Respect, Toleration and Diversity:
Protecting Individual Freedom in Liberal Societies
Peter Balint
A thesis submitted in fulfilment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Faculty of Arts & Social Sciences
University of New South Wales, January 2009
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Abstract
In diverse societies like Australia, Britain, Canada and The Netherlands, government
policy has increasingly focused on inter-citizen relations. There have been demands
for citizens to respect each others’ differences, as well as fears about declining social
cohesion and acts of intolerance. In political theory, these themes also have currency,
although here they often have been obscured by a tendency to think in terms of
‘majorities’ and minorities’, and ‘we’ and ‘they’, rather than in terms of the state and
the individual citizen. This thesis argues that while respect of difference may seem to
be the best way to successfully accommodate individual difference, it is an
indefensible demand on the citizen: such a demand is both excessive and
unnecessary, and has the potential to unjustifiably limit individual freedom and the
accommodation of difference. Further, the requirement for social cohesion is often
overstated, while acts of intolerance are best avoided by citizens respecting each
others’ sameness (citizenship) rather than their difference. As far as the state is
concerned, by clearly distinguishing specific instances of tolerance (which always
involve forbearance) from the general practice of toleration, the thesis defends
toleration as a general and maximally permissive practice – one which is compatible
with both liberal neutrality and the maximal accommodation of individual difference, and thus the freedom of individuals to live their lives as they see fit.
Preface
Before enrolling as a PhD student, I spent a couple of years as a humanities teacher in the Australian TAFE (Technical and Further Education) system. One of my roles was teaching an alternative Year 10 program to a group of young people, who for various social, personal and behavioural reasons had not ‘gelled’ with the traditional school system. These students came from a wide a range of backgrounds, with a very high number of first and second generation migrants, some indigenous kids, and even some kids from seemingly middle-class backgrounds. These young people – many of whom were more enthusiastic and intelligent than a great deal of the university students I have since taught – were, as one would imagine, not afraid to speak their mind, and had finely tuned bullshit detectors. Their behaviour towards each other was also far from civil. They were stereotypically ‘multicultural’ in appearance, and as a group they would have made the perfect picture for the front page of a multicultural policy document or media campaign. But their actions towards each other displayed none of the ‘harmony’ and ‘respect for diversity’ that such documents commonly proclaim. Yet, on the whole, in their non-harmonious way they managed to get along as a group. On the odd occasion that real fights broke out, it was over things that had nothing to do with their ethnic background, but more to do with things such as which girl had stolen somebody else’s boyfriend.
vi Preface
At roughly the same time, the Australian TV show Pizza, set in western Sydney, was in its heyday. In Australia, this was the early 21st Century’s Wogs out of Work or
Kingswood Country (equivalent UK examples here would be The Kumars at No. 42,
Goodness Gracious Me, or Love Thy Neighbour). Pizza successfully used humour, and often very cutting humour, to deal with inter-ethnic relations. Whereas these previous shows had mainly dealt with Italian and Greek migrant relations with
‘Anglo’ Australia, Pizza threw everyone into the mix: Lebanese, Maltese, Italian,
Vietnamese, Kiwi, Maori, and Bogan backgrounds, among many others, were represented and all ruthlessly parodied. The characters constantly laughed at and showed little respect for each others’ backgrounds. And there were fights, often very big ones. But once again, these fights were not normally about ‘ethnic’ stuff, but about other issues – usually drugs, and often about dodgy pizza.
Back to TAFE. As a humanities teacher I taught subjects such as Australian Studies and Community Identity, both of which had large components dealing with the issues of Australian multiculturalism. The teaching resources I was given, and the ones I found in the TAFE library, were full of material about ‘respecting difference’, ‘the importance of diversity’, ‘living in harmony’, and ‘cultural exchange’. Yet, as I have described, these multicultural kids did very little of this sort of thing; they, like the characters in Pizza, regularly teased and cajoled each other, and this was often along ethnic lines. While these students lived far from harmonious lives and had to deal with some very serious matters, at least in the interactions I saw, their ethnicity had very little to do with this.
Preface vii
It was this set of observations that was the initial starting point of this thesis. I was faced with teaching resources and a more general policy approach that seemingly tried to turn multicultural relations into something like idealised friendship relations.
Yet at the same time, I increasingly felt that it would be both much more feasible, and perhaps desirable, if these sorts of relations were seen more along the lines of being good neighbours, and not necessarily close neighbours at that. I was not driven by the thought that the verbal violence of TAFE or Pizza was a good model for a society, but instead, that society can function, and does function, without the soft and cuddly notions of respect of difference that seemed so favoured by multicultural educators – and that when problems do arise they may often have very little to do with these sorts of differences.
These feelings were reinforced when, just before enrolling in my PhD program, I visited a former undergraduate tutor who was now a lecturer in social policy. When I told her of my general interest in the issues of diversity, her first response was along the lines of: ‘don’t use words like tolerance and toleration, they have a really bad name’. She then proceeded to explain that ‘people don’t want to be just tolerated’, and that ‘it involves negative valuing and non-acceptance’. Having not yet raised these terms, but having intended to ground my eventual thesis in what I thought were important and not particularly controversial values, I was a little taken aback. How could concepts with such an important political pedigree have become no-go zones?
This was the motivation behind the other major thread of the thesis: I wanted to see whether toleration could, in fact, be benign, and whether it always had to involve
viii Preface
negative valuing. At the same time, it seemed to me that the practice of tolerance as
forbearance was exactly what was required in inter-citizen relations. Fast forward a few years, and what you have in front of you is my response to these questions: What should be asked of citizens of diverse societies in their relations with each other? And how should toleration be understood as a framework for accommodating diversity?
Acknowledgements
Other than my students and fellow staff at TAFE Sydney Institute and Paul Fenech
(a.k.a Pauly Falzoni) and the whole Pizza crew, I have several important intellectual and personal debts to acknowledge. This thesis, unsurprisingly, benefited an incredible amount from the feedback, support, and encouragement of a great many people. First and foremost, I am grateful to Geoffrey Brahm Levey as my primary supervisor, who through his critical feedback and attention to detail pushed this thesis well beyond the level it would otherwise have been. To Tiziana Torresi, whose intellectual support and encouragement helped me immeasurably in the early years and was a key scholarly (and tour!) guide. To Stephen Cohen, as my stand-in supervisor, your enthusiasm and positive feedback on the merits of this project made an enormous difference.
I have worked on this thesis in three different locations:
At UNSW Kensington, the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences provided much appreciated material support in the form of scholarships, travel bursaries, and physical space. Thanks to Michaelis Michael, Ephraim Nimni, Helen Pringle, Gavin
Preface ix
Kitching, John Rees, Moya Collett, Genevieve Bassin, Damian Grace, Paula Keating,
Ben Manning, Motoko Sugano, and the whole downstairs FASS (postgrad lab) group.
At The Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford, where I was hosted in such a wonderful intellectual environment, and Balliol MCR who took me in and made me feel at home. Thanks to Miriam Ronzoni, Christian
Schemmel, Laura Valentini, Ayelet Banai, Katherine Eddy, Kieran Oberman, Juliet
Tompkins, Kerah Gordon-Solomon, Toby Ord, Adam Swift, Derek Parfit, Tim
Soutphommasane, Varun Uberoi, Omar Khan, Steven Winter, Karl Widerquist, Sarah
Fine, and to all the other graduate students and staff who made my time there so rewarding. Also while in the UK, to Jo Wolff and Jonathan Quong for their very useful suggestions.
At UNSW@ADFA, thanks to the School of Humanities and Social Sciences for allowing me the time, space and resources to complete this project, and for providing such a supportive workplace. In particular, I want to thank David Lovell for making all this support possible as well as for his critical feedback and encouragement. Also thanks to Stephen Coleman and Jeff Doyle, who both read and commented on the final draft, as well as to Gavin Mount, John Connor and Susan Lever for their comments and ideas. While in Canberra, I have been privileged to have access to the research environment of the ANU, and without thanking everybody, wish to single out Katherine Curchin, John Dryzek, Lina Eriksson, Jan Burgers, and Christian Barry, for their useful feedback on this project.
x Preface
To those who are not associated with any of the above institutions, my gratitude to you is no less: Jennifer Balint, Eszter Kollar, Annamari Vitikainen, Rebecca Hopkins,
Joy Hall, Gabrielle Flax, Corinne Fagueret, Cate Furey, Sean Bridgeman, and Geoff
Turnbull. Also, thanks to the audiences who listened to and commented, often very helpfully, on the many and various conference/workshop/seminar presentations that ultimately make up this work.
Finally, without the love and support of my parents, John and Susan, my sister Jen, and my partner Bec, none of this would have been possible. I love you all very much.
This thesis is dedicated to the memory of my grandparents, whose humanity, drive and intellectual rigor was an inspiration.
Table of Contents
PREFACE v
INTRODUCTION 1
Three assumptions 10
Recognition, social cohesion, and state neutrality 14
Locating this work 27
Diversity, multiculturalism and difference 37
The structure of this thesis 41
CHAPTER 1
RESPECT RELATIONSHIPS IN DIVERSE SOCIETIES 46
Respect 48
Two planes of respect versus a majority/minority distinction 53
Respect of sameness 57
Respect of difference 63
Mediated respect 80
Conclusion: mediation for accommodation 85
CHAPTER 2
RESPECTING EACH OTHERS’ DIFFERENCES 88
Respect revisited 95
Appraisal respect of difference 99
Recognition respect of difference 104
A collapsed distinction? 114
Achieving a ‘tolerant society’ 118
Conclusion 130
CHAPTER 3
HOW MUCH SOCIAL COHESION IS REALLY NEEDED? 133
What is social cohesion? 137
Fraternity as a good in itself 139
Welfare redistribution and common social projects 143
National identity 153
Trust 159
Institutional belonging 164
Fair social outcomes 167
Conclusion 169
CHAPTER 4
RE-EXAMINING TOLERATION 173
Justifying toleration 182
The specific notion of tolerance: political, not moral 188
Toleration as a general practice 197
Responses to the apparent disconnect between toleration and negative valuing 206
Conclusion 223
CHAPTER 5
ATTITUDES AND RELATIONSHIPS TOWARDS SPECIFIC DIFFERENCES: A PRELIMINARY MODEL 226
Attitudes to specific differences 228
Three key considerations 231
Mediation 239
Contextual factors and attitudes to specific differences 243
Conclusion 254
CONCLUSION 255
BIBLIOGRAPHY 261
List of Tables and Figures
Figure 0.1: The link between respect of sameness (implying toleration) and the accommodation of specific difference 9
Table 1.1: Four types of respect relationship 47
Table 2.1: Darwall’s two types of respect 98
Figure 4.1: The general practice of toleration and the accommodation of specific differences 177
Figure 4.2: A liberal range of toleration and state neutrality 220
Table 5.1: Combining contextual factors with act related attitudes 242
Introduction
The late twentieth century saw issues of diversity increasingly come to the fore in
both western government policy and political theory. Although the acknowledgement
of the diversity of humankind is far from new, the waves of post World War II
migration, coupled with the end of European colonialism as well as progressively
more liberal attitudes towards issues of gender, sexuality, religion and indigeneity,
saw new laws and policies put in place as well as an increase in works of political theory in these areas. While this interest, often under the label ‘multiculturalism’, has continued into this century, the focus of government policy and the focus of political theory seem to have diverged.
In real world policy practice, as opposed to political theory, multiculturalism has been marked by three recent (and related) general trends. The first is the use of the language of respect. In 2005, just after his party’s re-election, UK Prime Minister
Tony Blair famously announced that ‘fostering a culture of respect’ would be his new goal in office. While addressed at a broad range of social interaction, ‘respect’ was in large part aimed at inter-ethnic relations. In Australia, Federal multicultural policy 2 Introduction
has explicitly used the language of respect since 1999,1 and this is now the case in most Australian states, including those with multicultural legislation.2 Similarly, in
Canada one of the core ‘Canadian values’ prescribed for all Canadian citizens is
‘Respect for Cultural Differences’.3
The second trend has been a focus on how citizens in diverse western societies relate to each other. Policies have aimed to make social interactions less hostile, and to reduce instances of racial and ethnic violence as well as discrimination. While this is most pronounced in the ‘softer’ policy responses to the various terrorist attacks on western targets since 2001, and to the race riots of Northern England of the same year, the concern for harmonious and peaceful inter-ethnic relations pre-dates this time.4
1 Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, A New Agenda for Multicultural Australia
(Canberra: Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, 1999).
2 See: Community Relations Commission and Principles of Multiculturalism Act 2000 (NSW);
Multicultural Victoria Act 2004 (Vic); Department of Premier and Cabinet, Tasmania, Tasmanian
Multicultural Policy (Hobart: Department of Premier and Cabinet, Tasmania, 2001); and Office of
Multicultural Interests, Government of Western Australia, WA Charter of Multiculturalism (Perth:
Office of Multicultural Interests, Government of Western Australia, 2004).
3 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, A Look at Canada (Ottawa: Citizenship and Immigration
Canada, 2006).
4 At the same time as the Howard Coalition Government (1996-2007) in Australia introduced the language of respect, it also introduced what was to become an increasing emphasis on ‘harmony’, about which there had been very little, if any, mention in the policy documents of previous governments. See Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999), cf. Office of
Introduction 3
The third trend is the emphasis on social cohesion – a sense of togetherness, and all
being part of the one project. Britain, The Netherlands, and Australia all provide good
examples of the move towards emphasising both social cohesiveness and stressing
some important commonalities around which those with differences need to integrate.
In Britain, following the Cantle Report which described the problem of ‘self-
segregating communities leading parallel lives’,5 the importance of ‘community
cohesion’ has continually been stressed. In The Netherlands, a policy which had
moved from the traditional Dutch ‘pillarization’ (where society was divided into
almost self-contained ‘pillars’ according to comprehensive religious or moral doctrines) to integration in the mid-1990s, has in more recent years increasingly stressed assimilation around a strengthening nationalist agenda.6 Similarly, in
Australia, the rhetoric of immigrants having to integrate and accept ‘Australian
values’ became increasingly shrill until these values were finally made explicit in
2007. Unsurprisingly, these values turned out to be of the typically generic liberal
democratic variety.7 Perhaps the most tangible policy in this area has been the
Multicultural Affairs, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, National Agenda for a
Multicultural Australia (Canberra: Office of Multicultural Affairs, 1989).
5 Home Office, Community Cohesion: A Report of the Independent Review Team, Chaired by Ted
Cantle (London: The Home Office, 2001).
6 Hans Entzinger, ‘Multiculturalism in the Netherlands’, in K. Banting and W. Kymlicka (eds),
Multiculturalism and the Welfare State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 177-201.
7 Christian Joppke writes of similar trends in Europe, where the attempt to spell out particular British or German values also ended with lists of what were really quite benign liberal values; Christian
4 Introduction
introduction of citizenship testing with accompanying study booklets. While Canada has had a citizenship test since 1994, the United Kingdom introduced its citizenship test in 2005, The Netherlands in 2006, Australia in 2007, and the USA introduced a completely revised version of its test in 2008.8 Many of these tests examine much more than simply civic knowledge and ability to converse in the national language, and extend to questions about national history, culture and, in the Australian case, sport.9 Put together, these three trends can be roughly summarised as an emphasis on respectful inter-citizen interaction around some sort of shared identity as a key towards building and maintaining social cohesion.
This general picture of real world policy is in some contrast to the discussion of multiculturalism in political theory which, with few exceptions, has had a different focus. Following, most prominently, Charles Taylor’s highly influential essay ‘The
Politics of Recognition’, there has been a concentration on the concept and language
Joppke, ‘The Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal State: Theory and Policy’, British Journal of
Sociology 55/2 (2004) 237-57.
8 France also has a recently introduced test, as have at least two German states (Baden-Württemberg and Hesse). For a comparative analysis of the recent trend in citizenship testing, see Amitai Etzioni,
‘Citizenship Tests: A Comparative, Communitarian Perspective’, The Political Quarterly 78/3 (2007)
353-363.
9 Two of the more bizarre questions in the current, but soon to be revised, Australian test relate to a long dead horse, and a cricketer with a batting average just under 100 (Phar Lap and Don Bradman, respectively).
Introduction 5
of recognition rather than on respect.10 Also, the question of what the state should do directly for the holders of difference has had greater priority over the question of what the citizen should be compelled or encouraged to do. While political theory more generally has seen discussions on the role and responsibility of the citizen,11 this interest has not been as prevalent in multicultural political theory. This focus on the state can be seen in the great volume of writing on topics such as cultural and religious exemptions from general laws, the wearing of headscarves in French public schools, the use of cultural defence in legal proceedings, and the issue of economically subsidising languages and ways of life. In short, the debate has largely been over minority rights, which, for the most part, are intended to be claimable
10 For notable examples, see: Charles Taylor, ‘The Politics of Recognition’, in A. Gutman (ed.),
Multiculturalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth,
Redistribution or Recognition? A Politico-Philosophical Exchange (London, New York: Verso, 2003);
Axel Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts (Cambridge,
Polity, 1995); James Tully, ‘Reconciling Struggles over the Recognition of Minorities: Towards a
Dialogical Approach’, in A. Eisenberg (ed.), Diversity and Equality (Vancouver, UBC Press, 2006);
Anna Elisabetta Galeotti, Toleration as Recognition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); and Patchen Markell, Bound By Recognition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).
11 For some examples of the literature on citizen virtues, see: Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues:
Citizenship, Virtue and Community in Liberal Constitutionalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1990); William Galston, Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues and Diversity in the Liberal State
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Eamonn Callan, Creating Citizens: Political
Education and Liberal Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Richard Dagger, Civic
Virtues: Rights, Citizenship, and Republican Liberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); and
6 Introduction
against a state or state-like entity. The area of social cohesion has been addressed in
the theoretical literature, with a focus, most notably in the writings of liberal
nationalists,12 on the importance of fostering a common sense of identity. In contrast to multicultural practice, the debate in political theory could be summarised as focussing on what the state should (or should not) do to accommodate the claims of diversity – either because of the importance of identity recognition, or because of the justice of minority claims – with concern also raised about maintaining social cohesion in the face of such diversity.
There is, then, something of a disjuncture between what is going on in government policy and what is being written about in political theory. Of course this need not necessarily be a problem,13 but many of those writing in this area of political theory
do intend to connect with actual multicultural policies and to have an influence on
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, revised edition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999),
particularly Part Three.
12 See, for example, David Miller, On Nationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), and David
Miller, Citizenship and National Identity (Cambridge & Oxford: Polity, 2000).
13 The interest in social justice that has continued since the publication of John Rawls, A Theory of
Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), has seen a parallel decline in the welfare state.
Nevertheless, the interest in luck egalitarianism – a much more choice-sensitive approach to redistribution – has been seemingly in step with an increased welfare policy emphasis on personal
responsibility.
Introduction 7
them.14 This thesis attempts to bridge some of this disjuncture using the tools of normative political theory to address this first set of issues regarding respectful and
cohesive inter-citizen relations. While it is decidedly not a thesis in public policy, it
takes a deeper theoretical look at some of these moves in contemporary multicultural
policy and shows where they are found wanting. This will at the same time expose
what I see as some areas of confusion regarding these issues in political theory. As
such, I will focus first on the meaning and use of respect, the role of the citizen in a
diverse polity, and the place of social cohesion. I will argue that respect can be used
in two distinct, but commonly conflated, ways: respect of sameness and respect of
difference. I shall argue that respect of sameness must have priority, and that respect
of difference is a deeply problematic policy, particularly in inter-citizen relations.
There is, however, at least one significant area of convergence in public policy and
political theory, and this is in the use of the language of toleration and tolerance. This
is the second set of issues the thesis examines: what does it mean for the state or
citizen (or indeed any other agent) to be tolerant? And how does toleration relate to
respect and social cohesion? My interest in toleration will not concern the question of
its boundaries,15 nor its status as a virtue.16 Instead, I will distinguish a general
14 I am not suggesting that those who write about policies such as Quebecois language rights or
headscarves in schools, for example, do not wish to connect with these policies. Rather, my point is
that less has been written on the more general policy prescriptions of liberal multicultural states.
15 For two opposed views on the limits of liberal toleration see Chandran Kukathas, The Liberal
Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003),
8 Introduction
concept of toleration as permissiveness from a more specific concept of tolerance as forbearance. I will defend this general concept of toleration – because of its maximal permissiveness of difference – as the most appropriate state approach to diversity.
I seek to defend the general concept of toleration against two lines of critique, both of which involve the same flawed premise; namely, that toleration must always involve the negative valuing of its object. The theoretical critique is that toleration is incompatible with liberal neutrality. The other, more policy-oriented critique is that toleration, because of its negative valuing, must be transcended rather than recommended. While negative valuing is true of specific instances of forbearance tolerance, it is not a necessary feature of the general practice of toleration. In relation to the specific concept of forbearance, I will argue that it is both the crucial minimum
and Brian Barry, Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism (Cambridge:
Polity, 2001). But see also, among many others: Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal
Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), particularly ch. 8; Mary Warnock,
‘The Limits of Toleration’, in S. Mendus & D. Edwards (eds), On Toleration (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1987), 123-139; Susan Mendus, Toleration and the Limits of Liberalism (Atlantic
Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1989); and Bhikhu Parekh, ‘Minority Practices and
Principles of Toleration’, International Migration Review April (1996) 251-84. There is also a wide literature on harm as well on free speech, which is very relevant. See, most notably, Joel Feinberg,
Harm to Others: The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), and
Joel Feinberg, Offense to Others: The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1985).
16 For discussions of toleration as a virtue see (once again among many others), David Heyd’s edited collection, Toleration: An Elusive Virtue (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).
Introduction 9
in inter-citizen relations, at least in their more public dealings, and that, with few
exceptions, is the maximum that can be asked of citizens. In short, I will argue that
toleration (implied by respect of sameness) is the appropriate umbrella principle for
the liberal state in dealing with the differences of its citizens. It is a permissive
concept that allows the successful accommodation of difference through either of
three general pathways: respect of difference, indifference, or forbearance tolerance.
My overall argument is summarised in Figure 0.1. In relation to the individual citizen
and his or her relationship to other citizens’ differences, I will argue that encouraging
respect of difference is problematic and may not lead to as successful an
accommodation of difference as encouraging respect of sameness and then following
a pathway of indifference or forbearance. Within the citizen-citizen sphere, respect of sameness will only imply toleration of difference in their more public dealings (qua citizens), and not necessarily in private.
Figure 0.1: The link between respect of sameness (implying toleration) and the accommodation of specific difference
Respect of Sameness General Position (implies Toleration)
Relationship with specific Forbearance instances of difference Indifference Respect Tolerance
Outcome for specific differences Accommodation
10 Introduction
Three assumptions
The fundamental premise of this thesis is the importance and priority of individuals
living their lives as they see fit within a particular political community, free from unjustified state interference. This liberal premise – the priority of individual freedom, the role of the state as its protector, and the need for state interference to be justified – has important antecedents. To quote John Locke: ‘The great and chief end…of Mens uniting into Commonwealths, and putting themselves under
Government, is the preservation of their Property’ – where ‘property’ must be understood broadly as, ‘life, liberty and estate’, or what have since become thought of as basic liberal freedoms.17 This type of liberalism should then provide a relatively
easy answer for diverse societies: the state should protect the freedom of individuals
to live as they see fit, and not interfere unless interference is necessary to protect that
very freedom. In other words, the state should only restrict the absolute freedom of
some citizens for the sake of the freedom of either all, or at least some, of its other
17 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, P. Laslett (ed.), (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, [1690] 2005), Book II. § 124, § 87 (emphasis in original). Gerald F. Gaus calls this presumption of liberty, where interference rather than non-interference requires justification ‘the fundamental liberal principle’; Gerald F. Gaus, ‘The Place of Autonomy within Liberalism’, in J. Christman and J.
Rogers (eds), Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2005), 272-306. See, also; Gerald F. Gaus, Justificatory Liberalism (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1996), pp. 164-65.
Introduction 11
citizens.18 This is, in effect, a presumption of toleration, albeit not of actions that
undermine the freedom of other individuals to live their lives as they see fit.
A state policy of toleration will allow a maximal number of ways of life by its
citizens, and thereby protect and provide the space for individual freedom. Of course,
the state will have to enact laws and policies that govern inter-citizen interaction for
this freedom to have any weight. Laws that do not allow citizens to unduly
discriminate against each other in important areas of life such as housing and
employment, and policies that encourage the upholding of basic civil rights will, on
top of the outlawing of clear harm to others, be minimally necessary to protect this
individual freedom. However, it is important not to move too fast here. This is not
intended as a perfectionist view of politics, and as such is not invoking either idealist
or strong autonomy notions of freedom. I will present a case for a type of state
neutrality shortly, but need to make it clear here that this is simply the starting point
for this thesis. While not everybody will give this notion of freedom absolute priority,
most, I hope, will give it sufficient weight in determining the merits of particular state
actions. I should also add, perhaps more controversially, that while there may be good
reasons to worry about preference formation, I will operate on the presumption that
18 It is worth noting that this is the case with almost all notions of freedom. So, for example, freedom as absence of physical interference, as absence of constraining law, as having sufficient resources, as making autonomous decisions, as ‘self realisation’, and as non-dependence, can all be restricted for some individuals for the sake of other individuals’ freedom in the same sense. However, as will become clearer, I will not endorse all these notions of freedom.
12 Introduction
people’s expressed choices and behaviour are ultimately their own, and that a concern for individual freedom means taking these expressed preferences very seriously.
A second assumption that needs to be made explicit is the existence and importance of the state, or state-like entity. Perhaps it is a good idea that the existence and power of states should be questioned rather than simply assumed. This indeed seems an important and valuable line of enquiry, and is pursued by one of the most important books in this field, where in relation to the issues of diversity, Chandran Kukathas deliberately does not ask: what should the state do? Instead, he asks the philosophically prior question: who should have authority?19 Nevertheless, this is not the approach that I will be taking. In keeping with my interest in maintaining a consistency between political theory and real world policy concerns, it seems sensible, at least at this stage, to hold states and their power as a relatively constant factor.
My third assumption concerns the question of what differences should be tolerated by liberal states. I will not be directly addressing the question of what the limits of liberal toleration should be, and will instead focus on what both the state and the citizen’s response should be to the differences that are ordinarily considered to be within these limits. I will simply assume, hopefully uncontentiously, that the sorts of differences I discuss should be tolerated. This is not because I think the question of the limits of toleration is unimportant – surely in some cases the continued viability of the liberal
19 Kukathas (2003).
Introduction 13
state requires a satisfactory answer to this question – but because I think more work needs to be done on what to do with the differences that are already within these limits, particularly for the individual citizen who has to deal with what, for her, might be quite repugnant (albeit legitimately state tolerated) differences.
The primary focus of this thesis, then, is on what can legitimately be required of citizens living in a diverse polity – or, more precisely, what should not be required of them. These constraints inform my response to one of the fundamental questions in political theory: what should the state do? My interest in this question is thus primarily concerned with how state power is used in inter-citizen relations. Here I will argue that for it to be maximally accommodating of individual difference, the state should not encourage respect of difference, but should instead encourage respect of sameness and require the minimum of forbearance tolerance amongst individual citizens in their more public interactions. I will also question the emphasis on social cohesion, and suggest that non-identity methods exist that should create sufficient cohesion to enable the functioning of a liberal state. While some degree of unity may be necessary for the creation and maintenance of any stable space within which individuals can live their lives as they see fit, beyond this basic point there are mounting costs for this individual freedom, and there are some ways of building and maintaining social cohesion that are significantly more costly than others.
14 Introduction
Recognition, social cohesion, and state neutrality
For the state to provide each citizen with the opportunity to live their life as they see
fit, it cannot simply stand back. In the first place, it will have to stop citizens harming each other. It will also have to take measures to avoid becoming too weak or collapsing; otherwise, as Thomas Hobbes argued, this sort of civil freedom will not be achievable, and even the strongest will not enjoy a particularly secure form of freedom. Finally, basic resources will seemingly be required for almost all conceptions of what it is to live a good life, if only to create the necessary space away from worrying about access to the most basic of necessities. As such, these requirements (non-harm, basic security and basic resources) can provide sufficient justification to interfere in some people’s freedom to live their lives as they see fit.
I do not want to offer a comprehensive account of what resources are required for an individual to live their life as they see fit; this is an area covered by many prominent political theorists.20 There are, however, two resource issues that are important for my
purposes: recognition and social cohesion. I will deal briefly with these two resources
20 I am using ‘resources’ here in a general sense. For notable examples in the contemporary debate
about what is more precisely required for a life, see: Rawls (1999); Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue:
Equality in Theory and Practice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000); Richard Arneson,
‘Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare’, Ethics 109 (1999) 287-337; G.A. Cohen, ‘On the
Currency of Egalitarian Justice’, Ethics 99 (1989) 906-44; Amartya Sen, Inequality Reexamined
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992); Martha Nussbaum, Women and Human Development
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); and Elizabeth S. Anderson, ‘What is the Point of
Equality?’ Ethics 109 (1999) 287-326.
Introduction 15
in order to outline what will be the background position on the role of the state in this
thesis. In this section, I suggest that a liberal state should be neutral and impartial in relation to its citizens and their ways of life. By this I mean that the state should deal impartially with its citizens and remain neutral on the issue of what sorts of lives they should lead.21 I will say more about this presently, but I shall use these two potential resources to help make this case.
I turn first to recognition. In the early 1990s, Charles Taylor presented a highly plausible argument, following Hegel, that people’s identities need to be recognised – first, for what they really are (i.e. ‘authentically’), and second, as worthwhile.22 If
your identity was misrecognised (for example, you were Welsh and you were viewed
as English), and/or your identity was viewed as being of lesser social status, you
could suffer a serious harm. This psycho-social hypothesis is then used to argue that
the state, and often the citizen too, must properly recognise all citizens’ identities.
Moreover, it is argued that the state already successfully recognises the majority
identity – indeed this is almost unavoidable – while the identity of minorities is
ignored and/or misrecognised and this should be rectified.
If we return to the premise of the importance of an individual living their life as they
see fit, what can be said about the recognition hypothesis? First, I will assume that
21 Peter Jones, ‘The Ideal of the Neutral State’, in R. E. Goodin and A. Reeve (eds), Liberal Neutrality
(London: Routledge, 1989), 9-38, p. 9.
22 Taylor (1994).
16 Introduction
Taylor is right when it comes to the harm of misrecognition, and that such a harm has the potential to curtail an individual’s freedom. But what is not clear is who should recognise an individual correctly or, to put it another way, how this harm should be avoided. If it is required that people be seen as who they ‘really’ are and as worthwhile, a liberal society which allows freedom of association should be able to achieve this end for virtually all its citizens. People can (and will) associate with others who recognise and value their identities and thereby have this basic need fulfilled. Indeed, requiring individual citizens to recognise each other’s identities may end up perpetuating misrecognition – it should not simply be assumed that all identities are entirely commensurate. If the intention is to take individual identities seriously, then it is almost incoherent to ask individuals to recognise each other’s identities correctly, let alone as ‘worthy’. Many people’s identities directly clash; traditional Christians and proponents of a hedonistic gay lifestyle are one of many possible examples.
But what role should the state play more directly? If the state can also misrecognise an individual’s identity, how should it avoid perpetrating this harm? As I stated above, the state should not interfere with individual freedom without the justification that it is protecting or promoting the freedom of individuals to live their lives as they see fit. If the recognition thesis is correct, it provides a strong prima facie justification for the state to recognise people’s identities. It is theoretically possible for the state to recognise its citizens’ identities and remain neutral and impartial. Neutrality need not
Introduction 17
involve ‘standing back’ (or what has been called ‘benign neglect’)23 in relation to
citizens and their ways of life; it may instead be understood as ‘helping or hindering
to an equal degree’.24 If the aim of an agent is to be neutral between competing
parties, then this can be achieved by either standing back and having no involvement
or, alternatively, providing equal support to all parties. To use an international
relations example, a country could sell arms to both sides of a conflict and still remain
neutral – it is not taking sides, and may have no intent of helping one side more than
the other. The state could recognise the individual identities of its citizens and remain
neutral in this sense.
But if misrecognition is such a harm, then there is a practical danger of the state
getting it wrong and doing more harm than good in its acts of recognition. Indeed,
while perhaps in a hypothetical polity with only a handful of individuals the state
could correctly recognise all identities, it seems hard to imagine for anything
approaching the size and diversity of a real polity.25 As is often pointed out, an
23 Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2002), p. 344.
24 Joseph Raz cites Alan Montefiore as saying, ‘To be neutral…is to do one’s best to help or hinder the
various parties concerned in an equal degree’; Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1986), p. 113. The remainder of this paragraph relies on Raz’s discussion of
neutrality.
25 Iris Marion Young (now rather infamously) argued that all minorities should be recognised – something that would be akin to 80-90% of the American population; Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). For the percentage figures, see
18 Introduction
individual’s identity is not some static thing that remains the same for their whole
lives, nor is an individual’s identity the same as that of somebody else who may have
the same identity markers – for example, there are many different identities contained
within the marker ‘Muslim’. Moreover, most people have identities that are
multifaceted; that is, their own individual identity is made up of many different
singular identities: Muslim, Australian, parent, Sydneysider, Manly Sea Eagles
supporter etc. The weightings and meaning of these identities for each individual are
likely to be dynamic and fluid. If the state is not capable of being both cognisant of,
and acting on, the subtleties of this identity fluidity, then it can either misrecognise
and/or ‘artificially’ fix or ‘reify’ particular identities.26 This means that, whatever the potential good of state recognition of identity, there are real practical problems to actually achieving it in any equitable fashion, and if the recognition thesis is correct
(as I assume it is), then there is a danger that the state can cause real harm by incorrect and inequitable acts of recognition.27
Barry (2001) pp. 306, 367, and Kymlicka (1995), p. 145. Others, most notably Kymlicka, have tried to
limit the numbers of those who should be recognised by only allowing certain types of groups (such as
national minorities) to make full cultural rights claims. I should stress though, that while this is a form
of recognition, it is not the same as the stronger form of recognition I am discussing here.
26 Nancy Fraser discusses ‘the problem of reification’ in Nancy Fraser, ‘Rethinking Recognition’, New
Left Review (new series) 3 (2000) 107-120.
27 Both false recognition and the reification of identity come together in what has been described as the
‘minorities within minorities’ problem. Here acts of recognition that recognise a whole group fail to see diversity within. This can lead to oppression of those within that group who hold divergent views, or at least have divergent interests. For discussions of this issue see A. Eisenberg and J. Spinner-Halev
(eds), Minorities within Minorities: Equality, Rights and Diversity (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Introduction 19
These problems point to state neutrality in the area of recognition of identity being best achieved by being ‘hands off’, rather than ‘hands on’. That is, the state should recognise no identities, rather than all identities. There are two obvious objections to
this position: that it is not possible, and that nothing will hold the political community
together. Let me deal with the impossibility objection first. This is the position that all
states necessarily privilege the majority ways of life; even if they strive to be neutral, they cannot but help making decisions and implementing policies that favour the majority. In the words of Will Kymlicka:
[T]he ideal of ‘benign neglect’ is in fact not so benign. It ignores the fact the
members of a national minority face a disadvantage which the members of the
majority do not face…Government decisions on languages, internal
boundaries, public holidays, and state symbols unavoidably involve
recognizing, accommodating, and supporting the needs and identities of
particular ethnic and national groups.28
The impossibility of a ‘hands off’ state neutrality can then been used to make a case
for a much more ‘hands on’ approach.29 But to argue for full recognition is
problematic for the reasons already articulated. The fact that a ‘hands off’ neutrality
can never be achieved is no reason in itself not to strive for it. The fact that
Press, 2005). See also the feminist critique of multiculturalism, most notably Susan Moller Okin, ‘Is
Multiculturalism Bad for Women?’, Boston Review 22 (1997) 2-28.
28 Kymlicka (1995), pp. 110, 115.
29 This is the response, although not always made in these terms, of most of those who argue for differentiated cultural rights and recognition.
20 Introduction
democracy, freedom, justice and most other political ideals are not fully achievable is no reason for not striving for them either. It is too quick to move from ‘never achieved’ (or ‘not fully achievable’) to an abandonment of the ideal altogether.
Instead, the sorts of government decisions that Kymlicka discusses above need to be held up and critiqued against this ideal. Where a policy can be moved closer to the ideal of neutrality, it should be.
It might be retorted that because both ‘hands on’ and ‘hands off’ neutrality are impossible, why should ‘hands off’ be the preferred form of the ideal of neutrality?
There are two reasons which I find convincing. First, the dangers of misrecognition for an individual’s freedom seem higher when done falsely, rather than when an identity is simply ignored. Misrecognition can lead to an individual internalising a false and poor view of themselves, and also to ignoring identities that exist inside recognised groups. Second, as a liberal I have instinctive wariness of state power – if a choice must be made between two similar positions, then the one that involves giving less power to the state must be preferred. Finally, the argument for a ‘hands off’ neutral state does not so much ignore the harm of misrecognition, as seek to avoid it through i) protecting freedom of association, and ii) having the state strive not to recognise any identity.
The second objection – that nothing will hold a political community together – leads to a deeper discussion of neutrality. This objection is that having a state that promotes no identity may not bring about enough stability or social cooperation to provide the
Introduction 21
sort of conditions that would enable people to live their lives as they see fit. If there is
no social bond, then how can there be an economic bond which is not purely self-
serving and short-sighted? And more worryingly, what would stop the state simply
crumbling? Why would large numbers of citizens not simply see their self interest as
being better fulfilled in opposition to the state and their fellow citizens? Thus, the
other resource that I flagged earlier, social cohesion, needs discussion, as without a
sufficient amount of it there may not be a possibility for individuals to live their lives
as they see fit. Although a degree of unity is required for a successfully functioning
polity, as I have already stated, social cohesion is not without costs to individual
freedom. As such, policies and procedures that intend to build and promote unity
must be held in check. It is here that the ideal of neutrality has an important role to
play.
Neutrality can be understood in two quite different ways.30 The first is the way I have been discussing so far, which is neutrality between ways of life. This itself can be separated into neutrality of aim – where there is no intent to help or hinder any party more than another – and neutrality of outcome – where the actual effects are taken into consideration.31 The other way of understanding neutrality is in relation to
30 Rawls writes that, ‘the term neutrality is unfortunate; some of its connotations are highly misleading’, and that ‘neutrality can be defined in quite different ways’ – he then goes on to describe three ways (procedural, aim, and effect or influence) which are consistent with the discussion of neutrality I make here; John Rawls, Political Liberalism: expanded edition (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2005), pp. 191, 191-195.
31 For a good discussion of this distinction see Raz (1986), ch. 5.
22 Introduction
justification. A neutral justification is one in which the rightness of no particular way
of life is used to justify a policy.32 For example, a policy of having English as the national language could be justified neutrally on the grounds that it is necessary for social order and functioning to have a single national language, rather than on the non-neutral grounds that English is a better language, or an easier language, or even the language that 'we speak around here'. Even more strongly, a policy that instigated an official civil religion à la Rousseau, could also be justified neutrally if it was successfully argued that a common religion was necessary to achieve the sufficient
level of social cohesion required for citizens to be able to live their lives as they see
fit.33 It seems, then, that neutrality of justification may actually come into serious
tension with a more commonsense neutrality between ways of life. As I have already
discussed, a pure neutrality between ways of life cannot be the end of the story. If the
freedom of individuals to live their lives as they see fit is taken seriously, then some
of this basic freedom must be curtailed in order to both preserve it and create
conditions in which it can be realised. But if we uphold the importance of an
individual living their life as they see fit, then it seems we should have some concern
about the potential effects of some neutral justifications.
32 In conceptions of justice such as those of Rawls and Dworkin, this neutrality is between ‘justice respecting’ ways of life, and not between all ways of life. This phrase is Kymlicka’s (2002), pp. 217-
219.
33 Kymlicka (2002), p. 344, who also uses the example of promoting political participation if done to ensure just and stable institutions and not because of its intrinsic worth. Charles Larmore states categorically that there can be no neutral justification of a state religion; Charles Larmore, Patterns of
Moral Complexity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 44.
Introduction 23
I will now put forward a way of balancing the ‘hands off’ state neutrality (that comes out of upholding the freedom for individuals to live their lives as they see fit), with the fact that neutrality of justification may in some cases undermine its realisation. I will suggest that a reflective notion of neutrality is the best way of realising this freedom. While the questions of precisely what sorts of justifications are neutral, and which justifications are appropriate are outside the scope of this thesis,34 I do,
however, want to discuss what happens after it is deemed appropriate to justify a particular policy on neutral (or near neutral) grounds, and to suggest a way that the freedom for individuals to live their lives as they see fit can still be upheld.
Regardless of the justification that is used for a particular policy, it should still aim to be as neutral as possible between ways of life (remembering neutrality is an ideal in this domain). This means two things. First, if, for example, a common language is
required, then its choice and use needs to be implemented to just the level required to
achieve its goal and no more. It is hard to say in the abstract how far this should be,
but the French history of nation building in the nineteenth century, involving the
deliberate wiping out of regional dialects and the punishment of those who continued
34 Rawls, for example, writes (even of his political liberalism) that ‘[j]ustice as fairness is not procedurally neutral. Clearly its principles of justice are substantive and express far more than procedural values, and so do its political conceptions of society and person, which are represented in the original position’. He does, however, then say that justice as fairness ‘seeks common ground – or if one prefers, neutral ground – given the fact of pluralism’; Rawls (2005), p. 192. Larmore, on the other hand, argues that there can (and should be) neutral justifications of neutrality – although, even he concedes they will not be perfectly neutral; Larmore (1987), pp. 53-55.
24 Introduction
to speak them would certainly be going too far.35 The ideal of neutrality between
ways of life needs to be balanced with the particular policy goal (even if justified
neutrally), to thereby keep it in check.
Second, and equally important, this balancing act needs to be ongoing rather than
simply one-off. A requirement for police officers to wear a uniform could have been
both justified neutrally, and initially implemented with neutral intent in relation to the
ways of life of a particular state’s citizens. However, if the freedom of individuals to
live their lives as they see fit is taken seriously, this cannot be the end of the story.
People change, fashions and tastes evolve, and migrants with different ways of life
enter a political community. The existing uniform regulations may become much less
neutral in outcome than they were initially intended. A form of neutrality that takes
the freedom of individuals to live their lives as they see fit seriously needs to be able
to respond to changing circumstances and change its policies to maintain a more
commonsense neutrality. This is not neutrality of outcome, but nor is it pure
neutrality of intent. It is instead a realisation that a policy that is both knowingly and
avoidably not neutral in its effects needs to be changed. Or to put it another way, a
commitment to the freedom of individuals to live their lives as they see fit (and
therefore to neutrality) is for life, not just for Christmas.
This notion of state neutrality sits between outcome and intent in much the same way as a commonsense notion of equality of opportunity is not purely formal, but at least
35 See Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen (London: Chatto & Windus, 1977).
Introduction 25
partially adjusts for outcome over time. In the police uniform example, this can be realised by expanding and changing the range of possible variations: skirts as well as pants, long sleeves as well as short ones, alternative headwear in the same colour as the existing hats etc.36 None of this is necessarily to deviate from a ‘hands off’ neutrality; rather it means only that the domain of that neutrality may expand and adapt – the details of the range of tolerable differences cannot be decided once and for all at a single point in time. The policy of police wearing uniforms is feasibly justified on the grounds that police need to be recognisable, and that a common uniform helps provide some discipline for them as well as authority in the eyes of the general public. These goals can be achieved with some variation (as now happens in most western liberal multicultural jurisdictions), and thus there is insufficient justification for the uniform to be strictly uniform, so to speak. I am not arguing for a
36 I am not arguing that a Sikh, for example, could not be a policeman without a change in uniform policy that allowed turbans. As Brian Barry would argue, he still has the opportunity to join the police force; Barry (2001), pp. 32, 37-38. However, I am arguing that if no good (neutral) reason exists for not allowing turbans as police headwear, then keeping in place a rule which bans turbans is not consistent with the freedom of individuals to live their lives as they see fit. For a critique of using a choice/chance distinction (i.e. ‘luck’) as the measure of the justice of minority rights claims, see Susan
Mendus, ‘Choice, Chance and Multiculturalism’, in P. Kelly (ed.), Multiculturalism Reconsidered:
Culture and Equality and its Critics (Cambridge: Polity, 2002), 31-44. For the view that opportunities in multicultural contexts (and others) must at least take into account barriers put up by ‘excessive costs’, see David Miller, ‘Equal Opportunities and Cultural Commitments’, in P. Kelly (ed.),
Multiculturalism Reconsidered: Culture and Equality and its Critics (Cambridge: Polity, 2002), 45-61.
