Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2018 and the Future Years Defense Program
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2014 Ships and Submarines of the United States Navy
AIRCRAFT CARRIER DDG 1000 AMPHIBIOUS Multi-Purpose Aircraft Carrier (Nuclear-Propulsion) THE U.S. NAvy’s next-GENERATION MULTI-MISSION DESTROYER Amphibious Assault Ship Gerald R. Ford Class CVN Tarawa Class LHA Gerald R. Ford CVN-78 USS Peleliu LHA-5 John F. Kennedy CVN-79 Enterprise CVN-80 Nimitz Class CVN Wasp Class LHD USS Wasp LHD-1 USS Bataan LHD-5 USS Nimitz CVN-68 USS Abraham Lincoln CVN-72 USS Harry S. Truman CVN-75 USS Essex LHD-2 USS Bonhomme Richard LHD-6 USS Dwight D. Eisenhower CVN-69 USS George Washington CVN-73 USS Ronald Reagan CVN-76 USS Kearsarge LHD-3 USS Iwo Jima LHD-7 USS Carl Vinson CVN-70 USS John C. Stennis CVN-74 USS George H.W. Bush CVN-77 USS Boxer LHD-4 USS Makin Island LHD-8 USS Theodore Roosevelt CVN-71 SUBMARINE Submarine (Nuclear-Powered) America Class LHA America LHA-6 SURFACE COMBATANT Los Angeles Class SSN Tripoli LHA-7 USS Bremerton SSN-698 USS Pittsburgh SSN-720 USS Albany SSN-753 USS Santa Fe SSN-763 Guided Missile Cruiser USS Jacksonville SSN-699 USS Chicago SSN-721 USS Topeka SSN-754 USS Boise SSN-764 USS Dallas SSN-700 USS Key West SSN-722 USS Scranton SSN-756 USS Montpelier SSN-765 USS La Jolla SSN-701 USS Oklahoma City SSN-723 USS Alexandria SSN-757 USS Charlotte SSN-766 Ticonderoga Class CG USS City of Corpus Christi SSN-705 USS Louisville SSN-724 USS Asheville SSN-758 USS Hampton SSN-767 USS Albuquerque SSN-706 USS Helena SSN-725 USS Jefferson City SSN-759 USS Hartford SSN-768 USS Bunker Hill CG-52 USS Princeton CG-59 USS Gettysburg CG-64 USS Lake Erie CG-70 USS San Francisco SSN-711 USS Newport News SSN-750 USS Annapolis SSN-760 USS Toledo SSN-769 USS Mobile Bay CG-53 USS Normandy CG-60 USS Chosin CG-65 USS Cape St. -
Fy15 Table of Contents Fy16 Table of Contents
FY15FY16 TABLE OF CONTENTS DOT&E Activity and Oversight FY16 Activity Summary 1 Program Oversight 7 Problem Discovery Affecting OT&E 13 DOD Programs Major Automated Information System (MAIS) Best Practices 23 Defense Agencies Initiative (DAI) 29 Defensive Medical Information Exchange (DMIX) 33 Defense Readiness Reporting System – Strategic (DRRS-S) 37 Department of Defense (DOD) Teleport 41 DOD Healthcare Management System Modernization (DHMSM) 43 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter 47 Global Command and Control System – Joint (GCCS-J) 107 Joint Information Environment (JIE) 111 Joint Warning and Reporting Network (JWARN) 115 Key Management Infrastructure (KMI) Increment 2 117 Next Generation Diagnostic System (NGDS) Increment 1 121 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Increment 2 123 Theater Medical Information Program – Joint (TMIP-J) 127 Army Programs Army Network Modernization 131 Network Integration Evaluation (NIE) 135 Abrams M1A2 System Enhancement Program (SEP) Main Battle Tank (MBT) 139 AH-64E Apache 141 Army Integrated Air & Missile Defense (IAMD) 143 Chemical Demilitarization Program – Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives (CHEM DEMIL-ACWA) 145 Command Web 147 Distributed Common Ground System – Army (DCGS-A) 149 HELLFIRE Romeo and Longbow 151 Javelin Close Combat Missile System – Medium 153 Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) Family of Vehicles (FoV) 155 Joint Tactical Networks (JTN) Joint Enterprise Network Manager (JENM) 157 Logistics Modernization Program (LMP) 161 M109A7 Family of Vehicles (FoV) Paladin Integrated Management (PIM) 165 -
Maritime Artist Corner
DAILY COLLECTION OF MARITIME PRESS CLIPPINGS 2017 – 237 Number 237 *** COLLECTION OF MARITIME PRESS CLIPPINGS *** Thursday 24-08-2017 News reports received from readers and Internet News articles copied from various news sites. The OFFSHORE WENDUINE inbound for IJmuiden – Photo : Jan Plug (c) Your feedback is important to me so please drop me an email if you have any photos or articles that may be of interest to the maritime interested people at sea and ashore PLEASE SEND ALL PHOTOS / ARTICLES TO : [email protected] If you don't like to receive this bulletin anymore : To unsubscribe click here (English version) or visit the subscription page on our website. http://www.maasmondmaritime.com/uitschrijven.aspx?lan=en-US Distribution : daily to 37.450+ active addresses 24-08-2017 Page 1 DAILY COLLECTION OF MARITIME PRESS CLIPPINGS 2017 – 237 EVENTS, INCIDENTS & OPERATIONS The NAVE ATROPOS aproaching the IJmuiden locks assisted by the Port Towages Amsterdam Operated tug VENUS photo: Peter Maanders Port Towage Amsterdam © OOCL celebrated the christening of hull of OOCL Germany OOCL celebrated the christening of Hull H2173, a 21,413 TEU newbuilding constructed at the Samsung Heavy Industries shipyard on Geoje Island. Named as OOCL GERMANY, this mega containership is the second of the six 21 thousand TEU class vessels on order at the shipyard and they are an important part to enhancing the competitiveness and efficiency of OOCL modern fleet, the company announces in its press release. As with many of OOCL newbuildings, extra efforts have been made to ensure that they are operationally efficient and meeting the highest environmental standards. -
Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress
Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress Updated September 30, 2021 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov RL33745 SUMMARY RL33745 Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) September 30, 2021 Program: Background and Issues for Congress Ronald O'Rourke The Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) program, which is carried out by the Missile Defense Specialist in Naval Affairs Agency (MDA) and the Navy, gives Navy Aegis cruisers and destroyers a capability for conducting BMD operations. BMD-capable Aegis ships operate in European waters to defend Europe from potential ballistic missile attacks from countries such as Iran, and in in the Western Pacific and the Persian Gulf to provide regional defense against potential ballistic missile attacks from countries such as North Korea and Iran. MDA’s FY2022 budget submission states that “by the end of FY 2022 there will be 48 total BMDS [BMD system] capable ships requiring maintenance support.” The Aegis BMD program is funded mostly through MDA’s budget. The Navy’s budget provides additional funding for BMD-related efforts. MDA’s proposed FY2021 budget requested a total of $1,647.9 million (i.e., about $1.6 billion) in procurement and research and development funding for Aegis BMD efforts, including funding for two Aegis Ashore sites in Poland and Romania. MDA’s budget also includes operations and maintenance (O&M) and military construction (MilCon) funding for the Aegis BMD program. Issues for Congress regarding the Aegis BMD program include the following: whether to approve, reject, or modify MDA’s annual procurement and research and development funding requests for the program; the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the execution of Aegis BMD program efforts; what role, if any, the Aegis BMD program should play in defending the U.S. -
American Naval Policy, Strategy, Plans and Operations in the Second Decade of the Twenty- First Century Peter M
American Naval Policy, Strategy, Plans and Operations in the Second Decade of the Twenty- first Century Peter M. Swartz January 2017 Select a caveat DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release: distribution unlimited. CNA’s Occasional Paper series is published by CNA, but the opinions expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of CNA or the Department of the Navy. Distribution DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release: distribution unlimited. PUBLIC RELEASE. 1/31/2017 Other requests for this document shall be referred to CNA Document Center at [email protected]. Photography Credit: A SM-6 Dual I fired from USS John Paul Jones (DDG 53) during a Dec. 14, 2016 MDA BMD test. MDA Photo. Approved by: January 2017 Eric V. Thompson, Director Center for Strategic Studies This work was performed under Federal Government Contract No. N00014-16-D-5003. Copyright © 2017 CNA Abstract This paper provides a brief overview of U.S. Navy policy, strategy, plans and operations. It discusses some basic fundamentals and the Navy’s three major operational activities: peacetime engagement, crisis response, and wartime combat. It concludes with a general discussion of U.S. naval forces. It was originally written as a contribution to an international conference on maritime strategy and security, and originally published as a chapter in a Routledge handbook in 2015. The author is a longtime contributor to, advisor on, and observer of US Navy strategy and policy, and the paper represents his personal but well-informed views. The paper was written while the Navy (and Marine Corps and Coast Guard) were revising their tri- service strategy document A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, finally signed and published in March 2015, and includes suggestions made by the author to the drafters during that time. -
Maritime Patrol Aviation: 90 Years of Continuing Innovation
J. F. KEANE AND C. A. EASTERLING Maritime Patrol Aviation: 90 Years of Continuing Innovation John F. Keane and CAPT C. Alan Easterling, USN Since its beginnings in 1912, maritime patrol aviation has recognized the importance of long-range, persistent, and armed intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in sup- port of operations afl oat and ashore. Throughout its history, it has demonstrated the fl ex- ibility to respond to changing threats, environments, and missions. The need for increased range and payload to counter submarine and surface threats would dictate aircraft opera- tional requirements as early as 1917. As maritime patrol transitioned from fl ying boats to land-based aircraft, both its mission set and areas of operation expanded, requiring further developments to accommodate advanced sensor and weapons systems. Tomorrow’s squad- rons will possess capabilities far beyond the imaginations of the early pioneers, but the mis- sion will remain essentially the same—to quench the battle force commander’s increasing demand for over-the-horizon situational awareness. INTRODUCTION In 1942, Rear Admiral J. S. McCain, as Com- plane. With their normal and advance bases strategically mander, Aircraft Scouting Forces, U.S. Fleet, stated the located, surprise contacts between major forces can hardly following: occur. In addition to receiving contact reports on enemy forces in these vital areas the patrol planes, due to their great Information is without doubt the most important service endurance, can shadow and track these forces, keeping the required by a fl eet commander. Accurate, complete and up fl eet commander informed of their every movement.1 to the minute knowledge of the position, strength and move- ment of enemy forces is very diffi cult to obtain under war Although prescient, Rear Admiral McCain was hardly conditions. -
