CASE PROGRAM 2004-9.1

Favoured servant or fall guy? Public sector reform in Antigua and Barbuda

On 1 December 2003, Elloy de Freitas reported to Antigua and Barbuda’s Establishment Department – the organisation largely responsible for human resources in the public service of the small Caribbean nation – in an “atmosphere of prayer”. A life-long public servant and union activist, de Freitas’ sometimes-strained relationship with his Government had contributed to an extended period of absence. Now back, and entitled to take up a public service position equivalent in seniority to that of a Permanent Secretary, de Freitas was keen to start work. He was, however, unsure in what capacity this work would be.

The role he was given was “better than [his] expectations”. Informed by the Chief Establishment Officer that the Public Service Commission had appointed him to be the first Director, Public Service Reform, de Freitas was initially stunned. A life spent in the pursuit of improving situations had the potential to come to fruition in this role. Yet, how to go about improving a public service in which reform was generally thought synonymous with employee retrenchment, was an issue that was likely to need much thought and a great deal of negotiation. An impending General Election, due to be held between March and June 2004, also needed to be taken into account.

This case was written by Jennifer Dickie for the Australia and New Zealand School of Government, with supervision by Dr Richard Norman, Victoria University of Wellington, as a basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of a managerial situation. The assistance of Elloy de Freitas is gratefully acknowledged. Cases are not necessarily intended as a complete account of the events described. While every reasonable effort has been made to ensure accuracy at the time of publication, subsequent developments may mean that certain details have since changed. This work is licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Licence, except for logos, trademarks, photographs and other content marked as supplied by third parties. No licence is given in relation to third party material. Version 16-6-05. Distributed by the Case Program, The Australia and New Zealand School of Government, www.anzsog.edu.au.

The country The nation of Antigua and Barbuda encompasses the eastern arc of the Leeward Islands of the Lesser Antilles and lies between the Atlantic Ocean and the Caribbean Sea.1 Formed by three islands – Antigua, Barbuda and Redonda – only the first two are inhabited. Most of the nation’s 68,0002 inhabitants live on Antigua where the capital, St Johns, is located. Tourism dominates the economy and accounts for more than half the nation’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Agriculture comprises only 3.9 percent of the islands’ GDP.3

Since the late 1990s, Antigua and Barbuda has attracted significant attention from international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The cause of this attention was a sharp downturn in economic growth in the first half of the 1990s (from an average of eight percent in 1984–89 to two percent in 1990–95). This contributed to large fiscal deficits that in turn led to unpaid foreign debt and a reduction in capital flows from external sources.4

International institutions like the IMF recognised that the decline in GDP was influenced by the decline in tourist numbers resulting from several hurricanes that wreaked havoc on the economy of the islands. However, in 1999, the IMF also commented that the government of Antigua and Barbuda needed “to address the problem of overstaffing in the public sector”.5

The Government

Antigua and Barbuda is an independent member of the Commonwealth. It is a constitutional monarchy, and has a UK-style parliament. The British Queen is Head of State and is represented by a Governor-General. There is a bicameral parliament with a 17-member Senate, appointed by the Governor General, and a 17-seat House of Representatives.6 The House is responsible for introducing legislation and the Senate is charged with reviewing and approving it. The major figures in Parliament and Government come from the House, to which members are elected every five years.7

1 Sandra W Meditz and Dennis M. Hanratty (eds.) Antigua and Barbuda – Geography. Federal Research Division. US Library of Congress. Retrieved 19 February 2004:http://countrystudies.us/Caribbean-islands/93 htm. 2 July 2003 estimate. CIA. The World Fact Book – Antigua and Barbuda. Retrieved 25 February 2004: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ac.html. 3 CIA. The World Fact Book – Antigua and Barbuda. Retrieved 25 February 2004: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ac.html. 4 IMF. Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 99/106. IMF Concludes Article IV Consultation with Antigua and Barbuda. November 23, 1999. Retrieved 24 February 2004: http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/1999/pn99106.htm 5 IMF. Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 99/106. IMF Concludes Article IV Consultation with Antigua and Barbuda. November 23, 1999. Retrieved 24 February 2004: http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/1999/pn99106.htm 6 CIA. The World Fact Book – Antigua and Barbuda. Retrieved 26 February 2004: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ac.html 7 Sandra W. Meditz and Dennis M. Hanratty (1987). Antigua and Barbuda – Geography. Federal Research Division, US Library of Congress. Retrieved 19 February 2004: http://countrystudies.us/caribbean-islands/98.htm

