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From “Object” to “Subject”: The contribution of small nations to region-building in North Eastern Jörg Hackmann a a University of Greifswald,

Online Publication Date: 01 December 2002

To cite this Article Hackmann, Jörg(2002)'From “Object” to “Subject”: The contribution of small nations to region-building in North Eastern Europe',Journal of Baltic Studies,33:4,412 — 430 To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/01629770200000201 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01629770200000201

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J6rg Hackmann, University of Greifswald

Abstract. This article analyzes the impact of small nations on the constitution of a historical region in North Eastem Europe. It is shown that the small nations' drive for emancipation, self-determination, and independence from the surrounding large states formed the backbone of regional discourses in the Baltic Sea region since the beginning twentieth century. Similar features may be noticed already in the older discourse on "Norden". After the realization of a Baltic League failed in the 1920s, and as the East Baltic states remained outside the "Nordic" unity, the "Baltic" issue consequently shrunk to the three Baltic states. For they continued to keep the notion of a Baltic Sea region in cultural and historical terms alive, North Eastern Europe may be identified as the centre of historical discourses on Baltic sea region-building, which is based on similar social values as in the Nordic nations.

ithout any doubt, the peaceful struggle of , and W for the renewal of their independence has fundamentally reshaped the perception of the Baltic Sea area, not only in international politics, but also in the scholarly world. The phrase "fundamentally reshaped" may seem to have been overused already during the last decade, but we must resort to it once again in order to describe the starting point for an analysis of historical region building processes in the nineteenth and twentieth century. Until the 1980s, speaking of the Baltic Sea region in history always carried with it either a notion either of nostalgia, or of a bitter anti-Soviet taste -- that is, if it was not imbued with the Soviet "sea of peace" ideology. With the new perception of the Baltic that has emerged, we should, however, revise our mental maps, and even the name of this region, as both these aspects are not based on unchanging units, but instead

Downloaded By: [University of Chicago] At: 04:08 26 April 2009 have been shaped by historical influences. Thus, one should avoid such pitfalls as an allegedly natural delimitation of the region: although the Baltic Sea seemingly provides a natural framework, the shape of the Baltic as a historical region, and its relation to other historical regions, are both topics still open to discussion. In addition, one has to be aware that the term "Baltic" itself in historical and political terms is rather ambiguous, a consequence of the changing meanings of this designation, in particular since the mid-nineteenth century. ~ Such aspects of the Baltic Sea region's history were the main reasons for the formulation of the concept of North Eastern Europe as a historical region. 2

JBS, VOL XXXIII, NO 4 (WINTER2002) 412 FROM "OBJECT" TO "SUBJECT" 413 This leads to two major topics to be discussed here: Firstly, can the drive of the "small nations" for emancipation and the maintenance of their independence be viewed as the central factor determining the historical structure of the North Eastern European region? And secondly, if so, what are the contours and cohesive forces of a region shaped in this way? Thus far, the German historiography on North Eastern Europe has been rather brief on the role of the small nations in the region during the inter- war period, although Klaus Zernack at least noted the continuation of a regional historical and cultural context (1993: 20-1). Stefan Troebst (61) made use of Karl Renner's formulation -- originally referring to the Habsburg Empire -- that small nations proved to be more powerful than the great states, in that the former succeeded in tearing the latter apart) Ralph Tuchtenhagen's article on North Eastern Europe includes the national movements and the small state identities of the Finns, Estonians and Latvians, as well as national aspirations of the Karelians and Ingrians, and he even speaks of a Balto-Scandinavian setting. The Lithuanians, however, are hardly regarded in his definition of the region (1999: 76-8). When discussing the case of the small nations in North Eastem Europe, two perspectives may be adopted: the first being the comparative analysis of societal developments across the region; and the second, the struggle of the small nations to maintain a place for themselves within the shifting power structures of the twentieth century. With regards to the first approach, any comparison should draw upon the rich material of the various national historiographies. Nevetherless, comparative analysis so far has been still limited either to the peoples of the tsarist empire (Kappeler 1992), or to single cases from the region being used in broader comparisons, although the influential study by Miroslav Hroch did include several eastern and northern European nations.4 Material for a broad

Downloaded By: [University of Chicago] At: 04:08 26 April 2009 regional approach may be found, however, in David Kirby's Baltic World (1995). Concerning the second aforementioned analytical approach, the research of such Finnish scholars as Kalervo Hovi, Seppo Zetterberg, and Marko Lehti has to be mentioned in particular.

