover, the Chinese Communists had destroyed Chinese culture and its values

and were bent on spreading Communism around th e world. The hope that with Am erica’s help

China would develop into a great modern natio n was ruined by the Communist victory in 1949.

Indeed, the Beijing regim e was a gr eat anomaly of an otherwise “normal” path tow ard China’s

modernization. Judd also recognized that th e Chinese C ommunists were now having great

troubles, but he insisted that this only proved that Am erica’s past strategy was sound.

“Everybody desires and hopes for ‘evolution’ in Red China,” Judd claimed. “If econom ic and

other press ures from within and without ar e com pelling som e Communist governm ents to

moderate their policies…shouldn’t we keep the pressures up rather than reduce them ?”68 George

Taylor, a China scholar from University of Washington and a strong voice of the China Lobby, agreed th at “Comm unist China’s do mestic pr oblems are serious and ex acting, her m ilitary as

66 Ross Y. Koen The China Lobby in American Politics (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1960); Joseph Keeley, The China Lobby Man: The Story of Alfred Kohlberg (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1969); Stanley D. Bachrack, The Committee of One Million: “China Lobby” Politics, 1953-1971 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976). 67 Bachrack, The Committee of One Million, pp. 231-232. 68 Testimony of Walter Judd, Hearings: U.S. Policy with Respect to Mainland China, pp. 437-452.

well as economic resources are not those of a great power, her adventurous excursions in foreign

policy have been costly and discouraging,” but there was “no world co mmunity…into which we

can induce the Chinese to enter” as long as China did not first change its behavior.69

The House and Senate hearings triggered m ore negative responses from the conservative

wing. On March 31, 1966, the National Review ran a forum against those who urged changes in

America’s China policy. “The recent hearin gs…furnished a platform for m any spokesmen for the Red China Lobby, all of whom peddled the ne w line of ‘containm ent without isolation,’ the

now fashionable euphem ism for appeasem ent,” the editorial declared. It asked, “Why does the

Liberal Establishment purse an app easement policy toward Communist regimes?” The answe r

was that “liberal p atriotism” was a false one a nd ther efore “it is im portant tha t the f ormal

argument against appeas ing Communist China b e widely d isseminated.” 70 On April 3, 1966,

Senator Barry Goldwater, the Republican nom inee for president in 1964, called the Senate

hearings on China “naked and unabashed propaganda shows” and lashed out at “lunatic crowd s

of appeasers, pacifists and pro-Comm unists and just plain Communists.” Such hearings,

Goldwater argued, would only encourage the C hinese Communists to take bold er action s in

Vietnam.71

The reactions from the Right and the historical influence of the China Lobby m ade the rise

of the “frustrated m odernizer” perception far from easy and sm ooth. “The China debate…is a

long way fr om a full and free-flowing discussion,” the Washington Post reported. “Much that

comes out [from the hearings] is phrased in careful terms, and some people are still keeping their

thoughts to themselves—the House committee couldn’t get some witnesses it wanted to hear.”72

69 Testimony of George Taylor, ibid., pp. 452-459. 70 “Four Against the Red China Lobby,” 31 March 1966, National Review, pp. 514-528. 71 “Goldwater Rips Inquiry On China,” 3 April 1966, NYT. 72 “China Is on Our Tongues,” 27 February 1966, Washington Post (hereafter WP).

The New York Times observed that “unfort unately, the new China hands, rem embering the fate

of the old China hands in the State Depart ment, are still cautious about speaking out.” 73 Indeed, the “Chin a Lobby” intensified its effort and in October 19 66 m obilized m ore than a hund red prominent Americans in a campaign to defeat China’s admission into the United Nations.74

But the China Lobby was fighting a losing battle. From 1966 onward, it was unable to block new discussions on China, as it had during the Kennedy years. Nor was it able to stage dramatic public campaigns, as it had when the term “Red China Lobby” was coined in 1963. 75 In general,

there were three reasons why th e China Lobby was losing its infl uence: shifting public opinion,

the changed role of Congress in in itiating new Ch ina policies, and the defection of some of it s

own members.

The testim onies of Judd and Taylor constitu ted only a m inority voice during the Senate

hearings and those hearings quickly built up a momentum for a vivid public discu ssion about

China. On March 10, the day after the Senate hearings started, the New York Times carried a

front-page report that P resident Johnson had ordere d to relax travel rest rictions to Communist

China if scholars and jo urnalists could get entry visas to travel th ere.76 A few days later, Vice

President Hubert Hum phrey attracted the whol e nation’s attention w hen he publicly urged

America to adopt the “containment without isolation” strategy toward China and argued that this

strategy would be the best way to moderate China’s radical behavior. 77 On March 21, 198

scholars and experts in Asian affairs signed a docum ent urging America “to drop its opposition

73 “Washington: The New China Experts,” 16 February 1966, NYT. 74 “114 Liberals Urge UN to Bar Peking,” 31 October 1966, NYT. 75 When Marvin Liebman learned in 1960 that Macmillan was going to publish Ross Y. Koen’s The China Lobby in American Politics, he managed to force Macmillan to withdraw the book from circulation. The book was finally published in 1974. Meanwhile, Liebman organized a counterattack by promoting the term “Red China Lobby.” In 1963, The Red China Lobby was finally published. See Forrest David and Robert A. Hunter, The Red China Lobby. For the battle between Liebman and Macmillan, see Bachrack, The Committee of One Million, pp. 167-172. 76 “U.S. Will Permit Scholars to Visit Communist China,” 10 March 1966, NYT. 77 “Vice President Softens Stand on Red Chinese,” 14 March 1966, WP; “Humphrey Hints U.S. Is Altering Policy on China,” 14 March 1966, NYT.

to adm itting Comm unist China to the United Nations and to op en negotiations f or the

establishment of for mal diplomatic relations with Peking.” 78 On April 7, the Ripon Society, a

group of young and liberal Republicans, declared that the U.S. should “bear the shield of

containment in one hand while offering to Red China the oliv e branch of peace with the other.”

More specifically, the Ripon Society proposed changes regarding Beijing’s entry into the United

Nations, the trade em bargo against China, and the establishm ent of diplom atic relations.

“Republicans can and must f ill a leadership [gap] in the formulation of American policy toward

China” while “rejecting both the ‘right righ t’ a nd the ‘sentim ental left,’” declared the Ripon

Society.79

Responses favoring a change in policy thus bu ilt up a m omentum that overshado wed the

counterattacks from the Right. “T he heresy is being exorcised before the Senate Foreign

Relations Committee these days,” the Washington Post declared. “Ghosts of Senators can almost

be discerned hovering agitatedly over the rites. China is be ing openly discussed on Capital

Hill.”80 Kenneth T. Young concluded that “these hearings…initiated national exposure to the

‘China problem’ and started general discussion within the United States.”81 To some, the “China

Lobby” itself was now cast as the villain respons ible for Am erica’s rigid containm ent policy

toward China. One colum nist wrote that “the reason why we have becom e so isolated from

China” could be found in “the story of how a sm all group of Chinese politicians and influence peddlers called the Chin a Lobby succeeded in com pletely changing American policy in the Far

East. Before that period, the United States had been the traditional friend of China.” 82 Thus the

Christian Science Monitor insisted that now Am erica must choose between the old

78 “Experts on China Urge U.S. To Seek A Peking Accord,” 21 March 1966, NYT. 79 “Ripon Society Eases Its Stand on Red China,” 7 April 1966, WP. 80 “New Look At China,” 12 March 1966, WP. 81 Kenneth T. Young, Negotiating with the Chinese Communists: The United States Experience, 1953-1967 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), p. 281. 82 Drew Pearson, “Lobby Cited for China’s Isolation,” 17 March 1966, WP.

“revolutionary m enace” im age of China and th e new “frustrated m odernizer” im age: “The

Johnson adm inistration m ust decide soon wh ich Communist China it believes in: a

thermonuclear ogre bent on world d omination, or a weak and unsuccessful intriguer suffering a

series of humiliating diplomatic defeats.”83

Another important indicator of shifting public opinion was the publication in 1966 of A. T.

Steele’s The American People and China. 84 In 1964, the Survey Research Center at the

University of Michigan started a project to g auge American opinion on a variety of questions

regarding China and the resulting book was pub lished by the Council on Foreign Relations. The

survey sample consisted of 1,501 persons, almost all of whom were heads of households and wives of heads of households. The survey revealed that there was a great need to “educate” the

American people on China, as one-fourth of th ose queried was not even aware tha t m ainland

China was ruled by a C ommunist government. The majority of those who were aware of both

Chinese governments, however, favored dealing with both. A m ajority also s aid that America should stay in the United Nations if Beijing was admitted. To be sure, the overall result of this survey was mixed, but it revealed an American mood more desirous of contact with Beijing than during the previous decade. 85 Steele thus concluded: “The President will have little incentive to

take the initiative [in a new China policy]…unt il he is convinced that there is enough public

interest to justify it. There are overt signs of increasing interest…President Johnson, with a much

larger popular m andate and a stro nger hold on Congress, has e nough political elbow room in

which to initiate a public discussion and t horoughgoing restudy of our China policy—if he

would.”86

83 “Conflicting Views of Red China,” 7 March 1966, Christian Science Monitor (hereafter CSM). 84 A. T. Steele, The American People and China (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966). 85 For the survey, see the appendix of Steele’s book. 86 Steele, The American People and China, p. 250.

While public opinion was shifting, the China Lobby was also losing its control of Congress,

the single most im portant platform for it in th e past. By 1966, early key m embers of the “China

Lobby” such as W alter Judd, Alex ander Sm ith, and W illiam Knowland were ou t of office.

Liebman still managed to keep some key members of Congress on the steering committee of The

Committee of One Million, including Paul Do uglas, Thomas Dodd, an d William Proxmire, but

none of them actively campaigned on behalf of the “China Lobby” as the early members had.

Moreover, the “China Lobby” itself was e mbarrassed by the breach in its own ranks. On

March 20, 1966, the Republican Senator Jacob K. Javits argued that “over the long term we must

find som e way to get along with Communist China” and “in th e long run norm alization of

relations b etween the United States and China and all that this would im ply is necessary.” 87

Several m onths la ter, J avits pub licly withdr ew f rom m embership in the Comm ittee of One

Million. He declared th at “the com mittee’s inflexible position on Communist China forecloses even the hope of negotiation with Peking” and therefore he must withdraw from the comm ittee

“in the interest of m y duty as a United States Senator to reta in f reedom of action regarding

Communist China.” He sent copies of his w ithdrawal letter to 49 Senators and 284 House members.88 The withdrawal of Javits from the committee put Liebman and his colleagues on the

defensive. “Notice th at what the Senator had done is to su ggest th at the Comm ittee of One

Million would frown upon negotiating the negotia ble. Which it clearly would not do.” the

National Review complained.89

Although the case of Javits was obviously the most visible embarrassm ent to the hardliners,

some other m embers of Congress quietly disassoci ated themselves with the “China Lobby.” In

the months following Fulbright’s hearings, Congr ess continued to conduct background research

87 “Javits Asks Shift In Stand On China,” 21 March 1966, NYT. 88 “Javits Disavows Anti-Peking Lobby,” 18 December 1966, NYT. 89 “Senator Javits and the Committee of One Million,” 10 January 1967, National Review, p. 14.

on China and hold other public hearings, which helped to further establish the image of China as

a “frustrated m odernizer.” In February 1967, the House-Senate Joint Econom ic Comm ittee

released a series of studies on the econom ic development of Communist China. The studies

covered such a wide range of topics as agriculture, heavy industries, trade, financial institutions,

transportation, urban planning, education, energ y, and population growth that the conclusions

decisively supported the “frustra ted modernizer” image. Most researchers agreed that it would

take a fairly long tim e for Chin a to recover from the econom ic disasters caused by the “Great

Leap Forward.” As a result, Beijing ’s econom ic and m ilitary power would be so lim ited that

China could not challen ge America’s global leader ship in the foreseeable future. On the other

hand, with the survival of their regime at stake, Chinese lead ers had already show n concerns

about domestic economic development. Thus the top priority of China at the current stage was to

get out of the dom estic economic chaos, which required a peaceful international environment. If

America would sof ten its policy to ward China, then the lure of foreign trade wou ld moderate

Chinese foreign policy.90

In April, th e Joint Eco nomic Comm ittee held open hearings on China’s econo my with

emphasis on its connections with the world eco nomy. William Proxmire, who by then also had

resigned from the Comm ittee of One Million, se rved as chairm an. This tim e the witness es

overwhelmingly supported a change in Am erica’s China policy. Edwin Reis chauer, former U.S.

Ambassador to Japan and a renowned East Asian sc holar himself, put it bluntly: “T he best we

can realistically hope for from the Mainland Chinese is that they will in time come to realize the

actualities of the world around them and accept the inevitability of peaceful coexistence with the

rest of us o n a live -and-let-live b asis.” “Tra de with the o utside world is p robably th e m ost

90 Joint Economic Committee, An Economic Profile of Mainland China (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967), 2 vols.

promising way by which the Chin ese will co me to these realizations,” he su rmised.91 Senator

Javits concluded that “the United States should revise its policy and encourage other countries which already have extensive [econom ic] contacts with C ommunist China—principally Japan,

Indian, Pakistan and the W est European Countri es—to broaden these contacts.” China, Javits believed, was a “third-class indus trial power” but a “fir st-class political power” in the world.

Sooner or later, China would be able to back up its political power w ith economic and military, especially nuclear, pow er. “The paradox is that because China is a first rank power it will become increasingly involved with and dependen t on other nations,” Javits claim ed, “if the

United States does not stand in the way, but in fact encourages this tr end, involvem ent and dependency can be turned into m ore normal relations.…By the time China becomes a first ran k nuclear po wer in ten or fifteen years, we m ust have already su cceeded in norm alizing relations.”92

Clearly, Congress as a national political platform started to tilt toward “containment without isolation” regarding China, and this factor was more im portant than shifting public opinion in combating the hardliners. Yet Congress could only devote lim ited energy and attention to China.

As a result, supporters of a new Chi na policy star ted to build a better organized outlet for their opinions. T he National Comm ittee on U.S.-China Relations, whose pr e-foundation activities already had contributed to the rise of the “frustrated modernizer” image, thus quickly became the most inf luential organ ization in this rega rd. It help ed to institu tionalize th e “f rustrated modernizer” image and proved to be an effective vehicle for fighting the hardliners.

91 Joint Economic Committee, Hearings: Mainland China in the World Economy (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 7-8. 92 Ibid., pp. 162-165.

The Last Brick: NCUSCR and the “Frustrated Modernizer” Image

The founders of the National Comm ittee on U. S.-China Relations clearly understood the

importance of an established institute to support ers of a new China polic y. In a letter sent to

Edgar Snow, an Ame rican journalist favored by Beijing, Cecil Thom as pointed out the

importance of initiating a grass roots movement to genera te new discus sions on China. If such

new discussions did not m aterialize, Thomas said, then “we sim ply will keep on having m ore

than 350 mem bers of Congress signing these ridi culous Committee of One Millio n statements

opposing the adm ission of China to the U.N. and opposing opening up any kind of relationship

with China. We have talked to m any of the Congressmen who have signed these statem ents and

they say that until there is som e public dem onstration of real concer n about re-exam ining and

perhaps changing our relationships with China, it is political suicide for m any of them not to let

their names be used by the Committee of One Million.”93 Obviously, the need to organize a kind

of collective effort to in itiate n ew discuss ions o n China served as a po werful ratio nale of the

eventual establishment of the National Committee.

Therefore, after th e s uccessful B erkeley and W ashington conferences, the o rganizers

quickly decided to launch a nonprofit group “to prom ote wide spread public discussion and

knowledge of Communist China.” Cecil Thomas was na med its ex ecutive secretary and Robert

Scalapino b ecame its acting chairm an, while numerous China scholars jo ined its steering

committee. The National Committee thus announced its birth.94

Immediately, “spontaneous requests for assi stance on conferences and for inform ation,

resources and materials on China began pouring into” the National Comm ittee’s headquarters, first lo cated in Calif ornia and the n m oved to New York City. “The requests cam e from

93 Thomas to Snow, 28 February 1965, NCUSCR. 94 “Cecil Thomas Will Direct U.S.-China Relations Panel,” 11 June 1966, NYT

University professors and high school students, businessmen and housewives, clergym en and

government officials,” the Nati onal Committee reported. “Most of them represen ted groups of

organizations ranging from m ajor universi ties and Churches to business groups and

corporations.”95 Encouraged, the National Comm ittee soon consolidated its goals: “1) to reach

all segments of American society—from the layman, through the specialist, to the policy m aker,

and 2) to forge enduring links between appropriate national orga nizations, information outlets,

secondary and higher education al institutions, American China specialists, and those abroad.”96

Indeed, between 1966 and 1971, the National Comm ittee made “educating” the American public on China its core task. As Edwin O. Reischau er concluded during a 19 69 conference sponsored by the National Comm ittee, “the reasons for our errors and fai lures [regarding policies toward

China] have usually not been the inadequacy of expert knowledge so much as the lack of popular understanding that would have permitted a wise political use of what knowledge we did have.”97

The National Committee created two major programs to achieve its goals. One program was designed to organize conferences , sponsor publications, and other highly vi sible public campaigns to m ake Americans aware of the iss ues related to China. The other was called the

“field staf f” program under which the Natio nal Comm ittee would send its staff m embers to universities, colleges, high sc hools, and other urban-area ba sed civic groups to organize seminars, disseminate booklets, and develop new curriculum s.98 With these increased activities,

the National Committee quickly discovered that “there are certain broad questions underlying the

public discussion…Such unvoiced questions could be expressed: what is the nature and extent of

China’s interaction with other Asian countries and how has the environment of China in the

95 “Annual Report 1966,” NCUSCR. 96 “Annual Report 1967,” NCUSCR. 97 A. Doak Barnett and Edwin O. Reischauer, eds., The United States and China: the Next Decade (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), p 241. 98 Each year’s annual report would summarize these programs.

twentieth century—its cultural heritage and rev olutionary experience—influenced the vision of

the world which is be ing held by the Chines e leade rship.” 99 Obviously, the future trend of

China’s foreign policy and China’s dom estic development were two questions that Am ericans cared about the m ost. There was also no doubt that these two questions we re closely connected.

Indeed, a quick look over the program s launched by the National Comm ittee made it clea r that most of them were designed to answer these two questions.

To be sure, the National Comm ittee was not the only non-governmental organization focusing on China in those days. But it distinguished itself in several ways. First, com pared with other organ izations inte rested in China, th e National Committee enjoyed certain advantages because it was founded much earlier and it focuse d exclusively on China. Moreover, it recruited some of the best China experts in the country. Many of them later on becam e involved in other organizations and thus made it easy for the Nati onal Committee to coordinate with other groups.

Second, compared with other organizations, w hich also focused exclusively on China, such as the Comm ittee on Scholarly Communication with the People’s Republic of China (CSCPRC) founded also in 1966, the National Committee was more active in trying to influence the making of America’s China policy by public officials. In fact, noticing that m ore and more U.S. policy- makers turned to it for infor mation and advice, the National Comm ittee proudly reported that it

“built on the network of contacts m ade during th e first two years of it s existence and, through expanding and intensifying its various program s, is now widely known by Am erican policy makers and im portant elem ents of the general public; it is recognized as a significant and established organization which can provide assistance and infor mation to individuals and groups

in virtually all segments of American society on questions pertaining to U.S.-China relations.”100

99 “Annual Report 1967,” NCUSCR. 100 “Annual Report 1968-1969,” NCUSCR.

Indeed, in February 19 68, the National Com mittee succes sfully gained an audien ce with

President Johnson. Johnson, who disc ussed various China-related i ssues with the m embers from the National Committee, pointed out that he in tended to “keep our options open.” Johnson praised the efforts m ade by the N ational Comm ittee to f orge a hea lthy public discussion on

China. He asked the Committee members to “write for him a directive as though addressed to the

Secretary of State, asking him to take step s ‘A through F’—things [that] ought to be done concerning China.” Johnson also urged the National Comm ittee to recommend som eone who could serve as his special advisor on China.101

The meeting with Johnson was the peak of the National Comm ittee’s performance before

1969. But what m attered here was not whether or not Johnson walked away from this particular meeting impressed by the expert s’ opinions. The significance of this m eeting was tha t the

National Committee managed to ins titutionalize and perpetuate the momentum build up f irst in

1966 toward a new Ch ina policy. Now the Committee itself became a legitimate source that the

President could consult with. This point can be further elaborated in several ways.

First, the National Committee perceived itself as taking a neutral position, that is, it claim ed not to promote a particular proposal or a p articular set of p olicies. In doing so, the Comm ittee tried to build up a small but diverse membership, believing that this membership could represent all major sectors of American so ciety. But in fact, it took a liberal/c entrist position, that is, it actually promoted the “frustrated modernizer” image of China while fending off attacks from both the Right and the Left. For instance, Scal apino, when he testif ied before Fulbright’s committee, argued that within China “there is a growing struggle which in its essence poses the primitivism im plicit in Maoist political-m ilitary doc trines agains t the prof essionalism that is implicit in the whole modernization program” and American policies should be designed to help

101 “China Experts Meeting with the President,” 4 February 1968, Special Files, Meeting Notes Files, Box 2, LBJL.

the la tter.102 This, of course, was a typical descripti on of the “frustrated modernizer.” Robert

Mang also observed that “the fo unding staff m embers, without exception, and m ost of the original organizing group, favored a change in policy leading to ‘normalization’ of relations with the People’s Republic of China.” 103 Thus in fact, this centrist po sition, from the very beginning, dominated the National Committee.

Second, to promote changes in Am erica’s actual policies, the National Committee endorsed the “containment without isolation” approach despite its claimed neutral position. To begin with, the National Committee proposed opening trade with China as the first step to be taken. Between

1966 and 1968 it produced a series of studies on this topic. A typical example was one study composed i n 1967 for the U.S. Mission to the United Nations then dealing with the Beijing representation issue. The author of the study c onducted a wide ranging survey of trade between

China and m ajor Asian countries, including Ja pan, and Western Europ ean nations. All the countries trading with China, the study pointed out, downplayed the politic al implications of their economic exchanges with China. Only Am erica maintained a rigid trade em bargo against

China while turning a blind eye to the f act that China was expanding its trade quick ly with the

West and now Japan was becom ing China’s largest trade partner. “For too long a period of time we have concerned ourselves with attem pting to use economic controls and re strictions to retard development and growth of unfri endly count ries—without m uch success,” th e study thus proposed. “The more positive approach would seem to be that of directing economic measures in a positive direction.” 104

102 Testimony of Scalapino, Hearings: U.S. Policy with Respect to Mainland China, p. 562. 103 Mang, “Origins of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations,” NCUSCR. 104 “Possible Relationships between Economic and Political Factors in Considering United States Policy toward the China Question in the United Nations,” 18 March 1967, NCUSCR.

The ideological position of the National Comm ittee and its impact can also be illuminated

by later developments. With the early programs expanding and gaining more public recognition,

the National Comm ittee also beg an to plan for fu ture moves, especially after President Nixon

indicated that he would pursue a new course co ncerning China. The National Committee played

a crucial role in the so-called “Ping-Pong Diplomacy” by sponsoring a visit of the Chinese Table

Tennis Team in 1972. 105 The visit turned out to b e a success, and the Committee con cluded that

now it “is in a position to play a facilitating role in planning a nd coordinating future educational

and cultu ral exchanges with PRC.” 106 Thus when Sino-Am erican bilateral exchanges sprinted after Nixon’s visit of China in 1972, the Natio nal Comm ittee was well positioned to play a leading role. Between 1972 and 1979, on average it sponsored or co-spons ored four to six

American d elegations to China each year and r eceived a relatively equal num ber of Chinese delegations. Meanwhile, the National Committee actively coordinated non- official exchanges

between America and China during the 1970s. In 1973, it decided to yield the trade-related U.S.-

China exchanges to the newly established National Council for U.S.-China Trade.107 In 1975, the

National C ommittee further resolved that “f uture activities of the Comm ittee should focus primarily on educational and cultural exchanges with [the] PRC” and decided to transfer some of its domestic programs to the Asia Society.108 In 1978, anticipating the es tablishment of a formal

diplomatic relationship between America and Chin a, the Committee decided to prepare itself for

a new era of U.S.-China exchange, focusing on in-depth exchanges and the potential issues

105 “Annual Report, 1971-1972,” NCUSCR; for details, see Ruth Eckstein, “Ping Pong Diplomacy: A View From Behind the Scenes,” NCUSCR. Ruth Eckstein was Alexander Eckstein’s wife. 106 “Annual Report, 1971-1972,” NCUSCR. 107 “Annual Report, 1972-1973,” NCUSCR. The establishment of the National Council for U.S.-China Trade, later renamed U.S.- China Business Council, was encouraged by the Nixon administration and facilitated by the Commerce Department. See, Memo to Henry Kissinger, 16 August 1973, in U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1973-1976 China Vol. 18, pp. 317-318 (hereinafter as FRUS) 108 “Annual Report, 1975,” NCUSCR.

associated with incom ing Chinese students. 109 T hus the Na tional Comm ittee once again w as

well positioned to deal w ith this new age of bilateral excha nge, as it almost doubled the num ber

of Am erican delegation s to China in the 1979-1980 period . In sum , the National Comm ittee

occupied the center stage in Sino- American exchanges during the 197 0s. And as I will show in

later chapters, the “frustrated modernizer” always served as its guiding doctrine.

When Ja mes Peck criticized the “ideology of modernization” am ong m ainstream China

scholars, he quoted Fairbank, Reischauer, Barnett, and others who were cl osely associated with

the Nationa l Comm ittee. W hen the National Review criticized th e National C ommittee, it

regarded its m embers not as neutrals , but as lobbyists who were trying to recognize Beijing by

“going through the let’s-have-a-discussion about China.” 110 Perhaps these critiques would best

illuminate the role pla yed by the National Comm ittee in f irmly planting the “f rustrated

modernizer” image into the American political scene.

Conclusion

This chapter has shown how, between 1966 and 1968, a great public debate over China

reshaped Am erica’s perception of that power. The rise of an “academic-legislative com plex”

urging a fresh reexam ination of America’s Chin a policy and the declining power and influence

of the so-called “China Lobby” gr adually replaced the old im age of China as a “revolutionary menace” wi th a new im age of China as a “frust rated m odernizer.” T he establish ment of the

National Committee on U.S.-China Relations a nd other sim ilar-minded organizations further amplified and perpetuated that new i mage. As a result, the shift toward a new “containm ent without isolation” strategy gained momentum. The basic premise of this approach was the belief that China’s own modernization would eventually require a more accommodating stance towa rd

109 “Annual Report, 1977-1978,” NCUSCR. 110 June 28, 1966, National Review, p. 605.

the W est. Thus by engaging China in trade, t echnological transfer, and cultural exchange,

America would m oderate the rad ical Chines e behavior and bring China back into the international community. But the “ frustrated modernizer” im age had to confront two new challenges. First, it m ust try to reshape act ual Am erican policies. Second, it must face the challenge posed by China’s Cultural Revolution.

Chapter 2

Containment Without Isolation: The Johnson Administration's New China Policy,

1966-1968

The first sign of changes in America's China policy during the Johnson administration came rather early when, on Decem ber 13, 1963, Roger Hils man, then Assistant Secretary of State for

Far Eas tern Affairs, made a speech on China in San Francisco. Th at spe ech, with the acquiescence of Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Johnson him self, was welcom ed by m ost observers as a m uch delayed foreign policy initiative toward China, for the new Johnson administration now admitted that America could not just ignore the Beijing regime as a “passing phenomena” and called for a m ore flexible “open door” policy toward B eijing.1 However, this speech conv eyed a m ixed m essage. Hilsm an made it clear that the viability of th is in itiative depended on Chinese leaders—they m ust abandon their commit ment “to a fundamentalist form of Communism which emphasizes violent revolution even if it threatens the physical ruin of the civilized world,” h alt “their determination to sp read their s ystem everywhere,” and “admit that there are co mmon interests which cross ideolog ical lines.” Hilsman hinted at the possibility of

relaxing America's trade embargo against China, which, however, would depend on China’s own

behavior.2

Hilsman's speech was soon dubbed as a “New Op en Door” policy tow ard China. Yet the

Vietnam War quickly destroyed an y possibilities of an i mproved U.S.-China relationship. Given

1 In his oral history, Dean Rusk confirmed that he and Johnson knew of Roger Hilsman’s speech before it was released. He also confirmed that no one opposed it beforehand. See “Rusk on China: Transcript,” Dean Rusk Oral History Collection, pp. 10-11, Dean Rusk Oral History Collection, Richard B. Russell Library, The University of Georgia Library, Athens, GA. 2 Roger Hilsman’s Speech on China Policy to the Commonwealth Club, San Francisco, CA, 13 December 1963, in National Security File (NSF), Country File (CF), China, Box 237, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin, TX (LBJL).

the Johnson adm inistration's obsession with the wa r in Vietnam , therefore, m ost scholars have

argued that in term s of U.S. -China relations, nothing happened during the late 1960s. For

example, Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, a leading authority on U.S.-China relations, argued that Sino-

American relations reached a sustained deadlock during the Johnson presidency. She pointed out

that the Johnson adm inistration's lack of "ener gy and im agination," the prom inent role of the

Vietnam War, and the chaos created by the so-called "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" in

China held back any trend toward normalization.3

However, the conventional wisdom that nothing happened to U.S.-China relations under the

Johnson administration is not completely true, especially with regard to the late Johnson years. A

careful examination of the Johnson team's record after 1966 reveal s that an energetic and vivid

reevaluation of America' s China policy occurred . While the sm all and unila teral steps taken by

the Johnson adm inistration in relaxing Am erica's trade e mbargo against China and lifting the travel ban for American citizens who wanted to visit China were dwarfed by the dram atic U.S.-

China rapprochement later under the Nixon administration, those steps nevertheless derived from changes in the Johnson administration's perception of China.

This chapter will examine those changes. First, I will discuss the historical context in which the "New O pen Door" mom entum created by Hilsm an's speech reapp eared. A co mbination of domestic and internatio nal factors, I argue, led the Johnson administration toward a new China policy that would recap ture the po litical and stra tegic initiative vis-à-vis China. Second, I will examine how the new im age of China as a “fru strated modernizer,” which was made popular first by the "academ ic-legislative complex," reshaped the Johnson administration's perception of

China. Finally, I will ex amine the impact of the Chinese Cultural Revolution on the Johnson

3 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, "Threats, Opportunities, and Frustrations in East Asia," in Warren Cohen and Nancy Tucker, eds., Lyndon Johnson Confronts the World: American Foreign Policy, 1963-1968 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 99-111.

administration and discuss how the new China po licy survived the chaos in China and, indeed,

was reinforced by it.

Regaining the Political Initiative At Home: America's China Policy under Siege

On December 15, 1965, Thomas L. Hughes, Director of Intelligence and Research (INR) of

the State Department, delivered a speech entitled "The World Looks at China" at a banquet held

by the Air Force Reserve. A frequent analys t on China in the Johnson adm inistration, Hughes

presented a lengthy surv ey of the attitud es held by W estern European, Communist, and Third

World countries. "None of these gov ernments is indifferent as it looks at China," he concluded,

since the C hina prob lem was deeply intertwine d with "the East-W est division between the

Communist and non-Communist worlds," "the Nort h-South racial divisi on between the colored

and less-colored people of the world," and "t he North-South econom ic division between the

developing nations and the alre ady industrialized ones." As fo r American officials, Hughe s

claimed that the cu rrent attitude toward China w as "never speak of it; always think of it." Ye t

Hughes clearly wanted his audience to think even harder on the China problem , as he ended his

address by asking rhetorically: "What do you want? Peace of mind?"4

Hughes's speech was only one of the m any signs that indicated the complexity of the China

problem regarding America's global Cold War strategy. Indeed, after the Johnson administration

escalated th e war in Vietnam in mid-1965, A merican policy-m akers becam e m ore and m ore

frustrated by the stagnant state of U.S.-China relations. The Beijing regime strongly opposed any

peace talks over th e war, further escalated the Si no-Soviet split, insisted that America was the

Number One enem y not just of China but of all peoples in the Third Wo rld, and th reatened to upset Am erica's relations with Taiwan. At th e sa me tim e, the Johnson adm inistration faced

4 Thomas L. Hughes, "The World Looks at China," Record Group 59 (RG 59), Lot File 72D139, Policy Planning Staff, Subject and Country Files, 1965-1969, Box 302, National Archive II (NA II), College Park, MD.

increased pressures for a new China policy from domestic sectors, its Cold War allies, and in the

United Nations, where sentim ent grew to ad mit the PRC. In sum , while the Johnson

administration m aintained its rigid containm ent rhetoric toward China in public, privately

American policy-makers started to feel that its policy was becom ing outdated, that W ashington

was losing the strategic initiative in the face of m ounting pressures from all directions. As a

result, the Johnson administration started to sear ch for fresh policy options. As Edward Rice,

America's Consul General in Hong Kong and an experienced China obse rver, reported, "the

United States is confronted with new and vastly complicated challenges from Peiping which will test the wis dom, f irmness and f lexibility of ou r China policy as never before." R ice further pointed out that he and his sta ff "see no need for the U.S. to reduce future m aneuverability and would favor maintenance of the ' open door' position expressed in Assistant Secretary Hilsman's speech." By introducing m ore flexibility into America's China policy, R ice argued, Washington would "put the monkey on the backs of Chicom leaders."5

Therefore, the first source of the pressure s for a new China policy within the Johnson

administration, not surprisingly, cam e from second-ranking officials such as Rice. In fact, those

officials were the first to become frustrated by the rigid containment policy toward China. Robert

Komer, a National Security Council (NSC) staffer and later a special assistant to LBJ on national

security affairs, argued even before Rice that "most people agree that, after 15 years of sustaining

a rigid policy against Peking, the erosion of our position is forcing us to take a different tack. We

want to retreat gracefully from an increas ingly isolated position toward a stance which puts the

onus for continued friction more on Peiping and less on us." According to him, "the real question

5 Hong Kong to State, 7 July 1965, NSF, CF, China, Box 238, LBJL.

is no longer whether to disengage from the more rigid aspects of our China policy but how and when."6

Komer had in m ind small steps such as lifti ng the travel ban on Chin a, but he understood that Dean Rusk was firm ly against even thes e steps. 7 Indeed, Rusk instructed John Cabot,

American Am bassador to Poland, not to rais e the travel issue with the Chines e in the ne xt

Warsaw Talk in July, 1965. Cabot argued back that "we could secure positive advantage without jeopardizing U.S. policy of fir m r esistance to Chicom expansionism by advancing proposals suggesting various form s of cont act," but he argued fruitlessly. 8 Marshall Green, upon leaving the State Departm ent's Far East division to b ecome American Ambassador to Indonesia in late

1965, admitted that "a personal disappointment in leaving FE after almost two years has been our inability ov er that pe riod of tim e to stre ngthen and m odernize our China polic y by lif ting restrictions on travel of Am ericans to Co mmunist China and by ta king certain other measures....We were unable even to include in our last Warsaw instruction the limited suggestion of inf orming the Chin ese r epresentative that we would be authorizi ng travel of Am erican medical and public health officials to m ainland China." 9 Jam es C. Thom son, another NSC staffer, complained that the old ideas from the Kennedy years—travel to China and other cultural contacts—"foundered because 'now is not the time.'" However, he put it bluntly: "I am convinced that 'now' is never going to be the right time—and that right now is actually as good a time as we may ever find for making one or perhaps both movers."10

6 "Chirep Thoughts," Memo from Komer to McGeorge Bundy, 23 November, 1964, ibid. 7 Komer understood that Rusk was against these small gestures because the war in Vietnam was going on. While Rusk thought that a more flexible China policy would look like a defeat in the eyes of Chinese leaders, Komer argued that America's efforts in Vietnam already proved that the Johnson administration was not soft in the face of Communist aggressions. See memo, ibid. 8 Telegram, Warsaw to State, 1 July 1965, NSF, CF, China, Box 238, LBLJ. 9 Memo from Green to James Thomson and Chester Cooper, 9 July, 1965, ibid. 10 Memo from Thomson to McGeorge Bundy, 13 May, 1965, ibid.

By early 1966, the frustration over Am erica's rigid China policy among m id-ranking

officials helped to create a m ore receptive atmosphere within the Johnson adm inistration. When

Congress was preparing for public h earings on Am erica's China policy, 11 William Bundy, who

succeeded Hilsman as Assistan t Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, tried again to write some new initiatives into the instruction for conducting a new round of Warsaw Talks scheduled on December 15, 1965. He argued that Am erica would “admit Chinese journalists to the United

States without reciprocity,” allow U.S. “doctors and scientists in the fields of public health and

medicine” to travel to China, and propose to “j ointly examine [Chinese] charges of air and sea

violations of their territory and attacks on Ch inese vessels on the high seas.” Anticipating a

Chinese rebuttal, Bundy insisted that “these m oves are important to indicate to the Chinese that

we still seek to avoid a m ajor confrontation. The moves suggested will not be in terpreted as a sign of weakness since our power position in the Far East is steadily growing. But if the Chinese eventually decide to look for a way out, this approach m ay ease the way. ” 12 On December 29,

the State D epartment announced that Am erican doc tors and scientists in the fields of public health and medicine would be allowed to travel to countries under travel restrictions for purposes directly related to their professional responsibilities.13 When the Fulbright hearings took place in

March 1966, Bundy followed them closely, reporting back to Rusk that nearly all of the

witnesses favored "seating Peking in the United Nations, while preserving a seat for Taiwan,"

"lifting the embargo on non-strategic trade with Communist China," and increasing "cultural and

private contacts with th e Chinese Comm unists."14 George Ball, then Unde r Secretary of State,

11 As discussed in Chapter 1, the House organized hearings on China in January 1966 and the Fulbright hearings took place in March 1966. 12 Memo from William Bundy to George Ball, 4 December 1965, RG59 Central Foreign Policy Files (CFPC), 1964-1966, Box 2019, NA II. 13 For the text of the announcement, see Department of State Bulletin (DSB), 17 January 1966, p. 90. 14 Memo from Bundy to Rusk, 4 April, 1966, RG59 Lot File 70D211&70D212, Office of Asian Communist Affairs (ACA), Box 1.

also favored what he called the "Fulbrigh t teach-in on China," because "we had gone a great

many years without a very hard look at the broader question—the philosophical place of the U.S.

in the world and whether these views of Bob's are correct in that China is the primary objectives

of the U.S." 15 In fact, as early as in 1960, Ball already proposed rappr ochement with China in a

foreign policy task force report drafted for President Kennedy.16

Johnson's top political advisors also urged th e President to show more flexibility on

America's China policy before the public. Jack Vale nti, special political assistant to LBJ, turned

to the NSC f or f uture "China str ategy" in th e m iddle of the Fulbright hearings. He then

forwarded a m emo to LBJ, which argued that America should try "to help domesticate the

Chinese Communist re volution in its r elations with other nations, or, to put it another way, to

help reclaim the Chinese mainland to responsible membership in the world community." In order

to achieve this goal, America should promote trade and cultural exchanges to "erode the Chinese

totalitarian state." 17 Bill Moyers, Johnson' s Press Secret ary and a close pol itical advisor, regarded Am erica's China policy as cru cial to the adm inistration's handling of the war in

Vietnam. In fact, Moyers alerte d Johnson that "we have very littl e China expertise at th e State

Department in general and no expertise at all at the hig her levels. " Referring to Llewellyn

Thompson, whom LBJ trusted on Soviet affairs, Moyers argued that "we could well use a

'Chinese Tommy Thompson' on the 7th floor [of the State Department]." 18 Ever sensitive to the

political wind, Moyers further urged Johnson to ta ke a more flexible pos ition in the face of

mounting pressures from the public for a new Ch ina policy. China was one of the "issues th at

history may judge absolutely critical to the Johnson administration," Moyers argued: "How we

15 Telcon, 11 February, 1966, Papers of George Ball, Box 2, LBJL. "Views of Bob's " here obviously referred to Robert McNamara's views about China's role in the Vietnam War. 16 James A. Bill, George Ball: Behind the Scenes in U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), pp. 58-59. 17 Thomas to Valenti, 1 March, 1966, NSF, CF, China, Box 239. 18 Moyers to LBJ, 18 January, 1966, White House Central File (WHCF), Countries-CO, Box 21, LBJL.

increased the 'thaw' toward China is just th at."19 James Thomson, after reporting that both the

scholars who testified before Fulbright' s comm ittee and Johnson' s Vice President Hubert

Humphrey supported a new "contai nment without isolation" polic y toward China, urged the

Johnson administration to " make the VP' s line the official Administration position. It gives us

just the room for maneuver that we will need in the months ahead. It should also help to avoid an unhealthy polarization on China policy. Furthermore, it need not be billed as a new policy." To recapture the political initiativ e, Thomson made the case that it should be stressed to the press that the Johnson administration always had an "open-door" policy toward Beijing.20

A master of politics himself, Johnson did not like being preempted on a sensitive issue such

as China policy. He was unhappy when Hum phrey t ook the first initiativ e to support a m ore

flexible China policy on television r ight in the middle of the Fulbright hearings. When Senator

Edward Kennedy called for a special m ission of China scholars to study the China problem,

Johnson finally exploded. He instructed Rusk to tell the media about "the Kennedy suggestion re reviewing China policy and point out we have been doing this for a long tim e...there was a constant review of our relations with China."21

The Johnson administration's general attitude in the face o f a new public awareness of the

China problem stirred by the "acad emic-legislative complex" indicated two m ain reasons why

Johnson and his advisors eventually decided to review their China policy. First, the thinking of

some officials on China actually paralleled the th inking of the "academ ic-legislative complex."

Therefore, they were more recep tive toward pressures o utside the g overnment. Second, the

Johnson adm inistration did not want to lose the political initiative: instead of being pushed

around on the China problem, Johnson wanted to recapture the initiative by leading the debate.

19 Moyers to Rostow, 17 June, 1966, NSF, Name File, Box 7, LBJL. 20 Thomas to Moyers, 15 March 1966, ibid. 21 Telcon, 3 May, 1966, RG59 Lot File 72D192, Records of Dean Rusk, Box 56, NA II.

Regaining the Strategic Initiative Abroad: China and America's Cold War Strategy

While the pressur es f or a n ew China polic y, com ing from within and without his

administration, edged J ohnson to take a m ore flex ible po sition to regain political in itiative domestically, international pres sures also m ade U.S.-China relations a priority on Johnson' s agenda. By early 1966, the problem of China had become a nexus in America's global Cold War strategy and threatened to dislodg e Am erica's re lations with its W estern European allies and

Japan, thw art Soviet-Am erican detente, disr upt Am erica's war efforts in Vietnam , and compromise Washington's commitment to Taiwan. Therefore, the Johnson administration started to review its China policy in order to regain the strategic initiative abroad.

By early 1966, Am erica's Cold War allies had also become frustrated with Am erica's rigid containment policy toward China, especially with th e total econom ic em bargo established by

America. Indeed, the is sue of so-called East-Wes t trade was insepar able from the politica l and strategic dimensions of the Cold War. Success ive American administrations argued that in order to fight the Cold W ar, the “F ree World” al so m ust launch econom ic warfare agains t th e

Communist bloc. The United Stat es not only m aintained a hars h economic embargo against its enemies, it also worked hard to get cooperation from its allies on this issue. In January 1950,

America an d its allies established the Consulta tive Grou p and a Coordina ting Comm ittee

(CoCom) associated with it as m ajor vehicles for fighting the econom ic Cold War. CoCom was

charged with the respo nsibility to oversee the day-to-day operati ons o f trade with the Sovie t

bloc; m ore im portantly, it was given the power to m ake sure that the strategic goods on the

embargo lists would be denied to the Communist bloc. After China intervened in the Korean

War, the Truman administration imposed a complete embargo on all ex ports to China, followed

by seizure of bank acc ounts and other assets owned by t he Chinese and the North Korean

government or their citizens. 22 On Septem ber 15, 1952, Am erica set up a trade control

organization functioning within the CoCom bod y known as the China Comm ittee (ChinCom).

China was to be considered a special case in international trading activities due to its war against

the U.S. f orces and the possibility of the rene wal of that war. 23 As a result, the econom ic

embargo imposed on C hina was more com plete than the one im posed on other Communist

countries. Now the China em bargo was to incl ude the goods on CoCom’s List 1B—goods other

Communist countries could get though with limited quantities. This “unequal” treatm ent soon

became known as the “China differential.” 24 The problem from the Am erican perspective, however, was that W ashington was never able to m aintain an abso lute embargo against China, since both Japan and some European allies managed to trade with Beijing. During the 1960s, the

issue of China trad e in creasingly caused frictions a mong Am erica and its m ajor allies. For

countries such as Japan, France, Australia, and Britain, trade with China was profitable and only

natural after both Europe and Japan recovered economically from World War II. F or American

leaders, ho wever, trad e with China repres ented appeasem ent and could have serious political consequences. The so-called DEMAG project was a typical case.

In February 1966, W est Germ an businessm en to ld Am erican officials that they wer e

negotiating with Beijin g to sell C hina a la rge “sta te-of-the-art” in tegrated s teel-rolling m ill

complex worth m ore than 150 m illion US dollars . This D EMAG project was to be built at

Wuhan, center of China’s autom otive industry a nd it would help to m ake the Wuhan truck

22 Memo of Conversation, 21 February 1951, in U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Vol. 7, pp. 1925-26 (FRUS). 23 Department of State position Paper, “Additional Economic Measures against Communist China and North Korea,” 30 October 1951, FRUS, 1951, Vol. 7, pp. 2028-39. 24 For detailed discussion of CoCom, ChinCom, and the early embargo against China, see Michael Mastanduno, Economic Containment: CoCom and the Politics of East-West Trade (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992) and Shuguang Zhang, Economic Cold War: America’s Embargo against China and the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1949-1963 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001).

production facilities the largest and m ost technologically advanced in China. 25 This deal immediately triggered a debate within Am erica. On March 2 5, Dean Rusk told Bon n that “th e substantial increase in the steel producing capability of…China is not a very comfortable idea for us…when China is doin g nothing to bring about peace in South-East Asia.” 26 West Germany, however, insisted that the technologies contained in the DEMAG project were not on the CoCom list and would not con tribute to China’s m ilitary power. 27 Meanwhile, th is deal caus ed a chain

reaction am ong Am erica’s other allies. Japa n followed the DEMAG project closely and

wondered how Am erica would respond if Japan wanted to sell a titanium plant to China. Rusk

answered that although t echnically CoCom would not block such a transfer , the titanium deal

would violate the basic objectives of CoCom since it would help China to prod uce stra tegic

material. T itanium products woul d contribute to Chin a’s aerospace industry and would affect

Japan’s own national security. Thus Am erican would be opposed to such a deal. 28 At the sam e

time, American Ambassador to West Germany announced in public that “when [West Germany]

first approached us regarding the steel mill project, we reluctantly did not object since there was

no for mal violation of COCOM…Ho wever, in light of current U.S. involvem ent in Vietna m

and…of our assessm ent of Peking’s continued aggressiveness, we could not help but be

disappointed at a decision to prom ote the sale.” 29 West Germany, however , ignored Am erica’s

warnings and continued the negotiation with Ch ina. In July, following the Germ an exam ple,

Australian Cabinet decided to sell 17,000 tons of cold reduced steel-sheeting to China. The

quantity of steel-sheeting, Canberra argued, repres ented only a sm all fraction of China’s total

needs and the Chinese would get this m aterial elsewhere anyway. Moreover, Australian firm s

25 Bonn to State Department, 30 March and 2 April 1966, RG59, CFPF, 1964-1966, Box 1423, NAII. 26 State Department to Bonn, 25 March 1966, ibid. 27 Bonn to State Department, 29 March 1966, ibid. 28 State Department to Tokyo, 1 April 1966, ibid. 29 C.M. McGhee, “East-West Trade—a Realistic Appraisal,” 31 March 1966, DSB, Vol. 54, pp. 1019-26.

needed this tran saction. 30 On July 29, Am erican officials in Bonn reported that Am erica’s opposition to the DEMAG deal caused a lot of criticism in W est Germ any and underm ined

America’s ability to influence W est Germany’s future China polices. B onn did not understand why America was against selling goods technically not on CoCom ’s embargo lists to China and it now regarded this deal as a test of Germany sovereignty.31

The DEMAG incident, therefore, n ot only crea ted tensions between Am erica and its m ajor allies, but also clearly signaled that Am erica's economic embargo against China was breached.

Indeed, in May 1966, after a review session on th e CoCom list, the State Departm ent reported that Great Britain, France, and Japan all "m aintained an adam ant position...that there can be no differential contro l f or the Far E ast." As a result, "th e prospects f or gaining m ultilateral agreement to a significant, or perhaps additiona l, embargo towards Communist China and other

Far Eastern Communist areas are very remote indeed."32

While the tension between Am erica and its al lies was som ehow tolerable for W ashington, the tension between China and the Soviet Un ion caused greater anxiety within the Johnson administration, as the Sino-Soviet split threatened to knock Soviet-American detente off its track.

Johnson had a genuine interest in pursuing detente with Moscow. According to Walt W. Rostow, who became Johnson' s National S ecurity Adv isor in early 1966, John son once said that "the

United States and the Soviet Union should regard themselves as the two eldest children in a large family. They had the responsibility of keep ing peace and order in th e fa mily. The younger children, however, were too old and independent to be ordere d around. Therefore, the United

States and the Soviet Union had to fulfill their joint m ission by three other methods: by setting a

30 Canberra to State Department, 27 July 1966, RG 59 CFPF, Box 1423, NAII. 31 Bonn to State Department, 29 July 1966, ibid. 32 Memo, "Prospects for Multilateral Cooperation in CoCom," 26 May 1966, RG59, Lot File 72D175, Subject Files of ACA, 1961-1973, Box 4, NA II.

good example in their bilateral relations; by wo rking together with others to create an

environment of peace; and, if othe rs fought, by bringing about peace, if possible, b ut if not, by

refusing to be draw n in to the f ight."33 Despite Am erica's interest in Sov iet-American deten te,

however, the Johnson adm inistration realized that China was a prom inent roadblock for an

improved relationship with Moscow. Soviet f oreign policy was fundam entally shaped by its

competition with China. As Foy Kohler, American Ambassador to the Soviet Union, reported on

December 13, 1965, "Moscow' s dispute with Pe king...continues to be m ainspring governing

Soviet behavior, and it seem s to be as true as it is ir rational tha t the harder Pek ing press es

Moscow, the m ore violently Moscow lashes ou t at u s."34 A National Intelligence Es timate in

April 1966 concurred by concluding th at, externally, Soviet leaders "have given first attention to

problems in the Communist world, particularly the challen ge of China." To disapprove th e

Chinese charges of U.S.-Soviet "collusion," Moscow would be reluctant to fully pursue detente

with Washington.35 Dean Rusk wrote in his memoir that "in our bilateral talks [with the Soviets]

they often seemed to be looking over their shoulders at China....What might appear to Americans to be a reasonable balance between the United States and Soviet Union requires something extra because of China." 36Indeed, Johnson him self later recalled after his m eeting with the Soviet

leader Aleksei Kosygin in 1967 th at "Kosygin had an obsession about China, he was scared to

death."37

At the sam e time, the Johnson team realized that over th e longer run the Sino-So viet split

might promote Soviet-American detente. Llewellyn Thompson later summarized the situation by

noting that Soviet leaders "m ust be genuinely worried about the chaotic situation inside

33 W. W. Rostow, The Diffusion of Power: An Essay in Recent History (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1972), p. 390. 34 Kohler to Rusk, 13 December 1965, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 14, p. 361. 35 National Intelligence Estimate, 28 April 1966, Ibid., pp (document 159) 36 Dean Rusk, As I Saw It (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1990), p. 356. 37 Robert Dallek, Flawed Giant: Lyndon Johnson and His Times, 1961-1973 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 432.

Communist China and would like be tter relations with u s not on ly in the event o f unforeseen contingencies but also to deter us from any in clination w e m ight have to get to gether with

Communist China in oppositio n to the Soviet Union." 38 While the Soviets indicated their

concerns over possible U.S.-Chi na collusion, Johnson seem ed to have different thoughts on this

matter and he kept elusive in the face of the Soviet appeal for coordinated policies against China.

In an off-th e-record co nversation with Max F rankel, a journalist from the New York Times,

Johnson admitted that although he u nderstood the Soviet concern about China, he did not "wan t that written—that we're over here carving up C hina." He further m used that "on ce the Chinese were given som e responsibility in the world, th ey'd behave m ore responsibly. And it wouldn' t hurt for the Russians and North Vietnamese to notice us doing business with China."39

Johnson already had started to think about the triangular rela tions among America, China,

and the Soviet Union, although a clearly define d linkage strategy was not fully articulated.

Meanwhile, when the prospects for Soviet-American detente invited a review of America's China policy, the war in Vietnam seem ed to m ake such a review even more urgent. Indeed, from

Washington's point of view, the China problem manifested itse lf in the war in two ways:

Beijing's strong opposition to any peace neg otiations an d its cons tant threat of m ilitary intervention in Vietnam. For the Johnson adm inistration in early 1966, the latest frustration over the war came from the fruitless search for pea ce negotiations during the bombing pause ordered by Johnson at th e end of 1965. W ashington's peace proposal was firm ly rejected by Hanoi, and

Johnson an d his advis ors had no doubt that Beijing w as behind the m ove. The Am erican

Consulate in Hong Kong, for exam ple, reported Beijing's "unyielding rejection of peace effort"

38 Thompson to Rusk, FRUS, 1964-1966, Vol. 14, p. 429. 39 Max Frankel, The Times of My Life and My Life with The Times (New York: Random House, 1999), pp. 295-296.

and concluded that Beijing's pressure on Hanoi made the latter unwilling to accept Washington's

terms.40

Meanwhile, Johnson's fear about a possible Chinese m ilitary intervention in Vietn am was

well known am ong and shared by hi s top advisors. George Ball la ter recalled th at a potential

Chinese intervention w as a constant concern fo r LBJ, who was dete rmined to k eep th e war

limited, since he "was wary of repeating MacArthe r's error of attacking too close to the Chinese

border; he did not want Am erican boys to have to fight the Chinese hordes again." 41 Indeed,

Johnson himself repeatedly said in public that Am erica did not wa nt to seek a war with China over Vietnam. In May 1966, Johnson took a rather unusual step. He insisted that he should clear the instructions for the next U.S.-China Am bassadorial talk persona lly. He wanted to te ll the

Chinese again that America would not seek a war with China over Vietnam, and he also wanted to emphasize his wish for serious discussions wi th China. Johnson even proposed a conference with Chines e lead ers a t the Fore ign Minis ters' level. 42 Des pite these efforts, however, the

Johnson adm inistration still rem ained alerted. Dean Rusk, for example, cautioned that the

renewed bombing should "be kept under firm control...[due to] dangers of the Chinese com ing

in."43 Thomas Hughes also reported that in light of recent developments in Vietnam, the Chinese

leaders "are m ore than ever c onvinced that som e sort of war with the U.S. at s ome tim e is

'inevitable.'"44 Clearly, the need to reach a tactical understanding with China over Vietnam spoke loudly for a review of America's China policy.

The role of China in the Vietnam War was intertwined closely with America's relations with

Taiwan, a final im portant strate gic factor in Washington' s delib erations over its China policy.

40 Hong Kong to State, 8 January 1966, NSF, CF, China, Box 239, LBJL. 41 George Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1982), p. 377. 42 William Bundy to Rusk, “Warsaw Instructions,” 20 May 1966, RG59, CFPC, 1964-1966, Box 2019, NA II. 43 Meeting Record, 27 January 1966, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 4, p. 164. 44 Hughes to Rusk, 29 March 1966, NSF, CF, China, Box 240, LBJL.

The Johnson adm inistration realized that Beijing' s concern was not just about a possible attack

on China by the U.S. via Vietnam ; rather, Beiji ng's worst nightmare was a possible joint attack

on China by Am erica and Taiwan. In Februar y, 1966, for exam ple, the Hong Kong Consulate

noticed "genuine Chicom fear s of US/GRC invasion." It re ported that "we have becom e

convinced, in watching the curr ent communist party cam paign te lling the people the U.S. is

planning to attack China, that th e m otive power behind the cam paign is no lon ger pr imarily

precautionary. Rather it is a widespread belief wh ich has gro wn and whi ch stems from the top,

that we will soon launch m ajor operations ag ainst the mainland [tog ether with Taiwan]." 45

Indeed, Chinese leaders had reasons to worry a bout this possibility. In Septem ber, 1965, Jiang

Jingguo, the son of the Nationalist Chinese lead er Chiang Kai-shek and Taiwan' s Defense

Minister, visited the United States. D uring a conversation with William Bundy, Jiang expressed

Taiwan's concern ov er the "d ilution of Am erican firm ness toward Comm unist China." W hen

Bundy raised a possible lifting of the travel ban to China to test the w ater, Jiang insisted that

America and Taiwan "must [have a] joint plan dealing with the m ainland." Bundy politely replied that while Amer ica would continue to support T aiwan, it did not want a war with

Beijing.46 Meanwhile, Jiang submitted a m ilitary operation p lan against the m ainland China to

Secretary of De fense, Robert McNa mara. This plan asked Am erican support to take five

Southwestern provinc es on the m ainland by m ilitary m eans, which McNam ara prom ised to

study. On November 16, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (J CS) rejected this proposal on the ground that

such a p lan was im possible witho ut invo lving Am erica m ilitarily. 47 In Decem ber, when an

American d elegation re turned the visit to Ta iwan, Chiang Kai-shek him self "for cefully" put

forward to General Earle W heeler, Chairman of the JCS, the sam e plan. Chiang prom ised that

45 Hong Kong to State, 2 February 1966, NSF, CF, China, Box 239, LBJL. 46 Memo of Conversation, 24 September 1965, NSF, CF, China, Box 238, LBJL. 47 Memo Thomas to McGeorge Bundy, 3 February 1966, NSF, CF, China, Box 239, LBJL.

Taiwan could "fight without using U.S. troops." Wheeler, who told Chiang that he would deliver

the message to LBJ, neverthe less firmly rejected this plan in his m emo to the pre sident. 48 But

Washington was alerted by Chiang' s plan. McGe orge Bundy told L BJ that America "should

avoid too close a connection with Chiang." 49 Jam es Thom as also urged that Am erica should force Chian g Kai-shek to face th e reality, that is, the chance for a N ationalist return to the

mainland was nil. 50 Yet in March, 1966, Chiang Kai-shek ag ain raised th is issue with W illiam

Bundy and he also offered to send C hinese Nationalist troops into South Vietnam ; both requests

were turned down by Bundy.51

While Chiang's dream of retaking the m ainland created tensions between W ashington and

Taibei, trends in the U nited Nations laid m ore burden on the alrea dy troubled relationship

between the two allies. The Unite d Nations, under pressure from the United States, recognized

the Taiwan governm ent, not the Beijing reg ime, as the legitim ate governm ent of China.

Moreover, in 1961 America pushed a resolution through the General Assembly dictating that any

proposal to change the representation of China is an "im portant question," which meant that a

two-thirds m ajority would be re quired in o rder to s eat the rep resentatives f rom Beijin g.

However, since the early 1960s, the idea that th e Beijing regim e should be adm itted into the

United Nations gradually gained ground am ong the expanding m embership. The Johnson

administration quickly recognized this trend. In September 1965, Johnson told Jiang Jingguo that

in terms of t he Communist Chinese representative issue in the UN, he "hoped that all countries

would hesitate to reward Peipi ng for their conduct in the last se veral years, but one never knows

how other countries feel about such questions." 52 In February 1966, William Bundy argued in a

48 Memo of Conversation, 31 December 1965, ibid. 49 Memo Bundy to LBJ, 15 January 1966, ibid. 50 Memo Thomas to McGeorge Bundy, 3 February 1966, ibid. 51 Memo of Conversation, 11 March 1966, ibid. 52 Memo of Conversation, 24 September 1965, NSF, CF, China, Box 238, LBJL.

memo that "all of us are now co nvinced that in the ab sence of so me truly ex traordinary

development, the odds are now heavily against the General Assem bly again voting to reject a

substitution resolution or to sustain the past votes on the important question."53 In May, the State

Department's Policy Planning Council reached a similar conclusion. "Over the years, the United

States has found it increasingly difficult to gain the support of a m ajority of UN members for its

position on Chinese representation," a policy pa per argu ed: "If not this year, then in all

probability within the next two or thre e ye ars, a m ajority of the Gen eral Assembly will b e

prepared first, to deny that Chinese represen tation is an important question and then to vote to

seat the Ch inese Communists and expel the GRC. In this situ ation, a re-evaluation of our

position on Chinese representation in the United Nations is clearly required."54

Having recognized this development, the Johnson adm inistration tried to design ne w strategies that would protect Taiwan's standing in the UN. On May 14, 1966, Dean Rusk told

LBJ that the United States faced two alternatives to Am erica's traditional policy regard ing the

Chinese representation issue: "a resolu tion expelling Taipei and seating Peking" and "a resolution inviting Peking to take a s eat while re taining Taipei as a m ember." Rusk ar gued that the second alternative "would al most certainly not be accept ed by Peking and would be far preferable from the poin t of view of the United States." In effect, Rusk now argued for a "two-

Chinas" approach. He concluded that "one course with the fewest risks involves a ' two-Chinas' approach, and that we should not oppose such a course if others raise it. The objective would be to reaffirm that the GRC has a right to representation in the UN, while opening the possibility for the Chinese Communists likewise to be seated." Yet Rusk realized that both Beijing and Taiwan would resist any two-Chinas solution. Therefore, he believed the next step would be t o convince

53 Memo, Bundy to Rusk, 16 February 1966, RG59, Lot File 69D28 Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, 1963-1966, Box 1, NA II. 54 "China and the United Nations," 13 May 1966, RG59 Policy Planning Council, Ernest K. Lindley Files, 1961-1969, Box 7, NAII.

Taiwan that the two-Chinas so lution was the o nly way to avoid to tal defeat for the Nationalist

government.55 Walt Rostow supported Rusk' s suggestions immediately. "The recomm endation

from Secretary Rusk," he told LBJ, "is som ething of a landmark since it recommends to you that

we begin to shift off our present policy toward Communist China in the UN, starting with talks

in Taipei." Rostow then suggested various step s that could reduce the possible domestic shocks

that this shift of strategy would produce. 56 The Johnson administration launched a series of talks

with Taiwan, urging the latter not to walk out of the UN should Beijing be seated. 57 While the

Johnson administration hoped that there would be some space for m aneuver with Taiwan, there was no way to engage Beijing in talks over the two-Chinas issue. As a result, Rusk later recalled,

America found itself caught deadlocked between the growing pressure for seating Beijing in the

UN on the one hand and its desire to protect Taiwan's position in that organization on the other.58

In sum, the Johnson adm inistration gradually concluded that China was a central problem for America's Cold W ar strategy. America's relations with its allies, S oviet-American detente, the war in Vietnam , and the f uture of Taiwan—all these m ajor issues seem ed to depend on the future of U.S.-China relations. Therefore, in order to regain the strategic initiative abroad and to protect America's Cold War interests, a reevaluation of America's China policy became a priority on the Johnson administration's agenda.

China's Modernization and U.S. Strategy: 1966-1967

From mid-1966 onward, the Johnso n adm inistration accelerated its rev iew of U.S.-China relations. A steady stream of reports, policy pa pers, and m emos flowing into and out of the

White House and the Foggy Bottom overwhelm ingly supported the new "containm ent without

55 Memo, Rusk to LBJ, 14 May 1966, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 30, pp (document 149). 56 Memo, Rostwo to LBJ, 17 May 1966, Ibid. (document 150) 57 For example, see Memo of Conversation between Rusk and Chiang Kai-shek, 5 July 1966, NSF, CF, China, Box 239, LBJL. 58 Dean Rusk, As I Saw It, pp. 284-286.

isolation" strategy. Everyone seemed to assume that a less radical Chin a behaving normally like a status quo power wou ld prov ide a m agic so lution to the Cold W ar problem s faced by the

United States. Yet no o ne expected immediate results. Indeed, what was striking w as that the

Johnson administration focused largely on long-term relations with Beijing. During this process, the Johnson team recognized China as a "fru strated m odernizer." A discourse on China' s modernization reshaped the per ception of China, and new st rategies were proposed based upon this new perception.

The most comprehensive document that portrayed China as a "frustrated modernizer" was a long-range study of China initia ted in March 1965 and releas ed in June 1966. The study was composed by a joint State-Defense task force with input from other agencies such as the CIA and the Department of Commerce and was over 300 pages in length. This study was both a summ ary of previous delibe rations on China within th e administration and a sort of guideline for later strategies. T he problem s which China posed for th e Unite d States we re ana lyzed within the framework of China' s modernization, and the key theme was that the roots of China' s radical behavior rested in the Beijing regime's failure to modernize China both internally and externally.

For the authors of the study, m odernization meant two things for Chinese leaders.

Domestically, they wanted to build m odern industries and establish a sound econom ic system.

"No responsible Chinese leadersh ip can escape the task of social, political and econom ic modernization," the stu dy asserted. Yet the Beijing regime clearly had failed in this task so far due to "the continued indifferent perfor mance of the economy and the prospect tha t its f uture performance will be little, if any, better." The study continued to po int out th at "Chinese economic growth is weighed down by the failure of the regime thus far to solve the problem of expanding agricultural output faster than populati on. If, as appears to be the most likely of

various possibilities, the agri cultural sector and population bot h grow by about two percent

annually over the coming decade, the econom y as a whole will p robably not be able to exp and

output by more than about 3-1/2 percent annua lly. More rapid grow th would require greater

support from agriculture in the form of industr ial raw m aterials, food for urban workers and

export earnings to pay for im ports of m achinery and technology." The future for China' s

modernization was indeed dim , si nce "pro longed sem i-failure is alm ost certain to wear down

both the morale of the Comm unist cadres and th e responsiveness of the Chinese people to

exhortations for greater effort." The possible solution, according to the study, "can be found only

by reducing the priority accorded expenditu res for m ilitary purposes or by seeking foreign

economic assistance."59 But clearly, neither was a current policy for the Beijing regime.

To m odernize China' s econom y was only one part of the Chinese leaders' vision of a

modernized China, however. The authors recogn ized that econom ic development was only one

step, although the m ost crucial one, for China to be accepted by the international community as

an equal power. Moreover, China wanted to be accepted as a regional or even global power that

could compete with America and the Soviet Union. This desire clearly came from China's history

in the pas t century kno wn as "A Century of Humiliation," when China suffered econom ically

and politically at the hands of We stern power s and Japan. As the study put it, "The Chinese

desire to be recogn ized as the equ al of th e U. S. and the USSR has its psychological roots in

China's long history during m ost of which Chin a was the center and gui ding light of its own world." Indeed, the ultim ate goal of the presen t Chinese leaders was to "see Chin a achieving a dominant position in Asia, ranking as the lead er of revolutionary f orces in the less-developed regions of the world, and becoming the co-equal of the U.S. and the USSR as a recognized great

59 "Communist China: Long-Range Study," June 1966, NSF, CF, China Box 245, LBJL.

power."60 Yet Beijing clearly also had fa iled to achieve it desired international status so far. The study pointed out that the Sino-S oviet split, the deadlocked relations between Am erica and

China, the hostilities between China and India, and the Chinese setbacks in Indonesia and Africa all made China suspicious in the eyes of countries around the world.

China, therefore, em erged from the study clea rly as a "frustrated m odernizer." The study then tried to convince its reader s that "the question of what ki nd of Chi na would best serve our interests acquires a spec ial importance." In other words, th e study argued that China' s model of modernization should becom e the prim ary concer n in the m aking of Am erica's China policy.

First, the root problem of Ch ina the "f rustrated modernizer" was that Communism was a f alse model of modernization. This poi nt was not ju st important for China, b ut also was relev ant for other developing countries as "the D octrinaire Maoist approach has little to offer the great bulk of developing nations. It is based upon a presupposition of able, disciplined, endlessly moldable masses who will under direction m ake incredible sacrifices to achiev e the s tate's announced purposes. These do not exist elsewh ere, if indeed they exis t in China itself." Since the Cold War was a global struggle to win m inds and hearts, Am erica must make it clear that "the Chinese model of de velopment is...irrelevant to m ost other nations." Second, the study recognized that

Beijing's failure to modernize China was the root of its radical behavior abroad. "The Communist leadership is determ ined to m ake China a gl obal power and world leader, but it lacks the economic base to supp ort this pos ition. The resu ltant sen se of frustra tion has enhanced the ideological predilection for a radical revo lutionary course as a m eans of overcom ing this deficiency," the study concluded. T his Chinese outlook posed a serious challenge to Am erica's international vision, since "the Chinese regim e's objectives of regional hegem ony and world revolution clash with our own fundam ental interests in preventing dom ination of Asia by any

60 Ibid.

single power and in developing a peaceful an d open wor ld society of free natio ns." Finally,

China itself was important for America, because "a weak or divided China has clear attractions,

but would probably be so unstable as to constitute a continuing threat to world peace, particularly

through its unsettling effect on U. S.-Soviet relations. A united Chin a may be best over the long

run, if it can be induced to abandon the expans ionist and disruptive policies pursued by its

present leaders." Clearly referring to the long-sta nding American interest in m odernizing China,

an interest first aroused by m issionaries and merchants in the nineteenth century, the study

concluded that "whatever the ou tcome of our current difficulties with Co mmunist China, we

have a continuing long-term interest in restorin g friendly relations with the people of m ainland

China and in joining them in a cooperative network of economic and cultural relations embracing

all of the nations of Asia."61

In order to deal with the problem of Ch ina, the study rejected the extrem es of

“disengagement” and “ showdown.” As a result, “we are left with a national stra tegy of seeking

concurrently to check the spread of Chines e Comm unist power and influence and to induce

moderation of Peking' s current e xpansionist policies…However, co ntainment is not a negative

defensive strategy, but requires the dyna mic and im aginative application of a wide variety of

political, military, economic and psychological measures.” The study then recommended certain

measures to support this "containment without is olation" strategy. First, Am erica must show

good will and recogn ize Beijing' s legitim ate goa ls of ach ieving econo mic m odernization and

international respect. More sp ecifically, America "should try to induce present or future

Communist leaders to reappraise U.S. inten tions by avoid ing actions w hich irritate the Chines e

without compensating benefits, by reassuring Peki ng publicly, privately a nd by our actions that

we do not intend to work for the overthrow of the regim e, by showing continuing interest in

61 Ibid.

discussing arms control proposals, and by m odifying our export controls to perm it humanitarian shipments to m ainland China." Second, Am erica "s hould seek to increase Peking's interest in developing a more constructive relationship by continuing efforts to develop unofficial contacts, proposing the exchange of cultural and educational materials and exhibitions and holding out the prospect of step-by-step general relaxation of our econom ic controls in the context of reciprocal

Chinese moves toward improved relations." Furtherm ore, America "should expose Chinese elite groups to a wider range of information through an expanded Voice of America Chinese language service and through indirectly feeding into information channels leading into China." Finally, the authors of the study were confiden t that the Chinese frustration over their failed m odernization could be capitalized on by Am erican polices because "gaining access to the U.S. m arket should be particularly attractive to the Chinese." The study further argued that "C hinese could turn for economic assistance to either the Soviet Union or to one or m ore non-Communist nations. Our long-term problem may well be how to ensure that, as co ntainment succeeds, China will tu rn toward the free world rather than toward the Soviet Union."62

Overall, th is lengthy stu dy revealed certa in basic assum ptions now underlining America' s

China policy. First, American policy-makers now recognized that the primary goal of the Beijing

regime was China' s modernization, which was a le gitimate goal rooted deeply in China' s long

history. The only problem was th at Communism was a f alse model for China's modernization.

Therefore, instead of seeking the destroy th e Beijing regim e through rigid containm ent, now

Washington decided to seek to change the regime through expanded contacts. Second, American

policy-makers were con fident in th e W estern m odel of modernization, and they believed that

over the longer run the Chinese would have to come to their sens es and recognize the values of

the Free World.

62 Ibid.

This long-range study could have easily become another think piece buried in files if not for

the fact that Johnson and his a dvisors shared similar assumptions. Johnson's own outlook toward

America's role in the world was both com plicated and oversimplified. Johnson loved power; but

he also genuinely believed in the use of power to "do good," to "give things to people—all sort s

of things to all sorts of people." 63 While this conviction certainly engineered his Great Society at

home, Johnson also carried it as a basic philosophi cal approach to foreign policy. Various

observers confirmed that the only book Johnson read over and ove r again was Barbara W ard's

The Rich Nations and the Poor Nations, which essen tially argued th at the already developed countries had the responsibility to help the poor ones.64 Johnson himself recalled in his memoir a

memo subm itted by Dean Rusk at the end of 1965, which stated that the world was an

"interdependent" one, a fact the United States must accept and deal with. Johnson fully agreed ,

warning against the lingering isolationism in America and arguing that Am erica must not shy

away from its international responsibilities.65 Indeed, in his memoir Johnson proudly pointed out

the efforts under his adm inistration to help Third W orld countries build m odern econom ic

infrastructures and expand educatio n—not just b ecause of the need to fight Communism , but

because they were good things to do. 66 As one scholar pointed out, Johnson was convinced that

American leaders could and should articulate the needs and shoulder the burdens of the

disadvantaged abroad as well as at hom e. 67 Doris Kearns, a Johns on aide and later his

biographer, concluded that Johnson shared a "national assumption" of "equat[ing] America's way

63 Dallek, Flawed Giant, p. 6. 64 See, for example, David Halberstam, The Best and The Brightest (New York: The Modern Library, 2001) pp. 498-499; Huge Sidey, A Very Personal Presidency (New York: Atheneum, 1968) pp. 210-211; George Reedy, Lyndon B. Johnson: A Memoir (New York: Andrews and MC Meel, INC., 1982), p. 23. 65 LBJ, The Vantage Point (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), p. 347. 66 See chapters on Indian, Latin America, and other Third World Countries in LBJ's memoir, ibid. 67 Randall B. Woods, LBJ: Architect of American Ambition (New York: Free Press, 2006), p. 385.

of lif e with the goals of civiliz ation itse lf." 68 In fact, Johnson believed that people under

Communism wanted the same things as people in the Free World: better education, better health,

and better m aterial life. He believed that Comm unism was the wrong way to deal with chronic

problems such as poverty and dise ase in the Third W orld, and eventually those problem s could

be solved by American dollars.69

Thus, on April 5, 1966, when Donald Zagoria, a professor at Colum bia University who

testified before Fulbright' s committee, suggested LBJ m ake a m ajor speech on China, Johnson

was receptive. 70 Rostow subsequently told Rusk that Johnson was personally interested in

"imaginative ways of handling the China proble m...the President emphasized he wants fresh

study groups, including the best people in the country in and out of the governm ent."71 On May

18, Robert McNam ara, Johnson' s much-trusted De fense Secretary, public ly urged “building bridges” between America and China. “Breaching the isolation of great na tions like Red China, even when that isolation is largely of its own m aking, reduces the danger of potentially catastrophic misunderstandings and increases the incentive on both si des to resolve disputes by reason rather than by fo rce,” he declared. “W e can do so w ith properly balanced trade relations, diplomatic contacts, and in some cases even by exchanges of military observers.”72

On July 12, Johnson finally decided to deliver a speech o n China, which was q uickly

regarded by the world as a landm ark on Am erica's China policy. The speech was given before the American Alumni Council and was broadcast on radio and television. Johnson acknowledged that the peace of th e world required a peacef ul China a nd “a m isguided Chin a m ust be encouraged toward un derstanding of the out side world and toward policies of peaceful

68 Doris Kearns, Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream (New York: Harper & Row, 1976), p.97. 69 A most vivid example was LBJ's speech on Vietnam "Peace without Conquest" delivered on April 7, 1965. Full text is in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book I, pp. 394-399. 70 Memo from Valenti to Moyers re Zagoria, 5 April 1966, NSF, CF, China, Box 240, LBJL. 71 Rostow to Rusk, 23 April 1966, NSF, Files of Walt W. Rostow, Box 15, LBJL. 72 Robert McNamara, “Security in Contemporary World,” 18 May 1966, in DSB, Vol 54. pp. 874-81.

cooperation.” In order to achieve that goal, Jo hnson pointed out that Am erica should keep in mind that “we have learned that the greatest for ce for opening closed minds and closed societies is the free flow of ideas and people and goods.” Although B eijing had rejected his initiatives of exchanging journalists and other contacts, Johnson urged the American people to be patient: “we persist because we know that hunger and di sease, ignorance and poverty, recognize no boundaries of either creed or clas s or country. We persist b ecause we believe that even the m ost rigid societies will one day awaken to the rich possibilities of a diverse world.” 73 In other words,

China's frustration as a modernizer provided a good opportunity to build bridges between Beijing

and Washington.

While John son's speech on China gained overwhelm ingly favorite pu blic response, the

perception of China's modernization quickly became a dominate discourse among his advisors in

the NSC and the State Departm ent. Johnson' s Na tional Security Advisor, W alt R ostow, who

happened to be a founding father of modernization theory, turned out to be a key supporter. In

1954 when he was still a professor at MIT, Rostow, together with others, published the book The

Prospects for Communist China. Although at that tim e the disastrous G reat Leap Forward was

yet to happen, Rostow already expressed seri ous doubts about China' s modernization. "Peking

must achieve industrialization, without excessive starvation, in the face of China' s underlying

problems of overpopulation and low agricultural productivity." Rostow thought these problem s would be hard to overcom e. "If their present indu strialization plan should clearly fail," Rostow

concluded, "then the leadership will face a critical choice: whether to change the whole cast of

their policy, or to strike out in to Asian food-surplus areas...In a ny case, the situation as a whole

would present grave dangers but also enormous opportunities to the Free World." Rostow clearly

73 LBJ, “Address to the American Alumni Council,” 12 July 1966, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book II, pp. 721-722.

believed that the trend of modernization would eventually change the nature of the Beijing

regime: "Despite the unique powers the Communist regime exercises on the m ainland, its fate

rests substantially with the peoples of the Free World and their gov ernments."74 In his landmark

book The Stages of Economic Growth, Rostow further argued that Communism was "a disease of

the transition" between trad itional and modern society. In China, political and social conf usion

before the economic "take-off" could be achieved made it easy for Mao and his comrades to take

power. Therefore, Communism was a false road toward modernization that was doomed to fail.75

As Rostow put it in his m emoir about the Johnson adm inistration, China' s key pr oblem was

"Mao's insistence that the political, social, and cultural life of mainland China not settle down to the more or less orderly routines of a poor nation seeking modernity." 76 Indeed, Rostow later recalled that his prediction about China's failure in achieving m odernization proved to be right, and as a result the Chinese came to see the values of the development model of the West.77

Rostow played a m ore im portant role as John son's National Security Advisor in that he maintained an uninterrupted flow of information on China from the NSC staff to the President. In

April 1966, Jam es Thomson urged Rostow to have a "full-time China guy in the White House" due to the Presiden t's interes t in C hina policy. 78 The "full-tim e China guy" turned out to be

Alfred Jenkins, a Foreign Service Officer from Dean Rusk's home state of Georgia. Rostow later

recalled that Jenkins wa s a br illiant China ha nd who functioned as th e link age b etween th e

74 W. W. Rostow, The Prospects for Communist China (New York: MIT Press, 1954), pp. 312-314. 75 W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1960), pp. 162-164. 76 Rostow, The Diffusion of Power, p. 372. 77 W. W. Rostow, Concept and Controversy: Sixty Years of Taking Ideas to Market (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2003), pp. 280-281. 78 Thomson was an early promoter of the image of China as a frustrated modernizer. In an early memo, he said that "my objective would be to try to bring our China policy into line with both reality and our long-term interests. Our aim has always been the 'domestication' of Communist China. A strategy of containment plus moral preachment has achieved little success in this regard. So why not try modified containment—plus subversion? By the latter, I simply mean the careful use of free world goods, people, and ideas—instruments which have proven their long-term corrosive value in our relations with other totalitarian societies." See Memo, Thomson to McGeorge Bundy, 28 October 1964, NSF, CF, China Box 238, LBJL.

President and the China expe rts outside the government.79 Indeed, Rostow frequently forwarded

Jenkins's memos to LBJ with a note attached saying this or that memo came from "our first-class

China Watcher." Jenkins, who grew up in China, admitted that at tha t time China was the only assignment he wanted and he even turned dow n an offer of an am bassadorship from LBJ. 80 For

Jenkins, Beijing' s failure to m odernize China was not jus t because Co mmunism was a wrong model, but because Comm unism was alien to Chines e history. "During th ese years th e

Communist leaders set their country upon a new and different pa th, destroying the vestiges of its historical social order based on Confucianism , and attem pting to build a new so cial order on

Mao's brand of Communism , based on nothing less th an a reconstituted hum an nature," Jenkins wrote. "Not surprisingly, that tall order is proving to be impossible to carry out." 81 Three weeks

after LBJ's China speech, Jenkins put down hi s thoughts in a m emo. "A se mi-demented, Mao-

Communist China is perhaps the world's toughest and m ost urgent problem," Jenkins asserted,

but "we will alm ost certainly have opportunities before very long which, if grasped rightly, can

materially reduce the problem ." Jenkins was optim istic because "six m onths ago we had no real

choice but to 'contain' and wring our hands. Now it seem s that mainland events may prove to be exploitable sooner than expected." Jenkins then pr oposed that the U.S. could talk w ith China at some international conference, accept Beijing into th e UN, es tablish "widest communication in

the arts, sciences and hum anities," and seek "unres tricted comm erce except on ly as activ e

military situ ation dicta te to the con trary." Jenki ns f urther c autioned tha t ther e would be some

dramatic changes within China in three years or sooner and Am erica must be prepared. "There

are several exciting longer term global factor s at work toward bringing China into the

79 Transcript, Walt W. Rostow Oral History Interview I, 3/21/69, by Paige E. Mulhollan, Internet Copy, LBJL. 80 Alfred Jenkins, Country, Conscience and Caviar: A Diplomat's Journey in The Company of History (Seattle: BookPartners, 1993), pp. 229-230. 81 Ibid., p. 232.

community of nations on an acceptable basis, " he concluded. "The electronics-communications explosion will in creasingly riddle c urtains as will th e com ing world stock m arket, f aster and cheaper travel, and tru ly futuristic p ersonalized global com munication made possible by laser' s gift of 'infinite' radio frequencies."82

While the J enkins-Rostow combination became a m ajor source for a new China policy in

Johnson's NSC, Jenkins was i mpatient with D ean Rusk' s conservatism on China. "W hile I believe the Secretary to be one of the greatest in our history, on the one issue of China his s tyle scares me." Jenkins told Rostow: "He is so orderl y and judicial and a sheaf of other virtues, that he wants all the returns in before he moves. On China we are not going to get as many returns as we want; and inaction is an act watched by m ainlanders, especially, I should think, the Chicom moderates."83

Jenkins's observation was accurate to a cert ain extent: com pared with other Johnson officials, Rusk was the most hawkish on China. Yet from early 1966, the Secretary started to show som e flexibility. In fact, Rusk did not fail to notice that Beijing had encountered m any setbacks both at hom e and abroad during the early 1960s. His hesitance to adopt bolder initiatives on China was not because he did not think China was a "frustrated m odernizer," but because he was worried about actual policy -making in the field. Althou gh he agreed that sm all steps such as lifting th e trade em bargo would help America to recap ture the strateg ic initiative vis-à-vis China, he thought t hose steps would also cause panic am ong Am erica's Asian allies without achieving real breakthr oughs in U.S.-China relations. Be sides, Rusk sim ply could not

"abandon" Taiwan, sin ce Beijing always in sisted that settling th e Taiwan issue was a

82 Memo Jenkins to Rostow, 3 August 1966, NSF, CF, China, Box 239, LBJL. 83 Ibid.

precondition of U.S.-China rapprochem ent.84 Yet at the same tim e, Rus k also understood the

danger of maintaining a too rigid C hina policy. As he later recalled, when he serv ed in Burma

during WWII, he cam e to appreciate an ancien t Chinese military doctrine set forth by Sun-tzu:

"Never completely surround an enemy, or he will fight too hard. One must always leave h im a route of escape." 85 Thus, to leave Beijing a route of escape, on Ma rch 16, 1966, Rusk proposed

“10 new elements” of future policies toward China. Now he was more flexible than eight months

earlier, when he instructed American diplomats not to mention the possibility of lifting the travel

ban to the Chinese during the W arsaw Talks. Rusk announced that, on the one hand, Am erica

must continue to contain China, which would re quire a firm comm itment to South Vietnam and

Taiwan. On the other hand, Am erica should “conti nue to enlarge the possibilities f or unofficial

contacts between Communist China and ourselves .” He pointed out that now m ore Am erican

citizens were allowed to travel to China, Am erican lib raries could freely purchase Chinese

Communist publications, and American citizens could send and receive mail from China. “If the

Chinese the mselves were inter ested in purchas ing grain we would consider such sales,” Rusk

concluded.86

Rusk's March announcem ent followed by Johnson' s July speech encou raged other o fficials

to act faster on a new China policy. The State D epartment quickly set up an inter-agency China

Working Group chaired by W illiam Bundy to review U.S. trade an d other con trols d irected

against China. On June 26, Robert Barnett from State's Far East division argued during a meeting

of the China Group that "the new phrase contai nment of Communist China without isolation

might be given m eaning through a relaxation of our trade em bargo. Indeed, such relaxation

might be the best, or only, way at present to signify a U.S. willingness to depart from its previous

84 Transcript, Dean Rusk Oral History Interview III, 1/2/70, by Paige E. Mulhollan, Internet Copy, LBJL 85 Rusk, As I Saw it, p. 366. 86 Dean Rusk, “United States Policy toward Communist China,” 16 March 1966, in DSB, Vol 54, pp. 686-95.

posture of 'isolation'."87 On July 21, Thomson told the participants at another group m eeting that

"the President wanted to keep a high degree of pe rsonal flexibility in the matter of reconciliation

with Communist China, and he regarded our trad e policy as one of the instrum ents that could

serve his interests." Oth ers agreed. One participant asserted that "Peking would be com pelled to

maintain a c onsistent ideological position, lest it be ac cused of a se ll-out to the imperialists by

Moscow and Hanoi. Backstage, however, the Ch inese Communists would be trying to see what

advantages they m ight gain from our rela xed controls through the use of comm ercial intermediaries." Anothe r participan t concurre d: "Ultim ately, our initiative would have some political attraction for P eking. If we relaxed our trade controls, another channel of contact and another means for signaling would immediately be available to them . Persons in time within the

Chinese Communist leadership would probably be stimulated to think of ways in which the available option m ight be taken up." 88 On July 25, 1966, Thom son told Jenkins that "we have

made some significant moves [on China policy] since early March...The new rhetoric has m oved

toward ' containment without isolation' and now ' reconciliation'—or a policy of 'firm ness and

flexibility' ( a phrase th e Pres ident likes ). Our problem in the m onths ahead is what kind of

substance, and at what pace, to pour into this n ew rhetorical cont ainer... It strikes m e that the

present commotion on the China Mainland m akes more desirable than ever U.S. 'intervention' in

the Chinese political process through further development of a multiple strategy."89

Things indeed were m oving fast. On July 26, R obert Barnett was told that "in line with the

present po licy review o f U.S. trade rela tions, c onsideration is being given to per mitting the

export of pharm aceutical and m edical equipm ent/devices to Communist China." While there

were concerns whether China would re-export th at equ ipment to North Vietnam , the general

87 Meeting Record, 26 June 1966, RG59 Lot File 72D175, Subject Files of ACA, 1961-1973, Box 4, NA II. 88 Meeting Record, 21 July 1966, ibid. 89 Memo, Thomson to Jenkins, 25 July 1966, NSF, CF, China, Box 239, LBJL.

conclusion was that "US exports might have no m ore than a m arginal impact [on Hanoi' s war-

waging ability] even if re-exported by China." 90 At the same time, the CIA reported that Beijing would even tually com e to app reciate Am erica's new policy because "if, hypothetically, the

United States were to remove all of its unilate ral controls over econom ic relations with Peking, the greatest gain to China would be its opportun ity to earn dollars by selling in the rich US market."91 Meanwhile, th e Departm ent of Agriculture inform ed W illiam Bundy that it "has a

deep inte rest in f inding ways to initiate a plant exchang e program with Red China" and

expressed the interest among som e of its constituencies in the future China m arket. Bundy told

Rusk that the Agriculture's idea was "worth a try."92

On August 4, Thom son told Rostow that W illiam Bundy had a China initiative ready for

review by Rusk. In the m emo attached, Bundy stat ed that "W e believe it is now desirable to

reconsider our China trade and transaction control programs in light of our current exploration of

possible ways to pie rce mainland China's 'isolation' from the rest of the world." Ev en if China

would fail to respond, Bundy arg ued, the Jo hnson adm inistration still should m ake such

unilateral moves, at l east to induce debates am ong the Chin ese leadership. "A chance to begin

developing an export m arket in the U.S. woul d have the m ost attraction for the Chinese

Communists," Bundy c oncluded, "a nd we could expect them soone r or later to test our

willingness to accep t their goods." Thom son fully supported Bundy's ideas. "The rationale for

modification of our trade e mbargo is familiar to you," he told Rostow: "In the short run, despite

anticipated Chinese Communist denunciation of such moves, we alter a substantive elem ent of

our previously rigid and defensive posture toward China, and we demonstrate to our critical

90 Memo, Oswald Ganley to Barnett, 26 July 1966, RG59 Lot File 72D175, Subject Files of ACA, 1961-1973, Box 4, NA II. 91 CIA, "Economic Benefits to Communist China of a Removal of U.S. Trade Controls," July 1966, NSF, CF, China, Box 241, LBJL. 92 Memo, Bundy to Rusk, 3 August 1966, RG59 Lot File 72D175, Subject Files of ACA, 1961-1973, Box 4, NA II.

friends and allies a welcom e degree of confid ence and flexibility...f or the longer run, we communicate a new and supportive message to elements within mainland China that are pushing

for policies of pragmatism and accommodation with the outside world."93

Bundy did not subm it the final draft of his m emo to Rusk until October 4, because he was

still not su re about Rusk' s attitude. Barnett then suggested to Bundy that "we s hould m ove quickly to get high level support at the W hite House [on t he trade package m emo]."94 Wh en

Thomson got the Bundy m emo, he was willing to be cooperative. "I anticipate resistance at the top of the Department [of State] even to these minimal steps," he told Rostow: "unless the White

House can deftly intervene."95 On August 16, Robert Kom er sent a memo to LBJ, urging him to

make new public ges tures to m aintain the m omentum created by his July speech. "I believe a

restatement of our China policy would be a m ajor foreign policy plus for your Adm inistration,"

Komer said. "An olive branch extended toward Re d China would add credib ility to our stated

peaceful purposes in Vietnam."96

Bundy's pa ckage, which suggested general lice nsing of relevant tr ansactions for those

categories o f U.S. citizens now entitled to tr avel to Communist China, ending the special

bunkering controls against China, a nd unilateral relaxation of trade controls with initial focus on

two-way trade in foodstuffs, non-wa r related pharmaceuticals, and art objects, was supported by

Edward Rice and George Ball. 97 Yet the Bundy package was held in abeyance by Nicholas deB

Katzenbach, the n ew Under Secretary after Ball left in Septem ber, for Katzenbach feared th at

93 For both memos, see Thomas to Rostow, " Relaxation of US Embargo on Trade with Communist China," 4 August 1966, NSF, CF, China, Box 240, LBJL. 94 Memo, Barnett to Bundy, 14 September 1966, RG59 Lot File 72D175, Subject Files of ACA, 1961-1973, Box 4, NA II. 95 Thomas to Rostow, " Relaxation of US Embargo on Trade with Communist China," 4 August 1966, NSF, CF, China, Box 240, LBJL. 96 Memo. Komer to LBJ, 16 August 1966, NSF, CF, China, Box 239, LBJL. 97 Letter, Barnett to Rice, 20 October 1966, RG59 Lot File 72D175, Subject Files of ACA, 1961-1973, Box 4, NA II.

