The Australian Offer

CHAPTER I1 THE AUSTRALIAN OFFER IN the days of intense anxiety immediately before the declaration of war, when the entrance of Britain into it and the steps which she would take if she did enter were equally uncertain, there was a feeling in the British dominions that a declaration of their support would strengthen her position in the eyes of the world. New Zealand on July 30th offered to send a force of New Zealand troops if need arose. In Canada, on July 31st, Sir Robert Borden, the Prime Minister, hurriedly returned to Ottawa, summoned a meeting of the Cabinet, and telegraphed to the British Government that it could count on the fullest aid from Canada. The Canadian Government asked its Ministry of Militia and Defence for advice as to the force which could be sent at an early date. During the next few days several telegrams reached the Australian newspapers reporting statements attributed to Colonel Sam Hughes, the talkative Minister of Militia and Defence in Canada. He had said that “an offer of 30,000 men had been practically decided upon,” and that 20,000 Canadians would be ready to sail within a fortnight if required. This news appeared in the Australian journals on Monday, August 3rd. under large headlines: “Canada offers 30,000.” As a matter of fact Canada had offered to send 20,000 men, and more if required, but the actual terms passed unnoticed in Australia. Within two months in Canada, as in Australia, the men in training were far more than were originally contemplated. It so happened at this perilous time there was brewing in Australia a Federal election, and one in which the political struggle was particularly bitter and the tactics intricate. The two parties in the country were Liberal and Labour. The Liberals had been in office, with Joseph Cook as Prime Minister and Senator Millen as Minister for Defence, but during their whole term they had been hampered by a heavy majority of their opponents in the Senate. Senator Millen, one of the most experienced and astute of Australian politicians. had been worried to the limit of endurance by the task of piloting Government measures through a hostile House. The

20 June-Aug., 19141 THE AUSTRALIAN OFFER 21

Ministry, in order to rid itself of this obstacle, had intro- duced a Bill specially designed to bring the deadlock to an acute stage, so that it might apply the remedy laid down in the Australian Constitution for such a situation, to wit, a dissolution of both Houses of Parliament. The newly-arrived Governor-General, Sir Ronald Craufurd Munro Ferguson.‘ had given his assent. Feelings ran high and bitter. Parliament had been dissolved on June 27th, and polling was to take place on September 5th. The Ministers were mostly in the constituencies far from Melbourne (the temporary Capital and Seat of Government), pursuing the business of the election. Under the arrangements made at the Imperial Conferences mentioned in the last chapter, the Committee of Imperial Defence, in assisting the dominions to draw up their “Defence Schemes,” had arranged certain warnings which should be sent to them by the British Government whenever there was danger of war. There are certain precautionary steps which, for reasons of prudence, every country takes when the inter- national situation is so threatening that war seems imminent. It may be necessary, for example, immediately to enforce certain measures in regard to the merchant ships of an enemy then lying in the country’s ports, and also certain precautions in the case of neutral ships, which might carry enemy spies or goods, or might be fired on by forts at night or wander into minefields. These and many other steps, which constitute the ‘‘ precautionary stage ” of mobilisation, are in prudence planned beforehand, so that they can be taken immediately upon the receipt of a warning that war is probably impending. The country is thus put into a position-its forts manned, its garrisons ready, its wireless stations and railway bridges guarded-in which it cannot be taken unprepared. Later, if word is received that war has actually broken out, a further and different set of measures can be applied. The Committee of Imperial Defence had drafted two messages which could be sent in times of peril by the British Government to the Governor-General of each dominion : the first warning him that there was imminent danger of war: the ’ Rt Hon. Vlscount Novar, K T , G C.M G., Governor-General of Australia, 1g14-zo Of Raith, Kirkcaldy, Scotland: b. Raith, 6 March 1860. Died, 30 March 1934. 