The Conspiracy That Never Existed: How Hawai'i Evaded Annexation in 1868

DAVID ZMIJEWSKI The Conspiracy That Never Existed: How Hawai'i Evaded Annexation in 1868 AMERICA RESPONDED to rumors of a crisis between Hawai'i and France by sending a fully manned warship to Honolulu to safeguard the interests of Americans in the Islands. Arriving on February 9, 1867, the U.S.S. Lackawanna was under orders to remain in Hawai'i permanently. Approximately one year later, George W. Lendeveg,1 captain's clerk aboard the ship, warned Kamehameha V, the monarch of Hawai'i, that "some few of the Americans, + English residents have went [sic] so far as to advise revolution to put these Islands under the American flag, . ." 2 Lendeveg then passed stolen information to the Hawaiians and implicated his captain in the conspiracy to incite rebellion. That action placed him in an untenable position between two countries that needed each other more than they needed him. This paper will analyze America's attempt to undermine Hawaiian sovereignty during the Lackawanna affair, and reveal how George Lendeveg played an unwitting role in preserving the independence of Hawai'i. David Zmijewski has previously written on Mark Twain for the Journal. He is the author of numerous articles, including an upcoming contribution to the Encyclopedia of Amer- ican Conspiracy Theories. He is now completing a book that traces the Hawaiian influence on Mark Twain's Adventures of Huckleberry Finn. Dr. Zmijewski, who has a Ph.D. in American Studies from the University of Hawai'i at Mdnoa, is an associate, pro- fessor of American studies at Baika Women's College in Osaka, Japan. The Hawaiian Journal of History, vol. 37 (2003) 12O THE HAWAIIAN JOURNAL OF HISTORY THE MAKING OF THE CONSPIRACY An associate justice of the Hawaiian Supreme Court, George M. Rob- ertson, may have precipitated the dispatch of the Lackawanna when his letter to James F. B. Marshall of Boston was brought to the atten- tion of U.S. officials. Robertson wrote, "I have no doubt we shall see a French Man of War here in a few months. But I trust the United States and Britain will save us from going under the French flag."3 Less than seven months after Robertson's letter, the Lackawanna, under the command of William Reynolds, anchored offshore without the permission of the Hawaiian government. In his memoirs, Charles de Varigny, who then served as the minister of foreign affairs for Hawai'i, charged that Reynolds "had solicited and obtained orders from his superiors to remain with his ship in Hawaiian waters, and to carry out what he [Reynolds] described as a 'mission of surveil- lance.'"4 Reynolds was familiar with Island politics and had a rapport with Americans there because he had been stationed in Hawai'i in the 1850s and early 1860s. During that time, he had gained notoriety as an avid annexationist, and according to Gavan Daws, the skipper "was back, and he was still talking about annexation."5 During the time of the Lackawanna's mission, ministerial-level negotiations were underway to strengthen economic cooperation between the United States and Hawai'i. This Reciprocity Treaty had been drafted by Charles Coffin Harris, the former minister of finance who represented the Kingdom of Hawai'i, and his American counter- part, General Edward Moody McCook, and was slated to be presented to their respective legislatures for ratification. Per orders of his sover- eign, Harris, who was in Washington lobbying Congress on the treaty, lodged a formal protest against the Lackawanna and Captain Rey- nolds to Secretary of State William Henry Seward: I am instructed to represent to you Mr. Secretary that since the arrival of the Lackawanna in Hawaiian waters, the conduct of her Commander has been most unfriendly to the government. He has sought to make himself a power and influence in the community; has promoted attacks against the government, and those administering it; and has endeav- ored to stir up dissension, and to excite in this country [America], and in Hawaii, an unfounded apprehension of the insecurity of the government of Hawaii.6 HOW HAWAl'l EVADED ANNEXATION IN l868 12 1 Reynolds was definitely meddling in Island affairs. But was he simply trying to derail the passage of the trade treaty, or was he actually fos- tering an atmosphere of political turmoil that would free him to respond militarily? Lendeveg cautioned that Reynolds was offering a solution while serving as the catalyst. Letters from Reynolds to Admi- ral Henry K. Thatcher show that the captain preferred possession to a treaty, and in his history of Hawai'i, Ralph S. Kuykendall concludes that Reynolds "was not adverse to the use of force, if necessary, to plant the American flag firmly on these islands."7 American investment in Hawai'i was substantial, and where dollars were at risk, protection was promised. With whaling in decline, Amer- ican investors turned to sugar in