Bundy's pac kage m ight becom e controversial w ith the Congressional election approaching. 98

Rusk's lieutenants, how ever, continued to push forward their agenda. O n February 8, 1967, the

China Group again raised the issu e to Rusk by arguing that "t hese actions [of Bundy' s memo] would contribute to the long term strategy of s eeking peace and reconci liation with Communist

China and encourage the more pragmatic elements in Peking to question the wisdom of Peking' s policy of h ostility to the United States. " 99 On February 28, Henry Owen from the Policy

Planning C ouncil rem inded Rusk of "the unsuita bility of Mao' s concepts for modernizing

China." Owen argued that China eventfully would "adopt more moderate domestic policies than

those Mao has advocated" and "open a dialogue w ith the U.S. on Taiwa n." Therefore, Am erica

should be making preparations now.100

Rusk was finally persu aded to act. In March 1967, Bundy r esubmitted his trade package to

Rusk. In the sam e month, Rusk approved a pr ogram whereby Washington temporarily removed

certain pharm aceuticals and m edical supplies from export con trols. He also allowed U.S.

subsidiaries abroad, with certain exceptions, to engage in non-st rategic trade with China, and

make Foreign Assets C ontrol regulations inapplicable to US do llar transactions between China

and third parties. But R usk still did not give full and perm anent approval to Bundy' s package.

Instead, in July he asked the China Working Group to revise the package, because now there was

a new element in the field: China's Cultural Revolution. 101

Therefore, from mid-1966 to m id-1967, the Jo hnson administration not only reshaped its

perception of China as a "frustrated modernizer," but also started to craft new strategies based on

this perception. The basic assumption now was that since the failure of the Chinese leadership to

98 Memo, Katzenbach to Rusk, 22 November 1966, ibid. 99 Memo, "China Trade Policy," 8 February 1967, ibid. 100 Owen to Rusk, 28 February 1967, RG59 Lot File 72D139, Policy Planning Staff, Subject and Country Files, 1965-1969, Box 302, NA II. 101 Memo, Harald Jacobson to Barnett, 24 November 1967, RG59 Lot File 72D175, Subject Files of ACA, 1961-1973, Box 4, NA II.

modernize China greatly jeopardized the regime both domestically and internationally, the only

rational choice left for B eijing was to adjust its policies. S ince America, by its econ omic power

and its inte rnational le adership, cou ld lend a hand to China' s m odernization by reopening the

world market to China, American strategies designed accordingly would induce Beijing toward

improved U.S.-China relations. That this basi c assum ption captured Am erican policy-m akers'

imagination was further revealed by Dana Robinson, a member of the China Working Group. On

December 26, 1967, Robinson told Jenkins that "I have found that when discussing the subject of

possible modification of present T rade Policy [rela ting to C hina], there is either an assum ption

that Am erican business men are being held back from the potential China m arkets or that by

relaxing the 'embargo' there could be som e business contacts developed which would lead soon

to improve relations."102

The only question left now was whe ther the Chinese leaders could choose rationally. Or, a s

Rusk's comments in July 1967 on the Bundy package mentioned, what would Chinese leaders do

in light of the emerging Cultural Revolution?

In the Shadow of the Cultural Revolution: 1967-1968

"It m ay be that, looking back, th e crisis inside Comm unist China will be v iewed by

historians as the m ost signifi cant event now taking pl ace on the world scen e. Ob viously it is extremely h ard to f ollow in deta il." So Rost ow told his impressions of the Chinese Cultu ral

Revolution to LBJ on July 28, 1966. 103 Although m odern scholars have different opinions

regarding the starting and ending dates of the C ultural Revolution, it was clear to the Johnson

administration that ever since m id-1965, China's domestic politics were becom ing radicalized.

Mao Zedong and his supporters not only launched campaigns at home against "capitalist

102 Memo, Robinson to Jenkins, 26 December 1967, ibid. 103 Memo, Rostow to LBJ, 28 July 1966, NSF, CF, China, Box 239, LBJL.

revisionists," but also maintained a hard-line policy toward the outside world. Over time, Beijing

recalled almost all of its am bassadors back home for "reeducation," and China descended into a

state of self -imposed isolation and chaos. 104 The Cultura l Revolution, therefore, became a new

challenge for W ashington's China policy, altho ugh its full im pact on Am erican policy-makers

was not clear until early 1967. For the Cultural Re volution raised a serious question: was the

Chinese leadership able to make rational policies?

Indeed, the Cultura l Re volution wa s a m ajor reason why m any Amer ican po licy-makers

became reluctant to carry out the various new in itiatives toward China. Rusk regarded th e

Cultural Revolution as a m ajor barrier to an improved U.S.-China relationship. He recalled th at

"throughout the late 1960' s the State Departm ent didn't even know to whom we s hould address

our le tters." 105 Rostow also recalled that because of the Cultural Revolution, "for a tim e,

mainland China almost ceased to have a foreign policy." President Johnson followed the ups and

downs of the Cultural Revolution closely, yet he was discouraged by the chaotic situation on the

mainland to m ake major moves.106 Even Jenkins, who was an earli er enthusiastic supporter for

building bridges between Am erica and China, st arted in early 1967 to shift to a wait-and-see attitude.107

However, the Cultural Revolution served to consolidate the image of China as a "frustrated

modernizer." When Washington first started to trace th e Cultural Revolution, the dominant view

was that it was a new e ffort launched by Mao Ze dong to modernize China. An early CIA report

argued that the Cultural Revolution was "Mao' s program to speed up the transition of China to a

socialist state. Although the first task is necessarily one of indoctrinating the people to accept the

104 See next chapter for detailed discussion on the Cultural Revolution. 105 Rusk, As I Saw It, p. 286. 106 Rostow, The Diffusion of Power, p. 372. 107 Jenkins, Country, Conscience and Caviar, p. 241.

program, the ultim ate goal is the agricu ltural m echanization and the industrialization of the

country." The report concluded that the Cultural Revolution was a "new leap forward," and it had

little ch ance for success . 108 The Hong Kong Consulate concu rred. The goal of the Cultural

Revolution, Rice reported, was to "take firm hold of revolution in order to stimulate production."

However, Rice already perceived failures of this ne w effort to modernize China: "It appears that

regime planners have recognized disruptive e ffect of ca mpaign on the econom y a nd are now

attempting to compartmentalize and separate these two...Once again Peking has had to sidetrack,

or at least slow down cherishe d political drives in order acco mmodate econom ic realities, a

development which would give consid erable comfort to Mao' s opponents." 109 On February 17,

1967, Rice further reported that "the economic policies and priorities, under which China

achieved virtually full recovery from the Great Leap Forwar d debacle, prevailed throughout

1966, but if Mao has his way they are due for dr astic revision. This is suggested by the failure to

disclose the outlines of the Th ird Five-Year Plan, which was to h ave been inau gurated on

January 1, 1966. "110

That the Cultur al Rev olution was a new and perhaps th e las t ef fort by Mao a nd his

supporters to modernize China according to the Maoist vision was supported by a new political

body: the China Advisory Panel. Established in December 1966 by the State Departm ent to help the rev iew of Am erica's China policy, th is Pa nel was composed of prom inent China scholars such as A. Doak Barnett, Alexander Eckstein, and John Fairbank. During the first P anel meeting in February 1967, the part icipants concluded that the Cult ural Revolution was both a power struggle and a policy conflict between the Mao-Lin 111 group and its opponents. W hat was at

108 CIA Report, 16 August 1966, NSF, CF, China, Box 239, LBJL. 109 Telegram, Hong Kong to State, 1 September 1966, ibid. 110 Hong Kong to State, "Communist China," 17 February 1967, NSF, CF, China, Box 240, LBJL. 111 At that time, Washington believed that Mao's principle follower was Marshall Lin Biao.

stake ultim ately, howev er, was China' s future m odel of developm ent. The Panel expected a

defeat for the Maoists because "Mao's biggest disadvantage is that the body of thought to which

he ascribes his nam e does not serve as a pr actical policy for creati ng and operating a m odern

industrial state." Eventually, the Panel concluded, a m ore moderate and more pragmatic Chinese

leadership would e merge after the Cultural Revolution, which would be m ore accommodating

toward the West.112

Jenkins rep orted after the Panel meeting th at "it was conceded that any attem pted step s

toward reconciliation now would be rebuffed and would not appreciably affect China." However,

"it was strongly felt by som e that even though it m ight not seem to m ake sense to attem pt

conciliatory gestures w hen they would not m eet with response, the U.S. could only take these

steps with g race at a tim e when China is weak—i.e. when they would not be in terpreted as a

knuckling under to pressure from a strong China." Jenkins further re ported that "the distinction

was drawn between a ' posture' a nd a ' policy' toward Co mmunist Ch ina. Agreem ent was

unanimous that our present 'posture' of quiet reasonableness and hope for ultimate reconciliation

is about right."113 Indeed, Jenkins himself perceived that the Cultural Revolution further revealed

China's failed modernization. On March 6, he told LBJ that the Cultural Revolution had already

inflicted m uch dam age on the Chinese economy and the prestige of the Communist Party.

Jenkins then speculated that since Mao proved to be unable to control the chaos, Zhou Enlai and

other moderates might seize power and adopt more m oderate policies. 114 On April 10, Jenkins

further concluded that "China's matured civilization was given a clear signal in the 1840' s that it

112 China Advisory Panel Meeting, February 1967, RG59, Lot File 73D8, Subject Files of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 1961-1974, Box 20, NA II. 113 Memo, Jenkins to Rostow, 3 February 1967, NSF, CF, China Box 240, LBJL. 114 Memo. Jenkins to Rostow/LBJ, 6 March 1967, NSF, CF, China, Box 241, LBJL.

had to m odernize and build a new civilization. It has m ade several agoni zing attempts to do so

since the 1890's. The tragedy of Mao is that he has given his nation another false start."115

The China Advisory P anel's proposal was sup ported by Rice, who argued that "at first glance, it m ight seem that the turmoil in Ch ina precluded any positiv e policy recommendations because p rudence dictated waitin g for the out come of Mao' s struggle for power befor e undertaking any fresh initiatives. We believe, however, that th is period of instability and uncertainty not only perm its but m akes more i mportant the continuation of our present policy with respect to clearing the way, in consonan ce with o ur overall Asian inte rests, f or th e possibility of an eventual norm alization of relations with Peking." 116 Dean Rusk was also

following the Panel' s discussion closely, and he asked one Panel m ember, Robert Scalapino, to

write to him directly. Thus on Ap ril 26 Scalapino told Rusk that "the Maoists may win the battle

but lose the war. In the long run, th e probabilities are high that many aspects of Maoism will be

progressively discarded since th e basic Maoist tenets cannot m eet the fundamental requirements

of the modernization process. " He then urged Rusk to be prepared: "Over time, we can establish

both a set of tactical-strateg ic positions and a ba sic philosophy conductive to greater world

support and a policy containing som e elem ents m ost likely to create subtle pressures within

China itself f or change s in those directions we deem desirable." 117 On May 11, Rusk' s own

subordinates reached a similar conclusion. Recent developments of the Cu ltural Revolution, the

Far East division concluded, "suggest perhaps that we need have less fear th an hitherto in the appeal of Comm unist ideology and can begin to regard it as but one of m any systems to which

115 Memo, Jenkins to Rostow/LBJ, 10 April 1967, Ibid. Jenkins continued to say that "I see little that can be done for the patient [China] until this protracted crisis is over." While this wait-and-see attitude was obviously induced by the chaos caused by the Cultural Revolution, this did not mean that Jenkins now retreated from his early stance that America should have a more flexible policy toward China. In fact, when Jenkins said 'I see little that can be done," what he had in mind were steps bolder than the mere relaxation of trade embargo such as a face-to-face meeting between the two countries' leaders. He still agreed that America should maintain an open and flexible "posture." 116 Hong Kong to State, "Communist China," 17 February 1967, NSF, CF, China, Box 240, LBJL. 117 Scalapino to Rusk, 26 April 1974, RG59, Lot File 73D8, Subject Files of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 1961-1974, Box 20, NA II.

impatient and disappointed minorities in developing countries may wish to reso rt in their s earch for shortcuts to effective national developm ent. They also suggest that Chinese Communist leadership itself m ay come to regard reso rt to violence as an ineffectiv e method of accelerating desired social change, and hopefully learn from Viet-Nam that an excessively costly one in light of China's own need to rely upon more norm al relations with countries in the non-Communist world." 118 In June, a second m eeting of the China Advisory Panel proposed that "the m ost effective approach is to dem onstrate U.S. flexibility by a series of relatively limited steps which will provide Communist China with a num ber of options, should it choo se to take them, in the direction of modifying its present position of unrelieved hostility toward the U.S." A participan t even shared gossip with the Panel: recently a Chinese diplomat told a Swedish diplomat that "the

U.S. is the only country that can help China's development."119

In sum , the Cultural R evolution only further reinforced the new im age of China as a

"frustrated modernizer. " More over, despite th e f act tha t Beijing n ow was unlike ly to b e responsive to any U.S. initiatives, several co nsiderations m ade the "containm ent without isolation" policy even more attractive to Washington.

One theme contained in the discussions m entioned above was the belief a mong America policy-makers that the new "containm ent without isolation" policy should target the so-called

"moderates" within the Beijing leadership, a group of Communists presum ably led by Zhou

Enlai. Since the genera l consensus was that the Cultura l Revolution would eventually f ail,

America should be prepared to deal with the m oderates who would control China' s polices after the Cultural Revolution or even after Mao' s death. On September 30, 1966, for exa mple, Jenkins

118 Memo by Robert Barnett, 11 May 1967, RG59 Lot File 72D139, Policy Planning Staff, Subject and Country Files, 1965-1969, Box 302, NA II. 119 China Advisory Panel Meeting, June 1967, RG59, Lot File 73D8, Subject Files of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 1961-1974, Box 20, NA II.

argued that "genuine m oderates do exist in the hierarchy, who believe Ch ina could best prosper by a return to the Bandung spirit. It is these, prim arily, to wh om we are signaling when we maintain a quiet, dignified stance, with carefully tailored offers of bridge-building." "I am

convinced," he declared, "that our signaling is having some effect." 120 On February 15, 1967,

Jenkins told LBJ that "what can be said [ of the current s ituation in China] is that the f orces of

moderation are on the m arch and are not likely to be stopped." 121 In March, the CIA reported

that the "m oderate" elem ents within the Chines e leadership started to "correct the wrongs on

economy" a lthough civil order in China had to be m aintained by the arm y.122 In Septem ber,

Rusk ordered all Am erican diplomatic posts abroad to pay close attention to any information on the Chinese economy and report back any change in Beijing' s policies.123 On September 19, the

Hong Kong Consulate reported that the full impact of the Cultu ral Revolution on the Chinese

economy had started to be felt in China as "the forward momentum of the recovery years, which

continued into 1966, has been lost." As a result , the moderates were trying to downplay politics

in production and install m ore pragmatic policies. 124 On Septem ber 28, J enkins concluded in a

memo specifically on Zhou Enlai that "there is evidence that he [Zhou] draws reasonable

conclusions from practical and dem onstrable realities in do mestic affairs and it m ay be that if

given a chance he would do so from deve lopments in inte rnational af fairs. " 125 In October, a

third China Advisory Panel m eeting observed th at "prosecution of the Cultural Revolution has

been moderated, with the Ar my dominant almost everywhere. Strong resist ance to what Mao is

120 Memo, Jenkins to Rostow, 30 September 1966, NSF, CF, China, Box 240, LBJL. 121 Memo, Jenkins to Rostow/LBJ, 15 February 1967, Ibid. 122 CIA, "The Impact of the Cultural Revolution on the Economy of Communist China," March, 1967, NSF, CF, China, Box 244, LBJL. 123 Telegram, Rusk to All Posts, 6 September 1967, RG59, CFPF, 1967-1969, Box 597, NA II. 124 Hong Kong to State, "The Chinese Economy in 1967," 19 September 1967, ibid. 125 Memo, Jenkins to Rostow, "Inside Chou En-lai," 28 September 1967, NSF, CF, China, Box 242, LBJL.

100

trying to do has now been clearly demonstrated." 126 On November 21, Jenkins further concluded that "the real drama, of course, is the slow death of communism as a politico-economic religion.

The Cultural Revolution is alm ost certainly a slow-motion Great Leap toward that demise... The

Cultural Revolution in recen t week s has broug ht us about full circle, with rem arkably little change from the status quo ante except a great deal of debris in the Revolution's wake. The point is that the status quo ante was a time of fairly steady change toward revisionism , which is what frightened Mao into cranking up the Cultural Revol ution in the first place. One way or another, in Chinese pace, we are in for a dynasty of a different character."127

Watching the unfolding drama in China, China-watchers like Jenkins became confident that

Maoism as a m odel of m odernization was doo med. The signs of the struggle between the moderates and the Maoists in China further su pported the idea that Am erican policy should target the m oderates who would eventually control China. Meanwhile, the John son administration also found signs indicating th at the Chin ese were becom ing cautious in thei r foreign policy. From early 1967 onward, Chinese leaders frequently said that China did not want a war with the U.S. 128 On May 3, for exam ple, Hughes told Rusk that Zhou had an interview with Simon Malley—"the first U. S. reporter [to interview Zhou] since [Edgar] Snow" and Zhou clearly wanted more communications with America.129 The next day, Jenkins told LBJ that "I am not convinced that the Chinese lead ers really believe in the ' inevitability' of war wi th the United

States."130

At the s ame time, however, th e Johnson administration continued to worry about Taiwan's policy toward the m ainland. In May 1967, C.K. Ye n, Vice President of the Nationalist Chinese

126 Memo, Jenkins to Rostow, 'China Discussion," 25 October 1967, ibid. 127 Memo, Jenkins to Rostow, "Cultural Revolution Developments," ibid. 128 See chapter 3 for detailed discussion. 129 Memo, Hughes to Rusk, 3 May 1967, NSF, CF, China, Box 241, LBJL. 130 Memo, Jenkins to Rostow/LBJ, 4 May 1967, ibid.

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government visited America. During a m eeting with LBJ, Yen said that the m ainland was being

consumed by chaos now and "in this situat ion chances for a reuni fication of China under

different leadership are greater than ever before."131 Although Johnson again refused to be drawn

into a war between Beijing and Taibei, he becam e worried that chao s in China m ight lead to a

virtual civil war that could ha ve repercussions well beyond the Chinese border. A subsequent study confirmed Johnson's concerns. The study pointed out that should a civil war break out i n

China, Chiang Kai-shek would take the chance to recapture the m ainland. However, the Soviet

Union would also get involved, si nce Moscow would take the opportu nity to reinstall a friendly government in China. In this case, it would be difficult for the U.S. not to get involved.132

Thus, although the Johnson adm inistration did not expect any reciprocal m oves from

Beijing, it realized the need to maintain an open and flexible posture toward China to avoid unnecessary provocations that might make the situation on the mainland worse. As Jenkins put it,

" the Chinese are more likely to come more in our direction if we curb our zeal." 133 In fact, Rusk quickly ordered American diplomats abroad no t to make any public comments that m ight hint

American encouragem ent of chaos on the m ainland.134 President Johnson even took a bolder

step. According to Rostow, "the most important diplomatic communication between Johnson and

Beijing" too k place in the summ er of 1967. In late June, J ohnson told the Rom anian Foreign

Secretary, I on Gheorgh e Maur er, who was visiting America, to de liver a m essage to Be ijing.

Johnson said that he wished neither war with China nor to change its for m of governm ent.

Rostow believed that th e message was delivered because the Chinese responded indirectly b y

131 Meeting Record, 12 May 1967, NSF, CF, China, Box 244, LBJL. 132 Special Study, "Chinese Civil War and the Soviet Union," 14 September 1967, NSF, CF, China, Box 242, LBJL. 133 Memo, Jenkins to Rostow, 20 August 1967, NSF, CF, China, Box 241, LBJL. 134 Memo, Rusk to LBJ, 25 September 1967, NSF, CF, China, Box 242, LBJL.

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suggesting that the W arsaw Talks be m oved from the virtually public locale of the Polish Place

of Culture to the privacy of the Chinese and American Embassies.135

By the end of 1967 and early 1968, the Johnson administration got more evidence showing

that the moderates in the Chinese leadership were slowly gaining the upper hand. On Nove mber

22, 1967, Jenkins reported that th e developments in the past few months in China "were

disastrous [for the Maoists], and brought recognition of certain realities resu lting in the shift to

moderation."136 On November 30, the CIA reported that the faction led by Zhou wa s trying to adjust differences among different political sects in China. 137 On December 19, Jenkins noticed

another sign of the rise of the m oderates: "business at the [ Canton] Fair was described as brisk

and m uch l ess obstructed by political ac tivity than was th e case last spring." 138 Sensing the encouraging trend in China, Rusk asked for a study on possible Chinese Communist membership in international technical organizations. He was told that "over the longer run, somewhat greater optimism may be justified. When the heavy political pressures created by the cultural revolution abate, the technical and scien tific fields are likely to be the most promising areas for expanding international contacts."139 On January 15, 1968, the CIA reported that in a confidential talk at the closing session of an Afro-Asi an conference, Zhou Enlai said that "he was greatly disturbed

about China's image abroad" due to the craziness of the Cultural Revolution and "claimed he was

now in firm control of China's foreign policy."140

135 Rostow, Concept and Controversy, p. 281. It was believed that in a more private place the Chinese delegates to the Warsaw Talk would be more flexible and forthcoming without fearing leaks to the Soviets. 136 Memo, Jenkins to Rostow, 22 November 1964, NSF, CF, China, Box 242, LBJL. 137 CIA, "Chinese Officials on Top-Level Chinese Factions," 30 November 1967, ibid. 138 Memo, Jenkins to Rostow, 19 December 1967, ibid. The Canton Fair, which was disrupted badly by the Cultural Revolution, was the only channel for the Chinese to conduct trade with other countries face-to-face. 139 Memo, Joseph Yager to Rusk, 22 December 1967, RG59 Lots File 72D139, Policy Planning Staff, Subject and Country Files, 1965-1969, Box 302, NA II. 140 CIA Intelligence Cable, 15 January 1968, NSF, CF, China, Box 242, LBJL.

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At the end of February 1968, therefore, the Johnson administration launched a last m ajor review of America's China policy, which produced four weighty m emos on China. The first was submitted to LBJ by a group of China scholars after the meeting between them and the President on February 2. 141 Since almost all of the scholars both testified during the Fulbright hearings on

China and joined the C hina Advisory Panel, it was not surprising that their memo was the m ost

"radical" one. "Dem onstration of our flexibility in China po licy is a va lid concept," the m emo stated. "U.S. policy is aim ed at the em ergence of a government on the m ainland which will live in pea ce with its ne ighbors and will s eek f or China prod uctive ar ticulation with the m odern world." It seem ed that the sc holars were optim istic that Be ijing, given the obvious disasters caused by the Cultural Revolution, would have no choice but to re spond to America' s new gestures. Thus the m emo recommended further relaxation of America's trade em bargo against

China. It also argued that America should not support Taiwan to return to mainland by civil war, and should drop previous opposition to Beijing's admission into the UN. 142

A second mem o was produced by the CIA, which perceived that the zeal of the C ultural

Revolution was declining. "After a year and a half of turm oil," the agency reported, "Peking' s major emphasis is on channeling the Cultural Re volution into non-disruptive channels, restoring order, and seeking to restore its controls over the country as a w hole and to reestablish a system of administration." Despite the fact that the CIA was asked to present a detached survey of the situation, which the ag ency did, the m emo st ill speculated a little about future U.S.-China relations. " While this situa tion co ntains obv ious elem ents of uncertainty and danger for the stability of East Asia, it also contains elem ents of opportunity for the United S tates," the memo concluded. "These elements revolve around the possi bility that the disillusionment over Maoism

141 The meeting was sponsored by the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, see Chapter 1. 142 Memo, Rostow to LBJ, 22 February 1968. The actual date of the China scholars' memo was February 12. NSF, CF, China, Box 243, LBJL.

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and the incr easingly pressing nature of China's internal problems will bring with them , on the part of a new leadersh ip, a re-reex amination of the prem ises and pr iorities of China' s f oreign policy."143

A third m emo was produced by Jenkins. He reminded Johnson again that the Chinese

Communists, still rem embering the "hundred years of ignom iny," wanted China' s national dignity restored. "Especially since the turn of the century, China has made increasingly urgent— almost frenzied—efforts to modernize into viability as a g reat power." However, after the Great

Leap Forward and now the disasters of the Cu ltural Revolution, "C hina was no longer the economic model for the Afro-Asian-Latin American world, and this fact began to register itself."

Like the authors of the other two memos, Jenkins also argued that America could take advantage of Beijing's failure to m odernize China, but he was more cautious. "So long as the true Maoists are in control, then, I think we can take it for granted that we will get no responses from any bridge-building efforts," he argued. "Our occas ional s tatements in th e ' ultimate rec onciliation' vein, as distinguished from tangible bridge-building offers, howev er, should be continued." At least, Jenkins thought, Am erica could help to "sharpen policy debates in Peking, and it seems certain that potential su ccessor leadership is we ll aware of its polic y options in our regard, if it should wish to test them." Jenk ins then recommended several limited steps toward China. First,

America "could afford to twist a rms in New Yo rk with less f erocity and anxiety on the Chinese

Representation issue...This is certainly no time to bring China into the UN, but I think there is no danger of it." Second, "we m ight keep adequate China trad e controls while removing the opprobrious 'trading with the enemy' label, and demonstrate readiness for future flexibility b y moving slightly from the total embargo wicket." Finally, "We should use the Warsaw talks more as an educational platform ...we should find excuses to weave in to our prepared m aterials at

143 CIA, "Communist China's Troubles and Prospects," 22 February 1968, ibid.

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Warsaw small discourses about the nature of the open world partly already arrived, partly just

around the corner: the overlapping, global patterns of social, ec onomic and cultural organization

constantly spawned by continuing revolutions in communication, travel and electronic wizardry;

the impossibility, today, of curtaining off a societ y if it ex pects to ke ep up with the advanced nations...[Just to] give the potential successors something to think about."144

The fourth m emo was subm itted to Johnson by Rusk. Not surprisingly, this was th e most

"conservative" one in tone and suggestion. "For immediate purposes, I believe we can take only very limited steps," Rusk cautioned, "since our firm posture in Asia generally remains crucial and any significant ' concessions' to Communist China would be seriously misunderstood in ke y quarters, not to m ention the Congress." Rusk ar gued that the war in Vietnam still required a tough stance toward China. "I co nclude with the basic thought that we m ust keep Communis t

China always in m ind in our choice of military actions in Viet-Nam and elsewher e," Rusk told

LBJ. "I do not think we are runni ng any significant risks on pres ent lines, but any proposal for new or increased action m ust take full account of this factor." However, Rusk still proposed some sm all steps such as extendin g the passport policy f or trave l to China so that any U.S. citizen could apply to go to China, and furt her relaxing the trade em bargo again st China. 145

Although Rusk himself was cautious on moves relating to China, he certainly did not discourage others to be m ore "radical." A few days before his m emo, for example, Rusk cleared a speech that W illiam Bundy was going to m ake. It hinted that the U.S. governm ent would consider recognizing the Beijing regim e if the latter would change its radi cal behavior. Rusk anticipated that the speech would provoke st rong negative reactions by Taiwa n, yet he thought that this might be a good thing. For Bundy's speech, "in addition to providing clearer basis for and greater

144 Memo, Jenkins to Rostow, "Thoughts on China," 22 February 1968, ibid. 145 Memo, Rusk to LBJ, "Policy Toward Communist China," 22 February 1968, ibid.

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flexibility in our Chin a policy, might possibly open way for m ore frank and realistic dialogue

with GRC c oncerning possibilities for long-rang e accommodation to its position on Taiwan in

manner which will meet both our national interests."146

The four memos, therefore, reconfirmed the Johnson administration's decision to pursue the

"containment without isolation" strategy regarding China, a stra tegy based on the new i mage of

China as a "frustrated modernizer." As Rostow remarked, although all m emos "believe that we are unlik ely to get appreciable recip rocation during the Maoist era from a ny attem pted rapprochement," they all "recommend certain steps to be ta ken unilaterally, where reciprocation is not expected, designed to incr ease contact and to signal to potential s uccessors to the Maoists that they will have policy options in our regard." 147 Indeed, in May 1968, Under Secretary of

State Katzenbach firm ly signaled to the worl d that "containm ent wi thout isolation" was

America's official stan ce toward China. In a speech deliv ered before the Nation al Press Club,

Katzenbach declared that the U.S. government did not seek to isolate China. He pointed out that

America recognized the existence of the Beijing regime and understood China's desire to become

a power respected by the world again. He further stated that the threat posed by Beijing "can be,

and perhaps at tim es has been, exaggerated" and Am erica would acknowledge China's

"legitimate security in terests of its own in As ia." Katzenbach concluded that America would

reciprocate any Chinese move to improve U.S.-China relations.148

As if to buttress Katzenbach' s speech, th e Johnson adm inistration, during its last few months, bec ame m ore inclined to b elieve th at a m oderate leade rship in China wa s rising. On

August 30, Rostow told LBJ that in China "the extreme left will die hard, for its death would mean nothing less than the failure of Mao' s utopian dreams. Nevertheless, the most recent swing

146 Telegram, Bundy to Taibei, 13 February 1968, NSF, CF, China, Box 242, LBJL. 147 Memo, Rostow to LBJ, 24 February 1968, NSF, CF, China, Box 244, LBJL. 148 Katzenbach, " A Realistic View of Communist China," 21 May 1968, DSB, June 10, 1968, pp. 737-740.

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to the conservatives appears to be highly signifi cant, in tha t it is broad er in scope, of clearer

definition, and likely to prove of greater permanence than any which have preceded." 149 On

October 4, Hughes reported to Ru sk that" there were indications that the end [of the Cultural

Revolution] m ight be in sight." 150 On October 5, reflecting on the recent Soviet invasion of

Czechoslovakia, Jenkins concluded that " in th e wake of the Czech developm ents the Chinese

evidently consider the Soviets rather than the U.S. as the prim ary threat."151 This new awareness

of the deteriorating Sino-Soviet split was conf irmed by a report from the Hong Kong Consulate

on October 29. It was reported that som e Chinese diplomats made "the first adult and rational

contact" s ince the Cultural Revo lution with the Norwegian am bassador to China, and the

Chinese ex pressed serious concerns about th e Soviet in vasion of Czechoslovakia and the implications for China.152

However, th e Katzenbach speech an d the Soviet invasion cam e too late for the Joh nson

administration to m ake major moves on the Ch ina issue. But from 1966 to 1968, the Johnson

administration firm ly e stablished "containm ent w ithout isolation" a basic strategy for future

U.S.-China relations. In Dece mber 1968, just be fore the departure of the Johnson team , the

Policy Planning Council of the State Department composed a paper entitled "U.S. Policy Toward

Communist China," a paper "prepared for the ne xt administration." After reviewing the m ajor

deliberations on China under LBJ, the paper concluded that "the long-range aim of United States

policy is a China which has been brought out of its largely self-im posed isolation, to becom e a

constructive member of the world community." 153 And to achieve that aim certainly was a major task of the incoming Nixon administration.

149 Memo, Rostow to LBJ, 30 August 1968, NSF, CF, China, Box 243, LBJL. 150 Memo, Hughes to Rusk, 4 October 1968, RG59, CFPF, 1967-1969, Box 1968, NAII. 151 Memo, Jenkins to Rostow, 5 October 1968, NSF, CF, China, Box 243, LBJL. 152 Hong Kong to State, 29 October 1968, ibid. 153 RG59 Lot File 72D139, Policy Planning Staff, Subject and Country Files, 1965-1969, Box 302, NA II.

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Conclusion

Between 1966 and 1968, the late Johnson adm inistration failed to achieve real breakthroughs in U.S.-China rapprochement. Although the Sino-Soviet split was further accepted in Washington as genuine, and there were scatte red reports of boarder c onflicts between the two

Communist powers, the general record remained silent on a possible triangular linkage am ong

China, the Soviet Union, and the United States. 154 This was partially because Johnson did not want to jeo pardize Sov iet-American deten te and partially because China' s hard-line po licy against both superpowers during the Cultural Revol ution made it hard to conceive of such a strategy. However, the image of China as a "fru strated modernizer" came to dominate American policy-makers' thinking on China. As a result, "containm ent without isolation" becam e a basic strategy. Although the Johnson administ ration tried to use such a stra tegy to regain the strategic initiative vis-à-vis China, its major interest was not in some immediate political dividends but in long-term U.S.-China relations. In late 1968, Johnson revealed his conviction that history was on the side of his new China strategy. While som e people "believe that the great thrust in the future will come from China a nd its Communist system," Johnson told Jack Valenti, "I don' t believe that at all...I see nothing in the future to dict ate that a Communist system is the direction other

Asian nations will take. History will have to be the judge of all this, but I am convinced I'm right and that Comm unism is wrong." 155 The Johnson adm inistration, therefore, fir mly laid the foundation for the later Sino-American rapprochement.

154 Such a conclusion, of course, risks reading history backward. 155 Jack Valenti, This Time, This Place: My Life in War, The White House, and Hollywood (New York: Harmony Books, 2007), p. 251.

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Chapter 3

Modernization and China's American Policy, 1966-1970

The conventional interp retation of China' s decision for rapprochement with the United

States em phasizes th e role of strategic and ge opolitical factors in Beijing' s calculations. The standard narrative argu es that Sin o-American rapprochem ent becam e a top priority on the

Chinese leadership' s foreign policy agenda only when the Soviet Union e merged as the m ost serious th reat to the P RC's nation al se curity in early 196 9. Especiall y, after the Sino-Soviet border clashes over Zhenbao Island ( Damansky Island in Russian) on the Ussuri River in March

1969, Mao Zedong and his colleagues decided to im prove relations with the United States in order to strengthen China's strategic position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. As a result, the Chinese leadership developed its own tria ngular diplomacy with the two Cold War superpowers to serve

China's security interests.1

While the importance of the strategic and geopolitical factors in Beijing's new relations with

the United States is undeniable , those factors alone do not fully exp lain China' s decis ion for

rapprochement with Am erica. Although the new st rategic environment in the afterm ath of the

Sino-Soviet border skirmishes made it necessary for China to adjust its relations with the United

States, that new environment does not explain why it was possible for China to improve relations

with Am erica, given China' s radical stance of fighting both superpowers during the 1960s.

1 For example, see John W. Garver, China's Decision for Rapprochement with the United States, 1968-1971 (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1982); Gordon H. Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972 (Stanford, CA.: Stanford University Press, 1990); Robert Ross, Negotiating Cooperation: The United States and China, 1969-1989 (Stanford, CA.: Stanford University Press, 1995). For similar views in the Chinese literature, see Gong Li, Mao Zedong waijiao fengyun lu (A Record of Mao Zedong's Diplomacy) (Zhengzhou: Zhongyuan nongmin, 1996); Tao Wenzhao, Zhongmei guanxi shi, 1949-1972 (A History of U.S.-China Relations) (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin, 2004).

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Indeed, some scholars have argued that in order to fully understand China's new America policy,

it is nece ssary to exam ine Chinese dom estic developments during the Cultura l Revolution. 2 In

light of this viewpoint, this ch apter discusses the relations between China's discourse on its own

modernization and Chi na's America policy. It argues that, in the minds of Mao and his

colleagues, the Chin ese Communist Revo lution was closely a ssociated with China 's

modernization. China's relations with both superpowers were deeply rooted in Beijing's constant

reinterpretation of China's model of modernization.

This chapter begins with a brief examination of the developmental experiences of the PRC

before 1966, and then discusses the general pattern of interaction between China's modernization

model and its Cold W ar stra tegies toward th e two superpowers. Next, I exam ine how Ma o

Zedong tried to consolidate th e Chinese m odel of moderniz ation through the Cultural

Revolution, and how that effort shaped his basi c perception of U.S.-Chi na relations. Finally, I

discuss the early Chinese m oves toward Si no-American rapprochem ent in 1969 and 1970,

focusing on how and why Beijing' s perception of China's modernization not only justified the

new relations with Washington, but also made the Chinese believe that they could negotiate with

America from a position of strength.

From the Soviet Model to the Chinese Model: 1949-1965

The term "modernization" was not unf amiliar to the leade rs of the Chinese Communist

Party (CCP). During the New Cultural Movement (1910s-1920s), most of the early CCP leaders,

including Mao him self, were ac tively involved in the national debate over China' s future. The

meaning of the very term "modernization," a key part of that national debate, was hotly contested

among Chi na's scholars and intellectuals. In general, two questions were asked: does

2 For example, see Chen Jian, Mao's China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill & London: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), Chapter 9; Robert Ross and Jiang Changbin, eds., Re-examining the Cold War: U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1954-1973 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), Chapter 10 & 11.

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modernization mean westernizati on or an universal m odel beyond the historical experience of

any specific hum an society? And, does the Russia n model after the October Revolution or the

western model best f it with China' s circumstances? Although the questions were by no m eans

solved at the end of the New Cultural Movem ent, it is well accepted by contem porary observers

and later scholars that Mao and his colleagues came to regard the Russian, and later the Soviet,

model as the one for modernizing China.3

In fact, Mao Zedong, the undisputed leader of the CCP since the 1930s, largely dictated the

strategy for China' s modernization once th e PRC was founded in 1949. Mao' s idea of

modernization was further divide d into two lay ers according to h is understanding of Marxism-

Leninism. The first layer was the so-calle d "econom ic founda tion," that is, China's

modernization first m eant rapid industrializat ion and greatly im proved "power of production."

Although one legacy of the New Cultural Movement was the realization of the cultural arrogance

associated with the very term "modernization," since its use im plied that by becoming "modern"

the Chinese people would necessarily become like the Americans or the Europeans, Mao himself

had no such scruples. In his report of March 1949 to the Second Plenum of the Se venth Party

Congress, Mao declared that th e future goal of the CCP wa s to "recover and develop production

quickly" and "transform China steadily from an agricultural country into an industrial country." 4

Indeed, Mao regarded industrialization as essential to China's modernization and he believed that industrialization was a key m arker of both capitalist and socialist societies, only that the future

PRC would have a higher level of industrialization as a socialist country.

3 For the most comprehensive discussions of the debate over "modernization" in Chinese literature, see Luo Rongqu, Xiandaihua Xinlun (A New Discussion of Modernization) (Beijing: Peking University Press, 1993); Luo Rongqiu and Niu Dayong, Zhongguo xiandaihua licheng de tansuo (Searching for China's Modernization) (Beijing: Peking University Press, 1992); Luo Rongqiu, eds. Cong xihua dao xiandaihua (From Westernization to Modernization) (Beijing: Huangshan shushe, 2008). 4 Mao, "Report to the Second Plenum of the Seventh Party Congress," 5 March 1949, in Mao Zedong xuanji (Selected Works of Mao Zedong) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1967), combined volume, p. 1327.

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At the sam e time, howe ver, Mao w as concerned with the second laye r of m odernization,

that is, the so-called "super-structures." A true Marxist-Leninist, Mao believed that "people," that

is, the working class and poor peasants in the Chinese context, should control the m eans of

production and political power. China' s industria lization should never allow the growth of a

powerful capitalist class that would control China's fate. Therefore, the only way to realize Mao's

blueprint was to follow the Soviet m odel of modernization. In his article "On the People' s

Democratic Dictatorship" issued on June 30, 1949, Mao made the famous choice of "leaning to

one side" regarding China' s fut ure developm ent. Aft er rev iewing China' s search for

modernization ever since the Opium W ar in the 1840s, Mao concluded that the efforts to "seek

truth from the W est" failed because "im perialist aggression shattered the fond dream s of the

Chinese about learning from the W est. It was very odd—why were the teachers always

committing aggression against thei r pupil?" Mao asserted that "t he Chinese learned a good deal

from the West, but they could not m ake it work a nd were never ab le to realize the ir ideals." On

the other hand, "the October Revolution helped progressives in China, as throughout the world,

to adopt the proletarian world outlook as the instrum ent for studying a nation' s destiny and

considering anew their own problem s." Mao th erefore decla red: " Follow the path of th e

Russians—that was their conclusion." He was convi nced that the future PRC must "lean to one

side" and join the socialist bloc led by the Soviet Union.5

As one of Mao' s m ost im portant theoretical works, "On the People' s De mocratic

Dictatorship" clearly expressed the insep arable r elationship be tween China' s dom estic

development and its foreign policies. First, the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Revolution was based upon the prom ise that the CCP woul d lead China on the road toward modernization.

5 Mao, "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship." English translation quoted in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1961), Vol. 4. For the Chinese version, see Mao Zedong Xuanji (Selected Works of Mao Zedong) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1991), 2nd Edition, Vol. 4, pp. 1468-1482.

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Second, "leaning to one side" was not just a forei gn policy statement; it was also an "inevitable

historical choice" of following the Soviet m odel of modernization. Therefore, after the new PRC

was founded in October 1949, Mao traveled to the Soviet Union at year's end to seek a treaty that

would materialize the "leaning to one side" strategy. In Moscow, Mao told Stalin that "the treaty

should include political, econom ic, cultu ral, and m ilitary cooperation [between our two

countries]. And the most im portant cooperation is econom ic cooperation." 6 The Sino-Soviet

Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, which Stalin granted to Mao in February

1950, not only improved the PRC's national security, but also extended economic aid to China by sending Soviet economic advisors and providing lo ans to China. Upon returning to China, Mao told the p articipants of a Par ty m eeting tha t while he was in the S oviet Union he "was particularly interested in the history of Soviet econom ic construction." "When we toured their

industries," Mao said, "it was lik e small kids looking at the grow n-ups, because the level of our

industrialization is very low." He then concluded that "t he developm ental history of the first

socialist country is the best example for us, and we should learn from them."7

When the Chinese launched th e first Five-Year Plan (FYP) in 1953, therefore, they copied

heavily from the Soviet m odel of modernization. 8 In g eneral, the first FYP had three featu res.

First, it was initiated upon the com pletion of the so-called socialist tran sformation in 1953; that

is, th e chan ge from private to s tate and co llective ownership in agriculture, industry, and

commerce. Second, Beijing set up various Party and governmental organs, which highlighted the

role of central econom ic planning and m inimized the function of the fr ee market. Finally, the

planning m echanism allocated resources overw helmingly into the developm ent of heavy

6 CCP Central Committee Party Literature Research Center, Mao Zedong Zhuan, 1949-1976 (A Biography of Mao Zedong) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 2004), Vol. 1, pp. 45-46. 7 Meeting Record, 3 March 1950, in Ibid., p. 53. 8 For detailed discussions, see two recently published works. One is in Chinese: Hu Angang, Zhongguo zhengzhi jingji shilun, 1949-1976 (A History of China's Political Economy) (Beijing: Qinghua University Press, 2007), Chapter 4. The other is in English, Hua-yu Li, Mao and the Economic Stalinization of China, 1948-1953 (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006).

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industry, and the rural areas only functioned to produce f unds and raw m aterials for heavy

industry. Mao and his colleagues believed that th ere were only two mode ls of m odernization.

One was the Western model, under which industrialization started with light industry and usually

took 50 to 100 years before achieving full industr ialization. The other was the Soviet m odel, which started with capital-intensive heavy industry and achieved full industrialization within one or two decades. The PRC leaders, given their eage rness to modernize China, did not hesitate to pick up the Soviet model.9 Mao even argued that it was necessary to sacrifice the development of agriculture and light industry temporarily in order to achieve rapid industrialization.10

The first F YP was a successful application of the Soviet m odel in China. Industry maintained an average annual growth rate of 18 %, while the average ag ricultural annual growth rate was 4.5%. In terms of the total GDP, the proportion of industry was increased from 43.1% in

1952 to 56.7% in 1957. The proport ion of heavy industry was increased from 35.5% in 1952 to

45% in 1957. 11 At the same time, however, some CCP leaders, such as Liu Shaoqi, Chen Yun,

and to a lesser extent, Zhou Enla i, started to question the Soviet model. During late 1955 and

early 1956, CCP leaders perceived the dangerous ly growing gap between heavy industry and

agriculture and started to reevaluate the Soviet m odel. Mao himself rethought the Soviet m odel.

The result was an m ajor article on econom y issued by Mao on April 25, 1956, "On the T en

Major Relationships." In this article, Mao cri ticized "copying the Soviet Union blindly." He

further proposed to adjust the Soviet model in several ways. Fi rst, Mao argued that while the

development of heavy industry was still to be emphasized, more resources should be channeled

to agriculture and light industry. Second, he sugge sted that the central governm ent should relax

9 For deliberation on the two models, see Mao Zedong Zhuan, Vol.1, p. 273. 10 See ibid., pp. 274-275. 11 State Statistic Bureau, Xinzhongguo wushi nian, 1949-1999 (Fifty Years of the New China) (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji, 1999), p. 23.

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its centralized econom ic planning and allow local governm ents and individual factories to have

more autonomy. Finally, Mao said that instead of only learning from the Soviet Union, China should also send students to al l developed capitalist countries to acquire technologies and

managerial know-how. 12 Encouraged by Mao, both Zhou Enlai and Chen Yun, the fift h-ranking

CCP official in charge of economic planning, proposed during the Eighth Party Congress held in

September that, in the future, China should maintain a more balanced relationship between heavy and consumer industry. In May 1958, during the Second P lenum of the Eighth Party Congress,

Liu Shaoqi, now the second-ranking CCP official and Mao's heir apparent, formally articulated a strategy known as "walking with two legs," that is, a balanced development of heavy industry

and other economic sectors.13

As Mao himself later recalled, between the publication of "On the Ten Major Relationships"

and the Eighth Party Congress, China tried to fi nd a developmental model that would fit China's

reality by openly challenging the Soviet m odel.14 However, the new Chi nese model would slow

down the growth rate of heavy industry, a key i ndictor of industrialization in Mao' s eyes. The

impatient Chairm an decided to launch the so -called Great Leap Forward (GLF) in 1958, a movement that turned out to be a major econom ic disaster for China. To be sure, the GLF was not a return to the Soviet m odel. Rather, Mao regarded it as a genuine Chinese model toward modernization in that the whol e campaign relied on rapid collectivization of ag riculture. M ao

turned to m ass mobilization of the Chinese wo rkers and pe asants, believing that the mobilized

mass could quickly reduce the ga p between heavy industry and ag riculture. By doing so, Mao

believed that China could quickly achieve industri alization. In fact, he announced that China' s

12 For full text of this article, see Mao Zedong xuanji, Vol. 5, pp. 267-288. 13 Hu, Zhongguo zhengzhi jingji shilun, 1949-1976, pp. 209-210. For Chen Yun, see Nocholas R. Lardy and Kenneth Lieberthal, eds, Chen Yun's Strategy for China's Development: A Non-Maoist Alternative (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1983). 14 Mao Zedong zhuan, vol. 2, pp. 485-486.

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goal was to surpass Great Britain and the United States in industrial production within 7 years and 15 years, respectively.15

When the GLF ended disastrously in the early 1960s, Mao' s own credibility was tarnished

and the CCP abandoned Mao' s radical economic strategy. Mao himself was forced to adm it that

"it would take m ore than 100 years to build soci alism in China" and wanted to return to the

balanced economic strategies propo sed at the E ighth Party Congress. 16 By this tim e, however, the Sino-Soviet split had escalated and the Sov iet Union had withdraw n its econom ic advisors from China. As a result, China's economic exchange with the Soviet bloc was sharply reduced.

CCP leaders responded in two ways. On the one hand, they increasingly em phasized that

China would follow its own model of modernization. In February 1962, during a CCP's Politburo meeting, Liu Shaoqi, Chen Yun, and Zhou Enlai proposed to spend five years on econom ic recovery and decided to em phasize the development of agriculture and light industry first. 17 On

the other hand, China started to emphasize so-called "self-reliance." In other words, China would downplay the importance of foreign trade and develop an extreme "import substitution" strategy.

Thus, on January 1, 1966, Renmin Ribao (People's Daily) in an editor ial hailed at the success of the Chines e m odel after several y ears of eco nomic reco very from the GLF. The editorial welcomed the year of 1966 as th e starting point of the third FYP, and urged the Chinese people

to continue econom ic construction. After lis ting the m ajor achievem ents in agriculture and industry since 1962, the editorial boasted that China now had become the first nation in the world that paid of f all its externa l debts. Th e pressures from "U.S. imperialism " and "Soviet

15 Hu, Zhongguo zhengzhi jingji shilun, 1949-1976, Chapter 5; Mao Zedong zhuan, vol. 2, Chapter 19-20. 16 Bo Yibo, Ruogan zhongda jiece yu shijian de huigu (Reflections on Some Important Decisions and Events) (Beijing: Zhongyang danxiao, 1993), Vol. 2, p. 677. Bo himself was a high-ranking CCP official in charge of economic planning. 17 This meeting is also known as the "Xi Lou (West Building) Meeting." See Chen Yun wenxuan (Selected Works of Chen Yun) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1995), Vol. 3, pp. 191-206; He Peng, Mao Zedong shidai de zhongguo, 1949-1976 (China in the Mao Era) (Beijing: Zhonggong danshi, 2003), Vol.2, p. 222.

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revisionism," the editorial asse rted, only further convinced Ch ina of the va lidity of "self -

reliance."18

The above brief survey of the PRC' s developmental experiences s hows that between 1949

and 1965, China gradually developed its own mode l of modernization. Although this Chinese

model was not a com plete break from the Soviet one—heavy industry wa s still emphasized and

central economic planning was st ill important—the CCP lea ders did regard this model as m ore

suitable to the Chinese reality. Moreover, they regarded this model as a genuine alternative to the

Soviet model because it recognized the fact that China was still an agricultural society and thus

the road toward socialism in China was bound to be different.

Modernization and China's Relations with the Two Superpowers: 1949-1966

A close relationship existed between China' s modernization and its re lations with the two

superpowers. CCP leaders understood that Chin a's m odernization was bound to be associated

with the changing Cold War environm ent. Indeed, the twists and turns in China's modernization

strategy both affected and were affected by Chin a's relations with the Soviet Union and the

United States.

When Mao announced the "lean to one side" strategy, the decision to follow the Soviet road

was accompanied simultaneously by the rejection of the Western model of modernization, which

was manifested primarily through the United States. Between August and Decem ber 1949 the

Xinhua News Agency of the CCP published six editorials on The China White Paper issued by

the U.S. State Departm ent. These six articles, la rgely written by Mao him self, argued that the

U.S. econom ic m odel was the very antithesis of the Chinese Commu nist Revolution. Should

China follow the U.S. m odel, the predictabl e result would be the perm anent econom ic

18 Editorial, "Be Prepared for the Third FYP—Devoted to the New Year," 1 January 1966, Renmin Ribao (RMRB).

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exploitation of China by the U.S. and its "running dog," the Nationalist Chinese governm ent.19

Indeed, although scholars continued to debate w hether or not there was a lo st chance for better

Sino-American relations during the 1949-50 time period, the fundamental difference between the

CCP and America over the road to modernity made a more cordial relationship unlikely.20

Hence, in late 1949, the CCP started to conf iscate and nationalize industries owned by the

U.S. and other European countries. In July 1949, Zhou Enlai, who soon would become the Prime

Minister of the PRC, declared at a Party conf erence that th e first goal of the New China was

economic reconstruction and "we m ust expel imperialist forces from China, fight against the

economic embargo imposed on China, and turn the colonial and semi-colonial Chinese economy

into an independent econom y." 21 On Septem ber 29, 1949, the first meeting of the Chinese

People's Politica l Cons ultative Conference passed a reso lution as th e guide line f or China' s

economic reconstruction, which dictated that "t he People's Republic of China m ust end all the

privileges enjoyed by the im perialist countri es in China, and confiscate and nationalize

bureaucratic capital."22 PRC leaders were certain ly not in a hurry to establish friendly relations

with the West.

But CCP leaders were not pursuing a confront ational policy toward th e West either. The

overwhelming concern at that tim e was to m ake sure that China could have a peaceful

international environm ent for its m odernization. During his first m eeting with Stalin in 1950,

Mao told the Soviet lea der that "currently the most important issue is to m aintain international

peace. China needs a peaceful time period of 3 to 5 years for econom ic recovery." He then asked

19 For the six editorials, see Zhongmei guanxi ziliao huibian (A Compilation of Documents on U.S.-China Relations) (Beijing: Shijie zhishi, 1957), Vol. 1, pp. 1-28. 20 For example, see Hong Zhang, America Perceived: The Making of Chinese Images of the United States, 1945-1953 (Westport, CT.: Greenwood Press, 2002); Simei Qing, From Allies to Enemies: Visions of Modernity, Identity, and U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1945-1960 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007). 21 Zhou Enlai xuanji (Selected Works of Zhou Enlai) (Beijing: Renmin chubanse, 1980), Vol. 1, pp. 259-365. 22 "Joint Resolution of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference", in Central Archive, Zhonggong Zhongyan wenjian xuanji (Selected Documents of the CCP Central Committee) (Beijing: Zhongyang danxiao, 1987), Vol. 14, p. 146.

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Stalin: "The CCP Central Comm ittee entrusted m e to ask for your opinions—how and to what

extent international peace could be preserved?" Stalin answered that "there is no direct threat of

war to China right now...If we work together, we can maintain peace for te n years, even twenty

to twenty-five years."23 Stalin's comment was encouraging to the CCP leaders and thus Mao was not in a hur ry to im prove rela tions with the W est, and particularly with the U.S. Instead, he announced two new policies known as "m aking a fresh start ( lingqi luzao)" and "cleaning our

house before inviting guests." Under the firs t policy, Beijing refused to acknowledge all the

"unequal" a nd "hum iliating" tr eaties and ag reements signe d between the W estern powers and

China before the establishm ent of the PRC. Under the second policy, CCP le aders were

determined to elim inate the e conomic and cultura l influence of the W est in China first before

establishing new relations with the West.24 According to Wang Bingnan, a high-ranking official

in charge o f f oreign af fairs and la ter the f irst Chinese ambassador to the Sino-Am erican

Ambassadorial Talk, those two policies were dir ected particula rly toward eliminating the

"thoughts of worshiping and fearing the U.S. blindly."25

Convinced that there was no i mmediate threat of war, CCP leaders were also not in a hurry

to copy the Soviet m odel. In fact, in earl y 1950, Liu S haoqi proposed that given China' s economic reality, the PR C should first develop agriculture and light industry and gradually shift to the developm ent of heavy industry. 26 Yet the breakout of the Korean W ar shattered L iu's

proposal. Scholars now agree that a key m otivation behind China' s intervention in the war was

the perceived threat from the U.S. to the m ajor Chinese in dustrial base in Manch uria. Chinese

leaders were also convinced that should the No rth Korean regim e be crushed, China would not

23 Mao Zedong zhuan, Vol. 1, p. 33. 24 Ibid., pp. 57-58. 25 Wang Bingnan, Zhongmei huitan niunian huigu (Nine Years of Sino-American Talks: A Retrospect) (Beijing: Shijie zhishi, 1985), p. 4. 26 For Liu's proposal, see Liu Shaoqi xuanji (Selected Works of Liu Shaoqi) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1985), Vol. 2, p.4.

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be able to enjoy a peaceful internati onal environment for economic development.27 Once China

was involved in the war, its econom y was quickly shifted to support the fi ghting. In Novem ber

1950, Chen Yun announced that now the econom ic construction "should be carried out around

supporting the Korean War," which "would be different from econom ic plans during peace

time." He further dictated that war-related heav y industry should be developed first. Thus, the

Korean War had an im portant impact on China' s modernization strategy. On the one hand, the

war forced China to adopt the Soviet m odel immediately and silenced di fferent voices. On the other hand, although the war did put trem endous pressures on the econom y, the Chinese economy proved to be able to s upport the war efforts and even achieved real economic growth.

Mao and other economic planners obviously did not expect this; rather, the unexpected good performance of the Chinese economy convinced th e CCP leaders of the validity of the Soviet model.28

As noticed in the last section, CCP leaders started to challenge the Soviet m odel in 1956.

The reevaluation of the Soviet m odel and the GLF launched in 1958 were inseparable from

China's Col d W ar strategies. The Soviet leader Khrushchev' s secret sp eech on Sta lin and the

following crises in Poland and Hungary were shocking to Mao. On the one hand, the disasters of

Soviet agricultural collectivization under Stalin forced Chinese leaders to reevaluate China's own

growing gap between heavy indus try and agriculture and Mao st arted to support a new Chinese

model.29 On the other hand, Mao started to perceive that the new Soviet leadership wa s drifting

away from true Communism . The com plete "de- Stalinization" laun ched by Khrushchev was

wrong, Mao insisted. The basic principles of m odernization under the Soviet m odel were still

27 See, for example, Chen Jian, Mao's China and the Cold War, Chapter 4. 28 Mao Zedong zhuan, Vol.1, pp. 172-173; Liu Rixin, Xinzongguo jingji jianshe jianshi (A History of the PRC's Economic Construction) (Beijing: Zhonhyang wenxian, 2006), pp. 56-59. Chen Yun's remark quoted is on page 57. 29 Mao Zedong zhuan, Vol. 2, p. 483. Liu, Xinzongguo jingji jianshe jianshi, pp. 134-138.

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correct for the Soviet U nion, only they were dist orted by Stalin. Therefor e, Mao argued that the

new Chinese model was the true heir of Marxism -Leninism and China must fight against Soviet

"revisionism."30 To support his criticism of Khrushche v, Mao started to talk openly about how

the CCP was treated badly by the Soviet Union in the past and decided to launch the GLF.31

Beijing's attitud e towa rd W ashington was al so inf luenced by the shif t in China' s

modernization strategy. The Korean War, Mao conc luded, helped to delay the "third world war"

and the Cold War entered into another peace period which would last 10 to 15 years according to

Mao's estimation. Thus Mao believed that China achieved two major strategic goals through the

war: a n ew peaceful in ternational environment advantageous to China' s economic development

and increased international status of the PRC. 32 Meanwhile, the initial su ccess of the first FYP

played a k ey role in C hina's peace offensiv e at the 1954 Geneva Conference an d the 1955

Bandung Conference. When Zhou E nlai announced the five principles of "peaceful coexistence"

and proposed talks with the Am erican government, he was confident that now China could face

up to Am erica as an equal power. Z hou's decision to invite Am erican journalists to visit China

further revealed China' s confidence that on ce Americans saw China with th eir own eyes, they would be convinced of Ch ina's developmental model. 33 At the sam e time, however, China was

still suspicious about A merica's potential negative im pact on Ch ina's modernization. According

to Wang Bingnan, once the U.S.-C hina Ambassadorial Talks started, Ma o and Zhou instructed

30 For Mao's early critiques of Khrushchev, see, Mao Zedong, "On the Historical Experience of Proletarian Dictatorship" and "More on the Historical Experience of Proletarian Dictatorship," published in RMRB, 5 April and 29 December 1956, respectively. 31 The literature on the early development of Sino-Soviet split is growing fast. For example, see Odd Arne Westad, eds., Brothers in Arm: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945-1963 (Washington, DC.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998); John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997),Chapter 3. For works in Chinese, see Yang Kuisong, Mao Zedong yu mosike de enenyuanyuan (Turbulent Relations between Mao Zedong and Moscow) (Nanchang: Jiangxi renmin, 1999). 32 For Mao's conclusion, see Mao Zedong's speech on September 12, 1953 at a Party meeting, in Mao Zedong junshi wenji (Compilation of Mao Zedong's Military Works) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1993), Vol. 6, pp. 353-355. 33 Wang Bingnan, Zhongmei huitan niunian huigui, p. 18, pp. 46-49. Xia Yafeng, Negotiating with the Enemy: U.S.-China Talks during the Cold War, 1949-1972 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), Chapter 4.

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him to focus on the Taiwan problem first and br ush aside other trivial Am erican proposals. The

CCP leadership did not expect a quick settlement on the Taiwan issue. Yet Mao wanted to send a

clear signal to Am erica: China now could cont rol its own fate and China would not allow

American influence sneaking into China again while bypassing the Taiwan issue.34

American negotiators clearly understood this m essage. U. Al exis Johnson, W ang's first

American counterpart in the Talks, observed that after the founding of the PRC, "all rem nants of

the degrading colonial era had to be banished so that the new China could regain the pride and

strength of the old. The United States had been an important supporter of the colonial powers, and now wa s pre-eminent among them. Thus, it wa s natural that Am erica should becom e the

chief target of China' s new m asters."35 A later Am erican study also con cluded that "the United

States was the epitom e of the economic and technological stre ngth of the W est that was

responsible for China' s exploitation and its resultant backwardness. " Therefore, in dealing with

the U.S., Beijing's goal was "how to m odernize China without becoming dependent on, and thus

exploited by, the West."36

As Khrushchev becam e a revision ist in Mao' s eyes, China replaced the early open -minded

Bandung line with a more rigid rh etoric toward Am erica. In his m ind, Mao believed that the

Soviet Union had becom e "soft" as a result of Soviet-Am erican detente, and the so-called

"peaceful evolution" strategy proposed by America's Secretary of State John Dulles worked quite

well in the Soviet Union. In November 1959, Ma o presided over a conference in Hangzhou and

for the first tim e system atically discussed th e "peaceful evolution " st rategy. Mao argued that

"America did not dare to start a world war right now." Instead, America turned to economic and

34 Wang, Zhongmei huitan niunian huigui, pp. 41-42. 35 U. Alexis Johnson, The Right Hand of Power (Englewood Cliffs, NY.: Prentice-Hill, 1984), pp. 230-231. 36 Alfred D. Wilhelm, The Chinese at the Negotiating Table (Washington DC.: National Defense University Press, 1994), p. 38, 21.

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cultural tools to achieve its goal of aggression and e xpansion. Mao warned that Am erica wanted

to "use peaceful evolution to change us and corrupt u s f rom within" and "cap italism is being

restored in the Soviet U nion." Mao therefore urged the CCP leader s to be aware of this problem

and to fight against revisionism by all means necessary.37

Meanwhile, the econom ic recovery after the GL F raised Mao' s suspicion that revisionism

was growing in China too. Mao started to critic ize Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, who were in

charge of the economic recovery, of putting too much emphasis on economic development while

ignoring class struggle. 38 At the same tim e, Chi na adopted a more aggressive attitude toward

both superpowers. Between 1962 and 1965, the Sino-S oviet split escalated, as the great debate

between the Communist giants became emotional and confrontational. During this debate, China

announced that th e socialist cam p ceased to exis t and that the Soviet Union had becom e a

socialist-imperialist co untry. 39 Meanwhile, China openly supporte d the Hanoi regim e in the

Vietnam War, and th e U.S-China Am bassadorial Talks becam e a vehicle for Chin a to accu se

America of being the enemy of the "oppressed peoples" of the whole world. Indeed, the Chinese

abandoned the early, m ore relaxed attitude regarding cultural exchanges with the United States.

As Kenneth Young observed, while in the 1950s the Chinese tried to put Am erica on the

defensive by initiating exchanges of journalists, during the early 1960s th ey refused to discuss

similar ideas proposed by the Kenn edy and Johnson administrations. 40 A China struggling

against revisionism , Beijing obviously believed, would becom e vulnerable to Am erica's

"peaceful evolution."

37 Xu Xuechu and Zhou Yongzhang, Mao Zedong yangzhong de meiguo (America in Mao's Eyes) (Beijing: Wenshi chubanshe, 1996), pp. 143-144. 38 See Liu, Xinzongguo jingji jianshe jianshi, Chapter 11. Mao Zedong zhuan, Vol. 3, Chapter 29-30. 39 See Mao Zedong zhuan, Vol. 3, Chapter 31. The most important documents related to this Sino-Soviet debate were nine "comments" published by China on the Soviet Union. 40 Kenneth Young, Negotiating with the Chinese Communists: The United States Experience, 1953-1967 (New York: McGraw- Hill, 1968), p. 132-134.

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In sum, China's relations with the two Cold War superpowers were closely associated with

China's m odernization strategy. The shift from the Soviet m odel to the Chinese model was

inseparable from China's perception of the Sovi et Union as a revision ist power. And im proved

relations with the United States would im ply the correctness of the Soviet line and thus put the

Chinese m odel of m odernization a t r isk. Mo reover, a s we shall se e below, th e Cultur al

Revolution launched by Mao in 1966 was a ren ewed struggle against the threat to the Chinese

model both at hom e and from abroad. The result of the Cultural Revolution, however, created a

new environment in which improved Sino-American relations became possible.

China's "Grand Strategy" Toward America: 1965-1968

The so-called Great P roletarian Cultural Re volution dram atically radicalized China's

domestic politics, created chaos and armed conflicts in China, and paralyzed the Chinese policy-

making mechanism, especially during its initial years. Although the CCP announced in 1969 that

the Cultural Revolution had ended, the general consensus is that it lasted from 1966 to 1976, and

the trend toward the Cultural Revolution certainl y started in the early 1960s. A comprehensive

discussion of the Cultural Revolution is beyond the scope of this chapter, but it is sufficient to

say here that Mao' s perception of Soviet revisi onism and hi s fear about restored capitalism at

home played a key role in his decision to la unch this decade-long political campaign. When the

Cultural Revolution started, Mao called for struggles against the so-called "capitalist roaders,"

and those CCP leaders who were in charge of the economic recovery after the GLF, including

Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, Li Xia nnian, Bo Yibo, and Li Fuchun, were a mong the

first officials falling from Mao's grace.41

41 For the classic work in English dealing with the origins of the Cultural Revolution, see Roderick MacFarquhar, The Origins of the Cultural Revolution (London: Oxford University Press, 1974-1997), 3 Vols.

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The zealou s struggle agains t revisionism m ade it im possible for Beijing to respond positively toward the peace feelers from Washington. In fact, at the initial s tage of the Cultu ral

Revolution, China ceased to have a foreign polic y, let alon e an Am erican policy. Al most all

Chinese ambassadors were recalled home for "reeducation," and most of them were verbally and even physically abused by the Red Guards or other "rebel factions" as soon as they returned. The

Foreign Ministry quickly sunk into chaos, with Chen Yi, the Foreign Minister, being subjected to endless "criticism and self-criticism " at m ass rallies. Zhou Enlai, the top executive of China' s foreign policy next to Mao, essentially becam e a fire-fighter. A quick glim pse at Zhou's records during th is period would reveal that his daily job becam e rushing fro m one place to anoth er, arguing with different m ass groups, and protecting o fficials like Chen Yi from being abused at much as he could. 42 Under this situation, the small steps taken by the Johnson administration toward U.S.-China rapprochem ent were doom ed to fail. Indeed, W ang Guoquan, who replaced

Wang Bingnan in 1964 as the Chin ese representative in the U. S.-China Ambassadorial Talks , later recalled a "lost opportunity" in March 1966 after the 129th Sino-American meeting. At that meeting, U.S. a mbassador John Gro nouski said th at the U.S. was willin g to develo p bilateral relations with "the People' s Republic of Chin a." After the m eeting, the Am erican interpreter asked Wang if he noticed the use of the term "People's Republic of China" by the A merican side for the first time. Wang later recalled that he "heard this term very clearly" and he imm ediately filed a report to Beijing. However, his report was lost in the chaos of the Cultural Revolution and

Wang himself was soon recalled back to China. At home, Wang was abused by Red Guards and

42 For the chaos in China's foreign policy, see Barbara Barnouin and Yu Changgen, Chinese Foreign Policy during the Cultural Revolution (London: Kegan Paul International, 1998); Ma Jisen, The Cultural Revolution in the Foreign Ministry of China (Hong Kong: the Chinese University Press, 2004). For Zhou's daily rescue efforts, see CCP Central Committee Party Literature Research Center, Zhou Enlai nianpu , 1949-1976 (Chronology of Zhou Enlai) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1989), Vol. 3.

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demoted from his position. "We lost a chance to improve Sino-American relations," Wang wrote,

" It was a very regretful thing in our nation's history of diplomacy."43

This incident was certainly not a "lost oppor tunity" in Mao' s eyes. Any accomm odation to the Am erican peace f eelers would constitute a "surren der" both to im perialism and to revisionism. However, although China did not have an "operable" American policy in a technical sense, CCP leaders, and especially Mao himself, certainly did not stop thinking about U.S.-China relations. And Mao indeed had a loosely defined "grand strategy" toward Am erica, which was closely associated with his judgm ent of the th reat to China' s moderniz ation. This "gra nd strategy" had three in terrelated parts: the issu e of war and peace with the U.S., the perceived decline of Am erican power both domestically and intern ationally, and the issue of isolating

America by encouraging trade w ith other capitalist countries. As we shall see, this "grand strategy" paved the way for a dramatic turn in Beijing's attitude toward Am erica in 1969 and

1970.

Mao did not intend the Cultural Revolution to slow down China's modernization. Rather, he regarded the Cultural Revolution as the only way to push forward China's modernization without restoring capitalism. In fact, the overall slogan of the Cultural Revolution, which appeared in big red characters as the letterhead of government-issued documents, was "emphasize revolution and accelerate production" (zhua gemin, cu shengchan). Mao was not against the econom ic recovery after the GLF per se; afte r all, he him self recognized that the GLF, as a forced effort to modernize China overnight, was a disaster. Rather, he was worri ed about the m ethods used by the CCP officials like L iu Shaoqi and Deng Xi aoping. In Mao' s eyes, Liu and Deng' s emphasis

43 Wang Guoqian, "Wo de dashi shengya" (My Career as An Ambassador), in Dangdai zhongguo shijie waijiao shengya (Careers of Contemporary Chinese Ambassadors) (Beijing: Shijie zhishi, 1995), Vol. 2, 154-155.

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on "material incentives" and "economic laws" constituted a veiled effort to restore capitalism.44

Moreover, Mao becam e concerned that Party officials and cadres had beco me a privileged new class detached from the m asses and his revoluti onary ideals. Mao was c onvinced that this new class would evolve into a new cap italist class in China, just like what happened in the Soviet

Union. Mao's old age was certainly another factor that contributed to his sense of racing against time, as he frequently said during 1965 that he was going to "see Marx" (to die) soon and he was not so sure what the next generation would do with revisionism . Therefore, Mao used the

Cultural Re volution to "rec tify" th e er rors of those "capitalis t ro aders" by urging people to uphold class struggle while carrying out economic construction.45

Mao's sense of the weakness of the Chinese re volution pushed him to rethink the issue of

war and peace with the United States. And he r eached a seemingly contradictory conclusion: on

the one hand, Mao argued that an all-out war wi th the United States would not break out in the

near future; on the other hand, he urged the Party officials to prepare for a war with Am erica.

Mao's attitude was vividly reveal ed by the d ismissal of two Part y officials, W ang Jiaxiang and

Luo Riqing, during the early year s of the Cultural Revo lution. Wang was one of the m ost senior

CCP officials and had served as the first Chines e ambassador to the Soviet Union. On February

7, 1962, Wang drafted a guideline for China' s fo reign policy. W ang argued that "we do not regard a [new] world war as inevitable. We do not regard the contradictions between the socialist

camp and the im perialist camp as making a world wa r inevitable." He concluded that "the idea

that as long as im perialism exists, peaceful coexistence is im possible...is wrong." W ang then

proposed that China should adopt a flexible policy, including negotiating with Am erica to settle

44 Liu and Deng argued that the government should use material incentives to raise people's stakes in economic production and therefore encourage rapid growth. Mao believed that the revolutionary spirit of serving the people should be emphasized. Liu and Deng argued that economic growth had its own laws, and regarded the GLF as a violation of those laws which was doomed to fail. Mao thought those "laws" were actually capitalist laws. 45 For the development of Mao's thoughts before the Cultural Revolution, see Mao Zedong zhuan, Vol. 4, Chapter 34.

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international disputes. 46 On February 27, W ang, t ogether with two other officials, sent a joint

memo to Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, and Chen Yi. In this memo, Wang argued that "the job of

our dip lomatic endeavor is to ach ieve a long -term peaceful internation al env ironment for ou r

socialist co nstruction" and he im plied that it was irra tional to rais e tensions with the two

superpowers at the same time.47 Mao was not pleased. In July, he critic ized Wang's approach as

"alienating the Left and streng thening the Right." S ubsequently, Wang adopted a tougher stance

against the United States during an August international conference. Mao thus commented: "[it is good to] m ake a m istake in July and correct it in August." 48 Although refuted by Mao, W ang

maintained his position. In 1966 he even be came the head of the International Liaison

Department of the CCP Central Committee, the Party organ of foreign policy-m aking. Yet once the Cultural Revolution started, W ang was quickly labeled as a r evisionist and dism issed from his office.49

Luo Ruiqing shared a sim ilar fate with W ang yet for the exact oppos ite reasons. In 1965,

Luo, who was also a senior Party official, was th e head of the Chinese police and the deputy of

Lin Biao, China's new Defense Minister and a key supporter of Mao's Cultural Revolution. After

America's escalation of the Vietnam W ar in early 1965, Luo started to argue that China must be prepared for a war with the United States. In a May 1965 article, L uo called f or inten sive military preparations in case Am erica should carry the war into China. "Preparations must be made not only agains t any sm all-scale warfar e but also agains t any m edium-or large-sca le warfare that imperialism may launch," Luo wrote. "These preparations must envisage the use by the imperialists of nuclear weapons as well as of conventional weapons." Moreover, Luo called

46 CCP Central Committee Party Literature Research Center, Wang Jiaxiang nianpu, 1906-1974 (Chronology of Wang Jiaxiang) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 2001), pp. 486-487. For the full text of Wang's memo, see Wang Jiaxiang xuanji (Selected Works of Wang Jiaxiang) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1989). 47 Wang Jiaxiang nianpu, p. 488. 48 Ibid., pp. 490-491. 49 Ibid., pp. 496-499. When Wang was dismissed, his son committed suicide under the pressure of the Red Guards.

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for a forwar d defense and argued that China s hould launch counterattacks across its borders to

destroy the enem y "in its own lair." 50 If W ang's "soft" stance toward the U.S. caused his

downfall, Luo' s "tough" approach did not plea se Mao either. Indeed, Lin Biao mounted a

counterattack against L uo in September by pub lishing the now fa mous article “L ong Live the

Victory of the People’s W ar.” 51 Lin did not agree with Luo' s strategy of forward defense.

Instead, he argued that, should a war break out, China m ust lure Am erican troops deep into

China's inland and re ly on the "P eople's war" to elim inate enemy forces. Mao h imself regarded

Luo's proposal as dangerous, yet no t because it would provoke an unnecessary war. For Mao,

now the m ost serious threat to China cam e from within, and L uo's pr oposal would divert the

country's resources tow ard war preparation inst ead of fighting revisionism . Thus when Lin

alleged that Luo tried to gain more personal power through this proposal, his fate was sealed and

he was dismissed in 1966.52

The two cases of W ang and Luo, contrad ictory on the surface, showed the im portance of

revisionism in Mao' s thinking about U.S.-China relations. Wang' s thesis resem bled the Soviet

"peaceful coexistence" doctrine, a key indicator of revisionism. Luo's thesis exaggerated the U.S.

threat from abroad and overlooked the fact that revisionism was growing at hom e. To be sure,

Mao never stopped calling for war preparation; 53 yet his basic judgment was that America would

not dare to have a war with China in the near future. On January 17, 1964, for example, Mao told

American journalist Anna Louise Strong that the U.S. government was more concerned about the

50 For an English version of Luo's article, see Luo, "Commemorate the Victory over German Fascism! Carry the Struggle against U.S. Imperialism Through to the End," Peking Review, 14 May 1965, No. 20, pp. 7-15. 51 For an English full text, see Lin Biao, Long Live the Victory of People’s War! (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1965). 52 For Mao's criticism of Luo, see Mao Zedong zhuan, Vol. 4, pp. 1399-1400. Luo subsequently tried to commit suicide by jumping off a high building, only to paralyze himself for the rest of his life. 53 In mid-1965, when the CCP leadership was making the third FYP, Mao decided to shift the priority of economic construction to heavy industry again. He also proposed the so-called "third line construction," that is, to spread key industries into inland provinces in case the coastal areas should be seized by the enemy in war. The "third line construction" quickly became a national campaign, and Mao put forward a new slogan "Prepare for War! Prepare for Natural Disasters! For the People!" For Mao's idea of the "third line construction," see meeting records, in Zhou Enlai nianpu, Vol. 2, p. 654.

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Soviet Unio n than Chin a. Mao ass erted that America w ould not in itiate a th ird world wa r,

because "historically sp eaking, Amer ica always join ed th e war at th e final stage. It d id so in

WWI. And it did so in WWII." Thus Mao suggested that a war between Am erica and China was

unlikely to break out soon. 54 On June 23, Mao told a Chilean delegation that "w ar is not

beneficial for us. W e need to build our count ry, and war will destro y our construction." He

further speculated that "sooner or later U.S.-C hina relations will be norm alized. I think it will

take 15 years...If [15 years is] not enough, we can wait longer."55 On January 9, 1965, Mao had a

long conversation with his favorite American journalist Edgar Snow. Mao told Snow that he did

not expect a war initia ted by America, China did not want to initiate a war with Am erica, and

should America withdraw from Vietnam immediately China would not occupy Vietnam .56 Two years later, Mao still mainta ined this basic judgment even with the Cultural Revolution reaching its peak. In Septem ber 1967, Mao told Party of ficials in Wuhan that "I think it [ U.S. imperialism] dares not to have a war with us. It can not even deal with Vietnam successfully."57

Meanwhile, the Chinese governm ent warned the Johnson adm inistration through different

channels not to spread the war into North Vietnam and China. On April 2, 1965, Zhou Enlai

asked the Pakistani presiden t, Mohammad Ayub Khan, to pass a three-point m essage to

Washington in his upcoming visit to the United States. Zhou said that "China will not seek a war with the U.S. f irst; China means what it says ; China is pre pared." He also added that Am erican

54 Mao's meeting with Strong and others, entitled "Khrushchev is having a hard time." See CCP Central Committee Party Literature Research Center, Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan (Selected Diplomatic Works of Mao Zedong) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1994), pp. 513-517. 55 Meeting Record, ibid., pp. 529-533. 56 Meeting Record, ibid., pp. 544-562. 57 Mao Zedong sixiang wansui, 1961-1968 (Long Live the Thoughts of Mao Zedong) (Beijing: N.P. 1969), pp. 335-336. This collection of documents is an unofficial publication. During the Cultural Revolution, different Red Guard groups published collections of Mao's speeches, notes, and documents under the title "Long Live the Thoughts of Mao Zedong." But because those documents were secret, the CCP leadership soon recalled those collections. Today, this publication has different editions available. The version used here is the so-called "1969 Chinese version."

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air strikes against Chinese targets would constitute a declaration of war.58 When Khan's visit was postponed, Zhou asked the Tanzanian president on June 8 to deliver the sam e message.59 On

April 10, 1966, Zhou repeated the sam e m essage during an interview with a Pakistani newspaper, and the Chinese newspaper Renmin Ribao published Zhou's statement on May 10. 60

On May 25, Wang Guoquan again delivered Zhou's message at the 130th Warsaw Talk.61

Therefore, despite its tough public rhetoric, Beijing both believed that Am erica would not provoke a war with China and took precau tions by warning America. For the Chinese leaders, a peaceful international environment was preferre d for China's m odernization. More importantly, the threat from U.S. m ilitary aggression was surp assed by the threat of revisionism at hom e.

Thus China only needed to focus on its own housecleaning and did not need to wage a war against the U.S.

Mao's thinking on the issue of peace and war w ith America was related to another thought in his "grand strategy" in a qu ite nuanced way. Since the S ino-American contest was essentially a struggle between two models of modernization, Mao believed that there was no need to settle this contest by force. Rather, he seemed to believe that the achievements of the Chinese model, coupled with the decline of American power, w ould eventually prove th at history was on his side. Thus, Mao tried to set up a C hinese version of "the C ity on a H ill" and he was confident that others would follow the Chinese example.

Although Mao argued that China m ust support revolutions around the world, he also emphasized "self-relian ce," that is, revolution aries in each country should prim arily rely on themselves to carry out their revolution. Lin' s September 1965 article, for exam ple, stressed that

58 Zhou Enlai nianpu, Vol. 2, p. 723. 59 Ibid., p. 736. 60 10 May 1966, RMRB. 61 Gronouski to State, 25 May 1966, FRUS, 1964-68, Vol. 30: 314-317.

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the lesson of the Chinese Communist Revoluti on was self -reliance, and other nations should follow China's example. Meanwhile, Mao was convi nced that China' s road was a self-evident truth. In June 1967, for exam ple, Mao discusse d the significance of the Chinese Communist

Revolution. "Even if the whole world is in darkness, " Mao asserted, "as long as there is light in

China, there is hope for the world." 62 In the same month, Mao instru cted that there was no need to launch massive propaganda cam paigns about the Cultural Revolution abroad. "W e should be humble," Mao pointed out. "It is not necessary for us to explicitly articulate [the goodness of the

Cultural Revolution]." 63 A m ore revealing m oment took pla ce in July 1967, when Mao learned about the su ccessful detonation of China' s first hydrogen bomb. "China is not just the political center of world revolution, " the elated Chairm an clai med. "China also should becom e the military and techn ical center of world revolu tion." But M ao did no t call for active Chinese intervention in other countries' revolutions. "Right now many countries oppose us and at the first glimpse we are isolated, " Mao told Party officials, "but in fact they are af raid of us...We are not isolated; rather, our world influence has been greatly increased. The more they (the Soviet Union and the United States) oppose us, the m ore they will encourage people 's revolution. And the people of those countries will realize th at th e Chinese road is the only road to achieve liberation." 64 In fact, Mao soon started to oppose excessive propaganda cam paigns abroad, believing that the Chinese m odel should be foll owed by other countries naturally. On May 16,

1968, Mao criticized a docum ent that called Chin a "the center of the world revolution" as committing the m istake of " making ourselves th e core." On May 29, Mao further instructed :

62 Mao Zedong sixiang wansui, p. 314. 63 Ibid., p. 315. 64 Ibid., pp. 318-319.

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"Don't impose [our opinion] on others; don' t say that the mass movements abroad are influenced

by us. Such propaganda...is not beneficial for people's movements."65

China's self-confidence in its ow n m odel of developm ent was accom panied by the

perception of the decline of American power. While the publicly circulated Renmin Ribao talked

about the decline of Am erica in rather routine slogans, Cankao Xiaoxi (Reference News), th e

major source of infor mation on foreign affairs circ ulated internally within the Pa rty, presented

detailed descriptions of Am erica's dom estic developm ents. On March 1, 1966, for exam ple,

Cankao Xiaoxi reported that the Johnson administration was worried about the high casualties in

Vietnam and the "dram atically growing inflation." 66 On April 2, 1967, it reported that "the

Johnson administration is in the quagmire of war in Vietnam...and the White House is challenged

by the Congress." 67 On August 2, 1968, Cankao Xiaoxi further reported th at according to LBJ's

economic advisors, "next year America is likely going to have an econom ic recession." Another

article in the same issue described in detail how the 1968 U.S. budget created the "biggest deficit

in Am erican history." 68 Indeed, Cankao Xiaoxi steadily presented an im age of a declin ing

America. The CCP officials were obviously inf luenced by those gloomy reports. O n April 16,

1968, therefore, Mao issued an article entitle d "Support American Black People's Anti-violence

Struggle" af ter the assassination of Martin Lu ther King. Mao announced that the riots after

King's death constituted "a prominent manifestation of the political and economic crisis faced by

American imperialism." Mao did not cast those riots into racial terms; rather, he regarded them

65 Both remarks quoted in CCP Central Committee Party Literature Research Center, Mao Zedong wenji (Collected Works of Mao Zedong) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1999), Vol. 8, pp. 431-432. 66 "LBJ holds conference on Inflation," 1 March 1966, Cankao Xiaoxi. 67 "U.S. in the Quagmire of War," 2 April 1967, Cankao Xiaoxi. 68 "LBJ on Recession," and "1968 Deficit," 2 August 1968, Cankao Xiaoxi.

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as "class struggle between Black people and A merica's ruling groups." African-Americans, Mao

claimed, were awakening to class struggle and they would achieve liberation soon.69

The com bined sense of self-righteousness a nd Am erica's decline, therefore, m ade

unnecessary active Chinese interventions abroad. And this had a particular impact on the Chinese

role in the Vietnam War. On the one hand, Washington's growing difficulties in Vietna m

contributed to the Chinese perception of Am erican vulnerability. Thus Beijing was further

convinced that its unders tanding of the laws of history wa s correct. On the other hand, Beijing

felt that there was no n eed to inte rvene in the war directly, since the North Vietn amese were

doing well by following China' s strategy of "the people' s war." At the sam e tim e, China was

strongly against any negotiations with the United St ates, because the latter' s fate was sealed and

the U.S. governm ent only tried to get from the conference table what th ey could not get on the

battlefield.70 As a result, as we shall see later, China's perception of America in the Vietnam War contributed to its rethinking of relations with America.

Yet Beijing did not sim ply pursue a passive wait -and-see policy. It was also actively trying

to isolate America in the world. Indeed, this wa s the final com ponent in Mao's "grand strategy"

toward America. While American policy-makers thought the Cultural Revolution put China into

a self -imposed isola tion f rom the outside wor ld, the Chin ese lead ers believ ed tha t the United

States and the Soviet Union, not China, were isolated in world opinion. Between 1962 and 1965,

Mao further developed his theory of "interm ediate zone" regarding the international system.71

On January 3, 1962, during a conversation with a Japanese delegation, Mao said that now the

69 Mao, "Support American Black People's Anti-violence Struggle," in Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan, pp. 577-579. 70 For detailed discussion of China's role in the Vietnam War during this period, see Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975 (Chapel Hill, NC.: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000), Chapter 7-8; Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 77 Conversations Between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964-1977 (Washington DC: Cold War International History Project, 1998). 71 For Mao's initial thinking of the "intermediate zone," see Zhang Shuguang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese- American confrontations, 1949-1958 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992).

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world was divided into three zones. The U.S. stood alone as one zone, and the Socialist camp constituted another. Other countries, includin g capitalist countries such as Japan and W est

Germany, a nd em erging nation-states in Africa , Asia, and Latin A merica, belonged to the

"intermediate zone." Mao told his guests that A merica's goal was to " control this in termediate zone."72 In 1963 and 1964, Mao further argued that ther e were two "interm ediate zones" or two

"Third Worlds." One referred to the developing na tions in Africa, Asian, and Latin America; the other referred to cap italist countries, including the W estern European nations, Japan, Australia, and Canada. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union, like th e United States, now stood alone as one zone, as the Eastern European countries w ere fighting against Soviet control. Thus in Mao's mind, the main contradiction of the world was not th e struggle between capitalism and communism , but the struggle between imperialism /social im perialism and countries fighting for their econom ic and political independence. Alt hough there was Soviet-Am erican "collusion," Mao insisted that countries in the "interm ediate zones" would wi n the final victory and China would play a key role in this world struggle.73

For Beijing, the exis tence of the "interm ediate zones" m eant that China could pursue a

"United Front" policy th ere to isolate America. As Mao' s confidence in the Chines e model was increased by the Cultural Revolution, he contin ued to pursue this strategy. Here the Chinese relied heavily on econom ic tools, despite the disruptions by the Cultural Revolution. A typical example was the Chinese decis ion during the peak of the Cultural R evolution to finance and build a railroad connecting Tanzania and Zambia. According to He Ying, the Chinese ambassador to Tanzania who was deeply involved in this decision, it wa s political in nature.

After the two African countries failed to secure financial help from the W est and the Soviet

72 Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan, pp. 485-489. 73 Ibid., pp. 506-509.

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Union, they turned to China for help in early 1965. Zhou Enlai imm ediately agreed to help in principle and set up a special ta sk force to study this issue. The Chinese realized that by financing this railroad, China c ould gain substantial political capital among African nations, and in September 1967 China signed an official agre ement with the two countries by w hich China would finance this project and send engineers, workers, and logistic personnel to assist the construction.74

China regarded the railroad project as a golde n opportunity to gain pol itical support among

African countries and to isolate both superpowers in the "intermediate zones." More importantly, however, the Chinese decision was not just a short-term tactical calculation. It was based upon the genuine belief that the Chinese m odel of modernization was the only hope for the Third

World and it was China's responsibility to s how the way. Thus, Zhou e mphasized two points to the railroad task force in a closed door m eeting. First, Zhou pointed out that China should not worry about being m anipulated by the two Afri can countries politically. Instead, China should gladly become a pawn in the tw o countries' political struggle agai nst the superpowers. "There is no question that this rail road must be built. It can be built by China or othe r countries," Zhou said. "If China decides to build it... then the tw o presiden ts (of the two countries) will have a trump card in their hands...They can play the China card against the West." The key here, Zhou emphasized, was that "China m ust help the two countries sincerely; we should not play half- hearted political games." Second, Zhou said that although China was still a poor country, it was

China's duty to help build the Tanzanian-Zam bian railroad. "W e should not use this project to earn political credits," Zhou warned . "This project is essential to the African national liberation movement. To help them is to help ourselves . Chairman Mao once said that only by liberating

74 He Ying, "Dui yuanjian tansan tielu juece de huigui (The Decision to Finance the Tanzanian-Zambian Railroad: A Retrospect), in Foreign Ministry, Xinzhongguo waijiao fengyun (Important Events in New China's Diplomacy) (Beijing: Shijie zhishi, 1990), Vol. 3, pp. 31-43.

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the whole human race can the proletarian class liberate itself." Clearly, the railroad project was a

chance to demonstrate the universal validity of the Chinese model of development in Africa.75

While China was practicing its economic diplomacy in Africa, it also used foreign trade as a tool to isolate America from its Western allies and Japan. China's foreign trade policy during the

1960s was a natural product of China' s m odernization m odel. First, based on the principle of

"self-reliance," China relied h eavily on an "im port substitution" strategy and decided not to become dependent on a world m arket dominated by the West. Second, China wanted to conduct foreign trade with capitalist countri es on its own term s. China insisted that all trade m ust be conducted "equally and fairly" according to its ow n rules, and "political correctness" was the precondition for any country that wanted to do business with China. Fo r exam ple, in March

1968, Zhou Enlai told a Japanese trade delegati on that "China would never com promise its political principles in order to conduct foreign trade." Thus, in order to renew a trade agreem ent between Chi na a nd J apan, t he J apanese de legation had to reconfirm the so-called "Three

Principles of Sino-Japanese Relations."76

The Sino-Soviet split, ironically, provide d another incentive for China' s econom ic

diplomacy toward the West. From 1959 onward, trade between China and the Soviet bloc

declined steadily. In 1966, for ex ample, the total valu e of Sino-Soviet trade was only 14.5% of

the total value of 1959. However, th e proportion of the value of trade with the W est in China's

total trade was 70.13% in 1966. To be sure, the to tal value of China' s fo reign trade declined

between 1967 and 1969 as a resu lt of the Cultural Revolution. 77 Yet th e trend was reversed in

75 Zhou's remarks quoted in ibid., pp. 33-34. 76 Zhou Enlai nianpu, Vol.3, p. 223. The Three Principles are: Japan must stop stirring anti-Chinese feelings, Japan must stop making two Chinas, and Japan must stop obstructing the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations. 77 Compared with the total value of trade in 1966, China's total trade value declined 11.7% in 1967, 14.6% in 1968, and 15.8% in 1969, respectively. See Ding Xi, et al, Zhongguo duiwai maoyi (China's Foreign Trade) (Beijing: Zhongguo shangwu, 2006), pp. 160-166.

