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Asia's Energy Security
the national bureau of asian research nbr special report #68 | november 2017 asia’s energy security and China’s Belt and Road Initiative By Erica Downs, Mikkal E. Herberg, Michael Kugelman, Christopher Len, and Kaho Yu cover 2 NBR Board of Directors Charles W. Brady Ryo Kubota Matt Salmon (Chairman) Chairman, President, and CEO Vice President of Government Affairs Chairman Emeritus Acucela Inc. Arizona State University Invesco LLC Quentin W. Kuhrau Gordon Smith John V. Rindlaub Chief Executive Officer Chief Operating Officer (Vice Chairman and Treasurer) Unico Properties LLC Exact Staff, Inc. President, Asia Pacific Wells Fargo Regina Mayor Scott Stoll Principal, Global Sector Head and U.S. Partner George Davidson National Sector Leader of Energy and Ernst & Young LLP (Vice Chairman) Natural Resources Vice Chairman, M&A, Asia-Pacific KPMG LLP David K.Y. Tang HSBC Holdings plc (Ret.) Managing Partner, Asia Melody Meyer K&L Gates LLP George F. Russell Jr. President (Chairman Emeritus) Melody Meyer Energy LLC Chairman Emeritus Honorary Directors Russell Investments Joseph M. Naylor Vice President of Policy, Government Lawrence W. Clarkson Dennis Blair and Public Affairs Senior Vice President Chairman Chevron Corporation The Boeing Company (Ret.) Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA U.S. Navy (Ret.) C. Michael Petters Thomas E. Fisher President and Chief Executive Officer Senior Vice President Maria Livanos Cattaui Huntington Ingalls Industries, Inc. Unocal Corporation (Ret.) Secretary General (Ret.) International Chamber of Commerce Kenneth B. Pyle Joachim Kempin Professor; Founding President Senior Vice President Norman D. Dicks University of Washington; NBR Microsoft Corporation (Ret.) Senior Policy Advisor Van Ness Feldman LLP Jonathan Roberts Clark S. -
Journal of Current Chinese Affairs
China Data Supplement March 2008 J People’s Republic of China J Hong Kong SAR J Macau SAR J Taiwan ISSN 0943-7533 China aktuell Data Supplement – PRC, Hong Kong SAR, Macau SAR, Taiwan 1 Contents The Main National Leadership of the PRC ......................................................................... 2 LIU Jen-Kai The Main Provincial Leadership of the PRC ..................................................................... 31 LIU Jen-Kai Data on Changes in PRC Main Leadership ...................................................................... 38 LIU Jen-Kai PRC Agreements with Foreign Countries ......................................................................... 54 LIU Jen-Kai PRC Laws and Regulations .............................................................................................. 56 LIU Jen-Kai Hong Kong SAR ................................................................................................................ 58 LIU Jen-Kai Macau SAR ....................................................................................................................... 65 LIU Jen-Kai Taiwan .............................................................................................................................. 69 LIU Jen-Kai ISSN 0943-7533 All information given here is derived from generally accessible sources. Publisher/Distributor: GIGA Institute of Asian Studies Rothenbaumchaussee 32 20148 Hamburg Germany Phone: +49 (0 40) 42 88 74-0 Fax: +49 (040) 4107945 2 March 2008 The Main National Leadership of the -
Corporate Governance in China
This draft: September 26th 2014 Comments welcome Corporate Governance in China Randall Morck, University of Alberta and NBER, and Bernard Yeung, National University of Singapore* China’s recent economic history is phenomenal. The Communist Party of China (CPC), by abandoning Marxist-Leninist dogma and adopting pragmatic economic policies, has lifted hundreds of millions of people out of abject poverty in a few short decades. No other government in human history has accomplished anything remotely comparable. Most Nobel Peace Prizes celebrate far slighter achievements. Communist China’s accomplishments should caution outside experts. Economics surely has more to learn from China than China has ever learned from economics. Much rhetoric from the right (“See what happens when capitalism is unleashed!”) and the left (“Capitalism destroyed Chinese equality, Mao’s greatest legacy!”) is, in our opinion, far off target. China has not adopted capitalism, and Mao left no legacy of real equality.1 The CPC refers to its economic system as “Market Socialism with Chinese Characteristics.” Journalists reporting on China largely ignore this official phraseology, perhaps smiling at the Party leadership’s unwillingness to formally acknowledge having * Randall Morck gratefully acknowledges partial financial support from the Bank of Canada. These views are the authors’, and may not reflect those of the Bank of Canada or any of its staff. We are grateful for extremely helpful suggestions from the editor, Don Chew, and from Dr. Duvvvuri Subbarao. 1 See Dikötter (2010) on the social and economic inequality created by Maoist reforms and Freeman (2014) on the current Chinese leaderships efforts to correct these problems. -
