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1 11 Ownership2 EXLIBRIS MÉLÈZE MODRZEJEWSKI OWNERSHIP Acquisition and Loss thereof JLAlonso&JUrbanik, The Principles of Roman Law: Unit 1:11.2 ACQUISITION OF POSSESSION ACQUISITION OF POSSESSION ➤ animus ACQUISITION OF POSSESSION ➤ animus ➤ corpus ACQUISITION OF POSSESSION ➤ animus ➤ corpus ➤exception: acquisition through alieni iuris (but for stolen things) ACQUISITION OF POSSESSION D. XLI 2.18.1 (Celsus): If you hand an object over to an insane person, whom you reckon to be sane, you cease to possess even if he does not become the possessor: it is enough to get rid of possession even if you do not convey it. It would be ridiculous to say that someone wants to get rid of possession only when he wants to convey it to someone else, because if he conveys he wants to get rid of it, and hence he conveys it. ACQUISITION OF POSSESSION ACQUISITION OF POSSESSION D. XLI 2.34 (Ulp. 7. disp.). If you convey to me the mere possession of the Cornelian Estate and I think it is the Sempronian Estate, and then get the Cornelian, I do not acquire possession if we disagree not only about the name but also the object. And so if we disagree about the object as well, do you cease to possess, as we dispose and change possession by mere will as Marcellus and Celsus write? I do not think that the one who is mistaken acquires possession, and so the one conveys possession does not loose it, as if giving up possession under a condition. ACQUISITION OF POSSESSION D. XLI 2.34 (Ulp. 7. disp.). If you convey to me the mere possession of the Cornelian Estate and I think it is the Sempronian Estate, and then get the Cornelian, I do not acquire possession if we disagree not only about the name but also the object. And so if we disagree about the object as well, do you cease to possess, as we dispose and change possession by mere will as Marcellus and Celsus write? I do not think that the one who is mistaken acquires possession, and so the one conveys possession does not loose it, as if giving up possession under a condition. ACQUISITION OF POSSESSION D. XLI 2.34 (Ulp. 7. disp.). If you convey to me the mere possession of the Cornelian Estate and I think it is the Sempronian Estate, and then get the Cornelian, I do not acquire possession if we disagree not only about the name but also the object. And so if we disagree about the object as well, do you cease to possess, as we dispose and change possession by mere will as Marcellus and Celsus write? I do not think that the one who is mistaken acquires possession, and so the one conveys possession does not loose it, as if giving up possession under a condition. Why does Ulpian think that the mistaken purchaser does not acquire the possession? ACQUISITION OF POSSESSION D. XLI 2.34 (Ulp. 7. disp.). If you convey to me the mere possession of the Cornelian Estate and I think it is the Sempronian Estate, and then get the Cornelian, I do not acquire possession if we disagree not only about the name but also the object. And so if we disagree about the object as well, do you cease to possess, as we dispose and change possession by mere will as Marcellus and Celsus write? I do not think that the one who is mistaken acquires possession, and so the one conveys possession does not loose it, as if giving up possession under a condition. Why does Ulpian think that the mistaken purchaser does not acquire the possession? How could we argue that the alienor looses the possession? ACQUISITION OF POSSESSION D. XLI 2.34 (Ulp. 7. disp.). If you convey to me the mere possession of the Cornelian Estate and I think it is the Sempronian Estate, and then get the Cornelian, I do not acquire possession if we disagree not only about the name but also the object. And so if we disagree about the object as well, do you cease to possess, as we dispose and change possession by mere will as Marcellus and Celsus write? I do not think that the one who is mistaken acquires possession, and so the one conveys possession does not loose it, as if giving up possession under a condition. Why does Ulpian think that the mistaken purchaser does not acquire the possession? How could we argue that the alienor looses the possession? What does Ulpian say? ACQUISITION OF POSSESSION D. XLI 2.34 (Ulp. 7. disp.). If you convey to me the mere possession of the Cornelian Estate and I think it is the Sempronian Estate, and then get the Cornelian, I do not acquire possession if we disagree not only about the name but also the object. And so if we disagree about the object as well, do you cease to possess, as we dispose and change possession by mere will as Marcellus and Celsus write? I do not think that the