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1970. Meanwhile, China' s trade with the W est c ontinued to grow and Sino-Soviet trade so

declined that in 1970 the proportion of its total value in China's total trade was only 1%.78

Although the role of foreign trade was insi gnificant in China' s economic developm ent

between 1966 and 1969, CCP leaders still regarded it as an im portant too l to up hold China' s

modernization m odel in the world and to isol ate Am erica from its allies. In April 1966, for

example, the Foreign Trade Ministry issu ed the 1966 expor t quota to Guangdong, a m ajor

province in China' s foreign trade. G uangdong was re quired to "inc rease the value of exports to

capitalist countries by $ 200 million in 1966" an d this goal was "very important to support an ti-

imperialist struggles" in the Third W orld. 79 In May, the Foreign Mi nistry issued another

instruction, which urged Gua ngdong to fight an econom ic war against Am erica in Hong Kong.

After analyzing America's difficulties at hom e and in Vietnam, the instruction dictated that "our basic strategic task is to squeeze America out of the Hong Kong m arket, which must be carried out to its end." 80 When the Cultural Revolution escalated in 1967, foreign trad e became a major

battlefield for fighting revisionism and im perialism. China turned the Canton Fair ,81 the m ost

important trade fair for China where the Chin ese could do business with fore igners face to face, into a political show of the Cultural Revolut ion. In 1967, the CCP Central Committee ord ered that “the C anton Fair is an im portant batt lefield for spreading th e Thoughts of Chairma n

Mao…Everyone should educate foreign businessm en about the significance of the Cultural

Revolution and contribute to the growth of the international anti-American imperialism and anti-

78 Ibid. 79 "1966 Export Plan to Capitalist Countries," 30 April 1966, 302-1-265, Guangdong Archives (GDA), Guangzhou, China. 80 "1966 Policy Toward Hong Kong and Macau," 31 May 1966, 302-1-261, GDA. 81 The Canton Fair was a major channel for China to do business with the outside world. It was held twice a year, known as the Spring Canton Fair and the Fall Canton Fair. The Fair started in 1957 and throughout the 1960s, on average half of China's annual foreign trade was conducted through it. The Canton Fair and China's foreign trade during the Cultural Revolution will be further discussed in Chapter 5.

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Soviet Revisionism United Front.” 82 In 1969, the Foreign Trade Mini stry issued “Instruction on

Publicizing Mao Thoughts during the 1969 Spring Cant on Fair,” which require d that the staffs

working at the Fair to highlight the victori ous Cultural Revolution, highlight the Thoughts of

Chairman Mao, and highlight class struggle. Guided by the “three highlights,” the staffs were to

visit foreign traders personally, invite them to watch revolutionary operas, and give them Mao

badges.83

In terms of the actual conduct of foreign trade, therefore, th e Canton Fair was paralyzed by

the Cultural Revolution. Yet the Canton Fair "e ducated" foreigners about China' s unique m odel of modernization and helped "isolate" Am erica. For Chinese leaders, Ch ina was an irres istible

market for capitalist co untries. Thu s by cont rolling those countries' access to th e Chinese

market—either granting them access as an in centive or denying them access as a p unishment—

China could put pressures on America's key allies to improve their political relations with China.

Once those countries decided to im prove politic al relations with China, Chinese leaders

calculated, they would in return put m ore pr essure on America' s containm ent policy toward

China and the United States would be "isolated" in world opinion. In May 1967, for example, the

Foreign Trade Ministry emphasized the need to strictly carry out the policy of isolating America.

Some goods that China tried to purchase from the capitalist countries were either produced

indirectly by America or contained components produced by America. The Ministry ordered that

the f oreign com panies which wa nted to do business with China "m ust can cel the ir bus iness

contracts with Am erican com panies or do so i ndirectly." Clearly, China tried to put m ore

pressure on Am erica th rough third parties, while confident that the C hinese m arket was too

82 “Instruction for 1967 Spring Canton Fair,” 12 April 1967, 324-2-93, GDA. 83 “Instruction on Publicizing Mao Thoughts during the 1969 Spring Canton Fair,” 324-2-97, GDA.

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attractive for the third parties to abandon. 84 Meanwhile, the summary reports of the Canton Fair

produced during this era celebrated the "educational" effect of the Cultural Revolution on foreign

guests. A summary produced by the Shanghai Trad e Delegation in 1969, for exam ple, reported

that a Japanese businessm an was "moved into te ars" when he adm itted that he "m ade a big

mistake in the past of supportin g revisionism ." The report also summ arized sim ilar reactions

from other nationals, who overwhelmingly recognized the superiority of the Chinese road toward

building socialism.85 While the foreign business people m ight have different opinions about the

Cultural Revolution, a survey of the Chinese r ecords shows that at that tim e, the Chinese

believed th at Am erica becam e gr adually isolated in wo rld opin ion by China's econom ic

diplomacy, as America's allies increasingly criticized Washington's China policy.

Mao's "grand strategy" toward Am erica, th erefore, was based up on China' s general

perception of Am erica during the first stage of the Cultural Revolution. Because the power of

America was declining, Washington would not dare to launch an all-out war against China while

it was bogged down in Vietnam . Therefore, C hina could afford to maintain the status quo of

Sino-American relations while focusing on fighti ng revisionism , the bigger threat to China' s

modernization, at home. Moreover, because Ch ina was confident th at its uniqu e m odel of

development was superior to the models of the West and the S oviet Union, Beijing was willing

to wait patiently for other countries to turn ar ound in their attitudes toward China. The m ost

important aspect of Mao' s "grand strategy," ho wever, was that it provided the psychological

foundation for the later Sino-American rapprochement. When China agreed to im prove relations

with America, Chinese leaders b elieved that th ey could negotiate with Am erica from a position

of strength, since America, weakened and troubled, now had something to ask from China.

84 "Policy toward Western European Companies with Connections to American Capital," 26 May 1967, 302-1-268, GDA. 85 "Report of the 1969 Spring Canton Fair," 5 May 1969, B170-2-2039, Shanghai Archives (SHA), Shanghai, China.

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China's First Steps toward U.S.-China Rapprochement: 1969-1970

While China was confident in its own m odel of m odernization, that confidence was not

absolute. M ao, a revolutiona ry id ealist, a t the same tim e was also a shrewd realist. As a

theoretician and philosopher, Mao regarded the Marxis t and Hegelian d ialectics (the unity and

struggle of opposites, the transf ormation of quantity into quali ty, and the negation of the

negation) as the un iversal driving p rinciples of history. Therefore, he accepted the twists and

turns in U.S.-China relations as only normal and was willing to m ake tactical adjustments when

"the historical situation was ripe."

While Mao believed in the correctness of the Cu ltural Revolution, he also tried to curb the

"excessive" energies of it. In fact, Mao originally thought that the Cultural Revolution would end

by early 1967, yet he quickly discovered that he could not control the devil once Pandora's box was opened.86 Worse, the conflicts between different "rebel factions" quickly evolved into armed

struggles as the m asses sacked military bases and seized w eapons from the arm y. Even Mao' s

personal security was threatened in Wuhan during the so-called "July 20 Incident." In July 1967,

Mao went to W uhan to protec t Chen Zaidao, the m ilitary commander of the W uhan Milita ry

District, who was under attack from local Red Guards. The local Red Guards, however, were

divided into an anti-Chen gr oup ("The W orker's Headquarter") and a pro-Chen group ("One

Million Troopers"). Initially Mao thought he could reason with the anti-Chen group and solve the

problem peacefully. But W ang Li and Xie Fuzh i, two followers of Ma o's wife Jiang Qing who

accompanied Mao to W uhan, openly supported the an ti-Chen group. A s a result, the pro-Chen

group sacked the hotel where Wang and Xie stayed without knowing that Mao also stayed there,

since Mao's travel was unannounced. Mao was rush ed out off W uhan, and Jiang Qing declared

86 For Mao's original time table for the Cultural Revolution, see Mao Zedong zhuan, Vol. 4, p. 1485.

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that Chen staged a coup. But Mao soon realized that the whole event was caused by W ang and

Xie.87

The "July 20 Incident" was a m ajor turning point in Mao' s thinking about the Cultural

Revolution. Now he wanted to curb th e ex cessive rad ical beh aviors, especially the a rmed

conflicts all around the country. But before he made his moves, Wang Li, who emerged from the

"July 20 Incident" as a "hero" that saved Mao' s life, urged the Red Gua rds to sack the Foreign

Ministry and "strike down" the Foreign Minister Chen Yi. On August 22, the "rebel faction" within the F oreign Ministry and so me Beijing Re d Guards, in the excitem ent stirred by W ang, burned down the Office of the Bri tish chargé d' affaires. Zhou En lai, sensing an opportunity, immediately urged Mao to return China' s diplomacy to normal. Mao agreed that foreign policy- making m ust be controlled by the P arty, not th e m asses. He denounced Wang Li and several

others as "big, big, big pois onous weeds" harmful to the Cu ltural Revolution. Wang and his followers were quickly arrested, and a certain am ount of norm alcy was restored in the Foreign

Ministry, although Chen Yi was still subjected to harsh criticism.88

Meanwhile, Mao and Zhou also tried to curb th e political campaigns in the Canton Fair. In

April 1967, when the preparation of the Spring Canton Fair was stopped due to local power

struggles among different Red Guard groups, Zhou went to Guangzhou in person. There, Zhou

held a series of meetings with different local mass groups and urged them to ensure that the Fair

would be opened as scheduled. 89 The Red Guar ds were accusing the Canton Fair of tradin g

“Four Olds” 90with o ther countries an d therefore must be s topped. Zhou skillfully argued that

87 See Mao Zedong zhuan, Vol. 4, pp. 1491-1499; Chen Zaidao, Chen Zaidao huiyilu (A Memoir of Chen Zaidao) (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1991), Vol. 2, pp. 362-364; Yang Chengwu, Yang Chengwu jiangju zishu (The Autobiography of General Yang Chengwu) (Shenyang: Liaoning renmin, 1997), pp. 293-295. 88 Mao Zedong zhuan, Vol., 4, pp. 1502-1504; Zhou Enlai nianpu, Vol., 3, pp. 182-183. 89 Zhou Enlai Nianpu, Vol.3, pp. 145-146. 90 In the terminology of the Cultural Revolution, “Four Olds” referred to traditional Chinese artifacts including paintings, antiques, and other decorations that were deemed as “reactionary.”

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China should sell this “old stuff,” since China could dump such “reactionary” item s into

capitalist countries in exchange for money, which would suppor t the world revolution in return.

In fact, Mao supported Zhou this tim e. Before Zhou went to Guangzhou, Mao personally issued an instruction for the Canton Fa ir, in which he ordered that all Cultural Revolution related activities should be suspended during the Fair. 91 In 1968, Zhou and other Chinese leaders took

further step s to m ake s ure the Can ton Fair p roceeded sm oothly. On May 11, the Guangdong

Military District announced that the Army would enforce martial law during the Fair, and anyone

who dared to interrupt the Fair wou ld be punished. The CCP Central C ommittee also ordered to

stop all Cultural Revolution rela ted activities during the Fair and non-local Red Guards would

not be allowed to enter Guangzhou. Meanwhile, Z hou personally supervised the construction of a new building for the event.92

From late 1967 onward, therefore, China's behavior in foreign policy related areas gradually

returned to norm al. Mao and Zhou essentially form ed a team that controlled the basic direction

of China' s foreign relations. M eanwhile, Mao star ted to pay m ore atten tion to Am erica. In

October 1967, Mao read Richard Nixon' s article "Asia after Vietnam " in Foreign Affairs with

great interest and urged Zhou to read it too. 93 After the restoration of order in China's foreign

policy-making m echanism by early 1968, Mao furthe r decided that the Cultural Revolution

should come to an end the next year. Therefore, he started to prepare for the opening of the Ninth

Party Congress in early 1969. In January 1969, Mao decided to revi ve members of the so-called

"February Adverse Current", including four Marshals—Chen Yi, Ye Jianying, Xu Xiangqian,

91 Center of China Foreign Trade, Baijie Huihuang, 1957-2006 (Memorial of 100 Sessions of Canton Fair) (Guangzhou: Nanfang ribao, 2006), pp. 102-103. 92 Ibid., pp. 109-111. 93 Kong Dongmei, Gaibian shijie de rizi (Days that Changes the World) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 2006), pp. 45-46. Kong is Mao's granddaughter.

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and Nie Rongzhen.94 On February 19, 1969, Mao asked the four Marshals to "study international situations."95 The four Marshals, now still being critic ized by the rad icals a s m embers of th e

"February Adverse Current," nevertheless started to preside over meetings on foreign policies.96

Mao's decision to revive the four M arshals indicated his growing concern about the threat from the Soviet Union . In August 1968, the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslo vakia and announced that it had the right to intervene militarily in other socialist countries. T he message was explicit for Mao: would China becom e the next victim? Mao's concern was soon realized when on March 2, 196 9, China and the Soviet Union clas hed militarily along their border. On

March 5, 8, and 16, the four Marshals discussed the prospect of a war with the Soviet Union.

While the Marshals realiz ed the seriousness of the situation, th ey did not think that the Soviet

Union wanted to have an all-ou t war with China. Moreover, it was unlik ely that America would join the Soviet Union if the latter decided to escalate the confrontation. "The strategic priority of

America and the Soviet Union," they concluded, "is still Europe...Both powers wanted to divert the other's attention toward China while their real intention is to control Europe." In addition, the

Marshals argued that Soviet troops had been so weakened by revisionism that they would not dare to laun ch a war w ith China. 97 On March 22, Mao asked the four Marshals about their

94 In February 1967, the CCP Politburo had a meeting presided by Zhou Enlai to discuss how to "emphasize revolution and accelerate production." Yet the meeting quickly became a heated verbal contest between the radicals (Jiang Qing's supporters) and the senior Party officials. The senior officials accused the radicals of "messing up" the nation, while the radicals accused the senior officials of opposing the Cultural Revolution. When Jiang Qing reported this meeting to Mao, Mao became furious and denounced those senior officials as "February Adverse Current" trying to "restore capitalism." Yet Mao subsequently tried to protect those senior officials from being abused by the radicals. In early 1969, he formally ordered to protect them and their families. Mao's decision was crucial. Four members of those senior officials—Chen Yi, Xu Xiangqian, Ye Jianying, and Nie Rongzhen—would become key players in China's foreign policy and national defense, while other two members—Li Xiannian and Li Fuchun—would become key players in China's economic policy. See Mao Zedong zhuan, Vol.4, pp. 1480-1483. For Mao's 1969 order, see ibid., p. 1541. For other accounts of the event, see Zhou Enlai nianpu, Vol. 3, pp. 126-130; Zhou Junlun eds., Nie Rongzhen nianpu (Chronology of Nie Rongzhen) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1999), Vol. 2, pp. 1052-1054; Liu Shufa eds., Chen Yi nianpu (Chronology of Chen Yi) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1995), Vol. 2, pp. 1184-1185; Xu Xiangqian, Lishi de huigu (Historical Memoirs) (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1984), pp. 831-834. 95 Zhou Enlai nianpu, Vol. 2, p. 281. 96 Nie Rongzheng nianpu, Vol. 2, p. 1107. 97 Ibid., pp. 1108-1109.

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discussions and clearly wanted them to continue delib erating. 98 Mean while, Mao started to wonder about possible American reactions. "Now we had a fight with the S oviet Union," he told his secretaries. "This is a new topic for the Americans."99

In April, the Ninth Party Congress was held in Beijing. This Congress was another turning point in the Cultural Revolution. In its political report, Lin Bi ao announced that the Cultural

Revolution had been a success an d "class struggle" shou ld continue to be the guideline fo r

China's m odernization. In othe r words, the le gitimacy of the Cultu ral Revolution was now formally recognized by the Party mechanism . Mao and the four Marshals' deliberations on the new international situation, however, was not reflected in the report. Instead, it still declared that the Soviet Union and America tried to isolate China, and China must be prepared for a two-front war with both superpow ers in lieu of the March Sino-Soviet border clash. 100 However, the four

Marshals and other senior officials in charge of economic planning were reelected to the Central

Committee, a signal of their changing fortunes. After the Congress ended, Mao asked the four

Marshals to f urther study international situations. The Mars hals were su rprised: since the Party

Congress just announced the basic judgm ent of th e international situation, what else was there left for further study? Confused, they turned to Zhou Enlai. Zhou told them that the "current international situa tion is too com plicated to pu t sim ply in the politic al repo rt [ of the Party

Congress]" and Mao personally want ed them to continue the st udy. Zhou then appointed Xiong

Xianghui, a senior Party official and diplomat, as the staff chief for the Marshals and the liaison officer between them and Zhou. Zhou told the Ma rshals not to have an y "concerns" and they

98 Mao Zedong zhuan, Vol.4, p. 1541. 99 Quoted in CCP Central Committee Party Literature Research Center, Mianhuai Maozedong (In Memory of Mao Zedong) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1993), Vol.2, pp. 644-645. 100 For the full text of this report, see 28 April 1969, RMRB.

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could discuss anything they liked in their priv ate sess ions. This was a clear s ignal that M ao

wanted some fresh ideas and it was not a political trap to get the Marshals.101

The Marshals produced two reports, in July a nd September. Unfortunately, the full texts of

the reports are still not available to researchers. But we have a ba sic picture of their conclusions

from other sources. In July, the Marshals submitted the first report, "An Analysis of The War

Situation in the W orld." In th is report, the Ma rshals concluded that the danger of war between

China and the two superpowers was not as great as it appeared. Both Am erica and the Soviet

Union wanted to focus on Europe, not China. Moreover, the two superpowers still regarded each other as the major opponent, and neither wanted the other to gain leverage by getting itself into a war with China.102

The m ost striking thing about this report, however, was that the Marshals believed that

China actually had the upper hand in this situation and could deal with the two superpowers from

a position of strength. First, while the offici al political report of the Ninth Party Congress

declared that America and the So viet Union "colluded" to carv e up the w orld and both regarded

China as the major enemy, the Marshals argued that "America and the Sovi et Union are the real threat to each other." Therefore, China could take advantage of this situation and deal with each superpower from a position of strength. Second, both superpowers had been greatly weakened.

Revisionism had wrecked the Soviet econom y and the Red Ar my, and it would be difficult for the Soviet Union to provide logistical support to a war in the Far East. Am erica, on the other hand, was bogged down in Vietnam and overstret ched in the world. Anti-war m ovements and economic recession at hom e further weakened Am erica. Thus, neith er superpo wer dared to launch a war with China. Finally, the Marsh als were co nfident that "China rep resents the

101 Zhou Enlai nianpu, Vol.3, pp. 301-302. 102 Xiong Xianghui, "Dakai zhongmei guanxi de qianzou" (Preclude to Sino-American Rapprochement), in Xinzhongguo waijiao fengyun, Vol. 4, pp. 13-19.

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interests of the world proletarian class" an d China had m any supporters in the world. Thus

America and the Soviet Union would have troubl e finding allies if they wanted to attack

China.103

The Marshals' conclusions were re inforced by subsequent developments. On Septem ber 3,

Ho Chi Minh passed away. Soviet Primer Kosygin, while attending Ho's funeral, told Zhou Enlai that he wanted to v isit Beijing on h is way bac k. Mao decided to accept Kosygin' s offer and th e

Soviet lead er was received at the Beijing airp ort. The two countries agreed to d eescalate th e current situation and the crisis since March fade d slightly. At the sam e time, Nixon instructed

American ambassador to Poland Walter Stoessel to contact the Chines e and try to reopen th e

U.S.-China Ambassadorial Talks. T he Marshals we re amused. In their Septem ber report, "Our

Views on the Current Situation," the Marshals r eaffirmed the basic conclusions of July. The

Soviet Union and America would not dare to have a war with China, as confirmed by their recent moves. Moreover, the Marshals' sense that Ch ina had the upper hand in this situation was

strengthened. "We insist defea ting America and the Soviet Uni on [in our public rhetoric], but

Kosygin came to Beijin g in person for peace an d Nixon is eager to talk with us," th e Marshals

mused. "This is a g reat victory for China...The Am ericans—they can reach the moon, but they

can not reach us. Now both are trying to flirt with China." The Marshals then concluded that now

"the Soviet-Am erican conflict is greater than the Soviet-Chine se conf lict and the Am erican-

Soviet conflict is greater than the Am erican-Chinese conflict." Since "Nixon is eager to im prove

Sino-American relations," the report suggested, "i f we wa nt to take advantage of the Soviet-

American conflict, then it is neces sary to improve Sino-American relations." The Marshals then

recommended specific measures to be taken, such as reopening the Warsaw Talks.104

103 Ibid. 104 Ibid., pp. 20-28.

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Mao and Zhou seem ed to agree. On Nove mber 21, Zhou announced that "it is a one-sided

view to talk about Soviet-American collusion and not talk about Soviet-American conflict...If we

only see [Soviet-Am erican] collusion and overlook [t heir] conflict, then som e international

issues can not be explained."105 Zhou's remark showed that now China started to shift away from

the early stance of opposing both superpowers a nd toward a Sino-Soviet-Am erican triangular

scheme. Indeed, when Lei Yang, the new Chines e chargé d' affaires to Poland, reported in

December that Nixon wanted to reopen th e dialogue with China, Zho u was excited. "W e have

found the door," Zhou told Mao; "now we can knoc k on it; here is the knock." Mao then told

Zhou to "contact Americans publicly and there is no need to keep the contact secret."106

Mao's instruction not to keep the S ino-American contact secret reflected several threads in his own thoughts. First, Mao still did not fully trust Nixon's intentions. Thus, an open contact could save China from being accused of coll uding with Am erica. S econd, as the Marshals suggested, the contact itself was a strategic move that the Sovi et Union could not fail to understand. Finally, Mao was confident th at China could deal with America from a position of strength. Thus there was no need to keep the c ontact secret. As Mao frequently said, he liked

"open conspiracy" (yang mou), not "conspiracy" (yin mou).

China's confidence was further rev ealed when the Chinese issued the so-called " May 20

Announcement" in 1970. After De cember 1969, Chin a and Am erica did reestablish contact.

Ambassadorial talks occurred in January and February 1970. Yet in March, a coup in Ca mbodia overthrew Prince Sihanouk, a loya l Chinese ally. In April, N ixon authorized American troops to pursue North Vietnamese troops into Cam bodia. Under this situation, on May 20, Mao staged a mass rally in Beijing to denounce the Am erican "aggression" in Cambodia. The "May 20

105 Zhou Enlai nianpu, Vol. 3, p. 334. 106 Zhang Feijian, Yanjiu Zhou Enlai: waijiao sixiang ye shijian (Research on Zhou Enlai: Diplomatic Thoughts and Practice) (Beijing: Shijie zhishi, 1989), p. 15.

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Announcement" once again called Am erica a "paper tiger" and ca lled for a "united front" to

defeat Am erica. This announcem ent sent a clea r m essage to Nixon, that is, China would not

compromise its principles in order to improve bilateral relations with America. At the same time, however, China announced that the "the danger of a new world war is still with us....But, the main trend of today's world is revolution." Th is was a new idea proposed by the Chinese for the first tim e, and by replacing "war" with "revoluti on" as th e m ain trend of the world, Beijing clearly did not want to reverse the process of Sino-American rapprochement.107

Finally, in December 1970, Mao decided to send a firm signal to Nixon that he was ready to

improve relations with America. Mao again chose to send the signal through Edgar Snow, and he invited Snow for a long conversation. Mao covered a wide range of topics in this conversation, and twice he explicitly invited Nixon to visit China. As elusive as the Chairman's mind was, this conversation revealed Mao' s belie f that he could negotiate with Am erica from a position of strength and he lef t the im pression that he was not in a hurry. First, Mao reviewed the CCP' s history from the "Long March" in 1935 to the Cu ltural Revolution. Mao essentially argued that the CCP was able to develop from a minority party into a national regime because it followed the

"correct lines" all the tim e. The Cultural Revol ution, Mao said, m ade Ch ina "a better nation, although no t as good as they (the radicals ) claim ed." Mao adm itted that in econ omic term s,

China was still a backward nation. But the Chin ese model of modernization was an advanced one. "[China has]two things," Mao said, "One is very backward, the other is very advanced. They are struggling against each other." The problem of the Soviet Union, according to Mao, was that

"they looked down upon us" since China's economy was less developed. "But I don' t obey their orders," Mao told Snow. The unique Chinese ro ad of developm ent, Mao therefore suggested, was the wave of the future. Mao then rem inded Snow that George Washington too was a

107 Mao zedong waijiao wenxuan, pp. 584-586.

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revolutionary, and he s ucceeded because he followed the p eople's will at tha t time. "I am not

satisfied with China's progress," Mao mused, "but I am glad that revolution is making progress in

America." Here Mao suggested that Nixon should recognize the current situation soberly and his

visit of China would be a clever move to follow the "people's will."

Mao then told Snow that Nixon urged him to keep the new Sino-Am erican contact secret.

"Very m ysterious," teased Mao. But Mao u nderstood Nixon' s pol itical needs and now he

welcomed a secret visit by Nixon. "If Nixon wants to come, I am willing to talk, " Mao said. "It

does not matter whether we can reach some agreements. It does not matter whether we are going to quarrel. It does not m atter whether he visits as a tourist or as a president...I don' t think I am

going to quarrel with him , but I do need to criticize him ." Mao's relaxed and som ewhat

patronizing tone clearly reveal ed his confidence in dealing with Am erica. "I like Nixon," Mao

said. "I like the most reactionary person in the world...Nixon is not tricky...You can just tell him

that he is the Number One good guy in the world."108

Thus, Mao firmly sent the signal that he was ready to receive Nixon. His remarks, however,

would have confused an yone who was not fam iliar with the Chairm an's terminology. Why did

Mao regard Nixon as a good guy ? W hy was Mao willin g to talk with "the m ost reaction ary

person" in the world? While scholars usually fo cus on the invitation, they in general have

downplayed a deepe r message: tha t is, China w ould talk from a position of strength. This poin t

can be illuminated by examining what happened to the conversation later in China.

After the conversation, Mao in structed that the full text be distributed am ong the Party

down to the local branches. He was trying to prepare th e Party for a Sin o-American

rapprochement. And judging from the Party reactions, Mao achieved this goal. In early 1971, the

108 For the full text of the conversation, see Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao (Draft Writings of Mao Zedong since the Establishment of the Regime) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1998), Vol. 13, pp.163-187.

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Guangdong Party branch organized a study se ssion for the Mao-Snow conversation. After intensive discussions, the Party branch reache d several conclusions. Fi rst, the conversation confirmed that "now the revolutio nary situation is very good in the world." Second, "we need to distinguish the Am erican people from the reac tionary ruling groups in Am erica" and "the

American people will eventually win their revolu tion." The Party branch then urged every party member to study the conversation. 109 The discussion of the Mao- Snow conversation was m ore

vivid in Hangzhou, where the Bure au of Construction organized a study session in June 1971.

One Party member believed that Nixon's visit would open the American people's eyes to China's

achievements. "This is our strategy," this m ember said, "because when Nixon returns, he will do

some propaganda work for us. He can do the job better." Another Party m ember was convinced

that "the situation is getting better and better. Even a reacti onary guy like Nixon now wants to

see China." Another participan t p ointed out that "Nixon is less tricky because he is not a

revisionist. He is a n egative example. The m ore we realize how reactionary he is, the better we

can learn from this negative exam ple." Still another claimed that the conve rsation told him that

"we will eventually liberate Taiwan."110Overall, the group summarized that China now had won

a significant victory over America, and the Party members would carry out Mao's policies all the

way to the end. 111 These two study sessions, therefore, show ed that although the ordinary Party

members did not understand the nuanced triangular diplom acy, they did get the m essage that

now China would negotiate with strength. This m essage, self-d elusional or not, was clearly

intended to strengthen people's confidence in the Chinese model of modernization.

In sum, when China decided to launch its own triangular diplomacy by improving relations

with America, Mao and his colleagues did not perceive China as the weakest player in the gam e.

109 "Study Mao-Snow Conversation Carefully," March 1971, 294-A2.10-24, GDA. 110 The Mao-Snow conversation touched on Taiwan. 111 "Report on the Study of Mao-Snow Conversation," 14 June 1971, J127-006-61, Hangzhou Archives (HZA), Hangzhou, China.

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To be sure, the Chines e leaders kn ew that in terms of absolute ec onomic and military power,

China was the weakest player. Yet psychologicall y, the Chinese lead ers felt that Ch ina was the strongest party in the gam e. The Si no-American rapprochement was only a tactical m ove that would not compromise China's long-term goal of setting a model for the whole world. The roots of this Chinese m entality, thus, lay in th e genuine conviction that China' s m odel of modernization was superior both to the Soviet model and the American model. The fact that now both superpowers had to bow before China only further consolidated this mentality, which would continue to underline China's policy toward America until the mid-1970s.

Conclusion

The twis ts and turn s in China' s basic Cold W ar s trategies, as this ch apter shows , were closely con nected with China' s shifting s trategy of m odernization. Es pecially, the Cultu ral

Revolution convinced Mao that the unique Chin ese model could be saved by fighting against revisionism. Mao's confidence in the Chinese mode l, in return, convinced him that China could negotiate with both superpowers from a position of strength.

Meanwhile, it is interesting to see that between 1966 a nd 1970, both Am erica and China perceived U.S.-China relations from the perspe ctive of China' s modernization. While America was confident that expanded contact with China would change that regi me from within, Ch ina was also confident that improved bilateral relations would only prove the validity of the Chinese model. Thus during the early 1970s, when the two nations developed their strategic relations, the more i mportant th ing that was going on beneath the surface was a clash of two visions of modernity.

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Chapter 4

Guns and Butter: Toward Sino-American Rapprochement, 1969-1972

Internal deliberations on the nature of U.S.-China relations, both in Beijing and Washington,

were filtered by the discourse on C hina's modernization and helped to pa ve the way for a real

breakthrough toward Sino-Am erican rapproche ment. When Richard Nixon becam e President,

therefore, h e was well-position ed to constru ct a new China policy on the foundation of an

already growing consensus on the need for ne w approaches toward Beijing. Although Nixon and

his National Security A dvisor Henry Kissinger gua rded their China policy in high secrecy, they depended on the State Departm ent and other agencies to devel op various program s related to

their new China initiatives, at least initially. And the experience in the Johnson years certainly

prepared those agencies for the job. Meanwhile, with the Sino-Soviet re lationship continuing to

deteriorate, culminating in the 1969 border clashe s, Beijing began to show signs of flexibility

toward America, suggesting the possibility of an improved U.S.-China relationship. Thus, Nixon

could m ove beyond the stage of largely theoretical deliberations during the Johnson years to

actually expect Sino-American rapprochement.

The immediate motivation behind Nixon’s new China policy, as most scholars have argued,

was to reshape the global strategic balance of the Cold War. With America increasingly isolated

on the Vietnam issue, with the So viet Union ach ieving nuclear par ity with Am erica, with th e

Sino-Soviet split escalating, and with an economic recession at home and the growing challenge

to America’s economic interests from Western Europe and Japan, Nixon keenly sensed the need

and opportunity for a bold change in global st rategy. The rapprochem ent with China and the

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subsequent "triangular diplom acy" among Beijing, Moscow, and W ashington, Nixon believed, would create a new strategic environm ent favorable to th e United States. According to the traditional interpretation , the ke y rationale of Nixon' s new Chin a policy was to create a new strategic environment that would allow the United St ates to play the "China card," that is, to put

pressure on the Soviet U nion by playing Beijing off against Moscow . The goal of this "strategic

triangle" was to strengthen Am erica's hand in the Cold W ar vis-à -vis the Soviet Union by

improving relations with China, now a fierce en emy of the Soviet Union. At the sam e tim e,

Nixon also hoped that Moscow, under pressure, w ould move faster toward Soviet-Am erican detente and that improved relations with China would help America end the war in Vietnam.

While those strategic concerns were undeniably important, a sole focus on those issues can not fully explain the evolution of U.S.-China relations from 1969 forward. A major limitation of the tradition al in terpretation of U.S.-China rapp rochement, this ch apter argues, is that it has failed to sufficiently explore the historical cont ext within which Nixon' s "strategic triangle" was embedded. First, the decision to improve relations with Ch ina did not just involve cool-headed strategic calculations; it also invo lved changes in American policy-makers' perception of China.

In fact, the changed perception of China, in many ways, was a sine qua non of Si no-American rapprochement. Had th e Nixon administration conti nued to view China as a "Red Menace," it would have been difficult for W ashington to pur sue the rapproch ement with Ch ina. I n th is regard, the new perception of China as a "frust rated modernizer" certainly m ade new strategic dialogues with China conceivable. The Nixon adm inistration in fact embedded its "strategic triangle" within the new consensus on the nature of the Beijing regim e. As a result, the Nixon administration's deliberations on China starte d to em phasize the weakness of China as a

"frustrated modernizer." The fact that after the 1969 Sino-Soviet border clashes China started to

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show f lexibility in its attitude toward Am erica only rein forced the percep tion of China' s

weakness. Thus, Nixon and Kissinger were able to argue that the "strategic triangle" was feasible

because China needed America in light of its weak position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

Second, for Nixon and Kissinger, the comm on th reat from the Soviet Union could not

automatically guarantee a sm ooth developm ent of the U.S.-China rap prochement once it was

initiated. While it is understandable that m ost scholars focus on the strategic issues discussed during the m eetings between Am erican and Chin ese leaders, we should not ignore talks in

economic, cultural, and other non-strategic areas as "low politics." In fact, Nixon and Kissinger

developed a com plicated China policy package, which integrated stra tegic and non-strategic

measures. This package helped to push forwar d the Sino-Am erican rapprochem ent in several

ways. For one thing, Nixon and Kissinger did not wa nt to give the impression that they were

pursuing a straightforward allian ce with China against the S oviet U nion. They wanted the

pressures to be put on Moscow indirectly, and they worried that a bald anti-Soviet alliance would

only toughen the Soviet attitude and undermine the prospect for Soviet-American detente. In this

regard, the development of non-strategic relations with China wa s crucial in supporting Nixon' s

claim that he wanted to im prove U.S.-China re lations per se, not to play Beijing off against

Moscow. Another concern of no less importance was how to convince China that America would

not merely use China as leverage against the Soviet Union. Despite America's repeated pledge on

this point, as revealed by th e meeting records between the two sides, Nixon and Kissinger knew

that they must, as the Chinese put it, " match their words with their deeds." The developm ent of

economic and cultural relations with China, theref ore, became a m ajor tool to dismiss China' s

suspicion of America's motivations behind the rapprochement. At the sam e time, America had nothing to lose but everything to gain in expanding econom ic and cultural relations with China.

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The norm alization of econom ic and cultural rela tions with China coul d both gain support for

Nixon's Chi na policy from the "academ ic-legislative com plex," and, in the long run, help to

achieve the goal of "bringing China back into the international comm unity" and producing an

opportunity for Am erica to influence China' s m odernization. In sum , to fully understand the

development of U.S.-China rapprochement, we need to examine "guns and butter" together.

Finally, not only was the feasib ility of Nixon's "strategic triangle" based upon the image of

China as a "frustrated modernizer." The Nixon ad ministration also consta ntly gauged the actual

development of the "triangular diplomacy" against that im age. Although Nixon and Kissinger

were confident that, given China' s self-im posed isolation and its m ounting difficulty with the

Soviet Union, Beijing had to negotiate with Amer ica from a position of weakness, they were by

no means sure that China really wanted rapprochement with the United States. Thus, the Nixon

administration constantly needed to decipher Ch inese m oves in order to decide how genuine

China's pursuit of Sino-Am erican detente was. Duri ng this process, the "strategic triangle" and

the "frustrated m odernizer" im age reinforced each other. The more forthcom ing the Chines e

were in their pursuit of strategic cooperation with Am erica, the m ore convinced Nixon and

Kissinger were in their percep tion of China's weakness. At the sam e time, the m ore China wa s perceived as a weakened "frustrated m odernizer," the m ore the Nixon adm inistration cam e to believe in China' s genuine wish to pursue the U.S.-China rapprochement. For Chinese leaders, the developm ent of ne w strategic dialogues with Am erica was also entangled with their own vision of China's modernization. Available sources suggest that whether China should develop a rapprochement with Am erica was hotly debate d a mong Chinese leaders them selves. For Mao

Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and som e "moderates," China should adjust its re lations with Am erica

because the Soviet Union now becam e China's primary enemy. Making com promise with one

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enemy in order to counterbalance another was a necessary strategy to defend China's Communist revolution. For the "radicals," ho wever, an overture to ward Am erica was not a necessary compromise; it was appeasement, or, even worse, surrender to an enem y. Expanded contact, and especially expanded economic and cultural contact, with America, the leading imperialist, would undermine the whole Cultural Revolution, which help ed to put m any "radicals" in power in the first place, and which, after all, was a campaign against imperialism and revisionism. In sum, for both Am erican and Chinese leaders, the disco urse on China' s m odernization was a constant factor in the development of U.S.-China strategic dialogues.

This chapter will exam ine how strategic and non-strategic measures worked together to produce the U.S.-China rapprochem ent between 1969 and 1972. First, it exam ines how the perception of China as a "frust rated m odernizer" created the hi storical context for the Nixon administration's new China policy before Kissi nger's secret visit of China in July 1971. It discusses the role of that perception in the evolution of the "strategic triangle," as well as the use of non-strategic m easures by the Nixon team in th e pursuit of their strategic goals vis-à-vis

China. Second, it examines how the "academic-legislative complex" continued to urge for a new

China policy on its ow n initiative, and how that influenced Am erica's official China policy .

Finally, this chapter analyzes how the developm ent of the U.S.-China rapprochement after July

1971 continued to be influenced by the discourse on China's modernization. And it also discusses how the debate am ong Chinese leaders them selves created twists and tu rns in Sino-Am erican rapprochement.

The Reassessment of America's China Policy: January 1969 to August 1969

The popular cliché that only Nixon could go to China suggests that we need to start with him in understanding the rapprochement between America and China. Having established him self as

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a tough Cold W arrior during the 1950s, Nixon , upon taking over the White House in 1969,

enjoyed one advantage in dealing with Chin a—being f lexible with Communists was not a

political liability for him. At the sam e time, a brief exam ination of Nixon' s thoughts on China

before 1969 shows that the development of his thinking in certain ways paralleled the emergence

of the image of China as a "frustrated modernizer."

Nixon had already proposed a m ore conciliato ry attitude toward China before 1969. As

Eisenhower's Vice President, Nixon once advocat ed expanding trade relations with China.

During a National Security C ouncil (NSC) m eeting on Decem ber 23, 1953, Nixon pointed out

that the “po licy of containm ent and econom ic blockade [of China]… has very little chance” to

succeed. Instead, “we must recogn ize that trade is inevitable. Trade is a good cover, and we can

trade with China without recognizing her.” 1 On August 18, 1954, during another NSC m eeting,

Nixon urged the Eisenhower adm inistration to c onsider three questions about China: 1) how much was the U.S. willing to trade with Comm unist China? 2)should America recognize China? and 3) should Comm unist China be adm itted to the United Nations, an d if yes, when? Nixon favored a more flexible approach toward China, arguing that “there was an area of action in

between war and appeasement which we should explore, on the basis that in the long run Soviet

Russia and Communist China can and must be split apart.”2 During the 1960s, Nixon continued

to pay close attention to America’s China policy. When he visited France in 1963, he told French

President Charles de Gaulle that it m ight “be wise to develop lines of comm unications with the

Soviets and the Chinese.” Nixon pointed out that there w as a strong tende ncy in the US of a

“lineup of the Soviets, Europe and the U.S. against Chinese.” He then argued that it was better to

resist such short-term polices and to develop “parallel relationships with them (Soviet Union and

1 Record of NSC Meeting, 23 December 1953, FRUS, 1952-54, Vol., 14, pp. 348-349. 2 Record of NSC Meeting, 18 August 1954, ibid., pp. 529-535.

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China).”3 In March 1967, Nixon told his hosts during a nother trip to Europe that he “doubted that any true détente with the Soviets could be achieved until some kind of rapprochement could be reach ed with Communist China. ” An isolat ed China, Nixon insisted, would becom e the biggest threat to world peace.4

Nixon further developed his thoughts on China in his now much-celebrated Foreign Affairs article. “Any Am erican policy tow ard Asia m ust come urgently to gr ips with the reality of

China,” he argued, “Taking the long view, we si mply cannot afford to leave C hina forever outside the f amily of nations, ther e to nurtu re its f antasies, cherish its hates and threaten its neighbors.” In order to achieve this goal, Am erica would have to persuade China that it m ust change its dom estic and foreign policies. Yet Nixon again rejected the idea of forging an anti-

Chinese alliance with E uropean powers, including the Soviet Un ion, for “such a course would inevitably carry connotations of Europe vs . Asia, white vs. non-white, which could have catastrophic repercussions througho ut the rest of the non-white wo rld in general and Asia in particular. If our long-range aim is to pull China back into the fa mily of nations, we m ust avoid the impression that the great powers or the European powers are ‘ganging up;’ the response must be untainted with any suspicion of racism.”5

By the time Nixon was elected president, ther efore, he had already developed a rough blueprint for a new China policy, the gist of which l ater constituted the core of his administration's China initiative. First, Nixon sensed that China and the Soviet Union would split away sooner or later. By argui ng for a m ore flexible polic y toward China, Nixon actually developed a rudim entary "strateg ic triangle" by im plying that Am erica could use China as a

3 Memcon, Nixon and De Gaulle, NSC Files, Presidential/HAK MemCons, Box 1023, Nixon Presidential Materials (hereinafter NPM), NA II. 4 Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), pp. 282-283. 5 Richard Nixon, “Asia after Vietnam,” Foreign Affairs, (October 1967). pp. 111-125.

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counterbalance to the Soviet Union. Second, Nixon clearly regarded trade and other non-strategic measures as useful tools to lure China away from the Soviet Union. On this point, therefore,

Nixon's thinking m irrored the th inking of m any key m embers of the "academ ic-legislative complex," who, as discussed in Chapter 1, wanted to relax America's economic embargo against

China as the first step of their "containm ent without isolation" strate gy. Finally, Nixon did not support the idea that Am erica should cooperate w ith the S oviet Union to further contain and isolate China. His Foreign Affairs article implicitly recognize d C hina as a "frustrated modernizer." Thus like m embers of the "a cademic-legislative com plex," Nixon had becom e convinced of the need to break Ch ina's self-imposed isolation and bring that nation back into the world community. In sum , before he becam e President, Nixon had already develo ped a China policy package with a mixture of short-term and long-term, strategic and non-strategic concerns.

Nixon put China high on his fore ign policy agenda alm ost from the very m oment he was

sworn into office. In his 1969 Inaugural A ddress, Nixon m ade a veiled reference to his

administration's willingness to have meaningful dialogues with China: "Let all nations know that

during this adm inistration our li nes of communication will be open. We seek an o pen world—

open to ideas, open to the exch ange of goods and people—a world in which no people, great or

small, will live in ang ry isolation." 6 Beijing quickly denounced Nixon' s speech as a "desperate

confession" that on ly reflected the "irreversible decline of America." Nevertheless, the f ull text

of Nixon's address was published by Renmin Ribao, thus q uietly delivering its m essage to the

Chinese people.7

6 Richard Nixon, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Richard Nixon, 1969 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 3. 7 The editorial on Nixon's address was published by Renmin Ribao (People's Daily) and Hong Qi (Red Flag) on January 27, 1969. Nixon's speech was published by Renmin Ribao on Jauanry 28, 1969.

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In fact, Chinese leaders started to probe the possibility of reopening dialogues with America as soon as Nixon was elected president. On November 29, the Johnson adm inistration, with

Nixon's full knowledge, accepted th e Chinese offer to resume the Warsaw talks on February 20,

1969. Nixon certainly regarded this as a good start. In his handw ritten notes from meetings held immediately after his inauguration, N ixon wrote about the China problem : "Long range—we do not want 800,000,000 living in angry isolation." He then continued: "We want contact—will be interested in Warsaw meetings."8 On February 1, 1969, Ni xon further instructed K issinger that

"we should give every encouragem ent to the at titude th at this Adm inistration is ' exploring possibilities of raprochement [sic] with the Chin ese.'"9 Based on Nixon' s instructions, Kissinger on February 5 issued National Security Study Memorandum 14 (NSSM 14) asking f or an inter- agency study of U.S. policy toward China. The study would exam ine: 1) "The current status of

U.S. relations with Communist China and the Repub lic of China;" 2) "The nature of the Chinese

Communist threat and intentions in Asia;" 3) "The inte raction betw een U.S. policy and th e policies of other major interested countries toward China;" and, 4) "Altern ative U.S. approaches on China and their costs and risks." 10 NSSM 14 thus becam e the Nixon adm inistration's first comprehensive study of U.S.-China relations, and it was initiated in the context of a growing

Chinese flexibility toward the United States.

For the N ixon administration, the growing Chin ese flexibility reflected China' s weakness, which reduced its threat as an enem y and reinforced its image as a "frustrated modernizer." This judgment was cru cial, because it helped to convince A merican policy-m akers that a real opportunity would e merge sooner rather than la ter for the two nations to have m eaningful dialogues. The Johnson administration's initiatives toward China, as discussed in Chapter 2, went

8 Meeting notes, 20-21 January 1969, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, President's Handwriting, Box 1, NPM. 9 Memo, Nixon to Kissinger, 1 February 1969, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 341, NPM. 10 NSSM 14, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-134, NPM.

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nowhere in the absence of positive responses fr om the Chinese, altho ugh China was alread y regarded as a "frus trated m odernizer." Ch ina's growing flexibility, ther efore, su ggested that

Chinese leaders finally recognized the weakness of their regim e and they were soon likely to adjust China's domestic and foreign policies.

This possibility was firs t picked up by the St ate Department. On Nixon's inauguration day, the U.S. General Consulate in H ong Kong filed its first com prehensive analysis of China for the year 1969. After analyzing the m ajor domest ic and foreign setbacks China had suffer ed during1968, the report argued that the Chinese leader ship had finally starte d to realize the need to readjust its policies. At hom e, "the decision to suppress viol ence and reduce th e role of its youthful advocates seems irreversible." With regard to foreign policy, "si gnificant developments outside China within the past year seem to have spurred a reexam ination and changed appreciation by Peking of...its foreign policy." Moreover, "the Chinese leadership no longer regards war with the U S as imm inent—and views th e Soviet threat to Chinese security as far more worrisom e." The Hong Kong consulate was optim istic about the prospect of opening substantive dialogues with China, as it noticed that recent Chinese statem ents regarding the upcoming Warsaw talks neither attacked U.S. i nvolvement in Vietnam nor elaborated on China's duty to support Hanoi. 11 On January 21, the consulate furthe r argued that Am erica should take steps such as relaxing the trade embargo against China to encourage the growth of the strength of the "moderate" Chinese leaders. In f act, the report's analysis fit quite well with the "f rustrated modernizer" image of China, only now the predictions of that im age seemed to have com e true.

Therefore, the report urged Am erican policy-makers to grasp this opportunity to push forward new initiatives toward C hina: "To conclude, perhaps the m ost important thing we can say about

U.S. policy toward China is that not since 1950 has the outlook for m ainland China been so

11 Hong Kong to State, "Communist China: U.S. Policy Assessment," 20 January 1969, RG59, CFPF, 1967-1969, Box 1973.

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uncertain, the possibility for signi ficant ch ange so p alpable. It follows that th e need for

contingency planning on China ha s never been more urgent, nor the importance of taking steps

that could influence the shape of China's post-Mao policies so great."12

Nixon and Kissinger needed little edge to take advantage of the upcom ing Warsaw talks to

test their new China ini tiative. Furthermore, Nixon's inner foreign policy team agreed with the

State Department's analysis of recent developments in China. John H. Holdridge, a "China hand" of the State Department who was transferred to Kissinger's NSC in early 1969, later recalled that

he found it "astonishing" that the Chinese wanted to resume the Warsaw talks on the basis of the

"Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence," whic h were first proposed by the Chinese during the

1955 Bandung Conference. 13 Kissinger also told Nixon that "the re have been... indications of a

Chinese interest in retu rning to a ' softer foreign policy' emphasizing state relations rather than

being revolution-oriented." "At a m inimum," Kissinger asserted, "we have a retreat from

extremist position taken during the height of the Great Cultural Revolution."14

Meanwhile, Kissinger told Nixon that they shoul d not take dram atic initiatives, as those

steps might backfire and scare the Chinese away. With regard to the upcoming Warsaw meeting,

Kissinger reported, both the Stat e Departm ent and the NSC t hought that a m ore productive

approach was to rely on non-strategic m easures to convince China that Am erica genuinely

wanted to improve relations. At the current stag e, Kissinger argued, it was a "fruitless exercis e"

to improve U.S.-China relations by discussing issu es like Taiwan. However, Kissinger said, “we

have one more major play to make in this string—the offer to resume non-strategic trade with the

mainland.” In essence, Kissinger wanted to pursue a course that some State Department officials

12 Hong Kong to State, "Communist China: U.S. Policy Assessment, Part II," 21 January 1969, ibid. 13 John H. Holdridge, Crossing the Divide: An Insider's Account of the Normalization of U.S.-China Relations (New York: Rowan & Littlefield Publishing, 1997), p. 25. 14 Memo, Kissinger to Nixon, 12 February 1969, NSC Files, Country Files, Poland, Box 700, NPM.

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had already proposed: developing n on-strategic relations with China before starting negotiations

on strategic issues.15

On February 18, however, the Chinese cancelle d the planned February 20 W arsaw meeting

on the ground that a Chinese dipl omat in the Netherlands had de fected and was given political

asylum at the U.S. embassy in The Hague. Y et th e Chin ese can cellation on ly reinforced the

Nixon adm inistration's determ ination to open m eaningful exchanges with China. The Chinese

protest over the defected diplom at was quickly dismissed as a superficial ex cuse. The real

reason, as Nixon' s secretary of state W illiam Rogers told Senator J. W illiam Fulbright, was the

struggle between the moderates and the radicals within the Chinese leadership over the proper

course of China-U.S. relations. "It is by no m eans certain that exponents of a hard line have won

the day," Rogers asserted, "Peking has taken pa ins not to close the door for good on the W arsaw

talks." 16 The secretary put forward a sim ilar anal ysis to Nixon, and urged the President to

maintain the position that America would still be "ready to meet [the Chinese] anytime."17

Indeed, when Nixon made his first official trip to Europe between February 23 and March 2, he again dis cussed with French P resident Charle s de Gaulle the need for a new China policy.

This time the Sino-Soviet split figured prom inently in their d iscussions, and both leaders agreed that the Soviet "primary fear" of China created the possibility of a new Cold War strategy. Nixon believed that America should establish dialogues with China as soon as possi ble, but he told the

French leader that Am erica would not single-m indedly pursue a strategic triangle with the two

Communist powers. Im proving U.S.-China relations per se would be wo rth trying. "In looking down the road towards talks with th e Soviet Union we might keep an anchor to windward with

15 Ibid. 16 Letter, Rogers to Fulbright, 25 February 1969, RG59, CFPF, 1967-1969, Box 1973. 17 Memo, Rogers to Nixon, 18 February 1969, NSC Files, Henry A. Kissinger Office Files (HAKOF), Country Files, Box 86, NPM.

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respect to China," Nixon told De Gaulle: "This did not mean that we would do anything so crude

as to suggest we play China off against the Soviet Union...In 10 years when China had m ade

significant nuclear progress we would have to have more communications than we had today."18

Although Nixon did not want to pursue a "crude " triangular strategy, the Sino-Soviet split still quickly provided the m ost promising chance for a Sino-A merican rapprochement. After the

Sino-Soviet border clashes of Ma rch 1969, as Kissinger later recall ed, "ambiguity vanished, and we moved without further he sitation toward a mom entous change in global diplomacy." 19 Not only did the Sino-Soviet split beco me irrever sible, the Soviets a lso unintentionally helped the

Nixon adm inistration forge triangular diplom acy by constantly soliciti ng Am erica's support in their fight against China and thus revealing how serious the China p roblem was to them . 20

Accordingly, on March 31, Nixon asked De Ga ulle to play the role of a go-between and tell

Beijing th at Am erica would eventually with draw from the Vietn am W ar and that his administration desired to im prove relations with China. 21 On April 21, Rogers declared that an

improved Sino-Am erican relationsh ip would be crucial to peace in Asia. "W e shall tak e

initiatives to rees tablish m ore norm al relation s with Communist China and we shall rem ain

responsive to any indications of less hostile attitudes from their side," Rogers told his audience.22

While the Nixon adm inistration was trying to keep communication channels with China open, it also accelerated its internal studies in response to NSSM 14. By May 1969, the agencies involved had the first drafts of their studies ready. On Ma y 15, Kissinger chaired a Senior

Review Group meeting on NSSM 14. He opened the meeting by asking the participants' opinions on the three principle choices w ith regard to China: "co ntinue present course," "intensify

18 Memo of Conversation, 1 March 1969, NSC Files, Presidential/HAK MemCons, Box 1023, NPM. 19 Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), pp. 171. 20 See Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 172-176. 21 Memo of Conversation, 31 March 1969, NSC Files, Presidential/HAK MemCons, Box 1023, NPM. 22 Address by William Rogers, 21 April 1969, in DSB, (May 12 ,1969), No. 1559. p. 399.

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containment," and "reduction in tension." No par ticipant wanted to take the "tough" containm ent

approach toward China. Kissinger agreed, and he argued that Am erica should focus on how to

make China m ore cooperative in international affairs in the long-term . But he then played the

devil's advocate by asking why America should try to im prove relations with China, and not

continue the current China policy or even work with the Soviet Unio n to contain China. In

response, one participant argued that by im proving relations with China Am erica "could

discourage the Chinese from rebuilding their ties with the Soviets. " Another argued that

"bringing China into th e world community m ight make her m ore manageable and her policies

less prone to erratic uncertainty." All seemed to agree there was a fair chance that America could

moderate C hina's radic al policie s given the c urrent d ifficult situation in which the Chinese

leaders found themselves. In other words, China's weakness as a "frustrated modernizer" made it

possible for America to reopen di alogues with Beijing. At the same time, China's weakness also

made it easier for Am erica to pursu e a "strategic triangle" by c ooperating with China, not with

the Soviet Union. Kissinger agreed . He told the group that “history suggested to him that it is

better to align yourself w ith the weaker, not the stronger of two antagonistic partners.” Before the group broke apart, therefore, the participants decided that the Nixon administration should do

something immediately in the areas of trade and travel to send clear signals to the Chinese.23

The decisions made by the Senior Review Group were supported by Nixon himself. And the president especially wanted to sugarcoat his strategic goals with non-strategic measures. On June

11, Nixon said he would “favor a few short-term steps which would not offer real prospect of reciprocity, such as relaxation of trade and travel con trols” toward China. 24 Thus on June 26,

Nixon officially issued National Security D ecision Memorandum 17 (NSDM 17), which relaxed

23 Record of Meeting, 15 May 1969, NSC Files, H-Files, Box H-037, NPM. 24 Memo to Kissinger, 11 June 1969, NSC Files, Haig Chronological Files, Box 957, NPM.

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certain econ omic contro ls ag ainst C hina. 25 The p olicy chang es dictated by NSDM 17 were

designed to achieve multiple goals. For one thing, Nixon and Kissinger intended to send stronger

signals to China that America genuinely wanted to develop all-out relations with China, not jus t

to use China as a leverage against the Soviet Union. At the same time, those non-strategic policy

changes were closely related to the Nixon team's pursuit of the "strategic triangle." On July 3, for

example, Kissinger told Nixon that the relaxation of economic c ontrols against China “would be particularly valuable as a for m of pr essure on the Soviets…and m ight encourage the Soviets to show m ore willingn ess to be f orthcoming on key problems such as th ose in Sou theast As ia."

Kissinger immediately added that "this argument, however, cannot be used publicly.” 26 Thus on

July 11, Kissinger urged Nixon to announce NSDM 17 in such a way as to avoid giving the

decisions "overly overt anti-S oviet significance.” The State De partment soon announced these

changes in a “low-key fashion.” 27 Meanwhile, on July 3, Kissinger issued NSSM 63, which

asked for a comprehensive study on Sino-Soviet split and its implications for U.S. policy.28

In August, the final version of the respons e to NSSM 14 was completed. This Nixon

administration's first comprehensive study of U .S.-China relations was clearly based upon the

perception of China as a "frustra ted modernizer." The basic object ive of the Beijing regime, the

study pointed out, was to realize its own vision of m odernity not just within China but also

within its neighbors. China "wants other Asian st ates to accommodate their policies to those of

the PRC and eventually model their societies and governments on that of Communist China," the

study asserted. Yet China' s ability to attain its objectives was lim ited due to "severe econom ic

25 According to NSDM 17, the restraints on the Foreign Assets Control regulations were to be removed, which would permit foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms to export non-strategic items to China. Foreign Assets Control regulations were to be modified to allow U.S. tourists traveling abroad to purchase Chinese goods in limited quantities. Export Control regulations were to be amended to permit licenses for the export of agricultural equipment, chemical fertilizers and pharmaceuticals. See NSDM 17 “Relaxation of Economic Controls against China,” 26 June 1969, RG 273, NSC, NSDM, Box 1, NAII. 26 Memo from Kissinger to Nixon, 3 July 1969, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 86, NPM. 27 Memo from Kissinger to Nixon, 11 July 1969, FRUS, 1969-76, Vol. 17, pp. 46-47. 28 NSSM 63, "U.S. Policy on Current Sino-Soviet Differences," 3 July 1969, NSC Files, H-Files, Box H-155, NPM.

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problems," "political confusion internally and ineptness externally imposed by Maoist ideology,"

and "a m ilitary capability gear ed largely to d efensive op erations." The study sugg ested that

unlike the Johnson adm inistration, whose China initiatives we re thwarted by the Cultural

Revolution, the Nixon adm inistration m ight be able to see som e real ch anges in China. The

growing ch aos at home and the escalating co nfrontation with the So viet Un ion now became

gloomy reminders of the failure of the Chinese model for CCP leader s. Thus in the near f uture,

"it is m ore like ly tha t China' s policy ultim ately will m oderate, g iven an inte rnational clim ate conductive to moderation. Domestic economic pressures and the emergence of a more pragmatic leadership in Peking to cope with these pressures would contribute to such an evolution."29

The study acknowledged that Am erica could n ot just quietly observe the troubled Beijing regime without doing anything, for the China problem was both a historical and a present concern for the United States. "The US has had a special concern [about China] since the 19th

Century, " the study concluded. "Since the Kor ean W ar...US policies toward China [have] affect[ed] to som e extent our relations with vi rtually all third countries . The policies of the US toward most of Asia are closely related to the kind and degree of threats that Peking may present to the US or other countries in the area." In short, the question that what kind of China the United

States would prefer m attered a lot to Am erica's national interests. The best way to protect

America's interests vis-à-vis China, therefore, was to find a way to "obtain Chinese acceptance of such a system of independent states and Peking’s cooperation with other Asian countries in areas of common economic and social activity and interest." The Nixon administration should also try to "achieve a relaxation of tensions between th e US and the PRC, including participation of the

29 "NSSM 14: U.S. China Policy," 8 August 1969, NSC Files, H-Files, Box H-023, NPM.

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PRC in discussions on measures for arms control and disarmament, and the normalization of US

political and economic relations with the PRC."30

On August 14, when Nixon and Kissinger held a NSC m eeting to discuss NSSM 14, they

explicitly connected the image of China as a "frustrated modernizer" with the "strategic triangle."

China's domestic and internati onal setbacks, Nixon believed, hi ghlighted China's weakness not

just to the rest of the w orld, but also to Chinese le aders themselves. Therefore, Nixon told his

subordinates, "this is a most useful tim e to focus on our relations with China." 31 Kissinger

agreed. He told the participants of th e meeting that the studies made for NSSM 14 made it clear

that "no one supported...increase[d] deterrence and isolation on China." 32 Nixon emphasized that

"we won't join the Soviets in any plan to 'gang up' on China."33 Indeed, pursuing a possible Sino-

American d etente was favored by most agenci es. Moreover, Kissinger argued th at China' s

weakness made a successful pursuit of Sino-American rapprochement feasible. "Peking's policies

are more likely to be moderated," Kissinger concluded, "if its leadership is more often and more

intensively exposed to the reality of the outside world and that the position s in those in the

Peking leadership who have argu ed f or inc reased con tact with the United Sta tes cou ld b e

enhanced if there were a clea rer signal tha t this alterna tive policy is open to the Peking

Government."34

Between the start of Nixon' s tenure in the W hite House to the com pletion of NSSM 14, therefore, the Nixon adm inistration conceived its "strategic triangl e" in light of the im age of

China as a "frustrated m odernizer." In the ey es of American policy -makers, the "frustra ted modernizer" image rendered China less as an en emy that the United States m ust contain at all

30 Ibid. 31 NSC Meeting, "Nixon Talking Points," 14 August 1969, NSC Files, H-Files, Box H-023, NPM. 32 NSC Meeting, "Kissinger Talking Points," 14 August 1969, Ibid. 33 NSC Meeting, "Nixon Talking Points," 14 August 1969, Ibid. 34 NSC Meeting, "Kissinger Talking Points," 14 August 1969, Ibid.

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cost, and more as a reg ime whose leaders, as proved by their recent flexible attitude toward

America, were capable of changing policies on the ground of national interests. Furthermore, the

"frustrated modernizer" im age hi ghlighted China's weakness, whic h contributed to Am ericans'

confidence that the U. S.-China rapprochem ent was feasible and w orthwhile. Indeed, the

connection between the "frustrated modernizer" image and Nixon's new China initiative was put

into perspective by Rogers in an August speech. "I doubt very m uch if Peking's leaders really consider tha t they a re threatened b y the m ilitary str ength of the Unite d States, " the secre tary stated. "I suspect they sense that the real threat to them comes from the superior perfor mance of open societies....[M]any of their neighbors are experiencing econom ic growth at rates among the highest in the world. Alone among major nations, Communist China has at best stood still....This is one reason why we have been seeking to open up channels of communication."35

Moving Toward Sino-American Rapprochement: September 1969-July 1971

After the co mpletion of NSSM 14, the Nixon ad ministration accelerated its pursu it of the rapprochement with China. For their part, the Chin ese finally agreed to meet the Americans face to face, which even tually led to Kissinger' s s ecret v isit of China in July 1971. During this interval period, strategic concer ns and the "frustrated m odernizer" image of China once again reinforced each other in shaping the Nixon ad ministration's China po licy. In term s of the

"strategic triangle," the Nixon ad ministration further decided that it would line up with China against the Soviet Unio n. This " lean to Chin a" strategy w as produced by the perception of

China's weakness. At the same time, Nixon continued to pursue the development of non-strategic relations with China. S uch m easures, he beli eved, would help the developm ent of strategic relations with China by convincing Chinese leader s that A merica regarded U.S.-China relations per se as important and did not w ant to play China off against the S oviet Union. In addition,

35 Speech of William Rogers, 8 August 1969, in DSB (September 1 1969), No. 1575, p. 180.

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Nixon certainly had a long-term goal in m ind: expanded economic and cultural contact between

America and China would eventually help to re orient China toward the West econom ically and

politically.

On Septe mber 9, 1969, Nixon instructed W alter J. Stoessel Jr., Am erican Am bassador to

Poland, to pass a m essage to the Chinese privatel y that his adm inistration wanted to reopen the

Warsaw talks.36 Meanwhile, on Septem ber 11, t he review group set up for NSSM 63 laid out four broad strategies for the Nixon administration: 1) "to collaborat e with China in its efforts to avoid Soviet-im posed political-econom ic isolati on;" 2) "to collaborate with th e Soviets in

isolating China;" 3) "to adopt a ' hands-off' attitude, refusing to ha ve anything to do with either opponent that could be interpreted by the other as tilting the balance; " and 4) "to im prove

relations with both opponents, gain ing 'leverage' from the dispute where the US could in pursuit

of its own interests." The group argued that sin ce China obviously was the weakest power in the triangular relationship, Am erica should put pressures on the S oviets while "k eeping the door

open" to the Chinese. 37 On Septem ber 17, another m eeting decided to send clea r signals to the

Soviets that Am erica w ould st rongly oppose any preem ptive m ilitary action s against China.

Should the Soviet Union decide to blockade the Chinese coastline, especially should the Soviets

deny access to Hong Kong, there would be a U.S. military reaction.38

On Septem ber 25, Kissinger chaired another m eeting of the review group on Sino-Soviet

differences. He told the group th at Nixon wanted to im prove re lations with both Communist

powers. However, the national secu rity advisor declared "that in a no n-hostilities situation we

would be more inclined to lean toward Ch ina while publicly pronouncing that we favor

36 Memo of Conversation, 9 September 1969, RG59, CFPF, 1967-1969, Box 1973. 37 "NSSM 63: U.S. Policy on Current Sino-Soviet Differences," 11 September 1969, NSC Files, H-Files, Box H-040, NPM. 38 Washington Special Actions Group Meeting, 17 September 1969, NSC Files, H-Files, Box H-114, NPM.

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neither."39 A few days later, Kissinger told Nixon that he was concerned about the Soviet probes

on possible American reactions to a war between the two Communist powers. The United States

"should m ake [it] clear that we are not play ing along with these ta ctics....The principal

gain...would be in our stance with respect to China. The benefits would be long rather than short-

term, but they m ay be none the less real. Beha vior of Chinese Comm unist diplomats in recen t

months strongly suggests the ex istence of a body of opini on, presently subm erged by Mao’s

doctrinal views, which m ight wish to put US/C hinese relations on a m ore rational and less

ideological basis than has been true for the past two decades."40

Meanwhile, the State Departm ent was undertak ing its own study on U.S.-China relations.

On October 6, Marshall Green, who now served as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, prepared a memo reviewing U.S.-China relations since Nixon's inauguration.

Green was pleased to report that th e modifications taken by the Nixon adm inistration on trade and travel restrictions on China had produced p ositive responses from the Chinese. He believed that China genuinely wanted to m ove toward a rapprochement with America, since Zhou Enlai told the Fr ench Am bassador to China tha t Beiji ng appreciated th e fact that Am erica had "not attempted to take advantage" of the Sino-Soviet split."41 While the "China hands" were hopeful about a rapprochem ent with China, the "Soviet hands" of the State Departm ent were concerned about Nixon' s "lean to China" strategy. In a memo draft ed on October 27, for exam ple, the

"Soviet hands" declared that "we remain concerned that the Soviets may misconstrue actions we take toward Communist China to norm alize our relation s...we therefore believe that it m ay be desirable to take som e parallel ac tion with the S oviets...to underscore a general posture of U.S.

39 Senior Review Group Meeting, 25 September 1969, NSC Files, H-Files, Box H-040, NPM. 40 Memo, Kissinger to Nixon, 29 September 1969, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 337, NPM. 41 Memo, Green to Richardson, 6 October 1969, RG59 CFPF, 1967-1969, Box 1973.

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evenhandedness...."42 W illiam Rogers adopted this m ore balanced view . Yet Rogers believed that possible Soviet reactions should not stand in the way of Sino-American rapprochement. He added that America should also downplay concerns of another player, Taiwan, proposing that the

Nixon administration should "quietly terminate regular [naval] patr ol of the Taiwan Strait" and take more "commercial steps" to send stronger signals to Beijing.43

By the end of 1969, therefore, the Nixon administration further confirmed the consensus that

America sh ould "lean to China" in the em erging "strategic tr iangle." China' s weakness as a

"frustrated modernizer" and the gr owing signs of China' s new flex ible attitude toward Am erica

no doubt en couraged Nixon and his advisors to reach that consensus. Meanwhile, the Nixon

administration finally established direct contact with China on December 3, 1969, when Stoessel

delivered Nixon's message to the Chinese diplom ats in Warsaw that America wanted to resum e

the W arsaw talks. On Decem ber 11, Lei Yang, the Chinese Charg é d' affaires, visited the

American embassy in his unm istakable Hong Qi (Red Flag) limousine flying the PRC's national

flag to convey Beijing's acceptance of America's proposal. On January 8, 1970 it was announced

that the Warsaw talks would resume on January 20.44

Both the State Departm ent and the White H ouse were pleased. For Kissinger, the Chinese

decision to resume the W arsaw talks was a "tactical step designed to pu t pressure o n Moscow"

and proved that China w as forced to talk with America out of weakness. 45 Nixon and Kissinger

wanted to use this meeting to tell China tha t America did not "p ropose to take sides in Sino-

42 Memo, Martin Hillenbrand to Under Secretary of State, 27 October 1969, ibid. 43 Memo, Rogers to Nixon, "Next Moves in China Policy," 29 October 1969, Ibid. The memo was drafted on October 29, and the final version was sent to Nixon on December 2. 44 See Walter E. Jenkins, Oral History Interview, Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection (FAOHC), The Library of Congress; Jing Zhicheng, "Meiguo dashi zai huasha zhuiwo de zhenxiang (The American Ambassador Chased After US at Warsaw: The True Story)," in Foreign Ministry, Xinzhongguo waijiao fengyun (Important Events in New China's Diplomacy) (Beijing: Shijie zhishi, 1999), Vol. 5, pp. 254-257. 45 Memo, Kissinger to Nixon, 10 December 1969, NSC Files, Country File, Box 700, NPM.

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Soviet differences or to join any con dominium against China." 46 Rogers also wanted to discuss

"the whole range of trade questions" with the Chinese. At the same time, he wanted to emphasize

the issue of Taiwan in the f orthcoming talks with the Chinese sinc e it was the " key to any

improvement of relatio ns with the PRC." 47 During the January 20 meeting, Lei Yang, not

surprisingly, repeated B eijing's stance on th e issue of Taiwan, that is, Taiwan should be part of

China and it was Am erica's policy toward Taiwan that sto od in th e w ay of better U.S.-China relations. Stoessel, however, noti ced that China now took a new but m ixed attitude toward

America. O n the one hand, China greatly softened its anti-U.S. stance displayed in previous

Warsaw talks. On the other hand, Stoessel also observed that Ch ina tried to nego tiate f rom a position of strength. Lei Yang was car eful not to give Stoessel th e impression that China wanted

badly to improve bila teral re lations and thus give Am erica m ore leverage in the negotiations.

Nevertheless, China clearly wanted to further pursue the rapprochement and Lei Yang proposed

"higher-level discussions or any other channel which both sides might agree upon."48

The two sides decided to have another m eeting on February 20, which, as it turned out, would be the last m eeting of th e Warsaw talks. On Februar y 3, Kiss inger told Rogers that th e president wanted a "game plan" to sort out U. S. objectives and tactics for the next m eeting.49 In the subsequent studies, the State D epartment focused heavily on the problem of Taiwan. The nature of the Taiwan problem , however, was not ju st narrowly defined as an issue im portant to

America's credibility—Taiwan had been a loy al ally and Am erica maintained a d efense treaty with the Chinese Nationalist regime. Rather, it was recognized that the problem of Taiwan was at the heart of the Communist China' s vision of m odernity. Without Taiw an, the very prom ise of

46 Haig to Eliot, "Rationale for Inclusion in Instructions to Ambassador Stoessel," January 1970, NSC Files, Country Files, Box 700, NPM. 47 Rogers to Nixon, "Guidance for Sino-US Ambassadorial Meeting," 14 January 1970, RG59, CFPF, 1970-1973, Box 2187. 48 Warsaw to State, "Stoessel-Lei Talks," 24 January 1970, ibid. 49 Kissinger to Rogers, "Game Plan for Warsaw Talks," 3 February 1970, RG59 CFPF, 1970-1973, Box 2188.

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the Communist revolution, that is, that Chin a would becom e a m odern and unified state

respected by the international community, would collapse. Thus the State Department recognized

that it was unlike ly for Beijing to make major concessions on th e Taiwan issue, and Am erica

should find a way to bypass the Taiwan issue and focus on othe r issues that could help build a

lasting Sino-American rapprochement.50 In a memo sent to Nixon, Rogers thus argued that in the

next W arsaw m eeting Stoessel sh ould "ind icate US inten tion to redu ce [ American] m ilitary

facilities in Taiwan as tensions in the area dim inished, but [give] no indication of the tim ing of

such moves or how far they would be taken."51

During the February 20 W arsaw meeting, Lei Yang indicated that China too was willing to find a solution which would allow the two sides to bypass the Taiwan issue. Moreover, Lei noted that "the PRC was awar e that the settlement of the Taiwan issue required that an effort be m ade to create appropriate conditions for its resolution." Lei did not elaborate on those conditions, but

Stoessel tho ught Lei' s statem ent very interestin g b ecause it "was in tended as [a] hint th at the

Chinese may be prepared to consider more [compromising] solution on Taiwan or to m ake some gesture of [a] substantive move on other issues." Meanwhile, during this meeting China officially invited America to send a higher-ranking representative to Beijing for further discussions.52

The reopening of the Warsaw talk s, therefore, convinced the Nixon administration that their basic strategy toward China was valid. The Chinese, however, still needed more time to make up their minds. Thus after the Febr uary Warsaw meeting, China rem ained elusive on the issue of

U.S.-China rapprochement. Under this situation, Nixon and Kissinger decided to build up the so- called "backchannels" of communication with C hina, a pro cess that gradually cut off the State

Department from the adm inistration's China policy-making. In June, Nixon instructed Major

50 "U.S. Strategy in Current Sino-US Talks," February 1970, RG59 CFPF, 1970-1973, Box 2187. 51 Rogers to Nixon, "Sino-US Negotiations in Warsaw," 7 February 1970, NSC Files, Country File, Box 700, NPM. 52 Warsaw to State, "Stoessel-Lei Talks," 21 February 1970, RG59 CFPF, 1970-1973, Box 2188.

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General Vernon A. Walters, the U.S. m ilitary attaché in Paris, to contact his Chinese counterpart

in Paris, and to tell the Chinese that Nixon want ed to establish a direct yet secret channel of

communication through Paris. 53 But the Chinese rem ained uncommitted, and the Paris channe l

did not really work until after Kissinger' s secret visit of China the n ext summer. 54 On October

25, Nixon asked Pakistani President Yahya Khan, who was going to visit China in November, to

tell the Chinese leade rs that Am erica still wanted to "ope n negotiatio ns with China" and his

Administration would make "no condom inium [with the Soviet Union] against China." Nixon then asked Khan to tell the Chines e that he was willing to send a sec ret delegation to China. 55

The next day, Nixon told Rom anian President Nicolae Ceausescu essentially the sam e message, and he hoped that Rom ania could help to inform Beijing about Am erica's willingness to have a more normal relations with China. On October 27, Kissinger repeated the m essage in his private meeting with Ceausescu .56 Thus, from the end of October, Nixon and Kissinger started to put

together their backchannels of communication wi th China, with the Pakis tani channel becoming

the most useful one in the near future.57

Meanwhile, the Nixon adm inistration initiated anot her round of internal studies on China.

On Nove mber 19, the Nixon adm inistration i ssued NS SM 106, which asked for another

comprehensive study of Am erica's China policy in lieu of the n ew d evelopments since the

completion of NSSM 14. On the same day, NSSM 107 was also issued, which demanded a study

53 Haig to Walters, 15 June 1970, NSC Files, China/Vietnam Negotiations, Box 1031, NPM. 54 See Vernon A. Walters, Silent Missions (Garden City, NY: Double Day & Company, 1978), pp. 526-530. 55 Memo of Conversation, "Meeting between the President and Pakistan President Yahya," 25 October 1970, NSC Files, Chronology of Exchange with PRC, Box 1032, NPM. 56 Kissinger to Nixon, "Your Meeting with Romanian President Ceausescu," 25 October 1970; Kissinger to Nixon, "My Conversation with President Ceausescu," October 27, 1970; Ibid. Both Yahya and Ceausescu were in the U.S. at that time to attend the 25th Anniversary of the U.N. 57 For up-to-date discussions of those backchannels, see Xia, Negotiating with the Enemy, Chapter 6; Mircea Munteanu, "Communication Breakdown? Romania and the Sino-American Rapprochement," Diplomatic History 33: 4 (September 2009), pp. 615-631.

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on the issue of Beijing's membership in the United Nations.58 In December, Nixon requested the

Under Secretaries Comm ittee conduct a special study on trade and trav el with China as part of

the comprehensive study of NSSM 106.59

The response to NSSM 106 of Fe bruary 1971 reinforced the perception of China as a

"frustrated modernizer." NSSM 106 singled out two factors th at contributed to China' s willingness to open d ialogues with America. O n the on e h and, "with the violent p hase of the

Cultural Revolution now over, the PRC is attempting to end its isolation." On the other hand,

"the virulence of the hostility be tween the PRC and the Soviet Union has contributed to China' s interest in m aintaining some contact with the US ." In other words, the Chinese leadership now realized the need to adjust their pas t policies because Beijing's aspiration of becom ing a great modern state was obviously frustrated by developm ents both at hom e and abroad. Thus, NSSM

106 spoke confidently that Am erica's new China policy would work and argued that the long- rang goals (4-8 years) of that policy should incl ude bringing China back into the international community, urging China to play a m ore constr uctive role in in ternational af fairs, and encouraging the Sino-Soviet split. Econom ic relations with China would play an important role in achieving these goals, as America would try to “achieve more normal political and economic relations with the PRC, including participation in the growing trade with it.”60

Indeed, by m id-1971, the "frustrated m odernizer" image had transformed the perception of

China so much that the Nixon administration w as willing to m ake compromises on the issue of

Taiwan. On March 12, a Senior Re view Group m eeting agreed that America would have to be

prepared to recognize Beijing as the sole government of China and allow Beijing into the United

58 NSSM 106 & 107, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 365, NPM. 59 Memo from Kissinger to Irwin, 26 December 1970, FRUS, 1969-76, Vol. 17, pp. 252-253. 60 “NSSM 106—China Policy,” 16 February 1971, NSC Files, H-Files, Box H-177, NPM.

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Nations before im proving U.S.-China relations substantially. 61 In November 1970, the m ajority in the UN for the f irst tim e voted in f avor of the so-c alled "Albanian Resolution " to adm it

Beijing and to expel Taiwan, although the required two-thirds majority (Important Question) was not acquired to pass it. Noticing this developm ent, the participants of a March 25 NSC m eeting recognized that Beijing' s entry into the UN was inevitable. The interesting thing, however, was that no one wanted to have a fight in the UN to block Beijing's entry. China's weakness greatly reduced its threat to the Free World; therefore the blow to America's credibility vis-à-vis Taiwan could be lim ited. Besides, Am erica's passivity on this issue would furthe r convince China that

Nixon genuinely wanted to im prove relations . China' s adm ission into the UN would also encourage the Beijing regime to become a "responsible" member of the international community.

The State Department was more conservative, and it proposed the so-called "dual-representation" formula; that is, Am erica would not block Beiji ng's entry into the UN but Am erica would also try to preserve Taiwan's seat in the General Assembly. Fully aware tha t both Beijing and Taibei were strongly against any "two-Chinas" formula, Nixon instead seemed to prefer maintaining the current U.S. policy on this issue (keeping Beijin g out and keeping Taibei in) while hoping that reality would take care of this issue.62

Meanwhile, Nixon decided to rely even m ore heavily on non-strategic steps to encourage favorable C hinese responses. The special study on trade and travel th at Nixon requested in

December 1970 was finished in March 1971. It pres ented a coordinated, three-stage strategy for developing trade with China. During the first st age, America should relax its control over direct trade with C hina on th e basis of the sm all steps previously taken. This would require gradually dismantling the “China differential.” “The closer our treatment of trade with the PRC approaches

61 Meeting Record, 12 March 1971, NSC Files, H-Files, Box H-112, NPM. 62 Meeting Record, 25 March 1971, NSC Files, H-Files, Box H-031, NPM.

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that applied to the Soviet Union, th e m ore seri ously our assertions of willingn ess to im prove

relations with the PRC will be b elieved, and the m ore likely it be comes that Peking will

eventually respond favorably to our initiatives. ” During the second stage, America should “[go]

beyond steps of a limited and still q uasi-symbolic nature and [work] toward the developm ent of

substantial two-way trade” by fa cilitating exports and im ports between the two countries, and especially by selling aircrafts to China whic h “would be much welcom ed by our industry.”

During this stage, therefore, America would place China trade on a par with Soviet trade. During the last s tage, America would ex change trade delegations, offici al and unofficial, with China.

Moreover, in certain areas such as grain sales, America would give m ore favorable treatment to

China than to the Soviet Union. If Nixon decided to do so, the study pointed out, this step would

“indicate that the U.S. attached a higher value to good relations with China than with the USSR” and Nixon “would be taking on a major domestic battle.” 63

On April 13, Nixon approved th e steps recom mended by the study. 64 Nixon’s decision seemed to produce som e positive results. A m emo prepared in May stated that d irect trade with

China would not only contribute to the political dialogue between America and China, but would also m ake Am erican farm ers in the western st ates happy and thus gain dom estic support for

Nixon’s China policy. 65 In fact, by now the s teps toward relaxing trade controls against China

had created such a m omentum that it was harder not to take more steps. On June 3, Kissinger

told Nixon that “the Chinese will not be interested in such trade if we restrict our exports to them

significantly more than exports to the USSR.” This would not onl y affect the pol itical dialogue

with China, since Beijin g might feel that Am erica valued the Soviet Union m ore, it would also

63 Memo from Kissinger to Nixon, “Steps Toward Augmentation of Travel and Trade Between the People’s Republic of China and the United States,” 25 March 1971, NSC, Kissinger Office Files, Box 86, NPM. 64 NSDM 105, “Steps Toward Augmentation of Travel and Trade Between the People’s Republic of China and the United States,” 13 April 1971, NSC Institutional Files (H-files), Box H-223, NPM. 65 Memo from Peterson to Kissinger, 24 May 1971, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 17, pp. 320-321.

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cause “American business interests to criticize you and not the Chinese for the failure of trade to

develop.” Kissinger thus stronger urged Nixon to terminate the “China differential.”66

Since the com pletion of NSSM 14 in A ugust 1969, theref ore, the Nixon adm inistration

further shaped its China policy according to the "f rustrated modernizer" im age. Internal s tudies

continued to present C hina as a w eakened po wer that wa s f orced to adjust its d omestic and

international policies. The resumption of the Warsaw Talks and other signs of Chinese flexibility

toward America only highlighted China' s weakness. As a result, Nixon and Kissinger believed

that their n ew China policy was f easible becau se China was no lon ger an im placable "Red

Menace" to the United States. Meanwhile, the Nixon adm inistration did n ot pursue a

straightforward anti-Soviet alliance with China. Not only did they repeat this point both in public

and in priv ate; they also reli ed heavily on steps in trade and travel regarding China to pu sh

forward Sino-American detente. They understood that a single-m inded focus on the "strategic

triangle" would not work, for the Chinese woul d be suspicious of U.S. motivation. Thus

developing non-strateg ic relations with China was im portant for th e success of N ixon's grand

strategy. In this regard, moreover, the Nixon adm inistration was able to gain support from the

"academic-legislative" complex.

The Academic-Legislative Complex and the U.S.-China Rapprochement: 1969-1971

While the N ixon administration was deliberatin g on its new China policy, m embers of the

"academic-legisla tive com plex" rem ained active in pus hing for improved Sino-Am erican

relations. They influenced the course of U.S.-C hina rapprochement in several ways. First, the

membership of the "complex" continued to grow after Nixon was elected president. In fact, when

Nixon implied that he soon m ight improve relations with China, he actually encouraged m ore people to join the "complex." The influence of the "complex" was thus further increased,

66 Memo from Kissinger to Nixon, 3 June 1971, NSC Files, HAKOF, Box 86, NPM.

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especially with new heavyweights from Cong ress such as Edward Kennedy and Hugh Scott.

Second, m embers of the "com plex" continued to base their proposals on the "frustrated modernizer" im age of China. Like Nixon and Ki ssinger, they also perc eived the heightened weakness of China after the Sino -Soviet border clashes in 1969. But the "complex" developed a complicated relationship with the President. Sometimes Nixon wooed them for their support in pursuing U.S.-China detente; yet som etimes the "radical" moves of the "com plex" jeopardized

Nixon's delicate strategic designs an d threatened to stea l his thunder. Third, th e activities of the

"complex" also had a significant impact on the Chinese. On the one hand, the spontaneous moves of the "com plex" members to im prove relations with China convinced CCP leaders that the "Am erican people" wanted friendship with the "Chinese people." On the other hand, the differences between the "com plex" and the Ni xon administration provided the Chinese with a chance to manipulate America's public opinion, thus exerting more pressures on the Nixon team.

Moreover, a divided America also helped to feed the growth of China's sense of negotiating from a position of strength.

Nixon knew that he could not ignore the "academ ic-legislative com plex" if he wanted to have a new China policy. For example, on Ja nuary 27, 1969, Paul Findley, a House Republican actively involved in foreign policy, urged Nixon to have "a new open door policy" toward China.

Findley, a loyal supporter of the fa rmers in his home state (Illinois), particularly wanted to open trade re lations with China. "United States po licies d id no t preven t Ch ina from increas ing her trade with the W est to the point th at it now con stitutes two-thirds of the total," argued Findley, who urged Nixon to use trade as a tool to encourage moderates in the Chinese leadership toward a rapp rochement with Am erica. 67 Meanwhile, at a conference sponsored by the National

Committee on U.S.-China Relations (NCUSCR), five Senators urged the Nixon administration to

67 Letter, Findley to Nixon, 27 January 1969, White House Central Files (WHCF), Subject Files, Box 20, NPM.

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recognize the Beijing regime, demilitarize the Taiwan area, end the trade embargo against China,

and stop blocking Beijing' s admission into the U N.68 In June 1969, the NCUSCR held its first

National Convocation. Senator Edward Kennedy, a potential De mocratic opponent of Nixon in the next presiden tial election, m ade a key-note speech in which he laid out a seven-stage blueprint for improving relations with China. Kennedy urged Nixon "not to allow the Russians to make continuing hostility toward Peking the pri ce of future Soviet-American cooperation." He then declared that the A merica public now was ready to recognize China, and he challenged the

Nixon adm inistration to follow th e people' s will. Although these appeals revealed a growing support for a new China policy, they were also quite an irritant for Nixon, who was not ready to move quickly on the China issue. In response to the June NSUSCR convocation, for exam ple, it was observed that the m eeting convinced China th at the "US is a paper tiger, who is torn by domestic dissension, college and racial riot, and who wants to negotiate out of weakness and fear."69

Nixon him self tried to win suppor ters for his China policy am ong the "com plex." In this regard, Nixon paid particular at tention to Mike Mansfield, the powerful Senate majority leader.

Mansfield, who consistently ur ged an effort for im proved re lations with China during the

Johnson years, continued to do so. On March 1969, for example, Mansfield delivered a m ajor foreign policy speech in which China figured prominently. Mansfield reminded his audience that while th e A merican peo ple were tra ditionally A tlantic-oriented cu lturally and politically, the

United States now in fact was als o a Pacific and Asian power. To Mansfield, the reason for

America's present trouble in Vietnam was the m isunderstanding of China, the key to peace in

Asia. Mansf ield argued that Am erica and China should not be enem ies, but should naturally

68 "Five Senators Urge a New China Policy," 25 January 1969, New York Times (NYT). The five Senators included William Fulbright, Jacob Javits, and Edward Kennedy, who were members of the "complex" in the Johnson years. 69 "First National Convocation of National Committee," 6 June 1969, WHCF, Subject Files, Box 18, NPM.

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work together constructively to maintain peace in Asia. He especi ally urged the two countries to

develop trade relations, a m ove that would also benefit Japan, with which Am erica and China

could build an even m ore stable Asia. Finally, Ma nsfield asserted that "there are n ot two Chinas

and the attempt to delineate them is synthetic...China is a part of Taiwan and Taiwan is a part of

China." America, Mansfield urged, should get its hands off the Taiwan issue as soon as

possible.70 Partially to win Mansfield' s support, and partially to put the S enator's independent

China initiative under control, Nixon quickly arranged a private meeting with Mansfield. He told

the Senator that he too had "a lifelong interest in that part of the wo rld (China)—understandable

for a California boy." The Presiden t then told Mansfield that he planned to relax the trade

embargo against Chin a, lift th e travel ban on China, an d resum e the W arsaw talks. The

Democratic Majority Leader was p leased and h e told the R epublican P resident that he would

support his Administration's new China policy.71

Another potential supporter of Nixon's China policy was Senato r Hugh Scott, a Republican

from Pennsylvania who became the Senate Minority Leader in 1969. By coincid ence, Scott, like

Mansfield, was also a China sch olar, esp ecially in terested in colle cting an cient Chines e

artworks. B y 1969 he already had published wide ly on this subject. In fact, Scott becam e

interested in a new China policy during the Johnson years. In Ma y 1967, for exam ple, he sent a

letter to the NCUSCR, asking the C ommittee to keep him updated on the latest new s regarding

China.72 Moreover, Scott believed that China would eventually reject Communism as a model of

modernization, as he argued in a working paper prepared in 1967 that the "Chinese people have

demonstrated more and more clearly that it is their firm resolve not to rem ain any longer under

70 Mansfield, "A Pacific Perspective," 10 March 1969, Serious 22, Box 79, MMA. 71 Mansfield Interview, "A Size-Up of President Nixon," 6 December 1971, U.S. News & World Report. 72 Letter, Scott to NCUSCR, 29 May 1967, Papers of Hugh Scott (PHS), Accession # 10200-etc, Box 117, Special Collections, University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville, VA.

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the Communist yoke." 73 Nixon tried carefully to cultivate Sc ott's support for his fore ign policy.

Scott him self later recalled that during the early 1970s he worked closely with Mansfield to

"maintain foreign policy consensus" behind Nixon. 74 Indeed, like Mansfield, Scott also became

deeply involved with U.S.-China relations.

Members of the "complex" also stepped up their effort to use Congress as a tool to get a new

China policy. On September 25, 1969, the Senate pa ssed a resolution declar ing that "when the

United States recognizes a foreign government and exchanges diplomatic representatives with it,

this does not of itself imply th at the United S tates approves of the form, ideology, or policy of

that foreign governm ent." During the Senate floor debate, the author of this resolution argued

that "it should not be construed prim arily as laying the groundwork for recognition of Peking."