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Since 1976, the Antigua Labour Party (ALP) had commanded the majority of seats in the House and formed the Government. From its inception, Vere Bird Senior dominated the ALP. He was Prime Minister continuously from 1976 through to his retirement in 1994, upon which time, his son, Lester Bird, was appointed leader of the ALP and Prime Minister.8

During its nearly thirty years in power prior to de Freitas’ promotion to the Public Service Reform position, the ALP pursued a policy of not retrenching public employees. Additionally, the government deliberately used the public sector in “taking up the people who were left jobless by the disastrous effects on the tourism industry over the years 1995 to 2000 when [Antigua and Barbuda] had six hurricanes one after the other”.9

The opposition

At the time of de Freitas’ appointment, the United Progressive Party (UPP) – a coalition of three former opposition groups – was the major opposition party in Antigua and Barbuda. In the 1999 General Election it received 45.5 percent of the popular vote compared to the ALP’s winning 53.2 percent.10 In December 2003, the UPP was well into its 2004 election campaign.

This campaign incorporated the theme of “government in the sunshine” and promised accountability, transparency, peoples’ participation, and good governance in the Caribbean nation. The UPP indicated that, if elected, it would evaluate all of the human and other resources of the country before embarking on any specific public sector reform programmes.11

The media

Before a Privy Council decision ended the monopoly in 2000, the major broadcasters were either owned by the Government, or significantly influenced by the Prime Minister’s immediate family.12 By December 2003, the most popular radio stations were privately operated. The press was more active and professional than previously and information about government and governance was widely discussed on the islands’ many talk shows and call-in programmes.13 In the lead-up to the election, public sector reform issues, which directly impacted on the livelihood of a large proportion of the population, were very topical.

8 Vere Bird Sr.’s eldest son, Vere Bird Junior, was also a prominent politician. 9 Hon. Lester Bird. Antigua and Barbuda: The Way Forward. A statement to the luncheon of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry on 27th January 2004. Retrieved 16 March 2004: http://www.antigua-barbuda.com/busnss_politics/chamber_of_commerce_speechbypm270104.pdf 10 CIA. The World Fact Book – Antigua and Barbuda. Retrieved 25 February 2004: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ac.html 11 Elloy de Freitas. Case Study for the Commonwealth Advanced Seminar, 2004. 12 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S Department of State. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2002 – Antigua and Barbuda. Released March 31, 2003. Retrieved 16 March 2004: http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18316.htm 13 Elloy de Freitas. Case Study for the Commonwealth Advanced Seminar, 2004.

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The public sector

Of the Caribbean nation’s population of about 68,000 in 2003, government employed approximately ten thousand people – fifteen percent of the population. Of these ten thousand, roughly 30 percent were employed by the Public Service Commission (PSC) in accordance with Antigua and Barbuda’s constitution – the PSC also controlled the promotion, transfer and discipline of these public officers, known as established workers. A further 30 percent of the public workforce were employed in the service of statutory bodies. Specific laws regulated their employment

However, Antigua and Barbuda’s public service also included another category of worker. These public officers, called non-established workers (NEWs), constituted about 40 percent of all government employees in 2003. They were accorded all the rights and privileges of established workers but differed from them in that they were employed by ministers through their constitutional right to direct and control permanent secretaries. Ministers also ultimately controlled the promotion, transfer and discipline of these NEWs.14

In 2002, the government spent on average 70 percent of public income on wages and salaries.15 Despite, or perhaps because of, this high investment, there were concerns about the efficacy and efficiency of Antigua and Barbuda’s public service. In a survey of the nation’s public officials, conducted by the World Bank in 2000, 68 percent of respondents commented that government was performing unnecessary functions. Seventy-three percent thought that some government functions could be delegated to civil society groups and associations, and the majority of officials believed that some government functions could be handled at the regional or sub-regional level. Officials said that the primary obstacle to regional efforts to pool resources was government leaders who refused to relinquish political power.16

Eighty-three percent of officials agreed that waste in the public service could be reduced.17 Officials thought that planning functions in the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Planning were not performed effectively, mainly as a result of a lack of adequate information in the planning division and because the actual actions of the government diverged greatly from the stated mission.18