Petroleum Politics: China and Its National Oil Companies
MASTER IN ADVANCED EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES ANGLOPHONE BRANCH - Academic year 2012/2013 Master Thesis Petroleum Politics: China and Its National Oil Companies By Ellennor Grace M. FRANCISCO 26 June 2013 Supervised by: Dr. Laurent BAECHLER Deputy Director MAEIS To Whom I owe my willing and my running CONTENTS List of Tables and Figures v List of Abbreviations vi Chapter 1. Introduction 1 1.1 Literature Review 2 1.2 Methodologies 4 1.3 Objectives and Scope 4 Chapter 2. Historical Evolution of Chinese National Oil Companies 6 2.1 The Central Government and “Self-Reliance” (1950- 1977) 6 2.2 Breakdown and Corporatization: First Reform (1978- 1991) 7 2.3 Decentralization: Second Reform (1992- 2003) 11 2.4 Government Institutions and NOCs: A Move to Recentralization? (2003- 2010) 13 2.5 Corporate Governance, Ownership and Marketization 15 2.5.1 International Market 16 2.5.2 Domestic Market 17 Chapter 3. Chinese Politics and NOC Governance 19 3.1 CCP’s Controlling Mechanisms 19 3.1.1 State Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) 19 3.1.2 Central Organization Department 21 3.2 Transference Between Government and Corporate Positions 23 3.3 Traditional Connections and the Guanxi 26 3.4 Convergence of NOC Politics 29 Chapter 4. The “Big Four”: Overview of the Chinese Banking Sector 30 Preferential Treatment 33 Chapter 5. Oil Security and The Going Out Policy 36 5.1 The Policy Driver: Equity Oil 36 5.2 The Going Out Policy (zou chu qu) 37 5.2.1 The Development of OFDI and NOCs 37 5.2.2 Trends of Outward Foreign Investments 39 5.3 State Financing: The Chinese Policy Banks 42 5.4 Loans for Oil 44 Chapter 6. -
China Regulatory Enforcement Quarterly
CHINA REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT QUARTERLY WHAT’S INSIDE Executive Summary China’s Anti-Terrorism Law New Measures on Healthcare Donations Major Enforcement News Overseas Regulators Q4 – 2015 | www.dlapiper.com EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Legal and regulatory developments in Q4 2015 continue to reflect attempts by the Chinese government to respond to the significant challenges presented by the slowing market economy and other domestic crises, while the country aspires to transition into a more consumption-driven, innovative, and diversified economy. For example, the Shanghai Stock Exchange, which crashed in Q3 and made a small recovery in Q4, collapsed to a 52-week low in the first week of 2016. The government implemented a number of reforms aimed at preventing future crashes which, ironically, may have in some cases compounded the problem. One such reform was the introduction of a “circuit breaker system” which halted the trading of Chinese stocks that made gains or losses of more than seven percent on any given trading day. The circuit breaker system may have contributed to the crash as anxious investors looked to quick sell when markets began to tumble. The China Securities Regulatory Commission (“CSRC”) suspended the system within three trading days, having publicly admitted that the measure was unsuccessful in achieving its aim. Furthermore, the central government’s stance against corruption remains steadfast as evidenced in its propensity to investigate, arrest, and prosecute individuals responsible for such crimes. Disaster struck in Shenzhen on December 20 when a dumpsite of construction debris collapsed toppling dozens of buildings and apartments. Official reports state that 69 people were killed while eight remain missing. -
Chinese Politics in the Xi Jingping Era: Reassessing Collective Leadership
CHAPTER 1 Governance Collective Leadership Revisited Th ings don’t have to be or look identical in order to be balanced or equal. ڄ Maya Lin — his book examines how the structure and dynamics of the leadership of Tthe Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have evolved in response to the chal- lenges the party has confronted since the late 1990s. Th is study pays special attention to the issue of leadership se lection and composition, which is a per- petual concern in Chinese politics. Using both quantitative and qualitative analyses, this volume assesses the changing nature of elite recruitment, the generational attributes of the leadership, the checks and balances between competing po liti cal co ali tions or factions, the behavioral patterns and insti- tutional constraints of heavyweight politicians in the collective leadership, and the interplay between elite politics and broad changes in Chinese society. Th is study also links new trends in elite politics to emerging currents within the Chinese intellectual discourse on the tension between strongman politics and collective leadership and its implications for po liti cal reforms. A systematic analy sis of these developments— and some seeming contradictions— will help shed valuable light on how the world’s most populous country will be governed in the remaining years of the Xi Jinping era and beyond. Th is study argues that the survival of the CCP regime in the wake of major po liti cal crises such as the Bo Xilai episode and rampant offi cial cor- ruption is not due to “authoritarian resilience”— the capacity of the Chinese communist system to resist po liti cal and institutional changes—as some foreign China analysts have theorized. -