However, it was observed that "if the resolu tion is not intended to clear the w ay for the

recognition of Communist China...then it is difficult to understand the motivation behind it."75

In September and Octo ber 1970, th e House Fo reign Affairs Comm ittee organized its first hearings on China since 1966. The m ajority of th e witnesses were veterans of the "academ ic- legislative complex," such as Doak A. Barnett, Thomas Wolfe, Harold Hinton, Robert Scalapino, and Alexander Eckstein. Most of them appeared before Fulbright's 1966 hearings and articulated the "frustrated m odernizer" im age of China. Th is tim e, they argued that not only was their perception of China accurate, bu t that the small steps taken by the U.S. Governm ent since 1966 based on the "frustrated m odernizer" im age also had started to hav e real effect. Barnett, fo r example, argued that now America faced "an op portune time to translate the rhetoric of our new

China posture into specific policy changes." Ba rnett observed that since 1968 there had been signs of a s oftened Chinese attitude toward Amer ica, and B eijing showed particular interests in

73 "The Major Problems Now Confronting the Chinese Communist Regime," 1967, ibid. 74 "Oral History Interview of Scott," 13 September 1976, PHS, Accession # 10200-ab, Box 9. 75 Congress, China: U.S. Policy Since 1945 (Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1980), pp. 36, 187.

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taking advantage of the rela xed A merican econom ic em bargo. Improved relations with China surely could help America in areas s uch as the war in Vietn am, yet Barnett argu ed that "it is an error to allow a preoccupation" wi th those strategic issues "to push aside such basic long-term problems as how to work actively toward im proving relations with Communist China." "W ho knows," he mused, "perhaps eventua lly the lure of tour ist dollars m ight have som e e ffect on

Peking."76 Fr ed Greene, a prof essor at W illiams College, ag reed. He to ld the Comm ittee tha t

"the facts are that the C hinese—including Mao—are very much concerned with their long-range

economic developm ent." Greene believed that the Chinese could never achieve this goal

"without very close and sustaine d relations with the non-Communist industrialized world." This

Chinese concern, therefore, would provide a motivation f or China's rapproche ment with

America, for "the United States is obviously a better prospect, in terms of resources for the long

future."77 Marshall Green, the only government official who testified before the Committee, was

naturally m ore cau tious than ot hers. But he also observed that the unilate ral steps taken by

America related to trad e and travel seem ed to have som e real im pact on the Chin ese a ttitude toward America. In ad dition, Green took pains to reconfirm the point that Am erica was only

committed to the def ense of Taiwan and the Pe scadores, not Quemoy and Matsu, an d America

would not help Chiang Kai-shek retake mainland China.78

The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations wa s not to be outdone. In June 1971, Fulbright

arranged hearings on five resolu tions relating to China intr oduced in th e Senate ear ly that year.

Joint Resolution 48, introduced by Senators F rank Church and Charles Mathias, dem anded

repeal of the 1955 Formosa Resolution, which grante d the President authority to use armed force

76 House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings: United States-China Relations: A Strategy for the Future (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), pp. 3-9. 77 Ibid., p. 13. 78 Ibid., pp. 286-287.

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to protect Taiwan from attack. In a letter sent to Hugh Scott for support, Church said that

"strange as it may now seem, the grant was not only indefinite in scope, but entirely unlim ited in

time." Terminating the Form osa Resolution, therefore, could both avoid a chance of war with

China and send a friendly signal to Beijing. 79 Resolution 18, introduced by Senator Mike Gravel, provided that the two Chinas should be encourag ed to reach agreem ent on unification and that the United States should support the entry of m ainland China into the U.N. and the Security

Council. Resolution 37, introduced by Senator Jacob Javits, provided that the US should support

Beijing's entry into the UN, seek diplom atic relations with Beijing, and m aintain support of

Taiwan as a UN member. Resolution 82, introduced by Senator George McGovern, provided that the US should support Beijing' s entry into the UN and its Security Council, and recognize th e

Beijing regime as the so le government of China. Finally, Resolution 139, introduced by Senator

Edward Ke nnedy, provided that Beijing should be given full UN m embership and the United

States should not try to preserve membership for Nationalist China.80

During the hearings, m ost witnesses supported normalization of relations with the PRC,

although they recognized that the is sue of Taiwan would be a m ajor obstacle in this regard and

differed on how far the interests of Taiwan shoul d be com promised. Yet most of the witnesses

agreed that given the recent dev elopment on th e issu e of Beijing' s m embership in the UN,

allowing Be ijing into th e UN would be the b est way to encourage th e Communist regim e to

forge "constructive" relations with other countries. Moreover, a Be ijing regime with its stakes

raised in th e interna tional comm unity would be less like ly to sta rt a war with Taiwan. I n

addition, Am erica should try to stay out of the dispute between Beijing and Taiwan. Not

79 Letter, Church to Scott, 23 February 1971, PHS, Accession # 10200-etc, Box 67. 80 For the hearings as well the full text of those Resolutions, see Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings: United States Relations with the People's Republic of China (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1971). J Res. 48 was the only Resolution that would have the force of law, which was not repealed until 1974. The other Resolutions would be advisory only.

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opposing Beijing' s adm ission into the UN would only be the first step tow ard a normal

relationship with China. Normalized economic and cultural relations surely would follow, which would benefit America greatly. As one witness argued rather enthusiastically, "the Chinese trade

has proven profitable and challeng ing to W estern traders, and...i t prom ises to prove so to

Americans as well." 81 Indeed, the general tone of the hear ings showed m uch confidence in th e

proposed steps toward China based on the "frust rated modernizer" image. The witnesses were

not aware of Nixon' s secret contact with Chin a, and they were not aware of Nixon' s exact

thinking on the "strate gic tr iangle," but they believ ed tha t China simply could n ot resist the

temptation of gaining access to the world market in order to push forward its own modernization.

Fulbright was especially convinced that China wa s a "frustrated m odernizer" and did not harbor

any aggressive intentions toward its neighbors. Am erica's past perception of China as a "Red

Menace," h e said, was m isleading because th e U. S. Governm ent did not always tell the truth

about China.82

Nixon perceived the activities of the "complex" with mixed feelings. While the spontaneous

request of the "com plex" for a rapprochem ent with China could build up public support for the

President's new China policy, it could also jeop ardize Nixon's delicate diplom atic design of the

"strategic triangle." Moreover, som e "complex" members' moves threatened to steal the thunder

from Nixon's hands. Mansfield, for example, turned out to be a particular problem. In June 1969,

Mansfield sent a letter to Zhou En lai, in which he asked to visi t China to "develop a greater

understanding" between th e two countries. The Pr esident, Mansfield told Zhou, "is conversant

with m y intention." 83 Nixon' s initial respons e was that "h e is m ost pleased" with Mansfield' s

81 Ibid., p. 257. 82 Ibid., p. 252. Fulbright even told the press that regarding China, "we've been deceived for a long time, much longer than we thought and much more profoundly." 83 A copy of Mansfield's letter is in WHCF, Confidential Files, Box 6, NMP.

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initiatives.84 In August, Zhou flatly denied Mansfield' s request. Yet the Chinese, in their internal debates, did not want to reject Mansfield's overture completely and decided to "let him wait for a while."85 In April 1971, in an obvious effort to further test Nixon's intention on U.S.-China rapprochement, Zhou suddenly deci ded to invite Mansfield to visit China at a tim e of the

Senator's own choice. Although Nixon continued to encourage Mansfield' s contact with the

Chinese wh en he m et with the Se nator, in private he w as greatly irritated by a possible

Mansfield-Zhou meeting. During a June 28 m eeting with Kissinger and H.R. Haldeman, Nixon

"made the point that Henry m ust get an agreement out of Chou En-lai that no De mocrats is [sic] to go to China before the P goes." 86 Later, Kissinger dutifully raised this issue with Zhou at their first m eetings in July 1971. Clearly, the Chinese m anipulation between Mansfield and Nixon contributed to the Nixon's eventual decision to visit China.87

Although Nixon clearly double-crossed Mansfield in keeping the Senator in the dark about his own secret con tact with the Ch inese, he s till rushed to win Mansfield and other Senators' support once Kissinger's July visit to China was announced. At the bipartisan leadership meeting on July 20, Nixon told the Senators that now the trend toward a rapprochem ent with China had become irreversible. Nixon assured the Senators that the two countries "are not m eeting about other n ations. W e are m eeting about each othe r." To gain th e S enators' sup port, Nixon emphasized that China was "m uch in need of te chnology" and "prepared to have trade relations

[with America]," which obviously could benefit the Senators' constituencies. Moreover, Nixon proposed that he wanted to send Mansfield and Hugh Scott to China soon after his own visit.88

84 Memo, Butterfield to Kissinger, 26 June 1969, ibid. 85 Xiong Xianghui, "Dakai zhongmei guanxi de qianzou" (Preclude to Sino-American Rapprochement), in Xinzhongguo waijiao fengyun, Vol. 4, pp. 76-79. 86 H. R. Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries (New York: G.P. Putman's Sons, 1994), 28 June 1971, p. 307. 87 For a detailed discussion of Nixon's response to the possible Mansfield visit, see Oberdorfer, Senator Mansfield, pp. 393-403. 88 Leadership Meeting, 20 July 1971, PHS, Accession # 10200-n-p, Box 8.

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In short, the "academ ic-legislative com plex" contrib uted to the Sino-A merican

rapprochement by further building up public support for a new China policy and providing China with a chance to nudge Nixon toward a summit m eeting. More im portantly, the interes t of the

"complex" in developing non-strategic relations with China was helpful in convincing China that

America's new China p olicy was not a sho rt-term expedient. In addition, as we sh all see later,

many members of the "com plex" rushed to visit China after Nixon' s visit in pursu it of cultural,

economic, and academ ic exchange with the PRC. As a result, they helped to bu ild a broad er

foundation of the new relationship than the one based solely on geopolitical considerations.

The Final Leg of the Journey: July 1971-February 1972

In June 1971, Pakistani Am bassador Hilaly went to see Kissinger and delivered a m essage

from Zhou Enlai to Nixon, in which the Chinese formally invited the Pr esident to visit China. 89

After patient and sometimes frustrating diplomacy of more than two years, light finally appeared at the end of the road. Nixon was pleased, and it was quickly decided that Kissinger should visit

China in secret to make preparations for Nixon's visit. Kissinger visited China twice, in July and

October 1971, and in January 1972 another advance team led by General Alexander Haig went to

China to make f inal pr eparations f or the Pres ident's visit. Yet both the Am ericans and the

Chinese quickly dis covered th at th e need for a U.S.-China rapprochem ent out of strategic considerations could not guarantee a sm ooth final leg of the journey. W hen they started to meet face-to-face, both sides found that their approaches to common strategic interests were shaped by their respective visions of history and modernity.

For Nixon and Kissinger, the direct talks with Chinese leaders provided a chance for them to gauge China's behavior against the "frustrated modernizer" image. And they quickly reached two conclusions. First, the Chinese pretence to nego tiate from a position of strength only belied

89 Message from Zhou to Nixon, 29 May 1971, NSC Files, China/Vietnam Negotiations, Box 1031, NPM.

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China's weakness. The more Chinese leaders said that they did not fear the Soviet Union and that they did not need Am erica as a counterbalan ce, the m ore Nixon and Kissinger were convinced that China indeed need ed America to im prove its strategic environm ent. As a resu lt, American policy-makers cam e to believ e tha t China wanted to pu rsue a rapp rochement with the United

States as a long-term effort. S econd, it was obvious that the direct talks we re largely controlled by Zhou, who had long been regarded as the l eader of the "m oderates." And Zhou apparently was backed by Mao Zedong hi mself in those talks. Nevertheless, although they did not have full access to th e Chinese internal debate, Am erican policy-makers understood that Sin o-American rapprochement was a hotly contes ted issue within China. Thus, Nixon and Kissinger decided to encourage the "m oderates" to co ntinue the pursuit of U.S.-China rapprochem ent. They repeatedly told the Chin ese that America was in terested in developing re lations with China pe r se, and the Nixon adm inistration would not play China off against the Soviet Union. They were also willing to m ake more concessions on th e issue of Taiwan, and Am erica continued to develop econom ic and cultural relations with China. In sum , the discourse on China's modernization was a factor that constantly influenced the tone and pace of those direct talks.

For their p art, Chinese lead ers in deed had intense debates over a rapprochement with

America. Zhou and his supporters had to fend off the radical leaders who tried to sabotage Sino-

American rapprochement. Lin Biao, China' s Defense Minister and Mao' s designated successor, and Jiang Qing, Mao' s wife, had long consolidat ed their power by supporting radical Maoism during the Cultural Revolution. A pparently both Li n and Jiang feared that a softened attitude toward America would com promise their own ra dical ideology and thus weaken their dom estic power base. It also seem ed that the radical lead ers, especially Jiang Qing, resented the fact that

Mao entrusted Zhou to take charge in preparing the meeting with Americans. Unfortunately for

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the modern researcher, there are simply not e nough archival sources to for m firm conclusions

regarding the role of those radical leaders in the U.S.-China rapprochement. Yet at least we know

that th e rad ical leaders' oppositio n to any negot iations with Am erica was based on their own

understanding of m odernity in Ch ina, which continued to dict ate a tough stance toward both

superpowers.

For example, when the four Marshals were as ked to study the intern ational situation, Lin

Biao also s tarted his own evaluation of China' s relations with the Soviet Union and the United

States. In Ju ne 1969, the Military Commission of the CCP Central Comm ittee initiated a m ajor

study of the prospect of war against China in the near future, a study supervised by Lin' s loyal

supporters, Huang Yongsheng and Wu Faxian. The st udy concluded that "eve ry activity" of the

Chinese government should be orientated toward war preparation—presu mably a two-front war

with both superpowers—and urged a m assive defense buildup. 90 On October 17, 1969, Lin Biao issued "No. 1 Order of the Vice Chairm an Lin," which order ed the mobilization of the People's

Liberation Ar my (PLA) to a state of e mergency war preparedness. Apparently, Lin did s o without consulting Mao and Zhou. The next day, upon hearing Lin's report, Mao ordered him to

"burn it (Lin's order)" immediately. 91 Indeed, Lin Biao' s radical stance seem ed to be a m ajor

internal obstacle for Mao's new America policy, a problem that was solved only by Lin's death in

September 1971. Allegedly, on Septem ber 13, Lin Biao tried to escape to th e Soviet Union after his "military coup" aimed at Mao failed, and his plane crash ed in Mongolia killing ev eryone on broad. Mao later told Nixon that "in our country also there is a reactionary group which is opposed to our contact with you. The result was that they got on an airplane and fled abroad."92

90 Zhou Enlai nianpu (Chronology of Zhou Enlai), Vol. 2, p. 306. 91 Ibid., p. 329; Mao Zedong Zhuan (A Biography of Mao Zedong), Vol. 4, pp. 1564-1565. 92 Memo of Conversation, "President's Talks with Mao and Chou En-lai," 21 February 1972, NSC Files, HAKOF, Box 91, NPM.

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Meanwhile, the long-standing anti-U.S. propaganda so suc cessfully penetrated the Chinese bureaucracy that it created additional probl ems for Ma o and Zhou' s Am erica policy. On

December 29, 1969, for exam ple, Zhou told Mao that Chinese officials in the Foreig n Ministry

"dare not to have any contact with the Am ericans." Zhou was worried, and he wanted those officials to soften their a ttitude and at least listen carefully to what the Americans had to of fer.

Mao agreed.93 Mao later revealed to Nixon that "our si de is also bureaucrat ic in dealing with matters," because the lower-m iddle ranking Chinese officials s imply resis ted any Am erican proposal for trade and cultural exchanges "without settling major issues" first.94

However, the difference regarding China' s America policy between th e "radicals" like L in

Biao and the "m oderates" like Zhou Enlai was no t absolute. While Zhou and the four Marshals, backed by Mao, preferred opening dialogues with America, they by no means wanted to abandon their belief in the basic correctness of CCP' s vision of history and m odernity. They only wanted to readdress the los t balance in China' s modernization process caused b y the exces sive Cultural

Revolution. In this regard, a tactical Sino-American detente would be welcomed, but not eagerly sought. This basic stance thus dictated CCP leaders to negotiate with Americans from a position of strength. At the same time, the Chinese leaders were also aware of the fact th at China had not only failed to achieve rapid m odernization, bu t was also greatly weakened by the Cultural

Revolution. The need to cover up China' s weakness required Beijing to act from a position of strength, at least psychologically.

The first m ajor Chinese move to occupy th e psychological high ground vis-à-vis Am erica since the Mao-Snow conversation in late 1970 wa s the famous "Ping-Pong diplomacy." In April

1971, the Chinese Table Tennis team attended th e World Table Tennis Cha mpionship games in

93 Memo, Zhou to Mao, in Gao Wenqian, Wannian Zhou Enlai (Zhou Enlai's Later Years) (Hong Kong: Mingjing chubanshe, 2003), p. 415. 94 Memo of Conversation, "President's Talks with Mao and Chou En-lai," 21 February 1972, NSC Files, HAKOF, Box 91, NPM.

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Nagoya, Japan. W hen a Chinese player Zhuang Zedong made friendly cont act with Am erican

players, Mao' s attention was caught: "Zhuang not only plays good Ping-Pong; he also

understands politics." 95 On April 3, the Foreign Ministry submitted a r eport regarding whether

the American team should be invited to visit China. It conc luded that the situation was still "not

right" for such a m ove. Zhou forwarded this report to Mao on April 4, and the Chairm an

approved this report. However, on April 6, Mao changed his m ind a few hours before the gam e

ended in Japan, and the Foreign Ministry rushed to invite the American team for a visit.96 Nixon was surprised. "I had never expected that the Chin a initiative would come to fruition in the form of a Ping-Pong team," he later recalled. 97 Nixon publicly endorsed this exchange, yet in private

he certainly understood that Mao' s goal was to take steps to "see that China, not the United

States, would be regarded as th e initiator of improved relations." 98 Ind eed, Chines e leaders

widely regarded Ping-Pong diplom acy as a vict ory for them , as China was confident enough to

offer this invitation in the first place.

Encouraged by the worldwide positive respons e to Ping-Pong diplom acy, the CCP Central

Committee held a Politburo m eeting on May 26 to discuss future strateg ies in U.S.-China

negotiations. The m eeting establ ished eight basic principles regarding possible visits by

Kissinger and Nixon. Six out of the ei ght principles were directly re lated to the issue of Taiwan.

The Politburo demanded that a dead line should be set before which all Am erican armed forces

and m ilitary installation s should be withdrawn from the "Chinese pro vince Taiwan" and the

Taiwan Strait area. If no agreement could be reached on this point in principle, then Nixon's visit

might be postponed. Second, Taiwan was China' s territory, and the issue of Taiwan was China' s

95 Lin Ke, Xu Tao, and Wu Xujun, Lishi de zhenshi (The Truth of History) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1998), p. 244. Lin, Xu, and Wu were all Mao's personal assistants. 96 Mao Zedong Zhuan (A Biography of Mao Zedong), Vol. 4, pp. 1630-1631. 97 Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, p. 548. 98 Holdridge, Crossing the Divide, p. 48.

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internal affair. No foreig n intervention should be tolerated. Japanese m ilitarism in Taiwan m ust

be resisted. Third, China would do its best to liberate Taiwan peacefully. Fourth, the Chinese

Government and Chinese people would oppose any m oves toward "two Chinas" or "one China,

one Taiwan." If Am erica wanted to establish dipl omatic relations with China, it m ust recognize

the PRC as the sole legal government representing China. Fifth, if the previous three points could

not be met, and thus it was not suitable for Amer ica and China to es tablish diplomatic relations,

then the two sides could establish liaison offices in each o ther's capital. Sixth, Chin a would no t

initiate talks concerning China's seat in the United Nations. If the Americans initiated this issue,

China would m ake it clear that it would not accep t any arrangem ent of "two Chinas" or "on e

China, one Taiwan." The Politburo concluded w ith two final principles. China would not initiate

talks concerning US-China trade. After the principle of withdr awing A merican arm ed forces

from Taiwan had been accep ted, trade cou ld be discus sed. Finally, the Chinese Governm ent

believed that American military forces should be withdrawn from the three Indoch ina countries,

Korea, Japan, and Southeast Asia to maintain peace in the Far East.99

The eight principles both confirm ed Chin a's tough attitud e toward Sino-Am erican

negotiations and introduced a certain degree of flexibility into China's basic strategies. Instead of

demanding an unconditional withdraw al of U.S. forces fr om Taiwan as a pre-condition for

Nixon's visit, now China only demanded an American agreement on Beijing's basic stance on the

Taiwan issue "in principle." China also did not ask the Nixon administration to cut off diplomatic

relations with Taiwan be fore his visit. At the same time, China promised to try its b est to solve

the Taiwan issue "peacefully," thus m oving closer to the U.S. stance. The proposal of

establishing liaison offices also showed flexibility, since the previous Chinese position was that

99 Zhou Enlai nianpu (Chronology of Zhou Enlai), Vol. 2, pp. 458-459; Gong Li, Mao Zedong yu meiguo (Mao Zedong and the United States) (Beijing: Shijie zhishi, 1999), pp. 252-253.

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no official contact whatsoever should be m aintained between the two sides as long as Am erica

had diplomatic relations with Taiwan. However, the Chinese were not ready to make m ajor

concessions on the issue of Taiwan, and their insi stence that the Taiwan issue m ust be settled

first before such issu es as bilateral trade cou ld be discussed indicated th at China was not afraid

of a fruitles s meeting with the Am ericans. Indeed, the Politburo agreed that it was Nixon who

badly wanted a Sino-Am erican rapprochem ent, and China had nothing to lose even if no agreement was reached during Nix on's visit. The Politbu ro further res olved tha t a China-U.S. meeting did not mean a compromise of China's pursuit of its own social system , nor did it m ean

China was going to reduce its support for world revolutions. Moreover, a meeting with America

itself would m ean a victory for China, as the mo st powerful im perialist country was forced to

seek a modus vivendi with China. Thus China's prestige would be further enhanced, which could

encourage labor' s m ovements and Civil Rights movements within Am erica. Af ter the May

Politburo meeting, Zhou Enlai had m any talks with CCP Party officials to convey the point that

Nixon cam e to Chin a to beg for p eace and C hina would deal with him from a position of

strength.100

Meanwhile, Kissinger prepared for his July visi t. The visit was code-nam ed "POLO I" and

Kissinger assembled his staff (the State Department was of course kept in the dark) to work on

the "Books"—an extensive and detailed set of br iefing papers that cove red every possible topic

that might be discussed with the Chinese. Kissinger expected the Chinese to focus on the Taiwan

issue during his visit, b ut he thought China was in such a weak position vis -à-vis the two

superpowers that Am erica could "suspend" the Taiwan iss ue while ge tting Chin ese help on

100 Zhou Enlai nianpu (Chronology of Zhou Enlai), Vol. 2, pp. 459-465; Gong Li, Mao Zedong yu meiguo (Mao Zedong and the United States), pp. 253-255; Tang Yanzhou, Mao Zedong de Meiguo guan (Mao Zedong's America View) (Xi'an: Shaanxi renmin, 2009), pp. 314-315.

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issues su ch as settling the war in Vietnam . 101 On July 1, Nixon gave Kissinger his final instructions bef ore the la tter's departure. Nixon wanted K issinger to tell the Chin ese that if

necessary, he would "turn hard" on Vietnam. Kissinger also should emphasize the Soviet threat

to China and be "m ysterious" on the Taiwan issu e. Finally, Nixon wanted Kissinger to "arrange

for grain shipm ents [to China] before his own trip, which woul d help placate his conservative

critics."102

Thus, when the Kissinger team snuck into Chin a, two different vision s based on different

social systems, different cultural values, and dif ferent senses of modernity, came to directly face

each other. The Americans could not help but feel they were experiencing a very unique moment

of history. For instance, W inston Lord, Kissinger's special assistant, managed to seat him self in

such a position on the plane that he becam e the first American official to cross into China since

the 1949 Communist Re volution. Kissinger, instead of focusing on the upcom ing talks with the

Chinese, became furious when he found that his assistant forgot to pick up a pack of his shirts.103

Others, however, were eager to seek signs that would prove the failure of Communism in China.

Holdridge, for example, was relieved when he obse rved that one of the Chinese sent by Zhou to escort the Kissinger team into China quietly pocketed the cigarettes offered by the steward. "This seemed to be a hopeful sign that he was hum an," Holdridge thought, "and that China was still

China."104

Shortly after the Kissinger team landed at Beijing, Zhou opened the first meeting with them,

which lasted until m idnight. Kissinger made it clear that he hoped the tw o sides could put aside

ideological issues and focus on common interests. "You are dedicated to the belief that your

101 Briefing book for HAK's July 1971 Trip, POLO I, NSC Files, China Trip/Vietnam, Box 850, NPM. 102 "Meeting between President, Dr. Kissinger, and General Haig," 1 July 1971, NSC Files, For the President's Files (FPF), Box 1036, NPM; Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 735-736. 103 Oral History of Winston Lord, FAOHC. 104 Holdridge, Crossing the Divide, p. 55.

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concepts will prevail. We have our own convictions about the future," Kissinger told Zhou. "The

essential question for our relations is whether both counties are willing to let history judge who is

correct, while in the interval we cooperate on m atters of mutual concer n on a basis of m utual

respect and equality and for the benefit of a ll mankind." Zhou agreed. "Each side has its own

convictions," he said, "but this shouldn't hinder our two countries on the two sides of the Pacific

Ocean seeking what you mentioned—a channel for coexistence, equality, and friendship."105

Despite the expressed willingnes s to focus on concrete issues instead of having an

ideological debate, the two sides in evitably turned to discuss Taiwan, an issue deeply related t o

the two sides' most basic principles. Zhou, who followed the basic principles set by the Politburo in May, made it clear that China did not want to use force to reunite Taiwan with the m ainland, yet China also did not want to see "two Chinas" in the world. The United States, Zhou said, must recognize that Taiwan was part of China and set a timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. m ilitary forces from Taiwan. Kissinger told Zhou that the Ni xon administration was "prepared to begin reducing our other forces on Taiwan as our relations improve" and Am erica would "not

[advocate] a ' two Chinas' solution or a ' one China, one Taiwan' solution." However, Kissinger

pointed out that the with drawal of U.S. troops from Taiwan was linked to the war in Indochina.

Zhou immediately refused to make any promises on Indochina, as China m ust allow the peoples

in Indochina to decide their ow n fates. Kissinger also prom ised that America would not collude

with other countries against Ch ina, nor would Am erica take a ny m ajor steps affecting China

without discussing them with the Chinese first. However, Zhou re fused to discuss a united front between China and the United States. In fact, neither the Soviet Union nor Japan was specifically mentioned.106

105 Memo of Conversation, 9 July 1971, NSC Files, FPF, Box 1032, NPM. 106 Memo of Conversation, ibid.

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When Zhou reported to Mao about the first m eeting, the Chairm an had mixed feelings. He

was pleased to know that Am erica was prepared to withdraw tr oops from Taiwan and Vietnam .

Although America still wanted to "k eep a tail" in those areas (not complete withdrawal), its new

position was still an "evolution" that satisfied Mao. Yet Mao was also unhappy, since Kissinger's

pledge that Am erica would not collude with th e Soviet Union against China suggested China' s

weakness. Mao instructed Zhou to tell Kissinger that China was not afraid of a war with both

superpowers: "We are prepared to have Chin a divided up by the U.S., the Soviet Union, and

Japan. We invite Nixon to visit on this basic premise." Mao also told Zhou that China should not

forget its international responsibilities. Referring to the interests of North Vietnam, Mao said that

"we should not invite Nixon here just for our own interests." Clearly, Mao anticipated m ajor concessions from the United States and wanted to make the Chinese position even stronger.107

The next morning, Zhou arranged a tour of th e Forbidden City for the Am ericans, during which the Chinese proudly showed the artifacts unearthed during the Cultural Revolution. W hen the Kissinger-Zhou talks resum ed, Zhou dutifully delivered Mao' s message. "There is chaos under heaven," he told Kissinger. "In the past 25 years, th ere has been a process of great upheaval, great division, and great reorganization. " Both the United State s and the Soviet Union had "stretching hands all over the w orld." China, Zhou said, was ready for a people' s war with both superpowers, maybe also plus Japan. Zhou then again returned to the issue of Taiwan, and argued that Taiwan was not an isolated problem , but at the heart of any possible U.S.-China rapprochement.108

Kissinger was not to be intim idated. He re minded Zhou that it was the Chinese who m ade

the initial move to sugg est a Nixon visit. In deed, China would benefit gr eatly from such a visit,

107 Wei Shiyan, "Jixinge mimi fanghua neimu" (An Insider's Account of Kissinger's Secret China Visit), in Xinzhongguo waijiao fengyun, Vol. 2, pp. 41-43. 108 Memo of Conversation, 10 July 1971, NSC Files, FPF, Box 1032, NPM.

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as the visit "also has trem endous symbolic significance because it would m ake clear that normal

relations ar e inevitab le." As f or the issue of Taiwan, Kissinger told Zhou that he had already

explained that America would start to withdraw its armed forces from Taiwan, and the future

status of Taiwan would be settled in due course. 109 The two sides then broke for lunch. Friendly

conversations followed during the break, but Holdridge observed that Zhou was deeply

convinced of the Maoist vision of modernity. 110 After lunch, the two sides continued and mainly

focused on how to properly announce Nixon' s visi t. The Chinese draft of the announcem ent,

which said that Nixon asked for an invitation to China, was totally una cceptable to Kissinger.

"We would not appear in Peking as supplicants," Kissinger later recalled. "We would not com e

for the sole purpose of discussing Taiwan or even simply to seek 'normalization of relations.'"111

The problem was eventually solved by Mao, who dict ated that "both sides took the initiative [for the visit]." The final draft of the announcem ent, therefore, said that Zhou, "knowing of President

Nixon's expressed desire to visit the People's Republic of China," had duly invited him.112

Both Kissinger and Nixon regarded POLO I as a success. W hen the news broke that

Kissinger had visited China and that Nixon w ould visit China in early 1972, the world was indeed shocked. Meanw hile, Nixon once again decl ared in public that he would not pursue a

"crude" anti-Soviet alliance with China. On July 7, when Kissinger was still on his way to China,

Nixon made a m ajor speech on the issue of "C hina trade" at Kansas C ity. For those who still remembered Senator Kenneth W herry—who in 1940 said, " With God’s help, we will lift

Shanghai up and up, ever up, until it is just like Kansas City"—Nixon's speech certainly bore the weight of history. Nixon called China one of the five em erging world econom ic centers. "The

109 Ibid. 110 Holdridge, Crossing the Divide, pp. 59-60. 111 Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 751-752. 112 Wei Shiyan, "Jixinge mimi fanghua neimu" (An Insider's Account of Kissinger's Secret China Visit), in Xinzhongguo waijiao fengyun, Vol. 2, pp. 43-44.

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very succe ss of our policy of endin g the iso lation of Mainland China will m ean an immense

escalation of their economic challenge, not only to us, but to others in th e world," Nixon said. "I

again come back to the funda mental point: 800 m illion Chinese, open to the world, with all th e

communication and the interchange of ideas that inevitably will occur as a result of that opening,

will become an economic force in th e world of enorm ous potential." This, however, would be a

good thing for the United States. "T he US had all the chips and we had to spread a few of the

chips around so that others could play," said the President confidently.113

After POLO 1, Am erica and China activ ated the Paris Channel to dis cuss everything from

the changing international situation to the l ogistics of Nixon' s visit. Nixon soon decided that

Kissinger should visit China again to sm ooth out more details for his visit the next year.

Especially, Kissinger should work w ith the Chinese to get a draft for a joint communiqué of the

President's visit. Thus in October, Kissinger visited China again, this tim e openly, and brought

Alfred Jenkins—the Johnson White House China expert now working at the State Departm ent—

with him. To get the Chinese used to the logistical aspects of Nixon's visit, Kissinger flew to

China in Nixon' s airplane, the Spirit of '76. H owever, this decision was perceived at least by some Chinese as a "show-off," which revealed a "spirited" (meaning arrogant) Kissinger.114

Unknown to the Kissinger team a t that tim e, China in October was still absorbing the

shockwaves created by Lin Biao' s death in Septem ber. Although the radicals suffered a severe

blow, they were determ ined to fi ght back. T hus when the Kissin ger team arrived at th e

Diaoyutai, an elegantly decorated hotel reserved only for foreign dignitaries, the Americans were

surprised to f ind in th eir room s copies of a People's Daily edito rial in English calling on the

"people of the world" to overthrow the Am erican "imperialists and their running dogs."

113 Speech, 6 July 1971, NSC Files, HAKOF, Country Files, Box 86, NPM. 114 Wei Shiyan, "Jixinge di'erci fanghua (Kissinger's Second China Visit)," in Xinzhongguo waijiao fengyun, Vol. 3, p. 61.

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Kissinger ordered his team to gath er all the cop ies and send them back to the Chinese on the

grounds that they m ust have been left by a pr evious party. Zhou was em barrassed and furious,

and both sides understood that the opponents of th e U.S.-China rapprochem ent in the Chinese

leadership wanted to have their voices heard. Zhou immediately reported the incident to Mao,

who then tr ied to assu re the Am ericans: "Te ll them these [editorials] are noth ing but em pty

cannons of rhetoric." T he next day, when Ji Pengfei, now China' s Foreign Minister, escorted

Kissinger to the meeting place, he p ointed at the posters on the walls and told Kissinger that all

the "anti-U.S." posters were now gone.115

When the two sides sat down for serio us b usiness, th e Taiwan issue again figured

prominently. POLO II, the briefing books for Ki ssinger's second visit, noticed that during the

July meetings China did "not set any specific time-frame" for the withdrawal of American forces

from Taiwan. Therefore, Kissinger should "av oid comm itting the Pres ident to any kind of a

formal stand on norm alization and troop withdrawals." 116 During his m eeting with Zhou,

Kissinger thus stressed to the Chinese Am erica's intentions on the T aiwan issue. "We recognize that the People's Republic of China considers the subject of Taiwan an internal issue," Kissinger said, "and we will not challenge that."117 But when the two sides tried to put the Taiwan issue in the draft of the joint communiqué, they found it ha rd to reach agreement. The Am erican draft contained rather standard communiqué language about how the two sides recognized each other's differences but how they would work together to maintain world peace. It was also vague on the

Taiwan issue, only expressing th e hope that th e issue would be solved peacefully. When Zhou reported to Mao, the Chairm an disliked the draft. The draft did not have "spirit," Mao said. To him, the soft language of the draft failed to sh ow China's firm convicti on that history was on

115 Idid., pp. 61-62; Holdridge, Crossing the Divide, pp. 70-71; Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 776-778. 116 POLO II, Taiwan, NSC Files, FPF, Box 850, NPM. 117 Memo of Conversation, 21 October 1971 (10:30am-1:45pm), NSC Files, FPF, Box 1035, NPM.

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China's side. "I repeated it m any times that now all under heaven is in chaos," Mao instructed

Zhou. "We need to talk about revolution, liberating the oppressed nations in the world."118

On October 24, therefore, Zhou told Kissinger that the joint comm uniqué must reflect the fundamental differences between the two countries. To do otherwise woul d be dishonest, the kind of thing the Soviets would do. The "awake ning consciousness of the people is prom oting changes in the world, or we m ight call it turmoil," Zhou lectured Kissinger: "Of course, perhaps limited by your system, you are unable to m ake any greater changes, while we, due to our philosophy, foresee such a thing." In fact, here Zhou clearly indi cated that the common strategic interests between Am erica and China should not be used to cover up their different visions of modernity.119 The Chinese then proposed their own dr aft of the communiqué, in which the tw o

sides would sim ply state their own different vi ews on m ajor issues. As a result, Kissinger an d

Lord redraf ted the communiqué, which basica lly followed the Chinese proposal. Most

importantly, the two sides finally agreed on the language regarding the issue of Taiwan. The U.S.

draft of October thus stated that "the United States acknowledges th at all Chinese on either side

of the Taiwan Straits maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a province of China. The

United States Government does no t challenge that pos ition....The United States accepts the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of its a rmed forces from the Taiwan Stra its, and pend ing that will progressively reduce them as tensions diminish [sic]."120

While the Kissinger-Zhou talks continued, Hold ridge and Jenkins conducted their own talks with Xiong Xianghui and Zhang Wenjin, two ra nking officials from the Chinese Foreign

Ministry, on non-strategic issues. Th e two sides c overed a w ide range of topics, fro m fertilizer for agriculture to bilateral trade, yet the Chines e made it clear tha t they were not interes ted in

118 Wei Shiyan, "Jixinge di'erci fanghua (Kissinger's Second China Visit)," in Xinzhongguo waijiao fengyun, Vol. 3, p. 67. 119 Memo of Conversation, 24 October 1971 (10:28am-1:55pm), NSC Files, FPF, Box 1035, NPM. 120 Memo of Conversation, 26 October 1971 (5:30am-8:10 am), ibid.

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developing cultural and econom ic exchanges, at least not before th e "big issues" were settled.

Jenkins noticed with particular interest that Xi ong elaborated with great effort on the m erits of

China's "social system " and "self-reliance." Xiong, at the sam e ti me, t old the Americans that

China did not want to exchange liaison offices with Am erica, s ince no of ficial contac t with

America would be possible while A merica maintained diplomatic relations with Taiwan. "W e will not try to em barrass you," Xiong said, "an d you should not try to em barrass us." It seem ed that Xiong' s position w as a s tep b ackward fro m the principles estab lished by th e Politburo in

May.121

Mao Zedong was satisf ied with the new draft of the joint communiqué. In fact, another

unexpected "victory" cam e when Kissinger was leaving China. On October 25, the issue of

China's representation was voted on again in the United Nations. The General Assembly voted to

admit the PRC into the United Nations and expe l Taiwan. Nixon told the press that he was

"outraged" but in private he was relieved that the issue was f inally solved. He then asked

Haldeman t o tell con servatives s uch as Ronald Reagan and Barry Goldwater that h is

Administration had fought hard to keep Taiwan in the UN. 122 In fact, Nixon and Kissinger only

fought a half-hearted battle to preserve Taiw an's seat. Since the completion of NSSM 107,

Nixon, fully aware that neither Beijing nor Ta ibei would accept a "two Chinas" arrangem ent,

repeated in public that Am erica would continue to support Taiwan' s seat in the UN. But in fact,

he was pursuing "dual representation." George H.W. Bush, the American Ambassador to the UN,

concluded then that "I am totally convinced that the President is correct in his approach [toward

the issue of Chinese rep resentation]. Given the changes in the world, our for mer position would

not have been sustained. The votes sim ply aren't there to su pport it. The only way Nationalist

121 Memo of Conversation, 21 & 22 October 1971, NSC Files, HAKOF, Country Files, Box 87, NPM. 122 Haldeman, Haldeman Diaries, pp. 368-369.

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China can be kept as a UN m ember is for the dual rep resentation approach to succeed." 123

However, Kissinger's October visit of China coin cided with the UN vote, and Bush a sked Nixon to reschedule the trip since Kissinger' s trip w ould be interpreted by other countries as a signal that Am erica would abandon Taiwan. Nixon reje cted Bush' s request firm ly. The Chinese

"already told us [their] displeasure on our UN position," Nixon told B ush. "HAK must go [to

China]," Nixon said, "otherwise [the] PRC [will] change [Nixon's visit] schedule."124

The Chines e were certainly en couraged by r ecent developments. Ta iwan now was finally

expelled fro m the UN and Am erica seem ed to have m ade m ajor co ncessions o n this is sue.

Wouldn't these changes further prove that hist ory was on China' s side? Nixon and Kissinger, on

the other hand, believed that the developments since Kissinger's July visit proved that China was

negotiating from a position of weakness. The reports and analyses on China drafted by Kissinger

and his NSC confirmed that China really wanted to improve relations with America. Despite the

clash between Kissinger and Zhou over ideol ogy and history, the C hinese seemed eager to

improve relations with America by moderating their rigid position on the Taiwan issue. Beneath

their detached and indifferent attitude, Am erican analys ts believed, the Chinese were deeply

interested in gaining access to Am erica's market and technology. Moreover, the Soviet Union

obviously became nervous over the Sino-American talks. In short, it seemed that the Chinese had

finally com e to app reciate th e failu re of their previous policy and the value of a U.S.-China

rapprochement.

Thus, when another A merican team went to China in January 1972 to m ake the final

preparations for Nixon's visit, its leader, General Alexander Haig, almost spoiled the whole thing

with his patronizing language. During his meeting with Zhou, Haig did his best to convince Zhou

123 Letter, Bush to William Brock III, 30 September 1971, George Bush Personal Papers (GBPP), United Nations Files, Box 3, George Bush Presidential Library (GBPL), College Station, TX. 124 Bush Handwriting Meeting Notes, 30 September 1971, GBPP, United Nations Files, Box 4, GBPL.

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that the So viet Union was the biggest thre at to Chin a's s ecurity, and Am erica's bom bing campaigns in Vietnam could reduce Soviet inf luence in S outheast Asia. Am erica would try to prevent the Soviet Union from " encircl[ing] the PRC with unfriendly states." And Hai g concluded that "the future viability of the PR C" was of the grea test intere st to the United

States.125 After the talk, Haig reported to Kissinger that his statements were well received by the

Chinese and he thought that China w as going to use "some better language" on the Taiwan issue

in the join t communiqué. 126 Zhou Enlai, however, i mmediately gathered his best translators to

decipher th e word "v iability." Af ter consulting all the English dictiona ries they had on hand,

Zhou was assured that the word "viability" was correctly translated into Chinese as "the ability to

survive."127 After listening to Zhou's report, Mao said sarcastically: "China is encircled! And we need them (U.S.) to save us...China's independe nce and viability m ust be protected by the U.S.!

We are in real danger!" 128 During the next m eeting with Ha ig, Zhou thus argued that although

China was a "big country" and not yet "a ve ry strong one," China did not need Am erica's

protection for its "future viability." After reiterating how a ll under heaven was in chaos, Zhou

reminded Haig it was Am erica that wanted a summit meeting badly. "No country should ever

rely on exte rnal f orces to m aintain its indepe ndence and viability," concluded Zhou. Haig, an

inexperienced diplomat at that time, argued that the United States had no intention to become the

"protector" or "guarantor" of China' s viability, but China' s "viability and f uture health " were

125 Memo of Conversation, 3 January 1972, NSC Files, Haig Files, Box 1015, NPM. 126 Memo, Haig to Kissinger, 4 January 1971, ibid. 127 Zhang Hanzhi, Kuayue houhou de dahong men (Crossing the Big Thick Red Door) (Shanghai: Wenhui chubanshe, 2002), p. 239; Kong, Gaibian shijie de rizi (Days that Changed the World), pp. 115. The Chinese translators included Zhang Hanzhi, Wang Hairong, and Tang Wensheng (Nancy Tang). Zhang was the daughter of Zhang Shizhao, Mao's mentor when the Chairman was young. Mao himself jokingly called Zhang Hanzhi his "English tutor." Zhang was also married to Qiao Guanhua, China's Vice Foreign Minister and later Foreign Minister. Nancy Tang was born in the U.S., and she was a star translator on the Chinese side. Kissinger once joked that Tang could win a U.S. presidential election since she was born in the U.S. 128 Wei Shiyan, "Heige xianqianzu wei nikesong fanghua anpai de jingguo (The Story of the Haig Team's China Visit for Nixon's Visit )," in Xinzhongguo waijiao fengyun, Vol. 3, p.78.

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important to the United States. H e did not w ant to pa tronize China, Haig said def ensively;

perhaps the Premier could forgive "the simple language of a soldier."129

If Zhou was willing to forgive Ha ig, Jiang Qi ng certainly was not. After several days in

Beijing, the Haig team went to Shanghai, a city controlled by Wang Hongwen, who was one of

the so-called "Gang of Four." W ang was on a busin ess trip in Beijing when Haig arrived at

Shanghai, so the Haig team was received by Xu Jingxian, a protégé of Wang. Unknown to Haig

and to Zhou, Jiang Qing told Xu that Haig ha d "insulted" the Chinese people in Beijing,

obviously referring to the "viability" incident. Theref ore, when Haig failed to reply to Xu' s toast

during the reception din ner, Xu was ready to pick a quarrel. He abruptly ended the dinner an d

Haig, sensing som ething was wrong, nevertheless had no clue of what had just happened. The

next day, Haig toured an industrial fair and the Shanghai radicals delivered an oral protest to him on the grounds that A merica just announced a w eapons sale to Taiwan. W hen the Haig team arrived at Hangzhou, things becam e even worse. Local offi cials at Hangzhou were ordered to

"abandon" the Haig team on a floating boat on the Western Lake without food and drink for half a day. Previously, it was decided that each American would receive 10 jin 130of Chinese candies

as gifts. No w it was d ecided that each person would only receive 5 jin of candies. Xiong

Xianghui and Zhang Hanzhi, who accom panied Haig to Shanghai and Hanzhou, decided to

report the situation to Z hou and Mao. Mao immediat ely ordered that each Am erican still should

receive 10 jin of candies, and he ordered Wang Hongwen to go back to Shanghai immediately to

give a proper departure cerem ony for Haig. Zhou also sent Nanc y Tang down to bri ef Haig on what had happened—of course, only the "toast" in cident was mentioned as a m isunderstanding.

At Beijing, Zhou harshly criticized the radicals for trying to sabotag e Haig's visit. At Shanghai,

129 Memo of Conversation, 7 January 1972, NSC Files, Haig Files, Box 1015, NPM. 130 1 Jin = 0.9 Pound

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local officials rushed to produce boxes large enough to hold 10 jin of candies and presented them to the Americans at the last m oment, with the b oxes still w et with fresh glue. The Am ericans, their luggage already checked in, had no choice but to carry those large boxes of ca ndies aboard by hand.131

The basic tone of the pr ojected Nixon visit, therefore, was laid down by the clash between the two sides' basic sense of history and m odernity. Indeed, when N ixon m et with Mao on

February 21, 1972, he found the Chairm an only wa nted to discuss "philosophical questions."

When Nixon wanted to discuss bi lateral relations after Mao said tha t it would be inevitab le for

China to have contact with the U.S. Democratic Party, Mao waved him off. "Those questions are not questions to be discussed in m y place. They should be discussed with the Prem ier. I discuss the philosophical questions." W hen Nixon wanted to discuss specific issues such as Taiwan,

Vietnam, and Korea, Mao again said that "all those troublesome problems I don't want to get into very m uch." 132 But Mao' s "philosophical questions" in fact laid out C hina's basic policies regarding the questions Nixon want ed to discuss. Kissinger later recalled how as tim e went on

Mao's words started to have a deeper m eaning. "Later on as I com prehended better the m any- layered design of Mao' s conversation," Kissinger wr ote in his m emoir, "I understood that it was like the courtyard in the Forbidden City, each leading to a deeper reces s distinguished from the others only by slight changes of proportion, with ultimate meaning residing in a totality that only long reflection could grasp."133 Indeed, Mao wanted to stay detached from the making of specific policies while setting th e basic direction of those policies. He did not mention America's policy toward Taiwan, for example. He only said that he and Chiang Kai-shek were "old friends," who,

131 Zhang, Kuayue houhou de dahong men (Crossing the Big Thick Red Door), pp. 240-246; Kong, Gaibian shijie de rizi (Days that Changed the World), pp. 118-120; Alexander Haig, Inner Circles: A Memoir (New York: Warner Books, 1992), pp. 263-264. 132 Memo of Conversation, "President's Talks with Mao and Chou En-lai," 21 February 1972, NSC Files, HAKOF, Box 91, NPM. 133 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 1061.

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Zhou then interrup ted, "abuse each other." "Actua lly," Mao to ld Nix on, "th e history of ou r friendship with him is m uch longer than the hi story of your friendship with him." By talking about the Taiwan issue in such a way, Mao suggested that the pr oblem would be solved between the "old f riends" (thus a n internal issue for China) and there were issu es more important than

Taiwan. When Nixon tried to convince Mao that the Soviet Union was China' s biggest threat, and it was in China' s interest to hav e Japan "neutralized" by America's military presence, Mao responded indirectly that "at the present tim e, the question of aggression from the United States or aggression from China is relatively sm all...[A] state of war does not exist betw een our two countries. You want to withdraw som e of y our troops back on your soil; ours do not go abroad." 134 To Nixon and Kissinger, th erefore, Mao actually im plied his support for closer

strategic relations between America and China.

Mao's decision to m eet Nixon, which was not sc heduled before Nixon' s visit, obviously

signaled Mao' s support for the U.S.-China rapp rochement. But the Chairm an still wanted to

show his confidence in the m erits of his revolution by showing that he was not eager to im prove

relations with Am erica overnight. "It is alr ight to talk w ell and also alrigh t if there are no

agreements," Mao concluded the m eeting: "W hy is it tha t we m ust be able to rea ch results ?"

Nixon, on the other hand, insinuated that Mao should revise his own vision of history to find

common interests with the US. "I also cam e from a very poor family," Nixon told Mao. "History

brought us together. The question is whether we, w ith different philosophies, but both with feet

on the ground, and having com e from the people, can make a breakthrough that will serve not

just Chin a and Am erica, but the whole world in the years ahead." 135 Kissinger, m eanwhile,

perceived a weakened China and a less confiden t Mao. When Mao told Nixon that his writings

134 Memo of Conversation, "President's Talks with Mao and Chou En-lai," 21 February 1972, NSC Files, HAKOF, Box 91, NPM. 135 Ibid.

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did not change China but only changed a few pla ces in the vicinity of Beijing, Kissinger thought

Mao adm itted the "rev olutionary d ilemma" he faced. "To Mao, Communism was the tru th,"

Kissinger wrote, "but...he discover ed that the evolution of Communis m could wind up m ocking

its pretensions."136

After the Nixon-Mao meeting, th e Americans sat down to discu ss specific issues with Zhou

and his colleagues. There were in fact no urgent agendas in the talks, perhaps because Kissinger

and Zhou had already covered so m any topics in the past year, and also because the fact that the

talks could happen was more signi ficant than the content. Yet Ni xon still wanted to engage the

Chinese in all sorts of questions from the strategic triangle to bilateral trade. However, the issu e of Taiwan, again, could not be i gnored, as Nixon was determ ined that it not be allowed to color unduly the developing relations with China. Thus, at the beginning of the first restricted talk with

Zhou, Nixon proposed the so-called "five principl es" regarding Taiwan, which essentially m et

China's demands with regard to U.S.-Taiwan relations. Nixon told Zhou that the two sides should refrain from m aking Ta iwan "a bi g issue" in the next two or three years. In response, Zhou stressed that China would still regard Taiwan as an "internal issue." But, Zhou said, "we woul d rather let the question of Taiwan wait for a little while."137

136 Kissinger, White House Year, pp. 1063-1064. 137 Memo of Conversation, 22 & 28 February 1972, NSC Files, HAKOF, Box 91, NPM. The "Five Principles" were: "The Principle one. There is one China, and Taiwan is a part of China. There will be no more statements made—if I can control our bureaucracy—to the effect that the status of Taiwan is undetermined." "Second, we have not and will not support any Taiwan independence movement." "Third, we will, to the extent we are able, use our influence to discourage Japan from moving into Taiwan as our presence becomes less, and also discourage Japan from supporting a Taiwan independence movement. I will only say here I cannot say what Japan will do, but so long as the U.S. has influence with Japan—we have in this respect the same interests as the Prime Minister’s government—we do not want Japan moving in on Taiwan and will discourage Japan from doing so." "The fourth point is that we will support any peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue that can be worked out. And related to that point, we will not support any military attempts by the Government on Taiwan to resort to a military return to the Mainland." "Finally, we seek the normalization of relations with the People’s Republic. We know that the issue of Taiwan is a barrier to complete normalization, but within the framework I have previously described we seek normalization and we will work toward that goal and will try to achieve it."

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When Nixon started to talk a bout the war in Vietnam , howev er, he discovered that his

concessions on Taiwan did not bring about Ch inese help. Z hou only urged Nixon to withdraw

from Vietnam as soon as possible. "You went th ere by accident. W hy not give up?" Zhou said.

When Nixon solicited possible Chinese help in the U.S.-North Vietnam negotiations, Zhou

refused because China respected H anoi's "sove reignty and independenc e." But Nixon did get

something from the Chinese. Zhou told Nixon that China had "exe rted grea t res traints" in

Indochina since July 19 71, and China "will no t get involv ed [in the war] unless, of course, you

attack us." In other words, Zhou elim inated the earlier American concern that the escalation of

the war in Vietnam would tr igger a Chinese m ilitary in tervention.138 Like his stance on the

Vietnam issue, Zhou was also aloof regardin g Nixon's proposal regard ing Japan. Nixon again tried to convince Zhou that America's withdrawal from Japan would only create a power vacuum that would be f illed by other powe rs (nam ely, the Soviet Union). And Am erica's presence in

Japan actually benefited China, since both the Soviet Union and a rising Japan were counterbalanced by A merica. In response, Zhou argued that at "a cert ain point" Japan would

"crease listening to the U.S. and st art to pu rsue its own policy." 139 Zhou also revealed another

concern. "T he worst possibility is...that you all would attack China," Zhou told Nixon, "the

Soviet Union com es from the north, Japanese a nd the US from the east, and India into China' s

Tibet." To Nixon, this was the m ost straightfo rward evidence that Chin a indeed had serious

concerns about its national security, concerns upon which the U.S.-China rapprochem ent could

be based. T he President thus reassured the Ch inese that the US "would oppose any attem pt by

the Soviet Union to engage in aggressive actio n against China." But Zhou still refused to forge

an overt anti-Soviet alliance with America. Instead, he proposed that China and the United States

138 Memo of Conversation, 22 & 28 February 1972, ibid. 139 Memo of Conversation, 23 February 1972, ibid.

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oppose any efforts by any countries to seek hegem ony.140 In the end, from the Vietnam issue to

the Soviet issue, China refused to commit itself to a close strategic relationship with the United

States.

While Nixon and Kissinger were discussing strategic m atters with Zhou, the State

Department was having the so-called "counterpart" meetings with the Chinese on trade, cultural,

and other non-strategic issues. Rogers and G reen, who headed the Am erican team , quickly

discovered that the Chinese were not willing to make any commitment in those areas. Moreover,

the two sides' opinions on those issues were f undamentally shaped by their different social

systems and cultural values. For ex ample, when R ogers told Ji Pengf ei that the U nited States

wanted to increas ed trade with China, Ji st arted to com plain how the previous Am erican

embargo and the U.S. MFN policy unfairly targeted China. Ji then expressed that China was not in a hurry to develop trade with Am erica, and lectured Rogers on th e m erits of China' s self -

reliance model. Moreover, Ji revealed a long-standing stereotype of America held by the Chinese

that the China m arket was som ething the Am erican cap italists cou ld not resist. The pressures

from those capitalists, Ji assumed, forced the Nixon administration to come to China and beg for

trade. "There were many corporations in the U.S. which were anxious for trade with the PRC and

were pressing the [Chinese] Minist ry of Foreign Trade," Ji told Rogers, "The [U.S.] governm ent

might be relaxed about trade, but the corporation [sic] clearly wanted it." To Rogers, the Chinese

were ignoring the fact that China's economy had suffered greatly in the past years and China, not

America, was going to benefit m ore from expanded bilateral trade. Undaunted, Rogers pointed

out that "the US Governm ent had no control over private companies. They exist to d o business,

and their eagerness has nothing to do with th e government. " "Experie nce in trading with

communist countries," the Secretar y then counterattacked, "had s hown that they liked to trade

140 Memo of Conversation, 22, 23, 24 February 1972, ibid.

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with the United States. The Yugoslavians and the Romanians were constantly in touch with the

U.S. on ways to increase trade."141

Between July 1971 and February 1972, therefore, the direct talks between Am erica and

China were profoundly influenced by the im age of China as a "frustrated m odernizer." While common strategic concerns becam e powerful in bringing the two parties togeth er, neither s ide wanted to pursue a straightforw ard anti-Soviet alliance. Yet th e "frustrated modernizer" image

and the Chinese weakness associated with it played a crucial role in convincing Nixon and

Kissinger th at it was f easible to e stablish th e U.S.-China rapprochement. A weakened China

made it less risky for Am erica to make concessions on the status of Taiwan. A weakened China,

moreover, would likely continue to im prove its re lations with Am erica. The "m oderates" in the

Chinese leadership, on the other hand, also tried ha rd to fe nd off attacks from the radicals who still wanted to pursue confrontation with bo th superpowers. (Nixon, indeed, often wondered

what Zhou had to tell "his Barry Goldwater.") In doing so, the "m oderates" claim ed that the

U.S.-China rapprochement was a victory for Chin a, and it would not compromise China's model

of modernization. In sum, both sides were trying to negotiate from a position of strength, because

both were trying to convince them selves that the ot her side must have real ized the failure of its

own past policy.

Conclusion

The U.S.-China rapprochement between 1969 and 1972 can not be explained by any single

factor. W hile strateg ic concerns such as the perceived com mon threat from the Soviet Union

were important, a sole focus on th ose concerns do not tell us th e whole story. As this chapter

shows, the perception of China as a "frus trated m odernizer" n ot on ly created the his torical

context for the Nixon adm inistration's "strategic triangle," but also influenced the developm ent

141 Counterpart Meeting, 22 February 1972, NSC Files, HAKOF, Country Files, Box 93.

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of the U.S.- China rapprochem ent once it was in itiated. M eanwhile, a s we shall see in la ter chapters, once the two sides decided to im prove relations, America did help to end C hina's self- imposed isolation. Over time, expanded economic and cultural contact with America induced the

Chinese leadership to reevaluate the Maoist m odel of m odernization. This legacy was captured by Winton Lord when he summarized Nixon's motivations to improve relations with China. "For

Nixon and Kissinger...a longer range consideration was the potential of economic relations with

China," Lord recalled. "This was less important over the near term, but they saw this in long term dimensions, unlike most American policy makers. They could see a day when China could be an important economic partner of the United States, as well as in term s of cultural exch anges and some other aspects."142

142 Lord Oral History Interview, FAOHC.

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Chapter 5

Tacit Ally: Consolidating the U.S.-China Rapprochement, 1972-1976

Nixon's 1972 visit of China launched a new er a for Sino-Am erican relations. The U.S.-

China rapprochem ent not only reshaped the global Cold W ar powe r balance through the establishment of a new stra tegic relationship between Beijing and W ashington; it also started to expand contact between America and China in va rious areas. Yet the developm ent of the new bilateral relationship was far from smooth. Although America and China quickly becam e what

Kissinger termed "tacit allies" af ter Nixon's visit, the trend towa rd normalization—that is—the establishment of diplom atic relations, was tem porarily set back after late 1973 both because of developments in th e U.S.-PRC-USSR triangle and becau se of the two countries' dom estic situations. However, the two sides still m anaged to consolidate the U.S.-China rapprochement in various ways, as neither wanted to break up the "tacit alliance."

The time pe riod between 1972 and 1976, therefore, was a crucial transi tional period that tested the strength of the newly born Sino-American rapprochement. Like the development of the

U.S.-China rapprochement between 1969 and 1972, the evolution of Sino- American relations between 1972 and 1976 also could not be fully explained by the two countries' common strategic concerns. Instead, strategic a nd non-strategic issues, unified by the discourse on China' s modernization, once again worked together in shaping relations between Am erica and China.

This and the next two chapters will examine the course of Sino-American relations between 1972

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and 1976 by focusing on different dim ensions of t hose relations. W hile the next two chapters

will ex amine the developm ent of "non-govern mental" cultural exch ange and trade relations

between America and China respectively, th is chapter focuses on the developm ent of "official" relations between the tw o nations. Of course, the distinction between "official" and "unofficial" was not absolute, as both governm ents tried to us e "unofficial" channels to achieve their policy goals. Nevertheless, the development of "official" relations between America and China was still distinguishable from the development of "unofficial" relations. Moreover, on the American side, in terms of "official" U.S.-China relations, we need to focus on both the executive branch and the legislative branch of the U.S. government.

This chapter first examines the development of "official" U.S.-China relations from the end of Nixon's visit until Novem ber 1973, when Kissi nger visited China for the sixth tim e. During this time period, Am erica and China had a "honeym oon" of sorts in their bilateral relations, as common strategic concerns and new cultural and ec onomic contact quickly turned the two into

"tacit allies. " Next, this chapte r examines the evolution of U.S. -China relations between late

1973 and late 1974. During this tim e period, the "o fficial" bilateral rela tions entered into a stalemate. The Watergate scandal in Am erica, Nixon's resignation in August 1974, the so-called

"Second Cultural Revolution" in Ch ina, as well as the developm ent of Soviet-American detente, held back further m oves toward the norm alization of U.S.-China relations. Finally, this chapter examines how, despite the stalem ate, Am erica and Chin a m anaged to preserv e the "tacit alliance." It argues that both sides still needed each other to counterbalance the Soviet Union and

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the image of China as a "frustrated modernizer" again played a key role in com bining strategic

and non-strategic concerns to preserve the alliance.

Honeymoon: U.S.-China relations, 1972-1973

After Nixon's visit of China in February 1972, the U.S.-China rapprochement continued to

gain momentum until late 1973. One reason for such a "ho neymoon" was the co mmon threat

from the Soviet Union perceived by both sides. The two countries' common interests in an anti-

Soviet alliance certainly emerged before Nixon's visit, but after his visit the formation of such an

alliance accelerated considerably. Before Nixon' s visit, as discu ssed in the last chapter, the

Chinese were evasive regarding an anti-Soviet alliance with Am erica. And Beijing emphasized

China's ability to deal with the Soviet prob lem without Am erica's help. Nixon and Kissing er were more outspoken on the need f or an anti-S oviet alliance, but they also refused to pursue a rapprochement with China based exclusively on anti-Soviet calculations . Clearly, both sides thought that a straightforward pursuit of an an ti-Soviet alliance would show weakness to the other and thus give it unwarranted leverage. After Nixon' s visit, however, both sides were convinced that the U.S.-China rapprochem ent was not a short-term expedient. And the hesitance and evasiveness in the previous U.S.-China negotiations regarding the Soviet Union were replaced by blunt and frank discussions of the need to counter the "polar bear" together.

At the same tim e, the two sides pursued th e developm ent of non-st rategic relations in cultural and economic areas. Nixon and Kissinger continued to order internal studies on the best way to develop non-strategic relations with Chin a, and they still rega rded those non-strategic relations as crucial in achieving their str ategic goals vis-à-vis China. Meanwhile, key m embers

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from Congr ess decided that they must have a say in the future developm ent of U.S.-Chi na

rapprochement, and m any of them rushed into Chin a to have talks over a wide range of topics .

For the Chinese lead ership, the Sino-American rapprochement was helpful to China' s economic

development, as the end of the Am erican-imposed economic embargo against China gave back its access to the world m arket an d advanced t echnologies. After N ixon's visit, the Chin ese showed keen interest in taking advantage of the new internati onal environment to give a tim ely

boost to their languishing econom y. And they quickly learned that they could use the lure of

trade to maneuver among different American groups.

For American policy-makers, the development of a Sino-American "honeymoon" continued

to be connected with the image of China as a "frustrated modernizer." The fact that after Nixon's

visit the Chinese became more and more forthcoming in forging an anti-Soviet alliance with the

United States was inte rpreted as proof that China' s isolated positio n in the interna tional community plus its struggling econom y at home had forced the Chinese to rethin k their policy

toward the United Sta tes. The new rela tionship also validated Am erica's "containment withou t

isolation" policy toward China developed since the Johnson year s. The prem ise of that policy

was that by engaging China in all kinds of intern ational issues, the United States could moderate

China's radical f oreign policy by gr anting a cer tain degree of legitim acy to the Beijing regim e

and by raising China' s stakes in stabilizing the current international system . Indeed, the

development of Sino-Am erican relations after Nixon's visit led the Nixon team to think that

America m ight have already achieved those policy goals. Meanwhile, after Nixon' s visi t

American policy-makers were eager to look for si gns that China would ev entually reorient its

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economic and social developm ent toward the West. To be sure, they unde rstood that the change in China's modernization would take a long ti me to happen, especially while Mao Zedong was alive. Nevertheless, subsequent developm ents did give American polic y-makers hope that the

United States would soon have a chance to influence China's modernization.

Thus Nixon and Kissinger continued to beli eve that the newly achieved U.S.-China rapprochement required more than strategic cooperation between the two sides. As a result, soo n after his re turn from China, Ni xon started to take new steps to prom ote the developm ent of cultural and economic relations. On March 9, 1972, Kissinger issued NSSM 148, in which Nixon

"directed that a study be m ade of ways in which US-PRC exchanges in such fields as science, technology, culture, sports, and journalism, agreed on in th e Joint United States-PRC

Communiqué, can be facilitated." 1 The next day, Kissinger issu ed NSSM 149, in which Nixon requested a com prehensive study on ways by w hich the A merican government could facilitate trade with China. 2 The issue of those two NSSMs was timely. Nixon' s China visit had opened the gate for a flood of requests from the Am erican public regarding ex panding exchanges with the PRC, and Am erican officials so on felt overwhelm ed.3 The studies of NSSM 148 and 149, therefore, focused on the ways by which the Nixon administration could control or at least guide cultural and econom ic exchanges with the P RC, although the "unofficial" nature of those exchanges was recognized.

1 NSSM 148, "US-PRC Exchanges," 9 March 1972, NSC Files, HAKOF, Box 86, NPM. 2 NSSM 149, "US-PRC Trade," 10 March 1972, ibid. 3 For example, see Telegram, Arthur Watson to State, 21 March 1972, NSC Files, HAKOF, Box 93, NPM.

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The final response to NSSM 148 was com pleted on March 23, which m ade it clear that

expanded cultural exchanges with China would he lp America achieve its short-term and long- range policy goals toward the PRC. NSSM 148 d eclared that "th e developm ent of cultural, educational, and scientific exchanges...would provide...evide nce" of the new strategic relationship. Moreover, gi ven the "unofficial" natu re of th ose exchang es, they d id not requ ire either s ide to com promise prin ciples or to resolve a ny curr ently ir reconcilable po litical differences, thus providing "an easy and a practical way to begin the process of norm alizing relations." In terms of America's long-range objectives, expanded exchanges would also create a chance for the United States to in fluence Chin a's dom estic developm ent. "The opening of channels of comm unication," NSSM 148 asserte d, "should m ake in tim e a contribution to pressures for opening up their closed soci ety." Meanwhile, NSSM 148 warned against uncoordinated exchanges with the PRC, which c ould easily overwhelm the Chines e and create unexpected problems for the newly born yet still fragile U.S.-China rapprochement. Thus NSSM

148 argued that the Nixon administration should identify some "umbrella organizations," such as the National Comm ittee on U.S.-China Relatio ns, and us e them to f acilitate ex changes with

China.4

On March 24, the final response to NSSM 149 was submitted. It concluded that "the PRC is

unlikely soon to become a major market for US goods." In fact, "at this st age, USG expectations

for developments in the trade field are m ore political than economic." The chief political benefit

of expanded Sino-Am erican trad e, NSSM 149 argued, was that th e growth of bilateral trade

4 Response to NSSM 148, 23 March 1972, NSC Files, H-Files, Box H-189, NPM.

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would "provide tangible evidence of m omentum in the improvem ent of relations between the

two countries." Besides, "trad e s hould prov e to be an area of positiv e and constructiv e

discussion...helping to build tr ust between our negot iators and setting a positive tone for discussion of m ore difficult m atters." At the sam e ti me, the economic value of the projected bilateral trade was not neglig ible. "Purchases by the PRC m ight become significant to a num ber of US industries, among them such key econom ically depressed industries as aircraft manufacturing and m achine tools," NSSM 149 re ported. "Comm odity purchases could also become i mportant to US agriculture." Therefor e, the U S Government m ust take steps to

"maximize exports of US goods and services [t o China]" and "encourage PRC purchases of US goods and technology in areas of the US econom y which are currently depressed and which could benefit most from new markets." More importantly, NSSM 149 argued that the long-ter m prospect for U.S.-China trade was good, and expanded econom ic intercourse with the PRC would definitely help the spread of Am erican social values into the "Communist Chinese society which has up until now been denied them ." For now, NSSM 149 argued that the Nixon administration must find a way to coordinate private economic overtures to the C hinese from

American business, and suggested the establishment of an "unofficial" organization to do the job correctly.5

The decisions made by NSSM 148 and 149 showed that the Nixon administration wanted to

have an organic policy package on China, a pack age that could integrate non-strategic m easures

5 Response to NSSM 149, 24 March 1972, NSC Files, H-Files, Box H-190, NPM. That "unofficial" organization was established in early 1973 called National Council on U.S.-China Trade, which will be discussed in chapter 7.

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with strategic moves to further consolidate the U. S.-China rapprochement. At the same time, the

success of Nixon' s visit of China created a st rong sense of confidence am ong American policy-

makers that the administration's new China policy was working, a sense that was reflected by the

confident tone of NSSM 148 and 149. For Am erican policy-m akers, once Chinese leaders

accepted th e flaws of their curren t dom estic a nd foreign policies, they would find further

developments of the U.S.-China rapprochem ent irresistible. This wide -spread feeling am ong

American leaders was further revealed during the first Congressional visit of China, led by Mike

Mansfield and Hugh Scott, in April 1972.

For people well-informed on the course of Sino-Am erican rapprochem ent, it was only

natural for the Senate m ajority leader and m inority leader to l ead the first C ongressional team

into China. No doubt Nixon also wanted the tr ip to take place, which could gain m ore

Congressional support for his new China policy. W hen the two Sena tors returned f rom China,

they were convinced that the Chinese were determ ined to sustain the U.S.-China rapprochement.

Moreover, the Senators openly praised Nixon' s Ch ina policy, which, they argued, created a

chance for the United S tates to hav e a say in Ch ina's f uture deve lopment. In China, the two

Senators were received by Zhou Enlai and Vice Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua. Zhou and Qia o

made it clear that Ch ina shared common strategic interests with the United States. However, the

Chinese focused almost exclusively on the war in Vietnam. "The single theme that dominated the

talks was the war in Vietnam," Scott reported later. "Their preoccupation with this conflict to the

avoidance of as full, in depth, discussion about other problem areas leads one to the conclusion that the Chinese do want to get out of that ar ea as much as t he Americans do." Zhou expressed

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pleasure with the policies the Nixon adm inistration was following in South Vietnam , but he

urged a more speedy and complete withdrawal of U.S. forces, which, he claimed, would create a

"neutralized" Indochina. As for the issue of Taiwa n, the threat from the Soviet Union, the rise of

Japan as a p otential military power, and other m utual strategic concerns, Zhou and Qiao either

remained silent or mentioned those issues in passing.6

There is no definite evidence showing w hy Zhou and Qiao only focused on the Vietna m

War issue. Circum stantial materials lead to two sp eculations. One was that the Chinese, at that time, wanted to have com prehensive talks on stra tegic issues only with Nixon' s inner circle of advisors. Second, given the fact that the war in Vietnam was a hot issue in the U.S. Congress, and especially given Mansfield' s well-known pos ition on this issue, th e Chinese m ight try to intrigue the two Senators by focusing on the Vi etnam W ar. In any case, Mansfield and Scott were convinced that China shared sim ilar strategic views on key world issues with the United

States. Mo reover, th e Chinese ad mitted that they now faced difficu lties both a t hom e and internationally, which indicated China' s genuine de sire in pursing better relations. F or example,

Zhou bluntly told the two Senators that the war in Vietnam "is deterring China from m aking the economic progress she would like to m ake." 7 Meanwhile, the Chinese, to a certain d egree,

understood the m echanism of Am erica's dom estic politics, as Zhou frequently "discussed the

irreversibility of the tre nd in Sino- US relation s, saying that whether the next President be a

6 China Trip Report, Scott to Nixon, May 1972, PHS, Accession # 10200-u, Box 15. 7 Ibid.

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Democrat or Republican, we woul d continue on our present path towards the norm alization of relations."8

Besides talks on strategic issues with Chin ese leaders, another im portant part of the

Senators' trip was a two-week tour of China, dur ing which the Americans visited factories, rural communes, schools, and other places. The Chines e obviously wanted to show off the best achievements of m odernization under Communism , and the two Sen ators cam e away deeply impressed by China's economic development. Ordinary Chinese people, they reported, seemed to be well-clothed and well-housed, have enough f ood, and enjoy a well-establi shed social welfare program including affordable m edical c are. Yet they could not h elp b ut com pare the Chine se economy with Am erica’s. If the econom y of the “New China,” as Mansfield term ed it,

“measured by some of our common yardsticks, the bottle will be seen as half-empty…If China is viewed in the ligh t of its ow n p ast, th e bottle is ha lf-full and rapidly fil ling.” Mansfield understood that the so-called “self-reliance” was the guiding principle of China’s economy, yet it would be inevitable for China to seek advanced technologies and m anagerial skills from the

West. Thus “every encouragem ent should be given to the fullest possible developm ent of commerce [between America and China].” Scott got a similar impression. “There is no question of great material progress since the Liberation. But where d oes China go from here?” he asked.

“China…is a developing nation faced with many decisions and m any alternativ e courses o f action. It is important that we normalize relations to the greatest extent possible.” By normalizing relations with China, Scott suggested, Am erica could help to steer the future course of China 's

8 Notes from China Trip, April 1972, PHS, Accession # 10200-ab, Box 44.

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development and peacefully co-exist with China.9 Therefore, although members of the American delegation were surprised by the "good" economic condition in China, in general they agreed that it still had a long way to go to achieve full mode rnization, a conclusion certainly with rich implications for the role America could play in the future.

The Americans also were encouraged by their di rect interaction with the Chinese people. A

Chinese interpre ter, f or exam ple, told them that "he gr ew up on W alt Disney f airy tales. "

Another Am erican, after being told that young people in China still loved Am erican m ovies, concluded that "people aren't all that different...They want to have fun." It was also observed that the Chinese in fact were deeply in terested in the Am erican way of life, as the qu estions on e

Chinese asked about America "indicated that he was familiar with current issues and that he h ad a good understanding of the A merican system ." All those observations were tentatively interpreted as signs tha t the Maois t model of modernization was losing its cr edibility in China.

After a tour of a local market, one A merican even cried out loudly about the potential revival of consumerism in China: "It was touching to see their enthusiasm for buying, regardless of how narrow the choice."10

The Mansfield-Scott trip highlighted the fact that th e Chinese society was again being

opened up to Americans. Especially for articulate members of the academic-legislative complex,

there finally cam e a golden chance to develop an all-ou t rela tionship with China. For m any

people, trade became the most useful way to p ursue a balanced relatio nship. In June 1972, the

9 “Journey to the New China,” April-May 1972, Series 13, Box 98, MMA. 10 Notes from China Trip, April 1972, PHS, Accession # 10200-ab, Box 44.

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Joint Economic Committee of Congress held hear ings on China's economic development, which

focused on the develop ment of bilateral trade. Senator M ansfield, drawing on his recent trip,

cautioned against the overly optim istic feeling among American business about the huge China market. Trade with China was sure to develop in the long run, yet curr ent conditions there—the

self-reliance principle in the economy, the Chinese preference for balanced trade (i.e. no debts or

credits), the connection between trade and pro gress in U.S.-China norm alization—made short-

term growth of trade less prom ising. "Nevertheless, it seems to me that the administration would

be well advised to pursue trade prospects [with China] vigorously," Mansfield argued, "not only

because there may be profits to be made from it but also because good mutual trade relations can

be an im portant factor in breeching in peace the great wall of separation which has stoo d

between the two nations for alm ost a quarter of century. Good trade rela tions tend to equal good

foreign relations." 11 Senator Scott arg ued that "th e free world 's trade with the PRC more than

doubled in value during the 1960' s," and this tren d might well help China reorient economically

and politically toward the W est. In additio n, "in [the] category of technology-intensiv e

machinery and equipm ent...the United States may be expected to enjoy its greatest advantage"

regarding trade with China. "A lthough China is not likely to a ccount for a significant portion of

total U.S. t rade in the foreseeable future," Scott conclud ed, "this tra de will offer im portant

opportunities to individual firms, and businessmen should now explore the possibility of trade in

this area."12 William Proxmire, chairman of the Committee, aptly summarized the importance of

11 Testimony of Mansfield, in Congress Joint Economic Committee, Hearings: Economic Developments in Mainland China (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), pp. 2-6. 12 Testimony of Scott, in ibid., pp. 13-18.

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trade with China. "W e have ev erything to gain by in creasing trade with China and much more

than th ey h ave to gain in term s of our f oreign policy inf luence," P roxmire m used. "Because

China's economy is not as big as ours, their dependence on us would increase greatly...In other words, if we have $10 0 m illion worth of tr ade it w ill be 10 tim es as im portant to them as it would be to us and, therefore, we might in that sense have 10 times the influence."13

The "China momentum" created since Nixon's visit continued to grow, and in June 1972 the

House sent its own delegation to China. The origins of the House trip clearly showed that dealing

with China had quickly becom e a political privilege fought ove r by different political groups

within the United States. Afte r the scheduled Mansfield-Sco tt trip w as announced, the House

leaders felt "betrayed" by the fact that Nixon was will ing to send a Senate delegation to China

first. Speaker Carl Albert was so angry he ev en refused to talk with Nixon' s Congressional

liaisons. Nixon had to intervene pe rsonally, and it was agreed that after the Mansfield-Scott trip,

the House would send its own de legation to China led by m ajority leader Hale Boggs and

minority leader Gerald Ford. 14 The Chinese seemed to be able to appreciate the en tangled issue

of China in America's domestic politics, and the Boggs-Ford visit further signaled to the Chinese

that U.S.-China rapprochement had won bipartisan support in America. Zhou Enlai, for example,

praised Nixon' s efforts to im prove Sino-Am erican relatio ns. He believed th at b oth political

parties in the United States suppor ted normalization of relations with China, and he pledged that

13 Ibid., pp. 21-23. 14 Memo, Richard Cook to Nixon, 29 February 1972; Memo, Clark Macgregor to Nixon, 7 March 1972, WHCF, Subject Files, Box 19, NPM.

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China would continue to im prove relations with America "no m atter what party w ould control

the White House."15

The two House leaders, moreover, discovered th at Chinese leaders were more forthcom ing

in talking strateg ic issu es than th ey had be en with Mansf ield and Sco tt. Zhou too k a r elaxed

stance on the issue of Taiwan, saying that China was not in a hurry to get it back since the United

States already recognized that Taiwan was part of China. Zhou also reassured the House leaders

that China would not send combat troops into Vietnam, but he urged an early withdrawal of U.S.

forces from the entire Indochina area. More importantly, Zhou made it clear that the threat from

the Soviet Union was the foundation for U.S.-C hina strategic coopera tion in various world

issues. "Chou was extremely emphatic that the Soviets will never reduce their military effort; he

seemed eager for reassurance that the balancing U.S. power will not b e reduced," Ford reported.

"Throughout, we detected a profound distrust and di slike of the Soviet U nion, fear of her powe r

and possible intentions, and concern lest political efforts in the United State s to cut the def ense

budget will make us too weak to counter Soviet designs on China."16

While the Am ericans were pleased by China' s frank admission of its fear of the Soviet

Union, the two House leaders were also eagerly looking for ways to improve economic relations.

Boggs showed particular interest, as he in sistently asked the Chinese “how Am erican

businessmen [m ay] best m ake China aware of th eir products.” Ford al so observed that the

Chinese showed m uch interest in getting advanc ed technologies from America. Qiao Guanhua ,

15 Memo of Conversation, 28 June 1972, Ford Congressional Papers, Box B219, Gerald Ford Presidential Library (GFPL), Ann Arbor, MI. For the Chinese version, see Zhou Enlai nianpu (Chronology of Zhou Enlai), Vol. 3. p. 532. 16 Memo of Conversation, 28 June 1972; Report to Nixon, 20 July 1972, Ford Congressional Papers, Box B219, GFPL.

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for example, was particularly interested in kno wing how America mechanized its agricu lture.17

Li Xifu, head of the C hinese Cou ncil for the Pr omotion of International Trade, hinted at the possibility of expanded U.S.-China trade. After repeating the merits of the self-reliance principle,

Li pointed out that self -reliance "doesn' t m ean we are for seclusion. We also learn advanced techniques from other countries for our construction and econom ic expansion." 18 Meanwhile,

Boggs and Ford showed m uch concern about Chin a's future socio-politi cal developm ent. To

them, some values inherent in Chinese society were also shared by Am erican society. "We were

particularly impressed by the Purita nical ethic of this society," Fo rd reported. "Some of the ' old

virtues' so important to America's rise seem to be deeply rooted in today' s Chinese society. It

appears to be an austere, Cott on Mather type of society—prim and proper, not sim ply prudish

about sex but actively hostile to any licentiousness or self-indul gence of any kind." Ford' s

concern, however, was how China was going to develop on the foundation of those values.

Would this China-as-early-Am erica becom e a so ciety sim ilar to m odern Am erica? Or would

China go down "the one sure road to political salvation according to Mao's commandments?" To

Ford, improved U.S.-China relations would help to steer China away from Maoist ideology. And

one way to do so was to develop Am erica's ability to influence "the recep tivity of the country' s

future leaders to technological advances so desperately needed in so many areas."19

While the two Congressional trip s to China plus the grow ing public interest in trade and

cultural exchanges helped to sustain the m omentum of U.S. -China rapprochem ent, Nixon a nd

17 Report to Nixon, 20 July 1972, Ford Congressional Papers, Box B219, GFPL. 18 Memo of Conversation, 29 June 1972, ibid. 19 Report to Nixon, 20 July 1972, ibid.

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Kissinger continued their secret pursuit of strategic cooperation. Moreover, a memo prepared by

Winston Lord in March made it clear that U.S.-China strategic cooperation was global in nature.

Nixon and Kissinger, Lord summarized, had made a whole package of commitments to China. It included "a series of assurances on our Soviet policy, including equality of treatment, meticulous

debriefing, and deflection of pressures." The pack age also included "our various assurances on

Taiwan policy, as reaffirm ed by the President. " In addition, the pack age contained "other

miscellaneous understandings, including coordina tion on South Asian polic y, restraint on Japan,

confidentiality of our ta lks with th e PRC, and various trav el/exchange matters in the W atson

channel."20 Nixon and Kissinger were determ ined to hono r those commitm ents. As a result,

Kissinger traveled to C hina three tim es, in June 1972, February 1973, and November 1973.

Between th ose trips, Kissinger and his staff fre quently ha d ta lks in the New York City with

Huang Hua, head of the Chinese delegation to the United Nations. They also m aintained close

contact with Huang Zhen, the C hinese Am bassador to France, f irst in Pa ris, and la ter in

Washington D.C. after Huang became head of the PRC Liaison Office in March 1973.

For Kissing er, the th ree sets of ta lks in Beijing provided def initive evidence th at the

Chinese genuinely wanted to continue the U.S.-China rapprochem ent, and the Chinese decision

was not a s hort-term expedient us ed by Beijing as a pro paganda too l to hum iliate th e Nixo n

administration. To Nixon and Kissi nger, the perception of China' s attitude was a crucial point,

because it h elped to con nect the pursuit of U.S.-China strategi c cooperation with the im age of

China as a "frustrated modernizer." Between 1969 and 1972, the very f easibility of Nixon an d

20 Memo, Lord to Kissinger, "Understanding with the PRC," 17 March 1972, NSC Files, HAKOF, Box 87, NPM.

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Kissinger's "str ategic tr iangle" re lied on the perceived Chinese weakness. Only a Chinese

leadership frustrated by domestic and international difficulties would be shocked to appreciate

the ben efits of a rapp rochement with th e Unite d S tates. After Nixon' s visit, the continued

perception of China' s weakness wa s still im portant in ter ms of sustaining th e mom entum of

Nixon's ne w China policy. During Kissinger' s three visits, the Chinese reinforced Am erica's

perception of China' s weakness when they openly expressed their fear a bout the Soviet Union.

As a result, Kissinger cam e away from the visits convinced that China indeed becam e a "tacit ally" of America in world affairs.

During Kissinger's June 1972 visit, the two side s, from the very beginning, focused their talks on the global strategic environm ent. Kissinger meticulously debriefed the Chinese on the recent summit meeting between Nixon and the Sovi et leader Leonid B rezhnev, as well as th e recently-concluded SALT I nego tiations. Kiss inger di d his best to as sure th e Chin ese th at the

United States would not pursue the Soviet-Am erican detente at the exp ense of China. "There is no question that one of the results of my visit to Peking last year, as the Prime Minister foresaw,

was a considerable speeding up of our relationshi p with the Soviet Union, " Kissinger told Zhou

Enlai almost apologetically. "This was not a case that we particul arly sought. In fact we thought

there was a possib ility that af ter my visit to P eking we w ould confront a period of extrem e

hostility [with the Soviet Union]." F or his part, Zhou tried to dism iss China's concern about the

Nixon-Brezhnev summit. "We were quite relaxed [regarding the summ it]," Zhou said, "W e had

231

turned ou r atten tion to other things." 21 Zhou' s effort to negotiate from a position of strength,

however, was quickly belied by his later rem arks. China, after all, deep ly f eared the Soviet

Union. During the talks, Zhou, Mars hall Ye Jianying, and other Chin ese leaders made it clear to

Kissinger that China no w explicitly recognized it as a com mon adversary. Obviously trying to

assure the Am ericans that China would not allow specific issues to block the developm ent of

U.S.-China cooperation on grand strategic issu es, Zhou told Kissinger that Beijing would not

push Washington for an early settlement of the Taiwan issue. On the issue of the war in Vietnam,

Zhou said that China w ould not raise pressure s on America. However, Zhou urged Kissinger to achieve a political settlem ent in Vietnam as soon as possible on th e grounds that prolonged

American entanglement in Vietnam would only pr ovide a chance for Moscow to increase the

Soviet influence in Indochina. Besides Vietnam, the Chinese also detected a global Soviet threat.

Thus, Zhou urged Am erica to strengthen NATO politically and militarily, to counterbalance the

Soviet influence in India, and to prevent a possible Japanese tilt toward Moscow.22

Kissinger was deeply impressed by China's genuine desire to improve bilateral relations. "It

was obvious that the rapport establ ished during the past year was in tact and that they wanted to

build it," Kissinger reported to Nixon. " We have established a unique bond between ourselves

and the Chinese which both sides highly re gard and want to strengthen further. 23 The Chinese

fear of the Soviet Union, Kissinger concluded, produced such a convergence of Chinese and

American strateg ic in terests tha t "th e Chinese have m oved...from an adversary posture to one

21 Memo of Conversation, 20 June 1972, NSC Files, HAKOF, Box 97, NPM. 22 Summarized from Zhou-Kissinger talks. See Memo of Conversation, 20, 21, 22 June 1972, ibid. 23 Memo, Kissinger to Nixon, "Atmospherics of My Visit to Peking," 27 June 1972, ibid.

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which can only be desc ribed as ta cit ally. "24 Nixon was pleased. "An ex cellent account," he commented on Kissinger' s report. Referring to the co rdial atmospherics of Kissinger' s visit, the

President wrote that "in the long run this is more important than day to day substance."25

When Kissinger returned to Beijing again in February 1973, he found the Chinese even more friendly and forthcom ing. Of course, by this tim e a key obstacl e for closer cooperation between America and China had been overcom e—on January 27, the United States signed the

Paris Peace Accords which ended Am erica's direct m ilitary invo lvement in Vietnam and temporarily stopped fighting between North Viet nam and South Vietnam. Moreover, Kissinger told Zhou that "upon the conclusion of the Vietnam war we would reduce our forces on Taiwan."

He then promised that he would give Zhou "a preci se schedule of our reduction during this year, and it will b e substantial."26 Kissinger further pledged that "aft er 1974 we want to work toward

full normalization and f ull diplomatic relations with the Pe ople's Republic of China before the

middle of 1976." 27 The Chinese were pleased. With a political settlement sealed in Vietnam and

Kissinger's prom ise to withdraw U .S. forces from Taiwan, the Am ericans were f ulfilling the

promises they m ade during Nixon' s visit. As a re sult, Kissinger reported after the trip that the

Chinese "have always been cordial, but on this occasion th eir cordiality was not kept within a

Great W all of privacy but was made conspicuously public." Ki ssinger noticed that Beijing

mobilized its propaganda m achine and reported Kissinger' s visit fully to the pubic. Kissinger' s

24 Memo, Kissinger to Nixon, "My Trip to Peking, June 19-23, 1972," NSC Files, China Trip/Vietnam, Box 851, NPM. 25 See Nixon's handwritten comments on Kissinger's memo, "Atmospherics of My Visit to Peking," 27 June 1972, NSC Files, HAKOF, Box 97, NPM. 26 Memo of Conversation, 15 February 1973, NSC Files, HAKOF, Box 98, NPM. 27 Memo of Conversation, 16 February 1973, ibid.

233

airplane was given the privilege to land right out off the gate of Beijing airport, and PLA guards everywhere started to salute the American delegates.28

The highlight of Kissinger's February visit, however, was an unexpected meeting with Mao

Zedong. "Now we call the relationship between ourselves a friendship," Mao told Kissinger right after the exchange of pleasantries. 29 "So long as the objectives are the same, we would not harm

you nor would you harm us," the Chairm an proposed. "And we can work together to commonly

deal with a bastard." Mao brushe d aside the issue of Taiwan, only indicating that he was pleased

to know about the withdrawal plan Kissinger told Zhou. Instead, he focused on the common

threat from the Soviet Union. Ma o urged Am erica to tighten relati ons with its allies to contain

the Soviet Union. The unity of NATO was partic ularly important, since Mao believed that the

Soviet strategic em phasis was in Europe. Mao also wanted Am erica to work closely with its

allies in South Asia and the Middle East, becaus e the Soviets also wanted to "grasp" those areas.

He welcomed continue d Am erican m ilitary co mmitments to South Korea and Ja pan. "Rathe r

than Japan having closer relations with the Soviet Union," Mao told Kissinger, "we would rather

they would better their relations with you." In general, Ma o proposed a global alliance against

the Soviet Union. "We should draw a horizontal line—the U.S.-Japan-Pakistan-Iran-Turkey and

Europe," M ao declared. Kissinger agreed th at China and the United States sho uld for m a

"community of interest" agai nst the Soviet Union. And, afte r Mao suggested that Am erica

wanted to "[push] W est Germ any t o m ake p eace with Rus sia and then push Russia eastward

28 Memo, Kissinger to Nixon, "Atmospherics of My Trip to Peking," 2 March 1973, RG59, Lot File 77D114, Policy Planning Council (PPC), Winston Lord File, 1969-77, Box 374, NA II. 29 Mao said the word "friendship" in English.

