Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 2006

ISSN 1648–8024

General Jonas Žemaitis Lithuanian Military Academy

Institute of International Relations and Political Science of the University of Vilnius

Strategic Research Center

LITHUANIAN ANNUAL STRATEGIC REVIEW 2006

Vilnius 2007 Editorial Board Raimundas Lopata Jūratė Novagrockienė Gediminas Vitkus

Managing Editor: Gediminas Vitkus Make-up Editor: Amy Elizabeth Jurkauskas

Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 2006, Vilnius: Lithuanian Military Academy, 2007.

The main objective of this publication is to provide the readers with a wide-scale analysis and generalization of the changes, both essential and significant, for the national security of Lithuania at the international–systemic, regional, and national levels. The book also aims to give maximum emphasis to the specificity of Lithuanian national security issues and comprehensively present them to a widely interested and concerned audience.

© Authors of the articles, 2007 © Lithuanian Military Academy, 2007 Content Preface...... 5 Global International System and Lithuania...... 8 Transatlantic Relations and Challenges to US – EU Cooperation Robertas Bružilas, Donatas Vainalavičius...... 11 “Global War on Terrorism”: Rediscovering the Insurgency and Counterinsurgency Theory Tomas Jermalavičius ...... 27 Changing European Security Space...... 45 Financial Perspective 2007-2013: The Last Version of the Old Model Jonas Čičinskas...... 47 Russian-Lithuanian Relations: Between Negative Perception Stereotypes and Pragmatic Cooperation Leonid Karabeshkin...... 65 Lithuania’s Eastern Neighbours...... 85 Electoral Democracy in Russia: Trends and Prospects Virgilijus Pugačiauskas ...... 87 Russia’s Economic System: Corporate State’s Modified Model Dalia Šiukštienė...... 103 Geopolitics and Information Warfare: Russia’s Approach Nerijus Maliukevičius...... 121 Belarus – the Unfulfilled Phenomena: The Prospects of Social Mobilization Jovita Pranevičiūtė ...... 147 National Security Issues in Lithuania...... 175 Lithuania’s Evolving Security and Defence Policy: Problems and Prospects Gražina Miniotaitė ...... 177 Lithuanian Strategic Culture Vaidotas Urbelis...... 193 The Security Studies: The Status Quo and the Trends Kęstutis Paulauskas...... 209 Political Risk in Lithuania and Central Europe – Moderate Risk Analysis Model Giedrius Surplys...... 233 Information Security in Lithuania: The Problem of May 9th and the Crash of the Russian Fighter Diana Jurgelevičiūtė...... 259

Preface

The Strategic Research Centre, established in 2001 under the agreement of the Lithuanian Military Academy and the Institute of International Rela- tions and Political Science of Vilnius University, has compiled and is presenting the fifth edition of the “Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review” devoted to Lithuanian, European and global security policy actualities and problems of 2006. Following the established tradition, the compilers of the publication have divided the presented scientific studies into four parts. The first part, called “Global International System and Lithuania”, comprises two studies related to still urgent contemporary problems – the state of trans-Atlantic relations and the international war on terrorism. Robertas Bružilas and Donatas Vainilavičius have prepared a study exploring modern trans-Atlantic community, which analyzes obstacles precluding the USA and the EU cooperation. The authors make the conclusion that objective impediments to fruitful cooperation between the USA and the EU are non-existent, yet a lack of political will and excessive ambitions of political leaders “derail” the process. Meanwhile, Tomas Jermalavičius has analyzed the phenomenon of the ongoing war against terrorism at the international level and proposes to apply to its analysis the theory of insurgency and counter-insurgency that has already been previously developed, yet in a slightly different context. Having read this article, we will see what advantages the application of the old theory developed for the analysis of internal state conflicts, provides in the new international context. The second part of the review “Changing European Security Space” also covers two texts. The first, dealing with peripeties of the negotiations for strategically important to Lithuania financial EU perspective for 2007 – 2013, was prepared by Jonas Čičinskas. It is obvious that 2006 for Lithuania within the European Union was not particularly successful because of the decision of the European Commission not to grant Lithuania permission to join the Eurozone since the inflation level was 0.07 percentage point higher than the Maastricht criterion. Though the author of the article does not directly analyze this problem, he aptly associates this failure of Lithuania with the same attributes of the EU that were manifested in the negotiations of the EU states for a new financial perspective. Čičinskas points out that negotiations of the European states for the new financial perspective indicated that the EU old-timers are so far neither theoretically nor politically ready to put up with or take into consideration the fact that the Union was joined by a group of countries of qualitatively lower economic development level. The second article presented in this part of the “Review” is a glance from St. Petersburg at the relations of Lithuania and Russia. Leonid Karabeshkin analyzes changes in the quality of Lithuanian and Russian relations after Lithuania became a member of NATO and the EU. The author objectively admits that, in spite of existing close economic and cultural ties between Lithuania and Russia, a large area for political disagreements still remains and mutual trust is in short supply. Yet the author is optimistic in his

standpoint and believes in good future of Europe as well as good relations between Lithuania and Russia. In the third part of the “Review”, the difficult to predict post-Soviet space is placed “under the magnifying glass of the researchers”. As many as four articles refer to this. In the context of the coming Duma and presidential elections, Virgilijus Pugačiauskas analyzes the phenomena of the Russian political system named “the power party” and “the administrative resource”. Dalia Šiukštienė, on the basis of Russia’s example, explores a broader problem of the interference of political power in the economy and predicts that the current intervention of the Russian power in economy plunges the country into the quagmire of monopolization and uncompetitiveness. The study by Nerijus Maliukevičius examines an essentially new phenomenon – informational geopolitics – and enquires into how it is perceived and applied in Russia as well as how under these new conditions the information security policy should be shaped. Finally, the article by Jovita Pranevičiūtė is one more attempt to solve the puzzle of the authoritarianism in Belarus, a neighbour of Lithuania. The author is engrossed in the rhetoric of the Belarussian authorities and the opposition, defines the former as more adequate for the expectations of society and thus provides an original explanation of the current situation. The fourth part of the “Review” deals with urgent aspects, problems and cases of Lithuanian national security. This part starts with a synthesized study by Gražina Miniotaitė and is devoted to the generalized estimation of the entire development of the Lithuanian security and defence policy from 1990 to date as well as to its essential changes that have followed the accession of the country to the EU and NATO. The publication further presents the analysis of the Lithuanian strategic culture by Vaidotas Urbelis who aims at revealing and evaluating its peculiarities as well as presenting recommendations for its improvement. The article by Kęstutis Paulauskas can be considered an urge to more deeply modernize and diversify security studies that are under development in Lithuania and also to overcome the so far dominant traditional geopolitical approach (which, by the way, was widely discussed in the previous editions of the “Review”). He not only profoundly explores the existing diversity of approaches to security studies but also makes a point of proving that modern critical attitudes to security studies open new research possibilities and thus are capable of forming a weighty alternative to the rationalistic approach. In this “Review” we are happy to present not only Paulauskas’ encour- agement to diversify security studies in Lithuania but also rather interesting attempts to implement the aforesaid practically. The articles by Giedrius Surplys and Diana Jurgelevičiūtė can be attributed to such attempts. The first study refers to the methodology of political risk analysis and exploration of the Lithuanian case in conjunction with the implemented proposal to expand the traditional analysis of the political risk and pay more attention to new, “soft” or, according to the author, “reasonable” threats. Another article is a research into two anti-Lithuanian information campaigns launched by Russia in 2005, employing for the study the constructivist model of “securitization” of events.

Carrying out the analysis of the two cases, the author pointed to the essential aspects of the confrontation between Lithuania and Russia from the viewpoint of information security and attempted to answer the question which of the countries won a victory in each of these information confrontations. Thus, we wish our readers to have an interesting read while getting acquainted with the new studies into the actualities of Lithuanian foreign and security policy in 2006. We would also like to remind the reader that both this and the previous volumes of “The Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review” are accessible on the Internet web site of the General Jonas Žemaitis Military Academy of Lithuania.

Editorial board

Global . International . System . and Lithuania

11 Robertas Bružilas* Institute of International Relations and Political Science, University of Vilnius Donatas Vainalavičius* Institute of Political Science and Diplomacy, Vytautas Magnus University

Transatlantic Relations . and Challenges to US – EU . Cooperation

This article analyzes the transatlantic relations and cooperation challenges between the U.S.A. and the EU. The first part of the article covers the conditions for the functioning of transatlantic relations, the main actors and their roles in contemporary world order, and also the international system and the placement of the EU and U.S.A. within it. Other factors which have an essential influence on a successful relationship between these 2 actors are discussed as well. The second part of the article is dedicated for the assessment of factors and presumptions about the U.S.-EU contest and cooperation. The article concludes with remarks highlighting the economical presumptions to developing transatlantic relations and turns the audiences attention to necessities in which to strengthen this political model, by making a review of the political and ideological relationship, evaluating requirements of the world order, image and also aspects for future visions. Changes in the role of international organizations, more clearly expressed EU member states sovereignty and U.S. unilateral politics, remain potential sources of challenges for the US-EU relations.

Introduction

After the terrorist attacks of 11 September against the U.S.A., political scientists turned their attention to transatlantic relations. Transatlantic partners and the international community saw that dangers for international security are far more complex and severe than was previously presumed. So the solidarity of the transatlantic community in the fight against terrorists in Afghanistan, the split of views on intervention in Iraq and the U.S.A. “Coalitions of the Willing”, and politics, lead to a review of transatlantic relations from an academic point of view.

* Robertas Bružilas is a PhD candidate, Institute of International Relations and Political Science, Univer- sity of Vilnius. Address: Vokiečių 10, LT-01130 Vilnius, Lithuania, tel. +370-5-2514130, e-mail: robertas. [email protected] * Donatas Vainalavičius is a PhD candidate, Institute of Political Sciences and Diplomacy, Vytautas Magnus University, Kaunas. Address: Gedimino 44, LT-44240 Kaunas, Lithuania, tel. +370-37-206704, e-mail: [email protected] “Coalitions of the Willing” or “Ad hoc alliances” could be formed by several nations willing to participate in a certain operation. 12

According to Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the Common For- eign and Security Policy, different understandings about the new challenges and dangers can cause a “transatlantic split,” and the dissatisfaction of Europeans about the U.S. war on terrorism can develop into an anti-American European integration model. One can notice that in the context of new dangers, the U.S. position and conceptions towards the states and regions, and also allies and enemies was changing. The tensions in these transatlantic relations (recently becoming more apparent) are explained by the predominance of unilateral and imperial tendencies in the nowadays U.S. foreign policy. In the context of transatlantic relations, disagreement about the war on Iraq has caused the most major crisis in these transatlantic relations, since the end of World War II. According to Andrew Morawcsik, the transatlantic community is in crisis and disagreements cannot be hidden under common member states’ statements and photos. Nowadays the U.S. policy, especially its official discourse, infringe on the fundamental norms of transatlantic communication which was a grounds for establishing a transatlantic security community. This because the U.S., while resolving world problems, appeals to the ”Coalition of the Willing” but not to international institutions. The current situation is influenced by differences in various points of view between the U.S. and Europe towards the international system. According to Robert Kagan, due to unequal power distribution transatlantic partners do not share a common strategic culture, so therefore a new transatlantic deal is required. However there is a wish to believe that the transatlantic community itself is more than political, military, and economical alliance and disagreements do not overwhelm common values and objectives. Europe, together with the U.S., are interrelated through mutual economical interdependence, and different political and economical interests. One of the main factors that determined the weakness of Europe as a transatlantic relations partner was incapacity of the EU to frame a concerted and consistent EU foreign and security policy (CFSP). CFSP was has been more of the purpose so far, then a fact. However in 2003 the EU intergovernmental conference made a big step towards the consolidation of an EU security policy. The heads of the EU member states, along with the candidate states, were in favour of a common vision. “The world according to Europe” was drafted by the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana, it is a clear set of political objectives, priorities and means to achieve it. European Security Strategy constitutes to be the first official EU document dedicated to formulating a common security policy among the member states. The two main actors of contemporary international order are – the U.S.A. and EU. Their place in it, along with other factors that have an essential influence on the successful relationship between these two actors is analyzed in this article. It could be presumed that if both actors will successfully conform

Solana J., “The Transatlantic Rift”, Harvard International Review, 24(4), 2003. Kagan R., Paradise and Power, London: Atlantic Books, 2003 Moravcsik A., “Striking a New Transatlantic Bargain”, Foreign Affairs, 2003, 82(4), p. 74-90 13 to the requirements of today’s world order, there will be a precondition for their further cooperation. This article assesses that the initiative for creating the world order belongs so far to the U.S., but the EU understands the importance of “survival in the game” and thus seeks with the help of all possible means to limit the U.S. influence in the international environment, in order to equalize the opportunities of both actors. The difference between European and US approaches to international security and challenges facing transatlantic relations will be also discussed while assessing two key documents: European Security Strategy – “A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy” (hereinafter – ESS) and the “National Security Strategy of the United States of America” (hereinafter – NSS), issued by G. W. Bush administration in the beginning of March 2006. Taking into consideration the political context, that they were drafted in the shadows of 11 September and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the above mentioned documents are powerful political tools carrying specific messages for both – domestic and international audiences.

1. Modern Transatlantic Relations

Current transatlantic relations can be best illustrated by various international forums binding the partners on both sides of the Atlantic. National interests and defence are carried out through alliances and international coalitions. It is considered that unilateral actions, which negatively influence other actors of international framework, would have a strong influence on the character of the security relations within the system, thus countries quite often hide such actions via concentrating assistance to other countries and using political, economic, and other balanced bilateral actions. Michail Mastanduno stresses that the U.S.A. is in the centre of the current unipolar international system. No one and nothing can equal out to the four-dimensional U.S. power being: “global military capacity, global economic influence, global cultural, and an ideological attractiveness, and the result of it all – global political power.” Such understanding allows the U.S. to undertake the role as the most important actor and shaper in modern global politics. Other countries are either trying to adjoin to the U.S. or to keep their independence. The author, after an in-depth analysis, has determined that it is the unipolar model which best characterizes the current state of international relations.10 It has been noticed that the most successful “transatlantic projects” cover

Council of European Union, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, http://www.whitehouse. gov/nsc/nss.html, 01 09 2006 Riordan S., The New Diplomacy, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003, p. 32 Mastanduno M., “A Realist view: three images of the coming international order” in Paul T.V., Hall A.J., In- ternational Order and the Future of World Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 28. Brzezinski Z., Nebevaldomas pasaulis: Globalinė sumaištis XXI amžiaus išvakarėse, Vilnius: Tvermė, 1998. p. 87. 10 See: Mastanduno, (note 8) p. 28-37 14

aspects regarding the economy and security. Such close economic and military cooperation, which has occurred over the last sixty years between transatlantic partners, did not pass by without tracks. Peter Gowan notes that the foreign political culture of Atlantic powers has the characteristics of realistic authority politics.11 The remaining understanding of the state, as the most central character of international relations, and idea of a balance of powers shows that a (neo)realistic understanding of modern international relations exists. Transatlantic relations in the context of NATO and the EU have even crystallized common core values, an understanding of identity, and the like. During the time of the Cold War Era, a more egocentric and homogeneous system directed towards fighting a common outside enemy, and inner competition as well as economic capacity, has formed the alliance of integral, tied together, and ready to resist sorties of external enemies. Barry Buzan suggests defining this security complex as a subject of geographic proximity with a friendly / adverse relationship structure.12

1.1. To be or not to be for the Complex of Transatlantic Security

The concept of a security complex emphasizes interdependence, which shows as much via the competition as via mutual interests. As an analytical tool, the concept mentioned concentrates attention to a regional analytical level and helps to “exclude autonomic regional security dynamics from local and systemic level dynamics” and, what is most important, “clarifies the reciprocity effect between the big powers and local states.” 13 Buzan recommends analyzing regional security sub-systems through the friendship and hostility structure, when the friendship and hostility of the states is expressed in a certain geographical territory. “The structure of the states’ friendship and hostility”14 is the outcome of this balance of power, and the nature of the relationship between the states varies depending on the changes in the balance of power. In the mean time, the historic dynamics of friendship/hostility is just party related to the balance of power. Hostility can be very much long term, when in the relationship of states it obtains a historic character. For that reason, friendship/ hostility aspects have to be considered as separate elements in the security topic arena.15 Helga Haftendorn16 enriches these studies of regional security by stating

11 Gowan P. The Global Gamble: Washington‘s Faustian Bid for World Dominance, London: Verso, 1999, p. viii-x 12 Buzan B., Žmonės, Valstybės ir Baimė [People, States and Fear] Vilnius: Eugrimas, 1997, p. 243 (in Lithuanian) - “Security complex is a group of states that close share the main interests and their national security cannot realistically be separated from each other.” 13 Ibidem, p. 243-244 14 Ibidem, p.242 15 Ibidem, p. 243 16 Haftendorn H., “Das Sicherheitspuzzle: Die Suche nach einen tragfahigen Konzept Internationalen Sicherheit” in Moltmann B., Schmidt C., eds., Regionalisierung der Sicherheitspolitic, Baden-Baden, 1993, p. 23., quoted in Venckus A., “XX a. Tarptautinės krizės”, Jaunųjų politologų almanachas, 2006, Nr.2, p. 18 (in Lithuanian) 15 that these regions emerge because of social reciprocity, when it is the condition and the outcome of individuals, groups, and social institutional relations in the regional space. Such regional identification is not limited to the definition of geographic regions and thus is more acceptable. Buzan and Ole Weaver in their book “Regions and Powers,”17 which was published in 2003, identify the existence of separate security complexes for North America and Europe. It is stated that the North American security complex is a type of central superpower, which means that the complex is unipolar and conditioned by the interests of superpower security. In the mean time the EU is central institutional type – meaning a region which acts in international relations via the help of institutions.18 The authors propose that in central regions, global security is influenced by one or a few members of the security complex.19 An institutionalized central regional security complex, under the Bjorn Hetthe scale, would take the level of regional community, which is one step higher than regionalism.20 In the institutionalised complex the major role is played by formal organisations and institutions, inducing member cooperation, establishment, and nurturing of common values, as well as the formation of civil society. The analyst noticed that such a region can grow into a regional institutionalised order, which has an independent identity, institutional capacities, and legitimisation. This enables the region to become a functioning subject of international relations.21 Hence, until the U.S. ensured European security the EU states recognised NATO as a sole security guarantee, and also that there was a basis for envisaging the existence a transatlantic central institutionalised security complex. In the transatlantic region characterised by NATO membership, one could have a realistic foundation on which to see a regional security complex, because in the world of power under the arms race and ideological confrontation, major security interests of the NATO states were so closely bound that their national security could not be comprehended individually. Furthermore, the group of transatlantic security relations can be characterised by a relatively inbound character (e.g. Article 5 guarantees in the North Atlantic Treaty) and relative weakness of interaction with their neighbours. Existence of an institutionalised Alliance within a transatlantic security complex would determine a central type of institutional security complex. This means that the global security could be influenced by one or a few members of the transatlantic security complex. Up till now the U.S.A. was the major contributor to the Al- liance, nevertheless, there is a possibility that other members of the Alliance could gain the same footing as well.

17 Barry B., Waever O., Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 18 Ibidem, p. 62 19 Ibidem, p. 55 20Hetthe B., “Communication and Non-communication in a Regional System: the Pathological Cleavage Pattern of South Asia”, SASNET Workshop on Global Networking in South Asian Studies, 2002, http://www. sasnet.lu.se/hettne.pdf, 10 09 2006 21 Ibidem. 16 1.2. The U.S.A. and EU in Contemporary World Order

The U.S.A. was not always such a major player in the international system. Since the doctrine of James Monroe, until the beginning of World War I, the U.S. pursued an isolationist policy and its influence on Europe was a minimal one. After World War I, the U.S. indulged into a resolution of important global questions, because the war gave an opportunity to acquire a stronger global economic position. And after World War II, the U.S. became a global actor, having interests in many parts of the world. During the bipolar system of the Cold War the two blocks had their clear enemies and threats that made them cooperate within and pool, together, their joint resources. The collapse of the bipolar world order influenced a further chain of changes in the international system. After the Cold War, when the U.S. became the only superpower, the priorities of foreign policy had to be revised and adapted to the new system. After the collapse of the bipolar international system and the balance of power of the Cold War, the U.S. as the most powerful super state had a great chance to use the security vacuum that had emerged. Therefore U.S. foreign policy architects decided to implement the “go global” vision and initialise the setting of a new world order22. Chris Brown argues that in 1990, the most powerful state of the world has started to form the new framework of the world order, which had to “put a basis... for the legitimisation of the priorities of the U.S. policy.” 23During the last decade of the 20th Century, the American government elite and businesses tried to develop the U.S. (“go global”) as a power that would control major economic and political events in the Twenty- first Century24. The strategic interest of the U.S.A. is to prevent any other state from dominating in the world or strategically important regions. According to Zbigniew Brzezinski25, while aiming to gain ground in Eurasia the U.S. must understand that Germany and France are the major actors in Europe. Second, Brzezinski noted that a consensus with China, a state that is growing in power, has to be found in the Far East, because it is the only way for it to become a keystone for the U.S.. And third, according to the author, one must understand that in the centre of Eurasia between enlarging Europe and more powerful China there is a “black hole” – Russia still cannot create a post-imperial identity, hence the regions south of Russia threaten to become “Eurasian Balkans.” B. Buzan supposed that the world powers have to consolidate regional powers around them, so that they do not become rival powers. Hence, the U.S.A. has to try to indulge itself into global and regional relations in various fields as much as possible, so it attracts to itself as many satellites as possible.26

22 World Order – some particular rules of the game for states and other international players, by which players attempt to prevent conflicts or other means that could destroy international stability. 23 Brown C., Understanding International Relations, London: Palgrave, 2001, p. 224 24 Gowan, (note 11) p. vii 25 Бжезински З., Великая шахматная доска: [Brzezinski Z., The Grand Chessboard], Москвa: Международные отношения, 1999. p. 231 (in Russian). 26 Buzan, (note 12) p. 199 17

As far back as in the early seventies European and U.S. leaders agreed upon so-called Gymnich formula, according to which European countries undertook an obligation to inform the U.S.A. about their decisions on policies that could have negative impact on the interests of this state. The formula came to life when disagreements between the U.S. and European leaders for the Middle East policy broke out. It should be noted that the U.S. had started to prepare for the world leader status (Pax Americana) in the seventies, starting an American-British Dollar - Wall Street Regime. This international economic regime was aimed to fortify the role of the U.S. national currency in international transactions and take away a possibility for others to fix a stable dollar interest rate, in order to control the process.27 The regime tied up the currency market to Wall Street, which could unilaterally change the rates of the dollar and other major currencies, which reflected the political and economical interests of the U.S. The Richard Nixon administration urged OPEC to raise oil prices and paralyse Japanese and European economies, which were basically dependent on the oil of the Middle East.28 Furthermore, historically the U.S. was interested in the rise of loyal and regionally competitive European powers, and therefore used various measures to limit the growing power of other states. The dollar-Wall Street regime implanted by the Nixon administration “slowly became a common Atlantic (U.S. and EU) project against the rest of the world.”29 This common project was challenged by third world countries: in November 2000 Iraq started selling oil for euros and challenged the dollars’ – Wall Street hegemony. Later, in the year 2003 China changed a part of its reserve into euros. These changes caused a big confusion for the U.S. elite.30 The U.S.A., and it‘s claim for global hegemony, is predicating on the responsibility it took on itself for the preservation and spread of democratic values. According to Jonathan Monten, the U.S. is following a common hegemonic logic – “our values are universal values, the worlds’ matters are our matters, by meeting our interests we are meeting the worlds’ interests.”31According to the way this was formulated using realistic approach, any great power would try to become the only power.32 Moreover, the U.S.A. has a strong belief in its’ oneness and its’ noble mission. In the 19th Century the U.S.A. was acknowledging itself as a country of freedom, equality, and possibilities in contrast with constrained, backward-looking and full of controversy Europe. Contemporary U.S. foreign policy is also a little idealistic. The U.S. NSS is showing a distinct moral dimension in strategic discourse: it emphasizes its support for freedom and democracy and makes strong statements in respect

27 Gowan, (note 11) p. 4 28 Ibidem, p. 21 29 Gowan, (note 11) p. 126 30 Prashad V., “Primacy”, ZNet, October 30, 2005, http://www.zmag.org/sustainers/content/2005-10/30prashad. cfm, 20 10 2006 31 Monten J. “The roots of Bush doctrine”, International security, Vol. 29, Issue. 4, 2005. 32 in. Mastanduno, (note 8) p. 28-37 18

of “others”. The president of the U.S.A., President Bush, in his speeches is also using idealistic and high-sounding rhetoric. Critics across Europe doubt his “sacred mission” in Iraq where the regime was being changed through the use of a military campaign. It‘s rather a pandering of the U.S. security and influence expansion interests in a geopolitically important region. If Clinton’s administration was well known for its not signing of international agreements, Bush and his neo-conservatives are well known for unilateralism without precedent. There is an obvious swing in U.S. foreign policy from selective multilateralism to aggressive unilateralism –Clinton‘s administration acknowledged the principle: “together when it is possible – alone when we have to” verses Bush’s which is “together when we have to, alone when it is possible.” Overall, superpowers think that the principle of multilateralism is constraining their freedom. U.S. foreign policies, led by the Bush administration are some kind of mix of idealism and realism – Americans believe in some sort of speciality of their ideas and want to spread them through the use of their power and military advantage not taking into consideration the opinions of other countries. According to Samuel Huntington, relying only on itself and behaving in such a way like the world is unipolar, the U.S.A. might be left alone as a “lonely super-power.”33 The U.S.’s and Europe’s views on using their power, and on the effectiveness and acceptiveness of the power, are getting more and more diverse. Moreover the U.S.A.’s claim to global hegemony is tearing transatlantic partners apart. Tod Lindberg is stressing, that till 11 September 2001, the relationship between the U.S.A. and Europe was not safeguarded. After the attack of Al- Qaeda, the routine was replaced by friendliness. In the face of crisis the U.S.A. and Europe once again consolidated their positions, but the sense of solidarity wasn’t felt for too long. After the events of 11 September, a new U.S.A. dominant world power started emerging34. The rhetoric of the U.S.A. administration was clear – “either with us or against us.”35

2. Concentric Forces in Transatlantic Relations

The terrorist attacks of 11 September had a huge impact not only on the foreign policy of the U.S.A., but also on the international system. It strengthened the commitment of the U.S.A. to dominate in the world, and war against terrorism led by the Bush administration was announced as the main priority of their foreign policy36. For a few decades now terrorism has been identified as a threat to a country’s safety but after the incidents of 9/11, the initiative of

33 Huntington S. “The Lonely Superpower”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 78, no.2, 1999. 34 Lindberg T., “Introduction: the limits of transatlantic solidarity” in Lindberg T., ed., Beyond Paradise and Power, New York, London: Routledge, 2005, p. 4 35 Ibidem, p.4-5 36 Hirsh M., “Bush and the World”, Foreign Affairs, 2002, September/October, p. 36 19 the U.S.A. gained a new dimension and may be interpreted not as an attack against one country but as an attack against Western political structure and its virtues. Taken into consideration its past experiences, the U.S. not only initiated but also took an active part in the political campaign in Afghanistan. In the year 2002, in his yearly report, U.S. President Bush called Iraq, Iran, and North Korea the “axis of evil” countries and promised to take all of the actions needed for combating such evil.37 The ex-parte of the U.S.A. had an impact on NATO, which was a transatlantic relations institution during the Cold War. The phrase of Donald Rumsfeld became the slogan of Americans in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars: “mission determines coalition, not the coalition mission.” Many countries wanted to start a coalition with the U.S.A.. The unilateralism of the U.S. has had a negative impact on foreign policy of countries which do not belong to the transatlantic community. It is possible, that such countries as China, Pakistan, and or Russia will start copying the preventive actions of the U.S. and start their intervention into other countries (as if they have a precedent excuse).

2.1. The U.S.A. and EU on the Way to a Bipolar World

The split of opinions in the transatlantic security complex appeared relatively early. Probably France should be named as to be first bellman in search of a Euro- pean identity as the country withdrew from the NATO military segment. Several states, constituting the nucleus of the European Community became more active individually within the European part of transatlantic security complex. The threat of direct and ideological confrontations with the states of Warsaw pact withered in Europe after the end of the Cold War. The threat forced states to hold the egocentric approach orientated for inside the transatlantic security complex. Thus, it is possible to argue that after the decrease of outside threats to the transatlantic security complex, the growing political and economical power of European States, and due to that strengthening the concurrency between the U.S. and states of European Community, the links among those nations started to lose their strength. In the shadow of the invasion to Iraq, it was possible to identify two security complexes and even more so we could identify the day when European and North American security complexes were separated. This day is in March 2003, the official beginning of Iraq war. The Western world has split into two camps: the U.S.A., the UK, Spain and “New Europe” are on one side, which missed their chance to remain silent according the president of France, and France together with Germany, opposing the war are on the other side. The majority of “old European” states have opposed the U.S. intervention in Iraq, not because they had some objections concerning the overturn of the political regime, but due to the fact that not all diplomatic means and capabilities were used to. Those countries also opposed the U.S. intervention to Iraq without

37 State of the Union Address, http://www.whitehouse.gov/, 12 10 2006 20

the resolution of the UN Security Council. It is most likely that the accusations on unilateral actions would not have been so loudly expressed if France and Germany would have supported the intervention. According to Kagan, that which some critics call the U.S. unilateralism in Iraq, is just the wish of the Bush administration to act without the support which was provided by traditional European allies.38 From a power perspective, the contemporary international system is so diverse because the power is distributed among several strong and many weak members39. The presumption might be drawn that the days when the U.S. is dominating within the contemporary world order are over. Some scholars argue that other states are attempting to counterbalance the U.S.A.’s influence in the world. One of the aims of the EU is to develop a competent economy, create a political counterbalance (or the centre of political influence) and by adapting the common currency counterbalance the dollar’s influence on international trade. This was also noticed by Jack Donnely, who argued that in the light of rising hegemony, other states will be forced to balance because capabilities concentrated in one hands creates the threat of imperial dominance.40 The strategic provision, that the U.S. must not only consolidate the military and economical power gathered during the Cold War, but also must guarantee that all its competitors at all sectors would be demolished.41 According to Huntington, such position is a key one for the security and liberty of the U.S..42 Condoleezza Rice, at that time a representative of the U.S. administration, was visiting the Institute of International Strategic Studies in London in July 2003. At that time, Rice has told that multipolarity is the theory of competing powers and values, and that the .A has already used it before, but that led to the Second World War.43 By the way, the provision that unipolarity is the best position from all available in anarchy due to the fact that it provides the best conditions to develop national interests, is illustrated by public discourse of one of the U.S. strategic oversights fixed in Pentagon political planning guidelines in 1992 – “now our strategy must refocus on the prevention of the emerging of any other global rival in the future.”44 Kagan points out that the U.S. withholds the unilateral approach due to enough power to act independently in international relation, and Europe has tied itself by agreements and the rule of law and multilateralism because it is weak and a little bit wishful thinking. Europe has no ambitions to become a world superpower and no wish to return to times of power balance, and ac-

38 Kagan R., “America’s Crisis of Legitimacy”, Foreign Affairs, 2004, March/April, p. 65-88. 39 Buzan, (note 12) p. 203 40 Donnelly J., “Beyond Realism and its Critics: The Decline of Structural Neo-Realism and Opportunities for Constructive Engagement” in Lawson S., ed., The New Agenda for International Relations, JK: Polity Press, 2002, p. 190 41 Prashad, (note 31). 42 Ibidem. 43 Rice C. Speech given at Institute of International Studies in London in 2003., http://www.iiss.org/conferences/recent-key-addresses/condoleezza-rice-address, 02 12 2006 44 Tyler E. P., “U.S. Strategy Plan Calls For Insuring No Rivals Develop”, The New York Times,. 8 March 1992., p. A1 21 cording to Kagan, restrict itself to declarations, agreements, treaties, and some contribution to peace keeping after that when the U.S. has already used their military power.45 There are open concerns about the effectiveness of the use of force in solving problems of international security concern. One of the common aspects of critics is the effectiveness of military power as a long-term stability guarantee and reconstruction element. Marta Dassu, a year after the Iraq war has started, considered the price of war: “Hussein is overturned, that is undoubtedly well. But nevertheless, rogue state overturning to lose is equal to losing”. Europeans are not supporting democratisation “by force” and considers that human convictions and settled norms are changing gradually, and also that an institutional system can not be imputed from aside. One of the EU foreign and security policy makers Robert Cooper has noticed that it is not true that in general Europe has no wish to use force. The UK and France forces (as quick reaction forces) were used in Bosnia, and Ger- man troops actively perform in Kosovo and Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the author agrees that European capabilities in foreign missions are very limited. In that sense, it is the most likely that the U.S. could independently conduct a war, in Balkans and Afghanistan, but it needs the support from other states to keep peace and in that way legitimise its actions46. The author stresses that behind the peaceful development of Europe, in second part of XX Century, were standing the NATO and U.S. military power. Today it seems that nobody would attempt to attack Europe, but it would be useful to know how the EU would act in the face of such a troubling threat. While the U.S. guarantees the security of the European states, according to Cooper, asymmetry in European and the U.S. attitudes towards a common defence would exist.47 Ivo H. Daalder after assessing the contradictions between the U.S.A. and Europe concerning war issues in Iraq, argues that the “changing structure of relations between the U.S.A. and Europe means, that those relations need a new basement, otherwise they can end up in restraints or even divorce”48. Strategic European priorities haven’t changed dramatically because the main European foreign policy focus is given for elimination of possibility to return back to inter- conflicts. Daalder argues that “the EU expansion has a possibility to become a more and more united actor of international relations in foreign and security policy – the one which it is already in economics.” The author noticed that the costs of the EU expansion are huge and most probably, Europe will remain concentrated on its biggest project at least for decade, while U.S. has turned aside from the Europe, Europe has just even more focused to itself.49 This divergent attitude by the U.S.A. and Europe leads to other pre-

45 Kagan R., Paradise and Power, London: Atlantic Books, 2003. 46 Cooper R., The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century, London: Atlantic Books, 2004, p. 156 47 Ibidem, p. 166 48 Daalder I.H., “The End of Atlanticism”, in Lindberg T., ed., Beyond Paradise and Power, New York, London: Routledge, 2005, p. 40 49 Ibidem, p. 43 22

sumptions – a hegemonic power can have a tendency to value international organisations, regimes, and treaties sceptically. Europe, in contrast from the U.S., conducts such a global foreign policy which is based on international cooperation and used as a tool to act in face of various challenges and possibilities provided by globalisation. The EU considers that multilateralism and cooperation could the best correspond to the challenges of the global world, because changing political agendas and the rise of nongovernmental actors means that even the most powerful states lose a capacity to control everything that goes in the world.50 It is possible to agree that Europe has a lack of military power and reliable forces that is not a secret that the decision on Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan are taken in Washington. But one must keep in mind the current international system, European security starts far more than at the external EU borders. According to Cooper, the EU does not conduct even the half of foreign policy related with war issues, but just little one related with peace, because it performs active development assistance politics and represents soft power.51 The EU, and states of its nucleus, attempt to counterbalance the EU to the U.S.A.. As it was noticed before, the U.S.A., in order to occupy and hold the dominant position must involve itself in all parts of the world in order to prevent the appearance of a strong independent and disloyal to U.S. ideology, rival state. Thus if the EU intends to compete with the USA, it must attempt to get other regional powers to gravitate to its side. While possessing no military resources to counterbalance the U.S., the capabilities of the EU are related to attempts of their own goals by other means. The EU is not indifferent to the “go global” principle, as it shows ambitions to extend cooperation with China, participate in conflict resolution in Africa and South Caucasus, regulate crisis in Balkans, and withhold values in confrontation with Belarus authoritarian regime. In case of success, the balance of power could be achieved and then the U.S. Hobesian understanding would balance with the EU’s Kantian understanding of the world. Due to their inconsistency, contemporary transatlantic disagreements appear and that brings a lot of challenges to U.S. and EU cooperation. Americans’ explain the U.S. refrain from participation in an international regime by national interests and the goal to secure its sovereignty, which they perceive as key and unquestionable. The U.S.A. constitution establishes the principle of national law which is higher than any international one. Despite frequent critics on the U.S. due to ignorance of international law, the majority of disagreements between the U.S.A. and EU have appeared earlier that 9/11, or the beginning of the performance of the Bush administration. During the Clinton administration period, Europeans were expressing their dissatisfaction of U.S. power and arrogance, but dissatisfaction reached its peak in 2001 when Bush had taken post in the U.S. Neoconservatives tended to behave in a way that the world was unilateral. It is possible to draw a conclusion that the

50 Ibidem, p 46 51 Cooper, (note 50) p.156 - 165 23 framework of events of 9/11 gave the U.S.A. the chance to direct their foreign policy towards unilateralism. The fight against international terrorism was based on huge power projection abroad and the enforcement of military capacities. The war against terrorism, and fight for democratic values, points out a new phase of U.S. global expansion. Within this context it is possible to come back to the U.S. intervention in Iraq. It was not the last war for democracy establishment, and even not even the war for the future of Middle East – in reality it was a fight for U.S.A. role fortification in the international system. It is possible to state that the U.S. administration hasn’t properly studied the lessons learned from Afghanistan, and unilaterally decided to go for another risky and not well prepared step – a military campaign in Iraq. This campaign, as it is known, became a huge challenge for not only the U.S., but for their other allies participating in the coalition.

2.2. Perspectives of Cooperation

The ESS appearance was influenced by a natural attempt by Europe to gain more influence in the international system, thus documents containing insights on how Europe could contribute to fight against threats, become more active, stronger and persistent global player appeared. By the way, the first sentence of the ESS states that Europe has never been so prosperous, secure, and free. It is also mentioned that the violence that lasted in Europe in first part of the 20 Century led the way for a place for peace and stability. The EU is the global player of twenty five constituting nations, containing more than four hundred fifty million inhabitants, producing one fourth world’s GDP, bearing a whole complex of measures and prepared to share the responsibility for global security and creation of a better world. The ESS states and discusses the aspects of EU and U.S. relations, stressing that by acting together it is possible to become a powerful force. And even more, Europe was named as the only one reliable global partner for the U.S. and vice versa. It is stated that Europe so far is confronted with threats and challenges to security. New security challenges are less visible and hard to predict: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state collapse and organised crime. Due to majority of conflicts appearing in other regions, Europe must locate its frontal defence line far beyond its borders. The ESS stresses close cooperation with partners and most importantly – a continued irreversible transatlantic partnership. The necessity to take decisive preventive actions is established in the ESS. Thus, one of the tightest links to the NSS can be found, as NSS foresees the preventive strike and pre-emptive actions. U.S. administration announced an updated version of the NSS in March 2006, which focused on the fight against terrorism. By the way, the U.S. global strategy perceives Europe as a priority for U.S. strategically important regions. The NSS points out that “there are few long-term works, which could be done by 24

the U.S. alone, without their Allies in Canada and Europe. And two of the most important international organisations: NATO and EU are located in Europe.”52 Europe is perceived as a democracy establishment guarantee and the main U.S. ally in the military, economical, and cultural sphere. But the status as an ally does not mean that Europe will be allowed to become strong and possibly create a challenge to U.S. domination. It is possible to state that, according to the opinion of the NSS authors, only a strong, secure, and democratic Europe could guarantee the U.S. domination and interests in the world. With most of close cooperation trends between Europe and U.S., universal western values mean that the U.S. is just “a little bit like another Europe.” Thus EU and U.S. cooperation within various fields is unavoidable and of course understandable. But nobody can guarantee that interests of the U.S.A. and Europe will always fall together. This is the reason why Cooper suggests thinking about a united strategy instead of creating a separate ESS.53 The base for EU-US cooperation remains not only due to common national security interests, but due to tight links based on democracy, human rights, and a liberal market established within various institutionalised and informal forms for national states and in daily processes of internal policy making. By the way, the NATO Riga Summit declaration54 envisages that NATO and the EU share common values and strategic interests. Organizations paid attention to successful cooperation in the West Balkans, including that through the Berlin Plus arrangements, which contribute to peace and security. Also, it is pointed out that in order to strive for improvements in the NATO-EU strategic partnership, to achieve closer cooperation and greater efficiency, and avoid unnecessary duplication, it is necessary for a spirit of transparency and respecting the autonomy of the two organisations. The declaration states that a stronger EU will further contribute to common security. Within possible context of intensified cooperation between the U.S. and the EU it is possible to agree with C. Fred Bergsten and Caio Koch-Weser, insights that just only by performing together can the EU and the U.S. be able to protect themselves from the erosion of transatlantic relations, refrain U.S. from unilateral foreign policy decisions, and EU – from orientation to inside. By the way those authors paid attention to the fact just only by performing together, can those actors safeguard leadership in the world’s political, social and economical life - to reach a more efficient bilateral relations (indicating the strategies of the both players) and more efficient economical order of the world.55 Precisely economical interests could become a good catalyst for bilateral transatlantic relations because the U.S. and the EU are the main inter-trade partners.56 They present more then half of the GDP of the world, as well as the fact that they are very comparable in direct investments and the labour force.

52 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (note 6), p.25 53 Cooper, (note 50), p. 165 54 NATO Summit, Riga Declaration, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm, 01 12 2006. 55 Bergsten C.F., Koch-Weser C., “The Transatlantic Strategy Group on Economics, Finance and Trade” see.: Weidenfeld W., Koch-Weser C., Bergsten C.F., Stutzle W., Hamre J., eds., From Aliance to Coalitions – The Future of Transatlantic Relations, Gutersloh: Bertelsman Foundation Publishers, 2004, p.238-240 56 According to EUROSTAT data, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/QueenPortletized/, 15 11 2006 25

Moreover, the inter-trade between the U.S.A. and EU presents more then 1/5 of the total world trade. Among other international players the size of trade is just one third of EU-US trade level. However, it is important to notice that only 2% of the trade disputes directly could be related to the inter-trade. Therefore, intensive trade, investments and less restriction are very useful mutually. According to the G-8 logic there are some suggestions to form informal G-2 regime57 on an economical basis, which cover two main politically and economically strongest international relations players today.

Concluding Remarks

Contemporary international relations are marked by new battles for political, economic, and ideological influence. The U.S. and EU remain among the most powerful economies in the world. Therefore, the constantly increasing economical potential of China may misbalance the U.S. and EU markets of international trade and investments. If the attractiveness of the U.S. and EU markets fell, and it could happen, and if the inter-trade barriers grew, then the inter-competition would increase in the growing markets. It is very important to underline that from those relations between Brus- sels (in essence Berlin – Paris axis) and the main associate of the Cold War in the other side of the Atlantic Ocean rise a lot of questions. When analysing the changes nowadays in the international system, it is possible to identify the features confirming certain ambitions of particular EU countries to force the EU to become a super-power and be able to compete with the USA globally. In the meantime, the U.S. is striving to expand, or at least to keep, its’ domination and influence in Europe in different ways. The U.S. will try to block the EU’s opportunity to grow as independent power centre. However, the EU will not be able to become a global power centre and an independent international player until its security depends on the U.S., or is strongly influenced by regional powers. The changes in the world order – intensify or weakening of the international organizations - proportionally will correct relations between the USA and EU. It looks like in order to achieve the U.S. and EU common position of world order, it will be complicated in as much as the EU expresses its own sovereignty. Remarkably, there are still possibilities to form the united security complex because of US-EU common values. Transatlantic relations could be positively influenced by divided areas of action and encouraging cooperation between NATO and the EU. It is possible that in this field a very important role belongs to the states

57 Bergsten, (note 59) p. 237-249 26

government’s and even to some particular political leaders. Therefore, if the French political elite would change partly, and democrats come to the government in the U.S., it could be more seriously researched the possibility for transatlantic connections. It is necessary to strengthen the attractiveness of the political model for saving the advantages of the G-2. This could be done by using already existing multilateral forums and reducing visibility of individual states in the international arena. A common reciprocity validates G-2 participation in the international relations and would lead to the desirable institutionalised order of the world. The compromises of the G-2 realized within a framework of valid international agreements, would lead not only to rehabilitation of the transatlantic relations but also to win-win relations of USA and EU cooperation in the international arena.

Vilnius – Brussels, September - November, 2006 27 Tomas Jermalavičius∗ Baltic Defence College

“Global War on Terrorism”: . Rediscovering the Insurgency . and Counterinsurgency Theory

The “Global war on terrorism” has become a widely used expression in the lexi- con of Western policymakers, analysts and academics. It causes many controversies and interpretations which are not always helpful in comprehending the essence and logic of this ongoing conflict. First of all, it is necessary to admit that it is indeed a war, where protagonists use violence for political purposes. Having in mind that one of the belligerents is a non-state actor, the most productive way to understand this struggle is to apply a well-established and developed theory of insurgency and counterinsurgency, which until now was mainly used to explain an intra-state armed conflict. The strategic logic of a “global war on terrorism” follows closely the principles of this theory. However, they have to be seen in the context unusual for the insurgency and counterinsurgency theory. Its application at the level of the international system is fraught with challenges and difficulties stemming from the conflict’s global and trans-national dimensions.

Introduction

In the spring of 1999, the author of this article attended the Wilton Park conference in the United Kingdom. As was usual at that time, the main theme of the event was transatlantic relations and their prospects. All participants – security policy experts, academics, diplomats, and military officers – almost unanimously agreed that after the end of the Cold War and with the overwhelming common threat gone, the transatlantic Alliance got into a certain strategic vacuum. Neither the Balkan wars, nor expansion of democratic space eastwards, managed to fill it in. However, a thought by one history professor drew the attention of at least some of the audience. As all historians are, apt to see the broader chronological perspective, he postulated a far-sighted, even prescient, idea. According to him, accepting that history is cyclical in its nature, we had to think of our times not as a post-war period but rather as of another inter-war period. It should be viewed as a period between the Cold War and some other war of a global scale, the causes, reasons, parties, and characteristics of which we still do not anticipate.

∗ Tomas Jermalavičius is Dean of the Baltic Defence College. Address: Riia 12, 51013 Tartu, Estonia. Tel. +372 717 6039. E-mail: [email protected] 28

Two years later, this thought came true. On September 11th, 2001, the strategic landscape of the world was altered instantly. The radical Islamic group, Al-Qaeda, challenged the global hegemon, the United States of America, by striking targets in New York City and Washington D.C., symbolizing the hegemon’s economic and military power. The shock and impact of that day on the U.S. foreign policy and strategy are often compared to those caused by the Pearl Harbour attacks of 1941. The difference is that the terrorist attacks struck at the heartland of the United States, and was broadcasted live across the entire world through the television and internet channels. It also caused the deaths of almost three thousand people, mostly civilians and billions of dollars of damage. However, the most unprecedented aspect of the challenge was that it stemmed not from another state, but from a non-state actor. The scale and ambition of the U.S. response are equally formidable. President George W. Bush declared a war which came to be known as the “global war on terrorism”: the enemy was identified, the allies were mobilised, hesitant parties were warned, ideological parameters were established, police, and surveillance functions of the state were strengthened, the defence budget was substantially increased and military action was launched. In the context of this conflict, the last decade of the 20th Century indeed looks like an inter-war period. True, peace during that period was as elusive in most of the regions of the world as at any other time, even to Western powers which practiced the so-called “humanitarian intervention” doctrine and were sending their troops to various hotspots. However, at least it was hoped that the conflict of a global scale, such as the two world wars and the Cold War, became remote and with less theoretical possibility. Even if forecasts and speculations were made, they focused on China as a rising power. But Osama bin Laden, Al-Qaeda’s leader, proved that it is sufficient to mix a dose of religious extremism and zeal, good planning, imagination, a few hundred thousand dollars with the right political, social and strategic context in order to provoke a new global conflict. Almost everyone is in agreement that, this new conflict is different from the previous ones, just as the Cold War was different from the two world wars. Discussions regarding its nature still continue. Some experts reckon it is not a war at all and therefore military power has no role to play in it. Others reject its level of ambition, that it is a so called war on “terrorism,” claiming that it is the same kind of rhetoric as the “war on drugs.” Still others study all available sources on combating terrorism in their pursuit to provide a basis for an effective strategy, but more or less ignoring political and ideological dimensions of the conflict. However, there is an interesting strand of literature which examines the “global war on terrorism” through the lenses of the insurgency and counterinsurgency theory. Until recently, this theory has been employed to analyse armed conflict within states. In the case of a “global war on terrorism,” its application is raised to a higher level of analysis, that of the international system. In a way, it is a logical extension of the thesis which became popular during the 1990s, that the influence of non-state actors is growing in international relations and that the probability of a major inter-state war is low. At some stage, with those non-state actors acquiring access to a wider range of 29 sources of power, the conflict with the main agents of the current world order, states, became inevitable. The challenge came in the shape of the Al Qaeda organisation and was directed against the hegemon, whose political, economic, military, and cultural power maintains that world order. It is only natural that a theory explaining armed conflict between the upholder of political system, the government, and non-governmental groups, becomes attractive at the level of the international system. The purpose of this article is to employ the main elements of the insurgency and counterinsurgency theory in order to highlight the logic and, as Clausewitz would put it, the “grammar” of the “global war on terrorism.” The main question is how this theory can help with the interpretation of contemporary conflicts in the international system and anticipation of their probable outcomes. The article does not aspire to go into any depth to characterize the international system or examine actions of various actors and events. Its attention will be focused entirely on adequacy of the insurgency and counterinsurgency theory in the context of the “global war on terrorism.” A more strategic level narrative is chosen without going into details of operational and tactical levels. The article draws broad parallels between intra-state insurgency and counterinsurgency and the “global war on terrorism.” Its first chapter provides a rather comprehensive overview of the literature on insurgency and counterinsurgency and the main tenets of the theory. The second part is devoted to analysing the “global war on terrorism” as global insurgency and counterinsurgency.

1. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency Theory

The insurgency and counterinsurgency theory is not a theory in a strict meaning of this term. It can be better described as one of the fields of war studies, exploring a specific type of armed conflict, that which is between a government and armed rebels. Precursors to the systematic discussion on insurgency and counterinsurgency in Western strategic thought can be found not only in a treatise of Carl von Clausewitz, but also in a book by another representative of classic strategic though, Antoine Henri de Jomini, entitled “The Art of War, “ where he commented upon the Spanish resistance to the Napoleonic occupation. More dedicated studies appeared at the start of the 20th Century. The best know author from this period is Thomas Edward Lawrence, or Lawrence of Arabia, a British officer who described his observations from the Arab rebellion against the colonists in 1916-1918 in his book the “Seven Pillars of Wisdom” and in its abbreviated version “Revolt in the Desert.” Another contributor to the creation of insurgency and counterinsurgency theory was yet another British officer, C. E. Calwell, who drew upon his rich experience of colonial wars and suppression of insurrections in South Africa and India from which to write a classical book, “Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice.” In the course of the 20th Century, the amount of literature on insurgencies and counterinsurgencies grew, along with the increasing “popularity” of this 30

type of conflict, starting with the rebellions against the colonial powers and ending with violent ideological conflicts between communist and anti-communist movements. Mao and Che Guevara are perhaps best known theorists and practitioners from this period, although there were host of other authors, from Irishman Michael Collins and Vietnamese Vo Nguyen Giap to Brazilian Carlos Marighella. Contemporary modifications of insurgency and counterinsurgency theory are reflected in the concepts of 4th Generation Warfare (4GW) and netwar by such authors as Thomas X. Hammes and John Arquilla respectively.

1.1. Terminology Problem: Is Insurgency a War?

While reading the literature of the above authors, one’s eye captures a great variety of terms used in this field. But all of them essentially refer to the same phenomenon of insurgency and counterinsurgency, just at different levels or placing an emphasis on its different dimensions and characteristics: guerrilla warfare where emphasis lies on tactics; armed resistance (focus is on the violent element); asymmetric warfare (asymmetries in power and methods of the opposing sides are highlighted); “small wars”; and revolutionary wars (etc.). There is a universal agreement about one thing: insurgency and counterinsurgency is war. It may seem an obvious observation. However, states and societies often refuse treating this conflict as a war until it is too late. The same problem arises in the “global war with terrorism” discourse, where many analysts question the use of the term “war.” For instance, James Carroll asserts that, “The war on terrorism is not a war because though we have an enemy, the muscle-bound Pentagon offers no authentic means of assault.” By the same token, it is claimed that the response to the Al Qaeda’s challenge is more a function of police and intelligence services rather than the armed forces. As we shall see later in the discussion this conclusion is entirely correct, but not because insurgency and counterinsurgency are not war. The classical definition of war, even a test of some sort, is the concept of war proposed by Clausewitz. According to him, “war is… an act of force to compel the enemy to do our will”. At the same time war is “a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means.” The essence of insurgency and counterinsurgency also is the use of force and violence for political purposes and seeking to compel the opponents to do ones will. As

See Lind W. S., ““The Changing Face of War: into the Fourth Generation”, Marine Coprs Gazette, 1989, October, pp. 22-26, and Arquilla J. et al, “Networks, Netwar, and Information-Age Terrorism”, in Howard R. D. & Sawyer R. S. (eds.), Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment, Guilford: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2002, pp. 86-108. Carroll J., “Is America actually at war?”, International Herald Tribune, 30 January 2006. See Record J., Bounding the Global War on Terrorism, Carlyle: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2003, p. 2-6. Clausewitz C., On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 75. Ibid, p. 605. 31

Steven Metz and Raymond Millen wrote, “Insurgency is a strategy adopted by groups which cannot attain their political objectives through conventional means or by a quick seizure of power. It is used by those too weak to do otherwise. Insurgency is characterized by protracted, asymmetric violence, ambiguity, the use of complex terrain (jungles, mountains, and urban areas), psychological warfare, and political mobilization all designed to protect the insurgents and eventually alter the balance of power in their favour.” It is obvious that insurgents are motivated by a political agenda, therefore the “Crime and Punishment” discourse which is often employed in the context of terrorism (or, in essence, insurgency and counterinsurgency) is problematic, often inadequate and leads nowhere in strategic sense.

1.2. Definition and Types of Insurgency

At this point, it is necessary to characterise insurgency and counterinsurgency in greater detail by discussing the essence of this type of conflict, its nature, and certain features of its evolution, but also bearing in mind that generalisations are risky in war studies. In the most general terms, insurgency can be defined as a legitimacy crisis, whereby one or several aspects of a state are challenged - ranging from legitimacy of a state itself, to the legitimacy of its political and social order, a particular government or its certain policies. Depending on the nature of crisis and aims of the insurgency, non-governmental groups which emerge and resort to violence are classified by Bard O’Neill into several types: • Anarchistic, which reject any governance and government; • Egalitarian, which use radical methods to overthrow the existing social order within some particular political community; • Traditionalist, seeking to restore political order of the past, based on traditional values. Herein fall reactionary-traditionalist groups pursuing restoration of ancient political system, idealised as "golden age"; • Apocalyptic-utopian, mostly religious cults; • Pluralist, which aspire to a political system based on democratic values; • Reformist, which seek to change governmental policies; • Preservationist, which are determined to prevent political and social change; • Commercial, which simply pursue self-enrichment through usurpation of political power.

Metz S., Millen R., Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response, Carlyle: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2004, p.2. See O‘Neill B., Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse, Washington: Potomac Books, 2005, p. 15. Ibid, pp. 19-29. 32 1.3. Strategic Objectives and Logic of Insurgency: The Importance of Audiences

Whatever the roots of insurgency, its strategic objective is to shape the public’s perception of the legitimacy aspect which comes under challenge. Violence is employed as a means of persuasion which helps to discredit the state, political order, government or its policy, attract and mobilizing supporters, intimidate opponents of insurgency and isolate them from the government. Metz and Millen call this “armed propaganda” which also assists political mobilisation. It facilitates the establishment of “brand awareness” and promotes the political agenda of the insurgent group within the general public. Speaking in strategic terms, such an approach is similar to a concept explaining how the armed forces are used in international relations. Called “armed suasion,” this concept was elaborated by Thomas Schell- ing in his book of 1967, Arms and Influence. Its essence is that the demonstration of military power, its use or the threat of use, are employed to shape the perception of opponents as well as allies about the situation and influence their ensuing decisions about further courses of action. This is a strategic logic and mechanism underpinning insurgencies too. David Galula, a French author and former officer who fought Algerian insurgents, argues that the watching audience is key to each insurgency as its opinion and support determines the final outcome.10 According to him, each audience can be divided into a minority of active supporters of insurgents, which the insurgents need to expand since it serves as a vital source of intelligence, logistics, and sanctuary (etc.). This minority of active supporters of the government needs to be intimidated or destroyed and it needs to be a passive majority.11 It is this passive majority from which the perceptions and opinion of which constitute the main battleground of insurgents and counterinsurgents. Already a commonplace phrase, the “battle for the hearts and minds,” which became very popular after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, is related exactly to this characteristic of insurgency and counterinsurgency. As Manwaring comments, “its chief aspect is the use of words, images, and ideas.”12

1.4. Challenges to the Counterinsurgent

The success of insurgency is contingent upon many factors such as geographical conditions, organisation, experience, resources, and the will of the active minority of supporters, external assistance, and availability of safe sanctuaries (etc.). Listing and analysing all of them would require a separate article. Therefore it is necessary limiting the discussion to two crucial aspects. The first is the appeal of insurgent aims to the broader public, this being if they

See Metz S., Millen R. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualising Threat and Response, Carlyle: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2004, p. 4. 10 See Galula D., Counter-Insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, London: Pall Mall Press, 1964, p. 8. 11 Ibid, pp. 75-76. 12 Manwaring M. G., Shadows of Things Past and Images of the Future: Lessons for the Insurgencies in Our Midst, Carlyle: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2004, p. 2. 33 are articulated in a way which strongly resonates with the existing problems and popular grievances in relation to state, political order or government, then the insurgency stands much greater chances of eventually succeeding. According to Galula, “The best cause for the insurgent’s purpose is one that, by definition, can attract the largest number of supporters and repel the minimum of opponents.”13 Exactly for this reason the main target of counterinsurgents usually is the insurgents’ cause which either needs to be discredited or simply “stolen” by demonstrating that the problems and grievances feeding insurgency are being seriously addressed and effectively dealt with by the government. The second aspect is the competence and experience of the counterinsurgent itself in suppressing insurgencies this being: the political will and determination of its leadership and the external moral, political, financial and military support and assistance.14 Every war, following Clausewitz’s words, is a duel.15 Actions of one side evoke the responses and reactions of the other side. The actions and image of the counterinsurgent, in the eyes of a general public, often determine the outcome of the conflict. Therefore insurgents, by employing violence, seek to demonstrate the counterinsurgent’s weakness, incompetence and isolation, and most importantly provoke the government’s inadequate and disproportionate response. Such a response leads to negative public opinion and increases the number of members of society supporting the insurgency.16 The counterinsurgent’s situation often is unenviable. First of all, signs of the insurgency become evident only when the political dimension has already been shaped in favour of the insurgents. Governments are slow to recognize preconditions of insurgency and its early evolution, when the underground organisation of the insurgent movement takes place. Therefore they are forced to react to violence which already cannot be defeated or neutralised with coercive measures available to the government, unless parts of society are effectively repressed. This is a phenomenon of a gradual transition to war, whereby governing authorities do not realise in time when the situation warrants extraordinary emergency measures inherent to wartime, or, if they do recognize the challenge in time, find it difficult to impose such measures due to a negative public reaction.17 Furthermore, there is an asymmetry of responsibilities between the insurgents and the counterinsurgent, which aggravates the position of the latter. Authorities are responsible for ensuring law and order in the entire country’s territory and protect its economic, financial and administrative infrastructure, citizens, and their property. Insurgents, unburdened by such responsibility, exploit this asymmetry causing overstretch of the authorities which struggle to maintain control of the country’s territory. For this characteristic, insurgency and counterinsurgency was dubbed as “war of fleas,” where “fleas” (insurgents)

13 Galula D., Counter-Insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, London: Pall Mall Press, 1964, p. 19. 14 Ibid, pp. 75-76. 15 Clausewitz C., On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 75. 16 See O‘Neill B., Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse, Washington: Potomac Books, 2005, p. 104-106. 17 See Galula D., Counter-Insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, London: Pall Mall Press, 1964, p. 9. 34

simply exhaust the “dog” (government) by relentless attacks which cannot be prevented, countered, and or responded to everywhere and at all times.18 Most of the authors agree that the administrative capacity of the counterinsurgent, its ability to maintain control over the territory and population, without leaving the vacuum of governance where alternative administrative structures of the insurgents could emerge, are very important elements in successful counterinsurgencies. Related to that is the importance of effective coordination of all state authorities and agencies – military, intelligence, police, internal security, financial, migration, diplomatic, judicial, economic, and even educational – in counterinsurgency campaigns. It is argued that only about one fifth of the overall effort in dealing with the conflict is concentrated in military and law enforcement dimensions.19 Most of it takes place in political, social, ideological, and propaganda dimensions. Every war is a continuation of politics, and insurgency and counterinsurgency is an absolutely political war, dominated by interactions on the political level.20 Therefore, most of the authors concur that there are no military solutions to insurgency. This observation is well in line with the analysis of the main objectives of the counterinsurgent – “stealing” or discrediting the insurgents’ cause and isolating them from the society upon which the insurgents draw for support. This is a war between two political, social, economic, administrative, military, intelligence, and information networks, competing for popular support. It is exactly this notion of competing networks which lies at the core of 4GW and netwar concepts. In the age of the Information Revolution, forming and running such networks are greatly facilitated by the Internet and mobile communications. According to Arquilla, Ronfeldt, and Zannini, “netwar refers to an emerging mode of conflict…at societal levels, involving measures short of traditional war, in which the protagonists use network forms of organization and related doctrines, strategies, and technologies attuned to the information age.”21 In any case, insurgency and counterinsurgency usually is a long war, lasting for years and even decades, where both sides are simply seeking to outlast each other. For this reason, Mao calls his model of insurgency “a protracted people’s war”. As Metz and Millen wrote, “Often insurgencies drag on so long that entire generations emerge that have known nothing but conflict”.22 More than that, insurgents use time as their weapon because, as Drew put it, “every day of the conflict when insurgent movement continues its existence…dis- credits the government and its ability to govern effectively and control its own

18 Robert Taber was the first to apply this popular analogy. See Taber R., The War of the Flea: A study of guerilla warfare theory and practice, L. Stuart, 1965. 19 Ibid, p. 89. 20 See Manwaring M. G., Shadows of Things Past and Images of the Future: Lessons for the Insurgencies in Our Midst, Carlyle: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2004, p. 2. 21 Arquilla J et al, “Networks, Netwar, and Information-Age Terrorism”, in Howard R.D., Sawyer R. L., eds., Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment, Guilford: McGraw Hill / Dushkin, 2004, p.90. 22 Metz S., Millen R., Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualising Threat and Response, Carlyle: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2004, p. 5. 35 destiny”.23 Bearing in mind that all what the insurgents have to achieve is to survive and to demonstrate it, time is often their greatest ally. This rather detailed overview of the insurgency and counterinsurgency theory provides sufficient ground for looking at how it could be applied on a global level of analysis in order to explain the conflict between the United States and Al Qaeda. In addition, while discussing the U.S. strategy in the framework of this theory, some additional theoretical concepts will need to be employed although they fell outside the scope of the above overview. Nonetheless, it supplied enough of theoretical material to support drawing parallels between the “global war on terrorism” and classical insurgencies / counterinsurgencies. The next chapter of this article is devoted for establishing such parallels.

2. Al Qaeda Challenge and the U.S. Response: The Logic and “Grammar” of Conflict

This chapter attempts answering the main question of the article – can insurgency and counterinsurgency theory explain the conflict which we came to know as “global war on terrorism”? How can we employ this theory to interpret Al Qaeda’s and U.S. strategies in the conflict? Does the character of this conflict correspond to the main tenets of the insurgency and counterinsurgency theory? To what extent does its global scope limit the applicability of the theory? Or, perhaps, we should be looking for and articulating an entirely new war theory, which can better characterize the “global war on terrorism”?

2.1. Al Qaeda and their Goals: Supra-national Agenda

One should start looking for the answers to the above questions by ex- amining the Al Qaeda and their goals. The very fact that the Al Qaeda is not a state actor of international relations should direct our attention to the theoretical frameworks incorporating such players. In war studies, the insurgency and counterinsurgency theory offers perhaps the only appropriate model in this respect. However, the first complication immediately arises as this theory investigates conflict within state. In the meantime, Al Qaeda’s goals hardly suggest that boundaries of some particular state act as a constraint. Statements by their leader Osama bin Laden and accompanying actions reveal much more global ambitions. Essentially, the Al Qaeda seek to unite the world’s Islamic community (umma), stretching from North Africa and Middle East through Cen- tral and South-West Asia to South-East Asia, into a single caliphate governing

23 Drew D. M., Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: American Miliary Dilemmas and Doctrinal Proposals, Air University Press, 1988, p. 6. 36

by Islamic law, shariah.24 There is no doubt that this is a political goal, although inspired by religion and its historical past. According to Jason Burke, “Many Muslims, including bin Laden, believe it should be given political expression through the eradication of divisions, national or other, among Muslims and the unification of the umma, or Muslim community.”25 Any attempts by the opponents of the Al Qaeda to treat armed violence in pursuit of this goal, simply as blind and fanatic destruction in the name of some utopian religious goals, would completely ignore the Al Qaeda’s political agenda. Using O’Neill’s classification, the Al Qaeda qualifies as a reactionary-traditionalist insurgent group seeking to restore lost reputation and influence of Islam in the world which existed in the early Middle Ages. This political agenda logically leads to the strategic objectives which are, again, very clearly expressed in order to: eliminate Western political, economic, cultural, and military influence in the Islamic world which allegedly corrupts the Muslim community and which is interested only in the division and weakness of Islam; to depose corrupt repressive regimes in the Muslim countries because they just reflect the will of the West; and to prevent the rebirth of the Islamic community and its unification in a single state.26 No matter how idealistic or ambitious these objectives are war as a means to achieve them can be one of the rational political instruments - but war against whom? In the insurgency and counterinsurgency theory, the insurgent’s opponent is the state’s government and its supporters. It can be observed that the political goals and strategic objectives of Al Qaeda lead to a clash with many opposing governments and political systems, the legitimacy of which is ques- tioned by this organisation – be it Saudi Arabia, Jordan, or Pakistan. Even its organisational principles may lead us to believe that we are dealing with just another group seeking to influence processes at the state level, since it represents and supports a network of intra-state Muslim insurgent groups operating within their national boundaries.27 However, two aspects indicate that the scope of insurgency is much larger and that it affects not only specific governments or political systems. Firstly, it is the chosen main opponent – the United States. And, secondly, it is the nature of grievance lying at the heart of this insurgency and around which Al Qaeda’s ideology and strategy revolve – the alleged suppression and humiliation of all the Muslims caused and sustained by the current world order, the main “agent” of which is the United States.28 In his “declaration of war” circulated in 1998, Bin Laden makes the following statement: “It is no secret to you, my brothers, that the people of Islam have been afflicted with oppression, hostility, and injustice by the Judeo-Christian

24 See Fowler M. C., Amateur Soldiers, Global Wars: Insurgency and Modern Conflict, London: Praeger Security International, 2005, p. 2. 25 Burke J., Al Qaeda: the True Story of Radical Islam, London: I.B. Tauris, 2004, p. 27. 26 See Sageman M., Understanding Terror Networks, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004, p. 18-19. 27 Ibid. 28 Fishel K. L., “Challenging the Hegemon: Al Qaeda’s Elevation of Asymmetric Insurgent Warfare Onto the Global Arena”, Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement,vol. 11, No. 2/3, 2002, p. 285-298. 37 alliance and its supporters…but the blatant imperial arrogance of America, under the cover of the immoral United Nations, has prevented the dispossessed from arming themselves.”29 It is exactly here that the roots of the insurgency or legitimacy crisis, inspired and led by Al Qaeda, lie. But, in such a case, we have to acknowledge that this is the legitimacy crisis affecting not some particular political system or political regimes in the Muslim states but the entire world order maintained by the global hegemon, the United States, and its political, economic, military, and cultural power. The nature of the Al Qaeda’s goals has pre-programmed the clash with the United States – the clash which by virtue of the U.S. global reach and influence turned into a global conflict. However, the international system and state as two distinct analytical levels may not succumb so easily to the application of the same theoretical framework – insurgency and counterinsurgency theory. In addition to that, it is not enough to brand the conflict as insurgency and counterinsurgency solely on the grounds that the “global war on terrorism” is a manifestation of the political legitimacy crisis and that it involves a non-state actor as one of the belligerents. Strategic logic which drives the opposing sides is equally important.