26 Introduction
recognition of certain cultures or groups or a ‘hands on’ neutrality37 (for the reasons
already mentioned above), but for a ‘hands off’ neutrality that is capable of reflecting
on changing circumstances. It is this notion of state neutrality that most accurately
realises the freedom of individuals to live their lives as they see fit. I should stress
that this is not neutrality of outcome. This view is not concerned if certain ways of
life die out and or if others become very popular. This reflective notion of neutrality
is concerned, however, if certain ways of life are made either more difficult or more
popular due to avoidable and changeable state actions.
I have taken the time to spell out this view of state neutrality at the outset as it forms
the background to much of this thesis.38 In my view, state neutrality should be a position of even handedness, with a strong preference for non-interference, but with
an acceptance that policies and procedures cannot remain both static and sufficiently
neutral, and thereby sufficiently protect and promote the freedom of individuals to
live their lives as they see fit. I acknowledge that not everyone accepts state neutrality
37 This is Anna Elisabetta Galeotti’s view. She argues that the state should not simply expand its policies in these areas to be more neutral, but that, in so doing, it should also publicly declare the particular culture to be of equal worth; Galeotti (2002).
38 Another reason to outline my view of neutrality here is to attempt an answer to a challenge best expressed by Gerald F. Gaus: ‘Compared to other debates in political philosophy, the light-to-heat ratio of discussions of neutrality has been somewhat dismal…most political philosophers seem to know whether they are for or against it, [but] there is considerable confusion about what “it” is’; Gerald F.
Gaus, ‘Liberal Neutrality: A Compelling and Radical Principle’, in G. Klosko and S. Wall (eds),
Perfectionism and Neutrality: Essays in Liberal Theory (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003),
137-165, p. 138.
Introduction 27
(in any form), but a full defence of neutrality is not the primary aim of this thesis. So
although the thesis assumes this background position of state neutrality, my
arguments against inter-citizen respect of difference, scepticism of social cohesion –
particularly in national identity form – and my discussion of toleration, simply require
that individual freedom, and particularly the freedom of individuals to live their lives
as they see fit is sufficiently important to be given strong consideration when
deciding social policy. If one gives no weight to this type of individual freedom, then
the remainder of this thesis will likely be unconvincing.
Locating this work
In recent years, there has been a vast amount written on multiculturalism and related
topics in political theory. While my discussion so far has begun to locate this thesis in
this field, in this section I will briefly explain more explicitly how my thesis sits in relation to some of the more prominent theoretical approaches. My aim is not a
survey of all the relevant literature, but simply to highlight similarities and departures
from the more important theoretical positions.
The dominant normative theory of multiculturalism comes from Will Kymlicka,39 whose primary concern is individual autonomy. Briefly, his argument is that
individuals need a ‘societal culture’ in which they can then make autonomous
39 See Kymlicka (1995), as well as Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1989), and Will Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism,
Multiculturalism, and Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
28 Introduction
choices. Without the structure of a societal culture – which is usually territorially
concentrated, based on a shared language, comprises shared history, values,
institutions and practices in both public and private40 – individuals will be less able to make sense of the world, and therefore less able to make meaningful choices about their life plans.41 Kymlicka is choice-sensitive, and allows national minorities, such as indigenous groups and the Quebecois in Canada, significantly greater rights to protect their societal culture than immigrant groups whose weaker cultural rights are intended to simply ease the transition into the host nation’s societal culture.42 As
matters of justice, national minorities are to be granted self-government rights, while
immigrants are allowed lesser ‘polyethnic’ rights. Moreover, because the promotion
of individual autonomy is the primary justification of Kymlicka’s differentiated
rights, he is concerned that these rights provide only external protection from the
influences and pressures of outside decisions, but not provide any support for groups
who wish to put internal restrictions on their members. Indeed, he believes the liberalisation of minority groups should be encouraged.43
The argument of this thesis differs in numerous ways from Kymlicka’s approach. My
concern is not with autonomy in anything but the weakest possible sense, nor do I
differentiate historically between types of difference, as Kymlicka does with national
minorities and immigrant groups. Fundamentally, however, the difference here is one
40 Kymlicka (1995), pp. 76-80.
41 Kymlicka (1995), pp. 83-4
42 Kymlicka (1995), pp. 85-6, 94, 95-8.
43 Kymlicka (1995), p. 95, ch. 8.
Introduction 29
of focus. Kymlicka is concerned with minority rights – claims against the state –
whereas I am mainly interested in what should be asked of individual citizens in
diverse societies in their interactions with each other. In relation to my second focus
on toleration, Kymlicka is interested in what practices should be tolerated by the
state, thus his concern with distinguishing the internal restrictions groups may wish to
place on their members from the external protections they may wish from outside
influences. In contrast, my focus is on what it means to tolerate in a general sense and
not on which practices are at the boundaries of toleration. Nevertheless, the argument
that toleration can theoretically involve specific acts of respect of difference
(although whether it should is another matter) is not at odds with Kymlicka’s
position. Despite Kymlicka’s language of ‘differentiated citizenship’, his concern for
minority rights is driven by respect of common citizenship, a respect of sameness,
which he then argues in some cases justifies a respect for difference. This process of
mediation44 (where a general category such as citizenship justifies respect or tolerance of specific difference) plays a pivotal and explicit role in this thesis. I use it to show how respect of sameness or citizenship can lead to the accommodation of difference through three potential pathways: respect of difference, indifference of difference and tolerance of difference.
44 The concept and phrasing comes from Peter Jones. See Peter Jones, ‘Toleration, Recognition, and
Identity’, The Journal of Political Philosophy 14/2 (2006a) 123-143, and Peter Jones, ‘Equality,
Recognition and Difference’, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 9/1
(2006b) 23-46.
30 Introduction
In clear contrast to Kymlicka, Chandran Kukathas does not begin with the importance of autonomy, but instead with the fundamental importance of freedom of conscience and freedom of association.45 Further, Kukathas is not concerned with questions of justice, but with legitimate authority.46 Because of his primary concern for freedom of association, as a corollary of freedom of conscience, Kukathas holds toleration to be the value which is fundamental to liberalism, such that ‘a society or community is a liberal one if, or to the extent, it is tolerant’.47 Kukathas fully accepts that this maximal toleration is likely to undermine both social cohesion and political unity.
Thus without the usual guiding concerns of justice or social unity, and with a paramount concern for freedom of association (with a formal right to freedom of exit), Kukathas arrives at the metaphor of ‘the liberal archipelago’. This is a ‘society of societies’ or ‘collection of communities (and so, authorities) associated under laws which recognize the freedom of individuals to associate as, and with whom, they wish’.48 Particular authority within this archipelago rests on the acquiescence of individuals, rather than on any account of justice.49 Kukathas’ theory of multiculturalism takes us far from traditional closed society theorising about justice and difference with its concern for sufficient unity, to an open society without a centralised power or an overarching and imposed view of justice. In a ‘liberal
45 Kukathas (2003), p. 15.
46 Kukathas (2003), pp. 5-7.
47 Kukathas (2003), p. 23.
48 Kukathas (2003), pp. 8, 19.
49 Kukathas (2003), p. 19.
Introduction 31
archipelago’, individuals are free to associate and acquiesce with any particular
authority that will accept them.
Like Kukathas, I take toleration rather than autonomy as fundamental to a liberal
approach to diversity because of its maximal accommodation of people living their
lives as they see fit. However, unlike Kukathas, my position is not maximally
tolerant. Because my primary interest is not in questioning the boundaries of liberal
toleration, but in what goes on within them, I accept that liberal states will have
conceptions of justice that they will impose. These conceptions of justice will inhibit
deep diversity, and thus inhibit the following of strongly divergent life plans.
Although I do not argue for it here, I put some faith in neutralist liberalism to arrive at
principles of justice that accommodate a great range of differences, and certainly
more than most real liberal states do now. While the position I argue for here has its
roots in a wariness of centralised power, and most of the countries I discuss are either federations or parts of confederations, for ease of discussion I simply assume a unitary power called ‘the state’. Like Kukathas, and in contrast to liberal nationalists,
the theory I offer here does not accord social unity much importance. As I will argue,
its justification can only be instrumental and not intrinsic, and because of its tension
with toleration needs to be treated with extreme care. I will argue that many of the
goods of a liberal society can likely be achieved with minimal social cohesion, and
that identity forms of nation building are the most pernicious to the freedom of
individuals to live their lives as they see fit. Thus while the approach of this thesis has
32 Introduction
a great deal of sympathy with Kukathas’ libertarianism, my acceptance of states and
their (albeit neutral) conceptions of justice takes me in a different direction.
From my previous discussion of the recognition thesis of Charles Taylor, the
relationship of my argument to that of the identity theorists should be reasonably
clear. While I accept the importance of identity recognition, the dangers of
misrecognition point to both no direct recognition of identity by the state, and to no
imperative on the citizen to recognise identity either. In my earlier discussion, I
suggested that freedom of association against the backdrop of a neutral state was the
best way to avoid the potential harms of misrecognition.
Brian Barry offers the most trenchant critique of multiculturalism in either of its
autonomy promoting, toleration maximising, or recognition of identity guises.50 His
intention is to defend a liberal approach to diversity as one of strictly equal treatment.
Barry argues that multicultural policies which attempt to treat individuals differently
based on their religion, ethnicity, or other cultural attributes, are a complete anathema
to liberalism (and a distraction from the main game of a more egalitarian distribution
of resources). Barry argues that liberalism is not ‘difference-blind’ – it recognises the differences between the rich and the poor, employed and unemployed, well-educated and ill-educated, and so on51 – but that the sorts of differences that multiculturalists
50 Barry (2001). Also see Brian Barry, ‘Second Thoughts – and Some First Thoughts Revived’, in P.
Kelly (ed.), Multiculturalism Reconsidered: Culture and Equality and its Critics (Cambridge: Polity,
2002), 204-238.
51 Barry (2001), p. 63.
Introduction 33
want recognised should be private matters.52 Instead of a ‘rule-and-exemption’ approach to issues such as humane animal slaughtering laws (as most western countries have in relation to Kosher and Halal meat production), Barry argues that if there is not sufficient justification for current humane slaughtering laws (or to use another of his examples, the prohibition of cannabis – an issue for Rastafarians amongst others), then these laws should be changed.53 But if there is sufficient justification, they should apply to all citizens without exception. The only reason
Barry gives for maintaining a particular ‘rule-and-exemption’ is pragmatic, conceding that changing a long standing exemption, such as in the case of humane slaughtering laws, could do more harm than good.54
While Barry has a tendency at times to overstate his case, the position I defend here is
broadly in keeping with his ‘equal treatment’ approach. The type of neutrality I have
argued for – favouring expanding the space for diversity rather than offering exemptions or recognition of particular differences – is in line with Barry. As Barry’s book proceeds, one question that starts to arise is: how neutral is he really? David
Miller accuses him of not holding completely to his ‘austere’ version of liberalism and becoming an ‘unabashed perfectionist’ in his discussion of education and arts funding.55 Here Barry defends ‘education for living’ which should provide ‘what the
52 Barry (2001), ch. 2.
53 Barry (2001); in particular, pp. 32-50.
54 Barry (2001), pp. 50-54.
55 David Miller, ‘Doctrinaire Liberalism versus Multicultural Democracy: Review of Culture and
Equality’, Ethnicities 2/2 (2002) 261-64, p. 263.
34 Introduction
best and wisest parents would want for their children’,56 while the criterion for
publicly funding the arts ends up being ‘excellence’.57 It seems then, and it is no
surprise considering his consistent citing of J.S. Mill, that Barry is concerned with
autonomy promotion. Add to this Barry’s willingness to accept the validity of local
customs and mores of the ‘this is the way we do things around here’ variety, and he is
looking significantly less neutral. Nevertheless, Barry’s initial arguments against state
respect of difference are ones with which I sympathise. Yet, like Kymlicka, Barry’s
main focus is on what the state itself should (or should not) allow. Unlike the
approach of this thesis, Barry’s focus is not on what the state should require of the
individual citizen.
Finally, not all views of multiculturalism have concentrated on the role of the state
directly. There are those such as Bhikhu Parekh (but also Seyla Benhabib and
Monique Deveaux), who advocate approaching the issues of diversity through cross-
cultural dialogue.58 This would involve exchanging information, giving reasons, and engaging in public debate as the way of dealing with the difficulties of achieving successful accommodation. The aim of this type of dialogue is to increase
56 Barry (2001), pp. 221-25.
57 Barry (2001), p. 198-99.
58 See respectively: Bhikhu Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political
Theory (London: Palgrave, 2000); Seyla Benhabib, The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002); and Monique Deveaux, Cultural
Pluralism and Dilemmas of Justice (Ithaca, NJ: Cornell University Press, 2000).
Introduction 35
understanding all round, and even to transform the practices of both majority and
minority groups.
One of the primary criticisms of the cross-cultural dialogue approach concerns the
issue of who speaks for the group. Anne Phillips points out that what commonly
occurs in practice is that specific spokespeople (usually male, conservative, and not
particularly young) are selected who then speak on behalf of the group as if it has no
internal dissent.59 Their power is then reinforced by public agencies (not to mention
journalists in a hurry to meet a deadline) who, for ease of communication, prefer a
‘top down’ approach to ‘dialogue’. While this fixing of group identity, as well as its potential to curtail the freedom of internal group members to live their lives as they see fit does concern me, it is not the primary focus of this thesis. Even if the problem of giving more power to self-appointed (and externally affirmed) group leaders was somehow avoided, this would still place a large burden on the individual bearers of difference. This need to ‘explain yourself’ to your fellow citizens in order to justify
your practices and have them accommodated, while in some cases prudent, seems a
heavy burden to place on the individual. Likewise, the need for all majority members
to actually listen and explain themselves is, as I will argue, also an unjustifiable
burden. Interestingly, it always seems as if the majority members most likely to listen
and participate in these exercises are those who actually have very little trouble
59 Anne Phillips, Multiculturalism without Culture (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press
2007), p. 161. Despite these concerns, Phillips does, however, end up arguing that ‘[s]olutions to multicultural dilemmas are best arrived at through discussion and dialogue’, p. 180.
36 Introduction
accommodating difference in the first place. It is in these areas of inter-citizen relations where I will question the need for such deep interaction, most critically in the form of respect of difference.
Though not exhaustive, this discussion of the literature situates my work in relation to the major positions in the field, and will help indicate where my argument for the treatment of the issues of diversity differs, and where there is overlap. My general divergence from the literature is primarily in terms of focus, rather than in offering an alternative approach to commonly discussed cases such as Wisconsin v. Yoder, l’affaire du’foulard, or Sikh exemptions from compulsory construction site and motorcycle helmet laws. Although the neutrality that I assume when discussing state- citizen relations does imply a position on many of these cases, my interest in this sphere is more on showing how toleration is an extremely accommodating approach, both to individual differences and to different multicultural theories. My other focus on citizen-citizen relations is an attempt to untangle the ‘we’ in multicultural theory, and to look at what can reasonably be asked of individual citizens in diverse societies.
This question has previously been subsumed into questions of state-citizen relations in the form of what policies citizens should support in their democratic decision making. My interest differs from this in looking more at what is now a key focus of multicultural policy: how citizens should relate to each other in their interactions. The democratic issue and the daily interaction issue cannot be entirely separated; one will undoubtedly inform the other – your decision whether or not to support policies of increasing neutrality or even cultural rights will most probably be linked to your
Introduction 37
attitude to your fellow citizens in your other interactions. But this does not mean that more should be asked from the individual citizen in the form of respecting difference.
In fact, it may well mean the opposite. Clear and simple policy prescription in this area along the lines of ‘regardless of what you think or feel, all citizens have a right to live their lives as they see fit’, may ultimately lead to a greater likelihood to support increased neutrality – and potentially cultural rights for those who want to take this path – than encouraging respect of difference. At the same time, it provides significantly more freedom for individual citizens to live their lives as they see fit.
Diversity, multiculturalism and difference
Stressing the importance of individuals living their lives as they see fit, and taking this freedom on face value rather than questioning the expressed preferences of citizens, leads to a certain view about politics. This is that politics is not about ethics or morality in any thick sense, but about creating a pragmatic space for individuals to be able to exercise this freedom to live as they see fit. This means that diversity itself is neither a good nor a bad thing. There are those in both policy and theory who hold that diversity ought to be encouraged, or at least respected, for the benefits it provides in either economic opportunities, a richer social environment, or for providing a greater context of choice.60 However, if the freedom of individuals to live their lives as they see fit is seen as primary, then there are good reasons to think that diversity itself is neither good nor bad. We need to be open to the possibility that everybody might choose the same things, or alternatively that they will choose very different
60 I discuss these arguments for respecting difference further in Chapter 1.
38 Introduction
things. Preserving a particular difference for the sake of choice or for the sake of a difference itself seems to place an unjustifiable burden on the individual/s who must practice it. The empirical fact of diversity is something that theory and policy must deal with, and not something that should be either feared or valorised.
‘Multiculturalism’ has been the most common term used in these areas of debate in both policy and theory. In a normative sense, it describes a set of policies that deal with the facts of difference that occur primarily, but not solely, through immigration in most contemporary western countries. Within the last decade or so, the term – and the associated policies – has been derided by its more liberal critics for, amongst other things, failing to take social unity seriously,61 for promoting cultural or moral
relativism, and for undermining the achievement of ‘common dreams’62 (its less
liberal critics have, of course, seen it as an unjustified dilution of pre-existent national
identities, among other evils).63 In this thesis, I will mainly use the term ‘diversity’
61 See, for example, David Goodhart, ‘Too Diverse?’, Prospect 95 (2004). Goodhart argues that
multiculturalism is undermining support for the welfare state.
62 See, for example, Todd Gitlin, The Twilight of Common Dreams: Why America is Wracked by
Culture Wars (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1995).
63 I am not suggesting that attacking multiculturalism is a new activity, far from it. Just that, in recent years, it seems the attacks have actually started to bite. For earlier attacks on Australian multiculturalism see: Geoffrey Blainey, All for Australia (Sydney: Methuen Haynes, 1984); Frank
Knopfelmacher, ‘The Case Against Multi-culturalism’, in R. Manne (ed.), The New Conservatism in
Australia (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1982); and Stephen J. Rimmer, The Cost of
Multiculturalism (Belconnen, ACT: S.J. Rimmer 1991). For other earlier critiques of multiculturalism in the USA see Arthur M. Schlesinger, The Disuniting of America (New York: W. W. Norton, 1992),
Introduction 39
rather than ‘multiculturalism’ for two reasons. First, in recent years use of the term
‘multiculturalism’ has, most likely as a result of its critics, been on the decline in public policy. To give but one example, by late 2008 the Australian Federal
Government (despite a new Labor government being elected in November 2007) had stopped using the term altogether, and removed it from the title of the relevant department.64 In keeping with my goal of maintaining as much of a connection between the language of policy and the concepts of political theory as practicable, I will try to avoid the term. This is not to say I agree with those who denounce the term and want to see it expunged from public policy debates, but simply to acknowledge the term is now very loaded (albeit often for mistaken reasons).65
and Robert Hughes, The Culture of Complaint: The Fraying of America (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1993).
64 In January 2007 ‘The Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs’ changed to ‘The
Department of Immigration and Citizenship’. The word ‘multiculturalism’ has almost entirely been replaced with the phrase ‘a diverse Australia’ on the department’s website, and the Federal policy
United in Diversity which formally expired in 2006 is yet to be replaced. This may, however, change in the future as the Rudd Labor Government announced on the 17th December 2008 the formation of a new ‘Australian Multicultural Advisory Council’.
65 Geoffrey Brahm Levey argues, that in the Australian case at least, multicultural policies which were intended to be basically practical and aid integration, have become increasingly viewed as symbolic and thus a threat to national identity; Geoffrey Brahm Levey, ‘The Antidote of Multiculturalism’,
Griffith Review 15 (2007) 199-208. Also see Geoffrey Brahm Levey, ‘The Political Theories of
Australian Multiculturalism’, The University of New South Wales Law Journal 24/3 (2001) 869-881.
40 Introduction
Second, ‘multiculturalism’ seems to suggest a particular type of difference – those
that are derived from immigrant cultures come most immediately to mind. Using the
term ‘diversity’ instead is intended to capture a much broader and wider variety of
differences than those traditionally thought of as ‘cultural’ or ‘ethnic’. When it comes
to the question of how citizens should and do relate to each other, differences such as
religion, sexuality, socio-economic class, race, geographical location, indigeneity, and even hobbies and associations can create at least as much, if not more, social friction than those usually thought of as cultural. While a political theorist may wish to argue that indigenous peoples, for example, can make different claims to those of immigrant cultures,66 ordinary citizens may well be more concerned with differences such as
sexuality. By using the term ‘diversity’ in a broad sense, and its companion word
‘difference’, I want to avoid reducing the scope of what differences actually matter to
people along the more traditional cultural lines implied by ‘multiculturalism’. This is
not to say that the state should not differentiate between different types of differences,
so to speak, but that where issues of respect, tolerance and social cohesion arise, the
differentiations that the state should make may not match the ones that individual
citizens hold as important.
66 This is mostly strongly seen in Kymlicka’s choice-sensitive approach to multiculturalism which gives greater rights to non-immigrant citizens, such as national minorities like the Quebecois, than it does to traditional immigrant groups (see n. 39 for references). Jonathon Quong refers to this as ‘luck- multiculturalism’; Jonathan Quong, ‘Cultural Exemptions, Expensive Tastes, and Equal
Opportunities’, Journal of Applied Philosophy 23/1 (2006) 55-73.
Introduction 41
I use the term ‘difference’ throughout this thesis. I mean nothing metaphysical by it,
and use the word only in the most straightforward and broad senses: that is, the things
that differentiate citizens of the same polity from each other. Similar to my decision
to use the language of ‘diversity’ rather than ‘multiculturalism’, I do not want to prejudge which differences actually matter to people along cultural, ethnic or some other lines. Thus when I speak about maximising the accommodation of difference, I simply mean protecting the freedom of individuals to live their lives as they see fit.
The structure of this thesis
Chapter 1 of the thesis introduces two key distinctions that help drive the remainder of the work. The first is that when respect is used in relation to diversity, two distinct types of respect are at play: of difference and of sameness. The second is that it is a mistake to talk about respect relationships as ‘us/them’ or in ‘we’ terms, but that a clear distinction between the state and the citizen is both more normatively useful and empirically accurate. This then gives four types of respect relationship: respect of sameness between state-citizen and citizen-citizen; and respect of difference between state-citizen and citizen-citizen. After constructing a working definition of respect, I then argue that in both state-citizen and citizen-citizen relationships, respect of sameness is preferable to respect of difference. The chapter concludes by introducing the key notion of mediation. This is where respect of sameness may entail respect of difference (or indifference or even tolerance) which can then lead to accommodation.
42 Introduction
In Chapter 2 I explore in greater detail one of these four types of respect relationship: respect of difference among citizens. In policy terms, particularly in education, this is the site of much of the language of respect. I argue that this relationship is highly problematic, and that no known concept of respect can do the work required here without seriously limiting the freedom of individuals to live their lives as they see fit.
In this chapter I revisit Stephen Darwall’s influential distinction between appraisal respect and recognition respect; first introduced in Chapter 1. I argue that neither appraisal respect nor recognition respect can offer a way of successfully fulfilling any moral or political demand for individual citizens to respect each others’ differences, and that encouraging this form of respect may in fact limit the accommodation of difference. I argue that there is a serious disconnection between respect of difference and the accommodation of difference; it is not necessary to respect a difference to adequately accommodate it, and even when respect of difference is practised, this will not necessarily lead to the adequate accommodation of difference. I conclude the chapter by examining and (ultimately) rejecting the weaker demand that respect of difference should simply be encouraged where possible as a tool for building and maintaining a tolerant society.
This then raises the question of what will hold a society together. Respect of difference among citizens has been used as a policy tool for both building social cohesion and reducing the incidences of intolerance. In Chapter 3 I argue that while social cohesion is necessary to create the freedom for individuals to live their lives as they see fit, it is not without significant costs to that very freedom. As such, the
Introduction 43
methods used to create social cohesion need to be carefully examined, as does the amount of cohesion required to achieve a particular goal – it should not be treated as a costless good that should simply be maximised. After first rejecting the intrinsic case for social cohesion on a national scale, I then turn to the instrumental argument that social cohesion is necessary for achieving welfare redistribution and other common projects. Here I examine four ways of achieving sufficient cohesion: the national identity methods of liberal nationalists, which I then contrast with more direct trust building, institutional belonging, and ensuring fair social outcomes. My argument is not that any one of these methods is preferable, but rather that national identity building, even in liberal nationalist guise, is likely to be significantly more demanding than these three alternatives. I will also argue that the alternative approaches, particularly trust building, have the added and important advantage of allowing a more targeted approach to particular problems of social cohesion, rather than targeting all citizens for the sake of a few. My aim here is not to give a comprehensive account of the various means and ends of social cohesion, but simply to emphasise that certain types of means and certain types of ends are more costly than others, and that alternatives do exist which maintain a reasonable balance between the need for some ‘glue’ to hold a functioning polity together and the primacy of allowing individuals to live their lives as they see fit.
The thesis then moves to the issue of toleration. In Chapter 4 I argue that while the concept may have its political roots in the putting up with things that are morally repugnant despite having the power to negatively interfere, this is too narrow an
44 Introduction
understanding of the way toleration is (and should be) used today. By using a distinction between general and specific uses of the term, I argue that while specific instances are consistent with the traditional forbearance understanding, general uses are not. A generally tolerant agent – whether state, citizen, or corporation – is mostly indifferent, occasionally forbears, and can even be respectful towards specific differences. I use this distinction to argue that toleration and liberal neutrality are wholly consistent, and that those who think that toleration is always negative and thus unfair on those who are subjected to it misunderstand what it is to be tolerated.
Further, I argue that both the general practice of toleration and specific instances of tolerance need to be understood as political rather than moral notions when dealing with the issues of diversity. In the specific forbearance sense, too strict a measure of tolerance (that is, treating it as a moral virtue) overlooks instances of real and important forbearance in inter-citizen relations. In state-citizen relations, the justification of the general practice of toleration is not contingent on some other good, such as protecting autonomy, peaceful coexistence, or even scepticism; its maximal permissiveness should simply be the ‘default’ position of a liberal state. Finally, I show that even though the model of state toleration I advocate primarily involves indifference, toleration is consistent with respect of difference and forbearance tolerance of difference. Indeed, most liberal practices of toleration will involve all three types of attitude to specific difference.
To this point, I will have argued that respect of sameness is both more important and less problematic than respect of difference when practised among citizens of a diverse
Introduction 45
polity, as well as in state-citizen relations, and that toleration is the appropriate
description of the general policy towards specific differences in such a polity. But I
have yet to address in any detail the question of what more precisely the attitudes
towards specific difference should be from both the state and the citizen. In Chapter 5
I provide a general sketch of these attitudes – respect, indifference and forbearance
tolerance – towards specific differences in a diverse liberal polity. In other words,
what respect of sameness and toleration as a general practice entail when dealing with
specific differences. I do this by including three types of variable. First, the type of
agent: the state or the citizen. Second, the type of sphere: basic political, important non-government, or personal. And third, the type of difference itself. While the model
I construct is not intended to be exhaustive, I use it to argue that at no point will the individual citizen be required to do anything more than forbear (and sometimes not even this), and that with only a couple of exceptions, the state will almost always be
required to be indifferent towards the specific differences of its citizens. This most
basic contextual analysis then shows that many general statements about the
treatment of individual difference cannot be sustained.
Chapter 1
Respect relationships in diverse societies
Respect is a term that is used freely by both policy makers and theorists in relation to issues of diversity. We are told that respect is the answer to many of the problems that exist in a diverse polity, whether this be ethnic tensions, discrimination and prejudice, minority disadvantage, social cohesion or democratic equality. In relation to these issues of diversity, the concept’s general ambiguity coupled with its positive sounding nature seems to allow it to float conveniently between several potential meanings as well as agents. Is respect in these contexts of personhood, of citizenship, or of specific differences? And who exactly should respect whom? This chapter aims to clarify the possible respect relationships in diverse societies, and to explore both their normative basis and practical possibility. I will suggest that when respect is used in relation to diversity, there are two basic types of respect at play. The first is respect of sameness, for example, of an individual’s equal status as a citizen, and the second type is respect of specific difference, for example, a particular culture or cultural practice. I will also suggest that there are two different types of respecting agents: the state and the citizen. This then gives four basic types of respect relationship as outlined in Table 1.1. Respect relationships in diverse societies 47
Table 1.1: Four types of respect relationship
Respect of Sameness Respect of Difference
Between state and citizens Between state and citizens
Between citizens Between citizens
These relationships of respect figure centrally in much of the contemporary
theoretical and political debate over multiculturalism and difference, although they
are often conflated and confused. Is it enough for the state to respect the things its
citizens have in common, or should it also respect their differences? And should
citizens simply respect each other’s common membership, or should they also respect
their differences? These are different sorts of questions, which unfortunately become
confused when the issues of diversity are either couched in terms of ‘we’ and ‘they’
(or ‘us’ and ‘them’), or when respect is invoked vaguely. In using this set of
distinctions, I want to bring into much sharper focus both the serious problems of
justification and feasibility involved in respect of difference, and argue that respect of
sameness, whether between the state and its citizens or between citizens, remains
entirely justifiable and normatively preferable to respect of difference in either of its forms. In the first section of the chapter, I will construct a relevant working definition of respect, before applying it in the following sections to the four basic respect relationships, in the process highlighting their respective strengths and weaknesses as political objectives. The latter part of the chapter will then discuss ‘mediated respect’,
48 Chapter 1
a potential compromise between respect of sameness and respect of difference, where
a clear stressing of respect of somebody’s sameness allows a respect of their
difference. Here I will argue that despite having some advantages, mediated respect is
nonetheless a form of respect of difference and thus is susceptible to many of the
same problems. The concept of mediation is not entirely dismissed, however, and the
chapter concludes by suggesting the possibility of a greater accommodation of
difference through mediation.
Respect
Respect has several different senses which can be further divided into both moral and
non-moral dimensions.1 For example, respecting a parent’s ability is different from
respecting their status as a parent or respecting their personhood, their character or
even respecting their power. Thus, before exploring the nature of potential respect
relationships in a diverse society, an appropriate working definition of respect in this
particular context is needed. The notion of respect I will use in this chapter is based
on Stephen Darwall’s notion of ‘recognition respect’, which he characterises as
‘weigh[ing] appropriately some feature or fact in one’s deliberations’, for example,
the way we might respect the law or respect someone’s feelings.2 (Darwall contrasts
this notion with ‘appraisal respect’, which involves the positive evaluation of the
1 This has been noted by several authors, see: Stephen L. Darwall, ‘Two Kinds of Respect’, Ethics 88/1
(1977) 36-49; Stephen D. Hudson, ‘The Nature of Respect’, Social Theory and Practice 6/1 (1980) 69-
90; and Robin S. Dillon, ‘Respect’, in E. N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(2007),
2 Darwall (1977), pp. 38, 39.
Respect relationships in diverse societies 49
relational object – for example, respecting a musician’s ability. I examine this distinction in more detail in the next chapter.) Darwall narrows the general definition of recognition respect – which can include things such as ‘respecting the rapids of the
Colorado [river]’ – to its moral sense. Morally relevant recognition respect is simply then, ‘appropriate weighing or consideration of a feature or fact, when failing to do so would result in behaviour that is morally wrong’.3
This definition would be reasonably clear and workable if my discussion was simply limited to respect. However respect is not the only notion that can be used when discussing social and political relationships in diverse societies. Respect is often usefully contrasted with another approach to specific instances of difference, namely tolerance (in the sense of forbearance). A problem arises in that the above definition of respect is equally applicable to a normative notion of tolerance, where failure to tolerate might also result in morally wrong behaviour. Something else is required in order to differentiate this notion of respect from tolerance in this domain.
Significantly, respect and tolerance involve particular types of value associated with their relational object. In the classic meaning of tolerance, an unambiguously negative value is associated with the relational object. In contrast, cases of indifference are marked by their lack of any value associated with the relational object. Where does this then leave respect? It seems too strong to say that because respect is an opposite of this forbearance notion of tolerance it must involve a positive valuing of its
3 Darwall (1977), p. 40. The ‘respecting the rapids’ notion of respect is later described by Hudson
(1980) as a type of ‘obstacle-respect’.
50 Chapter 1
relational object. A judge, for example, can be respected in the relevant sense, that is,
by doing all the right things in a court of law, without thinking much of her character
or the institution she represents. Likewise we can begrudgingly respect the rapids we
must cross. Instead what marks the uses of respect in cases of diversity is an attitude
that the relational object is somehow worthy. Considering something worthy is
different from (but can include) actually liking or thinking that a thing is good. It
extends to the idea that the relational object should be taken seriously and considered
in action. Whereas in cases of tolerance the attitude towards the relational object is by
definition negative, in cases of respect the attitude needs to be something other than
strictly negative. It is this difference that I am trying to capture with the concept of
‘worthy’. A workable definition of respect in relation to the issues of diversity now
reads:
Holding some feature or fact worthy enough to then weigh it appropriately in
one’s deliberations; where failure to do so would result in behaviour that is
morally wrong.4
4 This may still throw up the objection that tolerance can be made to fit this definition too: cases of tolerance also require that the relational object be taken seriously enough to be considered in
(in)action. I would make two points in response. First, this is far from a sufficient definition of what it is to tolerate, but simply a necessary feature. For something to be described as an act of tolerance it will also require negative valuing. Second, this is intended as a working and not a comprehensive definition, and so it should be sufficient for the discussion of respect relationships in diverse societies I want to undertake in this chapter.
Respect relationships in diverse societies 51
This broad definition opens up at least one very useful question: What does
‘appropriately’ mean? The answer to this will, of course, be context-dependent, but
can be made substantially clearer by answering two further questions: What features
or facts are relevant? And what type of agent is deliberating?
The question of which features or facts are relevant will be explored in this chapter by
distinguishing between respect in relation to both a specific commonality and in
relation to a specific difference. The question of what type of agent is deliberating
will be answered by maintaining a distinction between the state and the citizen as
respecting agents.
‘Recognition’ is another term that figures prominently in the theoretical debates about
‘difference’. 5 My decision to focus on the language of respect rather than recognition
in this chapter and throughout the remainder of thesis is deliberate and motivated by
three concerns. First, as I mentioned in the Introduction, I want to match the
discussion of the issues of diversity more closely with the language and ideas of
governmental policy statements – where the notion of respect is frequently invoked in
a variety of senses. The Australian approach to multiculturalism provides a good
illustration of the various uses of respect in policy documents, where the concept is invoked at both Federal and State levels. At a Federal level, for example, one of the four key principles reads:
5 For prominent examples, see n. 10, Introduction.
52 Chapter 1
Respect for each person – subject to the law, all Australians have the right to
express their own culture and beliefs and have a reciprocal obligation to
respect the right of others to do the same.6
This is not to forget Britain, where, as a more general panacea in 2005, the then
newly re-elected British Labour Government aimed, ‘to foster a culture of respect’,7
or Canada, whose multicultural policy is: ‘[to] promote policies, programs and
practices that enhance the understanding of and respect for the diversity of the
8 members of Canadian society’.
The second motivation for using the language of respect rather than recognition is to
match more closely debates in the broader field of political theory, where respect is a
more common concept. The importance of respect in political theory has been picked
up and used to justify respect of difference. Bhikhu Parekh, for example, writes:
The liberal is in theory committed to equal respect for persons. Since human
beings are culturally embedded, respect for them entails respect for their
cultures and ways of life.9
6 Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, Multicultural Australia:
United in Diversity (Canberra: Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs,
2003).
7 Hansard House of Lords vol. 672 Col. 6 (17 May 2005).
8 Canadian Multiculturalism Act, RSC 1985 (4th Supp.), c.24, s.3 (2) (c).
9 Bhikhu Parekh, ‘Cultural Diversity and Liberal Democracy’ in G. Mahajan (ed.), Democracy,
Difference and Social Justice (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), 202-227, p. 206.
Respect relationships in diverse societies 53
Third, despite the arguments and approach introduced by the ‘politics of recognition’,
I hope to show that a broader understanding of the issues can be realised through the language and theory of respect, and that the use of respect can help highlight some of the confusion in this discourse. Nevertheless, there remains a considerable overlap
between the definition of respect I am proposing to use, and recognition as it is often
discussed in multicultural theory, that is, the acknowledgment that the relational
object is of some worth and some act/s need to take place to avoid perpetrating a
moral wrong. To this extent, and notwithstanding their differences, my use of respect
might well be translated into the language of recognition if so desired.
Two planes of respect versus a majority/minority distinction
The arguments surrounding cultural diversity are all too often conceptualised in
terms of the relationship between the majority and the minority (or minorities).10 The issue is then commonly expressed as to whether the nature of this relationship should be one of toleration,11 respect,12 or the giving or upholding of particular rights13.
10 Evidence of the predominance of this approach can be seen in the subtitle of one of the most influential books in the field, Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority
Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
11 For an argument that this should not be a relationship of toleration, see Ghassan Hage, White Nation:
Fantasies of White Supremacy in a Multicultural Society (Annandale, NSW.: Pluto Press, 1998). For
an argument about the primacy of toleration (but importantly a non-acceptance of a predetermined
‘we’), see Chandran Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2003).
54 Chapter 1
Moreover, this type of question is often only asked in one direction; that is, should the
majority tolerate/respect/grant rights to the practices and beliefs of their minorities –
should we tolerate them? Yet, as I will argue in this section, this type of
majority/minority distinction fails both to fully capture the real world dynamic of a
multicultural society, and to adequately cover the theoretically important relationships
in such a society.
While there is empirical and theoretical truth in the majority/minority relationship, its
scope, both empirically and normatively, is limited. A finer grained distinction that
involves two distinct planes needs to be added. One plane is the relationship between
the state and citizens or types of citizens, and the second is the relationship between
citizens or groups of citizens. One of the main problems with a majority/minority
distinction is that it does not fully capture real inter-citizen relations. If we look at
diverse societies, it can be seen that animosity (both in the form of values and actions)
can run both ways and can be at least as strong and as serious from some members of
minorities towards members of majorities. Take for example, the actions and attitudes
of some youths of Lebanese descent in Sydney,14 and at least a small number of
12 See, for example, Monique Deveaux, Cultural Pluralism and Dilemmas of Justice (Ithaca, NJ:
Cornell University Press, 2000), Chapter 2, and Bhikhu Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural
Diversity and Political Theory (London: Palgrave, 2000).
13 See, for example, Kymlicka (1995).
14 It was widely reported at the time of the gang rapes in Sydney at the turn of this century – popularly referred to as ‘The Lebanese Gang Rapes’ – that the assailants, who were of Lebanese background, used racial slurs and may have been motivated by race issues in the selection of their victims, that is,
Respect relationships in diverse societies 55
young Muslims in Britain. It might be argued that this animosity can simply be explained by the fact that many members of these groups are disenfranchised by the majority. But this would simply be a causal explanation which does not shed light on what it is to tolerate or respect difference, and would only explain an apparent lack of tolerance by an apparent lack of tolerance. This is not to say that this is not an important issue, only that it is a separate one.
Moreover, the majority/minority distinction does not seem to cover relationships between minorities, which often show little respect to each other. By this I do not mean the sorts of cases where a minority is temporarily part of the majority, such as often occurs in immigration debates, where it is the most recent immigrant group that commonly bears the hostility of less recent immigrants. Lack of respect can and does occur between two minorities in a minority context. Consider, for example, the animosity that has existed in New York between Hasidic Jews and African-
Americans.15 The point here is that the respect/tolerance relationship between citizens or groups of citizens is complex and is not as simple as majority/minority. This is a
they attempted to attack victims from what they perceived to be the majority ‘Anglo’ community. Scott
Poynting et al. clearly acknowledge this fact, even though they then argue that there is no necessary connection between the youths’ background and their actions and that the media did not treat the issue appropriately; Scott Poynting et al., Bin Laden in the Suburbs: Criminalising the Arab Other (Sydney:
Sydney Institute of Criminology, 2004), pp. 125-138.
15 See, for example, The Foundation for Ethnic Understanding, The 3rd Annual Report on Black/Jewish
Relations in the United States in 1998 (New York: The Foundation for Ethnic Understanding, January
1999),
56 Chapter 1
point seemingly missed by Anna Elisabetta Galeotti, amongst others, who argues both
that tolerance in a political context only makes sense between the majorities and the
minorities, and that ‘the dislike of a minority towards the behaviour of a majority has
never given rise to any question of toleration’.16
This distinction between the state and the citizen may simply appear to be a
theoretical nicety; in reality, the overlap between the state and majority interests is so
substantial as to render such a distinction meaningless. Two responses can be made
here, one empirical and the other normative. From an empirical point of view, there
are plenty of examples of liberal democratic states ignoring clear majority opinion, in
everything from the death penalty, to the recent Iraq War, to the volume and type of
migration that occurs. Moreover, as Eric A. Nordlinger has powerfully argued, there
is substantial factual evidence that when there is a conflict between the preferences of
the state and those of society (where society is measured either in numerical majority,
or in the form of the most powerful interest groups), the preferences of the state and
its public officials do often win out, and as such, the state must be considered an
autonomous agent.17 From a normative perspective, the state and the majority cannot
be the same thing – at least not in any liberal version of a state. While the majority
will exercise political power, it is only the state that can legitimately exercise coercive
16 Anna Elisabetta Galeotti, Toleration as Recognition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2002), pp. 85-114, 89.
17 Eric A. Nordlinger, On the Autonomy of the Democratic State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1981).
Respect relationships in diverse societies 57
power over citizens, and moreover the obligations of individual citizenship are of a fundamentally different nature to the obligations the state has to its citizens.
Thus, I suggest that it is more useful and accurate to use a state/citizen(s) and citizen/citizen distinction first, and then a majority/minority distinction, only where relevant. Even where a majority/minority distinction is relevant, it should be noted that its significance is not purely numerical, but involves a power differential. A twin focus on state/citizen(s) and citizen/citizen relations allows us to ask two separate (but related) questions: What is entailed in respect relationships between the state and citizens in a diverse polity? And what is entailed in inter-citizen (and/or group) respect relationships in such a polity? These two planes of respect will structure the discussion of the different notions of respect that follows.
Respect of sameness
If we refer back to the working definition of respect offered in the introduction to this chapter, the question of what features or facts need to be weighed appropriately can begin to be addressed. The simplest way to fill out this definition is using the liberal notion of respect of persons, where the feature or fact is the natural property of personhood (however defined). This provides us with a general category of respect: the natural properties persons have in common. Yet in discussing respect relationships in diverse societies, personhood is not the only, or even the most important, general category. Rather, it is the relational property of citizenship or membership that appears to be the most relevant. People in a particular polity hold or
58 Chapter 1
are given specific sets of rights18 based on their membership of the polity and the
state’s respect for the status of that membership. Of course in liberal polities general
respect of persons is foundational for the narrower, yet thicker, general category of
citizenship. But conceivably the general category of citizenship need not require
respect of persons; it could simply be based on membership status, in which case it is
unlikely to be liberal.19 Respect of sameness is a conventional notion with a powerful
pedigree from at least the eighteenth century onwards. Although I do not have the
space to argue its case directly here, it is still worth clarifying its foundational role
and importance, as well as briefly examining its boundaries, before moving on to
discuss respect of difference.