List of Participating Deans
LIST OF PARTICIPATING DEANS Jan Ketil Arnulf Moshe Porat Jan Ketil Arnulf Associate Dean, BI-Fudan MBA Program Dean, Fox School of Business and Management, Temple University Associate Professor, BI Norwegian Business School Associate Dean, BI-Fudan MBA Program Bruno van Pottelsberghe Associate Professor, BI Norwegian Business School Martin Binks Dean, Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management Dean and Professor of Entrepreneurial Development, Nottingham Jan Ketil Arnulf is an associate professor at BI Norwegian Business School and the associate dean University Business School Loïck Roche of the BI-Fudan MBA program, where he has been teaching since 2006. Dean and Director, Grenoble École de Management Dr. Arnulf’s key teaching and research interest is in leadership, global leadership and leadership Eric Chang development. His research on management team has been awarded a prize, and he is on the Dean, Quoin Professor in Finance and Chair Professor of Finance, Michael Roos editorial board of the scientific journal The Leadership Quarterly. Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Hong Kong Research Dean and Professor, Faculty of Management and Economics, Ruhr-University Bochum Dr. Arnulf has extensive practical experience as a consultant to companies in both private business Rabikar Chatterjee and public administration, and has taught at several universities, repeatedly receiving awards as Associate Dean for Masters and Executive Programs, Katz Graduate John Ryan “best faculty”. School of Business, University of Pittsburg -
China's Rulers: the Fifth Generation
CHINA’S RULERS: THE FIFTH GENERATION TAKES POWER (2012–13) Michael Dillon This project is funded by A project implemented by The European Union Steinbeis GmbH & Co. KG für Technologietransfer © Europe China Research and Advice Network, 2012 This publication may be reproduced for personal and educational use only. Commercial copying, hiring or lending of this publication is strictly prohibited. Europe China Research and Advice Network 10 St James’s Square London SW1Y 4LE +44 (0) 20 7314 3659 [email protected] www.euecran.eu Contents Foreword ........................................................................................................ 4 ExecutIve Summary ........................................................................................ 6 Key PRC PolItIcal BodIes .................................................................................. 7 Timetable for Leadership Changes .................................................................. 8 Introduction ................................................................................................... 9 1 Change and ContInuity ............................................................................... 11 2 Senior PolItIcal Appointments .................................................................... 14 3 PolItIcal GeneratIons In China .................................................................... 16 4 CCP FactIons and the SuccessIon Process ................................................... 17 5 Key Issues ................................................................................................. -
The 16Th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: Formal Institutions and Factional Groups ZHIYUE BO*
Journal of Contemporary China (2004), 13(39), May, 223–256 The 16th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: formal institutions and factional groups ZHIYUE BO* What was the political landscape of China as a result of the 16th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)? The answer is two-fold. In terms of formal institutions, provincial units emerged as the most powerful institution in Chinese politics. Their power index, as measured by the representation in the Central Committee, was the highest by a large margin. Although their combined power index ranked second, central institutions were fragmented between central party and central government institutions. The military ranked third. Corporate leaders began to assume independent identities in Chinese politics, but their power was still negligible at this stage. In terms of informal factional groups, the Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL) Group was the most powerful by a large margin. The Qinghua Clique ranked second. The Shanghai Gang and the Princelings were third and fourth, respectively. The same ranking order also holds in group cohesion indexes. The CCYL Group stood out as the most cohesive because its group cohesion index for inner circle members alone was much larger than those of the other three factional groups combined. The Qinghua Clique came second, and the Shanghai Gang third. The Princelings was hardly a factional group because its group cohesion index was extremely low. These factional groups, nevertheless, were not mutually exclusive. There were significant overlaps among them, especially between the Qinghua Clique and the Shanghai Gang, between the Princelings and the Qinghua Clique, and between the CCYL Group and the Qinghua Clique. -