2.2. Strategic Logic: The War of Images and Ideas

The main indicator of the “global war on terrorism” as an insurgency and counterinsurgency lies in the role of and interaction between military power, ideology, and propaganda. As it was pointed out in the first chapter, in insurgency and counterinsurgency violence is used as a means of suasion which amplifies and communicates an ideological message and shapes the image of the belligerents in the eyes of the observing audience. Al Qaeda’s campaign against the U.S. hegemony started well before the September 11th attacks. Bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, as well as the attack on the USS Cole at the Aden harbour in Yemen, preceded them. However, it was exactly the attacks of September 11th which, in terms of a dramatic effect, were rather unprecedented in the world’s military and political history and which were broadcasted to the entire globe by the news channels that established Al Qaeda as an equal opponent to the hegemon. As Colin Gray, one of the most prominent contemporary strategy theorists put it, the Al Qaeda “…assumed the mantle of an historic victor. Islamic warriors for God had seen off a superpower. This was a heady conviction, one which still plays its role as a potent source of self-confidence and prestige.”30 It can be argued that violence was not employed just for the sake of physical destruction as a strategic goal. The Al Qaeda’s strategists obviously pursued two main goals: • To establish its “brand awareness” in the Islamic world and beyond. An audacious and effective attack undoubtedly helped to attract new follow-

29 Quoted in Lawrence B., Messages to the World: the Statements of Osama bin Laden, London: Verso, 2005, p. 25. 30 Gray C. S., Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2005, p. 237- 238. 38

ers.31 From that moment, the group accelerated its drive to become the main conduit of Muslim grievances which mobilises and directs their energies in the right direction. By and large, the main audience of the attacks was exactly the world’s Muslim community which was supplied with ample evidence of how vulnerable “the great evil,” the United States, was; • To provoke a disproportionate U.S. response which was supposed to even further push those in doubt of the Al Qaeda’s goals and aspirations into the ideological embrace of the group.32 In the framework of the insurgency and counterinsurgency theory, the objective of the struggle is a passive majority winning the support of which is crucial for achieving the aims of an insurgent as well as counterinsurgent. Just as in any other insurgency, violence is used to persuade the third parties to withdraw from the conflict and cease providing support to the opponents. In such cases, the audience of violence is comprised of the societies of those countries. This logic was behind the terror attacks in Madrid in 2003, executed in a run-up to the Spanish general elections. It turned the public opinion in favour of the political party which was advocating withdrawal of Spain’s military contingent from Iraq.33 It may be just a coincidence, but terror attacks on July 2005 against London’s public transit system were perpetrated the next day after the city was chosen to host the summer Olympics of 2012: intentionally, or not, the message to the British public and to the world was that the country would not be safe as long as it plays such a prominent role in the U.S.-led coalition in the “global war on terror.” The United States, having declared a global campaign against terrorism in the aftermath of September 11th, managed, at least for some time, to avoid the trap of disproportionate response. The campaign in Afghanistan was launched as a rather limited mission, without major excesses of the use of force. But already at that time the actions of the United States and their allies started supplying propaganda ammunition for the ideological and political machine of Al Qaeda. Everything, starting with the speech of President G. W. Bush which contained an unfortunate branding of “the global war on terror” as a crusade, then the incarceration of the suspected Taliban fighters at the Guantanamo base, the occupation of Iraq, treatment of prisoners at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq by the U.S. military personnel, rendition of the suspected terrorists to the third countries practicing torture as an interrogation technique, and similar episodes served well the Al Qaeda’s cause. They were used as evidence to underscore the point that, allegedly, the United States and their allies sought to perpetuate humiliation and oppression of the Muslims. For instance, one of Bin Laden’s statements, commenting on the invasion of Iraq pronounces: “while these wars are being waged by the Americans for religious and economic

31 See Fowler M. C., Amateur Soldiers, Global Wars: Insurgency and Modern Conflict, London: Praeger Security International, 2005, p. 6. 32 Ibid. 33 This rationale is best revealed by Bin Laden’s statement “To the Peoples of Europe”. See Lawrence B., Messages to the World: the Statements of Osama bin Laden, London: Verso, 2005, p. 233-236. 39 purposes, they also serve the interests of the petty Jewish state and its murder of Muslims there. There is no better proof of this than their eagerness to destroy Iraq… and their efforts to fragment all the states in the region… into paper mini-states whose weakness and disunity will guarantee Israel’s survival and the continuation of the brutal Crusader occupation of the Peninsula.”34 Even the reluctance of the United States to rein in Israel during its short campaign in Lebanon in the summer of 2006 was employed as a testimony to Western plot against the Muslims. All this effort to use violence and propaganda directed against the United States, the West in general, and against repressive regimes in the Muslim countries is greatly aided by the global means of communication and media, especially the Internet and satellite TV. They were given special attention in the treatise of Ayman al-Zawahiri, the Egyptian who is one of the main Al Qaeda’s ideologists and strategists, entitled “Knights under the Banner of the Prophet.”35 These instruments that are used by the Al Qaeda very actively and adroitly, although the atrocities of the organisation such as the bombing of a wedding party in the hotel of Amman in Jordan or recorded beheadings of hostages in Iraq, also may have had a negative impact on the Muslim public opinion. Under the pressure of the U.S.-led campaign, the Al Qaeda has morphed into a diffuse movement the followers of which inspired by its leaders initiate and perpetrate the terrorist attacks without much organisation from some centre. The Al Qaeda only provides a broad direction, sometimes funding and training, perhaps indicates the suitable timing, but its main role now is the legitimisation of “resistance” to Western oppression. According to Burke, the Al Qaeda’s name should be translated not as “a base” anymore, but as “a maxim.”36 From Muslim teenagers in the United Kingdom to wealthy entre- preneurs of the Gulf states, from Egyptian students to Pakistani traders and Indonesian peasants, the Al Qaeda’s ideological movement has become as global a phenomenon as its global projection of military power. Terrorist acts, wherever they take place – in London, Bali, Istanbul, Amman or Riyadh – are just the symptoms of a continuing and growing insurgency. This is clearly appreciated by most Western strategists who urge others to address the roots of it and not the symptoms. Thus, by its strategic logic, the “global war on terrorism” is indeed an insurgency and counterinsurgency war – a war where images, ideas, and perceptions constitute perhaps the most important dimension of the struggle.

34 Quoted in Lawrence B., Messages to the World: the Statements of Osama bin Laden, London: Verso, 2005, p. 60. 35 See Sageman M., Understanding Terror Networks, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004, p. 20. 36 See Burke J., Al Qaeda: the True Story of Radical Islam, London: I.B. Tauris, 2004, p. 290. 40 2.3. Counterinsurgent’s Response: Challenges of a Global Campaign

Those accepting the Pax Americana thesis will find the Al Qaeda’s challenge neither new nor original. Western empires such as the Romans and British crumbled under the pressure of insurgents, thereby eroding their legitimacy. But application of the insurgency and counterinsurgency theory to the conflict between the Al Qaeda and the the United States implies equating the power of the United States in the international system with the power of a government inside a state. It is hardly possible to put a sign of equation between them, which has important consequences in the context of this article: in dealing with the insurgents, government as a counterinsurgent can afford applying quite different means and strategies compared to what is possible and available to a state acting in an anarchic international system comprised of sovereign states. In the “global war on terrorism,” the United States cannot use military force with the same ease as a government inside a state. State sovereignty, although weakened by the processes of globalisation and regionalisation, still constitutes the basis of the international system. Any exercise of the U.S. power faces constraints and imperatives stemming from this fact, such as the need to rally political support of other states to military action or conclude military transit agreements. Meanwhile, in classical counterinsurgency, the government is not constrained by the sovereignty of other countries in their actions, unless insurgents find a safe haven and establish their base abroad. The netwar concept, briefly introduced in the first chapter, offers a partial solution to this conundrum. One of its main ideas is that the organisational networks must be confronted with other networks. If inside a state, the counterinsurgent network takes shape between governmental agencies and political supporters of the regime, then in the international dimension the United States would have to rely on a global network of friendly states which at least partially reduces the barriers of national sovereignty in the global counterinsurgency campaign. Such a network enables the exchange of information, facilitates consent with and support to intelligence and military activities, and provides a platform for a common action against, for instance terrorist financial flows, (etc.).37 However, in order to make global counterinsurgent action even more seamless in a system of sovereign states, the United States must integrate into this network not only states, but also non-governmental and international organisations, media, the private sector, internet communities, religious Muslim groups, and even warlords. Otherwise the network of the Al Qaeda, operating without regard to national borders and sovereign authority and composed on non-state elements, will not encounter opposition where it is most necessary – in a diffuse and amorphous space which can be called the “global street,” particularly in its Muslim part. It is not too difficult to realise that creating and

37 A multinational counter-terrorism network as an opponent to Al Qaeda’s network is envisaged by John Sullivan and Robert Bunker. See Sullivan J. P., Bunker R. J., “Multilateral Counter-Insurgency Networks”, Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement,vol. 11, No. 2/3, 2002, p. 353-368. 41 sustaining such a network is a daunting undertaking. Furthermore, its effectiveness on a global level and without sources and instruments of power available to any country’s government within national borders is far from warranted. In addition to a network-against-network approach, there are more and also closer parallels between what strategic issues a government conducting counterinsurgency within state border encounters and what the United States face in the international system. Take the problem of failed states, which is rather salient on the agenda of the “global war on terrorism.” In the framework of the insurgency and counterinsurgency theory, they can be compared to state provinces which fall outside control of central authorities and are used by insurgents to expand their campaign. Restoring governance in such provinces is one of the primary objectives of a state government. In a similar vein, reconstruction of failed states which potentially can and often do become havens for terrorist groups, has become one of the main concerns of the United States and their allies, as the continuing effort in Afghanistan demonstrates. Secondly, just as insurgents inside a state, the Al Qaeda is not encumbered by obligations and constrains which limit freedom of action for governments. The United States, no matter how hard its government lawyers try to find some elegant and “innovative” justifications for various aberrations, must adhere to the norms of international law. Such asymmetry of commitments and restraints is inherent to the dynamics of insurgency and counterinsurgency. The Al Qaeda is one of very few actors in the international system capable of projecting its power globally (sufficient to look at the geography of its terrorist acts) and it does so without any moral qualms or systemic constraints.38 Furthermore, its global campaign is being conducted with minimal financial resources, compared to the U.S. military, homeland security, and intelligence budgets. Such asymmetry of resources required to support opposing strategies is also in line with the tenet of insurgency and counterinsurgency theory that insurgency is “war on a cheap” for the insurgents. Again, following the principles of classical insurgency and counterinsurgency theory, counterinsurgents like the United States and their allies, are seeking ideological and political measures to neutralise the goals of the Al Qaeda, marginalise this movement, and isolate it from the majority of the Muslims. The central element of this strategic thrust, at least until a predica- ment in Iraq and a victory of a radical Islamist group Hammas in the elections in the Palestinian territories, was a Middle East democratisation initiative. The United States attempted to present a viable alternative to the Al Qaeda’s radical vision of the Muslim world by arguing that it is individual liberty and democracy, not violence and theocratic dictatorship (often called as being tan- tamount to fascism), which represent a way and mechanism for the Muslims to regain their standing. The U.S. administration even tried to pressure some of the friendly authoritarian regimes in the Islamic world (e.g. in Egypt and Saudi Arabia) to reform and liberalise political and social life. According to

38 See Fowler M. C., Amateur Soldiers, Global Wars: Insurgency and Modern Conflict, London: Praeger Security International, 2005, p. 6. 42

O’Neill, it is exactly initiating fundamental reforms, which is most effective at isolating and suppressing insurgency.39 However, it seems that the United States lacks the leverage to instil change in sovereign states as well as little political will to employ even those which are in their possession. This is aggravated by perceived short-term strategic gains which can be derived from propping up friendly undemocratic regimes and by the possibility of seeing radical groups exploit democratic procedures to seize power, as it happened in the Palestin- ian territories. The latter scenario repeated in, for instance Pakistan with its nuclear arsenal, would be a nightmare to the Western security community. It is therefore not surprising that the United States, despite all the rhetoric, seems to be losing penchant for the democratisation strategy, while there is no other alternative allowing them to seize the initiative from the Al Qaeda’s ideological offensive, which has been found. Perhaps the most prominent indicator of the convergence between the classical insurgency and counterinsurgency theory and “global war on terrorism” is the admission by the United States that it is this theory which constitutes a conceptual basis for the U.S. strategy. The Quadrennial Defence Review of 2006 cites the classics of insurgency and counterinsurgency and emphasises the limits of military power in the “global war on terrorism” as well as the necessity to coordinate military action with political, diplomatic, economic, social, informational, intelligence, and law enforcement dimensions. Fully in line with the theory, U.S. strategists admitted that it would be a long war – even the title of the document itself is “Long War.” Military power is perceived only as an instrument to achieve a degree of security and contain the threat while the conflict is resolved in the dimension of “hearts and minds,” just as insurgency and counterinsurgency theory calls for.40 Unfortunately, although the U.S. is rediscovering its military competence in counterinsurgency, there is little done in the main, political and ideological, dimension. At the same time, all military errors and political mistakes are exploited by the Al Qaeda to further erode the reputation of the United States in the Muslim world. There is a tremendous lack of U.S. attention to the part of the counterinsurgent network which consists of non-state actors and which can provide much better access to Muslim “hearts and minds” than friendly but highly unpopular regimes. The United States, just as many countries in the past which were challenged by insurgencies, missed the latent phase of global Al Qaeda’s insurgency against its hegemony – the phase where political and military mobilisation of the group took place. In the phase of active confrontation, there is some progress in containing the threat, absence of any major attack against the U.S. homeland since September 11th being one of the most frequently cited indicators. But there have been many strategic mistakes made too. By acknowledging that the “global war on terrorism” is nothing else but global insurgency and

39 See O‘Neill B., Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse, Washington: Potomac Books, 2005, chapter 8. 40 See Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2006. www. defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf (Accessed: 18 August 2006). 43 counterinsurgency, then perhaps some mistakes can be avoided in the future. But we also have to recognize that the end of this long war will be as elusive and unnoticeable as its beginning.

Conclusions

The term “global war on terrorism” has become quite ubiquitous and terrorism experts lavish their advice regarding appropriate strategies and their execution, but with rare attempts to link them to a broader and well-tested theoretical framework. Starting with an outright refusal to recognize the ongoing conflict as war and up to a failure to appreciate its global scale, strategists on the front lines of this conflict had lost much time until they discovered the value of a classical insurgency and counterinsurgency theory as well as of its contemporary variations. What we are accustomed to treating as a “technical” struggle to prevent further terrorist attacks has to be seen as a “political war” unfolding in the dimension of images and ideas, where the most important player is the audience of the Muslim world and where violence is employed by the Al Qaeda to shape, influence, and mobilise it. The fact that the target of this war is the hegemon of the international system and the guardian of the current world order, the United States, as well as the supporting states and societies, turns it into a global war. It is further globalised by the agenda, mobilisation capacity, and operations of the Al Qaeda which transcend national borders. Due to the conflict’s global scale and the nature of the belligerents there can be certain difficulties in transferring the classical insurgency and counterinsurgency theory to the level of the international system, but the conflict’s strategic logic follows the theory’s tenets flawlessly. In this war, military force plays a much lesser role compared to a conventional armed conflict between states. In the opposing networks – the Al Qaeda’s and U.S.’s – information, propaganda, political, social, and cultural connections matter much more than raw military power. It definitely may change the world order, just as all world wars – First, Second, and Cold – have, and just as insurgencies are able to change domestic political order. Perhaps a global Al Qaeda’s insurgency, pressed on by a resolute counterinsurgent who is prepared for a long haul and learns from own mistakes will eventually dissipate as it happens to most intra-state insurgencies. But there is an equal possibility that the Al Qaeda’s insurgency will become a catalyst leading to the implosion of Pax Americana. Such a scenario would need more ingredients to fully materialise such as a further rise of China, growing opposition of Rus- sia, a deep economic and financial crisis in the United States, their loss of the technological lead and dominance, and similar factors. However, it is worth remembering that it is a similar combination of weaknesses, imperfections, mistakes, and misfortunes of political regimes which allowed insurgents to prevail in intra-state conflicts. The United States, although slow to comprehend this strategic picture, 44

is already utilizing explanations and principles of the insurgency and counterinsurgency theory in their strategy. There was even an attempt to articulate ideological alternatives to the Al Qaeda’s radical vision and thus discredit or neutralise its cause. But there is still little understanding that, in foreign policies and security policies, the United States can ill-afford actions and initiatives which are uncoordinated across their global network, fragmented, poorly conceived, inconsistent, or narrowly targeted only towards some states or regions. In such a war, which is waged by the United States and their allies, lack of coordination between various strands of strategy or lack of their subordination to a global counterinsurgency framework and logic will have grave consequences. Whatever these consequences are, we will not see them for a long time to come. Insurgency and counterinsurgency is indeed a long war, and time is usually on the side of the insurgent. One thing is clear – when this war ends, the world will be quite a different place compared to what it is now. Changing. European. Security . Space

47 Jonas Čičinskas* Institute of International Relations and Political Science, University of Vilnius

Financial Perspective 2007-2013: . The Last Version of the Old Model

Questions on the strategy of the EU development still are rare in the political discourse in Lithuania. This, of course, is a temporary phenomenon. Direct “physical” participation of our country in the European integration and consolidation processes shall lead to, inescapably, a larger involvement into debates about strategic issues of these developments. The financing of processes facilitating integration is one among them. The article deals with the debates on a new seven-year budgetary framework of the EU, the so-called financial perspective (FP), for the years 2007-2013. The article begins with description of several prominent and specific features of the EU budget formation and structure. Main attention is given to the discussion about the new FP during the period of 2004-2006. As a main financial document of the EU, the FP has provoked more exact definitions of national interests within the EU member states, brought their differences to the surface, forced them to specify their demands towards scale and structure of the budget, and pushed them one more time for the search of a compromise. The analysis of the discussion is summarized by general conclusions.

1. Peculiarities of the EU budget

The very infrequency of the discussion on the European Union (EU) multi-year budgetary framework or “financial perspective” (FP) – and having it once in seven years – equips it with a significant political and ideological importance. There are also other opportunities for reflecting and focusing attention on problems that have accumulated, thereby intensifying the debate on the strategic issues of the EU’s development. But few cases stimulate or have a requirement for finishing the discussion up to the very end - by saying “yes” or “no.” The approval of single version of the budget (telling „no“ to alternatives) provides clear resolution for the future of seven-years duration, allocating in this way, by assigning finances, relatively modest resources for the common actions not gaining preference of the member states and relatively generous resources to the ones which deserve such support. The seven-year long budgetary structure tells much about what the position is of the EU member states and first of all – its larger member states – with regards to the further Community integration and its directions. If political rhetoric, before

* Prof., habil. dr. Jonas Čičinskas is a Head of European Studies Department, Institute of Interna- tional Relations and Political Science, University of Vilnius. Address: Vokiečių 10, LT-01130 Vilnius, tel.: +370-5-2514142, e-mail: [email protected] 48

the decision on the FP, takes place then afterwards it will decorate the whole discussion with very different formulations and emphasises. This “reflection ability” of the EU budget can be the more so pronounced if we pay due regard to its two peculiarities, defined in the founding treaties of the European Community. Firstly, each year the budget should be balanced, and, secondly, it has to be financed in full by Community‘s own resources. In other words, the goals defined in the budget cannot be financed, in the case of need, by borrowed resources, as well assurplus of revenue should be transferred to the next year thereby reducing that years’ member states’ contributions accordingly. This means that the EU budget cannot be used as a discretionary means of active macroeconomic policy put into action in a fluctuating manner that whenever there is a need to smooth its cyclicality (to cool down when it is heating and to spur it on when it cools down). Its function, when it is ready, is a fully passive one meant to collect effectively the defined amount of revenue and direct it to the defined areas of economic or other activity. In other words, within the Community budget, it fulfils only small redistributive role by which it influences the allocation of productive resources in member states. It is to be pointed out also, that while being designed with no anti-cyclical capacity, the budget is not pro-cyclical either. It would be as such only if it would be composed each year, limited by the percentage part of GDP (i.e. it would depend on the amount of GDP in previous year) and, as it is now, would be fully balanced. A budget prepared for the seven year period keeps it from being pro-cyclical, at least partially. More so, due to the orientation towards a longer-term period, the budget to some extent is even anti-cyclical, this being first and mainly for the countries which are relatively large recipi- ents. Lithuania, for example, (and other new member states) receives (shall receive) from the EU budget more than three percent of its GDP and this will tangibly rectify its economic activity and will become a stabilising factor for the Lithuanian economy. But for the donor countries to the contrary; such a levelled out planning of contributions and payments might be pro-cyclical since it does not reduce contributions when the economy is “cooling” and does not increase them when economy is “heating.”

The categorical content of such a statement is somewhat tempered by the efforts to coordinate the fiscal policy of the member states by the means of the Stability and growth pact, especially through commitment (for the members of the EMU accompanied by sanctions in case of breaking it) to secure the implementation of the principle of a balanced budget with only mild deviation, up to 3 percent of the GDP from the full equilibrium. 49

Although the budget is made up from its so-called “own resources,” actually only common external tariff and, also agricultural levies, are Community sources, this because they exist due to the implementation of the Common Com- mercial Policy of the Community. Meanwhile payments of value-added tax and the contribution calculated as a part of gross national income (GNI) are liabilities, established by the common agreement of the participating countries; this is like a particular kind of “membership fee.” Even more important is the fact that due to foreign trade liberalization, these two forms of ones “own resources” make up progressively declining part of the budget. Therefore, the question of genuinely own resources for the Community, which is deepening (or striving to deepen) integration, is being raised more acutely. Already in 1997, the European Commission while presenting the draft financial perspective for 2000-2006, pointed out that “a real modification [of budgetary resources – J.Č.] would be brought about only by the passage to a situation where the whole of the Community budget would be financed by autonomous fiscal resources.” This reduction of the share of own resources, which come to the budget directly from the economic activity of the Community, makes budget more passive and still more oriented towards its redistributive function. However, the Commission proposals to widen the variety of own resources is being confronted by strong opposition. Therefore, other means are searched for as to achieve still the same goal, i.e. to deepen the integration of the national economies of the EU member states. These other means are the coordination of national economic policies and harmonization of their separate components. Again, the significance of the EU budget is sometimes overestimated; its huge impact on agricultural production and farmers’ income, without any good

The so called traditional, own, resources consist of customs revenue, agricultural levies, and the sugar levy; two other types of own resources are the one based on value added-tax and another one based on gross national income (GNI) and calculated as a residual value, i.e. as the amount, needed to cover all agreed expenses of the EU budget, not funded by the means provided by the all the other own resources. Total amount of all budgetary expenses should not exceed 1.24 percent of GNI (Overview of the own resources system, http://europe.eu.int/comm/budget/financing/index_en.htm). Some time ago the upper limit of budgetary expenses was defined as 1.27 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP). According to the Decision of the Council and Euratom 2000/597/EU, Euratom GNI is gross national product of the current year. The Commission by its Communication of 28 December 2001 informed that due to the switchover from GDP to GNI the adjustment of the upper limit of the own resources was accomplished – 1.27 percent of GDP was recalculated as being 1.24 percent of GNI. The figure has decreased because capital outflows from the EU exceed its inflows, resulting in its GNI being larger than its GDP (net capital earnings abroad, repatriated to the EU, make the extra national income) and, therefore, the defined sum of own resources is represented by a respectively lesser share in GNI. In 2004 m. the contribution calculated as a share of GNI made up 73.4 percent of all EU budget revenues, while the share of the revenue based on VAT provided 14.1 percent. (European Commission. MEMO/04/30. Brussels, 10 February 2004). European Commission. “Agenda 2000. For a stronger and wider Union”, Bulletin of the European Union. Supplement 5/97. Luxembourg, 1997, p. 67. Later the Commission tried to raise the question about creating an own resource in the form of a special Community tax on energy resources using (“energy tax”). Recently the Commission made a proposal to establish a European tax as an independent direct source of the EU budget revenues once again, by presenting draft new financial perspective (Thatcher‘s rebate haunts EU’s 2007-2013 budget plans, www.euractiv.com, 15 07 2004). 50

reason, is passed over to the other fields of economic and social life, although budget possibilities there are very small. It is determined by its relative size – that the EU budget has not to trespass the limit of 1.27 percent of the total EU GDG (1.24 percent of GNI). In practice, this ceiling is never achieved (for example in 2005 only 0.95 percent of GNI was made in for payments). For the sake of comparison it is to be observed that the budget of almost every developed country exceeds 40, sometimes even 50 percent of its GNI. Why, in principle, is there any need to centralize a portion of public funds in federalist (including quasi-federalist) structures? As the theory of fiscal federalism states, the criterion of optimality of funds (and expenses) concentration at the central (federal) government level is the adequacy, by kind and amount, of public goods provided to tax payers for the needs and preferences of them. Specifically, centralization of the budgetary revenues and expenses might be supported by the following arguments: • Economy of scale and scope in providing public goods or services – which means that in this case every unit of such a good (services) is cheaper and requires less inputs for its production; • Centralization pools and disperses risks, which exist due to the asymmetry in the demand cycle of such services; • Public goods are characterised by non-excludability, which means that supply will be insufficient if delivered in decentralized way; • Decentralised provision of public goods might cause negative (or positive) externalities to the other administrative territories of the "federation"; • Duplication is avoided; • Negotiating power increases. Economic integration is, first of all, liberalization of economic activity on the international scale within some territorial region. It raises the economic efficiency and welfare of every participant. It is considered that every citizen in the European Union, thanks to economic integration, has their income 10 percent higher than it would be without the EU. Therefore, there is no reason even to start raising questions about the rationality of contributions dedicated to support (deepen) economic integration. If there would be no policy of income redistribution in the Community arena and the contributions of the member states would be restricted by sums, necessary to finance the administration of the EU, then the benefits of being in the Union would be absolutely obvious and nobody would question neither the necessity of such contributions, nor their amount. The situation is different when the full value of the “surplus” part of the contributions is given back to the members of the community.

In 2004 the average public expenses in the OECD countries was 40.8 percent, among them in Sweden – 57.1 percent, Denmark – 56.3 percent, Finland – 50.7 percent. (European Policy Centre. Growth and Jobs. September 2005, p.41). Iain Begg. Funding the European Union. A Federal Trust Report on the European Union‘s Budget. London, March 2005, p. 19. George Gelauff, Herman Stolwijk, Paul Veenendaal. Europe’s financial perspectives in perspective. European Network of Economic Policy Research Institutes. Working Paper No. 46, April 2006, p. 3. 51

The EU budget is bigger then is needed to maintain the administration. While the Community does not conduct any stabilization policy by means of excessive or deficit budgeting, its budget makes an impact on the economy by its allocative actions in several chosen sectors and also indirectly by its redistributive policy implemented throughout some long sequences. Only some 5 - 6 percent of funds are used to finance the functioning of the EU institutions, the rest comes back to the member states; but their addressees are different and the fields of activity chosen to be financed are narrowly defined. This domination of the passive redistributive function of the EU budget eventually turned up its shadowy side – it has developed an exclusively “trade-off” approach, a nurtured view of “just return” to the formation, and the distribution of the budget has weakened its original purpose and meaning. Besides, the budget structure also came to be obsolete, irrelevant, and rising dissatisfaction with it also strengthens differentiation on the views of the budget formation. The budget became a serious subject of content and it stimulates back-door factional fighting, it also suppresses the idea of solidarity, which was laid down in its nature. “…no voice will defend overall EU interests. For any individual country the return from defending an EU-wide, encompassing interest is negligible compared to the advantage it can obtain from a change in the budget that might lead to lower overall efficiency, but to more money for its own citizens or regional governments.”

2. The Budgetary Framework for . 2007-2013: A Road to Agreement

A switchover to a more perspective planning of the EU contributions and expenses was accomplished in 1980’s when difficulties for countries to agree on a yearly EU budgetary plan arose. With the beginning of the implementation of the Single Market Programme the need emerged to have a multi-year budgetary perspective, defined and also known in size and structure, in advance. First such a financial perspective (Delors I package) was prepared exactly for the period of the Single Market Programme implementation, i.e. year 1988-1992. Other framework plans turned to the seven-year period: they were so-called Delors II package, which was basically devoted to financing actions necessary to achieve goals put in the Maastricht Treaty (1993-1999) and “Agenda 2000” (2000-2006) oriented towards the coming EU enlargement.

The domination of the barter-type approach, which will eventually entrenched itself in the process of the EU budget formation has overshadowed the real meaning of income redistribution within the Community – to assist lagging EU countries (partners) to raise their economic potential and to prevent the emergence of a “race to the bottom” in the sphere of social protection. (Žr. Sara Conolly, Alistair Munro. Economics of the Public Sector, Prentice Hall Europe, 1999, p. 498). D.Gros and S.Mikosi. A better budget for the European Union: More value for money, more money for value. CEPS Policy Brief, No. 66, Brussels, 2005, p.1. 52

A new draft financial perspective was prepared by the Commission also for a seven-year period, although it has had stated that a period of five years, which matches the European Parliament‘s and the Commission‘s terms, would be preferable. The European Parliament, when discussing the FP guidelines, also expressed itself as being in favour of a five year horizon.10 The reason for declining these changes was that one of the main budget expense articles (the biggest one by its share) was already determined by the German-French agreement (October 2002), which was not to reduce (not to raise as well, while the EU widens) the amount of the Community funds directed to agriculture by the means of Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) until 2013 (to retain them unchanging in absolute amount approximately of 45 billion Euro).11 It is commonly admitted that Germany has agreed with this demand of France in exchange for the latter’s agreement not to object to the EU Eastern European enlargement, which at that time was the main geopolitical interest of Germany. In December 2003, in Copenhagen, European Council member states came to common conclusions that they will return to the CAP reform in 2013. An agreement between Chirac and Schröder on the funds provided to agricultural sector became a go-ahead sign for the member state’s initiatives presented during the preparation of the new seven-year financial framework. The first official proposal directly targeting the framework was the statement issued by six member states, the largest net contributors (Germany, Austria, France, The Netherlands, Sweden and United Kingdom), requiring a reduction of the total EU budget amount down to 1 percent of GNI, issued in December 2003 (right after the failure of Intergovernmental Conference, which was held to approve the draft Constitutional Treaty). The official debate on the new financial perspective that the Commission started in February 2004 through the Communication, “A prosperous Europe: political timetable and budgetary resources for an enlarged EU, 2007-2013” (later renamed to “Building our common Future: Policy challenges and Budg- etary means of the Enlarged Union 2007-2013”), this emphasizing the need to implement the goals defined in the Treaty of the European Union. The Com- mission then drafted the budget, which during the seven–years period would require from the member states (EU-15) 1.22 percent GNI on average (with the share of the budget rising from 1.17 percent in 2007 to 1.24 percent in 2013). Having thess expenses recalculated for the EU, now enlarged to 27 member states, would mean that the outlays would reach just 1.15 percent in 2013 and would equal 1.14 percent on average throughout the period.12

10 The necessity to switch to the five-year cycle, according to the EC statement, is based on the endeavour- ing need that future financial frameworks “...should become more consistent with this institutional rhythm [defined by the terms of the EC and EP – J.Č.]”, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. Building our common Future: Policy challenges and Budgetary means of the Enlarged Union 2007-2013. Brussels, 26.2.2004. COM(2004) 101 final/2, p. 34. 11 The return of Franco-German dominance? By Charles Grant, CER Bulletin, Issue 28. February/March 2003. - http://www.cer.org.uk/articles/28_grant.html. 12 European Commission. IP/04/189. Building our common future: Financial and political outlooks for the enlarged Union 2007-2013. Brussels, 10 February 2004. 53

The Commission pointed out that, although the Community is confronted by new tasks and it has considerably enlarged, there is no increase to the maximum amount of contributions (1.24 percent of GNI). But quite an arduous debate evolved not about the need to raise the upper limit of contributions, but about the requirement to reduce it. Although there were no direct references to the disagreement on it and the failure of the draft “EU Constitution,” delivered by the Convention, the parallel was obvious – in both cases attempts to strengthen federal elements in the functioning of the Community met fierce opposition. The Commission stressed in its Communication that, “The gap between the ambitious, highest-level political commitments, and a failure to implement them cannot be allowed to grow any wider.” The goals and expectations of the Union should be supported by adequate resources.13 The goals of the Union for the planned period were formulated by the Commission in four directions: sustainable economic growth, preservation and management of natural resources, issues of citizenship, freedom, security and justice, and also the role of the EU as a global partner. By suggesting to actually maintain the all existing structure of major expenses, the Commission also proposed to rearrange to some extent the proportions of different expenses, raising them in the areas important for the Union’s economic growth and development. For instance, expenses for agriculture (both as direct payments and for rural development), hidden under a rather sophisticated heading “Preservation and management of natural resources,” were defined not rising indeed – beginning from 2008 (in 2007 they still would be 57 billion Euro) up to 2013 they would remain the same amount, 58 billion Euro (in them direct payments for farmers and funds for agricultural product market regulation would even shrink a little bit – from 43.5 billion to 42.3 billion Euro). Meanwhile funds dedicated for the competitiveness and growth, and in order to sustain the rise of output and employment, would increase from 12 billion in 2007 to 26 billion Euro in 2013 (through the means financed by the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund). The Commission also envisaged more than double the finances directed to the heading “Citizenship, freedom, security and justice” – actually to fund expenses linked with the strengthening of external borders and the already being implemented common asylum and immigration policy and enhancing internal security (from 1.6 billion in 2007 to 3.6 billion Euro in 2013). The third purpose, “The EU as a global partner”, „was also assigned a significant 38 percent raise in finances – from 11.4 billion in 2007 to 15.7 billion Euro in 2013”. The main factor of the changes was the EU enlargement, resulting in an extension of the Community by countries of lesser level of economic development. Neither of them could become a donor country, meanwhile their eligibility to receive according to the rules agricultural payments, and the assistance from Cohesion Fund, as well as for protection of the new EU border was very intensive and accentuated.

13 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. Building our common Future. Policy challenges and budgetary means of the Enlarged Union 2007-2013. Brussels, 10.2.2004, COM(2004) 101 final, p.6. 54

Already in 1997 the Commission, presenting draft “Agenda 2000,” has demonstrated its farsightedness pointing out that “the next enlargement, which will take place during the period covered by the next financial perspective, will inevitably provoke a deterioration in the budgetary positions of all the current Member States. This cannot come as a surprise and should not give rise to claims for compensation.”14 The publication of the new draft financial perspective just fuelled demands for compensation of contributions – not by giving them back through rising payments from the EU budget to donor countries, but by requirements to reduce their total amounts. The demand of the six net contributors to reduce the Community budget expenses to the limit of 1 percent of GNI, mentioned above, has drawn a new line which is a significantly lower line of solidarity and financial assistance directed to the less developed Community regions. The European Parliament stood against this position as well. Although its actual composition, with the new EP elections coming, did not take the job of thorough investigation of the budget structure, it nevertheless found reasonable (in April 2004) to observe that the requirement of the “six” is not well grounded. Coun- tries of the “six” maintained that the EU should reduce its budgetary expenses since already many of these member states cannot hold expenses of their own national budgets, surpassing the threshold of the 3 percent of the GDP budget deficit. Regarding this, the EP noticed that in the period of 1996-2002 the EU budget rose by 8.2 percent while national budgets swelled by 22.9 percent on average. Therefore the increase in the EU budget expenses, by coming closer to the established limit, would have a minor impact on national budgets, since their deficits according to the figures just quoted, emerged or increased mainly due to the rise of domestic expenses and not because of the rising contributions to the EU budget).15 An important subject of contention came to be the partial refunding of the UK contributions (rebate). In 1984, yielding to the UK requirement, the European Council made the decision to adjust contributions to every member state which, “experiences excessive, in comparison to its relative well-being, a budgetary burden.” The UK at that period was indeed a relatively less wealthy country (numbering fourth from the bottom in the then EU-12).16 The situation in the UK has changed later on and it overtook other large EU countries by GDP

14 European Commission. Agenda 2000. For a stronger and wider Union, Bulletin of the European Union. Supplement 5/97. Luxembourg, 1997, p. 68. 15 See: Parliament adopts guidelines for 2007-2013 financial perspective,www.euractive.co m, 26 04 2004. Some economic sense is contained and another argument, unofficially held by Germany, does contain some economic sense: the suggestion is not to include member states contributions to the EU budget when national budget deficit is calculated by monitoring implementation of commitments after Stability and Growth Pact. (See: “Najlepsze porozumienie juź w czerwcu”, Rzeczpospolita, 14 03 2005). Since these contributions go to the Community budget, their deficit (that is, inflation generating) origin is tempered to the extent which the rest of countries do not experience problems arriving at the balanced budget. However, if this would be the way the all member states escape the budget deficit problem, the idea would turn to be senseless because the entire eurozone would risk becoming an offender of the Stability and Growth Pact and would seriously destabilize the economy. 16 See: www.euobserver.com, 16 06 2005. 55 per capita as well.17 The provision that the rebate is given temporary, and has to be reviewed, existed all the time. In 1997 the Commission, preparing new draft FP “Agenda 2000,” made a remark that only “uncertainties surrounding the future relative prosperity situation of the United Kingdom, however, lead the Commission to propose postponing a re-examination of the rebate mechanism until immediately after the first enlargement.”18 It was stated that the political decision on the new FP should be made not later than June 2005; this was required by the necessity to conduct all preparations for the new budgetary period (according to the Commission, the work needed 12 to 18 months). With June approaching it became clear that advocates of alternative proposals of contributions being limited by 1 percent GNI or 1.14 percent of GNI are not ready to come to a quick agreement. This threatened support receiving countries by significant losses. It is enough to observe that without approval of a new multi-year financial framework, financing in the new period would be conducted according to the yearly expenses in the previous period (every month delivering one twelfth of funds), and the actual expenses are always less than appropriations for commitments. Besides, the previous budget (for the period 2000-2006) did not fully reflect the following EU enlargement, therefore its automatic continuation to the new budgetary period also would mean that less amount of funding would be delivered to the new member states. The Temporary Parliamentary Committee prepared a report on the financial perspectives including a proposition to set the limit for the expenses of the new EU budget for the new period as 1.07 percent of GNI.19 If compared to the EC draft, it suggested a reduction of funds in the field of agriculture and administration. The Commission tried once again (at the beginning of June 2005) to convince member states, that a 1 percent ceiling, proposed by the “six,” was unacceptable. If we are to maintain a CAP and cohesion policy, the EC wrote in its official document, then we shall have to sacrifice many measures that we are committed to implementing by realising the Lisbon strategy. But if we want to accelerate the EU’s economic growth and strengthen its competitiveness, then we shall have to review a new agreement on the CAP and to change the basics of the cohesion policy, which will unavoidably trigger protests of many member states. The CAP, as the Commission conceded, is the element which splits the unity of the countries and stirs up their intransigence most powerfully.20 During the first half of 2005, Luxembourg, holding the presidency of the EU, prepared a compromise. It proposed to reduce the commitment ap-

17 According to preliminary data, in 2005 the GDP per capita in PPS in the UK was 115 percent of the EU-25 average, while in Germany it was 110, in France – 109 per cent. (Eurostat news release, 79/2006, 15 June 2006). 18 See: European Commission. “Agenda 2000. For a stronger and wider Union”, Bulletin of the European Union, Supplement 5/97. Luxembourg, 1997, p. 68. EC made the proposal to establish a standard adjustment mechanism, according to which each member state will be regarded as over-paying if its net contribution to the EU budget would make up more than 0,35 per cent of its GNI; in this case it will be repaid 66 per cent of overpayment, but the total amount of rebate should not exceed 7,5 billion Euro per year. (See: Thatcher‘s rebate haunts EU‘s 2007-2013 budget plans, www.euractiv.com, 16 07 2004). However, the proposal was eventually rejected. 19 Žr. EP committee wants 1.07% spending cap for 2007-2013, www.euractiv.com, 12 05 2005. 20 See: “Financial perspective – why 1% is unrealistic”, http://ec.europa.eu/financial_perspective/pdf/why_ar- guments.pdf#search=%22financial%20perspective%20-%20why%201%25%20is%20unrealistic%22. 56

propriations to 1,06 per cent of the EU GNI, and payment appropriations to 1.00 percent.21 The European Council’s meeting in Brussels in June disapproved the proposal. It concluded that no agreement has been achieved. Like in 1999, in Berlin, the European Council discussed the previous financial perspective for 2000-2006 and the threat arose that with approval of a new budgetary framework coming too late, then the whole process of economic and political integration will suffer a serious setback. The member states were left with the last opportunity - to come to an agreement at the European Council in December. As the Presidency of the EU now went to the hands of the UK, all the initiative was delivered to it. One of the biggest reserves to reduce expenses was the UK rebate. The pressure to reduce it, the UK made dependent, as it used to be in intergovernmental bargaining, on the requirement to review the whole structure of financial perspective, wherein it (and not only the UK) saw the CAP with its large budget share being the most requiring of reform. “…We will have to chart a new direction for the European Union budget to ensure that it can respond to the challenges of the 21st Century. That requires establishing a clear timetable for a review covering all aspects of revenue and expenditure,” declared Jack Straw, the UK minister of foreign affairs in his speech in the EP on 16 November. So belated a proposal to reconstruct the EP anew was profoundly unrealistic and there was a good reason to regard it as being a deliberate manoeuvre with the aim to secure the British rebate and leave it unchanged (and, in absolute terms, growing).22 The commissioner Dalia Grybauskaitė, charged with the financial programming and budget, agreed with J. Straw in that “today’s European budget is not a budget for the 21st Century,” but strongly criticized the principle Brit- ish attitude to receive a fair return from the contributions, which for the Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was the main argument to require her “money back.” This British invention, D. Grybauskaite underlined, historically brought in “a poisonous element into the financial discussions.”23 The situation was to be rescued as it used to be, when two very different views confronted one another and when the clash takes place in the EU, which is experienced in regulation such clashes, to search for some compromise. The British position was more beneficial. They have been feeling some bitterness from the very moment of signing the Single European Act when they had to concede with the majority voting (instead of decision taking by consensus) on Single market issues. They looked suspiciously to many steps in the EU towards furthering integration (even in the economic area) thereby the threat for the deepening of the EU integration, which now has arisen, scared them less than their partners.

21 See: Financial perspective 2007-2013. Negotiating box, Council of the European Union. Brussels, 15 June 2005. 10090/05. 22 In 2005 the rebate amounted to 4.6 billion Euros. With the EU budget revenues and expenses rising due to the economic growth this sum would increase to 7 billion Euros, See: EU budget explains, www.euobserver. com, 16 06 2005. 23 Grybauskaitė: “Today‘s budget is not a budget for the 21st Century, www.euractive.com, 03 08 2005. 57

Having resolutely objected to the Luxembourg compromise in June, the UK was preparing its own proposals until as late as December. When at the end of November the first information on the British proposal was leaked to the press it became clear that the amount of budget will be suggested for further reduction, if compared to the Luxembourg compromise (not to speak about the EP and Commission proposals). The very delay to publish own propositions was a tactical manoeuvre aimed to provide less space for the searching and presentation of new propositions (The British also used this period for the very active diplomatic activity in order to gain wider support to their attitude). The main British target was the CAP and the funds dedicated to it; the UK justly considered France as being the principal supporter and advocate of the CAP. Therefore the essence of its tactics was to encounter the French position and to prove that it obstructs the EU’s efforts to achieve progress and precludes it to come to an agreement on the global scale. In the Doha round negotiations (where stubborn EU opposition to further liberalization of agricultural trade has led to the halt of the whole process of negotiations) the UK blamed France with inflexibility. The British themselves declared that they would profoundly reform the rebate repayments if the CAP would also start to be reformed. Prime Minister T. Blair offered the new member states that he shall immediately surrender payment of the part of the rebate if they support the British stance.24 On 5 December 2005, the UK officially made its proposal – to reduce the Luxembourg compromise on the ceiling of the EU budgetary expenses from 1.06 percent to 1.03 percent GNI, thereby cutting away another 24 billion Euro (totalling the reduction to 178 billion Euro when compared with the original Commission‘s proposal, when the ceiling was to be 1.14 percent GNI). Since the outlay for agriculture was fixed by the 2002 agreement between Germany and France, the UK quite naturally turned to another heading of large expenses and regional policy measures dedicated to the less developed EU countries and first of all – for the new member states. The UK suggested a reduction of regional funds by 10 billion Euros (a further 7 billion would be cut from the agricultural expenses - and 2 billion from rural development). Such UK propositions were met by vehement opposition and criticism.25 The British started quite irksome bargaining about the various relocation of tiny numbers simulating the search of compromise, but in fact striving to defend their own principal position and/or to force opponents to retreat from theirs.26 The European Council, meeting 15-16 December, was obliged to come

24 “Blair and Brown hatch plans to make France the EU villain”. The Telegraph, 03 12 2005. 25 It seems that politicians from these countries become irritated by T. Blair‘s cynical phrase that payments to assist new member states shall be reduced “by no more than 10 percent.” (Financial Times 5.12.2005. Quoted by R. G. Whitman, G. Thomas. Two cheers for the UK‘s Presidency, www.chathamhouse.org.uk, 16.12.2005. 26 When immediately before the beginning of the European Council T. Blair acquainted the EU member states leaders with the British proposal and the peers resolutely rejected the proposal. The British then managed to deliver another draft budget – adding to the previous sum of 847 billion Euro of total expenses a further 2.5 billion Euros (by this sum raising payments to the new member states which suffered a big reduction of support compared to the former British proposal). (See: “Blair promises third budget proposal”, www. euobserver.com, 05 12 2005). Finally bargaining started to become similar to a cheap farce. Actually, another version of the compromise began to emerge – to review the whole approved financial perspective in 2008. 58

to an agreement on a new financial perspective. After serious blows to the EU unity, delivered by Common foreign and security policy (CFSP) crisis on the issue of Iraq intervention, rejections of the Constitutional Treaty, after shameful elections to the European Parliament, when only minority of the EU citizens came for voting27, inability to agree on new financial framework could be the last argument in proving that the EU entered the phase of its deep crisis, and has now to shelve the tasks of strengthening economic competitiveness and raising welfare. The agreement was achieved and the compromise found. The EU budget for the years 2007-2013 was increased to 1.045 percent of GNI (to the total sum of 862 billion Euros) mainly thanks to the mediation of German Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel (Germany agreed to reduce regional aid it receives) and the concessions of the UK (it consented with the reduction of the rebate by 10.5 billion Euros during 2009-2013 and to waive it beginning 2014) and France (it did not object to decision on substantial revision, in 2008, of the whole budgetary structure).28 Pretty scared, the new member states accepted the subdued verdict. Although the agreement removed the threat of a serious crisis, it has demonstrated the persistent significant differences in the economic interests in the “united Europe” and the political trajectories they determine, whenever periodical attempts to design common policies are undertaken. “Europe escaped paralysis,” commented the agreement EK president Jose Manuel Barroso. “True, the European Commission wanted larger budget. However, the agreement of the 25 member states came to show what the political reality is.”29 Commissionaire D. Grybauskaite resumed it in a similar way but more succinctly that, “Europe receives the budget it deserves.”30 The multilateral budgetary frameworks have not been established by the Rome Treaty, they therefore are approved according to the so-called Inter- institutional Agreement on Budgetary Discipline and Sound Financial Manage- ment. After the new framework has been elaborated in the Commission and approved in the Council, it was handed over to the European Parliament. The new financial framework has been discussed there over several months and the trilateral agreement was achieved on 4 April 2006. On 17 May, the Inter- institutional Agreement on the financial perspective 2007-2013 was signed and it came into force on 1 January 2007. The EP succeeded in that, the final version of the FP took into account its requirements – the total sum of the budget expenses was increased to 864.3 billion Euros (thereby maximum appropriations for commitments rose from

27 In the whole EU area the turnout in the EP elections was 45,7 per cent, and in the old member states (EU- 15) – 49,1 per cent, in new member states (EU-10) – 26 per cent (see Kenneth Chan. Central and Eastern Europe in the 2004 European Parliament Elections. A Not So European Event. – SEI Working Paper No.81, EPERN Working Paper No.16, p.5. – University of Sussex, 2004. 28 See: W. Becker. EU summit reaches surprise agreement on budget for 2007-2013, www.dbresearch.com, December 22, 2005. 29 “Nowy budźet Unii: 60 mld zł rocznie dla Polski”, www.gazeta.pl, 18 12 2005. 30 “Na jaki budźet zasluguje Europa”, www.gazeta.pl, 20 12 2005. 59

1.045% to 1.048 % GNI).31 Besides, it was concluded to detach budgetary components which amplify the budget‘s flexibility, while at the same time keeping their composition and governance in the competence of Inter-institutional Agreement. These autonomous components were the Emergency Aid Reserve, The EU Solidarity Fund, The Instrument of Flexibility, and the European Glo- balisation Adjustment Fund.32 The funds of the budget, when it is approved, will be used as it has also been up until now, in three main directions – to make a positive impact on the economic development, to provide for the EU citizen’s security and other essential social needs, and to finance actions of the EU as a global actor. Perhaps the most important correction in the use of expenses is a significant rise in attention for the strengthening of economic dynamism and competitiveness (heading 1 “Sustainable development”). Alongside routine directions of regional policy, and those financed from Cohesion fund (sub-heading 1b “Cohesion for growth and employment”), a new accentuated direction was defined – “Competitiveness for growth and employment” (sub-heading 1a, embracing Community funding for R&D, innovations, education and training, EU-wide production networks, and social policy). In the new seven-year period, expenses for the needs of economic growth will increase from 51.3 bln. Euros in 2007 to 58.3 bln. Euros in 2013 (their share in the budget will grow from 42.5% to 45.9%), in which expenses for competitiveness (sub-heading 1a) will rise from 8.4 bln. Euros (7.0 %) to 13.0 bln. Euros (10.2 % which is the largest rise in the share of expenses for the budget). Of course, expenses for traditional targets and infrastructural projects continue to dominate in absolute terms – in the seven year period 308 bln. Euros will be committed for them, meanwhile for the means committed for competitiveness growth – 74 bln. Euros. Funding for agricultural needs is gradually receding. In the implementation of decisions brought in by the CAP review in 2003, and the agreement to freeze agricultural expenses until 2013, financing of agriculture and rural development (80% of which are expenses for agricultural product market regulation and direct payments for farmers) will shrink from 55 bln. Euros in 2007 to 51.2 bln. Euros in 2013, thereby, alongside with some extension of the budget due to economic growth, their share in the whole budget will decline from 45.6 % to 40.3%. Dynamics of the Community budget for the year 2007-2013 is also evidence that an increase of expenses (therefore also revenues as well) goes slower than that of the EU GNI. Therefore, appropriations for commitments will decline from 1.10% GNI in 2007 to 1.01% GNI in 2013, and appropriations for payments, respectively, from 1.06% to 0.94%.33 True, this change in share is calculated on the assumption that GNI of the EYU member states will grow

31 EP warranted the increase of expenses by 2 billion. Euro in the sub-heading “Competitiveness for growth and employment”; in other fields of expenses it made only minor changes. 32 See: A New Financial Framework for the enlarged Union (2007-2013), http://ec.europa.eu/budget/prior_fu- ture/next_fin_framework_en.htm 33 The whole data about budget figures - see: A new Financial Framework for the enlarged Union (2007- 2013), http://ec.europa.eu/budget/prior_future/next_fin_framework_en.htm 60

in this period by 2.3 % on average. If the GNI will grow faster, the share of the Community budget expenses will decrease and if GNI will increase slower – the movement will be the opposite.

3. Some Results of “The European Union . Case Study”. What has been demonstrated . by the discussion on the new financial . perspective in 2004-2006?

The investigation of the debate on the financial perspective for 2007-2013 is a kind of “EU Case Study.” As with any kind of detailed budget activity, the FP reflects the main goals, priorities, comparable scale of directions chosen for actions, and also the interests of the members of that organization as when they search for an agreement, as well as the means they use in order to materialize them. The financial perspective, and debate on it, is to some extent a discussion on the perception of the EU and its further evolution, conducted up until the very end. Perhaps, the main conclusion of such an investigation will be that the last EU enlargement, the incorporation to the Union of qualitatively less economically developed countries, disclosed both theoretical and political under preparedness of the “old” EU for the integration of countries being at some different level of development. The British rebate is one spectacular example of such under preparation –when some part of contributions of relatively poor post-communist countries to the EU budget are directed to the EU budget to improve the contributions and payments balance for a relatively prosperous country, the United Kingdom.34 One more example is the restriction of structural funds by 4 percent, of the recipient country GDP, which leads to the situation where significantly richer the member states, which continue to receive the EU financing in absolute terms per capita, are given larger assistance than those less wealthy. The third, even more conspicuous example is the convergence criteria that is to be fulfilled for joining the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and also for introducing the Euro in new member states. As the national economies of the EU member states function within the single market for goods, services, labour and capital, and the price level in new member states is twice lower than in EU-15 countries, the criterion requiring approximately the same inflation (price level rise) rate can not sustain any more serious criticism, and the requirement for new member states to be benchmarking their price level movement to that of countries with the least inflation rate (with just 1.5 percent adjustment upwards) provokes thoughts about theoretical incompetence. By

34 In 2005, the GDP per capita in the UK was 115 percent of the EU average, meanwhile in Lithuania the indicator was 52 percent, Estonia – 57 percent, and the Czech Republic – 73 percent. - See: Eurostat News Release. 79/2006 15 June 2006. 61 the way, some part of the criticism should be directed towards the new member states themselves – their academic and political elites are not fully ready profes- sionally to investigate it and dull enough not to show it more emphatically. Secondly, the discussion on a new financial perspective became an episode (not the first one), during which we see the recurrent tactical line of the member state’s behaviour – in the periods of tension turn towards re-nationalisation of economic (not only) policy. One among such solutions was the CAP review, conducted in 2003, according to which the decoupling of farmers support from the amount of their production has started from 2005. Every year the direct support for farmers is reduced by 3 percent until it will decline by 20 percent, with the redirection of the saved funds to so-called second pillar of CAP i.e. assistance for rural development (and forestry). Since direct payments are fully financed from the EU budget, and rural development projects require 25 percent of national co-financing, this change is reasonably referred to as a move of re-nationalisation of the common policy for agriculture and rural development. Having in mind that richer EU member states have had more possibilities to co-finance rural development projects (therefore, to gain more Community funds for that purpose), such turn would in the same time mean the weakening of the essential goal of the Community budget – that of cohesion (not to mention distorting the impact on competition in the agricultural market). 35 Of similar content is the more recent proposal by the Commission to increase national state aid for small and medium enterprises (according to it the upper limit for states subsidies would be raised from 100,000 Euros to 200,000 Euros).36 The EU budget, which can not come closer to the agreed upper limit, is the phenomenon of the same tendency. Thirdly, on the macroeconomic (national) level the structural funds are earmarked for the reduction of economic and social differences between (small) countries and (in big member states) regions by using Community budget financing. But on the microeconomic level, assistance that is provided by structural funds becomes one more instrument in a national market by which those that have much receive the largest share of the assistance. The collapse of command economy and systemic changes experienced during these transformations, to the liberal market economy have caused a large increase in inequality in Lithuania, at a regional dimension as well. As research shows, in 1966 (when data on the district’s economic and social development were first published) the difference between the richest district and the relatively poorest one in Lithuania was 60 percent, and in 2001 it differed 2.2 times.37 Government investment increases the difference even more,38 and the means provided by the EU structural funds, to the extent it can be judged on the beginnings of the

35 Michael Halderman and Michael Nelson. EU Policy-Making: Reform of the CAP and EU Trade in Beef & Dairy Sector with Developing Countries. PLPI Working Paper No.18. 25 January 2005, p.20, http://www. fao.org/AG/AGAInfo/projects/en/pplpi/docarc/wp18.pdf 36 See: Commission to allow larger subsidies for SMEs, www.euractiv.com, 11.10.2006. 37 Larry Sawers. “Inequality and the Transition: Regional Development in Lithuania”, Baltic Journal of Economics, vol. 6, no. 1. Spring/Summer 2006, p.40. 38 Ibid., p. 50. 62

process and does not promise any evolution towards reductions of differences. Hence, structural funds do assist in raising the level of economic development in relatively lagging countries, but the progress inside countries (Lithuania) goes as a process of deepening the inequalities in a population’s well-being and this makes people to question the mechanism and/or criteria of the use of incoming financial assistance.39 Fourthly, the domination of the redistributive function in today’s EU budget divides (and shall divide – until the member states essentially will not differ among themselves by the level of their economic development) the member states into two camps of diverse interests. In one of them the donor countries and aid–receiving countries confront each other, in the second one – countries receiving big sums for agricultural financing and those who actually finance this meet in the same antagonistic manner. The existence of the first camp, which in political rhetoric is explained and justified by the solidarity idea is basically a rational move. This policy, being implemented in an integrated entity, supports the states which have large growth potential with the result that their growth will support and stimulate dynamics in mature economies as well. This motive therefore raises less doubts. On the contrary, the existence of the second camp is more controversial – support of agriculture, especially by the existing measures has become question- able and if the very idea of support (“to preserve agriculture and rural life”) might be acceptable for rather a significant number of member states, hardly fewer of them see irrationalities of the support mechanism. The CAP, as the political and legal basis for agricultural expenses in the EU budget, is now the closest subject for reforms. More so – by designing its reform - it would become possible (or necessary) to foresee the preliminary steps or versions for solutions of other tasks of the Union’s economic development as well.

39 This is not the only case, when the use of means of structural funds disavows the very purpose of these funds. The Commission still is preparing the rules, to be proposed at the end of 2006, according to which the information on the aid provided by implementation of CAP, shall compulsory be public. In several EU member states the community had expressed concern that huge funds go to big landowners who rent the land to farmers. Within the last two years the UK, the Netherlands, and Denmark made public the information about addressees of CAP money. The fact that the largest sums flow to the hands of royal families, ministers, international corporations, and other big landowners significantly undermined public trust in CAP. (See: “Brussels needs Finland in EU transparency push”, http://www.euobserver.com, 21.09.2006). 63 Annex

Table 1. A comparison of the initial version of the financial perspective 2007-2013, presented by the Commission, and the final one, approved by the Inter-institutional Agreement, million Euros.

Appropriations 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total

Initial version

Appropriations 1335,60 138,700 143,140 146,670 150,200 154,315 158,450 1,025,035 for commitments Percent of GNI* 1.23 1.25 1.25 1.26 1.26 1.27 1.27 ... Appropriations 124,600 136,500 127,700 126,000 132,400 138,400 143,100 928,700 for payments Percent of GNI 1.15 1.23 1.12 1.08 1.11 1.14 1.15 1.14

Final version

Appropriations 120,702 121,473 122,564 122,952 124,007 125,527 127,091 864,316 for commitments Percent of GNI 1.10 1.08 1.07 1.04 1.03 1.02 1.01 1.048 Appropriations 116,650 119,620 111,990 118,280 115,860 119,410 118,970 820,780 for payments Percent of GNI 1.06 1.06 0.97 1.00 0.96 0.97 0.94 1.00

* The limit of 1.24 percent of GNI was calculated for the appropriations for payments. Recalculated as appropriations for commitments it made up 1.31 percent. (See New budget, old dilemmas. By Iain Begg and Friedrich Heinemann. - CER briefing note, 22 February 2006, p. 2.). Therefore appropriations for commitments are, in this table, larger than 1,24 percent of GNI, but they do not achieve 1,31 percent. Besides, as from 2008, the Commission has had foreseen the inclusion into the budget funds dedicated for the developmental needs of less developed countries (in the final version the idea was abandoned, the European Development Fund remained outside the EU budget). Note: Yearly amounts of the budget are calculated on the assumption that real GDP of the Commu- nity will grow in average by 2.3 percent per year. – See www.eubusiness.com, 05 February 2004. Source: Data of the European Commission; author’s own calculations.

The information on the aid provided by implementation of CAP, shall compulsory be public. In several EU member states the community had expressed concern that huge funds go to big landowners who rent the land to farmers. Within the last two years the UK, the Netherlands, and Denmark made public the information about addressees of CAP money. The fact that the largest sums flow to the hands of royal families, ministers, international corporations, and other big landowners significantly undermined public trust in CAP. (See: “Brussels needs Finland in EU transparency push”, http://www.euobserver.com, 21.09.2006).

65 Leonid Karabeshkin* St Petersburg Baltic Club, Tallinn Eurouniversity (Euroülikool)

Russian-Lithuanian Relations: . Between Negative Perception . Stereotypes and Pragmatic Cooperation

Lithuania’s accession to the EU and NATO predetermined a new stage for Lithua- nian-Russian relations. However these relations are still accompanied with a negative and suspicious attitude. Despite the number of contacts on various political levels and the functioning mechanisms of bilateral cooperation, and by content, featured by the implementation of mutually beneficial economic projects, are on a definitely high level. Therefore the author argues that in major issues of Russian-Lithuanian interaction, the balance between negative stereotypes of perception and interests of pragmatic cooperation are drifting in favour of the latter. In the long-term optimistic scenario, the factor of negative mutual perceptions is going to weaken, thus decreasing the opportunities for utilizing it in domestic politics. Relationships between Russia, the EU, and the U.S.A. alongside with keeping elements of competition are doomed for cooperation and probably partnership, reducing the demand for criticism towards Russia. So, the Baltic States will confront with necessity, the building of a cooperative model of relationships with their Eastern neighbour. The development of economic and humanitarian links, in particular on a regional level, serves as a precondition for overwhelming mutual negative images and fostering political dialogue between Russia and Lithuania.

Introduction

The political, territorial, social, and cultural interaction and transfusion between Russians and Lithuanians has a centuries-long history. But the current stage of Russian-Lithuanian relations - which started at the end of 1980’s to the beginning of 1990’s - may qualify as phenomenal insofar as they have been developing in a qualitatively new geopolitical reality and foreign policy context. It is logical to raise a question about the priority of the ranking of relationships between each other for both Russia and Lithuania and the answer is likely to be asymmetric. This is due to the fact that for Lithuania, in spite of the proclaimed integration into Euro-Atlantic structures and successfully reaching the end of accession to the EU and NATO, Russia still remains a meaningful

* Dr. Leonid Karabeshkin is a Chairman of the Baltic Club (St. Petersburg, Russia) and Associate Professor of the Eurouniversity (Euroülikool) in Tallinn, Estonia. Address: P.O. Box 488, 191123 St Petersburg, Russia, tel. +372 6115229, e-mail: [email protected] 66

economic partner and political reference point, though often with some negative sides too. For Russia (except the very limited North-West regional group) in terms of trade turnover (this is the argument that used to be regularly mentioned by the Russian leaders, when characterizing relations with other states) Lithuania is of marginal importance. Nevertheless, it should be recognized that the magnitude of the relationship with Lithuania, for Russia, exceeds the scope of its economic weight. This is caused by both traditional and relatively newly emerging reasons. Firstly, there is a long period of common history and co-existence in the framework of a common state and also a formed system of economic links in a broad range of sectors, in particular, the energy sector (including nuclear energy), and transport and transit sectors. The level of economic interdependence, that emerged during the Soviet time, was even more than between Russia and many other republics of contemporary CIS. Along with the economic dimension, the key meaning has been assumed by the politico-psychological one. Relationships with Lithuania (as well as with other Baltic States) play the role of a “thermometer” for processes of domestic political transformation and a searching place in the world. Keeping in account the obvious existence of mutual perception complexes (not always and not all positive ones) both in Lithuania and Russia, then one may conclude that Rus- sian-Lithuanian relations are important not only by the virtue of, but as well as, in spite of enjoying a common history. Secondly, Lithuania is a neighbouring state, of Russia, bordering not the mainland territory, but the Kaliningrad enclave which is even more important. Alongside the natural desire of any country to have stable, and at least not adversary, regimes around the perimeter of its borders, a kind of a “good- neighbourhood belt” versus a cordon sanitaire, cooperation with Lithuania is important with the axis of providing the Russian status of the Kaliningrad Oblast. The top cooperation agenda for the Kaliningrad area is occupied by the issues of “access” – such as passenger, cargo, military transit, transportation of raw materials and energy - which in the Russian political vocabulary has constituted of a “basic subsistence” of the Kaliningrad Oblast. Thirdly, alongside with the “traditional” factors, new ones tend to affect Russian-Lithuanian relations. Accession to the EU and NATO predetermined the new stage of Lithuania’s foreign policy. On one hand, Lithuania is striving to play a more active role in the Euro-Atlantic groupings, by influencing inter alia formulation and the implementation of policies of these organizations towards Russia. On the other hand, with account of its relatively small territory, population, and the economic potential as well as of peripheral geographic location, Lithuania realized the need to look for a “specialized niche” in framework of European politics. Lithuania set a goal for the promotion of its regional status and capitalizing on its “expert” role in the post-Soviet space, first and foremost in the European republics of CIS and South Caucasus, which are treated in Russia as a zone of traditional influence. Lithuania’s line has been supported and stimulated from Washington, which transformed its North European Ini- tiative (NEI) into e-PINE – “Enhanced Partnership in Northern Europe” and 67 affected the EU initiative “Wider Europe – New Neighbourhood” elaboration, furthered by the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Nevertheless, the growing activism of the EU and USA in the region of CIS was accompanied with a negative and suspicious attitude towards the aforementioned initiatives in Moscow has not led to a serious deterioration in Russian-Lithuanian relations. The number of contacts has taken place at the highest political level, there are functioning mechanisms of bilateral cooperation, and by content, featured by the implementation of mutually beneficial economic projects, and these are on a definitely higher level than Russia’s relations with other Baltic States. The author argues that this is reasoned by the fact that in the major issues of Russian-Lithuanian interaction the balance between negative stereotypes of perception and interests of pragmatic cooperation is drifting in favour of the latter. In this article the author tends to show the controversial implications of this balance by reviewing different aspects of economic cooperation, and also the domestic and foreign policy of Russia and Lithuania.

1. Economics of the Russian-Lithuanian . Relationship

Throughout the last decade and a half, Russia has been the leading trade and economic partner of LR. According to Lithuanian statistics, in 2005 Russia occupied the first place rankings both in exports (10.4%) and imports (27.8%). A similar situation remained for 2006 – 11.3% and 27.9% respectively for January through July of 2006. The traditional sphere of Russia’s interest in cooperating with Lithuania are fuel and energy, as well as transport and transit. Russia almost entirely covers the gas balance of Lithuania, granting more competitive prices than for the rest of the EU (105 USD to 135 USD per thousand cube meters in 2006). Besides, the entire gas transit to the Kaliningrad Oblast is performed through Lithuanian territory. The Russian gas monopoly “Gazprom” has a stake of control in gas retailers “Lietuvos Dujos” and “Dujotekana” and purchased the Kaunas TPP. Besides, direct agreements provides for privileged conditions for the gas supply to the Lithuania’s chemical giant “Achema.” It is noteworthy that Lithuania became the first country where “Gazprom” entered the electricity generation business. Alongside with the officially stated purpose of business diversification and penetration into the Lithuanian energy market, which is getting more attractive after termination of the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant, “Gazprom” reportedly pursued the goal of starting to export to the Kaliningrad Oblast. This would help “Gazprom” to decrease the volume of gas to be sold at a much lower domestic price to another Russian monopoly RAO “UES” for

Counted by data from the Department of Statistics LR, http://www.std.lt “President Litvy Nagovoril Na $30: Gazprom Prodolzhaet Povyshat’ Ceny”, Kommersant, May 5, 2006. 68

the Kaliningrad TPP-2. The probability of this scenario is confirmed by the draft of the “Gazprom” Investment Memorandum. Cooperation in the gas sphere, and access of the Russian state monopoly to privatization in Lithuania, witnesses about the pragmatic long-term calcula- tion on behalf of Lithuania to utilize the natural advantage of its geographic location – the proximity to the resources of fossils. At the same time, the story with the double privatization of “Mažeikių Nafta” (MN) is an example of another sort, where the political factors played against the economic benefits. It is well known that after unsuccessful ownership of American “Williams” in 2002, the refinery found itself under the control by Russian oil company YU- KOS, which invested into its modernization and provided a stable oil supply and profitability. The bankruptcy of YUKOS caused by the steps of the Rus- sian leadership, forced the company to sell its assets, including the Lithuanian subsidiary. It became unavoidable when YUKOS lost the quota for oil pumping through the pipeline system of state-controlled “Transneft.” There was an impression that the issue of the foreign assets of YUKOS, including MN, had a peripheral meaning during the process of its parcelliza- tion. The transfer of this property directly to one of the Russian oil companies (“Rosneft” as the main debt holder) was complicated by the fact that formally, property rights belonged to the YUKOS “daughter” company, registered in Hol- land. Though Russian companies “LUKoil” and TNK-BP took part in the tender on MN, their bids proved to be uncompetitive. The best offer was proposed by Polish “PKN Orlen” which defeated “KazMunaiGaz” from Kazakhstan, though the latter proceeded with attempts to outbid MN. After that the accident on the trunk pipeline a “Friendship” happened, what resulted in the reduction of oil pressure and switching off the branch to Biržai. The Russian authorities insist that the pipeline needed a long-term restoration, thus producing speculations on the political motives of the “accident.” The interest of Russian companies, and even competition between them, over control of MN looks natural in context to Russia‘s energy strategy, which stipulates the shaping of strong vertically integrated national energy companies with a world-wide presence. But though the shortage of modern refineries is obvious, Russian companies were not eager to overpay for MN, while the finalists – PKN “Orlen” and “KazMunaiGaz” were ready to offer “political” premiums for entrance into the new markets of oil procession and transit. The “avarice” of Russian companies might be explained by a number of considerations. First of all, they could have decided that Polish and Kazakh companies would fail to provide for a condition of stable oil supply, whereby the majority of observers, including representatives of Lithuanian political elite, realized that none but Russia could be a source of raw materials. The alternative options such as oil import through the Būtingė oil terminal would negatively affect the effectiveness of oil refining, putting it under risk in case of a serious fall in oil prices. The Russian companies will hardly be enthusiastic

Butrin D., Vodo V., “Litva proschaetsia s “Lietuvos dujos”, Kommersant, March 25, 2004. Cf.: http://www.akm.ru/rus/news/2006/october/17/ns1795851.htm 69 about providing a stable supply for a refinery which is out of their control. The problem may exacerbate due to the potential shortage of oil on the Western direction in context of the prospective construction of the pipeline to China. This paradoxically increased the chances of “KazMunaiGaz” to agree with Russia on oil transportation to Lithuania, because Russia is getting more interested in substitute oil flows westwards, which may originate first of all from Kazakhstan. Besides, the high level of relationships between Russia and Kazakhstan - between N. Nazarbaev and V. Putin - as well as the intertwined interests of Russian energy companies in Kazakhstan could contribute to settling the issue. Nevertheless, Russian companies managed to lobby abrogation of the oil transportation quota through the “Transteft” system for “KazMunaiGaz” in November 2005. All of this was to have convinced the Lithuanian Government to support one of the Russian companies in the tender. Though officially, the Lithuanian Government was not a party in the negotiations on selling shares of MN, it explicitly tried to pursue its preferences. The transfer of control to a Russian company was not a preferable option for Lithuania. The former minister of foreign relations A. Valionis openly claimed that the “sale of MN to Poland is a fact of extraordinary geopolitical importance, it is not only a commercial project, but an element of geopolitical battle, where success or failure would be of utmost importance for us.” Seemingly, it is referred to as a battle for Lithuania’s independence from Russian oil supplies, which according to some Lithuanian experts, may be gained through the creation of the united Central European oil concern by means of the amalgamation of Polish, Hungarian, Austrian, and Lithuanian companies. Presumably the position of the Lithuanian Government was as well affected by the again sparked “Russian question.” Some political forces in Lithuania tend to interpret naturally what is explicitly declared by Russian companies and the state’s desire to widen their presence on the European market and take their niche as the world energy leader as an attempt of Rus- sia to project its “illegitimate” influence on Lithuania through dummy firms. In this context “Mažeikių Nafta” was presented as a centre of financing for subversive activities. But it would be an oversimplification and exaggeration to view Russian national interests in supporting the foreign expansion of the Russian energy sector exclusively for the purposes of putting Lithuanian domestic politics under control. Russia’s interest is rather aimed at decreasing political and economic risks of delivering energy resources to the West and supporting strategic investment of Russian companies abroad. The latter is of special importance

Zaslavsky I., “Delo truba. Baku – Tbilisi – Ceyhan i kazakhstanskii’ vybor na Kaspii”, Moscow: Europe, 2005. p. 71. “Veselye sosedi. Khoroshie druz’ia”, Expert, no. 44. November 21, 2005. http://www.expert.ru/printissues/ expert/2005/44/44ex-pov11 BNS, “A.Valionis: “Mažeikių naftos” pardavimas Lenkijai - geopolitinio mūšio dalis”, September 5, 2006 Janeliunas T., Molis A. “The NGEP Ends Lithuania’s Hopes of Becoming a Transit Country”, Baltic Mosaic, 2005, no. 1. p. 30-31. 70

with account to the psychological factors behind some of the recent failures, e.g. the unlucky story of the merger “Severstal” and “Arcelor”. The project 2K aimed at coordination of the Kaliningrad and Klaipeda ports has as well suffered from accusations related to activities of special services. It was initiated in 2000, but in 2003 the Lithuanian Department of State Security brought accusations that it was used for establishing Russian control over transit and withdrawing Russian transit cargoes from Klaipeda to Kaliningrad. Indeed, between 2000 - 2004 the share of Russian cargoes in cargo turnover at the Port of Klaipeda fell down about 5 times or by 5.3 %. But this took place when the project existed in a form of declarations rather than practical implementation. At the same time it should be recognized that Russian and Lithuanian approaches towards implementation of 2K are disaccording, when the very project contains a number of in-built contradictions. For instance, Lithuanian railways and the Port of Klaipeda act as competitors meaning that the reorientation of cargoes towards Kaliningrad is lucrative for the former. After signing the Agreement on Cooperation in Implementation of the 2K project (May of 2005, Trakai), the trend of growing Russia’s cargo share in Klaipeda has manifested and accordingly in 2005-2006 it increased 43% and 64 % respectively.10 Though the contribution of the 2K project to this growth can hardly be properly identified, it sends a positive impetus for business and evidences about the long-term intentions of Russia and Lithuania to cooperate in the transport and transit sphere. The significance of the project was pointed out by President V. Putin during his visit to Kaliningrad (in September of 2006): “What concerns our relationships with Lithuania in this sphere is that we both have no alternatives to joint efforts. I do not think that everything there (in the 2K project – L.K.) has finally been arranged and functioning as we agreed, but I rely that as a result of collaboration all impediments will be removed.”11 The head of the Russian railway company “RZhD” Vladimir Yakunin identified the Lithuanian direction as the most perspective for transit cargo flows though railways, predicting a 40% growth in 2005 - 201012. The recently revived criticism of 2K, catalyzed as well by domestic developments in Lithuania, is evidence of the attempts of utilizing political (or even geopolitical) factors in economic competition. Accompanied by the process of the privatization of “Mažeikių Nafta,” it resulted in a severe worsening of the psychological environment of Russian-Lithuanian relations and excessive politicization of their economic component. Lithuania suspects that Russia may attempt an intentional cut off of the pipeline and hints that the Lithuanian railways as well need renovation, thus jeopardizing the stability of transit to the Kaliningrad Oblast. Russia, in turn, demonstrates an independence from Lithuanian transit routes by pompously opening the railway ferry between Ust-Luga (Leningrad Oblast) and Baltijsk.