Locating sameness and its respect at the level of citizenship, invites the question: ‘but
how much the same?’ The issue of how thick the sameness of citizenship needs to be
to enable it to be something that can be respected as being ‘the same as’ is relevant
for respect in a diverse society. In theory, sameness could simply be civic, that is, of
shared citizenship status. But there is also an argument that for this type of sameness
18 Although I have introduced the concept and language of ‘rights’ here, I am simply using the term, both here and throughout the thesis, as a convenient shorthand way of describing the fundamental interests that are acknowledged in respect of sameness, and I mean nothing metaphysical by the concept.
19 This non-liberal approach would still require the general category of persons, just not respect for this category.
Respect relationships in diverse societies 59
to actually be meaningful, it must be somehow identity-based.20 I discuss this issue at
length (and with a certain degree of scepticism) in Chapter 3, but wish to make three
brief points here. First, it is worth noting that the question of whether citizenship
needs to be more than simply civic may have different answers depending on whether
it is the state or the citizen that is doing the respecting. State respect of citizenship can
surely be simply civic. On the other hand, for citizens to respect each others’
citizenship may require some notion of identity, that is, for citizens to really see each other as ‘the same’. The issue here is what type of bond, or sameness is required to keep a just and successful polity together. Second, if some notion of identity is required for citizens to uphold their individual duties in real world practice, particular care needs to be taken not to reify in theory what is effectively a feasibility constraint.21 And third, regardless of which position on the continuum between civic-
and identity-based citizenship is chosen, there still exists the problem of how to deal
with the differences that will almost definitely occur within the particular society. It is
here, when dealing with diversity, that the civic and identity-based models of
citizenship will involve different sorts of approaches. While a civic notion of
20 For a civic approach see Maurizio Viroli, For Love of Country: An Essay on Patriotism and
Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), and for a variant on the civic theme, see
Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal, Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe
(London: University of Chicago Press, 1994). For the liberal nationalist approach, see David Miller,
On Nationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), and Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).
21 This argument is made by Sune Laegaard, ‘Feasibility and Stability in Political Philosophy: The
Case of Liberal Nationalism’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9/4 (2006) 399-416.
60 Chapter 1
sameness can attempt to achieve a high degree of neutrality in relation to differences
and thus of the space for individuals to live as they see fit, an identity-based sameness
involves a clear move away from this type of neutrality,22 although to what extent
will depend on the thickness of the particular approach to identity.
So what role does respect of sameness actually play in a diverse society? It is difficult
to answer this question without also pre-empting at least part of the answer as to how
differences should be justly treated in a diverse society, that is, without at least
partially addressing issues of equality. Put simply, a basic respect of sameness is vital
for any notion of a just society. To use the two planes of respect, such a society
requires that citizens respect each others’ common citizenship, that is, they treat each
other as equal members of the political community and as the legitimate bearers of
the rights provided by the state. A just society also requires that the state respects this
common citizenship, that is, the state treats its citizens with equal concern by both
providing appropriate rights and creating and maintaining the conditions for them to
be upheld.23
22 The use of an identity-based category of sameness may involve the rejection of this type of neutrality, but not necessarily impartiality. A real life example would be the State of Israel, which by being a Jewish state has rejected neutrality, but need not in theory reject impartiality when dealing with the different type of citizens it contains.
23 There is of course the other direction of the state-citizen respect relationship: that of the citizen to their particular state. Citizen acts of respect in this direction can include obeying the law, upholding state institutions, and voting appropriately at the ballot box. The boundaries of what precisely is an act
Respect relationships in diverse societies 61
While the sameness I have been focussing on is that of citizenship primarily because
of its foundational importance, this is certainly not the only sameness that should be
of concern in a diverse polity. There should also be respect of other commonalities
such as an individual’s relevant capabilities. For example, in recruiting for fire
fighting positions, the capability of fire fighting should be respected, and irrelevant
differences such as religion should be ignored. An individual should be treated ‘the
same as’ in relevant aspects.
Returning to sameness as citizenship, it is important to note that even for liberals,
such as Will Kymlicka, who argue for differentiated and not strictly equal notions of
citizenship, their argument still hinges on a respect of sameness. In Kymlicka’s case,
his right to a ‘societal culture’ is contingent upon both citizenship within a particular
state, and more broadly on respect for personhood and thus the importance of
autonomy.24 The argument for differential treatment requires, and is founded upon, a basic respect of sameness. Indeed this also appears true of non-liberal theories, at least those concerned with achieving a just and diverse polity. Even here, without even a minimal respect of sameness (which is far from trivial) of persons or some type of citizenship, there could be no call for different treatment.25
of respect in this context are contested, particularly over the nature of what can be considered civil
disobedience, and thereby maintaining a respect for the state, and what is simply unlawful activity.
24 Kymlicka (1995).
25 Margalit and Halbertal, for example, base their argument for the state support of explicitly non- liberal cultures on the belief that ‘human beings have a right to culture’. Despite their argument that ‘a culture essentially requires a group, and that the right to culture may involve giving groups a status that
62 Chapter 1
The question that then becomes relevant for diverse polities is just what type of work
can and should state respect of sameness do directly? That is, should all peoples’
cultures be respected by both the state and the citizenry because respecting citizenship
implies a respect for culture just as much as a respect for basic welfare? Or, on the
other hand, should respect of sameness, whether as persons or citizens, mean that
certain cultural practices be suppressed because they are seen to be breaching the
fundamental respect of sameness? Or, should respect of sameness simply imply non-
interference?
State respect of sameness can be pulled in three very different directions. The first is towards an intolerance of difference, the second is towards a virtual indifference to difference, and the third is towards a deep and particular respect of difference. If
neutrality is abandoned and sameness is interpreted in a very thick sense, for example
along ethnic lines, then this is likely to lead to an increased intolerance of difference.
If, in the second case, neutrality is maintained and interpreted in a ‘hands off’ sense,
and citizenship is seen as particularly civic, then this will lead to a high degree of
indifference towards difference. In the third case, if respecting sameness is seen as
contradicts the status of the individual in a liberal state’, this right to culture is still grounded in the
respect-of-personhood of the individuals in the group, in this case the Ultra-Orthodox in Israel; Avishai
Margalit and Moshe Halbertal, ‘Liberalism and the Right to Culture’, Social Research 61/3 (1994)
491-510, p. 491. This even seems true of Ephraim Nimni’s contemporary advocacy of the virtues of
Bauer’s and Renner’s National Cultural Autonomy model; Ephraim Nimni, ‘Nationalist
Multiculturalism in Late Imperial Austria as a Critique of Contemporary Liberalism: The Case of
Bauer and Renner,’ Journal of Political Ideologies 4/3 (1999) 289-314.
Respect relationships in diverse societies 63
entailing respect for particularity, then this more ‘hands on’ (sometimes) neutralist approach will be anything but indifferent to difference. The first direction, at least in its strongest sense, can be immediately rejected due to its illiberal tendencies and its failure to secure a sufficient accommodation of difference. I will, however, address a more significantly liberal version of this position in Chapter 3. The second direction, sometimes called ‘benign neglect’, is a more traditional liberal position. This direction, although not to its full extent, will be the background position of this thesis
– that is, in general terms, the state has no business interfering with the differences of its citizens. The third direction, towards a deep and direct respect of difference will be examined in the next section, before then considering a position – mediation – that does not push so far in the same direction, and uses respect of sameness more directly to achieve respect of difference.
Respect of difference
The second type of respect I want to differentiate is respect of difference. By this I mean respect of specific differences as against respecting difference as a general phenomenon. Although a valuing of difference in general may motivate or provide reasons for respecting specific differences, this need not be case. Much of the contemporary literature on diversity involves presenting the case for the importance of respect for specific difference. Generally speaking, this is an argument that equal rights and/or state neutrality are not sufficient to deal appropriately with the differences that citizens in a state hold, and that something else is required (precisely what is subject to considerable argument) that both acknowledges and respects these
64 Chapter 1
differences, rather than merely tolerating and/or ignoring them. There are various
different justifications that have been given for the importance of acknowledging and
respecting people’s differences directly. Although the five justifications I list below
are not always framed in terms of, or require direct respect of, specific difference,
they can be, and are sometimes, employed in this way:
i) The belief that there is no abstract universal liberal individual can mean it is
virtually nonsensical to respect anything other than specific difference.26 If people are to be given respect, and thereby rights, this can only be done through their differences
– it makes no sense to ground anything substantive in a general category such as personhood as this is an empty category, and any substantive notion of respect must be tied to specific differences.
The next two justifications are generally put forward as correctives, either to avoid/reverse a harm, or to somehow equalise the position of the members of a particular group. In the latter case, it is commonly argued that some identities or ways of life are already respected/supported by the state (normally those held by the majority of citizens), and therefore other identities or ways of life must also be respected in order to avoid causing harm (either in absolute or relative terms) to these minority individuals.
26 Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 2nd edition (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998).
Respect relationships in diverse societies 65
ii) An appeal to the importance of a person’s particular identity for their self esteem
(and the importance of self-esteem as a vital human need), combined with a particular
reading of Hegel’s master/slave dialectic. The argument here is that your identity
needs to be recognised by somebody that you also recognise, and that any misrecognition can be internalised as part of your identity and cause you to not only be treated badly, but to view this maltreatment as acceptable.27 Thus without the
correct recognition of your true identity, you will be harmed.
iii) The third justification involves a more directly liberal argument that difference-
blind liberalism may fail to deal justly with some of the real and important differences
that exist between people, and that specific differences (which ones and why is a
matter of debate) may require direct respect and differential treatment. Kymlicka for
example, argues that minority ‘societal cultures’ can require respect in order for their
members’ autonomy to be fulfilled,28 whereas Nancy Fraser argues for changing the
27 See Charles Taylor, ‘The Politics of Recognition’, in A. Gutman (ed.), Multiculturalism (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1994), and Axel Honneth, ‘Redistribution as Recognition: A Response to
Nancy Fraser’, in N. Fraser and A. Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition? A Politico-Philosophical
Exchange (London, New York: Verso, 2003), pp. 110-197.
28 Kymlicka (1995). In Kymlicka’s theory this right to your own societal culture is only provided to
national minorities and not to immigrant groups who must accept the majority societal culture.
Immigrant groups are however entitled to ‘polyethnic’ rights, which involve a lesser form of respect of
difference.
66 Chapter 1
particular institutionalised value patterns that deny some differences equal social
status, so that these differences can be seen to be worthy of respect.29
There are two further types of justification which, unlike the first three types of
reasons, are not related to the welfare of the individuals who hold particular
differences.
iv) In the same way that many people view fine art, differences can be seen as
independently valuable, that is, as good in themselves. A culture, for example, might
be respected because it is believed to have some sort of intrinsic value (in the
broadest sense of the term). Moreover, in some circumstances a failure to respect a
specific difference may lead to its extinction via an assimilation of its holders into a
more dominant culture. This is the concern of those who worry, for example, about
the loss of unique languages or traditional ways of life. This type of view is evident in
parts of Charles Taylor’s seminal work ‘The Politics of Recognition’.30
(v) Finally, respect of specific difference has been justified because it serves interests
beyond those who directly hold the difference. While there are cases of specific
29 Nancy Fraser, ‘Rethinking Recognition’, New Left Review (new series) 3 (2000) 107-120. See also
Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1990). Carol Gilligan’s approach to feminist issues is yet another example of this third type of justification; Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development
(London: Harvard University Press, 1993).
30 Taylor (1994).
Respect relationships in diverse societies 67
differences being supported for the sake of the wider society – the way traditional indigenous culture is now used in wider Australian identity provides a good example
– it is generally the presence of diversity itself that is seen as important here. In order for a range of acceptable differences to survive, specific differences may then need to be respected. This has been justified on economic grounds (a variety of languages and backgrounds provides a country with increased trading opportunities),31 or for the sake of increased autonomy (where the context of choice is increased by having more valuable options to choose from),32 or for the sake of simply having a richer life.33
31 The Australian Federal ‘Strategic Direction’ entitled ‘Productive Diversity’, for example, sees
‘Australia’s multiculturalism as a most valuable [economic] resource’; Department of Immigration and
Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003), p. 8.
32 For an older example, see J.S. Mill, ‘On Liberty’, in J. Gray (ed.), On Liberty and Other Essays
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, [1859]1998), 4-130. For a more recent exponent, see Joseph Raz,
The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).
33 Robert Goodin, for example, argues that a notion of ‘polyglot multiculturalism’, where multiculturalism is supported for the sake of the majority, can be entirely liberal; Robert Goodin,
‘Liberal Multiculturalism: Protective and Polyglot’, Political Theory 34/3 (2006) 289-303. Bhikhu
Parekh, on the other hand, puts forward several arguments for the good of cultural diversity, including that ‘[i]ts unassimilable otherness challenges us intellectually and morally, stretches our imagination, and compels us to recognize the limits of our categories of thought’; Parekh (2000), p.167. And finally, the multicultural policy of the previous Australian government stated that ‘[e]very Australian benefits from our diversity’ and is concerned that ‘we continue to reap the rewards of our diversity’;
Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003), p. 5.
68 Chapter 1
In the remainder of this chapter and in the thesis more generally, I will not argue
directly against the basic soundness of the above justifications.34 However, by
maintaining a distinction between the state and the citizen as respecting agents, I will
raise questions about the practical and theoretical possibility of respect of difference,
and its subsequent desirability as a public policy program. Before proceeding, I
should also make clear again that respect is not the only, or even the main path to
accommodation of difference – both indifference and tolerance can, and do, lead to
the accommodation of specific differences. If the aim of a state policy is, as in my
view it should be, the accommodation of difference, then it need not necessarily
follow that differences should be respected and, as I will argue in the next section, there are good reasons to think that respect of difference will not always lead to the greatest possible accommodation of difference.
State based respect of difference
Just as the state can respect the commonality of its citizens by, for example, granting them equal sets of rights, so too can it respect the particular differences that its citizens hold by, for example, making public statements on the positive value or attributes of a particular group, funding specific cultural groups, providing exemptions from general laws to specific types of citizens, and even granting different political rights to specific citizens.35 All these moves can be ways of the
34 For a trenchant and direct critique see Brian Barry, Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of
Multiculturalism (Cambridge: Polity, 2001).
35 Jacob T. Levy, although using the language of rights, provides a useful classification and summary
of types of state action that could show respect to a particular group’s differences; Jacob T. Levy, The
Respect relationships in diverse societies 69
state showing respect, rather than simply tolerance or indifference, for specific differences.
It might seem that acknowledgement that leads to accommodation of a specific difference or potential range of differences is the same as respecting those differences. However, because respect is not the only value that can lead to accommodation (indifference and tolerance can too), this need not be the case. As discussed in the Introduction, the presence (or potential presence) of specific differences could simply cause a state to rethink its commitment to neutrality and make changes that allow that specific difference (and any similar ones) greater possibilities within that society. This is a reflective and dynamic view of neutrality of intent, which is different from the more static ‘hands off’ neutrality implied in
‘benign neglect’. To give an example, an acknowledgement that many cultures wear different types of headwear may lead to a broadening of the potential range of headwear permitted in a particular government occupation such as bus conducting.
This change in policy is not necessarily an act of respect for any specific differences.
The move to allow a greater range of headwear could instead be driven by a valuing of neutrality and thereby an expansion in the range of indifference. So while some acts of accommodation may appear to respect a specific difference, they need not be
Multiculturalism of Fear (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p.127, and Jacob T. Levy,
‘Classifying Cultural Rights’, in W. Kymlicka and I. Shapiro (eds), NOMOS XXXIX: Ethnicity and
Group Rights (New York: New York University Press, 1997), 22-66.
70 Chapter 1
acts of respect. They may simply be acts of accommodation through a value of
indifference or tolerance for which a specific difference was merely a catalyst.
The distinction between different ways to accommodate a difference (respect,
tolerance or indifference) may appear trivial; as long as those with particular
differences can still do what they want, surely that is what matters. But for many of
those who advocate direct respect of difference, respect and even positive affirmation
is the key issue. For this type of multiculturalist and difference advocate, it is crucial
that the difference or identity is publicly valued as somehow worthy, and this public
positive valuing is viewed as at least as important, if not more so than ‘mere
accommodation’.36
It is worth noting that at least some of the drive for positive valuing rather than ‘mere
accommodation’ can at least be partially separated if one of its motivations is
examined: the prior existence of a public and negative valuing. A good recent
36 Galeotti, for example, puts forward a view in which ‘…tolerance will be seen as a form of recognition of different identities in the public sphere…[involving] a semantic extension from the negative meaning of non-interference to the positive sense of acceptance and recognition’; Galeotti
(2002), p. 10. In even stronger terms, Karl-Otto Apel argues for an approach that moves from
‘[n]egative tolerance based on indifference [to] positive or affirmative tolerance, based on appreciating…all the value-traditions that make up the cultural identity of the members of a multicultural society’; Karl-Otto Apel, ‘Plurality of the Good? The Problem of Affirmative Tolerance in a Multicultural Society from an Ethical Point of View’, Ratio Juris 10/2 (1997) 199-212, pp. 200,
207 (emphasis in original). I take up the issue of these views of toleration and tolerance in Chapter 4.
Respect relationships in diverse societies 71
example of this is the gay marriage issue in Australia. In 2004 the Federal
Government successfully amended the 1961 Marriage Act to explicitly exclude gay
marriage, and the then Prime Minister John Howard publicly added, ‘marriage is a
voluntarily entered into union of man and a woman to the exclusion of all others’.37
Prior to these events, groups such as the ‘Let’s Get Equal Campaign’ (a gay and
lesbian lobby group) made no mention of marriage, and had as their chief concern
‘removing legislative discrimination against same sex couples in state laws, or, to put
it another way, equal recognition of same sex couples in state law as for opposite sex
couples’.38 However, since the then prime minister’s public comments and the passing of the amended legislation, groups such as ‘Australian Marriage Equality’ have been formed explicitly to ‘campaign for law reform and attitudinal change necessary to allow same sex couples to marry’.39 The public and symbolic
recognition of worthiness, and not simply equal legal recognition, had become the
issue.40
37 This position has also been endorsed by the next Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd.
38 Matthew Loader, ‘Recognising Same Sex Relationships: Ideas and an Update from South Australia’, in Word is Out 7 (2003) 8-18.
39 See
40 Even a group such as ‘Australian Coalition for Equality’, which is clearly geared to equal treatment,
still places as a goal; ‘to work towards the day when Australia not only recognises and accepts our
amazing diversity, but celebrates that reality!’;
=87> 72 Chapter 1 When a difference, such as homosexuality, is publicly given less value, issues of identity can become confrontational. Requests for accommodation of difference can become requests for respect of difference precisely because of their strongly value based rejection.41 From the position of justice, the issue can become more like one of redress than one of equal treatment,42 and as such it seems at least a partially separable issue. This then raises the question of whether direct respect of difference is in fact the most appropriate form of redress, and if so, in which form. Regardless of its motivation, state respect of difference raises several important issues, which can only be briefly discussed here. As I wrote in the Introduction, people’s differences, or at least the identities associated with them, are not simply fixed and unchanging things. They are capable of changing and reacting to their 41 The motivation of turning a negative view of a difference, such as has been the case with homosexuality, into a positive view which celebrates the previously demeaned identity drives Tariq Modood’s theory of multiculturalism. Modood starts with the recognition of ‘negative difference’ and seeks the goal of ‘positive difference’, which involves both respect of sameness and respect of difference. Tariq Modood, Multiculturalism: A Civic Idea (Cambridge: Polity, 2007), pp. 55, 58, 61,69. 42 This is not to say that allowing gay couples to marry is not equal treatment, just that the marriage part of the claim has achieved a greater level of symbolism. Nancy Fraser brings both of these issues together in her notion of ‘participatory parity’ in relation to the gay and lesbian marriage issue which she sees as a problem of an unjust institutionalised value pattern; Fraser (2000), pp. 114, 115. Nevertheless, it seems like changing institutional arrangements to allow greater equality is different from redressing clear and deliberate acts of non-recognition, even if both potential injustices may appear to have the same cause. Respect relationships in diverse societies 73 environment. They are also rarely singular in nature. Someone’s identity will normally comprise many different elements, and the elements which are seen as important will change in relation to particular contexts, and over time. Respecting a difference through a state action will have a real effect on that difference. It has the potential to entrench and ‘artificially’, or at least politically,43 construct identities which are necessarily fluid, and very commonly ‘hybrid’ in nature. David Miller provides a useful summary of this issue – which is a reasonably common critique of multicultural policies – using the work of M.C. Waters.44 Miller argues that many people choose (and continually choose) their identity or identities in response to both their own personal cultural preferences and the relative social attractiveness of the identity. As such, political recognition fixes and consolidates this flux of identity choosing, by reducing the attractiveness of some choices and increasing the attractiveness of others, as well as crucially providing an external public statement and clarification of what it means to hold a particular identity (for example, a Muslim in Britain), which can reduce the internal opportunities for the 43 Kukathas, for example, argues that culture follows politics much more than the other way around; Kukathas (2003), p. 198. For a fuller and more illustrated discussion of the political construction of identity, see Chandran Kukathas, ‘Are There Any Cultural Rights?’, Political Theory 20/1 (1992) 105- 139. 44 M.C. Waters, Ethnic Options: Choosing Identities in America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990). 74 Chapter 1 identity to change and contest itself.45 Chandran Kukathas makes a similar argument, adding that, ‘diversity is too complex for group equality to be reached without significantly altering the structure of diversity. Indeed, most of the time it is too complex for us to be aware of the differences that exist – or to understand which differences matter’.46 This means that there are two types of problems that can occur, even if one thinks that it is permissible for the state to make some identities more desirable and less flexible than others. The first is a problem of feasibility. If the aim of the state is to respect at least some of the particular differences of its citizenry, then because of their fluid nature it will be difficult in practice to keep track not only of which identities should be respected, but also how they should be respected. States and their policies are 45 David Miller, Citizenship and National Identity (Cambridge & Oxford: Polity, 2000), pp. 70-71. This does not mean that deliberately disrespecting a difference will have the opposite effect either. Ayelet Shachar warns of a ‘reactive culturalism’ (a strengthening and re-enforcing of points of difference) against enforced assimilation; Ayelet Shachar, Multicultural Jurisdictions: Cultural Differences and Women's Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 33-37. Likewise, Daniel M. Weinstock argues that ‘[r]ecent claims for greater autonomy on the part of cultural minorities such as the Basques, the Bretons and the Corsicans in France, similar developments in Spain, as well as the strong reaction of the French Muslim community in what has come to be called “l’affaire du foulard,” indicate that the assimilationist strategy almost inevitably engenders a “culturalist reaction”’; Daniel M. Weinstock, ‘Beyond Exit Rights’, in A. Eisenberg and J. Spinner- Halev (eds), Minorities within Minorities: Equality, Rights and Diversity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 227-247, p. 240. 46 Kukathas (2003) p. 235. Respect relationships in diverse societies 75 notoriously slow and blunt, and as such, if identities are moving and changing it will be nearly impossible for even the most reactive state to keep pace and attempt to minimise the political skewing of its citizens’ identities. The second problem is more theoretical, and involves unintended consequences, where the intention of respecting the differences of its citizenry may lead to either the unequal respect of differences or even the disrespect of some differences. This unintentional disrespect of difference can be considered a ‘minorities within minorities’47 problem, whereby some holders of a particular difference (often women) are disadvantaged by the provision of extra resources and power to those who are already powerful members of their group.48 What this means is that even when the respecting of difference is motivated by a 47 See A. Eisenberg and J. Spinner-Halev (eds), Minorities within Minorities: Equality, Rights and Diversity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). Ayelet Shachar describes this issue, particularly in relation to women, as the ‘paradox of multicultural vulnerability’; Ayelet Shachar, ‘The Paradox of Multicultural Vulnerability: Individual Rights, Identity Groups, and the State’, in C. Joppke and S. Lukes (eds), Multicultural Questions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 87-112, and Ayelet Shachar (2001). 48 Kymlicka (1995) tries to solve this type of problem with a distinction between ‘external protections’ (i.e. cultural rights) and ‘internal restrictions’ (i.e. deliberate restrictions on the freedom of group members). However, others, perhaps most notably Susan Moller Okin, have argued that multicultural accommodation potentially leads not only to overt sex discrimination (and thus there needs to be prohibitions against internal restrictions), but also can help perpetuate ongoing and much more covert discrimination against women in the private sphere; Susan Moller Okin, ‘Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?’, Boston Review 22 (1997) 2-28. Kukathas (2003), pp. 181-89, takes a different line of attack, arguing that Kymlicka’s distinction is meaningless if it is not supposed to be enforced (bearing in mind practical considerations). For a recent attempt to reconcile women’s rights with multiculturalism, see Anne Phillips, Multiculturalism without Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007). 76 Chapter 1 commitment to neutrality (in the sense of helping or hindering to an equal degree), this commitment cannot be met by direct respect of difference. To use the example of being a Muslim in Britain, public acts of respect face the practical difficulty of latching onto the changing meaning of this identity, and if it is decided to further sub- divide the identity into smaller entities, this problem will not go away, rather its practical difficulties may seemingly be multiplied. Considering that being Muslim in Britain has multiple and not always compatible meanings, as well as is held by people who have other identities, respecting this identity in some ways (for example condoning the use of Sharia law),49 has the potential to be antithetical to some who hold this identity as well as lead to serious acts of disrespect to some British Muslim identity holders.50 Citizen based respect of difference The second way in which respect of difference can be called for is amongst the citizenry; it is here that the citizen and not the state is the agent of respect. This idea 49 Pascale Fournier offers a good brief summary of the literature, debate and history of the proposal to establish Muslim family law in Britain; Pascale Fournier, The Reception of Muslim Family Law in Western Liberal States (Gananoque: Canadian Council of Muslim Women, 2004), pp. 22-26, available at 50 For examples of the Canadian debate on this issue, particularly concerning the place of women, see Marion Boyd, Dispute Resolution in Family Law: Protecting Choice, Promoting Inclusion (Ottawa: Ontario Ministry of The Attorney General, December 2004), and Natasha Bakht, Arbitration, Religion and Family Law: Private Justice on the Backs of Women (Ottowa: National Association of Women and the Law, 2005). Respect relationships in diverse societies 77 often falls under the rubric of ‘mutual respect’, a term which seems to oscillate conveniently between respect of a general status and respect of difference. Here I will use ‘mutual respect’ to refer to respect of difference between citizens or groups of citizens. This type of respect of difference involves more than indifference, and typically involves encouraging citizens to actively learn about each other and positively appreciate, share and value their differences. The idea sounds nice on paper; let’s all learn about each other, break down barriers, and really value the differences that exist in our society. I take up the issue of citizen based respect of difference in much more detail in the next chapter, but at this stage I want to flag three problems with either requiring or encouraging citizens to be the agents of this type of respect. First, requiring citizens to respect each others’ differences stands up very shakily against even a weak notion of freedom of conscience. While it may be one thing to require citizens to accommodate each others’ differences regardless of how they value them – which is effectively requiring them not to act in particular ways – it is quite another to require citizens to positively value each others’ differences. And what about the person who just wants to mind their own business? If mutual respect of difference was to be implemented it would need extra-ordinary justification, and not simply on the grounds that it would lead to social harmony or cohesion – lots of things would do this, including drugging people. It would need to be shown that it is both necessary for cohesion (and that the level of cohesion intended was also 78 Chapter 1 necessary), and that it can bring it about with significantly less cost to individual freedom than any viable alternatives. Second, regardless of the issues of conscience and justification, mutual respect of difference does not appear to be entirely coherent. It is premised on the existence of difference and the potential clashes that can ensue, yet it seems to require both taking differences seriously on the one hand, while also asking the holders of those differences to take each other’s differences seriously on the other. We end up with classic clashes, such as the abortion activist having to engage in mutual respect with the strict Catholic.51 It just does not make sense to respect these people’s differences and the crucial roles they play in their own identities, while at the same time asking them to respect each others’ differences. Such a position seems to assume that the differences that will be tolerated in a liberal polity are highly commensurate. Respecting a difference implies taking the difference as somehow worthy, but asking the holders of differences (and on occasion, quite opposed differences) to then find each other’s differences respectable seems not to take their potentially clashing differences very seriously at all. I am, of course, assuming that such respect exercises are not intended only to involve people whose differences are, or at least could easily be made to be, thoroughly liberal. If, however, the aim is to involve only the holders of liberal-type differences, this would be to substantially narrow the range of possible diversity, and would, as a policy, not be very liberal or accommodating at all. 51 This example comes from Kukathas (2003), p. 34. Respect relationships in diverse societies 79 Finally, it might be retorted, ‘not everybody has to be involved in mutual respect, what about just getting most people involved in respecting each others’ differences?’ This view is consistent with mutual respect being more of a policy guideline than a legislative or moral requirement. This, however, leads to a third problem. Any attempt to implement such a policy, which is often done using funding as a ‘carrot’,52 will both change and limit the types of differences accommodated in the society and unfairly treat some differences preferentially to others. To be involved in mutual respect one has to be both respecting and respectable. This will necessarily involve the holders of particular differences accentuating their ‘cuddly’ bits – their cooking and dancing – while downplaying their values. (Witness the ubiquitous multicultural festival.) This political interference has the potential to then narrow the range of differences towards the mutually respectable, and worse, quite likely skew the range further towards the sorts of differences readily acceptable to the majority of citizens – these will be the most broadly respectable. This type of impact seems nothing short of an assimilation of difference, albeit under a different name.53 This may not be a 52 For example, the Australian Government’s ‘Living in Harmony Initiative’ which ‘promotes harmony, brings down barriers between cultures and addresses issues of racism’, gave $AUS 1.5million a year to projects that further its aims, Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003), p. 7. 53 This ‘skewing’ potential is not lost on all advocates of multiculturalism. Joseph Raz, for example, freely acknowledges the ‘transforming effect’ of mutual respect and appreciation which ‘leads to inevitable developments in the constituent cultures in their society’. For Raz, as a perfectionist liberal however, this is not necessarily a problem and indeed is a positive outcome; Joseph Raz, ‘Multiculturalism’, Dissent Winter (1994) 67-79, p. 73. 80 Chapter 1 problem if one does not believe in neutrality in relation to difference, but it is a problem if one believes in treating differences with any notion of equality that is not simply based on numbers of members, or if one wants to hold that people’s differences should only have (state-sanctioned) pressure put on them if they are causing harm to others. This sense of mutual respect is an area where a majority/minority distinction remains a useful analytical tool. It is worth stressing that the boundaries of the tolerable are always going to be wider than the boundaries of the respectable in any given society. Direct respect of difference, while perhaps justified in some circumstances and at least desirable in others, harbours serious practical and theoretical problems which occur whether the respecting agent is the state or the citizen. As such, it appears that failure to directly respect specific differences does not necessarily result in behaviour that is morally wrong, and ironically attempting to respect difference in this way could itself result in behaviour or policies that are themselves morally wrong, as well as practically not possible. Mediated respect So far I have stressed the importance of respecting a general category such as citizenship, and raised serious doubts about the viability of directly respecting differences, I have not, however, dealt with the question of whether differences can somehow be respected as a consequence of respecting citizenship. In this section, I Respect relationships in diverse societies 81 will look at one potential solution to the problem of respecting difference that overtly uses respect for a general category. Peter Jones introduces the notion of what he calls ‘mediated recognition’ in opposition to ‘unmediated recognition’. 54 While Jones specifically uses the term ‘recognition’ – one article is a response to Anna Elisabetta Galeotti’s book, Toleration as Recognition, while the other also deals with the recognition theories of Taylor and Axel Honneth – the sense in which he uses recognition translates nicely into the definition of respect I am using.55 He uses the concept of mediation to explain how it would be possible to actually respect a difference that may be associated with a negative value. Whereas unmediated respect of an identity/practice/belief involves direct respect (what I have so far been calling respect of difference), mediated respect involves initially respecting something as a general category, for example as a person or citizen, and then as a consequence of this respect, respecting the specific difference. Jones uses the example of Islam to explain the process of mediation. We may think that Islam is a valueless and perhaps even detrimental religion, but, he says, because of our respect for an Islamic person’s 54 Peter Jones, ‘Toleration, Recognition, and Identity’, The Journal of Political Philosophy 14/2 (2006a) 123-143. See also Peter Jones, ‘Equality, Recognition and Difference’, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 9/1 (2006b) 23-46. 55 After a clear and useful examination of the potential meanings of recognition, Jones adopts a notion of recognition that he sees as consistent with ‘those who call for ‘recognition’ in relation to identity’, describing it as ‘accord[ing] some sort of positive value to whoever or whatever is recognised. Typically it entails an acceptance or an attribution of standing’; Jones (2006a), p. 128. 82 Chapter 1 citizenship, we may then believe we should respect their Islamic beliefs and identity. Because it matters to them, we decide it will matter to us. Or to put it another way, our respect for their sameness leads us to respect their difference. With mediated respect, specific respect comes through a prior and more general form of respect. This opens up the possibility of actually respecting a difference despite having a negative view of it. Clearly, mediated respect offers a potential pathway that enables specific differences to be respected. But does it necessarily follow that respect of sameness will lead to respect of difference? At one point Jones goes as far as to say, ‘respecting you as a person requires that I respect the identity that you embrace,’56 but this seems an unnecessary overstatement of his position. All he needs to say is that respecting you as a person (or citizen) means that one has a strong, but not sufficient, reason to respect the identity you embrace, and that this reason is significantly stronger than the reason to respect your identity directly. While mediated respect could significantly increase the range of differences that are respected when contrasted with direct respect of difference, it could not mean that all identities or differences are automatically respected by respecting their holders. Some identities may be beyond the bounds of the tolerable and as such there can be no question of these identities being respectable in a liberal polity. 56 Jones (2006a), p. 139. Respect relationships in diverse societies 83 In a diverse society, mediated respect seems very important if the aim is respect of difference, and it does initially seem to avoid some of the problems of direct respect of difference.57 But once again it needs to be asked, just who is the ‘we’ who should do the respecting? If it is the state that uses this process of mediation, this seems a reasonably useful idea. The state will respect the citizenship of its citizens, and can use this respect to then respect their specific identities. Mediated respect could also be used as motivation for expanding the boundaries of state policies of toleration. The state could use this process of mediation to expand the possible range of differences that it permits. Yet despite the greater moral strength of mediated respect of difference from the state when compared to direct respect of difference, some very similar issues will arise. Even though this respect of difference is mediated, it still remains nonetheless a form of respect of difference. As such, most of the same problems remain, such as the potential entrenchment and construction of politically motivated identities, as well the practical issues involved in keeping up with changing and multiple identities and respecting the individuals that hold them appropriately. Once again it needs to be remembered that the respecting of the constituent elements of diversity can lead to the 57 While Jones is overt in his claim for mediation of difference through respect of sameness, his approach has similarities to other liberal arguments for respecting difference which also use respect for a general category as a justification for respecting difference; for example, Kymlicka’s (1995) respect of difference because of respect of autonomy, or Tamir’s (1993) respect of difference premised on an individual ‘right to culture’. The main and important difference with Jones seems to be a continual emphasis on the category of sameness while still respecting difference. 84 Chapter 1 fixing of these elements, and that this may then show a lack of appropriate respect to some of the holders of these differences. Does mediated respect offer a better solution when it comes to inter-citizen respect of difference? It does seem to weaken the issue of freedom of conscience and open up the possibility of holders of at least partially conflicting values being able to respect each others’ differences. Because the conflicting values need not directly confront each other, but can do so through a shared status of citizenship, then this should increase the range of differences and their holders that could actually mutually respect each other. Nevertheless, it seems there may still be a problem for the holders of strongly conflicting values, which even if mediated will not be respectable to one another. On the positive side, mediated respect does take people’s differences more seriously by providing a mediated pathway that allows respect for both the differences of the respecting agent and those of the respected agent. Even so, mediated respect still has the potential to narrow the range of difference that can exist in a diverse society in the same way as direct inter-citizen respect of difference, although to a significantly lesser extent. This is because some differences, even if mediated, will still not be respectable despite being within the bounds of the tolerable. While these are questions about the potential workings of mediated respect between citizens, to what extent is this a concept that citizens could in fact use? Mediated respect between citizens seems to invite statements along the lines of, ‘I recognise your practices have value for you and respect their worth, even though they have no value for me, and may even not be good practices for you’. Yet it seems this sort of Respect relationships in diverse societies 85 statement can only really come from a very ‘multiculturalised’ citizen. Despite mediated respect being a moral possibility from a state towards its citizens, this does not seem to be something that can realistically be demanded of citizens – the radically multiculturalised citizen is surely an exception, even though he or she might be the ideal citizen for many.58 Not all citizens can be asked to undertake this form of respect – some might really believe the practices are actually doing harm. Mediated respect makes more sense as a state rather than inter-citizen practice where the issue of conscience is not so significant. Conclusion: mediation for accommodation A liberal state should allow the greatest possible accommodation of difference consistent with the viability of the state and the implementation of its principles of justice. I have argued in this chapter that respect of difference may not lead to the greatest possible accommodation of difference. However, what I have not yet made clear is how respect of sameness can instead lead to a greater accommodation of 58 One version of this type of citizen is Jeremy Waldron’s cosmopolitan citizen who is described as ‘liv[ing] in San Francisco…of Irish Catholic ancestry …[where]...he learns Spanish, eats Chinese, wears clothes made in Korea, listens to arias sung by a Maori princess on Japanese equipment, follows Ukrainian politics, and practices Buddhist meditation techniques’. Waldron’s cosmopolitan position is that while ‘we need culture, we do not need cultural integrity’; Jeremy Waldron, ‘Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative’, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 25 (1992) 751-93, pp. 754, 786. However, unlike the ideal multicultural citizen who is full of respect for other cultures as they are important for their holders, Waldron’s cosmopolitan is much more interested in how these other cultures are good for him/herself. I thank Katherine Curchin for pointing out this difference. 86 Chapter 1 difference. In my discussion of mediation, I have been talking about mediated respect involving both a general and then a specific sense of respect. But it is quite conceivable that respect in the general sense of citizenship might only imply the potential indifference or forbearance tolerance of the difference in question, both of which can then lead to accommodation. Instead of respect-then-respect, we have respect-then-tolerate or respect-then-be indifferent. All three of these relational values can lead to accommodation through this process of mediation. Of course, mediation may not always lead to accommodation; the state may respect an individual as a citizen, yet legitimately refuse to tolerate their particular difference because of the harm it may cause. Nevertheless, on behalf of the state, mediation through respect of sameness should lead to greater and more coherent accommodation than direct respect of difference. Another way of putting this is that respect of sameness implies toleration in the generally permissive sense (but not necessarily in the forbearance sense) and thus allows a high degree of accommodation of difference. For the individual citizen, mediation through respect of sameness provides a strong reason to then tolerate (forbear) or be indifferent to specific differences. The citizen must simply recognise a sameness and with it a bundle of citizenship rights in a bearer of difference. Whether they then have a relationship of respect, forbearance tolerance or indifference to the particular difference is then entirely a matter of individual choice. All three options offer a pathway to accommodation of the difference and its bearer. As far as policy goes, this then suggests that states could achieve greater accommodation of difference by stressing respect of sameness Respect relationships in diverse societies 87 amongst citizens, albeit a thin or civic notion of sameness, rather than respect of difference. To conclude, a proper understanding of respect relationships requires the maintenance of a distinction between respect of sameness and respect of difference, as well as between the two potential agents of respect, the state and the citizen. Such an approach highlights the importance of respect of sameness and the serious problems of respect of difference. Using citizenship to mediate respect of difference does make respect of difference less problematic, but only to a degree. If the aim is to allow the expression and existence of individual difference in a liberal society, then this process of mediation can be used as a motivation and justification for the greater accommodation of this difference, whether this be from the state or between citizens. Respect of sameness must have priority over respect of difference. It is a strong, yet thin concept with an important pedigree which is best conceptualised as a bunch of basic liberal citizenship rights. Chapter 2 Respecting each others’ differences Respect is a fundamental liberal demand. The liberal state should, in Dworkin’s phrase, treat its citizens with equal concern and respect, and the citizens should, if they are to avoid committing moral wrongs, respect the personhood of their fellow citizens. Yet as I argued in the previous chapter, when it comes to issues of diversity, there is an ambiguity regarding whether the mandated respect concerns difference or sameness. The other ambiguity I raised in the previous chapter concerns whether the state or the citizen is the agent of respect. This ambiguity is not insignificant. After all, what may legitimately be asked of the state is of a very different order to what may legitimately be asked of the individual citizen. While there has been substantial theoretical debate over whether the state should respect difference (or at least over whether ‘we’ should),1 less has explicitly been said about the individual’s role in 1 For some examples of those who favour this type of respect of difference, see: Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Joseph Raz, ‘Multiculturalism’, Dissent Winter (1994) 67-79; Charles Taylor, ‘The Politics of Recognition’, in A. Gutman (ed.), Multiculturalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Monique Deveaux, Cultural Pluralism and Dilemmas of Justice (Ithaca, NJ: Cornell University Press, 2000); Respecting each others’ differences 89 respect of difference. At the same time, as I will soon outline, multicultural policies have increasingly emphasised the importance of individual citizens in the accommodation and respect of difference. In this chapter I want to address this gap, and focus on respect of difference among citizens. Struggles for multicultural recognition and/or accommodation provide an interesting example of a move from initially making demands on the state, to making, or at least accepting, greater demands on the citizen. Calls for respect of difference have historically been primarily directed at the state, whether implicitly or explicitly. These calls typically include: cultural rights claims, seeking of exemptions to existing laws, public acknowledgements of worth, and degrees of self-determination. These types of claims involve asking the state to take some action as a form of showing appropriate respect. In many western countries, while some of these types of claims have been met, drawing on at least the Australian and British experience, many have not. Instead state policy responses to diversity have increasingly focussed on citizen-citizen relations, and less so on state-citizen relations (with a few notable exceptions). This is particularly the case in relation to respect, and a large part of these governments’ diversity policies are aimed squarely at encouraging respectful relations among and Bhikhu Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory (London: Palgrave, 2000). For examples of those who do not favour respect of difference see: Barry, Brian, Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism (Cambridge: Polity, 2001); Chandran Kukathas, ‘Liberalism and Multiculturalism: The Politics of Indifference’, Political Theory 26/5 (1998) 686-699; and Chandran Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 90 Chapter 2 citizens. At least as far as governments are concerned, respect in relation to difference seems to have become more of a community relations issue, than a state-citizen issue. A good example of this change in onus from the state to the citizen can be found in the changes in Australian multicultural policy over the last decade or so of the twentieth century. While in 1989 the Hawke Labor Government’s main policy document, The National Agenda, emphasised cultural rights (of individuals), that is, things the state primarily ought to do, by 1999 the Howard Coalition Government’s replacement, A New Agenda, placed much more emphasis on individual duties rather than cultural rights.2 The importance of the obligations of individual Australians both towards the state and towards each other was now foregrounded, and the things the state should do received significantly less emphasis. This new policy made it clear that in order to receive rights (both those of citizenship and of culture) citizens had a responsibility both back to the state (‘civic duty’ was now the first principle), and also to each other (the second principle directly linked the acceptance of rights with the obligation to accept the rights of others).3 The 2003 policy merely reaffirmed and 2 Geoffrey Brahm Levey, ‘The Political Theories of Australian Multiculturalism’, The University of New South Wales Law Journal 24/3 (2001) 869-881. See also Office of Multicultural Affairs, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia (Canberra: Office of Multicultural Affairs, 1989), and Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, A New Agenda for Multicultural Australia (Canberra: Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, 1999). 