"Small" Nations and States

The discourse of "small" nations and states, which is frequently used today as a category in political and scholarly discussions, was initiated by Tom~i~ Garrigue Masaryk in 1902, with specific reference to the case of the Czech nation (Strkl 18-9, Hadler 115). In this case, the notion of the "small nation" was introduced with the aim to promote the creation and stabilization of new nation states in Central Europe. Thus it departed from Franti~ek Palack2~'s conception of 1848 that the Habsburg Empire provided 414 JORGHACKMANN the best framework for the development of the Austro-Slavic nations, since in 1918 the historic situation had become favourable for the appearance of small states (Masaryk 1922a: 42). Masaryk's argumentation reveals that smallness is not only a matter of a state's absolute or relative size and power, but is also a question of culture, where rivalry with larger states leads to increased efforts by small nations to prove their cultural worthiness (1922a: 43-4). This sentiment is echoed in the statement of Anthony D. Smith (217) that for small nations, their distinctive culture is their "very raison d'etre". 5 When categorizing small states, the primary criterion of absolute size is rather simple to identify. It seems, however, that such a quantitative approach becomes more important if it is based on a diachronic or synchronic comparison of demographic developments. In that respect, the question, "Why are there so few Estonians?" (Raun 1995: 67), increases in importance as a line of inquiry, as it might show that political structures had a major -- that is, negative -- impact on the demographic trends in Estonia in comparison, for instance, with Finland. The second way of determining a "small nation", on which already Masaryk was focusing (StSkl 27-8), takes geopolitical relations into account. Looking at the relative size in particular has to deal with the constellations of political power. Thus, a state is first of all "small" when it is in proximity to a "great" power. In this respect, Ukraine, too, is a "small nation" (Kappeler 199I). For a "small" nation at the periphery of a given region, smallness seems to be a less important issue than for those directly neighbouring a "large" nation or state. A third perspective takes the internal features of a society into consideration, when judging "smallness". Once again, this approach, too, was already an important point in Masaryk's reflections (Hadler 116-7). Following Hroch's analysis of nineteenth and early twentieth centuries Downloaded By: [University of Chicago] At: 04:08 26 April 2009 processes, small nations may be described as "non-dominant" ethnic groups. They are shaped, firstly, by an incomplete social structure, as the elites in society are predominantly drawn from a different ethnic group; secondly, by the "lack" of history, in the sense of an uninterrupted existence of a distinct cultural and political unit of their own; and thirdly, by the lack of political independence (Hroch 16). This approach implies that a nation remains "non-dominant" until the creation of a state wherein it becomes the titular one. 6 But as these societal issues mentioned by Hroch also shape the mentality of such a nation, their influence persists, even in the period of national independence. Hence, the mental consequences of those deficits in the societal structures form an important aspect in the problem of small nations. If we extend Hroch's model, we may take up the approach of the Estonian historian Hans Kruus (1939; cf. Leitsch and FROM "OBJECT"TO "SUBJECT" 415 Jansen 2002), and speak of a specific mental mould of small nations, which is shaped by the above mentioned features of absolute and relative smallness, as well by the structural deficits named by Hroch. We may hence concentrate our following analysis on two aspects: Firstly, "smallness" in the context of the power structures in North Eastern Europe, and secondly -- in a broad sense -- on the societal features of "smallness" in the region.

"Smallness" in the Baltic Sea Region

With regard to North Eastem Europe, the first of these two aspects has been already thoroughly researched. Smallness in that respect is closely tied to the analysis of the political relations within the system of the Great Powers and its modem transformations. With the rise of Peter the Great's Russia at the beginning of the eighteenth century, Klaus Zernack has identified this system in his research on the Great Northern War as the gravedigger of North Eastern Europe as a historical region (1993: 17-8, 1977: 57-8). The distinct stages of this decline are well known. In 1772 Poland lost her access to the Baltic, before she was ultimately divided by the three "black eagle" powers in 1795. definitively lost her great power status with the Russian amputation of Finland in 1809. Denmark, however, first lost Norway to Sweden in I814, and then the relics of her political power in the conflict with Prussia over Schleswig-Holstein. As a consequence, Denmark turned into small nation also internally, which had an important impact on her mental history (¢)stergfird 1997a: 26, 1997b: 39). As a result of this change in the power structures, and with the intent of distancing from the wing powers of Prussia-Germany and imperial Russia, the notion of "Norden" and Nordic neutrality emerged, manifesting itself in Sweden with Karl XIV Johan's declaration in 1834 (Str~th 2000a: Downloaded By: [University of Chicago] At: 04:08 26 April 2009 209). This led to the idea of a "domestic consolidation" (SCrensen and Strfith 15) of the national societies in the Scandinavian countries. Two points may be concluded with regard to the notion of a historical Baltic Sea region: Firstly, until 1945 all nations on the Baltic rim -- with the exception of Germany and Russia -- may be defined as small ones, although Sweden and Poland might require a more differentiated look. In Sweden, the perception of her history of greatness stands in opposition to the idea of a national "smallness", but one might regard the Swedish discourse of "poverty" as playing a similar function in the national consciousness (Strhth 2000b: 380-7). Poland's political self-definition in the inter-war period as well as her policy towards Lithuania can hardly be called that of a small nation, but within the constellation of real political power, however, Poland remained "small". 416 JORGHACKMANN Secondly, the notion of "Norden" emerged already during the first half of the nineteenth century as a regional notion forming a counter model against the idea of a Baltic Sea region. 7 This, in turn, had an important impact on a changed understanding of "Baltic", which now started -- in the German discourse -- to narrow its denotation towards the Baltic provinces of Russia. At the time, North Eastern Europe as a historical region tended to coincide with the territory of the three Baltic nations in our present understanding, but it has not become entirely identical, as it is argued here.