Manomaititė M., “Podpisanie proekta 2K garantiruet okonchanie tarifnoj voiny?”, Jura, no. 3. 2005. 10Calculated by: Pavuk O. “Kurs na konteinetizatsiju i konsolidatsiju”, Baltic Course, No. 41, Summer 2007. http://www.baltkurs.com/new/rus/index.htm?read=1512 11 Interfax – Zapad, September 11, 2006. http://www.interfax.by/?id=33&id_sp=26683&d=11&m=09&y =2006&lang=ru 12 Regnum, April 12, 2006, http://www.regnum.ru/news/622734.html 71

At the same time, a number of positive examples of Russian-Lithuanian economic cooperation may be enumerated. Russia and Lithuania managed to protect interests of the Russian metallurgic industry, through providing additional export quotas for service centres of the Russian companies in Lithuania (and Latvia) after EU enlargement.13 Reportedly, the Russian steel company “Mechel” acquired the Kaunas metal processing factory “Nemunas.” However, the opportunity of penetration to Europe through the markets of “new-com- ers” was articulated by experts in Russia,14 in practice few companies utilized it like the aforementioned “Mechel” or “Konversbank” which bought one of the largest retail banks in Lithuania – “Snoras” bank. At the same time, in spite of certain worries related to possible negative implications of EU enlargement for Russian-Baltic economic relationships, those economists were true who assessed that these implications would rather be of marginal influence. In particular, the share of Lithuania in Russia’s trade turnover has not changed substantially, constituting in 2005 about 1.4%, and in May - December 2004 it was 1.3%,15 while the growth of absolute figures was compatible with the total increase in Russian foreign trade.

2. Foreign Policy

As mentioned before, though relations with Lithuania cannot be qualified as a top priority of Russian foreign policy. Lithuania is gaining importance through various contexts of a broader foreign policy agenda meaning Russia’s Baltic policy, the Kaliningrad problematique, and relationships with the USA and European Union. The impact vector of these aspects is both diverse and controversial.

2.1. Russia’s Baltic Policy

Moscow’s Baltic policy has been shaping a controversial context for Rus- sian-Lithuanian relations. On one hand, the notion of the “Baltic states” has acquired a negative sense arising from the ideas of discrimination against Russian ethnic minorities, NATO enlargement, and attempts to “rewrite history” or to glorify some of its unsavoury periods, as well as from simple nostalgia over the late USSR. Pribaltika – the Soviet name for the three Baltic republics – obtained a certain revanchist connotation. On the other hand, in Russia’s Baltic policy, Lithuania has always enjoyed the place of “most favoured” Baltic nation. The evolution of Russia’s policy towards the Baltic States has gone

13 Joint Statement on EU Enlargement and EU-Russia Relations. Luxemburg, April 27, 2004. http://ec.europa. eu/comm/external_relations/russia/russia_docs/js_elarg_270404.htm 14 “Rossiia i Pribaltika II. Report”, Moscow: Council on Foreign and Security Policy (SVOP), 1999, http:// www.svop.ru/live/materials.asp?m_id=6883&r_id=6915 15 Based on data of the Federal Customs Service of the Russian Federation, http://www. customs.ru/ru/stats/arkhiv-stats-new/popup.php?id286=125 72

through several stages. During the years 1989 - 1991 the Russian Federation (RSFSR) forged a tactical alliance with Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian republics in opposing the Soviet leadership. However, their interests began to diverge after the Soviet Union collapsed and Russia faced the need to develop its new foreign policy course. At that time, Russia sought to preserve the elements of the Soviet superpower grandeur by prioritizing global, over narrow, regional interests. On one hand, Moscow agreed to withdraw Russian troops from Lithuania by the end of 1993 which was faster than from Latvia or Estonia. This signalled an emerging differentiation of Russia’s approaches towards the Baltic States. On the other hand, Lithuania, on a par with other Baltic states, became a target for Russia’s coercive policies. The winter of 1992-1993 demonstrated the ability of Moscow to wield its economic power, including the “energy supplies” card.16 At the doctrinal level, the mentioned differentiation was stipulated in Russia’s “Long-term Strategy of Relations with the Baltic States” published in early 1996. By that time, Russian troops had been fully withdrawn and Mos- cow’s major concerns came to be the rights of Russian-speaking minorities and the prevention of the Baltic States’ accession to NATO. The “Strategy” was premised on distinguishing among the Baltic countries. Russia was prepared to forge economic ties and good-neighbourly relations, including the signing of border treaties, if the Baltic states committed to fully observing minority rights and promised to forgo NATO membership. As long as Lithuania did not create problems for ethnic Russians to obtain citizenship, and was engaged with Russia on the Kaliningrad issue, Vilnius was touted by Moscow as an example for other Baltic States to follow while the main Russian criticism was directed at Latvia and Estonia. During this period, Moscow and Vilnius arranged the regime of Russian military transit through Lithuania. In 1997, the two sides signed agreements on their borders and delimitation of the sea shelf. Similar agreements between Russia and other Baltic States were initialled but never officially signed by 2006. It is worth noting that President Yeltsin signed the border agreement with Lithuania despite objections from the Russian State Duma which warned that it would fail the ratification.17 Duma deputies raised the issues of Russian transit to the Kaliningrad region across Lithuania, Vilnius’ aspirations to join NATO, and even the rights of Russian-speaking minorities. They were also invoking the controversial inclusion of the Klaipeda (Memel) region into Lithuania after World War II. The border treaty with Lithuania was only ratified in 2003, as part of a package that included agreements on the Kaliningrad transit regime. In contrast to Estonia, Lithuania (and also Latvia) was granted most-favoured- nation (MFN) status in trade with Russia.

16 Vitkus G., “Lithuanian-Russian Relations in 1990-1995. A Study of Lithuanian Foreign Policy”, Untersuc- hungen des FKKS an der Universität Mannheim, 12/1996, p. 17: http://www.uni-mannheim.de/fkks/fkks12. pdf 17 See: Address of the State Duma to President of the Russian Federation on planned signing of the Border Treaty between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Lithuania], adopted September 26, 1997, http:// www.akdi.ru/gd/post/19352GD.htm - in Russian 73

Along with coercion, Moscow began to employ tactics of engagement and reassurance. In 1997, Russia proposed multilateral security guarantees to the Baltic States in return for their forgoing of the NATO option. Speaking at a press-conference in Moscow, Lithuanian President A. Brazauskas voiced his discontent with a “hasty rejection of security guarantees offered by the Rus- sian president.” However, the three Baltic leaders soon declared the Russian proposal unacceptable because their countries were hoping to obtain security guarantees by integrating into Euro-Atlantic institutions. This did not stop top Russian officials (President B. Yeltsin, Prime-Minister V. Chernomyrdin and Foreign Minister E. Primakov) from pressing ahead with this initiative. As its first move, Russia announced that it was reducing armed forces by 40 percent in the North-Western region, including Kaliningrad oblast. Yet this unilateral initiative failed to impress foreign experts who considered it inevitable in light of the crisis that afflicted the Russian military. The financial default of August 1998 led to escalation of the domestic political crisis in Russia, predefining concentration on economic issues and setting up a period of “peripherization” of the Baltic issue in Russian foreign policy. Russia quite droopingly reacted on a politically motivated deal on privatizing the MN refinery and adoption by the outgoing Seimas the Law on Compensation for the Damage Caused by Unlawful Acts of State Authorities (2000). This period clearly elicited Russia’s inability to coordinate foreign policy activities and economic interests of Russian companies abroad. This resulted in a growing temptation for some companies to pursue their own policies, which often were not corresponded to Russian national interests. A growth of Russia’s activism in Baltic policy became a result of relative macroeconomic and political stabilization after V. Putin ensured his presidency. The content of the new stage was characterized by a number of experts as “pragmatization”.18 The role of economic factors in Russia’s Baltic policy increased, Russia acknowledged the unavoidability of a NATO enlargement to the Baltic States, and with moderate optimism was expecting the enlargement of the EU, pursuing a strategy of damage minimization. As a result, such a problematic issue in bilateral relations as the signing (with Estonia and Latvia) and ratification (with Lithuania) of border treaties, which were treated in Russia as an instrument of containing their accession to NATO and the EU, lost its former relevance. The accents in such an important issue as defending the rights of national minorities have been changing as well. In interview with Finnish journalists in September 2001 V. Putin claimed that he “does not intend to make a problem out of the status of the Russian-speaking population in the Baltic States, which hinders the development of intergovernmental relations, because this would be to the detriment of Russian themselves living in the Baltic States.”19 The domestic political changes in the Baltic States, as well, were to improve

18 Cf., e.g.: “Rossiia i Baltia: 2010. Report”. Moscow: Foundation for Prospective Studies and Initiatives, April 2003, http://www.psifoundation.ru/publications/2003/05/baltika1.htm 19 Interview of V.Putin to Helsingen Sanomat, September 1, 2001. 74

a background of Russian-Baltic relations. In Estonia a moderate former head of the ESSR A. Ruutel was elected as a President, in Lithuania a left-center coalition of A. Brazauskas was created. There was a hope that the Baltic States in lieu of strengthening the anti-Russian vector in NATO and the EU would prefer employing a role of a bridge between Russia and the West. This period is marked by the active development of Russian-Lithuanian political dialogue. In the end of March 2001, Lithuanian President V. Adamkus made an official visit to Moscow and Kaliningrad. Though, in spite of the efforts undertaken by Lithuanian diplomats and other officials, the border treaties had not been ratified on the eve of the visit and the joint Russian-Lithuanian Declaration was signed.20 In this document Russia implicitly recognized the right of Lithuania to become a member of NATO (agreeing that each state has its right to choose the way of providing security with parallel obligation not to strengthen security at the expense of other states) and promised to proceed with efforts aimed at ratifying border treaties. The very fact of signing this declaration demonstrated a qualitatively higher level of mutual understanding in bilateral relationships in comparison with other Baltic States (the drafts of Political Declarations with Latvia and Estonia proposed by Russia in spring were rejected by Riga and Tallinn). The election “of the person who had for many years lived and studied in St.-Petersburg”21 R. Paksas as a President of Lithuania in 2003 gave a chance to further the progress in Russian-Lithuanian relations. The press-service for the Kremlin at least twice informed about direct phone conversations between R. Paksas and V. Putin. Besides, the Russian President in one of the addresses emphasized a personal role of R. Paksas: “For some time past…Russian-Lithua- nian relations have reached a qualitatively new level of understanding and mutually beneficial cooperation. In this your personal contribution is obvious.”22 The statement of R. Paksas on the meeting of Lithuanian ambassadors indicated his intention to pursue a more balanced foreign policy line: “Lithuania has accumulated considerable experience of co-operation with Russia’s leadership and Kaliningrad region of Russia. It would be useful to build on this experience in developing co-operation with other, first of all Northwest, regions of Russia.”23 The proposals on the “northwest initiative” were positively met in Russia, including regional authorities of Russia’s North West. Unfortunately, due to subjective reasons and the consequent political crisis in Lithuania, it was not further elaborated. Another side of Russian’s Baltic policy “pragmatization” manifested in the acceleration of measures, ended at the diminishing transit dependence from the ports of the Baltic States, inherited from USSR. The started construction of

20 http://www.kremlin.ru/text/psmes/2001/03/32255.shtml 21 Words of V.Putin on Russia-EU Summit, St.-Petersburg, May 31, 2003. http://www.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2003/05/47580.shtml 22 Press-release of Press-service of President of Russia. 16 February, 2004. http://www.kremlin.ru/text/ psmes/2004/02/60665.shtml 23 Speech by H. E. Mr. Rolandas Paksas, President of the Republic of Lithuania, during the meeting with the Lithuanian Diplomatic Corps. February 27, 2004, http://paksas.president.lt/en/one.phtml?id=3602 75 the Baltic Pipeline System (BPS) to the new port of Primorsk (the Leningrad Oblast) became a quintessence of this line. Simultaneously with diversification of its transit flows, Russia tends to take under control the transit infrastructure of the Baltic States, thus ensuring itself from probable changes of domestic political conjuncture in these countries. The decision on the cancellation of oil transit through the pipeline towards Latvian Ventspils, adopted at the end of 2002 and ultimately fulfilled in 2003, was advantageous for Lithuania and resulted in a reorientation of oil flows to the Butinge terminal. Since this period, Russia’s policy of protecting the interests of Russian companies abroad is getting more consistent. The process of preparation and the accession of Lithuania alongside with other Baltic States to NATO and the EU resulted in the erosion of Russia’s Baltic policy agenda. On the one hand, it failed to become a comprehensive policy line, while its instruments (such as differentiation) proved to be ineffective. In particular, it failed to prevent NATO enlargement and significantly improve the situation with Russian-speaking minorities in Latvia and Estonia. On the other hand, Russia has been gradually realizing that in the forthcom- ing perspective the negative stereotypes of mutual perception will hardly be overcome, while economic cooperation may become not a result but a condition for improving relationships on the political level. Besides, with account to a sustainable economic record and growing international influence, Russia became less cautious that some concessions on its part would be interpreted as an indicator of its weakness rather than a goodwill gesture. So, the elements of reassurance without engagement in Russia’s policy towards the Baltic States have appeared. It stipulates a more individual approach to all three Baltic States, thus weakening the impact of the policy towards the Baltics in general for Russian-Lithuanian relations. At the same time the weight of Russia-West relationships, including the Kaliningrad issue, has increased.

2.2. Kaliningrad

Cooperation on Kaliningrad has traditionally been a top issue in the agenda of Russian-Lithuanian relationships, as soon it corresponds to interests of both Russia and Lithuania. Russia is interested in keeping an indivisibility of its political and economic, information as well as cultural and humanitarian space, with the Kaliningrad enclave. This is a prerequisite for preserving territorial integrity and sovereignty, no matter how the role of these definitions might be criticized in the West. Among the natural priorities of Lithuania, related to Kaliningrad, the Swedish researcher I. Oldberg emphasized economic interests (utilizing the advantages of the Kaliningrad Oblast as a “bridgehead” for penetration into the Russian market), sustaining cooperative modus operandi in relations with Russia on the eve of accession to EU and NATO and after, playing the role of a channel for EU policy towards Kaliningrad, beneficial in terms of the political emancipation of Lithuania in regional context and 76

in European politics in general.24 Indeed, the Kaliningrad problematique has become a stabilizing factor in relations with Russia, the interaction on which was not disrupted even in the periods of the largest tensions in bilateral relations, in particular in 1999-2000. As a result of such cooperation, in February 2000, the Nida Initiative aimed at making joint projects in the priority fields of the Northern Dimension Action Plan was proposed. Actualization of the Kaliningrad problematique was caused by the pending May 2004 enlargement of the EU and Lithuania’s accidence to the Schengen Agreement. It made impossible the preserving of the earlier acting provisions of transit for Russian citizens to/from the Kaliningrad Oblast through the territory of Lithuania. As a possible solution, Russia suggested to conclude a special Russian-Lithuanian agreement which would codify a preferential fashion of relationships on Kaliningrad as a precondition for ratification of border treaties. But these tactics appeared to be of little effectiveness since the position of Lithuania was objectively restricted by the approved terms in relation to accession to the EU (acquis communautaire). It must be mentioned that Lithuania came to the European Commission with the initiative of making exceptions from Schengen regulations for Kaliningraders, but it aroused negative reaction in Brussels. Some observers in Russia suggested that Lithuania intentionally tried to propose initially unacceptable suggestions to Brussels in order to get rid of the responsibility for settling the transit and visa issue. The Deputy Head of the Russian MFA, E. Gusarov, characterized the ambiguity of Lithuanian policy in the following statement: “The Lithuanian position seems to contain a certain slyness… they are screening themselves behind the position of the European Union. At the same time, there is an objective interest.”25 Indeed, Lithuania had a specific interest in preserving the maximally favourable regime in regards to visiting the Kaliningrad Oblast for Lithuanian citizens due in account to the large-scale economic and humanitarian links within the region. It was not a surprise that Lithuania, at higher levels, suggested the introduction of magnet cards which would facilitate border crossing for both Kaliningrad and Lithuanian residents. Anyhow, the main part of the negotiation process on Kaliningrad was gradually transferred from the technical and bureaucratic levels, to the highest political level of relations between the EU and Russia. Russian diplomacy once again had to resort to tactics of bilateral contacts with the leading countries of the EU. This was in order to achieve a long-expected compromise by the summit between Russia and the EU (November 2002, Brussels). It stipulated the introduction of facilitated (railway) travel documents (F(R)TD) for land and railway transit through the Lithuanian territory. The Russian-European political agreements were then put into practical terms in the framework of the Russian-Lithuanian dialogue during the winter/spring of 2002-2003. Though

24 Oldber I., “Kaliningrad: Russian exclave, European enclave”, Stockholm: Swedish Defense Research Agency, June 2001, p. 43. 25 Minutes of the State Duma session, June 19, 2002, http://www.akdi.ru 77 this process was successfully finalized by July 2003, once again it demonstrated a shortage of trust in the Russian-Lithuanian relations which derived inter alia from the impact of negative stereotypes of mutual perception. So, because of this, Lithuania insisted on a prior ratification of the border treaties, while on the other hand Russia at first proposed to work out a final form of implementation of the RF-EU agreement alleging that a “representative of Lithuania adopted a position, which varies from the agreements, achieved on the summit Russia- EU.”26 Additional tensions were caused as well by the incidents on Lithuania’s borders with the Kaliningrad Oblast and Belarus, referred to as unacceptable from the Russian point of view, conduct of Lithuanian border guards while checking travel documents of train passengers. Eventually the mechanism of FTD – FRTD came into force, when Russia not only ratified the Treaties on Border and Delineation of the Sea Shelf, but as well signed and ratified the Agreement on Readmission of Illegal Migrants. The latter has become the first international document of this kind for Russia. However, despite the bravura statements of all involved parties that the transit is functioning efficiently and does not make problems, the real spill over of the visa/transit negotiation process on a broader context of bilateral relations is hardly positive. The achieved compromise has an asymmetric character, while the very FTD intrinsically is a quasi-visa27 and number of people who have chosen railway transport continued to fall down.28 The Lithuanian side persistently modified the conditions for transit by the requirement of an insurance policy or prohibition of transit for “potent” pharmaceuticals. Some Russian experts believe that Russia was to have rejected the Agreement on such terms and organized a full-fledged air-bridge to Kaliningrad. According to the Situ- ation Analysis of the Council for Foreign and Security Policy (SVOP), though both parties will abstain from harsh statements, the issue will continue to be a source of aggravation in Russian-European relations.29 Of course, all parties recognize the sovereign right of Lithuania to know who is crossing its territory. At the same time, the currently functioning transit regime hardly corresponds to the “threat” which this transit poses. In particular, no single illegal migrant has left a Russian transit train and has been deported according to the provisions of the Agreement on Readmission. Alongside with passenger transit, the issues of cargo and military transit seem to be far from finding their final resolution. In spite of the assurances made by Vilnius before the EU enlargement, transit towards Kaliningrad has

26 Stenography of answers of Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation I. Ivanov after the address in the Council of Federaion, Federal Assembly. March 26, 2003, http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/ sps/8BBCEA21DC27333243256CF50063BE92 27 The consular service of Lithuania informs, that “FTD are made equivalent to visas, which does not allow entrance to other country”, http://amb.urm.lt/kaliningradas/ambtopmenuitems.php?TopMenuID=1200&Si teID=86&LangID=3 28 This trend tends to overcome only in 2006. Cf.: Nilov A., “Na Kaliningradskoi’ zheleznoi’ doroge vyros objem grozuperevozok i passazhiropotok”, http://amb.urm.lt/kaliningradas/ambtopmenuitems.php?TopM enuID=1200&SiteID=86&LangID=3 29 “Otnosheniia Rossii i Evropei’skogo soiuza: Sovremennaia situaciia i perspektivy. Situation Analysis”. Under supervision of S. Karaganov, http://www.globalaffairs.ru/docs/report.doc 78

become virtually more expensive and complicated. The qualitative increase in transit through Lithuania is masking its quality, this featured by a fall in trade turnover between the Kaliningrad Oblast and other Russia’ regions.30 The progress on signing a bilateral treaty on military transit is also not expected, though the prospects of such document were indirectly envisioned by the Joint Russian-Lithuanian Statement (Moscow, March 30, 2001). So, the Government of Lithuania by de facto continues to regulate Russian military transit on a unilateral basis. Besides, it is a known and rather negative stance on behalf of Lithuania on the issue of organizing non-stop high-speed railway communication to the Kaliningrad Oblast. There are uncertainties on how the transit regime to/from the Kaliningrad Oblast will be arranged after abolition of internal borders in the EU, which may happen by 2008, after Lithuania ultimately joins the Schengen space. Set against this background, Vilnius and Brussels have periodically encouraged Russia not to get hung up about the transit aspect and pay more attention instead to economic development on the basis of a more cooperative approach towards involvement of the European Union. At the same time, it is clear that the interests and policies of Russia, the EU, and also Lithuania on the economic future of Kaliningrad are divergent.31 All of this, if it is desired, might be interpreted in the context of the implementation by Vilnius and Brus- sels of the policy line aimed at “natural” dissociation of the Kaliningrad Oblast from the Russian Federation. The officially stressed rhetoric on the inherent belongingness of this region to Russia is accompanied by low-profile suffocation of arteries, connecting Kaliningrad with the mainland Russia, and providing more favourable conditions for boosting cooperation with the neighbouring countries. Such an interpretation of Lithuania’s and the EU’s positions, conditions Russia’s response and has been expressed in a form of an emphasized demonstration of opportunities to decrease transit dependence on Lithuania (presentation of the railway ferry Ust-Luga – Baltijsk presided over by V. Putin) or the introduction of a relatively large minimal volume of investment to be accepted into the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) regime, while Lithuania is represented in the region mostly by small and medium enterprises. In general, the impact vector of the Kaliningrad problematique on Rus- sian-Lithuanian relations is quite controversial. Positively, it has contributed to sustaining tonus in bilateral dialogue in 1990;s and 2000’s and also the elaboration of experience and mechanisms of interaction between Vilnius - Moscow and Vilnius - Kaliningrad, and all of this could then be translated into other spheres of cooperation. Negatively, it indicated that the fears on real intentions of each other are still in force, thus weakening balance (including the psychological one) between cooperation and competition in favour of the latter and playing the role of a long-run “coolant” for bilateral relations.

30 “Kak sdelat’ bolee effektivnoi’ sistemu sotrudnichestva Rossii i ES”, Moscow: Probel -2000, 2005. p. 39-41. 31 Karabeshkin L. “Rossiia, ES i problema Kaliningrada”, Evropei’skaia bezopasnost’: sobytiia, otsenki, prognozy, no. 3 (19). Moscow: INION RAS, 2006. p. 7-9 (in Russian). 79 2.3. Relations Between Russia and the West as a Factor for Russian-Lithuanian Relations

The past recent years have demonstrated the increasingly vivid trend of the growing impact of Russia’s relationships with the USA and the EU on the context of Russia’s relations with the Baltic States. In the beginning of 1990’s, the West and first of all the USA were taking Russia’s regional concerns into consideration, e.g. on the Baltic membership in NATO. In addition, it is better to tell not about the American factor in Russian-Lithuanian relations at that period, but rather about Lithuanian (or the Baltic) factor in Russian-American relationships. At that time Washington was not ready to mar relations with Russia on this issue. But already in the second half of 1990’s the negative Russian attitude towards NATO enlargement was not considered. Though Russia tried to draw “red lines,” making relationships with the West dependent on the membership of the Baltic States in NATO, it was not interested in open confrontation and preserved serious financial dependence from the West. In its turn, the latter did not make harsh steps such as: proclaiming the policy of “open doors” for membership in the Alliance the precise parameters and timing of the next wave of enlargement were not announced. The Baltic Charter, signed in 1999 between the USA and the Baltics, was interpreted both as a waiting room and a as a substitute accession of the Baltic States to NATO. But even without this issue the Russian-Western relations tended to deteriorate. During the first presidency of V. Putin, the Russian foreign policy was gradually drifting from the “Primakov’s Doctrine,” embarking on a course of revitalization of dialogue between the USA and EU. It is also worth mentioning that the current Russian President, being yet a “successor” to B. Yeltsin, among one of the instruments of international legitimization used the idea of trans- forming the Kaliningrad Oblast into the “pilot region” for Russian-European cooperation. This was outlined in the Mid-Term Strategy of Relationships with the European Union presented by than Prime-Minister V. Putin in Helsinki (in October 1999). Though the “pilotness” has not been officially conceptualized, it indicated the desire of the new Russian leadership to seek for rapprochement with Europe. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 led to serious improvement of relations between Moscow and Washington, based on the common interest of combating international terrorism. As a kind of compensation for NATO enlargement, Russia received a renewed format of the Russia-NATO dialogue – the new NATO-Russia Council (NRC) was established in May 2002. This period was marked by positive dynamics in Russian-Baltic and Russian-Lithuanian relations as well. Lithuania underscored its desire to enhance the development of contacts between Russia and NATO. On the hearings in the House of Repre- sentatives of the U.S. Congress, the Lithuanian Ambassador Vygaudas Ušackas emphasized that accession of the Baltic States to NATO would “strengthen the 80

stability in Europe as well as contribute to a new relationship which is being shaped between Russia and NATO, which we certainly welcome.”32 But already, since 2003, the crisis symptoms both in Russian-European and Russian-American relationships manifested themselves. The ambiguous Russian position on Iraq, diverging approaches to definitions of a terrorist threat, “color” revolutions in CIS countries, the growing presence of the West on the post-Soviet space, the YUKOS case, and also different approaches to energy security, composed only a narrow list of the newly emerged controversies. Rus- sia’s Western counterparts specified the fact that true partners should adhere to common values alongside with common interests. As a pattern, Russia was called to adopt Western standards of democracy and human rights. The Rus- sian political elite, in turn, insisted on a vision of democracy for Russia which crystallized into a concept of “sovereign democracy.” The exacerbation of relationships between Russia and the West tended to aggravate the environment for relationships with the Baltic States. After accession to the EU and NATO they were looking for a niche in Euro-Atlantic politics. Feeling the demand for critics of Russia on the part of the West, the Baltic countries readily met it. The active role of Valdas Adamkus in the Or- ange Revolution in Ukraine, the profound support of the new ruling regime in Georgia, the denial to attend celebrations for the 60th Anniversary of the Great Victory in Moscow (May 9, 2005), and exposure of Russian “spies” serving in the diplomatic corps had not gone unnoticed in Russia. Such a policy of the neighbour could hardly be welcomed in Moscow. There were no fears about the excessive growth of Lithuanian influence on the post-So- viet space. The main anxiety was caused by the trend of growing American, and to a lesser extent, European presence in the CIS where Lithuania positioned itself as a “subcontractor” of carrying it out. The Baltic States, as the first former Soviet Republics accessed to the EU and NATO, opened a symbolic door for further east- ward penetration of Euro-Atlantic groupings. The assurances by Washington, that further NATO enlargement is not aimed at undermining Russia’s interests, carry little conviction for the Russian political elite. As a response Russia opted for tactics of “marginalization” of the Baltic States in international context. On the one hand, it was focused on the cultivation of a negative image of the Baltic States, which are used to violate human rights and turn in to a “hero” the crimes of Nazism and revise the results of WWII. On the other hand, Russia revived the tactics of contrasting “old” and “new” Europe. The logics of “marginalization” predetermined the non-invitation of Lithuanian (and Polish) leaders for celebrations of the 750th Anniversary of Kaliningrad (2005) or promotion of the project of the North European Gas Pipeline from Russia to Germany bypassing territories of the Baltic States and Poland.

32 NATO Enlargement: A View from the Candidate Countries. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Europe, Committee on International Relations. House of Representatives. 107th Congress, Second session, serial no. 107-8, May 1, 2002, p. 43. 81 3. Domestic Context of Foreign Policy

At the very beginning of the process of nation-state building, Lithuania like many other newly emerged or transition countries, employed the model of the so called “conflict ethnic conduct,” which consisted of utilizing the image of the outside enemy for domestic consolidation and attracting political attention and economic assistance of the countries of a “democratic core.” It is not surprising, that it is the former metropolis which was selected for this role. As far as the Lithuanian statehood was strengthening, this mobilizing mechanism was gradually losing its importance. But even now Russia continues to stay a significant “other” or a negative point of reference. Evaldas Nekrašas qualitatively describes relations with Russia as vulnerable, considering that Lithuania‘s membership in the EU and NATO has not eliminated but rather added to the escalation of Russia militarily and politically as well as the economic threat.33 Simultaneously, there are strong doubts about the predictability of Russian policy. This is conditioned not only by the growing authoritarianism, mentioned by Lithuanian journalists and political analysts. In fact, in spite of Lithuania‘s claims to be an expert in the post-Soviet region, Russia is getting a terra incognita for it, while the serious analysis of political and economic processes in Russia are often replaced by ideologised rhetoric. The cautious attitude to Russia among Lithuanian political elite is rooted in public opinion, but at the same time is fuelling it up. According to the public polls, 46.2% of Lithuanians believe that Russia represents a threat for their country, while the opposite opinion is shared by 39.1%.34 Unfortunately, the thesis on the all-permeating “Moscow hand” is a meaningful argument in settling issues of domestic political and economic agenda, which works effectively without solid evidences. It is worth reminding the stories of R. Paksas’s impeachment, the political neutralization of V. Uspasskih, and the most recent fire on the MN refinery. It is remarkable, that the impact of the “Moscow hand” is a priori adversarial, while nobody is afraid of the “Washington hand”, though methods and provisional damage of both can be similar. One may remember the loss brought about by the deal with American company “Williams” which was lobbied by authorities of the USA. The discussion about a new informational type of threat that originated in the East has been revitalized recently. The point is that Russian audiovisual content aspires to occupy a growing share of Lithuanian TV channels. The image of Russia as a source of threat naturally affects the defining of foreign policy ends of Lithuania, augmenting measures on limiting Russia’s influence and fencing from it. Such measures, on the one hand, include strengthening Transatlantic links and relationships with Washington, and on the other hand, providing political and economic assistance to certain CIS countries, in particular through supporting their aspirations for NATO and EU membership

33 Nekrašas E., “Lithuanian Foreign Policy: Achievements, Concepts and Predicaments”, Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review, no. 1-2. 2004, p. 28-35. 34 BNS, October 19, 2006. 82

(from this perspective, Lithuania not only serves American interest on the post- Soviet space, but as well has its own one). There is a widely spread assumption in Lithuania, that the country cannot entirely rely on Europe in ensuring its security, because the largest countries of “old Europe” could make a deal with Russia, behind the backs of small states, thus betraying their interests. Respectively, the Lithuanian image in Russia is beginning to be perceived in the context of a newly emerging cordon sanitaire around the perimeter of Russia’s borders. Whereby in public opinion, Lithuania has steadily occupied the highest ranks in the “hostility index” – both in 2005 and 2006 Lithuania was qualified by 42% of respondents as adverse to Russia (2nd - 3rd place after Latvia and Georgia).35 One more significant factor having roots in domestic discourse and affecting foreign policy refers to different interpretations of XX century history. Lithuania tried to inscribe the discussion of historic issues into the general context of a bilateral dialogue. Russia persistently rejected such attempts (V. Putin stated that: “…Some of our historical heritage is very complex, but we wouldn’t like to see it additionally politicized”36) and emphasized the thesis about the voluntary character of inclusion of the Baltic States into USSR in 1940. In fact, this does not mean that approaches to evaluation in a number of historic events in Russia and Lithuania are ultimately incompatible. The main reason for Russia’s rigid position is disbelief on the part of the political elite, that acknowledgement of the occupation and bringing official apologies will be used by Lithuania for improving bilateral relations. Vice versa, the set perception stereotype gives one ground to expect their further deterioration, producing new condemnations and adding legitimacy to the claims of financial compensations.

Conclusion

The ambassador of the Republic of Lithuania in Russia, R. Šidlauskas, in one of his interviews characterized Russian-Lithuanian relations as smooth, in a legal and practical sense, specifying that border issues have been settled, treaties have been ratified, and problems that would need unachievable solutions are lacking. Simultaneously, he pointed out a negative psychological environment.37 The problems associated with negative perceptions and stereotypes affect all spheres of Russian-Lithuanian relations being – economic, foreign policies, and their domestic context - this often playing a role of an additional irritant and constraint for their development. Often this results in assessing steps of each other in terms of a zero sum game. Nevertheless, the 15 years

35 Golov A., “Strany-druz’ia i strany-vragi dlia Rossii: peremeny za god”, June 5, 2006, http://www.levada. ru/press/2006060502.html 36 Vladimir Putin had a press briefing at the International Press Centre in Strelna, St Petersburg. July 17, 2006. http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/sps/6831F8C1E83F4664C32571AE002A97E6 37 BNS, 17 May 2006. 83 history of the bilateral relations has demonstrated that as a rule, the balance between pragmatic interests and stereotypes drifts in favour of the former. The accumulated experience and elaborated mechanisms of interaction, mutually accepted rules of game, and also the foremost rational estimation of benefits of practical cooperation in various spheres from economy to ecology constitute an objective basis for it. In the long-term optimistic scenario, the factor of negative mutual perceptions is going to weaken this thus decreasing the opportunities for utilizing it in domestic politics. Relationships between Russia, the EU and the USA, alongside with keeping elements of competition, are doomed for cooperation and probably partnership, thus reducing the demand for criticism towards Russia. So, because of this, the Baltic States will confront with necessity of building a cooperative model of relationships with their Eastern neighbour. The development of economic and humanitarian links, in particular at a regional level, serves as a precondition for overwhelming mutually negative images and fostering political dialogue between Russia and Lithuania.

Lithuania’s . Eastern . Neighbours

87 Virgilijus Pugačiauskas* Lithuanian Military Academy

Electoral Democracy in Russia: . Trends and Prospects

The paper reviews the phenomena of the “party of power” and “administrative resource,” which have become an integral part of the Russian electoral system. These said phenomena are considered anti-democratic and informal elements, preventing the consolidation of the democratic electoral system. Practices of federal election, those at the end of 2005 and also the regional of 2006, are coherently discussed. This with the goal to explore the extent and methods of the dispersion of the said phenomena of the electoral process and the impact of political conjuncture related thereto. Based on the comments established, possible preliminary scenarios of the oncoming election are discussed, in particular that of State Duma in 2007 and certain possible links to the Presidential election in 2008.

Introduction

Modern Russia is often described as a controlled electoral democracy; that is the greatest national achievements in the democratisation process are related to the democratic functioning of the election mechanism, ensuring a legal and peaceful way for the change of powers. There is legislative basis, which provides for democratic procedures of the election process. Citizens are now enabled to express their civil duty, the election takes place in due time and the runners in the election do not question its results. For the first time in Russian history, power receives legitimization from the people. Therefore the election can be regarded as a significant quality feature of democracy, although its qualitative and quantitative parameters fade in the overall context in political regime wherein the election process takes place. Political parties in Russia do not perform the principal policy making function as is the case in the representative democracy; rather they express themselves in politics as certain additional instruments of personalised power. Lastly, the outcome of the party system and its brief historical development is particularly fragmented and unstable; political parties standing in society are weak and the massive electoral behaviour of voters is not settled yet.

* Dr. Virgilijus Pugačiauskas is an associated professor of the Political Science Department of the Lithu- anian Military Academy. Address: Šilo 5a, LT-10322 Vilnius, Lithuania tel. +370-5-2103569, e-mail: [email protected] Sakwa R., Russian politics and society, 3 rd., ed., New York: Routledge, 2002, p. 172–200; McFaul M., “Political Parties” in McFaul M., Petrov N., Ryabov A., Between dictatorship and democracy. Russian post–communist reform, Washington: Carnegie endowment for international peace, 2004, p. 105–131. 88

The principal purpose of the paper is to review the Russian election practise, which has risen over more than a decade on the basis of an informal phenomena: to review the “party of power” and administrative resource; to analyse the development trends of election system that have emerged and the traditions which have formed in practises of federal and regional elections; and to compare the conformity of the same to the rules of the democratic elections, as well as that based on the study performed to attempt the shaping of the prospects of the oncoming election of 2007 and 2008.

1. Election Facts

In such a vast country consisting of 89 federal units, elections on various levels (federal, regional, and local municipal) are an almost everyday Sunday practise, and the elections statistics is particularly impressive: 3,000 elections in 4 years and 20,000 total in 2000. Two million people or approximately 2% of the population is related to arranging the workings of the election process in one way or another. With view to preventing the election process from becoming routine, which would have a direct negative impact on the activity of the electors, the efforts since 2006 were taken to implement the so called single election day project, where the election of all levels took place simultaneously: e.g. on 8 October, two federal levels (repeated election to the State Duma), 27 regional and 387 local municipal institution election took place. The literature of political science names the election of a national level, i. e. the election of the State Duma and presidential one as electoral cycles: the first in 1993, 1995–1996, the second from 1999–2000, the third from 2003–2004; all of them took place within a short interval except for the first one. According to Mr. Vladimir Gelman, a political scientist, it was the second political cycle that has ended the process of the so called constitutive elections and marked the end of political regime transformation process. Yet one has to note that further steps of a rather radical character with view to strengthen the so called vertical of power have witnessed the instability of the political regime and the further consolidation towards mono-centric power rather than the end of transformation process. We shall focus chiefly on the electoral practice of various levels which helps to discover the democratic level of the election system, rather than on the technical elements of the election system such as the voting composition structure of the election districts or the election formula. Based on experience of the State Duma and presidential election, one can distinguish two principal phenomena of the Russian election campaigns, such as the “party of power” and administrative resource directly related thereto; the two have become an integral part of the election and have a significant impact on the results of the

Ibidem, p. 24; “Сведения о назначенных выборах”, http://www.cikrf.ru/_2/doc_2_1.htm, 2006 04 02. Гельман В., Второй электоральный цикл и трансформация политического режима в России, http:// www.spb.ru/socio/files/cycle_2s.pdf. 89 political competition. On the other hand, it is those specific phenomena of the election system that are the principal indicators causing well-founded doubts regarding the democracy of the Russian election system. In fact, they should not be considered as phenomena of an autonomous character detached from the overall socio-political and public context of Russia. Before we begin exploring the problematic issues, it is worthwhile to briefly describe the legislative basis of the Russian election process. One must stress that the laws governing the Russian election process are consistent with principal provisions of democratic elections and correspond to the standards of rights and liberties of the election, thus enabling electors to express their will freely. The said practise, or more precisely the consolidation of the election system, has existed since 1999-2000 where institutions of central power have successfully agreed and passed principal laws governing elections. The election laws are further improved and reformed by amending or supplementing certain rules of law. In fact one can state that such amendments or improvements take place far to often, as many as 13 took place in 2005, including more significantly worth mentioning: the financing of the parties was increased 10 fold; there was a change of the mixed voting system to the proportional one when electing members of the State Duma; the prohibition to form election blocks in elections of all levels; and the representing threshold has been increased by 7%. These amendments are mostly related to the Kremlin political strategy with view to stabilise and strengthen the positions of dominant party, United Russia, and further decrease the number of parties. In the following year, the number of improvements have been initiated by members of United Russia (possibility to vote against all has been eliminated and the procedure of preliminary voting has been reinstated, etc.). One can assess constant amendments of election laws also as temporary tactical steps inspired by political conjuncture of the “party of power” (effort to insure more favourable conditions before the oncoming election to the State Duma in 2007), which undoubtedly imposed more restrictions and limitations on the field of political conjuncture, even more favourable conditions being set to arrange the election, without an election, by purposely influencing the electors choice. Yet what causes the failure to consolidate the election rules is the disregard of laws, which in its turn witnesses a low legal culture rather than greater or lesser amendments of the legislation.

Ibidem; Гельман B., “Создавая правила игры: Российское избирательное законодательство переход- ного периода”, № 4, Полис, 1997, c. 21–22. Федеральный закон “О выборах депытатов Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания Россий- ской Федерации”, http://www.cikrf.ru/_3/zakon/zakon51_180505/zakon_51.htm, 2006 05 12; “Интервью Председателя ЦИК России А. А. Вешнякова журналу “Профиль” от 17 июня 2006 года”, http://www. cikrf.ru/_1/int_vesh_profil.htm, 2006 05 13; “Oбщественный интернет–мониторинг и оценка предста- вительной власти России в 2006 году. Результат экспертизы Nr. 1 (изменение законов о выборах”), http://www.indem.ru/russian.asp, 2006 03 26 90 2. “Party of Power” as an Instrument . for Election Politics

The functioning of the “party of power” is related to the desire of the political elite to implement their strategy in the election. The literature of political science calls it a quasi party, simply put, that is the political organisation which the elite create for a single purpose – not to lose the election. The appearance of such an organisation, which tends to be most active during the election, is related to the so-called institutional crises of the executive and legislature, i. e. efforts were taken constantly to neutralise and balance the confrontation between the principal political institutions, the President and the Parliament, since President Boris Yeltsin. Yet it was not until the end of the first term of President Vladimir Putin that this purpose was reached and the stable Duma majority has been formed exclusively from the exponents of presidential policy, which also meant integrating the legislative institution into the system of a “vertical of power.” It was the “party of power” throughout the entire Yeltsin governing period that was used as a means to implement political, economical, and the social development strategy of Russia. The main effort was used to improve the reputation of the democratically disposed president intending to implement the democratisation plan of Russia. Thus the “party of power” since the first moments of presence in political life has not become political organisation, wherein modern democratic initiatives are generated and implemented. Furthermore, its instant transformation took the direction and turned out a substantial obstacle to consolidate democracy rather than support it. Since 1993, several “parties of power” have struggled for member man- date, this established due to the harsh competition between the governing groups. According to Ms. Olga Kristanovskaja, investigator of the Russian political elite, such actions were not premeditated tactics and they would lose votes due to disagreements. Yet this loss was partly compensated by another fact: the “party of power” would reappear for every election under a different name which greatly facilitated the solution of the principal issue, i.e. to mobilise electors within the short term. The result came, despite the fact that what the ordinary elector knew of the party was that it supported a strong state, was active in combating corruption and criminality, and it had support of Prime Minister Putin. Another

Хенкин С. “Партия власти”: российский вариант”, № 1, T. 1, Pro et Contra, 1996. Sakwa R., Russian Politics..., p. 192; Knox Z., Lentini P., Williams B., “Parties of Power and Russian Politics”, Problems of Post–Communism, Vol. 53, No 1, 2006, p. 6–7; Голосов Г., Лихтенштейн А., “Партии власти” и российский институциональный дизайн: теоритический анализ”, Полис, № 1, 2001, c. 6–14. Голосов Г., Политические партии и электоральная политика в 1993–1995 гг. Первый электораль- ный цикл в России (1993–1996), Москва: Весь Мир, 2000, p. 108–109; Крыштановская O., Анатомия Российской элиты, Москва: Захаров. 2005, p. 159, 160. Petrov N., “Russia’s “Party of power” takes shope”, Russia and Eurasia rewiew volume 2, issue 6, 2003, p. 8–9. 91 intention of changing names is that there was no force liable to the elector for the deteriorating situation in the state. In the State Duma election of 1999, this irrational position was most active. The political elite in power failed to escape internal conflict (greatly influenced by the weakness of Mr. Yeltsin’s power), in designing a political organisation of the election, therefore only two “parties of power” took part in the election: the old one, the Fatherland All-Russia; and the new one, Unity, representing the interests of Mr. Putin, a new and still growing more popular Kremlin leader. The latter having been created two months before the election has successfully attracted electors, which are in favour of new parties, and ensured their sympathy. Having scored 23.3% of votes, this political organisation, constructed by administrative means, has come second to the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (hereinafter CPRF) and outscored the “party of power” which got 10% less votes. Yet this scenario of events does not witness a more intense competitive environment for the political race, because after the election a portion of the regional leaders supporting the old “party of power” have supported Mr. Putin and have explicitly stated that the political composition was designed for election purposes only.10 Following the 2000 presidential election and the emerging of new political conjuncture, the issue of the “parties of power” has successfully been dealt with having created a single strong political organisation under a new name, United Russia. It ranked the long-term designers and principal participants of the said structures: Mr. Jurij Luzhkov, and Mr. Sergej Soigu. Once president Putin gathered obviously more power, there were no longer reasons to cause conflicts among those in power; furthermore, the Kremlin became the principal player in the oncoming elections and the designer of the agenda. In fact, one should note that there was still an additional version of the “party of power” planned, with view to gather additional votes of those electors who would obviously not vote for the bureaucrats party; this role was taken by the election block Rodina, hastily formed before the very election (on the basis of three parties).11 It is due to the above reasons that, in comparison to the former election, the one in 2003 to the State Duma, the list of parties taking part in the election, displays a substantially stronger single “party of power” and the political elite had no choice but to agree and coordinate its activity so that it conforms to the political direction of highly legitimate President. Therefore United Russia has become one of most successful Kremlin “party of power” projects; its leaders, given favourable political conjuncture (stabilised political, economical, and social life of the country), and having unilaterally available substantial administrative, financial, and informational resources (State controlled media) and supported by the popular Mr. Putin, won 222 (out of 450) mandates of members.

10 Colton T. J., McFaul M. J., Popular Choice and managed Democracy: the Russian Elections of 1999 and 2000, London: Routledge, 2003, p. 7; Shevtsova L., Putin`s Russia, Washington: Carnegie Endowmenent for international Peace, 2003, p. 44–46; Макаркин А., ,”Партии власти”, Россия в избирательном цикле 1999–2000 годов, Москва: Генфальд, 2000, c. 144–153. 11 Соловей В., Избирательные темы и окно возможностей для новых субьектов российской политики, http://carnegie.ru/ru/pubs/media/68498.htm, 2006 04 21 92

Yet it is due to such hypertrophied actions that the outcome of the election was obvious well before the election, and the political competitors were compelled to run under unequal competition. The observer commission of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (hereinafter the OSCE) precisely noted this fact in the election report.12 One should also note that United Russia demonstrated unity and consolidated political rows after the election, as was different from the earlier political structures of such character. Having listed over a million members in party list and having branches in all regions, it became the dominant political power in the party system. This political force, having reached new qualitative and quantitative parameters, remained the principal and loyal supporter of the Kremlin policy and its leaders have not shown any disposition to develop towards a “normal” party.13 That enables one to claim that the “party of power” shall traditionally function in the marathon of the oncoming election. That is a powerful player, capable to employ a vast range of formal, and in particular informal measures, or to put it differently, it remains the principal administrative obstacle to developing political competition.

3. Administrative Resource - Dispersion . of Informal Tradition

Apart from “parties of power” there is another not formalised phenomenon we come across in the election process, that is, the administrative resource, being illegal or a semi legal method of the elector campaign which is intended to mobilise them and to weaken or eliminate the positions of the competitors. This is a complex socio-political phenomenon, covering a wide context of the election process: the political and economic elite; its relationship to the political parties; special features of elector political behaviour; etc. It is common knowledge that the principal election function is to ensure the fair representation, the presence whereof being among principal democracy requirements, whereas upon universal use of an administrative resource equal competitive conditions are simply violated for all participants of the election race.14 One should point out that the Russian scientific literature is increasingly focusing more towards the problems of the phenomenon; meaning that it explores the legal, social, political, and socio-cultural aspects both on the national and regional levels. We shall first focus on the ways of the administrative resources, which are employed to control elector behaviour. We shall consider the three principal ones: the informational one, manifested by the media use; the official, meaning the use of the official position during the election; and the forced,

12 Pugačiauskas V., “”Power Vertical” in Russia: 2003-2004 Election Cycle Peripeteia”, Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 2004, Vilnius: Lithuanian Military Academy, 2005, p. 141–158. 13 “Партия “Единая Россия” сегодня”, http://www.edinros.ru/news.html?rid=298, 2006 04 23. 14 Воронцова А., Звоновский Б., “Aдминистративный ресурс как феномен pоссийского избирательного процеса”, Полис Nr. 3, 2003, p. 114–124; 93 meaning direct influence on the will of the electors and forgery of election results.15 Activity via modern media (television, radio, and newspapers) is the most common and effective way when influencing the political choice of the elector. According to the results of sociological studies, television is the leader in this respect, i.e. ordinary citizens receive most information on the course of the election and participants from the central state television channels.16 However one must point out that in 14 years of election practice, there were no more signs of pluralism and independence in the State owned media. On the contrary, their active stance being manifested through production of political production, mostly on an illegitimate basis such as campaigning (covertly) for a particular candidate and political party.17 It is clear that candidates following the Kremlin line and “parties of power” were among those who mostly seized this opportunity. The official position, being the advantageous starting position when striving for a better advantage, is also used very often due to its effectiveness in particular as regards to the regional election. This method should be as closely related to the recourse to violence of a different form. It is mostly used in statutory organisations (mostly actions recorded in military units), “references” to business structures to take part in the election foundation of a friendly candidate, inclusion of subordinate authorities and economical institutions in the organisation activity of election campaign, etc.18 The OSCE commission, having analysed the course of the election to the State Duma in 2003, has stated in the closing part of the report called the recommendation that the principal issue was the administrative resource and it should be dealt with by authorities of federal and regional levels and the Central Election Commission by way of the legislative basis available. The latter should also initiate the performance of monitoring and arrange a study in order to penalise politicians, political parties, and other officers in charge for abusing administrative resources.19 According to the data of the official documents of the Central Election Commission and practise, and analysis of the regional election, one can claim that the administrative resource in terms of the principal issue of democratic election is simply ignored. Political parties with representatives in top levels of federal and regional executives, employ the administrative resource; to put it differently, the administrative resource under the split elite has more or less been accessible not only

15 Мониторинг злоупотреблений административным ресурсом в ходе федеральной кампании по выборам государственную думу Российской Федерации в декабре 2003 г,. Москва: ПравИздат, 2004, p. 21–24. 16 Задорон И., Средства массовой информации и электоральное поведение россиян. Россия в избира- тельном цикле 1999–2000 годов, Москва: Генфальд, 2000, p. 268–269. 17 Панарин И., Информационная вoйна и выборы, Москва: Городец, 2003, p. 145. 18 Николаев А., Административный ресурс в региональных избирательных кампаниях, Россия. политические вызовы века. Второй всероссийский конгресс политологов, Москва: Российская поли- тическая энциклопедия, 2002, p. 270–271. Cмирнов В., Избирательные права российских граждан перед вызивом власных технологий, Россия..., p. 751. 19 Russian Federation elections to the state Duma 7 december 2003, OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Report, Warszaw, 2004, p. 27, www.osce.org/documents/html/pdftohtml/1947_en.pdf.html, 2006 09 05. Also see note 15. 94

to the “party of power.” Yet the policy strengthening the “vertical of power,” pursued by Mr. Putin, this having consolidated the political elite, has influenced the character of use of this method. The access channels have been gradually monopolised in the hands of a single political force. The 2003 election serves as the best example again, where the regional elite automatically redirected its electors to join supporters of United Russia, thereby taking votes from the other parties, the CPRF in particular.20 On the other hand, what gives the politicians impetus to act this way is the fact that political preferences of the electors are imbalanced, meaning that they fall easy prey to various manipulations, and lastly the potential majority of ordinary electors fails to identify the impact of the administrative resource. In 2000, only 4% of the electors interviewed were able to identify with various levels of precision the administrative resource and less than one third (27%) had any knowledge or awareness of the existence of the phenomenon21. The fact that the administrative resource still remains one of the principal instruments of the political fight is evidenced by the 2005 election to Moscow City Duma. The participants in the election took great efforts to make public the use of the monopolised administrative resource by United Russia and Mr. Luzhkov, the mayor of Moscow representing the same, as well as to confront him with any small means available. An exceptional, so to speak step, confirms it, where opponents of totally hostile political ideologies, Yabloko, Union of Right Forces, CPRF, and the Russian Pensioner Party united and instituted a Coordinating council, the principal purpose whereof was to monitor the administrative resource and record other violations of law on the election.22 Mr. Sergej Mironov, Chairman of the Federation Council, leader of new Russian Party of Life, publicly discussed the use of the means of the administrative character in the election process. The leaders of party in power gave a lot of effort not to get involved in the far-reaching discussions regarding the accusa- tion of political opponents and only issued public statements claiming having used a single administrative resource, the authority of Moscow power, ap- parently meaning the popularity of Mr. Luzhkov, the mayor, and high merits and his services to the city. In fact, one should agree, that the living standards in Moscow greatly exceed the statistical country average, though it calls for a separate paper whether all of them should be attributed to a politician who has governed Moscow for 14 years.23 Yet, such a minimum effort of political competitors could not prevent

20 Макаренко Б. И., “Парламентские выборы 2003 г. как проявление кризиса партийной системы”, Полис Nr. 1, 2004, p. 59; Звонковский В., Социокультурные факторы административного ресурса в российских провинциях, Гражданское обшество и политические процессы в регионах, Московский центр Карнеги, Рабочие материалы, Москва, Nr. 3, 2005, p. 48, 51. 21 Административный ресурс – это “заначка администрации”, http://www.bd.fom.ru/report/cat/elections/ of004407, 2006 09 10. 22 “Подписано межпартийное соглашение о контроле за проведением выборов в МГД. Пресс-релиз 15 сентября 2005 г., http://www.yabloko.ru/Pres/2005/050915.html, 2006 03 23. 23 “Цой: административный ресурс Москвы: авторитет московской власти”, http://www.rian.ru/politics/ 20050820/41195374.html, 2006 03 25; Володин B., Москвичи в очередной раз показали, что они хорошо разбираются и в партиях, и в политиках, http://www.edinros.ru/print.html?id=10950, 2006 04 19. 95

United Russia from employing the usual range of administrative resource means: financial resources; respective social policy pursued by municipality in more active way; and above all state and municipal media, which went all the way to publish material of campaign character. Municipality, and its subordinate enterprises, organisations, and officers making use of their official position, became canvassers and supporters of the “party of power” and organisers of its election process. Obviously, these were the actions that the party management tried to perform covertly and there was no way one or several parties could possibly identify it, let alone establish the exact level of their efficiency. As a matter of fact, the analysts investigating the problems of the administrative resource all agree that the efficiency of this phenomenon should be calculated on the basis of 10%–15% of the elector vote margin.24 One must stress that the administrative resource manifested in yet another form, which continues acquiring integral elements of antidemocratic traditions, namely the elimination of political opponents from the election process. The decision of the Moscow election campaign (endorsed by the Court ruling) to eliminate the party Rodina from the election raised justified doubts due to its radical character. It is obvious that one should not regard such a decision in terms of legal means of powerful elite combating with an increasingly spreading racist, xenophobic, migrant phobic, anti-Semitic sentiments and those inducing ethnic discord in public and political life. Firstly, that is only an efficient way to do away with a political competitor, to put it more precisely, the first specific warning from Kremlin politicians to the leaders of Rodina, who attempted to pursue policy not agreed with in a position of central power. Human Rights Organisation, a public organisation, at their Moscow office which monitored the election, has found that in the Russian liberal democrat party of Mr. Vladimir Zhirinovsky, certain candidates of the CPRF and some small parties (Russian Party of Life and Free Russia) have expressed themselves in similar xenophobic manners in the election campaign, yet this did not provoke negative responses from competent institutions and no sanctions were employed in this regard.25 Sociological studies again confirm that an ordinary citizen in the capital city, even taking into account the fact that he or she is more politically aware and more critical than the rest of Russian population and finally most of them approve of the democrats, still finds it complicated to identify the impact of the administrative resource use. In the sociological survey by Jurij Levada analytical centre, 28% of respondents stated that there were no significant violations, and as many as 44% found it difficult to reply precisely to the question. Yet the majority of electors had a more crystallised view and were able to answer more precisely to the question regarding the political party most likely to ben-

24 “Итоги выборов в Московскую городскую думу. Стенограма X Круглого стола”, http://scilla. ru/works/uprzdem.krst10.html. 2006 04 05; Also see: “О нарушениях прав избирателей на выборах в Мосгосдуму”, http://www.jabloko.ru/Press/2005/0512042.html, 2006 03 23. 25 “Kсенофобия, мигрантофобия и радикальмый национализм на выборах в Московскую городскую думу”, http://www.antirasizm.ru/publ_056.doc, 2006 04 06; Петров Н., Думократизация, http://www. grani.ru/opinion/petrov/m.99202.html, 20060503. 96

efit from it: 52% supported United Russia, and only 23% failed to reply.26 On the other hand, the ability of democratic forces to unite and tackle a high 10% election threshold witnesses that it is possible to stand against consolidated administrative influence. Yet this situation is not good news, because the percentage of voters in 2003 compared to that in 2005, reveals that both parties got 6.7% votes less, whereas all the other parties (including the Communists) successfully improved the results.27 With view to thoroughly investigate the circumstances and efficiency of use of the Russian election administrative resource, one must take a brief look at the wider context of latest regional election.28 The practice of a single Election Day, 12 March 2006 and 8 October 2006, comprised more than half of all country regions, wherein the election of regional legislation and municipal (mayor and council) took place. It should be stressed that agenda of the regional election included usual violations of the democratic election process, in particular the elimination of parties and specific candidates from the election was employed. To that end, the local election commission were employed, also involving judicial institutions, for example 10 out of 23 parties were prevented from taking part in election run of 12 March in 8 regions (in Nizhni Novgorod 7 out of 13 parties were eliminated, meaning not registered or eliminated in course of election process) due to violations of legislative procedures: violations in gathering residents signatures; violations of nomination procedures of candidates in parties; and failure to submit documents necessary for registration purposes.29 Yet there are few circumstances posing doubts whether the regional election commissions have complied with the law on election at all times. By the way, speaking of an administrative licence (“административные перегибы” in Russian), one means a negative application or loose interpretation of rules of the laws on the election by the election commissions, law, and order institutions and the courts. These actions have become almost a usual component of the everyday election agenda, in fact, even Mr. Aleksandr Veshniakov, the head of the Central Election Commission has stated publicly himself on it as an evident issue of the election process30. Firstly, what makes selective party selection performed suspicious is the fact that mostly the same parties find themselves among those in violation of the registration procedures, e.g. Agrarian Party of Russia, Social Justice, Russian Patriots, Iabloko, and Rodina in particular. Secondly, in Rodina the case it is obvious that party elimination from the election process rate accelerated in the election of 12 March. It topped the list of those in violation of the election order,

26 “ Москвичи об итогах думских выборах”, http://www.levada.ru/press/2003011900.html, 2006 02 03. 27 Маслов О., Прудник А, Скрытие итоги выборов в Московскую городскую Думу и их влияние на последующие выборы в России, http://www.polit.nnov.ru/2006/02/15/mosgorduma/, 2006 05 26. 28 Петров Н., Титков А., Региональное измерение выборов, Россия в избирательном цикле…., p. 400. 29 “Доклад секретаря ЦИК России О. К. Застрожной”, http://www.cikrf.ru/_1/dokl_zasrojn_0906/dokl_za- srojn_090606.htm, 2006 04 09. 30 “Интервью Председателя ЦИК России А. А. Вешнякова газете “Ведомости”, http://www.cikrf. ru/cikrf/aboutcik/charmain/int_vesh_220306.jsp, 2006 04 10. 97 being prevented from taking part in 7 out of 8 regional elections. Where the management of the party attempted objecting the Kremlin’s intention to unite several parties, Mr. Dimitry Rogozin, party leader who was totally opposing such idea, resigned from the managerial position being aware that he shall not be in a position to oppose the Kremlin.31 Yet, following the resignation of the rebellious politician, no obstacles remained to run the election and the new management eagerly took on the new Kremlin project, i.e. the joining of the three parties (Rodina, Russian Pensioner, and Russian Life parties).32 The issue of the administrative resource in this election was practically excluded from public discussion by all local institutions competent in the election organisation, the Central Election Commission, in charge of control of performance of election law, even opposition parties. Only violations recorded by the observers were established and the press showed very little interest33. The examples show witness that the regional political elite considers the administrative resource essential, rational, and even semi legal (inspiring no legal consequences) action of the election process and the representatives of the “party of power” increasingly monopolise the same in their grasp. One can therefore state that the trend to narrow the field of political competition has not only remained, it has even grown stronger. The results of this election illustrate a clear setting of political forces, which given stable political conjuncture, should not radically alter in the nearest future. United Russia came out as the favourite of the 12 March election: 55% members mandates in 8 regional parliaments (197 out of 359), and 8 Oc- tober – in 9 parliaments 53.9% respectively (244 out of 446). The Communists retained second place, by gaining 11% and 6.8% of elector votes respectively. The remaining votes were taken by the Party of Life, Russian Pensioner Party, Rodina, liberal democrats headed by Mr. Vladimir Zhirinovsky, and other small parties. The principal opposition democratic parties, Iabloko and the Union of Right Forces in the first day election were able by chance to take part in 3 and 4 regions respectively, and in the second one, only a party headed by Mr. Grigorij Yavlinski (in 3 regions), although the democrats faced total fiasco by failing to step to the 7% election threshold.34 In fact, in Karelia, where this party has traditionally enjoyed wide support, it was simply eliminated from the election.35 These examples demonstrate the inability of democratic forces to develop the agreements reached during the

31 See: note 29; “Рогозин: Меня хочет сместить власть. И мне об этом сказано прямо” http://www. rodina.ru/interwiew/show/?id=473, 2006 04 06. 32 “Тезисы выступления А. М. Бабакова на внеочередном съезде партии “Родина”, http://www.rodina. ru/article/show/?id=564, 2006 06 06. 33 “Aдминистративний ресурс делили почту пополам между “Единной Россией” и “Партией Жизни”, Родная газета, 26 10 2006. 34 Интерфакс, Глава ЦИК Вешняков “Единая Россия” победила на выборах всех девяти регионах”, 09 10 2006, http://www.main.fci.ru/index.cfm, 2006 05 23; ЦИК, Интерфакс, “Единая Россия” победила на восьми региональных выборах, 13 03 2006, http://www.main.fci.ru/index.cfm, 2006 05 23. Машкин М., “Полупраймериз. Девять регионов готовы явится к урнам”, Независимая газета, 2006 10 06. 35 Пресс-служба, О нарушении избирательных прав граждан в Республике Карелия, 6 октября 2006 года, http://yabloko.ru/Press/Docs/2006/1019-karelia.html, 2006 04 29. Also see note 31. 98

election to the Moscow Duma regarding joint actions. It is therefore no surprise that these parties suffered expulsion to the margins of political competitions. Therefore the practical examples from the election of Moscow, the mega city Duma, and regional legislation institutions, do not give basis to await at least the minimum changes towards the democratisation of elections at least in the nearest future. One can state with confidence, that issues of administrative resource dis- persal have remained an acute issue of the election process still not dealt with, and the impunity of the activity provides for ideal conditions for spreading political corruption. It is important to state that neither the top level officials, nor institutions charged with the election process, deliberately deal with such deeply rooted totally opposite tradition to rules of the democratic elections.

4. Scenarios of the Election Prospect

The prospect of the oncoming election, in particular that of 2007 State Duma and certain possible connections to 2008 presidential election, shall be discussed in this case in narrow context on the basis of experience and of the election readily held – the phenomenon of the “party of power,” the administrative resource, the changing role of opposition in the political system, and obviously in the context of the policy pursued by the Kremlin. It is also obvious that the dynamics of the political situation within a year before the first election can easily destroy the forecasts (as has happened before on many occasions) based both on theoretical and empirical insights. There are no greater doubts today that the “party of power” shall remain the principal means in the Kremlin strategy enabling one to ensure the continuity of the general policy line of the executive. One can only add that the Kremlin policy makers have initiated preliminary preparation for the oncoming elections. This with view to ensuring favourable positions, and to protect themselves from possible surprises, they engaged in setting additional scenarios of party of power. Therefore it is worthwhile to explore thoroughly the circumstances of this political decision, even more so because of the fact that the leaders of United Russia commented this news publicly rather carefully, without much enthusiasm.36 However, there is no big deal in this matter. It is clear that the technologists of the election process, when designing a new election strategy, directly rely on the experience drawn from the previous election, to be more precise, they have employed some of the scenarios used in the federal election which have shown to be time-proven. In the 2003 election to the State Duma, Rodina can also be attributed the role of the second “party of power.” One can state that the foundation of the new party, bearing the unusual name Fair Russia: Fatherland, Pensioners, Life does not pose a greater risk of

36“Первый вице-спикер Госдуму Олег Морозов – о новой партии власти”, http://www.morozowov. ru/index.php?id=637, 2006 09 10. 99 splitting the elector votes due to two important tactical motives. Firstly, according to the Kremlin design, the principal task of the election political organization was to attract elector votes from CPRF, the principal competitor; regional election and sociological surveys also support this view. The new “party of power,” headed by Mr. Mironov, a politician loyal to Mr. Putin, announced its principal program purpose, socially headed fair state, and the press called this single project real left.37 Secondly, the new party will be supported by those who potentially are not happy with the policy pursued by United Russia for one reason or another. With view to these factors and keeping in mind the fact that elector is not yet able to resist the magic of the new party names, and the administrative resource shall become principal means, one can speculate that this election organisation shall collect more votes than necessary to pass the election threshold. Therefore parties of power have begun thorough preparation for the oncoming election and the results of the interim election suggest that the other political forces shall face an unusually hard battle given the unequal conditions. One can firmly state that the Kremlin, with just one year before the election, is finally ready to deal with issue of power in the 2007 traditional way with the aid of “parties of power.” The President, supported by the two powers, has more room for political manoeuvre and is prepared whereas the first party fails to get necessary majority of the electors. It is rather complicated to define the prospect of the 2008 election be- forehand, in particular on the basis of former experience of the election process only. Therefore it is only possible to name certain assumptions or simply a few possible scenarios. With still two years still to go before the election, Presi- dent Putin has publicly announced that no amendments in the Constitution regarding the extension of a presidents term of office shall be made. Thereby he has only partially revealed his position, though it still will remain in question the way the principal issue shall be dealt with. Today the governing elite, at least externally, are gathered in the President’s political force field, i.e. it is not affected by open and deep conflicts as compared to the era of Mr. Yeltsin. Most of them, including regional leaders, attempt to retain status quo and that is the principal challenge, i.e. to ensure the coming of new Kremlin teams in a way following the policy line pursued by Mr. Putin for 8 years. However, stepping aside from the strong political figure opens better chances for new configurations of the governing elite in the battle for the central office of power; particular politicians shall no doubt have benefited from it, therefore there are some assumptions of public conflict. As the election date draws closer, Mr. Putin is obliged to be more open about the construction design of his political process. Most recently the president has stated that by being legitimated by the society, he shall be able to influ-

37 “Программное заявление партии “Справедливая Россия: Родина, Пенсионеры, Жизнь”, http://www. rodina.ru/article/show/?id=567, 2006 09 14; Серова Я., Раздвоение партии власти. Победу празнуют как “ЕдРО, так и “актуальные левые”, http://2006novayagazeta.ru/nomer/200678n/n78n-s16.shtml, 2006 09 12. 100

ence the processes underway in the country. This has only contributed to the rising temperature of imagination among the public and also political scientists in particular. Nothing was said about the fact that having resigned, and only relying on trust, the political force should can be maintained and enforced. High legitimization by the society is an effective means only given specific political post and there is only one significant office in Russia, the President. Therefore, in order to remain the actor dealing with state matters, at least two points are necessary: the new president has to be bound by links of total dependency; and secondly, he has to take direct part in the policy, in one of its forming institutions. More recently, Russia saw an active discussion of the version whereby Mr. Putin could relate further retaining of force, by way of political party instrumentation, i.e. party prospect being related to United Russia, by attributing to the same exceptional role (that of dominant party) in the party system. It is this party that is most likely to become the principal means whereby it will be attempted to deal with the issue of 2008 and to ensure continuity of the executive in the long run.38 In fact, even prior to the public announcement one can see that the activity rate rising in party actions and manifesting itself via an active regional election campaign, and statement of Mr. Boris Gryzlov to the effect that the party shall dominate its candidate to 2008 presidential election, this further induces to view this event scenario as real.39 The fact that the party is able to gain a dominant party position in the nearest future is evidenced by the sociological insights based on precise empiric. And these claim that the society wants to consolidate in the structures of majority power. The present political structure, impossible to identify given political ideology, meets best the need of society still mixed between the ideas of the left and right. It is able to gain sympathy of vast masses by accumulating wide range of ideas (it liberates the elector from independent ideological determination).40 Yet only the oncoming events shall verify the future scenario reality even that based on strongest arguments. What is clear today is that, independently of mechanisms to be chosen to implement this complex political construction, the issue of new president shall not be entrusted to the society in the competitive democratic elections. It is most likely, both theoretically and practically, that the election shall take place according to the usual Russian order of democratic election where ordinary citizens are easily swayed by manipulative means and shall be mobilised to approve a decision given to them from above. Considering the possibilities of the democratic opposition forces to be

38 Гельман В., “Перспективы доминирующей партии в России”, Pro et Contra, No. 4, 2006, c. 62–71; Мигранян А., Преемником В., “Путин а может быть сам В. Путин, Известия, 2006; Rusijos Federacijos Prezidento administracijos vadovo pavaduotojas Vladislavas Surkovas iškėlė valdžios partijai uždavinį per 10–15 m. užtikrintį dominavimą partinėje sistemoje. Plačiau žr.: “Политический процесс будет строиться вокруг “Единной России”, http://edinros.ru/news.html?id=114850, 2006 10 29. 39 “Единная Россия” будет предлагать своего кандидата на президентских выборах 2008 года”, http:// edinros.ru/news.html?id=114118, 2006 10 30. 40 Бызов Л., Потребитель стабильности (о феномене (“Единoй России”), http://www.politnauka. erg/library/parties/byzov.php, 2006 09 15. 101 part of political elective institutions, one must state that there is no positive development in this field. It is sad that the democratic forces did not find the impulse in the Moscow Duma election lesson to strengthen one’s position and carry on qualitative reforms. Regional elections are yet another more obvious example witnessing that society is not yet ready to support the democratic forces more actively and the latter are not capable to adequately react to an adverse situation. It was the 2003 Duma election that demonstrated more obviously that ordinary elector has related all single country failures with democratic political forces.41 Given this adverse situation, there is only one way out - to combine efforts in the fight for elector support. Yet when analysing public statements and the latest program documents of political parties, it became clear that the politicians calling themselves democrats underestimate the impact of inactivity, they are not capable to transcend or to tackle the patterns of their inert thinking, and above all, personal ambitions. According to the long standing politician Mr. Anatolij Ciubais, the Democrats form separate, independent pillars: Mr. Grigorij Yavlinski, Mr. Vladimir Ryzhkov, Mrs. Irina Chakamada and the Union of Right Forces.42 As a matter of fact, Mr. Ciubais, like Mr. Nikita Belych, the current party leader, attempts uniting democratic forces and takes part in the oncoming election in the single list, though that is not the case with other leaders’.43 There is no time for lengthy theoretical discourse and hollow political rhetoric, whereas the “party of power” strengthen their positions by taking part of the ideas and electors from the democrats, and increasingly monopolising the administrative resource field. On the other hand, a proportional election system introduced simply induces parties to work in the regional level more efficiently in order to ensure substantial support in national election. Therefore it already is today, that one can claim the prospect that democrats are being not highly productive. Firstly, these forces have failed to arrange and mobilise themselves in a short period of time, that is to say that they shall not be properly prepared for the important election. Secondly, unless they unite, they cannot expect to pass the election threshold in the oncoming State Duma election.