14 Approximate numbers are used due the “absence of readily accessible, current and accurate basic records and statistics from which to analyse basic employee data such as numbers of established workers and non-established workers in each Ministry…” as acknowledged in the PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) Review. The statistic in the PwC Review that the Government employed approximately 16% of the population in 2002 indicates that PwC were working with either slightly higher numbers of government employees than those quoted here, or a slightly lower population total (See Appendix C). 15 PricewaterhouseCoopers (2002). Government of Antigua and Barbuda Public Service Review, p.4 16 World Bank. Administrative & Civil Reform: Antigua. Retrieved 24 February 2004: http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/civilservice/countries/antigua/assertion1.htm 17 World Bank. Administrative & Civil Reform: Antigua. Retrieved 24 February 2004: http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/civilservice/countries/antigua/assertion4.htm 18 World Bank. Administrative & Civil Reform: Antigua. Retrieved 24 February 2004: http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/civilservice/countries/antigua/assertion2.htm

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The majority of surveyed officials believed that the size and quality of the civil service was not suited to the functions of government19 and 89 percent of those surveyed believed that their organisations operated under political micro- management.20

In response to criticisms about an overstaffed, ineffective and inefficient public sector, and in an effort to tackle the large national debt, the ALP government’s 1999–2004 term in office saw the launch of several reform initiatives. These included:

1. A review of the public sector; 2. An upgrade of information management and record-keeping processes described as “Information Technology and Business Process Re- engineering”; 3. The development of a National Physical Development Plan (NPDP); 4. The development of a National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP); and 5. The formation of a Constitutional Review Commission.

However, at the time of de Freitas’ appointment in late 2003, the NPDP had not been fully implemented. The technology and information systems upgrade had only been partly completed, the NSDP was still in draft form, and the Constitutional Review Commission had not yet published anything.

Review of the public sector

In late 1999 the Government of Antigua and Barbuda (GAB) circulated a notice prepared by the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) recruiting consultants (see Exhibit 1). This notice was circulated internationally and was listed on United Nations and other websites. The GAB and CDB also formulated “Terms of Reference for Consultancy for Public Sector Review” which included as background:

“GAB has identified the following as the main factors which highlight the urgent need for the reform of the public sector: (a) Government is the largest employer of labour and its labour force appears to be too large in number and consequently too expensive to sustain; (b) The question of size of the workforce, productivity therefrom [sic] and value-for-money expended, have become very relevant in the current thinking re effective governance; (c) The size and structure of the bureaucracy have tended to result in a slow and inefficient service generally and in significant pockets of incompetence; and (d) The high external debt of the country which needs to be drastically reduced.”

19 World Bank. Administrative & Civil Reform: Antigua. Retrieved 24 February 2004: http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/civilservice/countries/antigua/assertion.htm 20 World Bank. Administrative & Civil Reform: Antigua. Retrieved 24 February 2004: http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/civilservice/countries/antigua/assertion6.htm

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PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) won the contract for the Public Sector Review, which was signed on 1 September 2000. The report was completed in April 2002 and the PwC consultants made a formal presentation to Permanent Secretaries on 16 September 2002; and to Cabinet on 18 September 2002.

The key critical issues identified in the PwC Review were:

1. Poor levels of commitment and “buy-in” towards the Reform Project, 2. Poor information management and record-keeping processes, 3. Absence of an effective, centralised recruitment process, and existence of a “Parallel Service”, 4. Inequitable pay policies and salary structures, 5. (lack of consensus over the) Role of the Ministers vs. the Permanent Secretaries, 6. Lack of operational and effective middle management, 7. Need for development of an integrated planning and policy framework, and 8. Unsustainable employment and wage levels (See Exhibits 2 and 3).

The large percentage of the population employed in the public sector was highlighted as a significant issue, and the high number of NEWs, employed directly by politicians and permanent secretaries, was singled out as being of particular concern.

In 2000, the Minister of Planning, the Hon. Gaston Browne, had commented that the “Government of Antigua and Barbuda recognizes that Public Sector Reform is imperative and it is totally committed to the reform process”. He noted that in particular the reform process would take into consideration an “oversized public sector”, as well as “Government’s objective of optimising employment” and the need to reconcile the anomalies in a “bifurcated system of public sector workers”.21

Yet, after the results of the PwC Review were known in 2002, the government opted not to act comprehensively, citing proximity to the 2004 election as the reason. However, in 2003, the new position of Director, Public Sector Reform was created, ostensibly to demonstrate the government’s commitment to public sector reform.