Constituting North Eastern Europe

This brings us to the hypothesis already alluded in the title of this article, namely, that the small non-Nordic nations played an important role in constituting North Eastern Europe as a historical region. A brief sketch may serve as an illustration. In the political discourses in Germany and Russia, but Britain should be included here also, the Baltic Sea had been increasingly and predominantly conceptualized in terms of power politics since the mid-nineteenth century. The dominating approaches were those of the balance of power, for instance in neutralizing the/~land islands after the Crimean War; and of "spheres of influence" as expressed in the German "Hansa" ideology, Wilhelmine naval policy, and also in the Russia's attempts to control her Baltic buffer zone. With regard to historical perceptions, this resulted in nationalistic notions of the Baltic Sea as the "Germanic Sea" (Maschke; cf. Hackmann 1995; Tuchtenhagen 2000: 35). In Russia as well, a nationalist approach emerged, which strove towards a negative connotation of the German elites of the Baltic provinces as "ostzeitsy" (ocm3e~tztbt). 8 The well-known conflict between Iurii Samarin and Carl Schirren in the 1860s then led to a re-definition of the term "Baltic" in narrowed regional and ethnic understanding within the Downloaded By: [University of Chicago] At: 04:08 26 April 2009 German discourse, and to an differentiation of "rossiiskii" and "russkii" in the Russian discourse (Kappeler 2000: 87, Renner 98). Furthermore, Russian interest arose in the ancient Slavs of the Baltic littoral, thus offering a competing Slavic notion of the Baltic Sea region. 9 Despite the obvious tensions between these images, Russian and German conceptions of the region were very closely linked to ideas of dominance in the region. The regional approach of the small nations within the tsarist empire was, however, different. They started with definitions of their national territories in opposition to the respective elites. More general aspects, though, -- linguistic kinship, in particular -- also played a role. Since the beginning of their national awakening, the Estonians orientated themselves towards the Finns, for instance in the creation of their national epic Kalevipoeg by Friedrich Reinhold Kreutzwald (Hasselblatt). In addition, FROM "OBJECT" TO "SUBJECT" 417 one has to mention the attempts at a unification of the Latvian and Lithuanian peoples, promoted by certain intellectuals from both nations. 1° Furthermore, there were also contacts between the east Baltic nations and Finland before 1914, and the Lithuanian priest and patriot Juozas Tumas- Vaizgantas gave an address at the inauguration of the "Estonia" Theatre in Tallinn 1913 (Peets 225-6). There are many more hints of contacts between those small nations. For example, one might mention the adoption of Finnish national romanticist architecture in Estonia and Latvia, which connoted the delimitation from tsarist Empire and "German" Neo-Gothic styles. H There are, however, pitfalls to drawing conclusions about cultural affinities too hastily: as architects from St. Petersburg were also involved with building projects in Estonia's and Latvia's cities, one should not overlook the importance of the imperial metropolis for the surrounding small Baltic nations (Lehti 2002). As well, regardless of cultural contacts abroad, the small nation's strategies nevertheless were orientated towards their own national territories. The development of a regional conception based on the contacts of the small Baltic nations within the tsarist can be traced also after World War I, when they turned -- to use the Estonian historian Hans Kruus' terms ~2 -- from "object" to "subject" of history within their own nation states (Kruus 1932: 5).