22 THE STORY OF ANZAC [ 1908-14 second, if war arrived, notifying him of the fact. On the receipt of the first iiiessage the Government of the dominion would, if it thought fit, order the “precautionary stage” of mobilisation. On receiving the second it would take whatever steps it had decided upon for a time of war. Australia, fortunately, had her “Defence Scheme” almost ready. It so happened that in Igo8-the year following the Imperial Conference which originated the plan-the Chief of Staff of the Australian Forces was Colonel IVilliam Throsby Bridges,2 an able soldier and a man whose grim driving force at all times strongly influenced whatever Minister he might be working with. Bridges (whose title was Chief of Intelligence, inasmuch as the “General Staff” had only been established since the South African War and was a new thing at the date in question) started upon a Defence Scheme of his own. He first sketched in his mind the scheme as a whole, and then decided to begin upon the detailed measures to be taken by the Commandants in the six States, each of which is a ‘‘District’] in the Australian army ~ystern.~He left until later the proceedings to be undertaken by the central authority of the Common- wealth acting from Melbourne, such as censorship of letters, cables, and newspapers. In this work, shortly after he had besin it, he was joined by a young oflicer of the Royal Aus- tralian Garrison Artillery, newly returned from two years in the British Staff College, Major C. B. B. When Colonel Bridges left the Headquarters Staff in Melbourne in order to become the Australian representative on the Imperial General Staff in London, the work was continued under his successor, Brigadier-General Joseph Maria Gordon. The steps to be taken by the States had been completely drawn up. For those to be taken by the Commonwealth a beginning had been made by Bridges himself, who drafted them with a stern rigidity. He laid down the conditions to be imposed upon the press. “I

~~ 3 Major General Sir W. T Bridges, K C B.. C.11 G Commanded 1st Aust. Div and AIF. 1914/15; b. Greenock, Scotland, 18 Tcb, 1S61; died of wounds, 18 May. I915 ‘The six States and the SIX Vilitary Districts are almost identical. the only important difference being that Broken Hill in New South Wales belongs, for ronrcnicnce, to the 4th Military District (South -4nstralia), and part of the h-orthern Rirers of N.S W. to the 1st Military District IQucensland). 4 General Sir C B B White. K C B , KChI G . K C VO D S 0. psc Puring the last offensive of the war Chief of Staff. ith Armv Chief of General Staff of Australian Forces, rqzoi23 and 1950 Chairman. Commonwealth Puhlic Service Board. 1923/28, h St Arnaud, Vic, 23 Sept.. 18jh Killed in aeroplane craqh, 13 Aug, 1940 1908-141 THE AUSTRALIAN OFFER 23 never for a moment believed they’d stand ’em,” he told a friend, long afterwards, expressing his surprise at the public- spirited manner in which the newspapers had accepted the restrictions designed to prevent information from reaching the enemy. After Bridges left Melbourne, considerable additions were made to the Defence Scheme by Major White. At the outbreak of the war it was still incomplete. But the instructions to the States were ready. The sentling of a certain telegram from Melbourne would put into force sets of printed orders which lay in the safes of the District Com- mandants, waiting only to be unsealed. On Wednesday, July zgth, the British Government despatched the first of the two warning telegrams. This was received by the Governor-General of Australia on July 3oth.6 It informed the Government that the time had arrived for bringing into force the “precautionary stage” of the Defence Scheme. This was immediately followed by a second telegram, instructing the Australian Government that the measures for the examination of ships entering Australia11 ports were not at the moment required, but that arrangements should be made to enforce them when necessary. On Saturday, August Ist, the word came that this precaution also should be taken. On Thursday, July goth, when the first critical news arrived, the Governor-General was in Sydney, as was also Senator Millen, the Minister for Defence. Joseph Cook. the Prime Minister, alone was at the seat of Government in Melbourne: he had arranged to follow Andrew Fisher, the leader of the Opposition, in an important election speech at Colac on Saturday. It will appear to future generations of Australians a strange token of the manner in which Australia stood on the brink of the precipice without suspecting the tremendous plunge ahead of her that, even on the receipt of this warning, the Prime Minister (whose whole-hearted unswerving devotion to the British Empire was and is one of the main principles of his life) did not instantly call the niemhers of