one who is mistaken acquires possession, and so the one conveys possession does not loose it, as if giving up possession under a condition. Why does Ulpian think that the mistaken purchaser does not acquire the possession? How could we argue that the alienor looses the possession? What does Ulpian say? If the 3rd party acquires the said estate, who is its possessor? ACQUISITION OF POSSESSION D. XLI 2.34 (Ulp. 7. disp.). If you convey to me the mere possession of the Cornelian Estate and I think it is the Sempronian Estate, and then get the Cornelian, I do not acquire possession if we disagree not only about the name but also the object. And so if we disagree about the object as well, do you cease to possess, as we dispose and change possession by mere will as Marcellus and Celsus write? I do not think that the one who is mistaken acquires possession, and so the one conveys possession does not loose it, as if giving up possession under a condition. Why does Ulpian think that the mistaken purchaser does not acquire the possession? How could we argue that the alienor looses the possession? What does Ulpian say? If the 3rd party acquires the said estate, who is its possessor? What about ownership? ACQUISITION OF OWNERSHIP ➤ derivative ➤ formal: in iure cessio, mancipatio ➤ informal: traditio ➤ original ➤ usucaption (prescription), ➤ occupation, occupatio ➤ thesaurus, thesaurus ➤ accession, accessio ➤ specification, specificatio usucapio ➤ fruits, fructus NEMO PLUS IURIS AD ALIUM TRANSFERRE POTEST QUAM IPSE HABE(RE)T MANCIPATIO G. I 119 Mancipation … is an imaginary sale, belonging to that part of the law which is peculiar to Roman citizens, and consists in the following process: in the presence of not fewer than five witnesses, citizens of Rome above the age of puberty, and another person of the same condition, who holds a bronze balance in his hands and is called the balance holder, the alienee holding a bronze ingot in his hand, pronounces the following words: This man I claim as belonging to me by right Quiritary (hunc ego hominem meum esse ex iure Quritium aio) and be he (or, he is) purchased to me by this ingot and this scale of bronze. He then strikes the scale with the ingot, which he delivers to the mancipator as by way of purchase money. MANCIPATIO G. I 119 Mancipation … is an imaginary sale, belonging to that part of the law which is peculiar to Roman citizens, and consists in the following process: in the presence of not fewer than five witnesses, citizens of Rome above the age of puberty, and another person of the same condition, who holds a bronze balance in his hands and is called the balance holder, the alienee holding a bronze ingot in his hand, pronounces the following words: This man I claim as belonging to me by right Quiritary (hunc ego hominem meum esse ex iure Quritium aio) and be he (or, he is) purchased to me by this ingot and this scale of bronze. He then strikes the scale with the ingot, which he delivers to the mancipator as by way of purchase money. Abstract and formal act: conditions of validity MANCIPATIO G. 1.119 Mancipation … is an imaginary sale Caroline Islands, the Isle of Yap MANCIPATIO G. 1.119 Mancipation … is an imaginary sale USES: Caroline Islands, the Isle of Yap MANCIPATIO G. 1.119 Mancipation … is an imaginary sale USES: Mancipatio nummo uno Caroline Islands, the Isle of Yap MANCIPATIO G. 1.119 Mancipation … is an imaginary sale USES: Mancipatio nummo uno Solutio per aes & libram Caroline Islands, the Isle of Yap MANCIPATIO G. 1.119 Mancipation … is an imaginary sale USES: Mancipatio nummo uno Solutio per aes & libram Coëmptio fiduciae causa Caroline Islands, the Isle of Yap MANCIPATIO G. 1.119 Mancipation … is an imaginary sale USES: Mancipatio nummo uno Solutio per aes & libram Coëmptio fiduciae causa Emancipatio/Adoptio Caroline Islands, the Isle of Yap MANCIPATIO G. 1.119 Mancipation … is an imaginary sale USES: Mancipatio nummo uno Solutio per aes & libram Coëmptio fiduciae causa Emancipatio/Adoptio Mancipatio familiae Caroline Islands, the Isle of Yap MANCIPATIO G. 1.119 Mancipation … is an imaginary sale USES: Mancipatio nummo uno Solutio per aes & libram Coëmptio fiduciae causa Emancipatio/Adoptio Mancipatio familiae Rabel: nachgeformtes Rechtsgeschaft Caroline Islands, the Isle of Yap IN IURE CESSIO G. I 24: Conveyance by surrender before a magistrate (in iure cessio) is in the following form: in the presence of some magistrate of the Roman people, such as a praetor, the surrenderee grasping the object says: This man I claim as belonging to me by right Quiritary (hunc ego hominem meum esse ex iure Quritium aio).
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