Baltic Sea Region Building Since 1917

Indeed, it was the east Baltic nations that were most interested after 1917 -- as well as since 1987 -- in contacts comprising the whole Baltic Sea area (Jaanson). Their most important partner in 1917 was Finland, which already after the declaration of the Eduskunta in July had received Downloaded By: [University of Chicago] At: 04:08 26 April 2009 signals by Lenin that the Bolsheviks -- once in power -- would recognize Finnish independence. In addition, for the Estonian national movement the "Finnish bridge" (soome sild) was a well known metaphor since the 1860s, and it formed the context for the Estonian-Finnish political union proposed in October 1917 by Gustav Suits, a member of the Estonian Social Revolutionaries and leader of Noor Eesti (Young Estonia) (Zetterberg 519- 21). 13 Already earlier that year, at a session of the Estonian Maan~ukogu, Jaan TSnisson, the leader of the People's Party, had proposed a Baltic federation which should comprise not only the three East Baltic nations, but also Finland and Scandinavia (Lehti 1999:11-2, Rauch 41). The idea of a Baltic League, which was also submitted to the British Foreign Office, was explicitly based on the assumption that the small states should unite to protect themselves against threats from Germany and Russia (Lehti 1999: 418 JORGHACKMANN 83). By 1922, the initially broad idea of the Baltic League had been narrowed, at conferences of the Baltic Sea states, to a draft of a treaty assuring benevolent neutrality in the case of conflict. Its provisional signatories were to be Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Poland. Finally however, this project was rejected by the Finnish Parliament in 1922, although the insinuation that the Finnish Foreign Minister had been continuously drunk during the debates in Warsaw caused some public interest, at least.14 Looking at international relations, it is however obvious that it was the Polish-Lithuanian conflict that, since 1920, played a major role in the failure of this Baltic League. A second reason may be the fact that Finland's foreign policy was being pulled in two different directions at once. Societal development was orientated towards Scandinavia, and since 1924 Finland was a member of the Association for Nordic Unity, the most important forerunner of Nordic cooperation (Osterg~d 1997a: 45). By contrast, Finnish contacts with the southern rim of the Baltic were mainly concerned with strategic interests in defending against Russia (Lehti 1999: 281). Within the course of the present discussion, it is significant that at these conferences for a Baltic League a conception of the Baltic Sea area as a region of the small nations was launched in 1918. This idea was then repeatedly discussed during the inter-war period, although more in terms of cultural than defence policy. A comprehensive look at these regional conceptualizations by politicians and scholars shows that they shaped an ongoing discourse on the Baltic Sea region during the inter-war period. In 1918, the Estonian diplomat Kaarel Pusta saw the Baltic Sea region composed of three subregions: Scandinavia, the Eastern Baltic (Finland, Estonia, Latvia), and the Southern Baltic (Lithuania, Poland) (Lehti 1999: 134). A similar idea was discussed by Masaryk, who divided the zone of Downloaded By: [University of Chicago] At: 04:08 26 April 2009 new, small states in Central Europe after 1918 into the Baltic Sea region and the Danubian region (Lehti 1999: 166). This shows that within the notions and terms of the beginning 1920s, the ideas of Baltic Sea cooperation and cooperation amongst small or young states were two sides of the same coin. For instance, Baltimere vabadus ('the freedom of the Baltic') was a common slogan of the Estonian contributions to the discussion on the Baltic League (Lehti 1999: 307). Lehti explains the juxtaposition of the term "Baltic" with "freedom" in this phrase by the fact that it might serve as a label that allowed one to claim this politically formulated connection to be something inherently "natural" (1999: 209- 11). Indeed, also the regional conceptions launched by geographers since the end of nineteenth century may be looked at through the prism of FROM "OBJECT" TO "SUBJECT" 419 political schemes. This becomes particularly obvious in the discussion on alternative regional conceptions, leading in the 1930s to the "Baltoscandia" conception, which was championed especially by the Lithuanian geographer Kazys Pakgtas in a presentation in 1934.15 Initially, the term "Baltoscandia" was coined in 1928 by the Swedish geographer Sten de Geer, as a revision of the geographical notion of "Fennoscandia" of the late nineteenth century (Lehti 1999: 20). Both concepts were based on geopolitical foundations. Whilst "Fennoscandia" proclaimed the link between Sweden and her former province Finland, de Geer's extension towards "Baltoscandia" included Estonia and Latvia as well. As he constructed his argument around historical and cultural features such as Protestantism, however, Lithuania remained outside the scope of "Baltoscandia". The Estonian geographer Edward Kant likewise also saw "Baltoscandia" as a natural unit, being thus something more cohesive (Lehti 1998: 21). Against this definition, Pakgtas (10-4) proposed six descriptors for his regional conception, which included the prevailing "northern" mentality of its nations; the unity of the northern states family despite cultural differences, in an analogy with the Mediterranean; and finally concluded his list with "a zone of smaller nations of common cultural interests and mutual sympathies". In hindsight, this last point, however, was no more than wishful thinking, as Pak~tas envisioned seven states living in such a harmony as nowhere else, being capable of solving complicated border problems. Such a vision could only be proposed if one ignored the realities of Poland' s regional ambitions.