An indirect warnma vas received hy the Yzvy Office about tltc same time from the Senior Naval Officer on the New Zealand Station and the Coinmanrler. in-chlef of the China Station HT IO 10 pm on Julv 30th the Arlstralian Squadron, which had been cruising off the Queensland coast, was on its way south under orders from Senator Millen and the Naval Board 24 THE STORY OF ANZAC [July-Aug., 1914 his Cabinet to meet him the next day or the day after in Mel- bourne; that the Minister for Defence did not immediately return to the Navy and Defence Departments at the seat of Government ; and that the Governor-General did not forth- with move to Melbourne and ask the Prime Minister to confer with him.* Certain swift and comprehensive orders were given to the Fleet; but, except for this, the only definite step was that the Minister for Defence sent for the acting- Chief of the Military Staff to travel up to confer with him in Sydney. This was the officer on whom at the moment rested almast the entire responsibility for the control of Australia’s military system. Its headquarters in Melbourne were thus left temporarily without the normal head of the most important branch. It so happened that at this crisis the Australian army was without its Chief of Staff. Brigadier-General Gordon, who succeeded Colonel Bridges, had recently retired. Bridges, now Brigadier-General, having established the Military College had been made Inspector-General, and was absent in the north of Australia. Colonel Legge,s an Australian officer who had made his name by his administrative ability, and who was largely responsible for the details of Lord Kitchener’s scheme, upon which the Australian army was now organised, had been in England as Australia’s representative on the Imperial General Staff. He had been recalled to succeed General Gordon as Chief of the General Staff, but was at sea on the outbreak of war, and did not reach Melbourne till August 8th. The officer who was filling the position in the meantime was Major C. B. B. White, upon whom, during these days, there fell almost the sole responsibility for advising the Government. On the night of Friday, July 31st, Senator Millen, by his statement in Sydney that Australia was “no fair-weather partner” in the Empire, and Andrew Fisher at Colac. by pledging to the support of Great Britain, if necessary, Aus- tralia’s “last man and last shilling,” placed the position of AUS- tralia beyond doubt before the world. The European newspapers spread the news of those promises next day. During

But see pp zz-I ‘Licut.-Ceneral J. C. Legge, C.B., C.M.G. Commanded 1st Auot. Dir.. rgrj. 2nd Aust nix. , iqi:/ib. Commandant Royal hIilltary College of Australla, Duntroon. IOZO/~Z: of Sjdney, N.S.\V.; b. London. Eng.. 15 Aug, 1863. 30th July-2nd Aug., 19141 THE AUSTRALIAN OFFER 25 the two days which followed, Senator Millen in Sydney con- ferred with Major White, and also with the Governor-General and William Irvine, the Federal Attorney-General, who happened to be in that city. But even yet the “precautionary steps” recommended by the telegram received on July 30th were not taken. The Prime Minister was speaking at Colac, and the rest of the Government was scattered throughout Australia. It was reported that an urgent telegram reached one of them in the country, but that there was no one with him who could decode it. On Sunday, August 2nd. a further telegram came from the British Government asking that precautionary measures should be taken at defended ports. The greatest haste ensued. Heads of military departments, Mr. T. Trumble (the acting-Secretary) Colonel Sellheim ( Adjutant-General) ,’ Lieutenant-Colonel Forsyth (acting- Quartermaster-General) ,* Lieutenant-Colonel Horace Dangar (acting-Chief of Ordnance), J. B. Laing (Finance Member of the Military Board), and Captain T. Griffiths (Secretary of the Military Board)s were brought in by motor-car to their departments. Later in the morning they met the Prime Minister at his office. The Prime Minister held the first call on all telegraph and telephone lines during that day. Separated from his Minister for Defence and from the Chief of the General Staff at a moment when the precautions laid down for times of “danger of war” were due to be promulgated, he was in a position of great anxiety: but the situation was eased by a meeting of the Minister for Defence, the Attorney-General, and the Governor-General in Sydney, where it was decided to put the “precautionary stage” into force. At 1.50 pm. on Sunday, August 2nd. Senator Millen telegraphed to the Prime Minister that this action was proposed. That afternoon orders were issued bringing into effect (as the press said) “the first statre of an ordinarv mobilisation.” ‘Major General V. C. M. Sellheim, C.B.. C.M.G. Comdt. Admin. H -Q.. A.I.F. Egypt. 101 5/16, London, 1916: Adjutant-General and Second nlilitary Member of Militarv Board of Australian Forces 1914 and 1917/24. Administrator of Norfolk Island.. 1q26/28: of Brisbane: b. SGdney. 12 May, 1866. Died, zj Jan., 1928. * Major-General J. K. Forsyth C.M.G. Commanded and Inf. Bde., 1915/!6. ~uartermaster-Genera1and Third ’Military Member of Military Board of Australian Forces, rgrg/zz; of Fortitude Valley, Brisbane, Q’land; b. Brisbane, g Feb , 1867. Died, 12 Nov.. 1928. ‘Brig.