search of profit; however, a viable sugar industry depended on low-cost access to American markets. Although a number of other products—coffee, raw cotton, fruits, veg- etables, furs, and hides, among them—would also pass tariff-free into American ports, the Reciprocity Treaty would guarantee the health of the plantations by removing or lowering tariffs on certain grades of exported sugar.8 Contemporary observers of the economic rela- tions between the two countries like Mark Twain, the future author of the Adventures of Huckleberry Finn (1885), argued that Honolulu survived solely because of American capital. In the tenth of a series of twenty-five travel letters written for the Sacramento Daily Union, many of which he penned on a four-month visit to Hawai'i in 1866, Twain sermonized: The whaling trade of the North Seas—which is by no means insignifi- cant—centers in Honolulu. Shorn of it this town would die—its business men would leave and its real estate would become valueless, at least as city property, though Honolulu might flourish afterwards as a fine sugar plantation, . .9 With the limits of continental expansion reached, the United States targeted more distant territories to bring within its sphere of influence, and as a significant repository of American investment Hawai'i was an ideal candidate. An anonymous correspondent for The Philadelphia Inquirer of July 16, 1867, raised the issue of Island indebtedness. The writer stated that the King "owes all that he is to the kind and thoughtful solicitude of the American mission . .", then 122 THE HAWAIIAN JOURNAL OF HISTORY extended that obligation to all Hawaiians: "His people owe everything that has elevated them beyond, and far beyond all other kindred cases in the Pacific, in education, morals and in the pursuits of the business of life, to our missionaries."10 This defense of the long-term American investment of religion, culture, and money was merely a springboard for a more compelling solution. The author concluded that Ameri- cans were entitled to much more: The Islands, if they could now come into our hands could be fortified, and made secure for our shipping in the event of future wars. In case of a war with England, our people in Oregon, and California, and the Territories, would overrun and hold British Columbia, which would give us the whole coast.l ] Living with recent memories of a devastating domestic war, Amer- icans would have been receptive to propaganda linking the possession of Hawai'i with national security; any buffer between an external conflict and the mainland would have been a tactician's or a politi- cian's dream. America, however, was not free to move unilaterally; England and France arguably had a say in the future of Hawai'i. England, France, and the United States, were engaged in a veiled tri- partite struggle over who would eventually control the kingdom. The opinion seemed to be that Hawai'i was too important to retain its independence. Captain CRT. Laplace of France had threatened to attack Hawai'i in 1839 if his demands were not acceded to, and in 1843 Lord George Paulet of England actually annexed the Islands to the British Empire. To gain an upper hand in this three-way standoff, Americans required the support of the Hawaiians themselves, or, at the very least, appeals from expatriates warning that the nation was doomed without assistance. Such a sense of urgency is to be found in the personal correspon- dences of the American missionaries. These men were keenly aware of the debate over reciprocity and annexation, and though their opinions varied, most agreed that the spiritual and economic invest- ments in the Islands had to be protected. For these exporters of Christian democracy, a self-righteous attitude often prefaced their entreaties for more direct involvement. Writing to an O'ahu missionary in December 1867, Reverend Elias Bond referred to the present monarch as "a dissolute infidel king" HOW HAWAl'l EVADED ANNEXATION IN 1868 123 who was responsible for "one of the vilest and in every sense wicked- est crusades against morals and religion, ever existing, . ."12 Out- raged by this alleged dissipation, Bond reversed his political stance. Eight months earlier, Bond regarded the talk of annexation as "all moonshine."13 But by December he confessed: "I have always dreaded the idea of annexation to the U.S. because I have felt sure that the people wd soon be trodden down into the grave. But I w^ now do anything in my power to bring about annexation. ..." Bond appealed for American intervention to save the people from what he regarded as the "darkest hour" in the Islands since the missionaries arrived in 1820.14 Hawai'i's moral dilemma as depicted in such letters was effective propaganda for those Americans who may have doubted that they were politically justified in making Hawai'i part of their territory.

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