Inter-war Discourses on the Baltic Sea Region

The Nordic or Scandinavian discourse, however, clearly separated itself from the notion of Baltic cooperation. In terms of foreign policy, this Downloaded By: [University of Chicago] At: 04:08 26 April 2009 opposition became manifest with the Scandinavian states' refusal to take part in the Baltic states conference in the Latvian spa Bildeflingshof (Bulduri) in August 1920, and with the setting up of their own political framework beforehand at the Oslo conference in May of that same year (Lehti 1999: 263, Jaanson 270). In Finland, one may speak of the choice between a Randstaaten and a Nordic orientation, which turned towards the latter with the refusal to sign the Baltic League treaty in 1922 (Lehti 1999: 235-41). In addition, the Polish-Lithuanian conflict finally led to a reduction of the concept of five Baltic states: first to four, and subsequently to the number of three, which since the 1930s denominates the contemporary trinity. The Baltic Entente of 1934 has then to been seen within the changed international framework of the 1930s, and can hardly be understood as conscious alternative to the former broader Baltic Sea 420 JORGHACKMANN politics, not to speak of security politics, which was only included with the declaration of neutrality after the forced normalization of the Polish- Lithuanian relations in 1938. To receive a more detailed picture of the regional coherence, the civic actors must also be taken into consideration. It should hence be asked, whether there is any evidence for non-governmental contacts between the Nordic nations -- including Finland -- and the east Baltic nations, similar to those undisputedly existing amongst the Nordic nations themselves (Lehti 1999: 281). In that respect, the delimitations were not as clear as in the case of the international political relations. On one hand, the Foreningerne Norden (Association for Nordic Unity), founded in 1919, admitted Finland in 1924; but in 1928, Norway's refusal prevented Estonia and Latvia from becoming members (Kristiansen 1992). Nevertheless, there were, for instance, contacts between Nordic and Estonian and Latvian trade unions (Lehti 1999: 495-502, OstergSxd 1997a: 44-5). After the failure of the Baltic conferences in 1925 and the limitation of the cooperation to classic bilateral relations, at least an interest in the symbolic maintenance of Baltic relations remained, for instance through official visits by heads of state, such as that of the Swedish king, Gustav V, to Estonia in 1929 (Jaanson 273). The shift towards authoritarian regimes in the East Baltic countries, however, posed serious hindrances to further cooperation with Sweden. Nevertheless, common geographic and historical links still remained elements of discourse throughout the 1930s (Lehti 1999: 472-3). One example is the Conventus Primus Historicorum Balticorum of August 1937 in , where the Baltic Sea region was presented as commune patrie (585). The conference, however, was not free from nationalist agendas; the hosting Latvian president Ulmanis understood this event to be a

Downloaded By: [University of Chicago] At: 04:08 26 April 2009 contribution toward the historical legitimation of the Latvian state, which was a main feature of his ideology. 16 Yet, the centre of initiative for Baltic cooperation remained unchanged. In 1933, a Baltic Union of the three Baltic States was founded in Riga. Tellingly, aside from the national languages of the member states, the Union's slogan, "The Baltic Sea unites us and there is nothing that separates us", was also used in English and French, but not in German, Polish, or Russian.17 Another approach to the conceptualization of the Baltic region may be noted in Poland. Initially, the issue of Poland's access to the sea clearly dominated Polish policy. From the mid-1930s, though, attempts to establish cultural and scholarly contacts with Scandinavia increased. For instance, the journal Baltic Countries, founded in 1935, sought to present Poland as a Baltic Sea state. Its editorial policy statement described the FROM "OBJECT" TO "SUBJECT" 421 journal's focus as the "'Baltic states" (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) with Poland and with three of the "Scandinavian states" (Denmark, Sweden and Finland)". Finland, however, was also at times considered to be one of the Baltic states (Borowik 95). Norway and Russia, "not being predominantly Baltic in their orientation", were excluded from this regional notion. So too was Germany, with the exception of Pomerania and East Prussia -- areas viewed by Poles as lying within the sphere of Polish interests. 18 J6zef Borowik, director of Poland's Baltic Institute, discussed whether certain traits identified as "Scandinavian" posed a problem for contemporary region building. These traits -- "material prosperity, respect for the law, and democratic citizenship" (95) -- were viewed by Borowik as the basis of Scandinavian solidarity and neutrality politics. He argued, however, that these attitudes may be found in other societies as well, and thus cannot be regarded as obstacles to an expansion of Nordic neutrality to encompass the "the eight countries around the Baltic". Nor was there any reason for Scandinavians avoiding close cooperation with Poland, which was purported to be the dominant power of this Baltic Sea region (95-9, cf. Hackmann, "Zugang").