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[against China]," Kissinger again pledged that the United States would never im prove relations

with the Soviet Union at the expense of China. In return, Mao, who usua lly did not discuss non-

strategic issues, told Kissinger that China was pr epared to develop trad e with Am erica and to

send students to study in the U.S.30

Kissinger was greatly encouraged by his meeting with Mao. "Mao and Chou were obsessed

by Moscow's intentions," Kissinger reported to Nixon, "The contrast of their views with July

1971 was remarkable. Rather than being scolded for our global presence we were scolded for not

doing enough to counter Soviet pres sures." The Chinese finally adm itted their fears about the

Soviet Union, and, therefore, their weakness, before the Am ericans. " Peking has chosen

normalization because of our strength," Kissinger em phasized. "For now...they need us, and

their course is set." Nixon's new China initiative, Kissinger concluded, now started to bear fruit:

"We are now in the extraordinar y situation that, with the exception of the United Kingdom , the

PRC m ight well be closest to us in its global perception." 31 Kissinger also observed broad changes in China's domestic development. "One striking overall impression gained from my visit was the evidence that the Chinese are moving at a more rapid pace than in the past several years to orient themselves to the major nations of the West in cultural and economic terms," Kissinger reported. "Their desire to remove impediments to trade with the U.S., and the attempt to develop a major export market for their trad itional handicrafts—which was said by one Chinese official to be the purpose of the handicr afts exhibit we were taken to—i ndicate their se rious intent to

30 Memo of Conversation, 17 February 1973, NSC Files, HAKOF, Box 98, NPM. 31 Memo, Kissinger to Nixon, "My Asian Trip," 27 February 1973, ibid. Italics original.

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sustain their acquisition of W estern technology." 32 Besides the general strategic agreem ent between A merica and China, Kiss inger's visit al so achieved another conc rete r esult. The two

sides d ecided to f urther institu tionalize the U. S.-China rap prochement by exch anging Liaiso n

Offices (LO). Huang Zhen, the m ost senior and most experienced Chinese diplom at became the

first head of the PRCLO, while Nixon nam ed Davi d K. E. Bruce, one of the m ost respected

American diplomats, as the head of USOL, aided by Alfred Jenkins and John Holdridge.

When Kissinger visited China again in Novem ber 1973, the Chinese further elaborated on

the "horizon tal line" Mao Zedong proposed during his las t visit. In add ition, Zhou Enlai and

Marshall Ye Jianying started to talk with the Americans regarding possible military cooperation

against the Soviet Unio n, which, at this s tage, primarily focused on exchange of intelligence.

Mao himself again decided to grant an audience to Kissinger, which, unexpectedly, lasted m ore

than th ree h ours. Mao warned Kissinger abou t the "deceptive" nature of the Soviet-Am erican

detente, arguing that Am erica should never let its guard down with regard to the Soviet Union.

For his part, Kissinger assured the Chairman that "the Soviet Union likes to create the impression

that they and we have a m aster plan to run the wo rld, but that is to trap other countries. It' s not

true. We are not that foolish." In return, Mao once again elaborated o n the im portance for the

United States to work closely with its allies ag ainst the Soviet Union. He even expressed his

concern that "if the D emocratic P arty com es into office, they will adopt the policy of isolationism." Mao clearly referred to the repeated theme by the Democrats that the United States

32 Memo, Kissinger to Nixon, " "Atmospherics of My Trip to Peking," 2 March 1973, RG59, Lot File 77D114, PPC, Winston Lord File, 1969-77, Box 374.

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was "overstretched" globally, a nd specifically he m aybe had in m ind the proposal to cut down

American troops in Europe sponsored by Senator Mansfield. Kissinger again tried to assure Mao

that the Democrats, should they come into office, "would pursue the present course."33

When Kissinger retu rned from China, he repor ted to Nixo n that his v isit "was a p ositive success on all p lanes." This vis it, Kissinger argued, was able to achieve "confirm ation and deepening of the close identity betw een you and the Chinese leaders' strategic perspectives on the international situation." The Chinese fear of the Soviet U nion had put Am erica "in probably the ideal situation with regard to the two communist giants: they both want and need to deal with us because they cannot deal with on e another." The Chinese were willing to be patient regarding the issue of Taiwan, and Am erica and China "share essentially th e same views about the Soviet strategy, the necessity of a strong Am erican world role and defense cap ability, and the strateg ic importance of Europe, Japan, the Middle East, and the Near-East-South Asia axis. " Besides the strategic issues, Kissinger also reported that the Chinese becam e more interested in "econom ic

normalization" with the United States and expanded cultural exchanges.34

Between Nixon' s February 1972 visit of Chin a and Kissinger' s November 1973 visit of

China, therefore, Beijing and W ashington came to share sim ilar strategic viewpoints on m any

issues, a change that was indeed astonishing gi ven the p reviously deep-seated hostility between

the two nations. As discussed above, while geopolit ical considerations played a crucial role in

bringing this "tacit alliance" a bout, the allian ce was able to develop qu ickly only b ecause the

33 Memo of Conversation, 12 November 1973, NSC Files, HAKOF, Box 100, NPM. 34 Memo, Kissinger to Nixon, "My Visit to China," 19 November 1973, RG59, Lot File 77D114, PPC, Winston Lord File, 1969- 77, Box 374.

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strategic calculations were em bedded in the im age of China as a "frustrated m odernizer." For

Nixon and Kissinger, the fact that Chinese leaders repeatedly di scussed the common threat fr om the Soviet Union belied their s ense of occupying the weakest position in the "strategic triangle."

The perceived Chinese weakness, therefore, became a powerful rationale for sustaining the U.S.-

China rapprochem ent. Moreover, by opening dialogues with Beijin g, Nixon and Kissinger

quickly discovered that they were steadily achieving the goal of "bringing China back into the

international community." The Chinese not only ab andoned their previously radical behavior in

international af fairs, bu t a lso s tarted to shar e comm on interes ts with the Unite d States in

maintaining the s tability of the cu rrent international system. There were also encouraging signs

that China was reorienting itself toward the We st both politically and economically. In sum,

America's new China policy based upon the "frustra ted modernizer" image of China seem ed to

work well in reality.

Stalemate: U.S.-China Relations, 1973-1974

Although Kissinger left China satisfied in November 1973, he did not foresee that the Sino-

American "honeymoon" would quickly come to an end. From late 1973 to early 1975, in fact, the

Chinese deliberately cooled down their relations with the United States. A careful reading of the

record suggests that Ch ina did so for two reas ons. First, the Chinese we re disappointed by the

lack of substantial progress in the norm alization of U.S.-China relations. America failed to make

visible moves to keep the prom ise that full normalization would be achieved by 1976. On top of

that, the ongoing Soviet-Am erican detente rekindl ed the C hinese fear that Am erica was only

interested in playing off Chin a against the Soviet Union. Se cond, the developm ent of econom ic

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and cultural relations with Am erica reminded the Chinese leadership of the danger o f "peaceful

evolution." Especially, the "radicals" now led by Mao' s wife, Jiang Qing, launched the so-called

"second Cultural Revolution" in late 1973. The U. S.-China rapprochem ent, together with the

Chinese leaders identified with it such as Zhou Enlai and Ye Jianying, became a major target of the "radicals." In sum , if strate gic and non-strategic con cerns worked together before to sustain the Sino-American rapprochement, now they managed to stalemate the "tacit alliance."

Unknown to Kissinger, his Novem ber visit actually helped to push the Chinese tow ard a

cooling-down of rela tions with the United State s. Chinese s ources revealed that M ao was no t happy with America's attitude on two issues: Taiwan and the nature of th e Soviet threat. During his talks with Kissinger, Mao appeared to take a relaxed view on the future of Taiwan. "I say we

that we can do without Taiwan for the tim e being, and let it com e after one hundred years," he told Kiss inger. "Do not take m atters on this world so rapidly." But Mao imm ediately told

Kissinger that "as for your relations with us, I think they need not take a hundred years." Given the Chines e insistence that the Un ited S tates mu st cut of f diplom atic relation s w ith Ta iwan before the establishm ent of full diplom atic relations with Beijing, Mao clearly suggested here that W ashington should accelerate the process of nor malization of relations by settling its relations with Taiwan. Kissinge r, despite his repeated pr omise that Nixon wanted full normalization of relations by 1976, wa s evasive on this issu e. "Our difficulty is that we cannot immediately sever relations with Taiwan, for vari ous reasons, all of them having to do with our domestic situation," he told Mao. The Chinese u nderstood that by "domestic situation" Kissinger was referring to the W atergate scandal. But what the Chinese could not understand was why

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Watergate was able to block the process of U.S.-China normalization. "Why is it in your country,

you are alw ays so obsessed with that nonsensica l Watergate issue?" Mao asked, "The incident

itself is very m eager, yet now such chaos is be ing kicked up because of it. Anyway, we are not

happy about it."35

Mao also had different views on the nature of the Soviet threat. The Chairm an thought the

Americans misjudged Soviet strategic intentions. The Soviet Union still regarded America as its

primary enemy, Mao argued, and E urope was still the primary prize for the Soviet Union. In

order to turn American attention away from Europe, the Soviet Union would "make a feint in the

East but attack in the West" by increasing tensions with China. "In my opinion, their aim is to tie down a portion of your streng th in the Pacific Ocean to av oid your sending a larg e number of troops westwards," Mao told Kissinger. The Am erican failure to decipher the Soviet intention correctly was not because America was deceived by the Soviet Union, Mao asserted, but because

the W est wanted to "c hannel the evil wa ter to the East," that is, to f acilitate a conf rontation

between China and the Soviet Union. For his part , Kissinger tried to dismiss Mao' s concern that

America wanted a war between China and the Sovi et Union. He also indirectly refuted Mao' s

judgment that the Soviet strategic em phasis wa s in Europe. To him, China was the next

immediate target of the Soviet Union, and Am erica was here to help the Chinese against

Moscow.36 Mao later revealed that he was not happy with Kissinger's judgment. He believed that

it was the United States that needed China as an ally against the Soviet Union, not the other wa y

35 Memo of Conversation, 12 November 1973, NSC Files, HAKOF, Box 100, NPM. Mao revealed his reservations with regard to Watergate to his colleagues later. See Mao Zedong zhuan (A Biography of Mao Zedong), Vol. 4, pp. 1668-1669. 36 Memo of Conversation, 12 November 1973, NSC Files, HAKOF, Box 100, NPM.

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around. "I had a talk with Kissinger for three hour s," Mao later recalled. "I n fact there was only

one point I wanted to make: be careful; the polar bear is going after you."37

The Chairman's unhappiness with the Am ericans caused China to cool down its relations

with America after Kissinger's November visit. At the same time, the Chinese de cision to pu t

some distance between the Am ericans and themselves was manifested primarily through the so-

called "Second Cultural Revolution" and some "incidents," non-strategic in nature, in U.S.-China

relations. T he future course of Sino-Am erican relations th us quickly becam e a rallying po int around which the "m oderates" and the "radicals" in Chinese leadership wa ged their ideological

battles. In fact, and here we need to backtrack the story, the contest between the "moderates" and the "radicals" regarding the course of U.S.-C hina rapprochement never abated, although it was temporarily subdued when the Sino-Am erican alliance was at its peak. A s discussed in previous chapters, the foreign policy-m aking process in China was ultimately controlled by Mao Zedong himself. And Mao chose to implement his foreign policy decisions primarily through Zhou Enlai.

Meanwhile, Mao functioned as the final authority who could hold the "radicals" at bay regarding

China's foreign policies. The "radicals" like Jiang Qing were able to disturb the process, yet they were prevented from completely sabotaging the rapprochement. Moreover, once the U.S.-China rapprochement was on track, Jiang herself was forced to show support. A revealing example took place in June 1973 when an American basketball team visited China. Bruce, head of USLO, was astonished to find that Jiang Qing presided over the match in Beijing. "High ranking leaders of the PRC, most notably the top lef tists, turned out in force for the first Sino-American basketball

37 Mao Zedong zhuan (A Biography of Mao Zedong), Vol. 4, p. 1669-1670.

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games in Pe king June 19," Bruce recorded in hi s diary. "Madam e Mao, neatly attired in a grey

Eleanor Roosevelt length dress with white shoes and matching purse, was most welcoming to all

the visiting team leaders at tea before the gam e." Yao Wenyuan, another top leftist at the m atch,

told Bruce "how happy he was that the Sino -American relationship was developing." Bruce

immediately understood that the Chin ese tried to turn the basketball game into a political show.

"Media cov erage has been prom inent...and will dem onstrate to th e Chinese that all the

leftists...fully support the new relationship at its current stage of development."38

Bruce's observation that now the "radicals" openly supported U.S.-China rapprochem ent

was accurate, although at that tim e he had no way to kno w for sure why they behaved in that

way. The real reason w as that on June 17 Mao ha d a m eeting with top Chinese leaders, during which he urged the leaders to m aintain "uni fied" support for his policies, including the rapprochement with the United States. 39 Jiang Qing and her follo wers, however, were only

biding their tim e. Although Jiang herself was excluded from the day-to-day m anagement of

Sino-American relations, which was largely cont rolled by Zhou, it seem ed that she was able to

recruit f ollowers f rom the Mao-Zh ou team . Tang W ensheng (Nancy Tang), Mao' s English

interpreter, and W ang Hairong, Mao' s grandniece a nd a p ower in the Foreign Ministry, were

widely regarded as two "radicals" within the Mao-Zhou foreign policy team. Known a s the "two

ladies," Tang and W ang cooperated with Jiang fr om ti me to tim e. They quickly m ade Qia o

Guanhua, a main supporter of Zhou, and Qiao's wife Zhang Hanzhi, their major targets. By doing

38 Bruce diary entry, 20 June 1973, in Priscilla Roberts, eds., Window on the Forbidden City: The Beijing Diaries of David Bruce, 1973-1974 (Hong Kong: The University of Hong Kong Press, 2001), pp. 133-134. 39 Mao Zedong zhuan (A Biography of Mao Zedong), Vol. 4, p. 1655.

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so, they indirectly targeted Zhou. Ji Chaozhu, Z hou's Harvard-educated English interpreter, who

had previously worked for Mao, later recalled how the "two ladies" becam e "Jiang Qing' s eyes

and ears in the Foreign Ministry " and how they, from the very beginning, were determ ined to

have their own marks on U.S.-China detente. When Nixon visited China, Zhou welcomed him at

the airport with Ji as the inte rpreter. However, when the photo of that scene was published in

China, Ji recalled, "I was airbrushed out of the picture, and wher e I had been standing there was

Wang Hairong! The two young ladies had been busy." Clearly, the "two ladies" would not allow

Ji, then a convicted "rightist" in the Foreign Ministry, to appear in that photo in front of the

whole nation.40

Under this situation, th erefore, the "radicals" were de termined to m iss no opportunity to

undermine Zhou's power and the U.S.-China rapprochement so closely identified with him. More importantly, Mao was willing to g ive the "rad icals" such a chance, w hich came along in m id-

1973. Mao' s decision revealed the extrem ely co mplicated Mao-Zhou relationship. On the one hand, Mao had no doubt about Zhou' s loyalty to him , and they indeed forged an unbreakable comradeship during the revolutionary years. On the other hand, however, Mao believed that

Zhou was "ideologically weak," that is, Zhou was usually too eager to re ach compromise with

China's enemies, that his policy constituted "appeasement."41 Furthermore, at that time Mao was

uneasy about Zhou' s dom estic policies, which thr eatened to underm ine the very credibility of

40 Ji Chaozhu, The Man on Mao's Right (New York: Random House, 2008), pp. 253-266. Quotation on page 259. For discussion of the "two ladies," also see Zhang Hanzhi, Kuayue houhou de dahong men (Crossing the Big Thick Red Door), pp. 257-259. The relations between Jiang and the "two ladies" were complicated. The "two ladies" were not loyal supporters of Jiang, and they clearly had their own agenda. But in general, it seems that both they and Jiang wanted to weaken Zhou Enlai's influence in foreign policy-making. 41 Gao Wenqian, Wannian Zhou Enlai (Zhou Enlai's Later Years), p. 452.

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Mao's Cultural Revolution. Since the death of Lin Biao in Septem ber 1971, Zhou was put in

charge of "correcting" the wrongs done by Lin and his followers. As a result, Zhou's power in the

State Council (central governm ent) was increa sed. Meanwhile, since L in's power was largely

rooted in th e PLA, Zhou took the o pportunity to place m oderate leaders in key positions of the

army. For instance, Marshal Ye Jianying, one of the four m arshals who were asked by Mao in

1969 to study U.S.-China relations, becam e a top l eader of the PLA. In addition, Zhou was als o

able to strengthen his power in the Foreign Ministry after Lin' s death, and the Cultural

Revolution waned first in that agency. Ther efore, Zhou' s power and prestige was greatly

increased after L in's death. For Mao, who was a m aster of balancing his subordinates, it would

not hurt if Z hou's power were weakened slightl y. However, a m ore important concern for Mao

was that Zhou labeled Lin as an "ultra-leftist." Zhou was thus able to blame all the chaos caused by the Cultural Revolution on L in. Initially Mao played along, and he feinted innocence by claiming that he f ailed to appre ciate the sin ister nature of Lin. But over tim e, the attack on L in the "ultra-leftist" became a way for people to a ttack the Cultur al Rev olution its elf. Mao thus became alerted. The Chairman by no means was going to admit that the Cultural Revolution was a mistake. Lin's crime, Mao started to argue, wa s not that ideologically he was standing on the

"Left" of the Chairm an, but becaus e he was st anding on the "Right." Therefore, b etween late

1972 and mid-1973, Mao decided that Lin Biao was actually an "u ltra-rightist" who tried to restore capitalism in China. This d ramatic change certainly disoriented ordinary citizens, but for

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insiders Mao's message was clear : no one was allowed to atta ck the Cultural Revolution, and

China was going to continue its struggle against "revisionism."42

Under this situation, therefore, Mao decided to hand the "radicals" a chance to attack Zhou.

It just happened that in June 1973 the Foreign Ministry, approved by Zhou, produced an analysis

on the international situation shortly after the Soviet leader Brezhnev's visit of America. The full

text of the analysis is not available, but we do know its major thesis. The analysis warned against

growing Soviet-American detente, which seemed to gain momentum ever since the signing of

SALI I Treaty. The recent Brezhnev visit to Amer ica only further added to "the atmosphere that

the Soviet Union and the United S tates would dom inate the world together." The analysis thus

warned that the Soviet-American detente was "full of deception" and China must be aware of the danger of being manipulated by the two superpowers.43 When the final report of the analysis was

submitted, Zhou ordered it to be pu blished and distri buted to relevant P arty officials. However,

after being debriefed on the analysis by the "two ladies," Mao became furious because the gist of

the analysis strayed away from his own understanding of the international situation. Beneath the

surface of Soviet-Am erican de tente, Mao insisted, the do minant trend was still the Soviet-

American contest. Zhou and othe r top Foreign Ministry official s, therefore, were guilty of

misreading the inte rnational situation. "Do not bot her me with those s hitty analyses, including

the Premier's speeches, anym ore, " Mao stated angrily. "And let m e wa rn you, if that kind of

42 Mao Zedong zhuan (A Biography of Mao Zedong), Vol. 4, pp. 1644-1649; Gao, Wannian Zhou Enlai (Zhou Enlai's Later Years), pp. 450-452; For a recent analysis in English, see Frederick C. Teiwes and Warren Sun, The End of the Maoist Era: Chinese Politics During the Twilight of the Cultural Revolution, 1972-1976 (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2007), Chapter 1. 43 Mao Zedong zhuan (A Biography of Mao Zedong), Vol. 4, p. 1656; Gao, Wannian Zhou Enlai (Zhou Enlai's Later Years), pp. 452-453; Gong Li, Kuayue honggou: 1969-1979 nian zhongmei guanxi de yanbian (Bridging the Chasm: The Evolution of Sino- American Relations, 1069-1979) (Zhengzhou: Henan renmin, 1992), pp. 212.

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analysis continues, it will lead to revisionism ." On July 4, Zhou, after learning about Mao' s

anger, immediately recalled and destroyed copies of the analysis. He then wrote a letter to M ao,

admitting that it was his mistake to produce such an analysis. He further told Mao that he was

ready to m ake "self-criticism " on his m istake. Mao spared Zhou of m aking "self-criticism ."

However, he was only willing to let the m atter rest tem porarily. His h arsh rem arks on Zhou,

including the word "shitty," started to circu late, which provided a platform for the "radicals " to

launch their own attack on Zhou.44

For USLO officials in Beijing, th erefore, signs of troubles in U.S.-China relations appeared

even before Kissinger' s Nove mber 1973 visit. At the same tim e, Bruce and his subordinates

started to worry that Am erica's own actions would provide political amm unition for the

"radicals" to attack th e Sino-American rapprochement. That worry qu ickly materialized in July

1973 when Senator W arren Magnuson, chairman of the Senate Commerce Commi ttee, led the

first Congressional trade delegation to China.

Magnuson claimed himself to be a China expert because he had worked in China as a postal

clerk in the 1920s. As a Senator from W ashington State, he was enthusiastic about expanding

trade with China partia lly on beha lf of the f armers in his hom e state and the Boeing com pany.

Since the beginning of U.S.-China rapprochement, he quickly became another articulate member

of the "acad emic-legislative complex" promoting normalization of econom ic relations with the

PRC.45 From the strategic perspective, however, US LO deemed Magnuson's visit of China as a

44 Mao Zedong zhuan (A Biography of Mao Zedong), Vol. 4, p. 1656; Gao, Wannian Zhou Enlai (Zhou Enlai's Later Years), pp. 454-457; Gong Li, Kuayue honggou (Bridging the Chasm), pp. 213-214; Zhou Enlai nianpu (Chronology of Zhou Enlai), Vol. 3, pp. 603-605. 45 Magnuson's promotion of trade with China is discussed in Chapter 7.

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potential disaster for U.S.-Chi na rapprochement. "The visit by this delegation has from the

beginning been a disaster due to the attitude and personality of its chairman, Magnuson," Bruce

reported to Kissinger on July 6. "He was disgr untled by not being received on arrival by m ore

high-ranking officials...but above all...not having an appointment with the Prime Minister."46 We do not know whether the Chinese deliberately do wngraded the reception for Magnuso n because of the ongoing attack on Zhou. But when Magnuson did get to m eet Zhou, it becam e clear to

Bruce that the Senator's lack of diplom atic s ophistication, m ore so th an his sense of self- importance, could potentially harm relations with China. On July 8, Magnuson told the Chinese that "the large number of Taiwanese on Taiwan has been foolish to allow themselves to be taken over by a sm all number of people from the China m ainland, and if the Taiwanese had worked together the y could h ave prev ented this and established an independ ent Taiwan. " Bruce was alerted. The Senator "did not specifically speak favorably of an independent Taiwan under present circum stances," Bruce told Kissinger, "but he m ust have left the im pression with his

Chinese table com panion that this was in his m ind."47 In addition, Magnuson asked how the

Nationalist troops were transporte d to Taiwan in the first place. "'W as it by boat,' " he inquired?

"'No,' answered his Chinese guest of honor, 'it was by American airplanes.'"48

Besides his unpleasan t remarks on Taiwan, which the Chin ese received with grace, USLO

officials believed that Magnuson m ade a bigger m istake by offending China' s pride in its own

model of development. The Senator's "evident built-in feeling of American superiority on part of

46 Telegram, Bruce to Kissinger, 6 July 1973, RG59, Lot File 77D114, PPC, Winston Lord File, 1969-77, Box 328. 47 Telegram, Bruce to Kissinger, 8 July 1973, ibid. 48 Bruce Diary Entry, 8 July 1973, Roberts, eds., Window on the Forbidden City, p. 171.

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some others which cau sed the ove r-felicitous phraseology pattin g Chinese on he ad f or their limited but prom ising accom plishments" d irectly challenged the Chinese prid e in their own model of modernization. 49 Moreover, the attitude of other m embers of the delegation was "read by the Chin ese a s a rrogance and was well des igned to tr igger s ensitive Chinese p ride." Mr s.

Magnuson, for example, told Wang Hairong, one of th e "two ladies," that "the best am bassadors which Americans could possibly send to China w ould be washing m achines and electric irons."

USLO officials were h orrified. "You well know [W ang] is clos e to Mao," they reported to

Kissinger.50 Clearly, the Magnuson party' s attitude c ould provide excellent ammunition for the

"radicals" like W ang Hairong to attack the " moderates" on the grounds that U.S.-China rapprochement opened the gate for Am erica's "peaceful evolution" strategy aim ed at changing the nature of China's revolution.

Magnuson's visit did not do perm anent damages to U.S.-China relations, but it did trigger a new round of battles between the "radicals" and th e "moderates." For USLO officials, therefore, it was not surpris ing when the Chinese decided to escalate the so-called "U.S. Marine Incid ent" after Magnuson's departure. USLO, although not an official Am erican diplomatic establishment in China, still functioned as an em bassy. Thus, like US embassies anywhere in the world, USLO had Marine Security Guards stationed in its Beijing compound. On July 4 1973, Bruce presided over the first Am erican flag-raising cerem ony in Ch ina with the Marines fully dressed in their uniforms. The Chinese, however, imm ediately protested. An official from the Foreign Ministry

49 Jenkins to Kissinger, 18 July 1973, RG59, Lot File 77D114, PPC, Winston Lord File, 1969-77, Box 328. 50 Jenkins and Holdridge to Kissinger, 19 July 1973, ibid.

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complained to Jenkin s that US Mar ines "wearing military uniforms and carry ing arms openly"

constituted a provocative scene for the lo cal population, because it rem inded people of those

days when foreign troops could roam freely in China. Bruce then decided that the Marines would

wear their uniforms on duty and wear civilian cl othes off duty. The Chinese, for the tim e being,

seemed satisfied.51

The Marines, however, continued to be a pr oblem for the Chinese. W ithout any kind of

entertainment available in Beijing, lif e was ex tremely boring for the community of foreign

diplomats. The Marines, therefor e, set up a bar nam ed "The Red Ass Saloon" and started to sell

tickets and drinks to diplomats, journalists, and others. The Ch inese, who had never experienced anything like this, were greatly disturbed. The bar set up by the Marines introduced the "bad" elements of capitalism into the heart of China. On Septem ber 26, the Chinese summoned Bruce and dem anded the withdrawal of the Marine s. Bruce was rightfully worried about the consequences. "If the Chinese dem and for withdraw al were com plied with," Bruce wrote, "the resultant effect on our mutual relationship, when this action was publicly known, m ight be little

short of catastrophic." 52 The Marines, however, were sa ved from expulsion by Kissinger' s

November visit.

But the Chinese continued to watch the Mari nes closely. In April 1974, when the Marines

called for the form ation of a softball league am ong the Beijing d iplomatic co mmunity by

distributing a circular signed by "Slugger" so-and-so and "Killer" somebody, the Chinese finally

51 Bruce to Kissinger, 4 July 1973, ibid. 52 Bruce Diary Entry, 26 September 1973, Roberts, eds., Window on the Forbidden City, pp. 283-285.

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exploded. On April 26, Bruce informed Kissinger that China officially demanded the withdrawal

of the Marines. Kissinger had no choice but to re place the Marines with civilian Foreign Service

security officers.53

By April 1974, however, the whole Marines affair had already b ecome part of the so-called

"Second Cultural Revolution," which was running at full speed. Mao' s unhappiness with Zhou, which was temporarily subdued after July 1973, flared up again after Kissinger's November 1973 visit. W ith the exception of Mao's m eeting with Kissinger, Zhou handl ed the rest of the

substantial talks with the Americans. On November 13, Kissinger said that America was ready to

"be helpful by supplying equipm ent and other servic es" to China in the latter' s struggle against

the Soviet Union. Zhou told Kissinger that he would need to consult Mao before m aking any

decisions.54 The meeting ended in the early m orning of November 14, and when Zhou rushed to

report to M ao, the Chairm an was already asleep . Unwilling to dis turb Mao, Zhou return ed to

continue talks with Kis singer.55 From 7:35 a.m . the next m orning, Zhou and Kissinger m et for another hour before the latter' s departure. Zhou to ld Kissinger that China was interested in his proposal, noticing that the estab lishment of satellites and hotlines for intelligence sh aring would be useful to China in the case of war with the Soviet Union. Zhou prom ised that he would keep

Kissinger's proposal as a s ecret and further study it. 56 When the "two ladies" debriefed Mao on

the Zhou-Kissinger talks later, however, Mao becam e convinced that Z hou had gone "soft" on

53 Bruce to Kissinger, 26 April 1974, RG59, Lot File 77D114, PPC, Winston Lord File, 1969-77, Box 376. For detailed recollections of the Marine affair by USLO officials, see Holdridge, Crossing the Divide, pp. 124-126; Jenkins, Country, Conscience and Caviar, pp. 326-327; James Lilley, China Hands: Nine Decades of Adventure, Espionage, and Diplomacy in Asia (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), pp. 182-184. 54 Memo of Conversation, 13 November 1973, RG59, Lot File 77D114, PPC, Winston Lord File, 1969-77, Box 381. 55 Gao, Wannian Zhou Enlai (Zhou Enlai's Later Years), p. 462. 56 Memo of Conversation, 14 November 1973, RG59, Lot File 77D114, PPC, Winston Lord File, 1969-77, Box 372.

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the Am ericans. In line with his belief that Zhou had always been "ideologically weak," Mao

believed that Zhou' s accommodating position regard ing m ilitary cooperation and intelligence

sharing with the US con stituted a po licy of appe asement. Subsequently, he warned Zhou not to

become a "Rightist" w hen dealing with th e Am ericans. Zhou immediately m ade a "self-

criticism," admitting that he was "not tough enough" during the talks.57

Despite Zhou's "self-criticism," Mao refused to let him off the hook ea sily. In addition, as

we noticed before, Mao was already displeased by Kissinger's insistence that China was the main

target of the Soviet Union and by Kissinger' s failure to make a firm commitment on the issue of

Taiwan. The Chairm an's anger thus provided a ch ance for the tens ions between th e "radicals"

and the "m oderates" built up since the very beginning of the Si no-American rapprochement to

finally erupt. Beginning on November 21, 197 3, th e CCP Central Committee held a series o f

Politburo meetings that lasted well into Decem ber. Jiang Qing and other "radicals " completely dominated those meetings, which had only one th eme—criticizing Zhou and Marshal Ye for the

"mistakes" they made in dealing with the Americans. During those meetings, Jiang accused Zhou of all kinds of crimes, including "right-inclined weakness," "betraying China's national interests,"

"right capitulationism," and "being impatient", i. e. trying to replace Mao as China' s top leader.

And, above all, Jiang accused Zhou and Ye of trying to restore capitalism in China. When Zhou replied that he would not wear the hat of "rig ht capitulationism," the meeting became physically tense. Mao was furious about Zhou' s re marks, and he ordered the "struggle" against Zhou to

57 Mao Zedong zhuan (A Biography of Mao Zedong), Vol. 4, pp. 1670-1671; Zhou Enlai nianpu (Chronology of Zhou Enlai), Vol. 3, p. 634; Gao, Wannian Zhou Enlai (Zhou Enlai's Later Years), p. 463.

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continue.58 Meanwhile, Jiang Qing ordered the F oreign Ministry and other relevant agencies to

stop receiving delegations of cultural affairs from "capitalist countries." Those delegations would

only bring the "bad" e lements of capita lism into China, and to rece ive them was to "open the

door and invite the thieves in." Zhou was forced to concur.59

By early 1974, Jiang and her s upporters had expanded the attack on Zhou into the "Second

Cultural Revolution." The "Second Cultural Revolution" was carried out through the so-called pi

Lin pi Kong campaign, that is, "to criticize L in Biao and Confucius." F or many people, it was obscure why Lin and C onfucius, the ancient C hinese philosopher, should be criticized together.

Yet the "rad icals" quickly made their ration ale clear when th ey mobilized the m edia to prepare the people for their new campaign. Lin Biao now wa s labeled as an "ultra -Rightist;" Confucius, whose philosophy emphasized the re storation of "ancient ritual s," was a conservative, and therefore, a "Rightis t."60 When the cam paign started to r un at full speed, however, it b ecame

clear that C onfucius was m erely a substitute for Zhou Enlai. China's new relationship with

America in particular b ecame a useful vehicle fo r the "radicals" to attack th e "moderates." A

typical case was the so-called "snail incident " of February 1974. In late 1973, China m ade a

proposal to buy a production line for color tele vision from an American company, a proposal approved by the Politburo. In fact , one Chinese source stated that Jiang Qing herself particularly

wanted this production line because she thought th at television would be a useful propaganda

58 Mao Zedong zhuan (A Biography of Mao Zedong), Vol. 4, p. 1671; Gao, Wannian Zhou Enlai (Zhou Enlai's Later Years), pp. 465-467; Zhou Enlai nianpu (Chronology of Zhou Enlai), Vol. 3, p. 634. 59 Zhou Enlai nianpu (Chronology of Zhou Enlai), Vol. 3, pp. 633-634. 60 For the most important propaganda made for the pi Lin pi Kong campaign, see editorials, 1 January 1974, Renmin Ribao (People's Daily) and Hong Qi (Red Flag).

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tool she could utilize. When Chinese represen tatives visited Am erica in late 1973 to conduct

further negotiations, each represen tative received a small glass snail f rom the US com pany as a

gift. Jiang Qing learned about this when the pi Lin pi Kong flared up, and she immediately saw a

chance to attack Zhou. Jiang in sisted that the Am erican com pany deliberately "insulted" the

Chinese people by sending snails as gifts. Th ose snails, sh e asser ted, implied tha t China was

"crawling" in term s of its econom ic developm ent. The Chinese representatives w ho received those snails were guilty of "wor shiping foreigners blindly" a nd "knuckling under to im perialist pressure." Jiang then dem anded those snails be returned and the pr oposal for buying the TV production line cancelled. Zhou Enla i quickly intervened and a ppealed to Mao, arguing that should the snails be retu rned, it might cause unnecessary troubles for U.S.-China relations. Mao agreed, and the Politburo decided to refute Ji ang's demands. Yet Zhou only achieved a partial victory. Mao might think that Jiang had made a big deal out of a trivial detail, but the Chairman nevertheless cancelled the production line project and allowed pi Lin pi Kong to continue.61

Indeed, from late 1973 onward, China' s domestic politics gradually cam e to be dom inated by the pi Lin pi Kong campaign, which did not wind down un til late 1974 and early 1975. Since one central them e of t he cam paign was the propos ition m ade by the "rad icals" that closer relations with the West would compromise the purity of China's revolution and provide a chance for capita lism to sneak back into C hina, the c ampaign ine vitably inf luenced Chin a's relation s with the United States. On May 24, 1974, for e xample, Bruce reported to Kissinger that "there

61 "Woniu shijian shimo (The Snail Incident)," in Foreign Ministry, Xinzhongguo waijiao fengyun (Important Events in New China's Diplomacy) (Beijing: Shijie zhishi, 1991), Vol. 2, pp. 176-180; Zhou Enlai nianpu (Chronology of Zhou Enlai), Vol. 3, p. 650.

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[has] indeed been a 'cooling off'" in U.S.-China relations. Bruce was worried about the attack by the "radicals" on Zhou, the "bas tion of present stability." S hould Zhou be purged, the strong

xenophobic feeling stirred by the "radicals" m ight se riously cripple, if not destroy, the U.S.-

China rapprochement. At the sam e time, Bruce appreciated Mao' s unhappiness with the United

States regarding broad strategi c iss ues. The United States had "disap pointed" the Chinese in

several ways, Bruce argued. China f eared that " our detente with the USSR will lead us into

actions and agreements inimical to the nation al interests of the PRC," and China als o suspected

that "we will not within the next couple of years proceed to a fu ll diplomatic recognition of the

PRC, and a withdrawal of our Embassy from Taiwan." As a result, Bruce predicated to Kissinger

that the current stalemate in U.S.-China relations would last.62

Bruce's prediction turned out to be accurate. For American policy-makers, there was little they could do to break this stalem ate in the middle of the escalating Watergate crisis. On August

8, 1974, Nixon resigned as President of the United States and Gerald Ford stepped into the White

House. On August 9, Ford m et with Huang Zhen, head of PRCLO, to affir m his desire to m ove

toward nor malization. 63 However, the creation of a new Am erican adm inistration hardly

guaranteed an acceleration in the d evelopment of U.S.-Chi na relations. Indeed, when George

Bush, who replaced Bru ce as head of USLO af ter Nixon's resignation, was about to leave for

China, he was warned b y Brent Sco wcroft, Deputy National Security A dvisor to Ford, that he

62 Telegram, Bruce to Kissinger, 24 May 1974, NSC Files, HAKOF, Box 96, NPM. 63 Memo of Conversation, 9 August 1974, National Security Advisor (NSA), Memcons, Box 4, GFPL.

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might "feel a bit of frustration" in China. "Does USLO feel there has been a pullback [of

relations]?" Bush asked. "I'd say it's more a matter of no movement," Scowcroft answered.64

The situation of "no movem ent" indeed continued. In October 1974, a CIA report aptly

summarized the strategic dim ensions of the st alemate. "Since mid-1973 progress in norm alizing

Sino-US relations has slowed m arkedly," the report pointed out. The m ain reason behind this

slowdown was China' s belief that it had been "deceived" about American po licy, because th e

United States failed to m ake visible moves to push forward toward norm alization of relations. 65

Meanwhile, Bruce, upon leaving China to become the US Ambassador to NATO, offered his last observation on the non-strategic dim ensions of th e stalem ate. On October 10, Bruce told the

Senate Fore ign Relation s Comm ittee that the n ew U.S.-China rapp rochement was still f ragile because Chinese leaders feared the impact of Am erica's economic and cultural power on China.

Referring to the pi Lin pi Kong campaign, Bruce told the Committee that the Chinese "feeling of self-sufficiency is very strong and very deeply rooted" and the "radicals" particularly resented the idea of expanding econom ic and cultural contact with th e West. Bruce made it clear that the stalemate in U.S.-China relations was not on ly produced by strategic concerns, but also by

Chinese leaders' sense that the very nature of their regime was threaten ed by exp anded contact between the two societies.66

By late 1974 and early 1975, therefore, the U. S.-China rapprochement seemed to enter a

deadlock. Handicapped by the Watergate crisis, the Nixon administration failed to take dramatic

64 Memo of Conversation, 25 September 1974, NSA, Country Files, PRC, Box 13, GFPL. 65 CIA Report, October 1974, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 18, pp. 543-545. 66 Testimony of Bruce, reprinted in Roberts, eds., Window on the Forbidden City, pp. 591-593.

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steps towar d norm alization of r elations with Ch ina which would require a reconfiguration of

Washington's relations with Taiwan. Meanwhile , the ongoing Soviet-Am erican detente revived

China's fear that Am erica was only interested in playing China off against the Soviet Union. At the same time, the lack of progress on the issue of Taiwan and other bilateral strategic concerns was intertwined with the "Second Cultural Revolutio n" within China. The fear of the so-called

"peaceful evolution " p roduced by expanded ec onomic and cultu ral contact with Am erica triggered a backlash from the "radical" Chines e leaders, whose pure Ma oist ideology not only contributed to th e s talemate in U.S.-China rela tions, but also had the pot ential to destroy the

"tacit allian ce." This, therefore, w as the his torical s ituation bef ore Kissi nger's seventh visit of

China in November 1974.

The "Tacit Alliance" Preserved: 1974-1975

While the stalemate in U.S.-China relations was real, the situation was not hopeless. In fact, since m id-1974, both sides tried to break this stalemate by various m eans. Am erican policy- makers, frustrated by the stalem ate, nevertheless showed great conf idence in the survival of the

"tacit alliance." This co nfidence was again con nected with the im age of China as a "frustrated modernizer," whose weakness dictated its continue d interest in be tter relations with the Unite d

States. As Soviet-American detente increasingly came under attack within America, the need to play the "China card" continued to be strong. In order to perverse relations with China, American policy-makers relied on two m ain strategies. On the one hand, they continued to debrief the

Chinese on almost every major foreign policy deci sion in Washington, and repeatedly reassured

Beijing tha t Am erica w ould not sa crifice Chin a in o rder to im prove r elations with the Sov iet

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Union. On the other hand, they continued to re ly heavily on developing econom ic, cultural, and

other non-strategic relations with China to conso lidate relations. In return, new developm ents in

China which gradually shifted the nation's attention to economic development boosted American policy-makers' confidence that China would n eed Am erica for its own m odernization. As a result, China's own modernization continued as an integral part in America's calculation of state- to-state relations.

From the Chinese pe rspective, the "tac it allia nce" also managed to survive the "Second

Cultural Revolution." Two factors contributed to this result. Fi rst, China continue d to valu e

America as a counterweight to th e Soviet Union. Although unsatisfi ed with the slow progress in

U.S.-China normalization, Mao still wanted to play W ashington off against Moscow. Am erica's domestic troubles in the afterm ath of W atergate, the growing energy crisis and a new global economic recession, and the declining popularity of Soviet-American detente led the Chinese to argue (unconvincingly to the Am ericans) that th e United States need ed China m ore than China needed America in counterbalancing the Soviet Union. As a result, Chin a was confident that it could push America harder toward normalization without breaking up the "tacit alliance." At the same time, from late 1974 forward, the "Second Cu ltural Revolution" started to fade away, and many senior "moderates," including Deng Xiaoping, we re restored to power. As a result, China started to emphasize econom ic de velopment as the primary goal of the regime. A good relationship with th e United State, theref ore, once again b ecame important since A merica was the key country in terms of China's access to world market and advanced technologies.

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In any case, the first light of hope in preserving the Sino-American "tacit alliance" appeared when Kissinger started to prepare for his sevent h visit of China in late 1974. On Novem ber 18,

George Bush, who by then had m ade himself busy in Beijing as the new head of USLO, sent a backchannel message to Kissinger summarizing recent developments. "The ideological campaign which was just gathering steam at the tim e of your last visit now seem s to [be] drawing to a close," Bush reported on the pi Lin pi Kong movement. Recent d evelopments convinced Bush that Chin a was m oving away from the M aoist m odel of modernization and tow ard a m ore accommodating position regarding the West. "We suspect that...a compromise position has been reached," he reported, "which, for the presen t at least, has satisfied Chinese leaders that they can move toward greater co ntact and exposure to the West while maintaining the essential principle of self -reliance." Notic ing the ascendancy of Deng Xiaoping and the new trend in China that

"attention is focused upon building up the national economy," Bush concluded that "the direction of Chinese policy remains very much in the hands of the same establishment which first decided to permit the opening of the present U.S.-PRC rela tionship." Bush expected Kissinger's visit to be able to preserve the U.S.-China "tacit alliance."67

Clearly, Bush's report w as based on the belief that the power balance in China was titling toward th e "m oderates," who w ould likely continue the U.S. -China rapprochement. Such a prospect was especially promising because it s eemed that the very direction of C hina's future development was being reoriented toward the West.

67 Bush to Kissinger, 18 November 1974, NSA, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1974-1977, Box 4, GFPL.

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Bush's optimism was not without f oundation. In order to fully understand Bush' s report and

the context of Kissinger' s seventh visit, we need to backtrack those developm ents first. W hile

Mao Zedong gave Jiang Qing and her supporters a free hand in launching the "Second Cultural

Revolution," he had no intention of completely abandoning Zhou Enlai. On the contrary, in early

1973, Mao had started to strengthe n the hand of the "m oderates" and readdress the excessive

damage caused by the Cultural Revolution. A crucia l step in this regard took place in March

1973, when Mao decided to restore Deng Xiaoping to office. Deng had been "struck down" as

the "No. 2 capitalist roader" (No. 1 being Liu Sh aoqi) during the initial s tage of the Cultur al

Revolution. However, Mao still regarded Deng as his loyal supporter, and he personally ordered

physical protection of Deng from th e Red Guards, a safety m easure Mao refused to grant to Liu.

Deng himself later recalled his life was saved by Mao during the Cultural Revolution. 68 In May

1972, Zhou Enlai was diagnosed with cancer, and his health stead ily deteriorated. Zhou thus used his health as an ex cuse to argue before Mao that he needed help. Ma o, in return, agreed to restore Deng as Vice Primer, and Deng became Zhou's chief deputy.69

Deng's restoration greatly encouraged the "moderates," and many senior Party officials who

were "struck down" during the Cultural Revoluti on started to ask for their own restoration. But

Mao wanted to have a trial period before he could give real power back to Deng. China's

relations with Am erica provided an opportunity for Mao to further test Deng. After Kissinger' s

68 CCP Central Committee Party Literature Research Center, Huiyi Deng Xiaoping (Recollections About Deng Xiaoping) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1998), Vol. 1, pp. 38-39. 69 Zhou Enlai nianpu (Chronology of Zhou Enlai), Vol. 3, p. 583-584; Mao Zedong zhuan (A Biography of Mao Zedong), Vol. 4, pp. 1649-1653; Gong Li, Deng Xiaoping yu meiguo (Deng Xiaoping and America) (Beijing: Zhongyang dangshi, 2004), pp. 100- 104.

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November 1973 visit of China, as we discusse d above, Mao allowed the "radicals" to launc h

attacks on Zhou, who was accused of becom ing "sof t" b efore the A mericans. Deng was also

requested to criticize Zhou during those Politburo m eetings. Deng showed his com plete loyalty

to Mao by reiterating the m istakes that, as everyone understood, Mao thought Zhou had m ade.

Yet Deng also took the chance to express his own understanding of the current international

situation. He argued that the dominant trend in the world was still the global contest between the

two superpowers. But since neither the Soviet Un ion nor the United S tates was ready for a war,

China could play one superpower off against th e other. In any case, Deng argued, China was not

afraid of a war with the superpowers. Deng's argument closely mirrored Mao's own viewpoint on

the current international situation. When the "two ladies" debriefed Mao on Deng's remarks, Mao was pleased . Now Deng proved that he was a loyal f ollower of Mao' s "politica l line." The excited Chairm an asked to see Deng i mmediately, only to give up when no one could find

Deng's address in the middle of the night. On December 22, 1973, Deng was officially restored as a Politburo m ember. On January 18, 1974, Ma o appointed Deng to a special group in the

Central Military Comm ission to tak e charge of military affairs. In sum , from November 1973,

Deng started to have real power.70

Deng's restoration would have profound im pact on the future of U.S.-China relations.

Convinced of Deng's loyalty, Mao put Deng in charge of China's foreign policy, as Zhou's cancer

prevented him from attending those heavy discussi on sessions with foreign leaders. Meanwhile,

70 Mao Zedong zhuan (A Biography of Mao Zedong), Vol. 4, pp. 1674-1675; Gong, Deng Xiaoping yu meiguo (Deng Xiaoping and America), pp. 125-126; Mao Mao, Wo de fuqin Deng Xiaoping: Wenge suiyue (My Father Deng Xiaoping: The Cultural Revolution Years) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 2000), pp. 288-289.

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Mao rem inded the Am ericans of their need for China as an ally against the Soviet Union. In

doing so, Mao tried to underm ine the Soviet-Am erican detente, which would be a threat to

China's interests. A major technique Mao used was his new theoretical invention—the so-called

"theory of the three w orlds," which was clea rly based upon his early theory re garding the

"intermediate zones."71 The new theory was first systematically proposed in February 1974 when

Mao had a m eeting with an African leader. A ccording to Mao, the interna tional comm unity

could be divided into "three worlds." The "First World" consisted of the two superpowers, and

the "Third World" consisted of all the developing countries, incl uding China, that were still

fighting for their econo mic and political independe nce. The industrialized countries , including

Western Europe, Japan, and Cana da, belonged to the "Second W orld." Mao argued that both the

Soviet Union and the United States wanted world hegemony, and although som etimes they

would "collude," conflict between the two still dominated their relations. Countries in the "Third

World", and, to a lesser degree, countries in the "Second W orld," must resist the two superpowers' efforts to establish hegem ony. Mao further argued that as a member of the "Third

World," it was China's international duty to support the struggle against the two superpowers.72

In practice, Mao's "theory of the three worlds" targeted the Soviet Union as the main enemy of China an d of world peace. First, he in sisted that "conflict" was the d ominant feature of the relationship between the two superpowers. Mao reiterated his b elief that Sov iet-American detente could not last long and the contest betw een Moscow and W ashington would continue to

71 See Chapter 3. 72 CCP Central Committee Party Literature Research Center, Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan (Selected Diplomatic Works of Mao Zedong), p. 600.

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shape the international environm ent. Second, he argued that China w ould continue its fight against the two superpowers, in rea lity identifying the Soviet Union as China' s main enemy. If we recall Mao' s proposal for the form ation of a " horizontal line" with th e United S tates against the Soviet Union, then it would become clear that Mao wanted to f orge a broad united front among the "Third World" countries against Moscow.73

Once the "theory of the three world s" was pr oposed, Mao decided that the United Nations

would become an ideal forum for introducing his theory to the whole world. On March 20, 1974,

Wang Hairong, then the Vice Foreign Minister, told Zhou Enlai that Mao wanted Deng to head a

special delegation to the United Nations in Apr il. On March 22, the Foreign Ministry dutifully

submitted a proposal that sugges ted Deng as head of the delegation, which Mao app roved two

days later. Jiang Qing, however, was angry. Shoul d Deng head the special delegation, then the

whole world would notice the rise of Deng aga in in the CCP hierarchy. Moreover, it had been

announced recently that the Fourth National Peopl e's Congress would be convened in the near

future, which would produce a new central governm ent. Deng's mission to the United Nations

would only incre ase h is power, which in retu rn would ce rtainly gu arantee a high p osition f or

Deng in the new central governm ent. On March 25, therefore, Jiang called W ang Hairong four

times, demanding the withdrawal of Deng's appointment on the grounds that Deng was needed at

home. W ang turned Jiang down, arguing that she had no authorization to withdraw the

73 For more detailed discussion of Mao's "theory of the three worlds," see Mao Zedong zhuan (A Biography of Mao Zedong), Vol. 4, pp. 1687-1688; Gong Li, Kuayue honggou (Bridging the Chasm), pp. 222-241; Teiwes and Sun, The End of the Maoist Era, pp. 86-87.

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appointment, which was approved by Mao him self. 74 The next day, Zhou presided over a

Politburo meeting on Deng' s appointment, and he al so invited the "two ladies" to the m eeting.

Zhou pointed out that Deng' s trip to the UN would be significant in terms of "increasing China' s

international prestige" and "creating a f avorable situation f or China's future diplomatic work."

Jiang Qing, however, continued to ask the "two ladies" to withdraw Deng's appointment. When

she was turned down again, the meeting became one of verbal abuse between Jiang and the "two

ladies." When Mao learned about Jiang' s objection, the Chairm an became angry. On March 27,

Mao wrote Jiang a harsh letter. "It was m y decision to send comrade Deng abroad; you' d better

not oppose me," Mao warned his wife. "Be careful; Do not oppose my opinions."75 The defeat of

Jiang's objection over Deng' s UN trip thus sent a clear signa l that Mao him self was behind

Deng's ascendancy in the power hierarchy.76

When Deng led the C hinese d elegation to th e United Nations in April, he d utifully

articulated Mao's "theory of the three worlds." Deng was especially hard on the two superpowers

by calling for a united front am ong the "Third World" countries to fight against both Soviet and

U.S. hege mony. 77 On April 14, Kissinger had a m eeting with Deng. W hen Kissinger half-

jokingly referred to Deng' s UN spe ech as "cannons " fired at Am erica, Deng m ade it clear that

74 Wang, also a "radical" and one of the "two ladies," actually openly confronted Jiang over Deng's appointment. We don't have enough evidence to trace the relations between Jiang and the "two ladies," but the "two ladies," who were close to Mao, clearly tried to have their own political agenda, which was not always in line with Jiang's. 75 Letter, Mao to Jiang, 27 March 1974, in Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao (Draft Writings of Mao Zedong since the Establishment of the Regime), Vol. 13, p. 373. 76 For detailed discussion on Deng's appointment, see Liu Huaqiu, "Zhengyi zhansheng xie'er—ji weirao Deng Xiaoping tongzhi chuguo de yichang douzheng (Justice Defeated Evil: A Struggle Surrounding Comrade Deng's Trip Abroad)," in Foreign Ministry, Xinzhongguo waijiao fengyun (Important Events in New China's Diplomacy) (Beijing: Shijie zhishi, 1998), Vol. 5, pp. 24-25; Gong, Deng Xiaoping yu meiguo (Deng Xiaoping and America), pp. 129-130; Mao Zedong zhuan (A Biography of Mao Zedong), Vol. 4, pp. 1689-1690; Zhou Enlai nianpu (Chronology of Zhou Enlai), Vol. 3, pp. 657-658. 77 A translation of Deng's UN speech is in The New York Times, 12 April 1974.

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China's major target was the Soviet Union, not America. Deng, to be sure, still expressed China's

frustration over the lack of progress in norm alization of U.S.-China relations. "Why is there still

such a big noise being m ade about Watergate?" Deng complained to Kissinger. "Chairm an Mao

told you that we are not happy about this." Yet in general, Deng wanted to strengthen the anti-

Soviet alliance with America. He warned Kissinger that the Soviet Unio n was not to be trusted.

"In my experience we (China and the Soviet Union) could never reach agreem ent," Deng said.

He then urged Am erica to provide more help to Pakistan in the latter' s conf lict with India, a

Soviet ally. He also urged America to stand firmly in the Middle East to prevent further spread of

Soviet influence in that area. Moreover, Deng tried to cover up the di fference between Mao and

Kissinger regarding the current stra tegic focus of the Soviet Union. "I have read the record of your talk with Chairm an Mao Tse-tung," Deng to ld Kissinger: "The only difficulty is on where the Soviet strategic focus is. On this point, we have some differences, but these differences do not matter." "Exactly, " Kissinger ag reed. "Wherever the first focal point is, the next focal point is obvious. If the focal point is in Europe, then the next is on China. If the focal point is China, then the next one is E urope." The two sides, therefore, concluded that the U.S.-China "tacit alliance" should continue.78

Meanwhile, realizing that Am erica was not able to m ake m ajor breakthroughs toward

normalization soon, Nixon and Kissinger decided to rely heavily on the developm ent of trade

and cultural relations w ith China to preserve the relationship. In fact, the Nixon adm inistration

quickly granted special treatm ent to China in th e area of trade, and China cam e to enjoy m ore

78 Memo of Conversation, 14 April 1974, RG59, Lot File 77D114, PPC, Winston Lord File, 1969-77, Box 374.

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privilege in trade than any other Communist country. Moreover, the Nixon adm inistration even

developed trade with China in the grey area of "dual-use" technologies.

The decision to sell nuclear reactors to Ch ina in 1974 was a good example. In late 1973,

three American companies approached the Nix on administration for perm ission to sell nuclear

power reactors and uran ium fuel to China. The Ch inese were very inter ested in th e sale, it was reported, and the m oney was good. 79 Kissinger was intrigued. "N o Comm unist country has

purchased Western [nuclear] power reactors," he reported to Nixon in April 1974. Yet instead of

denying this transaction, Kissinger urged Nixon to act quickly in o rder to "[ establish] the

necessary conditions for possible sale of U.S. nuclear power reactors and fuel [to China]." 80 A

subsequent study concluded that "the export of one or two U.S. reactors to the PRC could contribute to the im provement of U.S.-China rela tions, would not appear to affect serious ly the strategic balance in the near term , and would contribute to the export earnings of private U.S. firms."81 On July 22, Nixon issued NS DM 261, which authorized relevant U.S. federal agencies

to nego tiate with the P RC on the nuclea r sa les. 82 The decision showed how far the Nixon

administration was willing to go to preserve th e "tacit alliance" with Beijing. Im plicit in the

American decision was the belief that Am erica should help to strengthen China bot h

economically and militarily as an ally against the Soviet Union.

79 Memo, Kenneth Rush to Nixon, 14 February 1974, ibid. 80 Memo, Kissinger to Nixon, 24 April 1974, NSC Files, H-Files, Box H-53, GFPL. 81 "Nuclear Sales to the People's Republic of China," undated, 1974, RG59, Lot File 77D114, PPC, Winston Lord File, 1969-77, Box 374. 82 NSDM 261, "Nuclear Sales to the PRC," 22 July 1974, NSC Files, H-Files, Box H-53, GFPL.

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This belief was expressed once again in the making of the 1974 Trade Act. In 1973 the

Nixon administration proposed a co mprehensive new trade bill that incl uded broader authority

for the president to negotiate reductions in tariffs in the upcom ing round of international

negotiations. As part of the U.S. -Soviet Trade Agreement, the bill included a proposal to extend

MFN status to the Soviet Union. T he Trade Ac t was to be passed by Congress in Decem ber

1974, but only after a protracted debate over trade concessions for the Soviets. While Soviet-

American détente increasingly became subjected to criticism within A merica, key members of

Congress took a tougher stance toward the Soviet Union through this Trade Act. Eventually the

so-called Jackson-Vanik Amendment was attached to it, which linked MFN status for the Soviet

Union with assuran ces that Mo scow would relax its restricti ons against the em igration of

Russian Jews.83

The 1974 Trade Act, however, would be applie d to all comm unist countries. On October

16, 1973, a worried David Bruce told Kissinger that if the Jackson-Vanik Amendment were to be passed, then the “bill [would] apply equally to PRC and [woul d] be a m ajor obstacle to

developing U.S.–PRC trade relations.” 84 Realizing the potential dam age the Trade Act could do

to U.S.-China relations, Kissinger during his Nove mber 1973 visit told Zhou Enlai that Am erica

was “in principle...prepared to gr ant most favored nation status to the PRC. The difficulty that

now arises with m ost favored nation has nothi ng to do with China, but people who are adding

amendments which are aimed at the Soviet Un ion which may apply to the PRC even though the

83 For a general discussion of the making of the 1974 Trade Act, see Paula Stern, Water’s Edge: Domestic Politics and the Making of American Foreign Policy (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1979). 84 Telegram from Bruce to Kissinger, 13 October 1973, NSC Files, HAKOF, Box 93, NPM.

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people may be favorable to the PRC.” Kissinger pr omised that Henry Jackson, the chief sponsor of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, only wanted to target the Soviet Union, not China. Kissinger

then suggested that China should invite Jackson to visit in order to smooth things out.85

When Jackson did visit China in July 1974, he quickly found a common anti-Soviet language with Chinese leaders. “W hat about déte nte?” Jackson asked. “We don’t believe in it,” the Chinese answered. A nd both sides burst into laugher. They then discussed Soviet m oves in

Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East. Both agreed that Am erica and China m ust work together against global Soviet expansion. Jackson, who wondered whether China would develop enough eco nomic and m ilitary po wer to deter th e Soviet Union, of fered som e advanced technologies, such as deep-water oil drilling, to the Chinese. He then joked: “I am the representative of the military industrial complex, the Senator from Boeing. I represent the ruling circles with headquarters in W all Street.” Again, both sides burst into laughter. 86 After the visit,

Jackson strongly urged Am erica to lean toward China inste ad of developing parallel relations

with both China and the Soviet Union. He even urged the Nixon administration to consider early

diplomatic recognition of China. Jackson ar gued that a strong C hina, econom ically and

militarily, was in America's interest.87

Jackson made it clear that the upcom ing Jackson-Vanik Amendment would not becom e a

serious obstacle for expanding U.S.-China trade. While admitting during a press conference that

China would not allow free em igration, Jackson said that the em igration issue contained in the

85 Record of Conversation, 12 November 1973, NSC Files, HAKOF, Box 100, NPM. 86 Various Records of Conversations, July 1974, AN 3560-28, Box 1, HMJ. 87 “Jackson China Trip Report,” August 1974, AN 3560-6, Box 11, HMJ.

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Amendment, when applied to China, would only work toward “uniting f amilies…where part of

the Chinese fa mily is in the United States or Hong Kong and part are in the Republic of the

Chinese mainland.” 88 Indeed, a com promise over the Am endment was reached, by which th e

president was author ized to waive the f reedom of e migration requirement if he reported to

Congress that the waiver could promote the free emigration objectives and he received assurance

that the concerned country woul d liberalize its em igration po licies. Th e busine ss community

immediately celebrated the 1974 Trade Act as a m ajor step toward expanding U.S.-China trade.

“If everything goes well, China could have MFN within the fo reseeable future, ” a leading business journal claimed.89

Before Kissinger's seventh visit of China in November 1974, therefore, Am erican policy- makers had reason to be confident that the U.S.-China "tacit alliance" would be preserved. Mao's

"theory of the three worlds," the Deng-Kissinger meeting in April 1974, as well as other bilateral talks conducted through the two liaison offices, convinced American policy-makers that China

still regarded the Soviet Union as its main enemy.

America's confidence was confirm ed by Kissinger' s seventh visit of China. Deng Xiaoping

became the chief Chinese negotiator this tim e, as Zhou Enlai was hospitalized due to hi s

advanced cancer. Although both sides hoped to push forward the normalization of relations, it

quickly became clear that the issu e of Taiwan was still a n insurmountable obstacle. Kissinger

told Deng that the n ew Ford adm inistration still wanted to estab lish d iplomatic relations with

88 Press Conference, 8 July 1974, AN 3560-6, Box 10, HMJ. 89 “China and the Trade Act of 1974,” U.S. China Business Review (1975 Vol. 2), pp. 3-10.

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China by 1976, but he wondered if Am erica could have a grace perio d regarding its relations

with Taiwan. Specifically, Kissinger said America wanted to maintain a liaison office of sorts on

Taiwan after recognizin g Beijing as the so le government of China. W hile Kissinger prom ised

that Am erica would ev entually withdraw all its military f orces f rom Taiwan, he insis ted that

Washington still ne eded to m aintain its d efense treaty with Taiwan f or a while un less Beijing

would openly pledge to solve the p roblem of Taiwan peacefully. Deng, however, would not

yield. He was displeased by America' s hesitance with regard to the Taiwan issue. "On this issue,

as we see it, you owe us a debt," Deng said. And the only way to norm alize bilateral relations,

Deng pointed out, was for Am erica to follow the so -called "Japan way;" that is, A merica must

cut off all official relations with Taiwan. Kissi nger's proposal, Deng argued, would only create a

situation of "two Chinas" or "One China, one Taiwan," which China would never accept.90

At the same time, however, Deng pointed out that China was willing to let the Taiwan issue wait in order to keep the "tacit alliance" against the Soviet Union. "It appears that you still need

Taiwan," Deng told Kissinger. "If you still need Taiwan we can wait. We can wait until the time is m ore ripe for the solution of the question." Although Kissinger tried to assure Deng that

America would eventu ally so lve the Taiwan issu e according to th e "spirit" of the Shangh ai

Communiqué, he was happy to bypass this sore point. Instead, Kissinger em phasized the

common threat from the Soviet Union. " We have also had common fronts," he told Deng; "they

were mostly produced by the ' polar bear.'"91 Deng agreed. A nd the two sides spent the rest of

90 Memo of Conversation, 26 November 1974, 10:20-11:02 a.m., NSA, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East, 1974-1976, Box 2, GFPL. 91 Memo of Conversation, 26 November 1974, 3:45-5:00 p.m., Ibid.

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Kissinger's visit talking about possible U.S.-China cooperation against the Soviet Union in

various world areas. "The basi c impression...were their continued preoccupation with the Soviet

Union, and the poss ibility that we will no t make major progress on the normalization question

this tr ip," Kissinger r eported to Ford. "However, the Chinese st ress tha t the two issues a re

separate and we have after al l no reason to be over-anxious." 92 Kissinger was relieved to

discover that Deng would follow the strategic views of Mao a nd Zhou. "He outlined various

Chinese positions in a general tour d' horizon of international issues," Kissinger o bserved. "He demonstrated across the board co ntinuity on Chinese in ternational p olicies, with the c entral theme once again being Soviet he gemony and ways to counter it." 93 Kissinger further reported

that Deng invited Ford to visit China without normalization of relations as a precondition.94

Kissinger's Nove mber 1974 visit of China confir med that the U.S.-China "tacit alliance"

would continue, but China' s dom estic developmen t again proved to be crucial for the future

course of U.S.-China relations. Just a few weeks before Kissinger' s visit, the "rad icals" and the

"moderates" had another major battle over China's modernization, a battle that in many ways laid

the foundation for future Sino-Am erican relations . The whole battle unfolded around the so-

called "Fengqing Incident." In October 1974, the Fengqing, a Chinese designed and constructed

ocean-going freighter, made its first successful journey from Shanghai to Europe and back. Jiang

Qing and other "radicals" imm ediately launc hed a propaganda cam paign, arguing that the

success of Fengqing proved that native technology was enough for Chi na's modernization. The

92 Memo, Kissinger to Ford, 27 November 1974, Ibid. 93 Memo, Kissinger to Ford, 28 November 1974, Ibid. 94 Memo, Kissinger to Ford, 27 November 1974, Ibid.

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"radicals" overlooked the fact that given China's level of technology, building the Fengqing type

freighter was m ore costly than buying or re nting ships. Neverthe less, they used the Fengqing

story to lau nch another round of attack on Zhou and Den g, accusing them of prom oting a

"slavish comprador philosophy." On October 17, when Jiang Qing attacked Zhou and Deng

during a Politbu ro m eeting, Deng o penly confront ed her and walked away from the m eeting.

Jiang immediately held a m eeting with th ree "radicals"—Wang H ongwen, Yao Wenyuan, and

Zhang Chunqiao. The four then decided to "s ue" Deng Xiaoping before Mao Zedong. The next

day, Wang Hongwen secretly went to Changsha, where Mao was having his vacation, and told

the Chairman that Deng was trying to "com pletely deny" the Cultural Revolution. However, this

time Jiang Qing' s strategy backfired. Mao imm ediately saw through his wife' s strategy. He

harshly criticized W ang, and warned Jiang Qing not to form a "gang" with W ang, Yao, and

Zhang. Indeed, this was the first time that Mao started to think of the "radicals" as a "gang," and

Mao's decision to support Deng this time signaled the changing fortunes of the "radicals."95

On Decem ber 14, Mao had a long talk with Deng during w hich he sup ported Deng over

Jiang. Deng took the chance to seek Mao's permission to further readdress the excessive Cultural

Revolution. "The key problem , " Deng told Mao, "was how to balance revolution with production. If we don't have a stable political environment, then it will be very difficult for us to increase production." D eng thus proposed to r eestablish the norm al Party hierarchy, and he especially u rged Mao to reestab lish stable Party branches at the local level. Deng also had a

95 Mao Zedong zhuan (A Biography of Mao Zedong), Vol. 4, pp. 1701-1704; Gong, Deng Xiaoping yu meiguo (Deng Xiaoping and America), pp. 151-154; Zhou Enlai nianpu (Chronology of Zhou Enlai), Vol. 3, pp. 679-680.

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second proposal. To Deng, the U.S.-China rappro chement created an inte rnational environment favorable to China' s ec onomic developm ent. "T he two superpowers dare not to launch a war

[against China], and we can have a period of p eace for at least five years ," Deng said. "We must take full advantage of this five years [to develop our economy]." Deng especially emphasized the need to expand trade and econom ic relations with other countries. "Of course, we do not need to do so, and we can still develop our economy, " Deng cautioned. "But our develop ment will be slow. No country in the world can develop inde pendent of the internat ional environment. We need to learn from others, including the United States." "Your idea is good," Mao responded, and he approved Deng's proposals.96

After this talk, Mao continued to limit the power of the "radicals." On December 23 and 24,

Mao summoned Zhou Enlai and Wang Hongwen to Changsha to discuss the upcom ing Fourth

National People's Congress. For the first time, Mao explicitly warned Wang not to form a "Gang of Four," that the whole central leadership shou ld be "unified." Mao then said that Deng was a talent that China badly needed. And he propos ed that the upcom ing National People's Congress

nominate Deng as First Vice Prem ier , Vice Chai rman of the Central Military Commission, and

Chief of Staff of the PLA in the next central government. As for Jiang Qing, Mao dictated that her task was to "study the international situation" and she should not have any formal position in the new government.97

96 Conversation between Deng and Mao, 14 December 1974, in Mao Zedong zhuan (A Biography of Mao Zedong), Vol. 4, pp. 1709-1710. 97 Meeting Records, 24 and 25 December 1974, ibid., pp. 1711-1712. Also see Gong, Deng Xiaoping yu meiguo (Deng Xiaoping and America), pp. 159-160.

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When the Fourth National People' s Congress convened in January 1975, therefore, the

power of the "m oderates" was greatly strengthened. Zhou Enlai was again nom inated as China's

Premier. The Congress also nominated Deng to the positions in the new government proposed by

Mao. The highlight of the Congress was Zhou' s government work report, which officially

proposed the so-called "Four Modern izations" as China' s priority for the rest of the twentieth

century. The report proposed two steps. "The first step is to use 15 years, that is, before the year

of 1990, to establish an independe nt and relatively com plete sy stem of industry and national

economy. The second step is to achieve com prehensive modernization of agriculture, industry,

national defense, and science and technology before the end of this century so that our national

economy will b ecome one of the most develo ped in th e world." 98 In retrospect, the Fourth

National People's Congress was not a com plete victory for the "m oderates" over the "radicals."

But in many aspects, it was still a turning point for China's future development. The emphasis on

the "Four Modernizations" started the slow but steady trend toward refocusing China' s domestic

politics around economic development. The "Four Modernizations" also signaled that China was

going to shift away from the radical Maoist ideology toward a m ore pragm atic m odel of

modernization, a shift that would help to strengthen China's relations with the United States.99

American policy -makers immediately reali zed the significance of the Fourth National

People's Congress. "The Congress indicated that the left wing of the Chinese Communist Party, which we have hypothesized has been on the politic al defensive during the past three years...was

98 A full text of the report is in Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), 21 January 1975. 99 Zhou Enlai nianpu (Chronology of Zhou Enlai), Vol. 3, p. 691; CCP Central Committee Party Literature Research Center, Deng Xiaoping nianpu, 1975-1997 (Chronology of Deng Xiaoping, 1975-1997) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian 2004), Vol. 1, p. 5.

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further attenuated in its organizational influence at the Congress," Kissinger reported to Ford on

January 27, 1975. At the sam e time, Kissinger noticed the shift in China' s ideology of economic

development. "The Congress approved an econom ic policy line which allows for contract labor,

private plots, and...the sam e set of policies which was criticized heavily during the Cultural

Revolution," Kissinger observed. "T his indicates that PRC leaders rem ain concerned about their

economic base, and will attem pt to m ake a big push in econom ic production in the com ing

year."100 George Bush, the m an in the field, was ev en more optimistic. Indeed, Bush wondered aloud if China was on the verge of having a "f ashion revolution." "USLO suspects the prim e topic of conversation in the al leys of Peking these days is not the outcom e of t he National

People's Congress or who controls the People' s Liberation Army," Bush reported, "but the new dress styles being shown in a major Peking clothing store as the 'in thing' for this summer...Large crowds of excited women, and a few m en, are looking at the dresses and exchanging comments as if the clothes were the latest import from New York or Paris." Bush was encou raged by the sign of growing consumerism in China. "Who knows," he concluded, "next year, mini-shirts?"101

The shift in China's ideology of economic development in early 1975, therefore, was widely welcomed by Am erican policy-makers. Besides c oncerns about the Soviet Union, now China' s decision to reevaluate its model of modernization consolidated another powerful rationale for improved U.S.-China relations, as Am erica certainly would becom e a source that could satisfy

China's need for W estern technologies and mana gerial know-how. Subsequent developm ents

100 Memo, Kissinger to Ford, 27 January 1975, NSA, Country Files, PRC, Box 13, GFPL. 101 Telegram, Peking to State, 19 February 1975, RG59, CFPF, 1973-1975, Electronic Records, Document Number 1975PEKING00269, NA II.

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confirmed this perception. After the Fourth National People's Congress, Deng in fact became the acting Premier in charge of running the daily affairs of Chi na. And the year 1975 was quickly labeled the year of "readjustm ent." In retrospe ct, Deng in 1975 tried to sy stematically "correct the wrongs" caused by Mao's Cultural Revolution. And he started to indicate China's willingness to expand econom ic relations with Am erica. On April 1, 1975, for exam ple, Deng told an

American Congressional delegation that "it would ta ke us 50 years at leas t to reach the current level of your economic development." He declared that in the future "w e will continue our self- reliance principle, but we will a lso learn from others."102 On June 2 Deng told a delegation of

American journalists that China was willing to be patient on the issue of Taiwan, and China was not in a hurry to push America for normalization of relations. China's priority for the near future was to " realize th e ' Four Mode rnizations,'" and Chin a needed a "p eaceful international environment" for that purpose. 103 On August 6 Deng told an American Congressional delegation that "the current state of U.S.-China relations is normal." He again em phasized that China was not in a hurry to get back Taiwan, and China wa nted to expand economic relations with America in order to facilitate China's economic development.104

Deng's remarks to th e Americans were not mere gestures. On the contrary, Deng and his supporters started to seriously r eevaluate China's self-reliance principle in econom y. In August, the State C ouncil produced a national plan for industrial developm ent. The plan specifically emphasized the need to "im port new technologies and new industrial equipm ents from abroad."

102 Deng Xiaoping nianpu (Chronology of Deng Xiaoping), Vol. 1, pp. 30-31. 103 Ibid., pp. 52-53. 104 Ibid., pp. 76-77.

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It proposed to sign "long-term contracts" with foreign companies. And since China did not have

enough foreign currency reserve, the plan suggested China use its raw materials such as coal to

pay for those im ports.105 Meanwhile, Deng and Z hou Enlai star ted to rebuild China' s economic

infrastructure. For example, Gu Mu, Zhou' s deputy in econom ic affairs who was purged during the Cultural Revolution, was restored to office and put in charge of building China' s seaports in

1975. Gu later recalled that Zhou summoned him to a m eeting in early 1975 and urged him to modernize China's seaports in three years. Zhou emphasized that the new international situation faced by China would inevitab ly lead to the g rowth of China' s foreign trade. Thus, China m ust modernize its seaports in anticipating such growth.106 In a 1975 instruction he issued to Qingdao,

a seaport city in North China which was an American naval base before 1949, Zhou urged the

local government to "modernize Qingdao port in orde r to contribute to th e development of U.S.-

China relations."107

Kissinger and Ford were certainly encouraged by China's domestic developments. However,

for the rest of 1975 Chi na was still reluctant to move closer to America when there was no hope

for an early settlement of the Taiwan issue. Meanwhile, the year 1975 was a troubled year for the

Ford administration's foreign policies. The fall of Saigon, America's setbacks in the Angola Civil

War, the stalled SALT II negotiations, the growing Soviet nuclear capability, and the increasing

criticism of Soviet-American detente at hom e forced the F ord administration to play the "China

105 Ibid., pp. 83-84; CCP Central Committee Party Literature Research Center, Deng Xiaoping sixiang nianpu, 1975-1997 (Chronology of Deng Xiaoping's Thoughts, 1975-1997) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1998), pp. 14-15. 106 Gu Mu, Gu Mu huiyilu (Memoir of Gu Mu) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 2009), pp. 267-271. 107 Zhou, 1975 Instruction to Qingdao Port, unprocessed, Qingdao Archives, Qingdao, China.

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card" once again. 108 Thus in October 1975 Kissinger visite d China for the eighth time to prepare

for a projected Ford visit in December. In Beijing, Kissinger was received by an aging Chairman

Mao, who now had mixed feelings toward America. Mao was unhappy that China was not on the

top of America's foreign policy agenda. Moreover, he told Kissinger in harsh tones that "we s ee

that what you are doing is leap ing to Moscow by way of our s houlders, and these shoulders are

now useless." Kissinger rushed to defend Am erica's position, arguing that China was still the

Ford adm inistration's top priority, and Am erica would never leap to Moscow on China' s

shoulders. Mao, for his part, quic kly revealed that he was less concerned about America playing

China off a gainst the Soviet Union than Am erican setbacks in the world since 1975. Mao

understood, for example, that the fall of Saigon was a severe blow to Am erica's prestige. Europe

and Japan were also becoming "soft" and starting to tilt toward the Soviet Union. Mao's concern,

therefore, was America's "strategic passivity." As for the issue of Taiwan, Mao again showed his

patience. "The small issue is Taiwan, the big issue is the world," Mao urged America to maintain

Sino-American cooperation: "If ne ither side had anything to ask from the other, why would you be coming to Peking?...Why would we want to receive you and the President?"109

Mao, therefore, once again laid dow n the basic tone for the upcom ing Ford visit. Kissinger,

for his part, returned from his eighth visit of China both depressed and encouraged. On the one

hand, Kissinger told F ord that "I believe our relationship with China has cooled." He wa s

particularly disturbed by "China' s taking us less seriously as a world power that is capable of

108 For a detailed discussion, see Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, Chapter 12-16. 109 Memo of Conversation, 21 October 1975, NSA, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East, 1974-1976, Box 2, GFPL.

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resisting a S oviet Union that contin ues to incr ease its m ilitary strength and expand its politic al influence." On the other hand Kissinger believed that the U.S.-China "tacit allian ce" would continue because China sim ply had no other choice. "They have no real strategic options at this time to continuing our relationship," Kissinger reported. "They clearly are eager to have you visit

China. The forces that brought us together rem ain basically at work. They still treat Moscow as the principal enemy and will maintain some restraint in their posture toward us."110

Kissinger's observation once again revealed hi s conviction that as a result of China' s weakness, Chinese leaders would swallow their di sappointment and continue to cooperate with the United States in world affair s. On Nove mber 20, Kissinger furt her told Ford that in fact

China was negotiating from a position of wea kness. "Having thus ex posed their position,"

Kissinger advised Ford, "there m ay now be a more healthy psychol ogical ba lance in the relationship which will enable you to present your positions forcefully and to emphasize the need for m utual ef forts in c oping with inte rnational security questions of comm on concern and in completing the norm alization process." There were two m ajor sources for China' s weakness according to Kissinger. One was China's continued fear of the threat fro m the Soviet Union, and the o ther was th e cu rrent trans itional pe riod in China' s dom estic politics, which r endered th e

Beijing regime vulnerable. Therefore, although Kissinger did not expect Ford's visit to make real breakthroughs in the norm alization process, he t hought another presiden tial visit could strengthen the bilateral relationship. "W e believe the m ost realistic appr oach to your trip to

110 Memo, Kissinger to Ford, 24 October 1975, ibid.

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Peking is that of a sustaining visit, " Kissinger concluded, "an effort to maintain what has been a

useful dialogue on world issues and a symbolic relationship of strategic value to both sides."111

President Ford' s visit o f China in Decem ber 1975, indeed, turned ou t to be a "su staining

visit." Mao Zedong, who was quite sick, had a meeting with Ford on December 2. For Kissinger,

Mao said nothing new in his talk with Ford. Ma o again said that he wa s patient regarding the

issue of Taiwan, and "relations between our two countries should continue." For his part, Ford dutifully p layed the "So viet ca rd" b efore Mao. "W e have to work in trying to a chieve better coordination on the international scene, with emphasis on the cha llenges from some countries such as the Soviet Union," Ford told Mao. Mao was pleased, and he lectured Ford on the Soviet threat, which the Chairm an thought was spreading everywhere from Europe to Africa, and from the Middle East to Japan. Ford ag reed, and he told Mao that Chin a and the U.S. could have "a gentleman's agreement" by which "you put pressure [on the Soviet Union] from the East, and we will put on pressur e from the W est."112 While the Ford-Mao meeting was la rgely symbolic in

nature, Ford was convinced that "th e Soviet Union had an implacable enem y in the PRC" and

"that enmity...would continue even after Mao was gone."113

The subsequent talks were ca rried out between Deng Xiaopi ng and th e Americans. While

Deng followed Mao' s line that China could be patient reg arding the issue of Taiwan, he

nevertheless presented a tough stance on the future of Taiwan. Deng made it clear that the so-

called "Japan model" was the on ly solution acceptable to C hina, and A merica must completely

111 Memo, Kissinger to Ford, 6 November 1975, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 18, pp. 835-855. Italics original. 112 Memo of Conversation, 2 December 1975, NSA, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East, 1974-1976, Box 2, GFPL. 113 Gerald Ford, A Time to Heal (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1979), pp. 336-337.

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cut of f all of ficial re lations with T aiwan bef ore estab lishing diplom atic re lations with China.

Ford and Kissinger reassured Deng that normalization of relations with China was still America's goal, but they also adm itted that Am erica's current do mestic situation m ade "abandoning

Taiwan" impossible. Perhaps, Ford told Deng, "aft er the [presiden tial] election we will be in a position to move much more specifically toward the normalization of relations, along the model perhaps of the Japanese arrangement."114

Deng showed a rather unusual interest in expanding econom ic relati ons with Am erica.

"Some things we are interested in perhaps you find it im possible to supply, " Deng said, "L ike for instance computers of a speed of 10 million times." Kissinger, who always regarded trade as a useful tool to im prove relations with China, promised that America "could approve com puters to the People' s Republic of China that would be of considerable quality." Moreover, Kissinger suggested the establishment of a special trade channel. Through this channel, China could tell

America "informally" what it wanted, and America in return would find the best available things for China. Deng prom ised that he would study Kissinger's proposal. Meanwhile, D eng spoke at length about China's modernization. "There is still quite a lot to do," Deng told Ford. "To achieve the standard, or just to g et close to the standard of the West in various f ields, will take years, at least 50 years." Ford immediately recalled that when he visited China in 1972 as a Congressman, he was told that China was interested in agricultural m echanization. China, Ford said, had great potential in its economic developm ent. And ma ybe Am erica could help in this regard. "You

114 Memo of Conversation, 4 December 1975, NSA, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East, 1974-1976, Box 2, GFPL.

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should come and see our agricultural lands, Mr. Vi ce Premier, " Ford sai d. "Maybe I will have

the chance in the future," Deng answered. "It would be quite interesting."115

President F ord's visit of China did not ach ieve any breakthroughs in norm alization of

relations with China. Yet Ford' s visit was si gnificant because of its tim ing. Both Am erica and

China were going through troubled times at home, and both perc eived a rapid growth of Soviet power. Ford's visit reaf firmed to both that they must sustain the "tacit alliance. " The growing strategic and non-strategi c relations between the two nation s since 1971 sim ply made breaking

up the alliance unprofitable for both. "There has b een a great deal of s peculation that relations

between the People' s Republic and the United St ates have cooled," Ki ssinger thus announced.

"This is not the perception of th e United States, and I am confident it is not the perception of the

Chinese lea ders. W e believ e that the re lations between the United States and the People' s

Republic of China are good, and we are confident that th ey will be improved steadily in th e

months and years ahead."116

Epilogue: The Twilight of U.S.-China Relations, 1976

On December 7, 1975, President Ford delivered a speech at the University of Hawaii on his

way home from China. In that speech, Ford pointe d out that the U.S.-China alliance was crucial

for America's interests in the rap idly changing in ternational struc ture. " The cente r of politic al

power in th e United States has sh ifted westwa rd. Our Pacific interests and concerns have

increased," Ford told his audience, "The securi ty concerns of great wo rld powers interse ct in

115 Ibid. 116 Kissinger news conference, 4 December 1975, ibid.

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Asia. The United States, the Soviet Union, C hina, and Japan are all Pacific pow ers. W estern

Europe has historic and econom ic ties with Asia . Equilibrium in the Pacific is absolutely

essential to the United States and to the other countries in the Pacific." Ford then laid out several

basic premises of his "New Pacific Doctrine, " one of which was "the norm alization of relations

with the People' s Republic of China, the stren gthening of our new ties with this great natio n

representing nearly one -quarter of m ankind." Drawing on hi s recent visit to China, For d

announced that Am erica and China were able to find comm on int erests despite different ideologies. He then encouraged China to furthe r become a "constructive" member of the Pacific and international communities. "Our relationship is beco ming a perm anent feature of the international political landscape," Ford concluded. "I reaffirmed the determination of the United

States to complete the normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China on the basis

of the Shanghai communiqué."117

The President's remarks certainly revealed how far U.S.-China relation s had traveled from

the early Cold War years. America no longer regarded Chin a as a country of 800 m illion people

armed with nuclear weapons. Instead, China no w was regarded as a "pilla r" for world peace and

an ally for Am erica. However, despite his pledge to normalize relations with China, Ford failed

to make any major moves regarding China for the rest of his term.

Indeed, 1976 was a rather unique yet crucial one for U.S.-China relations. On the one hand,

it was an "e ventless" y ear f or the b ilateral re lationship. The Ford adm inistration continued to

117 Gerald Ford, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Gerald Ford, 1975 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), pp. 1950-1955.

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struggle with dom estic and other problem s that dem anded its imm ediate attention, and the

upcoming presidential election m ade it im possible for Ford to m ake dramatic moves regarding

China. For their par t, the Chine se were a lmost com pletely o ccupied with th eir dom estic

developments. In January 1976, Zho u Enlai passed away. In April, Mao Zedong, who becam e

uneasy with Deng Xiaoping' s "year of readjust ment," which threatened to underm ine the

credibility of the Cultural Revolution, decided to purge Deng once again. Once again, Jiang Qing

started to attack the "m oderates" for their effort to "res tore capitalism" in China. In Septem ber,

Mao himself died, and he nam ed a relatively unknown figure, Hua Guofeng, as his successor. In

October, the new leadership, led by Marshal Ye and several other se nior Party officials, arrested

Jiang Qin and her major supporters, and thus "crushed" (fensui) the "Gang of Four." The Cultural

Revolution finally cam e to an end. Dom estic problems within both countries, therefore, paralyzed the movement toward normalization.

At the same time, however, 1976 was also an "eventful" one for the U.S.-China alliance. The

"tacit alliance" not only survived the political transitions within both countries; its foundation was also further conso lidated as new leaders o f both nations decided to continue the alliance.

More importantly, with the end of the Cultural Revolution, China finally started to shift away from the Maoist model of modernization. Although Deng was purged again in April, Mao's death several m onths later paved the w ay for his re surgence, and this tim e, it was perm anent.

Meanwhile, Deng's 1975 effort at "readjustment" was not wiped out completely after April 1976.

Thus Deng's 1975 achievem ent helped him to la unch the so-called "open and reform " policy

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later. Indeed, some scholars even regarded the year 1975 as Deng' s "rehearsal" for the "open and reform" era.118

The Ford adm inistration watched China' s internal development and its impact on the "tacit alliance" with m ixed fe elings. On the one ha nd, Am erican policy-makers were helpless as bystanders. "There is ve ry little th e U.S. can do to inf luence the PRC as the curren t leadership feud plays itself out," Ford' s National Security Advisor Bren t Scow croft reported. "W e are passive observers of that situation...We are most likely to hold the Chinese to their foreign policy course of dealing with us if we can reassert a more active foreign policy that combines efforts to reach agreements that serve our interests with both Mosco w and Peking, and at the sam e time demonstrate a willingness to stand u p to Soviet pressur es. Completion of normalization of U.S.-

PRC relations might make the relationship less vulnerable to criticism in China." But the Ford administration had neither time nor political capital to carry out those steps.119

At the same time, the Ford administration continued to believe that China would uphold the

"tacit alliance." China's weakness associated with the "frustrated modernizer" image was still the basic American perception of China. This perception, moreover, was able to survive the political transition in China. An exam ple could be found in the case of Senator Scott' s July 1976 visit to

China. Scott was received by Zhang Chunqiao, one of the "Gang of Four" and a leading "radical" in China. During their conversations, Zhang changed the line pr eviously held by Zhou and Deng that China would be patient on the issue of Taiw an. Rather, Zhang bluntly said that China woul d

118 See Cheng Zhongyan & Xia Xingzhen, Deng Xiaoping zai 1975 (Deng Xiaoping in 1975) (Beijing: Zhongguo qingnian, 2003). 119 Memo, Scowcroft to Ford, 12 March 1976, NSA, Country Files, PRC, Box 13, GFPL.

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use force to take back Taiwan in the future, and the whole issue was entirely an internal affair of

China.120 Scott was horrified. He was well aware that if Zhang's remarks were made public, the

whole U.S.-China rapprochement would be seriously damaged. Scott reported the whole event to

Ford. 121 The NSC, howe ver, downplayed this even t. The aggressiv e rem arks from Zhang ,

Scowcroft argued, were only norm al in light of th e domestic power struggles in China. On the other hand, "there is no indication that the current Chinese regime is prepared to see a worsening

of relations with the United States because of a lack of progress on the Taiwan issue." Moreover,

Scowcroft seem ed confident that regardless of the outcom e of the power struggle in China,

China would still maintain its alliance with America even if the "radicals" came into power. "The

entire spectrum of the Chinese leadership, in cluding the lef t, still believ es tha t continue d

relaxation of tensions with the Unite d States is desirable," Scowcroft concluded. 122 Kissinger, in

an August meeting with Thomas Gates, the new head of USLO after Bush was appointed head of

the CIA, also dismissed Zhang's remarks as insignificant. Zhang was probably cornered by Scott

on the Taiwan issue, Kissinger said, and China w ould not try to destroy the "tacit alliance" by

acting aggressively on Taiwan.123

Meanwhile, China slo wly star ted to end th e Cultural Revolution despite the tem porary setbacks of the "m oderates." W hen Mao Zedong died in Septem ber, Am erican leaders immediately observed that the post-Mao leadersh ip "em phasized p ractical work rathe r than

ideological campaigning, suggesting that in the...pos t-Mao period the leadership sees a need for

120 Memo of Conversation, July 1976, PHS, Accession # 10200-z, Box 1. 121 Letter, Scott to Ford, 27 July 1976, Ibid. 122 Memo, Scowcroft to Ford, 29 July 1976, NSA, Country Files, PRC, Box 14, GFPL. 123 Meeting Record, 25 August 1976, NSA, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1974-1977, Box 6, GFPL.

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the people to f ollow norm al livin g patte rns r ather than be swept u p in unsetting politica l

activism." 124 Af ter the " crushing" of the "Gang of Four" following Mao' s death, the Ford

administration was further convinced that China was heading away from its radical past for

good. On October 8, Kissinger m et Qiao Guanhua in New York City once again. To Kissinger's

relief, the Chinese con tinued to regard the S oviet Union as its m ain enem y, and China still

valued Am erica as a counterbalance of Moscow . Thus, despite all the domestic troubles in

China, the "tacit alliance" survived.125

The year of 1976, t herefore, in m any ways helped to reinforce the U.S.-China

rapprochement. Common strategic concerns certai nly brought the two nati ons together, yet the

discourse on China' s modernization constituted a broader foundation for the new relationsh ip.

Strategic factors were enough to sustain the relationship, but for China and Am erica to further

expand their relations in various areas, China must abandon the Maoist model of modernization.

In this regard, domestic changes in China in 1976 certainly encouraged American policy-makers regarding the future bilateral relations. The deat h of Mao paved the way for China to break its self-imposed and self-enforced isolation. The in coming Carter administration, therefore, found itself in a new environm ent where Am erica, for the first tim e since 1966, had a real chance to influence China's modernization.

124 Memo, Scowcroft to Ford, 9 September 1976, NSA, Country Files, PRC, Box 14, GFPL. 125 Memo of Conversation, 10 October 1976, NSA, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1974-1977, Box 6, GFPL.

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Chapter 6

"Seeing is Believing?”—Modernization and U.S.-China Exchanges in the 1970s

The U. S.-China rapprochement, we have seen, turned America and China into "tacit allies."

At the sam e time, social contact between the two countries also quic kly expanded. During the

1970s, thousands of Am ericans vis ited China as privat e citizens, with their num bers growing each year. A smaller number of "private citizens" of China also visited America, although in fact they were associated with the Chinese governme nt in one way or anot her. Those visits, dubbed

“people’s d iplomacy” or “people -to-people” exchanges, had substantial im pact on the development of Sino-Am erican relations, as th ey contributed to th e m utual understanding between the two countries and som etimes serv ed as im portant chan nels of communication between the two governm ents. Meanwhile, these ex changes contributed to the developm ent of

Sino-American relations in vari ous areas and helped to s ustain the mom entum of U.S.-Chi na rapprochement as well as ongoing deliberations on China's model of modernization.