3 The four principles of Australian multiculturalism in A New Agenda read: Respecting each others’ differences 91 strengthened this shifting of onus onto the citizenry, with the first principle now called ‘responsibilities for all’.4 This continued in subsequent policy and public statements by the Howard Government, where the main focus was been continually on community ‘harmony’ – that is, the relationships among citizens and how they ought to behave toward each other – and anything to do with cultural rights and other claims on the state was correspondingly downplayed. civic duty – which obliges all Australians to support those basic structures and principles of Australian society which guarantee us our freedom and equality and enable diversity in our society to flourish; cultural respect – which, subject to the law, gives all Australians the right to express their own culture and beliefs and obliges them to accept the right of others to do the same; social equity – which entitles all Australians to equality of treatment and opportunity so that they are able to contribute to the social, political and economic life of Australia, free from discrimination, including on the grounds of race, culture, religion, language, location, gender or place of birth; and productive diversity – which maximises for all Australians the significant cultural, social and economic dividends arising from the diversity of our population; Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999), p, 6. 4 In full, the first principle read: ‘responsibilities of all – all Australians have a civic duty to support those basic structures and principles of Australian society which guarantee us our freedom and equality and enable diversity in our society to flourish’; Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, Multicultural Australia: United in Diversity (Canberra: Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs 2003), p. 6. 92 Chapter 2 Australia is not unique here. In Britain, particularly after the Oldham and Bradford riots of 2001 and the subsequent Cantle Report,5 the concept of ‘community cohesion’ has become a key focus. British multicultural policies moved from what was previously more of a rights and representation agenda (as a response to the race riots in the 1980s, amongst other things) towards a very strong and overriding emphasis on community relations, and with it the responsibilities of ‘active citizenship’.6 As the Australian and British experiences indicate, the role of the citizen has come to be seen as of prime importance in government policies that deal with the successful accommodation of diversity. Yet how much can legitimately be asked of the individual citizen? Within this shifting of onus to the citizenry, both laws and policy prescriptions have, in some jurisdictions, also called for citizen-citizen respect of difference, or, given the vagaries of policy language, something that sounds remarkably like it. For example, in the Australian State of New South Wales, the 5 Home Office, Community Cohesion: A Report of the Independent Review Team, Chaired by Ted Cantle (London: Home Office, 2001). 6 See: Jonathan Burnett, ‘Community, Cohesion and the State’, Race & Class 45/3 (2004) 1-18; Paul Thomas, ‘Moving on from ‘Anti-Racism’? Understandings of ‘Community Cohesion’ held by Youth Workers’, Journal of Social Policy 36/3 (2007) 435-455; Arun Kundnani, ‘The Death of Multiculturalism’, Institute of Race Relations April (2002) Strengthening Society: The Government’s strategy to increase race equality and community cohesion (London: Home Office, 2005). Respecting each others’ differences 93 Community Relations Commission and Principles of Multiculturalism Act 2000 reads: ‘All individuals and institutions should respect and make provision for the culture, language and religion of others within an Australian legal and institutional framework where English is the common language.’7 While in Canada, the ‘Federal Immigrant Integration Strategy’ has been defined as: ‘Newcomers are expected to understand and respect basic Canadian values, and Canadians are expected to understand and respect the cultural differences newcomers bring to Canada.’8 Finally, calls for what amounts to citizen-citizen respect of difference can also be found among theorists. James Tully, for example, uses the importance of correct identity recognition to argue that such an obligation would be justified: ‘…the condition of self-respect is met only in a society in which the cultures of all others are recognised and affirmed by others, both those who do and those who do not share those cultures.’ 9 7 Community Relations Commission and Principles of Multiculturalism Act 2000 (NSW), Part 1, Section 3, Principle 2. 8 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Immigrant Integration in Canada: Policy Objectives, Program Delivery and Challenges, May 16, 2001, p. 4, available at Hauck_May01.pdf>. 9 James Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 190. Likewise, Joseph Raz, using a different type of justification (that individual freedom and wellbeing depend on being a member of a respected and prosperous cultural group), writes: ‘multiculturalism insists that members of different groups should appreciate and respect the other cultures in their society’; Joseph Raz, ‘Multiculturalism’, Dissent Winter (1994) 67-79, pp. 72, 73. Although, in a revision of the same article, this quoted passage reads much more cautiously: ‘multiculturalism insists that members of the different groups in a society should be aware of the 94 Chapter 2 In this chapter, I will examine the strength, possibility and potential consequences of this sort of demand on the individual citizen in detail, going beyond the brief discussion in the previous chapter. I will argue that respecting difference among citizens is not possible in any meaningful sense. By this I do not mean that it is never possible (there are plenty of examples of respect of difference in practice), but that such respect is not possible when it seems to matter most, that is, when real differences are involved. Moreover, there is a serious disconnect between respect of difference and the accommodation of difference. Accommodating difference does not require respect of difference; nor does respect of difference necessarily lead to the adequate accommodation of difference. I will first examine the potential of any inter- citizen demand to respect difference, before then examining the weaker demand that respect of difference should simply be encouraged where possible. I will conclude that citizens do not have any obligation to respect each others’ differences and, further, there are good reasons why they should not even be encouraged to do so. I will argue, however, that individual citizens do still have an obligation to tolerate each others’ differences (arising out of respect of sameness), and that this is an obligation that should certainly be encouraged in policy terms. My discussion will proceed as follows. In the next section, I re-introduce Darwall’s distinction between appraisal and recognition respect, and argue that neither way of different cultures in their society, and learn to appreciate their strengths and respect them’; Joseph Raz, ‘Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective’, in his, Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994),155-176, p. 166. Respecting each others’ differences 95 respecting is able to fulfil a demand that citizens respect each others’ differences. I then briefly question the scope of Darwall’s distinction and suggest some modifications for it to have relevance beyond Kantian-type respect-of-persons situations. Yet even with these modifications, there is still no conception of respect that can satisfy a demand to respect difference. As this exhausts the most relevant conceptions of respect, this demand cannot be legitimate. Finally, I examine, and ultimately reject, a potential overriding consideration: that despite its problems, respect of difference (in some form) should still be encouraged amongst citizens as a tool for building and maintaining a tolerant society. Respect revisited For respecting difference among citizens to be a valid principle of political morality, it must have a morally compelling justification as well as be possible in a morally appropriate way. In the previous chapter I listed several justifications that can be adduced in support of respect of difference. Significantly, these justifications primarily speak to the state rather than to the citizen. Arguments from individual welfare, for example, are mainly aimed at the state rather than the citizen, and arguments for the importance of a ‘societal culture’ and the like, are squarely aimed at the state as it is the only agent that can act to protect and promote them. Likewise, identity recognition arguments are primarily concerned with the state’s privileging of majority culture/s and failing sufficiently to recognise other identities. Indeed, as I have argued, any argument that it is individuals who need to recognise identities is close to self-defeating, unless it is somehow assumed all identities are entirely 96 Chapter 2 commensurate. A legitimate justification for state action cannot automatically be considered a legitimate justification for individual action. And even where a justification may be relevant, it will commonly be a substantially weaker reason for citizen action than for state action. So while I am sceptical of the possibility of there being a morally sufficient reason for individual citizens to respect difference, I want to leave aside this question of justification. For respect of difference amongst citizens to be a feasible demand there must also exist a morally appropriate way of respecting difference amongst a citizenry, and it is to ways of respecting I now turn. In Chapter 1, after a brief discussion of Darwall’s distinction between recognition and appraisal forms of respect, I settled on a definition of respect that focussed on holding an object as sufficiently worthy. However, in order to examine the possibility of citizen-citizen respect of difference more thoroughly in this chapter, I want to return to Darwall’s more precise formulations and see whether they offer possible ways of respecting difference in this domain. In so doing I have two aims. The first, and most important, is to show that no formulation of respect can be invoked to make citizen-citizen respect of difference a moral imperative in a diverse liberal society, and further that some forms of respect may even risk undermining accommodation. The second, more general aim, is to shed more light on what it is to actually respect something, and in so doing, I will raise questions as to the accuracy of Darwall’s highly influential distinction beyond paradigmatic Kantian respect-of-persons situations. Respecting each others’ differences 97 Recall that Darwall distinguishes between two notions of respect.10 The first is ‘appraisal respect’, which is essentially a merit based way of respecting. It involves respecting something as a ‘good’ thing, for example, the way someone might respect musical ability. Here the respect is of a particular characteristic of a musician (their ability), it is primarily an attitude, and it easily admits degrees. You can respect one musician more than another in the same sense. ‘Recognition respect’, on the other hand, is of roles or status; for example, respect of persons or of a judge in a court of law. It is respect of the status of that somebody or thing, and involves taking that status into consideration when deciding how to act. Darwall gives its general character as ‘the disposition to weigh appropriately some feature or fact in one’s deliberations’. Recognition respect always involves behavioural decisions whereas in examples of appraisal respect this does not have to be the case, and appraisal respect can simply remain an attitude. I will return to recognition respect and flesh out more of its features later, but at this stage this description should suffice.11 I have set out the main characteristics of this distinction in Table 2.1. 10 Stephen L. Darwall, ‘Two Kinds of Respect’, Ethics 88/1 (1977) 36-49. 11 It should be noted that these are not the only possible forms of respect. Robin Dillon, for example, introduces the notion of ‘care-respect’, which comes out of a feminist ethics of care, and is exemplified in an environmentalist’s deep respect for nature; Robin S. Dillon, ‘Respect and Care: Toward Moral Integration’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (1992) 105-132. I will not examine this way of respecting difference as it would clearly be too strong to be a legitimate possibility, and will also succumb to many of the criticisms I will make of appraisal respect in this domain. 98 Chapter 2 Table 2.1: Darwall’s two types of respect • Merit based (respect as a ‘good’ thing) • Of characteristics (e.g. musical ability) Appraisal Respect • Attitudinal • Admits degrees • Of roles or status (e.g. persons or a judge) • ‘the disposition to weigh appropriately some feature or Recognition Respect fact in one’s deliberations’ • Behavioural Before examining whether either of Darwall’s two types of respect can be considered possible ways of respecting differences among individual citizens, I would like to introduce three examples: Example 1: Dinner party with known vegetarian You invite several guests for dinner in your home, one of whom you know to be a strict vegetarian. Example 2: Dinner party with surprise vegetarian (a) You invite several guests for dinner in your home, only when they arrive do you learn that one of them is a strict vegetarian. (b) One of your guests decides between the soup and the main course that they will from that moment on be a strict vegetarian. Respecting each others’ differences 99 Example 3: Impromptu dinner with vegetarian You are in a house cooking dinner, there are several other people in the house, you know they are hungry, and since you have plenty of food, you do not mind if they eat some too. You know one of them is a strict vegetarian. In all three examples the ‘default’ meal is entirely meat based, that is, there are no vegetarian options. I will assume that the vegetarians in these examples are motivated by either ethical or religious concerns – that is, they really believe that eating animal flesh is morally wrong. It is an important issue of conscience for them. This leads to what seems an entirely reasonable assumption: that being this type of vegetarian is a legitimate difference, and if differences are to be respected this sort of difference should qualify. Finally, no one will die or suffer any permanent injury if they do not eat during the course of these examples. Appraisal respect of difference If ever there were a case for respecting somebody’s vegetarianism, then it must involve the first example. The person was both invited for dinner and their particular dietary habits were known beforehand. As such, there seems a very strong case for recognition respecting their vegetarianism; that is, providing food that is appropriate for them to eat. But even in this case there is clearly no obligation to have appraisal respect for their vegetarianism, you do not have to think it is a good thing, and you could quite rightly think that their vegetarianism was both wrong and particularly annoying for you (even, or especially, while preparing a separate vegetarian meal for 100 Chapter 2 them). This demonstrates the first serious – and quite obvious – problem with appraisal respect: there can be no legitimate demand on an individual citizen to think other people’s differences are meritorious. This would be a clear and straightforward violation of freedom of conscience. Importantly, it can also be seen here that a difference (in this case vegetarianism) can be accommodated without it needing to be seen as at all meritorious. These points are enough to show that appraisal respect of difference is neither a legitimate possibility for respect of differences among individuals, nor is it necessary for accommodation of difference. It cannot be demanded of anybody; nor does it need to be to warrant accommodation. Nevertheless, I want to continue to explore appraisal respect as a way of respecting to show that not only is it problematic as a way of respecting difference (and is unnecessary for the accommodation of difference), but that it also poorly serves those whose differences are commonly the objects of appraisal respect exercises. In other words, appraisal respect of difference is problematic for both the respecter and the respectee. Appraisal respect is common in policies such as multicultural festivals and other activities that aim at providing appreciation and understanding of each others’ unique difference. Here diversity is commonly promoted as a good thing, and an effort to fight discrimination is made by showing the positive effects of difference. Appraisal respect is being at least partly used here as a tool to achieve, or at least encourage, appropriate behaviour. Yet despite its apparent appeal and popularity, there are four Respecting each others’ differences 101 main problems with it as a basis for the accommodation of differences, and more seriously, that show it has the potential to seriously undermine the achievement of the much more fundamental recognition respect of persons, as well as any possible recognition respect of particular differences. First, appraisal respect is contingent. It may be easy to encourage, but it is also easy to lose. Appraisal respect may seem a tempting path to take in order to achieve the greater accommodation of difference. Because the sorts of reasons that lead to appraisal respect can appear very tangible, it may seem easier to encourage in at least some citizens. It can be encouraged through the highlighting of positive virtues, both moral and non-moral. To give some examples: ‘you should respect Muslims, they are [morally] good people’; ‘you should respect the Chinese, their food is excellent’; and ‘you should respect immigrants, they are good for the country’. Unfortunately however, this sort of approach may leave those who are the object of such types of respect exercises high and dry when it is shown, for example, that not all Muslims are morally good, Chinese food is no longer fashionable, or immigrants are found not necessarily to be good for the country. Second, appraisal respect can confuse liking or enjoying with respecting. It sometimes seems to be thought that if different people get to like each others’ differences then they will respect each other. One reason this is problematic, despite the already stated problem that tastes change, is that appraisal respect applies to particulars. Thus we might like an aspect of somebody very much, yet not respect 102 Chapter 2 them either as a whole, or in the sense that is actually important to them. For example, an individual might really like Islamic Mosques, think they are very beautiful, perhaps even think that wearing the hijab is a good and respectable thing, but may not respect Islamic religious beliefs at all. Third, appraisal respect allows degrees and comparisons which further erodes the possibility of sustained accommodation. For example, one’s respect for a singer may wane after a bad performance, or may simply be less than that for another singer, whom you think is better. This aspect of appraisal respect means it cannot be a foundational way of respecting if what is aimed for is some type of equal and sustained accommodation of differences. Finally, the connection between appraisal respect and accommodating behaviour is particularly weak. It might be thought that, despite its problems, appraisal respect could at least act as a sweetener or teaser to get people to behave appropriately towards each other. Yet appraisal respect and recognition respect involve very different sorts of attitude: appraising or evaluating versus ‘weighing appropriately some feature or fact in one’s deliberations’. Subsequently, there is no clear link to behaviour coming out of appraisal respect. Someone may say, for example; ‘I think it’s great you’re a vegetarian, I really respect your moral commitment and your belief, but we’re eating meat tonight’. In cases of appraisal respect the decision to act is a separate one, unlike recognition respect where respect occurs during the decision to act. Even if appraisal respect provides sufficient extra motivation to accommodate a Respecting each others’ differences 103 difference on one occasion, it may well not on the next. Indeed, because it is contingent, is of particulars, and easily allows degrees and comparisons, we need to be particularly wary of using appraisal respect as a motivation for any sustained accommodation. The very things that lead to appropriate accommodation in the short term may undermine it in the longer term, and as such any argument that appraisal respect could somehow shore up or lead to recognition respect should be treated with suspicion. Appraisal respect should neither be demanded of citizens, nor have a significant role as way of respecting differences. Despite its surface appeal, appraisal respect should be used very sparingly, if at all, in government programs that aim to achieve a greater accommodation of difference – particularly if, as I will argue, there are better ways to achieve the accommodation of difference. This means we are left with the concept of recognition respect. To many who call for respect of difference, this may seem to be quite a loss. It may seem a much weaker demand that respect simply involve the ‘weighing appropriately some feature or fact in one’s deliberations’, and not actually thinking that the difference is a good or likeable thing – there is nothing in recognition respect that requires a positive attitude at all. For example, one can ‘weigh appropriately’ the fact that the river you are trying to cross has a dangerous set of rapids. You can hate that fact yet still respect it, that is, behave in ways that display this respect such as by using a safety rope. 104 Chapter 2 Recognition respect of difference Social examples of recognition respect involve a socially recognised code of deportment.12 That is, not only is the role/status somehow socially recognised, but the behaviour that follows is also of a socially recognised character. A paradigm case, respecting a judge in a court of law, involves acting in a socially appropriate way irrespective of attitude. In this case an individual may actually think the judge is not respect-worthy and that the institution is also not respect-worthy. Yet perhaps out of fear of going to jail, they still could be said to have been respectful in court by following the appropriate behavioural conventions such as standing when the judge walked in. While it may seem that I have introduced a distinction between showing and having respect, recognition respect does not divide in this way so neatly. Leaving aside the potential to unintentionally show respect (for example, providing a variety of main courses, one of which just happens to be vegetarian), the focus should be on the intention to respect as well as the reasons for this intention to respect. The reasons for respecting help motivate an agent to weigh appropriately, and these can range from believing something is of a worthy enough status to respect, to being afraid of the consequences of not respecting it, such as going to jail or drowning. The idea of 12 This is Stephen D. Hudson’s description of ‘institutional respect’, which is effectively a more narrowly defined form of recognition respect. The other part of recognition respect he calls ‘obstacle respect’ of which respecting the rapids is an example; Stephen D. Hudson, ‘The Nature of Respect’, Social Theory and Practice 6/1 (1980) 69-90, p. 76. Respecting each others’ differences 105 having or not having respect (partly)13 fits in here, and the way this distinction is drawn will depend on what type of reasons are deemed sufficient so that one can be said to ‘have respect’: Does the person who only behaves respectfully to the judge because of fear of jail ‘have respect’? Or, is this only reserved for those who believe the judge and the institution she represents are actually respect worthy? While a virtue ethicist may want to say that only the second person ‘has respect’, and that this is true respect,14 if the ultimate concern is with the political and social relationships that occur among citizens, outcomes will be of significantly more importance than motivating reasons. As such, in discussing recognition respect of difference I will primarily use an outcome model of ‘having respect’, rather than the stronger, more moral notion of ‘having respect’.15 Towards the end of this section I will return to the issue of intention and highlight its import. When it comes to respecting difference, recognition respect opens up two possibilities: (i) The first possibility is to ascribe a particular status to particular differences. Just as policemen, for example, have a particular status, and to respect them as policemen is 13 The other part is, of course, outcome related. 14 This would be consistent with the Kantian view that one should act out of duty and not pretence of duty. 15 It may be noticed that the beginnings of a potential collapse of Darwall’s distinction are appearing; namely, that recognition respect must involve some sort of appraisal as well. I will deal with this issue in next section, and show that while problematic, it is not the total collapse it may appear to be. 106 Chapter 2 bounded by particular forms of behaviour, so too it could be decided that particular differences also have a status, and those who display these differences should be respected (considered in action) in a particular way. The importance of the status of certain differences could be enculturated as well as the appropriate behaviour that should then follow. This means that one way of getting our vegetarians fed would be to infer a particular status onto ‘vegetarian’ and then have socially recognised behaviour that would follow. This approach may initially appear feasible as a way of respecting difference, and the fact that there are a variety of roles in society that receive this sort of respect suggests that it may be possible to introduce new status conventions that could actually become respected. However, this is not an ideal solution to the problems of accommodation. It immediately invites the question of how to decide exactly who should gain this status: major cultural groups? most cultural groups? vegetarians? And even if the question of to whom to give the statuses could be somehow settled, because this way of respecting involves an institutional-style response – you’re like X, we will treat you like X – there appears to be little room for flexibility within a particular status. Differences typically are not like roles, they are much more fluid and of course ‘hybrid’. As I have previously discussed, particular differences have further differences within, and to treat one person a certain way may well be disrespectful to the next who displays the same apparent difference. To give just one behavioural example: is a man opening or not opening the door for a woman more respectful of the status ‘woman’? This type of approach to respect may end up with Respecting each others’ differences 107 the problem of treating a person as their obvious difference, that is, assuming that they should be respected in this way, when in fact they may simply want to be treated ‘normally’. Moreover, any move to solve the problem of variety and hybridity of difference by adding new statuses and changing existing ones would soon seem to fail as it would not be possible for the individual citizen to keep up with whom to respect and how. Even being a vegetarian is not that clear cut; it is a general position – indeed I once met a ‘vegetarian’ who ate steak! Two further points may be made here. First, even if appropriate statuses could be decided, this recognition respect approach to difference would represent an enormous social engineering project, which seems to be both an unjustified overstepping of the mark and a rather convoluted way of achieving a goal. And second, any temptation to widen the status to the point that it is simply ‘those that are different to you’ would render the idea meaningless. If the citizen should simply behave in a particular way to those who are different to them, then either the idea does not have any useful content, or we should instead be talking about the status of ‘person’. This leads to the second possible way of recognition respecting difference: using the status of ‘person’ or ‘citizen’. (ii) In this possibility of recognition respecting difference, it is the general status itself that entails respect of specific difference. This can be a deep and personalised form of respect-of-persons. If there is a moral duty to respect each other as persons in general, and if this type of respect entails respecting a person’s specific difference, then 108 Chapter 2 respecting difference could certainly be a legitimate moral demand among citizens. This demand could even be made stronger because it is not all persons (despite that being its potential base), but fellow citizens. A special relationship is already established.16 This is recognition respect for persons, or more precisely citizens, entailing respect for their differences. In the first two vegetarian examples, the reason there appears to be an obligation to provide food (or at least attempt to provide food in Example 2) is that the vegetarians in the examples have a particular status, ‘invited dinner guest’, which means a level of respect different to Example 3 where they are an ‘uninvited dinner guest’. It is this status that dictates the depth of respect of their specific difference. Yet we only need to turn to Example 2, ‘Dinner Party with Surprise Vegetarian’, to see that the depth of this respect (for the invited dinner guest) has boundaries. If a guest’s dietary habits were not known about, or they change unexpectedly (Example 16 I should acknowledge that I am putting aside the strict moral cosmopolitanism position here, and assuming that there are greater duties to fellow citizens than to other individuals, but importantly, not that there are no duties to non-citizens, or that they are not particularly demanding. For the strict moral cosmopolitan position see, for example: Peter Unger, Living High and Letting Die: Our Illusion of Innocence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); Peter Singer, One World: The Ethics of Globalization (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002); and Onora O'Neill, Bounds of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). For the opposite, communitarian view see, for example, Alasdair MacIntyre, ‘Is Patriotism a Virtue?’, in R. Beiner (ed.), Theorizing Citizenship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), 209-228. Respecting each others’ differences 109 2b), then even though there may still be some obligation to attempt to feed them because they are our guest, clearly this obligation is significantly weaker than in Example 1, where their vegetarianism was known about beforehand. Respect of specific difference coming out of respect for a status cannot ‘go all the way’, and it must be weighed against at least three other considerations: those of a moral nature, those of a practical nature, and those that address the capability of the respecting agent. On the moral front, this type of respect cannot require any corresponding attitude, since to do so would risk a violation of freedom of conscience. As I stated in the previous chapter, particular differences can often involve conflicting values (the example I gave was a Catholic priest and an abortion activist), and it is precisely in these sort of cases – that is, where there are serious risks to successful accommodation – that respect of difference must be able to operate for it to have any meaningful content. Despite recognition respect primarily being an issue of behaviour, care must be taken at its intersection with appraisal respect, that is, requiring that the particular difference is worthy of recognition respect. Because of its potential to be too morally onerous, any strong notion of ‘having respect’ (where you believe the object actually to be respectable) cannot apply, and only the weaker outcome/behavioural notion remains. Yet even this weaker notion of ‘having respect’ has the potential to be too morally onerous because the behaviour required by some respect actions may also be too morally demanding. Examples here may include 110 Chapter 2 having to kiss the ring of a priest, having to provide meat when you are a vegetarian or alcohol when you are a teetotaller. This potential to be overly morally onerous in both attitude and behaviour suggests that this idea has a central inconsistency. If respecting persons creates a demand to respect their differences, then this very demand has the potential to be dis-respecting of persons at the same time. That is, the very demand for a citizen to respect difference may well be dis-respecting of their own differences, and thus, on this reasoning, of their personhood. Because not all differences are compatible – despite being within the bounds of what should be tolerable – not all holders of difference can respect each others’ differences in either an appraisal or a recognition sense. Indeed, if all the holders of difference in a particular liberal society could somehow respect each others’ differences, then the range of differences would be very small and not very different at all; in fact, it would seem entirely erroneous to call such a society ‘diverse’. As the dinner party examples show, another important consideration is practical. The more practically onerous on the individual to respect the difference, the more it ceases to be legitimate demand. In Example 2, if feeding the vegetarian involved little or no extra effort – for example, if there were suitable left-overs in the fridge, then it seems they should be fed, but having to drive half an hour to the shops would significantly change the equation. Respecting each others’ differences 111 Finally, the issue of an agent’s capacity to show respect needs to be taken into consideration. Examining this consideration will also shed more light on the nature of recognition respect itself. Recall that recognition respect is the weighing appropriately of some feature or fact in one’s deliberations (when considering how to act). But what happens if despite an intention to respect, this weighing process fails to deliver behaviour which may be considered respectful? This could occur in at least two different ways. First, there is the possibility of dispute over what ‘appropriately’ means, which could include both how a particular difference should be weighed against other considerations, and how its status should be ranked in relation to the status of other differences. Second, an intention to respect may not always lead to an appropriate show of respect, either trivially because of some sort of distraction, or more seriously through an inability to actually grasp a particular difference and the appropriate behaviour that should follow. For example, a dining room chef at University College London was apparently fired after he continued serving dishes such as quiche lorraine as ‘vegetarian’ meals. He was apparently unable to grasp what being a vegetarian actually entailed.17 Individuals might intend respecting an object, that is, have the right disposition, but can still fail to display appropriate behaviour, either because of (often contested) overriding considerations, or in spite of them. The degree to which respecting particular difference is considered overly demanding may well be contested, and it will not be equally burdensome on all holders of 17 This story was relayed to me by Jonathon Wolff, University College London. 112 Chapter 2 difference. But the fact that respecting difference can be overly demanding should be clear. While the overall nature of our obligations to our fellow citizens might ultimately be quite onerous, these obligations should not be contradictory. Respecting one citizen’s difference should not involve the potential disrespect of the other citizen’s personhood. And this should certainly not be the case when more reasonable means and ends are available. Respect of difference coming out of respect-of-persons can neither require respect in attitude (even a recognition respect type of attitude) for difference, nor can it mean behaviour in any deep sense. While I have argued that there is no possibility of any meaningful demand for citizens to respect each others’ differences, at this point an objection might be that the demand is simply to try to respect specific differences. But this is a very different type of demand. To have sufficient normative weight it must be feasible, and as I have shown such a demand has practical and theoretical difficulties. It is scarcely possible for the citizen to respect either directly in an appraisal or recognition sense, or indirectly through respect-of-persons, the differences they come in contact with – or at least not when it actually matters. This last point is crucial. It will always be easy to respect things you already find worthy of respect, but these cases are not what respecting each others’ differences is – or at least should be – about. If respect of difference aims to be a legitimate strategy for dealing with the real social and political problems that occur in diverse societies, then, as I have argued, it is with difficult cases that it must be able to prove itself. Respecting each others’ differences 113 Nevertheless, what does apply is a general obligation to respect the status of your fellow citizens in spite of their differences. Return to Example 2(b) and imagine that the meal is now vegetarian friendly. The morally wrong thing to do would be to say, ‘No you can’t have any. You’re a vegetarian now’. The vegetarian must still be respected as a dinner party guest despite their vegetarianism (regardless of your potentially negative attitude to vegetarians). To put this another way, a legitimate demand on individual citizens is to tolerate each others’ differences.18 Respect-of- persons generates a legitimate demand to tolerate the differences of one’s fellow citizens. This move from respect of the differences to tolerating the differences of fellow citizens both weakens and strengthens this demand. It weakens it by making it much less onerous for citizens to deal with each others’ differences. But this very move also strengthens the obligation by making it more feasible. How strong can this obligation be? The bounds of this obligation will in theory be decided by the same sort of principles used in the case of respect: that tolerating the difference is not overly morally onerous, overly practically onerous, and that the capability exists to tolerate it. When it is remembered that tolerance will occur not directly in relation to the difference, but rather will be mediated through respect-of-persons, the extent to which differences can be tolerated, and thereby accommodated, will be further enhanced. 18 Although, as I argue in Chapter 5, this demand is not relevant to all inter-citizen relations. 114 Chapter 2 A collapsed distinction? I have now shown that appraisal and recognition respect are not feasible ways of respecting difference among citizens in a diverse liberal society, and as no other plausible conception of respect exists, I have also shown that any general demand for citizens to respect each others’ differences fails.19 While appraisal and recognition respect are among the most developed and accepted conceptions of respect, one might discern two flaws in this common distinction in the discussion above. The first is the issue of degrees of respect, and the second is the process by which something becomes considered worthy of respect. In this brief section, I will argue that while neither of these flaws is ultimately lethal, Darwall’s distinction between recognition and appraisal respect needs some modification to maintain its relevance beyond Kantian-type respect-of-persons situations. Indeed, even when modified, recognition respect becomes more, rather than less, problematic as a way of respecting difference. The discussion at the end of the previous section of an agent’s capacity to respect difference introduces the possibility of degrees of recognition respect. While appraisal respect clearly admits degrees – different people’s characteristics can be respected either more or less in an evaluative sense – Darwall holds that recognition respect does not admit degrees.20 One either behaves in a morally appropriate way or 19 I make no claim to have exhausted all the possible conceptions of respect, only that I have exhausted the most plausible candidates for any demand for citizens to respect difference. 20 Darwall states that the only sense in which recognition respect can admit degrees is comparative – that is, recognition respecting one social convention more than another, but crucially, he does not allow for degrees of recognition respect of the same thing; Darwall (1977), pp. 44-46. Respecting each others’ differences 115 not. However, this depiction cannot adequately capture the example of the ex- University College London chef, who while certainly failing to act entirely appropriately, still did not knowingly serve ‘vegetarian sausages’, for example, that were made of meat. Nor at the other extreme, would it accurately describe a hypothetical chef who instead of simply offering one adequate vegetarian dish, prepared ten excellent dishes. This indicates that degrees are of some relevance to recognition respect. Nevertheless, degrees do play a different role in recognition respect than in appraisal respect. Whereas appraisal respect easily admits degrees, recognition respect is best understood as having an objective benchmark (‘adequate’ behaviour), which then allows degrees in relation to that benchmark. Making this modification to recognition respect – that is, where an intention to respect may either not entirely meet, or even exceeds, expected behaviour – more accurately captures acts involving limited capacity or limited resources as well as supererogatory acts where more respect than is strictly necessary is shown. The second potential flaw in Darwall’s distinction is the issue of how objects actually come to be deemed as ‘respect worthy’, which is of particular import for any demand to respect difference. While in Kantian respect-of-persons situations this issue is settled relatively straightforwardly, in cases involving diversity, it is not so clear cut. Recall that in cases of appraisal respect whether or not something is deemed respectable is entirely subjective – it is up to the respecter whether they find, for example, a musician’s playing good enough to be respected. In cases of recognition respect there also has to be reasons why something is worthy of respect. These 116 Chapter 2 reasons can be either entirely objective (for example, the sanctity of persons, or the dangers of a set of rapids), or much more subjective, whereby an individual themselves believes a certain feature is worthy of strongly taking into consideration when deciding how to act. The fact that recognition respect can also involve a form of appraisal appears quite problematic. In respect of difference situations, there are two basic ways an act of recognition respect may be justified. An individual may evaluate a particular difference worthy of their respect and behavioural action, or, a particular difference may have been evaluated by a third party, such as the state, as worthy of respect and appropriate behaviour. It may seem then that the only difference between these two forms of respect is that in appraisal respect one always does the appraising oneself, while in recognition respect the appraising can sometimes be done for you. But this is not the collapse it may initially appear to be. There remains a key distinction in the type of appraising that is being done. In recognition respect, something is being appraised as worthy of behavioural respect, while in appraisal respect something is being appraised as being worthy enough to have a particular kind of attitudinal (and not necessarily behavioural) respect. As such there still remains a difference between appraising something as qualitatively worthy versus demanding behavioural consideration. None of this, however, solves the more serious problem of third party appraisal of difference. One of the fundamental problems of respect of difference among citizens Respecting each others’ differences 117 is that something which should involve individual appraisal actually involves third party directives to respect. While this is not a unique situation – social statuses such as ‘policeman’ do have third party directives (with sanctions) attached to them – it is a problem for liberal politics. The reason why it is legitimate for social statuses such as ‘policeman’ or ‘judge’ to have been appraised as worthy of respect by a third party is that they are clearly necessary for maintaining and protecting individual freedom. But this is not the case with giving statuses to individual differences, where reducing some freedom cannot be justified as necessary for protecting greater freedom. Likewise, the third party appraisal that citizenship status is worthy of recognition respect is also something not done directly by us. But this is also disanalogous for two reasons. First, citizenship status is shared, and thus directing others to respect this status simply involves, in principle at least, an equally shared benefit and burden to all citizens. Second, because particular differences are by definition not something held in common, this is a substantially more intrusive demand on individual citizens. They are not, if you like, respecting themselves, but being asked to respect differences they may not deem at all respect-worthy. If all that is required is appropriate behaviour, then this can be achieved by respecting the commonality of citizenship, and the basic rights that all citizens hold. This approach has citizens (minimally)21 tolerating each others’ differences. Darwall’s distinction, particularly the definition of recognition respect, needs modification in relation to the issue of degrees and appraisal in order to still remain relevant in describing and understanding the possibility (or otherwise) of respect of difference. This exposure of a form of 21 By ‘minimally’ I mean in the forbearance sense of tolerance. 118 Chapter 2 appraisal in recognition respect makes it even less feasible as a potential way of demanding inter-citizen respect of difference. Achieving a ‘tolerant society’ I have now argued against any meaningful demand on citizens to respect difference among themselves. In this final section, I will address one potential objection in more detail. This is that while in difficult cases respect of difference may not be feasible, it may still be a good idea to promote it as a tool for the achievement and maintenance of a tolerant society; a society in which individuals are free to practise their cultures and lifestyles and not be unduly discriminated against in the public sphere (politics, housing and employment). This is certainly a legitimate policy goal, and as such, it may initially appear that despite not always being feasible, encouraging respect of difference may help realise such a society. My argument against this objection will unfold as follows: after first outlining what I see as the most plausible depiction of a ‘tolerant society’, I will then argue that inter-citizen respect of difference (as a state policy directive) is deeply problematic as a tool for achieving and maintaining such a society for several reasons. These include: that such a policy is too broad as it wrongly targets those who were never going to be intolerant, while at the same time failing to address those who are actually intolerant; that it ignores the fact that there is no necessary connection between a lack of respect and a lack of tolerance; that while proclaiming to respect difference it does not do so itself; and finally, that it places undue state-sanctioned pressure to become more respectable on those with perfectly tolerable differences. Respecting each others’ differences 119 In order to first outline what a reasonable conception of a tolerant society should entail, I want to contrast two very different understandings of the notion of ‘tolerance’. The first is based on what is almost a complete consensus view in the philosophical literature on the meaning of ‘tolerance’: x can be said to be tolerating y’s performance of z when x disapproves of y doing z, and when x has the capacity to intentionally hinder y in their performing z, and yet chooses not to.22 The second comes from UNESCO, whose Declaration of Principles on Tolerance reads: Tolerance is respect, acceptance and appreciation of the rich diversity of our world's cultures, our forms of expression and ways of being human. It is fostered by knowledge, openness, communication, and freedom of thought, conscience and belief. Tolerance is harmony in difference. It is not only a moral duty, it is also a political and legal requirement. Tolerance, the virtue that makes peace possible, contributes to the replacement of the culture of war by a culture of peace.23 22 This is a modified version of Andrew Shorten’s definition; Andrew Shorten, ‘Toleration and Cultural Controversies’, Res Publica 11 (2005) 275-99, p. 280. I discuss the two modifications I have made in Chapter 4. 23 UNESCO, Declaration of Principles on Tolerance, Proclaimed and Signed by the Member States of UNESCO on 16 November 1995. 120 Chapter 2 We have here, then, one view which sees tolerance as a type of forbearance, of putting up with things you disapprove of despite having the power to negatively interfere, and another, which sees tolerance as something much more than simply not interfering with things you believe to be repugnant or problematic, but much more positively, embracing and appreciating these very things. When it comes to the adjective ‘tolerant’ in tolerant society, both of these meanings of tolerance will have limited application. The first meaning of ‘tolerant’, that of forbearance towards difference, can only capture some instances, and probably very few, of how citizens both will and should relate to each other. Many differences between citizens will be quite unremarkable, and will simply be objects of indifference – things such as hobbies, whether somebody enjoys stamp collecting, model trains or bushwalking, provide good examples here. And there is no good reason to think these sorts of things should be anything more than objects of indifference. Other sorts of differences may well be the objects of respect and appreciation – one thinks here of the way food now is treated by many people in immigrant societies. And finally, there will be differences that will need to be the objects of forbearance tolerance – things that often fall into this category are ideologies, religious beliefs, customs, and clothing. Even the most free, peaceful and equal (in substantive opportunities) societies will have instances of all three types of attitude (indifference, appreciation respect, and forbearance tolerance) displayed by its citizens towards their fellow citizens, and the instances of tolerance so understood might even be quite rare. A tolerant society as one in which forbearance always takes Respecting each others’ differences 121 place does not make much sense from a descriptive point of view and is even stranger from a normative point of view. But as should be clear, this does not mean that the UNESCO view of a tolerant society makes complete sense either. In the UNESCO view, tolerance is ‘respect, acceptance and appreciation’ of difference. Here there is the opposite problem: there are only positive attitudes towards difference. There is no mention of the other understanding of tolerance at all, nor of the attitude indifference. Indeed, there appears to be no space for either of these attitudes in this view of a ‘tolerant society’. There are two other problems with a UNESCO type description of tolerance. First, the more precise meanings of tolerance are lost. This is much more than simply a semantic issue; when it comes to the crunch in issues of difference among citizens, the forbearance meaning of tolerance is a crucially important moral minimum. If the goal of a tolerant society means, at minimum, that such a society should be free from acts of intolerance (hate crimes, serious public discrimination etc), then the forbearance notion of tolerance must be retained. To lose this notion, or even to seriously diminish it, is deeply problematic, and this is the case even if the intention is to strive for something more than ‘mere tolerance’. The second problem with a UNESCO approach is that it conflates a method of achieving a tolerant society with tolerance itself. If a tolerant society is one that is as free as possible from acts of intolerance, then it is still a separate question as to how that society should be 122 Chapter 2 achieved, and encouraging ‘respect, acceptance and appreciation of difference’ is only one possible candidate. I want to suggest then that a tolerant society, in a public sense, can be described as having four basic features: 1) there is a minimal degree of acts of intolerance (hate crimes, serious public discrimination etc) 2) the right of fellow citizens to follow their own beliefs and practices is respected 3) the attitude towards a fellow citizens’ differences can be indifference, respect and appreciation, or tolerance 4) forbearance tolerance is the minimum attitude required by citizens in their broadly public interactions This view of a tolerant society is one of toleration as a political practice, it encompasses both of the views of tolerance discussed previously, but crucially is wedded to neither. A tolerant society is a free society where people can (within limits) live their lives freely without undue discrimination and harassment from their fellow citizens in the public sphere. To achieve this picture of a tolerant society it is reasonable to assume that the state will have to encourage virtues among its citizenry. Encouraging respect of difference is a potential candidate here, and, as I have already discussed, it is proposed in several approaches to multicultural education, as well as in many policy documents. Respecting each others’ differences 123 Although I have already argued this is not feasible as a general demand in a liberal society, in order to reduce the number of acts of intolerance, citizens might perhaps be encouraged to ‘respect, accept and appreciate’ the differences of their fellow citizens. This type of policy may be more a matter of sufficiency – aiming to reduce rather than totally avoid acts of intolerance – and as such, respect of difference and the interactions it involves might appear useful in building the sufficient amount of goodwill necessary to achieve a tolerant society. The ‘respect, acceptance and appreciation’ of difference approach to building and maintaining a tolerant society can be thought of as either one-sided, or as two-sided (or mutual). In the one-sided approach, people are simply encouraged to respect, appreciate, and value the differences of the people they interact with. In the two-sided approach, the idea of mutuality is stressed – respect and appreciation of difference is to be a mutual affair between citizens.24 In the one-sided approach, it is easy to see that if some people respect each others’ differences, then there is a good chance that these people, at least, will not be involved in acts of intolerance towards the holders of differences they respect. If enough people are involved, intolerance should generally dissipate, and it seems that if a two-sided or mutual approach to respect of difference is added, then this possible effect should only be strengthened. 24 An example here is the ‘Vision Statement’ of Western Australia’s Charter of Multiculturalism, which reads: ‘A society in which respect for mutual difference is accompanied by equality of opportunity within a framework of democratic citizenship’; Office of Multicultural Interests, Government of Western Australia, WA Charter of Multiculturalism (Perth: Office of Multicultural Interests, Government of Western Australia, 2004), p. 5. 124 Chapter 2 Yet how effective and justifiable is the one-sided approach likely to be in achieving a more tolerant society? When respect of difference is encouraged in a society, the differences that are mostly likely to be respected are the ones that were previously associated with the attitude of indifference rather than intolerance. I might, for example, not have thought much (negative or positive) about my local Nepalese immigrant community, but after being encouraged to learn about them, and most likely sample their food, my attitude towards, at least their food, may well turn to appreciation. ‘That’s great’, you may say. But what if I never had any problem with them in the first place? It may seem like a trivial point, but I could have done other things with my time and energy. Perhaps in some views my life is now richer for understanding the local Nepalese culture. But this will not limit my intolerance of Nepalese people as I did not have any to begin with. As to making my life better, learning about other cultures and trying their cuisines is ultimately a hobby, and hobbies in any neutral liberal society should normally be entirely freely chosen and not state subsidised, or at least not differentially subsidised or encouraged by the state. Nevertheless, this is not the main problem with respect of difference as a tool for building and maintaining a tolerant society. The main issue is that it does not, nor can it, engage properly with ‘difficult’ or challenging differences – precisely the things that will require acts of forbearance tolerance. While many differences in a society are commonly respectable – cuisine being the obvious category again here – there will always be those that are not so easily respectable despite being within the limits Respecting each others’ differences 125 of what should be tolerable. These differences are often, though not always, ideological or religious. Because these sorts of differences are not easily respectable, and sometimes not respectable at all by many citizens, these differences are left out of, or minimised in this type of respecting game. And on the other side, because of some citizen’s differences, for example their religious beliefs, it is not a game they can easily play; they may not find many common differences respectable at all (issues of modesty and sexuality in western societies provide good examples here). Simply put; it is not equally easy for all citizens to respect the differences of their fellow citizens. Of course this is most likely intentional. This approach encourages these types of citizens to engage fully with their fellow citizens in order to avoid acts of intolerance. But this is its very problem. Why should those who have beliefs that make it hard for them to respect other differences be strongly encouraged to do so? If there was a necessary connection between a lack of respect of a particular difference and acts of intolerance towards its holder, then a strong case could be made. But this is certainly not the case. It is clearly possible to not respect a difference, and not act intolerantly towards its holder. Most religious people do this every day towards those with alternative beliefs and practices. Indeed, it seems the man who is a contemporary ‘star’ of tolerance, the Dalai Lama, is not respecting of homosexuality, among other ‘deviant practices’.25 To repeat: while those who act intolerantly towards the holder 25 ‘A sexual act is deemed proper when the couples use the organs intended for sexual intercourse [the penis and the vagina] and nothing else [anus, hands or mouth] ....homosexuality, whether it is between men or between women, is not improper in itself. What is improper is the use of organs already defined as inappropriate for sexual contact’; Dalai Lama, Beyond Dogma: Dialogues and Discourses (Berkeley: North Atlantic Books, 1996), pp. 46-47. 