Shooting the Moon
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Appendix D—Timeline Notes from Propellant Anomaly Daniel R. Andrews Shooting the Moon This is an unusual book about an unusual mission to find water on the moon. The LCROSS mission had a noble purpose, but with little time and money, we had to do things differently. My goal with this book is to let you inside the project to see the world through the eyes of the project manager. How we did what we did. Why we did what we did. I suspect you’ll find lessons that apply to project work anywhere. The stories within come from the many notes I took over the course of the mission. They include my personal reflections, observations, assessments, learning, techniques, and recommendations. The chapters are sometimes analytical and procedural, and at other times observational, reflective, amusing, and absurd. It was a great honor to lead the LCROSS team – we all learned and played harder than we probably thought we could. We became a force and a pathfinder, all while forging friendships that will last a lifetime. On behalf of the LCROSS team, I hope the stories and learning captured within this book are valuable and amusing to others. i Appendix D—Timeline Notes from Propellant Anomaly SHOOTING THE MOON The Project Manager’s stories of how we found water on the moon by Daniel Andrews ii Appendix D—Timeline Notes from Propellant Anomaly Table of Contents 1 Introduction 1 2 In the Beginning... 5 3 LCROSS Mission Overview 9 4 Faster, Better, Cheaper? 15 5 Managing the Project Basics 23 6 Managing the Project Phases 41 7 Managing the Project Staffing 57 8 Managing the PM – PSE Relationship 63 9 Managing the Success Criteria 69 10 Managing Design-to-Cost 73 11 Managing the Reserves 81 12 Managing the Schedule 85 13 Managing the Complexity 95 14 Managing Risk and Opportunities 99 15 Managing Risk Messaging 109 16 Managing Openness and Trust 117 17 Managing the Stakeholders 129 18 Managing the Middle 139 19 Managing the Big Decisions 151 20 Managing the Bad Day 157 21 Managing the Lunacy 171 22 Calibrating Our Approach 197 23 A Lasting Impact 207 24 In the End... 211 iii Appendix D—Timeline Notes from Propellant Anomaly Appendix A Tips and Tricks of the LCROSS Project 217 Appendix B Wisecracks and Wisdom – LCROSS Notable Quotables 235 Appendix C LCROSS Quick Mission Facts 245 Appendix D Timeline Notes from Propellant Anomaly 255 iv Appendix D—Timeline Notes from Propellant Anomaly Take calculated risks. Be willing to change course. Keep moving. v Appendix D—Timeline Notes from Propellant Anomaly Acknowledgement I would like to thank the amazing LCROSS project team. It was an honor to work beside you. I would also like to thank my family for their support and patience throughout the LCROSS mission. I am indebted to you and hope I made you proud. vi Appendix D—Timeline Notes from Propellant Anomaly LCROSS NASA-ARC first team picture, 2006. Last row standing (L to R): Rich Aros, Tony Ricco, John McCormick, Dana Lynch, Leonid Osentinsky, Ken Galal, Rusty Hunt, Jim Hanratty, Brian Day, Silvano Colombano, Tom Luzod, Darin Foreman; First row standing (L to R): John Bresina, Paul Tompkins, Kim Ennico-Smith, Arlene Schwartz, Rosatina Chan, Bob Barber, Dave Squires, Steve Ord; First row kneeling (L to R): Leonard Hee, Tony Colaprete, Gil Kojima, Jeff Brown, Mike Schobey, Daniel Andrews, John Marmie, Roger Arno. Someone told me early on, “You ought to take a team picture at the beginning of this project and then take another one at the end, because you’re going to see a lot of changes between now and then.” This person was referring to the fact that we were about to embark on a very challenging adventure, one that would consume some of us (who wouldn’t be able to see it to the end) and age the rest of us. So here is the first NASA-Ames Research Center (NASA-ARC) team picture, taken near the beginning of the project. At the end of this book is the final team picture. vii Appendix D—Timeline Notes from Propellant Anomaly viii Chapter 1—Introduction This story is about an unlikely NASA mission to the Moon. It was unlikely because it was started with far too- little time and too-little money to complete. It was unlikely because it was able to take chances – to accept risk of failure. It was unlikely because it was searching for the unthinkable: water-ice on the moon... The mission of the Lunar CRater Observation and Sensing Satellite (LCROSS) was to investigate the possibility of water ice in craters on the Moon’s poles. This is certainly an interesting scientific topic in itself, Figure 1-1: LCROSS Mission. but I intend to focus on the compelling experience of managing the LCROSS Project in the context of this storied