The role de Freitas was appointed Director of Public Service Reform at a time when, he admits, it was “not seen as a very glamorous position”. A large part of this was because the prevalent assumption amongst public officials was that reforming the service meant “firing people”.

21 Hon. Gaston Browne. Public Sector Reform – Antigua and Barbuda. Presentation to the First Caribbean Ministerial Consultation and High-Level Workshop on Capacity Building for Small Caribbean States in Public Administration, Governance and Regional Cooperation, May2000.Retrieved 24 February 2004: http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/caricad/unpan008485.pdf

6 However, the role was also difficult for other reasons. A new position within the Ministry of Planning, there was no budget for it. Thus de Freitas could be appointed to the job, but the Ministry had to pay him out of an existing budget somewhere else. The problem was solved by making him Permanent Secretary of Trade and Industry within the Ministry of Planning and then seconding him to the newly created Reform role within the same Ministry. This meant that while de Freitas was as senior as a Permanent Secretary from the beginning of his appointment, and was paid as such, he had no specific resources to command. He, himself, was charged with determining the amount and type of resources he would need to get the job done.

Gaining the needed resources was also likely to be an issue. Provisions made in the annual Parliamentary budget fund Antigua and Barbuda’s public sector. However, funding decisions for a given year are made in June of the year previous. Supplementary appropriations could be made at any time, but de Freitas had to decide whether this was necessary in the first year of his appointment, or whether he could work within the existing budget of the Ministry of Planning and its Establishment Department.

The role of Director of Public Sector Reform was also made potentially more challenging for de Freitas because of his strong Public Service Association (trade union) ties, and history of legal conflict with the ALP government.

The background of the Director, Public Service Reform de Freitas believes his appointment to the reform directorship was a result of having been working in “changing and improving on systems” since he started with the public service as Assistant Extension Officer in the Ministry of Agriculture in 1979.22

However, de Freitas acknowledges that some people, aware of his situation, might view his appointment more cynically. In particular this perception might arise from a knowledge of de Freitas’ past activities as General Secretary of the Antigua and Barbuda Public Service Association (ABPSA) and champion of workers’ causes from 1981 through to the time of his appointment as Director, Public Sector Reform.

Commented de Freitas:

“the diabolical way of looking at my appointment is that the one who is championing workers’ rights would be the one who is sending them home. And that would be the end of that person [in terms of credibility]. Put him in a big position and now look how he is. Maybe that is one way of looking at it. I don’t really give it any weight.”

This “devious interpretation” could be substantiated by the strained relations de Freitas has had at times with the ALP Government. In 1990, having been Extension Officer and Acting Extension Officer within the Ministry of Agriculture for

22 In de Freitas’ words: “Agriculture extension is informal training. So that is basically teaching the farming community the requisite skills so that they produce more and produce better. So it’s teaching and training. Subject matter in agriculture, farm management, livestock management etc”.

7 approximately five years, de Freitas was put on “interdiction” and stood down from his duties. In his own words: “Interdiction means you’ve done something wrong and they’re in the process of dismissing you – they’re doing the inquiries etc but more than likely you will be out.” de Freitas was put on interdiction for joining a protest, led by the major opposition party, calling for the resignation of the then Minister of Agriculture who had been condemned in a commission of inquiry for his part in the transfer of guns through Antigua to the Medellin drugs cartel in Colombia. de Freitas was under interdiction for eight years. The length of his interdiction was a result of a prolonged court process related to the constitutionality or otherwise of the Ministry of Agriculture’s actions in standing him down:

“As soon as they interdicted me I went to the court to make it a constitutional matter. I said they had violated my constitutional rights. So that the proceedings with the interdiction couldn’t really go on until the court matter was settled. In the first round, the high court ruled that the interdiction was unconstitutional and I should be put back to work. The government appealed the decision right away. At the OECS regional court – the Eastern Caribbean Court of Appeal – the government won. Right away the commission wrote to me that they were ready to take action. So I had to go to the Privy Council [in London], which is the final court of appeal. The judgement was delivered in July 1998. The Privy Council ruled that the action was unconstitutional. That’s when I went back to work. Now they had created two posts of Extension Officer.” de Freitas navigated the complicated situation of being one of two Extension Officers for a year. In 1999 he was granted duty leave to study and, having completed an MBA while under interdiction, he began a doctorate of business administration.