The Americans who toured China in the 1970s were both a diverse and a coherent group.

By occupation, they could be divided into tw o categories: business people and non-business professionals, both loosely defined. The fo rmer category included people from bot h multinational com panies and Am erican com panies of m uch sm aller-scale, covering industries

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from high technologies, heavy m achinery, manufactured consumer goods, and arts and crafts. 1

The latter catego ry in volved college profess ors and educators, scientists, m edical experts, organized athletes, art perform ers, social activis ts, journalists, and representatives from various non-government organizations. By personal experience, some served or worked in China before the Chinese Communist Revolution of 1949 and most of them did not hesitate to call themselves

“Old China Hands.” Others, especially the younger visitors, did not have any previous experiences with China. But they were f ascinated by this mysterious Communist giant and they convinced them selves that they could go to C hina with open m inds. By personal values and political beliefs, the Am erican visitors were also a m ixed group. Some were ready to criticize, lightly or heavily, the Chinese system by using Am erican standards of individual liberty and the free m arket, however defined. Some were willing to adm it that the Ch inese sys tem, however different from the Am erican system, worked in China. A third if small group believed that

America should learn from China, especially in ar eas such as gender an d racial equ ality, social welfare, and medical care. By focus of interest , some American visitors concentrated more on discussing their expertise with the Chinese coun terparts while others were eager to go beyond their respective fields to reach some general conclusions about Chinese society.

This list of division s could go on much longer. However, what m atters m ore is that the

American visitors were also a c oherent group in certain respects. First, almost all of them were keenly interested in foreign relations. Some were active members of the American foreign policy public, usually well-connected to policy-m akers in W ashington. Others followed Am erican

1 Trade-related activities will be examined in the next chapter.

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foreign policy closely, genuinely disturbed by the many problems and challenges America faced

in the 1970s. Second, in general the Am erican visitors believed that the rela tionship between

America and China was the key in term s of unde rstanding and m eeting som e challenges t o

American foreign policies. And they were convinced that they were contributing to the growth of that relation ship th rough bila teral exchanges. They also tended to ar gue that Sino-Am erican relations would becom e more and more im portant in the ongoing Cold War against the Soviet

Union. Finally, they were aware that, hindered by their own values and beliefs, they could not reach “objective” observations of Chinese so ciety. Indeed, many of them were quite articu late

about this point, as they went to great lengths in their trip reports and journals analyzing their

own assumptions and biases. To a researcher, this kind of se lf-conscious practice provides a

good chance to comprehend these “people-to-people” exchanges on the most basic level.

One way to understand these bilateral “people- to-people” exchanges is to exam ine them

from the perspective of the discourse on China' s modernization. In othe r words, we need to

historicize the discourse on China's m odernization by showing how the actors them selves

thought about China's modernization and its role in U.S.-China relations. This in turn forces us to

recognize that there was no single, com prehensive theory of modernization shared by m ost

participants in those exchanges. Som e Am erican visitors , especially scholars in the social sciences an d hum anities, ref erred to the so-ca lled “China Model” and talked exp licitly abou t

China’s m odernization in its to tality. Other s, less in terested in the tota lity of China’ s modernization, tended to focus on their individual fields such as agriculture, com puter science, or m edicine. Yet they freely used dichotom ies closely associated with contem porary

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modernization theories, such as “m odern/pre-modern,” “advanced/backw ard,” and

“developed/underdeveloped (or, undeveloped). Still others, who did not show any explicit

interest in modernization theo ry and simply recorded their visits m atter-of-factly, nevertheless

fell back on the terminology of modernization to make sense of what they saw in China.

Furthermore, the engagement of China’s modernization on different levels among American

visitors shared two similarities. First, China’s modernization loomed large on the cons ciousness

of m ost Am erican visitors, no matter how theo retically-orientated they were. Second, when

Americans deliberated on this top ic, most of them evaluated China’s modernization against the

American experience, either implicitly or explic itly. A few of them , to be sure, also com pared

China with other countries, especially Third W orld countries such as India. But overwhelm ingly

Americans tended to use m odern America as the yardstick in gauging China’s social, econom ic, and cultural achievem ents. Th ese observations, thus, suggest that the discourse on China' s

modernization is a useful approach to understand Sino-American exchanges in the 1970s.

For the Chinese who either tour ed America in the 1970s or rece ived the American visitors

at home, China's modernization was also a prom inent theme. Without exception, those Chinese

were either officials in various ministries o r members of semi-official institutions such as the

Chinese Academ y. Although in general Chinese sources regarding thos e exchanges are not

available to researchers, we still have som e primary sources which suggest that the Chinese

participants in those ex changes frequently compared the Chinese m odel of m odernization with

the American model. Thus, the bilateral exchanges eventually helped China to reevaluate its own

model of modernization, especial ly given the fact that the Ch inese participants in those

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exchanges constitu ted the "elite" g roup in Ch ina that con trolled Chin a's econom ic and so cial development.

This chap ter, therefore, exam ines the bi lateral exchanges between A merica and China during the 1970s. First, it briefly exam ines the initial social contact between the two peoples from Kissinger's July 1971 visit of China to Nixo n's 1972 visit of China, which by and large set the basic tone of later bilateral exchanges. Second, it exam ines the fi rst stage of U.S.-China bilateral exchanges between 1972 and 1975. During this first stage, the Chinese were particularly defensive regarding China's model of modernization, as they tried to persuade the Americans that the Chinese m odel really worked well f or th em. Finally, the chapter exam ines U.S.-China bilateral exchanges from 1975 to 19 79. During this stage, th e Chinese p articipants became less defensive and m ore flexible rega rding the prospect of China le arning f rom Am erica in th eir modernization effort.

While the Chinese sources are sparse, there are abundant s ources on the Am erican side.

Since a sing le chapter can not do justic e to the se, I will re ly primarily on the archives of the

National Committee on United States China Relations2 to construct the main thread of the story.

The reason is simple. As I mentioned in the last chapter, the Nixon administration decided to use the National Comm ittee as an "umbrella" organization for bilateral exchanges. I will also d raw freely on other sources as supplementary materials.

2 Hereinafter cited as the National Committee.

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Setting the Tone: Initial Social Contact between America and China, 1971-1972

Once the projected Nixon visit to China was announced, China suddenly became "the latest

American Thing." Am erican interest in China, held back for m ore than two decades by m utual isolation and anim osity, revived almost overnight. "The interest in China extends to all th ings

Chinese and involves a whole spectrum of activities, from fashions to food, from travel to trade, and from science to edu cation," the New York Times reported in February 1972. Enrollm ent in

China courses had risen dram atically on m any campuses, and book publishers had rushed to expand their catalogs on China. Various social groups wanted to establish exchange program s with China, and the Chinatowns in Am erica s uddenly becam e hot places to visit. Chinese craftworks such as tapestries and bamboo produ cts became the latest Am erican fashion, and the demand of infor mation on China soared. But all in a ll, f or m any Am ericans, the U.S.-China rapprochement provided a chance to reestablis h th e "sp ecial re lationship" b etween the tw o peoples that existed bef ore the Chinese Co mmunist Revolution. Am erica would once again become a fr iend of Chi na, and perhaps once agai n become a m odel for China to em ulate. For example, Alexander Eckstein, chair of the National Committee, was surprised that there was "an incredible amount of curiosity, goo dwill and sympathy [toward China]." Another TV network put it more bluntly in the title of its China program: "China, Lost and Found."3

For m any Am ericans, the first problem of th e long journey toward recovering the "lost"

China was how to understand it under Communism . Here, the im age of China as a "frustrated

3 "China: It's the Latest American Thing," 16 February 1972, New York Times (NYT); "China Special," 15 February 1972, Washington Post (WP).

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modernizer" undoubtedly underlined the basic Am erican approach. A typical example was the

visit of China by John Service in late 1971. T he Service visit, in m any ways, had im portant

symbolic significance for the new U.S.-China rela tions. The m ere fact that Serv ice was an "old

China hand" who was purged during the era of McCarthyism spoke a lot about changed Sino-

American relations. Service' s own experience as a State Departm ent official who worked in

China before 1949 also allowed him to com pare the "New China" with the "O ld China" in

meaningful ways. Now a privat e citizen, Service developed a mixed impression of the "Ne w

China" during his visit. On the one hand, he was im pressed by China' s econom ic and social

achievements under Communis m. The Communist regime had developed its ow n industrial

system, and irrigation projects had been develope d everywhere in the countryside. For exam ple,

the great rice bowl of the rich Chengdu plain, wh ere Service was born, had been converted to

two-crop rice, each m ore plentiful than the si ngle crop of the past. C orruption, p rostitution, crime, and other "s ins" associated with th e "O ld China " h ad been co mpletely swept away. I n

sum, the Communist regim e had created a "New China" under which the m ajority of the people now enjoyed a bett er m aterial lif e.4 On the other hand, S ervice clearly saw the lim itation of

China's achievements in m odernization. "Life is obviously much better for the great m ajority.

There is no longer starvation and bitter poverty," Service observed. "But by American standards, life is s till sim ple, f rugal, and aus tere."5 Moreover, Service wondere d what happened to the

"Chinese-ness" of the "Old China." The kind of individualism and relaxed attitude toward life ,

4 John Service, "That Old China Was a Troubled Place," 24 January 1972, NYT. 5 Service, "Life in China Is 'Obviously Better,'" 26 January 1972, NYT.

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with which Service was so f amiliar when he was in China bef ore 194 9, were replaced by a

collective spirit and a strong na tional purpose of building up soci alism. Thus for Service the

basic tone of the new age of social contact wa s doomed to be influenced by the two countries'

different visions of modernity.6

The Service visit foresh owed the basic th emes of later U.S.-China exchanges. W hile many

American visitors becam e i mpressed by Ch ina's m odernization under Communism , they nevertheless thought that the Chinese m odel was bound to change, a belief based on the assumption that the de sire f or gr eater ind ividual f reedom was sim ply ir resistible and that

Communism was alien to Chinese trad itions. The Ch inese participants in those exc hanges also displayed an am bivalent attitud e. On the one h and, they w ere deep ly impressed b y Am erican technologies and m aterial life, a nd they displayed keen interest in learning from Am erica in various areas. On the other hand, they still believ ed that China' s frustrated m odernization effort was only tem porary, and that the Chinese model was the only choice for China' s future.

Therefore, the clash between two visions of m odernity became the dominant th eme of the f irst stage of U.S.-China exchanges.

In fact, the basic tone o f Sino-American social contact was further crystallized during the

Nixon visit. While the high-level m eetings between the American and Chinese leaders naturally attracted people's attention, the l ogistics of the Nixon visit were no less im portant. In fact, both sides realized that the logistics, if not handled properly, might compromise the whole U.S.-China summit meeting. In January 1972, the Nixon adm inistration sent an advance team , led by Ron

6 Service, "A Conscious Pride in China's Development," 25 January 1972, NYT.

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Walker, to China to m ake preparations. Gene ral Haig, with the m emory of his unpleasant

experience in China s till fresh, 7 warned the team leaders about the highly sensitive nature of

their trip. "We're past the point of talking about things, dealing with principles and making broad

arrangements, " Haig cautioned. "Now we' ve got to produce the baby. When you do that, that' s

when the real frictions develop." To Haig, the most important thing for the advance team was not

to offend Chinese pride in their ow n social sy stem by fla mboyantly displaying the "Am erican

way" of doing things.8 For their part, the Chinese were also busy getting ready for Nixon' s visit.

Zhou Enlai personally took charge of preparations , and he wanted his subordinates to take the

attitude of "neither haughty nor humble" toward the incoming American visitors. Zhou realized

that the logistics of Nixon' s visit would challe nge China's technological capability, and Chinese

officials were bound to be im pressed by Am erica's efficiency and tech nological sophistication.

Yet he warned the Chinese officials not to be "bluffed" by the Americans. Instead, China should

put on a "show" that could im press the Am ericans about China' s own social and econom ic

achievements.9

Had members of the Am erican advance team known Zhou's instructions, they would have

found that their Chinese counterparts followed t hose instructions closely. But the gap between

the two sides' technologies quic kly created the first platform on which China' s m odernization

came under challenge. Because of China 's self -imposed isolation , the Chinese had not

7 See Chapter 4. 8 Anne Collins Walker, China Calls: Paving the Way for Nixon's Historic Journey to China (Lanham, Md.: Madison Books, 1992), p. 10. 9 Tang Longbin, "Yici juyou zhongda lishi yiyi de waijiao renwu: Meiguo qian zongtong nikesong shouci fanghua jiedai gongzuo jishi (A Diplomatic Task with Historic Significances: The Reception of American President Nixon)," in Dangdai zhongguo shijie waijiao shengya (Careers of Contemporary Chinese Ambassadors), Vol.3, pp. 343-357.

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experienced the kind of technology the Americans took for granted. Thus, it was only natural for the Chinese to feel em barrassed in front of all the fa ncy stuff the Americans brought into China.

At the same time, the Chinese, in order not to be "bluffed" by the Am ericans, had to pretend to be indifferent toward Am erican technologies and equipment. In fact, this pattern happened as soon as direct contact between America and China began. For example, when Kissinger flew into

China on the president's airplane during his October 1971 visit, the last leg of the trip was taken over by two Chinese navigators. Th e aircraft was equipp ed with two inertial navigation systems capable of giving accu rate fixes on latitude and longitude at any tim e and in any part of the world. The Chinese pilots glanced at the inertial navigation systems in the cockpit and appeared to grasp the significance of the devices imm ediately. Instead of further inquiring about those devices, they ignored them completely and continued the flight with one m aking hand signals to the other.10

Once the advance team started to work around the clock to prepare for Nixon' s visit, however, th e Chinese indifference yielded to c ontrolled curiosity. The Chinese were really surprised and overwhelm ed by th e logistics required by the Nixon visit. Moreover, it soon became clear that many American technologies and equipment were beyond their understanding.

"The PRC was em barrassed at not being properly pr epared to receive u s," Ron Walker reported to the W hite House. 11 Initially, the incapability to com prehend American technologies led the

Chinese to take a detached and even uncooperative attitude toward the A merican advance party.

10 Holdridge, Crossing the Divide, p. 70. 11 Walker, China Calls, p. 34.

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As soon as they settled down in China, Walker and his colleagues started to set up a telex in their hotel room, which would allow faster and m ore secure communications with the W hite House.

However, they failed to get help from the Chin ese sid e. The Chinese, in fact, were confused.

"You must understand that we are very concerned," Han Xu, who was t hen the Chinese head of protocol, told W alker: "We are very troubled an d worried about what you are asking us to do.

You keep a sking for this comm unication with y our country. W e don't know what it m eans...If you can talk to your country, you can talk to an y place. W e don't know where this inform ation will go...Perhaps the po lar bear will be ab le to lis ten." Th e Am ericans were shocked. They realized that the Chinese thought they were spie s. Fortunately, Walker immediately reported this encounter to the W hite House, and a W hite House intervention finally convinced Han Xu tha t

Walker and his colleagues were only preparing for Nixon's visit and were not spies.12

Once their initial reservation was overcome, however, the Chinese became curious and even keen learners of American technologies and equipment. For example, the Chinese had never seen a Xerox co pier and were fascinated by the A mericans' machine that could m ake copies in an instant. The Chinese desk clerks so on approached the Am ericans, wanting to use the copier to make copies of their files, which they had to do by hand otherwise. "If th is trip did nothing else for international trade," the Americans soon concluded, "it would help Xerox sell copy m achines in China."13 The Chinese were also fascinated by America's communication equipment, as China did not yet have communicatio n satellites. "Through the gr ound station for satellite

12 Walker, China Calls, pp. 68-72. 13 Ibid., p. 145.

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transmissions, phone-calls to Am erica went thr ough clearly and loudly," one Chinese official

observed, "the quality of those phone-calls was even better than the local Beijing phone-calls."14

In fact, the Am ericans soon discov ered that their Chinese counter parts were so interested in

American technologies that som etimes they even e mbarrassed the Am erican technicians. "W e understand how all the video works. And we thought we understood all of the audio as well, " one Chinese technician observed to his American counterpart. "But could you please clarify one thing? What is fucking audio?"15

Walker and his colleagues were actually proud in displaying all the a dvanced technologies and equipments before the Chinese. However, th ey quickly realized that despite all the aw e inspired by Am erican technologies among the Chines e, the latter were dete rmined to set up the

Nixon visit in their own way. Quite sensitive to the technological gap between the two countries,

Chinese of ficials tr ied everyth ing they could to avoid being "bluf fed" or "hum iliated." For example, while it was agreed that th e American advance team would install a ground station for satellite transm issions in China because the Nixon visit was going to be broadcast live in

America, Zhou Enlai insisted that China should buy the ground station first and then rent it to the

Americans in order to protect China' s "sovereignty." 16 Similarly, when th e American advance

team decided to turn their Boeing 747 aircraft into a communication center, the Chin ese offered

to buy the aircraft and became baffled when Walker turned them down on the ground that he was

14 Jiang Chengzong, "Huiyi nikesong fanghua shi de jizhe jiedai gongzuo (The Reception of American Journalists during the Nixon Visit)," in Xinzhongguo waijiao fengyun (Important Events in New China's Diplomacy), Vol. 4, p. 115. 15 Walker, China Calls, pp. 369-370. 16 Jiang, "Huiyi nikesong fanghua shi de jizhe jiedai gongzuo (The Reception of American Journalists during the Nixon Visit)," in Xinzhongguo waijiao fengyun (Important Events in New China's Diplomacy), Vol. 4, p. 113.

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not authorized to sell it. 17 Chinese officials also insisted th at Nixon ride with Zhou in Chinese- made cars, and no American-m ade transportati on vehicles would be used in China during

Nixon's visit. Indeed, the Am ericans were amused but also frustrated by the Chinese sensitivity.

"For weeks now, every tim e an American screwed a screw, connected a c onnection or nailed a nail, his Chinese counterpart w ould unscrew, disconnect or rem ove and re-do on the spot,"

Walker recalled. "It was clear. They wanted all the equipm ent used for the President's visit to be installed by Chinese w orkers."18 Besides being obsessed with th e need to bridge the gap in technologies, the Chinese were also busy setti ng up "controlled scenes" for Nixon and his fellow visitors. For exam ple, when Nixon visited a depa rtment store, som e Chinese officials were disguised as custom ers who were busy "buyi ng" stuff. When Nixon visited a worker' s community, some workers were coached to play poker outdoors in order to show how ordinary workers really enjoyed life under socialism . Unfortunately, it was sim ply too cold outdoors in

Beijing at that tim e for the whole scene to be credible. In addition, those workers, probably taught to be "neither haughty nor humble" toward the Americans, completely ignored Nixon and his wife when they passed by.19

While the encounter between the A merican advance team and their Chinese counterparts, technically speaking, w as not an exchange progra m, it did foreshadow th e shape of things to come. The Chinese sen sitivity and Am erican f rustration made both side s aware tha t the clash

17 Walker, China Calls, p. 368. 18 Ibid., pp. 366-367. 19 Jiang, "Huiyi nikesong fanghua shi de jizhe jiedai gongzuo (The Reception of American Journalists during the Nixon Visit)," in Xinzhongguo waijiao fengyun (Important Events in New China's Diplomacy), Vol. 4, p. 116-117; Tang Longbin, "Yici juyou zhongda lishi yiyi de waijiao renwu: Meiguo qian zongtong nikesong shouci fanghua jiedai gongzuo jishi (A Diplomatic Task with Historic Significances: The Reception of American President Nixon)," in Dangdai zhongguo shijie waijiao shengya (Careers of Contemporary Chinese Ambassadors), Vol.3, p. 354.

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between two different visions of modernity was bound to dominate future social contact between

the two nations. This point wa s aptly summarized by Jam es Reston, a journalist from the New

York Times who went to China during Nixon' s visit. "I t is only in China that one realizes why

they em phasize that they are seeking a ' cultural' revolution—a philosophical ideal that will

destroy the acquis itive m aterialism of the W est," Reston told his readers. The future

confrontation between Am erica and China, he c oncluded, would not be "a confrontation of

armies and m ilitary power, but...a 'Confront ation of Societies,' of ways of life." 20 Joseph Kraft,

one of the few Am erican journalists who were a llowed to stay in China after Nixon left, shared

Reston's conclusions. During his extended stay in China, Kraft visited factories, rural communes,

and some cultural facilities. Everywhere his Ch inese hosts proudly showed him achievements of

the "New China," especially the new Nanjing bridge across the Yangtze River that overcame the

River as a natural and historical transportation barrier. "It is th e Chinese equivalent of Egypt' s

Aswan Da m, a national showcase storied in film, song, dance, picture postcard, and visits by

millions of ordinary citizens, " Kraf t observed. "But like m any showcases, the Nan king bridge

tells more than its promoters imagine. If it announces organized effort on the grand scale, it also

speaks of weakness and division." 21 To Kraft, the limited Chinese achievements only confirmed

China as a "frustrated modernizer. " Yet the Ch inese were not going to adm it that, and they

insisted that history would prove the validity of the Chinese model of modernization. For Kraft,

20 James Reston, "A New Confrontation," 23 February 1972, NYT. 21 Joseph Kraft, The Chinese Difference (New York: Saturday Review Press, 1972), p. 49.

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therefore, th e key theme of the future U.S.-C hina exchang es was how and when the Chinese

would recognize the basic flaws of the "New Maoist Man."22

Controlled Tourism and the Chinese Model of Modernization: 1972-1975

While the s ocial contact between Am erica and China accom panied by the Nixon visit shaped the basic themes of later bilateral exchan ges, the U.S.-China summit also initiated a new era of Am erican tourism in Chin a. American visitors who went to China in the 1970s were on tourist visas, acquired usually through a Chines e em bassy in a third co untry. Yet they were hardly tourists as we understand this term today. In fact, “controlled to urism” might be a m ore

suitable label for them. A number of visible and invisible rules were applied to American visitors

who were enthusiastic about pi oneering into Communist China. Although this ki nd of control

could be partially explained by th e fact that A merica and China had n ot yet es tablished formal

diplomatic relations, this was only a minor reason, for the Chinese extended the same rules to all

foreign visitors from capitalist countries and countries whose governments the Chinese leaders

deemed as “unfriendly” or “reactionary,” with or without formal diplomatic relations.

Thus in the 1970s, going to China itself becam e an industry which quickly pro duced its

instant experts. For example, in a guidebook p ublished in 1975, the author explained in great

detail all aspects related to a China trip, from getting a visa, arranging itinerary, food and hotels,

activities allowed in China, to em ergency contact addresses in China. 23 For old-tim e American

visitors to C hina, this kind of guidebook was merely a factual description of th eir experiences.

22 Ibid., Chapter 3. 23 Ruth Lor Malloy, Travel Guide to the People’s Republic of China (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1975).

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For first-time China trav elers, it made plain th at they were not going to wander freely in China

and have a taste of the “real” China. In other words, the trip was doomed to be a controlled one.

At first, the controlled trip only hig hlighted the contrast between China and the ca pitalist

world. For exam ple, the Luo Hu Bridge, a footbr idge which was the las t leg of the passageway

that connected Hong Kong with China 24, almost became a m ental and cultural landm ark firmly

planted in the visitors’ m inds. Upon walking across the b ridge, Ross Terrill, a China scho lar

from Harvard University who visited China in 1971, felt as if he was passing “from one universe

to another…Behind me, the aggressive vendors, the gaudy clothes, the Coca-Cola. Ahead, a

world which is sterner in its political imperatives.” 25 Leigh Kagan, a member of the Committee

of Concerned Asian Scholars (CCAS) delegation that visited China in 1972, recalled that as soon

as he walked across the bridge, he encountered “a series of di scoveries: seeing the posters of

scenes from revolutionary operas and ballets on the walls of th e pavilion that followed, seeing

the PLA 26, hearing the songs and music from the revolutionary operas and ballets…We knew that we were crossing the bounda ry between two very dif ferent worlds…then we were busy apprehending things that were familiar to us—but only superficially.” 27

It was natur al, ther efore, f or the f oreign visitors to expect s ome difficulties as they were

crossing the border inspection. Yet they were surprised when their passage turned out to be easy

24 The route into China taken by Americans, especially to those who traveled in the early 1970s or who traveled as individuals, was usually through Hong Kong. The next stop, or the first stop in China, was always Guangzhou, a provincial capital two hours away from Hong Kong by train which traditionally served as the most important, if not the only, contact point between China and the outside world. Then from there, the travelers could go to other Chinese cities either by train or by plane, but the scope of the cities foreigners could visit was also severely limited. With some variations, foreigners would visit urban areas such as Shanghai, Nanjing, Xi’an, Hangzhou, Shenyang, and, of course, Beijing. 25 Ross Terrill, 800,000,000: The Real China (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971), pp. 1-2. 26 People’s Liberation Army 27 Leigh Kagan, “Letters from China,” National Archive on Sino-American Relations (NASAR), Box 7, Bentley Historical Library (BHL), University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

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and smooth. Charlotte Y. Salisbury, wife of an Am erican journalist who went to China in 1972,

was expecting a harsh custom s inspection when she crossed Luo Hu Bridge. She was surprised

when after an exchang e of few words, a you ng Chinese soldie r “sm iled and said in pe rfect

English, ‘The inspection is ove r.’” She was then led into a waiting roo m where she was serv ed

Chinese tea and snacks. “ We don’t encounter su ch good manners at home,” she mused. “Never

have I seen such polite, civilized people, friendl y and so attractive, and if the com parison of the

ladies room in the Hong Kong station with the one in this building is typi cal of all comparisons, there can be no doubt about the system .” 28 Emmett Dedmon, a Chicago-based journalist who

went to China in 1973, felt of “bein g suspended in space and time between the Free World and

the Communist World” when he walked throug h the bridge, yet he observed that “there are no

barricades and no barbed wire. The space on the other side of the boarder is sunny and

open…Customs formalities are brief…[we are treat ed] always with exq uisite courtesy—always

with more tea.”29

Some visitors speculated that the board inspection was easy for them because their Chinese

hosts made it so. In fact, in t hose days one could visit China only when one was invited by the

Chinese. The invitation certainly did not come from individual Chinese citizens; rather, it usually

came from Chinese “non-governm ental organizations ,” such as the China Travel Service, the

National Academy, and the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries,

which everyone knew were controlled by the C hinese government. In other words, such visits

28 Charlotte Y. Salisbury, China Diary (New York: Walker and Company, 1973), pp.2-3. 29 Emmett Dedmon, China Journal (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1973), pp.7-9.

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were already approved by the Chinese government beforehand, eliminating the need to make the

customs inspection hard. Yet this was an irrelevant point for most American visitors. To them, it

soon becam e clear that behind all the openness a nd cou rtesy was a China confident th at i ts

socialist achievem ents would d eeply im press any f oreign visitor. “T he Chinese really hav e

created a new m an,” Salisbury recalled, “a m an who knows what he wants and is p eaceful and

kind.”30 Terrill admitted that he was “moved by t he social gains of the Chinese revo lution. In a

magnificent way, it has healed the sick, fed the hungry, and given security to the ordinary man of

China…It has put a flas h of pride in the Chinese eye.” 31 Another visitor obs erved that once in

China, “one has the sen se that the Chinese feel that th ey have arrived, and that th eir revolution has been consolidated…the atm osphere, today, is one of confidence and calm .”32 In sum, from the very beginning of their journe ys, the tourists were surrounde d by the most appealing aspects of the Chinese developmental model.

The Americans whose visits were organized by the National Committee did not need to take care of the logistics by them selves. Yet their vis its were no less controlled than those who went to China without the backup of a powerful orga nization. From the very beginning, they knew that the term “facilitated exchange” meant that their visits woul d be controlled by the decision- makers of t he National Comm ittee, and, even more so by the Chinese. In general, the National

Committee sponsored three types of delegations: specialized delegations, usually with a scientific or economic focus; athletic and cultural delegations; and delegations of Americans who

30 Salisbury, China Diary, p. 4. 31 Terrill, 800,000,000: The Real China, p 9. 32 Peter Worsley, Inside China (London: Penguin Books, 1974), pp. 56-58.

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shared some common background but ha d a wide variety of interests in world affairs, education, and social problems. The Chinese typically would arrange a full program of discussions between the visitors and their ap propriate Chinese counterparts. Usually the delegates would m eet with local or national Chinese officials, with the last group having more such opportunities. Although each delegation would f ocus on its specialized fields, in the end the Chinese always made sure that all delegations shared a sim ilar, if not iden tical, itinerary. In gener al, the de legates would visit a rural commune, an urban factory, an educational institute (universities, colleges, or middle schools), a hospital, a children’s ins titute, a s hopping center, and a cultural ins titute (museum, theaters, or parks).

This highly controlled itinerary provoked complaints from the visitors. After a trip to China sponsored by the Nation al Committee in 1973, the leader of the U.S. Swi m Team resented that

“the Chinese from the very beginning showed a great anx iety to have everyth ing well agreed upon and laid out ahead of tim e so no hitch c ould interfere—the trip has gone off like clockwork.” Each day of this two-week visit wa s filled with activities from seven o’clock in th e morning to nine o’clock in the night, always accompanied by the Chinese guides. Only those who were willing to sa crifice their sleep were a ble to experience th e “real” China, such as the leader himself who got up at six in the m orning to take a “free” walk around th e hotel. 33 The

Swim Team’s experience was not unique. “The Chinese,” another delegation reported in 1975,

“assures that any Westerner who goes to China determined to experience the conditions of life of the ‘average’ Chinese—whether it be eating among th e people in local restau rants, traveling in

33 “U.S. Swim Team to China,” NCUSCR.

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the sam e railroad coaches, sleeping in th e sam e hotels or guest houses, etc. —will m eet

frustration and disappointment.”34

The Chinese-controlled itine rary c reated a f eeling am ong Am ericans that they were in

China but also not in China. Another factor furthe r contributed to this feel ing: American visitors

were put into hotels specially reserved for foreigners. “The foreigners live in splendid isolation—

a privilege which the Chinese afford them/us,” Orville Schell, who visited China several times in the 1970s, recalled. “Foreigners are grateful for the comfort. But it is also circum scribing; one is hardly in China in the Peking Hotel.”35 Some attributed this isolation to the old Chinese way of

handling “f oreign barb arians;” so me saw it in the Chinese trad ition of making the guest as

comfortable as possible. Eventually, however, th ey re alized that the most im portant re ason

behind the tight schedules and reserved hotels wa s the Chinese eagerness to show the foreigners the best of China, namely, the great achieveme nts of Chi na’s m odernization under socialism.

Noticing that in the Peking Hotel “everything on the seventeen floors...has been made in China,”

Schell observed that “the Chinese are recklessly proud of this accomplishment.”36

Paul A. Cohen, a renowned China scholar who led a National Comm ittee delegation to

China in 1977, had a m ore positive view regarding this controlled tourism. According to Cohen,

the Chinese tradition of keeping foreigners at a distance, th e Chinese custom of providing the

best accommodations for guests, and China’s shortage of tourist facilities—all contributed to the

foreigners b eing “isola ted” f rom the “rea l” China. But the re was no s uch thing a s the “ real”

34 “Report on the Congressional Committee Staff to the PRC,” NCUSCR. 35 Orville Schell, In the People’s Republic (New York: Random House, 1977), p 11. 36 Ibid., p 10.

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China. He argued that if left alone, Am erican vi sitors would not be able to see all the places which they could otherwise see on a trip con trolled by th e Chinese. Thus in a sense, what mattered was why certain places were shown to the Am ericans. These choices themselves said a lot about China’s own assumptions about its modernization.37

Cohen made a valid point. In f act, the Chinese intentionally designed th e itinerary to show the best aspects of China’s modernization under socialism. An instruction issued for receiving an

American m edical delegation in 1973 was t ypical. “When receiving the delegation,” the instruction dictated: “w e m ust put politica l do ctrines in th e f irst place. W e m ust be friendly, passionate, and alert—never give out any s ecrets. W e m ust educate them on the great achievements of our socialist revol ution and socialist reconstruction.” 38 Another instruction, issued in 19 74 for receiving an American com puter science delegation read alm ost identically.

“We must receive them neithe r haughtily nor humbly,” the instruction stated. “W e need to be friendly and we need to educate th em on the gr eat achievements of our so cialist reconstruction.

We need to increas e our influence am ong Am erican scientists, yet don’t force anything upon them.” 39 In fact, som e term s—“neither haughtil y nor hum bly,” “educate them on the great achievements of our soc ialist reconstructions,” and “don’t fo rce anything upon the m”—became standard language for such inst ructions. It revealed a clear me ssage: the Chinese were confident that the facts—their econom ic and social ach ievements—would speak for them selves, although

37 Paul A. Cohen, “Report on the Visit of Young Political Leaders Delegation to China,” NCUSCR. 38 “Plan of Receiving the American Medical Delegation,” 22 January 1973, B242-3-408, Shanghai Archives (SHA), Shanghai, China. 39 “Report on Receiving American Delegation,” 18 March 1974, C42-2-51, SHA.

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they failed to see that their c onfidence was undermined by the contro l of what the visitors were allowed to see.

Thus the Chinese we re upset when the vis itors did not listen to the “facts.” In a repo rt submitted after the vis it of the Am erican medical group mentioned above, the authors showed a mixed response. The head of the delegation, the report concluded, “was very friendly…he repeatedly urged us to send a doctor to Am erica whom would be trained by himself personally.”

The authors were pleas ed when th ey noticed that m any mem bers of the delegation “regarded

Chairman Mao as the greatest leader of th e wo rld…and said tha t C hina has a very advance d medical science.” Those m embers, according to the report, were also i mpressed by China’s medical care system as they said that “although America has advanced medical technologies, we lack the sp irit to s erve the people. In term s of providing m edical care to the m ajority of the people, we have a lot to learn from you.” Not surprisingly, the report labeled those m embers as

“friendly” and “progressive.” The authors were equa lly p leased when two African-Am erican members of the delegation harshly criticized the American system. Racial discrimination, lack of education for young Blacks, and the low level of medical care for African-Americans—all these further validated the f eeling that socialism was superior to capi talism. The deputy head of the delegation, however, proved to be a problem . “He was fairly friendly, but he was cunning,” the authors reported. “He claimed to be a doctor, yet he was not sli ghtly interested in medicine…he disseminated som e m aps that excluded Taiwan fr om China…he wanted to find prostitutes in

Shanghai…In Beijing, he asked to go to a bar and tried to find a opium-smoking den…In fact, all he cared was to use this trip to earn him self political capital.” The authors were also upset when

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they reported that two m embers of the delegation were very interested in “taking photos of the

backward things in our country.”40

Negative Chinese responses could be found in other cases. W hen an Am erican computer

scientist urged the Chinese to abandon the labo r-intensive method of production and to use m ore

computers on the product lines, the Chinese s imply dism issed him as “not understanding our

current level of technological development” and set up th e task to “e ducate” him on this. 41

Similarly, after attending a lec ture given by an Am erican biologist, a Chin ese author reporte d that “the top ic has no p ractical values whatsoever because this field has not been es tablished in

China; I went to the lecture merely out of respect.” 42

Surely the American scientists were offering sincere advice. The deputy head was not really

interested in finding prostitutes or opium-smoking dens per se—he was just su spicious about the

Chinese claim that socialism had elim inated such bad things that had flourished in Old China.

One also could not assum e that the Am ericans who took photos of China’s backwardness

harbored any ill feelings toward China. When the Chinese protested the “improper” photo-taking

and accused the foreigners of being eager to transfix China as one great antique for them to enjoy

forever, Paul Cohen came up with two alternative answers in his own mind: either the Americans

really had the “unspeakable wish that China s hould be preserved as a colossal m useum for t he

eternal pleasure of foreigners” or they sim ply wanted to record som ething “lack[ing] in [their ]

own lives, a sense of increasing separation from the real, a deep yearning for a mode of existence

40 “Briefs on Receiving the American Medical Delegation, No. 1-5,” March 1973, C242-3-408, SHA. 41 “Electromagnetism,” C42-3-28, SHA. 42 “Summary of Lecture,” June 1974, C42-2-51, SHA.

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in which people were more clos ely in touch with the basics.” 43 But ne ither answer mattered to

the Chinese. Cohen quickly realized the real point: China could not hide its backwardness and

China was not proud of it.

But this was not exactly why the f oreigners’ “improper” activities so upset the Chinese. To

them, the more im portant issue was that the Am ericans had the wrong point of reference. The

Chinese wanted to em phasize the p ositive changes after their revolution while th e Americans,

perhaps inevitably, were inclined to com pare China with 1970s Am erica. Yet m ost Americans

quickly grasped this point, which, in fact, becam e a starting point for their perceptions about

China’s m odernization. W hen Nor ma Lundholm Djerassi stepped into a Chinese industrial

exhibition hall in 1973, for example, she thought that she “[stepped] backward in time to another

century. Perhaps Chin a’s instruments, electr ical and photographic equipment are not as

sophisticated as ours, but China is incredibly self-sufficient.” 44 The Chinese would regard this

as an “ob jective” observation and be pleased: they di d not deny that China was less-developed

on the m aterial leve l; y et China s till m anaged to becom e self -sufficient, which wa s achiev ed

despite the isolation im posed on China by the Am erican imperialism and the betrayal by the

Socialist Imperialism—the Soviet Union. 45 Thus to the Chinese, Am ericans should learn from

such “objective” observations that socialism was the best way for China’s modernization.

Indeed, Americans soon adopted China’s own terminology, as they used terms such as “pre-

Liberation” freely in their reports, diaries, a nd journals. The first National Committee delegation

43 Cohen, “Report on the Visit of Young Political Leaders Delegation to China,” NCUSCR. 44 Norma Lundholm Djerassi, Glimpses of China From A Galloping Horse (New York: Pergamon Press, 1974), p. 6. 45 The “betrayal” was real to the Chinese when the Soviet Union withdrew all its experts and aids from China in 1960.

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(exclusively composed of Committee members) to China in 1972, for example, made an effort to

evaluate China’s m odernization in its own ri ght. The delegation toured som e model rural

communes, urban factories, medical and educational institutes. Throughout the tour, the Chinese

stressed two principles: self-reliance and serve -the-people. The rural co mmunes, the Am ericans

were told, were built after the ex ample of Dazhai, a rural commune in Shangxi Province. Before

Liberation, Dazhai was a poor rural area even by Chinese standards. It suffered from barren soil ,

lack of water, and various natural disasters. As a resu lt, it h ad to rely on relief from the centra l

government, if it was lucky to get any. After Liberation, however, Dazhai was transformed into a

rich rural comm une guided by self-reliance. Under collective agriculture, peasan ts in Dazhai

organized themselves to build a hundred-m ile long irrigation system using their bare hands and

primitive tools. As a result, Dazhai now beca me a prospero us land. The urban facto ries, on th e

other hand, followed the exam ple of Daqing, a n oilfield in Northeast Chin a. According to the

Chinese, Daqing broke the myth that China did not have large oil reserv es, a myth populated by

“foreign experts” before Liberation. After Li beration, however, workers in Daqing abandoned this f oreign m yth and relied on to ols they ha d m ade them selves to f inally d iscover a larg e oilfield, which rend ered China s elf-sufficient in oil. These two glaring exam ples, the Chinese proudly pointed out, proved the principle of self-reliance correct.46

The other principle—serve-the-people—was m anifested ev erywhere in Chinese society.

Mao Zedong launched the Cultural Revolution partiall y because he feared that intellectuals and

46 For an official Chinese version of self-reliance and the so-called “in agriculture, learn from Dazhai; in industry, learn from Daqing,” see “Words for the New Year,” 1 January 1966, Ren Min Ri Bao (People’s Daily).

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bureaucratized politics would lead to elitism and introduce revisionism/capitalism into China. He thus decided to “reed ucate” intellectu als an d cadres 47 by “sending them down” to the countryside. Thus when the Nation al Committee m embers visited som e medical institutes, they found that the Chinese put em phasis on the so-called “bare-foot” doctors—doctors only with the most basic level of training who served in rural areas. More advanced doctors working in urban hospitals, however, were required to work with those “bare-foot” doctors in the field several months a year. The educational institutes followed the same principle. Both the teachers and the students, the delegation learned, we re required to spend about 1/3 of their tim e in manual labor each year. Many schools set up their own fa ctories or workshops since Mao believ ed that physical work was a good way to keep the intellectual in touch with the working class.

The delegation tried seriously to grasp the meaning of these prin ciples by co mparing today’s China with the Old China. “China rem ains an extraordinarily poor society,” Robert

Scalapino reported. “One cannot blam e the communist s for this situation. It is one which they inherited.” Yet he was im pressed by China’s developm ent after Li beration: “One of the m ost important accomplishments of the comm unists seems to have been that of putting a foundation under the lowest socio-econom ic classes, guaranteeing them a m inimal livelihood, hence, som e modicum of hum an dignity.” In agriculture, Scalapino noticed that “unquestionably, grai n production has risen in the 1960s, pe rhaps on an average of 3 percent per annum . The increases have been due prim arily to water conservation work, including the strides m ade in irrigation.

This has enabled double and triple cropping over a wider area.” In industry, “industrial

47 The Chinese term for party and government officials.

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production has increased at a higher, albeit uneven, rate, causing overall GNP gains to average 4-

6 percen t in the pas t decade.” Scalapino conc luded th at “th e bas ic pattern of Chinese

development appears to be set. T he key…wi ll continue to be agriculture—and population

control.” Meanwhile, he observed that “commune se lf-reliance will continue to be stressed” and

“industrialization would also rem ain a prim e target.” 48 Scalapino, therefore, recognized that the

Chinese model of m odernization worked for China to a certain extent and gained its legitimacy

among the people. He observed th at “the vital nuclear units of Chinese communist society

remained operative and, for the m ost part, intact despite the m agnitude of the crisis that swept

over the upper sections of the political system.” The people , in other words, carried out the

Chinese model at the local level without much interruption from the top. 49

Other visitors echoed S calapino’s observations. “There can now be no serious doubt that

China is devising a highly effective economic system,” John Kenneth Galbraith, who was later to

become the most favored Am erican economist by the Chinese, observe d after a visit in 1972.

“With the liberation, decades of national and civil war, endemic pillage and public anarchy came to an end…There is m assive evidence of great continued m ovement—new housing, new industrial plants, new building at old plants, the impressive figures on the increase in local industrial and agricultural production and employment, the supply of basic staples in markets and shops, the people thronging throug h to buy them and the estim ates of relative or percentage increases in production.” Aware that China w as still poor com pared with W estern countries,

48 Robert A. Scalapion, “China and the Road Ahead,” 1973, NCUSCR. 49 Ibid.

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Galbraith nevertheless argued that “in a poor country an arrangement by which every person gets

two sets of sound basic garments every year at low prices seems to me an exercise in the greatest

good sense. The proper com parison of the comforta bly clad Chinese is not with Am ericans or

Europeans but with the huddled and half-clothed people of northern or upland India in the winter

months.” Referring to the Chinese model based upon self-reliance, he then claimed that “let there

be no doubt: For the Chinese it works.”50

In 1975, th e Nation al Comm ittee sent ano ther delegation whose m embers includ ed such

prominent Americans as Cyrus R. Vance and A llen S. Whiting to explore “selected com ponents

of the PRC developm ental expe rience to asce rtain what co nstituted the Chinese model and to

assess its potential relevance elsewhere.” The delegation concluded, as Whiting wrote in the final

report, that self -reliance was the most im portant ra tionale of the Chinese m odel, as “m ost

members of the group were im pressed with the degree to which the ideal of self-reliance has

been propagated as a model for emulation an d for evaluation of perfor mance.” Under this

guideline, the Chinese model pr oduced a new pattern of orga nizing the people for econom ic

development. For ex ample, Whiting noticed the new role of women as a resu lt of the em phasis

on gender equality. First, “wom en have been tr ansformed from consumers into producers…this provides a double benefit to a developing society with scarce resources, m aterial and hum an.”

Second, “wom en’s control over th e local services and daily living needs provides the best informed and m ost concerned sourc e of direction, permitting the disciplined decentralization of management in areas particularly suscep tible to bureaucratic apathy, ignorance and

50 John Kenneth Galbraith, A China Passage (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973), pp. 118-137.

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corruption…This goes far to explain the high sta ndards of health, cleanliness, and civic order

which impress all visitors to China.” Lastly, “the liberation of women from their traditional role

as bearers of children and water has raised the self-respect and sense of dignity of half the

population, a m ajor gain by any measurem ent of human progress. ” Whiting also noticed “the

mobilization of all able-bodied pers ons, young and old, in some sort of productive o r supportive

activity.” He seemed to appreciate this aspect the m ost: “Active involvement in collective effort

can be rewarding in itself for the individual and for the regim e. Alienation and anxiety m ay not be the necessary concom itants of social change , modernization, and urba nization. Participation

can generate a proper pride and sense of responsibility that kni ts otherwise disparate social

groups into a common whole. Thes e collective political and indi vidual psychic gains m ay well

outweigh the econom ic costs that are m easured in term s of effi ciency or input-output

calculations.” In conclu sion, Whiting admitted that the delegation was favorably impressed by

the Chinese model and this model would remain valid for the Chinese in the near future. 51

Thus during the early 1970s, the bilateral exchanges between Am erica and China were

firmly lodged in the discourse on m odernization. True, the controlled tourism allowed the

Americans to see only a sm all section of China; yet that s ection was deem ed by the Chinese

themselves as a show piece of China’s m odernization. The Chinese insisted that their m odel be

evaluated in the Chinese context, especially with regard to the pre-1949 China. The Am ericans,

when they were forced to do so, nevertheless were impressed by the Chinese model. Yet for most

American visitors, what m attered to them was not the Chine se model per se, but its f uture and

51 Allen S. Whiting, “Report of the World Affair Delegation to the PRC,” 1976, NCUSCR.

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the implications for Sino-American relations. The Chinese, when it came to the future of China’s modernization, were also showing signs of some flexibility. W hile the Chinese were celebrating their m odel and the A mericans were playing al ong, both sides started to reevaluate China’s modernization.

The Chinese Model Reevaluated: 1975-1979

The most fr ustrating thing for American visitors to China, perhaps, wa s that the C hinese were so self-absorbed that th ey showed little inte rest in knowing Am erica. Indeed, m any

Americans pointed out that while they expected a lot of questions about Am erica from the

Chinese, they eventually became disappointed. In 1976, for exam ple, a delegation o rganized by the National Comm ittee reported that “the American visitor to China inevitably makes various comparisons: China with the United States; our system vs. theirs; or, their experience compared to that of other socialist or developing states . While these com parisons spring naturally to the western m ind, what seem s to m atter m ost to th e Chinese, and what many would argue is the more appropriate test, is the change in the moral and material quality of Chinese life since 1949.”

The Chinese were so indif ferent to life in Americ a that the author of the tr ip report cried out aloud: “they don’t need us!” Yet he was not about to give up by hinting that som ehow America must find a way to make the Chinese interested in American society.52

So why did the Chinese show little interest in Am erica? One reason, obviously, was that many of them were genuinely convinced that C hina’s model of m odernization was the wave of the future and therefore there was no need to get deep into the Am erican model. Yet another

52 “Report on Congressional Committee Staff Delegation to PRC, 1976,” NCUSCR.

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reason, perhaps more important fo r the Chinese `whom the Am ericans came into contact with , was that before 1976 any close association with Am ericans could easily get one into trouble.

Under the radical atm osphere of the Cultural Revolution—although it st arted to fade away

slowly after 1975—anyone who s howed interests in things foreign would immediately be

suspected as a revisionist, if not a traitor. Many Americans in fact realized this and they were too

polite and considerate to engage their Chinese hosts in conversations about America.

Yet this does not m ean that the Chinese were totally ignorant about America. At least in areas directly related to China’s modernization such as science and technology, the Chinese were well aware of Am erica’s leadi ng role. For example, a 1975 scie ntific delegation from Texas

A&M University was surprised to discover that the institute they v isited “had an excellen t reference set with most of the wo rld’s leading scientific journals.”53 On the other hand, while

Americans were impressed by the Chinese model, they also decided that this model was bound to

change in the f uture. And they wer e confident that sooner or la ter the Chinese would have to

become interested in the Am erican experien ce of modernization . In fact, the m utual

understanding between America and China, a major goal claimed by the bilateral exchanges, was

achieved precisely by this kind of thinking, for it constituted a process of de mystification. This

process of dem ystification unfolded through tw o phases. During the first phase, Am ericans started to understand that th e Chinese m odel explained a lo t about the Chinese worldview.

During the second phase, however, th e idealized Chinese model itself started to be disassembled

53 Perry Adikisson, “China Trip Notes,” 1975, NASAR, Box 1, BHL.

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when the two sides came to understand that after all China could, and perhaps, should learn a lot from America.

Scalapino, f or exam ple, pointed ou t that “d espite recen t gains, the Chinese econom y remains in f ragile condition.” He argued that the current Chines e model would lead to a dead- end, unless the Chines e became willing to aban don the rigid self-reliance. “It is clear th at self- sufficiency in many instances can be extrem ely uneconomic,” he concluded. “If China is to take full advantage in the era in which we live, it must interact on a much more intense level with the advanced industrial societies. From them , it can acquire the tec hnology and the m achines necessary to leap ov er decades of p ainful pioneering. Obviously, m any of China’s leaders now recognize this fact, and while the signs are mi xed, there are strong indi cations that ‘Maoist economic principles’ are in the course of being modified. In the com ing decade, we can expect the People's Republic to be incr easingly receptive to advanced technology from abroad and to some expansion of trade.” In fact, he noticed w ith much enthusiasm in his report that cur rently an internal debate was going on among the top Ch inese leadership between self-reliance and a more outward-oriented position. He also challenged the myth of the Chinese model directly. The

Chinese model claimed to create a “New Socia list Man,” which, Scalapino believed, “bears a decided resemblance to the ‘Old Modern Man’ of the West.” Both centered their political values around the nation-state; both em phasized education, science, and technology; and both believed that m aterial progress was the central task of the governm ent. “To t he W esterners and to the

Japanese,” Scalapino argued, “the above themes are all familiar aspects of an era through which we have been passing, despite our diverse cultural backgrounds.” Therefore, “in essence, China

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is best seen as a part of the m odernizing wo rld, despite the fact that its ideology—or m ore precisely, its political system —is a variable of m ajor consequence. ” By highlighting the similarities between the Chinese model and the Western model and by putting the for mer at an earlier stage of a universal m odel of m odernization which the W est and Japan already passed,

Scalapino suggested that sooner or later the C hinese would em ulate Am erica in modernizing their country.54

Allen S. Whiting reached similar conclusions. He reported that “th e delegation found that the virtues of ‘self-reliance,’ decentralized management, and mass participation in implementing decisions are wholly appropriate for China’s present stage of developm ent, but pose m ajor problems in the not too distan t f uture.” W hiting argued that China’s plan for m odernization, especially the one announced by China’s Prem ier Zhou Enlai in January 1975, “will require the reversal of many political and socio-economic policies which have been raised to a new level of importance since the Cultural Revolution…Autom ation, quality control, the sophistication of knowledge and technology, the worldwide standardiz ation of methods and even of com ponents to facilitate technologi cal transfer and international com patibility, all are ant ithetical to the

Maoist ethos as presently m anifest in China.” Realizing that a dramatic ch ange in China’s policies would face m any political obstacles, Whiting nev ertheless thought that America must play a crucial role in China’s future developm ent: “The group found it imperative to develop not only an appreciation of what is happening in C hina, but for Chinese to gain an app reciation of

54 Scalapion, “China and the Road Ahead,” 1973, NCUSCR.

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America through m eans other than their official m edia. Only th rough this process can m utual understanding lay the basis for developing a dialogue on matters of mutual interest.”55

In fact, the Chinese quietly b egan to reevalua te their m odernization str ategies af ter Sino-

American exchanges s tarted. Yet the signals they sent out were m ixed and confusing; and the pace of their adjus tment was uneven in different fields. Thu s the Am ericans were n ot surprised when setbacks occurred. A m ajor one happened in 1974 in the field of cultural exchange. Yet given the delicacy of Chinese politics, the setb ack seemed to send a signal for China’s overall development strategy. In Septem ber 1973, the Phila delphia Orchestra visited China, sponsored by the National Committee. The visit was a huge su ccess as ordinary Ch inese received Western music well. Yet the most im portant thing ab out this vis it was that Jiang Qing attended th e performance. Sue Dunn, the author of the after-trip report, obser ved that “she wore a sim ple black, occidental-style dress, a gesture which was widely interpreted as representing openness to the West.” Moreover, the Orch estra was even caught unprepared when Jiang personally asked that Symphony No. 6 of Beethoven be played. “It would seem that the Ch inese leadership used the visit as a signal that a ne w Cultural policy was being cons idered,” Dunn concluded. “The repeated pledges of friendship indicated to the domestic audience an openness and acceptance of the Am erican visitors and their hom eland.” 56 Yet in early 1974, Jian g suddenly launched a campaign against Western music. “All music,” an editorial article of People’s Daily argued, “has class content, and those who contend that a particular work can be judged on artistic merits alone

55 Whiting, “Report of the World Affair Delegation to the PRC,” 1976, NCUSCR. 56 Sue Dunn, “Music and Ideology: the Philadelphia Orchestra Experience,” 1973, NCUSCR.

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are attempting to obscure the bou rgeois, capitalist nature of its content, and their ow n bourgeois reactionary rebellion.” 57 While Am ericans were confused, th e real target of Jiang’s cam paign

was Zhou Enlai. Zhou was long known as the leader of the m oderate Chinese officials. The

power struggle between the m oderate group and the radicals led by Jiang reached a crucial point

in 1974, as Jiang was trying to reorganize the Ce ntral Governm ent with herself as the head.

When Zhou agreed to invite two Canadian m usicians to China in late 1973, Jiang used this as an

excuse to attack Zhou, accusing him of “opening the door to thieves” and thus “selling China out

to the enemies.” 58 To Americans, it b ecame clear that the political instability of the top Chinese

leadership was a major obstacle for China’s reevaluation of its developmental strategy.

The period between 1975 and 1976, therefore, turn ed ou t to be a wa tershed f or China’s

future modernization, and the changed Chinese domestic politics created a better environm ent

for Sino-American exchanges. As discussed in Chapter 5, after the "Second Cultural Revolution"

faded away in late 1974, the m oderate Chinese leaders led by Zhou En lai and Deng Xiaoping

started to reorient China toward more pragmatic tasks such as economic development. In January

1975, Zhou officially proposed the so-called "F our Modernizations" as China' s top priority for

the rest of the twentieth centu ry during the Fourth National People’s Congress. Deng Xiaoping

further announced that 1975 would becom e the year of “adjustment,” which in practice meant to

water down the heavy political tones of the Cu ltural Revolution and concentrate on econom ic

57 “Untitled Music,” 14 January 1974, RenMin RiBao. 58 See Ma Wenbin and etc, eds., Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhizheng Sishi Nian, 1949-1989 (40 Years of the Chinese Communist Party, 1948-1989) (Beijing: Zhongyang Dangshi, 1989), p 369.

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development.59 In March 1975, Deng pointed out during a co nference of industrial planning that

“we must a bandon the idea that we prefer poor communism over rich capitalism . There is no

such a thing as poor communis m.” 60 In August, Deng told two visiting m embers of the U.S.

Congress that “China’s m odernization is based on self-reliance, but self-reliance does not m ean

that we will pursue isolationism. We must learn all the advanced technologies from the world.”61

The National Comm ittee delegations experienced these changes firsthand. In Novem ber

1974, when a delegation of universit y presidents asked Deng to di scuss China’s future plan for

modernization, Deng took the opport unity to give an unusually l ong lecture. After reviewing

China’s developm ents in all m ajor fields sinc e Liberation, Deng told th e delegation that “the

principles will s till be self -reliance, f rugality, dilig ence. Self -reliance does not e xclude th e

absorbing of good technology from outside. From our own experience, this road might be one of

gradual progress, perhaps it is not quick but it is more stable. Generally speaking, we are still

backward.”62 In May 1975, Richard Baum , leader of th e American Track and Field delegation,

was surprised when he did not encounter the heavy propaganda that confronted pervious

delegations to China. Instead of boasting thei r achievements, Baum obs erved, now the Chinese

frankly told him that they were frustrated by the slow pace of China’s modernization. Moreover,

the Chinese seemed to become interested in America. When he asked his counterpart, a Chinese

coach, whether he wanted to com e to the United States, Baum observed: “His eyes lit up and he

59 Cheng Zhongyuan and Xiao Xingzhen, Deng Xiaoping Zai 1975 (Deng Xiaoping in 1975) (Beijing: Zhongguo Qingnian, 2004), pp45-51. 60 Ibid., p 48. 61 CCP Research Office, Deng Xiaoping Nianpu (Chronology of Deng Xiaoping) (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian, 2004), Vol. 1, pp. 85-86. 62 “Transcript of conversation with Deng,” 1974, NCUSCR.

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said, ‘Just give me the chance.’ He looked very excited about it.” 63 In October 1975, Yao Yilin ,

China’s Vice Minister of Foreign Tr ade, told Cy rus Vance that China in tended to ac celerate its

modernization process and China would not m aintain a closed-door policy. China would require

advance technologies and equipm ents not just from the U.S. but fr om all developed countries in

the world.64

The Chinese domestic environment continued to improve from the standpoint of U.S.-China

exchanges. W hen the National C ommittee-sponsored Gymnastics te am visited China in

November 1976, they found the country in the m iddle of c elebrating the downfall of the “Gang of Four.” Suddenly, the team was spared all th e Chinese propagandas, and the authors of the after-trip report observed “the remarkable show of normalcy in the midst of the political turmoil engendered by the death of Mao Zedong and the pur ging of the gang of four.” The Chinese showed a trem endous amount of goodwill toward th e Americans, but earlier Am erican visitors would have been shocked by what the Gym nastics team encountered. In Shanghai, when the team wanted to listen to the current news, the manager of their host hotel immediately gave them a radio and tuned it to Voice of America. Now the Am ericans were allowed to wander around without escorts, and they could take photos freely. The Chinese they came into contact with also showed great interes ts in Am erica. Some team members were approached by strangers on the street, because those Chinese wanted to practi ce their English. The interpre ter assigned to the team, in the past usually a polite but elusive figure, now wanted to “learn new colloquial

63 Richard Baum, “AAU Track and Field Delegation,” 1975, NCUSCR. 64 “Interview with Yao Yilin,” 1975, NCUSCR.

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expressions in English.” The report authors obser ved that quickly the word “cool” w as added to this fellow’s vocabulary. More shocking things waited for the team in Beijing. There, a sports news crew from ABC’s Good Morning America joined the team and they fil med a special scene of the Am ericans p laying golf on the Great Wall. In a departm ent store, a clerk asked the

Americans about the presidential election and said that “he preferred C arter because he would cut defense spending and increase social welfare programs, which the clerk endorsed.”65

The trend toward openness and f lexibility was d uly reflected in m ore “serious” exchanges.

In August 1976 the Chinese sent an agricultural de legation to America. The purpose of this visit, the delegation reported, was to “understand why in Am erica 5 percent of the labor force can produce enough to feed the whole nation while stil l having a large surplus for export and to see what we can learn from America in agricultural mechanization.” The delegation inspected almost every aspect of American agriculture as they visited a dozen farms in more than ten states. “The

American experience absolutely proved that the only solution for our agriculture is mechanization,” concluded the delegation. Am erica’s success, the delegation observed, was due to “agricultural specialization combined with mechanization,” “high percentage of investment in research,” “mechanization in every stage of production,” and “competition in the fr ee market.”

Thus the delegation recomm ended further studies of Am erican agriculture and n ew plans for

China’s agriculture based on learning from America.66

65 “Gymnastic Team Visit”, 1976; Ronald Suleski, “Report on Gymnastic Visit,” 1976, NCUSCR. 66 “Report on Agricultural Delegation to America,” December 1976, 274-1-193, Guangdong Archives (GDA), Guangzhou, China.

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In 1977 Li Xiannian, now the third ranking Chin ese official, adm itted to an Am erican

delegation that the central plan ning of the eco nomy in China was a “headache. ” Li further

elaborated on China’s m odernization plan. “Agricu lture will come first, and then light industry,

and then heavy indus try,” he s aid. Adm itting that China was backward, Li hinted that Chin a

could learn a lot from America.67 American visitors were certainly encouraged. In fact, during a

1977 trip, an Am erican delegation was so excited by China’s new m oves that they asserted that

“communes as we saw h ere function as en capsulated, collective form s of capitalism .”68 Finally the Chinese were willing to give a second thought to th eir self-reliance. And it seem ed that

America was going to becom e the model for Chin a in the near future. In August 1978, when members of the Commi ttee on Scholarly Communi cation with the Pe ople's Republic of China

(CSCPRC) visited China, they witn essed a greate r change in the Chinese attitude toward Sino-

American exchanges. When Huang Kunyi, who re presented the Chinese Academy, frankly said that China would replace “scienti fic tourism” with “m ore in-depth program s,” everyone in the room knew only too well what he m eant and burst into laughter. Huang proposed longer exchange program s in more specific fields, and he also said that China was planning to send students to American universities.69

When the CSCPRC delegation visited China, Deng was about to announce in a few months

a new policy known as “Open and Refor m.” In January 1979, Am erica and China established

formal diplom atic relations. Su rely the trend toward openness and flexibility discussed above

67 “Conversation with Li Xiannian,” 1977, NCUSCR. 68 “American Cancer Society Trip Report,” 1977, NASAR, Box 1, BHL. 69 “Conversation with Huang Kunyi,” 1978, NASAR, Box 6, BHL.

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accelerated after Janu ary 1979. But th e crucial question to be addre ssed here is, to what extent

did China reevaluate its mode rnization model between 1975 and 1979? And to what extent did

China turn to Am erica as a guide? Of cou rse one can not answer these questions with mathematical precision. Yet it is enough to say th at the Chinese leaders in no way wanted to

rashly abandon the old m odel based upon self -reliance and Communist ideology. The above-

mentioned Chinese agricultural delegation, fo r exam ple, while highly adm iring Am erican

technologies, nevertheless perceived an on-going agricultural crisis when they were in the United

States. They blamed the crisis on A merican capitalism and were conf ident that, once it r eached the Am erican level of agricultural m echanization, China would never see such a crisis as

socialism would not allow it to happen.70

Indeed, the Chinese elite, who had a chance to see American society with their own eyes,

quickly developed mixed feelings toward the sharp comparison between American and Chinese

societies. For example, Zhu Lin, wife of Hua ng Zhen, who was the head of the PRC Liaison

Office in Am erica, was deeply im pressed by Am erica's economic development. In her m emoir,

Zhu spent pages talking about her visits to Am erican farm s, factories, and universities. She

observed that mechanization and highly-trained workers contributed to the high efficiency of the

American econom y, and she was especially impressed by the close connection between

American research institutions and Am erican industries. Clearly with the wrecked Chinese universities during the Cultural Revolution in mind, Zhu m arveled at Am erica's ability to transform the latest research results into "pow er of production." At the sam e time, Zhu, with a

70 “Report on Agricultural Delegation to America,” December 1976, 274-1-193, GDA

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defensive tone, expressed her dism ay about th e racial discrim ination and urban slum s she

encountered in America. Such things, she insisted, would never happen in Communist China.71

As the Chinese repeatedly suggested in their talks with A mericans, all they wanted wa s advanced technologies from America which, they s eemed to believe, woul d fit into the Chinese system without changing the system itself. Yet the Chinese were diligent students of history, and they knew that technologies were not value -free. In fact, during the 1970s, the Chinese government tightened its control on the inform ation of the West available to ordinary Chinese people. In 1976, for example, the C entral Committee of the Guangdong CCP ordered to cut th e flow of inform ation about Am erica between Hong Kong and China. The Central Committee noticed that “some American institutes stationed in Hong Kong launched a cultural invasion by distributing American cultural products among the Chinese people” and thus ordered Guangdong customs to confiscate all such products and track down the Chinese receivers. 72 Again, controlled U.S.-China exchanges were allowed, but uncontrolled con tacts with Am erica were forbidden.

But once C hina decided to revaluate its m odernization model and to learn from America, the door opened and proved hard to be closed again. The Chinese leaders continued to encourage bilateral exchanges with Am erica despite the fear of so-calle d “peaceful evolution.” More importantly, the Chines e gradually star ted to d evelop exch anges in the hum anities and social sciences. In August 1978, for exa mple, a "responsible mem ber" of the Chinese Academ y of

71 Zhu Lin, Dashi furen huiyilu (Memoir of An Ambassador's Wife) (Beijing: Shijiezhishi, 1991), pp. 205-227. 72 “American Institutes in Hong Kong distribute Cultural Products in Guangdong,” 1976, 214-A1.3-15, GDA.

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Social Scie nce told the CSCPRC delega tion th at "beginning from now on the whole field of

social sciences, including work in both institute s and universities, will im prove" and China was

ready to develop exchanges in those fields. He admitted that there was a "complete stagnation" in

China's social scien ces and China "lost m uch time" due to the Cultura l Revolution. He f urther

admitted that "in the field of econom ic theory, es pecially the m anagement of industry, there is

also much to be learned from other countries." The Chinese particularly wanted to buy books of

humanities and social s ciences f rom the United States, a nd they wanted to invite Am erican scholars such as William Skinner and Fred W akeman to visit China be cause they had developed

"interesting" theories about Chinese history. 73 The development of exchanges in the hum anities and social sciences was certa inly encouraging to the Am ericans. For everyone knew that compared with exchange program s of science a nd technology, exchanges in the fields of the humanities and soc ial s ciences wer e m uch m ore sensitive, since the Chinese alwa ys reg arded those fields as battlefi elds for id eologies. Th ere were sev eral possib le explan ations for the change of m ind of China. Firs t, C hinese leaders realized that they could no long afford self- imposed isolation. Second, Chinese leaders were still conf ident that the Chinese people in general would continue to suppor t Communism and thus they woul d reject the cap italist values.

Lastly, Chinese leaders perhaps simply did not have enough tim e to fully com prehend the implications of the sudden exposure to the outside world.

However, whatever confidence Chinese leaders had in the people' s support for

Communism, the continued U.S.-China exchanges seemed soon to erode that confidence. Orville

73 Memo of Conversation, 15 August 1978, NASAR, Box 6, BHL.

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Schell, the old-tim e China traveler already mentioned, visited China again in late 1979. In

Beijing, he was stunned to discover that almost overnight bars, night clubs, and private-owned

small shops emerged everywhere. Strangers would approach him, talking about their stories and

hopes. W hen he asked one Chinese friend whet her he thought so m uch W estern technology

would have “any undesirable side effects,” his fr iend answered: “It is still early. Too m uch is

happening now. Things are going so fast that ther e really has been no a ppropriate moment to

reevaluate. But personally, I hope th at we can modernize b y taking only what we need from the

advanced country and avoiding many of the pr oblems with which you are already fam iliar.

Anyway, this is my hope.”74 Schell was not convinced. In fact, he becam e worried: “Potentially

at stake, it seem ed to m e, was the in tegrity of China’s na tional iden tity.”75 W ith an obvious

loathing toward all the negative things under capitalism , he wondered aloud whether the W est

would destroy China’s sim plistic way of life whic h he had learned to love. But he knew that

there was no turning-back.

All in all, from showing off their model of modernization to learning from America, the

Chinese during the 1970s went through a gradual yet significant process of reevaluating their

development. The bilateral U.S.-C hina exchange s both contributed to th is chang e and were shaped by this process. The change on the Chin ese part, however, was not a linear and complete one. Yet without doubt, the “controlled tourism ” in its unique way helped to achieve the

American goal of bringing China back into the international community.

74 Orville Schell, Watch Out for the Foreign Guests: China Encounters the West (New York: Pantheon Book, 1980), p. 69. 75 Ibid., p. 27.

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Conclusion

So what conclusions can we draw from ex amining bila teral exch anges between Am erica

and China in the light of the discourse on China' s modernization? First, those exchanges helped

Americans to de mystify China by i mproving mutual understanding between the tw o countries.

While in th eory dem ystification was a natur al result of bilater al exch anges betwee n any two

counties, th e Chinese case was unique. To m ost Am ericans, Communist China was full of

irrational revolutionary impulses, and China’s revolutionary zeal (or craziness) certainly reached

its peak during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, which defied rational explanation. This perception, together with the fact that Am erica and China were isolated from each other for two decades, contributed to a highly tu rbulent Si no-American relationshi p. Although Nixon’s visit broke the deadlock between the two countries, ol d perceptions proved hard to die and a new

U.S.-China relationsh ip had to be accepted by most people as legitimate. The d iscourse on modernization helped this transition in a uni que way. Som e Am erican visitors who were i n

China before 1949 were happy to discover that the “Old China” they once fell in love with could still be spotted in the “New China.” As a result, Communist China was regarded as a new stage, although an ideologically wrong one, of China’s m odernization infused with strong nationalism.

Others, who did not have the chance to have a taste of the pre-Comm unist China, nonetheless quickly compared the current China with Am erica of the eig hteenth or nineteenth centuries. To them, Communist China resem bled an early stag e of m odernization. T hus, the discourse of modernization helped Americans to grasp the Chinese reality and transformed a rather alienating experience into a familiar one.

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Second, the U.S.-China exchanges were closely related with the developm ent of relations between the two governm ents, despite the claime d non-governmental nature. W hen the official relationship was war m, greater ex changes were encouraged. W hen sens itive political issues popped up, exchanges were lim ited and even cancelle d. The Chinese seemed especially adept at manipulating these exchanges to put pressure on the U.S. govern ment. They would cancel som e exchanges at the last m inute because they were unhappy with the current relationsh ip between

America and Taiwan, for exam ple. Or they would refuse the request for further exch anges made by American visitors because they resented the lack of progress in establishing formal diplomatic relations between America and China. In this case the Chinese always took care to point out that further exchanges of such and such would depend on whether or not official diplomatic relations could be established. On the other hand, howeve r, the Chinese clearly used the bilateral exchanges to keep the channel of communicati ons open. When the official relations cooled down, the Chinese never failed to rem ind American visitors that their very presence was a sign of friendship and cooperation between the two countries. The American visitors gradually became aware of the Chinese trick s and played along. To them , the exchanges, subject to th e changing official U.S.-China relations but never completely stopped, indicated that China also judged such activities on their own m erits. In fa ct, as China gradually turned to the W est, and especially to America, for advanced technologies and m anagerial skills to push forward its own modernization, more and m ore Americans became convinced that the bilateral exchanges could contribute greatly to C hina’s m odernization. Once China realized the real benefits of these exchanges, they further argued, China would pref er a m ore peaceful relationsh ip with Am erica.

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Based on this reasoning, m any Americans, upon returning from China, started to publish books, write for newspapers, talk at comm unity gatherings, attend conferences, or use other methods to

popularize the image that China was genuinely pur suing modernization and the Chinese wanted

anything but a dangerous confrontation with America.

Finally, and m ore importantly, the U.S.-China exchanges were directly connected with the

issue at the heart of the Cold W ar: the com petition among different m odels of m odernization.

Recent scho larship has em phasized the Cold W ar as such a com petition be tween different

developmental m odels: it was a struggle to win people’s hearts and m inds on the m ost basic

level. 76 The bila teral ex changes be tween Am erica and China, in fact, largely reflected th e

competition between th e two countries ’ different models of m odernization, as each side was

eager to p rove that theirs was th e better model and the wave of the future. Thus the exchanges,

especially those in th e early 1970s, were full of clashes between the C hinese m odel and the

American model, or, to use m ore popular term s at that tim e, between Chinese Socialism and

American Capitalism. Gradually, however, the Chinese watered down the heavy political tones

associated with early exchanges an d started to discuss more practical matters with Americans

during later exchanges. They started to show, especially since 1975, real interest in learning from

America in various fields. To Am ericans involve d in Sino-Am erican relations, this new trend

was a long-awaited sign: now the Chinese started to appreciate the American model, and the goal

76 See, for example, Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Time (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Melvyn P. Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War (New York: Hill & Wang, 2007). For the most recent examples, see the forum on modernization in Diplomatic History (Vol. 33, No. 3), June 2009.

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to “bring C hina back into the internationa l community,” as articulated by Nixon and his successors, seemed on the way to be achieved.

Yet one needs to be very caref ul here. W hile it was tru e that the Chinese sta rted to reevaluate their model of modernization during the late 1970s, it was not a simple, linear story in which the innocent, sincere, and enthusiastic Am erican m odernizer finally conquered the

Chinese Communist fortress. First, while the period between 1975 and 1976 can be regarded as a turning point in the change of Chinese attitude, it was not an absolute one. The Chinese, in fact, never fully em braced the Am erican model. Second, the Chinese attitud e toward th e American model was influenced by China’s dom estic po litics. The rapidly ch anging Chinese dom estic politics in those days not only und erlined the way Am erican visitors were tre ated in China, b ut sometimes the inner struggles were directly rev ealed to the guests. A s a result, the Chinese perception of the Am erican model was filtere d by China’s domestic politics. Finally, although

China’s plan for m odernization was controlled by top officials, in practice the Chinese were not always ab le to carry o ut their m aster p lan smoothly. Moreover, the Ch inese were constantly puzzled by certain aspects of the Am erican mode l. The struggle to solv e the contradictions between the two m odels, therefore, pushed the Chinese to think more creatively about China’s modernization in the 1980s.

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Chapter 7

Traders and Diplomats: Doing Business with China in the 1970s

While American officials and delegates of exchange programs increased their contacts with

the Chinese during the 1970s, econom ic relations between China and the United States also

developed rapidly. In fact, for m ost Am ericans, trade with China becam e one of the m ost important results of Sino-Am erican rapproche ment. On t he one hand, the perceived China

market of 800 m illion consum ers, m ore attractive th an the China m arket of 400 m illion

consumers before 1949, suddenly cam e to dominate the im agination of the Am erican business

community. For many American business executives, this potential China market became a vital

outlet for them to get out of the econom ic recessions of th e 1970s. On the other hand, Sino-

American trade became the most visible symbol of U.S.-China detente. Chinese goods displayed in New York City departm ent stores said a lot about the improved relations betw een the two

nations, which, in retu rn, reinforced the lure of trade with China. Thus, we need to examine the

development of U.S.-China trad e during the 1970s to get a fuller understanding of the evolution of U.S.-China rapprochement.

This chapter is about Sino-American business encounters during the 1970s. It is not a study of trade patterns and econom ic statistics per se . The U.S.-China trade in the 1970s covered a wide range of industries, and di fferent stories in different areas would m ake a study of Sino-

American trade from a pure econom ic standpoint beyond the scope of a single chapter. Instead,

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the primary goal of this chapter is to discus s the hum an dramas involved and the perceptions

formed during those business encounters. It argues that the development of U.S.-China trade not

only contributed to the ongoing U.S-China rapprochem ent, but also helped to increase Am erica's

influence over China's modernization strategy. In a sense, trade became the most tangible benefit

of U.S.-China rapprochement, and it crystallized the image of China as a "frustrated modernizer"

for ordinary Americans.

The chapter is divided into three parts. Fi rst, it exam ines the initial business c ontacts

between America and China during the early 1970s. On the American side, it exam ines the rise

of the im age of China as a poten tial m arket, and how the Am erican business community

perceived the development of that market. It argues that America's interest in the China trade was

never purely econom ic; rather, Am erican business people regarded themselves as both traders

and "unofficial diplomats" who could both get rich in China and help to improve Sino-Am erican

relations. On the Chinese side, this chapter discusses China's effort to readjus t its foreign trade policy in light of the im proved relations with America, and how the Beijing regime perceived

future economic relations with the United States.

Second, this chapter exam ines the developm ent of Sino-American tr ade between 1972 and

1975. In this part, as well as in the next part, I w ill focus primarily on the Canton Fair and other

business activities coordina ted by the National Council for U.S.-China Business. 1 An examination of Sino-Am erican trade during this time period rev eals that the con duct of trad e between the two countries was la rgely shaped by the clash between their different social and

1 See further discussions of the Fair and the National Council later.

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economic system s. As a result, Am erican trad ers becam e increasingly frustrated, and their

Chinese counterparts also displayed num erous complaints. Yet despite all the dif ficulties, both

sides were determ ined to devel op trade relations, and the U.S.-C hina trade slowly started to

mature.

Finally, this chapter examines the d evelopment of Sino-American trade between 1975 and

1978. During this stage, changes in China' s dom estic politics dram atically reshaped China's

approach toward trade with Am erica, and American business pe ople were convinced that the

potential China market was going to m aterialize sooner than they expected. Meanwhile, the two

sides worked closely to solve the difficulties th ey encountered during the early s tage of the

bilateral trade, and the Chinese bec ame increasingly willing to adhere to the Am erican standard

of doing business. Those new developm ents, mo reover, m ade m any contem porary observers

believe that China was definitely shifting away from the Maoist economic model and reorienting

itself economically toward the West. In sum, the history of U.S.-China trade during the 1970s is

another piece of the Sino-American rapprochement puzzle that needs to be examined.

Trades and Diplomats: Initial U.S.-China Business Encounters, 1971-1972

"After a 20-year em bargo, Am erican cor porations have begun to do business with

Communist China." So announced the Wall Street Journal in a front-page article on March 11,

1971. "The flow of Am erican products and t echnology into the People' s Republic has just started, and it is only a trickle, " the article comm ented. "Still, it amounts to at least several millions of dollars a year. And many businessmen who have no tr ade with mainland China now are seeking it." The author of the article noticed that trade with China was such a highly sensitive

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issue that neither the Commerce De partment nor the executives of Am erican companies wanted

to reveal the details. However, an optimistic atmosphere clearly existed. "You just can't look at a

market of that size and not believ e that eventually a lo t of goods are going to be sold there," a spokesman of a drug co mpany mused. "One aspirin tablet a day to each of those guy s, and that's a lot of aspirin." The article concluded that desp ite the current difficulties in doing business with

China, the developm ent of trade relations w ith the PRC would "help Am erican businessm en compete more effectively for sales abroad even when the China-bound portion is insignificant."2

This kind of enthusiasm for U.S.-China trade m ight sound naive, as it evoked the stereotyped image of China as a huge and natural market for America. But it was not dif ficult to understand why the American busine ss community displayed a touch of euphoria in light of the

Nixon administration's new China initiative. At the same time, many American businessmen and businesswomen were anything but naive regarding the potential for trade with China. W hile the lure of the China m arket was the talk on the street, m any people also cautioned about the uncertain p rospect of U.S.-China tr ade and th e lim ited potentia l of the Chinese market in the immediate future. During the early 1970s, m any promoters of Sino-Am erican trade em phasized that American business people should not enter th e China market for quick sales. Fo r example, the American Management Association told its members that "patience and long-term planning, rather than expectation of quick sales and prof its, are characteris tic of the advice most often given American businessmen by China trade experts and other consultants."3

2 Jonathan Kwitny, "The China Trade," 11 March 1971, Wall Street Journal (WSJ). 3 Dale Tarnowieski, "China Trade: An Overview," in Trade With China: An AMA Research Report (N.P.: American Management Association, Inc., 1972), p. 4.

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Therefore, from the very beginning, gainin g access to the reopened C hina m arket was

perceived by the Am erican business community as a long-term endeavor. The question is, why

did many American business people believe that it was worth the effort to invest time and money

in this f uture market? A key reason is that per ceptions were once again cl osely associated with

the im age of China as a "f rustrated m odernizer." This con nection had two im portant resu lts.

First, many American business ex ecutives were convinced that the development of substantial trade between America and China was inevitable, since China needed American technologies for its own modernization. Second, many American business people not only regarded themselves as traders who would benefit econom ically from doing business with China, but also as unofficial

diplomats who would contribute to the developm ent of Sino-Am erican detente and increase

America's influence ov er China's modernization strategy. 4 Thus, the com bination of econom ic

gains and a certain kind of e motionalism convinced many Americans that it was worth the effort

to develop trade relations with China.

The potential econom ic benefit of trading w ith China was som ething that m any in the

American business community could not ignore, no m atter how limited the China market was at

the time. The China m arket turned out to be prom ising for some American industries as soon as the Am erican econom ic em bargo on China was lif ted. In fact, the Am erican m edia quickly started to report sensational st ories of successful trade deals between America and China. One case was a possible deal between the Boeing Com pany and China, which the public followed closely. The deal was in itiated by th e Chinese b ecause they were im pressed by Boeing aircraft

4 See discussions later.

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during Nixon's visit. Yet for ordinary Am ericans, this deal far surpassed expectations about the

resumed trade with China. The tech nologies involved in such a deal seem ed too advanced and

strategically im portant to be exported to China. "Incongruous thought for the day," the Wall

Street Journal reported. "A leading U.S. defe nse cont ractor provid ing the official plan e for

Chairman Mao and Chou En-lai." 5 The deal, however, was quickly cleared by th e Commerce

Department, and in Septem ber 1972 Boeing announced that China had deci ded to purchase ten

707 aircrafts and pay the price of ab out $150 m illion in cash .6 The Boein g story, tog ether with

other success stories, certainly encouraged the American business community.

For m any shrewd Am erican business executiv es, a sole focus on th e cash value of the

Boeing deal was superficial. For them, the key poi nt behind that deal was the Chinese need for

advanced technologies, which was perceived as a natural outcom e derived from China's goal of

modernization. Moreover, m any American business people were convinced that modernization

was a long-term project for China, thus guarant eeing a lasting need for Am erican products and

technologies. As a result, they saw the two coun tries' economies as structurally complementary,

with China providing raw m aterials and cheap labor in excha nge for foreign currency and

manufactured industrial goods. In other words, Chin a, the "frustrated modernizer," badly needed

to trade with America, and this need ensured the development of the China market.

This line of reasoning was expressed in diffe rent ways. One Am erican business ex ecutive argued that the complementary economic structures between America and China were crucial for

5 "Boeing Has Been Talking With Peking on Jet Sale," 29 March 1972, WSJ. 6 "Boeing Confirms US Clears Permit for Sales to Peking," 6 July 1972; "Boeing Confirms Accord for Sale of 707s to Peking," 12 September 1972, WSJ.

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his company's survival. "The pottery and glassw are industries are dying in the United States and the West in general," he argued, while debriefing some newcomers to the China trade. "This is a

very hot and dirty industry to work in and th e Am erican workers are turn ing away from it

altogether. I think the f uture of this industry lies in China wher e they have m anpower. This is

why my company has been looking toward China for long term goals." 7 Murray Berger, ch ief

executive of an Am erican food company, did not want to transplant hi s production lines into

China, but he believed that China would becom e a crucial supplier of raw m aterials for his company. Berger was in the seafood business, and in 1972 he turned out to be the first executive of the US food industry to visit China. Berger recalled that he becam e interested in the China market during the late 1960s, when he looked at China's coastline and realized that China was going to be the "largest seafood producer." He thus kept writing letters to China every six months for possible trade deals, and finally he was inv ited to a ttend the Canton Fair in th e spring of

1972. He recommended being "a regular buyer thr ough good and bad tim es, high markets, low markets....One day [you] will be rewarded."8

Indeed, for m any Americans, China was not a likely m arket for quick, lucrative business

deals. Rather, it required long-te rm strategic planning and even short-term financial loss. Bob

Boulogne, director of international buying of JC Penny, once summarized the need to be patient:

"We don' t dare to go o ut of this m arket...because we know it' s got to develop; it' s got to be important....In other m arkets we would say, well, we 'll come back when it is ready. W ith this

7 "Pre-Canton Fair Briefing," 5 April 1977, National Council for U.S.-China Trade (NCUSCT), Box 71, GFPL. 8 "Interview with Murray Berger," NCUSCT, Box 373, GFPL.

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market...we cannot take that chance....W e are ha nging on and we are l earning and we have

developed a couple of program s that are getting to be quite sound and which we can use and which are building our relationship and where I think we have finally f ound the way to m ake some money." With his competitors all hang ing on in China, Boulogne added, the choice was obvious.9

The confidence of the Am erican b usiness co mmunity in the Chines e m arket was not

without foundation. Many Americans who managed to conclude business deals during this initial stage of trade were convinced that China genuinely wanted to do business with the United States.

The conclusion of a satellite ground station co nstruction deal between China and RCA Global

Communications, Inc., a com pany that had comm unications opera tions with more than 80

countries in the 1970s, was revealin g with regard to this point. RCA was in charge of setting up

the satellite ground station in Ch ina for Nixon's visit, and the Ch inese were obviously impressed by Am erica's m odern comm unication technolo gies. As a result, China signed a $2.9 m illion contract with RCA in early 1972 and another contract wo rth $5.7 million later th at year. RCA was going to build a couple of sa tellite ground stations in China, which would provide China with the most advanced international comm unications facilities for expanding the country' s direct television, telephone, telex, and date communications links around the world. The RC A team that worked in China during the construc tion found the Chinese keen students of Am erican technologies. In addition , despite China' s public rhetoric on the Cultural Revolution and world revolutionary m ovements, the RCA team was co mpletely spared f rom Chinese politics. The

9 "Interview with Bob Boulogne," ibid.

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Chinese "were efficient and orderly in our business dealings," RCA's chairman Howard Hawkins

recalled. "They seemed pleased with our interest in their country and exhibited a genuine interest in the Am erican people. W e were never subjected to any unfriendly action." At the sam e time,

"trade with China does not com e about autom atically or by happenstance," Hawkins observed.

"The traditional hard se ll or a ttempt at making a quick and sharp dea l will not wor k here." The point Hawkins hin ted at was that the Chinese did not random ly pursue trade with Am erica.

Rather, the centralized foreign trade apparatus in China allowed the g overnment to plan trade

strategically, with priorities put on technologies and products crucial to China's modernization.

This scheme convinced Hawkins that "the Chines e are sincerely interested in developing trade

with the Un ited States." Thus what Am erican companies needed to do was to "establish you r

business purpose, credibility, and the need for your products or services." Meanwhile, "never

expect to fly in, make a fast deal, and leave quickly."10

The Boeing team that negotiated with the Chin ese in 1972 shared sim ilar experiences with

the RCA te am. When the te am visited China in April, the team members discovered that th eir

counterparts were quite sensitive about China's achievements in modernization. "The Chinese are

obviously proud of their achievements and their country and are most desirous of improving their

image to the rest of the world and particula rly the United States," a trip report observed. At the same time, the author of the repor t noticed that the Chinese eagerness to show the best of their country to the Boeing team belied their desire to get advanced technologies from Am erica. The

10 Howard Hawkins, "RCA's Venture in China," in Patrick Boarman, eds., Trade With China: Assessments by Leading Businessmen and Scholars (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), pp. 133-138.

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Boeing people traveled within China on Soviet-m ade airplanes, and as experts in the aviation

industry they were naturally aware of the obsolete Chinese aircrafts. "They can do much better if

they so desire," the author of the report c oncluded, obviously sensing a potential d eal between

China and Boeing. W hen they sat down for busin ess, the Boeing team found that the Chinese

"appeared to have a very strong interest in knowledge of the Boeing Company, what our product

line is, and of course details of our aircraft." Indeed, the Chinese scrutinized every techn ical

detail of the four types of aircraft Boeing offered them , and the two sides held long and

exhausting discussions for successive days. But this was still not enou gh for the Chinese. The y

soon decided to arrange sightseeing tours for the Boeing team, because they needed more time to

review and understand those technical deta ils am ong t hemselves. The Boeing team was

impressed. The Chinese not only showed a strong interest in buy ing from Boeing; they also

indicated that China did not rega rd a con tract with Boein g as a one-tim e deal. R ather, China

seemed to want to use the relationship to completely modernize its aviation industry.11

For many American promoters of U.S.-China trade, the RCA and Boeing cases were not

isolated success stories. Rather, the two cases revealed that China's modernization could lead to

stable trade relations. As a result , some promoters started to plan long-term trade with China. A

typical example was the governm ent of the st ate of W ashington, whic h established a China

Trade Developm ent Council as early as 1971. As the hom e state of the Boeing Com pany,

Washington believed that the whole northwest region of Am erica could develop close trade

11 "Trip to China," April 1972, Record Group Commerce & Economic Development, Trade Development, Box 55, Washington State Archives (WSA), Olympia, WA.

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relations with China. 12 On July 8, 1971, a few days before Kiss inger's first secret visit of China,

the state governm ent sent a letter to the Ch inese em bassy in Canada inquiring about trade

possibilities. The letter pointed ou t that th e State of Washington traditionally took a leadership

position in promoting trade with China, and now it had at least two kinds of products that could

satisfy China's needs—agriculture products such as wheat and a dvanced technologies. 13 In Ju ly

1971, the state sent a delegation to Hong Kong, tr ying to establish contact s with China. W hile the delegation did no t get a clear response, given the sen sitive tim ing of the co ntact, it was certainly not discouraged. The delegation discovered that China relied heavily on the Hong Kong middlemen to export its goods indire ctly into America. Such a discovery suggested the potential gains once direct U.S.-China trade was established. Moreover, when the Beijing government sent an agent down to Hong Kong to meet the delegation, it w as revealed that China kept a good record of all the past letters sent from the state to China asking for trade.14

Nixon's visit to China f urther wetted the state' s appetite in doing busin ess with China. In

March 1972, for exam ple, the S tate government prepared a detailed plan for developing trade.

The plan ar gued that China' s desir e f or m odernization co nstituted a reliable f oundation f or

expanding trade between the State and China. "T he m ajor problem of i ndustrialization stands

before the Chinese," the plan concluded. "The Chinese w ould like to acquire the know-how

necessary to build cars, refrigerato rs, and washi ng machines. And they can be expected to turn

12 The state government gained support in its effort from the Seattle Chamber of Commerce. On June 8, 1971, the Chamber adopted a resolution, arguing that in light of the recent Nixon initiative the city should grasp the opportunity to position itself as a future leading trade partner of China. "The volume [of U.S.-China trade] is steadily increasing and one can anticipate that in due course, a country with a population estimated at 750-850 million people will not only become an excellent market but also a good source of supply," the resolution concluded. See "Resolution," 8 June 1971, ibid. 13 Letter, 8 July 1971, ibid. 14 Memo, "Contacts in Hong Kong with PRC Representatives," 13 September 1971, ibid.

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more and more to Western natio ns for assis tance, s ince trade with Russia see ms out of t he

question." Therefore, China would find a "ready market in the US."15

In sum, through the initial business contact with the Chinese, American traders perceived a

long-term market in China. The Chi nese desire to trade with Am erica in order to benefit their

own modernization convinced m any Americans that they should invest money and tim e in this

future market even if there were n o quick ga ins. As Sidney Sweet, president of a New Yor k-

based com pany, put it, "we should try to do business with the C hinese even if we are

unsuccessful." "The fast-buck approach isn' t goi ng to be successful or even alluring to the

Chinese, whose limited foreign exchange must be carefully rationed and applied in areas where the United States has expertise, such as electronics and computers, heavy equipment, and motor power," Sweet concluded. "The re luctant bride can be won, however, if we are prepared to buy

Chinese goods and offer our best quality and best technology to them."16

While the trade promoters sensed huge trade potential in the China market, they also argued

that American businessmen and businesswomen could function as unofficial diplomats to China.