41 Gelman V., “Political Opposition in Russia: A Dying Species?”, Post-Soviet Affairs, 2005 21-03, p. 4, 12. 42 “Анатолий Чубайс: Объединение правых с левыми – это забавный союз бессмыслености и безумия”, http://sps.ru/?id=216972, 2006 06 07. 43 Eмельянова Н., Комерсант: На II конгрессе демократических сил Перми было подписано соглашение о сотрудничестве, http://www.sps.ru/?id=216539, 2006 06 07; Белых Н., Наш основной политический опонент – это партия власти “Единая Россия”, http://www.sps.ru/?id=206905, 2006 06 07. 102 Final Comments

There is little risk to be wrong when stating that, despite Russian laws governing the election process being relatively democratic in formal terms, the phenomena that has formed and is deeply rooted in the election practice, such as “party of power” and the administrative resource, along with the way that they occur, shall remain the principal means of the political elite in power, in the competition battle. There is therefore very little doubt that the oncoming national election will witness the violation of a fair election. That shall not be affected by neither the situation before the election in the country, nor party system fragmentation level, nor the level of the elector activity, and or other similarly important factors. It is therefore hard to expect that the election in the nearest future shall set an example of democracy consolidation. 103 Dalia Šiukštienė* Lithuanian Military Academy

Russia’s Economic System: . Corporate State’s Modified Model

This article is based on a theoretical assumption that while international economic order has become increasingly politicised and political competition strengthened, governments become more and more active in intruding into the sectors of trade, finances, and production. Russia is being used as an example to investigate the way the decisions of cartelisation, export restrictions or stimulations, and similar ones become the most important mechanisms in dividing the markets. The analysis also includes the ways that Russia’s economic resources determine its strategic and diplomatic power, as well as how the modern Russian economic system and its developmental tendencies are influenced by a special factor that has emerged in the post-Soviet economies – the factor of the political leaders’ striving towards changing the state’s economic matters in one way or another for the sake of the stability guarantees for their own positions and financial backing, and for the sake of their own private wealth or that of their close associates.

Introduction

One of the first attempts to analyse the influence of the economy on foreign policy transformations was made by Suzan Strange in her article published in 1970 under the title “International Economics and International Relations: A Case for Mutual Neglect.” This analysis was made with the view on not the state alone, but also on other participants of the relationship in assessing the changes in the modern world. S. Strange, a representative of the British academic thinking, who has devoted over 30 years towards the study of modern international political economy, raised a question in her publications about who in fact was responsible for the world’s economy. Her statement was that those responsible were not just the governments but also big businesses, drug barons, insurers, accountants, and international bureaucrats – all intruders into so-called state’s sovereignty. Later academic studies, especially in the ones on modern integration, started to observe the influence of economic interest groups and

* Dalia Šiukštienė is an economist and a lecturer at the Political Science Department of the Lithuanian Military Academy. Address: 5a Šilo st, LT-10322 Vilnius, tel. +370-5-2103569, e-mail: [email protected] Strange S., “International Economics and International Relations: A Case for Mutual Neglect”, International Affairs, Vol. 46. No.2, 1970, p. 304-315. Strange S., The Retreat of the State. The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p.14. 104

bureaucratic institutions on inter-state relations and were providing an assessment of the manipulations, by economic means, in order to achieve political goals. The traditional view of any state’s foreign and home policy, usually puts the decisions of the political power above the decisions of the economy participants. However, the alternative that forces state leaders to choose between butter (factor of a population’s wellbeing) and cannons (factor of state security or defensive power), has become too simple at the end of the XX century. As the world’s economy has been under the influence of global tendencies, especially after it has been joined by the post-Soviet economies, a special factor emerged, i.e. the striving of political leaders at changing the state’s economic matters in one way or another for the sake of the stability guarantees for their own positions and financial backing, and for the sake of their own private wealth or that of their close associates. In recent years, a new inter-state aspect has become increasingly recognised when more stringent environmental regulations stimulate an increasing demand for cleaner fuel, i.e. natural gas and cutting edge technologies, together with the customers’ demand for a higher quality life, provoke an even higher demand for oil products. At the same time, a continuous increase of economic and, most importantly, energy and infrastructural interdependence in common European space elevates the natural competitiveness of Russia and makes it necessary to take into account the activities of the country’s local fuel and energy complex companies and their influence on the international arena. The transformation of Russia’s political institutions has become more apparent. In the first post-Soviet years, the country was bubbling with an abundance of parties and lived “from election to election.” However, the more recent political system has become much more rigid, and the tendentious strive of the ruling party to dispel the opposition parties as political institutions, employing both formal and informal means, ultimately has overwhelmingly diminished their influence in economic and political matters of the state. Russian analytical commentators have been speaking widely about the tendencies for the birth of a corporate state, indicating the merger of business and bureaucracy together with the search for a single-party system restoration, as the symptoms of the phenomenon. The processes under way in Russia often have been justified by such world-famous examples as the cases of Japan, Taiwan, or South Korea, when highly corporate-driven states had an objective to achieve prominent positions in the world market and have integrated into the world’s economy with the industrial and technological achievements of their national economies. Moreover, having successfully transformed their economies, they gradually established democratic societies as well.

Kirshner J.,”Political Economy in Security Studies After the Cold War”, in Review of International Political Economy, Vol.5, No. 1, 1998, p. 64. By the pole of December 2005 results, more than half of the Russia’s population would be satisfied with a single- or dual-party system, and 27% of them do not see any reason in the existence of other parties (source: “Эксперт Урал”, No. 21 (238), June 5, 2006). Lat. corporatio – an incorporation; emerged during the crisis of capitalism after WWI; its goal is to camouflage the dictatorship of monopolies’ capital and create the illusion of cooperation and harmony of interests within the state. 105

Modern Russia clearly demonstrates its drive to become a super-state, utilising the development of its fuel and energy sector and exports of the sector’s products. During Q1 of 2006, the export of energy recourses reached record levels in Russia’s history accounting for 71.1% of overall exports. However, the development process of the industrial countries indicates that economic policies of this trend have never ensured long-term economic growth. Although Russia officially declares its position to curb foreign investment, the news from the stock exchange and stock market show that the Russian energy sector is the most desired transactional subject, and the largest investment capital amounts flow through the companies registered in Luxembourg. The Russian President and his head of administration, Mr. Surkov, often declare the necessity to get rid effectively of the post-Soviet bureaucracy by employing alternatively dynamic people of modern thinking. Nevertheless, the same leaders encourage preserving the dominant position of a “unified Russia” for another 10 – 15 years, thus dragging Russia’s economy into the obscurity of monopolism and non-competitiveness, forcing it to be increasingly ineffective.

1. The Logic of the State or That of the Market?

On a theoretical level, economy can be defined as a system of production, distribution, and consumption of wealth and politics, as a totality of rules and institutions regulating social and economic relations. The investigation of the interaction of these two factors in a specific state against the background of the international and global environment usually employs one of the two methods: either io rely on the assumption that economic resources of the state determine its strategic and diplomatic power; or, conversely, to base the research on the influence of political factors on economic decisions and results. In the case of Russia, the former assumption seems to be rational, namely, that the size and structure of GDP, the amount and structure of the country’s natural resources together with the trade balance constitute the social and economic phenomena within the state. It is also obvious that the practical foreign economic policy is only a tool of the Russian home policy. The question of which direction Russia is heading today has not been unambiguously answered, neither by Russian or foreign observers. Andrej Ilarionov, a former advisor to Mr. V. Putin, stated in his public speeches that Russia, showing a decline of economic indicators in all major spheres of economy in the last four years, is expected to experience economic growth slow down to be followed by economic stagnation at some point in time.

Back in April 2005, President V. Putin in his annual address noted the importance of legal restrictions on foreign participation in the projects of importance to Russia’s security and independence. Russian laws effectively restrict investments in 39 strategic areas.

Frieden J.A., Lake D.A., eds., International Political Economy. Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth, New York: St.Martin’s Press, 1991, p.1. “Kremliuje galandami energetinio ginklo ašmenys”, Lietuvos rytas, 2006 05 13. 106

While the world’s newspaper headlines regularly speak of increasing disagreements about the energy policy in Europe and about the emerging restoration of Russia’s aggressive policy, sparkled by high oil prices on the world markets, it becomes more obvious that the Kremlin leaders are sure they are able to press Western countries to make concessions in any area with the help of their country’s vast energy resources. The Russian democrats say that whatever the Kremlin does, the West will just pat V. Putin on the shoulder and sign a contract beneficial for themselves. The Russian president was repeatedly vocal about the actions of the international community in relation to the Northern European oil pipeline and Russia’s natural gas monopolist, Gazprom’s intentions to expand its presence in Europe, calling these actions an attack of the West on Russia’s intentions to take over a leading role in the world energy market. The representatives of the natural gas giant itself have demonstrated a growing strength of the corporation by such declarations like “Europe will have to fight for larger gas imports from Russia. […] On the other hand, we will decide where the new flows of gas exports have to be directed. We are ready to meet the growing demand for gas in Europe but then our weight in the European basket must necessarily increase as well.”10 The events of 2006, related to the world-wide growing demand for natural gas and Russia’s unilateral possibility to terminate and renew its supply11, reminded us that the acting Russian President V. Putin, while still a modest person in politics, wrote that the key to the restoration of the former might of Russia is with the possibility of becoming the main supplier of energy resources to both industrial and developing countries.12 Having taken over the reign of power in the country, he made his first decisions that suppressed the efforts of the Kremlin liberals to curb Gazprom’s influence in the country’s home market. Moreover, at the outset of his career he made sure that at all the management levels of concern, there were people loyal to him. The Gazprom Group’s Supervisory Council members, who make the strategic decisions, today include the first deputy Prime Minister of the RF, the Minister of Economy and Trade, the Minister of Industry and Energy, and the Ambassador at Large of the Foreign Ministry.13 On the one hand, it means huge individual bonuses for

Norkus A., “Rusijos valdovai surado patikimą skydą nuo kritikos strėlių”, Lietuvos rytas, 2006 05 13. 10 Daily “Lietuvos rytas” information based on the “Reuters”, Lietuvos rytas, May 4, 2006. 11 On the first day of 2006, Russia terminated the gas supply to Ukraine over the pipeline crossing its territory and carrying the flow of gas to Western European countries. A little later, the gas flow to Georgia was terminated due to an unspecified explosion in the pipeline. Having been faced with the possibility of a fuel deficit or a considerable increase of its price on the eve of elections, the Ukrainian leaders agreed to transfer the rights to a part of the pipeline on its territory to Russia by transferring it to a very complicated international structure network with a Swiss-registered company RosUkrEnergo at its top; 50% of its shares owned by the Russian Gazprom, it has earned 478 million US dollars from the re-sale of natural gas and is sometimes called a cover for money laundering; due to its business obscure origin and the list of other shareholders, it has turned the attention of the investigators of the USA Department of Justice. 12 Природный газ: вопросы энергетической и национальной безопасности”, http://www.rambler. ru./db/news/html , 2006 04 20. 13 Годовое Общее собрание акционеров ОАО Газпром, http://www.gazprom.ru/article20289.shtml, 2006 09 14. 107 annual results; on the other, it is a possibility to utilize the ministerial powers and employ the bureaucrats of the relevant state institutions for the private interests of the company’s owners. This is why, when Gazprom’s share value went up 2.5 times during 2005, according to its Board Chairman, Mr. Aleksey Miller, the company took a firm place among the world leaders of the energy sector by its capitalization indicator. The Chairman also notes that a global competition is going on for the takeover of the world’s energy resources, which means that only those producers who are state-owned or have an overall support of the government will be able to win dominant positions on international markets. The annual report of the company’s Board of Directors, presented in June 2006, stated that it was only the union of the state and commercial thinking, as well as the perspective of “conquering” all the home state’s and foreign energy recourses that encouraged the company to undertake long-term planning. Consequently, according to Gazprom leader, having demonstrated all its advantages characteristic of a transnational giant, the corporation effectively made use also of all the aspects of national state companies which turned out to be useful.14 It is considered a prominent achievement of the company that it was the state that became the owner of the control stake of its shares in 200515 and a more brisk achievement expected in the next stage, i.e. in the sphere of vertical integration.16 With this view, the Gazprom Group’s activity is intended to be reformed in two stages by 2008, diversifying the network of the partially-owned companies into profile sectors like natural gas and oil production, gas/oil transportation, etc., which would be managed from a single centre and 100% of their companies’ share capital would be owned by the Gazprom Group by that time. It is also expected to become a prominent world supplier of liquid gas by 2010 – the first delivery of the product was delivered to the American consumers at the end of 2005. Further negotiations with the “major market players” for medium-term contracts, competing for the possibility of “taking over three largest markets with the help of long-term contracts, are expected to be carried out by the state - it is believed that only the state can open a solid exports channel for the company which will use it for the flow of its products evaluated on the basis of the oil product basket prices.17 The development of the world’s economy has proved that the question about whether private or state ownership should be dominant in a reasonably well-managed state is wrong in itself with its roots in traditional Marx- ist-Leninist view. Depending on the goals and tasks which have to be solved

14 Ibid. 15 On June 16, 2005 Gazprom agreed to sell 10.7% of its shares to the state for US $7.2 billion. The foreign press wrote that the Government sought to raise its share to 50% intending to sell it to Western investors after they would have been listed on the Russian stock exchange (while the shares were not listed, they were offered to Western investors as American depository receipts) (source: ‘Mixing oil, gas and politics’, The Economist, June 20th 2005). 16 A new industrial entity emerged, Gazprom Neft, when Gazprom bought 72.66% of Sibneft for US $13 billion in October of 2005 in its effort to become a multi-profile energy company with annual oil refining capacity of up to 9.5 million tons of oil; the work proceeds further for the development of synthetic liquid fuel production; a 10% stake of a strategically important state-owned electric power supply company Mosenergo acquired. 17 Годовое (note 13). 108

by society on certain stages of its development, the private sector is provided with more or less freedom, and decisions are being continuously altered. If the market development logic demands further expansion of economic activity, where it is most effective and yields the highest profits, the state’s logic seeks to control the economic growth, take over the accumulation of the capital, control it and channel it in the direction where it would best serve the groups with powerful influence within the state.18 We know that the market and exchange of goods unite the participants in the economy, but it is important to assess the process when the spirit of ownership and the instinct of wealth accumulation, merging with the production process, may considerably change the principals of existence both on the national and international societal level.19 Meanwhile, the on-going economic changes in Russia have been disrupting the international status quo for some time and raising new problems in both economic and political areas. E. g., Russia openly has been refusing to join the Energy Charter since 2003, this is the EU document that liberalized the energy resources sector. The most disagreements arise from the Transit Protocol, on the basis of which Russia has to provide the possibility for the EU to receive natural gas via pipelines from Central Asia. Another example is when Vneshtorgbank, a state-owned Russian bank, acquired 5.02% of the shares of the European Aeronautics and Defence industry concern EADS, and declared its intention to acquire a 25.1% share package, a blocking stake, the German leadership (the Bavarian Prime Minister Edmund Steuber) started to talk about further curbing of foreign investment. However, the Russian President V. Putin reiterated with unconcealed aggressiveness: “The Russians do not walk around armed with kalashnikovs. They walk around with money in their pockets, and I would suggest you’d better meet them pleasantly.”20 The conjuncture situation, economic and political decisions of Russia, provoke the assumption that the state economy tends to isolate itself from the outer world and by providing the state bureaucrats with an ever greater power of control over production, distribution, and pricing, which is creating the background for the revival of the Soviet-type central planning system. The absence of a real market economy and developed private production sector, together with the material interest of the governing elite, more often than not takes the upper hand over the factors of political culture and economic viewpoint, and provides for the formation of the corporate state. At the academic level, it has been widely reasoned about the traditional model of the corporate state, the name “corporate state” has been associated with the authoritarian system since long ago, as well as about the crisis of

18 Heilbroner R.L., The Nature and Logic of Capitalism, New York: W.W.Norton, 1985, p. 94-95. 19 Craig G. A., The Germans. New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1982, p. 105-106. 20 “Kanclerė atvėsino Rusijos vadovo planus”, pagal “Reuters”, Newsru.com” ir “Lietuvos ryto” inf., Lietuvos rytas, 2006 10 14. 109 neo-corporativism.21 The indicated reason is globalization, which increases the mobility of the labour force, this as well as the increase of the economic influence of the developing countries on the world economy. The corporative theory itself allows us to clarify the way that the state integrates business and labour interests, considering industrial executives, production, agriculture, and trade associations and labour unions as the most important interest groups, including the way the decisions on economic and social strategy of the state are being coordinated among state institutions, business associations and trade unions. Unfortunately, the reality is that the activity of the state’s interference into decision-making often fluctuates depending on how intensive is the pursuit of the dominating, creating, and dictating leader’s position. The government may choose one officially recognised organisational unit as its tool for dispos- ing of the society’s participation in political decision-making, which helped it minimise the power of civil society. The tool can not only be a national labour (professional) or another type of union, but also a separate business group or association, or a large corporation. E. g., a phenomenal case is considered to be the creation of Japan Inc., when large industrial conglomerates and their dependent workforces, being eager to achieve significant growth in the state economy, consciously let the Japanese government manipulate them in the post-war years.22 Advocates of the modern Russian economy policy often rely on the South-East Asian models of state corporatism stating that the business achievements of four countries in the world economy would not be possible without direct state involvement in formulating the goals for the private sector in implementing the reforms of national economy and politics together with the wide involvement of the private sector in decision making. However, these states managed to avoid the evolving of the corporate state into a dictatorship and the periods of economic stagnation which lasted for decades. Still, the features manifested by the combination of the modern Russian market logic and that of the state, show that an emerged corporatism in that country does not become a challenge to democratic pluralism but a cartel alliance where the elite collaborate rather than compete.23

21 The author follows the thoughts of Philippe Schmitter, Gerhard Lehmbruch, and Peter J.Katzenstein about the necessary tri-lateral agreements among the citizens’ unions, private sector (the capital), and the government. Such agreements must lead to the honourable distribution of the production growth benefits (profit) in the economy among the social partners, and the management of the level of wages during times of recession and considerable inflation. It is believed that such models exist, in reality, in only small countries with open economies which are very well managed and which have created a strict hierarchal structure of the trade unions, such as Finland, Sweden, Austria, Norway, Ireland, the Netherlands; it allows them to ensure effective relations of national and global economies (source: Schmitter, P.C. and Lehmbruch, G., (eds.), Trends toward Corporatist Intermediation, London, 1979.; Katzenstein, P., Small States in World Markets, Ithaca, 1985). 22 Unger J., Chan A., “China, Corporatism, and the East Asian Model”, http://www.usc.cuhk.edu.hk, 2006 05 14. 23 Dunleavy, Patrick and Brendan O‘Leary, Valstybės teorijos, V.: “Pradai”, 1996, p.173. 110 2. The Axis of Russian Economy or . “The Process of Creative Destruction”

It has been noticed in the theory of economy that every economy is a hierarchic structure composed of a dominating centre or an axis of growing economy where accumulations of capital, industry, and economic activity take place, and a periphery which is being involved in the economic system as the centre expands. Although a lot of options of such inter-dependence are known, the work distribution between the dynamic centre and the periphery is considered by the theory of economy as a universal, the most important feature characteristic of every economy.24 It has been noted that economic activity in the periphery is expanding very unevenly due to the lack of raw materials, business skills or other factors. E. g. a regional area or an economic branch that has never been in the forefront may become the centre of the national economic development, while the relatively stagnating economic areas become an obstacle for the development of the rest of the economy – the state is undergoing “the process of creative destruction. “25 The first actions of the Russian President V.Putin, in the process of forming the “vertical of power” back in 2000, has shown, according to Russian annalists, that the past, which was supposed to be scrapped in the preceding decade, “is under rehabilitation” and the modern Russian state is in the third stage of “challenge – response”26 with the new unique modernisation concept “to catch up and become a Western state” and the only obstacle is “the unfinished social pyramid of the state.” In such an environment, even the most absurd economic statements are being tolerated, e.g. well-known Russian economists are reasoning that that even when there are no guarantees that the projects initiated by the state will be successful, still it is worth “promoting and implementing them” as it is more beneficial for the people than absence of any strategy. There are attempts to justify family relationships within he highest structures of power by world examples, and the fusion of business and state power by historic examples of state development.27 The country’s statistics experts and commenting annalists are hilarious28

24 Friedmann J., “A General Theory of Polarized Development”, in Niles M. Hansen, ed., Growth Centers in Regional Economic Development, New York: Free Press, 1972, p. 95-99. 25 Schumpeter, J.A. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, New York: Harper and Row, 1950, p. 369. 26 The combination of “nature – collectivism” is recognized as the first stage, “Mongol conquest - long-term slippage and Christianity” as the second, “Western influence – modernisation taking Russia out of the traditional state” and as the third (source: “Презентация книги А.Ахиезира, И.Клямкина, И.Яковенко “История России конец или новое начало?”, http://www.liberal.ru/sitan, 2006 09 21). 27 E.g., it is stated that this trait was characteristic of Middle-age Germans, and 60 percent of the modern Swedish economy belong to the Wallenberg family. Excavations in historic places like Novgorod, Moscow, Suzdal, Tver and others are taken as a basis to prove the existence of boyar conglomerates, comparing them to allegedly similar ones in England, the Netherlands, Germany and other countries, with the difference that those managed “to get rid of irrelevant” features, so Russia should study and take over the experience of those countries (source: Презентация, (note 25). 28 E.g., if the projection for Q1 was 4.7% of GDP growth, the actual achieved growth was 5.5%; the announced consumption index growth of June was at record level in the last 5.5 years (4.7%), which was estimated as the turn to “the first acceleration stage” (source: Центр развития, “Обозрение Российской экономики”, http: www.dcenter.ru, 2006 09 11). 111 about the officially announced indexes of the Russian economy for 2006. How- ever, all the positive tendencies are interconnected by a few related reasons. As far as the first half of 2006 is concerned, the main factors to influence the economy, as it seems, were the oil prices that rose by 33% compared to H1 of 2005 and the mass of cash in circulation as well as the decrease to 5.4% of the real exchange rate of the national currency, the rouble, to the American dollar, compared to 7.6% at the end of the relevant period a year ago. It was noticed that the monetary policy of the Bank of Russia was changing due to the growing inflation within the countries – Russia’s trade partners and the decreasing inflation rate in Russia “the dual-currency basket” is in need of supplying it with the foreign exchange of other countries. A new tendency can be observed when the development of small business in the country is slowing down and the investments of own capital into production are diminishing, but Russian financial investments in foreign countries have doubled. If the usual tendency was to point out to the inappropriate Russian tax policy which was blamed for lack of investment, the comments at the middle of 2006 point out to the unacceptably high business risk in the country and infrastructural restrictions on the investment capital penetration. However, after the resounding shock recollections of the Jukos case had been dimmed in 2006, the former branch investment structure has been gradually revived E.g., during Q1 of 2006, the investments into oil production and other areas of fuel/energy sector increased 17.4%, while the investment even went down by 2.6% in 2005. Although the tendency for investment diversification, which arose in 2004-2005, still has a positive reflection on the capital indexes of the manufacturing industry (compared to 2004, after Q of 2005 the share of investment into manufacturing reached 47.1% of the total amount, i.e. the increase was 7.1 percentage points)., the country’s oil industry again is being called the axe of Russia’s economy.29 In September of 2006, an annual list of the largest Russian companies was published30 and compared to 2005, the list was renewed by 25%. If the main sensational news of the previous year’s list was the fall of Jukos out of the first ten on the list, the surprise of 2006 was the state-owned Rosneft climb- ing from 19th to 6th place, having managed to increase its own capital by the share of the dismantled Jukos – the oil-producing unit Juganskneftegaz, and the disappearance of Sibneft, usually present as No7 in previous years, which went into the consolidated financial reports of Gazprom. According to the compilers of the list, the first 5 companies on the list for three recent years present obvious “example of stability and the stagnation familiar to us from previous Brezhnev years: we can the names of energy holdings like Gazprom, Lukoil, Russian Union Energy System (Russ. PAO „EЭС России”), TNK-BP and Russian Railways. The oil holding company Jukos is coming back after having been crushed and partially nationalised. Its daughter company Tomskneft turned

29 Ibid. 30 The list is published for the third consecutive year by the “Финанс” magazine according to the complex system of indexes; the main rating “threshold” of the “Финанс-500” – amount of sales – was increased in 2006 by 34% - up to 4.8 billion roubles (source: http://www.rambler.ru/db/news, 2006 09 18). 112

up No 33 on the list and Samaraneftegaz – No 49. A special mini list of 25, the main criterion of which is company effectiveness, includes 11 companies out of 25, i.e. nearly half of the Russian mighty ones, which are involved in oil-gas production or its transportation via their pipelines. Two of them, Transneft and the Consortium of Caspian pipelines, increased their operational profit by 41% – 50% during the period concerned.31 The changes in the distribution of the Russian capital before June 2006 showed the tendency that was called “the ever shorter hand of the Kremlin” by the authors of the ratings list. According to them, although “kilograms of paper have been written about how the state is eager to attain private property and influence,”32 the state’s share in those 500 most important companies is decreasing, albeit at a slow pace, and accounts for just 35.39% calculated on turnover index. Nevertheless, 80% of the sales of all 500 companies belong to 10 state-owned holdings active in all the most important sectors of economy. The Russian oil-gas sector is controlled by the groups of Gazprom and Tatneft, the activity of which completely depends on the decisions of the Tatarstan government. On the other hand, the Russian President V. Putin personally approved the proposal of the management of the “United Energy System”33 in June of 2006 to increase the share of private capital in the energy sector of the country, and his “opinion” swiftly has been turned into the Programme of Energy Investments of huge proportions reaching 2010, together with two decrees by the Government on wholesale and retail electricity power market liberalisation by bilateral agreements with the regulated consumers. These facts and statistical indexes lead to the conclusion that the universal theoretical statement about the existence of the hierarchic economic structure and growth axe in any economy, where capital, industrial, and economic activity is being accumulated and in the Russian case it amazes us by its impudence. In this case, there is money and power to influence its flows at the top of the pyramid, and the axe for the economic growth s the profit from the oil and gas production, its transportation and distribution business. It is the centre for the development of the national economy, while other branches, currently under relative stagnation, are gradually becoming the obstacle for the economic development. The question about whether the state or market logics underline the economic decisions in Russia is meaningless as the facts show that they are inspired by group financial interests alone, which are serviced not only by separate society groups for the sake of some worthy leftovers from the feast table, but by the state as a whole. If the strive for the reestablishment of a single-party system and crush any trade-unionist dissatisfaction is being reported by the country’s news agencies reports, the merger between the big business and bureaucracy is openly demonstrated both by the state and private

31 Ibid. 32 The most often-mentioned facts pertain to the nationalised Juganskneftegaz, a subsidiary of Yukos that was given to the state-owned Rosneft to be managed, the take-over of management in “Avtovaz”, and the new purchase of Rosneft, the corporation Avisma. 33 The need for the swift reform in the Russian energy system was expressed by Anatolij Chubais in the meeting of June 2nd 2006, and the Government approved the Programme a few days after (source: http: finanmag.ru./33853, 2006 06 18). 113 sector’s leaders. A good example is the Gazprom leader’s words on the state being the worthy manager of the work in “taking over the markets through long-term contracts” simply due to the state having the power “to open a unified channel on the basis of the price basket.”34 At the background of the events of 2006 - confrontations and agreements, falls and rises in stock exchanges - an award was granted to the Russian finance minister, Aleksey Kudrin, at the autumn session of the World Bank and IMF in Singapore recognising him as the best minister among the ones of developing European countries.35 Speaking at the award ceremony, the Russian finance minister promised that the annual growth of the economy will be at 6% and that Russia will insure “a transparent” banking system and ease the conditions for investment into the country’s economy. It is quite easy to notice the relationship of this event with the content of the letter sent in May by Austria, holding the EU presidency at the time, to the Russian Government. The letter had it that the EU will not make any obstacles for the Russian natural gas supplier Gazprom to be involved in the European energy network if Russia, and on its side, will provide for the opportunity for the European companies to participate in its oil and gas business. The question of whether one can rely on the company which ignores the rules of the free market and has political ambitions has become not the problem of protectionism but the issue of a principal viewpoint. A concern and mistrust was expressed in “The Guardian” of May 4th, 2006 by a prominent economist George Soros who stated that Gazprom’s intention to acquire the British company Centrica36 needs political involvement as the trust in free market rules has reached absurd level – one day the Brits, as he says, may realise that their energy is managed by the methods freely chosen by the Russians who purchased the shares in open market. When reports appeared on the gas distributing company, Centrica, shares went up by several points due to the rumours and a new wave of commentaries arose on the distrust in the Russian business climate and the partisanship of the courts, poor reputation of Putin’s Government on democracy and human rights, and open Gazprom’s associations with the Russian Government. On the one hand, fear was expressed that once in Gazprom’s possession, the British company may be serving the interests of the Russian Government. On the other, Britain’s eagerness was defended to set an example for the other European states of economic openness in liberalising the markets, noting that except for the much exaggerated incident with the Ukraine Gazprom had always been a

34 Годовое (note 13). 35 The award for the most prominent input into home country’s economic development is given annually to the best minister of finance and central bank governor by the British dailyEmerging markets, the founders of which are the WB and he IMF. The Best Central Bank Governor Award of 2006 was granted to the Slovak Central Bank Governor (source: “Кудрин признан лучшим”, http://www.rambler.ru/db/news, 2006 09 18). 36 A. Miller, head of Gazprom, said in a press conference on April 2006, that if Europe didn’t let his concern acquire the shares of the Western energy company, it would do no good for Europe itself. Centrica, the largest British network of utility services with 17 million of gas and electricity consumers, it was alleged, is handy to the Russian Gazprom as the manager of the British company British Gas, through the status of which Gazprom may have a possibility to legalise and trade the shares of the state company’s Rosneft on international market, in other words, to trade the shares of Juganskneftegaz taken over from Yukos. 114

reliable partner in the environment of free market and had always kept to its obligations37. However, in the flow of all the commentaries and information one can quite easily see the tendency for the interests, intentions and declarations of one corporation to be equalised with those of the strategy and decisions of the state as a whole.

3. The Russian Economy in the Phase of Anomaly

As the structure of the modern world economy undergoes dramatic changes, it is often noticed that the domestic priorities of separate states and international norms are in clear conflict and the willingness of making profit at the expense of others is on the increase. While the markets experience structural alterations and the importance of economic policies change, there are attempts to employ economic politics theory in what was earlier considered an isolated economy. The theory states that the governments can, by keeping to fixed policy rules, make the markets function reaching both, the balance at home and international concord. However, an increasing interdependence of national economies and their increasing tendency to lean on a strategically more favourable environment provoke such governmental decisions which necessarily influence the well being of other countries, too e.g. the year 2006 saw a series of decisions by the previously little known Russian state institution Rosprirodnadzor when a new instrument of state policy was used that was more advanced than the traditional mechanism of putting pressure on businesses, i.e. taxation. It turned out that by revoking the licences for raw materials extraction, one can formally get rid of any company which is not favoured by the Government or by the businessmen whom it supports.38 The liberal provision, that trade and a combination of economic interests, is the basis for peaceful international relations that has been stimulating for the world economic thinking for so many years, assuming that people are divided by politics and unified by the economy, has the tendency of becoming an empirical economic science in recent years with its relative and normative “laws,” rediscovered approximately every 25 years. Rapidly developing economic branch protectionist systems, or the branch regimes39, which was discussed purely on theoretical level two decades ago, has become the subject for bilateral

37 Žinių radijas, 2006 05 05, 10:00. 38 The company LUK Oil was threatened with the possibility of their licence for oil extraction being revoked in 3-6 months in their 19 oil sites due to non-compliance with environmental requirements; when an of- fence against Yukos started in 2003; one of its daughter companies was obliged on December 31st to plant greenery on the territory of one of its oil sites in tundra before February 2nd, when the outside temperature at the time was – 59 degrees C; the pretences formulated on the grounds of ecology are always positively accepted on international level, that is why the termination of oil supply for Mažeikių Nafta after the Letter of Intent has been signed with the PKN Orlen, there were no resonance comments on the problem (source: “Эко государево”, http://www.rambler.ru/news/economy, 2006 10 16. 39 Aggarval V.K., Liberal Protectionism: The International Politics of Organized Textile Trade, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985. 115 discussions on governmental and economic partnership levels as well as the index for the effectiveness of the relative advantage “law.” Cartelisation, conscious restriction, or the stimulation of exports and similar mechanisms, when the markets are being divided or home production are stimulated with the help of foreign capital, this often raises the problems of economic fairness. Together with Russia, as a new superpower, aiming at its acceptable place in the world’s economic system, an approach towards the origin of international economy, towards the doctrines of nationalism and Marxism are changing, too. Instances of neo-protectionism are becoming recurrent and more often analysed, which are characterised not by a systematic economic or political theory but by a set of certain topics and viewpoints. A traditional definition of economic nationalism is being recalled, which says that economic activity has to serve the strengthening of the state and its interests. The analysis of the Russian economic system reveals a shocking phrase announced by the Rus- sian foundation “Liberal Mission” in March 2006, that the main branch in the Russian “gross domestic product is corruption,” the extent of which allegedly increased 10-fold in four years.40 The survey carried out among prominent Russian businessmen showed that the extent of corruption increased from USD 33.5 billion in 2001 to USD 316 billion in 2006, and the average amount of a bribe increased 13-fold, from USD 10.2 thousand to USD 135.8 thousand.41 While the lawmaking and court system corruption accounts for approximately 5% to 7 % of the total amount of corruption, the Executive Branch takes up around 87% of the “gifts.” The absolute amount of the bribe, considering the changes in the country’s economy, has become a relative notion e.g. if the amount of an average bribe taken from a private business was equal to the price of a 30 sq. metres flat in 2001, the amount was equal to the price of 209 sq. metres dwelling area in 2005. On one hand, these figures show a big mess in the state economic and legal system. And on the other, the assessment on the macroeconomic level leads to the conclusion that the Russian GDP in reality could be much higher than that announced by the official statistics. The representatives of the Russian economic thinking, the theoreticians, assess the published corruption indexes and state that this kind of situation in Russia has been created by the nationalisation of the public social and economic life, administrative reforms. The reforms instigated the wave of the increase in the numbers of bureaucratic institutions and civil servants, the reforms of civil service stopped the acceptance of new employees from “non-elite” circles. The experts proposed sensational solutions, like Evgenij Jasin, the President of the foundation “Liberal Mission, who thinks that a part of the shadow economy which is not assigned to the services area by the national accounting system and is not included in the GDP, may be equated to “the service of business life saving,” like a patient’s gift to the doctor for the possibility to live. Ac-

40 Research has been conducted by public regional foundation “ИНДЕМ” lead by Georgij Satarov, (source: Фонд Либеральная миссия, Динамика коррупции”, http://www.liberal.ru./sitan, 2006 09 11). 41 Ibid. 116

cording to his estimates, if the official index of the amount of cash in Russia accounted for USD 46.8 billion in 2005, the amount of “corrupt” cash amount was 6.75 times larger, while the amount of cash for bribery in private business turnover increased to 6.87% in 2005 from 4.0% in 2001.42 If a relevant method is found to include the corruption index in the country’s GDP, the main index of Russia’s economy allegedly would equal those of the economies of industrialised countries, says the scientist and promises to create such a method. According to E. Jasin, if “Росстат” officially recognised corruption and the existence of the shadow economy as an official process, it would be able to present the Russian GDP as a figure larger by 80%, as the present statistical indexes “show that at least half of the cash in circulation is forged,” distort the prices of goods, form a negative index of added value, and create a number of other anomalous effects. This and other similar assumptions prove that a country’s macroeconomic policy is the main arena for the possible political competition and that it needs political coordination, and a successful implementation of the projected policy can be determined not only by the economic structure and the wisdom of the policy itself, but also a comparative power of the state together with political skills.43 The present-day political elite of Russia have isolated themselves from society and are increasing the precipice between the public power and the state structure, which happens not for the first time in the country’s history. The real process of the bureaucrats turning oligarchs and their increasing power in the state control mechanism, together with the creation of the clan of the top-ranking civil servants who simultaneously hold highest posts in corporate management structures and the state institutions, gives the possibility to exert influence on the economy both through the shareholders’ and governmental decisions, and create the basis for the model of the Russian corporate state. The perspective of the state economic development in this context is assessed differently by the representatives of the Russian state institutions and those of the society and science. One of the more interesting works44 is the attempt to create the scenario of the state development by employing the methods of mathematical modelling. It predicts several local crises in Rus- sia in the near future. The first crisis point in the cyclical graph of economic development according to 6 factor groups is between 2008 and 2010 when allegedly the pace of economic growth will decrease to 3% - 4%, and the Rus- sian economy misbalance, formed after the crisis of 1998 and camouflaged only by high prices of energy recourses, will become evident. The modern Russian economy is characterised by the reticence of the home market and vast unused production capacity as well as labour reserves in the enterprises. Although the average 6.4% growth of economy in 2006 was attained by the forced exports and exceptionally high oil prices in the world, a disproportion

42 Ibid. 43 Bergsten C.F., Krause L.B, eds., World Politics and International Economics, International Organization, 1975, p. 23. 44 Белоусов А.Р., “Долгосрочные тренды”, Центр макроэкономического анализа и краткосрочного прогнозирования, http://www.forecast.ru/archive/analitics/ancea2005/doklad.pdf., 2006 06 04. 117 was created among the most important economy sectors. A large proportion of the Russian economy with more than a half of all the Russian labour force (manufacturing, construction, and agriculture) has become non-competitive by its profitability, extent of investment, level of wages and many other factors. If the mechanism of compensations was quite effective between 2001 and 2004, which allowed to “maintain” a low rate of foreign exchange, low prices of gas, electricity and transport without increasing the wages and putting the budget income burden on the exporters of raw materials, today the influence of the compensation policy seems to be weaker. Certainly, the largest benefits of the policy have always been received by the raw materials exporters45 and not by the end users. In other words, the benefits from the state-supported prices were directly reflected in the profit figures of the largest companies. In recent years, a lot has been discussed in Russia about another phenomenon, “the work paupers”, by saying that the earnings of 10% of the best-paid and 10% of the worst-paid employees differ from anywhere up to 26-30 times, and that the second group includes all those employed in health care, education, and also culture, while the category of “the paupers” can be applied to about 40% of Russian population.46 A special feature of the Russian social infrastructure is the worsening of its quality and decreasing funding. If it decreased to 69% of the 1993 level during the crisis of 1998, it reached just 98% of 1993 level by 2004, although the volume of services (goods and services for end users) has been constantly increasing – up to 110% of the 1993 level. It shows that with the help of cash, which accounted for just about 6 %of the country’s GDP, “the institution – resources mine-hole effect”47 was created together with the funding model for social matters the purpose of which was just “to maintain the budget network” but not to pay appropriately for the quantity and quality of services provided by the sector. Another problem equally bothering the scientists is related to the tendency of the ageing population. Due to this tendency, after 2010 Russia will face the need to ensure at least 3% - 4% growth in labour productivity to compensate for actual 8% - 10% loss in work force in every five-year period. The works of modern economic theory do not try to prove, they just state, that economic and political motives have always influenced each other in every state, and recently when the trade, financial and technological flows have become so intense, the interdependence of national economies is increasingly greater. Today’s play of economic indexes and the prediction of future consequences prove that as the society understands better the economic content of all political questions, the causes of economic discontent or wellbeing can be related (or are thought to be related) by the citizens to the specific actions

45 E.g., the amount of transport tariffs in Russia in 2004 accounted merely for 58 % of the tariffs in force in the USA at the time, and the volume of transport services for raw material exports was 14 times larger than that of the services for home market (manufacturing, construction and agriculture) (source: Ibid.). 46 Аналитический центр Юрия Левады, Проект Динамика бедности в России, http://www.levada. ru/dynamicabed.html, 2006 05 08. 47 Rus.: “Ресурсно-институциональная воронка”, the effect explained by the process when the lack of financial resources worsens the work quality of institutions, which creates a continuously decreasing effectiveness of the use of available resources and their increasing shortage. 118

of the state or of a groups of foreign interests. The state, Russia in our case, is a perfect instrument in defending someone’s economic interests, and especially in insuring the distribution of the produced wealth in someone’s favour. Con- sequently, the process of the wealth distribution or the problems of redundancy and inflation in the society are often estimated not as invariable economic laws but as consequences of certain persons’ actions. The 2006 survey of the Russian population showed that 22% are not in favour of the well-known oligarchs and their interference in the state’s economy and politics, 66% consider alcoholism narcotics as the main problem of the state, 56% are most concerned with the rising inflation and their own survival in the worsening economic situation.48 Although politics and the economy are still sometimes considered as separate forces which are changing the modern world, the phenomena of the Russian politics and economy prove that the sources of power are the markets which make a huge impact on the policy of the state, and the social consequences of the process are determined by management of the economic dependence levers with the introduction of own rules which coincide with the concept of individual benefit.49

Conclusion

Anywhere from about 20–30 years ago, the representatives of the traditional political economic view projected that capital would be the most migrating element in the world of national states and political borders - the capital tends to have a strong presence in the growing sectors of international economy as the fight for resources and markets is going on. Meanwhile, the states pursue the goal of becoming the sources of technological innovation, and attain industrial advantage over other countries. Once a technological monopoly is achieved in growing branches of the world economy, any state, is able to receive “a technology rent” from other economies within the system and come close to the “innovation edge of the product cycle” where the highest added value is created.50 The Russian case allows the “technology rent” concept to be supplemented by the “energy resources rent” concept, and a well-known observation by A. Smith about every businessman’s wish to become a monopolist and receive the profit or rent provided by the monopoly is perfectly applicable to the Russian state. Its pursuit for its home priorities in expense of international norms drives a wedge in the interdependent European economy. It would be scarcely possible for Russia to turn to the traditional way of economic liberalisation unless there were such radical changes that the government would be

48 According to the data of ВЦИОМ (source: “Цены страшнее преступности”, http://www.rambler. ru/news/russia/statistics, 2006 10 16). 49 Such relationships were introduced back in 1946 by H.H. Gerth and C.Wright Mills in the publication Essays in Sociology. 50 Dixit A.K., Kyle A.S., “The Use of Protection and Subsidiaries for Entry Promotion and Deterrence”, American Economic Review, 1985, No. 75. 119 willing to exchange its short-term narrow interests in favour of a wider goal of stable international economy and would start changing the provisions of home institutions and business practices. Modern Russia, with its economy less advanced than that of other industrial nations, seems to be hesitant to recognise itself as a political looser on the ideological arenas of the Cold War, The Soviet Union, and, finally, the Russian Empire itself. In its pursuit of overcoming the advantages of the industrial states, Russia is trying to follow its nationalistic industrial and trade policy. At the same time, it has to actively enter the world markets in order to create an effective economy of scale, acquire necessary resources of foreign exchange and the main capital to finance the imports. Alongside with other states, Russia has always declared its willingness to fasten its economic growth, curb its decline and defend the country’s wellbeing. As a dynamic and expanding international economy increases the interdependence of separate counties’ economies, the state’s interference in Russia’s economic matters has long been not in compliance with the norms and requirements of the liberal international economy. It is feasible that only those theoreticians and analysts are able to assess accurately and correctly modern Russia’s loftiness and falls who have known their consequences by experience. According to separate Russian economists, the local crises of the state provoke the increase of chaos and the anarchy in the state management. Obvious facts clearly support their opinion. These phenomena supposedly will cause a new systemic crisis similar to the one experienced back in 1990, which may ruin the state. “The new isolationism” is the term used by the Russian analysts to describe the ongoing processes in the country. They have in mind the technological backwardness, economic and social degradation as well as deepening territorial and social differentiation. However, the chauvinist virus of national greatness has penetrated even the most progressive thinking of the Russian economists e.g. when they speak of the “windows for new opportunities,” they say that the first one of these is continuously growing need of the leading countries for energy resources which is a strong card up Russia’s sleeve for many years to come. The second one is the intellectual services, the markets of which are expanding at especially high speed, and Russia allegedly has a strong position in those markets. Thus, the state is able to integrate successfully the elements of its industry, technologies and intellectual potential into the international links of added value creation. Another window is the potential for Russian agricultural production as the country possesses 10% of the world’s arable land and even a greater share of the world’s highest fertility black earth. Within geo-economic context, according to Russian economists, it would sufficient for Russia to create a common economic area with Kazakhstan, the Ukraine and Belarus, and a reliable and effective energy, transportation and information infrastructure to match that of Europe and Asia. It would be sufficient enough to solve a few problems in the sphere of social-economic issues. The most important thing would be to have “a stable balance between the ruling elite and the public interests” and the legitimization of the capital that would ensure the particularity of the Russian 120

interests. In today’s world economy the relative influence of the crucial factors of economic activity, i.e. the politics and the markets, is not alike in separate activity areas and at different time. Agreements among national states and trans-national corporations become ever so more important for the location of economic activity. The merger of the interests of the Russian government and the first Russian trans-national corporation Gazprom is no exception. In other words, a union of the state and commercial thinking has been born, which was catalysed by a common idea of the prospect of “conquering” of all the energy resources in the home country and abroad. The history of the world economy shows that some countries of weak economies have achieved big successes and advantages with the help of such corporations. At the same time, a complex and controversial model of the corporations and the states has been created, characterised by an intertwined management of the share capital, the mergers and agreements of companies that are authorised and supported by national governments. In Russia, this kind of practise is accelerating and active preparations are being made to gain victories on the world market where the unity of the state and corporate strategies, together with the actions of traditional relative advantage, have repeatedly determined the results of economic competition.

October 2006 121 Nerijus Maliukevičius* Institute of International Relations and Political Science, University of Vilnius

Geopolitics and Information Warfare: . Russia’s Approach

This article explores the viewpoint prevailing among Russian researchers in respect to the transformation of geopolitics in the Information Age. It focuses on the changes in the concepts of power and space, which resulted in the emergence of information geopolitics as an important problem for scientific analysis. The article discusses information warfare, which is perceived in Russia as a tool for implementing modern geopolitical strategies. Traditional manipulation techniques and mediagenic crisis scenarios are analysed. The concept of a national information culture, which performs the function of protecting modern society from information attacks, is also introduced in this article. A tendency has recently emerged in information warfare studies and practical politics to deal with the problem of information security by imposing traditional bans and restrictions. Since such an approach does not suit open democratic societies, this article proposes alternative methods of addressing information security issues.

Preface

The information revolution, globalisation, and internationalisation have transformed modern international relations. They are now developing within a global information environment, where new principles of political cooperation, competition, or conflicts between the subjects of an international system are set out. In this environment, political processes occur in real time, geographic barriers lose their former significance, and the very concept of geopolitics is changing. With Lithuania determined to become a dynamic actor on international arena and with a view of successfully attaining Lithuania’s foreign policy goals, it is necessary to understand how modern geopolitics is perceived in Russia, a country which exerted and continues to exert a strong influence on Lithuania.

* Nerijus Maliukevičius is a PhD candidate, Institute of International Relations and Political Science, University of Vilnius. Address: Vokiečių 10, LT-01130 Vilnius, Lithuania, tel. +370-5-2514130, e-mail: [email protected] Globalisation means a worldwide consolidation of information and technological standards, management and production patterns, and assimilation of social and political structures, cultures and values, promoting the creation of joint institutions and regimes. Internationalisation means an increasing interconnection between different subjects of international relations, uniting them into a single community wherein national and cultural identity is preserved. Global information environment means interacting or conflicting states, institutions, cultures or religions interconnected by information, telecommunications or media links which are unrestricted by geographical or time barriers. 122

In Lithuania, geopolitical discourse is very popular. The notion of geopolitical code, put forward by Raimundas Lopata and Vytautas Žalys, is discussed vigorously. It is important that these studies are carried out within the context of geopolitical strategies developed by Lithuania’s neighbours. However, they need to develop an information dimension, which is the pivot of the information geopolitics pursued in Russia. The concepts of geopolitical power and geopolitical space can be easily distinguished in Russia’s modern geopolitical interpretations. Russian experts in information geopolitics, Igor Panarin and Andrei Manoilo. underline the impact of soft power based on information and media resources on modern international relations. The global information environment is a new geopolitical arena that greatly differs from the topographic view of the world, which prevailed in traditional geopolitics. Some Russian experts (Sergei Rastorguev, and Georgi Pochepcov10) propose to use information warfare tools in the newly emerged environment. Within this context, information warfare emerges as yet another tool for attaining foreign policy goals, while legal, moral, or ethical aspects of such activity remain in the background. An analysis of this phenomenon is particularly topical for social sciences, aiming to present the most objective social view of the world, because information warfare has a completely different objective, which is to create through the distortion of reality, a favourable political, cultural, psychological, and information environment for the purpose of attaining specific political goals.

Raimundas Lopata ir Vytautas Žalys. Lietuvos geopolitinis kodas. Politologija, Nr. 1 (6), 1995, 13-21. Česlovas Laurinavičius, Egidijus Motieka, Nortautas Statkus. Baltijos valstybių geopolitikos bruožai: XX amžius. Lietuvos istorijos instituto leidykla, 2005. Geopolitikos akiračiai (Žygimantas Vaičiūnas (comp.) Geopolitikos akiračiai. Vilnius: Eugrimas, 2004) published in 2004, a study where the concepts of geoculture, Internet geopolitics and information security are analysed, could be considered as the first attempt by Lithuanian researchers to depart from the traditional framework of this discipline. Игорь Панарин, Технология информационной войны. КСП+, 2003; Игорь Панарин, Информационная война и мир. Олма-Пресс, 2003; Игорь Панарин, Информационная война и дипломатия.Городец, 2004. Манойло А.В. Государственная информационная политика в особых условиях. Mосква, 2003. http:// www.psyfactor.org/lib/psywar27.htm 02 11 2006 Расторгуев С.П. Информационная война. Радио и связь, 1999. http://www.bookap.by.ru/psywar/in- fowar/oglav.shtm 02 11 2006; Расторгуев С.П. Инфицирование как способ защиты жизни. 1996. http://www.koob.ru/rastorguev/virus 02 11 2006 10Почепцов Г. Г. Информационные войны. Киев: Ваклер, 2000. 123 1. Transformation of Geopolitics

1.1. Modern Power Levers

The end of the Cold War, according to Ian Clark, gave rise to new forms of power.11 Susan Strange points out that the state looses its monopoly on power in a modern international environment affected by globalisation.12 Large corporations, non-governmental organizations and other non-state subjects are gaining an ever-increasing influence. Other authors emphasize the ongoing fragmentation of sovereignty. Patrick Tyrrell predicts that linguistic, religious, or cultural forms of sovereignty will develop alongside national sovereignty within the global information environment, which will not necessarily coincide with state territorial borders.13 A question thus arises: who will be the sovereigns of the newly formed sovereign environments? Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye contend that the states will retain their sovereign status if they succeed in adapting to the realities of the Informa- tion Age and if they are able to wield soft power.14 Keohane and Nye define soft power as “the ability to get the desired outcomes because others want what you want.”15 Such power differs radically from the traditional military power that dominated during the Cold War. The concept of soft power has been borrowed by Russian researchers from their Western fellow colleagues and translated into a framework concept of information geopolitics. Information, information technologies, and the media are most likely to emerge as the crucial power resources of the 21st century. American political theorist James Burnham pointed out that a new managerial class, rather than the working class, was replacing the old capitalist class as the dominant power in post-industrial society.16 The new elite were the managers of information and knowledge. As early as in the middle of the 20th century, the Frankfurt School thinkers and scholars described them as the “managers of public opinion.”17 In the future, effective foreign policy will depend more increasingly on the popularity and public appeal of state-promoted ideas. To form successful coalitions and secure support for international initiatives, the states will have

11 Ian Clark, Globalization and Fragmentation: International Relations in the Twentieth Century. Oxford University Press, 1997, 196. 12 Susan Strange, The Retreat of State: the Diffusion of Power in the World Economy. Cambridge University Press, 1996. 13 Patrick Tyrrell, The Information Revolution. Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies (NLARMS): Information Operations, ed. J.M.J Bosch, H.A.M.Luiijf, A.R. Mollema. Haveka BV, 1999, 73. 14 Keohane R. O., Nye J. S. Power and Interdependence in the Information Age. Foreign Affairs, No.5 (77) 1998. http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/prg/nye/power.pdf 02 11 2006 15 Ibid. 16 Michael Rush, Politics and Society: an Introduction to Political Sociology. Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992, 65. 17Jim R. Macnamara, Mass Media Effects: a Review of 50 Years of Media Effects Research. CARMA White paper, 2003, 2. http://www.masscom.com.au/Downloads/Media_Effects_(A4).pdf 02 11 2006 124

to adhere to the principles of public relations or political marketing.18 We could say that the distinctive features of powerful and influential actors on the modern international arena are changing. Such changes can be illustrated by Niccolò Machiavelli’s division of the elite into “foxes” and “lions” – which was later on borrowed by Vilfredo Pareto for his elitist social policies:

Table 1. Machiavelli’s Distinctive Personal Qualities of the Elite in Pareto’s Theory

Foxes Lions

Intelligent Prone to confrontation Manipulative Resolute Imaginative Principled Consensus seeking Reliable Flexible Impatient Determined Merciless Enduring Unyielding

Source: Rush, (Note 16) 64.

Pareto’s principle of the rise and fall of the elites has now re-emerged on the international arena: the “lions” and their distinctive features that dominated the international relations of the Cold War period are replaced by the “foxes” of the Age of Information, i.e. the states, which are capable of effectively manipulating information to enforce their preferences, resort to persuasion in their policies; they are flexible but also resolute in attaining popularity for their policies, values and cultures. For modern geopolitics, social and communication resources (TV channels, radio, and the press) acquire the same scope of significance as natural resources (crude oil and natural gas). Control over the telecommunications market has become very important and leads to fierce economic and political struggles for media control in both, the internal market and the global information environment. Vygantas Žylė notes that power is transformed into communication structures, which emerge as the only expression of power.19

1.2. The New Geopolitical Environment

It is not only the concept of power that undergoes a major change in the Information Age; the understanding of space changes as well. In his analysis of the information society, Frank Webster underlines its multi-dimensional

18 Stephan C. Henneberg, Political Marketing Theory. Working Paper Series, University of Bath, 2004. http://www.bath.ac.uk/management/research/pdf/2004-01.pdf 02 11 2006 19 Vygantas Žylė, Sukonstruotos ideologijos tikrovė. Informacijos mokslai. Nr. 13, 2000, 31. 125 characteristics and identifies the following aspects of importance to modern geopolitics: • Technological, which focuses on the diffusion of information technologies and the tendency of declining operating costs; • Economic, which focuses on the knowledge economy and its impact on the competitiveness of modern societies; • Occupational, which focuses on the increasing supply of jobs in the information sector; • Spatial (information flows), which focuses on worldwide information networks, reshaping the meaning of geographic borders and time; • Cultural, which focuses on the role of intermediaries in the process of creating and spreading information and on the tendency of information growth, resulting in problems of social reality interpretation.20 It is namely the spatial and cultural aspects of the information society that has attracted the attention of experts in information geopolitics. Alvin Toffler points out that capitalist societies, entering the post-industrial age, create “information infrastructures where messages and news are distributed as effectively as products and natural resources in the Industrial Age.”21 A new environment is being created as a result of globalisation. Frank Webster describes globalisation as a merger of markets, currencies and corporations.22 This phenomenon could be also described, in broader terms, as the global consolidation of IT standards, management, and production patterns as well as global assimilation of social and political structures, cultures and values. When analysing the information environment within the context of globalisation, its global and universal aspect is emphasized. However, the global information environment is not homogeneous. In addition to the information environment within a state, there also exist information environments in various cultures and religions. Therefore the global information environment should be also analysed against the background of networking the differences or internationalisation. This process may be defined as a progressively intensifying interconnectivity between different subjects of international relations, uniting them into a single community where distinct national, cultural or religious features are preserved. By emphasizing not only similarities but also differences, attention is given to the fact that relationships in this environment can range from cooperation to conflict; providing for different tools to be used for attaining specific goals.

20 Frank Webster, Informacinės visuomenės teorijos. Vilnius: Poligrafija ir informatika, 2006, 14-27. 21 Alvin Toffler, The Third Wave. Bantam Books, 1980, 35. 22 Webster, (Note 20) 75. 126

Figure 1. Spectrum of Relations in Global Information Environment and Tools Used

The search for a modern geopolitical balance is conducted in the global information environment (GIE)23 (see Figure 2). The representatives of the Canadian security and war studies’ community introduced the concept of this environment.24 however, they were mostly interested in its impact on modern military conflicts. Other authors distanced themselves from military aspects and presented their vision of a global information environment comprised of the following elements:25 • information systems, which include communication networks (information transmission tools), telecommunication broadcasting technologies (information presentation tools) and software (consumer-friendly information processing and presentation solutions); • information; • people.

23The following terms are used: global information environment or global information infrastructure [N.M.]. 24 Garigue R., Romet T. Information Warfare and the Canadian Forces. National Defence, May, 1996. http:// www.iwar.org.uk/iwar/resources/canada/iw_&_cf.pdf 02 11 2006 25 Andy Jones, Gerald L. Kovacich, Perry G. Luzwick, Global Information Warfare: How Businesses, Gov- ernments, and Others Achieve Objectives and Attain Competitive Advantages. Auerbach Publ., 2002, 56. 127

Source: Adapted scheme. See Jones, Kovacich, Luzwick, (Note 25) 62.

Figure 2. Global Information Environment26

Ivan Zassoursky, who analyses changes in the media environment, points out that the traditional Gutenberg Galaxy has been expanded by the e-media and the Internet to a global extent, joining states, cultures, and religions in a single information network.27 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt describe this infrastructure as “noosphere.”28 In their opinion, it also includes cyberspace and media space.29 Panarin also uses this term and for him, noosphere is a

26 GIE – global information environment; RIE – regional information environment; NIE – national information environment; BNIE – basic national information environment; MIE – military information environment. 27 Ivan Zassoursky, Media and Politics in Russia in the Nineties. East Political Science Review, No. 6, 2000. http://www.polito.ubbcluj.ro/EAST/East6/zassoursky.htm 02 11 2006 28From the Greek noos meaning mind [N.M.]. 29 John Arquilla, David F. Ronfeldt. The Emergence of Noopolitik: Towards An American Information Strategy. RAND Corp., 1999, 4. 128

pseudo real space in which Russia’ geopolitical conceptions that produce real political impact can be modelled.30 The global information environment (GIE) means interactive or conflicting national information environments (NIE) as well as regional information environments (RIE) based on culture, religion, and or politics,31 which are interconnected by information, telecommunications, and media links. The basic national information environment (BNIE) is the backbone of the existence of the state. In times of military conflict, the military information environments (MIE) acquire a very special meaning and importance. Russian experts maintain that the core of a state comprises not only technical systems, but also those systems, which are based on social and psychological interrelations: • national cultural heritage, patriotism and values; • ability to effectively communicate Russia’s official policies on various issues to local and international society.32 Some authors33 say that currently 53 countries in the world officially discuss their information environments (NIE),34 analysing and improving them to ensure their security and stability. Representatives of information geopolitics are particularly interested in regional information environments (RIE). All of the other elements of the global information environment are built on a national geographic basis, while regional information environments have their roots in area-based cultures, values, religions, and businesses.35 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt have developed the notion of a new kind of politics, noopolitics, based on active information politics.36 Along this line of reasoning, the concept of post-Soviet space emerges as a geopolitical battlefield for Russian geopoliticians.37 It reveals yet another aspect to the phenomenon of “fellow nationals” (соотечественники,– rus.)38 and the work carried out by the institutions specially established to deal with relating issues.39

30 Панарин, Информационная война и дипломатия, 176. 31Examples of regional information environments: “post-Soviet space“, “European space“, “Oriental culture“, “Islam world”, etc. [N.M.] 32 Доктрина информационной безопасности Российской Федерации. http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/ decree/2000_pr-1895.shtml 02 11 2006 33 Jones, Kovacich, Luzwick, (Note 25) 56. 34 Terms may differ: national information infrastructure, national information environment (En.) and other. [N.M.] 35 Jones, Kovacich, Luzwick, (Note 25) 61. 36 Arquilla, Ronfeldt, (Note 28) 34. 37 В. В. Разуваев, Геополитика постсоветского пространства РАН. Ин-т Европы, 1993. 38 Игорь Панарин, Информационная поддержка соотечественников. http://www.panarin.com/ 02 11 2006 39 Department for Interregional and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries at the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation was established in March of 2005; it is headed by Modest Kolerov. See http://document.kremlin.ru/doc.asp?ID=027071 02 11 2006 129 1.3. From Classical to Information Geopolitics

Geopolitics is defined as the “transformation of power in geographic space.”40 The current changes in the concepts of power and space provoke discussions about their potential to modify the overall concept of geopolitics. At the beginning of the 20th century, geopolitics was directly related to political geography. A complete geographic picture of the world was formed. Therefore, a search began for the geographical pivot of the world, the control of which would provide the state with immense power. Halford Mackinder placed the pivot area in the Heartland of Eurasia,41 while Alfred Thayer Mahan contended that domination of the sea via naval power was the deciding factor.42 These geopoliticians created the traditional foundation for geopolitics: the never-ending dispute between the sea power and the land power. Nicholas Spykman and Karl Haushofer joined the dispute later on.43 It should be noted that classical geopolitics introduced the principle of dichotomy into international politics: the polarity between sea and land was subsequently replaced by a polarity between North and South, capitalism and communism, Christianity and Islam. The founders of geopolitics were influenced by geographical determin- ism; therefore they constrained state politics and their development by topographical frames. Subsequent representatives of classical geopolitics realized that the boundaries of this discipline were being changed and reshaped by technological progress: discussions started about controlling air power44 and aerospace power.45 The development of geopolitics was shaped not only by a more extensive and deeper knowledge of the physical world, but also by a more persistent focus placed by some geopoliticians on the social world. Structural and, at times, topographical analysis of history, economy, culture, and psychology resulted in the creation of maps of civilizations, cultures, and religions. The works by Samuel Huntington and Francis Fukuyama are sometimes described as new trends in classical geopolitics. Although the concepts of the “clash of civilizations” and the “triumph of liberal capitalism,” which emerged after the Cold War, offers an innovative outlook on geopolitical problems, they are nevertheless attributed to classical geopolitics: The response given by some international relations analysts to the challenges of modern international politics does not transgress the boundaries of classical geopolitics.46

40 Laurinavičius, Motieka, Statkus, (Note 5) 13. 41 Александр Дугин. Основы Геополитики. Москва: Арктогея, 2000. http://www.geopolitika.ru/geopol1. htm#3 02 11 2006 42 Дугин, http://www.geopolitika.ru/geopol1.htm#4 02 11 2006 43 Дугин, http://www.geopolitika.ru/geopol1.htm#6 02 11 2006 44 Giulio Douhet, Hugh Montague Trenchard, William (Billy) Mitchell. 45 Everett Carl Dolman, Astropolitik: Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age. Frank Cass Publ., 2002. 46Rimas Ališauskas, Interneto geopolitika. Žygimantas Vaičiūnas (sud.) Geopolitikos akiračiai. Vilnius: Eugrimas, 2004, 15. 130

For modern representatives of classical geopolitics, both the physical world and social world are definitive and distinct. They do not accept criticism that such worlds are created by separate people, societies, non-governmental organizations, transnational corporations, media conglomerations, and countries for their own benefit and also for the purpose of gaining power. The era of great geographical discoveries ended long ago but social reality will never end - it is to a certain extent moulded and shaped. The information society has access to social resources, which differ radically from the resources prevailing in the industrial society. Besides, information technologies and new means of communication have created the necessary conditions for stepping over the boundaries of the physical world and building a “media reality,” simulating identities, and joining virtual societies without geographic boundaries.47 In the 20th century, French geopolitical researcher Paul Vidal de la Blache pointed out that in addition to the geographic factor, the human factor was just as important in geopolitics. Human activity is based on initiative, values, wishes, and aspirations that predetermine the use or disregard of the geographic factor.48 Earlier, if an initiative launched by the state or society encountered political and geographical barriers, the usual solution for eliminating them would be resorting to traditional military force, like Nazi Germany did to control the Heartland. However, the information revolution has made it possible for any political initiative, launched either individually or by the state, to be displayed across the global information environment where traditional military conflicts have been replaced by information conflicts. For modern representatives of geopolitics, the transformation of power in space means a confrontation within the framework of the global information environment between societies and the states with highly developed information technologies and means of communication. There are other tools and devices, besides military weapons, for dividing this space. Russia’s modern geopolitical projects also include the ideas of Zapadniks (westernisers), Pan-Slavists and some elements of the Eurasian perspective of a great new state.49 They are different in many aspects but all of them are built on dual ideas. First, we should distinguish the neo-imperial discourse, ranging from incitements to expand Westwards and South Westwards to proposals for a political and ideological consolidation of the state, i.e. withstanding the post-Soviet “cycle of collapse” and concentrating all power and resources for a new cycle of the empire’s expansion.50 Such expansion does not relate to traditional geopolitical visions of enlargement, it rather relates to information

47 Virtual social communities, Internet communities, network social communities, and virtual coalitions have become the object of research. See Cristiano Castelfranchi, Tan Yao-Hua. Trust and Deception in Virtual Societies. Kluwer Academic Publ., 2001. 48 Дугин, http://www.geopolitika.ru/geopol0.htm#1 02 11 2006 49 Raimundas Lopata ir Nortautas Statkus, Empires, the World Order and Small States. Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review, No. 1-2 (15-16), 2005, 40. 50К барьеру: Дуэль Павловского и Белковского. Интегрум, 2005 03 25 http://kreml.org/other/82246730 02 11 2006 131 expansion, which is now actively discussed by Panarin.51 Second, such projects place a special emphasis on the Russian Orthodox Church. It is the religious aspect that allows geopoliticians to speak about the “Russian civilization” or the Third Rome. Statements are made to the effect that the Church was separated from the media in past decades; therefore it should regain its communication levers52. Alexander Dugin has taken yet another step in this direction and now works in the religious information environment.53 Panarin claims that he is the author of the concept of information geopolitics,54 which places primary importance on fighting for information levers instead of geographical territory. Manoilo also gives marked attention to these issues. Manoilo says that national information environments may clash, cooperate and compete. The state may effectively penetrate into the environment of another state and manipulate its public opinion only where both environments operate a common code (language, religion, historical experience, etc.).55 Oth- erwise, a confrontation is provoked which may result in extreme manifesta- tions. According to Manoilo, dominance in the information environment of a geopolitical adversary can be ensured only through the use of such tools as:56 • Latent information management of the opponent’s internal, economic and cultural processes – which would create the required background for information, ideological, economic, and cultural expansion and predetermine the opponents’ decisions beneficial for the manipulator. • Information-psychological aggression based on economic, political and diplomatic pressure. E.g. the wine blockade of Georgia and Moldova is accompanied by intense information-psychological attacks.57 • Information war based on economic blockade and threat of use of force. Russia resorted to this tool after the arrest of Russian servicemen in Georgia58. Russia continues to deploy its troops not only in Georgia but also in other post-Soviet areas, which allows it to use traditional military force in addition to information war levers when dealing with “frozen military conflicts.” The technological dependency of the state and the psychological dependency of society on the information resources manipulated by another state, encourages a subtle or aggressive information expansion; the range and variety of potential influence tools and techniques can be illustrated by the following model of information flows as designed by Renaldas Gudauskas:

51 Игорь Панарин, Евразийская Русь - Информационная Империя. http://www.panarin.com/comment/465 02 11 2006 52 Глеб Павловский, Идеология: Наша информационная доктрина. 2000 09 28 http://www. strana.ru/about/02.html 02 11 2006 53 Alexander Dugin is the Vechi programme author and presenter at the TV network Spas. See http://vehi. tv and http://www.spastv.ru 02 11 2006 54 Дмитрий Тымчук, Информационная геополитика: от теории до практики. http://www.panarin.com/ comment/249 02 11 2006 55Манойло, (Note 8) 76. 56 Ibid, 17. 57See news column: Запрет на ввоз молдавских и грузинских вин и минеральной воды в Россию. Regnum, http://www.regnum.ru/dossier/833.html 02 11 2006 58 See news column: Обострение отношений между Россией и Грузией. Regnum, http://www.regnum. ru/dossier/1056.html 02 11 2006 132

Source: Adapted model by Renaldas Gudauskas. See Renaldas Gudauskas, Valstybės informacijos strategijos Lietuvos įvaizdžio kūrimo srityje matmenys. Informacijos mokslai, Nr. 6 (1), 1997.