Appendix C: Military Operations and Planning Scenarios Referred to in This Report
Appendix C: Military Operations and Planning Scenarios Referred to in This Report In describing the past and planned use of various types conducted on the territory of North Vietnam during of forces, this primer mentions a number of military the war (as opposed to air operations in South Vietnam, operations that the United States has engaged in since which were essentially continuous in support of U.S. World War II, as well as a number of scenarios that and South Vietnamese ground forces). The most nota- the Department of Defense has used to plan for future ble campaigns included Operations Rolling Thunder, conflicts. Those operations and planning scenarios are Linebacker, and Linebacker II. summarized below. 1972: Easter Offensive.This offensive, launched by Military Operations North Vietnamese ground forces, was largely defeated 1950–1953: Korean War. U.S. forces defended South by South Vietnamese ground forces along with heavy air Korea (the Republic of Korea) from an invasion by support from U.S. forces. North Korea (the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea). North Korean forces initially came close to 1975: Spring Offensive.This was the final offensive overrunning the entire Korean Peninsula before being launched by North Vietnamese ground forces during the pushed back. Later, military units from China (the war. Unlike in the Easter Offensive, the United States People’s Republic of China) intervened when U.S. forces did not provide air support to South Vietnamese ground approached the Chinese border. That intervention caused forces, and North Vietnamese forces fully conquered the conflict to devolve into a stalemate at the location of South Vietnam. -
Overview of Platforms and Combat Systems
W. G. Bath Overview of Platforms and Combat Systems William G. Bath ABSTRACT Air and missile defense is a complex process involving the coordinated operation of equipment and computer programs. The most effective defense generally is multiple layers of defense using different technologies in each layer such as long-range hard-kill, followed by hard-kill area defense, followed by both hard-kill and soft-kill (electronic warfare) self-defense. A combat system must merge, fuse, and de-conflict many sources of sensor data to produce a single usable track picture for decision-making. Throughout, sensors are controlled and sensor resource use is man- aged to meet the overall defense needs. As technical direction agent and technical adviser for many of the combat system elements, the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (APL) performs the systems engineering, analysis, and experimentation that helps the Navy select the most combat system capability at an affordable cost. INTRODUCTION Most Navy warships have combat systems capable of in overall air and missile defense capability shown in air and missile defense. Those combat systems are well Figure 1. described by the “detect–control–engage” paradigm; Aegis destroyers and cruisers are the Navy’s most that is, the components of the combat system can be capable air defense units because of their long-range, notionally grouped as follows: multifunction phased-array radars; their inventory of • Detect components that find and track air and many different anti-air warfare, ballistic missile defense, missile targets and electronic warfare weapons; and their complex control processes for processing sensor data, making • Control components that identify the targets and engagement decisions, and controlling those weapons. -
Navy CG(X) Cruiser Program: Background for Congress
Navy CG(X) Cruiser Program: Background for Congress Updated January 13, 2011 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov RL34179 Navy CG(X) Cruiser Program: Background for Congress Summary The Navy’s FY2011 budget proposed canceling the CG(X) program as unaffordable and instead building an improved version of the Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class Aegis destroyer called the Flight III version. This report provides background information on the CG(X) program as it existed prior to its proposed cancellation. For further discussion of the proposal to build Flight III DDG-51s in lieu of CG(X)s, see CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service Navy CG(X) Cruiser Program: Background for Congress Contents Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 Background ..................................................................................................................................... 1 CG(X) Cruiser Program Prior to Proposed Cancellation .......................................................... 1 Announcement of Program ................................................................................................. 1 Replacement for CG-47s ..................................................................................................... 2 Planned Procurement Schedule .......................................................................................... -