As discussed in pervious chapters, the Nixon administration actively encourag ed trad e with

China because the norm alization of econom ic relations would c ontribute to the overall U.S.-

China detente. In 1972, the Nixon adm inistration established a new Bureau of East-West Trade

within the Departm ent of Commerce. According to William Clarke, direc tor of PRC aff airs in

the new bureau, trade with China was alm ost th e only task of its non-Soviet bloc branches,

15 "Trade with Red China," March 1972, Record Group, Governor Daniel Evans, Commerce, Box 2S-2-635, WSA. 16 Sidney Sweet, "We Should Try to Do Business with the Chinese Even If We Are Unsuccessful," in Trade With China: An AMA Research Report, pp. 33-37.

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because during the 1970 s trade with other Communist countries that fell within the jurisd iction

was basically non-existent. 17 The Bureau imm ediately started to promote trade with Chin a among Am erican businesses. "Tra de between our two countries has m ore than just econom ic significance. Or even if the volum e of trade re mained statistic ally m icroscopic—which is no t likely—there are advantages to be derived from focusing attention on it," a report argued. "Trade negotiations by private Am erican firm s m ay prove to be an especially significant arena for building mutual trust and confidence."18

The Nixon adm inistration's emphasis on the politic al implications of U.S.-China trade was widely shared by private Am erican business peopl e. In fact, Am erican traders had to cover up their eagerness to do business with China by adopting a "correct" po litical attitude toward the ir

Chinese counterparts. Otherwise, as Victor L i wrote, "the Chinese would see the ' typical' ugly

American capitalist who thinks money creates access to all things and who lacks any sensitivity

to Chinese preferences for m ethods of doing busi ness, particularly the preference for gradually and slowly building relations with trade partners rather than for plunging headlong into large dealings with whatever stranger com es along offering handsome sums of money." The "correct" attitude, therefore, was to show sympathy for and understanding of C hinese achievements first, and to indicate genuin e willingnes s to become China's friends. "[If] m any of the Am erican

'ambassadors'...perform well, they not only will ec onomically benefit them selves but also will help pave the way for i mproved political relations between the countries." 19 The "correc t"

17 Interview with William Clarke, NCUSCT, Box 373, GFPL. 18 "US Trade Prospect with the PRC," December 1972, NCUSCT, Box 4, GFPL. 19 Victor Li, "Trade with China: A Cautionary Prospect," in Arthur A. Stahnke, eds., China's Trade with the West: A Political and Economic Analysis (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), pp. 209-211.

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attitude toward trade with China would not only avoid creating m isunderstandings between the

two sides, but also would give America the long- term leverage of influencing China' s future

development. "The Chinese now are where the Russians were in 1925," Sam uel Pisar, another

China trade prom oter, argued. "The first flush of revolution is over. They have the problem of

industrialization. They cannot do it by them selves. They tried in a romantic and unscientific way

and it didn't work....By bringing [the Chinese] back into the worl d market, by helping them with

the know-how to build cars, refr igerators, washing m achines, we m ake their society m ore

complex. The force of their prosperity pushes them in the right direction."20

While the American business community was d eliberating on the future of China trade, the

Chinese government was also going through internal policy reevaluations. Those reevaluations proved th at the Am erican business community was right regarding the importance of foreign trade to China' s modernization. Indeed, foreign trade became an ideal field for Zhou Enlai and other "moderate" Chinese leaders to start the process of readjusting the ra dical Maoist model of modernization. As discussed in chapter 3, Zhou, backed by Mao him self, began since the late

1960s to curb the excessive influe nce of the Cultural Revolution on China's foreign trade. Zhou

had two m ajor concerns. First, he was worried about the dam age done to China' s international

prestige by the "radicals," who not only denoun ced foreign trade as a veh icle of resto ring

capitalism in China, bu t also subje cted f oreign traders wh o trave led to China to hum iliating political indoctrinations. Second, Zhou was worried about the disruption of China's foreign trade

itself. Although the absolute volume of China's foreign trade was small, it was still the only way

20 "China Trade: A New US Policy," 28 April 1971, WSJ.

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to acquire badly needed technologies and foreign currency for China' s economic development.

Therefore, foreign trade became one of the first areas that saw the Cultural Revolution waning.

When the U.S.-China rapprochement started, a m ore relaxed enviro nment was created

which allowed the "m oderates" to launch a comp rehensive campaign aimed at resetting China's

foreign trade policies. On June 5, 1971, Zhou Enla i issued a circular to foreign trade-related

ministries and provincial departments, which urged the resto ration of trading traditional Chinese

craftworks with other countries. During the peak of the Cu ltural Revolution, both the production

and trading of traditio nal craftwo rks were forbidden o n the ground that they represen ted

"reactionary" cultural elem ents harmful to people' s "revoluti onary spirit." Now, Zhou spoke

confidently that it was wrong to attach such id eological importance to traditional craftworks.

Instead, Zhou pointed out that th e unique cu ltural elem ents cont ained in Chines e craftworks

made them highly competitive in the world market. Thus, China should promote trade with other

countries on Chinese craftworks in exchange for foreign currency. 21 On July 26, Zhou further

expressed his dissatisfaction with the current stat e of China' s f oreign trade. "The total yea rly foreign trade value is o nly about $ 400 million," Zhou observed. "This is unacceptable." Zhou then asked Li Xiannian and Yu Qiuli, two officials in charge of economic planning, to im prove

this situation.22

In late 1971, Li and Yu presided over a nati onal meeting on foreign trade, the first of its

kind since the Cultural Revolution, to discuss a new comprehensive plan. This m eeting turned

21 "On Exporting Craftworks," 5 June 1971, 302-1-282, GDA. 22 Record of National Meeting on Foreign Trade, 1971, 324-2-110, GDA.

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out to be a none-too-veiled attack on the foreign trade polices of the "radicals." It was wrong, the meeting res olved, to ar gue tha t "f oreign trad e is unnece ssary" and "f oreign trad e will lead to revisionism." Instead, the m eeting concluded that f oreign trade w as cruc ial f or China' s modernization. Yu Qiuli, for exa mple, pointed out that "foreign trade is not purely about doing business. I t is a politica l tool, beca use it is im portant for our socialist construction." He then argued that China should expand the im portation of strategic raw m aterials such as rubber and copper, as well as advanced m achines and equi pment. By doing so, China could save tim e and money in achieving full industrialization. Li Xiannian expressed similar views, adding that it was wrong to argue that foreign trade would develop at the expense of domestic needs. "Self-reliance is not self-isolation," Li insisted. "A nd we can n ot ignore foreign m arkets. It is not n ecessary to satisfy domestic needs first and th en export our products. In fact, w e should ' squeeze' the domestic market a little bit to develop our export." The meeting adopted seven new policies.

First, China should prom ote exportation of agricultural products and anim al by-products.

Second, China should establish special production bases for cash crops. Third, for som e industries, China should im port raw m aterials and then export finished goods. Fourth, China should develop foreign trade in trad itional craf tworks. Fifth, China should use trad e fairs and other means to promote foreign trade, and should pay attention to feedback from other countries in order to improve the quality of goods for export. Sixth, China should keep a good balance between domestic and foreign trade. Finally, Ch ina should have institutional reforms to support production for foreign trade.23

23 Ibid.

349

On Dece mber 4, Zhou Hua min, Vice Foreign Tr ade Minister, called for a m eeting i n

Guangzhou to im plement those new policies. Zhou again emphasized that "s elf-reliance is not self-isolation." He especially wanted the Province of Guang dong to develop foreign trade, since it was the leader in that aspect. Zho u argued th at the current value of China' s export was only about two percent of China's total GDP. Thus the potential of China's foreign trade was still to be realized. For him, China now faced a unique opport unity. Ever since the initiation of U.S.-China rapprochement, Zhou observed, more and more countries rushed to establish diplomatic relations with China and solicited trade. China should take advantage of this situ ation to develop trade relations with other countries, especially adva nced capitalist countries. At the sam e time, Zhou cautioned against being too optimistic. "Foreign trade is different from domestic trade, " he said:

"in foreign trade, there is competition in the market. If we don't improve the quality and style of our goods, we won't be able to sell in the international market."24

From early 1971 on, therefore, China gradually started to reevaluate its foreign trade

policies. Although we do not have a comprehensive view regarding those new policies due to the

lack of prim ary sources, we can still reach so me reasonable conclusions . On the one hand, the

new trade policies clearly sought to reduce the hea vy political im plications attached to foreign

trade du ring the Cultu ral Revolutio n. The f act th at Chin ese trade officials cou ld openly tal k about "doing business for m oney" or "com petition in the market" indi cated a more relaxed political environm ent in China. On the othe r hand, the new trade polices em phasized the economic importance of foreign trade. Chinese tr ade officials started to stress the potential

24 Meeting Record, 4 December 1971, 324-2-110, GDA.

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contributions of foreign trade to China' s m odernization. In sum , while the Am erican business

community was specula ting abou t trade with Ch ina, the Chinese were prep aring their own

theoretical grounds for trade with the United States.

U.S.-China Trade and Its Problems: 1972-1975

The period between 1972 and 1975 can be regarded as the first stage of direct U.S.-China

trade. While trade was resum ed in 1971, it was in 1972 that the bilateral trade really becam e a

two-way activity and Am erican business people started to v isit China in large num bers. From

1972 onward, U.S.-China trade developed quickly in terms of the rate of growth, although the

absolute value of bilateral trade was s mall. In 1975, however, bilateral trade dropped

dramatically. 25 Meanwhile, Am erican traders and their Chinese coun terparts form ed new

perceptions of each other and adjus ted their trade strategies accordingly. The first stage of direct

trade, therefore, both tested the strength of the new Sino-American economic bond and paved the way for future trade relations.

For the American business comm unity, the good news of 1972 was that China finally decided to invite Am erican business people to visit the Canton Fair. Th e Canton Fair had been

held twice annually since it was started in the spring of 1957. Held in the spring (April-May) and

autumn (October-November), the event accounted for 30 to 50 perc ent of China's total foreign

25 U.S.-China Trade, 1971-75 ($ Million) Year US Exports US Imports Total 1971 0 4.9 4.9 1972 63.5 32.4 95.9 1973 740.2 64.9 805.1 1974 819.1 114.7 933.8 1975 303.6 158.3 461.9 Source: US China Business Review, Mar-April 1976.

351

trade. Over 50 percent of China 's total exports were sold there. The Canton Fair was thus the

most im portant business event for China traders. In addition, for Americ an traders and other

countries' traders, the fair was a un ique opportunity to meet face-to-face with representatives of

China's trading corporations and to conduct pr actical business negotiations. It was also a good

opportunity for American importers to have a first-hand look at Chinese products that might have

a market in the United States, since the fair was also an exhibition.

For American traders, the journey to the Canton Fair was more than a pure business trip.

Without exception, they believed they were m aking history. "It is clear that the C hinese are

going to in vite on ly th ose whom they think a re im portant to China," an Am erican business

executive who went to the 1972 Spring Fair report ed. "I think m ost of the Am ericans who were

invited to the Canton Fair, except for the representatives from the chambers of comm erce, had a

long history of doing business with China or had been working toward an im provement in the

relationships between our two countries." Th e proud business executive then announced that

"they gave us VIP treatment."26 Julian Sobin, chief executive of Sobin Chemicals, also thought a

new age of U.S.-China relations had started. "W e Americans got the message," he declared: "the

magic and profit-m aking had been hidden from us long enough; this wa s the world of China

Trade, swirling with rumor and reality."27

The excitement among American traders was certainly not surprising. For most of them, the

trip to the Canton Fair itself was more important than the actual business deals achieved, at least

26 B.T. Rocca, "A Report from the Canton Trade Fair," in Boarman, eds., Trade With China, pp. 114-115. 27 Julian Sobin, "Pilgrimage to the Canton Fair," 1972, RG40, General Record of the Department of Commerce, Office of the Secretary, 1953-1974, Box 352, NA II.

352

initially. Now they finally had a chance to do busi ness with China firsthand, and they could test

all the advice given by the China trade prom oters. Most of them found it essential to establish

"friendly" relations with the Chin ese before the actual conduct of business. In order to do so, for

example, a representative for Alexander's told the Chinese that her store was "the people's store"

and now "we will start to walk tog ether, bu t li ke child ren we will tr ip m any tim es." Another

group of buyers from New York were so excited about their experiences in China that "they

sound m ore like children suddenly let loose in Santa's workshop" than m ature executives. 28

Indeed, the excitem ent softened the tough nego tiating tactics of Am erican traders. "Maybe because I'm so grateful that I'm there," Da vid Cookson of I CD Group recalled, "no matter how many times I've been there for some reason I g et into a m ood...that they've accorded m e some great honor by allowing m e to negotiate with them, to go to their country and so forth and then everything falls into place and I yield too quickly and I don' t negotiate quite as ha rd as I do in other places and I forgive m ore easily when they're late in shipments or materials which doesn't quite come up in standard."29

Despite all the excitement, however, American traders developed mixed feelings toward the

China market. Most important, they were unable to take the initiative in bilatera l trade because

the Chinese only allowed American traders to participate the Canton Fair as invitees. Am ericans

had no way to know the Chinese criteria of selecti on, and some of them were even surprised that

they were chosen. Julian Sobin, for exam ple, wondered why he was in vited to the 1972 Spring

28 "To China and Back," 18 May 1972, NYT. 29 Interview with David Cookson, NCUSCT, Box 373, GFPL.

353

Canton Fair on his way to China. T he only reason he thought credible wa s that his com pany, a large chemical producer, might be regarded as "useful" to China's economy. Sobin thus decided to try his best by following the trade promoters' advice. Unable to sell his products to the Chinese during the Spring Fair, Sobin nevertheless pu rchased $400,000 worth of Chinese chem ical products. A fter he returned, his office kept a lmost daily communications with the Chinese.

Finally, Sobin was rewarded in the 1972 Fall Canton Fair, when he sold $600,000 worth of unspecified inorganic chemicals to the Chinese. The total trade with China in 1972 would reach

$4 million, representing 9 percent of the company's entire business.30

The success story of Sobin Chem icals, as well as other successful trade deals, was both

confusing and encouraging to fellow Am erican trad ers. They were kept in the dark, since the

Chinese were unwilling to provide information that would illuminate China's trade operations. At

the same time, the general pattern of the Chinese traders' behavior convinced the Americans that

China was carefully co ordinating its foreign trade according to its modernization blueprint.

When the Chinese found som ething that could cont ribute to China' s modernization, they would

move quickly and negotiate hard to seal a deal. For American traders, this pattern proved that the

foundation of the new bilateral trade was so lid and soun d. For example, W allace Chavkin,

another American invitee to the Canton Fair, c oncluded that "under its fourth Five-Year Plan,

which ends in 1975, China plans to modernize its steel, machinery, automobile, and shipbuilding industries, in addition to developing its air, overland, and maritime transportation systems. All of

30 "Canton Autumn Fair Marks Breakthrough in Sino-US Trade," 24 November 1972, RG40, Office of the Secretary, 1953-1974, Box 352.

354

these are areas in which the United S tates could be actively participating—trade areas that could

mean substantial business for our country."31

The American traders' feeling of being used as a pawn in the Chinese grand foreig n trade

strategy was justified by China' s own planning. On March 22, 1972, the Chinese Foreign Trade

Ministry iss ued an instruction en titled “On U. S.-China Trade,” which aim ed to set the basic

framework f or bila teral trade with Am erica. T his ins truction ref lected the m ixed trend in th e

development of China's trade policies toward America. On the one hand , it reflected the internal

debate since 1971, which suggested a m ore relaxed trade policy and the decoupling of politics

from foreign trade. On the other hand, it m ade clear that trade with Am erica was closely

associated with the overall state of U.S.-China relations. “Trade with America must be conducted

on the basis of equality and recipr ocity," the instruction dictated. "The progress of trade will be

decided by Am erica’s attitude to ward us.” At the sam e tim e, the instruction hinted that the

ideological tone associated with foreign trad e in the past should be watered down. Besides

inviting American traders “who have been friendly to China,” the Canton Fair should also invite

“representatives of the monopoly groups who can provide advanced t echnologies to China.”

Chinese delegates could feel free to offer certain goods not on the trading list com posed

beforehand if asked by American traders. The instruction also urged Chinese traders to study the

rules of international trade. “W hen dealing w ith Am ericans, we m ust study their m arket and

business practices,” the instructi on read: “we m ust pay attention to the quality of our goods and

31 Wallace Chavkin, "The Canton Trade Fair, " in William W. Whitson, eds., Doing Business with China: American Trade Opportunities in the 1970s (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), p. 419

355

observe the contacts strictly.” Mo re im portantly, the instruc tion m ade it clear that trade with

America was going to be planned and controlled by central authorities. China wante d to s ell its

products to Am erica as mu ch as possible, but it would "stric tly control im ports from America"

and China would "import advanced technologies first."32

While the C hinese were cautious in their in itial dealing with Am erican traders, they were

quite optimistic about the future of Sino-American trade. The reason can be found in the Chinese

perception of the world market in general and the American market in particular. On April 5, for

example, the Foreign Trade M inistry urged its local branches to take advantage of the cu rrent

situation in world markets to develop China's foreign trade. According to a research report issued

on that day, 1972 was going to be a year of "econom ic crisis in the capitalist world." The report

predicted three trends in the world market. First, the economic growth rate of the capitalist world

would slow down dram atically, with a high rate of inflation and unem ployment. Second, there would be fierce competition among America, Western European countries, and Japan for foreign markets. Finally, the dollar-based currency system would becom e unstable. This situation, the report concluded, would position China advantageously in international trade. Here, the authors also assumed that China was a m arket that the West sim ply could not resist. "The Nixon visit paved the w ay for direct U.S.-China trade," th ey argued. "Although we are not yet prepared to have a grea t leap in th e bilateral trade, they (American traders) were crying for doing business

32 “On U.S.-China Trade,” 22 March 1972, 324-2-117, GDA.

356

with us." China, therefore, should grasp the opportunity to "buy low" in the world market for raw

materials and machines that China did not produce.33

Chinese trade planners also found that the popul arity of Chinese products was rising in the

American market. "The wind of the ' China Thing' has already prevailed in Am erican society,"

another research report issued on April 7 declar ed. "The American people are friendly to China

and they are eager to learn m ore about China." Th e report identified six ar eas in the Am erican

market that could see growing demand for Chinese products. Firs t, American consumers "were

fascinated by Chinese apparels. " The report noticed that New York designers had displayed the

"Mao jacket" for m onths, and the retail pri ce was about $130. Even th e First Lady, Pat Nixon,

was a Chinese fashion f an, as sh e was featured on the cover of Ladies Home Journal wearing

Chinese style apparels. In addi tion, since early 1972, half of Am erica's importation of raw silk

came from China. Second, som e Chinese light industrial products were selling well in the

American market. The report s ingled out Chinese bicycles, table tenn is equipment, and panda toys as prominent examples. Third, China's traditional craftworks were welcomed, and the report observed that m any Am erican departm ent stores opened special "C hina counters." Fourth,

Chinese food becam e "hot" again, and m any Chinese culinary schools were estab lished. Fifth, some Chine se agricultural products and raw ma terials found a ready m arket in Am erica, and

Chinese pig bristles immediately became the major commodity in that category. Sixth, the report was amazed to discover that the "China Thing" created a new industry in America as it produced

33 "The Prospect of Trade of the Capitalist World in 1972 and Its Influence on Our Trade," 5 April 1972, 324-2-118, GDA.

357

many "China trade consultants" overnight. In conclusion, the repor t anticipated th at trade with

America would continue to grow.34

The Chinese percep tion of the American m arket and the p otential of trade with Am erica thus convinced planners that China could control the initiative in bilateral trade. In addition, they were fully aware of the "dangers" of a world market dominated by the free-market principle and capitalist rules of trade. It seemed that they had a particular concern about the negative impact on

China if China was drawn into the international trade on America's terms. For example, on April

21, the Foreign Trade Ministry and the People' s Bank of China issued a joint instruction regarding the exchange rate betw een the US dollar and the Chinese RMB. The rate was set at 1 dollar/2.673 RMB. Chinese trader s m ust follow this exchange rate strictly. Moreover, the concern was that the floating dolla r values in the world m arket, if allowed to h ave a role in bilateral trade, would cause "unnecessary loss" fo r China. Thus, the instruction dictated that

China should use dollars when buying from Am erica, and Am erican traders m ust use RMB in buying from China. Meanwhile, direct transactio ns between American banks and Chinese banks were forbidden.35

In sum, Chinese planners were both confident that trade with American would grow steadily and cautious in carrying out specific trade ne gotiations. The result of the 1972 Spring Canton

Fair further confirmed the Chines e perception of the basic p attern of U.S.-China trade. Chinese traders wer e pleased to f ind that "Am erican traders expr essed the ir willingn ess to prom ote

34 "The China Thing in American Market," 7 April 1972, 324-2-118, GDA. 35 "On Payment of Balance in US-China Trade," 21 April 1972, 324-2-117, GDA.

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friendly relations between the tw o countries and were serious in their negotiations with us."

American traders sh owed interes t in a wide range of Chinese products, especially in raw

materials such as pig bristles, feathers, leathe rs, and pine rosins. M eanwhile, many Americans

tried to sell their products to China, includi ng electronic products, machines, chem icals, and

other technologies. "This situation proved that American traders were eager to develop trade with us," the after-fair report concluded. However, Chinese trader s also had several disappointments.

Many Am ericans were m erely testing the wate r despite their expressed enthusiasm about

bilateral tra de. As a re sult, the v alue of actu al trad e deals was not as high as ex pected. This

result, however, was not com pletely a surprise. "We invited m any representatives of American

chambers of commerce to com e to the fair," th e report pointed out. "The goal was to prom ote a

generally favorable atmosphere for trade, not to conduct specific negotiations." The Chinese, nonetheless, did discover som e conc rete barriers for trade. For one thing, US tariffs were too

high for som e Chinese products to be com petitive in the A merican market, since China did not

enjoy MFN status. W hile this was understandable from the Am erican perspective, the Chinese

thought the high tariff was a "discr imination" against Chinese goods . For the future , the report

recommended several measures. First, China should "strengthen propaganda campaigns aimed at

American m erchants." By doing so, China could "educate" Am ericans about the Chinese

economy and could generate support am ong Americans for lowering the US tariff on Chinese

goods. Second, China should do m ore research about the Am erican market to learn about US

tariffs and other rules. Finally, China should not rely on experiences gained from trade with other

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capitalist countries to deal with Am erican m erchants. The Am erican m arket, the report concluded, "had its unique features."36

American traders h arbored s imilar feelings about the "un ique f eatures" of the Ch inese market. W hile the exc itement of doing business w ith C hina con tinued, Am ericans wer e frustrated by their Chinese counter parts. They quickly realized th at they were not dealing with

Chinese bus iness peop le, but Chines e trad e official s. In th eory as well as in pra ctice, f oreign trade in China was controlled by th e Foreign Trade Ministry. The Ministry had eight m ajor

Foreign Trade Corporations (FTGs). Each FTG, in return, controlled a sp ecific trade area, such as machinery, raw m aterials, agricultural produ cts, and so forth. In addition, the China Council for Promotion of International Tr ade (CCPIT), a sem i-official organization associated with the

Ministry, functioned as a go-betwee n in the direct U.S.-China tr ade, because the two countries did not have official diplom atic relations. Thus, in most cases Americans had to neg otiate with representatives of the CCPIT, an d sign contra cts with the FTGs. This Chinese tr ade structure, obviously, was frustrating and c onfusing to many Americans. For one thing, the Am ericans had trouble telling the ranks am ong the Chinese nego tiators, since they all wore sim ilar "Mao jackets" and they usua lly skipped over titles during intr oductions. As one American trader complained, "You don' t know if the guy sitting acr oss the table from you is top brass or a flunky."37 A more experienced British trader even played a prank on one American trader during the 1972 Canton Fair. When the American newcomer asked an English veteran of the fair how to

36 "Spring Canton Fair and US-China Trade," 10 May 1972, 324-2-118, GDA. 37 Letter, November 1975, NCUSCT, Box 188, GFPL.

360

tell from the identical Chinese mode of dress which members of a Chinese group had the highest

rank, "the Englishm an solem nly told the newcom er that the m ost i mportant m en wore white

socks, provoking many peeks under the table."38

The confusing Chinese trade hierarchy bewild ered m any newcom ers. Yet th is pa rticular

problem was dwarfed by another one: the Chin ese eva siveness du ring negotiatio ns. Chinese

traders, in line with their pre-m ade instructions, did everything they could during the early stage of negotiation to find infor mation from the Am ericans without m aking firm comm itments. For the Americans, however, the Chinese lack of di rectness and transparency was frustrating. "God,

I've had 30 cups of tea today," one American fairgoer complained. "If I have any more I'm going to float into the hotel. " Every tim e the Am erican raised a tough or direct question, the Chinese politely offered him a cup of tea without giving him any useful inform ation.39 Another trader

participated in the following discussion when he wanted to buy from the Chinese: "Do you have

any Tibet plates? No. Do you have any kolinsk y? No. Do you have any rabbits? No. Do you

have any calgans? No. Well, what do you ha ve for sale? What do you want to buy?" 40 American

traders quickly discovered that the Chinese evasiv eness was deeply roo ted in th e Chinese trade

structure, b ecause m any on-site Chinese repres entatives sim ply lacked authority to m ake

decisions that would deviate from pre-made instructions.

The list of American traders' grievances was indeed long, but in general Americans had two

major concerns during the first stage of U.S.-China trade. First, the s elf-reliance principle of the

38 Stanley Lubman, "Misconceptions Abound On All Sides," 9 December 1985, Financial Times. 39 "US Businessmen Find Haggling With Chinese Is Exhausting Work," 2 November 1972, WSJ. 40 David Buxbaum, "Negotiating With the Chinese," in Boarman, eds., Trade With China, p. 111.

361

Chinese economy constituted a barrier for Am erican exports to China. While China obviously wanted advanced technologies fr om America, under the self-reliance principle the Chinese only imported from America when necessary. American traders were especially disappointed to learn that China sim ply would not buy consum er goods from them. "Clearly, consum er goods aren't high on the list of goods China hopes to acquire from the U.S.," the Wall Street Journal concluded. "The Chinese aren't much interested in such 'frills,' and they feel they produce enough consumer goods of their own." For Am ericans, therefore, the crucial step to further consolidate the U.S.-China trade was to m ake the Chinese interested in purchasing such consumers goods as washing m achines, air-conditioners, and TV sets that Americans took for granted. In other words, whether or not China would buy those consum er goods wa s an im portant indicator of how far China would drift away from the self-reliance principle.41

Another American concern was whether or not the Chinese would eventually do business in the "Am erican way," which, not surprisingly, was also regarded by Am erican traders as the

"standard" way of doing business. For one thing, as Jerome Cohen pointed out, "the most striking thing to the newcom er to the Chinese business environment and legal envi ronment is there's no ready proof that China has a lega l system in the conve ntional western sense. " As a result, the

Chinese preferred short contracts, and they were suspicious about the ro le of arbitration and insurance in bilate ral tr ade. W hen there were di sputes or violations of contracts, the Chinese preferred settling the problems by "friendly discussions." The Chinese were also reluctant to take credits or loans in foreign trade, because they b elieved that debt occurred in trade w ould render

41 "US Businessmen Find Haggling With Chinese Is Exhausting Work," 2 November 1972, WSJ.

362

China dependent on "f oreign m asters." Thus they were p articularly e ager to m aintain ba lance

between exports and imports. Ne ither did the Chinese really understand the rules of the

American m arket. Besides the co mplaint abo ut the high US tarif fs, another major Chines e

grievance was about the regulations of the US Food and Drug Adm inistration (FDA). Although

American traders tried to assure th e Chinese th at the rules of FDA were applied eq ually to all countries that were exporting to Am erica, the Chinese insisted that FDA was "created" to discriminate against Chinese goods. China also failed to understand the importance of packaging in the American market. American buyers frequently discovered that damage to their goods such as glassware or craftworks was inevitable due to improper packaging. In short, the Chinese had a long way to go to become real "businesslike" in the eyes of American traders.42

The problems of the U.S.-China trade did not discourage American traders. On the contrary,

the Am erican in terest in th e Chin a trade co ntinued to g row. Meanwhile, lead ing Am erican

business people and concerned public officials st arted to argue that Am erican traders m ust

organize themselves to deal with the obvious problem s. As a result, in May 1973, the National

Council for U.S.-China Trade, in later years renam ed the U.S.-China Business Council, was established. The National Council was supposed to be an "unoffi cial" organization, although in fact the Nixon administration played a key role in its formation and continued to provide it with policy supp ort af ter its initiation. 43 T he organizers wanted the National Council to becom e a

major player in the China trade, although they did not expect that the Council would monopolize

42 Interview with Jerome Cohen, William Clarke, David Cookson, NCUSCT, Box 373, GFPL. 43 See discussions on NSSM 149 in Chapter 5.

363

U.S.-China trade. On April 16, 1973, for exam ple, Kissinger told the secretary of comm erce that

"much of the ef fort in the commercial f ield will be focused here in Washington, in both the

National Council for U.S.-China Trade and the Liaison Office of the PRC." 44 The major task of

the National Council was to provide service and co llect information for its members, and it also

started a major trade journal, the US China Business Review.

Christopher Phillips, president of the National Council until 1986, later recalled that intense

American interest in the China trade m ade th e council an imm ediate star in the business community. When he asked the bo ard of directors for "guidance" in his new job, the response was: "You know Chris, just to develop our trade and econom ic relations with the People' s

Republic of China." Phillips, onc e a career f oreign service o fficer and the son of an Am erican diplomat who served in China during WW I, certainly understood that "fascination for China and things Chinese has had a particular impact on Americans" and he immediately devoted himself to the council' s work. 45 However, the sim ple "guidance" turn ed out to be inadequate, which the

National Council soon discovered when it mobilized its resources to overcome the trade barriers

aforementioned.

From the ve ry beginning, the council leaders re alized that trade had political significance

for the overall U.S.-China relationship. More impor tantly, Americans saw trade as a m ajor tool

to influence China' s future m odernization. Through the work of the National Council, Am erica

sought "a norm alization of econom ic relations with [China]...we see econom ic interdependence

44 Memo, Kissinger to secretary of Commerce, 16 April 1973, RG40 Office of the Secretary, 1953-1974, Box 352. 45 Oral History of Christopher Phillips, FAOHC.

364

as a gr eat force for peace," William Casey f rom the State Departm ent told his aud ience during

the first Council m eeting. Trade with China woul d "bring into an econom ic equation which will

require scaling down the comm itment to arm s as it becom es necessary to expand the

commitment to trade and developm ent," Casey argued. " We believe that a world situ ation in

which China is prospering and improving the life of its citizens is as important to us as it is to the rest of th e world. Trad e is one of the ways to f urther this objec tive."46 Lucian Py e, anoth er

speaker at the m eeting, agreed. "T rade is one of, if not the, most effective bridges between our

very different social sys tems." For Pye, Am ericans actually only faced one customer in China,

that is, the Chinese gov ernment. He argued that given China's "disciplined, skilled, and cheap

labor" and the "great need for modern technology," that customer would eventually become more

flexible regarding its self-reliance principle. No doubt, he envisioned American traders to play a

leading role in bringing this about.47

The council' s m ission, in fact, found ready supporters am ong m any pr ominent Am erican

public figures. Senator Warren Magnuson was a typi cal example. Despite the negative im pact of

his visit of China in Ju ly 1973, as discussed in chapter 5, he wa s an enthusiastic promoter of the

China trade. In Beijing, he told Zhou Enlai that “the door for American trade with China is wide

open—if we can just figure out a way to walk through it.” The Chinese showed obvious intere st

in his proposals, but they also ar ticulated their concerns: lack of cheap credits and lack of MFN

status. Still, Magnuson cam e back w ith the impression that the fu ture of U.S.-C hina trade was

46 Speech by William Casey, 31 May 1973, NCUSCT, Box 4, GFPL. 47 Speech by Lucian Pye, 31 May 1973, ibid.

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promising. “Trade is more than an exchange of goods,” he pointed out. “It is an exchange of

ideas. It sets up the basic st ructure…for genuinely peaceful relations between nations.”

Magnuson thus argued that “when we talk about trade…we must talk in the long range.” To him, the two countries’ economies could become complementary: China needed agricultural products, machines, airplanes, and other techn ologies from the United States while Am erica could find a vast market in China. Magnuson thus decided to work toward granting China MFN status and long-term comm ercial credits. 48 Meanwhile, Magnuson urged farm ers in his hom e state—

Washington State—to produce more wheat for the China trade. “They want our wheat. Perhaps if

we can start growing it from fence to fence, th ere’ll be enough to sell them while taking care of

the regular custom ers in the Far East.” 49 W hen a constituen t rem inded him that “a lot of the

wheat country in W ashington is unf enced” and “ government long-range action was initiated to

take wheat land out of production” due to soil erosion problems, Magnuson responded that he

already had asked Congress to provide funds to “develop a special kind of wheat which would be

both marketable and which cou ld be planted early enough in the year to hold soil in place, thu s

protecting it against spring runoff.”50

While Magnuson was thinking about selling wh eat to China, the National Council focused

on "educating" the Chinese on doing business in the American way. In Novem ber 1973, the

Council sent its firs t delegation to China. In Beijing, William Batten, chairm an of JC Penney,

reminded his host of "the need for China to addre ss itself to such m atters as id entification of

48 “A Special Report from Senator Warren Magnuson,” July 1973, Warren G. Magnuson Papers (WMP), AN 3181-5, Box 60, Special Collections, University of Washington Libraries, Seattle, WA. 49 Warren Magnuson, “China Trip,” July 1973, ibid. 50 Letters between Magnuson and a farmer from Washington State, July 1973, ibid.

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market opportunities for specific Chinese exports, identification of product requirements in terms

of quality, design and pr icing, and a pplication of certain federal and sta te laws and r egulations with respect to product safety and consum er information." William Hewitt, chair o f Deere and

Company, told the C hinese that they would "need to have reciprocal exchanges of information."51 The Chinese might resent the Americans lecturing them on how to conduct trade,

but they clearly looked to the National Council for supervision of Americans companies. The

CCPIT naturally became the National Council' s counterpart, but the Chinese were unable to

understand that in fact the counc il did not have the authority th ey assumed it had. Nevertheless,

the council was encouraged by the Chinese attitude, because at least China was willing to listen.

As a result, council leaders and staff m embers decided to help the Chinese as m uch as possible.

For example, one staffer wrote that "I really think we should help the Chinese screen some of the

Fair goers." She m eant that the council shou ld run credit checks and gather necessary

information for the Chinese. In other words, the Council, perhaps unconsciously, assumed a role

of patronage toward the Chinese.52

Between its inauguration and 1975, the Nati onal Council achieved lim ited success in

"educating" the Chinese. On the one hand, the early problem s in the China trade persisted. For

example, the Chinese lack of understanding of th e American market was still a m ajor problem.

"Often difficulties in the clothing trade stem from a lack of unde rstanding of the other country' s

market," an Am erican trader repo rted. "The gu lf between the m ultifarious world o f ' Seventh

51 "Council Delegation in Peking," Jan-Feb 1974, US China Business Review (CBR) 52 "First Annual Report," June 1974, NCUSCR, Box 177, GFPL; Letter, 13 May 1975, NCUSCR, Box 188, GFPL.

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Avenue' and the Chinese ethics of fruga lity, modesty and pr acticality is v ast."53 The Chinese

suspicion of foreign econom ic "exploitation" co ntinued to be powerful. Chinese food producers

still refused to use American labels on their products because "they wish to develop a US market

for Chinese brands and not becom e anonym ous s uppliers to large whol esale houses or retail

chains."54 The Chinese also set their prices too high and, more annoying to American traders, the

Chinese had the same price for wholesalers and re tailers. "In market economies, this problem is ordinarily s olved in the m arketplace," an Am erican trader lam ented. "In Chin a, foreign trade apparatus is presently too inflexible to accommodate these varied pricing demands."55

On the other hand, American traders also percei ved greater flexibility on the Chinese side

and a slow shif t of China trad ers to f ollow the American way of doing business. For exam ple,

Americans at the Fall 1973 Fair "found the Chinese to be more accommodating and more willing

to complete negotiations on an expedited basis than at any tim e previously. Prices were higher,

but [there was] little complaining among Americans about prices." 56 At the same time, "both the

Light indus tries and Textiles corpo rations have increasing ly shown willingn ess to m odify the

design of their products for Am erican m arket conditions." 57 The Chi nese even invited an

America fashion designer into China to h elp design apparels for the Am erican market. "I posit

that the Chinese should study what can be m ade and make adoptions, then work out a m arketing

method," the designer reported, and she thought her hosts took her advice well.58

53 "Fashion Goods From China," Mar-Apr 1974, CBR. 54 "The Spring 1974 Canton Fair," ibid. 55 "The Spring 1974 Canton Fair," Jul-Aug 1974, CBR. 56 "How to Start Imports From China," Jan-Feb 1974, CBR. 57 "An Importers Introduction to the Canton Fair," ibid. 58 "An American Market Designer Visits China," Nov-Dec 1974, CBR.

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The m ixed trend in Chinese trade behavio r encou raged the Americans m ore th an

discouraged them. That China was becom ing more and more willing to a dhere to the American

way of doi ng business, no m atter how slowly, wa s actually the best result Am erican trad ers could achieve during the first stag e of direct U.S.-China trade. At le ast the p roblems were

identified and efforts were m ade to overcom e th e trade b arriers inherent in the C hinese trade

structure. Indeed, the N ational Council leaders star ted to see that they were help ing to build a

marketing m entality among their Chinese count erparts. However, whether or not their

"educational" campaign would achie ve full success still depended on C hinese trade practices in

the coming years.59

Toward the Maturation of U.S.-China Trade: 1975-1978

The time period between 1975 and 1978 can be regard ed as the second stage of direct U.S.-

China trad e, during which the b asic trad ing p attern was stabiliz ed a nd the Chinese tr aders increasingly started to a dhere to th e Am erican way of doing business. This stage was crucial because it not only helped the Chinese to reevaluate their self-reliance principle, but also helped to prepare for the new age of China' s m odernization know n as "open and reform ." After the

"open and refor m" policy was offi cially a nnounced in Decem ber 1978, Sino-American trade started to really "take off" as a result of the so-called "Foreign Great Leap Forward" under which

China rushed to im port, sometime blindly, fore ign technologies and consum er goods. The ne w age of U.S.-China trade after 1978, however, is beyond the scope of this chapter. The year 1975, on the other hand, should not be regarded as a clear and absolute watershed in U.S.-China trade,

59 "Importer's Note," 10 November 1974, NCUSCR, Box 73, GFPL.

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as total U.S.-China trade declined for the first time since direct trade was resum ed. But that was

partially because the impact of the "Second Cultu ral Revolution" did not fully m aterialize until

1975, and partially because of the stagnated wo rld market. The continued decline in 1976 both

reflected the world econom ic situation and Chin a's domestic problems caused by the passing of

Mao, Zhou, and other senior leaders. Once the "moderates" controlled power, however, U.S.-

China trade recovered quickly. In addition, during this stage of b ilateral trade, China gradually

started to have a trade d eficit vis-à-vis Am erica. The m ere fact that Ch ina came to tolerate an

unbalanced trade said a lot about the Chinese rethinking of self-reliance.60

For American traders, as discussed in the last section, the im age of China as a "frustrated

modernizer" was the source of confidence in the potential of the China market. But to realize the

potential, C hina m ust reevaluate its econom ic policies and abandon the Maoist m odel of

modernization emphasizing self-reliance. Transformed into specific trade practices, this required

China to abandon its insi stence on balanced trade and star t to purchase consum er goods, not

merely capital goods, from the United States. It al so required China to a dhere to the Am erican

standard of doing business, includ ing accep ting credits an d loans, following American legal

procedures, and launching aggres sive marketing campaigns. In fa ct, since the establishment of

the National Council for U.S.-China Trade, Am erican traders had been eager to look for signs of

60 U.S.-China Trade: 1975-1979 ($ Million) Year US Exports US Imports Total 1975 303.6 158.3 461.9 1976 135.4 201.9 337.3 1977 171.3 202.7 370.4 1978 818.2 324.1 1,147.7 1979 1,716.5 592.3 2,308.8 Source: CBR.

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changes in China's trade practices. In November 1973, for exam ple, the National Council sent a

delegation to China and had substantial talks with the Chinese. The talks focused on three major

topics: tradem ark, standard cont ract language, and arbitration ove r trade disputes. T he agenda

was set up by the Americans and the Chinese were willing to tag along. The Chinese appeared to be practical and did not raise a ny politica l or ideolog ical issues . Both sides agr eed tha t th ey would need to establish standa rd trade practices and legal pr ocedures. The Chines e, however, seemed willing to m odify their prac tice toward Am erican standards, an d they f requently asked the Am ericans to prov ide them with legal do cuments to b e used as “ models.” The Nationa l

Council reported that this trip was able to “estab lish a basic framework for future bilateral trade” and “it was very im portant for Am erican business that China would resp ect industrial property rights.”61

There were other signs of Chine se flexibi lity. For example, a China trade p romoter

observed in early 1974 that "the importance of foreign trade in the econom ic life of China

received a s ignificant boost in 1972-73 as a result of a decision by the Chinese governm ent to

accept larger and longer foreign cr edits than h itherto." Although trade was still deem ed as less

important than production and "tainted with capital ism," the promoter believed that "the strength

of commercial instincts in Ch ina" would push China to rethi nk its econom ic system sooner or later.62 In the 1974 Fall Canton Fair, it was observed that even th e lower ranking C hinese "for

the first time, show[ed] a faint interest in foreign marketing and canning technology."63

61 "Report of the Visit by the Delegation From the National Council to the PRC," 4-16 November 1973, NCUSCR, Box 36, GFPL. 62 Audrey Donnithome, "China's Foreign Trade System Changes Gear," Jan-Feb 1974, CBR. 63 "Kwangchow Diary," Nov-Dec 1974, CBR.

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Indeed, the connection between the discourse on China's modernization and th e future of

U.S.-China trade was p articularly f elt by som e Am erican trade rs who m anaged to estab lish

special relations with the Chinese leaders. The story of David J. Jaco bson is a good exam ple.

Jacobson was the chairman of Chi nese People’s Industries Corporation, an Am erican company

established shortly after Nixon’s Ch ina trip in anticipation of the China trade that would follow.

In July 1972, a newly established Chinese com pany, Sino American Export & Import Company,

contacted Jacobson, and decided to give his company exclusive m arketing rights for whatever it might produce in the future. Intr igued by this vague yet unusual message, Jacobson decided to talk with th e Chinese face-to -face and visited C hina in late 1973. For reasons unkno wn to him ,

he discovered that one tribute he had to pay to the Chinese was to bring two Am erican films just

for the personal pleasure of Jiang Qing. Still, he returned from China convinced that prospects

for trade were very prom ising. A survey of the Chinese economy, Jacobson reported, “indicates

in particular [the] PRC’s great need for technological and production assistance.” It was true that

the Chinese stressed self-reliance; “nevertheless, China is eager to trade with the U. S., realizing

that it is, d espite its size, an econ omically un derdeveloped country w hich becau se of its size

requires infinitely greater m anufacturing and m arketing capacitie s.” J acobson arg ued that “if

U.S. industry were to evaluate the PRC as a potential m arket under its present econom ic

conditions, then one would conclude that China is in fact a very minor customer.” Yet he was

optimistic about the future. “W ith its large pop ulation of over 800 m illion people with its larg e

untapped natural resources, with its position as an em erging major power, over the longer rang e

PRC indeed has great potential.” He then urg ed his f ellow traders to be patien t and to f irst

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develop a cultural understanding with the Chinese. Jacobson went further. “We are inclined to a strong belief that perhaps the m ost potent tool for assurin g peace and prosperity in Southeast

Asia as well as in the world is through harne ssing the economic power and strength of American industry itself and by directing this mobilized p roductivity toward helping to create and sustain economic viability within the PRC.” Given China’ s pride, the Chinese would not accept foreign aid provided by the US governm ent. Thus, Jacobs on argued that private Am erican industries must take upon themselves the job of achieving the goal laid out in his conclusion.64

Because of the favorable changes American traders perceived in their Chinese counterparts, therefore, the American business community was especially nervous when the "Second Cultural

Revolution" kicked off in 1974. They were rightly worried that this new backlash from the Left would turn back the clock. Howeve r, they were soon relieved wh en they found that the "Second

Cultural Revolution" only had lim ited impact on China's foreign trade policy. Am ericans who attended the 1974 Spring Canton Fa ir, for example, found that Chin a only invited importers, not exporters, from abroad. This clearly reflected Ji ang Qing's idea that China did not need foreign things. Yet the event w as still the largest Canton Fair ever, with m ore than 175 US fir ms attending. In general, "the curre nt cam paign to criticize Lin Pi ao and Confucius, so widely reported in the W estern press, was for practical purposes invisible to Fairgoers." Instead,

"negotiations conducted by the Chinese were f ree of political overtones which characterized

Fairs dur ing the Cultu ral Revolutio n." Moreover, "Am erican im porters were surp rised to see, among other things, ladies shoes in fashionable platform st yles, a growing selection of brass,

64 David J. Jacobson, “Report on Visit to China,” 1973, National Committee of U.S.-China Relations.

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woodwind and string instrum ents, hockey sticks with curved-wood blades , large varieties of

hand tools and transistor radi o." Clearly, the production of t hose things were unim aginable

during the peak of the Cultural Revolution.65

The American perception of the cha nges in China' s foreign trade was justified by C hina's internal deb ates. In f act, the Chine se in ternal debates which urged meas ures for "liberating"

China's rigid trade policy starte d in late l972. Those m easures, however, were more "radical" than the changes perceived by the Am ericans. This was not hard to understand. There was always a gap between mere policy debates and the implementation of those polices. Furthermore, for lower ranking Chinese trade officials, it was always safer to follow established polices than to take bold initiatives. In October 1972, for example, Li Xian nian started to em phasize the th esis that in foreign trad e “price should be decided by the m arket.” This was a "radical" thesis given that in the past price was decided and fixed by central economic planning agencies. Li pointed out that “we m ust respect the rules of suppl y and demand, and the price of goods should follow the ups and downs in the market.” In the past, the Chinese price was fixed simply by adding cost and profit. Profit, in return, was calculated by a fixed ratio based on cost. But recently, Li pointed out, China sold a garden stone, the cost of wh ich was m erely 100 RMB, at the price of 22,000

RMB. What should China m ake of this case? Li asked. Wouldn't this show that price should be decided by the m arket? Would this kind of pricing violate "socia list trade practice?" Li f urther argued that there was no need to worry about the im pact of i mported goods on the dom estic market, since trade could be com plementary to the domestic economy. Li thus urged Chinese

65 "The Spring 1974 Canton Fair," May-Jun 1974, CBR.

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delegates to be f lexible in trade negotiations.66 At the sam e time, the C hinese also decided to

expand trad e with America. In March 1973, the Foreign Trad e Minis try iss ued anoth er

instruction on U.S.-China trade. It ordered that China should expand the categories of trade with

America to include “m achines, in tegrated equipm ents, and high technologies, especially those related to oil productio n, telecom munication, and electronic tools.” Moreover, China was to import more consumer goods from America, including “grains, cottons, tobaccos, and cooking oils.”67 In the sam e month, Deng Xiaoping was rest ored to office. Chen Yun, a top econom ic

official, also regained power and im mediately started to take over the Canton Fair. He continued

to emphasize that “price should be determ ined by the market” and argued that “a certain degree

of flexibility in dec iding price according to th e market is not contradictory to Marxism .” As a

result, during the 1973 Canton Fairs, alm ost 90 percent of the commodities d id not have a fixed

price. The report after the fairs pointed out that “we must use the rules of the capitalist market to serve our own goals.”68

China increasingly attached m ore importance to trade with America. An early 197 4 report

proposed five steps for expanding trade with Am erica. First, China should increase dom estic

production of certain goods such as shoes to m eet Am erican dem and. Second, China should

adopt American standards on certain goods such as electronic components to open the American

market. Third, China should ship goods to America via H ong Kong instead of Japan to lower

66 Center of China Foreign Trade, Baijie Huihuang, 1957-2006 (Memorial of 100 Sessions of Canton Fair, 1957-2006) (Guangzhou: Nanfang Ribao, 2006), pp. 141-142. 67 “Instruction on US-China Trade,” 7 March 1973, 302-1-330, GDA. 68 Baijie Huihuang, pp. 152-153.

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cost. Fourth, China should urge America to lowe r its tariffs. Fifth, China should build up client

networks and find more information about the American market.69

In March 1974, the Foreign Trade Ministry issued a secret study entitled “The Prospect of

American Economy and U.S.-China Trade.” A merica, the study argued, was heading toward an

economic crisis. The growing stagflation, the de valuation of the dollar, the challenge from

Western Europe and Japan, and the im pact of th e Vietnam W ar contributed to the decline of

America’s economic power. Based on this analysis , the study proposed ne w measures regarding trade with America. First, since America regarded China as a vast market, China should take full advantage by maximizing its economic bargaining power. Second, since Chinese goods such as tea and s ilk traditionally were welcom ed in th e American market, China should recover these markets lost during the Cold W ar. Third, in 15 categories of consum er goods, such as textiles,

the United States relied heav ily on im ports. China could al so produce these goods and China

should try to get a share in these m arkets. Fourth, some Chinese goods, such as bicycles and decorations, were already welcom ed by Am erican customers. In the future China should try to

enlarge these m arkets. Fifth, China should improve packaging techniques, send trade

delegations, and use more advertisements to open the American market. China should also try to

find a way to bypass high US tariffs and try to incr ease the value of U.S.-China trade three- or

fourfold in two years.70

69 "Steps to Expand Trade with America," 1974, 302-1-330, GDA. 70 “The Prospect of American Economy and U.S.-China Trade,” 5 March 1974, 324-2-129, GDA.

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Those cool-headed calculations rev ealed th at the Chinese went to gr eat leng ths to let

economic, not political, rules decide China' s trade policy. At the sam e time, the i mpact of the

"Second Cultural Revolution" on C hina's forei gn trade w as lim ited. The m ajor category of

exports negatively influenced by th e "radicals" was trad itional Chinese craftworks. During th e

1974 Spring Canton Fair, the producti on and exportation of craftworks , such as paintings, china,

and sculptures, were greatly reduced. Jiang Qing and other "radical s" argued that those craftworks, based upon Chinese m yths and legends, were "feudal and reactionary." As a result, the value of those exports, compared with the last Canton Fair, dwindled by $20 million.71 Other categories of exports, however, were less influenced. In fact, it seemed that the "Second Cultural

Revolution" was re sisted at the grassroots level. One Chinese part icipant of the 1974 fairs, for

example, later hinted that on-site Chinese traders m anaged to ignore the dem ands of the

"radicals." "Every foreign trade worker knew that the 'Leftist' slogans would not generate foreign

currency," he recalled. "The so ber fact was that we badly ne eded advanced technologies,

equipments, and raw m aterials [from abroad]." 72 Indeed, right in the middle of the heated

"Second Cultural Revolution," Zhou Enlai ordered to construct new infrastructures to support the

Canton Fair. By the end of 1974, Guangzhou ha d two new highways, one telecommunication

center, and several new hotels. 73 M eanwhile, Ch ina's trade offici als continued to m ake cool-

headed calculations. On Nove mber 14, for exampl e, the F oreign Trade Ministry released a new

study on exportation of textiles. The study specifi cally targeted the Am erican market, arguing

71 Baijie Huihuang, p. 157. 72 Li Tongliang, "Huiyi 1974 nian chunjiaohui (A Retrospect on 1974 Spring Canton Fair), in Center of China Foreign Trade, Qinli guangjiaohui (My Experience of the Canton Fair) (Guangzhou: Nanfang Ribao, 2006), pp. 194-195. 73 Baijie Huihuang, pp. 151-157.

377

that China should try to increase its share. In order to do so, China should produce textiles which

could fit with changing styles in A merica, and China should launch m ore aggressive m arketing

campaigns.74

In fact, it seem ed that U.S.-China trade relations developed faster than bilateral relations in other areas during the mid-1970s. The "moderates" in the Chinese leadership were determined to

protect trade with Am erica despite the attack from the "rad icals." When the "Se cond Cultural

Revolution" faded in 1975, the Chinese again star ted to actively promote trade with Am erica.

Deng Xiaoping, for example, tried to dism iss the political implications attached to foreign trade.

"We should introduce new technology and equipm ent from other countries and expand im ports

and exports," Deng argued in 1975. "Foreign count ries all attach great significance to the

introduction of new technology and equipment from abroad. Take their products apart, and you'll

find that m any parts or com ponents are also m ade abroad." The m essage was clear. If other

countries did not fear foreign things, then why should China?75

For Am erican trad ers, the lim ited dam age don e to the U.S.-China trade by the "Second

Cultural Revolution" convinced them that China would continue to develop trade relations and

shift toward the American way of doing business. In November 1974, for example, Huang Zhen,

head of the PRC Liaisons office, made his first extensive tour of the United States. The tour was sponsored by the National Counc il, during which Huang, togeth er with several Chinese commercial officials, traveled m ore than 2,100 miles and v isited Chicago, Detro it, Pittsburgh,

74 "On Exportation of Textiles," 14 November 1974, 324-2-129, GDA. 75 Deng Xiaoping, "Some Comments on Industrial Development," in Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1984), p. 44.

378

Niagara Falls, and New York. The Chinese team also visited so me U.S. fi rms such as

International Harvester, the First National Bank of Chica go, Ford, General Motors, and

Westinghouse. "Huang repeatedly stressed to Am erican business leaders a number of PRC

commercial prospects and prioriti es, most notably the likelihood of increased oil exports," the

National Council reported. The Chinese "endeavored to learn as m uch as possible about the

American econom y, polity and so ciety by questioni ng ind ividuals in plants, res taurants, gas

stations and hotels." To Council leaders, Huan g's tour signaled a m ore open m indset on the

Chinese part toward A merica. 76 The decline in the to tal va lue of U.S.-China tr ade was not interpreted by the Council as a resu lt of Chinese domestic politics. Rather, the m ajor reason for that decline, according to the Council, was th e global economic recession of the m id-1970s. In addition, the Council observed that the "fall 1974 Cant on Fair saw a record num ber of

Americans" and Am erican now becam e the second largest group of forei gn traders in China .

"Despite [th e] projected decline [of trade in 1 975]...there will be an overall increase in the

proportion of US exports of m achinery, technology, and plant sold to China," the Council

concluded.77

The bankers from Manufacturers Hanover Trus t Co. (MHT) were equally optim istic. In

their contact with the C hinese, they perceived a reluctant yet gradual shift away f rom the se lf-

reliance principle on the Chinese side. In Nove mber 1973, Gabriel Hauge, chairm an of MHT,

was eager to discuss problem s with Qiao Peixi n, acting chairm an and general m anager of the

76 "Report on Tour of Huang Chen and Party," November 1974, NCUSCR, Box 1, GFPL. 77 "Prospects for US-China Trade 1975," 4 December 1974, ibid.

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Bank of China (BOC), including fluctuations in value between the U.S. dollar and the Chinese

RMB, the absence of facilities for buying RM B forward, and the lack of corresponding relationships between BOC and banks in the U.S. But the steps he proposed, which would start to connect the Chinese financial market with America’s, were obviously too bold for the Chinese to swallow at the time. Qiao dismissed his requests with politeness, saying that China would only pay cash in trade and would not rely on foreign loans or credits. But Qiao poin ted out th at

“China’s foreign trade is developing step by st ep,” indicating a certain inte rest in Hauge’s proposal for future developments.78

Two years later, in Novem ber 1975, Mark E. Buchm an, senior vice president of MHT,

found the Chinese m ore open toward his proposal s. Buchman found the Ch inese eager to seek

financial and econom ic inform ation on Am erica fr om hi m. The Chinese also asked his help

straightforwardly, especially in providing credit evaluations on some U.S. fir ms. Buchman was

still cautious though: “All in all, I don’t think we can expect any more for the moment. They are

fully aware of who we a re and are cognizant of our sens itivities…I tried to be very ‘Chinese’…

and emphasized we were going to be around foreve r and took a long view of our r elationship,

rather than being in for the quick buck with them .” In fact, he strongly supported a long-term

position: “What can we expect to do with them in the future?...There is substantial Sino-US trade

and with the settlement of the big questions, which will com e, I think the trade will grow. These

are products we can buy from China—oil, tin, ot her metals, plus an impressive array of light

manufactured goods. They will need trade fi nancing and lim ited—by their own pace—am ounts

78 Gabriel Hauge, “Memo of Conversation,” November 1973, NASAR, Box 7, BHL.

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of capital. We should try to posit ion ourselves for the future…I th ink Taiwan will eventually be neutralized into China a nd they ho ld the sword over H.K a t all tim es. Future v isits, if we can make them, are warranted.”79

Indeed, from 1975 on, things becam e better and better for Am erican traders. The Chinese became even more "businesslike." "Limited quantities of industrial con sumer goods continue to enter the P RC," the US China Business Review observed. "In the first place, changes in th e market for these commodities cons titute yet another index f or measuring Chinese f lexibility in interpreting the princ iple of self-reliance." After examining China's imports, the jou rnal further concluded that "China is diversifying and increasing her lim ited im ports of consum er goods...Much evidence can be marshalled [sic] to support the contention that policymakers in the

PRC have adopted a relatively le nient attitude towards consum ption of foreign goods am ong certain sections of the population." 80 An American trader who attended the 1975 Spring Canton

Fair reported back an even more relaxed political atmosphere in Guangzhou. The most surprising thing was th at "foreigners learned from recent H ong Kong a rrivals, or radio broadcasts, but not from the Chinese...that Saigon had fallen to Communist forces." That the Chinese did not make a propaganda ca mpaign out of the fall of Saigon showed that "bus iness is busine ss f or the

Chinese." In addition, the Am erican traders observed that m uch fewer chief Am erican business executives showed up in Guangzhou. Instead, business was carried out by their subordinates who

79 Mark E. Buchman, “Memo of Conversation,” November 1975, ibid. 80 John Kamm, "The Market in China For Foreign Consumer Goods," Mar-Apr 1975, CBR.

381

really knew the day-to-day operations. This show ed that now there was "more routine business"

between the two countries.81

In 1975 China started to fill the National C ouncil's agenda by sendin g one comm ercial delegation after another. A Chinese textile de legation toured Am erica between February and

March. The Chinese de legates were greatly in terested when the Am ericans wanted to "offer a

wide variety of fabrics representative of our 'life-style' and which represent 'American Fashion', a

fashion which is widely accep ted by the youth popul ation in all cou ntries of the world." Th e

Chinese wanted to know why American produc ts were so popular, and the proud Am erican

answered th at it was because of the "carefre e, colorful, y outhful loo k of our product." 82 In

September, China sent an arts & crafts de legation to A merica to "see old cus tomers and

familiarize themselves with th eir customer's businesses, to study the US m arket and its ne eds,

and to m eet with potential new custom ers."83 In the sam e month, a second delegation from the

Chinese Native P roduct and Animal By-Product Corporation visited Am erica. T he Chinese surprised the Am ericans by saying th at China would take the risk to adopt flexible prices for their products. "W in or lose is natural," the Ch inese said. T he delegation then started to seek long-term contracts with US firms.84

At the sam e tim e, 1975 saw m any "firsts" in U. S.-China trade that clearly indicated the

Chinese move toward adopting the American way of doing business. In October, "Good Health,"

a Chinese acupuncture kit, b ecame the first "C hinese tradem ark authorized by the PRC for

81 "Kwangchow Diary Spring 1975," May-Jun 1975, CBR. 82 "Visiting Chinese Textile Delegation, " February-March 1975, NCUSCR, Box 60, GFPL. 83 "Chinese Arts & Crafts Delegation, " September 1975, NSUSCR, Box 61, GFPL. 84 "Delegation from the Native Product and Animal By-Products Corporation, September 1975, ibid.

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registration by an Am erican corporation." 85 The fall 1975 Canton Fair becam e the first fair in

which Am erican traders no longer needed to attend by invitation only. The Chinese trade

representatives at the fair also "indicated a new willingness to give exclus ives to US

importers." 86 In November, the first insurance agreem ent was reached between Am erican

International Group (AIG) and the People' s Insurance Company of Chi na. This agreement "will

serve to f acilitate Sin o-US trade in a number of ways," the US China Business Review

celebrated. "Com prising a re insurance tr eaty, a cla ims settlem ent arr angement, and inf ormal

reciprocal technical advisory faci lities, the agreem ent is of as m uch interest to US exporters to

the PRC as to im porters of Chinese products. It m arks another m ilestone in the step-by-step development of US trade ties with China."87

The trend toward the "m aturation" of U.S. -China trade continued in 1976, when China started to have the so-called "Mini-F airs" between the two a nnual Canton Fairs. The Mini-Fair was held in other Chinese cities , usually focusing on a single category of product. For example, one mini-fair was held in Tianjin on textiles while another was in Shanghai for light industrial products. American traders rightly regarded the mini-fair as an innovation on the Chi nese part to promote trade. "The staging of 'mini-fairs' is becom ing an increasing ly im portant feature of

China's overall export strategy, a developm ent which portends significant im provements in the avenues ope n to f oreign f irms wishing to initia te or broaden business relations w ith Foreign

Trading Corporations," it was observed. "O n the whole...foreign com panies left Peking

85 "The First Chinese Mark Registered in the US," Nov-Dec 1975, CBR. 86 "Canton Fair Fall 1975," ibid. 87 " First US Insurance Agreement with PRC Establishes a Good Precedent," Mar-Apr 1976, CBR.

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convinced that Chinese comm itment to the m ini-fair technique would in crease and result in

significant improvem ents in the export trade. Mo st traders who atten ded are already m aking

plans for next year' s mini-fair."88 The Spring 1976 Canton Fair, at the same time, saw "reco rd

numbers of foreign firms vying fo r increasing ly scarce, often m iniscule quantities of Chines e

goods." In the words of one di sgruntled Am erican textile buyer, "under the present

circumstances, I'll take whatever they offer, whenever they offer, regardless of price."89

The Chinese also stepped up their m arketing effort in the United States during 1976.

"American consum ers and the public seem s very ready to accept products from China," an

American trader repo rted, which resu lted from incre ased Chine se adve rtisements. A representative of JC Penny was pleased: "As the Chinese begin to understand our needs and begin to co nform to and m eet those needs, m arketing their products will be sim ply a case of presenting a high-qualit y, low-priced product." 90 By the end of 1976, the Am erican business

community mused that "It appeared as if som e time last year China's FTCs decided that 1976

was going to be the year to gear up the prom otion of Chinese goods in th e US. Am erica's

bicentennial year has seen a splash of well- coordinated prom otions of Chinese products ,

focusing on traditional item s such as silk, carp ets, and bas ketware. Perhaps in anticipation of

this, China's FTCs have registered, via their H ong Kong agents, about a dozen tradem arks in the

US, a sign of a serious marketing campaign."91

88 "China's Mini-Fairs 1976," ibid. 89 "Canton: Why Do They Keep Coming?" May-Jun 1976, CBR. 90 " The Promotion of Chinese Consumer Products in the USA," Sep-Oct 1976, CBR. 91 "China Steps Out in the US," Nov-Dec 1976, CBR.

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For the American business community, China's new trade strategies proved that the Chinese

were abandoning the Maoist m odel of m odernization and shifting toward the Am erican way of

doing business. After the death of Mao and the downfall of the "Gang of Four" in late 1976,

American traders were f urther convinced that th e changes in China' s foreign trade policy would

be perm anent. The Americans who went to th e spring 1977 Canton Fair reported that "the

general impression of most visitors was that Chin a is returning to a state of order and preparing

for a period of substantial econom ic development." The Fair was again dom inated by China' s

politics. Ho wever, this tim e the to ne of the Chinese p ropaganda cam paigns was com pletely

different. This time China was announcing a new ag e of economic relations with the West. "The

directive of Chairm an Mao, firs t published in 1956, advocating that C hina must 'learn from the

West in technology' was one of the m ain themes at the fair," it was reported. Meanwhile, "the

Chinese recognize that they must improve the quality, design and packaging of the wide range of

consumer products now being manufactured in order to successfully market them in the West"92

The president of the National Council, Christopher Phillips, was told that "China definitely appeared comm itted to expandin g foreign tr ade and exporting m ore finished goods" and displayed "increasing evidence of willingness to produce expressly for the US."93

Indeed, Phillips later recalled that "the really dramatic change in China's policies towards foreign trade and investment, came with the return to power of Deng Xiaoping in 1977." Phillips

met Deng on several occasions and he was greatly impressed by the new Chinese leader. "Twice

92 "Spring 1977 Fair," NCUSCR, Box 71, GFPL. 93 Memo, Driscoll to Phillips, 31 May 1977, NCUSCR, Box 72, GFPL.,

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before, Deng had been purged from power fo r his unorthodox views. These included such

statements as ' It makes no difference whether a cat is black or white as long as it catches m ice'

and, 'seeking truth from facts and putting action before ideology.'" Phillips believed that the rise

of Deng wa s the turning point in China' s modernization. "Those were pret ty bold statem ents at

the tim e," he told his review er. "In fact, from the standpoint of orthodox Chinese communist

thinking, they were almost heretical. But 'putting action before ideology' led to dramatic changes

in Chinese life and in China's relations with the rest of the world. Despite our lack of diplomatic

relations with China, Am erican com panies we re becom ing increasingly involved in China's

development."94

Change gathered speed during late 1977. Am erican fairgoers to the fall 1977 Canton Fair

were surprised to hear the m usic of Mozar t and Beethoven broadcast on the loudspeakers.

Christmas decorations appeared on the Chinese export list for the first tim e, and Am erican

buyers were a mazed when the Chinese offered to pack porcelain with styrofoam to reduce

breakage during transportation. China' s FTCs, in short, had adopted a "down-to-business"

attitude.95 The 1978 Canton Fairs saw even m ore dramatic changes. The Chinese set up a coffee

shop with hamburgers in the hotels for their cust omers. For the first time, representatives of the

Chinese producers were allowed to participa te in business talks with f oreign companies. More amazing to Am erican traders, the Chinese F TCs started to com pete am ong them selves for foreign business, offering lower price and fast er delivery. T he Americans soon discovered that

94 Oral History of Christopher Phillips, FAOHC. 95 "US Businessmen Flood Canton Fair," 18 November 1977, WP.

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the reason was the reintroduction of m aterial incentives into the Chinese foreign trade

bureaucracy, which induced Chinese trade officials to work harder. 96 The National Co uncil also

observed "China' s increased will ingness to comply w ith US governm ent regulations such as

FDA requirements, labels on garm ents, manufacture for ex port according to specif ications and

designs of buyers." The Board of Directors even decided that the next task for the Council was to

study the possibility of joint-venture with the Chinese.97

Meanwhile, econom ic relations with Am erica fi gured even m ore prom inently in China' s

new national policy of "Four Mode rnizations." In late 1977, Chin a sent a large delegation to

America, which included representatives from the Foreign Trade Ministry, the Foreign Ministry,

the Central Econom ic Planning Council, the First Machinery Ministry, the Petroleum Ministry,

the Shanghai Governm ent, and other key econom ic departments. The delegation widely toured

American industries and concluded that "we sho uld learn from America [in various areas]." The delegation then m ade a long list of de sirable imports from the United States. 98 O n April 21,

1978, the Foreign Trade Ministry f urther instructed that China should get out of the shadow of

the Cultural Revolution as soon as possible and continue to expand trade with America. Noticing

the rapid growth of U.S.-China trade in 1977, the m inistry observed that "m ore and m ore

American businessmen became interested in our F our Modernizations." As a result, the m inistry

concluded, "we can develop trade with America even without the normalization of relations."99

96 "Report on Fall 1978 Canton Fair," 23 November 1978, NCUSCR, Box 76, GFPL; "Canton 43," Nov-Dec 1978, CBR. 97 "Board Meeting," 14 June 1978, NCUSCR, Box 2, GFPL. 98 "Report on Delegation to the US," 24 November 1977, 235-2-242, GDA. 99 "On US-China Trade," 21 April 1978, 235-2-163, GDA.

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Of course, soon China and Am erica were going to establish for mal diplom atic relations.

And soon China was going to announce the new "open and re form" policy. Trade between

America and China was also going to reach a n ew stage of developm ent. In m any ways, direct

U.S.-China trade between 1975 and 1978 helped to prepare the two countries for the coming new

era. Not only did the two sides become more experienced in dealing with each other; the Chinese

adoption of the Am erican way of doing business al so contributed to the change in China' s own

model of modernization.

Conclusion

Between 1971 and 1978, direct U.S.-China trade resum ed a nd developed rapidly despite

bumps in China' s dom estic poli tics and the two countries' offici al relations. Th e discourse on

China's m odernization once again underlined th e trajectory of Sino-Am erican trade. For

American traders, the im age of China as a "frustrated modernizer" guaranteed the Chinese need

for trading with Am erica, which constitu ted a solid foundation upon which Am ericans could

nurture the China market. Thus, despite the problems of bilateral trade, many Americans decided

to hang on in the China m arket. When China indeed became more flexible in its trade policy,

Americans took it as proof that China was revalu ating its model of modernization. In return,

American traders were further convinced that it was worth the effort to have long-term strategies regarding the China market.

Of course, it is not necessary to portray Am erican traders as noble crusaders who wanted to modernize China along the W estern way. Am erican traders, in fact, preferred the attitude that

"business is business" and wanted very m uch to separate trade from ideology. Yet at the sam e

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time, m any Am erican traders were aware that th eir activities in China would have enorm ous

impact on China' s modernization over the long term. Successful trade with China required the

Chinese to change their trade policy, which, after all, was deeply rooted in the Maoist econom ic

model. Thus, Am erican traders indeed served as "unofficial am bassadors" who helped to

negotiate a better term for U.S.-China relations.

Finally, it is necessary to point out that Am erican traders were not the only ones fro m

capitalist countries that the Chinese encountered during the 1970s. In fact, the Chinese were able

to play off other foreign traders against the Americans from time to time. Although China's trade

with countries such as Japan, France, and W est Germany was not discussed in this chapter, we

can s till arg ue that trad e with Am erica play ed the leading role in China' s reevalu ation of its

economic model. After all, wit hout the U.S.-China rapprochem ent, it would have been hard to

imagine that China could expand bu siness, including military transactions, with tho se countries in the first place.

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Epilogue

Toward Normalization of Sino-American Relations, 1977-1979

Between 1966 and 1976, the relationship between America and China changed dramatically

as the two former Cold War adversaries became semi-allies. As we have seen, common stra tegic

concerns, especially the perceived common threat from the Soviet Union, were important in

bringing about this alliance. However, it was the discourse on China's modernization that created

the historical context in which common strategic interests brought the two nations together. First

of all, the perception of China as a "frustrated modernizer" was crucial in convincing successive

American administrations that it was feasible to improve relations with the Beijing regime. Once

China was no longer reg arded as a "red m enace" bent on spreading Communis m to the world, it

was recast as a n ationalist-oriented regime whose primary goal was to modernize China so th at

the Middle Kingdom could both becom e a firs t-class econom ic power and a w ell-respected political power. From 1966 onward, Am erican po licy-makers and leading public figures on foreign policy concluded that the Beijing regime had failed to achieve th e goal of modernization

by using Communis m as a m odel. The Chinese failure, many argued, only highlighted China' s

weakness and m ade it possible for W ashington to use a new "containm ent with out iso lation"

strategy to change China' s attitude toward the United Sta tes by open ing up trad e and other

bilateral relations. At the sam e time, deter iorating Sino-Soviet relations made Chinese lead ers

realize that "Soviet revisionism ," not "Am erican imperialism," was the biggest thr eat to China.

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As a result, Mao Zedong started to reevaluate China' s relations with Am erica while his confidence in the Chinese m odel of developm ent made him believe that China could negotiate with America from a position of strength.

Thus, the Nixon administration was able to pursue a Sino-American rapprochement because such a strategy was m ade feasible by perceive d Chinese weakness. Nixon, Kissinger, and their successors never pursued a straig htforward anti-Soviet alliance with the Chin ese. Ins tead,

American policy-m akers developed a China policy package that blended strategic and non- strategic m easures. W ashington did its best to convince B eijing that it would not use China primarily as a counterw eight to the Soviet Unio n and it was genuinely in terested in im proving relations with China per se. At the sam e time, the long-term goal of i nfluencing China's future modernization by "bringing China back into the in ternational comm unity" functioned as a

powerful fram ework of referen ce for Am erican policy-m akers. The de velopment of trade,

cultural, and other bilateral relations with China could perpetuate the changes in China's attitude

and policy toward the United States and, in the l ong-run, change the very nature of the Chinese

Communist regime by increasing the im portance of America to China' s own m odernization. In

addition, the developm ent of non- strategic relations with China could gain m ore support for

U.S.-China rapprochem ent from the "acade mic-legislative com plex" and the business

community.

For their part, the Chinese also feared that a rapprochement with America based solely upon

an anti-Soviet rationale would be unstable, as America could "sacrifice" China in order to pursue

Soviet-American detente. Thus China was also w illing to develop an all-out relationship with

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America to stabilize the stra tegic alliance betw een the two countries. Expanded econom ic and

cultural contact with America, however, triggered inte rnal debates am ong the Chinese

leadership, when the "radicals" attacked the "moderates" by highlighting the danger of America's

"peaceful evolution " s trategy aim ed at Ch ina. Thus, th e overall trajectory of S ino-American

rapprochement was not just influenced by the two countries' common strategic interests, but also in a more fundamental way shaped by the two nations' different visions of modernity.

The development of Sino-American rapprochement started to slow down in the m id-1970s, as both sides, paralyzed by their dom estic po litics, becam e unable to push forward rapidly toward the norm alization of relatio ns. Yet the image of China as a "f rustrated modernizer" prevented the rapprochem ent from com pletely falling apart. W ith no sign of improved Sino-

Soviet relations and with the contin uing Chinese domestic difficulties, American policy-makers continued to perceive a weakened China that badly needed better relations with America to have a favorable international environm ent. For thei r part, the Chinese also cam e to appreciate the value of the rapprochem ent with Am erica, wh ich not only contributed to China' s national security, but also gained China access to advanced technologies and the world market.

China's domestic situation started to im prove from 1975 onward, as the "Second Cultural

Revolution" faded away and the "moderates" led by Deng Xiaoping gained the upper hand in the power struggle against the "radicals." After the death of Mao Zedong and the downfall of the

"Gang of Four" in 1976, China had an even bett er domestic environment for improved relations with America. Moreover, after 1975 China increa singly committed itself to the so-called "Four

Modernizations," which require d b etter ec onomic and str ategic r elations with A merica. The

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Chinese became more and more flexible in their dealing with Americans, and bilateral exchanges

and trade relations quickly developed. More impor tantly, Americans widely perceived a shift in

China's modernization strategy, an d they becam e convinced that China was reorienting itself politically and economically toward the West.

This, therefore, was the situation Jimmy Cart er faced when he cam e into office in 1977.

Carter inherited a China policy not of his own ma king, yet he quickly discovered that there were

more pressu res for him to break the stalem ate in Sino-A merican relations. Tho se pressu res

mainly came f rom two dire ctions. First, Sovi et-American detente, w hich was already under

attack from all corners in Am erica when Carter took over the W hite House, continued to cause

problems for the new A dministration. It was per ceived by many people as an Am erican foreign

policy failure, as the Soviet Union was believed to achieve serious adv antages over the United

States under the disguise of detente. As a re sult, although Carter dis liked the Nixon-Kissinger

style triangular diplomacy, he became more and more receptive toward playing the "China card"

against the Soviet Union, a tende ncy especially encouraged by his National Security Advisor

Zbigniew Brzezinski.

Second, the discourse on China' s modernization pl ayed an even bigger role in Carter' s

China polic y than it d id in pr evious Am erican adm inistrations. During Carter' s White House tenure, China cam e to f irmly commit itse lf to achieving the "Four M odernizations" and the

Chinese developmental model shifted decisively away from the Maoist one. This development fit well with C arter's own general foreign policy outlook, since the President was determ ined to bring the "moral dimension" back into America's foreign relations. Carter believed that America

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must once again uphold its m oral values in maki ng foreign policies by replacing balance of

power politics with "world orde r politics," promoting hum an rights abroad, and paying greater

attention to common world probl ems such as food, energy, and trade. T herefore, when China

increasingly looked up to Am erica for technol ogies and other economic sources for its own

modernization, Carter was convin ced that it was m orally righteous to m ove forward tow ard

normalization, as the e stablishment of f ormal diplomatic relations would greatly enhance

America's capability in influencing China's future model of modernization.1

In short, strategic and non-strategic factors made the Carter adm inistration continue to

highly value relations w ith China. B efore Carter, to be sure, Am erica and China could benefit mutually from the rapprochement without normalization of relations. The key change during the

Carter years, however, was that the previous stalemate in U.S.-China relations created a momentum for the achievem ent of norm alization. Both countries cam e to regard the lack of formal diplomatic relations as a m ajor obstacle in fully reaping the benefits of the U.S.-China rapprochement. As a result, both sides were determ ined to ach ieve norm alization as soon as possible. In order to do so, both were willing to suspend som e thorny issues for the tim e being, especially the issue of Taiwan. In sum, the need to perpetuate the U.S.-China rapprochement was so great that normalization of relations almost became irresistible.

This epilogue examines the road toward Sino-American normalization between 19 77 and

1979. First, it discusses how the Carter administration reexamined America's China policy during

1 For a synthesis of Carter's foreign policy, see William Stueck, "Placing Jimmy Carter's Foreign Policy," in Gary Fink and Hugh Graham, eds., The Carter Presidency: Policy Choices in The Post-New Deal Era (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1998), pp. 244-261. For recent studies on Carter's China policy, see “Special Forum: Transforming the Cold War: The United States and China, 1969-1980,” Diplomatic History 33:4 (September 2009).

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its first m onths, and how the post-Mao historical context m ade it imperative for Am erica to

establish diplom atic relations w ith China. Second, it exam ines how, after the first m onths of

1977, during which there were little m ovements toward actual norm alization due to various

reasons, America and China finally decided to proceed and achieved normalization by the end of

1978. The epilogue then exam ines the role played by the US Congress in the process of

normalization, and ends with a br ief discussion of Deng Xiaoping' s visit to A merica in January

1979. The discourse on China' s modernization, I argue, once again shaped the process of

normalization.

A Transitional Period: U.S.-China Relations, January-August 1977

The cliché that Jimm y Carter was not a "for eign policy president" is misleading. Although

Carter lacked experience in the actual m aking of foreign policy before he ca me into office, he still had an activ e foreign policy agenda and he was a fast learne r. Indeed, one core strategy of

Carter's presidential campaign, during which he presented his team as "Washington outsiders,"

was the pledge that his administration would change the mechanism of America's foreign policy-

making, which, under his Republican predecessors , was dom inated by geopol itical calculations

and shrouded in secrecy. Carter' s basic approach to foreign policy thus shaped Am erica's China policy in two ways. First, he insisted that "collegiality" should becom e the rule am ong his foreign policy advisors, that is , no single agency or single person w as going to control his

administration's foreign policy-m aking process. Es pecially the role of the State Departm ent,

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under its secretary Cyrus Vance, was to be restored. 2 Carter wanted Zbi gniew Brzezinski, his

National Security Advisor who was an im portant foreign policy advisor for Carter during the

presidential cam paign, to play the role of coordina tor without the power of his predecessor

Henry Kissinger. In addition, Carter also welc omed foreign policy input from other cabinet

members. W ith regard to Am erica's China po licy, therefore, Carter' s open style not only

eventually caused frictions am ong his advisors, bu t also forced him to seek a broader consensus

on this issue.3

Second, Carter tried to disa ssociate his China policy from the US-PR C-USSR strategic

triangle created during the Nixon- Kissinger era. Carter certainl y understood the im portance of

geopolitics, but he was uncomfortab le with the pursuit of an anti-So viet alliance with China. "I did not need to be reminded that we had to improve our relationship with China without reneging on our comm itments to the well-being of Taiwan and wi thout further affecting our already strained relations with the Sovi et Union," Carter later recalled. "However, I believ ed that too many of our international concerns were being defined almost exclusively by the chronic United

States-Soviet confrontation m entality, wh ich seem ed to m e short-sighted and

counterproductive."4 Thus, during his first year in the W hite House, Carter tried to justify a

possible normalization of relations with China not on the ground of playing the "C hina Card,"

but on the ground that norm alization could make America more capable in term s of influencing

China's reorientation toward the West politically and economically.

2 Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), pp. 34-36. 3 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981 (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1983), pp. 17-47. 4 Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), p. 192.

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The year 1977, however, saw little movement toward actual normalization. The main reason

was that both countries needed tim e to adjust to changes in lead ership, and both wa nted to test the other' s intentions before advancing the no rmalization process. At the sam e tim e, Sino-

American relations occupied a top position on th e Carter administration's foreign policy agenda almost from the very beginning, despite the lack of actual progress in the field. Carter and his advisors spent the first few m onths reading the ex tensive record of America's interactions with

China during the Nixon-Ford period, and they cam e to conclude that if the Sino-Am erican rapprochement was to be preserved, the new A dministration must convince the Chinese that it was still committed to normalization of relations without making formal commitment. Therefore, during his first m eeting with Chinese official s on February 8, 1977, Carter told Huang Zhen, head of the PRCLO, that he "hope[s] that progress will be re-stimulated, that we can grow closer together in the cultu ral field and in the f ield of trade." W hen Huang tried to talk about how the

Soviet Union used detente as a disguise for it s global expansion, Carter was reluctant to be pulled into such a Mao/Kissinger-s tyle conversation of geopolitic s. Instead, Carter told the

Chinese th at he hop ed a peaceful settlem ent of the Taiwa n issue bef ore norm alization with mainland China could be achieved. 5 Carter' s advisors were pleased by his perform ance. "The

President was eloquent and politely firm at appropriate points," Michel Oksenberg, the new NSC

China expert recruited by Brzezins ki, concluded. "He was wise in not pandering to Chinese

views of the Soviet Union. I was impressed by how he had absorbed his briefs, and yet played

the talking points with flexibility and ingenuity. We are working for a g ood man!" The Chinese,

5 Meeting Record, 8 February 1977, China Vertical File (CVF), Box 40, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library (JCPL), Atlanta, GA.

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Oksenberg observed, were convinced that th e United States was m oving forward toward

normalization.6

Carter's view expressed in the first Carter -Huang m eeting established the tone of his

administration's China policy for the rest of 1977. True, Carter wanted to m ake a fresh start in

the m aking of Am erica's f oreign p olicy. But with regard to China, the previously developed

policy package, which m ixed strategic and non-strategic concerns, still functioned as the basic

framework of Carter' s China policy and dictated more continuity than change in U.S.-China

relations. In other words, the image of China as a "frustrated m odernizer" continued to dominate the Carter administration's thinking on China. Ho wever, the new context m ade it imperative for the Carter administration to move forward toward normalization.

First of all, the perceiv ed Chinese weakness associated with the "frustrated m odernizer" image continued to m ake the Carter team believe that China needed Am erica as a "tacit ally " against the Soviet Union. At the same time, however, some members of the Carter team came to believe that Chinese weakness would not always guarantee a friendly Chinese attitude toward

America. O n January 19, 1977, for exam ple, Ok senberg raised a previously unthinkable possibility, that is, a possible Sino-Soviet rapp rochement. He observed that the d eath of Mao changed almost everything in China. W hen Mao was alive, it was im possible for China to se nd peace feelers toward the Soviet Union. The post-Ma o Chinese leadership, freed from Mao' s iron control, however, could try to im prove relations with the Soviet Union. Oksenberg pointed out

6 Memo, Michel Oksenberg (MO) to Zbigniew Brzezinski (ZB), "Analysis of the President's Meeting With Huang Chen," 8 February 1977, ibid.

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that "until the succe ssion strugg le in China is settled, Sino-Soviet re lations are unlikely to

improve." However, a Sino-Soviet rapprochem ent could not be ignored as a rem ote possibility,

because relations between the two Communist giants could be improved, and that would be a bad

development for the United States. To prevent a possible Sino-Soviet rapprochement, Oksenberg

argued, the Carter administration must by all m eans show its keen interest in the Sino-American

rapprochement, including continuously briefing the Chinese on American foreign policy actions.

Oksenberg understood that it was still too early to become formally committed to normalization.

But short of that f ormal commitm ent, Am erica m ust do its best to " restore m omentum to the

Sino-American relationship."7

Oksenberg's concerns were shared b y Brzezinski. The natio nal security advisor, wh o over

time was widely regarded as a pro-China, anti-S oviet hawk in the Carter administration, minced

no words in convincing Carter the im portance of the anti-Soviet al liance with China. "To an

even greater extent than I r ealized, common concerns abou t the USSR drove the U.S. and PRC

together in 1971," Brzezinski told Carter on Febr uary 4 after he finished reading the memoranda

of conversations between Am erican and Chin ese officials during the Nixon-Ford period. "In

sum, the Sino-Am erican relationship helped stab ilize our East Asian situation after twenty-five years of confrontation. " However, Brzezinsk i wa s worried about future relations with China,

because "the relationship has deteriorated since m id-1973."8 A f ew days late r, Brzezinski told

Carter th at recen t "Soviet peace offers" to the Chinese m ade it i mportant for Am erica to

7 Memo, MO to ZB, "Sino-Soviet Normalization," 19 January 1977, National Security Affairs (NSA), Country File, Box 8, JCPL. 8 Memo, ZB to Carter, "Meeting Next Week with the Representative of the PRC," 4 February 1977, CVF, Box 40, JCPL.

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strengthen its relations with China. Meanwhile, Brzezinski warned Carter not to allow Soviet-

American detente to af fect relations with China negatively. "I would like to stress the point that

the Chinese approach to the US-Chinese relati onship is shaped in broad global and strategic

terms," Brzezinski cautioned. "In that context, the triangular relationship between the US-USSR-

China is of central im portance, and the Chin ese are especially se nsitive to any change in US-

Soviet relations." Carter, theref ore, should tell the Chinese that Washington was determ ined to

"move forward with Peking on a b ilateral b asis" and "while we will be seek ing m utually

beneficial agreements with the USSR, we will not do so in concert against China."9

Brzezinski's stance was supporte d by Carter' s secretary of defense, Harold Brow n, who

even proposed the form ation of a security relationship with China. On February 8, for exam ple,

Brown urged Carter to estab lish military contacts with China as soon as possible. He was also

concerned that the Soviet-Am erican detente was hurting relations with China. "W e do need to

remain aware in our ef forts toward such [m ilitary] exchanges with the Soviets of the possib le

adverse effects on our relations with the PRC," Brown argued. "Parallel approaches to the PRC

could mitigate that problem."10 The next day, Brown further urged the Carter adm inistration to

take actual steps in o rder to c reate another momentum in U.S.-China relations. "In the past six

years the b uilding of a new Sin o-American re lationship has been a cen tral elem ent in

Washington's efforts to construct counterweights to and constraints on the Soviets," the secretary

declared. "However, I am concerned that the ne w Administration...may be giving the impression

9 Memo, ZB to Carter, "Your Meeting with Huang Chen," 7 February 1977, NSA, Country File, Box 8, JCPL. 10 Memo, Brown to Carter, "US-PRC Military Contacts," 8 February 1977, ibid.

400

that the weight of its na tional security diplomacy will be c ast in the f amiliar framework of the

Western alliance (and Japan) versus the Soviet Union and ignoring China."11

Led by Brzezinski, therefore, som e foreign policy-makers in the Ca rter adm inistration

believed that it was tim e for America to take n ew steps to im prove relations with China. For

them, Chinese weakness still serv ed as a powerf ul rationale for Beijing to m aintain its alliance

with W ashington, yet China' s wea kness alone was no longer powerful enough to sustain the

alliance. In f act, Brzezinski was co ncerned that America's "credibility" regarding China was a t

stake. "Nixon-Kissinger acknowledgem ent that there is but one Chin a, with Taiwan part of it,

and commitment to establish full relations by 1976 were the necessary ingredients to elicit PRC

support for the Japanese-American alliance, for a negotiated U.S. exit from Indochina, to a lesser

extent for p romotion of stability in Korea," he told Carter. For Brzezinski, should the Carter administration f ail to f ulfill Am erica's comm itments to China, then the Chinese would regar d

America as untrus tworthy and m ight ev en b reak away from the allianc e. 12 Me anwhile,

Brzezinski and his sup porters believed that A merica's "credibility " re garding China was al so

threatened by the Chinese percep tion that the United State was becom ing "soft" in the face of

global Soviet expansion. The im plications of such a Chinese c onviction particularly troubled

Oksenberg.13 The CIA reached similar conclusions. A March 1977 intelligence report concluded

that "Mao's successors seem to believe that the US is somewhat irresolute in its attitude toward

Soviet deployments globally, and they probably have reassessed th e value of the US to China' s

11 Memo, Brown to ZB, "US Relations with the PRC," 9 February 1977, ibid. 12 Memo, ZB to Carter, "Meeting Next Week with the Representative of the PRC," 4 February 1977, CVF, Box 40, JCPL. 13 See, for example, Memo, MO to ZB, "Sino-American Relations," 4 February 1977, ibid.

401

national security." The report argued that "the US connection is primarily important to China as a

deterrent to a m ajor Soviet attack" and therefore the Chinese "perceiv e no alternative to the US

as a counterweight to the USSR." However, the report hinted that it was dangerous to nourish

China's suspicion of America's softness toward the Soviet Union.14

Therefore, during the first few m onths of the Carter administration, the general idea that

America must re-energize the Sino-American alliance gradually emerged. For m any supporters

of this idea, normalization of relations was the ultimate way to achieve this goal. But this policy

consensus needed the support of another crucial player—Carter's secretary of state Cyrus Vance.

In fact, Vance did support normalization of relations with China. Here, the conventional wisdom

that Vance's differences with Brzezinski obs tructed Sino-American normalization is only partly

true. The Vance-Brzezinski divergence, which will be discussed later, was largely about how to

achieve norm alization, not about whether or not norm alization was desired. Indeed, when

Kissinger first introduced the secretary-designate to Huang Zhen on January 8, 1977, Vance told

Huang that "insofar as our bilateral relations with China are concerned, they [will] continue to be guided by the Shanghai Communiqué" under the Carter presidency. Vance did not elaborate, but the Shangh ai Communiqué itse lf explic itly stated that n ormalization was an ultim ate goal.

Meanwhile, Vance pledged that the Carter ad ministration would fa ce up against the Soviet threat, especially by strengthening NATO and other American allies.15

14 CIA, "The Value of the United States to China's National Security," March 1977, NSA, Staff Material, Far East, Box 54, JCPL. 15 Meeting Record, 8 January 1977, CVF, Box 40, JCPL.