126 Chapter 2 of a particular difference do not respect it, those who do not respect a particular difference will not necessarily act intolerantly towards its holder. The problem here is that people’s differences are not taken seriously, despite any rhetoric to the contrary.26 If the liberal notion of freedom is taken seriously, that people should be free to live their lives as they see fit as long as it causes no harm to others, then while acts of intolerance can be classified as harm, lack of appreciation and respect on its own cannot be. To encourage the respect of difference is simply privileging one view of the good against people who are not necessarily going to be intolerant anyway – either because they never really cared, or they cared deeply but were still able to practise tolerance where required.27 26 This point is not ignored by those with important ideological differences. Felix Cheung, for example, argues that multicultural attempts to view Christianity as simply a different, but equal way of seeing God, fundamentally misunderstand the distinction between special and general revelation, and as such fail to take Christianity seriously; Felix Cheung, Multiculturalism & Education: an evangelical Christian reflection on multiculturalism and its implications for intercultural education (Box Hill: PTC Media, 2006). 27 This approach, of aiming too broadly and encouraging a particular conception of the good, is perhaps analogous with the current approach to obesity in many western countries. There are some individuals who have serious health problems because of their weight. Yet putting on weight in itself (something that more of us are doing) does not directly lead to health problems, and clearly many of us despite our increased weight are living longer than ever before. Therefore trying, as seems to be the current policy, to encourage weight loss for all individuals is either using the proverbial sledgehammer to crack a walnut (why not just target the morbidly obese?) or, as seems to be the case, imposing a moral value onto obesity (it is after all linked to the traditional Christian sins of sloth and gluttony), Respecting each others’ differences 127 Far from being a better solution, the two-sided or mutual approach to respect of difference is doubly problematic. Here being a good citizen involves being both respecting and respectable. Of course this is not too challenging for those with ‘normal-ish’ differences, and amongst themselves these people can quickly become highly virtuous citizens. But if people’s differences are to be taken seriously, in that if they harm no-one else they should be left alone, then there is a problem for those whose differences are neither easily respecting nor easily respectable. If good citizenship, and thus the wide acceptance of your difference is primarily achieved by it being respectable to your fellow citizens, as opposed to being tolerated by the state, then this can have ramifications not only for what is respected, but what is tolerated as well. An approach to diversity where the state encourages citizen- citizen respect of difference is a move towards placing the very possibility for difference on both the success of being respectable in the eyes of your fellow citizens and your ability to be respecting in return – this will limit the freedom for diversity without necessarily getting any closer to the achievement of a tolerant society. To be involved in the process of mutual respect you have to be able to be both respecting and respectable. As I argued in the previous chapter, this can mean that in order to be good citizens, the holders of difference may need to accentuate their most agreeable and likeable features (generally their cooking and dancing, and perhaps their art) and using the excuse of some cases of morbid obesity to force this moral value onto everybody else. This argument is made by Linda Courtenay Botterill, ‘Leaps of Faith in the Obesity Debate: a Cautionary Note for Policy-makers’, The Political Quarterly 77/4 (2006) 493-500. 128 Chapter 2 while at the same time downplaying their values – things that are much more difficult to make as broadly respectable. This is likely to then narrow the range of difference towards the mutually respectable, which will further favour those with majority type differences (these are the ones that most easily play the respecting game). As I have argued, this then seems to be something of an assimilation of difference under the guise of respect of difference. The boundaries of the tolerable within a society are always going to be significantly broader than the boundaries of the respectable, and there is a real danger to both individual freedom and the maintenance of a tolerant society of either completely collapsing this distinction or creating strong inducements to become more respecting and respectable. There is a danger that those whose differences are just tolerable, and not easily respectable in the eyes of the majority of citizens may end up either having their very citizenship questioned,28 or alternatively, will be unnecessarily encouraged to modify their differences to be construed as ‘respectable’ by the majority of citizens. Let us return to the UNESCO approach to tolerance for a moment. If the forbearance notion of tolerance is removed or drastically reduced, the important question of what should be tolerated in a society can be affected by this type of mutual respect. Instead of the more liberal question of whether certain types of intolerance should be tolerated, the question can quickly become whether the disrespecting and 28 It is unfortunately not very hard to find plenty of real life examples of ‘majority’ citizens challenging the citizenship status of those whose differences – whether this be in the form of religious beliefs, cultural garb, language, or practices etc – that they do not find respectable. Respecting each others’ differences 129 disrespectable should be tolerated – especially if they become seen as ‘bad citizens’. Such a society would be significantly less tolerant of difference and certainly less accommodating of it. While it might still be retorted that people’s lives go better this way, this is an issue of how state power should be used, and the respecting and respectable way of being is simply a conception of the good. As I have argued, a liberal society is one of free association and belief, and it is a fundamental mistake to believe that all associations and beliefs within such a society must be made liberal. Attempts to do this with state power and resources are themselves illiberal: a thorough-going comprehensive liberalism is just another view of the good, and as such is an intolerant act itself. When it comes to the issue of respect and its role in building and maintaining a tolerant society, there is an alternative to the respect of difference: respect of sameness. Here the citizen is both required and encouraged to respect the citizenship status and its associated rights of their fellow citizens. Respect of sameness and its minimum requirement of forbearance tolerance of difference has several advantages: it takes people’s differences seriously; it does not target all for the sake of some; its demands are much more feasible; it maximises the space for individuals to live their lives as they see fit; and finally, with its simplicity, it is a much easier message to transmit to citizens – ‘it doesn’t matter what you think or feel, all citizens must have their rights respected’. Such a method, perhaps supplemented by encouraging the 130 Chapter 2 virtue of tolerance, would enable citizens to live their lives as they see fit, and backed by the rule of law, could successfully build and maintain a tolerant society. Conclusion In early 2008, a 12 year old Sikh boy was refused a place in a Queensland private school because he was not willing to cut his hair or remove his turban. Brett Webster, the principal of the school, said in his defence of the school’s position: We’re certainly not asking the family or the boy to turn their back on their religion. I mean it’s a given that people have different beliefs and it’s a given that we should respect those beliefs.29 Moreover, on the school’s website, its ‘Mission Statement’ explicitly stated: ‘The College affirms individual differences and actively promotes cultural and intellectual understanding’.30 So while both the school and its management were more than willing to respect, understand and appreciate the Sikh boy’s differences, it seems there was no way that they would be accommodating them. Both the college and the principal had seemingly adopted the broad multicultural policy demand that individuals (and civil society) should respect the differences they encounter. But as this case highlights, there is no necessary connection between 29 ABC News, ‘Principal Defends Turban Ban’, 26th February, 2008 30 See Respecting each others’ differences 131 respect of difference and accommodation of difference, and it seems all the respect, appreciation and understanding possible was not going to lead to the accommodation of this Sikh boy, with his turban and his long hair. This point about accommodation is important. For whether or not one thinks that in this particular case the school ought to have accommodated this child, to have any legitimacy at all, policies aimed at inter-citizen interaction must aim for increased accommodation. As I have argued in this chapter, this cannot be said for respect of difference. It is quite possible to respect a difference and not accommodate it, and to accommodate a difference and not respect it. Moreover, such policies must increase and not decrease the freedom for individuals to live their lives as they see fit. On both these counts, respect of difference among citizens fails. Despite the pronouncements of multicultural policies and the arguments of some political theorists, I have argued in this chapter that respect of difference is not a feasible demand upon the citizen. Moreover, I have also argued that it is not a necessary demand for the accommodation of difference. This means that it is an unjustified intrusion on individual liberty. Significantly, I have also argued that respect of difference can in fact be potentially damaging to the entirely legitimate goal of accommodation of difference as well as building and maintaining a tolerant society. This means it unjustifiably imposes on all parties involved in inter-citizen respect of difference. The position I have proposed, respect of sameness and tolerance (at a minimum) of difference, will involve encouraging significantly less interaction, 132 Chapter 2 knowledge and understanding among citizens, while at the same time giving greater freedom to the individual citizen. To some this may seem like a weakening of the fabric of society. In the next chapter, I will address this concern for a strong societal fabric, and argue that it is overstated. Chapter 3 How much social cohesion is really needed? In this chapter I turn to the issue of social cohesion. So far I have discussed citizen- citizen relations in a diverse society and rejected any demand for individual citizens to respect each others’ differences, arguing instead that the only legitimate demand that can be made on individual citizens is to respect their fellow citizen’s sameness, best understood as a bundle of basic citizenship rights. Perhaps more worryingly for some, I have suggested that there are good reasons for the state not to encourage citizen-citizen respect of difference at all – not even if the aim is to foster a tolerant society. This rejection of inter-citizen respect of difference may lead some readers to worry that if citizens in diverse polities cannot be legitimately compelled, or at least encouraged, to respect and understand each others’ uniqueness, then a society may lack sufficient unity to sustain welfare redistribution and other co-operative projects, may even fracture, and may simply not be a very nice place in which to live. In this chapter I will address this concern over the nature of citizen-citizen relations in diverse societies. I will put aside the questioning of the perceived benefits of inter- citizen respect of difference and thus its links (or otherwise) to social cohesion. Instead, I propose to challenge the good of social cohesion itself. I will suggest that, 134 Chapter 3 on liberal premises, there are better and worse ways to achieve whatever (minimal) social cohesion a liberal society may need. Something has to hold a society together. Without some sort of (not purely theoretical) bond, it is hard to see how individuals could accomplish any of the joint tasks that make political community worth belonging to in the first place. Yet while the concern over unity is a legitimate one, social cohesion, particularly at a national level, is not some benign good, and in most of its guises it has real costs for the space for individual freedom. This can be for two linked reasons. First, if social cohesion is maintained by state sanctioned norms, particularly those involving identity, then this move from neutrality can favour some ways of life over others – those who are more aligned with these norms will generally find life easier and freer than those who are not. Second, as J.S. Mill famously observed in On Liberty, one of the biggest threats to individual freedom is the social sanctions that the majority of a community can impose on those ‘not in harmony with its ways’: Society can and does execute its own mandates: and if it issues wrong mandates instead of right, or any mandates at all in things with which it ought not to meddle, it practises a social tyranny more formidable than many kinds of political oppression, since…it leaves fewer means of escape, penetrating much more deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the soul itself. Protection, therefore against the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough: there needs protection also against the prevailing opinion and feeling; against the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own How much social cohesion is really needed? 135 ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them; to fetter the development, and, if possible, prevent the formation, of any individuality not in harmony with its ways, and compel all characters to fashion themselves upon the model of its own.1 Examining social cohesion from a liberal perspective means that because of the importance of freedom of association, there is not much that can be said about social pressures and conformity per se. But when these social pressures are either sanctioned by the state or the state privileges certain ways of life over others, then this is a question for liberal political theory; at least of the type that concerns me here. Any liberal theory of social cohesion must be concerned that both the results, and the methods used to build social cohesion have minimal interference with individual freedom. The amount of social cohesion created, and the methods used to maintain it, must be justified on the grounds that they enhance rather than detract from the freedom of individuals to live their lives as they see fit. In the examination of social cohesion that follows, I mean to keep both of these dimensions in mind, and argue that social cohesion is not simply some maximisable good, but that both the amount of cohesion sought as well as the means adopted to achieve it need justification. 1 J.S. Mill, ‘On Liberty’, in J. Gray (ed.), On Liberty and Other Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, [1859] 1998), 4-130, pp. 8-9. Despite Mill’s worry about social pressures, he was still an ardent nationalist of sorts, seeing ‘fellow-feeling’ as particularly important for the emergence and existence of free institutions. See J.S. Mill, ‘Considerations on Representative Government’, in J. Gray (ed.), On Liberty and Other Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, [1861] 1998), 205-470, pp. 428, 443. 136 Chapter 3 Historically, various forms of nationalism have been used, and all too often abused, in the pursuit of communal goals. Yet more recently, several liberals have recognised this need for a ‘glue’ to hold a society together, and have suggested a form of nationalism that is compatible with liberalism: liberal nationalism, where nationalist sentiments are tempered by liberal principles.2 But this is not the only type of social bond or strategy that can be used to achieve legitimate communal ends and do so in a sufficiently liberal manner. There are viable alternatives that are, in fact, much more liberal. The alternatives I will consider in this chapter are: trust building; institutional belonging; and ensuring fair social outcomes. (I have already shown in the previous chapter why respect of difference is not a sufficiently liberal or effective basis for cohesion.) My argument is not that any one of these methods is preferable, but rather that national identity building, even in liberal nationalist guise, is likely to be significantly more demanding than these alternatives. I will do this by examining three potential ends of social cohesion projects: as a good in itself; for the success of cooperative projects; and, for maintaining support for welfare redistribution. Moreover, I will argue that the alternative approaches, particularly trust building, have the added and important advantage of allowing a more targeted approach to 2 See, for example: David Miller, On Nationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); David Miller, ‘Socialism and Toleration’, in S. Mendus (ed.), Justifying Toleration: Conceptual and Historical Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 237-54; David Miller, ‘In What Sense must Socialism be Communitarian’, Social Philosophy and Policy 6/2 (1989) 51-73; David Miller, Citizenship and National Identity (Cambridge & Oxford: Polity, 2000); Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); and Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). How much social cohesion is really needed? 137 particular problems of social cohesion. My aim is not to give a comprehensive account of the various means and ends of social cohesion, but simply to emphasise that certain types of means and certain types of ends are more costly than others, and that alternatives do exist which maintain a reasonable balance between the need for some ‘glue’ to hold a functioning polity together and the primacy of allowing individuals to live their lives as they see fit. What is social cohesion? The concept of ‘social cohesion’ – as opposed to ‘unity’ or ‘solidarity’ – is a relatively recent one.3 In policy statements, the concept has come in to increasing use in several multicultural jurisdictions since the turn of the 21st Century. In the United Kingdom, ‘community cohesion’ came to prominence in the 2001 Cantle Report4 and has remained in the forefront of policy language since. In Australia, ‘social harmony’ has been prominent since the 1999 ‘A New Agenda for Multicultural Australia’,5 while in Canada, ‘social cohesion’ has been a subject of interest to the Federal 3 Caroline Beauvais and Jane Jenson write that ‘social cohesion’ emerged in the first half of the 1990s in Europe and Canada; Caroline Beauvais and Jane Jenson, Social Cohesion: Updating the Research CPRN Discussion Paper No. F22 (Ottowa: Canadian Policy Research Networks Inc.: 2002), p. i. 4 Home Office, Community Cohesion: A Report of the Independent Review Team, Chaired by Ted Cantle, (London: The Home Office, 2001). For further discussion of this issue and references, see the introduction of Chapter 2. 5 Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, A New Agenda for Multicultural Australia (Canberra: Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, 1999). 138 Chapter 3 Government since 1996.6 The response of many social scientists trying to measure and study the concept has been to call ‘social cohesion’ a ‘quasi-concept’ because it ‘maintains a vagueness flexible enough to follow the meanderings and necessities of political action from day to day’.7 Part of the problem in the social sciences has been that differing definitions (based on differing values) has lead to very different measures of its rise/fall/existence.8 There has also been a dispute over whether cohesion should be viewed as a causal mechanism or as a consequence of other factors.9 In this chapter, I will deliberately use a broad definition of social cohesion, which, by not building too much into the concept, will hopefully avoid some of these disputes. 6 Dick Stanley, ‘What Do We Know About Social Cohesion: The Research Perspective of the Federal Government’s Social Cohesion Research Network’, Canadian Journal of Sociology 28/1 (2003) 5-17, p. 6. 7 Paul Bernard, Social Cohesion: A Dialectical Critique of a Quasi-Concept? SRA-491 (Ottowa: Department of Canadian Heritage, 2000), p. 3, cited in Stanley (2003), p. 8. Beauvais and Jenson, point out that many key social scientific concepts are similar, for example, ‘wealth’, ‘poverty’, ‘social capital’, and ‘social class’; Beauvais and Jenson (2002), p. 1 8 Beauvais and Jenson list five different ways of viewing the concept: ‘1. Common values and civic culture, 2. Social order and social control, 3. Social cohesion and reductions in wealth disparities, 4. Social networks and social capital, and 5. Territorial belonging and identity’; Beauvais and Jenson (2002), p. 2. Another good recent survey of this research is Andrew Markus and Liudmila Kirpitchenko, ‘Conceptualising Social Cohesion’, in J. Jupp, J. Nieuwenhuysen & E. Dawson (eds), Social Cohesion in Australia (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 21-32. 9 Beauvais and Jenson (2002), pp. 5-22. How much social cohesion is really needed? 139 As such, I will treat social cohesion as being present when there are ties among citizens, either directly or mediated through shared institutions. While this is obviously a vague definition, it allows an analysis of two distinct dimensions: one, the types of ‘tie’ that can exist among citizens, and the other, the degree of social cohesion. Social cohesion can be developed around a range of ties: from common ‘blood’ to shared religion or common culture (thick through to thin), and even to shared institutions. And each of these variables can lead to very different degrees of social cohesion: from very weak and almost non-existent, right through to so strong that members of a society will do virtually anything for each other and the society. What we are looking for, then, is first to find the type of tie/s that are most compatible with individual freedom – this rules out ‘blood’ straight away – and then second, to determine the sufficient strength of tie that is required to achieve legitimate social goals. But first, we need to determine what some legitimate social goals might be. Fraternity as a good in itself There is a common belief that living in a society with a strong fellow feeling amongst citizens is simply better than living in a society where people are not particularly connected. Indeed this was one of the reasons behind communitarian attacks on what was viewed as ‘atomised’ liberalism. The critique was that liberal theory assumes abstract and un-situated individuals rather than people whose community attachments are of crucial importance to who they are and how they act. It seems very hard to argue with the good of community; most people’s lives generally do go better when they know and get on with their neighbours, and when they feel connected to their 140 Chapter 3 local schools, neighbourhood centres, and other members of their community. Not only do people seem happier in these communities, but they often have the all important networks that allow them to find employment, and achieve localised common goals.10 Yet none of this is sufficient to warrant national policies of social cohesion, indeed it may even provide a case against such policies. As is well documented in popular movies (Footloose, Bend it Like Beckham, My Big Fat Greek Wedding, Head On, to name just a few), as well as in a great deal of literature and way too many country and western songs, communities can be extremely stifling places. Many individuals find their free expression curtailed by the prevailing norms of their community, as well as with the lack of privacy that occurs when everyone knows each other. The very things that provide freedom to some individuals severely constrain freedom for others. Communities themselves are not simply a good for all, and not all communities are good for everyone. This of course, does not provide a particularly serious dilemma for the liberal, and is dealt with by allowing and enabling freedom of association. If individuals are free to either associate in particular communities or leave one community for another, then they can experience the good of community and leave if a particular community is ultimately constraining their freedom. Of course, leaving a 10 Robert Putnam popularised the term ‘social capital’ for these sorts of connection; Robert Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000). How much social cohesion is really needed? 141 community is never easy, but in a polity with freedom of association it is possible.11 Likewise, it is not always easy to find and join a new community, but it is possible in a polity with free association. Moreover, it is a mistake to think of meaningful community as always being territorially concentrated. Many (perhaps most?) people find meaningful community relationships outside those of their immediate neighbours: in their sporting groups, religious associations, fellow hobby enthusiasts, and even in their workplaces. And finally there are always some people who want no part (or very little part) in community at all. Freedom of association allows such individuals the freedom to live their lives without (what they see as) the burden of community. When it comes to the issue of building and maintaining national social cohesion, the question of whether or not community is a good in itself is moot. What I have suggested here instead is that even if it is a good in itself, there will be serious problems if everybody shares the same community. Or to put this point another way: if the only exit option is to leave the polity altogether – the very thing that is supposed 11 There is a substantial discussion in the theoretical multiculturalism literature on the question of the right of ‘exit’ and what precisely is required from the state to make this right real. For a very minimal account, see Chandran Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). For more substantive accounts, see Jeff Spinner-Halev, ‘Autonomy, Association, and Pluralism’, in A. Eisenberg and J. Spinner-Halev (eds), Minorities Within Minorities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 157-71, and Susan Moller Okin, ‘Mistresses of Their Own Destiny: Group Rights, Gender, and Realistic Rights of Exit’, Ethics 112/2 (2002) 205-30. 142 Chapter 3 to protect individual freedom in the first place – then this is a rather absurd result for individual freedom. Because particular types of communities can have such a constraining effect on individual freedom, there can be no intrinsic reason for the state to sanction one overarching community.12 If communities do provide intrinsic goods, then these are achievable through freedom of association, and with it the possibility of a multitude of a communities. The only possible reasons, then, for state support of an overarching sense of community must therefore be instrumental as any intrinsic justification does not stack up. It is to instrumental justifications for social cohesion that I now turn. 12 There are different lines of argument for the intrinsic value of nationality given by both Thomas Hurka and David Miller; Thomas Hurka, ‘The Justification of National Partiality’ in R. McKim and J. McMahon (eds), The Morality of Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 139-57, and Miller (1995). For Hurka, the intrinsic value of national community derives from the fact it brings about objective goods through particular moral relationships. While for Miller, the intrinsic nature comes more from the fact that they constitute an important part of an individual’s identity and constitute bonds of solidarity and mutual trust. In response to Hurka, the remainder of the chapter looks at alternative methods of bringing about objective goods. My response to Miller’s argument is simply to repeat that what is good for many people is not necessarily good for all. Additionally, Margaret Moore argues that the most serious failing of Hurka’s and Miller’s arguments for the intrinsic good of nationality is their failure to distinguish nations from other intrinsically valuable moral communities; Margaret Moore, The Ethics of Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 31, 47-50. How much social cohesion is really needed? 143 Welfare redistribution and common social projects Other than the protection from physical harm and of personal property that being a member of a polity provides, perhaps the next most important good is the opportunity to benefit from cooperative projects. Things such as a healthcare system, and even roads, public transport and other infrastructures, are difficult for the individual to build and maintain, and can be of benefit to most members of a society. While it may certainly be rational for members of a society to support these sorts of projects – for a small outlay, they may receive great benefits – rationality may not be enough to actually elicit their support,13 particularly if they are suspicious of others who may also benefit from the project. Enough of a sense of togetherness may be required to establish and maintain ongoing cooperative projects on a national level. Amongst most contemporary liberal theorists, a just distribution of resources is also seen as an important function of the state. And because it is matter of justice, this goal is seen as a legitimate justification to curtail some citizen’s absolute freedom and thereby enhance the effective freedom of others.14 So while the redistribution of 13 Along similar lines, William Galston, for example, writes: ‘…few individuals will come to embrace the core commitments of liberal societies through a process of rational inquiry.…[This]can only be achieved through a process that is far more rhetorical than rational.’ William Galston, Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues and Diversity in the Liberal State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 243. 14 The classic statement of this is in John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), but see also, among many others, Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: Equality in Theory and Practice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000). This is not a view shared by all; right- 144 Chapter 3 resources that occurs in contemporary welfare states is a limitation on some citizens’ freedom to live their lives as they fit – as resources must be removed from them – it can be justified on grounds of justice; it is intended to provide all citizens with (at minimum) the basic resources required to live their lives as they see fit. While there is debate over the amount of resource distribution that is just – this is actually three debates, one over how much people need, the second over what they need, and the third over the circumstances in which it is okay to take from some and to give to others – there is also the quite separate practical question of how to sustain a populace’s motivation to contribute to a system of redistribution, especially the support of those citizens who are having their extra resources taken away. It is this practical question of support for welfare redistribution in the face of diversity that concerns me in this section. Both cooperative projects and resource redistribution require the broad support of the populace, and prima facie both can be used to justify a constraint on some people’s freedom for the sake of a greater amount of individual freedom. It may appear that too high a degree of diversity and too low an amount of social cohesion could undermine support for both types of project. I will assume here that if support is going to be lost for either type of project, it will be for redistribution libertarians argue that redistributive polices are an unjustified constraint on individual freedom. See Robert Nozick, Anarchy State and Utopia (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974). Further, not everyone sees redistribution as restricting freedom, some, such as Ronald Dworkin, see just redistribution as not curtailing freedom at all; Ronald Dworkin, ‘Do Liberty and Equality Conflict?’, in P. Barker (ed.), Living as Equals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 39-58. But this highly moralised sense of freedom is not the type to which I am referring here. How much social cohesion is really needed? 145 first, and cooperative projects second. Generally speaking, welfare redistribution will be more demanding on citizens than support for cooperative projects. While there will be exceptions, cooperative projects generally benefit all (or at least most) citizens, whereas by its very nature welfare redistribution, at least in the short to medium term, benefits some citizens and burdens others. This assumption will allow me to focus on the link between social cohesion and welfare redistribution; if it can be shown that this link is overstated, then the link between social cohesion and cooperative projects is most likely overstated as well. There is an argument run by several left critics of multiculturalism that policies that support diversity erode unity, and with it the sentiment required to support the welfare state. David Goodhart has provocatively called this ‘the progressive’s dilemma’.15 The argument is that multicultural-type policies erode trust and cohesion amongst 15 David Goodhart, ‘Too Diverse?’, Prospect 95 (2004). Even if this argument is correct, and diversity does undermine the support necessary for the welfare state, the actual decline of the welfare state – which has been occurring since the last quarter of the twentieth century – seems to be just as strongly linked to the rise in neo-liberal economics and the abject failure of many nationalised industries and social programs. Although there is certainly a temporal link between the rise of multicultural policies and the decline of the welfare state, Keith Banting et al. point out that many states with strong multicultural policies have actually had less decline in welfare spending than those with weak multicultural policies; Keith Banting et al., ‘Do Multiculturalism Policies Erode the Welfare State? An Empirical Analysis’, in K. Banting and W. Kymlicka (eds), Multiculturalism and the Welfare State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 49-91. 146 Chapter 3 citizens and consequently the popular support required to maintain redistribution.16 If this argument is correct, and redistribution is considered a matter of justice, then there is sufficient justification for state policies of social cohesion building. And moreover, there would be sufficient justification for policies that would curtail the freedom for individuals to live their lives as they see fit. Following this argument, liberal nationalists such as David Miller, Will Kymlicka, and Yael Tamir, argue that the only way to achieve this level of trust and cohesion is for the state to engage in a liberal process of nation building; without an overarching national identity, welfare redistribution (amongst other key social goods) will simply not be possible, and that building and maintaining a common culture is the business of the state in order to serve the ends of justice.17 Tamir writes: Willingness to assume the burdens entailed by distributive justice…rests on an assumption that liberal theory cannot itself provide, namely, a feeling of relatedness to those with whom we share our assets…Communal solidarity creates a feeling…of closeness and shared fate, which is a precondition of 16 Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka call this ‘the corroding effect’. They describe two other arguments that are commonly put forward for the incompatibility of multicultural polices and welfare redistribution: ‘the crowding out effect’, where the time and energy required to fight politically for welfare redistribution policies is taken up with issues of cultural recognition, and the ‘misdiagnosis effect’, where socio-economic disadvantage is miscast as cultural disadvantage; Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka, ‘Introduction’, in K. Banting and W. Kymlicka (eds), Multiculturalism and the Welfare State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 1-48. 17 For details, see n. 2. How much social cohesion is really needed? 147 distributive justice…[T]he community-like nature of the nation-state is particularly well suited, and perhaps even necessary, to the notion of the liberal welfare state.18 This argument can be challenged in several ways. These include: that it runs the risk of turning a duty of justice into one of charity;19 that it reifies what is essentially a feasibility constraint (the link between social cohesion and the realisation of social justice – itself potentially an issue of justice);20 that it is in danger of making the realisation of rights (the very things that are meant to make obligations immune from sentiment) dependent on the positive attitudes of the citizenry;21 and that it is silent on whether people’s sentiments actually coincide with their redistributive obligations.22 Nevertheless, I will put aside these issues here. Instead I will address three other issues raised in this argument. The first concerns the relationship between diversity and cohesion: Does diversity really undermine cohesion? And if so, what types of diversity do the most undermining? The second issue relates to how much cohesion is 18 Tamir (1993), pp. 118, 121. Similarly, Kymlicka writes: ‘The sort of solidarity essential for a welfare state requires that citizens have a strong sense of common identity and common membership, so that they will make sacrifices for each other, and this common identity is assumed to require (or at least be facilitated by) a common language and history’; Kymlicka (1995), p. 77. 19 Daniel Weinstock, ‘Is There a Moral Case for Nationalism?’, Journal of Applied Philosophy 13/1 (1996) 87-100, p. 94. 20 Sune Laegaard, ‘Feasibility and Stability in Political Philosophy: The Case of Liberal Nationalism’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9/4 (2006) 399-416. 21 Weinstock (1996), p. 92. 22 Weinstock (1996), p. 94. 148 Chapter 3 required to support welfare redistribution. And the third concerns what types of methods best build the sufficient quantity of cohesion required for welfare redistribution. I will look at the first two questions in the remainder of this section, before exploring the third question in more depth in the sections that follow. First, how plausible is the argument that diversity undermines cohesion? And if it does, what types of diversity are the most undermining? Looking at the empirical evidence, several studies done in the United Sates have shown that the presence of racial and ethnic difference – in particular African-American and Hispanic – does correlate negatively with spending on welfare programs in particular cities and states.23 However, there is no consensus on why this might be the case, with explanations ranging from genetic or learnt predispositions against favouring interethnic redistribution; to reduced trust across ethnic lines; to the difficulty of building inter-ethnic social capital; and finally, to the fertile political ground that diversity provides for far right political parties who are also anti-welfare.24 What is interesting, however, is that this correlation appears to be largely specific to the United States. Outside the United States (and sub-Saharan Africa) there is no significant correlation between ethnic and racial diversity and welfare spending.25 23 Banting and Kymlicka cite ten separate studies in support of this point; Banting and Kymlicka (2006), p. 25. For more detail, see Rodney E. Hero and Robert R. Preuhs, ‘Multiculturalism and Welfare Policies in the USA: A State-Level Comparative Analysis’, in K. Banting and W. Kymlicka (eds), Multiculturalism and the Welfare State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 121-151. 24 Banting and Kymlicka (2006), pp. 26-27. 25 Banting and Kymlicka (2006), pp. 28-29. How much social cohesion is really needed? 149 Looking more specifically at the relationship between trust and ‘ethnic heterogeneity’, Andrew Leigh found that in Australia, while ‘localised trust’ (at the neighbourhood level) is negatively affected by what he terms ‘ethno-linguistic fractionalisation’, trust on a more general level was not.26 It is this more general level that should be the most important for the support of national projects like welfare redistribution. Interestingly, Leigh also found that localised distrust correlated with linguistic rather than ethnic diversity, from which he concludes: ‘sharing a common heritage may be less important for localised trust than the ability to communicate effectively’.27 So empirically, the mere existence of diversity does not seem to correlate with decreased cohesion, particularly at a non-local level, and if there is a relationship other things may well be at play – for example, a long and severe history of institutionalised racism as is the case with African-Americans. And even if there was a correlation, while this might perhaps have an impact on immigration policy, it would still leave the issue of how to deal with the differences of already existent citizens. The relationship between diversity and cohesion can also be examined in terms of multicultural political rhetoric. While the empirical fact of diversity may have an impact on social cohesion, the rhetoric of difference may be just as, if not more, 26 Andrew Leigh, ‘Trust, Inequality and Ethnic Heterogeneity’, The Economic Record 82/258 (2006) 268-280. 27 Leigh (2006), p. 276. 150 Chapter 3 significant a threat to social cohesion.28 If this is true, then this would be problematic for the idea of ‘multicultural citizenship’.29 This is the view that the identity associated with citizenship should itself be multicultural – ‘it is our very difference and its acceptance/embracing of it that makes us unique’. This type of approach could backfire by bringing the issue of difference to the forefront, rather than common citizenship status. The promotion of this notion of citizenship by the state is then problematic for two reasons. First, in its drawing attention to difference it may actually undermine social cohesion and ironically the acceptance of difference, which would then limit the space for individuals to live their lives freely. And second, if the state promotes diversity itself as a good, this could prove to be an unjustified deviation from neutrality as it would not be protecting the freedom of individuals to live their lives as they see fit. Nevertheless, if this argument holds, it simply means 28 Geoffrey Brahm Levey concedes that the rhetoric of multiculturalism may undermine social cohesion, but argues that multiculturalism should involve practical policies of integration and not simply symbolic gestures. See Geoffrey Brahm Levey, ‘The antidote of multiculturalism’, Griffith Review 15 (2007) 199-208, and Geoffrey Brahm Levey (forthcoming), ‘Multiculturalism and Terror’, in R. Gaita and R. Manne (eds), Multiculturalism and the Global War on Terrorism (Melbourne: Text Publishing, 2009). 29 Varun Uberoi, for example, suggests that multiculturalism is a major part of Canadian national identity and a similar approach should be adopted for national building in Britain; Varun Uberoi, ‘Social Unity in Britain’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 3/1 (2007) 141-157. While in Australia, the case for a multicultural national identity has been put by Andrew Theophonous, Understanding Multiculturalism and Australian Identity (Melbourne: Elikia Books, 1995). See also Laksiri Jayasuriya, ‘Australian Multiculturalism and the Politics of a New Pluralism’, Dialogue 24/1 (2005) 75-84. How much social cohesion is really needed? 151 that states should tone down the rhetoric of multiculturalism and diversity – i.e. be more neutral – but not stop letting people live as they see fit. Regardless of whether diversity (in reality or in rhetoric) undermines cohesion, or whether diversity and cohesion are entirely compatible, there is still the question of how much cohesion is required on a national or at least state-wide level to achieve support for redistributive policies. (This, of course, is assuming that welfare redistribution does requires cohesion, and also that the building of this cohesion provides a justified brake on some individual freedom). This is the second question raised in the liberal nationalist argument I want to address. Although the answer to the question of quantity will clearly be situation specific, two points can be made. First, the actual amount of proposed redistribution is relevant, as are any potential markers of disadvantage. If a theory of just distribution requires a large redistribution, this will presumably require more support than a system with only relatively small amounts of redistribution. In this way, a strictly egalitarian distribution (particularly when talents and opportunities are not very equal) will presumably require more support and perhaps cohesion than say, a system of sufficiency, particularly where what is deemed to be a sufficient amount of resources is, in relative terms, low. Moreover, more support in the form of overall cohesion will presumably be required if the markers of disadvantage in a society are particularly distinctive sub-groups – for example, African-Americans, Indigenous Australians, or Turkish Germans. There will likely be problems if one (or a small number of) politically salient sub-groups are perceived to be ‘always taking and not contributing’. Second, and most importantly, 152 Chapter 3 because cohesion is not simply a good in itself – it has costs as well as benefits – it must only ever be of sufficient quantity. Its instrumental value and its potential to stifle individual freedom means that if it is deemed necessary in a particular situation to build support for redistribution, it should not simply be maximised. If national social cohesion is required for welfare distribution, and its potential costs for individual freedom are taken into consideration, and care is then taken to only build a sufficient quantity of it, then we are left with the third question raised above about what types of methods will best build sufficient cohesion for welfare redistribution. Clearly ‘best’ here is not simply the most efficient or most efficacious method of building sufficient cohesion. If it was simply about effectiveness in achieving the goal of sufficient cohesion, then all sorts of illiberal things might be superior candidates. ‘Best’ must be understood in terms of having the least costs compared to other methods, where ‘costs’ refers to the impingement on individual freedom. Obviously a very expensive program would impinge on freedom – by requiring a lot of tax dollars – however, of more significance, here, is the impingement on people’s freedom to live their lives as they see fit without undue state-sanctioned interference. I now want to look at this question in more depth by examining four potential methods of building and maintaining social cohesion: national identity, trust, institutional belonging, and ensuring fair social outcomes. How much social cohesion is really needed? 153 National identity The building of a national identity and culture is put forward by liberal nationalists30 as a key tool in maintaining support for redistributive polices. For example, David Miller writes: ‘Social [distributive] justice will always be easier to achieve in states with strong national identities and without internal communal divisions’.31 For Miller, ‘…a national identity requires that the people who share it should have something in common…which I prefer to describe as a common public culture’.32 Elsewhere he writes: [T]he kind of underpinning for a welfare state that socialists will look for can only be provided through a widespread sense of common membership throughout the society in question…it is worth stressing that this common identity must exist at the national level.33 But it is not just the existence of a national identity that enables welfare redistribution, but the nature of the identity: ‘It is not only the strength of national identity...but also the character of national identity that matters from the point of 30 I am deliberately focussing only on liberal nationalism and not on all national identity and culture building methods. As is well documented in history, many attempts at nation building through encouraging a shared identity and culture have dramatically and tragically curtailed individual freedom. As such, if I can show that even liberal nationalism is in danger of overstepping the mark, then these other approaches will certainly not be justifiable. 31 Miller (1995), p. 96. 32 Miller (1995), p. 25. 33 Miller (1988), p. 243 (my emphasis). 154 Chapter 3 view of social [distributive] justice.’34 Miller’s picture of state policies of national identity-building is one in which the state is involved in encouraging the maintenance of a shared common public culture and, with it, a national identity that is particular to that state and binds people in the right type of way. Clearly common identities can have costs for individual freedom. As discussed already, communities centred around a common identity can, for some individuals, have a constraining effect on their freedom to live their lives as they see fit. A national identity, as Miller says, involves a shared public culture, which he describes as: …a set of understandings about how a group of people is to conduct its life together. This will include political principles such as a belief in democracy or the rule of law, but it reaches more widely than this. It extends to social norms such as honesty in filling in your tax return or queuing as a way of deciding who gets on the bus first. It may also embrace certain ideals, for instance religious beliefs or a commitment to preserve the purity of the national language.35 Miller’s conception of the public culture that underlies his version of national identity contains, then, an element of, to put it colloquially, ‘this is the way we do things around here’. As a liberal he is obviously keen to point out that private sub-cultures 34 Miller (1995), p. 94 (emphasis in original). 35 Miller (1995), p. 26. How much social cohesion is really needed? 155 should not be ‘obliterated’,36 that free speech should remain protected, and that private self-regarding actions should be tolerated.37 Moreover, the details of what constitutes a particular national culture are not fixed, but: …ideally…should consist in a collective conversation in which many voices can join. No voice has a privileged status: those who seek to defend traditional interpretations enter the conversation on an equal footing with those who wish to propose changes.38 While this ‘way we do things around here’ norm can be enabling – it can allow efficient interaction and known expectations (as in the example of queue forming), as well as foster a sense of belonging – it can also involve ‘ways’ that are not desirable to all. If, as Miller says, a national culture involves beliefs, practices and sensibilities,39 then there will always be those who do not share the beliefs, enjoy the practices or exhibit the sensibilities. And while the process of defining a national identity and culture is intended to be inclusive and deliberative, it is still likely to favour a majority, or at least elitist view, with its attendant social pressures and sanctions on those who do not conform. Miller acknowledges that no national culture will have all members participate in all elements equally – he describes them as ‘a set of overlapping cultural 36 Miller (1995), p. 26 n.13, and Ch. 5. 37 Miller (1988), p. 248. 38 Miller (1995), p. 127. 39 Miller (1995), p. 85; see also ch. 2. 156 Chapter 3 characteristics…which different members exhibit in different combinations and to different degrees’.40 The precise characteristics of particular national identities will be hard to pin down; identities, as I have previously discussed, are notoriously difficult to accurately capture. Yet the argument for identity approaches to building and maintaining social cohesion involves asking the state to use its power to promote a national identity, and if a national identity is an amorphous, overlapping and slippery thing, what should the state do? To promote some aspects of a shared national identity – for example, interest in particular sports or particular cultural traditions – would be to favour a way of doing things that will not be shared by all those who subscribe to the identity. This is not simply encouraging those who do not subscribe particularly strongly to a national identity to come into the fold, but would be almost perversely telling those that do actually subscribe to the identity that they are somehow inauthentic. This problem – a ‘we’re not all like that’ argument – has been at least one of the motivations behind attacks on the recently introduced (and about to be revamped) Australian citizenship test and its accompanying booklet, which, as I mentioned in the Introduction, amongst other things, devotes a paragraph to the cricketer Don Bradman and another to the racehorse Phar Lap.41 Moreover, when 40 Miller (1995). 41 Lyn Allison (former leader of the now defunct Australian Democrats) took this line, arguing; ‘in many cases the values and history on which the test is based are both dodgy and obscure’, Lyn Allison, ‘Testing Times: How Australian Are You?’ Online Opinion, 5th October, 2007, new citizenship test’ How much social cohesion is really needed? 157 particular forms of identity are chosen for promotion, they will most likely be those that are (believed to be) the most commonly held, which will make conforming to these markers easier for some than others – it is hard to imagine a national identity being chosen that is equally difficult for all citizens to embrace. With perhaps the exception of ‘territory’, all state attempts to articulate and push an identity will involve promoting ideas that are easier for some than others, and will thereby not only curtail the freedom of some citizens, but do so in unequal ways. This problem is not solved by state policies simply being about creating space for a ‘collective conversation’ if the result of the conversation is then turned into state sanctioned policy. It is hard to see how even if liberal nationalists favour more ‘collective conversation’ than standard nation building exercises, the result would not still be both broadly majoritarian or elitist,42 as well as favour those most interested in joining the ‘collective conversation’ in the first place. I am not arguing that multiple identities are not possible – indeed liberal nationalists with their desire to protect the private sphere clearly acknowledge this. It is simply that for a public identity to operate as Miller wishes it to, it will need to mean (December 2008), the Rudd Government had just announced that it would remove this type of cultural question from the test, though not completely from the accompanying booklet. 42 Jamie Mayerfeld, in the context of a hypothetical discussion over what a particular national history in liberal nationalist terms should be, argues that by using Miller’s own logic ‘the deck will always be stacked in favour’ of those who want a ‘bowdlerized version’ of the nation’s history, rather than those who wish to point out lapses and shortcomings; Jamie Mayerfeld, ‘The Myth of Benign Group Identity: A Critique of Liberal Nationalism’, Polity 30/4 (1998) 555-578, pp. 572-73. 158 Chapter 3 something sufficiently strong for the individual citizens who hold it. It is hard then to see how it will not have a constraining effect on individual freedom. This is not an argument that national identity should be completely ignored by the state, but simply to repeat the point I made above: if national identity is found to be necessary to undergird redistributive justice, then the state needs to be very careful in fostering such an identity as there seems little way of avoiding its impingement on some citizen’s freedom to live their lives as they see fit. But is a national identity necessary at all? Much of Miller’s concern for a national identity and shared public culture is as a tool to enable the requisite trust needed to support social cooperation: I take it as virtually self-evident that ties of community are an important source of trust between individuals who are not personally known to one another and who are in no position directly to monitor one another’s behaviour…Trust assumes particular importance if we ask about the conditions under which individuals will give their support to schemes of social justice, particularly schemes involving redistribution.43 43 Miller (1995), pp. 92, 93; see also Miller (1989). Likewise Brian Barry writes, ‘there is a strong causal link between cultural similarity and trust’; Brian Barry, ‘Self Government Revisited’, in his, Democracy and Power: Essays in Political Theory Vol 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 177. Margaret Moore points out that Barry has since changed his mind – Brian Barry, Justice and Impartiality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 164-68 – and he now takes the view that reasonable individuals can be suitably motivated by impartial reason, Margaret Moore (2001), p. 81n. How much social cohesion is really needed? 