Figure 3. Model of Information Flows

The above scheme does not comprise a complete list of information channels, tools, and techniques, but it nevertheless illustrates the enormous complexity of this process. Manoilo underlines that in each state there exists a specific national system of creating and disseminating information – which is predetermined by the language, cultural, and religious aspects of receiving and understanding information.59 The information environment of the state comprises a specific information-telecommunications infrastructure, relevant information resources, telecommunications, principles regulating the media and entertainment business in the relevant country, and also its regulatory legal framework. Therefore, one of the most important factors predetermining the efficiency of information geopolitics is deep and expert knowledge of the information environment of other states. It is only after the relevant environment is studied in detail that the respective communication tools and information influence techniques are decided on. To this end, a special focus is made in information geopolitics on effective monitoring systems

59 Манойло, (Note 8) 79. 133 directed at the neighbouring information environments and on the required intellectual resources. Manoilo proposes to use the following criteria60 based on which it would be possible to determine the efficiency of information geopolitics: • Ability to efficiently control ones own segment of the information environment; this includes the level of development of the information infrastructure, a quantitative and qualitative expression of information and knowledge, and also independence (economic and cultural) from foreign telecommunications structures and strategic information. • Ability to ensure the security of ones own information environment from the information expansion and attacks by opponents. • Ability to expand ones own influence in the global information environment, which depends on the ability to pursue an active information policy in respect of opponents. • Ability to bring together allies for the purpose of an information battle and the ability to form “information coalitions”. In addition, there exist factors that weaken the resilience of the national information environment against information expansion, these being: disorientation of information policy, indefinite political priorities, and also a blurred vision of the national state. Such a situation creates conditions for destabilizing the political situation inside the state by information attacks, at the same time enforcing externally designed solutions to deal with a crisis. It is quite obvious that such solutions will suit only the influencing state. In his monograph, Manoilo contends: Information-psychological expansion is an activity which pursues national interests through penetrating by non-conflict methods the social and cultural relations within society. The ultimate objective is to consistently and gradually modify, without the knowledge or awareness of society, the system of social relations and tailor it for the needs of the influencing party. Information attacks are directed at the established ideology and aimed at replacing national values with the values and ideological stance of the influencing party. The following tools are applied: the control and regulation of strategic resources, information-telecommunications structures, and the media market”61. The representatives of information geopolitics thus take a different approach to power than classical geopolitical researchers. The latter see power as the management of various spheres of life (politics, economy) as delineated by political geography, i.e. the state’s territory and borders. Modern geopolitical analysts define power as the management of the information sphere based on knowledge, information infrastructure control, and public opinion influencing techniques.62

60 Ibid, 272. 61 Ibid, 303. 62Владимир Попов. Коммуникативная и социальная природа и функция власти. http://www.inform- analytic.ru/images/stories/text/popov5.zip 02 11 2006 134 2. Information Warfare as Instrument of Modern Geopolitical Battles

2.1. Information Warfare Target: Information Culture within the State

German geopolitician Friedrich Ratzel argued that states were like living organisms,63 seeking to grow in size. Ratzel compared their territorial borders and geographical boundaries to human skin, performing the protective functions of the organism. In the Information Age, the protective functions of the state are fulfilled not only by its borders, but mostly by the dominant world outlook within the information environment such as: it serves as an information filter or a meta-structure which helps society to understand, select, classify or reject information about itself or the outer world. Information geopolitics, with the help of military tools, has the immediate objective of penetrating this filter. In their studies, Pochepcov and Rastorguev make a strong focus on such actions. The first analysed the problem of influence effectiveness, underlining that internal influence was always more effective than external influence.64

Source: Georgi Pochepcov’s model. See Почепцов, (Note 10) 502.

Figure 4. Providing Information by Eluding the Filter

Pochepcov’s model may be explained on the basis of an individual person’s psychological protection, which means that a person dissociates himself from information that, in his opinion, is not in conformity with his moral or spiritual values and can destroy the nucleus of his personality. Juri Kolin, a Russian expert in information warfare, maintains that a “similar element of

63 Дугин, http://www.geopolitika.ru/geopol1.htm#1 02 11 2006 64 Почепцов, (Note 10) 502. 135 psychological protection also exists in society which, in an effort to escape disintegration, rejects and discards from its collective consciousness any information contravening the established world outlook and national identity.”65 It is said that such a filter performs the function of social immunity. In every state, there exist unique technical and cultural structures, which help to assimilate information and thus create awareness. Information warfare has the objective of penetrating them for the purpose of influencing society from the inside. Such a society protection mechanism became the object of Rastorguev’s analysis.66 Rastorguev compares information warfare to an information in- fection and analyses it within the context of biological, computer and social infections.

Source: Model by author based on Rastorguev’s conception of information warfare. Figure 5. Principle of Neutralizing Protection in Rastorguev’s Concept of Information Warfare

In information warfare, it is the weak spots in the society’s protection mechanism that are attacked. Such weak spots may be a high disintegration level of society, historical traumas or any weakness of the state and its separate elements (the media, education system, etc.) as well as vulnerability to economic and other tools of influence. Information warfare targets the relationship between society and government as well as relations between different groups of society to create a confidence crisis. Pochepcov maintains that the critical limit in each society is exceeded when “more than 40 percent of the population demand radical changes in the political system and less than 25 percent have

65 Колин Ю. Информационная война: перспективы и стратегии. Научная мысль Кавказа, No. 1, 2003. http://warning.dp.ua/tel7.htm 02 11 2006 66 Расторгуев, Инфицирование как способ защиты жизни. http://www.koob.ru/rastorguev/virus 02 11 2006 136

confidence in the central government.67 In this case, a legitimacy crisis emerges and there emerges a real threat to the entire political system of the state. Daiva Urbonaitė, who analysed the concept of information culture of the state, says that in a modern state there exists a special structure for receiving and assimilating information, which operates in compliance with its own communication standards and rules. This structure performs the functions of a “social and cultural immunity”68 system. Information culture may be seen as a specific protection mechanism of modern society against the aggressive strategies devised by information geopolitics.

Source: Model by author based on Urbonaitė’s notion of information culture.

Figure 6. National information Culture and Information War

Frank Webster describes cultural changes in the Information Age as follows: Contemporary culture is manifestly more heavily information laden than any of its predecessors. We exist in a media-saturated environment which means that life is quintessentially about symbolization, about exchanging and receiving – or exchange and resisting reception of – messages about ourselves and others69. The nucleus of information culture – values (being political, religious, etc.) – is formed in the process of socialization. In this way, concrete values are established in society, providing for motives to seek further knowledge for daily, occupational, or political activity. But within information society, this nucleus of values is surrounded by specific norms and rules of communication, which

67 Почепцов, (Note 10) 24. 68 Daiva Urbonaitė, „Informacinės kultūros teorinis pagrindimas.” Informaciniai mokslai, Nr. 10, 1999, 55. 69 Webster, (Note 20) 26. 137 predetermine the actual way of translating information into knowledge, the mode of the modification of values and emergence of new values. Such norms relate not only to the legal regulation of the media, but also to the code of ethics practiced by journalists, PR specialists, lobbyists, or political consultants. Urbonaitė points out that a specific etiquette for communicating has emerged in the information society,70 i.e. an understanding of what is appropriate and inappropriate when spreading information. Of course, communication norms differ radically in democratic and totalitarian societies. Kolin points out that information warfare has the objective of destroy- ing a society’s security system and at the same time disseminating within the information environment such information and interpretations that are in dissonance with the existing values, thus injecting instability into the society’s spiritual, political, and economic life.71 Therefore, any loopholes in the state system of information culture norms and rules as well as in its communication etiquette are primary targets. Specific focus is placed on the legal regulation of information technologies, telecommunications and the media. Market laws and principles are transposed to the media. Motivated information and communication systems are expanded. We have to admit though that the analogy of information warfare and biological or computer viruses represents a somewhat simplified approach because social and psychological processes are much more complicated than similar biological or computer processes. Such thinking paradigms may lead to the emergence of radical theories.72 Besides, politicians and military information experts may be tempted to resolve information security issues through restrictions and prohibitions – which is unacceptable for open democratic societies. Protection from biological or computer viruses is much more easy and simple than resolving the complicated issues relating to the society’s information security.

2.2. Information Warfare Tools: From Traditional Manipulation Techniques to “Mediagenic Crisis”

Pochepcov points out that advertising is based on the strategy of desire, public relations is based on the strategy of trust and confidence, propaganda – on the strategy of persuasion, and information warfare – on the strategy of resonance.73 The latter may be described as a “high-profile” communication, which has the objective of creating a disturbance and upheaval in public space, overshadowing all other types of communication. Such a strategy does not target understanding or rationality; it is rather directed towards emotions or impulses. Information warfare is based on three main principles:

70 Urbonaitė, (Note 68) 60. 71 Колин (Note 65). 72 Silver Bullet model in communication science or Pavel Polujan‘s conception of noovirus. 73 Почепцов, (Note 10) 9-10. 138 • attracting attention; • raising emotions or feelings; • imposing solutions for crisis settlement. The success of business or political communication in a modern society depends on the ability to attract the attention of an audience and direct it to specific information.74 Various means of information warfare are used to create emotions, a feeling of instability and dissatisfaction in an audience and at the same time to make society choose biased solutions for resolving an artificially created crisis. The techniques of influence used in information warfare are not exceptional or original. In most cases, they are based on propaganda manipulation, studied by scholars at the beginning of the 20th century.75 Such communication is based on providing selective information to the political and media elite, as well as ethnic and social groups. In addition, information is provided in doses and only that portion of facts is presented which is beneficial for the influencing person, while the other facts are passed over in silence. Information aggression is built on psychological pressure, meaning that an atypical order is given to act and perform quickly without allowing any time for thinking or using alternative information sources. Such information attacks are usually built on pseudo-events: A pseudo-event is not spontaneous: it is planned and planted in information soil by someone. [...] A pseudo-event is created for the purpose of being immediately exposed, reported, reproduced, and multiplied.76 A pseudo-event is not entirely real; it is a media event staged for the media or by the media and spread across the information space with the help of the media. However such events are real in their consequences, because even though they have a minimal link to objective reality, they make a direct influence on it by motivating society or politicians to perform specific actions. Information attacks are built on the human need (psychologically predetermined) to simplify complicated phenomena. In this way, the existing stereotypes and myths are used. In addition, new myths are designed, which do not require either deep analysis or sound behaviour motives; instead they create specific clichés of thought. During information attacks, public space is dominated by specific information, while rational arguments are translated into information noise that is usually ignored by society. Information chaos prevents the truth from being disclosed. Such a situation allows using the techniques of absolute falsehood, which cannot be rationally denied because of persistent information noise. Representatives of the Russian information geopolitics present the techniques used in information warfare as original and resulting from the information revolution.77 However, their comparison to the propaganda devices

74 The concept of the domino effect has recently become very popular in advertising and public relations. See http://www.martinlindstrom.com/ 02 11 2006 75 Edward L. Bernays. Propaganda. New York: Horace Livelight, 1928. 76 Leonidas Donskis, Gyvenimas pseudoįvykių pasaulyje. Klaipėda, 2005 07 18. 77 See: Панарин, Информационная война и дипломатия, 222-226. 139 described by the US Institute for Propaganda Analysis back in 193878 (see Table 2) revealed many similarities and repetitions.

Table 2 Propaganda Techniques Identified by the Institute for Propaganda Analysis

1. Name-Calling: an opponent is linked to a negative symbol; sarcasm is used against persons or ideas.

2. Glittering Generalities: virtue words are used against individuals or their actions, which are not based on proof or rational arguments.

3. Transfer: positive or negative phenomena or characteristics are compared without due argumentation.

4. Testimonial: a qualified source is cited to give greater emphasis to an idea.

5. Plain Folks: speakers attempt to convince their audience that they, and their ideas, are “of the people”.

6. Card Stacking: positive information is provided about a person or idea, with opposing evidence being buried or ignored.

7. Band Wagon: appeals are made to follow the crowd and join in.

Source: Propaganda Critic. See http://www.propagandacritic.com/ 02 11 2006

New influencing techniques are usually derived from traditional propaganda principles. Manoilo maintains that the e-media creates exceptional conditions to use manipulation techniques in geopolitical battles and lists them as follows: a biased selection of themes and topics; a fragmented presentation of information and the manipulation of information sources; the presentation of information to a selected social group; withholding information or the allocation of an disproportionately large segment of broadcasting time; the comparison of incomparable facts, phenomena, or individuals; manipulation by a biased adjustment of the audio and visual material; the selection or creation of a specific context for news or “compromat”; the manipulation of information for

78 In 1937, the Institute for Propaganda Analysis was created by social scientists to educate the American public about the widespread nature of political propaganda. 140

the purpose of creating fear, mistrust, disgust, and other such emotions; the presentation of opinions by biased experts as objective; the manipulation of reports or features to present negative opinions as unattractive or distorted; the manipulation of social questionnaires; etc..79 Such a classification expands the understanding of the tools of influence and their application to a specific means of communication but, in actuality, it merely reflects the propaganda devices described by the Institute for Propaganda Analysis. Georgi Grachev defines information warfare on the basis of the above mentioned and other manipulation techniques: It is an art of influence aimed at making people act in such a way as they would never behave if they had accurate information relating to the event at their disposal80. It should be noted that the media of today has created yet another exceptional media function, described by American sociologist Charles R. Wright, as the dysfunction of the media. Wright proposed that when the media alerted the public to a health risk, for instance, it was serving its news and information function, but if a public panic was created, this was a dysfunction of the media.81 Many analysts recall the famous radio adaptation of H. G. Wells’ classic novel The War of the Worlds and the panic it created in Britain.82 Within this context, the studies carried out by the American medical epidemiologist Timothy F. Jones, where he analyses the impact produced by the modern media on the outbreaks of mass psychogenic illness, are extremely interesting: Mass psychogenic illness involves people with real symptoms that are often triggered by misunderstood or false information. […] Outbreaks of mass psychogenic illness often involve acute onset and rapid spread of symptoms, with minimal physical or laboratory findings. […] Unfortunately, by the time many outbreaks are recognized as psychogenic illness, they have had a devastating effect on the communities and individuals involved.83

Timothy F. Jones believes that media coverage frequently escalates such epidemics of psychogenic illness. It is namely the media that exposes the symptoms of an illness. Later on, illness may escalate with vigorous or prolonged media response and its symptoms occur among a specific group of persons. Usually such groups do not have access to objective information or they do not believe in it. Although Jones is mostly interested in the medical aspects of mass psychogenic illness, its common characteristics, as described by Jones, are of immense importance within the context of information warfare:

79 Манойло, (note 8) 121-122. 80 Грачев Г.В. Информационно-психологическая безопасность личности: состояние и возможности психологической защиты. РАГС, 1998. http://www.bookap.by.ru/psywar/grachev/oglav.shtm 02 11 2006 81 Macnamara, (Note 17) 3. 82 Ibid. 83 Timothy F. Jones, Mass Psychogenic Illness. American Family Physician, 2000 12 15. http://www.aafp. org/afp/20001215/2649.html 02 11 2006 141 • Often occurs after exposure to an environmental trigger (e.g., odour, emergency response, rumour, reported toxin, etc.); • Individuals or groups of people with psychologic or physical stress are mostly affected; • Closed communities are especially vulnerable (schools, occupational or religious groups, etc.); • Symptoms spread by the media are instinctively imitated or reproduced; • Symptoms spread rapidly – which allows treating this phenomenon as an epidemic.84 Earlier, such phenomena were studied as outbreaks of mass hysteria or panic.85 However, Timothy F. Jones was the first to accentuate the crucial role played by the media. It is the media that often triggers epidemics of psychogenic illness. In his analysis of potential information attacks, Rus- sian political technologies researcher Gleb Pavlovski focuses on Russian opponents and their ambitions to translate technogenic calamities into mediagenic disasters.86 This line of thinking is similar to that pursued by Timothy F. Jones. It is thus possible to assert that information warfare, based on traditional propaganda techniques, allows not only to influence in a most subtle way the internal political processes of geopolitical opponents, but also enables to create and control mass political hysteria, built on the defects of modern media, in the information environments of other states.

3. How to Guarantee Information Security?

In the face of such a potential threat, ensuring information security emerges as an issue of key importance. Some efforts are made in the Lithuanian media, unlike in the academic circles, to discuss information security, however most of such public debates, with a few exceptions,87 result from information attacks against the Lithuanian society - they contain emotional evaluations hardly ever based on scientific arguments. In most cases, they create a climate of distrust in politics and the media. In Lithuania, information warfare and information security research is yet at a starting point - several master degree theses have been written88 and some articles have been published in academic journals, also relevant academic discussions include only reports in rarely held thematic seminars. PhD theses

84 Ibid. 85 Wessely S. Mass Hysteria: Two Syndromes? Psychol Med, No. 17, 1987. 86 Павловский, (Note 52). 87 Leonidas Donskis, Informacinis karas ir naujasis kultūrinis kolonializmas. Klaipėda, 2005 03 14. 88 Nerijus Maliukevičius, Informacinis karas: JAV ir Rusijos požiūriai. Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Lauras Bielinis, Vilnius: Eugrimas, 2000.; Gytis Oganauskas. Informaciniai karai: priemonės ir jų panaudojimas. Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Audronė Nugaraitė. - V., 2001.; Marius Varnas, Informaciniai karai, jų priežastys ir tikslai šiuolaikiniuose kariniuose konfliktuose. Supervisor:.Tomas Deržanauskas. – V., 2005. 142

written in Lithuania’s higher educational establishments analyse only in part, the problem of information warfare: Tomas Janeliūnas focuses on the technical aspects of information security;89 and Darius Petrošius analyses information warfare tools from the prism of operational activities.90 In these studies, little attention is given to the negative consequences of applying traditional information security instruments to open democratic societies. The most recent studies of information warfare, both in the West and in the East, focus on technical or physical methods of dealing with information security issues. It is the logical result of the realistic paradigm, which continues to dominate in international relations: Realpolitik has a natural reaction to the information revolution: It inclines strategists to prefer state control of informational stocks and flows, and to stress guardedness over openness.91 Rastorguev describes this kind of solution for information security as a strategy of “effective armour.”92 Such armour can be put on ones own computer systems, like in the United States, or on the media structure or even on the whole of society, like in Russia. Philip Taylor contends that the concept of prohibition is analogous to propaganda since both of them are different sides of the same coin intended for manipulating public opinion.93 Technological means that guarantee information security cannot be applied to the psychological security of democratic information societies. This position may be illustrated by the following proposition made by Henrik Friman in respect of information warfare: The question then is how to defend our mind, which in many aspects has characteristics that resemble the problem with computer viruses and Trojan horses,94 but that needs other solutions. In the computer world the best safety measure is to disconnect the computer from the surrounding world by using stand-alone machines, and access codes. This method is not suitable for individuals who need socialisation activities with others. Instead we need to find new ways for verification and authorisation that help us discover perception attacks.95 Some representatives of communication sciences propose pluralistic

89 Tomas Janeliūnas, Komunikacinio saugumo koncepcija saugumo tyrimuose. PhD Thesis, Vilniaus universitetas, 2006. 90 Darius Petrošius, Naujas konspiracijos principo turinys operatyvinėje veikloje. PhD Thesis, Mykolo Riomerio universitetas, 2003. 91 Arquilla, Ronfeldt, (Note 28) 31. 92 Расторгуев, Инфицирование как способ защиты жизни. http://www.koob.ru/rastorguev/virus 02 11 2006 93 Taylor M. P. Munitions of the Mind: a History of Propaganda From the Ancient World to the Present Day. Manchester University Press, 1995, 10. 94 Type of virus, which violates computer security systems, paving the way for an unsanctioned use of the system’s internal resources [N.M.]. 95 Henrik Friman, Perception Warfare: a Concept for the Future. Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies (NLARMS): Information Operations, ed. J.M.J Bosch, H.A.M.Luiijf, A.R. Mollema. Haveka BV, 1999, 18. 143 solutions to this problem,96 in particular when speaking about the regulation of the media. Such an approach to information security could be compared to the main principle of energy security – which is alternative energy supplies. In the energy sector, it means the diversification of natural energy resources, while in the case of information security it means the diversification of information and communication resources. In this way, power would be transferred from information producers and disseminators (potential manipulators) to the audience. It would thus become a power to choose, disbelieve and interpret. Everest Shostrom, an expert in psychology, maintains that the best antidote against manipulation is actualisation. He juxtaposes lies with openness, apathy with activity, control with freedom, cynicism with confidence.97 The formation of communication etiquette in the state’s information environment would greatly contribute to the neutralisation of information attacks. Intolerance of improper information provision methods, black technologies, or propaganda could level their impact by revealing the manipulator and his concealed objectives. In propaganda theory, this is described as source exposure. It is acknowledged that in this case, the ethical standards adhered to by journalists, public relations, and other specialists emerge as the principal tool. Without analysing different codes of ethics, we present below Johan Galtung’s approach to communication ethics:

Source: Johan Galtung’s Model. See Johan Galtung. State, Capital, and the Civil Society: The Problem of Communication. 1999.

Figure 7. Galtung’s Model of Communication Ethics

96 Macnamara, (Note 17) 3. 97 Эверетт Шостром, Человек-манипулятор: внутреннее путешествие от манипуляции к актуализации. К.: Psylib. 2003, 15. 144 Johan Galtung urges to seek the golden middle in both, meaning the formulation of professional codes of ethics and in any action relating to communication. The aspiration to establish an idealistic etiquette of communication is directed at information producers and disseminators; however, there also exist approaches that focus on the possibility of the audience (consumers of information) to ensure its information security. Austrian e-media researcher Kondrad Becker focuses on the cultural intelligence level of an individual person and society.98 Becker maintains that an intelligent society should be able to distinguish manipulation techniques and eventually ignore them. In Lithuania, the issues of communication competence was also analysed,99 but the main emphasis was made not on the competence to deconstruct information, but on the ability to construct information and transmit it. Beata Grebliauskienė distinguishes the following skills relating to the receipt of information in in- tercommunication:

Table 3. Classification of Communication Skills

Verbal Communication Non-Verbal Communication Type of Com- Skills Skills munication Activity Written Non-Written Written Non-Written

Ability to Ability to Ability to hear Ability to see Ability to see and receive Informa- read “be- and recognise: and recognise: recognise: tion tween the • verbal • symbols; • distances; lines.” speech; • text; • postures; • distinguish • photos; • gestures; intonations; • etc. • eye contact; • etc. • etc.

Source: Beata Grebliauskienė, Komunikacinių mokėjimų struktūra ir turinys. Informacijos mokslai, No 7 (2), 1997, 52.

Communication competence could be thus defined as a Gnostic and operational-technical ability to participate in the process of communication,100 i.e. the ability to generate, encode and transmit information (thought), and also to receive, decode and understand information (thought). Grebliauskienė analyses common communication competences but she does not single out the ability to receive information from the modern media, in particular from the

98 Konrad Becker. Cultural Intelligence and Social Control. Vienna: Selene, 2002, 69. 99 Beata Grebliauskienė, Nijolė Večkienė. Komunikacinė kompetencija. Vilnius: Žara, 2004. 100 Beata Grebliauskienė, “Komunikacinių mokėjimų struktūra ir turinys”, Informacijos mokslai, nr. 7 (2), 1997, 46. 145 e-media. Such competence could be defined as “media competence”, in ana- logue with the term “computer literacy.” Today it is generally recognised that every member of the information society must have computer and IT skills. Therefore the formation of media literacy in the state’s information culture should be among priority objectives with a view of teaching society to live in media reality conditions and neutralise information war offensives. It should be acknowledged, however, that such a pluralistic approach to information security is exposed to the information war techniques discussed above when rational arguments and their advocates are discredited. On the other hand, fascination with bans and information regulation techniques may pose a serious threat to open democratic societies.

Conclusions

When Lithuania joined the European Union and NATO in 2004, its political goals were attained; however, the merger of the Lithuanian society, in terms of culture and values, with Western political and information environment still lacks clarity and stability. Russia’s influence on the Lithuanian mass culture and the use of media products in Lithuania has become more pronounced. Some models relating to information geopolitical strategies and information warfare tools are used to gain control of Lithuania’s information environment. Russian information geopoliticians (Igor Panarin, Georgi Pochepcov and others) actively participate in designing and implementing foreign policy projects in the post-Soviet space.101 Such a situation confirms the exclusively close relationship between Russian geopolitical theories and political practices. Therefore, the theoretical approach presented above, which reveals the relationship between information geopolitics and information warfare, should contribute to the practical aspect of analysing Russia’s policies pursued in respect of Lithuania. The concept of information warfare created within the Western academic community engaged in military and security studies has been transposed to international relations and geopolitics. This tendency becomes particularly evident when analyzing works by modern Russian geopoliticians. It is therefore very important to understand how Russia uses information power levers to retain its influence in the post-Soviet space. It is also necessary to search for effective ways of ensuring Lithuania’s information security. It is essential to propose some alternatives to the current technical and physical information security methods, prevailing in both the West and the East, which would suit the needs of open democratic societies. It is therefore very important to publicly propagate communication etiquette, to provide society with guaranteed access to alternative information sources, and to raise its communication competence.

101 These authors are members of the controversial forum Europe. See http://europeforum.info/users/?user_ session=6723ae06a71de0fc0b027e8f4a931884 02 11 2006 146

In addition, we should note that most of the information warfare studies in Lithuania and abroad focus on its tools, manipulation techniques, or the vulnerability of information systems. The relationship between the information warfare and morale is rarely discussed. This phenomenon should be analysed in Lithuania within legal and ethical contexts. It would create the required conditions to disclose the negative aspects of this phenomenon, which have until now received too little attention.

Vilnius, October – December 2006 147 Jovita Pranevičiūtė* Institute of International Relations and Political Science, University of Vilnius

Belarus – the Unfulfilled Phenomena: . The Prospects of Social Mobilization

For more than ten years Belarus has be under authoritarian rule and it has been difficult to explain this phenomenon. The rhetoric of the Belarusian elites – governing and oppositional – is analyzed as the main tool of the struggle to mobilize society for collective action in the political fight. The rhetoric of the ruling elite, and also the opposition, is analyzed in three dimensions: how competing elites are talking about the glorious past; the degraded present; and the utopian future. Through collective action, the nation will reverse the conditions that have caused its present degradation and recover its original harmonious essence. The main aim of this study is to demonstrate that in short - and perhaps even in the medium-run - the Belarusian president Alexander Lukahenko will remain in power due to the successful employment of the trinomial rhetorical structure. The conclusions can be shocking meaning that the ruling elite has been able to persuade society that the glorious past has been realized in the times of Soviet Union and at the moment Belarus is living in the conditions of utopian future, i.e. future is a reality, nonetheless the short period of the opposition ruin rule in the nineties and negative actions of opposition in nowadays. While the utopian reality is based at least on the ideas of economical survival and believes that all the aims of society have been reached already, the opposition has no chance to mobilize a critical part of society to ensure the support to its own ideas and to get in to power.

Introduction

In 1994 the well-known European film director Emir Kusturica started to film his masterpiece, “The Underground,” which won the Golden Palm in the Cannes Film Festival in 1995. The same year (1994) Belarus elected their first and so far the only president. Nobody would have believed at that time that the two events had a connection. The action of the Kusturica film begins in 1941 when fascists start to attack Belgrade. A group of people trying to resist, and waiting for the Allies to liberate them, moved underground. Their life is in full swing there - weapons are being manufactured, people are dying and being born. The underground people never go out. But there is one of them – Marko - he is the only one who knows what is happening in the real world above them. On that ground he maintains an illusion that the war is not over for another 50 years. Children who have been grown up underground are not

* Jovita Pranevičiūtė is a PhD candidate, Institute of International Relations and Political Science, Uni- versity of Vilnius. Address: Vokiečių 10, LT-01130 Vilnius, Lithuania, tel. +370-5-2514130, e-mail: jovita. [email protected] 148

familiar with the real world and therefore come back beneath it. Adults who get out of their underground shelter continue waging their imaginary war refusing to recognize the changes. Only a madman manages in his own way to adapt himself to the world outside the underground. This is the grotesque utopia. This grotesque utopia was crucial in Yugoslavia when it was at war in 1992. It became crucial in Belarus as well in 1994. No social and political scientist either from the West or from neighbouring countries can explain what is happening in Belarus any longer. There is a reserved and self-contained space shaping up in this country. Myths are being created to justify this space. The “war” against enemies inside and outside the country is shaping the identity of its people. Everyone who does not believe it is a kind of madman. However, the system is able to adapt him as well. “The last dictatorship in Europe,” “the unfulfilled democracy,” “the soft authoritarianism,” etc. – these are the headings that dominate the World mass media. Western politicians shrug their shoulders unable to understand why Belarusian’s do not follow the example of Georgians or Ukrainians when loosing their freedoms of speech, press, and assembly. Their inability to understand strengthens even more bearing in mind that Belarus declares itself to be situ- ated in the geographical centre of Europe. Finally, it is a country, which has a history inseparable from the history of Central and Western Europe. Belarus is “a denationalized nation” for Western commentators. It is the state, which combines “weak or divided national consciousness with an insignificant experience of independent statehood.” There is no unanimous national identity in Belarus. Belarusian national identity is fragmentized and its roots lead in different directions. These analyses are based on famous Western theories discussing the processes of nation and state-building, and nationalism studies. The emergency of the modern nation-state is the consequences of historical evolution (Karl Deutsch, Charles Tilly, and Reinhard Bendix). Considering the Belarusian case, analysts try to answer the questions why there is no process of nation and nation-state formation in today’s Belarusian territory, why the national identity is so fragmentized, and how this influences the political regime. Modernization and transition theories are based on assumption that the key factors for the survival of a new state in the post- colonial period are socio-economical and political developments. Integration of society is based on civil values, but not on national, due to the historical circumstances (there has never been institutionalized state at certain territory, the borders of a certain state have been moving too often, the borders has been drawn without considering the ethnic background of inhabitants). After the fall of Soviet Union, European scientists focused on the transformation from

Marples, R. David, Belarus: A Denationalized Nation, Amsterdam: Harwood, 1999. Sanford, Goerge, “Nation, State and Independence in Belarus”, Contemporary Politics 3, no. 3 (1997), p. 225-245. Ioffe, Grigory, “Understanding Belarus: Belarusian Identity”, Europe-Asia Studies 55, no. 8 (2005), p. 1241-1272. Joselyn, Ed, “Nationalism, Identity and the Belarusian State” in National Identity and Ethic Minorities in Eastern Europe, ed. R. Taras, UK: Macmillan, 1998, p. 73-83. 149 authoritative rule to a democracy. So they have been talking, not about creation of the nation-state, but about the transformation of the political regime and strategy of the economic development. Transition theories are conformable for the Belarusian case study in order to avoid the problematic topic on national identity, but they are loosing the point that there is not any great transition of political regime or economical system in Belarus. Scientists and commentators, who looks from the “inside perspective” are comfortable with using the background of Western state-building and nationalism theories. But they are stressing that the Belarusian case study should be developed in the context of the general national politics, which had been implemented in the USSR. Borisova and Oleskin describe it very briefly: (1) it was mandatory (ethnic discrimination, isolation, and genocide); (2) it used manipulation (de-ethnification, assimilation, and deculturalization); (3) it was only illusion of the dialog among the ethnic units. The phenomenon of “the Soviet nation” (an attempt to create a anti-national state) or hierarchical federalism (the preferential system of administration and ethnic units) are still considerably influential factors in the post-soviet space. But these inside observations can only partly explain the phenomena of Belarus, which despite of the pressure of the second wave of democratization, the regime is irremovable and unexplainable as it has been since Lukashenko came to power. For some authors, such durability of the authoritarian regime is part of the state-building process, but the aim of the consolidation of the state is built not on nationalizing or democratizing rhetoric, but on a quite openly declared strive for political power. (a) Internal political actors can use the state-building process for reinforcing their powers or can strive to integrate opposing groups into an existing or a potential nation. In this situation the statecraft in an action leaded by political elites, who is using nationalistic rhetoric only to legitimize their power and strengthen the state. The Russian scientists are using this point of view for explaining the situation in post-soviet space. They believe that while the disintegration of the power of the Communist party was under the way in 1989-91, the vacuum of power appeared in the Soviet Union. This vacuum reinforced the struggle between the establishment of the Communist party and anti-establishment groups. The struggle for power took place all around former Soviet Union, but ethnic, religious, social, and economical differences framed the situation where both sides could try to influence the result (to establish in power). (b) External actors can use the state-building process for their own

Борисова О.В., А.В. Олескин, “Этническая группа и государство как субъекты социального взаи- модействия: социопсихологический и биополитический аспекты”, Общественные науки и современ- ность, 2004, № 3, с.136-142. Hippler, Jochen, Ethnicity, State, and Nation-Building - Experiences, Policies and Conceptualization. http://www.jochen-hippler.de/Aufsatze/Nation-Building/nation-building.html, 2006-04-19. Tolipov, Farkhod. “Nationalism as a Geopolitical Phenomenon: the Central Asian Case”, Central Asian Survey (2001), 20(2), p. 185. Moses, Joel C., “Soviet Provincial Politics in an Era of Transition and Revolution, 1989-91”. Soviet Studies, 1992, Vol. 44, Issue 3. www.ebsco.com, 2006-02-19. 150

interests. Those actors are aiming to create an influence or to reinforce it in foreign country or society in order to link the state-building process with the determination of the loyal regime, institution and staff. In this case we are talking not about the creation of a common identity or the state formation process, but about “organizing” the state (institutions), which is able to administer its territory and guarantee that different groups can coexist despite their differences. The essence of this view is the idea that nationality does not guarantee stability and survival of the state as such. This way of state building is suitable for the realizing short-term aims.10 When the case of Belarus is discussed, we then have to have in mind that the struggle for independence never took place in the late eighties in Belarus. Belarus has become an independent state because of the concatenation of circumstances. The political elites did not even accumulate their efforts. But the activities, which were taken after the Belovezho agreement, when Belarusian sovereignty was recognized de jure, could be called only as the struggle for the political power. In modern times in the race for power, the most effective tool is information. This means that the capability of the groups of political elites to guarantee the support of the society by presenting corresponding information, to offer such kind of information, which could help to formulation the certain opinion of the society, to create and recreate society it-self. This purposeful information usually is wrapped in rhetoric or even propaganda in order to make it more understandable for the broad public and enables political elites to diminish their disadvantages and underline their advantages. The analysis of Belarusian rhetoric of the governing regime and the opposition, manifest their fatalistic fight against each other, which started almost as soon as Lukashenko came into power (or more precisely – since the referendum on national state symbols and bilingualism). On the one hand it is a conflict of values in which different interpretations of history compete and various myths are being created. It is a struggle of the opposite conceptions of political and economic systems and at a deeper glance – of different approaches to the questions of relationship between an individual and the state and between and individual and the nation. On the other hand, it is a struggle of political interests, the main target of which is an overwhelming victory. To the governing regime, gaining victory means holding power. The victory of opposition would mean the alteration of authorities. Thus, both sides, and particularly their elites, have their own selfish goals. Moreover, this struggle is fatal, because the loss of it would probably lead any side to complete destruction. It does not matter whether the means of destruction would be legal or quasi-legal. This fatal fight has already lasted in Belarus for ten years. The opposi-

Ottaway, Marina, “Think Again: Nation Building”, Foreign Policy, Sept/Oct 2002. www.ebsco.com , 2006-02-19. 10 Talentino, Andrea Kathryn, “The Two Faces of Nation-Building: Developing Functions and Identity”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 3, October 2004, p. 558. www.ebsco.com, 2006- 04-21. 151 tion though loosing the battles one after another still does not believe that the whole war is lost. The winner of the battle is the one who is capable to rally the support of the spectators (the passive part of society) at a critical point such as the elections or mass actions. In other words, the objective is to make them active and convince to declare their will supporting one of the sides. The only difference is that one of the sides sets the rules of the game. Moreover, though both sides appeal to democratic values, however it is in reality that they only seek to create the illusion of it. In the long-run perspective, this mortal fight where there can be only one winner is more likely to be won by the opposition which at least declares their acknowledgement of democratic values. The victory of the opposition is more probable because of several reasons. Firstly, there has not yet been invented the form of government better than democracy. Secondly, the snowball effect should occur, as the second wave of democratization swept Eastern Europe (the examples of Georgia and Ukraine should be inspiring). Finally, foreign influence is possible as a result of the clash of democratic values and Russia’s great ambitions in Belarus. However in the short or even medium-term perspective the governing regime has more potential to endure, bearing in mind its experience of soviet authoritarian rule and the unique Belarusian model of state government developed and consolidated within 15 years. Firstly, there are a number of obvious examples indicating that in the short or medium-term various non-democratic regimes endure in developing countries such as: the USSR, Cuba, North Korea, and China. Secondly, society adapts to the existing situation so much that it forgets or even does not know the alternatives. Finally, there are examples (such as of Central and Eastern European countries in the interwar period) indicating that in the short-run, undemocratic regimes are able to attain rapid economic development11 gaining the support of society in this way. Thus, in principle, as the moments when society has to make its crucial decisions are getting closer, the question should not be raised “Whether democracy will win?” in Belarus. Instead, the question that should be brought up is “When will democracy win?” or more precisely, “Whether Belarus society is able to decide on democracy?” and “Why have not they done that before?” and also “Whether it will be able to do that soon?” The answers of these questions namely allow one to pursue the main aim of this study, i.e. to demonstrate that in the short and perhaps even medium-run the opposition professing democratic values has no chance to win the fatal duel. It has no possibility to gain the power and consolidate its values in society. The rhetoric of the Belarusian elites is analyzed as the main tool of the struggle for power. Political scientists and politicians employ the term “mobilization” when preparing for the political fight. The social mobilization refers to the attempts of elite to gain the support of some social group (such as voters, teachers, etc.) in order to achieve their own goals. In this paper the term

11 Карбалевич, Валерий, «Белорусская модель» по-своему живучая, но обречена на истори6еский тупик», Аналитический бюллетень “БЕЛОРУССКАЯ НЕДЕЛЯ”, Но. 512, 2004-11-24, www.belapan. com/ru/analit/512-3.html, 2006-04-19. 152

is used in reference with the attempts of any member of the policy process to stimulate the collective action of the society or its part. While talking about mobilization in national level, Levinger and Lytle suggest combining instrumental and constructivist approaches to the identity and self-definition of various groups using the trinomial scheme. This scheme could be useful for methodological analysis of the rhetoric, which helps elite mobilize society.12 According to the authors, it is usually possible to identify three characteristic elements of the rhetoric of the mobilisation of nation. These are the following: • The glorious past. The original nation once existed as a pure, unified and harmonious community. • The degraded present. The shattering of this corporate unity through some agency or traumatic series of events undermined the integrity of the national community. A key dimension of this rhetoric is the identification of the sources of the nation's decay. • The utopian future. Through collective action, the nation will reverse the conditions that have caused its present degradation and recover its original harmonious essence. This scheme enables one to avoid the division of rhetoric into the good and the bad one. It allows estimating them as competitors. Then again, methodologically this scheme helps to reveal the ways of constructing new cultural, political, social, and even economic identities, in the process of social mobilization and the stimulation of either activity or passiveness through these identities. The first part of this article provides a comparison of the efforts of the governing regime and the opposition, to create historical myths and to lay a kind of foundation of social consciousness appealing to which allows identifying potential supporters later on. This part of the paper seeks to evaluate the achievements and the potential of employing the above-mentioned foundation of both sides. The second part of the paper attempts to introduce the present definitions employed by both sides and to explain the influence of those definitions upon the motivation of society either to strive for changes or not. Finally, in the third part the future visions of the governing regime and the opposition are presented and the ability for the governing regime to maintain the groups mobilized as well as the opposition’s hopes of cardinal changes, these are both discussed. The analysis is based on the examples of Belarusian elections and referenda, public actions, and also public speeches of the members of the political process. The terms “governing regime” and “opposition,” which are used in this paper have no normative implications. They are employed in an attempt

12 Levinger, Matthew, Paula Franklin Lytle, “Myth and mobilization: the triadic structure of nationalist rhetoric”, Nations and Nationalism, 7 (2), 2001, p. 178. 153 to make a distinction between the two groups of actors in the policy process. Other political actors include state-owned mass media and independent mass media, having in mind that it has no connection, either ideological or financial, with the present government of Belarus. The distinction of non-governmental organizations and civil initiatives will be made analogically.

1. The Glorious Past of Belarus

1.1. A Long, but Intangible Past

The myths of an honourable past and the golden era of a country or nation were extremely popular in states re-emergence after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Lithuania emphasizes its long-lasting statehood in the Preamble to the Constitution basing it on the Statutes of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. In Ukraine the myth of the state deriving from Kievan Rus predominates. Graham Smith, when analyzing the connection between historiography and nation as an “imagined community,” mostly pays attention for the most part to the mytho- logical structure of national historiography as a head stone of national identity. He treats myths as narratives, which are neither true nor false.13 In Belarus the prevailing narrative is of the glorious Soviet Union and mortal but honourably lost World War II. The other narrative seeks to make an opposition to the first one. It attempts to reinforce the history of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and to emphasize the significance of independence (though conditional) during the interwar period and the prospect of the cultural renascence of Belarus. The interpretation of the history of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania as the foundation of Belarus statehood, has the strongest links to the Belarus opposition and first of all the right-wing parties such as the Belarusian People’s Front and United Civil Party of Belarus. However it should be noticed that the present Belarusian government cannot reject it as well. This stage of the Belarusian statehood history is not disregarded in the websites of the Belaru- sian President and Parliament. The other important aspects are the attempts to infuse the society with these historical myths through the system of education and how much attention is paid to history in the public sphere. Let us now recall some examples. Probably one of the best kept, the Radzivil family monument of history dating back to the times of Grand Duchy of Lithuania, is the Mir castle, a UNESCO World Heritage site. Moreover the view of that castle is being used as one of the images representing contemporary Belarus. And contemporary Belarus is the Belarus of A. Lukashenko. It is worthy of note that the Belarusian Academy of Science (which has a very strong connection with the President administration) has in recent years been holding various academic conferences and public events on subjects of the history of

13 Smith, Graham, Vivien Law, Andrew Wilson, Annette Bohr and Edward Allworth, Nation-building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands: the Politics of National Identity, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 23. 154

Grand Duchy of Lithuania in Minsk as well as in other places of large historical importance such as Navahradak and Hal’shany. The other important castle of the Radzivil family in Niasviz is being restored (although not very efficiently) and the government reminds their people of the achievements there constantly. Of course, the government does not miss the propitious moments to remind the public about which language was used in the Great Duchy of Lithuania as the official language. The main avenue in Minsk, previously called the Av- enue of Francysk Skarina, has been renamed to the Avenue of Independence. However the monument to the above-mentioned publisher of the first book in the Belarusian language was built close to the new library. Though the historical illiteracy of Lukashenko is often noticed in the public sphere, however the government does not allow the opposition to monopolize the interpretation of history according to which the Grand Duchy of Lithuania is considered as a head stone of the statehood of Belarus. Moreover it is somewhat of an attempt not to disregard the part of a society for which an ancient history of the Belarus nation is of great significance. According to the data provided by NISEPI (Independent Institute of Social-Economic and Politi- cal Research) the above-mentioned part of society is not small. When asked what was the first Belarusian state even 35 percent of respondents answered that it was the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. 15 and 17 percent accordingly answered that it was the national state of Belarus which originated in the interwar period and the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic.14 The only stage of Belarusian statehood incompatible with the ideology of governing regime is the establishment of Belarusian People’s Republic in 1918. According to some Belarusian historians, despite the fact that Belarusian People’s Republic had rather puppet government, however this very fact put a stop to the incorporation of Belarusian provinces into the Russian SSR.15 In other words, if the Belarusian People’s Republic of 1918 did not exist there would have also been no Belarusian SSR, which the governing regime considers as starting point of Belarusian statehood. It does not seem that the opposition is capable of making an advantage of the normative content of the history of Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The appeal of the opposition’s leaders to the tradition of professing European democratic values in Belarus hardly ever appears in the independent mass media. The rhetoric of the Presidential Election of 2006 gives enough evidence that the opposition’s candidates declared neither their value orientation nor interpretation of history. These can only be apprehended through their pronouncements of other topics such as democracy. The latest however is referred to as an alternative form of government but not emphasized as a value by itself. Though Lukashenko is constantly criticized for human rights violations, nevertheless

14 Свирко, Юрий, «Белорусы разлюбили Россию и объединятся с ней не хотят», 2004-04-23 www. charter97.org 15 Ровдо, Владимир, «При нынешней власти общество становится менее белорусским, но все более серым и безликим», Аналитический бюллетень “БЕЛОРУССКАЯ НЕДЕЛЯ”, No. 435, www.belapan. com/ru/analit/435-7.html, 2006-11-19. 155 the opposition is not stressing that human rights and freedoms are integral part of the civilized world. Finally, it is possible to get the picture of the field of values of the opposition either via the attempt of integration into the West they declare or (and even more often) through the emphasized expectancy of help from the West. Probably the supporters of neither Alexander Milinkevich nor Alexander Kazulin have neglected the idea of nourishing the myth of the long-lasting and glorious history of Belarus. However it should be noticed that though not emphasized in public speeches the concepts like national or cultural renewal are present in their programs.16 It is not a part of the narrative of the governing regime. This very aspect corresponds to the selected scheme of social mobilization rhetoric. In the Great Duchy of Lithuania, the Belarusian language was flourishing and the society was harmonious. Nowadays the Rus- sian language and culture prevail therefore the situation should be changed. Then again, as some historians aptly remark, although the history interpretations of the governing regime are amateur and limited, there is nobody to discuss them anymore. At least five generations back have never been told anything about the period of history starting from lawmaker Leu Sapega and ending in 1918. The patriotic intelligentsia who could remind the masses of this bright stage of history suffered at least four total “cultural disasters” during the last two centuries. The authors like Bykov, Korotkevich, and Alekseev, who do not surrender to the pressure of the government are also unfavourable. They appeal to conscience and the opposition remembers them during times of crisis. In this sense even Belarusian People’s Front could not avoid teaching about the “revolutionary situations.”17 There are only several examples, in an independent Belarus, of history demy- thologizing facts or historical myths helping the opposition to mobilize society. On April 26th, 1986 the disaster took place in Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant. Although Chernobyl was a Ukrainian city; Belarus was the country most affected by the disaster. The consequences of the Chernobyl disaster were belittled by the Soviet government. Despite the extremely high and harmful level of radiation, the May Day demonstrations were held and even children participated in them. The independent researchers and foreign mass media managed to bring out the real degree of the outcomes of Chernobyl disaster. What disappointed Belarusians’ most of all was the fact that the government they treated as being on their side could have dealt with them in such manner. Belarusians’ expressed their disappointment and indignation through a demonstration on the streets of Minsk in 1987. Thousands of people took part in those first demonstrations. Approximately five thousand people participated in the mass demon-

16 Александр КОЗУЛИН: «ЗА страну! ЗА народ! ЗА тебя!», www.kozylin.com/programma, 2007-07-01; «Свобода, Правда, Справедливость: основные положения предвыборной программы Александра Милинкевича», http://ru.milinkevich.org/about/mymention/prahrama, 2007-07-01. 17 Грицанов, Александр, Константин Скуратович, Моделируя прошлое. Белорусы и рынок, 2006-10- 09, No. 39, ст. C22. Note that A. Milinkevich when answering the questions of Polish journalist long after the election has not mentioned any famous Belarusian public man or cultural worker of not polish origin. Bykov, Korotkevich and Alekseev were also not mentioned. 156

stration named “Chernobyl Road” (Černobylskij šliach) in 2001. According to the internet news media of that time, a significant amount of Special Forces were drawn up to Minsk.18 The same actions attracted about three thousand participants in 2002 and 2003 and only 1.5 thousand in 2004 and 2005. In 2006 “The Chernobyl Road” took place just a month after the presidential election. In theory, the indignation of society caused by the illegitimate election, or at least the doubt of its legitimacy, should have stimulated a much higher participation in this activity. However the number of participants did not exceed three thousand in 2006. It is worth noticing that the amount of militia and the interior forces drawn up to Minsk was almost the same as the number of demonstrators. These actions have been politicized right since 1996 and are somewhat an expression of disobedience to the regime. However the Independent Institute of Social-Economic and Political Research (NISEPI) carried out research in April of 2006. The aim of the research was to find out whether the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster are still an important topic for Belarusian society and whether this problem is still on the political agenda. The research showed that 41 percent of the respondents feel anxiety for the consequences of Chernobyl disaster and as much of respondents again are afraid of them. Only 16 percent respondents answered that they are not particularly worried about this question.19 More than 85 percent are convinced that the health of their relatives has become worse because of the Chernobyl disaster. The above-mentioned answers were compared with the answers to other questions concerning the satisfaction of respondents with the present political situation. The results of the comparison indicate obviously that the majority of opponents of current regime are unfavourable to the measures the government takes to liquidate the consequences of disaster as well as to various social programs. For instance, 68 percent of those who voted for Lukashenko in 2001 are satisfied with the means of liquidation of consequences. Accordingly, only 2.8 percent of supporters, out of those who voted for Milinkevich, are satisfied with the current “Chernobyl policy.” In June, 1988 the article named “Kurapaty: The Road of Death” was published in “Literature and Art,” a Belarusian magazine. The authors of this article were an archaeologist Zenon Pozdniak, who lately became a significant political actor, and Auhien Smyhalou, an engineer. The article presented information about the mass burial place, which had been found in the Kurapaty area on the outskirts of Minsk. There were about two hundred and fifty thousand people who resisted the Soviet regime and were murdered by the NKVD from 1937 to1940 and buried in this burying ground. After the investigation, the Soviet government was constrained to confess that the remains found there belonged to the victims of NKVD. On November 1st, 1998 the Belarusian People’s Front held a large-scale demonstration near Kurapaty. The exact number of the participants of this demonstration is unknown. However, there is no doubt that a

18 „Незадолго до окончания акции можно с уверенностью сказать, что Чернобыльский Шлях удался“, http://www.charter97.org/rus/news/2001/04/26/30, 2006-04-19 19 „Долгое эхо Чернобыля“ http://www.iiseps.org/4-06-6.html, 2006-08-08 157 part of this society was already prepared to recognize the negative aspects of the government of the Soviet Union at that time. In recent years the events in honour to remember the tragedy of Kurapaty pass off almost unnoticed in Belarus. The society was reminded of Kurapaty in 2002, as according to the project of the Minsk Ring Road widening plan the above-mentioned road should have stretched along the Kurapaty site. In fact, the indignant members of non-governmental organizations managed to stop the lay of the road at that time. However, their success was not a result of resistance of mobilized society. Rather the government found it was not useful to create favourable conditions for the opposition to argue that the history was disrespected. A new memorial was built in 2004. From 2005 to 2006 Kurapaty was mostly mentioned in the press as foreign diplomatic representatives would come to visit it. The number of participants in the commemoration events held by Belarusian People’s Front in Kurapaty never exceeds 60 people.

1.2. A Short, but Painful Past

“The huge merit of our nation (and Belarusians’ most of all) is the rescu- ing of humanity from the brown plague,”20 states Lukashenko. This is a brief but highly expressive example of the way a governing regime treats the Belarus nation and its history. On the other hand, in 2002 Lukashenko encouraged the authors of school textbooks to make the training appliances which correspond to the “emotional – historic level of society development.”21 A concept, the teaching of Belarus history, was prepared to meet this object. It suggests studying Belarus as a part of Eastern Slavic civilization.22 Although the concept had never been approved, the preference is nevertheless given to the history of World War II at schools. One of the extra subjects available for schoolchildren is expressively called “An Introduction to the Orthodox Culture.” In 2005 even a new textbook was published, and a new subject, named “The Great Fatherland War in the context of World War II,” was introduced. There had been only two subjects devoted to the history of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the faculty of history at the Belarus State University during the last five years. One of them deals with the period before the Union of Lublin and the other covers the history following it. Students can also choose one of the three courses related to the history of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The opposition has clearly no administrative resources of spreading it own interpretations of history and all the more, is it also unable to compete with the governing regime in spreading them within educational institutions. The outcome of the “historical free-thinking” of the

20 Интервью Александра Лукашенко журналисту программы «Панорама» Белорусского телевидения Юрию Кзиятко. Но. 317 (2001-01-08), www.belapan.com/ru/analit/317-1.html, 2006-11-19. 21 Позняк, Кирилл «История Беларуси трещит по швам» http://www.naviny.by/rubrics/society/2003/02/04/ ic_articles_116_144681/ , 2006-11-19. 22 «В Могилеве представлена новая концепция изучения истории Беларуси» http://www.belapan. com/ru/news/32818.html , 2006-11-19. 158

European Humanities University is well known to Lithuanians who gave this University a shelter in their country. In general, the point of view towards history and its significance adopted by the governing regime is probably best reflected by the name of the subject taught at Belarusian schools which is “An Introduction to Belarus State Ideol- ogy.” The history of Belarus is only one of the measures helping the governing regime to mobilize the majority of Belarusian society. In other words, history is only a part of state ideology. Baring in mind his contradictions as well as the controversial statements and decisions Lukashenko still managed to create the myth which though eclectic has its clear boundaries. The kernel of this myth is the history of World War II and the Belarusian SSR. The history of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, as well as the one of independent Belarus before the election of Lukashenko, though not denied still play only a secondary role in this myth. The present regime succeeded in connecting the history of the country with its prosperity and modernization of economy. The history of the state begins in the 20th century. The state has always been the victim of accidents and the policy of foreign states. The state has many enemies inside and outside its frontiers. But despite all that, it remains independent and stable. The life in Belarus is much better in comparison with the worst cases. And the golden era of Belarus was the very beginning of its history – the Soviet time. Meanwhile, the opposition emphasizes the co-operation with the West and its politics is retrospective - no radical statements and no attempts to create either an alternative historical myth or the vision of the politics of culture. The opposition is afraid to announce that if they come to power the life will get worse but the prospects of future will arise instead. The ideas of independence and neutrality are strongly supported in Belarus nowadays. Therefore, an intense stress on relations with the West would be as disastrous as are the attempts to prove that the contribution of Belarusians was not crucial in World War II. There is a wide range of opposition parties able to form an alternative agenda of public debates including Conservatives and Christian Democrats on the right wing and the Communists on the left. Therefore, it is hard to believe that politicians and intellectuals of so different political attitudes could reach an agreement on some common interpretation of history. On the other hand, the opposition avoids raising historical questions and discussing them not only because of the monopoly of information, but rather because of its political interest. Firstly, the opposition is afraid of loosing even more of their supporters. Secondly, it is worried about providing the governing regime with a pretext to stereotype the opposition by epithets like “fascists,” “the instigators of nation,” and “the despisers of history,” etc. That is why the history of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania is romanticized but not discussed. Lukashenko succeeded in consolidating his conception of state ideology. In other words, he managed to establish the thinking of history as of a process of ensuring economical wellbeing and to thrust the public opinion on this thought. The Belarusian SSR was the starting point of Belarusian Statehood, because then Belarusians “obtained” their republic. Moreover at that very time Belarus “became the most internationalist country” (the total consolidation of 159

Russian language) and “was the bravest republic” (World War II). It was also “the most educated nation as being an assemblage department of the whole Soviet Union” as well as “the most diligent and therefore the richest nation in the USSR.”23 Two out of four historical myths are purely economical. They implicate clearly that the state is able to arise and remain solely if it ensures a certain living-wage. The relations between citizens and the government are based on rationalist arguments exclusively.

2. Here and Now

2.1. The Degraded Present

Belarus stands completely out of the context in relation to new Euro- pean democracies. All the attempts to change the current situation are in vain. The governing regime strengthens its position more and more, through the permanent use of propaganda. All the new technologies and mass media are subordinate to the propaganda mechanism. The stereotypes are created to maintain the fears of society. Thus, in the opposition’s point of view, the present Belarus is degraded. The signs of degradation are a planned economy as well as restricted human rights, social, economic, and political freedoms. As an example, the rhetoric of presidential election of 2006 directed at the audiences both inside the county and abroad can be analyzed. The rhetoric of the opposition before any election or referenda can be described in seven words, which are “united opposition, single candidate, and single program.” Let us begin from the end. Avoiding the possibility of raising historical questions for public discussion as well as to give an argumentative answer to the challenges of the Lukashenko state, ideology are by themselves an evidence that the single program of opposition is none but an illusion as it needs a normative ground to rest upon. There are certain groups having their own political attitudes. They interact with one another but have no contact with the government. There is no dialogue between the government and the opposition. A kind of sand box exists in which those who disagree with the governing regime can play democracy among themselves. In principle, the only thing uniting various political movements, parties, non-governmental organizations, and even the independent mass media is that they all find themselves in the same sand box. Let us now introduce some examples. The Congress of Democratic Forces took place from October 1st – 2nd in 2005 and the main purpose of this congress was the election of single candidate. It is obvious, that when Liberals, Social Democrats, Communists, Conservatives, and Christian Democrats negotiate, the person elected is not the one who fits the role best but the one on whom the compromise is reached. Milinkevich was elected to lead the opposition with the

23 Владимир Подгол, «Современная история Беларуси в архетипах и символически – функциональных фигурах» rengiama spaudai 160

majority of eight votes only. Three hundred and ninety nine delegates voted for him and three hundred and ninty one delegates supported Anatoliy Lebedka who remained the second. In spite of the attempts to rally a united block of democratic forces, two “democrats” took part in the election. These two were Milinkevich and Kozulin, the former rector of Belarus State University. Kozulin was relatively successful in mobilizing a certain part of society. On March 2nd, 2006 an unsanctioned gathering of opposition took place in the Independence (Svobody) square. People were not allowed in the square. They did not know where to go for a long time. Later on, the demonstrators made their way towards Minsk Sport Palace accompanied by the Special Forces and the officers of KGB in civilian dress. Although the amount of security forces and the number of demonstrators were approximately equal, people were frightened psychologically. Milinkevich was the only leader of opposition who, though late enough, appeared in this gathering. Kozulin had not shown himself. Independent activists opposing the governing regime affirm that when the tent town arose in the October (Oktiabriskaja) square on the day of presidential election they had to ask the single candidate to come and express his support although the weather was really bad and the demonstrators were constantly threatened to be treated harshly. As if it were not enough, when Milinkevich finally showed up he urged demonstrators to break up and indicated the date of the next meeting. On March 25th, another unsanctioned gathering took place in the square of Kupala. People were pouring into the square from all directions although all the entrances were closed. Even those who did not have an intention to join the meeting did so. However, when at the end of his speech Milinkevich suggested the crowd to break up it was obvious that he had lost not only the election which was almost impossible to win. Kozulin also defeated him as the latter had felt that the crowd needs action as well as the leader. The emotional stress was enormous. The election was counterfeit, the tent town had been dispersed the day before and more than five hundred people were arrested. Therefore as Kozulin called the crowd to go and support (the term used in his rhetoric actually was “to liberate”) those arrested in (out of the) pre-trial detention centre on Okrestin street; the government could not stand it anymore. If this measure had succeeded, it would have been obvious that the governing regime looses their overall control. The overall system of fear and distrust endures only owing to this control. Hence even the smallest victory of the opposition would mean the loss of the governing regime as the regime has never experienced any loss before. The last example refers to the situation after election. As a result of the above-mentioned escapade and due to his will to become the leader of a crowd, which was treated as a large-scale hooliganism, A. Kozulin of course was sentenced to five and a half years of imprisonment. According to the press of that time, it looks as if the united opposition had not been surprised. It did neither fall upon protests, nor it began participating in the meetings or organizing them. It seems that “the necessity to safeguard the freedom of the rest leaders of opposition” became the main goal. However the reason for this goal is not quite clear. The ambitions of Lebedka to become the single leader of 161 opposition are not realized. The Sergey Kaliakins party is by a hair of downfall. The main trouble of Vincuk Viachorka is to help the young generation of his party escape the imprisonment that threatens them. And finally, Milinkevich wanders across Europe as an ambassador of goodwill informing others of how bad the situation in Belarus is. Besides, though the idea of the Congress of Democratic Forces was to rally the opposition, however the situation after election demonstrates otherwise. Besides travelling abroad, Milinkevich is taking the initiative of creating a universal movement which should unify people in spite of their political attitudes. Sure enough, one more political movement will certainly not create an atmosphere of trust in the opposition, which is split enough already. It will rather give the government one more pretext to jeer at the opposition due to its inability to make arrangements. Several cases can be indicated in which the Belarusian opposition, however divided, managed to show a consolidated response. It is agreed on the fact that the election was unequal, unfair and not clear. However, as mentioned above, it is not clear what should be done to respond the situation except of making declarations. The strategy has never existed neither before nor after the election. The Tent Town arose almost suddenly and it probably should have not to. The march to Okrestin was spontaneous and did not gain any support from the huge bureaucracy, even at least a low-ranking or indirect one. The private enterprise left aside. The support for those who were arrested, paid fines, lost their jobs, or were expelled from their studies during the election was provided by the Western funds via local registered and unregistered non- governmental organizations. The number of university scholarships offered by single European countries, increased the number of Belarusian students expelled from the Universities. Generally, there would have probably been enough scholarships to provide them to anyone who had spent at least several hours at October Square. Moreover, the Belarus opposition has a principal agreement on the question of why there is and can in the near future be no democracy in the country. The reasons are as follows: • The first reason is the creation of a legal basis, which put further restrictions on the activities of the regime adversaries. A wide discussion was inspired by the alteration of the Penal Code in 2005. The aforementioned alteration increased the penalties for gaining unregistered foreign support (i.e. the support for which the permission of government has not been received), and organizing any public events or training activities with foreign participants. The new Code also introduced the penalties for the spread of incorrect or false information about the country inside it as well as abroad. The dissemination of any unsigned information was forbidden. Although it made independent press indignant, however this indignation lasted no longer than since the first consideration of this alteration and till the moment President had signed it. • The second reason is the mass media monopoly. The circulation of “The Soviet Belarus – Belarus Today” (“Sovetskaja Belarus – Belarus Segod- nia”), the biggest daily of the country, reaches 550 thousand copies. The budget 162

expenses for all public means of mass information totalled almost 50 million dollars in 2006.24 Meanwhile, according to the independent Belarus Association of Journalists, there are only 16 registered independent newspapers writing on social or political topics left in the country. The join circulation of them all is less than 250 thousand copies. Moreover, the majority of the above-mentioned newspapers are not inscribed on the list of subscription publications. Therefore in practice, they have no chances to gain an audience. Some of these newspapers are even not recommended to sell in the state shops, news-stands, etc. On the other hand, such working conditions should be familiar to any country of former Soviet block. For instance, the activity of “Samizdat” was quite a success in Lithuania. Neverthe- less, as an example of 2006 has shown, this way of information transmission is not well-developed. Neither the supposed network of readers nor the potential list of distributors exists. The project of European Union named “Two million” was also completely ineffective. A few hours a week devoted to Belarus topic on German radio “Deutsche Welle” is not enough to inform the society. The audience of “Radio Liberty” (“Radio Svaboda”) broadcast for a long time in Belarus does not increase 5 percent. All the more it is not worth expecting any results of a completely new project which, besides, has already managed to disunite the so scanty independent news media. The RTVi channel broadcasts the only program named “Window to the Europe” (“Okno v Evropu”) to Belarus once a week. Obviously, this program has its own steady audience. As Lukashenko likes to put it, “there is the only man who watches that program and his name is A. Lukashenko.”25 It is likely, that the planned broadcasts of satellite channel from Poland will be more effective at least because neither Germans nor Russians but Belarusians themselves will take part in creating the programs on this channel. • The third reason is the involvement of the security forces such as the KGB, the internal troops, Militsiya, and the rest units of Special Forces into the political struggle. It was necessary in order to achieve two strongly interconnected goals. Firstly, to frighten the society so that it felt as being spied upon. And secondly, to completely control the actions of the opposition if not to totally cope with them. Two days before the election Sucharenka, the chief of the KGB of Belarus, announced that this institution succeeded in blocking up the way to the attempt upon the security of the whole society. The opposition sought to destabilize the situation in Belarus by poisoning the water. They intended to ferment a rat in a bucket of water and later to pour this leaven in to a reservoir.26 The Western countries, of course gave a helping hand to the opposition not only by financing the activities of such kind but also by

24 «На какую прессу уходят государственные деньги?», http://www.charter97.org/bel/news/2006/05/23/ pressa , 2006-05-23. 25 Откровенный разговор: Стенограмма пресс–конференции Президента А.Г.Лукашенко для пред- ставителей российских региональных СМИ «Советская Белоруссия» №185 (22595), http://www. sb.by/?date=2006-09-30 2006-09-30. 26 The press-conference of Stepan Sucharenka and the reportage shown during it were broadcasted on Belarus National Television program “Panorama” on March 16, 2006. For more information see the statement of the chef of KGB: Выступление Председателя КГБ в Национальном пресс-центре Республики Беларусь, 2006-03-16 http://www.kgb.by/press/inform/10.html 163 organizing coups d’etat. Sucharenka denoted that information as well.27 The above-mentioned institution, together with customhouse officers and frontier guards also stopped the attempts to bring into the country a significant amount of literature published in Russia and the Ukraine. Moreover it was announced that the Belarusian KGB obstructed the preparation of bigger or smaller gather- ings of non-governmental organizations and civic initiatives before the election as well as after it. • And finally, as an independent Belarusian journalist Piotr Marcev aptly remarks, “The unrealizable task of making a single program for liberals, national democrats, communists, social democrats, human rights defenders and ordinary members of civil society – has been fulfilled very easily. All the ideas and ideologies, which, in principle, are the main points of divergence among the political parties, were put aside. What had been left were the objectives such as the struggle against dictatorship, “the criminal regime of Lukashenko” and Lukashenko himself. <…> The aim of “overthrowing Lukashenko” corresponded to the program of “overthrowing Lukashenko.” No other program had ever been discussed seriously even inside the coalition.”28 The abandoning of these ideas and ideologies has by no doubts abolished the necessity of running the election. The fact that the members of Communist party campaigned together with the members of Belarusian People’s Front can only be seen as a campaign against Lukashenko and for anyone else but not him. This single program turned against the consolidated opposition itself. It blocked the way to proposing any positive decisions and new ideas.

2.2. Two in One: The Present Which has Already Existed or the Fulfilled Utopia

The fact that the opposition suggests voting against Lukashenko, was more or less clear to the voters whereas the reasons of this suggestion were not. A granny and a graybeard watching Belarus television only, and believing that they will live to witness the prosperous country every day seen on TV, would undoubtedly not understand the reasons of above-mentioned agitation. In the governments’ point of view, the degraded present is already over. It started as Belarus gained its independence after the collapse of Soviet Union and ended when Lukashenko came to power. The remainder of this past is the current opposition. The alternate future will never come because the current President takes all measures to ensure that “whoever comes to power after him would never intend to change the course of the state and therefore the state would never step out its current way.”29 The culmination of the election cam-

27 № 6(226) КГБ раскрыт план силового захвата власти в Беларуси http://www.kgb.by/press/inform/8. html, 2006-03-02; Выступление Председателя КГБ в Национальном пресс-центре Республики Беларусь, http://www.kgb.by/press/inform/10.html, 2006-03-16. 28 Марцев, Петр, «Как стать оппозицией?» http://nmnby.org/pub/0610/16m.html, 2006-10-16 29 Четыре взгляда на будущее страны, http://ru.belaruselections.info/archive/2006/compare/ , 2006-03-13 164

paign of Lukashenko was the All Belarusian People’s Assembly. Two thousand five hundred delegates appointed by regional executives, labour associations and loyal non-governmental organizations from all over the country took part in it. The delegates had to approve a set of guidelines for state development and the chief tasks in all policy fields, the so-called five-year plan. Therefore, the governing regime considered this event as one of the ways of executing direct democracy. The speech of Lukashenko in this Assembly was indeed telling a tale. Firstly, the President understands that there is no opponent as strong as himself so far. As it turns out of his speech, that is the very reason why there is some space left for the activities of opposition. The opposition is an indispensable condition of legitimating the governing regime and thus creating an illusion of democracy. Lukashenko confesses being blamed for letting the opposition appear on TV (which means a right to two half-an-hour long election campaign translations both on national radio and television accompanied by plenty of negative information about them during the news broadcasts). However, the answer from Lukashenko to this “criticism” is straightforward. He says, “My dear fellows, if I did not allow them to talk on TV, you would never know them being morons.”30 Secondly, the stability is presented as the highest virtue in the rhetoric of a Belarus leader. “The confusion derives not from the greatness of intellect,” he says. “They (members of opposition – author’s remark) do not wish to understand how feeble is the boundary distinguishing peaceful life from bloodshed and meaningless cruelty as well as stability from chaos and anarchy.”31 It should from there be understood that the stability is already ensured in Belarus and any changes neither should nor would take place. Thirdly, an agrarian life should be made as comfortable as city life is. However, this program is being already accomplished. Fourthly, Belarus has already outrun the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Baltic States in sense of provision with lodging. What is left to do in that field is to introduce price regulation and ensure the opportunities for all young families to get lodging in no longer than three years, as well as for large families to receive credit discounts. Fifthly, the health care is and will always remain free of charge and generally available. All the hospitals function at the moment. It remains only to raise them to a qualitatively new level.”32 The state capital will further be spent on building sport centres.