402

Indeed, in terms of the need to normalize relations with China, Vance's view was similar to

Brzezinski's. In an April 1977 memo to Carter, for example, Vance argued that "normalization is

the best way to move our relations with Peking forward." Like Brzezinski, Vance understood the

delicate triangular relationship am ong Am erica, China, and the Soviet Union. "The principal

condition for good relations with the PRC will be to convince the Chinese that this

Administration has a m ature and realistic view of the world s ituation and the strategic balance," he told Carter. "We will need to demonstrate ou r determination to remain strong and to stand up to the Soviets." 16

Although Vance agreed with Brzezinski that nor malization should be pursued, he disagreed

with Brzezinski on how to achiev e that goal. During the first m onths of 1977, Vance regarded

Soviet-American relations, and especially the ne gotiation of SALT II, as his top priority. W hile

Brzezinski thought by playing the "China card" America could force the Soviet Union to be more

accommodating toward Am erica, Vance reached an opposite conclu sion; that is, better Sino-

American relations cou ld backfire and m ake th e Soviets more hostile toward A merica. Thus,

Vance wanted to keep Sino-Am erican normalization as a backburner issue for the tim e being

while he was focusing on the SALT II negotia tions. Meanwhile, Vance was worried about

America's credib ility v is-à-vis Taiwan, and h e in sisted that Beijing must prom ise a peaceful

solution of the Taiwan issue bef ore normalization could be achieved. "With norm alization itself,

16 Vance, Hard Choices, pp. 75-77.

403

I do no t believe we sho uld feel so com pelled to establish diplomatic relations with Peking that

we jeopardize the well-being and security of the people of Taiwan," he told Carter.17

The President essentially took a balanced view. On the one hand, he agreed with Brzezinsk i

that the previous Am erican commitments to China must be honored. "I understood...that there

were three 'matters of principle' which the Ch inese considered nonnegotiable: termination of the

United States-Taiwan defense treaty, establishment of diplomatic relations with the g overnment

in Peking instead of with Taipei, and withdrawal of United States military forces from Taiwan,"

Carter la ter reca lled. "I was willing to acc ept thes e pr inciples prov ided we could d o so in a n

honorable and orderly m anner." On the other hand, Carter agreed with Vance that Taiwan' s

security m ust be protected. Particularly, he wanted to m inimize the dam age to his

administration's credibility when diplom atic relations with Taiwan were cut of f. Carter wanted

that America could continue to sell defensive w eapons to T aiwan and m aintain unofficial trade

and cultural relations with Taiwan. Meanwhile, Carter wanted a "natural death" of the defense

treaty—he wanted to end the tr eaty, on one year' s notice, as th at treaty provided—instead of

terminating it at the very m oment when diplom atic relations with Beijing were e stablished. In

addition, Carter also hoped that his administration could state publicly and without contradiction

from China that the dispute between the mainland and Taiwan would be resolved peacefully.18

The analysis above showed that the value of China as a "tacit ally" was im portant for the

Carter adm inistration to pursue normalization of relati ons with China, a lthough the President

17 Ibid. 18 Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 195.

404

wanted to downplay Nixon-Kissinge r style geopolitics. But strate gic issues could not fully

explain Carter' s China policy. Indeed, China' s m odernization played an even m ore prom inent role in Carter's China policy th an it did in th e previous American adm inistrations. As discussed in the previous chapters, China had shown sign s of shifting away from the Maoist m odel of modernization since 1975. And the post-Mao leadersh ip struggle gave Americans hope that with the rise of Deng Xiaoping, that shift would be perm anent. Therefore, in line with Carter' s conviction that a moral dimension should be brought into America's foreign policy, the need for

America to help perpetuate China's reorientation toward the West played a crucial role in Carter's

China policy.

In fact, China' s dom estic developm ent was a key concern of the Carter adm inistration almost from the beginning. Vance, for exam ple, during his January m eeting with Huang Zhen, specifically inquired ab out China' s dom estic po litics. "W e heard about m ilitary co up d' etat in

China," he observed: "what is happening? " Hu ang immediately dismissed the alleged coup as

"rumors" and ensured Vance that China would c ontinue to im prove relations with the United

States.19 During his February meeting with Carter, Huang told the President that the "situation in

China is go od" with th e "Gang of Four sm ashed in one stroke." More specifically, Huang

emphasized that China now was determined to achieve the "Four Modernizations" as planned. 20

Carter and his advisors were im pressed by Ch ina's comm itment to a non-Maoist m odel of modernization, and they believed that relati ons with China should not be decided on purely

19 Meeting Record, 8 January 1977, CVF, Box 40, JCPL. 20 Meeting Record, 8 February 1977, ibid.

405

strategic grounds. "I believe that China constitu ted a political, econom ic, and cultural weight in

the world that the United States could not ignor e," Vanc e later recalled. "China was a great

country that had an important role to play in the final quarter of the twentieth century, not simply

one that might be a useful counterweight to the Soviet Union."21

Expanded economic and cultural relations betw een America and China further convinced

the Carter team that China would increasingly turn to Am erica for its own m odernization. On

March 10, for exam ple, Oksenberg argued that tr ade was becom ing a m ore efficient tool for

America to influence China' s economic development. At the beginning of 1977, the Am erican

business community started to worry about the gr owing trade deficit which was in China's favor.

During the first few years of direct U.S.-China tr ade, China imported from America more than it exported. The Chinese were determ ined to narrow the trade deficit and by 1977 they had

managed to reverse the trade balance. Oksenberg, however, thought the trade deficit a good thing for America. For him , the more China exported to Am erica, the m ore dependent C hina would become on trade with A merica. "It may not be a ba d idea to use the C hinese tactic of luring the adversary 'in deep'—encouraging Chinese sales in the U.S.—so we can have som e leverage over them by being able eventually to threaten their access to U.S. markets," Oksenberg concluded. 22

In fact, Oks enberg h imself was a C hina scho lar who strongly believed that China' s m odel of modernization was the ultimate factor in shaping U.S.-China relations, a belief he had expressed as early as in 1973.23

21 Vance, Hard Choices, p. 79. 22 Memo, MO to ZB, "US-China Trade Relations," 10 March 1977, NSA, Country File, Box 8, JCPL. 23 See, Michel Oksenberg, eds., China's Developmental Experience (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973).

406

The Carter adm inistration watc hed clos ely the le adership strugg le in China. I nitially,

America's China-Watchers were surprised when Hua Guofeng, a relatively unknown Party cadre,

became Mao's successor. But the rise of Hua was quickly interpreted as a political compromise

among Chinese leaders. Hua "is a Centrist in the Chinese political spectrum . In making his

spectacular rise, he had the favor both of Mao Tse-tung, for his loyalty to Mao' s revolutionary

objectives, and of Chou En-lai, for his m anagerial ability and s ensible work -style," an

intelligence estimation concluded in April. "He proved able to work with the Lef t and the Right,

to avoid th e m istakes m ade by leaders of bot h." Because Hua could not com pete with other

senior Party leaders in prestige and experience, he had to s upport Mao' s policies in order to

buttress his own legitimacy. But this did not m ean that Hua wanted to restore the radical policies

of the Cultural Revolution. On the contrary, Hua would shift away from Maoist ideology, although he would do so slowly. T hus the intelligence estim ate co ncluded that the "Left" in

China was defeated thoroughly, and the PRC leader ship would becom e "C entrist-Rightist" in time.24

Although it would take some time for China to have a new Party hierarchy, the Carter tea m

observed that the po st-Mao Chinese leade rship was f irmly comm itted to the "Four

Modernizations." The CIA concluded in June that "with broad agreement on the need to res tore

order and promote economic development, the post-Mao leadership appears less divided than at

any time in the past 20 years." 25 More importantly, this Chinese development greatly contributed

24 CIA, "The Gang of Four and The Rise of Hua Kuo-feng," April 1977, NSA, Country File, Box 8, JCPL. 25 CIA, "China: Recent Political History," June 1977, NSA, Staff Material, Far East, Box 60, JCPL.

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to a better relationship between Am erica and Chin a. "Over the past two years or so, there has been a notable trend in Peking toward the reordering of priorities abroad in order to mesh foreign policy m ore closely with the internal drive for m odernization," another June CIA report concluded. "China's growing recognition that the US is the ultim ate source of some of the most advanced expertise and equipm ent also has contri buted to the incre ased cordiality o f Sino-US relations since the beginning of the year." 26 Meanwhile, the "Centrist-Rightist" alliance in China quickly materialized. On June 15, Oksenberg obser ved that Hua "had made promises of a higher standard of living to the Chinese people which, if not fulfilled, could make him unpopular." As a result of Hua' s promise, "bonuses are being rein troduced in factories" and there appeared signs

"point[ing] to an increase in plants and technology im ports." The mo st im portant thing,

Oksenberg reported, was that "we now have firm ev idence that Teng will return toward the latter part of the year, probably as a Vice Premier and Vice Chairman of the Party."27

The Chinese domestic development was certainly encouraging to the Carter administration.

It appeared that the pos t-Mao Sino-American relationship was reaching a historical crossroad.

On the one hand, the Carter adm inistration feared that Chinese patience regarding the "tacit alliance" was wearing thin because of the stal emated process of normalization. O n the other hand, China's modernization was clearly going th rough a transitional period, which provided the best opportunity for America to influence China's future developm ent since the Sino-Am erican rapprochement was initiated. Therefore, Carter decided that norm alization should be achieved

26 CIA, "China: Economic Performance, Problems, and Policies," June 1977, ibid. 27 Memo, MO to ZB, "Current Chinese Domestic and Foreign Policy Scene," 15 June 1977, NSA, Country File, Box 8, JCPL.

408

despite the different voices within his administration regarding how to achieve it. In fact, on May

22, Carter for the first tim e pub licly pledged that his adm inistration would try to norm alize

relations with China. "It's important that we make progress toward normalizing relations with the

People's Republic of China," Car ter told h is audience. "We see the Am erican and Chines e

relationship as a central elem ent of our global policy and China as a key force for global peace.

We wish to cooperate closely w ith the creative Chinese people on the problems that confront all

mankind. And we hope to find a f ormula which can bridge som e of the di fficulties that still

separate us."28

Indeed, the pursuit of S ino-American normalization was quickly e stablished as the Carter administration's official polic y through the studies required by the Presidential Revie w

Memorandum 24 (PRM 24) issued in April 1977. PR M 24 was the first effort of the Carter administration to m ake a com prehensive study of U.S.-Chi na relations, and Vance was put in charge of it. In late June, the study was fini shed, and it developed four options regarding relations with China. Option one argued that Am erica should "m ake a m ajor effort to establish full diplomatic relations in the near future by recognizing Peking, allowi ng diplomatic relations and the Treaty with Taiwan to lapse , and remaining satisfied that alternative means will exist to sustain the substance of our cu rrent relationship with Taiwan." Option two argued that Am erica should "seek to achieve qualitative m ovement toward—but short of —full norm alization; by recognizing Peking while retaining some official repres entation and poss ibly military forces on

28 Jimmy Carter, "Speech at the University of Notre Dame," 22 May 1977, in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Jimmy Carter, 1977 (Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1977), pp. 954-962.

409

Taiwan." Option three wanted Am erica to "advance the relations hip not through norm alization

but through unilateral steps on Taiwan (t roop withdrawal, low ering the level of our

representation on Taiwan)." Option four recommended that America "maintain official relations

at cu rrent levels, with f ocus on co llateral enh ancements (s uch as increased s ecurity contacts,

intelligence sharing, s ale of dual-us e technolog y, and/or acquiescen ce of third cou ntry sale of

military technology)." The Policy Review Comm ittee "un animously e ndorsed Option 1." The

Committee further recommended t hat Vance should vi sit China in the near future, either to

commit America to norm alization, or to sound the Chinese out first. 29 Meanwhile, Brzezinski

urged Carter to instruct the new head of USLO, Leonard Woodcock, to tell the Chinese that "you

are now inclined toward m aking a m ajor ef fort to es tablish f ull diplom atic relations with

Peking."30

Carter followed his advisors' recommendations, and in late August Vance becam e the first high-ranking official of the Cart er administration who traveled to China. On August 22, during his first meeting with the Chinese, Vance told Huang Hua, now the Chinese Foreign Minister, that "we believe tha t the time has come for both sides to tak e the necessary steps leading to the establishment of full diplomatic relations between our two nations. W e believe that the tim e has come to place our relationship on a new and mo re permanent basis." Huang, however, needed more evidence before he could be convinced that the Carter administration was really committed to norm alization. One way to gauge Am erica's intention, obviously, was to find out its view

29 Memo, ZB to Carter, "China Policy Review," 7 July 1977, NSA, Country File, Box 8, JCPL. 30 Memo, ZB to Carter, "Meeting with Leonard Woodcock," 7 July 1977, ibid.

410

regarding the Soviet Union. As a result, Vance was forced to defend Am erica's resolution to

stand up against Moscow. "There is a changed mood within the Un ited States," Vance asserted.

"The electio n of President Carter m arked the watershed. It was not only his election but the

support that was given to a new view, a new set of principles that is marked by that event in our

history. There is no longer talk of escalation or retreat from global responsibilities in the United

States." Vance prom ised that Am erica w ould strengthen NATO, Japan, and other allies

economically and m ilitarily. W hen Huang charge d that SALT II allowed the Soviet Union to

narrow the strategic gap between the two superpowers, Vance countered that "we are at a critical turning point in which we are evaluating a wide range of new systems which will insure parity in the years ahead."31

Huang, however, rem ained skeptical. The next day, the tw o sides discussed situations in

Africa, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Eu rope. Huang was clearly troubled that the new

American adm inistration seem ed unable to co mprehend the nature o f the Soviet threat. Fo r

example, with regard to Soviet activities in the Horn of Africa, an area which b y then had already becom e a m ajor battlefield between th e two superpowers in the Third World, Vance

argued that "as we look at the Soviet efforts in Africa, we see less of a grand strategy...but rather

an attempt to pick what they believe to be targ ets of opportunity where they can come in and try

to take over as the dominant influence." Huang disagreed strongly. "We do not regard Soviet

actions in Southern Africa as only lim ited and accidental actions," Huang put it bluntly. 32 When

31 Huang-Vance Meeting Record, 22 August 1977, CVF, Box 40, JCPL. 32 Huang-Vance Meeting Record, 23 August 1977, ibid.

411

Vance met Huang again on August 24, the latter used even harsher w ords. "Mr. Vance has said that the obje ctive of the US policy is to m aintain the stra tegic balance between the U S and the

Soviet Union, but as a m atter of fa ct the Soviet Union is trying its be st to m aintain strateg ic supremacy over the US so that balance cannot be kept," Huang teased Vance coldly. "W e think the Soviet Union is on the offensive and the US is on the defensive. To be candid, we think that the US is a bit afraid of the Soviet Union."33

Not only did the Chinese rem ain suspicious about America's resolution to f ace up agains t

Moscow, they were also skeptical about the Carter administration's stance on Taiwan. On August

24, Vance m et with Deng Xiaoping, and the talk focused on nor malization. When Vance told

Deng that A merica wanted to m aintain unofficial relations with Taiwan after the establishment of diplom atic relations with Beijing and hoped to see the issu e of Taiwan solved peacefully,

Deng launched a long rebuttal. On the Taiwan issue, Deng said, "it is not China which owes a debt to th e United States but th e United S tates owes a debt to China" and the Carter administration "needs to m ake up its m ind" on normalization. "You want us to undertake the commitment not to use f orce in libe rating Taiwan. This constitu tes interference in the intern al affairs of China," Deng lectured Vance. "The second point is that you want an Em bassy [o n

Taiwan] that does not have a sign on its door," which was also unacceptable to Deng. "It all boils down to those three conditi ons—the Japanese form ula," Deng concluded, "as for non- governmental contacts, we can agree to som e; as for the liberation of Taiwan, that is an internal affair of China." At the sam e time, Deng also tr ied to offer som e assurance to Vance: "W e are

33 Huang-Vance Meeting Record, 24 August 1977, ibid.

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prepared to seek pea ceful means of settling this [Taiwan] issue withou t the pa rticipation of the

United States." Deng also insisted that Am erica "should be sensitive to Ch inese feeling, not just

US credibility." And since Taiwan was a "burden to you," Deng told Vance, America should just

let it go by following the Japanese formula.34

Vance's trip to China, th erefore, failed to get a clear and op en commitment from China that

the future reunification of Taiwan and the m ainland would be so lved peacefully. As a result,

Carter was f orced to delay the p rocess of norm alization. But the pursuit of n ormalization

remained a basic policy goal for his administration. Deng's tough attitude was not interpreted as a

change of principle on the Chinese side. After Vance's visit, Deng gra nted an inte rview to a

group of Associated Press official s, during which he disclosed hi s talks with Vance and charge d

that the Carter administration's stance on normalization represented a "retreat" from the stance of

the Nixon-Ford administrations. The Carter administration was annoyed by Deng's interview, but

Oksenberg observed that Deng only tried to pu t m ore pressures on A merica, which actually

showed that he was eager to accelerate the pro cess of normalization. Moreover, "the fact is that

Teng did not condem n our position on continued ar ms sales to Taiwan. A nd he referred to the

possibility of a peaceful solution of the issue."35

For the rest of 1977, the Carter administration had to fight a major battle over the P anama

Treaty, which would use up a lot of Carter's political capital in Congress. Clearly, Carter could ill afford to appear that he would "abandon" Taiwan when he was charged with giving up

34 Deng-Vance Meeting Record, 24 August 1977, ibid. 35 Memo, MO to ZB, "Analysis of the Teng Interview," 6 September 1977, NSA, Country File, Box 8, JCPL.

413

"American properties" in Panam a. Nevertheless, the Carter adm inistration still used various

means to convince the Chinese that Am erica would not create "two Chinas" and norm alization

was still a top priority for Carter . Brzezinski and his NSC staffers were particularly eager in this

regard. On Septem ber 21, for example, Brzezinski urged Carter to meet with Huang Hua, w ho

was visiting the United Nations. "V ance and I favor a 20-minute m eeting with Huang during

which you would express your commitment to normalization and describe your general approach

to foreign policy," Brzezinski recommended. "Since normalization probably now m ust await

ratification of the Canal Treaty, your m eeting with Huang would suggest the relationship

continue to be on track." 36 The Car ter-Huang m eeting f ailed to m aterialize due to a schedule conflict, but Huang did get to m eet with Vance on September 28, during which both sides stated that they we re still committed to no rmalization. "As long as the Chin ese remain convinced that we consider normalization to be an im portant issue," Oksenberg reported, "we should hopefully be able to s ustain the r elationship at its p resent level for at least the n ext few months."37 But

Oksenberg also understood that Chinese patience was wearing very thin. There was a difference

between the Chinese perception that "we are patient abou t normalization" and the on e that "we

don't give a dam n," he told Brzezinski. Th erefore, W oodcock, h ead of USLO, should do

everything he could to "deter the Chinese from continuing their public comm ents on specific

aspects of norm alization," "indicate our contin ued commitment to norm alization," and "ask to

remove possible Chinese misunderstanding of our position."38

36 Memo, ZB to Carter, "Meeting With Huang Hua," 21 September 1977, ibid. 37 Memo, MO to ZB, "Vance-Huang Meeting," 29 September 1977, ibid. 38 Memo, MO to ZB, "Instructions for Leonard Woodcock," 25 October 1977, ibid.

414

During its first year, therefore, the Carter adm inistration achieved little in term s of actually normalizing relations with China. But this was not a policy failure for Cart er, because he did not expect rapid normalization in th e first place. At the sam e time, maneuvers during 1977 laid the foundation for later m oves toward norm alization. On the one hand, the im age of China as a

"frustrated modernizer" convinced Carter and hi s advisors that China still valued the Sino-

American rapprochem ent, and China' s weakness continued to m ake the U.S.-China "tacit alliance" feasible. On the other hand, the new hi storical context of the p ost-Mao Sino-American relationship, especially China' s shift toward a non-Maoist mode l of modernization, convinced

Washington that norm alization was a desirabl e m ove for Am erica to perpetu ate the Sino -

American rapprochement.

Toward Normalization: August 1977-December 1978

While the C arter administration concluded that normalization of relations with Chin a was still desirable, the pos t-Mao Chinese leadership also concluded that it was in Chin a's interest to maintain good relations with the U nited States. In fact, the Chinese leadership struggle during

1977 paved the way for the rise of Deng Xi aoping, and created a dom estic environm ent favorable for Deng' s pursuit of norm alization. Deng Xiaoping' s tough attitude tow ard Vance during the secretary' s August visi t was partially aim ed at his dom estic audience. In fact, Deng was restor ed in of fice only a m onth bef ore Vance' s visit, when the CCP Centra l Comm ittee decided that Deng would get back all his form al titles and become the top leader, though not yet in name, in charge of the regi me's daily operations. As discussed in chapter 5, Deng was once again purged by Mao in April 1976, when the dyi ng Chairman suspected that Deng was trying to

415

systematically "correct the wrongs" of the Cultural Revolution. The f act that it took more than a

year for Deng to get back in power indicated that he must be very careful not to give his enemies excuses to attack him . Clearly, a flexible stan ce on the Taiwan issue would cause problem s for him.

By August 1977, however, the "G ang of Four" had already been "sm ashed" and Deng's major enemies were no longer the "radicals." Yet Hua Guofeng turned out to be a major obstacle for Deng's restoration. As aforementioned, Hua lacked his own pow er base and he had to defend

Mao's basic policies in order to becom e a leg itimate successor of the Chairm an. I n February

1977, Hua announced publicly that "whatever po licy Chairm an Mao decided upon, we shall

resolutely d efend; whatever o rders Chairm an Mao issu ed, we shall absolutely o bey." Hua' s

announcement was quickly dubbed as the "Two W hatevers" policy, and the Maoist policy line

seemed to be firm ly recognized by the new Chinese leadership. 39 Deng, however, imm ediately

refuted Hua's new policy. In February, he com plained in a private m eeting to an o ld colleague

that the "T wo Whatevers do not accord with Ma rxism, nor do they accor d with the Thought of

Chairman Mao."40

Deng had reason to be so ag itated. If the "Two W hatevers" becam e a well-es tablished

policy, then Deng woul d never have the chance to be restored. Everyone knew that Deng wa s

purged twice by Mao him self during the Cultural Revolution. And if the Chairm an's decisions

were to be honored, then clearly Deng would ha ve to remain out of power. Indeed, when som e

39 Editorial, 7 February 1977, RMRB. 40 CCP Central Committee Party Literature Research Center, Deng Xiaoping nianpu, 1975-1997 (Chronology of Deng Xiaoping, 1975-1997), Vol. 1, p. 155.

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senior Party leaders such as Marshal Ye Jianying tried to rehabilitate Deng during a CCP Central

Committee meeting in March 1977, they had to c onfront a reluctant Hua, who was s upported by

Party officials such as Wang Dongxing. Wang suspected that Deng would completely change

Mao's policies. Not surprisingly, the March m eeting reached no conclusion to rehabilitat e

Deng.41 Deng continued to fight, however. In April, he sent an open letter to the CCP Central

Committee, in which he explic itly refuted the "Two Whatevers."42 We still do not have the full

picture of the Deng-Hua relationshi p, but it appears that Hua only fought a half-hearted battle. It

seemed that Hua did not oppose Deng him self, and his primary concern was the dam age Deng's

rehabilitation would cause to the "Two Whatev ers" and thus Hua' s own credibility as Mao's

successor. In any case, Deng was fully restored in July by the Tenth Party Congress' s Third

Plenum, and he became the third-ranking leader after Hua and Marshal Ye.43

Deng's rehabilitation w as widely celebrated in China, which was tak en as a firm sign th at

China would soon get out of the shadow of the Cultural Revolution. In fact, the Chinese

leadership s tarted to focus on econ omic develo pment and tried to im prove rela tions with the

West in general even before Deng' s full reha bilitation. Hua Guofeng was committed to this

reorientation. In May 1977, the State Council (central government) established a special working

group in charge of im porting new technologies from abroad. Between May and June, the

working group sent a delegation on a tour of some We stern European nations. The report

submitted after the tou r argued that China should allow foreign capital a nd foreign technologies

41 Ibid., p. 156; Zhang Zhanbin, Huashidai de huiyi (A Watershed Conference) (Hefei: Anhui renmin, 1998), pp. 10-15. 42 Deng Xiaoping nianpu, Vol. 1, p. 157. 43 Ibid., pp. 162-163.

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to enter China' s m arket. 44 Deng, while patiently biding his tim e, started to recruit potential

supporters of his own de velopmental blueprint for China. On May 12, De ng had a m eeting with

two top officials in charge of education and science. He urged them to "learn from abroad." Deng

claimed that the Chinese people already had had e nough of "self-imposed isolation." "There is a

huge gap of technology between China and the advan ced countries," Deng said, "and we need to

catch up. " Deng suggested th at C hina was sta nding at a historical crossroad, waiting for a

dramatic change in the Middle Kingdom's relations with the outside world. "The Qing dynasty

maintained a se lf-imposed iso lation, and so d id the ' Gang of Four,' " Deng argued. "All the

advanced scientific research and technological innovations belong to the entire human race, why

shouldn't we use them? There is nothing shameful in learning from others."45

After Deng was f ully rehab ilitated in July, he "volunteered to take charge of the

development of education and science." Deng imm ediately started to " liberate" the intellectuals,

and he claimed that China m ust "respect the producers of knowledge." 46 On September 6, Deng

told Keith Fuller, head of an Associated Press delegation, that "the prin ciple of self-reliance had

been distorted by the ' Gang of Four.'" Deng argued that self-reliance did not mean self-isolation.

On the contrary, China must learn from other count ries, especially advanced nations, in order to facilitate China' s econom ic developm ent. Moreove r, China m ust also change the pure Maoist model of modernization. For ex ample, China should reintroduce the principle of "distribution

44 CCP Central Committee Party Literature Research Center, Zhongguo gaige kaifang ershi nian (20 years of China's Open and Reform) (Shenyang: Liaoning renmin, 1998), p. 29. 45 Deng Xiaoping nianpu, Vol. 1, pp. 158-159. 46 CCP Central Committee Party Literature Research Center, Deng Xiaoping sixiang nianpu, 1975-1997 (Chronology of Deng Xiaoping's Thoughts, 1975-1997), p. 32.

418

according to work" into its econo my. Deng thus s uggested that m aterial in centives should be

used in China' s future econom ic developm ent.47 On September 14, Deng repeated the sam e

thesis to a Japanese delegation. 48 D eng even to ld the North Korean leader Kim II-sung in

September that "China is lagging behind the adva nced countries in m odernization" and the only

way for China to catch up was to borrow from abroad.49

In short, the Carter adm inistration's observati on that China was shifting decisively away

from the Maoist model of moderation was accurate. As discussed in chapters 6 and 7, after 1976

the Chinese indeed became more willing to reevaluate their past developmental experience. They

also expanded econom ic and cultural intercourses with America, a trend widely welcomed by

American academic and business communities. China gradually came to regard the United States as a key source for the "Four Modernizations," and this change generated a favorable dom estic environment for Deng to pursue normalization of relations with America.

The Carter adm inistration's fear of a Sino-Soviet rapprochem ent failed to m aterialize. On the contrary, relations between the two Communi st giants further deteriorated during 1977.

While after the death of Mao both sides tried to initiate limited contact, they soon discovered that the Sino-Soviet split was too entren ched to be bridged quickly. The Chinese refused to im prove relations un less the Soviets were willing to m ake m ajor conces sions. And the Soviet Unio n continued its m ilitary deploym ent along the Sino- Soviet b order. In early 1978, Soviet leader

Brezhnev personally toured the borders in Serbia and the Soviet Far East. Meanwhile, the Soviet

47 Ibid., p. 39; Deng Xiaoping nianpu, Vol. 1, pp. 196-197. 48 Deng Xiaoping nianpu, Vol. 1, pp. 200-201. 49 Deng Xiaoping sixiang nianpu, pp. 76-77.

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Union launc hed m assive m ilitary ex ercises a long the Sino- Soviet bord er. As a res ult, th e two

countries continued the past hostility toward each other.50

From the Chinese pers pective, m oreover, the threat from the Soviet Union was greatly

increased because of the growing alliance betw een Moscow and Hanoi. Not only did the Soviet

Union greatly increase its econom ic and m ilitary aid to North Vietn am, Hanoi 's tilt toward

Moscow also made it possible f or the Soviet Union to acqu ire military bases in So utheast Asia and thus po se a m ilitary threat to China' s southern flank. Chin ese leaders were p articularly annoyed by an "ungrateful" Hanoi, wh ich, instead of paying Beijing back for its help in the war against the United States, turn ed against China after the uni fication of Vietnam . During 1977, reports about Hanoi's "slaughters" of Chinese immigrants in Vietnam increased. And Beijing was deeply concerned about Hanoi' s pressures on its ne ighbors. Chinese leaders started to argue that

North Vietnam was trying to establish "hegemony" in Indochina backed by the Soviet Union. For

Beijing, its concern was justified when in late 1977 Vietnam invaded Cambodia, whose Pol Pot regime was supported by Beijing as a counterweight to Hanoi.51

Therefore, China' s need to accelerate its m odernization and increase its national security

forced Deng to be patient regarding the Sino-Am erican normalization despite the fruitless Vance visit in August 1977. Meanwhile, the Chinese took every available opportunity to put pressure on

50 Elizabeth Wishnick, Mending Fences: The Evolution of Moscow's China Policy from Brezhnev to Yeltsin (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2001), pp. 45-48; Tao Wenzhao, Zhongmei guanxi shi, Vol. 3, pp. 43-44. 51 For detailed discussions on relations between China and Vietnam after 1975, see Odd Arne Westad and Sophie Quinn-Judge, eds., The Third Indochina War: Conflict Between China, Vietnam and Cambodia, 1972-79 (New York: Routledge, 2006); Priscilla Roberts, eds., Behind the Bamboo Curtain: China, Vietnam, and the World Beyond Asia (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006); Anne Gilks, The Breakdown of the Sino-Vietnamese Alliance, 1970-1979 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1992); Robert Ross, The Indochina Tangle: China’s Vietnam Policy, 1975-1979 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988); William J. Duiker, China and Vietnam: The Roots of Conflict (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1986).

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the Carter adm inistration. On October 21, for ex ample, two PRCLO offi cials expressed China' s

"patience" on the issue of normalization to Oksenberg. Oksenberg observed that his meeting with the Chinese was the "first tim e to see them w ear W estern-style coats and ties." O ne of the m discussed Shakespeare and "things W est" with Oksenberg in a very relaxed m anner. But the

Chinese then stated that they understood the Cart er administration had the Panam a Treaty battle to fight. That would postpone Sino-Am erican normalization into 1978, and perhaps, after the

1978 congressional election. By that time, however, Carter would have to focus on his reelection.

Therefore, the Chinese concluded, it would be unlikely to achieve norm alization during Carter's first term. Oksenberg r ealized that this Chin ese "patience" was only a veiled com plaint on the

Chinese part, and he denied that norm alization could not be achieved during Carter' s first term.

The Chinese imm ediately seized th e opportuni ty to invite Brzezinsk i to visit Chin a.52 In fac t, they had already identified Brzezins ki as someone who shared similar strategic views with them and who, compared with Vance, was m ore inclined to achieve norm alization without stirring up the issue of Taiwan. For exam ple, Han Xu, deput y chief of PRCLO, approached Brzezinski on

August 2 to discuss the "world situation. " Brzezinski proudly to ld Han that Am erica h ad

"outmaneuvered" the Soviet Union in Africa rece ntly and America would try to "forge W estern ties" with Albania, a form er Chinese ally whose relations with China had deteriorated in recen t months, to prevent it from turning to the Soviet Union for help. Han was pleased and he then told

Brzezinski that "the Vie tnam situation constitu tes a part of the Soviet Union' s global strategy. "

Han, who heard that recently the Vietnam ese had sent some peace feelers to Am erica, urged the

52 Memo, MO to ZB, "Meeting with Tian and Yang from PRCLO," 21 October 1977, NSA, Country File, Box 8, JCPL.

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Carter administration not to nor malize relations with Hanoi. Br zezinski promised that Am erica

would not normalize relations with Vietnam in a way to hurt China's interests.53

Brzezinski, in fact, started to get him self m ore actively involv ed in the Carter

administration's China policy after Vance' s China trip. He believed that it was important to

continue the anti-Soviet allian ce with China, es pecially in the face of t he stalemated SALT II

negotiations. He late r adm itted th at he a lso did som e behind- the-scene m aneuvering to get

himself invited to Chin a.54 At th e sam e ti me, Brzezinsk i tried to find more allies w ithin th e

Carter administration, and W oodcock quickly becam e another stro ng supporter of quic k

normalization. On Nove mber 16, Woodcock reported that he just had a m eeting with Huang

Hua, during which the Chinese Foreign Minister warned America not to "appease" the Soviet

Union. "The administration is on record as favor ing normalization and we have so inform ed the

Chinese," Woodcock told Carter. "I appreciate and understand our dom estic political problem s,

as well as p ublic attitud es about recognition of the PRC and breaking relations with Taiwan.

Nevertheless, while waiting for the right tactical moment to recognize the PRC, we should move ahead and m ake sure we have the actual sh ift properly defined." Woodcock argued that normalization almost became a necessary cond ition to continue the alliance with Ch ina. "After the secretary' s August visit, and those of the previous two adm inistrations, there is very little

more to talk about with the Chinese until we deci de to establish diplom atic relations," the chief

of USLO c oncluded. "We can only do so by agre eing to the three conditions, which we have

53 ZB-Han Meeting Record, 2 August 1977, CVF, Box 41, JCPL. 54 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, pp. 202-204.

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already done." Woodcock urged Carter to achieve normalization quietly and quickly—afterwards

"the debate [over Taiwan] will be largely academic."55

While the Chinese were putting pr essures on the Americans, Deng Xiaoping continued to

consolidate his power. The Cart er adm inistration welcom ed the rise of Deng. "The new

leadership style in Peking is beginning to aff ect the conduct of Chinese diplom acy," the CIA

reported in January 1978. "The f undamental elements of Peking's foreign policy, and especially

the cen terpiece of glo bal oppositi on to the USSR, re main in force. But China' s present

leaders...are displaying m ore initiative and tactical flexibili ty in pursuing China' s national

interests and in harnessing fo reign policy to the requirem ents of dom estic econom ic

development."56 Jam es Schlesinger, secretary of the new Departm ent of Energy, particularly

wanted to engage China in econom ic cooperation. On January 27, he told a Chinese petroleum

delegation that "we consider it in our interest that you make progress in your efforts to modernize

China. W e have an interest in China rem aining self-sufficient and becom ing a significant

supplier of world energy supplies."57

Indeed, things started to m ove forward in early 1978. In Fe bruary, Woodcock returned to

Washington and requested a p rivate meeting with Carter. Brzezinski told Carter that Woodcock,

a political power whom Carter could ill afford to alienate, "has becom e increasingly convinced of the historic and strategic im portance of norm alization."58 W oodcock urged Carter to visit

China in order to accelerate the process of nor malization. Although Carter did not want to visit

55 Telegram, Beijing to State, 16 November 1977, CVF, Box 40, JCPL. 56 CIA, "Chinese Foreign Policy," January 1978, NSA, Country File, Box 8, JCPL. 57 "Schlesinger Talks with the PRC Petroleum Delegation," 27 January 1978, ibid. 58 Memo, ZB to Carter, "Meeting with Leonard Woodcock," 7 February 1978, ibid.

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China until a high-ranking Chinese official could return the visits made by Nixon, Kissinger, and

Ford, he agreed that normalization should move forward.59 On February 28, Brzezinski, with the

help of Oksenberg, briefed Carter on China's recent internal developments. There was an obvious

"progress in China toward recons truction of order," Brzezinski told Carter: "China' s principle

concern is with developm ent of its dom estic economy." He agreed with Vance that in public,

America should take an attitude of "evenhandedness" toward Beijing and Moscow. But given

"China is weak," Am erican should "tilt" toward Beijing ins tead of purs uing parallel relations with both Communist powers. M oreover, Brzezinsk i arg ued that "we believe th at selective improvement of China's military capabilities may actually be in our in terest, since we desire the

Chinese to retain confidence in their ability to deter a Sino-Soviet conflict."60

Secretary Vance also decided th at the Carter adm inistration should have a m ore detailed

plan for norm alization. On March 3, Richard Holbrooke, assistant secretary of state for the Far

East, had a meeting with Oksenberg to coordinate the China policies of the State Department and

the NSC. "Vance is be ginning to tell som e Senators th at we intend to norm alize relations with

the PRC after the [congressional ] election," Oksenberg reported. Although Oksenberg thought i t

unwise to set up such a tim etable, he and Holbrooke agreed that "we need to m ove now" if the

U.S.-China normalization was to be achieved.61

Meanwhile, the Chines e, besides p utting p ressure on the Carter team , also offered m ore

economic rewards to Am ericans. On March 7, Ok senberg urged that the Carter adm inistration

59 Carter, Keeping Faith, pp. 197-198. 60 Memo, MO to ZB, "Briefing of the President on Chinese Internal Affairs and Aspects of Our China Policy," 28 February 1978, NSA, Country File, Box 8, JCPL. 61 Memo, MO to ZB, "Conversation with Dick Holbrooke on China Policy," 3 March 1978, ibid.

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"should encourage US corporations to get involved" in China' s new economic plan. At the sam e

time, he observed that the Chinese took new steps in their reorientation toward the West. "I do believe th e Chinese hav e been som ewhat affect ed by the President' s hum an rights concerns,"

Oksenberg reported. "They are concerned about thei r international image, and Hua went to great lengths to stress that China must re-establish a predictable legal system."62

During early 1978, therefore, strategic concerns and China's changing developmental model

convinced the Carter adm inistration that the p rocess of n ormalization should be accelerated .

Meanwhile, a tough American stance toward the S oviet Union was still th e key to convince the

Chinese that the Carter adm inistration was fi rmly comm itted to norm alization. "Peking views

U.S. willingness and ability to co ntain the Soviet Union as a ke y element in Chin a's strategic

position an d as und erlying th e de velopment of Sino-U.S. ties," an inte lligence estim ation

reported, noticing an "growing Peking concern over what it portray s as U.S. indecis iveness and weakness in the face of the Soviet challenge." Thus, to m ove toward n ormalization, Am erica

must convince the Chinese that it would "tilt" toward China in the strategic triangle, and would

not merely play the "China card" against the Soviet Union.63

Obviously, Brzezinsk i would be the best candi date for another trip to Beijing, giv en his

reputation as an anti-Soviet hawk in the Carter administration. Carter himself was also convinced

that a little play of geopolitics w ould not hurt his basic foreign policy goals. The SALT

negotiation was hopelessly stalemated in ear ly 1978, and the Soviet Union expanded its

62 Memo, MO to ZB, "Hua Kuo-feng's Report to NPC," 7 March 1978, ibid. 63 Foreign Broadcast Information Service, "Special Report on Communist China," 16 May 1978, NSA, Staff Material, Office, Box 127, JCPL.

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involvement in the war between Ethiopia and Som alia. Carter thus decided to send Brzezinski to

China. At the sam e tim e, Vance would go to Moscow for m ore SALT negotiations. "I had a

meeting with Brzezin ski, Brown, Vance, Mond ale, Jordan to discuss Zbig's trip to China, and

decided that we would move on no rmalization this year if the Ch inese are forthcoming," Carter

recorded in his diary on May 16. "Our preference is to m ake final action after the Nove mber

election. We all agreed that a better relationship with the PRC would help us with SALT."64

Brzezinski's trip to China in late May, therefore, had only one key goal—to convince China

that th e United Sta tes now was determ ined to achieve n ormalization. Thus during his f irst

meeting with Deng Xiaoping on May 21, Brzezinski hit the point directly: "He (Carter) asked me

to stress to you that we see our relationship as of central importance to our global policy, as

being based on a long term common st rategic interests, as not refl ecting any tactical expedient,

and as a relationship which we hope will expand and grow to a fully norm al cond ition."

"President Carter asked me to tell y ou that the U.S. has made up its m ind and that therefore we

are prepared to talk seriously not only about the international situation, not only about ways in

which parallel actions by us m ight help to pro mote the s ame objectiv es or to r epel th e same

danger, but also to begin talki ng more actively about our more immediate relationship." Deng,

for his part, emphasized that China still regarded the so-called "three conditions" as prerequisites of norm alization. "I was ins tructed to confir m to you the U.S. accep tance of the three basic

Chinese po ints," Br zezinski answe red. "The Pr esident pe rsonally is pr epared to r esolve this question as rapidly as it proves practical. We have no in tention of artificially delaying it." Deng

64 Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 198.

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was pleased. And he pointed ou t that no rmalization wou ld m ake the U.S.-China alliance

stronger. "The common problem...was the problem of coping with the polar bear, and that's that,"

Deng told Brzezinski. "I know that some Americans tend to think that normalization of relations

between our two countries will irritate the Soviet Union and make agreements between your two

countries even more difficult, but I think that one can imagine perhaps it is even easier for you to reach ag reement with the norm alization." Brzezins ki fully agreed. "My own view is that the

American-Soviet rela tionship will rem ain f or a very lo ng tim e to com e f undamentally a competitive and in som e respects a hostile relati onship," he told Deng. "Recent Soviet actions, particularly in Africa, [ have] signif icantly s trengthen[ed] the politic al influence of those who

have been arguing that Soviet designs are fundam entally aggres sive and that they m ust be resolutely resisted. This brings me to the question of m ore tangible cooperation between China and the U.S." Brzezinsk i even challenged Deng to an anti-So viet competition: "As far as being afraid to offend the Soviet Union, I would be w illing to m ake a little bet with you as to who i s

less popular in the Soviet Union—you or me."65

Brzezinski and Deng certain ly saw eye to eye on many strategic issu es. As a result, Deng appeared to be convinced that the C arter administration really wanted to achieve normalization,

and he agreed to launch secr et talks in June, prim arily through W oodcock, to discuss the

procedures of nor malization. Meanwhile, when Brzezinski m entioned that the Carter

administration needed a "histo rical transitional pe riod" regarding relations with Taiwan, that is,

America could not give a "sudden death" to offi cial U.S.-Taiwan relations, Deng was willing to

65 ZB-Deng Meeting Record, 21 May 1978, CVF, Box 40, JCPL.

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grant a "grace period" to America.66 The two sides also agreed to increase economic cooperation and scien tific exchang es. In f act, Carter per sonally c ame to put m ore em phasis on th e development of non-strategic relations with Chin a. A few days after Brzezinsk i's trip, Carter instructed Vance to tell the Chinese that "he hop es that the comm ercial and cultural dimensions of our relations will expand in the months ahead, particularly since he believes that an expanded and deepened relationship in the cultural and economic spheres contributes to the norm alization process."67

Brzezinski's visit was regarded by the Carter administration as a succes s, and America and

China finally started detailed negotiations ab out norm alization. But before the decision of establishing full diplomatic relations between America and China was announced on Decem ber

15, 1978, the two sides had to find a way to reach an agreem ent on the future U.S.-Taiwan relationship. While the issue of Taiwan had blocked the process of norm alization during 1977, after Brzezinski's visit the two sides were determ ined to find a m utually acceptable solution on this issue.

Meanwhile, China' s modernization becam e an even more prominent factor in the developing U.S.-China relationshi p, and it helped to convince the Carter adm inistration that normalization should not be delayed by the Taiwan issue. In deed, after Brzezinski's visit, Carter decided to improve relations with China in all areas even prior to full normalization of relations, and he particularly wanted to increase Am erica's influence in China's domestic development. In

66 Ibid. 67 Memo, ZB to Carter, "Vance's Meeting with Huang Hua," 31 May 1978, ibid.

428

July, Carter sent Frank Press, his advisor on science and technology, to China. The President

wanted to use this visit to further engage th e Chinese in econom ic cooperation, and he believed

that expanded econom ic relations could push China toward norm alization. Thus the Press visit

was supposed to "strengthen the hand of those Ch inese leaders who want to deal pragm atically

with the US," "anchor P eking's current 'tilt' toward the W est and diminish further any prospects

for Sino-Soviet reconciliation," "reinforce the PRC' s current m oderate policies in Asia and

possibly in duce flexib ility on Si no-US bilateral issues (e.g., Taiwan) by dem onstrating the tangible benefits that flo w from a clearer rela tionship with the US," "p lace the USSR on notice that provocative Soviet behavior could stimulate increasingly intimate Sino-US ties with security

overtones," and "broaden US commer cial opportunity vis-à-vis China." 68 Press's visit seemed to

achieve those goals. On August 11, Chai Zem in, the new head of PRCLO, told Vance that the

Press visit was particularly im portant for Sino- American relations. Chai appreciated Am erica's

economic help to China, and he emphasized that in term s of China' s modernization, "the US experience will be an important reference for us."69

On the sam e day, Oksenberg argued that th e Carter adm inistration should move fast

regarding normalization in order to "help" Deng domestically. "We are now far enough into the

Teng era in China so th at some evaluation of his strengths and w eaknesses can be made. We are

also beginning to get enough feel ...to crank the dom estic elem ent into the for mulation of our

China policy," he concluded. Deng Xiaoping "c learly h as the initiative in Ch inese po licy

68 Memo, ZB to Carter, "Sino-US Scientific & Technological Cooperation," 18 October 1978, NSA, Country File, Box 8, JCPL. 69 Chai-Vance Meeting Record, 11 August 1978, CVF, Box 41, JCPL.

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formulation across the b oard. The policies he is pushing are, incr easingly, openly ' revisionist,'

and some of the propaganda justifying them stops only a h alf inch sho rt of being plainly anti-

Maoist." Therefore, it was understandable that Deng had to fend off attacks from those who were

not happy with his anti-Maoist po licies. If America could move toward norm alization quickl y

and increase econom ic relations with China rapidly, then Deng' s domestic position would be

consolidated by his foreign policy victories.70

The State Departm ent reached sim ilar conclusions. Richard Holbr ooke, while scheduling a

meeting between Vance and Huang Hua, told his boss that the m eeting "comes at a tim e of a

rapidly expanding US-PRC relationship." "The main impetus for this change is the all-out effort

by the Chinese lead ership to ac celerate m odernization o f the PRC," Holbrook e observed.

"Education, scientific and technol ogical work, the econom y, and other im portant segm ents of

Chinese society are being overhauled, and the Chinese are looking to the W est and Japan for the

expertise to accomplish their ambitious goals." In September alone, Holbrooke told Vance, over

twenty PRC delegations visited the United States (compared with a rate six months ago of two or

three a m onth) studying city adm inistration, coal, electronics, geography, and etc. In addition,

large num bers of Am erican educators, techni cians, businessm en, and perhaps 15,000 tourists

were going to China during 1978. 71 On October 3, Huang Hua to ld V ance th at "p rofessional exchanges between China and the U.S. have increased. This is a positive development welcomed by the Chinese and American peoples." However, Hu ang pointed out that "our bilateral relations

70 Memo, MO to ZB, "Teng's Exposed Position," 11 August 1978, NSA, Country File, Box 8, JCPL. 71 Memo, Holbrooke to Vance, "Your Meeting with Huang Hua," September 1978, CVF, Box 40, JCPL.

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can develop in an all-around way only with the ea rly normalization of relations between our two

countries." Huang thus suggested th at the lack of diplomatic relations b ecame a bot tleneck for

U.S.-China relations, which w ould only prevent China from "l earning m ore" from the United

States. Vance, for his part, again assured Huang that the Carter administration had already "made

up its mind" on normalization.72

On Nove mber 15, Oksenberg furth er reported that Deng was fighting a battle with the

"conservatives over m odernization." Deng was on the offensive, Oksenberg observed, and "we

are now...faced with a situation wh ere the stak es are high and it is im portant to u s that Teng should win." One way to help D eng was to "qui etly encourage the Eu ropean countries to consider seriously China's quest for technology, arms and credit. If the Chinese feel that the door has been slammed in their face, Teng m ay be on the end of a very exposed lim b." The normalization of relations, of c ourse, would be the ultim ate way to help Deng dom estically.73

Carter indeed well understood the stakes invol ved. To further facilitate the process of normalization, in November Carter send his secretary of energy James Schlesinger and secretary of agriculture Robert Bergland to C hina. Both trips were made at a cru cial time, as Deng was preparing f or the upcom ing Third Plenum of the Eleventh Party C ongress scheduled in

December when he expected to sy stematically "correct the wrongs" of the Cultural Revolution and lay down the general policies for his ow n era in Ch inese h istory. The esta blishment of formal diplomatic relations with A merica would certainly strengthen D eng's hands in dom estic

72 Huang-Vance Meeting Record, 3 October 1978, ibid. 73 Memo, MO to ZB, "Rise in the Chinese Political Temperature and US Policy Implications," 15 November 1978, NSA, Country File, Box 8, JCPL.

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politics. On Nove mber 29, for example, Deng sa id that he hoped to achieve norm alization "as soon as possible." He pointed out that the Chinese leadership w as having a m eeting in preparation for the Third Plenum , which would primarily focus on the issue of modernization.

But to achieve m odernization, Deng said, China w ould need a better inte rnational environment, and the U.S.-China relationship certainly would be a key element in this regard.74

Both secre taries' trips , theref ore, were ine vitably intertwined w ith China' s new modernization plan. Schlesinger, for example, was asked to find out in what ways America could get involved in the new era of China' s econom ic developm ent. He was told that China's reorientation in its developm ental model was permanent. But because China' s new econom ic blueprint was "so ambitious" and its current economy was "so backward," it would be inevitable for China to turn to th e West for help. 75 Indeed, S chlesinger found this analysis to b e accurate.

After the tr ip he told Carter th at the Chinese were eager to initia te all kinds of econom ic cooperation with the United States. "The Chinese used these technical discussions to present a large number of energy projects that will provide potentially lucrative commercial opportunities for U.S. industry and the basis for expanded S &T (science and technol ogy) cooperation with various parts of the U.S. Gove rnment," Schlesinger reported. 76 Bergland was even m ore excited than Schles inger af ter his tr ip to China. "T he Chinese ar e comm itted to a m ajor ef fort to modernize their country by the end of the century," he told Cater: "It is due to their realization that the United States has much to offer in the way of technology in agriculture that we were able

74 Deng Xiaoping nianpu, Vol. 1, p. 443. 75 "Schlesinger Trip, Briefing Book II," October 1978, NSA, Staff Material, Far East, Box 62, JCPL. 76 Memo, Schlesinger to Carter, 'Report on Energy Cooperation with China," 27 November 1978, NSA, Country File, Box 8, JCPL.

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to score som e i mportant breakthroughs in our rapidly developing relationship with China."

Moreover, Bergland believed that Am erica now had a ne w "responsibility" of sorts toward

China. "They look to the U.S. alm ost naivel y, as holding the key to their objectives for modernizing their agriculture," he observed. "This faces us with opportun ities as well as seriou s challenges. The Chinese are unleashing forces which involve new freedom s for their people as well as rising expectations of material well-being....But I believe that it is very im portant that we establish in our re lations with th em a reco rd of dependability and reliab ility; that we not over - promise, but that we deliver on whatever we undertake to do."77

During the latter half of 1978, therefore, China's m odernization became even m ore

important in the Carter adm inistration's Ch ina policy. Moreover, changes in China were

perceived not just as pure econom ic changes. Instead, the Carter administration believed that

changes initiated by Deng Xiaoping would prof oundly influence China' s policy tow ard Taiwan

and China's domestic social system. On December 1, for exam ple, a State Departm ent analysis

noticed that posters and m ass rallies reappeared in Beijing. This time, however, those activities

were "initiated and guided by Teng to pressure th e leade rship into f ull ratif ication of his f ar-

reaching po licies." The analys is b elieved th at Deng would eas ily achieve a new consensu s

among the Chinese leadership, and am ong his policies were the " pursuit of the rapid

normalization of US-China relations, stressing peaceful reunification with Taiwan in the longer-

term future; development of the more far-reaching aspects of China's economic relations with the

77 Memo, Bergland to Carter, "Trip to China," 22 November 1978, NSA, Country File, Box 9, JCPL.

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US and our allies; gradual im provement in Chin a's legal system and in respect for individual rights (albeit within severely prescribed limits)."78

Significantly, the Carter administration was so concerned about China's reorientation that it greatly downplayed the hum an rights issue when dealing with China. When a Decem ber wall poster in Beijing hailed Am erica's human rights polic y and asked Carter to "pay attention" to human rights in China, the Carter adm inistration decided that Am erica "should indicate that we have heard the m essage and should explicitly note that even peoples as wi dely divergent as the

American and Chinese share common values. " However, no formal repose was to be m ade, and no talks on hum an rights should be initiated with Chinese officials. The Carter administration believed that China needed m ore tim e to comp letely get rid of its Maoist ideology, and a premature dialogue on human rights could only backfire. Indeed, as early as in 1977, Carter told

Senator Barry Goldwater that America must choose "appropriate tactics to pursue" with regard to

China's human rights issue. Putting too m uch pressures on the Beijing regim e too early would not only delay the developm ent of Sino-Am erican relations, but also destroyed the lim ited

American influence on China's domestic situation.79 Brzezinski also argued that human rights, in the current Chinese context, was first of all about "basic m inimum st andards of social and economic existence" and "achieving human rights is a process."80

The develo pments since Brzezinsk i's May trip to China, therefore, created a favorable environment for both sides to pursue the establishment of formal diplomatic relations. The rise of

78 Memo, David Mark to Vance, "Events in China," 1 December 1978, ibid. 79 Letter, Carter to Goldwater, 16 May 1977, WHCF, Country File, Box CO-15, JCPL. 80 "NSC Weekly Report," 16 April 1977, Donated Historical Material, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, Box 41, JCPL. Italic original.

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Deng in the Chinese leadership hierarchy, the be ginning of a new era in China' s modernization, and the common strategic intere sts between Beijing and Washington that continued to be important m ade the two sides re alize tha t th e benefits they could get from norm alization overweighed their differences over the Taiwan issue. Indeed, the Carter administration did not challenge the "one China" principle established by the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué. It primarily wanted, as Brzezinski termed it, a 'historica l transitional period" during which the United Sta tes could still m aintain unof ficial re lations with Ta iwan so that Am erica's credibility could b e protected from the de-recognition of Taiwan. Thus on Septem ber 11, Brzezinski urged Carter to be firm on the Taiwan issue during his upcom ing meeting with Chai Zem in. "The session takes place at a critical juncture in our relations with Peking," Carter was told. "After cultivating a very positive atmosphere, we are now bluntly telling them if they want norm alization with the framework of their three points, th ey must be p repared to tolerate continued U.S. arm s sales t o

Taiwan and must not co ntradict our statement that we are co nfident the Taiwan issu e would b e settled peacefully by th e Chinese themselves. Never before has our botto m line b een as clearly spelled out, and the session with you will be important to place Leonard's talks in the appropriate overall context."81 Subsequently, Carter told Chai that while America was "willing to honor your three points which your governm ent has m ade clea r to us," it was also "im portant that your government be ready to honor the need of the Un ited States to dem onstrate its dependability, credibility, integ rity, an d resolv e a s we chang e our relations with T aiwan and change our

81 Memo, ZB to Carter, "Your Meeting with Chai, " 11 September 1978, CVF, Box 41, JCPL.

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relations with the Peop le's Republic of China." Ch ai, for his part, "[did] not say arms sales ru le out normalization."82

Chinese leaders seem ed to understand the Cart er administration's concerns about Taiwan.

Deng, therefore, decided that as long as the "one-China" princi ple was not openly and directly challenged, China could m ove ahead with normaliz ation, even with the key issue of Am erica's arms sale to Taiwan unsettle d. The first breakthrough thus cam e in early Decem ber, when the

Chinese told W oodcock that "we can refrain fr om raising objections to statem ents by U.S. government leaders ex pressing th eir hope to see a peaceful resolu tion of the Taiwan issue."

China agreed that Am erica could maintain trade, cultural, and other non-o fficial relations with

Taiwan after norm alization. More im portantly, W oodcock successfully got "a Chinese acknowledge that arm s sales will continue; the Chinese object but will not let the fact prevent normalization."83 In short, China was willing to give the Ca rter adm inistration some tim e to adjust its relations with Taiwan after normalization.

Between December 13 and 15, Deng and W oodcock held the last round of negotiations on normalization. Deng was willing to allow unofficial relations between America and Taiwan after normalization, and he was willing to let the U.S.-Taiwan defense treaty die a natural death, since the treaty would expire in early 1980. But Deng tried for the last tim e to solve the issue of

American arm s sale to Taiwan. Deng argued th at Am erican arm s sale to Taiwan, although claimed by the Carter adm inistration as "defensi ve" in nature, would actually "prevent China

82 Chai-Carter Meeting Record, 19 September 1978,ibid. 83 Memo, ZB to Carter, "Leonard's December 4th Meeting," 5 December 1978, ibid.

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from taking any rational form ula to have a di alogue with Taiwan to solve the problem of

unification of the country." The reason, Deng s aid, was that Taiwanese leaders, encouraged by

the arms sales, would becom e "cocky" and thu s refuse to have peace talks with the m ainland.

"After the n ormalization of relations between China and the U.S.," Deng told W oodcock, "we

hope the U.S. will be very cautious and prudent in tackling your relatio ns with Taiwan and will not preven t China from finding a rational a nd peaceful solution w ith Taiwan. " W oodcock

ensured Deng that Americ a would not try to " fulfill the def ense treaty in a dif ferent form" by

arms sales. Rather, "politica lly f or any US administration we must do this (arm s sale t o

Taiwan)." He then to ld Deng that the problem could be further discussed after norm alization.

And, "as tim e passes and we hav e norm alized re lations, [the] political clim ate will change

substantially and for the better with relation to this question." Deng agreed that "we can continue

to discuss this question later on without affect ing the issuance of the [joint] communiqué [on

normalization]." Meanwhile, Deng hoped that if the issue of ar ms sales was raised by the

American media, "the President will be very vague and am biguous in answering this question so

that no problem will be raised."84

On Decem ber 15, Am erica and China sim ultaneously issued a Jo int Comm uniqué which

announced that the two countries would establ ish diplomatic relations on January 1, 1979 and

exchange embraceries on March 1, 1979. The United States recognized the People's Republic of

China as the sole legal governm ent of China and the "people" of th e United States would

maintain cultural, comm ercial, and other uno fficial relations with the "people" of Taiwan.

84 Woodcock to Washington, "Meeting with Deng," 15 December 1978, CVF, Box 40, JCPL.

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President Carter remarked that America did not undertake normalization for "transient tactical or

expedient reasons." Rather, a positive all-out re lationship with Chin a would "contribute to the

well-being of our own national intere st" and "the stability of Asia." 85 Meanwhile, Deng told his

colleagues that the year of 1978 saw "two m ajor achievements for the Chinese people." One was

the convention of the Third Plenum of Eleven th Party C ongress in late December, which

officially initiated a new era in Chin a's modernization (the Plenum was late r identified as the

starting point of the "open and ref orm" policy). The other was the establishm ent of diplom atic

relations with the United States. In Deng's mind, these two achievements were clearly connected.

"Now [that] we have a good international e nvironment," he said, "let' s focus on our

modernization."86

Congress and Normalization: 1977-1979

Congress played an im portant role in the form ulation of America's China policy during the

first two years of the C arter administration. In fact, the achi evement of norm alization of Sino-

American relations can not be fu lly understood unless we exam ine the role of Congress in thi s process. Generally speaking, Congress becam e more actively involved in the m aking of

America's China policy for two reasons. On the one hand, in the afterm ath of the Vietnam War,

Congress, frustrated by the executive branch's lack of consultation of Congress in foreign affairs, became m ore self-conscious in term s of getti ng itself involved in the foreign policy -making process. A com plicated issue such as th e es tablishment of diplom atic r elations with Chin a

85 For the full text of the Joint Communiqué and Carter's remarks, see DSB (No. 2022), January 1979, p.25. 86 Deng Xiaoping nianpu, Vol. 1, pp. 457-461.

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especially attracted lawmakers' attention, given all the interests involved. On the other hand, with the dramatically expanded economic and cultural relations between America and China since the mid-1970s, more and more members of Congress got in touch with the Chinese on behalf of their constituencies. As a result, m any members of C ongress felt confident that they had legitim ate reasons to participate in the development of U.S.-China relations.

For its part, the Carter adm inistration had to find allies in Congress in order to achieve normalization, especia lly since it r equired th e term ination of of ficial relations with Taiwan.

Although the support T aiwan enjoyed in Congress ha d already so declined that the residues of the "China Lobby" could no longer block expanded relations between Wash ington and Beijing, the issue of cutting of f diplom atic relation s with Ta ibei was still se nsitive enou gh f or m any legislators to be cau tious. In fact, the future s tatus of Taiwan and its r elations with the United

States quick ly becam e a rally ing p oint for the debate over the U.S.-China normalization in

Congress. In the end, the Carter administration was able to esta blish diplomatic relations with

China without a serious backlash in Congress because it was able to find enough support of its policy from key Congress members.

The discourse on China's modernization, once again, shaped the debate in Congress over the issue of norm alization. For supporters of norm alization, China's changing m odernization model profoundly reshaped the com plicated trian gular relationship am ong Beijing, Taibei, an d

Washington. As economic developm ent became the top priority of the Chinese leade rship, they argued, the Beijing regime would become more and more dependent on the United States and its allies for technologies, capital, and m anagerial skills. Und er this s ituation, China could only

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jeopardize its m odernization by using force to reunify Taiwan with the m ainland. The establishment of diplomatic relations with Beijing would only deepen China's dependence on the

United States, and thus m ade Taiwan m ore, not less, secure. Indeed, this kind of argum ent eventually prevailed in Congress, which m ade it m uch easier for the Carter adm inistration to finally normalize relations with China.

The m ost articulate supporter of Sino-Am erican norm alization, not surprisingly, was

Senator Mike Mansfield. In October 1976, Mansfi eld led the first Congre ssional delegation into the Post-Mao China, an d his report subm itted in November became the first cle ar signal from

Congress for the new Carter adm inistration that normalization of relations with China should be actively pursued. Mansf ield believed that w ith the death of Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek,

"it would seem to be a most propitious tim e to wipe the slate clean, to fulfill the promise of the

Shanghai Comm uniqué by com pleting the process of norm alizing relations with the People' s

Republic of China." To justify his position, Mansfi eld argued that the pe rceived threat from

China, especially China' s threat to Taiwan, was without foundation. "Tim e has pr oven that the justification presented to Congress for the defens e treaty with the Nationalist regim e was based on a distorted view not only of Am erica's long-range interests in the Far East but also of the nature of the People' s Republic of China," Mans field dism issed the necessity of the defense treaty between Taibei and W ashington: "Am erica's security was not involved in the future of

Taiwan." T he m ajority leade r sh owed his f rustration over the lack of progress toward normalization since 1972. "Stagnati on is the enem y of a sound, c onstructive foreign policy, and indecision in policy-making about Taiwan is providing political impetus for pushing citizens into

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choosing sides," he warned. "The delay, for ex ample, m ay well strengthen the hand of the

elements in the Chinese leadership s eeking to restore greater comity with the Soviet Union even

at the expense of the U.S. relationship." Mo reover, Mansfield argued that the new Chinese

leadership would f ocus prim arily on dom estic issues, and Beijing would not je opardize its

relations with America by attacking Taiwan. "Although it is unrealistic to expect that the Chinese

government will renoun ce the use o f force to regain control of Taiwan," Mansfield concluded,

"there is reason to expect that the Chinese will not rush the process of absorbing Taiwan into the

life of the mainland after the normalization of relations." America would surely continue to have

cultural and comm ercial relations with Taiwan in the f uture, bu t an im proved relationship

between Beijing and Washington would be the best guarantee for Taiwan's security.87

Mansfield's conclusions were we ll supported by other m embers of the delegation to China,

especially John Glenn, a rising Dem ocratic S enator from Oh io. Indeed, Glenn was soon to

become a key player in U.S.-China relations w hen he becam e a m ember of the Senate Foreign

Relations Committee and replaced Mansfield as th e chair o f the East Asian and Pacific Affairs

Subcommittee in 1978. On his first trip to China, Glenn was impressed by the Chinese

determination to turn the nation into an industria lized giant. He shared with Mansfield and his

Chinese counterparts the broad strate gic view th at the benefits of Sino-Am erican normalization

overweighed other concerns. The issu e of Taiwan "is a problem that must be resolved but...it is

more a thor n in the sid e that m ust be resolv ed at some time in the f uture," he to ld his Chinese

87 Senate, China Enters the Post-Mao Era: A Report by Senator Mike Mansfield (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), pp. 5-9.

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hosts. Sino-American cooperation on other issues, such as the comm on threat from the Soviet

Union, must not be allowed to be obstructed by the Taiwan issue. 88 At the same time, Glenn was

eager to develop trade relations with the Chinese, and he particularly wanted to find out whether

Ohio could get involved in China's energy projects. Deng Xiaoping took the chance to tell Glenn

that China would quickly becom e an oil-e xporter, and he welcom ed advanced drilling

technologies from the United States. But of course , Deng said, the lack of diplom atic relations

between America and China was a major obstacle for closer Sino-American cooperation on those

energy projects.89

Senator Hugh Scott also supported the establishm ent of diplomatic relations with China by

making the necessary decision to cut off diplom atic relations with Ta iwan as soo n as possib le.

After his late 1976 trip to China, the m inority leader urged that "early in 1977, we should press the process of cutting th is Gordian knot, through mutual search for accep table formulae." Scott warned that America must be very careful a bout long-term commitments of supplying weapons to Taiwan. Like Mansfield, he also believed that the lingering military ties between America and

Taiwan would only create m ore problems for relations with Beijing, and he argued that it would be unlik ely f or China to f orcefully take back Taiwan. 90 Moreover, frustrated by the lack of

progress toward norm alization, Sco tt turned to public opinion to put pressures on the Carter

administration. In August 1977, a few days before Secretary Vance' s travel to China, Scott

88 Memo of Conversation, 7 October 1976, John Glenn Archives (JGA), Senate Papers, Foreign Trips, Box 36, The Ohio State University Libraries, Columbus, OH. 89 Memo of Conversation, 9 October 1976, ibid. 90 Senate, The United States and China: Report by Senator Hugh Scott (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), pp. 2-4.

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disclosed to the New York Times his sec ret report to Pre sident Ford a fter his 197 6 China trip .

Scott a rgued that Am erican adm inistrations f ailed to f ulfill th e prom ise of normaliz ation of relations with China, an d he hoped the Carter ad ministration would tak e necessary steps in this regard. Meanwhile, Scott indicated wide support for norm alization in C ongress. "There is very wide congressional and public support for rapi d m ovement toward norm alization of our diplomatic relations with the Peopl e's Republic of China," he said, "even at the price of severing

diplomatic ties with our friends on Taiwan."91

Secretary Vance' s trip to China in August 1977, indeed, triggered the first round of

Congressional activities on U.S.-China norm alization duri ng the Carter presidency. In

September, the House International Relations Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs held

hearings on U.S.-China relations for six da ys. Twenty-two witnesse s, including several

legislators and som e we ll-known China experts , testified b efore the Comm ittee. Although th e

issue of Taiwan naturally becam e a point of deb ate, no one spoke out against the establishm ent

of diplomatic relations with China. Rather, th e key question debated w as not whether Am erican

should recognize the Beijing regime, but how and when the Sino-American normalization should

be achieved.

For supporters of normalization on China' s terms, the establishment of diplomatic relations

with Beijing could greatly enhance Am erica's global strategic standing and increase the prospect

of peace in Asia. Norm alization would stren gthen the anti-Soviet allianc e with China, some

argued, and unnecessary delays could force the Chinese to rethink their relations with the Soviet

91 "Hugh Scott Says He Urged Ford to Cut Taiwan Tie," 18 August 1977, NYT.

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Union. Moreover, som e witnesses clearly regarded the Chinese reorientation toward the W est

politically and econom ically as the best way to ensure T aiwan's security. The post-Mao China,

some insisted, would have to turn to the W est for help in achieving their "Four Modernizations,"

which created a golden chance for Am erica to achieve the long-standing goal of influencing

China's m odernization. Overtim e, China woul d becam e dependent on good relations with th e

West. Since Chinese leaders understood that the use of force against Taiwan would at least upset

two m ajor supplie rs of China' s moderniz ation, Japan an d the Unite d State s, th e Chines e

leadership, especially under the pragm atic De ng Xiaoping, would not take such a risk. In

addition, there was no legal obligation for the United States to maintain the mutual defense treaty

with Taiwan. As soon as America recognized the Beijing regime, the treaty would autom atically become invalid. Because the 1972 Shanghai Comm uniqué already establish ed the "one-China"

principle, therefore, it could not be legally justified to have a treaty with part of a country.92

Other witne sses, however, were co ncerned that Am erica's acceptance of Beijing' s "thre e

conditions" would be perceived as "abandoning" Taiwan, an old friend and ally. Moreover, the withdrawal of Am erican troops from Taiwan w ould be interpreted as the beginning of an

American withdrawal from the whole Far Eas t, which would cause unnecessary repercussions among other allies, such as Japan and South Kor ea. However, those witn esses also recognized the value of normalizing relations with China, a nd all they wanted was to find a way to protect

America's credib ility vis-à-v is Taiwan. Ralph Clough from the Brookings Ins titution, for

92 Summarized from testimonies. See House, Hearings: Normalization of Relations with the People's Republic of China (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977).

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example, proposed to use an "A merican Formula" to replace th e "Japanese Form ula." The new

formula would m odify Beijing' s "three conditi ons" by asking Taiwan and m ainland China to

reach a neg otiated peace agreement, which cou ld both satisfy the American dem and that the

issue of Taiwan should be solved p eacefully and the agreement contained in the 1 972 Shanghai

Communiqué that the Taiwan issue should be solved among the Chinese themselves.93

The September hearings did not have an imm ediate impact on the Carter adm inistration's

China policy partially because the August Van ce trip failed to achieve new progress in

normalization, and partially because the issue of Taiwan continued to be a concern in Congress.

However, several them es e merged from t hose hearings. First, no one argued against normalization of relatio ns with China per se; the difference was over tim ing and strategies.

Second, no one denied that China w as changing domestically, and m ost witnesses believed that

China's new m odernization strateg ies dictated better re lations with th e United Sta tes. Finally, those who argued on Taiwan' s behalf did not fight hard by organizing their efforts through law- making. In fact, it is in teresting to observe that Congress did not press Beijing to moderate it s position on Taiwan by collective action. It seem ed that Congress also appreciated the sensitiv ity of U.S.-China relations, and key m embers of Congress preferred quiet, rather than public , diplomacy.

On the last point, a revealing exam ple was the human rights issue with regard to China. A

February 1978 report produced by the Congressi onal Research Service pointed out that the subject of human rights in China had been prom inent in recent congressional hearings and other

93 Summarized from testimonies. See Ibid. Clough quoted in pp. 46-48.

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forums which had prompted debate on whether or not the United States should move to establish

full diplom atic relations with Beijin g and break its relation s with Taibei. Congress in general

accepted President Carter's announcement that human rights should become a major concern for

America's foreign policy. However, the report ob served that the debate on China' s human rights

record had little im pact on the Chinese, bec ause the leg islators were relu ctant to press the

Chinese government on this issue. "In practice...the United S tates has taken little action—apart

from private diplom atic representation—to advance hum an rights in China," the report

concluded. "For exam ple, the Carter adm inistration has repeatedly stated that its concern for

human rights applies to all c ountries; but the Adm inistration has avoided com plementing its

criticisms of hum an rights cond itions in such Co mmunist states as th e Soviet Unio n and such

authoritarian Asian nations such as South Kor ea with exp licit c ritiques of shortco ming in the

PRC." At the same time, the law-makers agreed that "US economic and strategic leverages" were

the best means to make China more responsive toward American demands.94

When the year 1978 started, som e members of Congress became even m ore frustrated by

the lack of progress toward nor malization. Meanwhile, Chinese lead ers started to work closely

with key mem bers of Congress as they realized the role of Congress in the norm alization

process. For exam ple, i n February 1978 Chinese leaders did their best to turn Senator Henry

Jackson, who was then visiting Ch ina, into an ally on norm alization. In fact, Jackson hardly

needed any push, as he had already repeatedly e xpressed his desire for normalization. During his

first two da ys in Chin a, Jackson held talk s with various Chinese official s, and the ta lks largely

94 Congressional Research Service, Human Rights in China (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978), pp. 50-51.

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focused on how to cooperate in dealing with the Soviet Union. For Jackson, who was perhaps the

strongest critic of Soviet-Am erican detente in Congress, Chin a's strong anti-Soviet attitud e was

particularly welcomed. But "if [t he issue of norm alization is] not resolved," Jackson's host, Hao

Deqing, told him , "the good desires of Mr. Sena tor cannot be realize d." "I subscribe to normalization," Jackson answered. "Political c onditions in the U.S. cause delay. There is no dispute that there can be only one China....W e should pursue this and continue our dialogue."

When Jacks on asked w hether Chin a wanted to purchase Boeing aircraft, Hao answered th at

China had already bought ten Boeings. "F ive mo re?" Jackson asked. "W hen we have m ore money," Hao tried to put Jackson off. " We have a lot of wheat to sell." Jackson was not daunted.

"Seriously, it is in our interest to help you develop your oil... we have the finest technology in oil and coal developm ent and can help." Hao was not moved. China would defi nitely continue to expand trade relations with America, he said, but the lack of normalization was a major obstacle in that r egard. 95 W hen Jackson m et Deng Xiaoping, De ng put China's position even m ore

bluntly. "China is ready to introduce all adva nced technology from the advanced countries,"

Deng told Jackson. "Many countries are ready to cooperate with China. But the greatest difference between the other countries, W estern Europe and Japan, is that their relations [with

China] are normalized, while US-PRC relations have not yet been normalized."96

Jackson returned from China deeply impressed by the new Chinese leadership under Deng

Xiaoping. "There is a new spirit in China today ....Today the leaders of the People' s Republic of

95 Memo of Conversation, 13 February 1978, AN 3560-28, Box 1, HMJ. 96 Memo of Conversation, 16 February 1978, ibid.

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China appear determined to turn an already great nation into one of the world' s industrial giants

by the year 2000," the Senator reported. "That sam e leadership is resolved to do what is in its

power to in sure the sec urity and territorial integrity of China so that the m odernization of the

country can proceed without interru ption." Jackson complained that "th e United States has no t

been giving sufficient priority to our own relationship with the People's Republic of China." "We

have a significant stake in the continued exis tence of a strong, independent China," Jackson asserted. "T he lack of norm alized relations obviously m akes working together on comm on concerns more difficult. I have recommended to the President and to the Secretary of State that a major effort be m ade to resolve the issues s till outstanding that block the full norm alization of relations." In addition, Jackson added, the American business community faced a great market in

China because "the Chinese appear to be co nvinced that Am erican petroleum technology is superior to that available anywhere else in the world."97

For Jackson, the "new spirit" in China signale d greater opportunities for Am erica to further

engage the Chinese in all kinds of cooperatio n. The sixteenth Congressional delegation that

visited Chin a in May 1 978 reach ed similar con clusions. Th e delegation was organ ized by the

House International Relations Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as a fact-

finding mission. The timing of its travel was a clear signal that Congress wanted to have a say in

the making of America's China policy, since Brzezinski went to China in the s ame month. If the

Chinese reg arded J ackson as an old friend wh o did not need m uch caj oling on the issue of

97 Senate, China and the United States Policy: Report of Senator Henry Jackson (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978), pp. 1-8.

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normalization, then Deng Xiaoping went all out of his w ay to charm this delegation. Deng

emphasized that China refused to openly pledge th at it would not use force to reunif y Taiwan

with the m ainland. However, Deng hinted that in practice China would not use force against

Taiwan. Moreover, Deng argued that Am erica and China should have a broad relationship, not

just a nar rowly def ined anti-Soviet allia nce. "The m eeting with the Vice Prem ier lef t the

delegation with the f eeling that the rela tionship between the People' s Republic of China and the

United States can and should be developed and expanded," the delegation reported, "but that it

should not be founded simply on the grounds of opposition to the Soviet Union." The d elegation also saw great opportunities for America to expa nd economic relations with China. While their

Chinese host were talking about the "Four m odernizations" all the tim e, "the delegation has substantial doubts that China can achieve this goal by the year 2000, or indeed in the foreseeable future, without the aid of foreign technology, cap ital, and m anagerial skills." Seeing a Chinese vulnerability in this regard, "the delegation is of the opinion that the People' s Republic of China is not likely to resort to force in the foreseeab le future as a m eans of reuniting Ta iwan with the mainland." In addition, China did not have enough military power to take over Taiwan, and th e

Chinese peaceful intentions could also be dem onstrated by the fact that Beijing had left Hong

Kong and Macao in tact. "It is the unanim ous consensus of the delegation th at there should b e normalization of relations between the United States and the People' s Republic of China. And it is fully recognized that probabl y there can be no norm alization unless the People' s Republic of

China's thre e te rms are m et," the delega tion c oncluded. "The im portance of norm alization of relations between the United Sta tes and the Pe ople's Republic of China overrides any detrim ent

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that would arise from the end of diplom atic re lations with Taiwan an d the te rmination of the

Mutual Defense Treaty."98

Brzezinski's visit of China in May 1978, whic h was widely speculated as a breakth rough

trip, further encouraged Congress to have an ac tive role in U.S.-China relations. In July, the

House International Relations Committee sent a delegation to China led by representative Lester

Wolff. This tim e, Deng Xiaoping decided to pu t pressure on the Carter adm inistration through

the Wolff delegation. During a m eeting on July 9, Deng initially to ld the delegation that China

highly valued its relations with America, especially the two countries' joint effort in dealing with

the Soviet Union. But when W olff told Deng that China and Am erica should continue the anti-

Soviet alliance regardless of the issue of Taiwan and that "you should never let a small fly spoil a

whole bowl of soup," Deng snapped. "Unfortunatel y, the question is not su ch a small fly," Deng

retorted. "Frankly, when we say that we agree to the Japanese Formula we are already m aking a

very big concession. B y the so-called Japanese Formula, after you abroga te the Treaty with

Taiwan, withdraw military forces and sever your diplomatic relations you can still maintain non-

governmental contacts in Taiwan as the Japanese do. This will not affect the interests of the U.S.

On the other hand, if you look at the question from the political and strategi c point of view it is

in the great interest of us both in dealing with the Soviet U nion if we can norm alize relations."

However, Deng told Wolff that China would try to solve the issue of Taiwan peacefully. The

Chinese Communist Party and th e Chinese Nationalist Party, De ng said, had already cooperated

98 Congress, The United States and the People's Republic of China: Report of the Sixteenth Congressional Delegation to the People's Republic of China (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978), p.4, pp. 57-60.

450

twice in the past. And both tim es the two parties' joint effort occurred at the very mom ent when

China's fate as a whole nation was to be decide d. Because the future of Taiwan was intertwined with the fate of China, Deng was thus confid ent th at th e two par ties could have a third cooperation to solve the reunification of China. "We will do our best to create conditions to solve this question by peaceful means," Deng assured Wolff.99

When the delegation reported to Congress about its trip to C hina, Wolff and his colleagues

believed that they just discovered a "new realism" on the Chinese part. It was the first time that

Deng told an American official that it was possible for the CCP to have a third cooperation with

the Nation alist Party. Excited, W olff reporte d th at "conversations w ith the P RC's leader s

regarding T aiwan and the Kuom ingtang represen t a potential opening, a nd the refore, in th e

context of an official U.S. congressional m ission, a new opening." Wolff believed that now

America and China could f ind a "' grey area' between the f ixed positions of both sides on the

Taiwan question." In conclusi on, the W olff delegation recomme nded normalization of relations

with China, and it believed tha t Taiwan' s s ecurity would not be threatened because "the

possibilities f or negotia tions re lative to Taiwa n, with genuine respect for the positions of all

parties, appear more favorable now than at any time in the past 20 years."100

Indeed, the Chinese strategy seem ed to be working. On August 17, Richard Holbrooke told

Chai Z emin t hat "e very me mber [o f t he Wo lff d elegation] seem ed m ore strongly in favor of normalization after the trip." In order to facilitate the process of normalization, Holbrooke told

99 Beijing to Washington, "Transcript of CODEL Wolff Meeting with Teng," 10 July 1978, CVF, Box 40, JCPL. 100 House, A New Realism: Factfinding Mission to the People's Republic of China, July 3-13, 1978 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978), pp. 5-10.

451

Chai, China should "work closely with Congress." He then urged Chai "to be sure to call on

Senator John Glenn." Chai thanked Holbrooke for his advice, and said that China hoped to

achieve normalization—"the sooner the better."101

During the Carter administration's first two years, therefore, normalization of relations with

China came to be supported by key members from Congress. To be sure, leading conservatives

such as Senator Barry Goldwater were not happy with the way the Carter administration handled

the issue of Taiwan, but the general consensu s was that norm alization was desirable. "Few

members opposed the establishment of diplomatic relations with Peking," a Congressional report

concluded, "as most agreed with the arguments of administration spokesmen that this was a goal

that had been widely accepted in the Unite d States since Nixon' s trip to China in 1972." 102 As discussed above, China' s changing m odernization m odel played a key role in persuading

American legislators that normalization of relations with China would not jeopardize the security of Taiwan. China's pursuit of the "Four Modernizations" would make it dependent on the United

States for econom ic reasons, and China' s stakes in m aintaining peace in Asia would also be raised. Those predicted developm ents, many Congress members argued, would becom e the best guarantee for Taiwan's security.

Indeed, the support of Congress on norm alization was the key reason why there was not a serious backlash in Congress when most m embers were surprised by the Carter administration's announcement on December 15 that Am erica and Ch ina had agreed to establish diplom atic

101 Washington to Beijing, "Chai's Call on Holbrooke," 17 August 1978, CVF, Box 40, JCPL. 102 House, Congress and Foreign Relations, 1979 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980), p. 56.

452

relations. Although the Carter adm inistration did have m any members of Congress involved in

the making of its China policy, the talks between the Chinese and various administration officials

such as Vance and Brzezinsk i were s till clos ely-held s ecrets. Thus f or som e mem bers of

Congress, the norm alization announcement represented a fait accom pli forced upon them . Yet

many Congress members quickly swallowed their disappointment and started to support Carter's

decision. Senator John Glenn, for ex ample, loudly com plained that he was inform ed about the

normalization decision only two hours before it was announced. However, in January 1979

Glenn led the first post-norm alization Congressional delegation to China and started to openly

justify the n ormalization decision on behalf of the Carter ad ministration. The Chinese, f or their

part, continued to assure m embers of the U.S. C ongress that they would not use force to attack

Taiwan. When Glenn was in Beijing, for exampl e, Deng Xiaoping even told him that "the

existing social and econom ic system on Taiwan could be preserved after reunification," a

statement that foreshadowed Deng' s later "one country, two system s" formula. 103 Thus assured,

Glenn tu rned to o rganize a new O hio Trad e Cor poration that would faci litate tr ade be tween

America and China. Although he was quickly involved in the m aking of the Taiw an Relations

Act (TRA), which was passed by Congress in March 1979, he unders tood that this new legislation would not unsettle the new Sino-American honeymoon after normalization, at least in the near future. Glenn m ade it clear that the TRA did not violate the 1972 Shanghai

Communiqué, as it did not recognize the Repub lic of China as an independent country. At the

103 "China Trip Press Statement," January 1979, JGA, Senate Papers, Office Files, Box 51. Deng officially proposed the "one country, two systems" formula in the early 1980s. This formula dictated that Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan, when reunified with mainland China, could maintain their capitalist systems.

453

same tim e, Glenn argued that "the PRC ha d begun to place top priority on econom ic

development and its fo ur m odernizations....In these circumstances, any military move agains t

Taiwan would risk rupturing its relations with the United States...and thus destroying its four

modernizations."104 Indeed, Glenn' s argum ent represented the thinking of m any others on the normalization issue: a changed China would become the best guarantee for Taiwan's security.

Conclusion: Deng Xiaoping's 1979 Visit of the United States and Beyond

Deng Xiaoping' s visit of the United States in January 1979 symbolized the dram atic changes in U.S.-China relations during the "long 1970s." Indeed, Deng's tour of the United States further cons olidated China' s i mage as Am erica's "old friend" who now desperately needed

American help to becom e a m odernized nation. Suddenly the Chinese we re no longer faceless

enemies, but ordinary hum ans beings who shar ed comm on values with ordinary Am ericans.

"Sure they're Communists...but what do you give a dog to vaccinate h im against rabies? You

give him a little rabies, don' t you?" a m ember of the Houston Cham ber of Commerce told a

reporter during a reception in Deng' s honor. "I don' t think this guy Ping is a Communist

anyway."105

While the Houston businessm an did not thin k Deng was a Comm unist, the Chinese m edia

also dramatically changed its perception of America. At the end of 1978, W ang Ruoshui, vice

chief of the People's Daily, ran a series of editorials about the United States based upon a recent

tour of America made by nine Chinese journali sts. America was no longer a "dying imperialist,"

104 "John Glenn Statement," 7 March 1979, JGA, Senate Papers, Office Files, Box 61. 105 Schell, Watch Out for the Foreign Guests, pp. 117-119.

454

those editor ials told the Chinese pe ople. Ordi nary Am ericans worked hard and enjoyed life.

"Work is work, play is play, and the two are kept separate." Am erican industriousness, W ang

said, contributed to the high level of econom ic development in the United States. "The elevator

ride to the 107th floor [of the New York Wo rld Trade Center] only took one m inute," Wang

marveled. "More than 20,000 persons can b e accommodated in the Center' s restaurants at th e

same time." The Chinese journalists were partic ularly attracted by autom ation in Am erica, and

they to ld th eir aud ience how traf fic ligh ts we re controlled by automation devices and how

automatic vending m achines could sell people news papers, tickets, and, of course, Coca-Cola.

Those editorials, no doubt, went beyond m ere physical descriptions of the United States in their

implications. For the readers m ust have wonde red how could Am erica, a capitalist country,

achieve a level of material life so much higher than that of China, a Communist nation.106

Deng's visit, therefore, crysta llized the deve lopment of U. S.-China relations during the

"long 1970s." "Deng probably sees hi s trip to Washington as the capstone of his extraordinary

career," Vance told Carter . "His visit vividly sym bolizes th e two principle thrusts of Chinese

policy under his leadership—m odernization an d opposition to the S oviet Union." Common

strategic concerns were still im portant f or bett er rela tions between Am erica and China, and

Vance warned Carter th at Deng pro bably would tell him that China would launch a quick war with Vietnam, a regi me now regarded by Beiji ng as a Soviet proxy. "But the importance of normalization transcends that (c ommon strategic concerns)." Deng' s visit would help the Carter administration to sell normalization to Congress and the American people, Vance concluded, and

106 Wang Ruoshui, "A Glance at the United States," 17 October 1978, 6 November 1978, RMRB.

455

"Deng will seek to 'broaden and thicken' the US-PRC relations hip across the board for his own political purposes and to bolster China' s m odernization ef fort." "Deng is anxious to m ake the historic changes now taking plac e in China ir reversible, " Van ce continued. "One of the best ways to put roots deep into the Chinese political system is to expose his people to the advantages of a relationship with Japan and the US—and to create a wide-ranging series of for mal and informal ties which will surviv e his passing as we ll as any future winds of political change in

Peking."107

For Vance, Deng just handed Am erica important leverage. "W e have m any things that he wants, and wants fast, including high technology, markets, credits, and US acquiescence in third- country arm s sales," Vance told C arter. "The rapidly expanding relati onships are im portant because they draw the Chinese further in to involvement with us and the rest of the world. To the extent that the Chinese becom e part of the co mmunity of prim arily non-Communist nations at this time in their development, so will our ties with China be more enduring when and if they are later tested by strategic or polit ical strains." Am erica would need to nourish China' s domestic changes carefully, and Vance urged Carter not to openly discuss human rights in China.108

Deng certainly regarded his visit as a success. On January 29, he was pleased to find that

Carter shared sim ilar strategic views. In a rath er lengthy presentation, Carter reviewed the state of the Sino-Am erican anti-Soviet alliance, and told Deng that the Soviet Union recently had suffered many setbacks in its f oreign policy. Ca rter told Deng that SALT II negotiations would

107 Memo, Vance to Carter "Scope Papers for Deng's Visit," 26 January 1979, CVF, Box 41, JCPL. 108 Ibid.

456

not m ake Am erica "soft" before the Soviet Union, and his adm inistration was determ ined to

stand up to any Soviet aggressions in the Third W orld. Deng, for his part, emphasized the

common threat from the Soviet Union, and he urge d Carter to continue to strengthen NATO and

other American allies. Deng also wanted America to provide more military help to China's allies,

such as Pakistan. In short, the establishment of diplomatic relations between America and China

made the two countries m ore forthc oming in their strategic cooperation. 109 At the sam e time,

Deng explicitly asked econom ic help from America. Carter agreed th at "one of the immediate

benefits [of normalization] to both our countries will be to establish normal trade relations." And

he promised that with re gard to the transf er of dual-use technologies to China, which was still under certain lim itations, "we will do everything we can to m ake this restriction flexible." The two sides further agreed that they would accelerate the process of student exchanges.110

After Deng's visit, the a ll-out relationship between America and China developed quickly.

In September 1979, Carter's vice president W alter Mondale visited China and the two countries signed a trade treaty. A round the same time, America also granted MFN status to China. Those developments convinced many Americans that they finally manage d to break down China' s self- imposed isolation and bring China back into the international community. For ordinary Chinese, the establishment of diplomatic relations with America and the new "open and reform " policy at home signaled a decisive shift away from the Mao era. Deng's visit was broadcast on the national television network in China. On the evening when Deng's tour of the Ford plant was broadcast, a

109 Deng-Carter Meeting Record, 29 January 1979, ibid. 110 Deng-Carter Meeting Record, 30 January 1979, ibid.

457

group of officials gathered before the television set to watch the news. They were badly shaken

by what they saw as the program showed the giant Ford plant. "W hat have we done?" an official

asked his colleagues. "Have we wasted thirty years?"111

Wasted or not, the first three decades of the People's Republic ce rtainly told the Chinese

people that changes were needed if China was to become a really modernized nation. No matter

how China's modernization model was to be de fined, the U.S.-China relationship was bound to

become a key factor in China' s developmental experience. Indeed, as I have argued throughout

this dissertation, the discourse on China' s modernization la id the foundation for the Sino-

American rapprochem ent during the "long 1970s," and it would conti nue to sh ape the two countries' relations during the 1980s.

Before I end this dissertation, how ever, one point needs to be clarified. Although the discourse on China' s modernization helped to br ing America and China together, over tim e the perception of China' s modernization created a gap betw een th e two countries' expectations

toward each other. During his visit to Am erica, Deng explicitly told C arter that "we have no worries of being influenced by your social system or your i deology."112 We don't know if Deng

was really conf ident in his people' s f aith in Comm unism, but this was clearly not what

Americans were thinking about. In May 1984, Pres ident Ronald Reagan, on his way back from

China, openly referred to China as a "so-called Communi st" country. "The first injection of free

market spirit has already enlivened the Chin ese econom y," Reagan told his audience. "And

111 Schell, Watch Out for the Foreign Guests, p. 124. 112 Deng-Carter Meeting Record, 30 January 1979, CVF, Box 41, JCPL.

458

capitalism will be th ere." 113 Reagan' re marks no doubt repres ented the thinking of m any

ordinary Americans and Chinese. Yet for the Chinese leadership , the new non-Maoist m odel of

modernization, certainly did no t m ean that China was going to copy the Am erican-style

capitalism. This difference partially explaine d why the 1989 Tiananm en Incident was such a

shock to Americans.

113 Ronald Reagan, "Remarks in Fairbank, Alaska," 1 May 1984; and Reagan, "Remarks Upon Returning from China," 1 May 1984, in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Ronald Reagan, 1984 (Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1984), pp. 613-618.

459

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