159 So one question that should be asked is: are there any non-identity methods, or at least non-national identity methods of building and maintaining trust that might be less restrictive on individual freedom?44 In the next sections, I discuss three possible alternatives: trust building, institutional belonging, and fair outcomes, and argue that these are preferable to national identity building. Trust Daniel Weinstock puts forward trust as a direct route to social unity, without the need to first have a shared identity – indeed Weinstock sees trust as not involving any particular shared characteristics at all (other than a sense of trust). This conception of cohesion has virtually no (or negligible) negative constraints on individual freedom.45 A society where trust is widely shared does not have to be a society where things are done particular ways – other than following through with agreed expectations, such as 44 Although I now turn to non cultural methods for building trust, I should point out that while initially plausible, I do not want to entirely concede the liberal nationalist point that a shared culture is linked to trust. There are good reasons to think that shared culture is neither necessary nor sufficient to gain trust. Arash Abizadeh argues that it is not necessarily the case that individuals will trust those who share their same culture – for example, many Chileans trusted British and Spanish Judges much more than they did Chilean Judges in relation to trying Pinochet. He also argues that general trustworthiness is better explained by a previous reputation for trustworthiness, rather than a shared culture, which may or may not lead to trustworthiness; Arash Abizadeh, ‘Does Liberal Democracy Presuppose a Cultural Nation? Four Arguments’ American Political Science Review 96/3 (2002) 495-509, pp. 501-502. 45 Daniel Weinstock, ‘Trust Building in Divided Societies’, Journal of Political Philosophy 7/3 (1999) 287-307. 160 Chapter 3 honouring contracts.46 Social trust relations in conditions of diversity can be understood as taking the form: A trusts B as an X to Ø, where X can be seen as ranging over roles or ‘politically salient identities’.47 Thinking of trust in this way allows a more targeted approach by programs and institutions in trust building (and maintaining), than more general identity approaches allow.48 Weinstock divides potential strategies of institutional design into three types. The first are those that affect A (the truster) by, for example, making it more rational for them to trust B, or by aiming to improve their attitudinal trust of B. The second are those that work on the trusted (B) by, for example, creating incentives for them to act in a trustworthy manner through rewards or punishments. And the third focuses on 46 This is not to ignore Emile Durkheim’s argument that ‘a contract is not sufficient by itself, but is only possible because of the regulation of contracts, which is of social origin’; Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society (New York: The Free Press, [1893] 1997), p. 162. While trust will of course require some shared values and norms, these are significantly fewer and of a different order to those involved in national identity projects. 47 Weinstock (1999), p. 297. 48 Weinstock is explicitly interested in institutional design rather than policy-making, arguing that: ‘[i]nstitutions structure citizens’ relations within civil society in a much more foundational and subterranean view than do policies. Fostering trust through institutional design might thus give rise to stabler long-lasting results. What is more, they will not risk being as counterproductive as might policies which are more explicitly geared to the task, and toward which members of a divided society might be more wary and cynical’; Weinstock (1999), p. 300. I should point out Weinstock is not necessarily trying to create ‘institutional belonging’ (which I discuss shortly) in divided societies, but to use institutional design to engender and build trust in divided societies. How much social cohesion is really needed? 161 the object or action (Ø) that A wants by, for example, making it easier to attain.49 Which method to use and how to put it into action will be context dependent, but nevertheless from this brief sketch it can be seen that it should be possible to work on trust issues in a reasonably targeted fashion. That is, where building and maintaining trust is a problem, institutions (and if necessary policies) can be designed to target the specific trust variables which need improving or maintaining. One potential negative attribute of a trust approach to building and maintaining sufficient social cohesion is that trust is malleable. While A’s trust of B to Ø is quite likely to extend to other actions too, conversely A’s distrust of B to Ø is likely to involve distrust with other actions as well. As Annette Baier writes, ‘trust comes in webs, not in single strands, and disrupting one strand often rips apart whole webs’.50 Moreover, this means that some part of the web must be intact – there must be some strands that are present that can be built upon if the aim is to increase trust relations in a diverse society.51 While this is a serious problem for trust building approaches to social cohesion, it seems only the most divided societies would have no trust web intact at all. Most diverse western liberal societies already have some trust networks in place, and the problem is more how to maintain and improve them and to stop them deteriorating, rather than how to bring them about in the first place. With some of the trust network in place, trust can be improved and maintained. 49 Weinstock (1999), pp. 300-305. 50 Annette Baier, ‘Trust and its Vulnerabilities’, in her, Moral Prejudices (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 130-151, p. 149, cited in Weinstock (1999), p. 299. 51 Weinstock (1999), p. 299. 162 Chapter 3 While in most western liberal societies generalised problems of complete distrust are not present, they do occur in specific areas. Indeed in many western liberal societies, these specific instances of distrust are one of the biggest issues; for example, the situation between Asian and non-Asian residents in several towns in Northern England, or between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians in many western New South Wales country towns. These types of examples indicate that trust issues do not normally involve all citizens of a polity, and are often very focussed. So once again, there is potential to have targeted solutions. One way this could be achieved is put forward by Patti Lenard,52 who suggests cooperation as a tool for trust building in very divided areas. Wary of simple ‘contact’ approaches, which in Michael Ignatieff’s phrase tend to lead to the ‘narcissism of minor differences’, Lenard suggests that under particular conditions and over sufficient time, cooperation in shared projects can build trust. For cooperation to build trust it must minimise the vulnerability of the parties – by, for example, making the costs of non-compliance low, and the benefits of compliance high – and the co-operators should have maximum input into the rules of the project to ensure that it is ‘theirs’. Lennard provides the example of a reasonably successful Serb and Croat house rebuilding project in the town of Gorni Vakuf in the former Yugoslavia, where a group of international non-governmental organisations provided the resources required for reconstruction on the condition that Serbs and Croats proved they were cooperating to rebuild homes for members of both groups. 52 Patti Lenard, ‘Trust, Democracy and Diversity’ (unpublished DPhil Thesis: Oxford University, 2005). How much social cohesion is really needed? 163 One of the big advantages of trust approaches to building social cohesion is that they are much more targeted. National identity building, which involves emphasising and promoting particular characteristics, is quite likely to affect a significant number of people who had no problem supporting common projects such as welfare redistribution in the first place. If redistribution is deemed of sufficiently high importance, and if identity is the only way of achieving this end, then, as I concluded above, a sufficient, and not simply necessary, amount of identity building is permissible. But if, as appears to be the case with more direct trust building methods, there are targeted ways of maintaining support for a project such as redistribution of resources with less cost to individual freedom, then these methods are to be preferred. There is always a danger with projects such as nation building that it will ‘over insure’, that is, while these projects might have legitimate ends, they may do much more than is necessary to achieve these ends, and thereby involve all citizens for the sake of the few that should have been targeted. It might be objected that this type of finely tuned approach would be far more expensive to execute than a more generalised trust approach. While this, if true, would be of some concern, it would not be a strong objection – the financial cost of a program should certainly not be the only normative consideration. Yet this approach may not be more expensive at all. An effective (as opposed to a short term politically expedient) approach to trust building will have to be very engaging, which would mean the fewer citizens involved, the better for both individual freedom and budget bottom lines. Superficial marketing slogans and events should not be confused with 164 Chapter 3 real and directed institutional and policy processes. The targeted approach seems much more likely to achieve actual results for less resources, as opposed to minimal results for less resources. Institutional belonging Another promising way of conceptualising the necessary glue to hold a society together is to look more deeply at what ties individuals to a polity. Andrew Mason argues that liberal nationalists conflate two ideas: belonging together, and belonging to a polity: In principle at least, the citizens of a state could identify with their major institutions and practices, and feel at home in them, without believing that there was any deep reason why they should associate together of the sort which might be provided by the belief that they shared a history, religion, ethnicity, mother tongue, culture, or conception of the good. In other words, the citizens of a state might in principle have a sense of belonging to a polity without thinking that there is any real sense in which they belonged together.53 Mason argues that there are two senses of identity at play. The first is an identity of belonging together, usually with a shared culture and common history, while the 53Andrew Mason, ‘Political Community, Liberal-Nationalism, and the Ethics of Assimilation’, Ethics 109 (1999) 261-286, p. 272. See also Andrew Mason, Community, Solidarity and Belonging: Levels of Community and their Normative Significance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). How much social cohesion is really needed? 165 second is an identity of belonging to the same polity where citizens identify with (some of) the same institutions and practices.54 While Mason acknowledges that such a distinction may be challenged as not having the likelihood of playing a role in real world national identification, such a distinction can be used to help explain national identification in countries like the USA, Switzerland, Belgium, and Canada. Indeed, the latter three multinational cases have forced at least one liberal nationalist to make some interesting moves to maintain coherence.55 The American case, one where there is a high degree of atomised individualism – something that Miller would say is the national culture56 – can also be read as a case where there is very little ‘belonging together’ but a sufficient amount of ‘belonging to’ the American polity, to its practices, symbols and institutions; ‘the flag, the Pledge, the Fourth, the 54 Mason (1999), p. 274. 55 Miller (1995), p. 96, writes that ‘Belgium, Canada and Switzerland work as they do because they are not simply multinational, but have cultivated common national identities’, to which he adds the footnote; ‘[t]here is a danger of saving the thesis by trivialising it’. Abizadeh accuses Miller of ‘trading on an ambiguity between two senses of common nationality: (1) sharing a common culture constituted in part by common beliefs, a common language, etc., and (2) sharing a common identity constituted by shared sentiments or an affective sense of belonging and commitment.’ He points out that Miller has stressed that two of the defining features of the nation are shared beliefs and a common public culture (1995, p. 22–25) and that what holds nations together are beliefs transmitted through a common culture (1995, p. 32), but now seems to have backed away from this seemingly foundational belief and emphasised shared institutions instead; Abizadeh (2002), p. 498. 56 Miller (1995), p. 94. 166 Chapter 3 Constitution’.57 This institutional loyalty can be seen as sufficient for citizens to accept the authority of shared institutions. Indeed as Mason argues, there is good reason to think that even when ‘belonging together’ is present, it is this institutional loyalty that maintains the viability of shared social schemes. He concedes that a ‘solidaristic national identity’ of Miller’s variety may be required for substantial redistribution (albeit an identity that has considerable agreement on the principles of social justice), redistribution could still be supported by citizens simply sharing a common fate through their belonging to the same polity.58 Belonging to a polity as the basis of national identity has the advantage that it allows citizens to identify with its institutions for their own reasons, rather than because of some official history – something that in many polities is both highly contested and exclusionary.59 Arash Abizadeh, along similar lines, uses the example of symbols such as flags, whose capacity to bind is not necessarily dependent on consensus over the meaning of the symbol; ‘a flag might symbolise the country’s military victories for one citizen, their Olympic glories for another, the federation of the country’s 57 Mason (1999), pp. 273-75, who is citing Michael Walzer, ‘What Does it Mean to be an American?’, Social Research 57/3 (1990) 591-624, p. 602. 58 Mason (1999), p. 279. 59 Mason (1999), p. 281 writes: ‘I want to allow that citizens may have very different interpretations of the ideals which they regard as embodied in its institutions – different conceptions of freedom, equality, and justice, for example – in such a way that they cannot be said genuinely to share principles. They might still value the same institutions, and identify with them in a way that is sufficient to sustain them, but for very different reasons.’ How much social cohesion is really needed? 167 constituent regions, and the country’s tradition of humanitarianism and peacekeeping for another’.60 While this is a necessarily simplified description, it should be clear that the ties that bind need not have an agreed public meaning, nor need they be directly related to other citizens. As such, it is theoretically and seemingly empirically possible to have a national identity that does not involve a shared culture and is mediated through institutional belonging, yet produces sufficient social cohesion to support common projects – including a degree of redistribution – while placing minimal constriction on individual freedom. Fair social outcomes So far I have been discussing welfare redistribution as an outcome of social cohesion, but there is good reason to think that this relationship can be reversed. Canada set up the Federal Government Social Cohesion Research Network in the late 1990s. It found that: social cohesion derives…from the very social outcomes (e.g., health results, security, economic well-being, education) that it contributes to. If a society fails to distribute its social outcomes equitably, social cohesion deteriorates and social outcomes suffer.61 Essentially the network found that social cohesion and social outcomes are in a reciprocal relationship, where improved social outcomes increase social cohesion and 60 Abizadeh (2002), p. 500 61 Stanley (2003), p. 8. 168 Chapter 3 vice versa. If individuals feel they are getting their fair share, then they are more likely to cooperate with others and enter joint enterprises, and if individuals feel they are excluded from fair outcomes, then this lowers their probability of cooperating.62 This is a model of social cohesion that has little to do with identity in the liberal nationalist sense, and is in fact reinforced by the very thing it is trying to achieve: a fair distribution of resources.63 The Canadian research network did find that shared values are required, but unlike the particular local values that are put forward in some approaches to social cohesion, these are simply generic liberal values. Dick Stanley lists them as ‘freedom, equality, tolerance, respect for the rule of law, [and] respect for human rights’.64 So while values such as these and their promotion will curtail the absolute freedom of some citizens, the promotion of these values is justified on the grounds that a society requires these values in order to protect individual freedom in the first place. These three alternatives to the shared national culture and identity approach to social cohesion appear quite promising; they are more targeted, and have less costs for 62 Stanley (2003), p. 13. 63 Likewise, James Jupp argues that social cohesion is maintained by a sound economy that distributes goods and services equitably. He thereby questions the Australian Government’s emphasis and increased spending on projects that assume the threat to social cohesion comes from ethnic diversity; James Jupp, ‘The Quest for Harmony’, in J. Jupp, J. Nieuwenhuysen & E. Dawson (eds), Social Cohesion in Australia (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 9-20, pp. 10, 18. 64 Stanley (2003), p. 10. How much social cohesion is really needed? 169 individual freedom. When social cohesion is a problem, it should not be assumed that it is a problem for all citizens and that the only way to improve it is on a national scale. Trust building, institutional belonging and fair social outcomes are methods that could be used in a complementary fashion to maintain sufficient social cohesion to support both cooperative schemes and welfare redistribution. It appears that the only role for the national identity methods of the liberal nationalists may be to support some forms of welfare redistribution, but even here it is not clear either that they are at all necessary, or that very much of this sort of identity is required. It seems, then, at least in relation to support for cooperative schemes, that nationalism should be kept to a minimum. Not only are other methods available and preferable, there is the very real danger that precisely because of the importance people place on their identities, nationalist sentiment is very hard to keep under control. If national identity is then promoted by the state, this has the potential to legitimate the social enforcement of ‘this is the way we do things around here’, which represents a direct threat to the core liberal value of liberty. Conclusion This chapter began with the concern that if citizens were not encouraged to respect each others’ differences, then society may lack sufficient unity to sustain welfare distribution and other cooperative projects, may even fracture, and may simply not be a very nice place in which to live. This concern over social cohesion has been a driving force behind many contemporary multicultural policies involving inter-citizen 170 Chapter 3 respect of difference. In the previous chapter, I argued that respect of difference was both an unjustified demand and an unjustifiable policy regime for individual citizens. Because of its apparent popularity as a policy prescription, this begged a question of social fragmentation. Yet rather than argue against the link between a policy of inter- citizen respect of difference and social cohesion (a link that is dubious at best), in this chapter I have instead questioned both the amount of social cohesion required and the methods used to achieve it. This was done by conceptualising social cohesion broadly as a tie that binds citizens together. It thus raised the questions of how strong this tie needed to be, what some of the threats to it could be, and finally, which methods were best used to achieve it. Because all forms of social cohesion have costs for individual freedom – either directly or through the social pressures to conform – state approaches to social cohesion building need to be justified by both (a) their achievement of a goal that will increase overall effective freedom, and (b) by their having the least costs to individual freedom compared to other methods. In this chapter I rejected intrinsic arguments for the good of national social cohesion as both too costly for individual freedom and because of the existence of a viable non-national alternative in freedom of association. Proponents of liberal nationalism provide an additional instrumental justification for social cohesion: its importance for the achievement of common projects and for redistributive justice. Yet fostering a national identity has costs for individual freedom which may not in the end be justifiable. Even if the importance of these goals is accepted, the building and maintaining of a common culture, decided How much social cohesion is really needed? 171 by citizens in the public sphere, has the potential to excuse the imposition of a ‘this is the way we do things around here’ mentality, which may go further than is required. This is of particular concern in the case of outlying citizens, many of whom may have actually supported common projects in the first place. The liberal nationalist approach is further weakened when it is acknowledged that viable and more liberal approaches exist, including targeted trust building, institutional belonging and ensuring fair social outcomes. While national identity building may seem a straightforward and direct path to social cohesion, it is a path that should be taken very warily. Because targeted trust building, institutional belonging and ensuring fair social outcomes are more liberal, they, and possibly other non-nationalist methods too, should be the preferred tools for building a sufficient quantity of social cohesion to achieve particular common goals. Finally, I am particularly sceptical about approaches that target all citizens for the sake of the few, especially when many of those targeted would support the common project without this type of coaxing, and those who would not, would quite often remain unaffected anyway. One objection that might still be put is that while I may have shown that national identity is not the only path to social cohesion, I have not necessarily shown it to be more demanding than the three alternatives I suggested.65 This objection turns on what precisely is being demanded. We can imagine somebody saying, ‘I’ll wear a hat with corks and sing nationalist songs, just don’t make me uphold equality of the sexes or have to employ and trust Jews’. Certainly for some citizens, being involved in 65 This objection was put to me by Geoffrey Brahm Levey. 172 Chapter 3 national identity projects may be easier than upholding the required norms of liberal citizenship. However, the types of practices found overly onerous here are sufficiently justified by the importance of maintaining basic civic freedom for all citizens; and as I have argued, the need to wear a cork hat, eat certain foods, or sing nationalist songs, is not so easily justified in this way. While the individual citizen is rightly expected to be minimally tolerant of their fellow citizen’s differences, they should not be required to respect them – even when they are the differences of the majority national culture. In the next chapter, I examine the meaning of ‘tolerance’ in this minimal requirement of citizen-citizen interaction, and distinguish this forbearance understanding of tolerance from the general state practice of toleration. Chapter 4 Re-examining toleration In many circles, toleration has a negative image. It is associated with either ‘mere toleration’ of difference (as opposed to some sort of enthusiastic acceptance or form of respect) or with a negative valuing based on an unequal and unjust power relation.1 The first part of this image problem was indirectly addressed in Chapters 1 and 2, where I argued that there were serious problems with an appreciation and respect approach to difference. I want to focus here on the second part of this image problem, the belief that if a person’s differences are tolerated, they are being viewed negatively.2 Yet this is not the only charge against toleration. From the other direction, it has been claimed that liberal neutrality, because it does not place any 1 Michael Walzer, for example, writes: ‘To tolerate someone else is an act of power; to be tolerated is an acceptance of weakness. We should aim at something better than this combination, something beyond toleration, something like mutual respect’; Michael Walzer, On Toleration (London: Yale University Press, 1997), p. 52. Two centuries earlier, Thomas Paine wrote that ‘[t]oleration is not the opposite of intoleration, but is the counterfeit of it. Both are despotisms’; Thomas Paine, ‘The Rights of Man’, in Reflections on the Revolution in France and The Rights of Man (New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday, [1791] 1973), p. 267. 2 While I will not directly address the issue of unequal power relations here, the argument I make in this chapter should deflate a large part, if not all, of this charge. 174 Chapter 4 value at all on particular differences, has superseded toleration.3 Thus it is argued, toleration is at best redundant, and at worst incompatible within liberal neutrality. Both of these criticisms rely, at least initially, on the premise that toleration is synonymous with negative valuing and forbearance. In this chapter, I critique both these lines of attack, and defend toleration as an important and pertinent political ideal, one that is maximally permissive of individual difference, and, crucially, one that does not always involve negative valuing. But before explaining my case further, I should perhaps address the question of ‘why bother?’. What is the point of rescuing toleration from this image problem, why not just leave it be, and let it have both a negative image and a negative value? As I have suggested already, respect of sameness implies toleration (as a general position), so why not just talk about respect of sameness and ignore toleration altogether? Toleration is a fundamental liberal value with an important and long pedigree. There 3 For statements of this view see: Glen Newey, ‘Is Democratic Toleration a Rubber Duck?’, Res Publica 7 (2001) 315-36; Glen Newey, Virtue Reason and Toleration (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999); Saladin Meckled-Garcia, ‘Toleration and Neutrality: Incompatible Ideals?’, Res Publica 7 (2001) 293-313; Saladin Meckled-Garcia, ‘Appendix: A Reply to Peter Jones’, in D. Castiglione and C. McKinnon (eds), Toleration, Neutrality and Democracy (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003), 181-85; Adam B. Seligman, ‘Tolerance, Tradition and Modernity’, Cardozo Law Review 24/4 (2003) 1645-56; John Horton, ‘Toleration as a Virtue’, in D. Heyd (ed.), Toleration: An Elusive Virtue (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 28-43; John Gray, Enlightenment’s Wake: Politics and Culture at the Close of the Modern Age (London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 19-20; and Robert Paul Churchill, ‘Neutrality and the Virtue of Toleration’, in D. Castiglione and C. McKinnon (eds), Toleration, Neutrality and Democracy (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003), 65-76. Re-examining toleration 175 is of course controversy over what its precise status is: Does it stand alone? Is it a derivative value out of autonomy?4 And how is it related to either liberty or equality? Yet regardless of whether it is a fundamental or derivative value, toleration remains a very important liberal value – albeit one whose meaning has subtly, yet importantly, changed over time. The fact that its meaning has changed from requiring European leaders to forbear and not impose their own religious beliefs on their subjects, to the more generally permissive meaning associated with the general practice of toleration today, does not diminish its importance in liberal theory. Concepts like freedom, equality, and justice have also been reinterpreted over time and they too remain vitally important to liberal theory and practice. By showing that its critics mischaracterise their target, the understanding of toleration I will advance here should hopefully help toleration retain its place as a fundamental liberal concept. 4 Chandran Kukathas describes toleration as the value ‘which is fundamental to liberalism’, such that ‘the greater the extent to which an association tolerates difference, the more it is a liberal association; and the greater the extent it suppresses dissent, the less it is a liberal association’; Chandran Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 23, 24. Others, such as Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) and Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), argue that autonomy is the fundamental liberal value on which liberal toleration turns (this is a position argued against later in this chapter). In contrast, Brian Barry has retorted ‘neither of the above’, instead advocating ‘the principles of equal freedom: civic equality, freedom of speech and religion, non-discrimination, equal opportunity, and so on’; Brian Barry, Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism (Cambridge: Polity, 2001), pp. 119, 122. 176 Chapter 4 In order to make my case, I will argue that in discussions of toleration there are two very distinct notions at play: one general and the other specific. The first is a general approach or regime and I will call this ‘toleration’. This concept is one of general permissiveness and need not involve negative valuing, but simply non-hindrance. The second notion involves negative valuing as well as withholding the power to negatively interfere, and this is the specific sense of the term that I will call this ‘tolerance’, or to avoid confusion, ‘forbearance tolerance’. I will argue that using this distinction has important advantages (particularly in a field where the two concepts are all too often used interchangeably), and that it allows us to understand a general regime of toleration as not solely being sustained by acts of forbearance tolerance, but also by indifference and even potentially by respect of difference.5 The general practice of toleration can be seen as an ‘umbrella’ term with specific acts of tolerance, indifference and even respect of difference underlying it and allowing the accommodation of specific differences. The link between toleration as a general practice and the potential accommodation of specific difference can be captured diagrammatically. From Figure 4.1 (which is a very slightly modified version of 5 The failure to uphold this type of distinction has led (in my mind at least) to a great deal of conceptual confusion. As Preston King put it in relation to two books on toleration he was reviewing: ‘to ignore the logical structure of the concept [of toleration] is to wander wilfully into a swamp – and that is a minor accomplishment of both books under review’; Preston King, ‘Review – Toleration: An Elusive Virtue; Tolerance and Community’, The American Political Science Review 91/1 (1997) 170- 71, p. 170. While the linguistic distinction between toleration and tolerance I am making here is at least partly stipulative, rather than a matter of logical structure, the distinction between the general and specific sense of toleration is a matter of logical structure. Re-examining toleration 177 Figure 0.1), it can be seen that toleration understood as permissiveness can involve either forbearance tolerance, indifference, or respect of specific difference, and that all three positions can lead to the accommodation of difference, that is, the freedom of individuals to live their lives as they see fit. This conception of toleration is in fact entirely consistent with strong multicultural and even (some) illiberal approaches to difference. While I have been advocating a predominately indifference approach to difference from the state, there is nothing in this understanding of toleration that says this need be the case. This model of toleration simply describes the conditions under which a general practice of toleration can lead to the accommodation of specific differences. It is a separate normative question as to which is the right approach to specific instances of difference to enable their accommodation under the umbrella of toleration. Indeed this high degree of normative neutrality is a big advantage of this model. Figure 4.1: The general practice of toleration and the accommodation of specific differences General Position Toleration Relationship with specific Forbearance Indifference Respect instances of difference Tolerance Outcome for specific differences Accommodation 178 Chapter 4 A distinction between ‘toleration’ and ‘tolerance’ is sometimes made in the literature, although it is seldom upheld. Anna Elisabetta Galeotti, for example, writes that, ‘there is a general tendency to use ‘tolerance’ for the interpersonal attitude and ‘toleration’ for the social and political principle’.6 Preston King argues that ‘toleration is broader than tolerance’, and he uses a negative way of distinguishing the concepts, such that ‘toleration’ is all ‘negations of intolerance…[including] indifference [and] favouritism, and most particularly…a system of equal rights’, and ‘tolerance’ is the ‘most minimal negation of intolerance’.7 In contrast, Bernard Crick uses ‘tolerance’ as ‘a specific term’, and ‘toleration’ for ‘explicit theories or doctrines which state we should be tolerant…of wide classes of actions or types of belief and behaviour’.8 So the semantic distinction is not without precedent. However, what I wish to argue is that upholding the general/specific distinction in relation to toleration clarifies several important misunderstandings, not least that toleration and liberal neutrality are incompatible. 6 Anna Elisabetta Galeotti, ‘Do We Need Toleration as a Moral Virtue’, Res Publica 7 (2001) 273-292, p. 273, n. 1. 7 Preston King, Toleration (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1976), pp. 12-13, 68. I take King’s distinction to be entirely consistent with the one I am using. Likewise, Jay Newman writes: ‘When we consider ordinary discourse, we are reminded that there are two different nouns corresponding to the verb ‘tolerate’ – ‘tolerance’ and ‘toleration’. The latter seems to have broader application; it refers to any instance of tolerating’; Jay Newman, Foundations of Religious Tolerance (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982), p. 5. 8 Bernard Crick, ‘Toleration and Tolerance in Theory and Practice’, Government and Opposition 6 (1971) 144-71, p. 144. Re-examining toleration 179 Being ‘tolerant’ One way to make the case for toleration not always being about forbearance and negative valuing, is to look at our use of the adjective ‘tolerant’. Sometimes it is used in a specific sense, for example, the way the now famous handshake between then Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin and then head of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation Yasser Arafat might be described. This is a tolerant act in a specific sense. When specific actions are described as tolerant in this sense, this usually means that there is some negative valuing that is being overcome, in other words, forbearance. In contrast, when an agent is described as particularly tolerant in the general sense, something quite different is usually meant. For example, the way a university might be described as particularly tolerant. In this general sense, what is normally meant is that a wide range of activities/differences is permitted. Yet importantly, in the general sense, this permissiveness is not the whole picture. Also implied is that this type of person/agent has fewer reasons to forbear in the first place. That is, a generally tolerant agent not only does not intervene particularly often, but also, and crucially, has less reason to interfere; their restraint is not only of action, but also of judgement. As John Horton writes: …the tolerant person is not a narrow-minded bigot who shows restraint; he or she is not someone with a vast array of prejudices about others’ conduct but who nonetheless heroically restrains him- or herself from acting 180 Chapter 4 restrictively…[t]he restraint involved in toleration is not exclusively of action but also of judgement.9 This point can also be made conversely. When an agent is described as intolerant in the general sense, this usually means that they not only put up with a lesser range of things before intervening, but also have narrower and stronger views on what they will permit in the first place. When a person or institution is said to be comparatively intolerant, this does not mean that they simply have the same values or types of irritants as a tolerant agent but choose to intervene more often. Rather, it means that the intolerant agent’s greater readiness to interfere is a result of their having significantly more potential irritants than a tolerant agent, which thereby generates a much wider scope of interference. Many things that may cause others to negatively intervene simply do not affect the tolerant agent at all – that is, they are entirely indifferent to many things that the intolerant agent associates with a strong value and thus reacts to. To repeat: the generally tolerant agent is more permissive across a greater range of differences, which are not only not acted upon, they are importantly not judged either.10 It is this sense of being tolerant that is captured in toleration as a general 9 Horton continues: ‘the extension of the concept to include narrowing of the range of what is considered objectionable is no doubt controversial…[y]et it is not altogether incongruent with many ordinary uses of tolerance’; John Horton (1996), p. 38. 10 Perhaps conceptually it might make sense to describe an agent who had negative views and judgements on absolutely everything they had power over, and who at the same time withheld Re-examining toleration 181 practice. A tolerant liberal state not only withholds power, but also crucially withholds judgement on a very wide range of its citizens’ differences. The tolerant liberal state is highly permissive, not because it forbears in relation to the differences of its citizens, but because, in most cases, it is indifferent to them. Beside arguing for the importance of maintaining this distinction between the general practice of toleration and specific instances of forbearance tolerance, in this chapter, I will also argue that the introduction of overly moral notions of both toleration and tolerance into discussions of diversity in contemporary liberal societies further confuses the issue, and that liberal regimes of toleration need to be understood politically as do specific acts of tolerance. Discussion of tolerance in relation to virtue ethics has too frequently, and unhelpfully, contaminated the discussion of toleration and tolerance in the political institutional domain. The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. In the next section, I present a justification for the general practice of toleration as permissiveness. I then argue for a non-moral interpretation of forbearance tolerance, before advancing a conception of toleration that is primarily, but not solely, sustained by indifference. Finally, I examine and reject three alternative solutions to the realisation that toleration may involve very little forbearance. These are: that toleration and/or tolerance should be transformed to entail positive valuing of difference; that liberal neutrality has supplanted toleration; interference on all these things, as very tolerant, but it is hard to imagine anything ever approaching a real case of such an extreme. Most agents are indifferent about at least some of the things that have power to negatively interfere with. 182 Chapter 4 and that neutrality and toleration remain consistent because toleration (as forbearance) is located in the citizenry, and state neutrality is its institutional expression. Justifying toleration If an agent, such as a state, is maximally tolerant it is maximally permissive of people’s differences, and conversely, if it is grossly intolerant it is maximally non- permissive of people’s differences. In this section I want to put forward a case that the general practice of political toleration is the appropriate state response to differences in a liberal society, and that the permissiveness of toleration should be the default position of the liberal state, rather than one that needs an instrumental-type justification. I should stress that my concern in this section is more with state-citizen and not citizen-citizen relations – I will address the nature of citizen-citizen relations in the section on forbearance tolerance that immediately follows this one. There are at least four types of arguments that have been used to justify toleration, including two types of epistemic argument. The first is that if we do not know what the truth actually is, there is no reason not to tolerate. If the best way of life cannot be known for certain, then there is no justification for repressing other ways of life. One of John Locke’s justifications for religious toleration was the inability to know Re-examining toleration 183 whether rulers and magistrates were actually enforcing the correct path to salvation.11 Second, and sometimes relatedly, it is argued that tolerating different practices will ultimately lead to the emergence of the truth.12 Thus although the best way of life may not be known now, tolerating a range of different ways of life will either eventually lead to the discovery of the best way of life, or at least the best way of life for each individual. Third, there is a pragmatic argument that toleration is a workable solution to disagreement – historically often very violent disagreement – on the issue of how people should lead their lives. This was one of the strongest motivations for the emergence of toleration in early modern political thought and practice. Here it was realised that trying to impose a way of life, in this case an interpretation of Christianity, onto unwilling others led to endless rounds of bloodshed as one side after the other seized power and tried to coercively enforce its beliefs. Practising toleration was seen as a way of finally breaking out of this cycle of violence.13 And 11 John Locke, Letter Concerning Toleration, J. Tully (ed.), (Indianapolis: Hackett, [1689] 1983). See also Voltaire, ‘Toleration’, in P. Gay (trans.), Philosophical Dictionary (New York: Basic Books, [1764] 1962). 12 J.S. Mill puts forward this argument for toleration in the second chapter of On Liberty. Importantly, these two epistemic reasons need not be linked, it might be believed that the true way of life may never be found, and thus toleration would not be linked to truth finding but only to scepticism. 13 Although certainly motivated by this problem of religious violence, Locke justified religious toleration of this sort theologically through the importance for salvation of individuals coming to God freely, rather than through coercion and violence, as well as by the fact that it is nowhere written in the New Testament (or shown by Jesus) that it is acceptable to use force to bring people to salvation. Locke also argues for toleration from reason (that it is simply irrational to coerce belief); that the 184 Chapter 4 finally, there is an argument that people’s lives go better if they choose for themselves, rather than have choices thrust upon them. That is, while there may be better or worse ways to live, the most important thing is that a person’s way of life is one they have chosen free from the coercive power of the state. The justification I want to give for toleration as a general political practice, however, is much stronger than these four. It is not contingent on truth claims, positive pragmatic outcomes, or whether people’s lives go better or worse. All of these types of argument are instrumental, in that they are contingent on toleration as a practice serving some other good.14 I wish to argue that toleration is the ‘default’ liberal position, whose validity is not contingent on it producing some particular good. As I wrote in the Introduction of this thesis, liberalism, if it is anything, involves respect for individual freedom and a questioning of the use of state power. Thus without sufficient justification, in relation to protecting and promoting this individual freedom, the state should not use its power to interfere with how people live their lives. In the words of Bernard Williams: magistrate has no right from either God or consent to care for salvation; as well as through the aforementioned argument from scepticism. See Locke ([1689] 1983). 14 The purely sceptical argument is not, it must be said, instrumental, but when coupled (as it often is) with the argument that allowing a greater range of ways of life can lead to the emergence of truth it is instrumental. In any case, it is contingent on the scepticism being warranted, as it implies that if somehow the truth could be known then toleration would not be justified. Re-examining toleration 185 [P]olitical power is withheld from enforcing certain outcomes, not because the people affected have a right under the good of autonomy to choose their way of life without undue external influence, but because state power should not be used in that kind of purpose…If such a view is taken about the restriction of state power, then toleration as a practice will indeed follow.15 This default position is one of toleration of difference. That is, it is maximally permissive of the way people live their lives. This is not to say the state cannot justly deviate from this position, simply that it needs sufficient justification for doing so. This position does not require any of the above four arguments. Arguing for an independent good that comes from toleration gets the whole thing the wrong way around. A regime of toleration is the correct liberal response to diversity irrespective of epistemic questions, pragmatic concerns, or a view on what makes people’s lives go better. Put simply, state power should be held back from influencing people’s lives without sufficient justification, and thus good reasons are needed not to practise toleration. The only right (rather than good) reason to practise toleration is that a liberal state should not interfere in people’s lives (without sufficient justification). Whether this actually leads to other effects such as the emergence of the truth about life, or people live happier, less hostile lives is beside the point. 15 Bernard Williams, ‘Toleration, a Political or Moral Question?’, in G. Hawthorn (ed.), In the Beginning Was the Deed: Realism and Moralism in Political Argument, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 128-38, p. 134. 186 Chapter 4 This description of a regime that is maximally tolerant as one that is maximally permissive is one in which people are the most free to live their lives as they see fit. ‘Free’ here means free from forms of coercion (by the agent of toleration) which would impinge on the living of a life as one sees fit. It might be and, indeed, often is argued, that being free to have and follow your life’s direction requires some sort of state interference. For example, if your difference involves speaking a minority language and your minority language has few speakers and strong outside pressures from a majority language(s), then the successful pursuit of your way of life may ultimately require state support, such as putting public signs in your language or providing funds for education in your language. I do not want to argue here directly against this conception of ‘maximally tolerant’ – this is something that has been criticised by several authors, and I have already discussed the problems of state respect of difference in Chapter 1 – except to say that each move the state makes to secure one person’s greater freedom to exercise their difference, all too commonly means another person’s potential to exercise theirs is diminished. As I have argued throughout, respect of sameness is of fundamental importance in a diverse liberal society. I have described it as a strong, yet thin concept, which is best conceptualised as a bunch of basic liberal rights of citizenship. Grouped together under the state with other citizens, this respect of sameness becomes the practice of toleration of difference. A regime of toleration of difference upholds the respect of each citizen’s sameness, permitting each citizen to live their own life as they see fit with the minimal amount of interference from the state. Importantly, respect of Re-examining toleration 187 sameness does not mean each citizen is the same in any thick sense, simply that they have the same basic rights and are entitled to the same respect of these rights. The sameness is what is held in common, and it is this that allows the expression of difference. It might be objected that toleration as the absence of state interference is not consistent with respect of sameness because it does not address the problem of individuals not necessarily having an equal chance to express their differences. Addressing this objection fully would mean opening up the question of what an equal opportunity means in this domain and how far it can be made to extend and at what cost to others. Nevertheless two quick points can be made in response to this concern. First, an opportunity to express your difference need not be equal, but could plausibly be sufficient and negative. That is, nobody is directly constraining your difference, such as may happen if homosexuality is made illegal. A sufficient and negative opportunity to be homosexual may simply require no laws that prohibit it or associated activities, and the upholding of no discrimination in the relevant public spheres. It does not necessarily require funding or support for homosexual groups, or, for example, a network to put isolated homosexuals in touch with each other.16 16 Brian Barry argues that what it means to have an available ‘choice’ or ‘opportunity’ should not simply be subject-dependent, but must be thought of as objective. That is, the existence of an opportunity cannot be contingent on other choices an individual may have made. For example, religious Jews still have the opportunity to work on the Sabbath, despite not choosing to. On the other hand, a wheel chair bound paraplegic does not have the opportunity to take several flights of stairs into a building. See Barry (2001), pp. 32, 37-38. This is in contrast with Bhikhu Parekh, who views 188 Chapter 4 Second, and importantly, even positions that hold that some (or all) specific differences require positive state support can, as I will show in this chapter, still be theoretically accommodated within a regime of toleration – a general concept of toleration is a concept of permissiveness, and permissiveness does not necessarily exclude assistance. The specific notion of tolerance: political, not moral I want now to turn to the specific sense of tolerance. In this section I will argue that the primary good of forbearance tolerance lies in the freedom of the individuals who are tolerated, and not in the virtue or reasoning of those who are forbearing. This means that in relation to institutional arrangements and design, forbearance tolerance should be interpreted politically and not morally. My primary interest here will be in outlining the appropriate notion of forbearance tolerance for inter-citizen relations. opportunity as being a ‘subject-dependent concept’, such that the religious Jew would not have the opportunity to work on Saturday; Bhikhu Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory (London: Palgrave, 2000), p. 241. As I mentioned in the Introduction (n. 36), Susan Mendus warns that this emphasis on choice and luck is the wrong way to think about both multiculturalism and egalitarianism, and that such a distinction cannot meaningfully be made in this sort of pre-institutional manner; Susan Mendus, ‘Choice, Chance and Multiculturalism’, in P. Kelly (ed.), Multiculturalism Reconsidered: Culture and Equality and its Critics (Cambridge: Polity, 2002), 31-44. While David Miller argues that the existence of an effective opportunity must take into account potentially ‘excessive costs’, for example, going against a cultural commitments or having to pay a large sum of money (such as in the case of expensive university education); David Miller, ‘Equal Opportunities and Cultural Commitments’, in P. Kelly (ed.), Multiculturalism Reconsidered: Culture and Equality and its Critics (Cambridge: Polity, 2002), 45-61, pp. 51-52. Re-examining toleration 189 The specific notion of tolerance is most commonly defined as involving an initial negative reaction towards something, the power to do something to negatively interfere with that thing (or its holder), and the decision not to interfere for some other reason. For example, an agent may think atheism is a serious moral wrong, they may have the power to legally discriminate against atheists in something like the gaining of employment, yet they may decide to employ an atheist because they believe that religious belief is not relevant in the performance of the job. To ‘tolerate’ here clearly involves a negative value to the object of tolerance. A more formal definition of this view of tolerance in specific instances can be stated as follows: x can be said to be tolerating y’s performance of z when x disapproves of y doing z, and when x has the capacity to intentionally hinder y in their performing z, and yet chooses not to.17 I will use this definition to refer to specific instances of tolerance, or simply ‘tolerance’. When dealing with specific instances of tolerance what is important is forbearance or intentional non-hindrance despite having both the power to hinder and a reason, such as the moral wrongness of a belief, to hinder. 17 This definition which I first introduced in Chapter 2, is based on Andrew Shorten’s, but has two key differences which I discuss in the text; Andrew Shorten, ‘Toleration and Cultural Controversies’, Res Publica 11 (2005) 275-299, p. 280. 190 Chapter 4 I have chosen to use the vague word ‘hinder’ as opposed to ‘prevent’ or even ‘interfere’. To define an act of tolerance as requiring ‘not preventing’ seems too strong. There are many acts which do not entirely prevent, such as acts of intimidation or failed attempts to completely prevent the performance of an action, which should still be considered intolerant. To give an example, throwing rocks at people of a certain background who are trying to reach a polling place may intentionally hinder them, even though it may not ultimately prevent them from voting. What precisely is an act of intolerance is contestable – is simply voicing an opposed opinion intolerance? Or does it require something stronger? Nevertheless, wherever the tolerance/intolerance line lies, it seems there are many acts short of successful prevention which should be rightly described as intolerant. At the other end of the spectrum, to say a tolerant act requires ‘not interfering’ is also problematic. While interference can often intentionally hinder, it can also intentionally enable; for example, giving extra resources to a minority language speaker. My use of ‘intentionally hinder’ is intended to track what would usually be considered intolerant acts. The above formal definition is a modified version of Andrew Shorten’s definition, which he claims is ‘normatively neutral’ and is intended to be ‘politically justifiable’. One of the other modifications I have made (besides changing ‘prevent’ to ‘intentionally hinder’) is to remove the proviso, ‘when y has freely chosen that she wants to do z’. By the inclusion of this proviso, Shorten intends to restrict instances of tolerance to non-ascriptive characteristics, and thereby rule out tolerance of things Re-examining toleration 191 like skin colour by definition. This may be a plausible move if the moral virtue of tolerance is being discussed, where virtue ethicists may wish to say that the forbearing of something that could not be otherwise is not as virtuous as tolerating something freely chosen by its holder. Nevertheless, this would not be ‘normatively neutral’. However, the discussion here is of specific instances of tolerance in relation to political and social arrangements. In this area, while choice on behalf of the tolerator is crucial – they have to be in a position to actually tolerate – choice is not crucial on the side of the tolerated. For an instance of tolerance to occur, all that is required is that despite a negative valuing of some aspect of the tolerated, the tolerator does not intentionally hinder them in their performing or expressing of some action. In defence of this requirement of choice, Shorten cites Richard Bellamy’s view that: ‘to claim to tolerate the fact that someone is black is as non-sensical as saying that one tolerates that the sun rises in the morning and sets at night’.18 By this he means that it makes no sense to tolerate something that could not be otherwise. As I state above, this may make sense from the perspective of virtue ethics: how can it be considered a virtue to withhold interfering in something that could not be otherwise, 18 Richard Bellamy, ‘Toleration, Liberalism and Democracy: A Comment on Leader and Valdes’, Ratio Juris 10 (1997) 177-86, p.177, cited in Shorten (2005), pp. 280-81. Shorten and Bellamy are not alone in the belief that tolerance can only occur in relation to chosen characteristics. Others who hold that things like ‘race’ cannot be objects of tolerance include; Rainer Forst, ‘Toleration Justice and Reason’, in D. Castiglione and C. McKinnon (eds), Toleration, Neutrality and Democracy (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003), 71-85, p. 82, n. 3; and Horton (1996), 28-43. 