"Norden" as a Competing Regional Concept

For a further analysis of inter-war conceptions of the Baltic region, delimitating and competing notions must be examined as well. Without doubt, the idea of the "Norden" is the most important regional alternative to the Baltic Sea concept of the small states, which emerged, as was shown above, from border zone politics. The recent Scandinavian and Finnish discussion has brought much insight into the rise, and the cultural and societal foundations underpinning the "Norden" concept. In particular, the attraction of the social democratic welfare state after the depression of Downloaded By: [University of Chicago] At: 04:08 26 April 2009 1929, as well as in the 1960s, has been pointed out (Scrensen and Str~th 19). If, for the moment, we disregard the pre-1800 traditions of "Nordism" (Lundh, Hennningsen 1997), we may concentrate on Scandinavism as a historical foundation, forming the point of departure in the debate of the 1930s. "Norden" in that respect was a reaction to the end of Sweden's and Denmark's ambitions for power at the beginning of the nineteenth century, which led these states to distance themselves from both Germany and Russia equally. Although Scandinavism for Swedes doubtless had a revisionist connotation towards Finland until the Crimean war, and formed a kind of defensive ideology in the Danish-German conflict on Schleswig until 1864 (Kirby 1995: 123-5, Musiat 107, Rerup), from the mid- nineteenth century onward, this notion came only second in intensity to the national movements concentrated in the single states. In that respect it may 422 JORGHACKMANN be mentioned that the Swedish version of "Norden" centred historically very much on Sweden's great power history, as illustrated by the Nordiska museet, founded in by Artur Hazelius, and its motto: warer Swenska (Osterg~d 1997a: 33). Thus, one may conclude that -- seen within the structure of power politics -- "Norden" may be regarded as a predecessor of the Baltic conception of the inter-war period. Denmark requires special attention in this context. The central person within the transformation process of Denmark into a small and modem nation, as a reaction to the decline of its ambitions for international power, was N.S.F. Grundtvig, who already in 1810 postulated a Nordic union (Rerup 79, Henningsen, 1977: 161-2). Another, and perhaps more important point, was the integration of the peasant population into the emerging modern nation through a national-theological programme. The essence of this can be seen in the slogan popular after 1864: "Outward losses must be made up for by inward gains" (Osterg~d 1997a: 66). The consequences of this process, according to Osterg~d (1997a: 43), were the economic and cultural colonization of Jutland, the movement for local folk high schools (folkehCjskoler) for the agrarian population, and a "Nordic" cultural radicalism. As already mentioned, the notion of "Norden" is not as homogenous as many depict it, in particular with regard to its peripheries. So, if one agrees that "Norden" is a social construction, and not a natural entity, a historian of North Eastern Europe may join Borowik's statement (99) and ask, whether its features are similar to the other regions bordering to the Baltic Sea. This is a point where one finds quite a relevant amount of similar trends in other regions on the eastern rim of the Baltic. The close connection between economic and cultural features in the nineteenth century's association movements was not only a characteristic feature of the "organic work" in Poland, but also in Latvia and Estonia -- not to speak Downloaded By: [University of Chicago] At: 04:08 26 April 2009 of attempts to bring education towards the agrarian population. One might disagree, pointing to the important differences of the social structure as peasants' servitude and ethnic limitations. And yet, it should be recalled in this context that Denmark around 1800 in her socio-structural situation was more similar to Livonia, than to Sweden. So, with regard to the construction processes of regions, we come once again back to the starting point, and shall look more closely at the (perhaps even hidden) features of similarity within the societies as the corner-stones of such construction.