-General T. Griffiths. C.M.G.. C.B.E. D.S.O. AA.G., AI.F., 1916; Commandant Admin. H -Q., A.I.F.. 1917/18 ;nd 1919. Administrator of New Guinea, I~ZO/ZI and rq3a/3j: Admmlstrator of Nauru. 1qa1/27; officer of Aust Permanent Forces, b. Prcsteigne. Radnor, S. \Vales. 29 Sept.. 1865 26 THE STORY OF ANZAC [~st-sthAug., 1914 All that the people knew of these proceedings was that the Prime Minister had received certain messages from England. “I cannot talk about these things,” he said to the pressmen. ‘“They are too grave. AI1 I can say is that we are not asleep.” It was announced that he had called a special Cabinet meeting for the next day. The Minister for Defence and the Attorney- General were leaving Sydney by that night’s express, and Senator McColl, the Vice-president of the Executive Council, was in Melbourne. The Cabinet meeting was to be held at three in the afternoon, immediately after the Sydney express arrived. It was indeed time for swift action. On August 1st a wireless message in the secret German code was received by many German merchant ships which were loading or unloading in Australian ports. On Sunday, August 2nd. two of the Ger- man steamers which were taking in coal at Newcastle in New South Wales suddenly left. It had previously been intended that they should sail romd the north of Australia through the intricate navigation of Torres Straits, and they had, according to custom, taken on board Torres Straits pilots for the pass- age. As soon as they were clear of Newcastle they stopped, sending the pilots back to port with the intimation that they would not be needed. The steamer Westfalen did the same next day. Another fine German ship, the Elsass, which was lying in Sydney Harbour at the wharves in Woolloomooloo Bay, with papers for a voyage to Antwerp, pushed off as early as she could on the morning of Tuesday, August 4th, and in the hurry of swinging round made a large hole in the Woolloo- mooloo Baths. There were no instructions to stop her, and she cleared at 8.5 a.m. through Sydney Heads. There were no recognised means of detaining such ships until a state of war was actually recognised. On August 5th the steamer Pfalc tried to get away shortly after noon through the heads of Port Phillip (Melbourne), but was stopped by a shot from the forts, which had just heard of the outbreak of war. The Governor-General and Major White returned with the two Ministers to Melbourne. The special Cabinet meeting, held immediately on Monday afternoon (August 3rd), decided to offer to the mother country the assistance both of rgrz-14J THE AUSTRALIAN OFFER 27 the navy and of a force of Australian troops. G. L. Macandie, Secretary of the Board of Naval Administration, and Major White, acting-Chief of the General Staff of the army, were instructed to be in attendance, and the latter was asked to furnish any plans that might exist for the sending of an expeditionary force from Australia oversea. It has been mentioned in the last chapter that the majority of the Ministers from oversea dominions who attended the Imperial Conferences in London were shy of making any provision, however tentative, for such a contingency. It is true that, under Richard Seddon, New Zealand did undertake the creation of a “reserve” pledged to serve abroad if required, and that Natal was willing to do the same. In 1913 New Zealand agreed to a definite scheme for an expeditionary force. But in other dominions ministers were nervous of the opposition which the mere suggestion might create among their respective peoples. The contingency was almost certain eventually to arise, unless history contradicted itself. During his work upon the Defence Scheme Major White had asked to be allowed to draw up a provisional plan on which such a force could at any time be quickly organised, if Parliament ever so required, but the permission was withheld. The De- fence Scheme of Australia provided only for the chance of an enemy raiding or invading her shores. A plan for meeting the enemy in the enemy’s own country-or. indeed. anywhere except within Australia-officially had no existence. One Australian Defence Minister, however, had faced the problem of sending a force to combine with New Zealand if ever need arose. Senator Pearce, Minister for Defence from 1910 to 1913, undertook such provision in the face of whatever political consequences it might bring. Major-General Alexander Godley, who had been lent by the British Govern- ment to inaugurate Lord Kitchener’s defence scheme in New Zealand, had chanced to visit Sydney in 1912. Rrigadier- General Gordon suggested that the opportunity was a good one for a meeting to discuss common action between Australia and New Zealand in case either were invaded. Senator Pearce agreed. At that meeting a scheme was proposed by which Australia and New Zealand should each provide contingents based upon the number of troops which they had respectively 26: THE STORY OF ANZAC [ I912-1‘$

