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Just and Unjust Wars: a Study of the Israeli Wars Raphael Cohen

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Just and Unjust Wars: a Study of the Israeli Wars Raphael Cohen 1 Just and Unjust Wars: A Study of the Israeli Wars Raphael Cohen-Almagor Abstract The debate as to what constitutes a just war is ancient. Just war theories stem from philosophical, religious and military thinking. Christian religious thinkers, like St. Augustine (354-430), and Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) spoke of laws of war and peace, reflecting on the reasons that brought about war (jus ad bellum) and the means employed in the conduct of war (jus in bello). A contemporary thinker that developed a liberal theory on just and unjust wars that accentuates moral considerations is Michael Walzer. He used Clausewitz as a point of departure, aiming to construct an interdisciplinary liberal theory that brings together political theory, ethics and international relations. In this paper, I employ Walzer’s theory to assess the justifications to all Israeli wars from the day of its establishment until nowadays. Section (I) provides historical-philosophical background and context. Section (II) accentuates the underpinning principles of Walzer’s theory. Section (III) explains Israel’s precarious position in the Middle East and its defence conception. Section (IV) employs Walzer’s theory to analyse the wars. I argue that while the 1948 Independence War, the 1956 Suez War, the 1967 Six Day War, and the 1973 Yom Kippur War were justified, the 1982 Lebanon War, the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War, and the 2008-2009 War on Gaza were not. Key words: Israel, Arab-Israeli conflict, just wars, jus ad bellum, jus in bello, Michael Walzer, proportionality 2 I. Introduction The history of war is as old as the history of nations. When nations perceive certain ends as valuable and aim to achieve them no matter what, they might opt to war once the peaceful means had failed. War is designed to coerce the opponent to abide by the wishes of the aggressor. Throughout history, nations competing for power waged wars in order to conquer territories, achieve economic domination or to compel others to abide by certain religious, cultural and social norms. Attitudes to war differed from time to time. The Greeks saw war as a necessary evil, an instrument to be employed from time to time in order to achieve normal, peaceful life. The Romans assigned far greater importance to war. Its manifestations found significant place in their language and way of life. The Caesar was called “Imperator” (Winner in a battle), and the first month of the Roman calendar was called Mars, God of War. The debate as to what constitute a just war is also ancient. The old saying “All is fair in love and war” might be true for love but it is patently untrue for war. Politicians, diplomats, scholars, theologians and lawyers have devoted a great deal of their time to address the challenging task of drawing boundaries to what combatants can do in a time of war. In the Bible we find attempts to discern between just and unjust wars, and to define just principles in the war conduct. In Deuteronomy, Chapter 20, we find war codes of conduct that instruct how to treat men, women and children of a conquered city: 20:10 When thou comest nigh unto a city to fight against it, then proclaim peace unto it. 3 20:11 And it shall be, if it make thee answer of peace, and open unto thee, then it shall be, that all the people that is found therein shall be tributaries unto thee, and they shall serve thee; 20:12 And if it will make no peace with thee, but will make war against thee, then thou shalt besiege it; 20:13 And when the LORD thy God hath delivered it into thine hands, thou shalt smite every male thereof with the edge of the sword; 20:14 But the women, and the little ones, and the cattle, and all that is in the city, even all the spoil thereof, shalt thou take unto thyself; and thou shalt eat the spoil of thine enemies, which the LORD thy God hath given thee; 20:15 Thus shalt thou do unto all the cities which are very far off from thee, which are not of the cities of these nations; 20:16 But of the cities of these people, which the LORD thy God doth give thee for an inheritance, thou shalt save alive nothing that breatheth; 20:17 But thou shalt utterly destroy them; namely, the Hittites, and the Amorites, the Canaanites, and the Perizzites, the Hivites, and the Jebusites; as the LORD thy God hath commanded thee: 20:18 That they teach you not to do after all their abominations, which they have done unto their gods; so should ye sin against the LORD your God; 20:19 When thou shalt besiege a city a long time, in making war against it to take