(In this part of his speech A. Lukashenko digressed from the text prepared in advance. Therefore, these very parts of the speech are not published in official sources) 30 Государство для народа: Доклад Президента Республики Беларусь А.Г.Лукашенко на третьем Всебелорусском народном собрании, «Советская Беларусь», №42 (22452), http://www.sb.by/article. php?articleID=50217, 2006-03-02. 31 Четыре взгляда на будущее страны, 2006-03-13 http://ru.belaruselections.info/archive/2006/compare/ (In this part of his speech A. Lukashenko digressed from the text prepared in advance. Therefore, these very parts of the speech are not published in official sources) 32 Ibid 165

Sixthly, the education system will not be changed in principle. Simply more attention will be paid to pre-school education and the improvement of secondary education during the next five years. In 2010 the share of assigna- tions to the system of education will make 10 percent of GDP.33 Seventhly, the pensions and wages, which are the highest all over the post-soviet area as it is, will be further raised. In five years they should double and bearing the inflation in mind the purchasing power of Belarusians should increase 1.5 times. And finally, despite the opposition, which is not worth to fight within the public sphere, Lukashenko has more constant enemies or more precisely, obstacles, which trouble his future a bit. These are bureaucratization and corruption. The fight against them is of course already declared, but not yet won. Lukashenko names the measures used to ensure the loyalty of civil servants and high executive especially quite openly. It is the renewal of personnel, which is referred to as the prophylaxis of bureaucracy and the maintenance of the activity of state system.34 This standard rhetoric of Lukashenko is an expressive example of how and why the ratings of this leader if not growing then at least ever go lower than 50 percent. The state leader seeks to create an image that all the main goals either normative (such as stability) or economic and social are already achieved. Only the means must be permanently perfected so that those permanent goals would permanently be achieved. It can be stated that the implementation of this pun let Lukashenko achieve his goal. According to independent surveys, 70 percent of respondents supporting the regime gave a positive answer to the question, whether Lukashenko, as a president, succeeded in coping with the problems such as maintenance of stability. Merely 24.8 percent of the opponents of the regime answered the same question negatively.35 When asked whether they believe that the five-year plan named at the All Belarusian People’s As- sembly will be put into practice, 63.8 percent of respondents answered that they believe in the fulfilment of the promises related with agriculture. 60.5 percent of respondents accepted the plans of raising wages and pensions as true. More than half respondents believed that favourable conditions to develop small and medium enterprise would be given in the nearest future. Slightly less than half of respondents are confident that the government will create auspicious conditions to work and get a good pay for it. Thus while in the Soviet Union, only the attempts were made to create a bright future, in Belarus this future has already come. And, as public surveys show, it seems that the greater part of the society is already entrusted that (at

33 Государство для народа: Доклад Президента Республики Беларусь А.Г.Лукашенко на третьем Всебелорусском народном собрании, «Советская Беларусь», №42 (22452), http://www.sb.by/article. php?articleID=50217, 2006-03-02. 34 Ibid 35 Тимошевич, Маринна, «Лукашенко для большинства электората – прежде всего гарант стабильнос- ти» Аналитический бюллетень “БЕЛОРУССКАЯ НЕДЕЛЯ”, Но. 598, 2006-08-08. http://www.belapan. com/ru/analit/598-9.html, 2006-11-19 166

least the part supporting Lukashenko at the election).36 The distribution of the answers to the question: “How do you think will socio-economic situation in Belarus change in the near future?” shows that in June 2006 number of believers in better future increased by almost one third (46%) comparing with 29.7% in 2005.37 It is clear, that this change of the opinion is related to the very active governing regime rhetoric during the election period. The main thesis of this period was “the life is getting better”. The analysis of the answers to the question “How has your welfare changed over the past three months?” demonstrates that the respondents just believe in what they are told. While analyzing their own welfare respondents are not so positive: number of those who feel the improvement slightly decreased (02’06 – 23.5%; 04’06 – 24.7%; 06’06 – 23.4%; 10’06 – 21.0%).38 Belarus can indeed be treated as phenomena in Europe (it is likely that the bright future has also already come in North Korea, Cuba, and some other less-developed countries). Belarusians believe that they live in a stable, prosperous country where anyone having minimal requirements can survive. They live in a country inscrutable to anyone outside it – in the “Underground” of E. Kusturica. In this case the opposition finds itself playing the role of the weak- minded. It has to adapt to the rules of game set by the government and is being exploited by the later as a mean of maintaining an illusion of democracy.

3. Unwelcome Future

So the situation of Belarus is quite curious. On the one hand, having forgot itself while playing democracy in its sand box, the opposition has, in principle, no response to the president. While the later performs almost all possible functions in the state – from the raising of idea to its implementation, and from the presenting of bill to the parliament to the control of the implementation of law, and also from the decision where the public toilet should be set up to the representation of the state abroad. On the other hand, the greater part of society trusts the present regime because it keeps society constantly mobilized – in the struggle for economic well-being. While the opposition raises political questions, the government raises economical ones. That is, the discussion between the government and opposition characteristic to democratic countries

36 Naturally, analyzing the case of Belarus the public surveys are not very reliable source of information, because the activities of the independent polling institutions are limitated and are walking a tightrope of legality. But the results pf public surveys could be considered as showing the trends of society. 37 Table 1. Distribution of answers to the question: “How do you think will socio-economic situation in Belarus change in the near future?”, % Fourth Quarter 2006: October, http://www.iiseps.org/e10-06-2.html, 2006-11-19. Variant of answer 06’04 03’05 06’06 08’06 10’06 Will improve 21.8 29.7 46.0 40.8 42.5 Will not change 46.2 40.8 35.8 36.3 37.7 Will aggravate 21.5 16.8 11.0 12.0 10.7 38 Fourth Quarter 2006: October, http://www.iiseps.org/e10-06-2.html, 2006-11-19. 167 does not take place in Belarus. And there are several reasons, why: Firstly, the comparative analysis of behaviour shows that for Belarus society economical questions (i.e. simply the survival) are of the highest importance. While 59.33 percent of Ukrainians and 54.55 percent of Russians consider the aim to success as being the motive of economic activity, only 54.55 percent of Belarusians share this point of view. However in the latter the share of society motivating itself with the aim of avoiding the failure is biggest (37.91 percent). By comparison in Russia and Ukraine only 18.18 percent and 3.33 percent of respondents accordingly motivate themselves in the above-mentioned way.39 L. Zaiko suggests calling such persons homo economicus, the ones who do not care about anything but survival. Therefore, the attempts of social mobilization using political arguments are condemned to failure. On the other hand, there is no accurate data about the standard of living in Belarus. Only the indexes of some other countries and international organizations can be referred to. On the issue of conditions of establishing and developing a private enterprise Belarus is ranked 129th out of 155 countries,40 the inflation rate reached about 10.3 percent in 2005,41 and in the index of Economic Freedom Belarus was ranked 151st out of 157 countries.42 Now more then ever, politics is most urgent to those people. As if it were not enough, the activity of the biggest state enterprises is maintained by government subsidies. If the subsidization stopped because of the alteration of political power, hundreds of thousands of Belarusians would lose their jobs. Now it is clear enough why those people do not struggle for their political rights. Good relations with Russia helped Belarus to keep the price of gas low and hence to ensure the competitiveness of Belarusian goods (though not always corresponding to European standards) and the budget returns from the resale of Russian oil. Therefore the pro-western arguments of the opposition frighten not only the employees of state enterprises but the businessmen as well. It is difficult to answer the question whether the expression of social discontent can be expected in Belarus. People do not feel that they live badly not because they live well, but because there is no evidence that they could live better in the same conditions.43 Therefore, those who claim that the reason why the “Belarusian model” holds out is the oil prices in global market are only partly right. Nonetheless, whatever the changes in oil prices, the governing regime would win because according to their rhetoric, the objective of the state is to survive. The same is the objective of the common Belarusian. Quite illustrative in this regard are answers to the question if people can provide their families with their current incomes. Thus, 50.7 percent of respondents said their incomes cannot or can hardly ensure normal nutrition, 73.5 percent said their

39 Заико, Леонид, «Белорус как homo economicus – фундамент страны и власти?», http://nmnby/pub/ 0606/09m.html, 2006-06-09. 40 Economy Rankings, http://www.doingbusiness.org/EconomyRankings/, 2006-11-19. 41 The World Facktbook, https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/bo.html, 2006-11-19. 42 Index of Economic Freedom, http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/about.cfm, 2006-11-19. 43 Лихутина, Софья, Янов Полесский, «Белорусизация Беларуси» http://nmnby.org/pub/051104/infocus. html, 2004-11-05 . 168

incomes are not enough or are hardly sufficient to buy footwear and clothes. Only three citizens out of a hundred (!) can presently afford more expensive purchases like furniture, a car, or an apartment.44 Therefore, the survival in the market, world policy, or anywhere else is the main trump of current regime in social mobilization. For if the state survives its citizens will survive as well. In comparison with this argument the reflections on the reforms, though necessary but not so urgent and as painless as possible, to keep “working places,” “friendly relations with Russia,” “stability,” “peace,” etc., are nothing more but the echoing of the government arguments. People are accustomed to the current government, which has refused any national-historical identification through economic or social aspects in its ideology. The Belarusians who allow the “underground” to remain alive identify themselves as members of certain socio-economic system. They are the ones who live better than their neighbours (the economy and social system are stable, prices are relatively low, and average wages and pensions are higher). Russians are the ones who break agreements, set higher prices and thus can ruin the stability of “underground.” The West is the place where instability, high prices, and the aspirations to “seize” Belarus predominate. In addition, the monopoly of information assured that the majority of Belarusians simply do not know that the situation may be different. And if they know, they refuse to acknowledge that, for if they do it will imply the necessity to acknowledge that they have been fooled for eleven years. In 2005 after the annual state address the question was asked: “In his recent address to the Parliament, A. Lukashenko said that we chose the right course in Belarus and it won’t change. Do you agree with him?” 21.3 percent of respondents answered “definitely yes”, 27.1 percent answered “rather yes”, and only 15.1 percent of respondents answered “definitely no”, and 22.9 percent answered “rather no”. The difference between an affirmative reaction to the question, in comparison with a negative reaction for the answers is more then 10 percent.45 Only 22 percent of respondents think that there is a need to reform economics and almost half of them are keen on changing the political situation.46 On the other hand, the Belarusians’ hardly believe that the change of regime or the victory of the alternative candidate but A. Lukashenko may influence situation in general. The dispersing of the answers to the question “Imagine that this is not A. Lukashenko but some other candidate who wins the next presidential election. In your opinion, what will change in this case?” shows that only a quarter of respondents expect improvement in the future (especially what concerns relations with Europe, democratization and prospects of the youth and active citizens), one third expects no considerable changes and an overwhelming minority expects deterioration of the situation in the future. This means the president will not be able to pin the hopes of the Belarusians

44 Analytics by the Fourth Quarter 2005, December, http://www.iiseps.org/e12-05-04.html, 2006-11-19. 45 Analytics by the Second Quarter 2005: May, http://www.iiseps.org/e5-05-4.html, 2006-11-19. 46 Analytics by the Second Quarter 2005, April, http://www.iiseps.org/e4-05-1.html, 2006-11-19. 169 for better future on his governance.47 Secondly, the means, which have been left to the activities of opposition, are ineffective. There is no governing party in Belarus. The parties loyal to the governing regime are rather nominal. In principle, it is not the parties who participate in the election but single individuals loyal to the regime. On the other hand, namely oppositional parties are left ostensibly as an instrument of social mobilization. Although various active non-governmental organizations are liquidated all the time, the opposition parties are reregistered. With their party structures not being regenerated, and their regional network destroyed, the opposition parties do not threaten the regime. But on the other side, their existence is somewhat an evidence of the existence of democracy in Belarus. Thus the opposition is everlasting and invariable just like “underground” itself. The researches, no matter governmental or independent, show that the opposition is supported by no more than 25-35 percent of Belarusians. How- ever, it is likely that the opposition neither wants nor is able to believe that, as it does not try to mobilize any new groups. The opposition does not offer any alternatives – neither for pensioners nor for employees of the state enterprise and bureaucracy. As some experts of Eastern Europe notice, the situation in Belarus before the election of 2006 was quite different from that of pre-election Ukraine in 2005. It has not been managed in Belarus to divide the bureaucracy and thus to ensure the support of at least some of its part or at least the neutrality of armed forces and the rest of security institutions.48 Businessmen are only allowed to act as long as they do not interfere with politics (some of the missing people were well-known businessmen and S. Skrebec, who had certain political ambitions was imprisoned for his business). The Belarusian opposition did not manage to find the weak spot of the regime. Meanwhile the governing regime was strengthening quite successfully. It started to apply new mechanisms of getting rid of potentially dangerous social groups. These were the groups, which had a well-known and understandable ideology and thus could have seemed attractive to the society. Some of the examples of such groups are the Party of Communists of Belarus, Belarusian Union of Youth and Children’s Pubic Associations (RADA), and The Union of Belarusian Writers. In the case of all the three organizations, there were their duplicates loyal to the government established. The duplicates were given the names very similar to those of the original organizations ensuring that at least several people would move from the initial institution to the new one. And that’s it! Isn’t it a democracy? The unsatisfied members leave the old party and create a new one. The old party starts to languish gradually, unable to carry out its activities, and if any legal cavil is found the activities of the party are suspended or even prohibited. The youth were forced to move to the Belarusian Republican Youth Union (BRSM) rehabilitated on the basis of the Komsomol like this. The Union of Writers of Belarus is run by M. Charhinets, the chairman

47 Analytics by the Second Quarter 2005: May, http://www.iiseps.org/e5-05-4.html , 2006-11-19. 48 Simon, Gerhard, “An Orange-Tinged Revolution: The Ukrainian Path to Democracy”, Russian Politics and Law, vol. 44, no. 2, March–April 2006. P. 12 (5–27) 170

of the Committee on International Affairs and National Security of the Belarus Parliament. That is how the government attempts to strengthen the illusion of democracy even more. This trick did not gain the response in society, because the civil society including its attribute, the critical public opinion, has not been developing for more than fifty years in the USSR. Now it continues not to develop for more than ten years further. Such a society is used to believe and approve.49 The role of a leader becomes extremely important in such a society. There is no belief in various mediators – parties, non-governmental organizations, governmental institutions, and even religious institutions are not quite important. The trust is particularly personalized, i.e. Belarusians trust Lukashenko himself but not the Presidential institution. The opposition has not yet managed to offer an appropriate alternative, having at least similar charismatic features as Lukashenko does. Thirdly, the fear of changes exists within the society. The destiny of the opposition activists presented in the news reports, daily pressure at educational institutions and at work, the increase of ideology staff (up to 25 thousand), responsible for loyalties of different social groups – all these factors contribute to the creation of the atmosphere of fear and distrust. Because of that the society keeps off the participation in public dialogue or moreover participation in public actions. This situation can be described as “kali nebyla voiny” (“everything is acceptable if there is no war”). The latest surveys show that Belarusian citizens concerned most about rise in prices (60.1% in June comparing with 73.2% June 2004). Without any rational explanation around 18% respondents were concerned by threats of the West (in June 2004 this number was only 7.7%)50. Finally, as for the identification of Belarus from abroad - the way other countries define Belarus encourages it to become even more utopian. The policy of the EU and the USA is unambiguous - the opposition fighting against the undemocratic regime is supported. Any government, of course, seeks to survive. Therefore it is not surprising that Belarus looks for allies in the East. The culmination of strategic partnership with Russia – the signing of the Constitu- tion of the Union Republic – has never come true. The conflict of the gas prices in December 2005 as well as the silent war of gas and oil prices, starting right next to the election, the taxation of transit of some Russian goods in Belarus and finally the abstain of buying Belarusian goods for the state money in Rus- sia tell about a clash between the interests of the two states and the business inside of them. Lukashenko has been maintaining quasi-diplomatic relations with the regions of Russia and visiting them constantly. Now however, he is forced to search for new partners, necessary to ensure the survival of the country economy. These are Venezuela, Tajikistan, and Cuba, the so-called non-allied countries. Belarus is in need of cheap energetic resources and the returns of

49 Николюк, Сергей, «Мобильность мнений и социальная мобилизация», http://nmnby.org/pub/280205/ mobility.html, 2005-03-03. 50 Analytics by the Second Quarter 2006: June II, http://www.iiseps.org/e6-061-3.html, 2006-11-19. 171 illegal weapons market (which undoubtedly is almost impossible to prove).51 If the viewpoint of the international politics actors towards Belarus does not change and Putin however raises the prices of gas and oil under the pressure of “Gazprom,” the threat of complete self-isolation will emerge to Belarus. The politics of this country is a “defence policy” already. It is implemented as somewhat a resistance to any actions of the East as well as the West. It seems like the governing regime has not left itself the possibility to adapt to the sud- den changes that may occur in the political reality (in this sense Belarus is not similar even to China).52 The unfamiliar regime and the turn of Russia into the newest enemy will stimulate the even more active withdrawal of the society towards “underground.” Having a monopoly of information Lukashenko will be the only “Marko” who “knows what is going on up there” and is able to create an illusion of permanent war. He will bring Belarus to the situation, which political scientists refer to as albanization. In the middle-term perspective, if the solid governing regime remains, the generation will raise in the existing social medium. This generation will always feel sentiments to that very medium and they will be likely to come back to it – just as it happened after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The institutions of special purpose will remain an influential power always willing to fight even after the war is over.

Conclusions

“Mobilisation” is the term used in military and strategic context. Political scientists and politicians employ the term “mobilization” when preparing for the fight as well – for the political fight. The term is employed while observing the attempts of elite to gain the support of some social group in order to achieve its own goals. The main tool for social mobilisation is the rhetoric. With the help of the rhetoric political elites are fighting for power. Both governing regimes and oppositions are stressing that the values frame their competition, but on the rhetorical level the values declared by both sides are the same. The Belarusian regime and opposition are playing the “one goal game” meaning, governing regime is declaring its fondness for democracy therefore it leaves a certain space for activities of the opposition, which legitimize this illusory democracy. On one hand, the governing regime has succeeded to intrude its historical myths upon the society, the roots of which lead to World War II and Soviet time industrialization. On the other hand, regime’s considerable tolerant approach to the myths of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and pragmatic use of them for state representation has ensured that opposition has no any monopoly of long

51 Douglas, Mark, “Choke off Belarus’s deadly arms trade”, International Herald Tribune, http://www.iht. com/articles/2006/10/09/opinion/eddouglas.php, 2006-10-09. 52 Карбалевич, Валерий, «Белорусская модель» по-своему живучая, но обречена на истори6еский тупик», Аналитический бюллетень “БЕЛОРУССКАЯ НЕДЕЛЯ”, Но. 512, www.belapan.com/ru/ analit/512-3.html, 2004-11-24. 172

and glorious past. There is no strict dividing line between “government” and “opposition.” Because of the power and media monopoly, the governing regime has succeeded to intrude the pattern of reasoning, which is based on the principle of the satisfaction with the minimum standards. The rhetoric of Mr. Lukashenko and his ideology ensured that interests and needs of the society are minimized to biological ones. The needs of social participation are limited to participation in “labour communities,” sport and health actions, organized by governmental institutions. There is no effective mediator between the government and society such as political parties, nongovernmental organizations, and independent trade unions. This prevents the formation of the social and political interests. The surveys show that Belarusians are less self-reliant then neighbours in Ukraine or Russia, less keen on taking the initiative. The society where minimal standards are reached, there is no unemploy- ment, although the salaries are low, there is a creaky but free health system, and also the pensions and all social welfare are paid on time. In this kind of the society there is no need for personal initiative. In this kind of the society, an illusion “all goals are reached” exists. Negative comparisons “our neighbours live worse” help for governing regime go further then Soviet Union. Mr. Lu- kashenko succeeded to convince the citizens of Belarus, that the bright future has already come. There is no need to change anything, because the changes are chaos and uncertainty. All Belarus needs is some insignificant upgrade of the situation and if the president works unhindered, Belarusians will live within the perfection of the here and now. Political discussions do not in principle take place in public sphere. The activities of the president and the entire government are reduced to the decision-making of communal level. Since the opposition has no means to solve communal problems, it is not worth awaiting the fight for power in Belarus grounded on political and democratic values at least in the near future. There is no knowledge within the society that it can live better not only then close neighbours live, but much better then the distant West. If the opposition, eternally the same and so convenient to the governing regime, decides however to try to attain its objectives and fight in a fatal fight of values and political ambitions it should prepare itself to appeal not to its own supporters but the ones of Lukashenko. It should not raise the political, cultural, or historical questions but rather debate with the government on the questions like where and when the public toilet should be built. The opposition should demythologize the present using concrete examples. It should strive to inform the society without the help from West or East. And what is the most important, that all those attempts should be made on public grounds because otherwise the opposition will be blamed of representing the interests of someone else. There is an annihilation of the atmosphere of fear only by presenting and spreading positive developmental programs and walking a tightrope between realistic promises and populism. As the last decade showed, the opposition is not capable to go beyond its political ambitions and find the compromise. So there are two possible ways: 173 firstly, the optimistic scenario and secondly, the pessimistic scenario. Accord- ing to the optimistic one, the Belarusian opposition has to acknowledge that it won’t win the political fight until the opposition itself is depersonalized, if there is no a person who is not associated neither with a regime or opposition. This person should be a certain charismatic character and who avows democratic values. The Baltic States has chosen ethnic emigrants, who were elected to high- ranking positions. But in Belarus these examples are not taken in to account. In Ukraine, the representatives of democratic groups managed to fragmentize the governing elite. And the leader of the opposition had become a man, who just little time ago was a part of governing regime. In all these cases international pressure has done its work, but the task of the opposition itself is to ensure the international support. According to the pessimistic scenario, the opposition can prolong its surviving waiting when the Belarusian economical miracle collapses. The optimistic scenario opens up the possibility for some “weak minded persons” to lead the Belarusian people from the Kusturica’s “underground” and to acclimatize for the majority of the nation to new environment at least in a long-term perspective. Whereas the implementation of the pessimistic scenario does not guarantee that the “underground” will disappear, nor that the causes which ensure stability of the nowadays situation will vanish. Then the situation in Belarus will be as in the last scene of Kusturica’s movie – some characters are not able to adapt to the new circumstances, and the majority decide to come back to their own “underground.”

National . Security. Issues in. Lithuania

177 Gražina Miniotaitė* Lithuanian Military Academy Culture, Philosophy and Arts Research Institute

Lithuania’s Evolving Security . and Defence Policy: . Problems and Prospects**

This article presents an analysis of the developments in Lithuania’s security and defence policy (LSDP) since 1990, and makes an attempt at clarifying its main tendencies and prospects. Lithuania’s SDP has been mainly shaped by the concerns of re-establishing the country’s statehood and state sovereignty. The re-emerging Lithuanian state had not only to guarantee the preservation of national sovereignty, but also to create conditions favourable to radical legal and economic change. When considering the ways in which to reach these formidable goals, Lithuania has treated membership in NATO and EU as the means for the state’s security. The process of access negotiations and then living up to the criteria for membership in these organizations led to a significant transformation of the state and the society. In regards to the security policy it led to the efforts of overcoming negative attitudes towards neighbouring states and accepting the idea of a collective security. In turn, this led to changes in the defence policy, replacing the idea of territorial defence to that of a collective defence and accordingly reforming the armed forces. Now a member of the EU and NATO, Lithuania has developed ambitions at becoming the leader of a region in spreading her experience of political and economic reforms to neighbouring eastern countries. Lithuania has supported the strengthening of the military dimension of EU, while being critical of the duplication of EU and NATO functions and capacities, and has linked her own security with the preservation of the strong transatlantic alliance.

Introduction

Lithuania, after obtaining membership in the EU and NATO in 2004, was actively engaged in activities of both institutions. Lithuania was the first of the EU member states to ratify, in 2004, the EU Constitution and among the first of the new member-states to seek entrance to the Euro zone. Both its population and its political elite are positively disposed towards Lithuania’s membership in the EU and NATO and optimistic about its prospects. Claims are often made that by decisively turning towards the West in 1994, Lithuania

* Doc. dr. Gražina Miniotaitė is a professor of the Political Science Department of the Lithuanian Military Academy and a researcher of the Culture, Philosophy and Arts Research Institute. Address: Šilo 5a, LT-10322 Vilnius, Lithuania tel. +370-5-2103569, e–mail: [email protected] ** The author is grateful to the EC COST programme and to Agency for International Science and Technology Development Programmes in Lithuania for support. 178

has developed an optimal foreign and security policy reflecting the aspirations of its people. One may wonder, however, whether such optimistic claims do not sound an “end of history” (a state) note. Is it not the case that the sovereign state has become a mere consumer of EU funds diligently complying with EU and NATO directives? Does Lithuania’s being in the space of EU leave any room for the country’s independent foreign and security initiatives? These questions, widely discussed in Lithuania’s media debates, are of particular urgency in studying the relation of Lithuania’s security and defence policies to the ESDP and NATO. An answer to these questions can be found in official statements and texts on security policy, all of them emphasizing that in her relations with the EU and NATO Lithuania is seeking to be “not only a consumer but also contributor.” Is this a true characterization of Lithuania’s SDP, or is it a mere slogan to be realized in an indefinite future? What is Lithuania’s international identity that this ambitious SDP is trying to create? How is it reflected in concrete political decisions? The article attempts to answer these questions by analyzing the evolution of Lithuania’s security policies and major recent tendencies in its SDP. The analysis is mainly based on the constructivist conception of security that stresses the importance of non-material factors (ideas, identities, values, historical myths, etc.) in foreign and security policy. However, it would be wrong to assume that constructivism, when dealing with the behaviour of states, is totally dismissive of objective circumstances. Lithuania will remain, in the foreseeable future, “the main zone of contact” between Russia and the EU. Yet, on the constructivist view, relations with Russia (as well as with other states) are not simply dictated by geopolitical environment, for they are affected by changes in the ideational factors. Our previous research provides us with the evidence that the concept of security, as it is used in Lithuania’s political discourse, closely resembles Barry Buzan’s definition of security, being that security is “the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and the functional integrity against forces of change which they see as hostile.” The definition rests on the blending of two main paradigms in the analysis of international relations, realism, and constructivism. In the spirit of realism, security is conceived as a nation-state’s security that is to be achieved by identifying the objective threats faced by the state and society and neutral-

See: Government Performance Report 2005. Prime Minister’s statement, 30 03 2006. http://www.lrvk. lt/main_en.php?cat=2&d=4001, 19 08 2006. Buzan B., Weaver O., Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p.343. See: Miniotaite G., “The Baltic States: In Search of Security and Identity”, Krupnick Ch.,ed., Almost NATO: Partners and Players in Central and Eastern European Security, Lanham Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003, p.261-296. Buzan, B. “New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century”, International Affairs. – 1991, 67 (4), p.432. 179 izing them. However, threats (“forces of change which they see as hostile”) are conceptualized inter-subjectively, as social constructs. This latter part of the security conception was further developed in Buzan and Ole Weaver’s works and came to be known as the “securitization theory.” To simplify it, securitization is a process of threat construction. Under certain circumstances, anything can become the object of securitization – any issue of domestic or foreign policy concern (national identity, migration, energy dependence on one source, etc.). This conceptual inconsistency finds its reflection in nearly all the documents laying out the guidelines of Lithuania’s security policy as well as in political decision-making. And it is related to the tasks that the re-emerging Lithuanian state had to face, which are not only that of securing the state’s sovereignty, but also that of creating conditions for radical legal and economic change. It was no accident that the quest for security had been the driving force in Lithuania’s domestic and foreign policy until full membership in EU and NATO.

1. Lithuania’s Security and Defence Policy . from 1990-2004

Theoretically, in terms of political and military security arrangements, after the country’s admission to the UN in September 1991, Lithuania could choose from: 1) non-alignment, or neutrality; 2) alliance of two or several small states; or 3) membership in a multilateral alliance around one or more major powers. All three options were considered in Lithuania’s security and defence discourse. However, the first and the second options remained at the level of a debate, and were never to be institutionalized. So therefore we will concentrate mostly on the third one. Neutrality and Baltic State’s alliance as a security policy options attracted some attention between the years 1990-1995, this being mostly under the influence of the model of interwar Lithuania. Lithuania’s foreign and security policy in the interwar period was a manoeuvring between Moscow and Berlin with the aim of regaining the Vilnius region occupied by Poland in 1920. The conflict over Vilnius prevented the formation of a strong alliance of the Baltic States. And Lithuania’s position of neutrality adopted in 1939 under conditions of severe international instability failed to provide security. Any attempt to revert to these ideas after regaining independence would have brought the stereotypes of interwar politics back into the political discourse of the newly

See: Law on the Basics of National Security of Lithuania), Valstybės žinios, 1997, 2: 2-20. Buzan B., Wǽver O., de Wilde J., Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1997; Wæver O., “Securitization and Desecuritization”, Lipschutz R. D.., ed., On Security, New York: Columbia University Press, 1995. p.46-86. See: Williams M.C., “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics”, International Studies Quaterly, 2003, 47 (4), p.511-532. 180

emerging state. In fact, the mere rehearsal of the conflicting interpretations of interwar Polish-Lithuanian relations led to tensions between the two countries from 1991-1992. At the time, however, the presence of Russia’s troops in the country made the option of a pro-Western security policy difficult to embrace openly. Thanks to joint endeavours of Lithuania, some Western states, and also other international bodies, Russian troops were withdrawn from Lithuania in the autumn of 1993. This made it possible for Lithuania to proclaim in 1994 its Euro-Atlantic aspirations, and membership in NATO and the EU as the main goal of Lithuania’s foreign and security policy. The pro-Western turn in Lithuania’s political discourse was portrayed as a “return to Europe” and its membership in NATO and the EU was presented as the guarantee of an irreversible integration with the West, finally shielding Lithuania from Russia’s threats to its sovereignty. The Western response to the bidding of nearly all post Soviet states for membership in NATO and the EU, was announcing the list of criteria for acceptance, known as the Copenhagen Criteria (1993), some of which were reiterated in The Study on NATO Enlargement (1995). These overlapping criteria demanded the establishment of regimes based on the principles of a Western liberal democracy. The criteria were supplemented by regulations for their implementation and for the monitoring of progress made (action plans, progress reports). The quest for membership in NATO and the EU initiated the process of rebuilding the Lithuanian state on the model of a Western democracy, and it required radical political and economic reforms, as well as changes in foreign and security policies. Like any attempt for a rational control of social processes, the Euro-integration faces the inertia of the social matter, the resistance of historical stereotypes, of social identities already in place, and, sometimes, of disappointed expectations. The Western world that Lithuania so much wants to enter is hardly homogeneous; it is characterized in part by marked differences between the socially oriented Western European welfare states and the more market oriented British and American models. Lithuania, like Estonia and Latvia, by focusing on economic growth, has been leaning towards the Anglo-Saxon model. In a relatively short time they have indeed achieved impressive rates of economic growth, however, the progress is accompanied by the growing gap between the well off and the poor, feelings of insecurity, and even some nostalgia for Soviet times. This creates conditions for political instability, left-right pendulum voting, support for populist parties and leaders, political cynicism, and corruption, as well as Euro-scepticism and anti-globalization. All political forces in Lithuania agree that these phenomena pose serious threats to Lithuania’s domestic security. In the security policy documents, the reduction of social exclusion and developments of civil society are proposed as an important means of preventing internal instability.

In 2006 Lithuania’s GDP reached 47 per cent of the average GDP of EU states, starting from the low point of 33 per cent in 1997. 181

In Lithuania’s foreign and security policy compliance with membership criteria has been linked to good relations with neighbouring countries, to the military’s capability of defending the state’s territory, and effective contribution to an NATO collective defence. Consistently seeking good relations with the neighbouring states, Lithuania scrapped its interwar stereotypes and established warm relations with Poland since 1997, considering Poland a strategic partner on the road to NATO and the EU. In Lithuania’s relations with Belarus, Lithuania has pursued the policy of pragmatic selective cooperation, taking in to account of the EU stance towards Belarus after the establishment of its authoritarian regime in 1997. The idea is that political cooperation with Belarus should be minimal (there have been no exchanges of visits between official heads of states, or high-ranking officials, since the end of 2000), while maintaining contacts with some power structures in Belarus and developing bilateral cooperation in areas that are important for the region’s security and stability. The area of cooperation includes the demarcation of state borders, illegal migration, local cooperation, and also energy issues. Lithuania’s most powerful and most troublesome neighbour is Russia. This is related not only to the fact that Russia has difficulties in reconciling with the break-up of the Soviet Union and with the loss of the Baltic countries, but also to its peculiar relations with the EU and USA. In an effort to help with the democratization of Russia, and thus to secure a trustworthy partner in energy supplies and in the war on terror, some Western powers (Germany and France in particular) have been prone to sympathize with Russia’s resistance to the Baltic States’ membership in NATO. The stance found its reflection in the NATO Madrid Summit (1997) decisions, when Poland was invited to NATO while Lithuania was only characterized as an aspirant country. Despite Russia’s resistance to Lithuania’s transatlantic integration, its relations with Lithuania developed much more smoothly than with the other Baltic States. Lithuania is the only Baltic state to have signed and ratified the border treaty with Russia.10 This is so not only because Russia has no complaints about Russian minority rights in Lithuania, but also because of the peculiarity of Russia-Lithuania borders. The relatively short mainland border of Lithuania with Russia’s Kaliningrad region is of particular importance for Russia. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and with Lithuania regaining independence in 1991, Russia lost its territorial integrity. Ties with its least developed region, the Kaliningrad region, became dependent on Lithuania’s good will concerning the issues of transit (military, economic, movement of persons, etc.) On the other hand, Lithuania is totally dependent on Russia’s supplies of oil and gas. It is no wonder that Russia is intent on preserving its political and economic clout in Lithuania.

On Lithuania’s relations with Belarus see: Lopata R., “Authoritarianism in Belarus: Eventual Threats to Lithuania’s Security”, Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 2002, Vilnius: Lithuanian Military Academy, 2003, p. 215-230; Understanding Belarus: Transition to Where? Proceedings of the International Confer- ence, Vilnius, Lithuanian Military Academy, 2003. 10 Lithuanian-Russian border treaty was signed in 1997 and ratified by Lithuania in 1999 and by Russia in 2003. 182

The position of Lithuania on the issue underwent changes because of changes in NATO-Russia relations as well as in EU policies towards the region. At first, the militarized Kaliningrad region was perceived as a direct military threat to Lithuania’s independence. In 1994 the issue of the Kaliningrad threat was made particularly acute. The treatment of Kaliningrad region as a permanent threat for independence of Lithuania was expressed in the Basics of National Security of Lithuania (1996).11 However, this position of ‘hard’ security was gradually replaced by a ‘soft’ one: in the National Security Strategy (2002) the issue of Kaliningrad was conceptualized not as a threat to Lithuanian security but as the “economic, commercial and cultural partnership.”12 One can agree with the authors of a study on the Kaliningrad region that “during the last decade, the region underwent transformation in the foreign policy of Lithuania from the main threat to security into an advantage – an opportunity to play an independent role of the leader in the south-east of the Baltic Sea region, truly contributing to promotion of stability in the area.”13 After NATO and the EU Summits in 2002, that have acknowledged Lithuania’s eligibility for membership in both organizations, Lithuania’s foreign policy and security policy in relation to Russia has mostly lost its independence by becoming a part of EU-Russia relations. After signing the EU-Russia Agreement on Russian transit from the Kaliningrad enclave through Lithua- nian territory in the end of 2002, Russia ratified the long delayed Treaty on the Lithuanian-Russian State Border and signed a readmission agreement in 2003. Stricter regulation of travel to/from the Kaliningrad region via Lithuania (a visa regime) came into effect on 1 July 2003. This brought Lithuania closer to the Schengen Treaty space without causing a major deterioration of relations with Russia. The troubling issue of Kaliningrad has been transformed into a ‘window of opportunity’ for regional cooperation. Lithuania proved to be capable of creatively implementing the cooperation model proposed by the EU and this has had some impact on the identification of the state. The image of Lithuania as a bridge between the East and the West was replaced by the images of the bridgehead between Lithuania and the West, and eventually, the outpost of Western values.14 While striving for membership in NATO and the EU, Lithuania not only diligently complied with the requirements of membership, but also embarked on some independent security policy initiatives contributing to Euro-Atlantic security and stability. Among the more important ones were the so-called Vilnius Conferences organized since 1997. Lithuania has established itself

11 See: Note 5. 12 National Security Strategy of the Republic of Lithuania 2002, available at: http://www.kam.lt/index. php/en/34381/, 17 03 2006. 13 Sirutavičius V., Stanytė-Toločkienė I., “Strategic importance of the Kaliningrad Oblast of the Russian Fed- eration”, Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 2002, Vilnius: Lithuanian Military Academy, 2003, p.193. 14 See: Miniotaite G. “Convergent Geography and Divergent Identities: A Decade of Transformation in the Baltic States”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 2003, 16(2), p. 209-222; Pavlovaite I., “Paradise Regained: The Conceptualization of Europe in the Lithuanian Debate”, in Lehti M. & Smith D., eds., Post- Cold War Identity Politics: Northern and Baltic Experiences, London: Frank Cass, 2003, p. 199-218. 183 as a forum for discussing the issues of developing friendly relations among neighbour states and of integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. In May of 2000 the Vilnius 9 Group (‘V-9’) was formed. In 2001 the ‘V-9’ was enlarged to ‘Vilnius-10’ (‘V-10’) by admitting Croatia.15 After the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States the ‘V-10’ stood firm behind the US. They issued a joint statement expressing solidarity with the United States and the Alliance. In 2003 the ‘Vilnius-10’ issued a similar statement in support of US position on Iraq. By linking national security to membership in NATO and the EU, Lithuania’s security policy has thus achieved its proximate goal. It was in the process of complying with the demands for membership that the main contours of Lithuania’s foreign and security policy were initially formed and then further modified in an attempt to live up to the requirements of the EU and NATO strategic documents. Its security policy is now part of a common EU foreign and security policy and Lithuania’s politicians are eager to make that part a highly visible one.

2. Lithuania’s Security Policy After . Dual Enlargement

With the accession to the European Union and NATO, Lithuania faced the task of reformulating key foreign and security policy issues and finding its place in common foreign and security policy (CFSP) of the European Union.16 During the period of candidacy, Lithuania’s domestic and foreign policy, like that of other candidate states, was inevitably adaptive in character. The character remained much the same even after the change in Lithuania’s status. As the new edition of National Security Strategy (2005) puts it: ‘Lithuania perceives its national security as a constituent part of the security policies of these organizations and follows the provisions of the NATO strategic concept, those of the European Security strategy and other strategic documents of NATO and the EU, and takes into consideration the threat analysis, strategic goals and measures laid down in these documents.”17 On the other hand, the activities of the ‘Vilnius-10’ and the country’s early involvement in EU New Neighbourhood Policy have created the premises for the realization of Lithuania’s ambitions “to consolidate our country as a centre of the regional cooperation”18 and of becoming a state that is “active,

15 “Vilnius-10” consists of Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 16 See: Nekrašas E., “Lithuanian Foreign Policy: Concepts, Achievements and Predicaments”, Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review, 2005, p. 28-37. 17 National Security Strategy of the Republic of Lithuania 2005, http://www.kam.lt/index.php/en/34381/, 10-05-2006. 18 Government Performance Report 2005, note 1. 184

visible in the world, and regionally influential.”19 In laying the foundations for Lithuania’s new foreign and security policy, the emphasis has been on the revitalization of the image of Lithuania as the centre and the leader of the region. As a matter of fact, during the period of 2004-2006 nearly all documents and official statements dealing with foreign policy and security policy put an emphasis on Lithuania’s aspiration to become “an active and an attractive centre of interregional cooperation promoting Euro-Atlantic values, and the spirit of tolerance and cooperation between cultures and civilizations.”20 It should be noted that the region of which Lithuania aspires to become the centre of has not been defined in the official documents and statements. This is so because the region does not in fact exist, it is rather a social construct still to be implemented by Lithuania’s foreign and security policy. In the spirit of theories about new regionalism, the region is conceived not so much as a common geographic space, but as a space of common values creating regional identity by economic, political, and military cooperation and leading to the extension of the Western security community.21 Regional identity is not merely a derivative of national identities, it is rather something based on common norms and values constituting of what Jürgen Habermas calls “constitutional patriotism.”22 In promoting regional cooperation and aspiring to become its driving force, Lithuania is in so fact creating it. The idea of Lithuania as a regional centre and regional leader is a discursive construction, a narrative on which Lithuania’s international identity is to be based.23 As the new edition of National Security Strategy (2005) puts it, by constructing its identity as a political leader promoting “freedom and democracy in the neighbouring European regions,” Lithuania is creating stronger foundations for its own security. This is the reason why Lithuania is strengthening its relations with Ukraine, Moldova and the Caucasian states. Lithuania supports these states’ quest for membership in NATO and the EU and offers them (Ukraine and Georgia in particular) practical assistance for meeting the criteria of membership in these institutions. In its relations with Belarus, Lithuania has followed a policy of ‘pragmatic selective cooperation at a practical level’ while strengthening support for democratic forces in Belarus. In particular, during the presidential elections in Belarus in 2005, Lithuania supported the opposition by offering it facilities to operate in Vilnius. Lithuania has also offered facilities in Vilnius for the European Humanitarian University that was ousted from Minsk. These actions on the part of Lithuania, led to tensions in the relations

19 Resolution of Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania on directions in Foreign policy of the Republic of Lithuania following Lithuania’s Accession to NATO and the European Union, Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review, 2005, 102-05. 20 Agreement between Political Parties of the Republic of Lithuania on the Main Foreign Policy Goals and Objectives for 2004-2008, Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review, 2005, 106-112. 21 Adler E., Crawford B., Normative Power: The European Practice of Region Building and the Case of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, Berkeley:University of California, 2004. 22 Habermas J., The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1998, p.225-226. 23 See Miniotaitė G., “’Europos normatyvinė galia’ ir Lietuvos užsienio politika”, Politologija, 2006, 43 (3), p.3-19. 185 between the two states. Belarus President accused Lithuania’s foreign minister of interfering in Belarusian internal affairs. Nevertheless, the democratization of Belarus and its involvement in EU New Neighbourhood policy remains an important item on Lithuania’s security policy agenda. Lithuania considers the strengthening of the EU Eastern dimension its main task as a participant in the EU New Neighbourhood policy. This was the major topic at the international conference ‘Common Vision for Common Neighbourhood’ held in Vilnius in 2006.24The conference focused on the “frozen conflicts” in Moldova, Georgia, Karabach, and Chechnya, and appealed for a more active involvement of NATO and the EU. All these conflicts were related to the alleged interference of Russia in the former Soviet space. In view of some commentators, insistence on the internationalization of the “frozen conflicts” as well as Richard B. Cheney’s statement in which he accused Russia of using gas and oil as “instruments of intimidation and blackmail in order to manipulate supplies and monopolize transit routes”25 and gave the conference an anti-Russian flavour. How much have the Lithuanian-Russian relations have changed since Lithuania’s joining NATO and EU? Have the tendencies to securitize Russia remained in place? First, as already mentioned, with Lithuania’s borders becoming external EU borders some major issues in Lithuanian-Russian relations (e.g. visa and border control) became issues of EU-Russia relations. In Lithua- nia this prompted ambivalent reactions. Nationalist forces are fearful of new threats to national sovereignty generated by pro-Russian policies of the EU. The prevailing attitude, however, is that Lithuania’s membership in the EU and NATO has finally eliminated Russia’s military threat. Nevertheless, Russia’s securitization remains an observable issue in Lithuania’s political discourse. There are incessant attempts at bringing Russia to remorse on account of Lithua- nia’s occupation and its tragic consequences. There are also fears concerning Lithuania’s dependence on Russia’s energy supplies and possible manipulations in Lithuania’s domestic policies by Russia’s secret services. This image of Russia has been manifested by Lithuania’s President’s refusal to participate at the 60th anniversary celebration of Russia’s victory over Hitler’s Germany held in Moscow in 2005 and their diplomatic support to Georgia in its hard relations with Russia and by the declaration of Vytautas Landsbergis, MEP, to the European Parliament that holds Russia (Soviet Union) responsible for “the loss of millions of lives, burnt in the flames of World War II” and demands “to preserve a place for these tragic facts in Europe’s collective memory.”26

24 Presidents from nine states of the Baltic Sea and Black Sea regions – Lithuania, Poland, Moldova, Romania, Georgia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Latvia, and Estonia – took part in the conference. Among the participants were also US Vice President Richard B. Cheney and Javier Solana, the EU High Representative for the common foreign and security policy. 25 Remarks by Vice President of the United States Richard B. Cheney at the 2006 Vilnius conference, May 4, 2006, http://www.vilniusconference2006.lt/sen/lib.download/15, 12 09 2006. 26 Declaration on the anniversary of 17 September 1939, submitted by MEPs Vytautas Landsbergis, Broni- slaw Geremek, Valdis Dombrovskis and Toomas Hendrik Ilves. The declaration was not adopted since only 80 MEPs did sign it. 186

Lithuania, together with other East European nations, the new EU member states, is intent on nudging the ‘old Europe’ to have a new look on Russia and to stop romanticizing its virtues of ‘spontaneity and unpredictability’ and to consider, in real terms, the potential threats implicated in Russia’s clamp down on democracy. It seems that the United States was the first to take notice of the EU newcomers’ concerns, as Richard Cheney’s speech in Vilnius demonstrated. Even when Lithuania was still knocking at the door of the EU and NATO and Lithuania made its pro-American stance quite clear, it was then further demonstrated by the ‘Vilnius 10’ support for the US war on terror and by Lithuania’s military involvement in the Iraq war. Politicians in Lithuania are nearly unanimous in rejecting any attempts at creating divides in the European and American understanding of international security, for they consider them as threats to Lithuania’s own security. This is explicitly stated in the White paper of Lithuanian Defence Policy (2006): “A strong transatlantic link between the US and Europe is an essential precondition to the long-term security of Lithuania.”27 So it seems that, on the whole, Lithuania’s security policy has evolved in the direction of global security. This is also evidenced by the development of a new agenda of Lithuania’s defence policy.

3. The New Agenda of Lithuania’s Defence Policy

Since becoming a part of collective defence system, Lithuania’s defence policy has set itself out two main tasks: building and extending a secure environment, and ensuring a reliable military defence. In pursuing the former goal it is guided by the European security strategy, while in pursuing the latter it relies on NATO strategic concept. In Lithuania’s political discourse, the EU and NATO play different roles. The EU is treated as possessing normative or civil power, which, in the words of Andrew Moravcsik, is grounded not on the “number of battalions and bombs,” but on “peaceful promotion of democracy by trade, foreign aid, and peacekeeping.”28 NATO, on the other hand, is seen as a provider of security based on military power. Supplementing the ‘soft’ EU power with the ‘hard’ military power is Lithuania’s preferred option. The tendencies, in the wake of the Iraq war, of downplaying NATO’s importance are worrying for Lithuania’s politicians. Judging by the content of Lithuania’s latest strategic documents, they fully endorse Madeleine Albright’s, former US Secretary of State, three famous Ds, which outlined American expectations from ESDP: “no duplication of what was done effectively under NATO, no decoupling from the US and NATO, and no discrimination against non-EU members.”29 In the White Paper (2006) a strengthening of the transatlantic link is a top priority in defence policy; its formulation reflects all the three Ds,

27 White Paper of Lithuanian Defense Policy 2006, http://www.kam.lt/index.php/lt/35629/, 06 06 2006. 28 Moravcsik A. “The Quiet Superpower”,Newsweek, 2002, June 17-27, p.12. 29 Albright M. “The Right Balance Will Secure NATO’s Future”, Financial Times, 1998, 7 December. 187 particularly, the first and the second being: “the principle of non-duplication of capabilities” and “new capabilities instead of new structures.”30 Being a member of the EU and thus becoming a part of a whole subject to common rules, Lithuania’s security policy has nevertheless maintained a measure of independence and used Lithuania’s unique experience of integration for getting a foothold in the new environment. One can say that on security matters, Lithuania does not merely comply with the common EU foreign and security policy directives, but makes efforts at influencing them, particularly, in trying to strengthen the eastern dimension of EU security policy. In aspiring to become the political centre of the region, Lithuania feels confident enough to be able to contribute to the strengthening of Europe’s normative power. Lithuania’s defence policy has always been linked to NATO. Since the start of the period of candidacy for NATO in 1994, Lithuania has considerably altered its defence objectives ever more accommodating them to changes in NATO security strategy. Neither the NATO security strategy, nor the requirement for the interoperability of the country’s defence forces with those of NATO, was ever in doubt in Lithuania. The most serious challenge to Lithuania’s defence policy has been the transition from territorial to collective defence. Lithuania’s conception of territorial defence, based as it was on the principle of total and unconditional defence, was in full accord with Lithuania’s political quest of nation state building. In the framework of this conception, NATO was primarily associated with Article 5 obligating member states to collective defence. NATO was perceived as the guarantor of Lithuania’s territorial integrity. This image of NATO was in line with Lithuania’s conception of territorial defence as formulated in The Law on Fundamentals of National Security (1996). Notice- able changes in the defence policy began with Lithuania’s involvement in the NATO Membership Action Plan in 1999-2001. It is moved from the purely threat based approach, which implied preparations for the worst case scenario, to a capability based approach, which implies having capabilities to respond to a variety of the most likely or most demanding scenarios. By 2004, Lithuania’s military strategy was already firmly based on the idea of collective defence: “By participating in international peacekeeping and crises response operations, the Armed Forces of Lithuania, an active member of NATO and the European Union, strengthen the national security as well as the security of the whole Euro-Atlantic community.”31 Accordingly, there are changes in the goals of Lithuania’s military forces, for example they are now oriented to actions unrelated to Article 5 and not only in the Euro-Atlantic area, but also beyond it.32 Priority is given to the development of the Reaction Brigade, which by the end of 2014 should be capable of deploying and sustaining one infantry battalion task group.

30 White Paper, note 27. 31 The Military Strategy of the Republic of Lithuania, 2004, http://www.kam.lt/index.php/en/34381/, 05 09 2006 32 For the latest information on participation of the Lithuanian military in NATO, ESDP, OSCE, UN international operations see a website of the Lithuanian Defence ministry http://www.kam.lt/index.php/ lt/104524/. 188

It is often emphasized by the high officials, that Lithuania must counter threats where they arise, in other words, the defence of Lithuania today starts in Afghanistan rather than within Lithuania’s borders.”33 However, Renatas Norkus, Secretary of the Ministry of National Defence, has observed that such concepts as crisis management, peacekeeping or reconstruction of a remote Afghan province are slow to enter Lithuania’s public mind. People find little reason in having armed forces engaged in forest fire extinction or environmental cleaning. The soldier is loosing the image of the nation’s and the country’s defender. And it is becoming more difficult to obtain public support for the increased funding of the military: “One of the most difficult challenges has been a mental one: to start thinking in terms of collective defence of the Alli- ance instead of a collective defence for Lithuania.”34

4. The Lithuanian and the European . Defence Policy

In essence, Lithuania’s system of defence has been developing as a part of the NATO system of defence. Lithuania has linked its own security to the preservation of a strong transatlantic link between the US and Europe. Some movement of the EU made in 2004, towards creating an autonomous European defence system, has had a lukewarm reception in Lithuania. Lithuania approves the instituting of the European Defence Agency and the strengthening of Eu- ropean military capacities only as a European pillar within NATO. Lithuania actively contributes to the development of the EU battle group, consisting of Polish, German, Slovak, Lithuanian, and Latvian troops. Yet even more emphatically Lithuania supports NATO aspirations to take greater responsibility for international security and more actively engage in peacekeeping, peacemak- ing and, if necessary, in combat missions anywhere in the world (see table).

33 See: Norkus R., “Defense Transformation: A Lithuanian Perspective”,. 11 April 2006, Garmisch-Parten- kirchen, Germany. http://www.kam.lt/index.php/lt/96062/, 2006 09 15. 34 Ibid. 189 Table 1. Participation of Lithuania in major military operations in 2005/2006

Operation ESDP NATO operations US-led operations operations CONCORDIA* 1 staff officer ARTEMIS - ALTHEA 1 staff officer 1 company (100); 1 pla- KFOR** toon (30) within . Polish-Ukrainian battalion 1 provincial reconstruction ISAF team (120) Pakistan relief 10 specialists operation 2 platoons with Polish and Iraqi freedom Danish contingents (110); Staff officers (12) Enduring . 1 staff officer Freedom * Operation was terminated in 2003. ** The three Baltic States have rotated a company size unit (the Baltic Squadron) every six months within a Danish Battalion in Bosnia and Herzegovina since 2000. Source: The Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania The table shows that only two Lithuanian soldiers have taken part in ESDP operations in 2006. Much more importance has been accorded to the participation of Lithuanian experts in various conflicts. Lithuanian experts were sent on the “rule of law mission” to Georgia and on border monitoring missions to Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia, and all EU missions. Lithuania is also supportive of EU plans to extend crisis management missions from neighbouring, to more remote, regions. In 2005 Lithuanian experts participated in EU missions to Indonesia and Palestine, and they took part in the training of Iraqi police. Overall, in 2005, there were 17 Lithuanian experts taking part in EU civilian missions and 33 Lithuanian observers involved in monitoring elections.35 The main contingent of Lithuanian troops has been involved in international operations led by NATO and the USA. This is again indicative of Lithuania’s treatment of NATO and EU defence policies as complementary and mutually reinvigorating parts of a whole. However, Lithuania has been concerned about some tendencies in the EU defence policy and its future development. As Kestutis Paulauskas noticed, the first concern is that EU and NATO military standards and defence planning system might diverge. In that case Lithuania’s efforts at reaching NATO standards would have been spent in vain. Besides, the ever more noticeable duplication between the military bodies of NATO and the EU would force a split in two of Lithuania’s modest defence capacities. The second concern relates to the stance of the European Defence Agency. Its pursuit of a common European procurement policy could

35 Lietuvos respublikos vyriausybės 2005 metų veiklos ataskaita, 2006 m. kovo 30 d., http://www.lrv. lt/main_en.php?cat=2&script=1, 10 09 2006 190

cost Lithuania a great deal, for in complying with its insistence on procuring European armaments Lithuania would lose American armaments supplies purchased on quite favourable terms.36 So it is natural that Lithuania wants the European armament policies to remain open to the transatlantic cooperation.

Concluding Remarks

“Not only consumer, also contributor” – a phrase used in many official documents, statements, and speeches is an apt description of the official stance of Lithuania, as member of both EU and NATO, on matters of security and defence. Does the foregoing analysis confirm this ambitious claim? Both NATO and the EU have always had a two-faced interpretation in Lithuania’s political discourse, the instrumental and the normative one. The instrumental view prevailed with respect to NATO, for NATO was primarily perceived as a security umbrella against threats from the East. A much more symbolically charged role was accorded to EU, since the prospect of joining the EU was like a return to the lost El Dorado, bringing not only national security, but restoring Lithuania to Western identity. The accession negotiations and the process of coming into conform- ance with the criteria of EU and NATO membership led to a thorough transformation of the state and society. In security policy this meant that the overcoming of negative attitudes towards neighbouring states and the embrace of the conception of cooperative security. This in turn led to adjustments in the defence policy, including the switch from the idea of territorial defence to that of a common defence. Since the accession to NATO and the EU, Lithuania’s formerly uniform security/defence policy began to come apart, splitting into both foreign/security policy and defence policy components. The former is associated with the expansion of Europe’s normative power, encapsulated in the appellation of EU security strategy ‘A secure Europe in a better world.’ In contributing to the realization of the strategy, Lithuania has assumed the ambitious role of a leader urging the rest ‘to extend the benefits of economic and political cooperation to our neighbours in the East.’ The annual Vilnius conferences have become a forum for post-Soviet states seeking membership in the EU and NATO. Lithuania’s defence policy has been developing as part of a NATO defense policy. In making its contribution for the attainment of NATO strategic goals, Lithuania has sought to become a trustworthy member of the alliance. The specific role that Lithuania envisions for itself in the alliance is Lithuania’s active promotion of NATO enlargement to the East. Lithuania supports the strengthening of the military dimension of EU, but opposes the possible duplication of the EU and NATO defence capacities.

36 In 2001-2003 Lithuania purchased from the United States 75 anti-tank missiles, 60 surface-to-air missiles, 8 launchers, and 15 Humvees. See Paulauskas K. “The Baltics: from nation states to member states”, Occational Paper, 2006, 62, p.38. 191

Thus we can give a twofold answer to the question whether Lithuania’s ambitions at having a high profile role in EU security and defence policy are justified. Lithuania has indeed played an active and creative role in implementing the EU security strategy by strengthening its eastern dimension. However, until now Lithuania’s participation in the strengthening of the military dimension of the EU has been merely symbolic.

193 Vaidotas Urbelis* Institute of International Relations and Political Science, University of Vilnius

Lithuanian Strategic Culture

The concept of strategic culture shows how traditions, stereotypes, or prevailing patterns of behaviour shape major strategic decisions. The research provides a fresh perspective on how Lithuanian strategic culture influences the internal dynamics of decision-making procedures. The article gives the particular attention to key three debates in Lithuania: defence budget, participation in international operations, and military reform. This article shows that certain characteristics of Lithuanian strategic culture, such as elitism, a huge reliance on the state, and the militarization of security, exercise a huge impact upon defence policy decisions. The article provides concrete recommendations how to overcome existing deficiencies and improve the decision-making procedures in Lithuania.

Introduction

All countries of the world exist on a space confined by their history, culture, or geography. All of these parameters constantly fluctuate, thus determining foreign and domestic politics, relations with neighbours, or geopolitical orientation. Security and defence policy is a product of outside influences or views and interests of leaders, organisations, and interest groups. From a neorealist perspective, security and defence policy reflect interstate relations, domestic political circumstances play only a minor role. From a neo-liberal or constructivist perspective, internal politics shapes the debates on security and defence. Constructivists inparticular emphasize the importance of the political and security culture for the formation and implementation of most the important security and defence policy decisions. The term strategic culture is used to explain patterns of behaviour, security, and defence identity of states and non-state actors. The concept of strategic culture is a direct descendant of the concept of political culture - which has been debated, developed, variously employed, and even more variously defined by political scientists since the early 1950s. Strategic culture is defined as the ideas, expectations, and patterns of behaviour that are shared across the actors involved in the processes surrounding security and defence politics of

* Dr. Vaidotas Urbelis - is a Lecturer of the Institute of International Relations and Political Science, University of Vilnius. Address: Vokiečių 10, LT-01130 Vilnius, tel.: +32 479946886, e-mail: [email protected] Šešelgytė M. The Problem of Common Defence Identity in the European Union, Doctoral dissertation, 2006. Gray C. Comparative Strategic Culture, Parameters, 1984, pp. 26-33. 194

particular countries. In this study Lithuanian strategic culture is understood as ideas, expectations, norms, and behaviour patters of Lithuanian decision makers that effect the formation and implementation of Lithuanian security and defence policy. This study focuses the biggest attention to defence aspects of Lithuanian strategic culture. Strategic culture could be analysed as a national style, given that a particular culture should encourage a particular style in thoughts and actions. For example, the United Kingdom and France possess strong expeditionary mentality and a tradition of active participation in world affaires. The President of the United States has a very strong authority to use military force abroad, while in Germany even minor decisions on defence have to be approved by the Parliament, and a strictly legalistic approach is used to define lawfulness of military interventions. Germany still retains conscription, and such decision could be interpreted as German self restraint from more effective and more deadly Bundeswehr. Denmark, Norway, and Lithuanian put self restraint on having nuclear weapons on their soil, while Iceland decided not to have armed forces at all. History plays a hugely important role in the formation of a strategic culture. For most of Europe, WWII influenced the formation of norms allowing the use of military force only for self defence purposes. The policy of non- alignment emerged as an attempt to escape involvement from a power struggle between two superpowers. Deadly conflicts in the Balkans fostered a more active strategic culture based on the norms of humanitarian intervention. The war in Iraq boosted a new debate on the lawfulness of military interventions and the role of United Nations Security Council A broad spectrum of views and historical traditions towards the use of force, self constraint, decision making procedures, and other issues, allows researchers to group nations into several categories. John Duffield suggests using two dimensions of strategic culture: unilateralism vs. multilateralism and militarism vs. antimilitarism. Alistair I. Johnston proposed to divide strategic cultures into defensive or offensive categories. Ulrich Krotz in his study of French and German national role conceptions, considers even more dimensions: military power vs. civilian power, unilateralism vs. multilateralism, military force as the evil vs. military force as a force for good, non-nuclear power vs. nuclear power, domestic consensus over major defence issue vs. highly fragmented politics, dependence on outside powers vs. independent power, and so on. This study discerns to show the different dimensions of the Lithuanian

Meyer Ch. Theorising European Strategic Culture, Centre For European Policy Studies, Working Docu- ment n.204, June 2004. Duffeld J. S. Political Culture and State Behaviour: Why Germany Confounds Neorealism, International Organization, 53 (4), 1999, p.779. Johnston A. I. Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in China History, Princeton Uni- versity Press, 1995, p. 112 – 113. Krotz U. National Role Conceptions and Foreign Policies: Germany and France Compared, Harvard University, Centre for European Studies, Working Paper 02.1, 2002. 195 strategic culture and its influence over decision making in the area of security and defence. This study is based on the notion that the Lithuanian security culture, as a system of symbols, consists of several parts. The first part is the fundamental assumptions about her strategic environment, i.e. the role of war in international relations, character of the enemy, and potential threats. The second part consists of attitudes towards and conditions for the use military force (when and how). The third part presents the concrete actions of decision makers and implementations of these decisions. The study starts with a short overview of the Lithuanian threat perception and decision making procedures in the security and defence sector using three important debates - participation in international operations, the defence budget, and defence reform. These examples illustrate the importance of strategic culture in analysing defence policy decisions.

1. The Main Features of Lithuanian . Strategic Culture

Lithuanian strategic culture is a result of its long history, and especially, of the last seventeen years of independence. After the reestablishment of independence in 1990, Lithuania was faced with a serious challenge – to redefine its identity and identify “them” and “us” in this world. During the first years of independence most Lithuanians shared very similar understanding of friends and enemies. They thought that Russia would remain hostile and would try to re-establish its control over the Baltic States. The Western countries would support Lithuania but not sacrifice their vital interest for the sake of small Baltic countries. The Lithuanian perception of “we” clearly encompassed Western civilization and values, while Eastern neighbours were perceived as “they.” Integration into NATO and the EU was based on the formation of a ‘European’ or ‘Western’ identity which was associated with the European way of life, cultural achievement, social welfare, and prosperity. Both elements were closely interlinked and embraced positive attitudes towards Western Europe and a negative view towards their Eastern neighbours. Not surprisingly, Samuel Huntington’s idea about the clash of civilisations was very popular in the Baltic States. The Lithuanian identity was created by distancing itself from Russian traditions and emphasising common European values that were considered to be very different from those of Russia. The Lithuanian security and defence policy reflected a clear and unambiguous identification with the West. As a result, a broad consensus on the Lithuanian security and defence policy agenda emerged among the elite. A consensus within the Baltic States along with very few discussions among politicians on security policy issues, allowed several observers to declare the existence of ‘tunnel vision thinking’

Šešelgytė, op.cit.. 196

among the political elite. For instance, F. Moller in 2002 declared that what is materializing in the Baltic States is a type of ‘tunnel-vision’ meaning that decision-makers can only see limited ways of achieving security and refuse even to discuss alternatives. This is as much a result of their security concepts as it is a product of how they conceive the states should be. […] A major result of the lack of alternatives is the absence of controversial public debate and the lack of interest or curiosity in this issue. All major political parties support the recent military policies, namely, the increase of military expenditure and integration in to NATO. F. Moller in his observation, failed to understand the complexity of the values, identities and interests driven approach towards integration in to NATO. In the Baltic States security conceptions are as much about identity and state-building as they are about security. Their aim is the construction of a collective self, meaning the identification of the individual with the nation, organized politically and socially as modern, sovereign nation-state. As the West in the Baltic States is being associated with prosperity, security, and democracy whereas, the East is loaded with poverty, unpredictability, totalitarianism, and insecurity. From the point of view of national security, the West linked in particular with the EU and NATO. After regaining its independence, the Lithuanian elite and general public was unwavering in their choice of integration with the West.10 It should be noted that the concepts of the East and the West are highly value-loaded in the Baltic States. Security debates and the perception of threats have been especially influenced by the period of almost fifty years of being part of the Soviet Union. It has been noted that “the experience of Sovietization was to have a profound impact upon the security aspirations and perceptions of the emergent Baltic political elites in the late 1980s.”11 The Soviet Union, and later its successor, the Russian Federation, has been perceived by all three countries as the main threat to their sovereignty and territorial integrity. Although good neighbourly relations have been declared as another foreign policy priority, the perception of the potential threat related with uncertainty about Russia’s internal political situation and its external policies have remained fairly stable. Euro-Atlantic integration reflected mostly “value driven” policy of the Lithuanian elite. At the same time it coincided with hard-liners view of the security situation in the region that considered the quest for membership as a way to escape the Russian influence. The pursuit for NATO and the EU membership united different factions of Lithuanian political spectrum. The most visible expression of consensus among politicians was a letter signed by the Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas to the NATO Secretary General Manfred Worner. In this letter the President expressed the Lithuanian desire

Moller F. The Baltic States: Security, Identity, and the Identity of the State. Bonn International Centre for Conversation, Brief 25. p.52 http://www.bicc.de/publications/briefs/brief25/content.php, 2002. p.48-51 Moller op.cit. p.48 10 Miniotaite G. The Security Policy of Lithuania and the ‘Integration Dilemma’, COPRI Working Paper, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, May 2000. 11 Herd G. P. The Baltic states and EU enlargement, in Henderson, K. (ed.) Back to Europe: Central and Eastern Europe and the European Union, London: UCL Press, 1999, p. 259. 197 to become a member of the Alliance. The letter was supported by all major political parties. Political consensus remains, until now, the dominant feature of the Lithuanian security discourse. In 2001 all major Lithuanian political parties signed an agreement on the Lithuanian defence policy and renewed it in 2004. In 2004 the “Agreement between Political Parties of the Republic of Lithuania on the Main Foreign Policy Goals and Objectives for 2004-2008” was signed. In this agreement they reiterated their support for major security and defence policy objectives, namely active participation in NATO and the EU. Agreement among all major political factions is a unique characteristic that rarely happens in other European capitals. The public opinion polls show that the general public agrees also with major security and defence policy objectives.12 Such a broad consensus could be explained by the prevailing elitism of security and defence discourse. In Lithuania, security and defence remain ‘high politics’ that rarely draws the attention of the general public. • According to public opinion polls from 23 categories of interest, defence occupies only 22 place; • National security appears as the last item in programmes of the political parties; • In 2006 newly appointed Government allocated to security issues only last paragraphs of its programme; • The President in his yearly addresses to the Parliament devoted to security only several sentences at the very end of his speech. The disappearance of major military threats or aggression by force allowed Lithuanian citizens to concentrate on other issues rather then defence. Not surprisingly, public support for Government actions is highly dependant upon an orchestrated and well organised public relations campaign. For example, during the Kosovo crisis, Lithuanian support for membership in NATO dropped to 27 percent. After the government launched a public relations campaign for support for membership, in several years time it increased to a staggering 70 percent. This proved that the Lithuanian elite can easily exploit public disinterest in security and defence and mobilise people to support already established security and defence policy objectives. Another important reason for the absence of any sophisticated debate on security and defence policy issues is how small the security expert community in Lithuania is. Security experts could be calculated in tens and they are the major source of information for decision makers and the general public: • Issues of security and defence policy are raised only from time to time in major newspapers. Only several journalists specialize in the defence sector. The Ministry of Defence publishes seven journals but their circulation is very limited. Two major defence related internet sites www.army.lt and www.ginklai.net rarely devote any attention to the Lithuanian defence policy.

12 Participation in international operations and active foreign policy in distant countries like Afghanistan is the only exception. 198

• Lithuanian academic institutions publish an increased number of articles on international relation issues, but only few experts specialise in defence policy in even fewer in Lithuanian defence. Some of them also occupy official positions in ministries and other governmental position; this can limit their ability to make open or provocative statements. • Lithuania has only one think tank that devotes most of this attention to defence (the Centre for Strategic Research established by the Institute of Inter- national Relations and Political Science, Vilnius University, and the Lithuanian Military Academy). In 2004 the Ministry of Foreign Affaires, Ministry of Defence, State Security Department, and three Universities established The Centre for Stra- tegic Studies. The main task of the Centre is to “help formulate strategic foreign policy goals and tasks, prepare strategies and action plans, and also to propose recommendations to Lithuanian governmental institutions.”13 The Centre fills the gap in security studies, but defence is not part of its studies yet. • Lithuanian ex-military do not participate in the public discussions on defence issues. The only exception is the former Chief of Defence MG Jonas Kronkaitis. • Political parties do not possess enough expertise to prepare a new defence policy agenda. Their election programmes barely mention defence issues - only defence budget and conscription deserves more attention. The Labour party that won the latest parliamentary elections did not express its opinion on any defence policy issue at all. A lack of expertise among politicians results in mistakes and misunderstandings in public speeches or even in the Programmes of the Government, for example the Programme of 2000 contained three serious mistakes and one mistake repeatedly appeared in the programme of 2004 and again in 2006. A lack of expertise narrows the debate on defence issues mainly to the exploration of concrete incidents that happens in the Lithuanian military. A broad discussion on the participation in international operations, the defence concept, NATO transformation, or Russian-Belarusian military integration is not taking place and is discussed only within a small community of experts working in the governmental institutions. The Lithuanian defence bureaucracy, that includes high ranking military officials, clearly establishes rules of the game. Others either have no expertise (political parties), or interest (public), or money (academic community). Domination of the defence bureaucracy results in a very state-centric security defence policy discourse. As a consequence, the state (or the Govern- ment), but not the non-governmental organisations and political parties, became subjects of security policy. Security is understood as solely a governmental activity, the voice of non-governmental agencies or organisations then disappears in the dark. Most importantly citizens also consider the state as the only security and defence actor. Lithuanian public distances itself from this arena; citizens do not consider individual efforts to be a part of security building efforts.