Mental Features of "Small Nations" in the Baltic Sea Region

Despite indications of at least some comparable social starting points between the "Nordic" and "Baltic" groups of countries, without doubt, the FROM"OBJECT" To "SuBJECT" 423 differences between them in economic situation, political culture, and so forth, prevail in everyday perception. Presently, it shall be argued, however, that with regard to the -- admittedly rather vague -- features of mental history, such similarities may be noticed in what might be called a specific mentality or consciousness characteristic of small nations (Leitsch, following Kruus 1939). Its cornerstones -- not only in the Baltic region -- are twofold. First, there is the question of power in foreign relations. The fact that small nations lack such power has been described by Jacob Burckhardt as a necessary condition of "real freedom" (60): small nations lack such power. Second, the small nations seek to create new values (Leitsch 151). Real greatness, Hans Kruus argued, following the Estonian patriot Jakob Hurt, is based on spirit and education (Leitsch 152). Cultural achievements, peacefulness, together with autochthony -- to name only some aspects of such an attitude -- enjoyed higher regard in the values system of small nations, than in the large ones. This becomes particularly evident in the Nordic example: Finland and Norway, as Matti Klinge argued (260-1), turned the deficit of lacking noble and civic structures, as well as their positions on the periphery, into a virtue that drew upon elements of civic religion. This was a myth which could be based also on older traditions of the peaceful North. A similar cultivation of small or non- powerful nations' virtues can also be found in Sweden and Denmark. And we could even point to a very different case, that of Poland, where Roman Catholic "messianism" in reaction to the partitions also provided a positive self-image, based not on power, but on a religious construction transposed into the political relations of the nineteenth century. Of course, this does not mean that those images were objective facts, 19 but they were similar constructions. Reconstructing a small nations' mentality in the vicinity of the Baltic Sea, we may hence first look at similarities in societal structures. Here, first Downloaded By: [University of Chicago] At: 04:08 26 April 2009 of all, it has already been referred to that the Scandinavian and the Finnish nations were predominantly peasant nations (Hovi 142), which organized themselves partly on the communal level, partly through voluntary associations (Stenius, Jansson 1982). Furthermore, there were direct parallels in the emergence of associations and of popular movements (Kirby 1995: 161), which were directed, in both the East Baltic, and the Nordic case, against the old political order (Scrensen and Str~th 4). If we look at the Protestant culture and mentality, or at the education of the peasant population, we find further points of similarities with the Estonian and Latvian nations (Feest; Jansson 1995). Lithuania, however, raises the question of the Catholic influence, but this can hardly be seen as an argument for her exclusion. Surely, the national contexts differ from each other, but this is also the case with Finland in regard to Scandinavia, 424 JORGHACKMANN although those differences seem to be smaller than those between Estonia and Latvia, on one hand, and Scandinavia, on the other. Another point refers to the European orientation of the cultural vanguards of the three East Baltic nations. The "young" Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians, were orientated towards European modernism, as were the Nordic nations. 2° The famous quotation by Gustav Suits -- "More European Culture! Let us be Estonians, but let us become Europeans!" (Suits 17, cf. Jansen 1990: 315) -- might be explored as an attitude of those who tried to overcome the limitations of a stubborn nationalism. Such a perspective, nota bene, has been revived in Estonia during the last decade (Jansen 2002). The last mentioned point also highlights that, besides structural similarities, transfers and mutual exchange must be accorded an important place, too. There were, for instance, direct receptions of peasant education from Northern Europe amongst the East Baltic nations (Rann 1985). In cultural terms, Northern Romanticism or "northern modernism" was of major impact among the three East Baltic nations at the turn of the century (Jansen 1990: 324). In the historical cultures, too, the turn towards the pre- Christian ages showed similarities among the small nations. Instead of the turn towards the Viking age, which became manifest in Denmark in 1845 (Osterg~xd 1997a: 37), indigenous mythic folk epics arose in the eastern Baltic area, such as the Kalevala, Kalevipoeg, Anafielas (Witolorauda), 21 and l_~6pl~sis (Kirby 1995: 127, Scholz 80-1). Surely, the national myths of the free peasants of Northern Europe (SCrensen and Str~th 3-4) were not there in the South Baltic area, but in Estonia and Latvia at least the national movements had a strong folkloristic element.

The North East European Challenge Downloaded By: [University of Chicago] At: 04:08 26 April 2009 This poses the question to which extent those differences that can be found without doubt in the differing structures of society influence the conception of a historical region. The differences are numerous: Already as a part of the tsarist empire, Finland had her own constitution, unlike the provinces of the East Baltic. The change of the state churches into national churches in Northern Europe (SCrensen and Str~th 11, Henningsen 1977: 35) saw difficulties in Estonia and Latvia, where the German influence seemed to prevent such a change, whilst the Catholic Lithuanian clergy dominated in initiating the Lithuanian national movement (Krapauskas). The most important differences, however, have to been seen in the twentieth century, in the role of social democrats and the influence of the welfare state concept in the North (SCrensen and Strhth 7), as against the authoritarian tendencies in the East and South Baltic in the 1930s. The FROM "OBJECT" TO "SUBJECT" 425 definitive, decisive factor, after all, was the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, and the subsequent occupation of the Baltic states. A comparison of these structural differences still is a desideratum, but, nevertheless, it seems that the clearly divergent paths of development began only in 1930s. The issues mentioned last, the peaceful coping with social conflicts and the resistance against forms of fascism (Osterghrd 1997a: 30) indeed shaped the distinct "Nordic" discourse. This raises the question: to what extent is Finland included in this Nordic model, as the Civil War and the Lapua movement in the inter-war period contradict aspects of the Nordic notion (S0rensen and StrAth 5). The North European discussion of the recent years has however shown that the "Norden" is a discursive and successful construction, but not a quasi-natural regional concept (Osterg~rd 1997b, Str~th 2000a, Lehti 1998). This very success of the "Norden" idea is also a major point of the recent criticism of the concept, particularly by OstergS.rd (1997a: 27; also S0rensen and Strhth), who states that the majority of the Danes and Swedes have ignored the Baltic as a region, and hence also ignored the determinants of their own common history. Thus, the question might be asked once again -- in the sense of a moral request, or of a political and scholarly notion of region building -- as to how North Eastern Europe is constructed through the small nations as a historical region.