Agency. Perhaps most interesting are the implications this story has for managing any development effort, lunar or not, and working a balance to achieve success. NASA is by design a risk-taking agency within the US Government. It could be argued that NASA’s purpose in the aerospace community is to take on the really big challenges that either the corporate world can’t afford, are not yet profitable endeavors, or are just too risky for private corporations to entertain. However, expectations of the Agency have evolved. A combination of grim human tragedies and some very public cost and schedule overruns have challenged the public’s and Congress’s tolerance for risk- taking within the Agency. NASA, which is supposed to be in the business of taking risks to do bold, difficult things, has become less and less able to do so within its cost framework. Yet effectively replacing prudent risk management with attempts to “risk-eliminate” is completely unaffordable. So where does risk-taking fit within the Agency, or within private/corporate organizations for that matter? Where astronauts play there is clearly concern about risk. When an organization puts humans in harm’s way, it is understandably going to take extra effort to assure nobody gets hurt. Doing so, of course, costs money – a lot of money to pay for labor and hardware which is attempting to assure nothing will go wrong. Sophisticated designs, with doubly- or triply-redundant systems, extensive testing to verify those systems, and numerous engineering test units built to learn and evolve a hardware design, all drive the cost and time required to implement. Human spaceflight is an expensive business because of the exceptional system complexity and levels of assurance required for human space travel. What about missions that do not involve human spaceflight? What about missions whose potential failure will not take a human life, whose costs are small and whose urgency and importance are limited by design? A portfolio consisting of this type of mission can be designed to be risk tolerant, not requiring large expenditures to guarantee against failure. With the money saved, the number of missions that can be executed within the portfolio grows, or the total cost of the portfolio can be reduced. The NASA LCROSS mission is a pathfinder example of a low-cost, quick turn-around mission which struck a balance on mission risk, while accomplishing big objectives, like defining how we understand the Moon. 2 Chapter 1—Introduction Ultimately, LCROSS is a story of a collection of groups brought together in a project context to walk a shared road on a mission to the Moon. Each party had reasons to play. The Agency wanted to demonstrate an effective way to make use of excess launch capability and to work cheaply; NASA-Ames Research Center (ARC) wanted to prove it was able to run small, fast-paced, lightweight missions; Northrop Grumman Corporation (NG) wanted to show that it could execute agile, quick turn-around spacecraft builds on budget and schedule; the commercial instrument sector found an on-ramp to space and lunar applications, Figure 1-2: Image from the classic 1902 film, La which could propel their businesses into a Voyage dans la Lune ("A Trip to the Moon"), by French new market. One of the great successes of magician/filmmaker Georges Melies, representing one LCROSS was aligning each team member’s of the world's first major science-fiction films. needs into a common purpose which upon success benefited everyone involved. 3 Chapter 1—Introduction 4 Chapter 2—In the Beginning... Early in 2006, NASA’s Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD) held a competition1 for NASA Centers to come up with innovative lunar mission ideas to launch with the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO) to the Moon: “ESMD is seeking mission candidates with total costs in the $50M range. Strong consideration will be given to lower cost mission proposals. Missions over $50M will be considered, however, in no case will NASA consider missions with a total cost exceeding $80M.” In addition to the financial constraint, the selected mission would have to be ready to make the LRO launch date in 31 months, could weigh no more than 1000 kg, and (here’s the interesting part) would be designated a “Class D” mission. We’ll discuss the “Class D” part later, but the Agency was in effect issuing a fixed-price mission on the winning team. This provides a sense of where the priorities were to lie for LCROSS: cost and schedule were capped, so those constraints could not be violated. The “Class D” criterion was, in short, a statement of relative risk tolerance for the mission – a pretty high risk tolerance as it turned out.