13 Institute for Strategic Studies. http://www.ssc-lietuva.lt/index.php?id=15,0,0,1,0,0 199

Diana Janušauskienė and Jūratė Novagrockienė, in their empirical research, revealed that most Lithuanians emphasize with state’s and Government’s role in assuring security. Only experts (elite) more clearly emphasized individual dimension of security.14 Not surprisingly, most Lithuanian defence and security related documents such as the Law on the Fundamentals of the National Security, the Security Strategy, and the White Book of Defence policy, also slightly mention individual and group level of security. Speeches of the President or Prime Min- ister on defence matters are dominated by the phrases as “national interest,” “balance of powers,” “great powers,” “domination,” etc. The most influential academic articled by leading researchers are written from a neo-realist understanding of security. Most importantly many neo-realists and geo-politicians later occupy important positions in the Government. Lithuania started integration into Western security structures adher- ing to the narrow understanding of security. Such an understanding sharply contrasts with the post-modern concept of cooperative security that prevailed in major European capitals, especially in the Scandinavian countries. Frank Moller noticed, that in Lithuania the “cooperative approach to security may be applauded up front at the stage, but it is laughed at behind the curtain as being unrealistic, naïve, and utopian.”15 Empirical research conducted by Susanne Nyes, in 2002, confirmed that the Lithuanian elite adheres to the traditional understanding of security, i.e. national actors (states) and military capabilities dominate the security discourse. Only in the last few years has a broad spectrum of security issues started to appear as an official threat analysis and action plans. The traditional understanding of security started to vanish only after perspectives of joining NATO and the EU became more explicit. NATO was no longer perceived by most Lithuanians as an anti-Russian organisation. Polls indicate that 73 percent of Lithuanians do not perceive any threat of military aggression. Only 20 percent thought that such threat could materialise in the nearest future.16 This number corresponds to the 24 percent of Lithuanians who think that NATO membership is necessary because of the Russian threat. The majority of Lithuanians think that membership in NATO increases security and stability, and also encourages investment and economic development. In the public survey conducted in 2005, most Lithuanians emphasised individual levels of fear or even personal security, over the fear of foreign aggression.17 A militarised understanding of security dwindled even earlier. The

14 Janušauskienė D. Novagrockienė J. Analysis of Attitudes of Lithuanian Citizens Towards Security [Lietu- vos gyventojų požiūrio į saugumą analizė], Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review, 2002, Lithuanian Military Academy, 2003, p. 289-290. 15 Moller F. The Baltic States: Security, Identity, and the Identity of the State. Bonn International Centre for Conversation. Brief 25. 2002. p.48-51. P.56 16 Baltic News Service, Polls show majority of Lithuania citizens wants to join NATO [Dauguma Lietuvos gyventojų nori į NATO, rodo apklausa], 20 06 2002. 17 Ministry of Interior, Attitude of Lithuanian Citizens Towards Public Security [Lietuvos gyventojų požiūris į viešąjį saugumą], http://www.vrm.lt , 2005. 200

Russian economic crises in 1999 and its repercussion in Lithuania strengthened the understanding that the threat from the East may not necessarily come in military uniforms. Russian willingness to use energy as foreign policy tool even further increased the Lithuanian obsession with economical security. An increase of natural gas prises to Ukraine, the breakdown of the oil pipeline to Lithuania, and the economic blockage of Georgia strengthen the perception that the role of energy security will increase and supplement the military component of security. The defence policy will be intimately interlinked with other dimensions of security, including homeland defence. In such a society, the business elite, non-governmental organisations, and other actors will play a bigger role in establishing defence policy objectives and the allocation of resources to achieve them.

2. Impact of Strategic Culture upon . Major Defence Policy Decisions

The main features of Lithuanian strategic culture such as elitism, militarization, political consensus, and domination of the state have a huge impact upon major defence policy decisions. The importance of these features in different societal groups may vary, but in general, they are more or less applicable to the elite and the general public. Some of these features are becoming less important but they still play an important role. The decision making procedures are also taken into account in this study. Lithuanian strategic culture is characterised by legally, very well orchestrated, but in practice quite weak, democratic control over the armed forces. The main reasons behind this are: • The Parliament has too little knowledge and expertise in defence matters. No single member of the Parliament has served in the Lithuanian armed forces. The Committee of National Security and Defence is supported only by the small number of staff which has no experience in defence issues. Former member of the Committee of National Security and Defence, Algirdas Gricius, recognizes that “there is indeed an urgent problem of experts and advisers to the parliamentarians,” but he continued “because the Parliament lacks expertise, the Lithuanian Armed Forces would be the one that would suffer at the expense of more of a transparent and allegedly “better” democratic oversight.”18 • Political parties have little expertise in defence and as a rule they continue the security and defence policy of former Governments. Civil service guarantees the continuation of approved guidelines and smooth succession. All Ministers of Defence make almost no political appointments and continued to work with staff members left by the previous Ministers. For example, when in 2000 the position of the Minister of Defence was given to Social democrats,

18 Gricius A., Paulauskas K. Democratic Control Over The Armed Force in Lithuania. Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review, 2002, Lithuanian Military Academy, 2003, p. 246-247. 201 several high ranking officials belonging to the Conservative or the Christian Democratic Party, continued to work in the Ministry. Ministers of Foreign Af- fairs usually became career diplomats. • The National Security branch in the Chancellery of the Government has only four civil servants who have to oversee the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defence, and other security related state institutions. Such a broad spectrum of their work does not allow them to prepare an independent and comprehensive overview of the defence sector for the Prime Minister. In addition to that, in comparison with most Western states, the Lithuanian Prime Ministers' involvement in the defence policy has a surprisingly low profile. It may be indicative that the Prime Minister is hardly ever mentioned in legal acts. The legal constitutional provisions focuses on the shared authority between the President and the Minister of Defence, without singling out the Prime Minister.19 • The Lithuanian Constitution and laws established a very strong institution of the Commander of the Armed Forces. The Commander of the Armed Forces is mentioned in the Constitution; he is approved by the Parliament and is a member of State Defence Council. As a member of State Defence Council he participates in discussions over national security aspects of foreign and domestic policy and performs other function rarely enjoyed by the Chief’s of Defence in other NATO countries. As a result the Commander of the Armed Forces participated in discussion on privatisation of Mazeikiu Nafta (the biggest oil refinery in the Baltic states) and even on the impeachment procedure to the former President Rolandas Paksas. As a result, the Minister of Defence and Commander of the Armed Forces dominate the debate over major defence policy issues. Domination of the executive branch of government makes a difference in determining the outcomes of major defence policy decisions.

2.1. International Operations

The agreement between Political Parties of the Republic of Lithuania on the Main Foreign Policy Goals and Objectives for 2004-2008 emphasize that Lithuania is oriented towards active foreign policy: “My vision of Lithua- nia is that of a country which through the quality of its membership of the European Union and NATO and good neighbourhood policy has become a leader of the region. I have a vision of Lithuania as a centre of the region with Vilnius as a regional capital,” spoke then the Acting President of Lithuania Artūras Paulauskas when introducing the Lithuanian Foreign Policy Concept and a new vision of Lithuania.20 Such leadership means not only honour, but also available human, financial, and military resources dedicated towards the achievement of this vision.

19 von Riekhoff H. Report on Specific Problems and Developments in Civil Military Relations in the Baltic Republics, Bulgaria, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine, Carlton University, 2001. 20 The Speech by the Acting President A. Paulauskas at Vilnius University on 24 May 2004. “On Lithuania’s New Foreign Policy”, http://www.urm.lt/data/2/LF51152557 Paulauskokalba.htm., 08 08 2004. 202

Active participation in international operations is an important element of an active foreign policy. Lithuania has participated in international operations since 1994 and is constantly increasing her contribution. Lithuania starter their participation with low intensity humanitarian operations in Bos- nia-Herzegovina, but later switched to high intensity war fighting missions in Afghanistan and Iraq. In real numbers, the Lithuanian contribution is less than moderate but taking into account her size, Lithuania is an active player in the international arena. The Lithuanian public is less supportive to international engagements then the elite. According to social polls 50 percent of Lithuanian population support participation in international operations but 44 percent are against it. This discourages many Lithuanian politicians from open support of international endeavours. From the other side, since the budget for military operations is a part of Ministry’s of National Defence budget, the costs of the Lithuanian military contributions has not been an issue of the public debate. Only then in 2006, the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affaires requested financial resources for civilian projects for the Lithuanian led Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan, financing of international operations started to draw public attention. Quite interestingly, a request for additional resources received only moderate support from all political parties. Aleksandras Matonis commented that the “Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affaires has no ‘Hawks’ that can […] and forcefully get required resources.” As a result, in sharp contrast to other nations, Lithuania in 2005 and 2006 assigned to civilian projects in the Provincial Reconstruction Team in total only 2 million euros. This comes not as surprise if one takes into consideration the small role of Ministry of Foreign Affaires in making decisions on Lithuanian participation in international operations. The decision making chain for such participation is the Chief of Defence – Minister of Defence – President – and also the Parliament. Even in the Parliament, international operations come under the supervision of National Security and Defence Committee while the Committee of Foreign Affaires has only a secondary role. For example, the decision on leading the Provincial Reconstruction Team was made mainly on military advice that did not fully exploit all economic, social, or financial aspects. The operation was planned by military staff with no participation from other Governmental agencies. Officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs latter recognized that “then in 2005 first group of Lithuanians landed to Chencharan we new about this province only from report of World Food Organisation.” Lack of coordination and information led to a sceptical view on the participation in Afghanistan from other institution, including the Ministry of Foreign Affaires. Interestingly, enough participation of Lithuanian soldiers in high intensity operations in Iraq or Afghanistan is not considered as a problematic issue by the Lithuanian elite. These operations are financed directly from the defence budget, thus allowing politicians to avoid public discussions. Confronted with the open debate over the civilian contribution to operations, the Lithuanian elite shows fewer abilities to implement foreign policy objectives. In order to avoid such discrepancies this study recommends: 203

• To broaden the understanding of international operations. So far the Law on International Operations, Exercises, and other forms of Military cooperation treats international operation as purely military activity neglecting other possible aspects of possible contribution; • To reorganise the State Defence Council into State Security Council and to include Minister of Foreign Affairs into this institution. The role of Ministry of Foreign Affaires must also increase; • To involve political parties and non-governmental organisations into the discussion on the size and geography on Lithuanian participation; • To link foreign policy objectives with available resources. The idea of “a centre of the region” must be backed by resources or new concept must be developed.

2.2. Defence Expenditure

Debates over the defence budget have shown an ambivalence of the Lithuanian security and defence policy. On one hand, the Lithuanian political parties want to be a reliable ally therefore in all international forums Lithuania declares her intentions to raise defence budget to 2 percent of GDP. On the other hand, political parties try to avoid public debates on this issue understanding that such policy would not find an adequate support among electorate. Conse- quently the 2 percent for defence were achieved not by raising the real defence spending, but by expanding the definition of defence expenditure to include additional defence related activities such as interior troops. Such a ‘covert’ action shows the gap that exists between foreign and domestic policy. Surprisingly though, the defence expenditure has never become the subject of hot political debates although several political parties tried to score some additional points advocating for a smaller defence budget. Especially after the economic crises in 1999, the left wing politicians took an opportunity to criticize the right wing Conservative government for their attempts to raise the defence budget in a time of serious economic problems. During the parliamentary election campaign of 2000, the New Union party (social liberals) declared that “in Lithuania, the balance between different social sectors is violated – the armed forces get the particular attention and social sphere, health and education are neglected.” The Agricultural party used even more radical rhetoric: “education and healthcare are at the brink of bankruptcy while the armed forces receive huge amounts of money arguing that this is necessary for NATO membership.” The candidate of this party, in 2005 presidential elections, Kazimiera Prunskienė (Minister of Agriculture in the current government) declared that “National security is based not only on integration into NATO and forthrightly understood strengthening of the armed forces and the growing defence budget.” Such propaganda drew attention even in foreign countries. Stratfor, in the analysis “Guns Versus Butter: A NATO Aspirant Reconsiders” noticed 204

the New Union Party‘s proposal for defence cuts.21 Stratfor emphasized that New Unions plan suggested spending about one fifth of the military budget on education: “all imply outright indifference to NATO membership. Joining NATO is a popular idea for most Lithuanians, particularly after just breaking free of decades of Russian domination, but the price tag of membership in the Alliance is high”. Stratfor concluded that “the Baltic states offer NATO no strategic advantage that is significant enough to make them a worthwhile investment.[…] The New Union seems to understand this dynamic and believes that the country should put its money into things that it can improve like education.” Such a forecast never became the reality. Vice versa, after the New Union party became part of the ruling coalition, it changed its attitudes and voted for an increased defence budget. Even more – the new centre left collation that ruled Lithuanian from 2000 promised to reach the 2 percent of GDP for defence in the coming years. Such changes clearly demonstrate how the political parties may become more hawkish after they become responsible for the security and defence of the country. In 2004 even Union of Centre and Liberals declared that they would seek “to equip the armed forces with modern equipment. We will assure necessary resources to implement this task.”22 Discussions over defence the budget clearly show how foreign policy and the international environment can dictate domestic policy discourse. Foreign and domestic pressure forced the New Union party to abandon one of the key electoral promises. Most importantly NATO’s pressure to increase defence spending was less important as then the will of Lithuanian citizens to become the member of the Alliance. From 2004, the defence budget started growing every year by almost 10 percent. Such growth was fixed in the National De- fence System Development Programme, approved by the Parliament in 2006.23 Even the Agricultural Party did not oppose the steep rise in defence spending. The growing defence expenditure did not raise particular attention among non-governmental organisations and the general public. Even more, political parties are no longer afraid to declare their support for defence. In 2007 political parties will start the discussion on the new defence agreement. The defence expenditure will again become the topic of political debates. In order to avoid unnecessary manipulation this study recommends that: • Decision makers must resist temptation to put under defence expenditure items that are not directly linked to defence; • A group of independent advisors could be set up to assist political parties and the Parliament to control effective use of defence resources. The biggest procurement programmes could become separate projects approved directly by the Parliament.

21 Stratfor Guns Versus Butter A NATO Aspirant Reconsiders, 03 06 2000, http://www.stratfor.com/CIS/commentary/0005031756.htm 22 All electoral programs could be found at http://www.lrs.lt 23 The National Defence System Development Programme [Krašto apsaugos sistemos plėtros programa]. Approved by the Parliament on July 4, 2006, n. X-743 205 2.3. Defence Reform

The attitude towards defence reform allows us to evaluate stratification of political parties on major defence policy issues. In this context the abolishment of total defence concept and creation of expeditionary capabilities was the dominant issue on the political agenda. The “total defence” concept previously applied by Lithuania required large mobilizable reserves to reinforce active units. A conscription system was essential to prepare each and every citizen to fight or to resist aggression by non-military means. In reality, the Baltic States never fully implemented this concept; the youth were unwilling to spend a year in the armed forces. The Ministries of Defence have never had enough human and material resources for the extensive training programs and preparation of infrastructure that would be required to deal with all the draftees who would serve under a system of truly universal service. On paper, the plans looked impressive, but in reality less than 10–25 percent of young males aged 18 served as conscripts in the Baltic States’ armed forces. Expeditionary warfare requires completely different type of forces - armed forces must be able to deploy, sustain, and fight in hostile environment without support any from local population. Huge difference also lay in logistics - expeditionary armed forces must assure that in the area of operations they have assured access to communications, food, fuel, and other supplies. Such armed forces can project power to other regions of the world and contribute to active foreign policy. Conscription may be retained but use of conscripts in expeditionary operations has little military meaning. Despite the consensus on major defence policy issue, most Lithuanian political parties have very strong views on the question of conscription. The Social democrats and the Conservatives are the most moderate parties in this respect. The Lithuanian Social Democratic Party in its programme declares support for “total civilian defence” although in prior to parliamentary election in 2004 they proposed to diminish number of conscripts by half. The Homeland Union (The Conservatives) in their programme state that they will support active reserve of the armed forces, the Rifleman Union, national defence volun- teers and will continue with conscription. Another camp is represented by the Liberals and the Liberal democrats who advocate for fully professional armed forces. Interestingly enough, two political parties have difficulties in merging they views on conscription with they foreign policy concept. The Conserva- tives may find it difficult to combine their adherence to active foreign policy with the call to retain conscription. The Liberal democrats may struggle to find the mission for fully professional armed forces if they would stop Lithuanian armed forces participation in foreign military endeavours. Actual voting in the parliament shows that behaviour of political parties 206

in the Parliament may be different from their electoral promises.24 An analysis of voting practices has shown that the Social democrats, the Conservatives, The New Union and even Labour party supported legislation that allows sending Lithuanian troops to foreign missions. The Agrarian party and especially Liberal democrats in most cases voted against such participation. The Lithuanian public does not take a very active participation in debates about conscription. Several non-governmental organisations support total defence concept and the system of conscription. They normally represent patriotic right wing population or former dissidents and fighters against So- viet occupation. Still public support for a professional military is increasing; more than half of the population (53 percent) declares their support for ending conscription.25 Of those polled however, 68 percent declared their support for the proposition that “the armed forces are necessary because only there can young people be taught how to defend our country.”26 This inconsistency reflects two distinct trends in the society: on the one hand, the general public wishes to preserve the armed forces as a state-building institution, while on the other, the absence of a visible military threat and the existence of NATO security guarantees strengthen arguments against conscription. It is worth noting that defence reform of the Lithuanian armed forces outpaces the political debate. The highly sophisticated defence bureaucracy has mildly pushed reforms through various governmental bodies. The Armed Forces have already abolished military infrastructure and unites designed for territorial defence. The Ministry of Defence has substantially increased allocations for international operations; in 2005 Lithuania spend almost 10 percent of defence budget for international deployments.27 The number of conscripts has been decreased to a degree that the concept of universal conscription and total defence has already lost its meaning. The National Security Strategy28 and the Development Plan of the National Defence System29 prepared by the Ministry of Defence and approved by the Parliaments does not even mention total and unconditional defence. Interestingly enough these profound and conceptual changes did not raise public discussions and strong reactions from politicians or non-governmental organisations. The abolishment of the total defence concept has clearly indicated how Lithuania strategic culture changed the pace and magnitude of defence reform. Insufficient funding forces the political-military elite to push hard with defence reform and create expeditionary capabilities to support foreign policy

24 Mačiulskaitė L. Voting of Political Parties on Major Defence Policy Issues [Lietuvos politinių partijų balsavimo gynybos politikos klausimais tyrimas], Vilnius University, (not published). 25 Baltijos tyrimai, Public opinion about the Lithuanian armed forces [Lietuvos gyventojų nuomonė apie Lietuvos kariuomenę], survey released in June 2003. In the same poll, 28 percent disagreed and 19 percent had no opinion on this subject. 26 Ibid. The poll found 24 percent against and 8 percent with no opinion. 27 The Guidelines of the Minister of Defence for 2006-2012, Ministry of Defence, 28 The National Security Strategy [Lietuvos nacionalinio saugumo strategija]. Approved by the Parliament on January 20, 2005, n. X-91. 29 The National Defence System Development, op.cit 207 objectives. Non-governmental organisations and political parties were passive observers unable to challenge official position or propose viable alternatives. In order for in the future to even improve decisions making procedures this study recommends: • Political parties must better link foreign policy objectives with defence priorities; • An agreement between political parties on defence policy must be more detailed and comprehensive; • The abolishment of total defence must be fully recognised by all defence actors and explained to the society.

Conclusions

This research has shown that elitism, militarization, consensus, and domination of the state are the main features of Lithuanian strategic culture. Their inclusion into analysis of decision making brings a completely different view of major decisions of Lithuanian defence policy. Three major debates being, participation in international operations, the defence budget, and reform of the armed forces, has proved that political intentions and the results that follow from these intentions can be very different. The research also demonstrated that the Lithuanian elite is able to adjust its thinking and political principles to the changing realities of the modern world. Lithuanian political parties that were arguing against a bigger defence spending have rapidly changed their positions after their realised that NATO membership is linked to the performance of applicant states. The drive for NATO membership also influenced the speed and magnitude of defence reform. All political parties still preserve their consensus on major defence policy objectives although the discussion of the future of conscription may change this pattern. The creation of expeditionary military capabilities will boost Lithuanians to strive to become more active players in the world or even regional centre, especially if more resources for development projects will be allocated. This analysis also emphasized that certain features of Lithuanian strategic culture, such as a state centric understanding of security, the militarization of security may have a negative impact upon effectiveness of decision making procedures. Lithuania must strengthen the security and military expertise of political parties and non governmental organisations. They must play a bigger role in the debate over strategic choices in the area of defence. Lithuania also must create a security community that possesses the knowledge and expertise to confront or provide an active support to governmental institutions.

Vilnius, January 5, 2007

209 Kęstutis Paulauskas* Institute of International Relations and Political Science, University of Vilnius Katholike Universiteit Leuven

The Security Studies: . the Status Quo and the Trends

Security Studies are undergoing a true upheaval in Europe and have become an unlikely cradle of new theories, new ideas, and new methods for the entire International Relations discipline. Three European schools of security studies – Copenhagen, Paris, and Wales – have produced a serious challenge to the orthodox canons of the US security/strategic studies on the understanding and explanation of security problems, as well as the very nature of the “security” phenomenon itself. Despite the active international academic battles, security analysis is in a firm grasp of geopolitics in Lithuania. An occasional critical article has not been able to launch a serious alternative to the strong school of Lithuanian geopolitics. Such an alternative, however, is necessary and could potentially bring a fresh impulse to the Lithuanian security policy itself. This article discusses the contemporary state and the most significant trends in Security Studies. Particular attention is given to the analysis of differences between the traditional, American security studies, and the critical, European schools. The main aim of this article is to present the possibilities inherent in critical security studies, which could present a strong alternative to the rationalist approach.

Introduction

What is security? Is absolute security possible? Why and how do security problems or security threats emerge? The Security Studies, one of the sub-disciplines of the International Relations, which was founded more than fifty years ago - is still searching for answers to these questions. Despite the constant and rapid growth of the body of literature devoted to the analysis of theoretical and practical problems of security, the same theme is always present in the public debate – that mankind lives under the conditions of constant insecurity. The state of insecurity allegedly is caused by numerous factors – the change of climate, natural disasters, industrial accidents, and epidemics of deadly diseases, armed conflicts, terrorism, and other natural or human-made causes. On the theoretical level, Security Studies are constantly evolving, becoming ever more sophisticated, bringing up new hypotheses, developing new, more advanced

* Kestutis Paulauskas is a doctoral student at the Vilnius University, Institute of International Relations and Political Science. From the fall of 2006, he was also an international scholar at the Catholic University of Leuven in Belgium. Address: Rue de la Rive 28, 1200 Brussels, Belgium. E-mail: kpaulauskas@gmail. com 210

tools of analysis and forecast, and yet all of this does not help to overcome the omnipresent - mass and individual – sense of insecurity. Moreover, some schools of the Security Studies believe that the attempts of the academics to propose solutions to security problems often only trigger new ones. Presumably, there is a rather strong relationship between security theory and security practice. Unlike in the case of the social science disciplines or sub- disciplines, this relationship may have existential consequences to individuals, entire social groups, or even states. In the case of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the academic play with the rational choice theories helped lead the world to the brink of self-destruction, when Nikita Khrushchev and John F. Kennedy started to play the nuclear “Chicken’s game.” During the Cold War, the link between security theory and practice has gained a paradoxical form: Security Studies have served the politics of the Great Powers: the centres of security studies were generously financed by the state (and especially in the United States) for the efforts to scientifically substantiate and legitimise the security policies pursued by the same state. Security theory did not simply intertwine with security practice – it became part of it. There were no Security Studies autonomous from political realities. The current trends in Security Studies are quite opposite – some of the streams have diverted exclusively into theoretical realm, detaching completely from the practical, material analysis of the consequences of (in) security phenomenon. The outcome of this trend seems logical; the scientific battles taking place in academic journals are not interesting to the political elite and incompre- hensible to the society at large. The current status quo of the Security Studies is thus not very promising: the representatives of the traditional security studies are too preoccupied with explaining security and are therefore not able to gain deeper understanding of security, whereas representatives of the new, critical security studies pursue understanding so vehemently that they are unable (and often unwilling) of explaining security. The efforts to link these two academic work strands do exist and are necessary at least for the sake of the Security Studies keeping the status of a serious sub-discipline of the International Rela- tions and avoid becoming pseudo-scientific genre of belletristic. The aim of this article is twofold – to discuss the current state of the Security Studies and their trends in Lithuania and the world, and to point out the existing opportunities to use the “security” concept as a variable (and not a static, fixed given) in the analysis of international relations/foreign policy. To that effect, the article discusses ontological and epistemological problems of Security Studies, the level of analysis and the unit of analysis problems, normative aspects, the distinction between the security “writing,” and also the security “practice”.

Interestingly, the “beautiful mind” of John Nash – the laureate of the Nobel Prize – has greatly contributed to the development of the game theory. 211 1. Lithuanian Security Studies: . The State of the Art or the Art of the State?

In Lithuania, institutional limits of Security Studies are rather clear: strategic studies, geopolitics, other disciplines devoted to the analysis of international and national security problems are taught at the Vilnius University, Institute of International Relations and Political Science (IIRPS), Lithuanian Mili- tary Academy, the Vytautas Magnus University, Institute of Political Science and Diplomacy, even the Klaipėda University, Social Sciences Department. There are also two strategic studies centres: in 2001, the Lithuanian Military Academy has established Strategic Research Centre (director – Jūratė Novagrockienė), and in 2004 the Strategic Studies Centre was established (headed by Egidijus Motieka). Both centre are financed from the state budget, thus they can hardly be considered completely independent. Even when they undertake scientific analysis, they first of all carry out the taskings’ of state institutions. The Strategic Research Centre carries out research of acute importance to the Ministry of National Defence, whereas the Strategic Studies Centre works in accordance with the requests of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, State Security Department, and the Ministry of National Defence. Undoubtedly, the latter institutions have some analytical capacities of their own, but their analytical work however, usually is not accessible to the society at large. It is obvious and arguably natural that under the given circumstances fundamental, theoretical security research receives less attention and resources than analysis of actual security policy problems, which is in high demand. Accordingly, the two main journals devoted to international relations – the Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review and Lithuanian foreign policy review – also focus almost exclusively on foreign and security policy practice. At a theoretical level, the security concept in the Lithuanian Interna- tional Relations discourse is almost completely usurped by the representatives of geopolitics (Jonas Daniliauskas, Tomas Janeliūnas, Laurynas Kasčiūnas, Česlovas Laurinavičius, Motieka, and Nortautas Statkus) and security studies (Gediminas Vitkus, Vaidotas Urbelis, and Egidijus Vareikis). The critical security perception is represented by very few authors (first and foremost

These authors have taught or still teach disciplines related to security studies or geopolitics, they have written scores of articles on the subject. For example, see: Laurinavičius, Č., Motieka, E., Statkus, N., Baltijos valstybių geopolitikos bruožai. XX amžius, Vilnius: Lietuvos Istorijos instituto leidykla, 2005 (in Lithuanian); Daniliauskas J., Janeliūnas T., Kasčiūnas L., Motieka E., Šiaurės šalių geostrateginė svarba Lietuvai, Vilnius: Eugrimas, 2005 (in Lithuanian). Vitkus is a chief editor of Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review and author of a number of articles. For example, see: Vitkus, G., “The Russia – USA – EU “triangle” and Smaller States in 2003-2004”, in Lithu- anian Annual Strategic Review 2004, p. 115-140. Urbelis teaches strategic studies in IIRPS and is an author of numerous articles on strategy and security. For example, see: Urbelis V., Lietuvos vieta JAV didžiojoje strategijoje, Vilnius: Lietuvos karo akademija, 2005 (in Lithuanian). Vareikis teaches a discipline on national and international security in the Vytautas Magnus University, he has also written some articles on the subject, see: Vareikis E., “Kas yra nacionalinis saugumas?”, Skaitiniai apie nacionalinį ir tarptautinį saugumą. Vilnius: 2000, p.7-12 (in Lithuanian). 212

Gražina Miniotaitė and Dovilė Jakniūnaitė). The author of this article together with Statkus also have attempted to polemise on the issues of security studies and Lithuanian security policy. Apart from these authors, a number of other Lithuanian political scientists, journalists, political analysts, and also politicians often comment on various aspects of Lithuanian or international security policy aspects. Despite such a significant number of security experts and analysts, in the main institution that prepares international relations specialists – IIRPS – only one dissertation devoted exclusively to security studies has been prepared and defended throughout the entire independence period (work by Tomas Janeliūnas “Communication security concept in security studies”) A rather narrow outlook of Lithuanian security experts, an often limited to national security problems, and also the lack of English language skills, causes a very insignificant representation of Lithuanian scientific thought in international security discourse, meaning that there is hardly a handful of articles by Lithuanian authors in the key international relations journals. The outcome of such (self)isolation is clear – geopolitics, which represents the state of the art in Lithuania, in the context of European security studies seems to be an anachronism. On the other hand, geopolitics are very popular in Russia (first and foremost in the personality of Aleksander Dugin, there is also an almanac Geopolitika published in Russian), China (Chinese together with Italian scientists publish a journal Heartland), and France (there is a French Geopolitics Institute), partially also in the US (journal of Geopolitics), however in this context of the great powers, geopolitics in Lithuania is a strange phenomenon. It would possible to accept the assumption that the dominance of geopolitics in Lithuania was caused by a difficult geopolitical situation of the country. On the other hand, the representatives of geopolitics were the ones who introduced the thesis that the geopolitical situation of Lithuania is difficult, therefore Lithuania needs a strong school of geopolitics, which could explain what it does entail in practical terms. Although such logic seems to be a tautology, today it is deeply engrained into the security discourse of Lithuania and has gained a dogmatic nature. The dominant narrative of this discourse maintains that Lithuania has a lot of internal and external security problems, which relate in one way or another with the threatening, hostile, other – Russia. Academic efforts of the school of geopolitics, and security experts, are thus devoted to suggest practical solutions to these allegedly real and objective problems.

Miniotaitė is an author of some interdisciplinary works; she actively takes part in the European discourse on security studies. Jakniūnaitė teaches and reasearches in the field of social constructivism. Pvz., žr.: Miniotaitė G., Jakniūnaitė D., “Lietuvos saugumo politika ir identitetas šiuolaikinių saugumo studijų požiūriu”, Poli- tologija 3, 2001, p. 21-43 (in Lithuanian); Miniotaitė, G., “Convergent Geography and Divergent Identities: A decade of transformation in the Baltic states”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs 16 (2), 2003, p. 209 – 222; Miniotaitė G., “Search for Identity in Modern Foreign Policy of Lithuania: between the Northern and Eastern dimensions?”, Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 2004, Vilnius: Lietuvos karo akademija, 2005, p. 69-85. Statkus N., Paulauskas K., “Lietuvos užsienio politika tarptautinių santykių teorijų ir praktikos kryžkelėje”, Politologija 2006, nr. 2, p.12-60 (in Lithuanian). Dugin A., Osnovy geopolitiki, Moskva: Arktogeja-centr, 1999 (in Russian). 213

Under the given conditions, at a theoretical level, the security concept is simply not problematic in Lithuania. Therefore, security is explained/written and practiced in a traditional, positive sense – as the state security from external political, military, economic, and other threats. The following chapters discuss the evolution of this traditional security concept and address the challenge presented to it by the alternative, critical schools, while contending that their insights may enrich Lithuanian security discourse.

2. The Development of Security Studies

Security is one of the main concepts in the field of International Relations. At the same time, it is an “essentially contested concept,” its definition and content is still a subject of disagreement. Moreover – disagreement is much deeper than ever before. From the Westphalian treaty of 1648, the concept of security was linked to the state. Security meant defence from organized violence coming from outside, i.e. the threatening others. A territorial state became the organising principle, which enabled separation and distinction between “us” and “them.” An accumulation of military might have helped with consolidating the state: instruments of violence – military capabilities in particular – effectively turned the state into the main provider of security while at the same time remaining the main interpreter of its meaning. For the better part of world history the security meant whatever the rulers wanted it to mean. Security acquired its current, modern meaning – that of a state attribute, which is ensured by military and diplomatic means – in the end of the 18th century. The social contract theories of Rousseau, Locke, and Montesquieu helped embed the concept of security into the political discourse. “Social contract” had to emancipate the individual from the state of anarchy, in which everyone is fighting everyone, and provide him with freedom and security. The Great French Revolution entered some corrections to the noble goals of the philosophers – individual security had been mechanically subordinated to the security of the nation. The concept of “national security” has emerged quite recently. Until the end of the World War II the concepts of “security” and “defence” have often been used interchangeably. The declaration of war usually was (and still is) publicly masqueraded as defence. Conceptualising the security of the state in peacetime did not make much sense. Pioneers of national security became the Americans by adopting the 1947 National Security Act. The concept of defence

More about essentially contested concepts see: Gallie W.B., “Essentially contested concepts” žr.: Black M., ed., The importance of language, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1962, p.121-146 Del Rosso, Jr., S. J., “The Insecure State (What Future for the State?)”, Daedalus 124 (2), 1995, p.183 McSweeney B., Security, Identity, and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 19. 214

and its strict territorial and mental limitations was becoming to weak a force to mobilise the American society for the Cold War. “National security” became the alma mater of the Security Studies. Security Studies can be catalogued in a variety of ways. Some authors argue that there is one discipline of Security Studies, which constantly evolves (e.g. Barry Buzan, who himself contributed to the evolution of the field). Other authors (e.g. Ken Booth) distinguish between two periods – the traditional security studies (the Cold War) and the period of the critical security studies (after the Cold War). According to Bill McSweeney, the security studies, as well as entire International Relations, have underwent 4 cyclic periods – political theory, political science, political economy, and sociology. In all these periods, however, two main ideas have been re-emerging – that of “national security” and that of “common security.”10 Security Studies face the same problem as the entire field of International Relations, instead of the accumulation of “knowledge,” which was usual to “normal sciences,” changes take place only in the composition of the participants of the “great debates” and “schisms,” while essentially contested problems remain unresolved. In the field of Security Studies different theories and schools come and go, but there advance towards accumulation of knowledge is piecemeal at best. In any case, the chronology of the Security Studies is short. The first period of Security Studies to a large extent coincide with the era of idealism in the International Relations. Before World War II and shortly after it, the idea of “common security” was floating around. Its origins lie with Woodrow Wilson and the League of Nations. The Charter of the United Nations was also an attempt to rehabilitate that same idea. Edward H. Carr11 and especially Hans Morghenthau12 gave rise to realism theory, which became the basis for the “golden age” of the security studies. Neoliberal school (Robert Keohane, Joseph Nye13) tried to challenge the realists with the “interdependency” thesis, which, in essence, was a more sophisticated version of “common security” idea. Finally, after the unexpected end of the Cold War undermined the authority of traditional security strategists, a number of new schools began proposing different project of widening and deepening of the concept of security. However, proliferating new schools were unable to remove the apologists of traditional security studies from the most prestigious academic institutions, research centres, and the pages of the key international relations journals. In the US, the “middle way” constructivists (Emmanuel Adler, Alexander Wendt) did manage to engage into a constructive dialogue with the (neo)realists and become a legitimate authors of the mainstream American IR discourse. More radical, post-modern thinkers, however, remained outside the margins of this discourse. In Europe, non-traditional approaches traditionally fair much better. It is

10 Ibid, p.28-30. 11 Carr E. H., The Twenty Years‘ Crisis 1919-1939, London: Macmillan 1946. 12 Morgenthau H., Politics Among Nations, New York, Knopf, 1948. 13 Keohane R., Nye J., Power and Interdependence, Boston: Little, Brown, 1977. 215 even possible to contend that constructivism is becoming more dominant than the neo-neo synthesis in European IR. Yet, neither in the US nor Europe, due to a variety of reasons the representatives of the new security studies schools have not find ways to influence the practice of international politics and some critical schools revokes the attempts of academics to influence politics altogether. Nevertheless, today the Security Studies is one of the most dynamic sub-disciplines of the IR. Some authors believe that Security Studies – traditionally a conservative and closed field – is giving new impulse to the entire IR discipline and is the ground on which the most active academic debates are taking place.14 Moreover – the Security Studies have been considered the citadel of realism therefore even modest victories of the constructivist camp in this field are extremely sweet. The differences between the debates taking place among the Ameri- can schools and European schools of security studies are noteworthy. In the American security studies the main frontline is between the “offensive” and “defensive” realisms. At the margins of this central debate there are post-classical realism, the “middle ground” constructivism, world system theory, which is akin to the ideology of neoconservatives, and partially the traditional liberalism. In Europe, beside the traditionalism (realism), active debates are taking place among critical schools – Critical Security Studies, Copenhagen School and Paris school. At the margins of these debates one can also find radical postmodernism and feminism. Under the conditions of such proliferation of security concepts, the apologists of the tradition security studies are losing the security of the intellectual monopoly they once had.15 The contemporary map of security studies is indeed colourful, as the Scheme 1 attests to.

14 Williams, M.C. “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and World Politics”, International Studies Quarterly, 47 (4), p. 511-531. 15 For example, see: Smith S. “The Increasing Insecurity of Security Studies: Conceptualizing Security in the Last Twenty Years”, in Croft S., Terriff T., eds., Critical Reflections on Security and Change, London: Frank Cass, 2000, p. 72-101 216

Materialist/rationalist ontology Idealist/subjectivist ontology Positivist epistemology Reflectivist epistemology

World systems theory Postmodernism Marxism Radical Structuralism postmodernism (holism) Securitization theory Critical security studies Neorealizm “Middle ground” constructivism Traditional Security (Strategic) studies Neoliberalism Individualism Liberalism Classical realizm

Scheme 1. Security studies in the context of IR theory

3. Security as Everything and Nothing

There are for key questions at the centre of debate among the different schools of the contemporary security studies16: • What is the object of security? In other words, whose security? De- pending on the theoretical approach, the security object can be an individual, group, community, state and even the whole world – anything from nothing to everything. • What is the nature of threats? Security from what/whom? Answers can vary from military threats to cultural and environmental factors to mere discursive, social constructions. • What/who is the subject, the provider of security? Individuals, army, state, or alliances? • By what means can security be ensured? These questions would presume that a given school already has answers to the essential question what is security? A postmodernist author R. B. J. Walker asserts that “national security” not only suggests a certain “reality” and “necessity” that everybody must accept - it also entails a very trivial definition

16 Aggestam L., Hyde-Price A., ed., Security and Identity in Europe. Exploring the New Agenda, London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 2000, p. 3-6. 217 that can mean everything and nothing.17 This author maintains that the uncertainty of certain things is the main problem.18 The palette of security concepts is indeed very wide – from a narrow, clearly defined traditional security concept to everything, “what we make security.”

3.1. Traditional Security Concept

The security concept is not a problem in the traditional security studies. Security is not even conceptualised – it simply has one clear definition. Accord- ing to Stephen Walt, the aim of security studies – accumulation of knowledge about military power. Security studies researches threats, the use of military force, and its consequences to the states and societies, states’ politics in preparation for a war or when fighting one.19 Security is defined in tautological terms – security is a state’s security from external (mostly military) threats and state security and security of its inhabitants is provided by... the state itself. It is effectively an anti-theoretical, positivist thesis. The neorealist ontology of security is well-known: states are the main subjects of international politics and anarchy is the constant feature of international system, therefore, the states seek to increase their power in order to ensure their security. The international system, national interests, and security policy are all tied up by cause relationships: anarchic international system triggers rational, egoistical search for power and security, and states pursue their policies to that effect, which, in turn, may impact the balance of power in the international system.

International system (bipolar, multipolar, unipolar)

National (security) Security policy interests

Scheme 2. Traditional security concept

In the traditional sense, security is a material quality. There can be more or less security, but the states will always feel insecure and will seek to increase their security. The proponents of “offensive” realism agitate in favour of increasing a state’s power and influence vis a vis other states.20 The proponents of

17 Walker, R.B.J. “The Subject of Security”, in: Krause K., Williams M., eds., Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases, London: UCL Press, 1997, p. 63. 18 Ibid, p. 76. 19 Walt S. M., “The renaissance of security studies”, International Studies Quarterly, 35, 1991, p. 212. 20 For example, Mearsheimer J.J., The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York: Norton, 2001. 218

the “defensive” realism recommend only balancing against the other powers 21 or threats.22 Security is a negative category; absolute security is impossible and the main problem of security is insecurity. A classical realist, Arnold Wolfers, contends that security is the absence of insecurity, a negative value.23 The geographical/geopolitical location of a country and its power are the main independent variables and security, and status, in the international system are the main dependent variables in the realist epistemology. Realists assert that weaker actors of the international arena can strengthen their security by pursuing a policy that would trigger hostile intentions on behalf of the other actors, or they seek to increase their power and prevent the hostile states from attaining their goals. The states can increase their power in two ways – by accumulating resources via internal balancing (resource mobilisation, arms acquisitions, etc.) or via external balancing, by aligning with the other states against a common enemy. The stronger actors are more likely to rely upon autonomous pursuit of power (internal balancing), although they do not avoid forming alliances by attracting weaker states to their side. Small and medium states are more likely to pursue external balancing – bandwagon with the great powers (including the revisionist ones) or the hegemon. All these, in the traditional security studies, are objective “truths” and “facts.” Critical schools, on the other hand, see those “facts” being nothing more than assumptions and beliefs, which, in addition, have a strong normative or even political agenda behind them. In other words, tradition security concept is a political solution, which would seem logical in the context of the world history of constant wars, if only it would not have contributed significantly to the very writing of this history. It is easy to trace the “strategy” of the creation of the traditional security concept. In the 16th - 17th century feudal system there were numbers, subjects, and objects of security: landlords, monarchs, churches, knights – whoever could afford his own private army and defend his territory or another source of power (e.g. religion, throne, etc.). The Westphalian system effectively curtailed security – state has become the guarantor of internal security and order, separating its inhabitants from the external dangers. This system functioned perfectly until the very end of the 20th century, therefore, the proponents of the critical security studies, who seek to expand and deepen the traditional security concept, face a trap: they either need to have a conscious political agenda, or their unconscious academic efforts will have eclectic, unplanned political consequences. (Neo)realists themselves could not disregard the changing realities of international politics and did try to expand their security concept. The classical work in this respect is Barry Buzan’s “People, states, and fear.” In its first edition in 1983, Buzan has mechanically expanded the concept of security by adding four new sectors of security – political, economical, ecological, and social –

21 Waltz K., Theory of International Politics, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979. 22 Walt S., The origins of alliances, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987. 23 Wolfers A., Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1962, p. 153. 219 to the traditional one (military).24 Security subject (what provides security) and objectives (what has to be secured), however, remained the state. Buzan’s approach to security has further evolved and expanded (see Table 1).

Sectors Military Political Economical Ecological Social 1983* State Security 1993** State Identity object National Environment, 1998*** State Sovereignty Identity economy climate * 1983 edition of People, states and fear ** Waever O., Buzan B., Kelstrup M., Lemaitre P., Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe *** Buzan B., Waever O., de Wilde J., Security: a New Framework for Analysis Table 1. Evolution of Buzan‘s security analysis: security sectors and objects In 1993, Buzan became a member of the Copenhagen school, which has made “social identity” a security object equal to the state so_vereignty. Accord- ing to this school, if a state looses its sovereignty, it ceases to exist as a state. Accordingly, if a society looses its identity, it ceases to exist as a society.25 The “middle ground” constructivists promulgated identity into the centre of a state’s foreign and security policy formation: changes in a states identity directly influence its interests and policy26 (see Scheme 3). In other words, the actors would not be able to define their interests, if they would not know who they are in the first place. However, these attempts to develop security concepts resulted in mechanically expanded definition by including a new variable – identity – rather then deepening the understanding of the phenomenon itself. A new concept - “national security culture” - has thus been born, but the concept of security did not become less “national” and more “cultural.”

24 Buzan B. Žmonės, valstybės ir baimė, Vilnius: Eugrimas, 1997 (in Lithuanian). 25 Waever O., Buzan B., Kelstrup M., Lemaitre P., Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe, London: Pinter, 1993, p.25. 26 Jepperson R. L., Wendt A., Katzenstein P.J. “Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security”, žr.: Katzenstein P. J., eds., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, New York: Columbia University, 1996, p. 33-78. 220

Cultural-institutional environment

Identity

Security interests

Security policy

Scheme 3. Security concept of the “middle ground” constructivism27

3.2. Critical Security Concepts

The end of Cold War has delivered a big blow to the (neo)realist citadel of security, but did not destroy it. Although critical schools started attacking the traditional security concept from every possible corner and trying to widen and deepen it, the traditionalists themselves were stubbornly declaring the “renaissance” of traditional security studies.28 Three schools of critical security thought have emerged in Europe29: Critical Security Studies (CSS), also known as the Wales School or Aberystwyth School; the aforementioned Copenhagen school and the Paris school. All three schools made problematic the concept of security, but also look cautiously towards expanding the concept because of the potential political consequences of such expansion, but there are also significant differences. The next chapter presents a brief discussion of the main ideas of the three schools – by no means does it attempt to do justice and provide an objective, comprehensive, and final analysis. There are much better and more authoritative sources available to that effect – the ambition of this article is limited to singling out and interpreting subjectively those strands that the author considers to be central in the thinking of each of the schools.

27 Source: Jepperson et al., (note 26). 28 E.g., Walt (note 22), also Mearsheimer J., “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War”, International Security, 15(1), 1990, p. 5-56. 29 Waever O., Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen New “Schools” in Security Theory and their Origins between Core and Periphery, paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Montreal, March 17-20, 2004. 221 3.2.1. Wales School

Critical Security Studies30 (Wales School) were first by the 1991 article by Booth31 and later developed in the 1997 anthology Critical Security Studies, edited by Keith Krause band Michael Williams.32 The central thesis of this school is Booth’s assertion that security is to be understood as emancipation of people – individuals or groups – from physical or other constrains – poverty, violence, political oppression etc. Security analysts should avoid eyeing security through the lenses of the state – the state itself is often the root of the problem and not its solution, as it is implied by the “national security” concept. The best way to conceptualise security is to link it with individuals, people and explain it in terms of emancipation. It is noteworthy that the ontology of this school has more in common with objectivism than reflectivism – this school, just as with the realists, asserts that it knows the “true” meaning of security. Ole Waever contends that this school seeks to analyze “real” threats to “real” people.33 The representatives of the school themselves, however, explain their normative agenda differently. Waever seems to fail to capture the key difference between his own Copenhagen school and the Wales school. The security concept of the latter is positive in its nature. McSweeney – one of the key figures of CSS – see an analogy between the positive and negative ideas of freedom of Isaiah Berlin and the negative and positive concepts of security. Just as with freedom, security may gain a negative meaning (“security from what?), and a positive one (“security for what?”). In the latter case, the notion of threat is absent. The Wales school considers this security concept to be the real, ontological one. In its very primary meaning, it is the relationship between a mother and a child, a primordial sense of security of a human being, a category of social relationship – a security of one in another.34 The semantic meaning of “security” also had a positive genesis from Latin “se cura” - “without care”, in other words, “secure” - this is quite an opposite meaning to the contemporary one. Ignoring the human dimension in security, conceptualisation contradicts logic – for security to have meaning at an international level it first has to make sense at an individual level.35 “Ontological security” is a natural, subconscious impulse, inherent in every individual from his very infancy in the form of necessity to feel security and be in control in his social relations.36 The Wales School does not hide its normative agenda – it seeks to offer a security concept, which would help improve the life of people and maximize their security via integration instead of isolation, and via opportunity instead of

30 Sometimes this term is used to define all the streams that oppose the traditional security studies. Within the confines of this article, the CSS acronym will be used only when referring to theWales school. 31 Booth K., “Security and emancipation”, Review of International Studies, 17, 1991. 32 Krause K., Williams M., eds., Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases, London, UCL Press, 1997 33 Waever (note 29). 34 McSweeney (note 9), p. 13-15. 35 Ibid, p. 16. 36 Ibid, p. 154-156. 222

necessity.37 The role of academics should not be restricted to a mere unbiased observance, but rather an active engagement. In this respect, CSS is reminiscent of Johan Galtung peace research. For Booth, the goal of theory is practice. If a theory pretends to explain international relations, it should be able to answer questions about the security of people in the streets of Baghdad. Thinking about thinking is important, but thinking about doing is more important.38 Accord- ing to Booth, theory is a form of practice, and practice is a form of theory. It is impossible to separate the two.

3.2.2. Paris School

Another critical direction of security studies is headed by Didier Bigo39 and Jef Huysmans and their Paris school. The main inspiration of this school comes from the ideas of Bourdieu and other sociologists, also partially from Michel Foucault. The main thesis of this school maintains that there is a very tight link between security studies and security policy, and security analysts and theorists had a direct impact on states’ policies from the very conception of the field. Representatives of this school seek to empirically explore the activities of various state, non-state, and other agencies, which have to do with security. In particular, they are interested in those practices and processes that take place beyond the confines of the official discourse. The characteristic feature of this school is questioning the distinction between the “internal” and “external” realms of security. With territory increasingly losing its previous importance in the contemporary world, various security agencies - be it policy, the military, border patrol or other – start to compete for security functions. Thus, the narrative of “new,” “trans-national” threats is conceived. What was known as international threats – immigration, terrorism, and organised crime – allegedly, has now transgressed borders and threatened the internal way of life in a given society. The insecurity that society feels is a direct result of the security narrative and security policy perpetrated by the security agencies. Differently from the Copenhagen school, Paris school is interested in empirical practice of security, not discourse. From a methodological point of view, it is no doubt an extremely complex approach, which, on the one hand, comes close to an ex- perimental, inductive mode of science, but on the other dangerously balances on the brink of “conspiracy theory.”

37 Booth K., “Security and Self: Reflections of a Fallen Realist” in Krause K., Williams M., eds., Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases, London: UCL Press, 1997, p. 105. 38 Ibid, p. 114. 39 For example, Bigo D. “When two become one: internal and external securitisations in Europe”, in: Kel- strup M., Williams M. C., eds., International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration. Power, Security and Community, London, Routledge, 2000, p.171-205; also Huysmans J., “Defining social constructivism in security studies. The normative dilemma of writing security”. Alternatives, 27, Supple- ment, p.41-62. 223 3.2.3. Copenhagen School

Probably the most established school of critical security studies is the Copenhagen School, which has united intellectual powers of the vanguard constructivists (Waever) and neorealists (Buzan) under one roof.40 The three main concepts of this school are securitisaiton, security sectors, and regional security complexes. This school in many respects is close to the ideas of the “middle ground” constructivism. This school believes that the term “security” implies inability to solve problems in the vane of “normal politics.” A special nature of security threats warrants the use of extraordinary means to quell them. Securitisation means that a certain problem contains an existential threat, which needs to be stopped. Accordingly, desecuritisation means the return of certain issue from the “threat- defence” discourse to the regular sphere of public policy. According to this theory, the key question is not how to ensure security, but rather who, how and why turns certain problems into security issues. It is noteworthy that the representatives of this theory do not deny the possibility that in certain cases securitisation of a problem is inevitable (for example, in the case of an immi- nent threat to a state) or necessary, when it is important to draw attention to a complex problem (for example, environmental degradation).41 However, even when the “hostile tanks are crossing a states border,” the threat (“hostile”) is an attribute of a social relationship, and not of the tanks per se. The securitisation theory provides clear responses to the aforementioned problems: 1) The security object is determined by the securitising actor. Such an object can thus become a group of individuals, population of rare species, or starving children of Africa. Not all attempts at securitisation (“securitising speech acts”) are successful: a certain problem becomes a security problem when the audience of the given “speech act” accepts it as such. 2) The objective threats do not exist – they are socially constructed by the securitising actors, who indicate a certain factor as “an existential threat.” 3) A state is the “ideal security actor,”42 which historically occupies a privileged position as is best equipped to carry out security tasks. 4) The main postulates of securitisation theory direct at a paradoxical conclusion that the best way to solve a security problem is desecuritisation. If a problem can be solved by means of normal politics, the basis for conflict between “identities” and use of force to stop the threat is removed. Wæver and Buzan reject the possibility of an objective definition of security meaning. They contend that the meaning of security is determined by the actors, therefore, security is inevitably subjective concept. These authors,

40 The key sources are: Waever O., Buzan B., Kelstrup M., Lemaitre P., Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe, London, Pinter, 1993 Waever, O., “Securitization and Desecuritization”, in: Lipschutz, R. D., ed., On Security, New York: Columbia University Press, 1995; Buzan B., Waever O., de Wilde J., Security: a New Framework for Analysis, London, Lynne Rienner, 1998. 41 Miniotaitė, Jakniūnaitė (note 4), p. 9. 42 Buzan B., Waever O., de Wilde J., (note 40), p. 37. 224

however, as well as the constructivist school at large, have not found a way to escape the trap of “double hermeneutics”. While asserting that a certain security meaning is constructed via speech acts by social actors, Waever and Buzan, however, indicate what kind of “specific rhetorical structure” one needs to look for in the texts – the one, in which there is a reference to “existential threat” and the necessity to quell it. They run away from the ontological, objectivist definition of security, but they fail to avoid a priori conceptualisation of security, which rejects any other understanding of security that does not entail references to “existential threats.” McSweeney is a particularly ardent critic of this gap in securitisation theory.43 As it was noted earlier, he maintains it is possible to perceive security not only in negative terms (security from what?) but also in positive terms (security for what?). Security can only have meaning when its primary subject is an individual. Copen- hagen school and the “middle ground” constructivists in general reject this kind of “methodological individualism.”44 According to Wendt, to study international relations without studying the states would be the same as studying a forest without paying any attention to trees. In this sense, the “middle ground” constructivism remains in a firm grip of rationalist ontology, in which a state is alfa and omega for any analysis of international relations. The constructivist “political” agenda has a certain normative basis – they aim at seeking “de-securitisation” of problems, i.e. their return to the realm of normal politics. As it was argued, in certain cases problems must be “securitised” to draw public attention (e.g. the Darfur crisis). Some constructivists use the concept of “positive securitisation to explain such cases. It is also possible to trace some constructivist attempts to influence the decision makers by publishing policy papers with recommendations for the best course of action. It is possible to expect that the constructivists will be able to engrain the terminology of “identity,” “norms,” and “de-securitisation” into the mainstream international relations discourse and eventually – practice, just the way the American strategists of 1940s and 1950s established the concepts of “national security,” “deterrence,” “power politics,” and “security dilemma” in the public discourse. The securitisation concept has a certain explanatory analytical value, which helps to take a fresh new look at the international politics from an unconventional angle. The military power or economic resources are not the sole determinative factors in the international relations – values, culture, and mentality of the society (including that of the political elite) also count. Moder- ate constructivists do not reject the importance of power, even to the contrary: for a securitising speech act to succeed, an actor should occupy a certain authoritative position. Practical consequences to international politics would be

43 McSweeney B., “Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School”, Review of International Studies, 22, 1996, p. 81-93; McSweeney B., “Durkheim and the Copenhagen School: a Response to Buzan and Waever”, Review of International Studies, 24, 1998, p.137-40. 44 Buzan B., Waever O., “Slipper? Contradictory? Sociologically Untanable? The Copenhagen School Replies”, Review of International Studies, 23, 1997, p. 241-250. 225 different if Tony Blair or George W. Bush would depict HIV in Africa as an international security problem, said a member of “Greenpeace” making that same statement.

3.2.4. Radical postmodernism and feminism

Radical postmodernists, who draw their inspiration from the philosophy of Derrida, Derrida, Foucault, Nietzsche, and Heidegger, do not propose their own security theory – they question and criticize security phenomenon as such. James Der Derrian, Walker, and similar authors undertake “post-modernisation” of security by asking why security should matter to anybody in the first place – it is much better to live an interesting and unpredictable life.45 In the context of the currently dominant security narrative (flooded by such scary threats and images as international terrorism, the falling towers of 9/11, Weap- ons of Mass Destruction, the avian flu, and many others) such postmodernist ideas would seem to be naive and even ridiculous. On the other hand, a radical postmodernist position may indeed have an impact on the implications of the debates taking place within the traditional security studies on the world after the 9/11. The question is simple – how far one can go in “securitising” terrorism as a total threat (i.e. by curtailing human rights, perpetrating universal, “Orwellian” surveillance, putting armed policemen or even the military on the streets and thus perpetuating the constant sense of fear) until the quality and meaning of the Western way of life will change. The total war on terrorism perpetrated in accordance with the principles of traditional security concept may lead to apocalyptic consequences just as in the aforementioned Cuban crisis case, when amazingly rational Game Theory brought the world to the brink of nuclear self-annihilation. The influence of the postmodernist insights, however, remains limited because the postmodernists stubbornly refuse to abide by the conventional rules of the IR discipline and relate their ideas to policy research, or write utterly unreadable texts written in self-invented postmodernist language. One of the few exceptions one could consider works of Der Derrian, which do have a quite direct relevance to world affairs.46 Feminists devote quite a significant amount of attention to security studies.47 A significant part of their work is close to the ideas of the Aberystwyth School. According to the feminists, the main object of security should be an individual, while traditional state-centric security studies are the product of men’s world. Sex, no doubt, is one of the main variables in security studies. This school, however, has yet to elaborate a more clear research agenda to warrant more attention of “the men’s” academic and policy communities.

45 E.g.: Der Derrian J., “The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard”, in: Lipschutz, (note 40), p.24-45; Walker (note 17). 46 See, for example, Der Derrian J. Antidiplomacy: Spies, Terror, Speed, and War, Cambridge: MA: Black- well, 1992. 47 Pvz., Tickner J. A., Gender and International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security, New York: Columbia University Press, 1992. 226

To conclude, security has many faces – to solve the problem of the “essentially contested concept” seems impossible, but it may well be “employed” for the purposes of academic research by using it for what it is – a variable.

4. Security as a Variable: Parameters for Analysis

The Ontological nature of the “security” concept. According the realist perception, security is objective, “thing-ish” and measurable – it can be acquired, sold, downsized or enlarged. According to the reflectivist conceptions, security first of all signifies a social relationship – in the case of securitisation theory, a negative relationship, in the case of critical security theories – positive, emancipatory relationship. In both cases, two actors are necessary to give meaning to security: when security is “thing-ish”, one actor may increase security at the expense of other actor’s security, i.e. a zero sum game takes place. In the second case, the social relationship is a presumed relationship, which, according to “middle ground” constructivists, may be interpreted as a “socially constructed reality”, which does have a material basis. One can also trace down a third ontological meaning of security in the works of postmodernists and poststruc- turalists – security, in this case, has only a discursive meaning within the limits of concrete discourse/text. The problems of epistemology and methodology. In the US, rationalist epistemology is firmly entrenched in the security studies and the IR discipline at large. Research that does not apply to the Game Theory, or does not use quantitative or statistical methods, or at least does not follow the cannons of a positivist social science as presented in the textbook of Gary King, Keohane and Sidney Verba,48 have little chance to get onto the pages of the main journals – American Journal of Political Science or American Political Science Review. In the European tradition of IR, anarchy of reflectivist epistemology prevails – the number of different schools and researchers match the number of analytical approaches and methods used in research. The most popular methodological tool of the critical security studies is discourse analysis. In a very general sense, discourse analysis can be defined as a qualitative and interpretative attempt at recreating the meaning of the language used by actors to explain and understand the social phenomena. Discourse is a sum of texts, speeches, documents, and social practices, which helps creating meaning and organise social knowledge. Unlike quantitative methods, statistics, programming, or modelling this method is very demanding towards the researcher himself. The author must persuade his audience that his interpretation of the meaning of a social phenomenon is useful to explain relevant empirical consequences.49 For example, to study securitisation means to study discourse. Security

48 King G., Keohane R. O., Verba S., Designing Social Inquiry, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994 49 Abdelal R., Herrera Y. M., Johnston A. I., McDermott R., Identity as a Variable, Harvard University, 2005, p. 21. 227 concept is determined by a textual criterion – specific rhetorical structure, which must be found in a text by searching for certain features. Analysis of discourse and official texts allows determining who, how, and when securitising various problems. Discourse analysis is a clear methodological instrument, which enables processing of empirical data, which, for the researcher, comes in the form of texts and public discourse. On the other hand, despite the logical consistency of the securitisation theory, certain gaps in applicability of this theory to the practice of international relations remain. First, official texts often differs from the actual policy of a state, while the most important decisions in world politics are often taken behind the closed doors – within David Easton’s “black box.” It remains to be seen whether the ambitious agenda of the Paris school to get inside that box and empirically research its contents will bear any fruit. Representatives of the Copenhagen school acknowledge that discourse analysis is of little help in identifying the actual motives of actors.50 Second, constructivists, while emphasising the social, subjective nature of reality and thus problematising the ontological assumption of realism, tend to forget to problematise their own tools and first of all language. For example, constructivists accept a “speech act,” which securitises a certain problem, as a social fact, which can be analysed by using tools of positivist epistemology. For more radical constructivist, this kind of “objectivisation” of language is not acceptable – language is only one of the building blocks of the constructed social reality, which is no more, no less subjective than any other category, first and foremost nonverbal practice of international relations. Level of analysis: depending on the theoretical approach, the nature of the problem or the research question, analysis in security studies can be carried out “top-down” (beginning with the international system) and “bottom-up” (beginning with the analysis of individual actions). In the traditional security concept, strategic studies, the conventional level of analysis is international system and the unit of analysis is a state. A state is the subject of security, which ensures internal security to its inhabitants and external security to itself, as the main object of security. Individual security is subordinated to state security. Critical security studies seek to expand the number of security subjects and objects. The proponents of the idealist, emancipatory theory believe that a human being should be the main object of security. Other theories suggest expanding to encompass other security objects, such as environment, economic and financial systems, cyberspace, etc. Proponents of securitisation theory content that security object is determined by the subject, who occupies a certain authoritative position, and names the given object or problem a security problem. The normative aspects. Due to its objectivist nature, the traditional concept of security is beyond the realm of morality. But this is the case only in the worldview of proponents of this concept – most reflectivist authors would contend that any theory has a normative, subjective basis, which originates d in the author’s conscious or subconscious, but in any case motivated choices.

50 Buzan B., Waever O., de Wilde J., (note 40), p. 176. 228 According to the realist worldview, anarchy of international system is an objective reality therefore every state is insecure and seek to increase its power, thereby increasing the sense of danger/insecurity in the fellow states. Realists can explain how international relations function, but they claim it is impossible to improve the state of affairs, because the security dilemma is irresolvable. The representatives of the critical security studies do not deny their normative inclinations and idealist efforts, to search for global peace by helping the international actors to understand how security dilemma can be overcome. Finally, proponents of the securitisation theory criticise both views because of their subjective normative stances and suggest an allegedly more “objective” method of analysis: to observe impartially the very process and aim at explaining how and why security problems emerges and help the actors to understand when it is important to avoid this process, and when to foster. Security writing vs. security practice. For the analysts of the traditional security studies writing about security and practice of security are two completely different endeavours: the analysts can only explain international relations and, based upon their arguments, provide some policy recommendations (numerous research centres and think-tanks in the US and Europe practice this kind of entrepreneurship) but practice of security itself is exclusively the prerogative of the state and its statesmen. The representatives of critical security studies face an ethical dilemma: security analysts by writing security take part in the process of formation of security policy and thus can influence security practice (in the case of securitisation theory – a theorist himself can become a securitising actor if he will perform the “speech act” - write/define a certain issue as a security problem, which must be solved by extraordinary means). This dilemma is still unresolved in the critical security studies: while criticising the traditionalist “writing” for their negative influence on “practice,” reflectivist avoid the responsibility to pinpoint what are the security problems and how they should be resolved. On the other hand, Booth himself admits that a better part of research consists of books about books, and papers about papers, while people continue to be tortured and killed. If the academics want to go beyond firing at each other from their ivory towers, they need to engage reality.51 The sense of insecurity in the streets of Baghdad or London is not merely a subjective social construction – for the inhabitants of those cities these are objective, material conditions of life. Discourse analysis cannot solve this security problem, let alone change those conditions of life. In conclusion, it is impossible to completely separate security theory and security practice - “fundamental” security studies would not make much sense if they were not applicable to the street-wisdom security. The parameters of security analysis, as discussed above, are summarised in Table 2.

51 Booth (note 37), p. 107, 113. 229 Heidegger circumstances Foucault, Derrida, (especially) nothing Der Derrian, Walker Security is criticised as phenomenon under any Radical postmodernism Security is everything and such, as inherently negative Understanding negative Paris school Bourdieu Not relevant Bigo, Huysmans Individual Reflectivism Subjectivist, controlled by institutions by controlled Subjectivist, Security agencies (military, police) Hierarchical, elitist - - positive cipation Individual emancipation McSweeney Emancipation ies (Wales school) Booth, Wyn Jones, Critical security stud Solvable via eman Objectivist: security is - relationship actor social Waever, Buzan Desecuritisation Securitising actor penhagen school) Durkheim, Austin Securitisation theory (Co Determined by securitising negative - constructed between actors Constructivism Matrix of security concepts identity Identity Adler, Wendt constructivism Inter-subjective: security is “Middle ground” “What states make of it”, i.e. inster-subjectively tion and collective Berger, Luckmann Solvable via integra Table 2. Table - Explaining - /power rela State Herz positive sum game Neoliberalism Keohane, Nye material Economic power Controlled anarchy State Resolvable via interna tional regimes, positive Rationalism tion between actors Walt Waltz might negative sum game Anarchical Neorealism Morgenthau Mearsheimer, Power, military Objectivist: security is irresolvable; zero irresolvable; - - - tives ences Theory Ontology Epistemology tions paradigm Security subject Intellectual influ Security dilemma Means of security International rela Security perception Current representa Main security object International system

230 Conclusions

• Security studies are undergoing resurgence. European schools of security studies have presented a serious challenge to the orthodox American security/strategic studies tradition. The security concept in this tradition is a material, a-theoretical given. Copenhagen, Paris, and Wales schools are dig- ging at the essence of the "essentially contested concept": what is security? This question is of no relevance to the American rationalist apologists. Renaissance of otherwise rather conservative sub-discipline has given a fresh new impulse to the European IR. • Geopolitics, to a large extent, shapes the worldview and understanding of security by political science students and the political elite in Lithuania. Only a very few Lithuanian academics attempt to breakthrough the rather narrow limits of national security/geopolitics discourse and take part in the European security studies discourse. A wider and more diverse debate exists between security theorists, analysts, and practitioners and would be a healthy and welcome development, which could significantly enrich the Lithuanian security policy itself. • The orientation of strategic research centres towards the analysis of practical security problems seems natural and logical. At the same time, Lithuanian academic institutions, political scientists and sociologists, students of political science could devote more attention to the fundamental security studies, including the development of security theory. As discussed in this article, the parameters of security analysis provide ample opportunities and space for theoretical, practical, and especially interdisciplinary research. • In the contemporary security studies, an author can choose between two normative positions: positivist, whereby the researcher relies upon objectivist security ontology; constructivist, whereby the author of a text understands his role in constructing a certain security narrative. In the first case, an unconscious contribution of the author to the escalation, securitisation of a certain problem, as well as consciously intended solution – in any case the author looses a secure claim at academic neutrality. In the second case the latter danger is well understood, therefore the author will either exploit his text to influence practice (as in the case of the Wales school) or consciously will try to avoid such an impact (Paris, Copenhagen schools). In any case, normative bias towards the object of analysis is inescapable, and the securitisation theory can only partially amortise this subjectivity. • Security can be researched as either an objective, materially measurable phenomenon, or as an inter-subjective social relationship between two actors, or as a reflective specific rhetorical structure within a certain text. It is important that a researcher would accept security as a variable and would not try to claim security as an inevitable, existential given. • In security studies, as well as in the entire IR discipline, the level of analysis and the units of analysis are at the jurisdiction of the researcher and to a large extent depend on the theoretical or practical problem at hand: "security" 231 can gain a certain meaning at an individual, group, state, or international system level. This provides space to interdisciplinary research – psychological and sociological insights about individual consciousness and collective behaviour have already made an impact on the European security studies. • There is not much new in the front of security epistemology: authors, who seek to explain security, cannot offer such an understanding of security; and vice versa authors, who seek to understand security, cannot offer an acceptable explanation. Mitigation of the tension between these two poles should be one of the main challenges for the critical security studies. It is possible to challenge the traditional security studies on their own turf of epistemology. In other words, the main methodological tools of constructivists – discourse analysis, interpretation, and sociological methods – need to be incorporated into a positivist research design if they are to be used to turn the gained understanding of security into the explanation of security. • Security practice is undoubtedly influencing security writing and vice versa: writing security may have and often has consequences for security practice, but not necessarily positive ones. The raison d‘etre of security studies should be finding an answer to the essential question being how to help solve the problems of security practice via security writing and not only to try to understand or explain them.

Brussels, September 2006

233 Giedrius Surplys∗ Lithuanian Military Academy

Political Risk in Lithuania . and Central Europe – . Moderate Risk Analysis Model

The political risk analysis investigates the influence that political decisions, or their absence, have on business. The author of the article describes the aims and methodology of the political risk analysis and claims that the methods employed by the leading companies engaged in political risk analysis are no longer sufficient for investigating political risk in the stable democracies. Risks like wars, massive commotion, or economic crises rarely occur in stable countries. However, new types of threats like the breach of technical standards, health risks, natural disasters, and anti-corporatism prevail. The author names them “the moderate political risks” and introduces the two-step moderate political risk analysis model. The model is verified by applying it to analyse the political risk in Lithuania and later comparing the risk in Lithuania with the risk in three other countries of the Central Eastern European region: Estonia, Poland, and Hungary. The analysis shows that the moderate political risk differs in the four countries, although the traditional political risk is very similar.

Introduction

The Central and Eastern European (CEE) region, which fully revealed itself to the world more than 16 years ago, (after the Cold war) is still charm- ing and perspective, but unpredictable. The actual facts about the region are mixing with the myths and investment hopes are often overshadowed by disappointment. Despite the fact that one member of the G-8 club, 10 NATO members, and 8 member-states of the EU fit in the region, and also despite the astonishing GDP growth up to 8% per year, as well as exemplary democratisation, the region remains not fully known. The political risk experts are not fully acquainted with the regions, as well. The same as the CEE region, the political analysis is also the result of dramatic changes of the XXth century. It became crucial to analyse and predict the impact political decisions can have on business after the new investment challenges had emerged, being that the geography and size of investment was extended and the interactivity of business and politics arose. Although the political risk analysis gradually turns from a management practice into a scientific

∗ Giedrius Surplys is a lecturer of the Lithuanian Military Academy. Address: Šilo 5a, LT-10322 Vilnius, Lithuania, tel. +370-610-49021; e-mail: [email protected] 234

doctrine, it is also facing challenges and is forced to renew its methodology constantly. One good example of a challenge is the CEE region, comprised of states that are of different stability and development. Hence, while analysing political risk within the CEE, one of the actual methodological problems of the political risk analysis becomes clearly visible – the same assessment criteria no more applies to stable democratic countries on the one hand and to those living through war, raisings, or dictatorship on the other. We will shortly present the concept of the political risk analysis and its methodology and then we will suggest the two-step moderate political risk analysis model, which should contribute to the research of risk in stable democracies. We will test the new model in the analysis of political risk in Lithuania. Then we will compare the result of this analysis to the findings of political risk research in Estonia, Poland, and Hungary.