sent to the South African War, but so organised as to com- pose, not a series of unconnected contingents, but a single fully-organised ‘‘ division.*’ A division at that time was 18.000 strong. Australia was to provide 12,000 men, and New Zealand about 6,000, orgaiiised in the appropriate units -two infantry brigades coniing from Australia and one from New Zealand, each with its proportion of ambulances and other troops. The details of Australia’s share in such a scheme-as to how the force should be raised and organised -were worked out by Major White. New Zealand’s share in it was elaborated in Wellington. This measure was one of co-operation between Australia and New Zealand only. But in August. rg13$the New Zealand Minister for Defence, visit- ing London, discussed with the British Army Council a provisional arrangement for an expeditionary force. The composition of the New Zealand quota of such a force, though independently arrived at, was almost the same as that in the previous arrangement with Australia. At the outbreak of war it had not yet been effectively organised; but as the scheme was ready and considered, it became the basis of New Zealand’s offer of troops to Great Britain. Now, therefore, when the Prime Minister of Australia needed a plan for the vast and urgent work of raising and training a force to be sent oversea, the notes formulated by the young Chief of Staff were the one piece of forethought on which the country depended in this emergency. Major White could guarantee that it was possible to raise and organise for service abroad a volunteer force of 12,000 men of all arms, and to have them ready for sailing within six weeks. The Prime Minister was determined that Australia’s contribution should be on a greater scale than this. If Canada had offered (as was believed) 30,000 men, Australia could not offer fewer than ZO,O~O. White agreed that ~0,000Australians could be raised, and that there was a fair prospect that they would be ready to sail within six weeks. He was asked to draft a cablegram to the British Government embodying that offer. The cable, which was immediately sent, ran as follows: In the event of war the Government (of Australia) is pre- pared to place the vessels of the Australian Navy under the control of the British Admiralty when desired. It is further pre- pared to despatch an expeditionary force of 20,000 men of any grddth Aug., 19141 THE AUSTRALIAN OFFER 29 suggested composition to any destination desired by the Home Government, the force to be at the complete disposal of the Home Government. The cost of despatch and maintenance will be borne by this (i.e., the Australian) Government. The Prime Minister, at the close of the Cabinet meeting, announced this offer to the press. It was at once posted out- side the newspaper offices, where the crowds who read it burst into cheers. The force had so far merely been offered “in the event of war.” The offer was published in the British press next day, August qth, before war had been declared. The British Govern- ment on the same day replied that there was no immediate need for the force, but that it would be wise to take steps in case the necessity arose. Two days later, on August 6th, the Secretary of State for the Colonies telegraphed that the British Government “gratefully accepted the offer . . . to send a force of 20,000 men. and would be glad if it could be despatched as soon as possible.” But already before that date men had begun to appear from a11 directions at the headquarters in Sydney and Melbourne begging to en- list, and on August 5th a small staff had been established in the Victoria Barracks, Melbourne, for registering their names. As yet it was not known what form the contingent would be required to take. The British Government had not stated what composition it desired. An inquiry was therefore despatched as to whether the War Office preferred the force to be sent organised as a division, or otherwise. On this apparently minor question, arising at the very birth of the Australian force, hung an issue all-important for Australia and of immense influence upon the development of the Empire. The young acting-Chief of the Australian General Staff, who was well acquainted with the British Staff, had fears that the latter would prefer the Australian force to be organised in small formations-such as infantry brigades, with the proper proportion of artillery, field ambulances, engineers, and transport attached-so that each Australian unit could be separated from the others and incorporated in a British division. From the British Staff Officer’s point of view the Australian troops were unlikely to be so efficiently organised or disciplined as those coming from the British army dCpbts, where the tradition of the British regular army and the efficiency of 