Conclusions

The concluding remarks on the question of the small nations' contribution to historical region building shall focus once again on a cultural historical finding already mentioned previously. In the reception of modern arts and architecture, one cannot neglect the relations across the Baltic, such as those existing between "Young Estonia" and the Finnish Downloaded By: [University of Chicago] At: 04:08 26 April 2009 and Norwegian cultural vanguards (Alenius 131, Levin 584-5), or between Finnish, Latvian, and Russian architects, etc. The political implication is highlighted in a statement of the Estonian newspaper Piievaleht of 17 March 1911 quoted by Raun (2000: 57) that "the Estonians were fully capable of cultural achievements comparable to those of the Norwegians and the other small peoples of Scandinavia".~2 The mutual relations in the cultural transfers -- as in almost every case -- were not equally strong, and the degrees of mutual perception presumably differed significantly. Thus, it seems that the East Baltic nations were more taking than giving, similar to the aforementioned one way streets in political relations. Traditionally, this fact would have been perceived as matter of Kulturbringer. But if one follows the arguments of Scandinavian art historians (Larsson; Bonsdorff), this transfer of culture is not only a matter 426 JORGHACKMANN

of the sender, but also of the recipient. One learns that region building is a process involving both sides, and one may henceforth come to a more appropriate notion for the reconstruction of regional ties. The reception of Ragnar Ostberg's design for Stockholm City Hall (constructed 1912-1923) in Riga and Tallinn -- as well as in Oslo -- may serve as an example illustrating region building features. If we assume that the region discussed here is less shaped by exact linear borderlines, but also through a dense network of relations, we may then identify a core, comprising Finland and the East Baltic states, with Poland rather at its edge, and, additionally, strong tendencies towards Scandinavia. As shown above, it was the East Baltic nations' drive to become a subject instead of an object of history which contributed to the region's constitution. If we take this seriously, then North Eastern Europe in the twentieth century has to be identified with the Baltic Sea region as a regional concept.

Notes

1. This resulted in different semantics of "Ostsee" and "baltisch" in contemporary German language, a distinction which does not exist in English -- a fact that often confuses German journalists using information about the "Baltic" states from English sources. 2. Cf. "Introduction". 3. Critical however with regard to the North East: Kappeler (2000: 67, 75). 4. It includes Lithuanians, Estonians, Finns, and Norwegians. 5. Cf. -- although from another perspective -- the findings by Blau, in particular chapter 2, on different patterns of behaviour of small and big groups. 6. This was also the approach of the European Science Foundation project on "Comparative studies on governments and non-dominant ethnic groups, 1850-1940" (8 vols., Aldershot, England and New York, 1991-1992). 7. This might be deepened by an analysis of the historical dimension of the "Norden" discourse, cf. Henningsen, "Construction". Downloaded By: [University of Chicago] At: 04:08 26 April 2009 8. A classical negative approach may be found in Dukhanov 0~yxanoB 5). 9. For instance, the work by Aleksandr Gil'ferding on the Slavic relicts on the southern Baltic rim (Frinbdpep~nHr) could be mentioned here. 10. Cf. Raun (1999: 67) on Atis Kronvalds. In addition, the turn towards Lithuania's ethnic Baltic identity in Jonas Basanavi~ius' activities was shaped by contacts to the Latvian patriot Krigjfinis Valdem~rs (Kirby 1995: 175). 11. Details in: Hackmann, Architektur (forthcoming). 12. "Es war ein ktihner und historisch entscheidender Schritt, den hier ein durch Jahrhunderte von fremden politischen Gewalten beherrschtes Objekt tat, indem es zu einem sein Schicksal nunmehr seibst bestimmenden Subjekt wurde" (Kruus 1932: 5). 13. A parallel Lithuanian-Latvian union was expounded by Jonas ~liupas in 1917 (Lehti 1999: 145). 14. Following Lehti (1999: passim). 15. Published first in 1942, reprint Kaunas, 1994. 16. Its participants included historians from Poland, Germany, but no Baltic German historians. FROM "OBJECT"TO "SUBJECT" 427 17. See the journal Baltijas Unija/L'Union Baltique 1-2 (1933-34); cf. Lehti (1998: 37); for the background of the Baltic Union Treaty of September 1934 cf. Jaanson (275). 18. "Editorial policy", Baltic and Scandinavian Countries 3.1 (1937). The German reaction to this notion was the journal Jomsburg, which alluded already in the title a Germanic-Nordic domination of the Baltic. In the Foreword -- 1 (1937): 1 -- the geographic extent is delimited by the Sound (Dresund), the Carpathians, the Elbe, and the western border of the , thus excluding Russia, but including eastern Germany and Poland. 19. This point was already stressed by StOkl (23-4). 20. For "Young Estonia", see l(,iimme aastat, cf. Jansen (1990: 319-25) and Raun (2000), and also the relation between the Lithuanian cultural vanguard and the "Young Poland" (Zukas). 21. Published by the writer J6zef Ignacy Kraszewski in Polish 1840-1845, the first volume Witolorauda was translated into Lithuanian in 1881 (Kirby 1995: 127). 22. According to Raun (2000: 57).

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