By 1 December 2003, de Freitas’ duty leave was up and he had to report for work. He noted: “In essence I had been out of the system from 1990 to 2003.” Because of this, de Freitas was initially surprised at his appointment. However, on reflection, he was less so:

“My way of looking at it is that I have been looking at changing and improving on systems since the beginning. And this is a continuation. Before, I was outside pelting stones. I didn’t have access to any information, right, I was pariah. Now I’m inside of the house with full access to all the data. And therefore I find it as a great opportunity, in terms of being given a chance to do what you’ve always been doing. I don’t think anyone in the public service is better equipped than me to do that job.”

Other key players

Further explanation for why de Freitas was given the post could involve a changing of the guard at some of the highest levels of Antigua and Barbuda’s public service, and within the nation’s political echelon. Individuals who might have opposed de Freitas’

8 appointment had, by December 2003, lost much of their influence.23 Other people, some of whom knew and were known to de Freitas in more positive contexts, had taken their place.

A person particularly key to de Freitas’ appointment, and the likely success of any reform initiatives he would embark upon, was Eusalyn Lewis. A former School Principal and Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Education, she became Chief Establishment Officer during the period of de Freitas’ interdiction. In this role she wielded a great amount of influence. As head of the organisation responsible for advising the PSC, Lewis contributed to many public service human resource decisions, and also had significant say over the way the Establishment Department’s considerable resources would be used. Lewis also happened to have been de Freitas’ school principal during his sixth form year.

Another key person in relation to de Freitas’ new role was the Minister of Planning, the Hon. Gaston Browne. As Minister for Planning, Browne had largely been the Government’s spokesperson on public sector issues. He had spoken publicly on the Government’s belief that “the Government needs less than 60 percent of the present public sector work force to carryout the present level of operations” and yet had stated that the Government was loath to follow the “obvious” strategy of downsizing because this “would result in serious unemployment and potentially costly social consequences”.24 Gaston Browne had been an acquaintance of de Freitas’ in the early 1980s when the Minister had been a secondary school student and was involved in the same theatre group as the public servant. While the two had “disconnected for about twenty years after [Browne] finished secondary school” de Freitas was hopeful that they could have a good working relationship during his time as Director of Public Sector Reform. de Freitas also noted that, at the time of his appointment, many other key national stakeholders such as business, trade unions, civil society organisations, and parts of government itself were critical of aspects of government and governance in Antigua and Barbuda. As a result there was much potential support for public sector reform initiatives in the Caribbean nation.25

Conclusion

Therefore, while de Freitas had a strained relationship with the public service and political establishment in Antigua and Barbuda in the past, the omens were auspicious for a better relationship in the future. In fact, in being appointed Director, Public Sector Reform, de Freitas had himself been made an important part of the public

23 For example, the former Minister of Agriculture who attempted to have de Freitas removed from public office was in 2004 facing corruption charges. 24 Hon. Gaston Browne. Public Sector Reform – Antigua and Barbuda. Presentation to the First Caribbean Ministerial Consultation and High-Level Workshop on Capacity Building for Small Caribbean States in Public Administration, Governance and Regional Cooperation, May2000.Retrieved 24 February 2004: http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/caricad/unpan008485.pdf 25 Elloy de Freitas. Case Study for the Commonwealth Advanced Seminar, 2004.

9 service establishment. Now that he was there, the question remained, “what exactly should he do?”

10 Exhibit 1: Notice for the prequalification of consultants

In late 1999 the Government of Antigua and Barbuda circulated a notice prepared by the Caribbean Development Bank for prequalification of consultants.

The first three paragraphs of this notice were as follows:

1. “The Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) has approved a technical Assistance project to assist the Government of Antigua and Barbuda (GAB) in meeting the cost of a Public Sector Review through the Ministry of Planning, Implementation and Public Service Affairs (MPIPSA). The Ministry invites Consultants interested in carrying out the Review to submit their prequalification information.

2. The objective of the proposed Review is to carry out a study of the current structures, procedures and management systems (administrative, human resource management and public financial management) of the public sector in Antigua and Barbuda to assist GAB in formulating a public sector reform programme. The review will cover the central public service, the relationships between the public service and state-owned enterprises (including statutory bodies), and the relationships between the public sector and civil society institutions (including the private sector). The Review will guide GAB in restructuring and rationalising the role and functions of the public sector, as well as determining staffing levels and skills requirements.