30 THE STORY OF ANZAC [5th-7th Aug., 1914 the British regular non-commissioned officer served as the foundation on which to build the new army. Moreover the British Staff would probably mistrust the capacity of senior Australian ofticers to command a large body of men in the field. British officers, and indeed British citizens, would not realise that there was any special desire on the part of Aus- tralian soldiers to retain their national identity. They did not themselves object to having a “colonial” brigade in most of their divisions, and they would naturally not realise what objection the Australian should have to such an arrangement. For these reasons the acting-Chief of Staff, although he drafted the cable so as to hint that Australia was capable of organising a division, rather feared that the War Office would ask for Australian troops in a form in which they could be split up amongst British divisions. And so it happened. The British Government’s answer, on August 7th, ran : “The Army Council suggest that a suitable composition of the expeditionary force would be two infantry brigades, one light horse brigade, and one field artillery brigade.” This answer suggested a force very similar to that which had been discussed in Australia’s arrangements with New Zealand-a force which would comprise only 12,000 men. It was quite clear that any force so composed would be dis- membered and incorporated with units from other parts of the Empire in such a way that its national character would be lost. But the man in whose hands the Australian Government had placed the organisation of Australia’s contribution to the army of the Empire abroad was one who saw far ahead, and who realised somethirig of what it would mean to her that this force should go to the war as a national unit. William Throsby Bridges, Inspector-General of the Australian Mili- tary Forces, had been in Queensland when the war broke out, but had been recalled to Melbourne. He was a man of great knowledge, slow of thought, but always thinking and thinking deeply, and when he arrived at a purpose lie held inflexibly to it. From August 5th, when he reached Melbourne and was entrusted with the organising of the expeditionary force, he was determined that Australia should send to this war an Australian “division”-a compact unit, to be kept and fought as an Australian unit wherever it might go. 5th-9th Aug., 19x41 THE AUSTRALIAN OFFER 31

To begin with, he took two steps. He appointed Major White as the chief of his staff in the new force; and he drafted for the Minister such a reply to the Army Council’s proposal as he knew would decide the matter in accordance with his resolve. It stated that Australia “fully expected 20,000 to go” and had begun organising a division of infantry, including -in accordance with the regular Home Army organisation- three brigades of 3-gun batteries of artillery, but without the howitzer brigade and heavy battery prescribed for a British division. (A full Eritish division at that time would amount lo IS,OOOmen). The telegram added that, in addition, a light horse brigade was being constituted, consisting of 2,226 men and 2,315 horses. “Do you concur,” it ended, “or still wish your proposal adopted? Anticipating em- barking in four to six weeks. An early answer is requested.” Nest day the British Government replied that it gladly availed itself of this offer in place of the force which the Army Council had suggested. The stand thus taken by the far-sighted, sardonic soldier- statesman was the first and greatest step towards settling the character which the expeditionary force was destined to assume-that of a national Australian army. The same question subsequently arose many times, in Gallipoli. France, and Palestine, the British Staff having the greatest difficulty in understanding Australian nationalism or grasping the fact that it could be used to the benefit of the allies. He was a long- headed man who saw, though dimly, even at this early stage, the national interest in keeping Australia’s force together. In the stand which he had made General Bridges was actuated by pure Australian nationalism. He does not appear to have had at the time the faintest idea that the division whkh he advocated woiild ever be commanded by himself. At the moment he was much more concerned with getting the Defence Scheme. which lie had fathered, into smooth working. In that scheme there was a provision that, in the event of war, the Inspector-General was to become automatically the commander of the troops in Australia. It was this position which he espected to occupy, and he believed that, if he could take it over promptly, he would be of use to the country. He saw that this was to be mainly an infantry war, 32 THE STORY OF ANZAC [gth-10th Aug., 1914