192 Chapter 4 such as black skin?19 But to what extent can this formulation actually be of much use in diverse societies? What markers of difference are actually chosen? And are they really freely chosen? That is, to what extent can somebody’s difference be otherwise through their own agency? If I am brought up in a particular way, denied particular information and experiences, perhaps schooled in certain prejudices, while I will probably have more choice to change my views and behaviour than my skin colour, how much significant choice do I have? And indeed, how is the tolerator to know what my particular background conditions are, let alone my potential genetic predispositions? How are they to know, for example, which head scarf wearers are exercising a free choice and which have been coerced?20 Galeotti puts the critique of the virtue ethics approach this way: The fact is that the philosophical discussion on toleration as a moral disposition is of little consequence for dealing with the political issue of toleration: one thing is to understand how permitting wrongdoing can be a 19 Similar to Bellamy and Shorten, Galeotti writes: ‘there is no first-order moral stance to overcome [with most ascriptive characteristics], as it is wrong to have racist attitudes in the first place’; Galeotti (2001), p. 280. 20 Even if, pace Shorten’s stated intention, his definition was in fact restricted to the moral virtue, the insistence on choice would still remain problematic, as indeed it does in the wider multicultural literature. Re-examining toleration 193 virtue, and another to understand how different and conflicting ways of life can peacefully coexist and express themselves freely.21 The issue here, and indeed in many discussions of the concept of tolerance, is one of requiring acts of tolerance as a political solution to the problems of diversity and the potential for serious acts of intolerance. While it may seem morally repugnant that racists exist within a society, all that can be required of them is precisely to tolerate that which they detest. It may ultimately be decided that tolerance is not enough to sustain a society, and that realising the respect of its citizens’ basic rights requires something else, such as education about the falsity of racist beliefs. But crucially, the racist will still be required to tolerate whatever it is they find despicable, chosen or otherwise. A distinction is sometimes upheld between acts of tolerance where the disapproval is based on moral reasons – because the object of tolerance is thought to be somehow immoral, for example the circumcision of children – and tolerance where disapproval is based on non-moral reasons, for example, dislike of someone’s clothing on aesthetic grounds.22 The ‘real’, or at least ‘strong’, notion of forbearance tolerance is 21 Anna Elisabetta Galeotti, Toleration as Recognition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 23. See also Galeotti (2001). She is critiquing here the use of virtue ethics in both the specific and general notions of toleration. 22 Mary Warnock makes this distinction between a ‘strong’ (moral) and a ‘weak’ (non-moral) sense of tolerance in response to Peter Nicholson’s narrow definition of tolerance as a virtue which requires disapproval to be strictly moral. She freely admits that it is quite a weak distinction, as both moral and 194 Chapter 4 then thought to be that which derives from moral disapproval. Yet this way of distinguishing types of tolerance is subject to much of the same difficulties as the attempts to rule out ascriptive characteristics. If the aim of trying to understand specific instances of tolerance is to help decrease the actual instances of intolerance, then this distinction is not particularly useful. There is no reason to suppose that the most intolerant acts, or at least those that most curtail the freedom of the holders of difference, are correlated with moral disapproval, and not just disapproval per se. Are those who are intolerant towards veiled women always doing so on moral grounds? Once again, attempts to distinguish between moral and non-moral tolerance – and then emphasise the importance of moral tolerance – will not be of much use in a real political context where individuals must at minimum practise forbearance tolerance. As such, I will simply allow that an agent’s reasons for distaste are theirs, and in political terms, it is not relevant why the distaste is there, simply that where it exists and threatens the pursuit of another individual’s rights and freedom, tolerance is to be practised. non-moral judgements are ultimately grounded in strong feelings for which no further reason can be given; Mary Warnock, ‘The Limits of Toleration’, in S. Mendus and D. Edwards (eds), On Toleration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 123-139, pp. 125-27, and Peter Nicholson, ‘Toleration as a Moral Ideal’, in J. Horton and S. Mendus (eds), Aspects of Toleration (London: Methuen, 1985), 158- 73. See also D.D. Raphael, ‘The Intolerable,’ in S. Mendus (ed.), Justifying Toleration: Conceptual and Historical Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 137-154, and Saladin Meckled-Garcia who curiously limits his seemingly political discussion on the compatibility of toleration and neutrality to the moral sphere only; Meckled-Garcia (2001), p. 295. Re-examining toleration 195 One final point needs drawing out about this definition of tolerance in specific instances: it requires power on behalf of the tolerator. A prisoner can be said to be tolerating (in the relevant sense) their imprisonment if they could in fact escape (such as they were a giant living in a world of little people), but if there was no possibility of escape, they cannot be said to be tolerating their imprisonment (in the relevant sense), but are merely enduring it.23 This requirement of power demonstrates perhaps the most serious theoretical problem with Bellamy’s forceful rhetorical analogy between tolerating a person’s blackness and the sun rising and setting. It is not possible to imagine a situation in which the tolerator has the power to intentionally hinder the sun’s rising and setting,24 but there are plenty of situations in which the tolerator has the power to not allow black people to freely perform important tasks in society, or worse, wants to, and can, cause them serious harm. Within a diverse polity, specific instances of inter-citizen tolerance simply require disapproval of a difference, the power to negatively interfere with its holder’s freedom to perform an act, and the decision not to negatively interfere. To ask for anything more risks conflating ethics and politics. This is not to say more should not be hoped from people, just that when designing political arrangements more should 23 King when making this distinction describes the powerless version of tolerance as ‘acquiescence’; King (1976), p. 22. 24 Of course, we can imagine a person so detesting the pattern of night and day that they lock themselves in a light-proof room, and indeed in this situation it would make sense to say that they cannot tolerate the sun rising and setting – they do have power. But this is not the type of move underlying Bellamy’s analogy. 196 Chapter 4 certainly not be assumed. Nor should important acts of tolerance be dismissed because they have not followed a correct and very precise moral path. Perhaps one of the biggest problems with the virtue ethics approach is that the focus is on the tolerator, and whether or not they are acting in a virtuous way. One assumes that this is at least partially motivated by the idea that if individuals all act more virtuously there will be good consequences for others.25 If instead much more focus is on the consequences of tolerance, that is, on the freedom of the tolerated to engage in an act free from negative interference, then less significance will be placed on any potential moral goodness of the tolerator. This is not to say that an act of tolerance should only be measured by the freedom of the tolerated, just that this should be the primary aim of encouraging and requiring acts of tolerance amongst the citizenry. As such, any strictly moral notions must be kept out of political discussions of tolerance. I have said nothing so far about specific instances of state-citizen tolerance, focussing instead on inter-citizen acts of tolerance. In many ways state-citizen acts of tolerance will actually have similar features to the virtue ethics approach; they should involve chosen features, and in many cases, moral beliefs. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the virtue ethics approach is suitable in this domain either. It simply means that the reasons the liberal state will have to forbear will by necessity be principled, rather than simple matters of taste. When it does forbear, it will be because those under its 25 While strict virtue ethicists hold virtuous acts as good in themselves irrespective of their consequences for others, most of those who write directly on tolerance (whether explicitly as a virtue or not), are concerned with its political consequences. Re-examining toleration 197 power hold views that contradict its conception of justice. Importantly, this overlap is coincidental, and does little to salvage the moral notion of tolerance in this context either. Toleration as a general practice I now want to introduce the general notion of toleration which differs significantly from the specific notion of what I have called ‘tolerance’. When toleration is used in a general sense, as in a ‘regime of toleration’, for example, it is no longer simply referring to acts of forbearance. Although I first introduced the features of the general concept by simply focussing on generally tolerant agents rather than directly on the state, I want to narrow the focus in this section to state practices of toleration because of their significant normative importance. In my exploration of the general concept of toleration I will have three lines of argument. The first is that toleration is not reducible to specific acts of forbearance tolerance, and instead comprises a great deal of indifference. The second is that, like the specific concept, it too needs to be thought of primarily in political and not mainly moral terms. And third, I will defend the justification for toleration I made earlier against autonomy-based and other instrumental justifications. Bernard Williams usefully draws a distinction between two types of general practice of toleration: political and moral.26 Unlike in the case of moral acts of forbearance 26 Williams (2005), and Bernard Williams, ‘Toleration: An Impossible Virtue?’, in David Heyd (ed.), Toleration: An Elusive Virtue (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 18-27, pp. 19-20. 198 Chapter 4 tolerance – where ‘moral’ is associated with the reasons for disapproval – in the general practice of toleration, Williams uses the political/moral distinction to refer to the particular justification of the general practice. Williams describes moral toleration as a practice of toleration which is grounded in the good of moral autonomy, that is, in the making of entirely autonomous (free from external inducements or pressures) decisions by individuals about moral choices.27 On the other hand, political toleration is not grounded in any singular attitude or value, but in a multitude of context- sensitive political attitudes. These could include a desire for social cooperation, getting on peacefully with other citizens, and realising the costs and limitations of using coercive power.28 He cautions that: We should be careful about making the assumption that what underlies a practice or an attitude of toleration must be a personal virtue of toleration…it is a serious mistake to think that this virtue is the only, or perhaps most important, attitude on which to ground practices of toleration…toleration as a matter of political practice…is an extremely important result; but as an 27 Williams (2005), pp. 131-35. Although Williams uses the phrase ‘moral autonomy’, he seems to be mainly referring to what is commonly called ‘personal autonomy’, rather than (or at least, as well as) full blown Kantian moral autonomy (the metaphysical idea that individuals have free will and moral responsibility, and are thus moral agents). For a crisp enunciation of this distinction, see Gerald F. Gaus, ‘The Place of Autonomy within Liberalism’, in J. Christman and J. Anderson (eds), Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism: New Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 272- 306, pp. 272-73. 28 Williams (2005), p. 138. Re-examining toleration 199 attitude is less than [‘forbearance tolerance’]…as a practice, the attitude it relies on is indifference.29 Williams’ point is twofold. First, as I was arguing in the previous section, acts of forbearance tolerance do not require the personal moral virtue of tolerance. That is, acts of tolerance can be engaged in for purely prudential, and not moral reasons. As I argued there, it is too narrow a view for any political discussion to hold that forbearance can only be rightly described as tolerance if it meets strict moral conditions. His second point is that the general practice of political toleration does not rely on tolerance as forbearance, but on indifference. The relationship between either the virtue of tolerance or singular acts of forbearance tolerance, and the general practice of toleration is far from straightforward. A regime of toleration is composed of much more than simply specific acts of tolerance. In fact forbearance may have a very marginal role to play. A tolerant regime is one that withholds power to negatively interfere. While historically, this power was withheld in specific cases because of moral disagreement, the contemporary liberal state withholds power for different reasons. In the vast majority of cases power is withheld because it is simply not the business of the state to interfere in (most of) the various ways people live their lives. While in some cases a (non-neutral) liberal state may have a view on what is a good life – for example, one that promotes autonomy – and thus will be forbearing in some areas, even here, the state should predominantly have 29 Williams (1996), pp. 19-20. 200 Chapter 4 no view at all on the vast majority of its citizens’ life choices. This is not to say that such a state is not tolerant, just that it does very little forbearing. If the general/specific distinction is accepted, then there is nothing particularly peculiar about this state of affairs. However, Williams’ point is wider than simply showing the lack of a link between a forbearance tolerance (even in a non-moral form) and the political practice of toleration. He is also arguing against any concept of what he calls ‘moral toleration’. By this he means the practice of toleration should not be justified via the moral value of autonomy. If acting autonomously is taken to involve the forming and following of rationally revised (and revisable) preferences without undue social coercion, then, as he argues, it is difficult to see how toleration can arise from this moral value. Williams makes two points against such a ‘moral’ justification of toleration.30 First, this view of autonomy makes any belief that liberalism is not just ‘another sectarian doctrine’ highly implausible. The goodness or rightness of this type of view of autonomy is clearly not readily acceptable to many.31 Second, if the importance of 30 Of course autonomy-based toleration is not the only type of moral toleration, even pragmatic justifications (such as prevention of physical violence) normally have some sort of moral element. But crucially this is not as thick a conception of morality as the practice of toleration justified through this value of autonomy. 31 A good example here is the British Islamic community’s response to the Swann Report on the education of children from ethnic minorities in the 1980s: ‘By multicultural education the Swann Committee wants to impose on Muslim children what it considers of educational value – such as autonomy, and a critical approach to their own faith and culture – and is not ready, in the name of Re-examining toleration 201 forming preferences without undue social pressure is taken seriously, then instances of forbearance tolerance (which will still occur within a regime of toleration) will be difficult to justify. This is because at least some senses of disapproval of another’s differences can be seen to undermine its holder’s autonomy. By disapproving of, even if not actually stopping, the expression of another’s particular difference, there is a risk of placing autonomy reducing pressure on the holder of this difference.32 It might be objected that the sorts of social pressures that actually impinge on autonomy only really cut in at a particular level. However, as Williams notes, there is no reason to think that this autonomy affecting level will in fact coincide with what can be considered a real act of forbearance tolerance, and not simply an act of ‘rationality’ to accept that which is based in revealed truth…This sort of multiculturalism claims to promote tolerance and understanding, but it tacitly justifies cultural domination by the secularist anti- religious majority’; The Islamic Academy, The Teaching of Islam in British Schools: An Agreed Statement (Cambridge: Islamic Academy, 1985), quoted in Geoffrey Brahm Levey, ‘Identity and Rational Revisability’, in I. Primoratz and A. Pavkovic (eds), Identity, Self-determination and Secession (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 43-58, p. 43. 32 Susan Mendus also criticises the use of autonomy to justify toleration. She argues that while the development of autonomy (which is ongoing and never complete) requires restricting freedom and thus the range of toleration, the exercise of autonomy requires much greater freedom, and thus much greater toleration. Since a concern with the development of autonomy will narrow the range of tolerated actions which can then impede the exercise of autonomy, she concludes that the distinction between the condition of autonomy and the development of autonomy cannot in the end be sustained; Susan Mendus, Toleration and the Limits of Liberalism (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1989), pp. 97-107. 202 Chapter 4 indifference.33 To put this second point another way: personal autonomy requires uncoerced choices, and there is no reason to suppose that uncoerced choices will be possible in situations of true forbearance because of the pressure of disapproval,34 and therefore it is difficult to use autonomy as the primary justification for forbearance and toleration.35 Nevertheless, a counter objection here may run as follows: ‘a general liberal practice of toleration primarily involves indifference, and as such coercive autonomy reducing pressures will not be present, and therefore autonomy can still be used to justify the practice of toleration’. There are three responses to this argument. First, the liberalism as just ‘another sectarian doctrine’ charge still holds. Second, as I have argued, a liberal regime of toleration will not only involve indifference but acts of forbearance too, and thus these acts of forbearance still need to be justified. And finally, even if liberal toleration did only involve indifference, then as I argued earlier, if we return to 33 Williams (2005), pp. 131-34. 34 Anne Phillips, in her discussion of whether women entering into arranged marriages are acting autonomously, argues that ‘emotional and moral pressure’ does count as the type of ‘literal and outright coercion’ which undermines real autonomy; Anne Phillips, Multiculturalism without Culture (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007), pp. 125-26. 35 There is a particular irony here. If Williams is right about the pressure of disapproval undermining autonomy, then the state that promotes this conception of autonomy strongly may also be undermining it to just such a strong degree. This is because the amount of forbearance that occurs in a regime of toleration will be directly related to the values of that particular state – the more values (in both quantitative and qualitative terms) the state has, the more it is likely to have to forbear those who do not follow them. Re-examining toleration 203 what I have taken as the fundamental premise of liberalism (that the use of state power, rather than its non-use, needs to be justified), then toleration as the absence of interference does not require this notion of autonomy to justify it. Autonomy may well be brought in to add another reason for toleration, but importantly it would not be necessary for the general practice of toleration to be justified on liberal grounds.36 Thus it seems that only a very weak view of autonomy can sustain the practice of toleration, and not an insistence on autonomy, as commonly understood, as a distinct 36 Joseph Raz also uses autonomy to ground the practice of toleration. He argues that for individuals to be able to exercise autonomy, there needs to be a situation of ‘competitive moral pluralism’; that is, the existence of incommensurate and distinct, yet morally valuable, options. However, because ‘competitive moral pluralism’ by its nature is likely to lead to intolerant tendencies, toleration, at least of morally valuable and autonomous ways of life, is required to sustain it; Joseph Raz, ‘Toleration, Autonomy and the Harm Principle’, in S. Mendus (ed.), Justifying Toleration: Conceptual and Historical Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 155-175. Deborah Fitzmaurice goes even further than Raz, arguing that ‘no independent principle of toleration is required’, and that instead the requirement is simply to sustain and foster individual autonomy; Deborah Fitzmaurice, ‘Autonomy as a Good: Liberalism, Autonomy, and Toleration’, Journal of Political Philosophy 1/1 (1993) 1-16, p. 16. I do not wish to critique either of these arguments directly here, but simply to say that: first, they hinge on the acceptance of autonomy as a primary moral good; second, while Raz’s argument may provide an additional argument for toleration, the rightness of toleration is not contingent upon it; and third, the question of what is an autonomy reducing pressure remains in both cases. 204 Chapter 4 moral good.37 This way of justifying the general practice of toleration is consistent with toleration as permissiveness justified through individual freedom, whereby state power should be withheld from interfering in people’s lives without sufficient justification. This is a much more political conception of toleration than the moral notion of toleration that is grounded in either the virtue of tolerance or the importance of autonomy. Earlier in this chapter, I argued that the practice of toleration should be grounded in the fact that the state should not interfere with its citizens’ ways of life without sufficient justification. It may seem, however, that I am contradicting this position in two ways here. The first apparent contradiction may be on the issue of autonomy and the formation of ways of life. I should stress that my argument for toleration as a political practice was based on the justification for the use of state power in interfering in people’s lives; I did not say anything about what particular conditions should be present for the formation of particular ways of life. As such, I leave open the possibility that a concern for autonomy could, in some circumstances, be seen as a sufficient justification for negatively interfering with people’s differences and thereby be a brake on the practice of toleration. But importantly, it would not be a justification for toleration itself. 37 I have deliberately been silent on whether the Kantian and much more metaphysical notion of moral autonomy justifies toleration. Certainly the fact that individuals have a particular moral worth is a necessary justification of the practice of toleration. Re-examining toleration 205 The second potential site of contradiction is in my now seeming endorsement of Williams’ grounding of political toleration in ‘a multitude of context sensitive political attitudes’, including, in his words, ‘a desire for social co-operation, getting on peacefully with other citizens, and realising the costs and limitations of using coercive power’. Earlier I rejected an instrumental approach to justifying toleration, and Williams has just provided one. While Williams’ political and pragmatic justification of the general practice of toleration is instrumental, importantly, it involves a wider set of reasons than the earlier justifications (epistemic uncertainty, positive pragmatic outcomes, and making people’s lives go better), and is thus preferable. Justifying toleration in liberal freedom does not ground its rightness in any of these type of reasons – including those of Williams. All of these types of reasons, including those Williams cites, could be motivations that help a regime institute the right liberal approach to diversity: toleration. But crucially, the primary rightness of toleration is not contingent on epistemic or pragmatic concerns. Thus my own view of political toleration differs from Williams’ as it is grounded in liberal freedom rather than in pragmatic concerns. While this view is in some ways more moral than Williams’ political toleration, importantly it is not as moral as an autonomy justified notion of toleration, and certainly not as moral as grounding toleration in any moral virtue of tolerance. Two things may now be concluded. First, reasons for practising tolerance (that is withholding the power to hinder) need not be strictly moral but can be prudential (including self serving), and reasons for any initial disapproval need not be moral 206 Chapter 4 either. Second, the practice of toleration can involve extremely little tolerance in the traditional forbearance sense, and may in fact be primarily sustained by indifference. The fact that a tolerant liberal state may not do much forbearing has been previously recognised. I will now examine, and ultimately reject, three other attempts to deal with what has been considered an anomaly. Responses to the apparent disconnect between toleration and negative valuing That the general practice of toleration is neither synonymous with, nor reducible to, forbearance tolerance has been noted by several authors and has elicited a range of responses, with some trying to salvage the forbearance conception, others trying to transform it, and yet others arguing that it is no longer relevant. If the distinction between the general practice of toleration and specific instances of tolerance is accepted, then, as I will argue in this section, these alternative accounts are, at best, no longer required, and at worst, incoherent. The fact that tolerant liberal regimes do not actually engage in constant acts of forbearance should not be seen as anomalous at all. It makes perfect sense, and is entirely consistent with both our common usage of these terms, as well as with their political, and not moral, interpretation. In this section, I will examine three alternative attempts at dealing with this issue: that toleration and/or tolerance should be transformed into something much more positive; that modern neutral states cannot rightly be considered tolerant; and that if toleration (as forbearance) is located in the citizenry, and neutrality in the state, then toleration and neutrality can be successfully reconciled. While these solutions, particularly the last one, are ingenious, they are not required. Re-examining toleration 207 (i) The first response to the fact that the general practice of toleration does not simply involve negative valuing is transformative in nature. Michael Walzer, for example, writes that toleration as a practice can be sustained by a range of attitudes: from resignation, to indifference, to stoical acceptance, to curiosity, and even to enthusiasm.38 Walzer accepts that the virtue of tolerance as normally defined is not sufficient to sustain the practice of toleration, but in order to maintain the direct link between specific acts of tolerance and the general practice of toleration, he greatly expands the specific sense of tolerance. Instead of saying that several attitudes or virtues can underlie the general practice of toleration (as I have been arguing), Walzer appears to suggest that all these attitudes or virtues should also be called tolerance, so that specific instances of tolerance can still underlie the general practice of toleration.39 While such a move certainly maintains a consistency between the general practice of toleration and specific acts of tolerance, it has the not insignificant disadvantage of losing the sharpness of the meaning of tolerance. In the political sphere, and quite likely in the moral sphere too, the strict forbearance notion of 38 Walzer (1997), pp. 11-12, 92. Walzer does also (at least initially) distinguish between tolerance as an attitude and toleration as a practice; p. xi. 39 Walzer is of course suggesting that the more positive types of tolerance should be aimed for (that is, things that on his spectrum are closer to enthusiasm). See, in particular Walzer (1997), ‘Epilogue’, pp. 91-112. A stronger statement of this view can be found in the UNESCO Declaration of Principles on Tolerance, which I discussed towards the end of Chapter 2. It states: ‘Tolerance is respect, acceptance and appreciation of the rich diversity of our world's cultures, our forms of expression and ways of being human. It is fostered by knowledge, openness, communication, and freedom of thought, conscience and belief. Tolerance is harmony in difference’; UNESCO, Declaration of Principles on Tolerance, Proclaimed and Signed by the Member States of UNESCO on 16 November 1995. 208 Chapter 4 tolerance is of great import. It is this notion which is a crucial minimum for citizen- citizen relations in diverse societies. While there are problems with transformative approaches to citizen-citizen relations, as I have already argued in previous chapters, this move is even more serious if it removes, or at least diminishes, a key conceptual device, forbearance tolerance, from the political repertoire. In contrast to Walzer, Galeotti attempts a transformative approach which focuses on the general concept of toleration rather than on specific acts of tolerance. She argues that a regime of liberal toleration should be sustained by acts of recognition – particularly recognition of previously marginalised groups. In this way the liberal state is not simply indifferent to the identities of its citizens, but is careful through acts of recognition, to achieve full inclusion.40 Galeotti is careful to reconcile this idea with liberal neutrality, albeit not a traditional understanding of neutrality as form of standing back. Her conception of neutrality is of an active ‘hands on’ rather than ‘hands off’ form. Her aim is to ensure the sufficient recognition of all identities, or at least their full inclusion. Importantly, this is intended to be in a ‘content-independent’ fashion, which she opposes to Charles Taylor’s ‘strong recognition’ where the specific content of a difference is recognised.41 Unlike Walzer who sees the need to transform the virtue or specific sense of tolerance, Galeotti is arguing for a rethinking 40 Galeotti (like Nancy Fraser, amongst others) argues for this on grounds of justice; Galeotti (2002), pp. 10-11, pp. 102-3, 105. 41 Galeotti (2002), pp. 10-16, 103-5. Re-examining toleration 209 of what a general regime of toleration should entail.42 It is precisely because toleration is a matter of justly dealing with diversity, that Galeotti sees the need to transform it to be more just through acts of symbolic recognition. Galeotti’s view is logically consistent. A generally tolerant regime can engage in acts of recognition and still be correctly described as tolerant. As I have argued, toleration need not only involve negative valuing. However, Galeotti’s is an argument for state respect of difference, and it appears to suffer from the usual problems associated with it that were discussed in Chapter 1: that state respect of difference can cause the fixing of difference and ultimately harm some of its holders, particularly ‘minorities within minorities’. Galeotti pre-empts this line of critique, arguing that a ‘content- independent’ form of recognition is intended to avoid the problems of ‘any pluralist encapsulation or ghettoization of group members’.43 To which she adds; ‘[s]uch recognition should help free minority members from the burden – which they do not choose – which is attached to their identity’.44 42 In a move that seems to combine both Walzer’s and Galeotti’s transformative approaches, Karl-Otto Apel – who does not distinguish the general from the specific sense of toleration – argues for an approach that moves from ‘negative tolerance’ based on indifference to ‘positive or affirmative tolerance’ based on appreciation. As I quoted in Chapter 1, n. 36, he writes: ‘it is…possible to argue in favour of our fundamental duty to support to a certain extent – that is in the way of affirmative tolerance – all the value-traditions that make up the cultural identity of the members of a multicultural society’; Karl-Otto Apel, ‘Plurality of the Good? The Problem of Affirmative Tolerance in a Multicultural Society from an Ethical Point of View’, Ratio Juris 10/2 (1997) 199-212, pp. 200, 207. 43 Galeotti (2002), p. 105. 44 Galeotti (2002). 210 Chapter 4 But it is in this defence that a question arises as to the extent to which Galeotti’s approach is actually one of recognition. Galeotti seems to be doing one of two things. Either, she is simply accommodating previously excluded groups. To this end, she gives examples of allowing gays in the military and headscarves in public schools. Yet these are things which do not have to been seen as recognition, except perhaps of past non-neutral policy failure. So while this interpretation of ‘toleration as recognition’ is clearly both neutral and just, is it really recognition anymore? Alternatively, Galeotti may be valuing identities as positive things, and thus much emphasis is placed on the importance of recognition for self-esteem.45 This, ‘hands on’ neutral interpretation is certainly a form of recognition, but it now seems sufficiently strong to fall foul of the problems of strong recognition that she is so keen to avoid. At one point, Galeotti writes that ultimately ‘members of…minority groups should relate to their social identity just as members of the majority have always done’.46 But is this not at least part of the problem? The multicultural critique of the practice (as opposed to the theory) of liberalism has been that the relationship between the majority (or at least the dominant) identity and that of individual citizens has been coercive, and that this pressure has been much greater on minority members, and thus unfair. In other words, the majority identity places real pressure on all citizens to 45 This is seen as the end point of a ‘causal chain’ that starts with recognition; Galeotti (2002), pp. 12, 101. 46 Galeotti (2002), p. 106. Re-examining toleration 211 conform. If members of the minority also relate to their identities in this way, then it seems the ‘ghettoization’ critique must hold against ‘toleration as recognition’. Indeed, further evidence that Galeotti’s recognition is of the stronger variety is suggested by her insistence that the state continue to support and protect weak identities for as long as they remain relatively weak.47 Galeotti’s ‘recognition-lite’ then seems to be either just accommodation under neutral principles, or else, and more likely, ‘recognition-not-so-lite’ with many of its attendant problems. Finally, there is also the concern in this type of depiction of a tolerant regime (i.e. one that recognises all identities),48 that the important role of indifference and forbearance tolerance are underplayed. It seems hard to envisage how all identities could be recognised – unless trivially – and as such, state indifference will still have a vital role to play. In the end her position can perhaps only lead to recognition of some differences. Nevertheless, I should stress these are normative disagreements with Galeotti’s approach, and not with her position that a general regime could conceptually be underwritten by acts of recognition. (ii) The second response to the problem of a perceived inconsistency between the practice of liberal toleration and forbearance tolerance involves a rejection of the general notion of liberal toleration altogether. Because of its association with 47 Galeotti (2002), pp. 13-14 48 Galeotti is essentially saying that the state does recognise ‘normal’ identities, so as a matter of justice it must recognise ‘abnormal’ ones too. 212 Chapter 4 indifference rather than forbearance tolerance, it is argued that liberal toleration by the state – at least in any neutral version of the liberal state – is at best irrelevant and at worst incoherent. A neutral state, it is argued, should have no value associated with the differences of its citizens, and therefore should show only indifference to its citizens’ differences, which then means it cannot rightly be described as ‘tolerant’.49 Neutrality and toleration are either inconsistent, or neutrality has simply supplanted toleration. More formally the argument is as follows: 1) liberal neutrality involves neither interfering with nor judging people’s differences ∴2) liberal neutralist states (or corporate agents) do not value negatively the differences of their citizens 3) toleration involves valuing negatively, yet not interfering, with differences ∴4) liberal neutralist states do not practise toleration, but indifference The argument that the neutral liberal state practises indifference and not toleration has two main problems. The first is that indifference can never be the whole story, even if indifference is the main attitude associated with differences in a liberal society. As I pointed out earlier, a liberal state will still have values – in particular those of justice – which it upholds. There will be practices and beliefs that should be permissible within a liberal society, but at the same time will go against these core values. A white supremacist group that did not believe in the equal moral worth of all citizens 49 For several examples of this view, see n. 3 earlier in this chapter. Re-examining toleration 213 provides a possible example here. The liberal state should not be indifferent to groups like this. But because of the importance of both freedom of conscience and of association, the liberal state has good reasons not to interfere, at least initially, with the activities of such groups. Because there is clearly a clash of values here and the state does have the power to interfere, the state is rightly said to be engaging in acts of forbearance tolerance with such groups. While these will be reasonably rare cases, the neutral liberal state is not neutral about absolutely everything. Neutrality is a range concept: states are neutral about everything within a certain range (typically a justice respecting range), and things outside that range – for example, violence or theft against others, as well as denials of equal moral worth – are certainly not things the liberal state should be neutral about. Things outside the range of neutrality are either interfered with, such as in the case of violence and theft, or at least judged, as in the case of those who deny equal moral worth. Premise 1) in the above argument is therefore false.50 The second problem with the argument that neutrality and toleration are inconsistent should hopefully now be quite evident. Premise 3) has been directly challenged by the argument I have been pursuing in this chapter. Toleration need not involve negative valuing, and, as I have shown, it is entirely consistent with indifference. Once this is accepted, toleration as a general practice is entirely compatible with liberal neutrality. 50 I should point out that I am not arguing that actual liberal states will be neutral about all the practices/beliefs that occur within this range – they may well respect some – just that conceptually the state can coherently be neutral within this range. 214 Chapter 4 Interestingly, even if some hypothetical state was somehow only indifferent to its citizens’ differences, it would still make sense to say that such a state was engaging in the general practice of toleration, albeit not in a liberal fashion. The general concept of toleration does not, conceptually at least, require any forbearance tolerance at all. The argument that liberal neutrality and toleration are not compatible fails on two counts. First, liberal neutrality is not simply indifference, and second, even if it was, it could still (at least conceptually) be considered tolerant. (iii) A third approach to the apparent disconnect between toleration and negative valuing is provided by Peter Jones.51 Jones does not question the belief that toleration necessarily entails both disapproval and the withholding of power; he accepts Premise 3) of the above argument. Instead Jones argues that in a tolerant liberal polity these two elements need not be located in the same place. For Jones, a polity is tolerant inasmuch as it reduces the possibility of acts of intolerance by one’s fellow citizens. Political and legal arrangements can rightly be described as tolerant if they create a state of affairs in which individuals are unprevented from performing certain actions by intolerant others.52 A tolerant regime then is one that upholds the ideal of toleration (in the forbearance sense) rather than one that engages in any forbearance 51 Peter Jones, ‘Toleration and Neutrality: Compatible Ideals?’, in D. Castiglione and C. McKinnon (eds), Toleration, Neutrality and Democracy (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003), 97-110, and Peter Jones, ‘Making Sense of Political Toleration’, British Journal of Political Science 37 (2007) 383-402. 52 Jones (2007), p. 388. Jones uses the word ‘unprevented’ here, rather than ‘intentionally hindered’, which I prefer. Re-examining toleration 215 itself.53 By separating out the site of the withholding of power from the site of disapproval, Jones attempts to maintain the coherence of political toleration as a form of forbearance. This move has several advantages, not least the way it maintains the potential consistency between toleration and neutrality.54 A neutral state is, according to Jones, the instantiation of the (forbearance) tolerance of its citizenry.55 Because reasonable citizens (in the Rawlsian sense) have reasons not to use politics to promote their way of life or hinder other reasonable ways of life, that is, they have reasons to refrain from using their power (‘the burdens of judgement’), they then have reason to support a neutral state. The initial forbearing is done by the citizen, but it is the state which upholds this non-use of power. As Jones puts it, ‘the neutrality of a government manifests the tolerance of its citizens’.56 So a neutral state is one in which citizens are free to live their lives as they see fit, in that they are protected from the views of others being used to make their lives more difficult. Toleration (in the forbearance sense) on behalf of individual citizens then justifies neutrality on the behalf of the 53 Jones (2007), p. 387. 54 Jones rightly points out that a general practice of toleration need not be even handed to be described as tolerant. Thus while toleration need not entail neutrality, Jones’ argument is that toleration can be expressed through neutrality; Jones (2003), p. 98. 55 Jones (2007), pp. 106-106. 56 Jones (2003), p. 108. 216 Chapter 4 state.57 This argument has the added advantage that it shows why an individual citizen should support a neutral state rather than a merely tolerant one. That is, it takes into consideration the democratic underpinning of modern liberal states, and thus addresses the concern of the stability of liberal political institutions. Jones’ argument is ingenious and provides a seemingly logical solution to the problem of the liberal neutral state not doing very much forbearing itself. But how successful is this reconciliation? Certainly, the argument that citizens should support a neutral state as the best way to avoid other citizens using the political process to advance their ways of life, or discriminate against others, is sound. In Jones’ argument there are two sites of potential forbearance. The first is in the support and setting up of political and legal arrangements. Here the forbearing is located amongst individual citizens in their non-influence of the political process in favour of their own ways of life and against other ways of life. The second site of forbearance occurs when these arrangements are in place. Here individual disapproval is stopped from turning into acts of intolerance by these very legal and political arrangements.58 In the first site, forbearance is clearly taking place, individuals are withholding their individual political power despite (one imagines) wanting to enhance their own way of life. But while this means that toleration (forbearance) can be said to be consistent with supporting neutrality, it does not mean that the neutral state is tolerant in this 57 Jones rightly criticises Glen Newey for ‘denying the possibility of a neutralist justification of toleration’, saying that he has things the wrong way around; Jones (2003), p. 99 n. 7. 58 There is in fact a third site of forbearance on which Jones, like the two previous approaches is silent – this is the already mentioned tolerance by the state in relation to the values of justice it upholds. Re-examining toleration 217 forbearing sense. If forbearance tolerance is located here, it seems the critics are right – the state cannot be both tolerant and neutral. Yes, the ideas can reinforce each other and coherence is maintained, but this does not mean the liberal state itself is both neutral and tolerant (in the forbearance sense).59 Jones’ location of the second site of potential forbearance, amongst the citizenry after neutral political and legal arrangements are in place, can be seen as a way of avoiding this problem. That is, the state is now rightly described as tolerant because it protects individual citizens from acts of intolerance by their fellow citizens – in effect, according to Jones, it enforces forbearance. But it is here that a real disconnect seems to take place. In this potential site of forbearance, the concept seems to collapse almost entirely into acquiescence or endurance. Jones argues that the good of toleration lies in the freedom of the tolerated to perform their tolerated act, rather than in the good of the tolerator to withhold their power to interfere.60 While this is an important point, and one that I made earlier – contra the virtue ethics approach, the importance of political toleration lies in the increased freedom of individuals, rather than the good of an individual engaging in acts of tolerance – this does not mean that forbearance can only be understood as being about increased freedom. For the forbearance notion of tolerance to stand up, somebody or something must be forbearing. If a disapproving citizen is, as Jones suggests, prevented by legal and 59 This is of course to ignore (as Jones does) the third site of forbearance raised in the previous footnote. 60 Jones (2007), p. 389. 218 Chapter 4 political arrangements from interfering in the actions of another citizen, then they are acquiescing rather than forbearing. They are having power withheld for them, rather than withholding it themselves. The problem here seems to lie in Jones’ apparent equating of less intolerant acts with increased toleration.61 While this would not be a problem if he accepted that the general practice of toleration need not be sustained by acts of forbearance, it is a problem if he wants to defend a forbearance conception of toleration. Less intolerance does not necessarily mean more forbearance, it could mean more acquiescence, more indifference, or even more respect of difference. A tolerant regime should reduce acts of intolerance amongst the citizenry, but this does not have to be related to acts of forbearance at all. Against these three attempts to solve the problem that the general practice of toleration is not reducible to forbearance tolerance and/or that the liberal neutral state cannot be described as tolerant, I want to suggest what seems a much simpler alternative. This alternative maintains the coherence between toleration and neutrality, and accepts that the general concept will primarily be maintained by acts of indifference. As I have argued throughout this chapter, the general practice of toleration is neither reducible to acts of forbearance tolerance, nor is it simply maintained by indifference. 61 ‘…[A] political arrangement…is tolerant not because it provides an arena within which people can engage in acts of toleration [forbearance] but because it holds intolerance at bay’; Jones (2007), p. 388. Re-examining toleration 219 Both the general practice of toleration and neutrality are range concepts. No liberal state will be either neutral or tolerant towards everything. There is an ongoing debate on just what ‘should be tolerated’ in a liberal state, that is, about what is inside and what is outside the limits or range of toleration. There is also, at least within liberal political theory, the argument that the state should be neutral among ways of life, but not among conceptions of justice. This means that, in theory at least, the range of toleration and neutrality may largely coincide. If they coincided completely, then those who say that liberal toleration is nothing more than indifference would be correct. Neutrality (as ‘hands off’) would then be expressed as acts of indifference to everything that is within the limits of toleration. Anything beyond these limits would neither be tolerated nor be an issue for neutrality. Yet even if this is somehow the case and the state is indifferent to all differences within its range of toleration, then it would still rightly be described as both tolerant and neutral (though probably not liberal). As I have shown, there is nothing in the general practice of toleration that requires anything more than indifference. Nevertheless, the range of toleration and the range of neutrality in a liberal state should not entirely coincide. Assuming neutrality is of the ‘hands off’ variety, the range of liberal neutrality will in fact be narrower than the range of liberal toleration. The liberal state should still tolerate, that is not negatively interfere, things that are outside its range of its neutrality – these will primarily be things that contradict its conception of justice, but are still not sufficiently powerful to be able to commit acts of injustice. Examples here could include the aforementioned white supremacist 220 Chapter 4 group, or a religious group that believed positions of political power should not be held by women. Thus a liberal neutral regime of toleration will be sustained by acts of indifference and acts of tolerance. This can be shown figuratively, as in Figure 4.2. Figure 4.2: A liberal range of toleration and state neutrality Rival conceptions The range of toleration of justice tolerance tolerance Things that cause The range of neutrality harm to others People's ways of life But this is not the yet the whole story. This very same regime can also be sustained, at least partly, by acts of respect. This can be in two different ways. The first is the acknowledgement that some differences will, for reasons of justice, need positive support from the state. One example here would be disability. Assuming that justice dictates the need for equality of opportunity, those with particular disabilities may need positive actions taken by the state for them to have equal or sufficient opportunities. While a disability is not usually thought of as a way of life (there are several notable exceptions such as deafness), the same reasoning could and has been given for some identities. If the notion of social cohesion discussed in the previous chapter is revisited, we can imagine that if a successful argument was made for the need for an overarching national identity because it was somehow required by justice, Re-examining toleration 221 then the state respecting that identity would not undermine either its toleration or its neutrality. The second way respect of difference can help sustain the general practice of toleration and not breach neutrality, is by taking a ‘hands on’ instead of a ‘hands off’ approach to neutrality. This was the type of approach argued for by Galeotti in her ‘toleration as recognition’. If the state aims to somehow maintain neutrality by actively helping all ways of life within its tolerated range, then respect and not indifference may be the primary attitude underlying toleration. Finally, it is important to point out that not all liberals favour neutrality. Liberal perfectionists62 favour respecting some ways of life and not others – generally these are ways of life that are consistent with increased autonomy. The perfectionist can still favour a regime of toleration, despite rejecting neutrality. The liberal perfectionist will advocate respecting ways of life that promote a good such as autonomy, being indifferent to many other ways of life, and having forbearance tolerance towards ways of life that either do not substantiate that good or somehow actively discourage it. 62 Most notably, Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), but see also: Thomas Hurka, Perfectionism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); Vinit Haksar, Equality, Liberty and Perfectionism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979); and William Galston, Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues and Diversity in the Liberal State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 222 Chapter 4 While I have been arguing for a tolerant approach to difference that relies heavily on indifference from the state, there is nothing in this understanding of toleration as a general practice that means this must be the case. The conceptual structure of toleration I have been exploring is entirely consistent with strong multicultural approaches to difference. This model of toleration simply describes the conditions under which a general practice of toleration can lead to the accommodation of specific differences. As I mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, it is a separate normative question as to which is the right way to link the general practice of toleration with the accommodation (or not) of a specific difference. Despite the way I want to use this model, this high degree of normative neutrality is actually one of its significant advantages. Returning to Figure 4.1, it can be seen that a state practice of toleration understood as permissiveness can involve either forbearance tolerance, indifference, or respect of specific difference, and that all three can lead to accommodation – the freedom of an individual to live their life as they see fit. I will discuss the issue of where each particular attitude is appropriate in the next chapter, but at this stage it should be noted that this is a normative and contextual judgement. Those who favour a high degree of ‘hands off’ neutrality will predominantly favour indifference, while those who reject this type of neutrality will presumably rely much more on respect and forbearance tolerance. Re-examining toleration 223 Conclusion By clearly separating out toleration as a general practice from specific instances of tolerance, and then emphasising the political rather than the moral dimensions of these concepts, several problems associated with discussions of toleration are avoided. The first problem is of minor importance for my purposes, but is commonly commented upon in the literature. This is the so-called ‘paradox of toleration’, which can be framed as: if someone has a moral reason to think something is not good and even harmful, how can they then have another moral reason that overrides this and means they must let the despicable thing continue? It is paradox of moral reasoning. This is certainly not a problem for the general practice of political toleration, as the practice of political toleration requires neither moral distaste nor moral reasons for withholding interference. Nor is it a problem for specific acts of tolerance, if as I have argued, they are viewed politically rather than morally. Reasons for disapproval, and reasons for withholding interference need not be moral, in which case an act of tolerance need not be paradoxical at all. If the paradox remains at all, it is only a potential problem for the moral virtue of tolerance in specific cases, and even this is questionable.63 63 Saladin Meckled-Garcia, using Joseph Raz’s concept of first-order and second-order reasons, argues that the moral reason for repressing a view or practice X, can be described as first-order, yet the reason for not repressing X should be thought of as second-order – that is, it is a reason about what sorts of reasons are appropriate to act upon; Meckled-Garcia (2001), pp. 296-97. Jones (2003), however, argues that Meckled-Garcia’s use of first-order and second-order reasons in this case is mistaken. Meckled-Garcia also attempts to avoid the paradox by using the range aspect of the practice of 224 Chapter 4 The second problem is the belief that ‘being tolerated’ must involve a negative judgement and thus is something to transcend rather than to recommend. Here I have shown that while specific acts of tolerance will involve a negative judgement, a general practice of toleration will not, and is in fact consistent with indifference and respect. A general practice of toleration is entirely consistent with a variety of judgements towards specific differences. The third problem is the perceived inconsistency between toleration and neutrality. Here I have argued that this view misunderstands both concepts, and the practice of toleration is entirely consistent with liberal neutrality. This problem arises from failing to distinguish between the general practice of toleration and specific acts of tolerance, as well as between the moral and the political. Finally, I have argued that in inter-citizen relations in diverse societies forbearance tolerance must be understood as not intentionally hindering, despite having a reason and the power to do so, and that any moves to build more into this forbearance concept have serious political and social risks. I also have maintained that the general state practice of toleration remains crucial in any liberal political regime. It is the permissiveness of toleration that allows individuals to live their lives as they see fit, and it is a fundamentally important ‘umbrella’ principle for dealing with diversity in a toleration, but this fails as it collapses specific instances of tolerance with toleration as a general practice, when the issue here is solely the moral virtue. Re-examining toleration 225 liberal fashion. As such, toleration as a practice should be understood as the default position of a liberal state, and any move to limit its scope needs compelling justification. Chapter 5 Attitudes and relationships towards specific differences: a preliminary model The overall argument of my thesis, so far, has been that in diverse societies state- citizen relations need to be clearly distinguished from citizen-citizen relations; that respect of difference is deeply problematic in both planes; and that respect of sameness is far more defensible and the preferred approach. This is a quite broad and generally negative position, which has not addressed in any detail the issue of what more precisely state-citizen and citizen-citizen relations should involve. In the previous chapter I addressed the state-citizen relationship and argued that it should involve a general toleration of difference, but I also showed that this general position does not determine what the particular relationship to specific differences should be. As I showed, toleration is compatible with a range of attitudes including respect, indifference and forbearance tolerance. Nevertheless, I have said very little about how citizens should relate to each other; I have simply argued that this relationship should be one of respect of sameness, and that forbearance tolerance should play a crucial role. In this chapter, I will address more directly the question of the content of state- citizen and citizen-citizen relations. My aim is not to outline a precise theory of how specific differences should be treated by both the state and fellow citizens. Rather, by Attitudes and relationships towards specific differences: a preliminary model 227 focussing on three areas, I will make some more general comments about what sorts of factors need to be considered. The first area concerns the agents in the relationship, that is, whether it is a state-citizen or citizen-citizen relationship. The second is the sphere in which the difference is displayed: is it the political, the public non- governmental, or the wholly private sphere? And the third is the type of difference that is being discussed: is it, for example, a political belief or a fashion-inspired clothing choice? While these are intended only as broadly suggestive factors, it should become apparent that by taking these sorts of factors into consideration, the question of which particular attitude is appropriate to specific instances of difference, will vary across circumstances. Broad claims, such as ‘we should respect difference’ or ‘we should simply be indifferent to difference’ will not survive even this most basic contextual analysis. The position I have taken in this thesis is one of ‘hands off’ liberal neutrality, which I described in the Introduction as reflective and dynamic in nature. Nevertheless, my overall point in this chapter – that prescribing singular attitudes towards all specific differences is problematic – will also be relevant to many alternative non-neutral (or non- ‘hands off’ neutral) approaches to diversity, as will be the argument that at least these three types of factors need to be considered before making any declaration of how a specific difference should be treated. Finally, I should point out that the model I will build here is only intended to give a pro tanto result, and there may be good reasons why, in specific cases, other things may also need to be considered. 