it, thou shalt not destroy the trees thereof by forcing an axe against 4 them: for thou mayest eat of them, and thou shalt not cut them down (for the tree of the field is man's life) to employ them in the siege; 20:20 Only the trees which thou knowest that they be not trees for meat, thou shalt destroy and cut them down; and thou shalt build bulwarks against the city that maketh war with thee, until it be subdued (Deuteronomy, Chapter 20, http://skepticsannotatedbible.com/dt/20.html). Just war theories stem from philosophical, religious and military thinking. Christian religious thinkers, like St. Augustine (354-430), and Thomas Aquinas (1225– 1274) spoke of laws of war and peace, reflecting on the reasons that brought about war (jus ad bellum) and the means employed in the conduct of war (jus in bello). The Prussian military thinker Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) wrote (1968, p. 125): “As war is not an act of blind passion, but is dominated by the political object, therefore the value of that object determines the measure of the sacrifices by which it is to be purchased”.1 War, according to Clausewitz, is the continuation of political negotiation by other, violent means. Policy does not stop when the war breaks: It continues violently. Therefore, national interests override military interests that, by definition, relate only to means, not to national ends. Morality is not an obstacle. The only restrictions on the employment of force relate to abilities. A contemporary thinker who developed a liberal theory on just and unjust wars that accentuates moral considerations is Michael Walzer. His book, Just and Unjust Wars, helped the shaping of the foregoing literature and became a classic text. Walzer used Clausewitz as a point of departure, aiming to construct an interdisciplinary liberal theory that brings together political theory, ethics and international relations. In this 1 For a concise history of the just war theory, see Lee (2012, pp. 35-67). 5 paper, I employ Walzer’s theory to assess the justifications to all Israeli wars from the day of its establishment until nowadays. Section (II) accentuates the underpinning principles of Walzer’s theory. Section (III) explains Israel’s precarious position in the Middle East and its defence conception. Section (IV) employs Walzer’s theory to analyse the wars. I argue that while the 1948 Independence War, the 1956 Sinai Campaign (known also as the Suez War), the 1967 Six Day War, and the 1973 Yom Kippur War were justified, the 1982 Lebanon War, the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War, and the 2008- 2009 War on Gaza were not. Some provisos are in place: I will not discuss the aftermath of the wars. It is granted that Israel's conduct after the wars was not always justified. I believe, for instance, that the aftermath of the Six Day War cannot be justified as occupation qua occupation is morally repugnant. This issue, however, deserves a separate analysis. I should also note that I will not address the War of Attrition, a nagging war of a constant drip of casualties with no ends in sight that lasted between March 1969 to August 1970 until official ceasefire between Israel and Egypt was declared (Bar-Siman Tov 1980; Kober 2009). In the focus of my analysis are the reasons that brought about war, jus ad bellum, whether the wars were in self-defence. I analyse only the Israeli side of the conflict. I will not address the war conduct of Israel’s enemies as my knowledge of languages is limited (I read mere two languages, Hebrew and English). To adequately assess the Arab side one needs to master Arabic. Because Israel was militarily attacked in 1948 and in 1973, the issue of jus ad bellum is straightforward and does not require elaborate analysis. 6 When discussing the 1948 War of Independence, the two Lebanon wars (1982 and 2006) and the Gaza Cast Lead Operation I will also attend to questions relating to the means employed in the conduct of war, jus in bello, the concept of proportionality, and the treatment of non-combatants. By proportionality it is meant that the evil inflicted on the enemy does not significantly exceed the resisted evil caused by the enemy. It requires weighing the moral wrong of an attack against the military advantage that is aimed to achieve (Lee 2012, p. 156). These questions were less significant in the conduct of the 1956 Suez Campaign, the 1967 Six Day War, and the 1973 Yom Kippur War. No war is completely free of atrocities but up till now there are no reported staggering events to suggest that the war conduct was immoral during those three wars. II. Theory Any violation of the territorial integrity or the political sovereignty of an independent state is called aggression (Walzer 2006, p.
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