and he considered that Australia would best be represented at the heart of it by an infantry division. At the same time he realised that light horse was the national arm of Australia, and he desired that arm to be represented. A brigade of light horse would roughly make up the 2,000 men required to complete the offer of 20,000. Accordingly such a brigade was suggested. He had no expectation of personally commanding either the force or the division. Indeed he himself suggested that the command should be given to Lieutenant-General Sir Edward Hutton,lo the brilliant British officer who had been lent to Australia as the first commander of her forces after the federation of the Australian States into the Commonwealth. Such were the events by which the Australian force was shaped. Had it fought through the war in the form favoured by the Army Council, there would have heen no Anzac Corps. Australia would have had to its credit no “Landing,” no Lone Pine, neither Poziitres nor Broodseinde, no Villers-Bretonneux, no Mont St. Quentin, neither Romani nor Damascus, no battle of the Hindenburg Line. The allies would have lacked an element whose enthusiasm was not without its influence upon the war. The Australian nation would not have existed in the same sense as to-day. The British Goveriimerlt on August 10th announced that it had gratefully accepted the offers of the dominions to supply the following forces : CANADA-The cruisers Niobe and Rainbow, and an expeditionary force of 20,om men; also such further numbers as might be required. AusTRALIA-The Royal Australian Navy, and an expeditionary force of 20,000 men. NEW ZEALAND-The New Zealand Naval Force, and an expeditionary force of over 8,000 men. The numbers of this first contingent from New Zealand were far greater in proportion to the population than those of the other oversea States. Her population at this time was 1,128,160: Australia’s 4,972,059 ; Canada’s 7,758,000. The

IO Lieut -General Sir E. T H. Hutton K C.B , K C hl.G, p s.c Organlsed and commanded aIst Division. 1gr4/1 j, bdt retired through 1ll.health; b. Torquay, Eng , 6 Dec , 1848. Died 4 Aug., 1923 I914-20] THE AUSTRALIAX OFFER 33 oversea States each offered to maintain their respective forces; from the first they paid the expense of every man whom they sent to the front, his sea transport, food, clothing, his horse and motor transport, the repair of his arms, and the ammunition fired by his guns. At first elaborate cross accounts were kept of the actual goods supplied; but from the commencement of the Gallipoli campaign a calculation was made of the cost per day of each man, and Australia paid a fised sum for the upkeep of every Australian soldier in the various theatres of the war. The arrangement worked most smoothly. The Australian Government was anxious to pay its full share, and the British Government showed in the details a large-minded liberality which was characteristic of Great Britain’s financial policy throughout the war. Up to the 30th of June, 1920, the ex- penditure of Australia upon war purposes was f385,760,402. Of this sum she had raised from revenue and internal loans f268.122,381,while f~~,~00,000had been lent by Great Britain, to which a large amount was further owing for various services. It became necessary to appoint a commander for the Aus- tralian Infantry Division and Light Horse Brigade. The Aus- tralian Government refused General Bridges’ suggestion that the position should he offered to General Hutton. The command was given to Bridges himself, and the work of creating the force was put into his hands. From that day forth Bridges. working continuously and inseparably with White as his Chief of Staff, in Melbourne, in Egypt, and in Gallipoli, organised the field army which was Australia’s main contribution to the war. The first question was whether the expeditionary force could be formed from the existing regiments and battalions of the Australian Army, or whether an entirely new army must be founded and trained. In Canada some of the existing regiments volunteered bodily for the front. In New Zea- land the system was that each of the battalions and mounted regiments of the New Zealand Army provided a company or a squadron in the expeditionary force ; these companies and squadrons carried the names and badges of their old regiments. But, as was explained in the last chapter, Australia had just accepted Lord Kitchener’s new army system. It had been a wholesale change: the old system of a militia was given up for I 34 THE STORY OF ANZAC [ 191 1-14 one in which the country was divided into 224 training areas. In each of these the boys were compulsorily trained as cadets from the age of twelve. At the age of eighteen they passed into the “Active” battalions and regiments of the Common- wealth Army, where they received a short annual training for a further seven years. The new system had been launched in 1911. The members of the old militia army had been per- mitted to complete the