3. The Review should be informed by past and ongoing efforts at public sector reform in the CDB’s borrowing member countries, particularly where successful initiatives and innovative solutions have been implemented. Key reform, modernisation and capacity-building issues should be identified and an analysis made of factors underlying successful initiatives. The Review should be directed at producing a comprehensive set of recommendations for guiding the future course of public sector restructuring and reform in Antigua and Barbuda”.

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Exhibit 2:Terms of reference for the PwC review

Scope of this Review

The Government of Antigua and Barbuda (GAB) in September 2000, contracted the services of PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) for the provision of technical assistance in conducting an organisation and management study to assist in the formulation of a Public Sector Reform Program for Antigua and Barbuda.

The GAB indicated the following as tasks that must be performed by PwC in undertaking this assignment:

a. Conduct of a situational analysis/audit of the existing Public Service (non-established and established); b. Undertaking of a needs analysis to factor into a human resource development plan with relevance to national development, given government’s strategic orientation and priorities; c. Determination of the resources (human and financial) required to efficiently carry out the functions to be undertaken by the Public Service; d. Identification of the reform tasks and definition of clear objectives and approaches for their achievement – i.e. numbers, time frames and realistic schedules; e. Development of feasible recommendations as well as implementation strategies; f. Placement of all the above tasks in the context of the changing role of the State as more of a facilitator and less of a provider and the need for interaction between the Government, the Private Sector and civil society; g. Organisation of a workshop, at which there will be representatives of the GAB, the social partners and the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB), to report on the findings of the study and solicit inputs from participants in finalising the Action Plan; and h. Provision of guidance and direction to GAB for establishing and operating the Reform Unit to be set up by the GAB for the implementation of recommendations agreed upon.

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Exhibit 3: Summary points from the PwC report

Key critical issues

1. Poor levels of commitment and ‘buy-in’ towards the Reform Project 2. Poor information management and record-keeping processes 3. Absence of an effective, centralised recruitment process and existence of a “Parallel Service” 4. Inequitable pay policies and salary structures 5. Role of the Ministers vs. the Permanent Secretaries 6. Lack of operational and effective middle management 7. Need for development of an integrated planning and policy framework 8. Unsustainable employment and wage levels

Key recommendations

1. Educate employees and the general public about the reform process and its objectives to enlist their co-operation and commitment 2. Computerisation of records and implementation of Information Systems 3. Strengthen recruitment and selection process and policies 4. Review the separate legislation governing the non-established and established workers with a view to merging the “Parallel Service”. 5. Review pay policies and salary structures 6. Review the roles and responsibilities of Ministers and Permanent Secretaries 7. Implement the use of performance-related employment contracts for recruitment of senior and middle management personnel 8. Develop an integrated planning and policy framework 9. There is an urgent need to examine feasible options for reducing the existing staff complements in the Ministries and subsequently the associated expenditure on wages and salaries.

Table I below illustrates existing and recommended staff complements in the Government.

As Table I shows, application of all options considered is estimated to result in an overall reduction in staff count of 2,404 persons.

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Table I: Summary Comparison of Benchmark, Existing and Proposed Staff Complements

Staff Complements

Benchmark Proposed

Existing GAB PwC (Jan 2002)

4,778 7,580 6,172 5,176

It has been estimated by government officials that reductions in recurrent expenditure will total approximately EC$58M. Based on analysis of the figures received as at Jan 2002 however, the proposed reductions in the staff complement will actually result in an approximate reduction in expenditure on salaries and wages of EC$135,330,715 as follows:

Table II: Summary Comparison of Benchmark, Existing and Proposed Staff Costs

Staff Costs (EC$ per annum)

Benchmark Proposed Existing

GAB PwC

132,979,091 265,958,181 147,601,599 130,627,466

Key projects

In the medium- to long-term, several projects are necessary to facilitate complete and sustained reform of the Public Sector.

1. Program and change management 2. Integrated HRIS and payroll system development 3. Development of legal framework 4. Organisation re-structuring and re-design 5. Implementation of a job evaluation and compensation system

14 6. Development of performance management and incentive system 7. Administration of training 8. Process re-engineering 9. Implementation of technology.

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