US Navy Program Guide 2012
U.S. NAVY PROGRAM GUIDE 2012 U.S. NAVY PROGRAM GUIDE 2012 FOREWORD The U.S. Navy is the world’s preeminent cal change continues in the Arab world. Nations like Iran maritime force. Our fleet operates forward every day, and North Korea continue to pursue nuclear capabilities, providing America offshore options to deter conflict and while rising powers are rapidly modernizing their militar- advance our national interests in an era of uncertainty. ies and investing in capabilities to deny freedom of action As it has for more than 200 years, our Navy remains ready on the sea, in the air and in cyberspace. To ensure we are for today’s challenges. Our fleet continues to deliver cred- prepared to meet our missions, I will continue to focus on ible capability for deterrence, sea control, and power pro- my three main priorities: 1) Remain ready to meet current jection to prevent and contain conflict and to fight and challenges, today; 2) Build a relevant and capable future win our nation’s wars. We protect the interconnected sys- force; and 3) Enable and support our Sailors, Navy Civil- tems of trade, information, and security that enable our ians, and their Families. Most importantly, we will ensure nation’s economic prosperity while ensuring operational we do not create a “hollow force” unable to do the mission access for the Joint force to the maritime domain and the due to shortfalls in maintenance, personnel, or training. littorals. These are fiscally challenging times. We will pursue these Our Navy is integral to combat, counter-terrorism, and priorities effectively and efficiently, innovating to maxi- crisis response. -
Appendix As Too Inclusive
Color profile: Disabled Composite Default screen Appendix I A Chronological List of Cases Involving the Landing of United States Forces to Protect the Lives and Property of Nationals Abroad Prior to World War II* This Appendix contains a chronological list of pre-World War II cases in which the United States landed troops in foreign countries to pro- tect the lives and property of its nationals.1 Inclusion of a case does not nec- essarily imply that the exercise of forcible self-help was motivated solely, or even primarily, out of concern for US nationals.2 In many instances there is room for disagreement as to what motive predominated, but in all cases in- cluded herein the US forces involved afforded some measure of protection to US nationals or their property. The cases are listed according to the date of the first use of US forces. A case is included only where there was an actual physical landing to protect nationals who were the subject of, or were threatened by, immediate or po- tential danger. Thus, for example, cases involving the landing of troops to punish past transgressions, or for the ostensible purpose of protecting na- tionals at some remote time in the future, have been omitted. While an ef- fort to isolate individual fact situations has been made, there are a good number of situations involving multiple landings closely related in time or context which, for the sake of convenience, have been treated herein as sin- gle episodes. The list of cases is based primarily upon the sources cited following this paragraph. -
The United States Navy As a “Hollow Force” an Assessment of Naval Readiness from 2010 to 2017
THE UNITED STATES NAVY AS A “HOLLOW FORCE” AN ASSESSMENT OF NAVAL READINESS FROM 2010 TO 2017 by Justin H. Witwicki A thesis submitted to Johns Hopkins University in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Government Baltimore, Maryland December 2019 © 2019 Justin Witwicki All Rights Reserved Abstract From 2010 to 2017, at least six separate but interconnected factors damaged the military readiness of the United States Navy. This thesis explored the concepts of force readiness and force “hollowness” as qualitative measures of a military’s ability to execute its national security responsibilities. Through that lens, seven “force hollowing” indicators – which were defined in 1996 by the Center for Naval Analyses – were reconsidered in the context of the 2010-2017 Navy. Of those seven, five were accepted as applicable in modern context. Those five indicators were: pressure to cut defense spending, declining military pay, poor force morale, delays in fielding modern equipment, and inadequate maintenance of existing equipment. Thereafter, two additional readiness indicators – unsustainable operational tempo and the effects of global climate change – were added to those already existing in the academic literature. Both were deemed critical to a holistic understanding of naval readiness during the early- and mid-2010s. Unsustainable operational tempo was identified as a valid indicator of naval unreadiness from 2010 to 2017. An institutional culture which accepted a “normalization of deviance” facilitated a measurable rise in operational tempo and ultimately resulted in four at-sea mishaps that claimed 17 lives in the summer of 2017. In addition, climate change, although it was rejected as a chronic readiness challenge during the 2010s, was accepted as a clear threat to future readiness.