three years for which they had enlisted, but the only new blood allowed into the army from 1911 on- wards was the young draft of 18-year-old boys (or “trainees”), about 17,000 in number, which came in every year from the senior cadets. Of the old militia only the officers and non- commissioned officers were allowed to re-engage in the new army. The result was that, although the numbers of the Australian forces had risen from 23,000 of the militia days to 45,000 under the compulsory training scheme, and were rising fast each year, they consisted almost entirely of boys of from 19 to 21, commanded largely by officers and non-commissioned officers of the old force. If the system had reached its full development (which would not have been until ~g~g),the expeditionary force could more easily have been constituted upon the basis of the existing army. But as Australia could not send away an army of boys, however willing, and as large numbers were needed in a short time, it was decided to raise a separate army specially for this service. That army eventually existed as a parallel force to the “Australian Military Forces” (as the army for home service was called). The expeditionary army had its own commaqder, its own headquarters and staff; and ultimately, when established in London, its Administrative Headquarters became a miniature War Office as large and important as the Central Administration of the Australian Army in Melbourne. It had its own rates of pay, its own rules for promotion, its own seniority and gradation list of officers. It must not be supposed that, when the first two Australian “ formations ” were offered to Great Britain, Bridges, or anyone else, had any idea of the size to which this army would grow. He was organising simply an infantry division and a light horse brigade. The popular idea was that the war would 19141 THE AUSTRALIAN OFFER 35 last for possibly five or six months, by which time the allies would be across the Rhine. Indeed more than one officer during the voyage studied Baedeker’s guidebook to the Rhine Valley, and wondered if he would be in time to reach the scene before the war was over. The contingent now being raised seemed an immense one for Australia. No provision for anything so large as a division existed in the Australian Army system ; a brigade was the largest formation yet provided for. Even Great Britain herself had never, before the present war, sent a fully- organised modern division across the seas as one compact unit. No one at this time dreamed that further contingents approaching the same size would be needed from Australia. For nearly a year the infantry division which Australia sent was commonly I

6.4 36 THE STORY OF ANZAC [ 1914 time was the conviction that, when the force arrived over- seas, there must be some Australian headquarters at the base to keep touch between the units of the Australian force in the field and the Australian Government; and he was haunted by the fear that he might be required to take charge of those duties and to leave his division. As time went on, it became manifest that such a staff was indeed required, and eventually, in Egypt, it was established. But on one thing Bridges was resolved-that, come what might, he would never be induced to leave his division in the field in order to command the force at the base. Such were the vague notions entertained at this early stage concerning the main expeditionary army which Australia set out to create. A second expeditionary force, smaller and quite distinct, was being raised at the same time, in order to comply with a request of the British Government for the seizure of German possessions and wireless stations in the Pacific. This force, whose establishment came under the new Chief of the General Staff, Colonel J. G. Legge, and which sailed on August rgth, was known as the Australian Naval and Military Ex- peditionary Force. The history of that expedition is told in another volume. It was necessary to give the main force a name to distinguish it from the smaller one, and at one of the earliest meetings with his new staff General Bridges asked for suggestions. About a dozen titles were put forward by various officers. “TOOlong!’’ said the General bluntly to some of these proposals. He would not on any consideration have the title “expeditionary.” “It’s not an expedition.” he said. “I want a name that will sound well when they call us by our initials. That’s how they’ll speak of us. We don’t want to be called the ‘B.L.U.F.’!” “Australian Imperial Force” was his own suggestion, and, like most strong men. he adopted his own proposal in the end. Though the day when every military institu- tion was called by its initials-as happened during the war- had not yet arrived, he was perfectly right in his forecast. It was by the letters “A.I.F.” that the Australian Imperial Force became known throughout the Empire