228 Chapter 5 Attitudes to specific differences To simplify my case, I will continue to use three types of attitude: ‘respect’, ‘tolerance’, and ‘indifference’. These attitudes are ‘act related’, that is, holding one of these attitudes towards a specific difference is highly correlated with performing or not performing an action in relation to that difference and its holder. There are other possible act related attitudes, most notably recognition, that are commonly used in situations of diversity. However, these three are importantly different from each other and neatly mark out the possible range of act related attitudes (with the exception of ‘intolerance’). The principles arrived at may be used in discussion of other act related attitudes, if so desired. In this chapter, I will continue to assume the differences under consideration should be accommodated, that is, they are within the limits of toleration. (As I noted at the outset, the question of which differences should be considered beyond the limits of toleration, while being important, is beyond the scope of this thesis, and this explains why I am not discussing the act related attitude of ‘intolerance’.) The question I am interested in, here, is simply which path (respect, forbearance tolerance, or indifference) is the most appropriate way of accommodating differences that are within the bounds of toleration, however defined. (The reader may recall Figure 0.1 (and Figure 4.1) which showed how these three attitudes can lead from respect of sameness to the accommodation of specific differences.)1 1 I should stress, once again, in response to those concerned about ‘mere accommodation’ of difference (in which case, ‘accommodation’ has a value), that this is not the sense in which I mean Attitudes and relationships towards specific differences: a preliminary model 229 In the previous chapter, I argued that respect of sameness led to a regime of state toleration which allowed citizens the maximal freedom to live their lives as they see fit. On the citizen-citizen plane, respect of sameness will also lead to toleration, albeit of a slightly different order and range. Here, the citizen is at least partially coerced into a generally tolerant position by the law. And further, because the citizen has private interests, they will have interactions where political notions of toleration are not applicable. Even so, in both planes, respect of sameness should lead to the accommodation of difference within their particular sphere of toleration. Tolerance Let us once again use the definition of tolerance in specific cases from the previous chapter: x can be said to be tolerating y’s performance of z when x disapproves of y doing z, and when x has the capacity to intentionally hinder y from performing z, and yet chooses not to. Essentially an instance of tolerance involves three necessary elements: a negative judgement of a difference, the power to negatively interfere with that difference or its holder, and the decision not to negatively interfere. ‘accommodation’ here. I simply mean accommodation to be an outcome that can be a consequence of respecting, tolerating or being indifferent, and that involves the non (negative) interference with a particular difference. Those who argue for a positive valuing of difference are simply arguing, on my conception, for a respect route to accommodation. 230 Chapter 5 Indifference I take indifference to mean the relevant lack of a value. If an agent is indifferent towards something, they associate no particular value towards that thing. This is not the same as saying something is of no value, as that would associate it with a value. As I have already suggested, in practice, indifference will be the dominant attitude towards specific differences. Most states and most people are indifferent to the vast majority of differences that are within their sphere of toleration; they ascribe them no value either way. One question which can be raised in this context is whether indifference actually requires particular knowledge of its object: can an agent be indifferent to something they don’t know about? If, for example, I do not know about Bob’s affair with his work colleague, then it seems I cannot be said to be indifferent to it. This would be true if I had never considered such things as affairs with work colleagues, or people’s choices in sexual partner. However, it makes sense to say the value I would associate to Bob’s particular affair is indifference, even without knowledge of it, if I had made some previous decision such as, I am indifferent to what Bob does, or more generally, I am indifferent to people’s choice in sexual partners. Thus, even without particular knowledge, specific instances can fall under the attitude of indifference, as long as there is a pre-existing range of indifference. Respect The concept of respect has been discussed extensively in Chapters 1 and 2. The main features of the concept to draw out for this chapter is that to respect a difference entails both (a) holding it in the sufficient or appropriate level of regard, and (b) Attitudes and relationships towards specific differences: a preliminary model 231 believing that some action (by you) is important as a result of this regard. Respectful acts of specific differences could include: a state agency making public statements about the worth of a particular way of life; or, providing funding for the maintenance of a particular language; or, an individual citizen deliberately not disturbing (by, for example, mowing their lawn) members of a nearby religious group who are at prayer. The question I now want to address is: when is the exercise of ‘tolerance’, ‘indifference’ or ‘respect’ appropriate in relation to a specific difference? But first I will give an outline of three types of factors that should be considered in making this judgement. Three key considerations (i) Types of agent As I argued in Chapter 1, it is essential to distinguish between the state and its relationship to instances of difference amongst its citizenry, and citizens and their relationship to instances of difference amongst their fellow citizens. In a liberal society, the state will have very different sorts of duties and obligations to those of the individual citizen. The state and the citizens are importantly different and separate – the more their difference is elided, the more illiberal a society becomes, and if the correlation of duties and obligations they share is too high, quite possibly become totalitarian. A slip into ‘we’ language when discussing the treatment of difference is unfortunately common, which further confuses the issue. The question; ‘how should 232 Chapter 5 we treat difference?’ has, as I will show, different answers depending on how the ‘we’ is conceptualised. (ii) Spheres The distinction between the public and the private interests of the citizen is fundamental to liberalism, and with it the implication that the state has no right to interfere in the private sphere. There is no clear agreement on the precise drawing of this line, and its location has changed significantly over time, with John Locke insisting that the family was always private, and more recently Susan Moller Okin challenging the position of the family as an entirely private matter in John Rawls’ original theory of justice.2 While I certainly do not want to argue against either the usefulness or normativity of this distinction, in this chapter I will instead use three different spheres of interest in which differences can be displayed. These spheres, which should allow a more fine grained discussion, are based on Richard Wassertrom’s distinction between three levels of social and political arrangements.3 Although crude, they should suffice to demonstrate the basic principles involved. They are: 2 See Susan Moller Okin, ‘Justice and Gender’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 16 (1987), and Susan Moller Okin, Justice, Gender and the Family (New York: Basic Books, 1989). 3 Richard A. Wasserstrom, ‘Racism and Sexism’, in R. A. Wasserstrom (ed.), Today’s Moral Problems, 3rd Edition (New York: Macmillan, 1985), 1-29. Wasserstrom (p. 20) acknowledges that these distinctions are crude. Attitudes and relationships towards specific differences: a preliminary model 233 • Basic political rights and obligations – the right to vote, the obligation to pay tax, freedom of political association, freedom of political speech, etc. • The area of important non-governmental institutional benefits and burdens – generally employment and housing. • Individual social interaction – friends, lovers, hobbies, etc. By using these three spheres as a basic template, it can begin to be seen that the act related attitude associated with a particular difference will vary according to the sphere in which the difference is expressed. In the first sphere, with the state as the agent, sex and gender, for example, should be associated with the attitude of indifference. The sex or gender of persons should make no difference to their involvement in the basic political sphere. In the second sphere, these aspects should generally be treated with indifference, but there may be exceptions; an example would be, maternity leave rights for women in the workplace. And in the third sphere there should be no ‘ought’ at all – if somebody wants to be friends only with men that is no matter for the state, and if they do not discriminate in this way that should be a matter of indifference too. Even when a particular view exists of how sex and gender (or any other difference) should be treated in this third sphere, this is not generally something the state should impose in a liberal society, but at best merely provide incentives.4 4 This is not to ignore the feminist argument that the ‘personal is political’, where, amongst other things, the social construction and imposition of gender roles in the traditionally private sphere is 234 Chapter 5 These three spheres are certainly not comprehensive. Education, for example, would appear to fall between the political and the non-governmental. Although often supplied by the state, education is an important benefit in the same way as other second sphere benefits. However education is also, at least in democratic theory, an important part of political citizenship. (iii) Different types of difference Differentiating between types of difference is certainly a very complex and vexed area. Here I simply wish to suggest some indicative general principles and distinctions. This suggestiveness will mean that I will not cover all possible permutations, but just a sufficient number to bring out some important general features. I suggest that there are six basic types of difference. This is not to say that all differences are entirely separable into these categories, just that these categories provide a basic structure for thinking about what particular differences are, and how they should be treated. Many differences break down further. Gender, for example, can be viewed as an identity, a type of belief, or a disadvantage, depending on context. Beliefs I will split differences as beliefs into two basic types: something the state should be concerned about. Nevertheless, for this concern to remain liberal, resultant policies should at most create incentives such as equal workplace parental leave, rather than enforce any view. See, for example, Moller Okin (1989). Attitudes and relationships towards specific differences: a preliminary model 235 (a) Beliefs about social and political arrangements. A paradigmatic case would be a fundamentalist Christian belief that the truth was contained in the Bible, and that the souls of all who do not follow this truth would not only go to hell, but that society should be structured in some way to reflect this belief. (b) Beliefs of a non-social or political nature. This category includes all other types of belief, from academic type knowledge such as, ‘the earth is round’, to more general beliefs about the world, such as, ‘BHP shares will continue to rise’; and even to beliefs such as, ‘chocolate milk shakes are better than vanilla’. Obviously beliefs do not always fall so neatly into either of these two categories. Moral beliefs, for example, could be either. A person who is a vegetarian for moral reasons may believe that vegetarianism should be encouraged or coerced by the state, or on the other hand, that it should be something that is simply a matter of individual choice, irrespective of the rightness of their belief. Tastes I mean ‘tastes’ in the most basic sense here, and I will take beliefs (generally) to be different from tastes. Fashion choices are a clear example. Although tastes may arise out of beliefs, they are not beliefs themselves. For example, Hassidic Jews and the particular way they dress arises out of a set of beliefs, but the exact expression of those beliefs is a matter of taste – it could have been (and could still possibly be) otherwise. 236 Chapter 5 There are those who try and reduce almost all differences to matters of taste, along the lines of; ‘your religious views are just what you think, just as your clothing choices are just what you think looks good on you’. Two types of people seem to have this belief. The first are those who think we, as individuals, can and should respect all differences (and against whom I argued in Chapter 2). This group, although it is not always made explicit, appear to treat beliefs similarly to tastes which then allows for no real conflict of differences – except of course, by ‘unreasonable’ people who really believe their particular belief is right and others’ wrong, and often morally wrong. The second group, hold the opposite view; differences should not matter to people because we really are the same after all. This group is more aggressive in its ignoring of difference; as simple expressions of taste, differences can be easily changed, and accentuating them in any way just causes unnecessary conflict. Both these views are overly reductive and trivialising. They both ultimately claim an essential similarity (and congruence) of differences which does not take the difference – nor, more importantly, the individual who holds that difference – seriously at all.5 In this way, there is a failure to respect sameness. Both views are ultimately assimilatory and not maximally permissive of difference and the freedom of individuals to live their lives as they see fit. 5 In a similar vein, Adam B. Seligman writes: ‘The denial of difference comes in many forms, most often as what may be termed the aesthetization of difference (differences are a matter of tastes, not morals, and there is no accounting for tastes)…The aesthetization of difference is often accompanied by the trivialization of difference’; Adam B. Seligman, ‘Tolerance, Tradition and Modernity’, Cardozo Law Review 24/4 (2003) 1645-56, p. 1647. Attitudes and relationships towards specific differences: a preliminary model 237 Acts Acts are physical expressions that may follow from one of the other five categories. Included in this category would be things like ceremonies, such as a Fijian Kava ceremony, street parades, public displays of dancing, the Muslim ‘call to prayer’ and Christian church bell ringing. Disadvantages I will use this term in a very narrow sense, as a shorthand way of describing things that are real physical differences that lead to meaningful disadvantages in certain circumstances. ‘Disadvantages’ here is intended to capture the sense of not having basic functionality relevant to the given situation. For example, being confined to a wheelchair when faced with a long set of stairs, or being blind when trying to cross a busy road. Disadvantages involve real features of the world that cannot be changed (easily) and could place the bearer at a significant disadvantage relative to other people if they were treated the same as others in particular circumstances. Thus not speaking the official language of a society could in some cases be considered a disadvantage in this sense, for example, in a court case. Being female will fit into this category in some cases, such as in reproductive rights/maternity leave cases, while it may at other times be treated as an identity. The inclusion of disadvantages as a category of difference is intended to be in contrast to other differences which can be seen more as ways of life, or as conceptions or expressions of the good.6 6 This meaning is consistent with those who hold that justice should involve correcting economic disadvantage in some form. As such, it is possible to incorporate Brian Barry’s riposte that liberalism is 238 Chapter 5 Identities This is the broadest category, and clearly has links to the other five; they all help form identities and sometimes are expressions of identities.7 I will take identities as socially relative things, that is, they may affix to real features of the world, but it is a social question as to which features are relevant to identity. For example, green eyes and black skin are both real features of the world, but it is a social question as to which, if either, has more relevance for identity. Moreover, identity can be chosen and changeable (for example, being a ‘Goth’), or unchosen and unchangeable8 (for example, skin colour), or unchosen but changeable (for example, nationality). not ‘difference blind’, but in fact recognises socio-economic disadvantage amongst others; Brian Barry, Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism (Cambridge: Polity, 2001), p. 63. 7 As Peter Jones argues, despite a clear causal connection, there are good reasons to treat identities and beliefs as separate things, particularly in the face of those who want to treat identities as aspects of persons. He writes: ‘[b]eleaguered believers should beware of identity theorists bearing gifts’. Jones’ point is that taking beliefs seriously entails understanding them as claims about the world, which should then involve challenging and testing them, whereas identity theorists hold that because of the strong connection (in some cases inseparability) of persons and their identities, showing them respect involves not undermining them, something that challenging and testing may well do; Peter Jones, ‘Beliefs and Identities’, in S. Mendus and J. Horton (eds), Toleration, Identity and Difference (London: MacMillan, 1999), 65-86, p. 83. As I will show, this distinction will only have relevance in some domains. 8 By fixed I do not mean it could not be another way, simply that under current social arrangements this identity, although ‘constructed’, is socially recognised. Attitudes and relationships towards specific differences: a preliminary model 239 There will often (in fact generally) be overlaps and connections between these five categories. For example, there is clear link between religious beliefs and acts, tastes and identity. A full blown ‘Culture’, will contain examples of all other categories, although with a very limited role for what I have called ‘disadvantages’. The only exception to this limited role may be language in some circumstances, and perhaps permanent physical scarring as the result of some cultural practice. But even here, it would seem there would be a need to be choice-sensitive. This is importantly different from the more common multicultural argument which sees identities as potential sites of disadvantage, but crucially, this is not in the physical sense that I mean. Mediation Although I have discussed the process of mediation throughout the thesis after first raising it in Chapter 1, for the purposes of this model it is worth reiterating.9 When an agent decides to engage in an act of forbearance tolerance or respect or place something in a range of indifference, it is for some reason. For example, when an individual citizen decides to tolerate the actions of another citizen whose difference they abhor, it should be because they respect the right of the holder to have such a difference. They thereby tolerate things they may wish to be intolerant of. When citizens respect another citizen as-a-person or as-a-citizen, this entails certain things, 9 As I noted earlier, the term ‘mediation’ comes from Peter Jones, ‘Toleration, Recognition, and Identity’, The Journal of Political Philosophy 14/2 (2006a) 123-143, and Peter Jones, ‘Equality, Recognition and Difference’, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 9/1 (2006b) 23-46. 240 Chapter 5 namely the respect of relevant rights.10 It is this respect of rights or sameness that means a citizen must, among other things, tolerate a difference they may otherwise abhor. To give an example, a citizen may have strong beliefs about the importance of modesty, yet live in a society where wearing revealing clothing is reasonably fashionable. To avoid unjust discrimination against fellow citizens, such as in the second sphere of work and housing, they may have to use a process of mediation. If their actions were based directly on their beliefs, they may behave intolerantly towards those who wear what they view as immodest clothing. But because the bearers of this taste are fellow citizens – something that they must respect – they will then have to tolerate their immodesty in this sphere. Their respect for the sameness of their fellow citizen allows them to then tolerate the immodest clothing. Or to use another example, a citizen may have a wheelchair bound employee, and after moving premises, they find the employee can no longer enter the work place because of the design of the building. Because the citizen as employer must respect the common citizenship or personhood of their employee (which in this case will involve workplace rights) they then should take action to accommodate their difference, in this case their employee’s disability. (This is assuming that the cost of assisting the employee is not overly onerous, but still involves some action and cost on behalf of 10 I should re-iterate a clarification I made in Chapter 1, n. 18: I am simply using ‘rights’ here as a convenient shorthand way of describing the fundamental interests that arise out of respect of sameness, and mean nothing metaphysical by the concept. Attitudes and relationships towards specific differences: a preliminary model 241 the employer.) A process of mediation allows greater accommodation by not requiring an agent to directly deal with the difference, but to use a commonality to mediate their relationship with the difference. On the citizen-citizen level, what this means is that any act of intolerance by a citizen (assuming that the difference is within the bounds of toleration) is also a failure to respect the appropriate rights of the holder of the difference. It is a failure to respect their sameness. For this reason, when a citizen in their private life decides, for example, to not associate with people of another religion, it makes sense to say that they have no tolerance in this particular area, rather than saying that they are intolerant, at least in the way I am using the term here. The citizen in this sphere is not violating any rights. You cannot, for example, claim a right to be someone’s friend. In relation to tolerance in a political sense, then, while the opposite of tolerance remains intolerance, there will be circumstances where the question of tolerance is of no political relevance. These three types of contextual factors can now be combined to provide the following table (Table 5.1). In the remainder of this chapter I want discuss some of the contents of this table, and explore in a general fashion the question of what should be the most appropriate act related attitude to specific difference in which circumstance, and thereby bring out some general principles. For the sake of brevity, and because the results will be the same, I have combined three types of difference (tastes, acts, and identities) into just one column. Once again, my aim is to simply sketch out the major 242 Chapter 5 contextual poles, rather than provide an exhaustive model of how all types of difference should be treated. Table 5.1: Combining contextual factors with act related attitudes Political and Non-political Disadvantages Tastes, Acts, social beliefs beliefs and Identities Basic political tolerance indifference respect indifference rights and (minimum) (only) (only) (only) obligations Non govt institutional indifference indifference respect indifference benefits and (only) (only) (only) (only) burdens STATE -STATE CITIZEN Individual indifference indifference indifference indifference social (only) (only) (only) (only) interaction Basic political tolerance tolerance tolerance tolerance rights and (minimum) (minimum) (minimum) (minimum) obligations Non govt institutional tolerance tolerance tolerance tolerance benefits and (minimum) (minimum) (minimum) (minimum) burdens CITIZEN - CITIZEN Individual no tolerance no tolerance no tolerance no tolerance social (minimum) (minimum) (minimum) (minimum) interaction Attitudes and relationships towards specific differences: a preliminary model 243 Contextual factors and attitudes to specific differences State-citizen I will begin the discussion of appropriate attitudes for the accommodation of difference with the state as the agent in the sphere of basic political rights and obligations, with the particular difference being a political or social belief. This is the first category in the top left corner in Table 5.1, and is probably the most complex. Political and social beliefs that are entirely compatible with a liberal conception of justice should be viewed indifferently by the liberal state. However, as I discussed in the last chapter, not all political and social beliefs should be matters of indifference for the state. An example is a citizen’s membership of a white supremacist or neo- Nazi organisation. Such a group has social and political values that are directly counter to those of a liberal state. Because of this serious clash of values, it may seem that the state cannot possibly tolerate the existence of the group or the free political expression of its members. But the state does have moral reasons to engage in an act of tolerance: the importance of both freedom of conscience and freedom of association that arise out of respecting the citizenship of those who are members of these groups. Assuming there are no overriding considerations – such as serious and real threats to public order and the stability of the state itself – then respecting this freedom will provide sufficient reason for the state to withhold its power from negatively interfering with the existence of the group and/or the wider political participation of its members. What makes this category particularly interesting is that 244 Chapter 5 it is only here that the rare instance of the state being in a position of tolerance can occur.11 In cases like that of the white supremacist group, whose political values are directly counter to those of the liberal state, the state can, and indeed must, engage in acts of tolerance. This is not something about which the state should be indifferent. The state has important political values, indeed values of justice, which the white supremacist group is directly challenging in this sphere. This category is also interesting because all three attitudes are possible here: not only tolerance and indifference, but also respect. Because in this political sense, the state does have a position – it is not entirely neutral – we can imagine the existence of a citizen who acts in a way as to always fulfil and indeed further the goals and ideals of the liberal state. It makes sense to say the state may actually respect the actions of such an exemplary citizen. This type of respect can sometimes be seen in the system of individual national honours that most countries employ. Thus in this first category, while tolerance is the minimum attitude, it is not the only act related attitude possible. This makes this category unique because, as will soon become clearer, all other squares involving the state have only one possible attitude. So what then should the attitude of the state be towards differences in the rest of the political sphere? That is, along the remainder of the top row of Table 5.1. If the state is neutral in a ‘hands off’ sense, then it should only be indifferent to non-political 11 The only exception might be because of ‘dangerous acts’, where the state might tolerate activities that involve some risk to third parties, such as car driving. Attitudes and relationships towards specific differences: a preliminary model 245 beliefs, tastes, acts, and identities in the respecting of basic political rights and the expectation of fulfilling associated obligations. Disadvantages in this sphere, however, will require the state to respect – that is, to actively take into consideration and treat differently, or at least make allowance for – things that cause citizens meaningful disadvantage in the exercising of basic political rights and obligations.12 While the state should not respect any particular non-political beliefs, identities, tastes and acts in this sphere (to do this would violate its ‘hands-off’ neutrality), it can respect relevant physical disadvantage, as this is not simply a way of life. Two different scenarios can be imagined. The first is where someone in a wheelchair needs a special lift or ramp in order to access a polling booth. The second is where elections are always held on Saturdays, a day when religious Jews would not be willing to physically cast their vote. In the first case, the state should respect the disadvantage of the wheelchair bound voter by installing a lift or ramp to accommodate their difference. However, in the Jewish case, the state need not respect the difference, but could instead realise its transgression from neutrality – that Saturday polling unfairly and unnecessarily impacted upon some ways of life – and change its policies. It could, for example, introduce postal voting so that differences such as those of religious Jews can be accommodated. The attitude towards Jewishness following this adjustment to neutrality (what I have called ‘reflective 12 I am deliberately trying to avoid opening up too far the issue of justice and equality here. While it is tempting to say that unchosen disadvantage should be equalised in this sphere, issues of language do not fit a chosen/unchosen view so easily. Nevertheless, the view of disadvantage I am putting forward should generally match most liberal approaches. 246 Chapter 5 neutrality’) would then be indifference. To put it another way, the realisation that Saturday polling was not neutral would not itself be indifferent, but the resultant changes would mean that the state was then indifferent to Jewishness and accommodated it in this sphere. Thus respect of sameness, and the general policy of toleration it justifies, allows for adjustments to policies and practices which thereby obtain the maximal accommodation of difference. It may seem as if there is a trivial difference between these two types of cases, but this is an issue of justification. The Jewish case needs ultimately to be justified by indifference, whereas this is not so important for the case of the wheelchair. In practice, attaching wheelchair ramps to all public buildings may seem very similar to allowing postal voting. No specific difference need be respected after the initial policy decision, the range of accommodated differences has simply increased – people using child strollers, for example, may now find life easier with ramps, even though this may never have been the intended justification. The difference between these two types of cases would arise, however, in specific cases involving individual acts of accommodation. There is also a difference between an initial respect for a difference, or more appropriately an acknowledgement of its existence (such as the religious Jewish voting case), and the longer term respect of a difference (such as might occur with continued higher levels of funding to those in wheelchairs). I want to now move down a row in Table 5.1, to the state’s attitude to differences in the sphere of non-governmental institutional benefits and burdens. From the Attitudes and relationships towards specific differences: a preliminary model 247 discussion of the role of the state in the previous sphere, it should be clear that in this sphere, indifference can be the only attitude in relation to all types of difference with the exception of disadvantages. The state, if it wants to ensure that all citizens have a reasonable equality of opportunity to perform basic functions in a society, should respect disadvantages in the non-government sphere. This may mean putting some money aside to help pay for things like wheelchair ramps, or even maternity (or parental) leave, that can then allow greater access by the disadvantaged in this important sphere. Finally in the third row of Table 5.1 (individual social interaction), the state should only be indifferent, even in the case of disadvantage. In a liberal state that respects individual freedom of association, interpersonal private relations should be no business of the state. I am not talking here about issues such as domestic violence, or serious harm of any sort, but simply about general non-political or non-commercial social interaction. While many things that occur in this sphere may appear to be unfair and often unpleasant, this should not necessarily mean the state is involved in either praising or forbearing private behaviour of this kind.13 13 While I have left open the possibility of state involvement in this sphere, there should be a very strong presumption of non-interference here. Careful thought should be given before accepting that ‘the personal is political’ on any issue. If (and this is a big ‘if’) it is found interference is necessary in this sphere, then it should preferably take the form of information and marketing, rather than legislation, and be as targeted as possible. Examples that may fall into this category would be programs that focus on child welfare of the ‘children are our future’ variety. 248 Chapter 5 Citizen-citizen Moving to the area of citizen-citizen relations, some important changes occur. I will start with the basic political sphere again. Individual citizens must respect the sameness of their fellow citizens, in other words, they must respect their basic citizenship rights. It seems reasonable to assume that this would include the respect of basic political rights. When an individual citizen views another citizen’s political or social beliefs in a negative light, in order to respect their basic political rights, they should then tolerate these alternative political beliefs. If we go back to the basic features of forbearance tolerance – a negative view, power to negatively interfere, and non-interference – then it may seem that very few, if any, citizens can really be said to be forbearing here, or indeed in any case where laws are involved in the protection of rights. The law, and the state’s power to enforce it, seem to put the citizen in a position of acquiescence rather than forbearance; there is no power to interfere. Indeed this was a charge I made against Peter Jones’ location of forbearance tolerance in the citizenry in the previous chapter. There are two ways, however, in which it is possible to say that a degree of forbearance may still be taking place. The first is to take a Hobbesian view of what a ‘free’ act entails. That is, you are free to act (in this case negatively interfere) as long as you are not physically stopped from doing so; the ‘artificial chains’ of the law are easy to break, it is only the danger of being caught, but not the difficulty of breaking them that constrains Attitudes and relationships towards specific differences: a preliminary model 249 action.14 The second, more politically relevant, possibility involves acknowledging that in most areas the law cannot wholly constrain an individual’s actions as the risk of being caught and prosecuted is not sufficiently high. In the case of intolerance of difference, the intolerant citizen can do much to avoid the dangers of being caught, particularly in isolated cases. The risk of being caught breaking the law may constrain many actions, but generally this is merely a risk, not a certainty, and so the citizen is still free to interfere with another citizen’s rights regardless of what the law says. In real, rather than ideal, situations the citizen still has an often high degree of freedom to perform intolerant acts. While it is not too difficult to think of examples of citizens performing intolerant acts in the area of non-governmental institutional benefits and burdens – discrimination on the basis of difference in employment and housing is unfortunately far from unheard of – it is perhaps harder to think of an example of a citizen being able to be intolerant in the sphere of basic political rights and obligations. But it is far from impossible. For example, a white supremacist group builds their headquarters nearby to a citizen who finds their views totally abhorrent. Using freedom of political association as an example, if the citizen went and destroyed their building, at least part of the wrongness of this act (outside the wrongness of destroying another’s private property) would be the failure to respect their freedom of political association. 14 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Richard Tuck (ed.), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, [1651] 1996), XXI [109], p. 147. 250 Chapter 5 Similarly, intolerance here could take the form of individuals physically trying to stop people voting for an alternative political party, or even registering to vote in the first place. The events of Leflore County in northwest Mississippi are but one of many examples of the attempted denial of basic political rights by both local authorities and individual citizens in the struggle for truly equal civil and political rights for African- Americans in the US.15 From the Summer of 1962 until the Spring of 1963, the Council of Federated Organizations (COFO), and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), mounted a voter registration campaign (despite Leflore County having a predominantly black population, less than 2% of black adults were registered to vote compared to 70% of white adults). Resistance by some members of the local white population was spectacular. In an attempt to intimidate and stop black voter registration, black homes were shot at, black businesses burned, the SNCC office was firebombed on one occasion and attacked by a group of armed whites on another. In February 1963, a car containing several senior COFO and SNCC organisers was subjected to a burst of gunfire from a car containing three white men. By the end of the campaign, on top of 1000 arrests, there had been 35 shooting incidents, 30 buildings bombed, 35 churches burned, 80 people beaten, and at least six people murdered. These, and other similar examples show that it is more than possible for individual citizens (particularly with the support of state officials) to 15 This example comes from Frank. R. Parker, Black Votes Count: Political Empowerment in Mississippi after 1965 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1990), pp. 15-16, and C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 186. Attitudes and relationships towards specific differences: a preliminary model 251 engage in intolerant acts in regard to the realisation of their fellow citizens’ basic political rights and obligations. Unlike the area of state-citizen relations, all citizen-citizen attitudes here involve only minimum values. The citizen may, depending on their own personal differences, have a range of values associated with the differences they encounter, from tolerance right through to respect of difference. The squares involving citizen-citizen relations simply contain the minimum attitude that is required, whereas the state, in all except the first case, should only have one particular type of attitude. This is not to say anything about which type of value would be ‘best’, in the sense of which attitude on behalf of citizens would make the best type of society to live in. As I have argued throughout, if differences and their holders are to be taken seriously, then negative as well as positive attitudes towards difference must be allowed to exist. The legitimate aim of accommodation of difference can, at least theoretically, be achieved by the citizen either forbearing, being indifferent to, or respecting the differences they encounter. If they are to respect sameness, then one of these mediating pathways must be taken. Tolerance will be the minimum value required of citizens in relation to specific differences across all types of difference in both the political and essential non- government spheres. This includes disadvantages. The citizen may resent the burden that having a disabled worker, for example, imposes on him, yet still have to respect their workplace rights. This is the same basic process of mediation as if the employer 252 Chapter 5 had an employee who believed in creationism, when they themselves were an ardent evolutionist. The only difference may be that the disabled employee may have a more specific right that needs respecting, as opposed to the creationist employee who may have a more general right against arbitrary workplace discrimination.16 Now, it might be suggested that for a liberal society to reasonably function, a sufficient number of citizens need to have a general disposition of either respect or indifference. Because, as I argued earlier, the citizen is still free to act intolerantly, there may be a risk that relying too heavily on the attitude of forbearance tolerance, while justifiable in theory, may in practice not be particularly stable. If too many citizens are not using the process of mediation effectively, and their forbearance relies more on fear of punishment than principle, then it appears there may be a danger for the successful accommodation of difference. Ultimately, however, this is more a pragmatic question than a theoretical one. But before making any moves down the policy path of encouraging respect of difference or even indifference, the process of mediation should first be strongly encouraged throughout the citizenry. That is, citizens of all ages should be encouraged to respect the basic rights of their fellow citizens regardless of how they view their differences. Whether this will be enough to sustain a sufficiently tolerant and accommodating society is finally an empirical question. As I wrote in Chapter 2, there will always be acts of intolerance, just as there will always be acts of theft, murder and other injustices. The aim of public 16 To be clear, I am not saying that an employer should tolerate all differences, just that they should tolerate differences that are not relevant to the performance of the job. Attitudes and relationships towards specific differences: a preliminary model 253 policy must be to reduce acts of intolerance; to completely eradicate intolerant acts is unrealistically utopian. Encouraging respect of sameness and thereby tolerance of difference between citizens is an approach that acknowledges this fact. Those who argue for respect of difference between citizens either seem oblivious to the potential consequences to people’s difference of this approach, or seem willing to try and reduce intolerance by actually reducing the space for individuals to live their lives as they see fit. While neither approach will completely stop acts of intolerance, respect of sameness and tolerance of difference at least respects the freedom for individuals to live their lives as they see fit (and thus takes their differences seriously), and is at the same time less demanding on individual citizens. Indeed, the very simplicity seems to make it an ideal policy prescription. Finally, in the sphere of individual social interaction (the bottom row of Table 5.1) there are no particular rights for the citizen to respect, and therefore tolerance is no longer a minimum. No tolerance becomes the minimum rather than intolerance, as intolerance, in the sense I am using it, implies the failing to respect some right. I should stress that all three spheres assume a basic background set of rights, such as a right not to be physically assaulted. This covers examples of aggressive intolerance of particular difference. A large part of the wrongness of an intolerant act like ‘wog’ or ‘poofter’ bashing is not specific to any particular sphere, and can be described as a failure to respect one of the basic background sets of rights. 254 Chapter 5 Conclusion The aim of this chapter was to begin to sketch out a more positive and precise answer to the treatment of specific difference. While I argued in the previous chapter that the state should be maximally permissive of difference, and by implication the citizen should also be tolerant of difference, prior to this chapter I had not indicated how this should be achieved. Though intended to be suggestive rather than exhaustive, I have argued that some basic contextual factors must be considered in any attempt to lay out the normative relationships towards particular differences. Specifically, I have suggested that, at a minimum, the agent involved, the sphere in which the difference is displayed, and the type of difference itself, must be considered. This is not to say these are the only possible considerations, and that it is not possible to have overriding considerations. But if the aim is, as it should be in a liberal polity, the maximal accommodation of difference, then the full range of tolerance, indifference, and respect should be used, both by the state and the individual citizen. To require only one of these attitudes (such as ‘we should respect difference’) is, at best, a conceptual confusion, and, at worst, a failure to respect fundamental sameness, and with it the freedom of individuals to live their lives as they see fit in a given polity. While, in all but one case, the attitude required by the state towards specific difference is pre-established, this is not the case for the individual citizen who is free to use all three possible attitudes in their accommodation of specific difference. This further underscores how the model is maximally accommodating of difference. Conclusion I began this thesis by noting a divergence in the focus of real world multicultural policy and multicultural political theory. Whereas much of the political theory in this area has focussed on what the state should do directly for its citizens (in the form of cultural rights, exemptions, symbolic recognition and so on), government policy in recent years has tended to focus more on inter-citizen relations, with a keen interest in fostering respectful interactions that both build and foster social cohesion and reduce acts of intolerance. In both government policy and political theory, respect in this area has often been invoked vaguely. Sometimes it is used to refer to respect of somebody’s difference and at other times to respect of their sameness or common citizenship. Yet these are two very different objects of respect, and one certainly does not imply the other. Further, while recent government multicultural policy has been explicit in demanding more of the individual citizen, the debate in political theory has all too often used an ambiguous ‘we’, thereby allowing normative demands to be directed at individual citizens as well as the state. However, if a political theory is to remain sufficiently liberal, demands placed on the individual citizen must be distinguished from those placed on the state. As I have argued in this thesis, a failure to clearly distinguish the normative demands of the citizen from those of the state is of particular concern in relation to respect of difference. When a state/citizen as well 256 Conclusion as a difference/sameness distinction is upheld, calls for citizen-citizen respect of difference begin to look increasingly demanding. In my assessment of the policies and prescriptions put forward to reduce acts of intolerance, foster social cohesion, and accommodate diversity, I have employed an explicitly liberal yardstick – the freedom of individuals to live their lives as they see fit without unjustified state interference. While it may initially appear that inter- citizen respect of difference would be the ideal method of achieving these ends, I have shown that this is not the case. Whether the ‘respect’ in respect of difference is conceptualised in appraisal, recognition or any other sense, it is much too strong a demand to be justified in this domain. But as I have also shown, it is an unnecessary demand, since it is quite possible to not respect a difference and yet not act intolerantly towards its holder; as I previously noted, this is something that many religious people do every day. Yet the disconnect between respect of difference and accommodation of difference goes even deeper. In the example I put forward at the end of Chapter 2 – the case of the Sikh boy not being allowed to attend a private school without first cutting his hair and removing his turban – it was seen that respect of difference, or at least what was believed to be respect of difference, did not necessarily lead to accommodation either. Inter-citizen respect of difference is an unjustifiable demand. It neither attains its apparent goals, nor is necessary for their attainment –all the while being extremely demanding on individual citizens. Even when put forward as a more general policy prescription, respect of difference puts unjustified pressure on those whose differences will not be as easily respecting or Conclusion 257 respectable as those of citizens who have more majoritarian-type differences. This pressure can be seen (perhaps ironically) as a potential assimilation of difference under the guise of respect of difference. Respect of sameness should be preferred in inter-citizen relations. It is a simpler and more feasible demand that is more closely linked to the successful accommodation of difference. Respect of sameness allows, through a process of mediation, individual citizens to accommodate a difference without having to view it as being worthy of their respect. This means that the minimum demand of individual citizens (qua citizens) is to engage in acts of forbearance tolerance. This is an approach of ‘regardless of what you think or feel (positive or negative), all citizens must have their basic rights respected’. This approach avoids making the successful respect of basic citizenship rights contingent on the views and capacities of individual citizens, and also avoids asking more of citizens than is required. Respect of sameness is, ultimately, more accommodating of diversity than respect of difference. The tendency to overshoot the mark and ask too much of the individual citizen is exemplified in certain approaches to social cohesion, particularly those that involve the building and maintaining of a national identity and culture. While a degree of social cohesion may well be required for the success of cooperative projects, its potential to restrict the freedom of individuals to live their lives as they see fit means that both the ends and the means for building and maintaining social cohesion need justification. While respect of difference should certainly not be seen as the ‘glue’ 258 Conclusion that holds a society together, neither should a national identity and culture, especially when there are other methods – such as targeted trust building, institutional belonging, and ensuring fair social outcomes – that can create sufficient social cohesion, with less costs to individual freedom. While the minimum required of citizens in their more public interactions is tolerance, how should this concept be understood? Although much has been written on the moral virtue of tolerance, treating tolerance as a moral virtue fails to render sufficient guidance in real political situations where the aim (quite rightly) is to avoid acts of intolerance. The primary measure of the good of an act of tolerance should be in the freedom of the tolerated, rather than in the virtue of the tolerator. Instead of being concerned whether a particular difference is freely chosen or is of a moral nature, or why precisely it is objected to, an act of tolerance should simply involve the negative judgement of a difference, the power to negatively interfere with the difference or its holder, and the decision not to negatively interfere. Asking for more is to conflate ethical concerns with political ones. This understanding of specific instances of tolerance must not be confused with the general practice of state toleration which has very different features. The general practice of toleration does not have to involve negative valuing at all; it may simply involve withholding the power to negatively interfere with a difference or its holder, despite having the power to negatively interfere. Indeed, a great deal of liberal toleration involves the attitude of indifference rather than forbearance tolerance. This Conclusion 259 is not to say it only involves indifference. Toleration is a range concept, and at its edges the liberal state will rightly be said to be engaged in forbearance tolerance, particularly with differences that are counter to its conception of justice, as in some racist or sexist beliefs. Moreover, it is also quite possible for toleration to involve acts of respect of difference. Understanding the general practice of toleration in this way maintains an important consistency between toleration and liberal neutrality. The range of liberal toleration will be broader than the range of liberal neutrality, and thus liberal toleration will not simply involve indifference. Further, this understanding of the general practice of toleration deflates the charge that ‘being tolerated’ must involve being viewed negatively. Toleration is an extremely permissive political ideal, not only of individual difference, but also, if so desired, of a range of different normative approaches to diversity. A society will always contain acts of intolerance, just as it will always contain acts of theft. This truism is worth pausing over. When public policy and the prescriptions of political theory are designed, there may be real costs for individual freedom of trying to entirely eradicate intolerance. These problems are merely exacerbated when policy prescriptions are too general and end up targeting all citizens for the sake of a few, especially when these prescriptions may not even affect these few. Policies and prescriptions that aim to increase accommodation, decrease acts of intolerance, and build and maintain support for cooperative projects should not be unnecessarily demanding and should not simply entail using what may initially appear to be the most efficacious and efficient methods. If diverse societies are to operate using liberal 260 Conclusion principles, then the freedom of individuals to live their lives as they see fit must be paramount. The arguments I have made in this thesis have both conceptual and policy implications. From a conceptual perspective, I have put forward significant interpretations of the concepts of respect, tolerance, toleration and neutrality, as well as clarified the ‘we’ in multicultural political theory and challenged the good of social cohesion. From a policy perspective, the implications of my argument are most pertinent in education policy, both for children, but also for programs targeted at adults. When people are educated for citizenship, simpler, more feasible, and less perfectionist demands should be preferred. A further policy implication is in the area of social cohesion, particularly, as seems to be increasingly the case in several multicultural jurisdictions, when a strong national identity and culture is put forward as the solution to violence, intolerance and perceived social fragmentation. Key demands in multicultural policy and multicultural political theory have been both too strong and poorly directed. 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