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STYLING vs. SAFETY The American Automobile Industry and the Development of Automotive Safety, 1900-1966 Joel W. Eastm'm STYLING vs. SAFETY The American Automobile Industry and the Development of Automotive Safety, 1900-1966 Joel W. Eastman UNIVERSITY PRESS OF AMERICA LANHAM • NEW YORK • LONDON Copyright © 1984 by University Press of America," Inc. 4720 Boston Way Lanham. MD 20706 3 Henrietta Street London WC2E 8LU England All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Eastman, Joel W., 1939– Styling vs. safety. Originally presented as author's thesis (doctoral– University of Florida) Bibliography: p. Includes index. 1. Automobiles–Safety measures–History. I. Title. 11. Title: Styling versus safety. TL242.E24 1984 363.1'25'0973 83-21859 ISBN 0-8191-3685-9 (alk. paper) ISBN 0-8191-3686-7 (pbk. : alk. paper) All University Press of America books are produced on acid-free paper which exceeds the minimum standards set by the National Historical Publications and Records Commission. Dedicated to Claire L. Straith, Hugh DeHaven and all of the other pioneers of automotive safety iii iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS No research project is entirely the work of one person, and such is the case with this study which would not have been possible without the cooperation and assistance of scores of people. I would like to express my appreciation to those who agreed to be interviewed in person or on the telephone, allowed me to examine their personal papers, and answered questions and forwarded materials through the mail. I utilized the resources of numerous libraries and archives, but a few deserve special mention. The bulk of my research was carried on at Baker, Houghton and Weidner libraries of Harvard University, but the specialized collections of the Detroit Public Library, Henry Ford Museum, University of Michigan, and Syracuse University were vital to my work. The original version of this study was written as a doctoral dissertation in history at the University of Florida but the major portion of the research was under- taken at Harvard University while I was serving as Assistant Editor of the Business History Review and Coordinator of the Business History and Economic Life Program, Inc. I must thank Arthur M. Johnson for engi- neering this arrangement and James P. Baughman for con- tinuing it and for offering insightful suggestions about the direction of my research. David L. Lewis of the University of Michigan was extremely supportive in the early stages of my work and provided personal in- sights on the nature of the contemporary automobile in- dustry. John K. Mahon, chairman of my supervisory com- mittee, guided me through the long process of writing the dissertation with patience and good humor. John B. Rae of Harvey Mudd College, James J. Flink of the University of California at Irvine, and Leon S. Robert- son of Yale University all gave generously of their time to read and comment on the manuscript and have been ex- tremely supportive of my work. My wife, Linda J. Eastman,•typed the first two drafts of the manuscript and aided me in solving many problems of composition and documentation. The revised draft was typed by Laura Graham and the final one by Patricia Peck. Vi TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction ix Notes xv The Safety of the First American Automobile 1 Notes 17 II. The Impact of the Annual Model Change on the Design of the American Automobile 23 Notes 43 III. The Safety Deficiencies Created by the Annual Model Change 51 Notes 73 IV. The "Horsepower Race" and Its Impact on Automotive Safety . 83 Notes 105 V. The Reaction of the Automobile Industry to the Problem of Traffic Accidents 115 Notes 129 VI. The Automobile Industry and the Highway Safety Movement 135 Notes 167 VII. The Origins of Automobile Design for Crash Protection 177 Notes 201 VIII. "Safety Doesn't Sell": The Develop- ment of Safety Research in the Automobile Industry 209 Notes 235 Conclusion 241 Notes 249 Selected Bibliography 251 Index 263 vi i viii INTRODUCTION When Charles E. and J. Frank Duryea placed a small, internal-combustion engine in a modified horse-drawn buggy in Springfield, Massachusetts, in 1893, the first step had been taken toward a revolutionary change in the highway transportation system of the United States and in American life. Within a generation road transporta- tion had been almost completely "motorized" -- mechani- cal power substituted for animal power in highway ve- hicles -- and the motor vehicle had become the most im- portant means of transportation in the country. The motorization of the highway system was begun without any formal consideration of either how the motor vehicle might serve the transportation needs of the nation or what effect a change from animal to mechanical power might have on the economy, efficiency and safety of the road system. Motor car enthusiasts uncritically touted the many expected benefits