Timings Stated Are in Singapore Time) 8:20 Am – 8:30 Am Admission of Participants
24 May, Monday (All timings stated are in Singapore time) 8:20 am – 8:30 am Admission of participants INTERNATIONAL MACROECONOMICS, MONEY & REAL ESTATE AND URBAN ECONOMICS BANKING International Financial Flows and Exchange Rates Climate Risk and Real Estate Chair: Christopher M. Meissner (University of California, Chair: Stijn Van Niewerburgh (Columbia University & ABFER) Davis) 8:30 am – 9:15 am 8:30 am – 9:20 am The Original Sin Redux: A Model Based Evaluation Climate Risk Perceptions and Demand for Flood Insurance Nikhil Patel (Bank for International Settlements) Buvaneshwaran Venugopal* (University of Central Florida) Boris Hofmann (Bank for International Settlements) Dimuthu Ratnadiwakara (Louisiana State University) Steve Pak Yeung Wu* (University of British Columbia) Discussant: Discussant: Carlos Garriga (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis) Linda Tesar (University of Michigan & ABFER) 9:15 am – 10:00 am 9.20 am - 10:10 am Scrambling for Dollars: International Liquidity, Banks Pricing of Climate Risk Insurance: Regulatory Frictions and and Exchange Rates Cross-Subsidies Charles Engel* (University of Wisconsin-Madison) Ana-Maria Tenekedjieva* (Federal Reserve Board0 Javier Bianchi (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis) Ishita Sen (Harvard University) Saki Bigio (University of California) Discussant: Discussant: Shan Ge (New York University) Ernest Liu (Princeton University) International Capital Flows Chair: Alessandro Rebucci (John Hopkins University) 10:30 am – 11:15 am 10:20 am – 11:10 am Capital Controls and Income Inequality -
Journal of Current Chinese Affairs
China Data Supplement September 2008 J People’s Republic of China J Hong Kong SAR J Macau SAR J Taiwan ISSN 0943-7533 China aktuell Data Supplement – PRC, Hong Kong SAR, Macau SAR, Taiwan 1 Contents The Main National Leadership of the PRC ......................................................................... 2 LIU Jen-Kai The Main Provincial Leadership of the PRC ..................................................................... 30 LIU Jen-Kai Data on Changes in PRC Main Leadership ...................................................................... 37 LIU Jen-Kai PRC Agreements with Foreign Countries ......................................................................... 44 LIU Jen-Kai PRC Laws and Regulations .............................................................................................. 47 LIU Jen-Kai Hong Kong SAR................................................................................................................ 48 LIU Jen-Kai Macau SAR....................................................................................................................... 55 LIU Jen-Kai Taiwan .............................................................................................................................. 60 LIU Jen-Kai ISSN 0943-7533 All information given here is derived from generally accessible sources. Publisher/Distributor: GIGA Institute of Asian Studies Rothenbaumchaussee 32 20148 Hamburg Germany Phone: +49 (0 40) 42 88 74-0 Fax: +49 (040) 4107945 2 September 2008 The Main National Leadership -
China's Leadership Transition and the Energy Sector
International Association for Energy Economics | 5 China’s Leadership Transition and the Energy Sector By Xioafei Li* Profiles of Potential Energy Leaders The composition of the new Politburo and their views regarding the large state-owned enterprises (SOE) will have profound implications for China’s socioeconomic trajectory in general and for the en- ergy sector in particular. It would be helpful for China watchers to grasp the biographical backgrounds of the top Chinese leaders who will likely govern the country for most of Li Keqiang Politburo Standing Wang Qishan this decade and beyond. Committee (PBSC) Zhang Dejiang In that regards, I would like to Petroleum divide the energy-related Chinese Zhang Gaoli Clique leaders into three groups: Politburo Zhou Yongkang Current New Leadership PBSC Standing Committee (PBSC), a su- Petroleum Clique that Influence Su Shulin preme leadership body that perches Energy Sector atop the China’s hierarchy; Petro- Retired Zeng Qinghong leum Clique, the politicians who PBSC made their political fortune through Jiang Jiemin their careers in the oil and gas in- CNPC Prominent CEOs in Wang Yilin CNOOC dustry; and the prominent CEOs in National Oil Firms China’s large oil companies. Fu Chengyu SINOPEC The PBSC Group – Xi Jinping will succeed Hu Jintao as president of PRC after the 18th Party Congress in fall 2012. He has long been known for his market-friendly approach to economic development, yet he has also displayed strong support for China’s flagship state- owned enterprises, including China’s large energy firms. Thus, these firms may continue to monopo- lize many major industrial sectors in the country under his tutelage.