of the transition. Some predicted a great revolution in transportation, but a positive one which would bring more freedom and a fuller life to Americans by solving many of the problems created by an urban industrial society. I Gouverneur Morris, in an article in Collier's in 1912, expressed this point of view very eloquently when he wrote, "God gave us the automobile: that in the short life which is ours we may see a few more hills and valleys, a few more fields of flowers. ."2 The American public accepted the motor car as en- thusiastically as its early proponents, and the reason for the response is not difficult to discover. The motorized passenger vehicle fitted perfectly into Amer- ican culture because it appeared to offer inexpensive, individualized transportation to an individualistic, highly mobile people. With the introduction of depend- able, low cost motorcars like the Model T Ford in 1908, Americans rapidly abandoned their horse-powered vehicles for mechanically-powered ones, and the motorized highway system appeared full blown, almost overnight. Once it had arrived, its mere existence became its raison d'etre, and it developed a momentum all its own, fired by a growing number of interest groups with a direct economic stake in continuing and expanding the motorized highway transportation system. The responsibility for the construction and main- tenance of highways and the regulation, if any, of road vehicles had traditionally lain with the states, but ix with the arrival of the motorcar there were calls for the duty to be accepted by the federal government. Ironically, the proposals came from the very interests which would so vigorously oppose federal regulation of motorcars sixty years later -- the automobile industry and its supporters, who wished to override conflicting state and local motor vehicle laws which they felt were inhibiting the sale and use of motor cars. National automobile laws appeared in Europe in the first decade of the twentieth century setting uniform standards of competence for motorists and of safety for motor vehicles. In 1902, Horseless Age, a leading Amer- ican automotive trade journal, endorsed the idea of government standards for motor vehicles as a way to keep unsafely-constructed automobiles off the market.3 More significant, in the same year, the National Association of Automobile Manufacturers petitioned both the United States Senate and House of Representatives, requesting the framing and enactment of legislation providing for a uniform national automobile license, and in 1905, the NAAM joined with the American Automobile Association in a campaign to secure a national motor vehicle law. Sev- eral bills were introduced during the Fifty-Ninth Con- gress, but all died in committee.4 The campaign continued, supported by national mag- azines like the Nation and Harper's, and in 1907 another bill was introduced by the NAAM and the AAA calling for federal regulation of speed, identification and regis- tration of vehicles, licensing of drivers, and establish- ment of a Federal Motor Vehicle Bureau to keep records, but the bill died before reaching the floor of the House.5 The high point of the attempt by the NAAM and the AAA to secure national regulation of automobiles came with the calling of a national legislative conven- tion on the matter in Washington, D.C., in February, 1910, but even this grand effort proved fruitless. Con- gressmen could not see the need for such legislation and doubted the constitutionality of the proposals which were -based on the commerce clause. By 1910, general adoption of interstate reciprocity agreements and a trend toward uniformity in state motor vehicle laws ended most of the major problems involved with conflicting state require- ments, and the campaign to secure national regulation was abandoned.6 In 1919, E. H. Beldon, Chief Engineer of the Willys- Overland Company, a well-known American automobile manu- facturer, stated: "I believe the time is coming when all cars will have to pass a government inspection for roadability for a given weight, and cars will only be permitted to travel below a definite speed depending on their roadability." 7 The time was coming, but it was nearly fifty years off. The federal government left the control of road vehicles in the hands of state and local authorities where it had historically lain. However, there were precedents for federal involvement in highway construction, and Congress did act in this area in re- sponse to pressure from the same groups which had called for national regulation of motor vehicles. A "Good Roads" movement had been formed in the 1880's by bicycle enthusiasts and manufacturers, and early in the next century it came to be dominated by automobile interests.8 In 1902, the NAAM resolved to support the Brownlow-Latimer Federal Good Roads Bill which would have appropriated $20,000,000 in government funds to construct a transcontinental highway.

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