1. Political Risk – Practice and Science

One of the main characteristics of globalisation is the birth of overlap and the interactivity of the fields of human activity. A common citizen can now strongly correct her/his governments’ policies and is even more strongly influenced by them. Her/his business can no longer neglect ecology, religion, or principles of welfare, etc. An outcome of one of these overlaps – the increased interdependence between the economy and politics – is political risk or the influence or otherwise political decisions on business. The political risk analysis, together with the economic and the financial risk analysis, form a contemporary discipline of risk management, which has the mission of ensuring safe business. According to Claude Erb, Campbell R. Harvey, and Tadas Viskanta, two factors decide the degree of risk in every country: the country’s wish to pay, and ability to pay. Hence, the political risk decides the wish to pay, whilst economic and financial risks indicate the country‘s ability to pay. The expropriation of the property of foreign companies in Iran after the 1979 revolution, the attack of Russian authorities against Yukos in 2003, or the extremely friendly relationship between the Alijev dynasty in Azerbaijan and the British Petroleum, are all examples of political risk. As the political risk analysis is a relatively young discipline (1980s can be treated as its beginning), the definition of its object has not been fully clarified yet and it is still fighting for its place within the system of political sciences. Different authors present different definitions of political risk. The directors of the Marwin Zonis and Associates, Marwin Zonis and Sam Wilkin, define political risk as “uncertainty that stems from the exercise of power by governmental

Erb C. B., Harvey C. R., Viskanta T., “Political Risk, Economic Risk and Financial Risk”, Financial Analysts Journal, November/December 1996, p. 29-31. Derringer H., Wang J., “Note on Political Risk Analysis”, Harvard Business Review (Harvard Business School), September 17, 1997, p. 1-11. 235 and non-governmental actors.” Ian Bremmer, the political risk analyst of the Harvard Business Review and the president of the Eurasia Group claims that political risk is just the influence of politics on markets. The experts of the risk management giant, the Aon, consider political risk as the threats to business arising from governmental actions or incapability to act. Hence, normally, two factors characterise political risk: • The exercise of political power or the incapability to exercise it; • The influence of this exercise on business. The aspect of business should be strongly stressed here because serving the needs of business, in particular, distinguishes the political risk analysis from the national security studies, the discipline it often confused with. As a matter of fact, the difference between the two disciplines is decided by the difference in their clientele. The goal of the national security studies is to assure security for all inhabitants of one country, whilst for the political risk analysis only the interests of national and foreign businesses are at stake. The political risk analysis became a professional practice and has recently become an academic discipline because of the increase of business-scale in general and the beginning of active investment into unstable regions (because they have rich oil resources, cheap labour force, etc.). It is the aim of the political risk analysis to decide, which countries are secure enough to invest in and how to profit from political changes. According to Martin Stone, the director of the risk analysis department at the Control Risks Group, the task of the political risk analysis is to protect the personnel of business companies (from criminal activities or threats of ethnic or religious origin), the equipment (from attacks of politically motivated van- dals or targeted terrorist attacks) and the assets (from expropriation or ban for money transfers to the country of origin). Taking into account the big role that the information society played by the image of the companies, we can also add protection of the image to the tasks of the political risk analysis (from labels like “corrupted company” or “anti-human-rights business”). Despite the fact that the political risk analysis has grown into entire scientific industry from ad hoc trips to the countries where the businesses had planned to invest or hasty investigation, anytime the need for investment had arisen (today it is taught at Universities, it has become a game of specialised

Zonis M., Wilkin S., “Driving defensively through a minefield of political risk”,Financial Times Master- ing Risk Series, 2000, p. 9-10. Bremmer I., “Managing risk in an unstable world”, Harvard Business Review, http://www.navigaterisk. com/risk/articles/ManagingRisk.cfm, 24-09-2006. Aon, Enterprise risk management, http://www.aon.com/uk/en/risk_management/risk_consulting/erm. jsp, 18-08-2006. Bremmer I., “Managing risk in an unstable world”, Harvard Business Review, http://www.navigaterisk. com/risk/articles/ManagingRisk.cfm, 24-09-2006. PWC Advisory and Eurasia Group, How managing political risk improves global risk performance, 2006, http://pwc.com/extweb/pwcpublications.nsf/docid/6c7fe77bcc684d01852571620083bd9a, 04-10-2006. Stone M., “Scourges that strike at the heart of global business”, Financial Times Mastering Risk Series, 2000, p. 12-13. 236

political risk think tanks, and the companies like the British Petroleum have established separate political risk departments), incidents like September 11, massive riots in Hungary in 2006, or the Mohammad drawings scandal in Janu- ary of 2006, are only a small number of those surprises that occur absolutely unexpectedly for political risk analysts. This makes constant revision of the methodology and the objects of the political risk analysis necessary. I would like to contribute to this revision by introducing the two-step moderate political risk analysis model, using the case of the political risk in Lithuania. After having presented the model and having tested it on the Lithua- nian case, I will verify it by comparing the political risk in Lithuania with the political risk in 3 other CEE countries.

2. The Moderate Political Risk Analysis Model

Ian Bremmer has written the article named “Managing risk in an unstable world” in 2006. It is logic that political risk is mostly linked to unstable countries, so the article names like that are very popular. However, more and more often the question of how to assess and manage political risk in the stable world becomes actual. The bombings in Madrid in autumn of 2003 and London in spring of 2005, as well as the wave of unstable governments in Lithuania, Poland, and Estonia in 2006 indicates that political threats are awaiting businesspeople in stable and democratic states.

2.1. Methodological Problem

The analysts meet a serious problem while investigating political risk in contemporary developed countries and constructing their risk ratings – they apply similar criteria to both developing, and even war experiencing states, also democratically stable countries. The usual factors of political risk (stability, capability of the government to preserve the unity of the territory and to ensure law and order, riots and raisings, threats of war and terrorism) are normally hardly identified in the Western European and the North American states that are living the époque of postmodernism. So these countries are marked as low-risk zones in the annual risk ratings and reports and no more of a detailed analysis is provided as there is a lack of indicators to evaluate the other risks. This causes problems because crises, like the riots in France or in Hungary in 2006, occur unpredictably. Also, the micro-level threats like diseases, NGO attacks, etc. are not foreseen.

Bremmer I., “Managing risk in an unstable world”, Harvard Business Review, http://www.navigaterisk. com/risk/articles/ManagingRisk.cfm, 24-09-2006. 237 2.1.1. Traditional Risk Indicators

We will now analyse several of the most popular models of political risk analysis. Employing those models, the respectable political risk analysis companies provide comprehensive reports on political risk in merely every country of the world and form regional, as well as global risk ratings (Table 1). We will see that many of the variables used in these models cannot be applied to investigate risk in democraticly stable countries. One of the traditional models of the quantitative political risk analysis, that has served as the fundamental for many specific practical methods, is the PSSI (political systems stability index), introduced by Dan Haendel, Gerald West, and Robert Meadow in 1974.10 It contains the indices of social-economic characteristics, governmental processes, and societal conflicts: • Social-economic characteristics: ethno linguistic fractionalisation, GNP growth per capita, and energy consumption per capita; • Governmental process: political competition, legislative effectiveness, constitutional changes per year, and irregular chief-executive changes. • Societal conflict: riots, demonstrations, government crises, armed attacks, assassinations, coup d’etats, guerrilla warfare, and internal security forces per 1000.

10 Derringer H., Wang J., “Note on Political Risk Analysis”, Harvard Business Review (Harvard Business School), September 17, 1997, p. 1-11. 238 Table 1 Traditional political risk indicators PSSI - Political POLITICAL RISK ANALYSTS ** *** **** ***** ****** System Eurasia Exclusive EIU PRS AON Stability Index.* Political com- Governmen- Politics Authoritarianism Legal and petition tal regulatory Legislative ef- Longevity of ficiency regimes Changes of Illegitimacy constitution Irregular Generals in changes of power CEO Governmental Corruption crises

Riots Societal Social Urbanisation Riots and demon- Strikes instability strations Demonstra- Islamic funda- Politically moti- Riots tions mentalism vated strikes Assassinations Ethnic tensions Street crimes Civil commotion Coup d’etats Organised crime Ethno linguistic Situation in the differentiation labour market

Number of Security War Location close to Arguing with other War security forces superpower or a countries INDICATORS for 1000 troublemaker Armed attacks Terrorism War or armed Terrorism and Terrorism coup d’etat militant actions Guerilla actions War

GNP per capita Economic GDP per capita Property restriction Economics growth Energy con- Inflation Operation Exchange sumption per restriction transfer capita Capital fluctua- Repatriation Sovereign tion restriction non-payment Foreign debt Discrimination in Political taxation interference Decrease in food Conversion restric- Supply production per tion chain vul- capita nerability Raw materials Tariff and non-tar- share in exports iff barriers * Derringer H., Wang J., “Note on Political Risk Analysis”, Harvard Business Review (Harvard Business School), September 17, 1997. ** Harvard Business Review, Eurasia Group methodology, 2006, http://www.navigaterisk.com/methodology/stabilityIndexExplained.cfm, 04-10-2006. *** Exclusive Analysis, Lithuania country profile, http://exan.info/LT/, 04-10-2006. **** Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Risk Service, 2006, http://graphics.eiu.com/files/ad_pdfs/ 2005CountryRiskService.pdf#search=’political%20risk%20ratings%20free’, 04-10-2006. ***** PRS Group, Country data, 2006, http://www.prsgroup.com/countrydata/countrydata.html, 04-10-2006. ****** Aon, 2006 Political and Economic Risk Map – Region Snapshots, 2006, http://www.aon.com/about/ publications/issues/political_risk_map.jsp. 239 Using the PSSI and other theoretical models, the companies engaged in political risk analysis are: the Eurasia Group, Exclusive Analysis, Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Political Risk Services (PRS) and Aon. These companies have created their own research methodology. Although every political risk analyst employs its own methodology, basically their variables are the same. They can all be divided into four groups: governmental, societal, security, and economic threats. Furthermore, we will shortly overview the risk indicators of each of the above mentioned companies. The Eurasia Group uses the specialised model of political risk in developing countries. The factors being investigated can be grouped into four categories: governmental, societal, security, and economic.11 The Exclusive Analysis employs four general indicator categories in order to estimate the political risk: war, terrorism, social instability and politics. To evaluate these indicators, the Exclusive Analysis uses qualitative analysis.12 The EIU analyses war, social instability, political violence, regime changes, institutional deficiency, corruption, and criminality as indicators of political risk.13 The PRS uses such factors as turmoil (riots and demonstrations, politically motivated strikes, disputes with other countries that may affect business, terrorism and guerrilla activities, civil or international war, street crime that might affect international business personnel, organized crime having an impact on political stability or foreign business), equity restrictions (limitations on the foreign ownership of businesses, emphasising sectors where limitations are especially liberal or especially restrictive), operations restrictions (restrictions on procurement, hiring foreign personnel, or locating business activities, as well as the efficiency and honesty of officials with whom business executives must deal and the effectiveness and integrity of the judicial system), taxation discrimination, repatriation restrictions, exchange controls, tariff barriers, and also other import barriers, etc..14 Finally, factors such as economics, exchange transfer, strikes, riots, civil commotion, war, terrorism, sovereign non-payment, political interference, legal and regulatory, and also supply chain vulnerability are decisive to the Aon’s political risk analysis. 15

11 Harvard Business Review, Eurasia Group methodology, 2006, http://www.navigaterisk.com/methodology/stabilityIndexExplained.cfm, 04-10-2006. 12 Exclusive Analysis, Lithuania country profile, http://exan.info/LT/, 04-10-2006. 13 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Risk Service, 2006, http://graphics.eiu.com/files/ad_pdfs/ 2005CountryRiskService.pdf#search=’political%20risk%20ratings%20free’, 04-10-2006. 14 PRS Group, Country data, 2006, http://www.prsgroup.com/countrydata/countrydata.html, 04-10-2006. 15 Aon, 2006 Political and Economic Risk Map – Region Snapshots, 2006, http://www.aon.com/about/publications/issues/political_risk_map.jsp. 240 2.1.2. The Case of Stable Countries

It is obvious from the research of the variables of the five political risk analysis companies that many of the indicators of the social, security, and economic threats can not be applied to the democratic stable countries, e.g.: coup d’etats, riots, war, civil war, guerrilla warfare, deficit of food and energy, state debt, and sovereign non-payment, etc. Hence, the stable countries are often placed in the top positions of the political risk ratings; the risk is indicated as low in them and the gap between them and the developing countries rises to several tens of rating points. In the Aon’s Political risk map of 2006 almost every member state of the EU is painted in the green colour of “low risk”, whilst the major part of Africa, Asia and Latin America is marked as “medium-high” and “high” risk.16 However, that does not mean that political risk in the democratically stable states does not exist. There is a variety of threats in these countries, which are not identified by political risk analysts, or they fade in the light of severe risks, faced by the unstable regions. This is because only traditional risk indicators are used in global investigations.

2.2. Two-Step Approach

In order to analyse the political risk in stable states, it is necessary to introduce additional variables that would enable analysts to investigate moderate political risk. The moderate political risk does not cause massive commotion nor threats to the very functioning of businesses, but it demands extra costs and may cause moderate losses. The new variables would help in creating the two-step model for political risk analysis. The first phase of the model is the research of traditional political risk. During the second stage, the political risk in highly stable countries would be additionally investigated by using additional indicators. We shall call the model the two-step moderate risk analysis model. Employing the two-step approach, the analysts would be able to exercise a more sophisticated approach to research the political risk in stable democratic countries. As the outcome of the two-step model, every country that has been assessed as low traditional risk state would also have the moderate political risk evaluation (e.g. low traditional risk, and high moderate risk zone, etc.). Graphically the model is illustrated in Picture 1. Factors like incapability of state apparatus to guarantee meeting technical standards (e.g. while constructing the buildings of public access or living houses), pandemics (e.g. SARS, Avian flu, etc.), natural disasters (e.g. annual floods in Central Europe, etc.), attacks by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and press (e.g. Greenpeace campaigns against Lukoil because of con-

16 Ibid. 241 struction of the D6 oil-terminal in the Baltic sea) constitute moderate political risk. Some of the above mentioned risks are already included into the analyses of the respected political risk analysis companies. The Aon calls huge attention to pandemics in its political risk map for 200617 and the EIU distinguishes infrastructure risk as separate risk category.18 One of the quickly emerging moderate political risks nowadays is the attacks of businesses carried out by NGOs (otherwise called anti-corporatism). Fighting for a cleaner environment or human rights, striving to combat starvation and diseases, entities like Amnesty International, Greenpeace, Oxfam, etc. can constantly lynch you in press, call for boycotts of your production, or even jump into your restaurant together with their tractor (as nationalist farmer José Bové did in one of the McDonald’s restaurants in France, in 1999). NGOs are causing more and more headaches for a company’s image, the equipment, and the personnel of business companies.

Picture 1. Moderate political risk analysis model

17 Ibid 18 Economist Intelligence Unit, Lithuania Risk: Risk Overview, 09-06-2006, http://www.eiu.com/index. asp?layout=VWPrintVW3&article_id=1690590354&printer=printer, 24-09-2006. 242

The media is also dangerous for the image in democratic countries. Objective and independent, or only pretending to be like that and serving somebody’s interests as through some means of mass communication, can strongly damage your image. In their political risk map for 2006, the Aon warns especially about the threat of pandemics, primarily – the Avian flu.19 And Jeffrey Staples adds to this warning that both political risk specialists and business are only learning to cope with risks like that.20 According to him, the pandemics differ from traditional risks in that they are only dangerous to human beings and are being hardly localised. In the case of traditional threats, the hazards are defined and then they are attempted to be neutralised or mitigated, and in the case of epidemics and pandemics, the threat lasts longer and it their trouble-spots can explode merely anywhere (for human beings and other virus-carriers travel from country to country). This is mainly because of global warming natural disasters (droughts and floods, frosts or earthquakes) are also becoming more and more tragic. The reader might wonder whether threats like health risks or natural disasters can be considered as having any sort of political origin. Let us remember two factors, wen characterising the political risk (they were distinguished in the first chapter of the article): the exercise of political power or incapability to exercise it, and the impact of this exercise on business. Of course the political authorities cannot prevent floods from happening (the fans of Jules Verne would never agree to this) neither can they create the pandemics (the authors of the conspiracy theories would object). However, the negative outcomes of the pandemics and natural disasters, or the activities of the NGOs, stem partially because the political authorities are not capable of taking sufficient prevention measures: they do not guarantee vaccination, do not regulate building of higher seawalls, do not watch-over meeting the requirements of ecological, anticorruption to other (thus creating the fields of reaction to NGOs), or approach too liberally the issue of the freedom of press, allowing the means of mass communication to become tools of economic influence, etc. hence, health risks, natural disasters, NGO and press attacks cause damage because the authorities cannot stop these threats (losses occur because of the incapability of the government to exercise power). Surely, the political risk specialists do not intend to be praising the abolishment of the freedom of expression and press, however the factual absence of anti-monopoly laws in the field of media (e.g. in Italy), insufficient responsibility for slander, disregard of ethical codes and other legal and administrative grey-zones that diminish the responsibility of NGOs and the press create conditions for the double two-face games with the smarty masks from the side of NGOs and the press. An attempt to illustrate that damages of natural disasters or diseases

19 Aon, 2006 Political and Economic Risk Map – Region Snapshots, 2006, http://www.aon.com/about/publications/issues/political_risk_map.jsp. 20 Staples J., “Grist: A new type of threat”, Harvard Business Review, 2006, http://www.navigaterisk.com/ risk/articles/TheOrganization.cfm, 26-09-2006. 243 can be mitigated, this shows a clear example of the difference between countries of low moderate risk (Japanese government has managed by employing a range of means to minimise the damage of earthquakes) and high moderate risk countries (Hungary and Czech Republic cannot cope with the tremendous losses of annual floods). It is easy to trace the influence of the above mentioned threats to businesses. Not meeting technical standards and health risks thereby create risks to people (personnel); natural disasters ruin the buildings (equipment) or cause the casualties (personnel); NGO attacks can threaten the equipment, personnel and primarily image. The attacks by the press are also targeted at the image of business companies. Hence, the pandemics, natural disasters, NGO and press attacks share both characteristics of political risk. Thus all these risks can be treated as political. We shall verify the two-step model of moderate political risk analysis on the case of Lithuania in the next chapter.

3. Political Risk Analysis in Lithuania

We shall first analyse the traditional risk in Lithuania, using the traditional methodology. We shall use both the data and evaluations of the above mentioned giants carrying out political risk analysis and the original evaluations and prognoses. After having assessed Lithuania as the country of low traditional risk, we shall proceed to analysing the moderate risk within the country. Then, in the following chapter we shall compare the results of the two-step Lithuanian political risk analysis to the political risk in other CEE countries. In its political risk map for 2006, the Aon specifies Lithuania as the low- risk zone.21 The Exclusive Analysis also provides a similar evaluation. According to the experts of this company, the highest risk can be predicted in the category of political risks, because the country usually has instable governments and high corruption-rate (especially in the construction sector).22 The Exclusive Analysis also names intensive organised crime activities as another concern. The EIU also places Lithuania in the group of countries with low-level risk.23 The analysts of the think-tank are convinced that almost no security threat exists in the country. Macroeconomic and taxation risks are also estimated low. Slightly higher risk is predicted in the categories of political stability (because of frequent changes of ministers), governmental effectiveness (corruption), legal and regulatory, labour market, financial system, and infrastructure.

21 Aon, 2006 Political and Economic Risk Map – Region Snapshots, 2006, http://www.aon.com/about/publications/issues/political_risk_map.jsp. 22 Exclusive Analysis, Lithuania country profile, http://exan.info/LT/, 04-10-2006. 23 Economist Intelligence Unit, Lithuania Risk: Risk Overview, 09-06-2006, http://www.eiu.com/index. asp?layout=VWPrintVW3&article_id=1690590354&printer=printer, 24-09-2006. 244 3.1. Traditional Political Risk

3.1.1. Governmental (political) Risk

The governmental, or otherwise – political risk, which is mostly criticised by both the Exclusive Analysis and the EIU, really is the most acute threat to business in Lithuania. The presidential scandal of Rolandas Paksas in 2003, the triumph of Viktor Uspaskich’s political party in the parliamentary elections of 2004 and then quick fall, the corruption case of the mayor of Vilnius Artūras Zuokas in 2005 and other cataclysms make the Lithuanian political system hardly predictable and risky. This may threaten the stability of business contracts or even cause a chain-reaction of social commotion, similar to the one in Hungary in 2006. The other threat, distorting the market and sometimes even breaking human rights, is corruption. Lithuania has ended in the relatively low 44th position (out of 158 states) in the annual corruption rating of the Transpar- ency International in 2005. As the data of the poll agency TNS Gallup indicates, inhabitants of Lithuania consider corruption to be the 3rd biggest problem in the society (after low salaries and criminal activities). The heads of business companies, on the other hand, treat corruption as the 2nd biggest problem after massive emigration. The inhabitants are convinced that the medical system, the police, parliament, courts, government, and municipal administrations are most corrupted. The heads of business companies name the same institutions to be most corrupted.24 The high rates of corruption in Lithuania means that businesspeople investing in the country are forced to pay bribes for the decisions the civil and other servants must take anyway. Thus the companies are risking loosing their profit and their employees are not guaranteed to receive proper medical service if they do not bend to the corruption pressure. The governmental instability and political intrigues might turn into massive commotion soon. Both societal and economic processes might cause massive strikes. The high level of alcoholism in Lithuanian villages and the experience of strikes (the farmers periodically block roads, the strikes of teachers and medical staff have recently been organised) make the probability of massive commotion relatively high. The presidential scandal in 2003 has already shown that society can be very reactive on political questions (when the then president was travelling across the country, little clashes between his partisans and the opponents took place). The upcoming joining of the euro zone will also have an additional thorn for dissatisfaction in the society. In the meantime, as the government is trying to restrain the level of inflation (obeying the requirement of the EU, under the Maastricht criteria), the interest rates are rising and additional taxes (e.g. the real estate tax for private owners) may be introduced. The price for heating

24 Transparency International, Lietuvos korupcijos žemėlapis, 2005, http://www.transparency.lt/new/images/ tns_gallup_kz2005_prezentacija_galutinis.ppt#469,4,Visuomeninių problemų svarbos vertinimas. 245 rose by 20% in some municipalities in 2006 and the prices for fuel have fluctu- ated up to 20%.

3.1.2. Societal Risk

High levels of criminal-intensity should be mentioned as the top societal risk. The Lithuanian criminal groups have bad fame for engaging in human and drug trafficking. The Council of Europe named Lithuania among the countries where human trafficking is highly intensive in its annual report in 2005. 25 However, this type of criminal activity does not create a direct threat to business. Much more dangerous to business companies are other sorts of criminal activities that are also popular in the country: robberies and car theft, as well as racketeering and blackmail. The Lithuanian criminal groups are especially advanced in the field of internet economic crimes. However, the level of some criminal activities is decreasing in Lithuania because of massive emigration to Western European countries. Such an example is the car theft – in 2006, the number of automobiles stolen went down by 25%.26 The businesses would be in a much lower risk of becoming the victims of the criminal activities if they established their offices or venues of production or retail further from the so called “grey zones”: villages or city districts where high level of alcoholism and criminality exist, cruel murders happen, and the murderers are never revealed and the police are not willing, nor capable of setting the order. An example of such a district is the Kirtimai district in Vilnius. One more societal problem is the lack of physical labour force. After Lithuania joined the EU in 2004 and the labour markets of some EU countries opened to the Lithuanians, massive emigration erupted in the country. In the beginning of 2002, 3.476 million people lived in Lithuania and in the beginning of 2006 there were 73,000 people less.27 According to unofficial predictions, the actual number of emigrants might be as high as 400,000. Hence, the companies wishing to employ physical staff have to increase the salaries, organise transport for employees in areas of up to 100 kilometres (sic! – the length of Lithuanian territory is only 400 km in some places) and provide all sorts of other privi- leges. Despite this, businesses in the construction, production, wood industry and other sectors still cannot manage working with full power because they lack employees.

25 O’Rourke B., “Europe: Council Of Europe Report Says Organized Crime Poses Threat To Democracy”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 26-01-2005, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/1/F7753263-8C4F- 4F41-9BFA-D3B2FF06CDFE.html. 01-09-2006. 26 Lietuvos radijas, Lietuvoje sumažėjo automobilių vagysčių, 2006-02-21, http://www.delfi.lt/news/economy/ automoto/article.php?id=8833508, 23-08-2006. 27 Lietuvos statistikos departamentas, Pagrindiniai rodikliai: gyventojų skaičius, 2006-02-21. http://www. std.lt/lt/pages/view/?id=1642&PHPSESSID=cbf19f06aacdaf98a131a6542c15e65a, 14-04-2006. 246 3.1.3. Security Threats

Despite the fact that both the Exclusive Analysis and the EIU estimate that the security risk as low in Lithuania, it cannot be completely neglected. Although Lithuania is in better relations with Russia than its Northern neighbours: Latvia and Estonia (Lithuania is the only Baltic state that has the border treaty with Russia ratified and there are no conflicts with Russia over the rights of Russian minorities in Lithuania), diplomatic rows, debates about the Kalin- ingrad transit or breaking of Lithuanian air space by the Russian flying objects occur rather often. In 2006, Russia stopped the oil flow to Lithuania after the oil refining factory Mažeikių nafta (which had earlier belonged to the Russian Yukos) was sold by the Lithuanian government to the Polish oil company PKN Orlen. Although the diplomatic Moscow blamed the disruption of the oil supply on the necessary repair of the pipeline, many political specialists were sure that the real reason for stopping the oil flow was Moscow’s disappointment that the Mažeikių nafta was not sold to the Russian oil giant Lukoil.28 However, although the diplomatic relations with Russia are constantly on fire, the hazard from the other Eastern neighbour of Lithuania – Belarus – cannot be overlooked. The countries cautiously demonstrate modestly friendly relations, but the regime of Alexander Lukashenko has expressed its fury several times over Lithuania’s support to the Belarusian opposition. The regime, having a lengthy track of the breach of international law, may become unpredictable if it will feel the massive revolutionary urge arising in the society.

3.1.4. Economic Threats

Apart from the problems of the euro introduction and the boom of massive lending from the banks, the economic risks also arise from the big growth of GDP. In the beginning of 2006 the GDP growth in the country was even 8.8%.29 Such a big leap causes an increasing gap between the rich and the poor and might result in social tensions. After having reviewed the political risk in Lithuania, we can conclude that it is a stable low-risk country, as there are no risks of coup d’etats or revolutions neither wars or economic depressions happen. However, despite the fact that the respected Western political risk analysis countries describe the country as the zone of low-risk, the risk report becomes more cautious when the analysis is carried out by a local analyst, who knows the spirit of the local society, the actual economic and criminal situation in different parts of the country and the possible scenario of political system. So, the real political risk situation in Lithuania may be a little worse than it appears in the reports of the Western companies.

28 Iškauskas Č., “Energetinė sausra” su politiniu kvapeliu”, Geopolitinių tyrimų centras, 07-08-2006, http:// www.geopolitika.lt/index.php?lang=lt&content=lt_geo_7_13&parent=lt_geo_7, 08-08-2006. 29 Lietuvos statistikos departamentas, BVP antrasis įvertis, 2006-08-29, http://www.std.lt/lt/news/view/ ?id=1502&PHPSESSID=aefeef9ce199115cbcb1bf20105558d2, 01-09-2006. 247 3.2. Moderate Political Risk

Just before presenting the moderate risk analysis of Lithuania and 3 more CEE countries, I must say my mea culpa to the academic society. This part of the article requires a much larger amount of paper, thus, as far as it was sandwiched into the strict frame, it is rather publicist. However, this leaves a lot of space for further thorough and detailed research. In this chapter we shall analyse the risks of technical standards, health, natural disasters, and NGO or journalist anti-corporatism in Lithuania and shall compare the findings with the risks in Estonia, Poland and Hungary in the next chapter.

3.2.1. Technical Standards

Lithuania, as many other CEE states are experiencing the hardly con- trollable boom of the real estate prices. As the huge demand exists because of the mortgage services by the banks, this process causes a very hasty increase in supply, as the construction companies are being established and expand very fast. These companies build living houses and premises of other purpose in tremendous temps and the quality of the buildings is of very poor condition because of this rush. The construction companies overcome the technical standards and requirements by corruption or by finding “holes” in the legal system.30 The same way fire security, electric installation and security-at-work requirements are met. The incapacity of public authorities to ensure the meeting of technical standards results in the technical condition of the living, administrative, and production buildings being poorly satisfactory. The road condition in Lithuania is good and much better than in the neighbouring countries: Latvia, Poland, Belarus, or the Kaliningrad Oblast of Russian Federation. With the financial assistance from the EU, new roads are being built and the old ones are being repaired. However, Lithuania has the worst situation in the EU in terms of traffic safety.31

3.2.2. Health Risks

The NGO Health Consumer Powerhouse acknowledged the public health service in Lithuania of the worst quality in Europe in 2006.32 Corruption among the medical personnel is a public secret in the country. Its indicators are highly raised by the pharmaceutical companies that use various gifts and financial

30 Grižibauskienė E., “Griūčių sezonas – ne už kalnų”, Veidas, 08-06-2006, Nr. 23, http://www.veidas.lt/lt/ leidinys.full/448914803b81f?veidas=58a9ee0d993c7b1. 31 European Union Road Federation, European Road Statistics 2006, http://www.erf.be/images/stat/ERF_ stats2006.pdf#search=’statistics%20of%20road%20accidents%20Poland%2C%20Lithuania’. 32 Lietuvos rytas, Lietuvos sveikatos sistema – prasčiausia Europoje, 27-06-2006, http://www.lrytas. lt/?data=20060930&id=11513818541150318794&view=4. 248

rewards in order to stimulate the doctors to prescribe their production to patients. Because of the actual system of medication and stationary treatment quotas, patients can buy necessary medication or stay in the hospital for stationary treatment only after bribing the doctors. This situation makes the Lithuanian public health very vulnerable and creates the threats of epidemics. In 2006, 30 towns and administrative units were announced the zones of the flu epidemic.33 So far no cases of pandemics were traced in Lithuania. But both in the cases of SARS and Avian flu explosions in the world Lithuania did not take any extra security measures. Hence, the state is not ready for tackling pandemics. The bad medical service condition in Lithuania results in the business companies investing in the country must often take care of the health of their personnel themselves by applying to the private hospitals.

3.2.3. Natural Disasters

There are no highly harmful periodic natural disasters in Lithuania.34 Only the lagoon of river Nemunas close to the Courland bay (Klaipėda County) can be considered as the zone of risk as annual floods occur in spring. Certain danger for the health of personnel and the operation of personnel arises in cases of cold winters. In 2006, the temperature used to fall below -30° C in January).

3.2.4. NGOs and Journalist Anti-Corporatism

The echo of global fight between NGOs and businesses (anti-corporatism) can sometimes be heard in Lithuania. The Lithuanian Greens’ Movement can be considered the most active anti-corporatist NGO in the country. The biggest victims of its actions are the Russian company Lukoil and the American fast food chain McDonald’s. In 2003, the Lithuania Greens’ Movement started the campaign aimed at stopping building of oil terminal D6 in the Baltic sea, close to the coast of the Courland Lagoon, by Lukoil. The purpose of the campaign was to call the society to boycott the production of Lukoil (it own one of the biggest petrol-station network in Lithuania).35 In 2002, the Greens started the range of campaigns against McDonald’s restaurants in Lithuania. They were disseminating the leaflets describing the harm McDonald’s causes to the health and the nature right at the doors of the restaurants.36

33 LR Sveikatos apsaugos ministerija, Gripas iš Lietuvos pamažu traukiasi, 15-03-2006. http://www.sam. lt/sam/naujienos/?idi=3084, 11-05-2006. 34 The CIA WorldBook, Field Listing – Natural Hazards, 30-11-2006, https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/fields/2021.html, 01-12-2006. 35 Lietuvos žaliųjų judėjimas, Žaliųjų kvietimas boikotuoti “LUKoil” susilaukia vis didesnio pritarimo, 14- 07-2003, http://www.zalieji.lt/temos/Lukoil/Boikotas_vyksta, 03-10-2006. 36 Lietuvos žaliųjų judėjimas, Lietuvos žaliųjų judėjimas organizuoja akciją “McDonald‘s šiukšlina jūsų skrandį ir gamtą,” 01-02-2002, http://www.zalieji.lt/temos/McDonalds/McDonald_pranesimas, 03-10- 2006. 249

Human-rights (the Human rights observation institute), anti-corruption (the Transparency International Lithuanian bureau) and other sorts of NGOs are also spotting the faults of the business companies. One more influential NGO – the Roman Catholic Church – must not be neglected as well. It is highly recommended not to use religious symbols for commercial purposes in the country. In the end of 2005, the Public advertisement commission banned the use of Rūpintojėlis (the Lithuanian wooden statue of Jesus) in the Kalnapilis beer commercial. The ban was passed after one of the hierarchs of the Lithuanian Catholic Church, the archbishop Sigitas Tamkevičius had publicly denounced the commercial. A huge reaction from the Church had also arisen after the Polish company Sobieski placed a picture of the main places of pilgrimage in Lithuania (Aušros vartai – the Dawn gates) on the label of its new vodka. The fact that the press enjoys many liberties in Lithuania (Lithuania is a relatively high 22nd position in the Raporteurs sans frontieres index of press freedom for 200537), also has negative aspects. The media easily overcomes the norms of the Public information law on slander and unlawful information col- lecting and become the tools of competition wars. The best example of employing media in politics and economy is the war between the two biggest dailies in Lithuania: Lietuvos rytas and Respublika that used to serve as the public stage for various interests, during the presidential impeachment in 2003. Both politicians and businesspeople were both participants and victims of the war. The companies share a larger risk of becoming victims of media attacks because a relatively large share of the means of mass communication belongs to local capital (Lithuanian industry confederation owns a national television channel BTV, a national daily Lietuvos žinios and a national radio channel Radiocentras; the retail chain Senukai owns the national radio channel Žinių radijas, etc.). Taking an active role in internal business and politics, the owners of the media can employ their means of mass communication for their own purposes without much restrain. As we can see, the moderate political risks, which usually stem from the incapability of the government to ensure the obedience of legal norms causes big danger to business companies and requires additional costs. Threats of health risks, as well as of the anti-corporatist attacks require additional expenses in order to preserve the health of the personnel and the image of the company. And the overcoming of technical standards, without meeting them in Lithuania, may have tragic effects on the operation of the business.

37 Raporteurs sans frontieres, Worldwide press freedom index, 2005, http://www.rsf.org/rubrique.php3?id_ru- brique=554. 250 4. Lithuania and the CEE Countries . (Estonia, Poland and Hungary)

We shall now verify the moderate political risk analysis model by comparing the evaluation of political risk in Lithuania with the evaluations of traditional political risk in the CEE countries, provided by the Exclusive Analysis and the Aon and the originally constructed assessment of the moderate political risk in these countries. Because of the limits of the article, we will only analyse three stable CEE democracies: Estonia (a little country), Poland (a big country), and Hungary (a medium-size country). Two groups of states can be clearly distinguished in the CEE region (Table 2). In the 1st group the political risk is still high and contains among other risks security threats (high probability of terrorism or armed conflicts and authoritarianism, etc.). The 2nd group contains stable democratic members of the EU and NATO. Table 2. Political risk analysis in the CEE countries

Exclusive Analysis** Transparency Raporteurs AON* international*** Sans Fron- tieres**** Albania High 126 62 Armenia High 2.5 (High) 88 102 Azerbaijan Medium-high 2.5 (High) 137 141 Belarus Medium-high 107 152 Bosnia and Medium-high 88 33 Herzegovina Bulgaria Medium 1.3 (Relatively low) 55 48 Czech Rep. Low 0.6 (Low) 47 9 Estonia Low 0.8 (Relatively low) 27 11 Georgia High 3 (High) 130 99 Montenegro Medium-high 97 65 Croatia Low-medium 70 56 Latvia Low 0.9 (Relatively low) 51 17 Poland Low-medium 1.2 (Relatively low) 70 55 Lithuania Low 0.9 (Relatively low) 44 22 Macedonia Medium-high 103 43 Moldova high 2.2 (Relatively high) 88 74 Romania Medium 1.2 (Relatively low) 85 70 Russia Medium 2.5 (High) 126 138 Serbia Medium-high 97 65 Slovakia Low 0.7 (Low) 47 8 Slovenia Low 0.3 (Low) 31 10 Ukraine Medium-high 1.9 (Relatively high) 107 112 Hungary Low 0.7 (Low) 40 12 Remark 1. Grey fields mark medium-high and high risk countries. Remark 2. Transparency International (corruption) and Raporteurs sans Frontieres (freedom of press) data indicate the country ranking (1 – the best result, last – the worst situation). *Aon, 2006 Political and Economic Risk Map – Region Snapshots, 2006, http://www.aon.com/about/publications/issues/political_risk_map.jsp. **Exclusive Analysis, Lithuania country profile, http://exan.info/LT/, 04-10-2006. ***Transparency International, Lietuva, 2005, http://www.transparency.lt. **** Raporteurs sans frontieres, Worldwide press freedom index, 2005, http://www.rsf.org/rubrique.php3?id_ru- brique=554. 251

Croatia can also be added to this group as a country of relatively low political risk. The Aon marks the country as the zone of medium-low risk.38 The countries in this group are described as low or relatively low risk countries. In order to analyse the political risk in these countries in detail it is necessary to employ criteria of moderate political risk.

4.1. Comparative Analysis of Risk

In order to illustrate how moderate political risk analysis reveals the differences among the low-level risk states, we shall compare the case of Lithuania with similar cases of Estonia, Poland and Hungary. We shall employ a typical method of risk assessment, taken from the business management theory, which counts the probability and expected harm of each threat (Table 3).39 Of course, the model is relative and is simplified to the case of the four countries investigated. Its aim is just to set guidelines for estimating the moderate political risk. Table 3. Moderate political risk in Estonia, Poland, Lithuania and Hungary

Technical Natural Health risks NGO attacks Media attacks standards disaster Bad condition The greens, anti- The media is power- of buildings; AIDS epi- corruption and ful, reactionary and Estonia Poor qual- demics human-rights serves political and ity roads on organisations economic interests islands The greens, anti- Bad condition The media is power- corruption and of buildings; ful, reactionary and Poland Floods human-rights Poor quality serves political and organisations; roads economic interests Catholic church Bad medical The greens, anti- The media is power- Bad condition service con- corruption and ful, reactionary and Lithuania of buildings; dition. Flu human-rights serves political and epidemics in organisations; economic interests winter Catholic church The greens, The media is power- Bad condition anti-corruption ful, reactionary and Hungary of buildings; Floods and human-rights serves political and organisations economic interests

We shall estimate the probabilities of the risks of the technical standards, health, natural disasters, and anti-corporatism, measuring them as “0” if the threat has not revealed itself in practice and no probability can be foreseen for its occurrence (low risk or strong prevention), as “0.5” if the threat has not occurred but it is strongly expected to occur (strong risk and weak prevention)

38 Aon, 2006 Political and Economic Risk Map – Region Snapshots, 2006, http://www.aon.com/about/publications/issues/political_risk_map.jsp. 39 Neverauskas B., Rastenis J. “Vadybos pagrindai”, Kaunas, Technologija, 2001. 252

and “0.9” if the threat has already occurred and there is a tendency of periodic occurrence. We will evaluate a little harm, in case of the occurrence of a threat as “1” (additional security measures have to be taken or the equipment, personnel, capital or image of the company is weakly harmed), a medium harm – as “2” (the equipment, personnel, capital or image of the company is harmed, but no hazard to the existence of the company arises), and a large harm – as “3” (the equipment, personnel, capital or image of the company are harmed to the extent which puts the very existence of the business into serious threat). Naming risk probability as “P” and harm as “H”, we shall count the average level of risk “R” in Lithuania, Estonia, Poland and Hungary under the formula:

Pn x Hn + Pn+1 x Hn+1 + Pn+2 x Hn+2 + Pn+3 x Hn+3 R = ______n+3

The comparative analysis should indicate that these countries differ significantly in terms of the moderate political risk.

4.2. Technical Standards

As is the case of Lithuania, the countries of Estonia, Poland, and Hungary are also living through the construction fever. Because of the hasty constructions and using inadequate materials the risk of the spoilage or even the collapse of buildings is relatively high in all 4 countries (it is typical to all post-communist countries in Europe).40 For example, in the Estonian sea-resort of Parnu, which has only 45,000 constantly residing inhabitants, 1,000 new houses are built each year.41 In Poland the risk of collapse has turned into a catastrophe in January, 2006 when 66 people were killed when the roof of the exhibition centre collapsed in Katovice during the bird exhibition. The projectors of the exhibition centre were arrested with charges for unaccountable work after the tragedy.42 The roof under construction of the German pharmaceutical company Seissenschmidt AG also collapsed in Hungary, on the 11th of November, 2006. So, we can conclude that the risk probability in Lithuania and Estonia, which have not yet experienced the collapses, is medium, whilst it has already become high in Poland and Hungary. Surely, the harm of collapsing building

40 Pankratov K. “It’s a cold, wet and slippery world”, British Helsinki Human Rights Group, 27-02-2006, http://www.bhhrg.org/mediaDetails.asp?ArticleID=935, 01-12-2006. 41 Roman S., “Appartment building fever hits Parnu”, Baltic Times, 06-04-2005, http://www.baltictimes. com/news/articles/12435, 24-02-2006. 42 News from Poland, Arrests follow Katowice disaster, 22-02-2006, http://www.poland.pl/news/ article,Arrests_follow_Katowice_disaster,id,212166.htm, 24-02-2006. 253 must be measured as large. In that case, the risk of Lithuania and Estonia equals: 0.5 x 3 = 1.5 and that of Poland and Hungary = 0.9 x 3 = 2.7. The group of 4 states splits into 2 blocks when speaking about the road quality. The businesspeople (especially working in the logistics) face narrow and often poor quality roads in Poland. Despite the fast reconstruction of roads, using the EU funds, the overall condition of roads remains poor. There are almost no highways in the country, thus trips and transportation in Poland last longer than in Lithuania, Hungary, and Estonia. The road infrastructure is poorly developed in the islands of Saaremaa and Hiuma, belonging to Estonia – absolute majority of roads is still covered with gravel. However, surprisingly the rate of road accidents where people are killed is highest in Lithuania (205 casualties per 1,000 inhabitants in 2003). The same rate in Poland is 149 casualties, in Hungary – 131, and 121 in Estonia.43 Hence, the businesspeople risk loosing the time and the money on the roads of Poland and loosing their lives on the roads of Lithuania. While measuring the level of the road infrastructure risk, we shall assess bad road condition in the larger part of a country as high risk, bad road condition in a considerable part of a country as medium risk, and a good road condition as low risk. We shall estimate the harm of the bad road condition as low (requires additional investment). On the other hand we shall assess mortality on roads as medium harm (the personnel and equipment are seriously hurt, but that does not inflict on the very existence of the business) and give medium probability to it in Lithuania and low – in Poland, Estonia, and Hungary. Based on such evaluations we shall come up to the following levels of risk-on-roads in the four countries:

• Lithuania. R = [0.1 x 1 + 0.5 x 2] / 2 = 0.55. • Estonia. R = [0.5 x 1 + 0.1 x 2] / 2 = 0.35. • Poland. R = [0.9 x 1 + 0.1 x 2] / 2 = 0.55. • Hungary. R = [0.1 x 1 + 0.1 x 2] / 2 = 0.15.

Hence, the final level of the technical standards risk would be as follows:

• Lithuania. R = [R1 + R2] / 2 = [1.5 + 0.55] / 2 = 1.025. • Estonia. R = [R1 + R2] / 2 = [1.5 + 0.35] / 2 = 0.925. • Poland. R = [R1 + R2] / 2 = [2.7 + 0.55] / 2 = 1.625. • Hungary. R = [R1 + R2] / 2 = [2.7 + 0.15] / 2 = 1.425.

43 European Union Road Federation, European Road Statistics 2006, http://www.erf.be/images/stat/ERF_ stats2006.pdf#search=’statistics%20of%20road%20accidents%20Poland%2C%20Lithuania’ 254 4.3. Health Risks

Because of the liberal politics of sexual services, Estonia runs strongly ahead of the 4 states in terms of the AIDS rate. According to the UNaids data, there were 7,700 people infected in Estonia in 2003, whilst in Lithuania the number was only 1,300, in Hungary – only 2,800, and in Poland – 14,000 (but compare - the population of Poland is close to 30 million and the 1 in Estonia is only 1 million).44 The statistic of the Health Consumer Powerhouse shows that the quality of the medical services is similarly poor in Estonia (20th position in Europe), Poland (21), and Lithuania (26th).45 This means that the public health system is not ready to cope with epidemics or pandemics. The situation is better in Hungary – the 14th position among European countries. Generally, only the health protection system of Hungary is ready to properly combat health risks. However, a risk of a deadly disease (AIDS) exists only in Estonia (medium harm because death threatens solitary employees, but there is no risk to overall existence of business) – medium probability. A risk of diseases of smaller danger exists in other countries (small harm as it requires additional investment, but causes no serious outcomes). Hence:

• Lithuania. R = 0.5 x 1 = 0.5. • Estonia. R = 0.5 x 2 = 1. • Poland. R = 0.5 x 1 = 0.5. • Hungary. R = 0.1 x 1 = 0.1.

4.4. Natural Disasters

Massive floods occur in Poland (the river Wystula basin)46 and Hungary (the river Danube basin)47 every spring because of the global warming. An estimated 35,000 people were evacuated from 200 villages during the flood of 2001 in Hungary. In Circa 90% of live-stock died and 2,100 houses were ruined during the flood.48 Small floods also occur during the spring in Estonia.49 As floods in Poland and Hungary occur annually and the governments are incapable of mitigating their negative impact, we shall assess the probabil-

44 Lietuvos AIDS centras, Table of country specific HIV/AIDS estimates and data, end 2003. 2004 Report on global AIDS epidemic, http://www.aids.lt/download.php. 45 Health Consumer Powerhouse, Euro Health Consumer Index 2006, 2006, http://www.healthpowerhouse. com/media/EHCI2006.pdf. 46 CIA World Fact Book, Poland country profile, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/pl.html, 23-03-2006. 47 Hanko Z. G., “Flood Risks in Hungary”, World Bank Group: Rural Development, http://wbln0018.world- bank.org/ECA/ECSSD.nsf/21fa768764fd12de85256bf1005aac54/663b3e89ad8f7f3985256cae0076e51a, 04-10-2006. 48 Ibid. 49 CIA World Fact Book, Field listing – Natural hazards, 11-30-2006, https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/ factbook/fields/2021.html, 12-01-2006. 255 ity of the risk in those countries as high. The harm is also high in Poland and Hungary. On the other hand, the probability of significant floods in Lithuania and Estonia is low and the harm is little:

• Lithuania. R = 0.1 x 1 = 0.1. • Estonia. R = 0.1 x 1 = 0.1. • Poland. R = 0.9 x 3 = 2.7. • Hungary. R = 0.9 x 3 = 2.7.

4.5. NGOs and Journalistic Anti-Corporatism

In Poland, the green-movement NGOs are very active (the Ecology club of Poland, Freedom and Peace, Anarchist organisation, Movement for alternative society, etc.). There were approximately 100 green organisations in Poland in 1996.50 The greens actively participate in environmental protection campaigns. In one of those, the activists of the Greenpeace stopped the disembarkation of genetically modified food products at Gdynia port in November 2005. 51 The activities of the greens are also visible in Estonia and Hungary. As in Lithuania, all other sorts of NGOs also threaten businesses in the 3 countries. According to the BBC analysts, the majority of the Hungary’s leading national daily papers is pro leftist-liberal (Nepszabadsag, Magyar Hirlap, Nep- szava) and are in good relations with political parties sharing the same ideology (), and with their financial supporters, obviously. The conservative trend is followed by the Magyar Nemzet. In 1998-2002, the centre-rightist parties who were in power were trying to break this balance by financing indirectly the right-wing Magyar Nemzet. But when the leftists and liberals returned to power, they stopped this indirect financing.52 The different situation from those in Lithuania and in Hungary is in Poland, where foreign capital is strongly established in the media market. This helps avoiding too much subjectivity and the biased participation of press in politics and business. The leftist trend is followed by the Trybuna and the Gazeta Wyborcza, whilst the rightist position is strongly protected by the media concern of the nationalist catholic priest Tadeusz Rydzik with its biggest flagmen: Radio Maryja and Nasz Dziennik.53 Foreign investment is also significant in the Estonian media market (especially from the Scandinavian countries and Norway).54 The country is

50 Duijvelaar C., “East-East cooperation among environmental NGOs in Central and Eastern Europe”, Regional Environmental Center, May 1996, http://www.rec.org/REC/Publications/BeyondBorders/ch34. html, 03-10-2006. 51 Greenpeace, Greepeace confronts GE-ship on Polish waters, 17-11-2005, http://www.greenpeace.org/international/press/releases/greenpeace-confronts-ge-ship-o, 27-09-2006. 52 BBC Monitoring: European press profiles, The press in Hungary, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4068565.stm. 53 BBC Monitoring: European press profiles, The press in Poland, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4470102.stm 54 BBC, Country profile: Estonia, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/1106425. stm#media. 256

scored high in the Media freedom rating – the 11th position in the world. 55 This diminishes the responsibility of the press, supported by the fact that the Estonian journalists’ union has not yet passed the Code of journalistic ethics.56 The risk of anti-corporatism in the CEE states is only acquiring speed, as both the means of mass communication and the NGOs are currently only learning to make the difference. Assessing the moderate political risk in the CEE countries in general, it must be stated that the annual floods in Poland and Hungary can have dramatic impact on business. Just because of this risk the two can be marked as high moderate risk countries. The moderate political risk in Poland can be assessed higher than in Hungary, however, because of the worse quality of roads and medical services. Estonia and Lithuania can be indicated as medium, moderate risk countries. The biggest risk to business (personnel in particular) emerges from the high AIDS level in Estonia. The probability of this risk increases because of the liberal sex industry policies and high drug abuse rates (possibility of being infected against your own will) in the country. But the overall expectation to be infected is relatively low. The other risk in Estonia is the bad road conditions on their islands. Lithuania can be assessed as the country with the low-medium level of moderate political risk. The risk level here is lower than in the other three countries investigated. Although the spectrum of moderate risks is rather wide, the risks that might have critical impact on business do not exist. The most acute threats in the country are related to poor regulation in terms of technical standards and bad medical service quality. However, the probability of serious hazards in these fields is really small. The most expected threats arise from the NGOs and the press. These threats can seriously damage the image of business companies.

Conclusions

The analysis of the traditional political risk is currently facing the problem when traditional risk indicators like war, sores of the authoritarian regime, raisings, riots, and economic crises cannot be applied anymore in stable democratic countries. This results in stable countries being marked as low-risk zones in the global risk ratings or reports and the more detailed analysis of risks in those countries not being provided. But the majority of the stable democratic states face new political threats nowadays, like anti-corporatism, breach of technical standards, natural disasters and health risks. These risks are named moderate political risks in the article. They can be analysed by employing the newly

55 Raporteurs sans frontieres, Worldwide press freedom index, 2005, http://www.rsf.org/rubrique.php3?id_ru- brique=554. 56 Loit U. “Estonia: self-regulation rather than state-regulation”, European Journalism Centre, Organising media accountability: Experiences in Europe, 2005, http://www.ejc.nl/hp/mas/loit.html. 02-10-2006. 257 introduced two-step moderate political risk analysis model. The model can be used in investigating political risk in stable democratic countries. We thoroughly analysed the political risk in Lithuania to verify the two- step model. The analysis has shown that despite the fact that the level of traditional risk is minimal in the country, and the respectable companies engaging in the political risk analysis describe Lithuania as the low-risk country, business can face significant moderate risks in the country. Not meeting technical standards (the risk to the personnel and equipment), health risks (threat to the personnel), and anti-corporatism (threat to the image of business companies) are singled out as the main moderate risks. The comparative analysis of the Lithuanian political risk and the political risks in the other three states of the CEE region: Estonia, Poland, and Hungary has shown that the countries where the traditional political risk is low differ significantly in terms of the moderate political risk level. Lithuania and Estonia were prescribed to the group of the medium moderate risk, and both Poland and Hungary were evaluated as high moderate risk zones.

259 Diana Jurgelevičiūtė* Institute of International Relations and Political Science, University of Vilnius

Information Security in Lithuania:. The Problem of May 9th and the Crash . of the Russian Fighter

In this article, two Russian information campaigns occurring in Lithuania, in 2005 are analyzed. The first one is related to the May 9th celebration in Moscow, the second one is related to the crash of the Russian fighter in Lithuania. The question is - how and why this diplomatic visit and military incident became information threats and what consequences have they caused. In explaining the reasons for Russian information pressure and its consequences, and in evaluating if it could pose a threat to Lithuania, the perspective of social constructivism is used. In applying the securitization model article analyzes, how did Lithuania and Russia understand the above mentioned events, what kind of behaviour did this understanding provoke and what impact did it make to information security.

Preface

Russia tries to keep Lithuania and the other Baltic States in its zone of influence regardless of their membership in euro-Atlantic organizations. In order to control its perceived zone of influence, Russia uses a means of indirect control. It can be noticed that over the past several years, Russia exerts its influence in the economical and also especially the energy sectors.. In their relations with these countries, Russia is also prone to use diplomatic pressure and new forms of power, namely information power. First, by using informational power, Russia seeks to interfere with Lithuania’s information sphere through the media, cultural and educational spheres. Second, it also seeks to voice its viewpoint about issues related to Lithuania in the international arena, which can be called the global information sphere. This sphere becomes a new place of competition between countries. The influence – ability to impose their point

* Diana Jurgelevičiūtė is a PhD candidate, Institute of International Relations and Political Sci- ence, University of Vilnius. Address: Vokiečių 10, LT-01130 Vilnius, Lithuania, tel. +370-5-2514130, e-mail: [email protected] Janeliūnas T., “JAV ir Rusijos įtakos persiskirstymas Vidurio ir Rytų Europos regione” [“Division of influence between USA and Russia in Central and Eastern Europe,” paper presented at TSPMI and LPA conference]. Praneši- mas metinėje VU TSPMI ir LPA konferencijoje “Lietuva po Prahos.” Vilnius, 2002 m. lapkričio 29 d. http://www. tspmi.vu.lt/files/mokslkonfer/janeliunas.doc, 15 01 2006. (In Lithuanian). Žalys L., “Lietuva iš Rytų jaučia smarkų informacinį spaudimą” [Lithuania feels powerful information pressure from East]. Kauno diena, 2006 m. vasario 27 d. Maliukevičius N., “Lietuva – Rusijos informacinė kolonija” [Lithuania as an informational colony of Russia]. Atgimimas, 2006 m. kovo 14 d. 260

of view – can be established with the help of information and communication technologies. In the global information sphere, the opinion voiced by Russia very often contradicts the official position of Lithuania, thus international community is misinformed about Lithuania. This allows for an assumption that Russia is waging an information/psychological war against Lithuania and because of that it becomes very important to identify information threats and raise the issue of vulnerabilities in Lithuania’s information security. There is no consistent and comprehensive research on Russia’s informational pressure against Lithuania. Among Lithuania’s political scientists, the information war was analyzed by Nerijus Maliukevičius, but he was mainly interested in information war operations exercised during military conflict. Tomas Janeliūnas pays more attention to information threats. Janeliūnas proposes to analyze information security by using the communication sector which is based on an objectivist methodology. According to him, the securitization model is not consistent because it analyzes how problems become a threat but it does not offer a mechanism on how to evaluate security policy. However Janeliūnas does not try to solve this problem. The author of securitization model, Ole Waever, asserts that although the securitization approach study’s “the processes whereby issues are turned into security concerns or purged of this quality (…) this does not mean that the securitization approach is without the possibility of criticising existing or suggested policy or in other ways advising, warning, or suggesting.” Considering the relevance of the topic and lack of comprehensive analysis, new confrontations between Lithuania and Russia become important from the information security point of view; they are analyzed in this article. There were two important information campaigns against Lithuania in year 2005 by Russia. The first event is the May 9th celebration, which marked the anniversary of the Second World War’s end and was held in Moscow. In this situation it was possible to see Russia’s active information pressure to Lithuania. The second event emerged after the crash of the Russian fighter “Su-27” on the 15th of September in Lithuania. This event is interesting in respect to the fact that it looks like a military threat at first. However, if we make a deeper analysis of the whole incident, we can see that it was more important as a threat to Lithuania’s information security.

Maliukevičius N., Informacinio karo koncepcija: JAV ir Rusijos požiūriai [Concept of information war: Views of USA and Russia]. Vilnius: Eugrimas, 2002. Maliukevičius N., “Karinis konfliktas informacijos amžiuje ir Lietuvos pasirengimas” [“Military conflict in information age and Lithuania’s preparedness”]. Lietuvos metinė strateginė apžvalga, 2003. Vilnius, 2004, 53-72. In his last publication he analyzed informational- cultural expansion from East – Maliukevičius N., “Ekspansijos iš Rytų apraiškos Lietuvos informacinėje erdvėje” [“Looking for clues of expansion from East in Lithuania’s information sphere”]. Politologija, 2006/2 (42). (In Lithuanian). Janeliūnas T., “Saugumo studijos – grįžimas prie objektyvistinio analizės modelio” [“Security studies – returning to objectivist analysis model”]. Politologija, 2004/2 (34). Janeliūnas T., “Gegužės 9-osios problema saugumizavimo teorijos ir komunikacinio saugumo požiūriu” [“The May 9th problem from viewpoints of securitization and communication security”]. Politologija, 2005/2 (38). (In Lithuanian). Janeliūnas T., “Gegužės 9-osios problema …”, (note 4) 27. Wæver, Ole, “Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen. New ’Schools’ in Security Theory and their Origins between Core and Periphery.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Montreal, March 17th -20th, 2004. Panel Geo-Cultural Epistemologies in IR: Thinking Security Differently, 23. 261

In analyzing the process of these events, the question that comes about is, why and how the diplomatic visit and military incident grew in to the threats pertaining to the information security sector and what the consequences might have caused. In this research, I first define the theoretical framework of analysis based on the social constructivist, which is based on social constructivist perspective. Second, by analyzing the May 9th issue and the fighter’s “Su-27” incident, the main aspects of confrontation between Lithuania and Russia are shown, which are important from an information security point of view. And by doing this, the question about which country won in each of these information confrontations will be answered.

1. Frameworks of Information Security Analysis

1.1. Information Security Researches

Information security indicates the protection of information, information and computer systems, and of processes based on information. Considering the nature of threats, it is possible to distinguish two types of information security. First, it is psychological information security. In this type of security psychological and information threats are relevant. They come from propaganda, restriction of information flows, making sure whosesoever viewpoint the dominant one is in the information sphere. Second, technological information security is related to threats of a technological character, like hacking into computers. In this research I will first analyze the type of information threats that are psychological threats, and also related to psychological information security. In this article they will be called simply, information threats and information security. Information security research, as a new aspect of security studies analysis, has not been developed yet. By integrating the information security topic into the security studies, the method for information security analysis must be chosen. Considering possible methodological assumptions, there can be identified two main streamlines of security studies. They differ in the way they evaluate security – objectively or subjectively. In first case, security is understood as an objective predetermined condition, meaning that it is possible to identify and analyze threats objectively, and security is a concrete appearance that can be reached. In the second case, security is understood as dependent from an individual and inter-subjective perception. Security is treated as a socially constructed phenomenon. The securitization model is based on this social constructivist perspective. It will be first analyzed in this article. The objectivist viewpoint will be shown by analyzing the communication sector. 262 1.2. Securitization Perspective

The main aim of the securitization perspective is to explain the logic of securitizing actors, according to how it behaves when some problems are ut- tered to be existential threats. When security questions are analyzed through the securitization perspective, it is not important if the threat is real. The most important point is how the problem is perceived or what is considered to be a threat. Security is treated as a socially constructed phenomenon, meaning that the problem becomes a threat when the securitizing actor names it as a threat. Successful securitization happens when the audience accepts the securitizing act – that the problem should be regarded as a threat. What is the audience depends upon the political system or nature of the problem. When a certain problem is presented as a threat the intent is to stress that it can not be compared to any other problems and must be solved by exceptional measures breaking normal procedures. Thus any question can be: • Non-politicised – the states does not solve such a question, it is not made of public debate; • Politicised – the question is part of public policy and is solved by the government decisions and resource allocations or other form; • Securitized – this question is presented as an existential threat, it is transferred from the usual political agenda to the one which is regarded as more important and which allows to use extraordinary measures for solving it. There is one more important term – desecuritization. It means that the problem which was securitized is returned to the regular political agenda or was not securitized. It is important to evaluate if the problem was securitized or not, because in any of these cases, this makes an influence on how actors keep behaving and what security policy they implement.

1.3. Evaluation of the Security Policy

Waever stated that the securitization model can help criticize security policy and give recommendations, but it did not explain how this can be done. In order to evaluate the consequences of securitization and desecuritization, that is the actions undertaken by countries according their perception about May 9th issue and fighter crash, certain evaluation criteria must be introduced. In this article it is stated that in evaluating the security policy we can invoke statements from security and foreign policy strategies, official statements that were presented earlier (before the celebration and military incident). These notions are not considered as stating real threats (in objectivist point of view).

Buzan B., Waever O, and de Wilde J., Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Boulder USA, London UK: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998. Ibidem, 11-12. Ibidem, 10. 263

They are the result of the previous securitization processes and they show how security and threats were perceived. Therefore it can be analyzed if countries acted according their previously stated interests and perceptions of security and threats to security.10 The assumption is that the two events that are analyzed could not change Lithuania’s and Russia’s national interest or what they regard as threats. Cel- ebration is related with the historical and fundamental aspects to the state idea. The perception of state idea is not fixed; it can be changed in what is considered a long-term process. The crash of the fighter as an unexpected event that lasted for a very short time (from the time of the crash till the announcement of the conclusions of the incidents investigation) could not change the previously established perception of security. Therefore Lithuania’s and Russia’s reaction to the events should match previously stated notions about security and threats. If actions of the two countries do not match the notions in their national security and foreign policy strategic documents, there are two reasons for this that can be mentioned. First, it might be that the security conception and threat perception, that is how security is defined and what is held as posing a threat, has been changed. But if the conception and perception is changed this must be clearly stated. Second, if actors who successfully securitize threats do not act according the aims, stated in national security strategy, and they do not declare the change of security policy, then the assumption can be made that they are not making consistent foreign and security policy decisions.11 This may happen because of three reasons. First, actors can securitize and overestimate dangers regarding them as a threat to those problems, which do not really pose threat to security (according to existing security conception, but not how real those threats are). Second, actors can desecuritize and regard dangers as ordinary problems, although according to existing security conception they are regarded as threats). Third, not to securitize – to decide to regard a problem as not a serious danger (not an issue of security), although according to existing security conception it should be regarded as a threat that should be securitized. Incor- rect security policy decisions can be made not only because of the incidental mistake. It might also occur because of the information manipulations pursued by a foreign country. Then the manipulated country can behave according not to its interests, by not knowing that. To encourage such behaviour – to obey to alien interests and commands – seek the creators of these information attacks. That is why it is important to evaluate the state behaviour from this point of view, which is important to the information security.

10 It can be noted, that the securitization analysts can fall into a trap – by offering security policy recommendation they become securitizing actors. But this can happen only if they had enough power, and this is very rare. It is not enough to voice a problem in order to securitize it. Also an acceptance of the audience and power to take extraordinary measures to solve the problems are needed. 11 This criterion does not mean that only status quo in security policy would be consistent. The emphasis is that the change of security policy should be clearly voiced, i.e. purposeful (this is called consistent position). Reverse position is when without realizing the opposite security policy then the one, that has been declared, is implemented. The aim of information attacks is exactly the same – to change the behavior of an opponent without him to realize this. 264

2. The May 9th Issue from the Perspective . of Information Security

2.1. Russia’s Attitude Towards the May 9th Issue

First, information security in the context of the May 9th issue is analyzed and the following relative questions will be answered: (1) how the May 9th issue was perceived by Lithuania and Russia; (2) what actions of these countries did this perception cause; (3) and what consequences followed. Second, it will be evaluated if the decision to participate in the May 9th celebration could cause a threat to Lithuania’s information security. In Russia the celebration of May 9th was regarded as an important historical celebration – the anniversary of Russia’s victory in Second World War. Before the celebration, Russia’s media was full of patriotic topics, stimulating patriotic feelings nationwide. Therefore the questioning of this date and everything what was related to it has been viewed by Russia as highly hostile. Rus- sia’s political scientist, Sergey Markov, who is held to be advocate of Kremlin position, claimed that “this is the best, of what we made in the 20th century and if someone wants to devalue what we are proud of, there can be no talk about rational relations.”12 A Deputy Speaker of the State Duma and leader of the ultranationalist Liberal Democratic Party, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, asserted that the “only in Baltic States the importance of the Victory is deemphasized and a parade of fascist movement took place there.” He also emphasized that together with Russia, that all of Europe is indignant with this.13 Hence he has highlighted that views of Russia and Europe are common and the posture of Baltic States is different. This aspect of Russia’s information pressure on Lithua- nia is important because of the two reasons. First, in this way officials of Russia tried to create a negative image of Baltic States in the eyes of Western countries. They did this by stimulating the differences between Western countries and the Baltic States, this would allow Russia to preserve the Baltic States in its zone of influence. Second, they made pressure on Baltic States, prompting them that they should behave like their Western partners. The fact that the May 9th has been securitized – Russia employed extraordinary measures after Lithuania refused to participate in the celebration – has shown the beginning of Russia’s information pressure on Lithuania – blaming

12 BNS, „S.Markovas: Lietuvos prezidentui neatvykus į Maskvą, šalių santykiai gali blogėti“ [„S.Markov: If Lithuania’s President does not come to Russia, relations between countries can worsen“]. 2005 m. balandžio 15 d. http://www.delfi.lt/archive/article.php?id=6484259&categoryID=7&ndate=1113573243, 15 09 2005. (In Lithuanian). 13 BNS, „V.Žirinovskis kaltina Baltijos šalis siekiant sumenkinti pergalės Antrajame pasauliniame kare reikšmę“ [„V.Zhirinovsky blaims Blatic States for depreciating the meaning of victory in the Second World War“]. 2005 m. balandžio 23 d. http://www.delfi.lt/archive/article.php?id=6536167&categoryID=8&ndate =1114203673, 15 09 2005. (In Lithuanian). 265

Lithuania of being hostile towards Russia and supporting fascism. Russia perceived the refusal to come to the celebration in Moscow, as disrespectful of historical events, which contribute to the identity building of Russia as a Second World War winner and world power. Identity, national values, and ideology, compose what can be called the state idea. Therefore Russia securitized the refusal of Lithuania as a threat to Russia’s state idea. The May 9th celebration can be understood as Rus- sia’s information campaign. With the help of this event Russia sought to establish the image of Russia as a world power. Also Russia’s officials sought to deny the viewpoint of the Baltic States about historical events. They claimed that the Baltic States were not annexed and joined Soviet Union by free will. Thus it can be noted that, first, Russia securitized Lithuania’s refusal to participate in the celebration and perceived the refusal as a threat to its state idea. Reacting to the refusal to participate in the celebration, as a threat to state idea, Russia began to pursue new information campaigns against Lithuania such as: information pressure to come to the celebration was changed to information pressure by which it was sought to discredit Lithuania’s image in the international arena. Hence, secondly, Russia brought pressure upon Lithuania to participate in the celebration and after Lithuania refused to come Russia criticized it and sought by hostile statements to discredit. Russia’s pressure upon Lithuania and other Baltic States revealed an often-noticed attitude of Russia towards them as its zone of influence, and not as an independent and sovereign country. Rus- sia also sought to present its viewpoint about historical facts, which were not favourable and acceptable to Lithuania. In both of these cases Russia sought to establish its viewpoint in the global information sphere.

2.2. Lithuania‘s Viewpoint about the May 9th Issue

It should also be noted that there were two attempts based on different arguments to securitize the May 9th issue in Lithuania. This determined different suggestions how this issue should be handled such as: to participate in the celebration, or not to. First, considering aspects in relation to the preservation of values and ideas, it was sought to avoid the indirect agreement on Russia’s viewpoint about how the end of the Second World War should be seen and to strengthen its positions in the information sphere. Participation in the celebration was securitized as a threat to the state idea, which is: participation would mean Lithuania’s agreement with interpretation of historical events stated by Russia. Accordingly it was proposed that Lithuania should not participate in the celebration. Second, there were some remarks, that the May 9th issue is important for the pragmatic interests of Lithuania. It was thought that the refusal to come to Moscow will pose a threat to Lithuania’s economic security. Thus by securitizing the May 9th issue it was prompted to go to the celebration. Third, the idea to participate in the celebration was motivated by saying that Lithua- nia should voice its opinion about how it sees the May 9th issue. But these two last securitization attempts were not successful. It is interesting that ordinary 266

people did not mind that the President of Lithuania would go to Moscow,14 and disagreed with the decision not to participate in celebration.15 Arguments on why the decision not to participate in the celebration was made show that Lithuania securitized the celebration of May 9th and Russia’s viewpoint about it as a threat. It was thought that Russia can make use of Lithuania’s participation in the celebration and provoke doubts about historical facts (participation could be interpreted as an acknowledgement of occupation). In Lithuania, Russia’s pursued questioning of the historical facts was seen as Russia’s doubts about Lithuania’s statehood, wish to keep Lithuania its zone of influence. Therefore this issue was securitized as a threat to state idea. It should also be noted that according to the discussions that arose in the public sphere, it can be seen that the possibility to agree with Russia’s interpretation about history, by participating in the celebration, was seen as a more serious threat then the possibility that Russia will be able to escalate Lithuania’s image as a pro-fascist and Russia-phobic country if Lithuania decides not to go to Moscow.

2.3. Outcomes of the Securitization of the May 9th Issue

In the case of the May 9th issue, a confrontation between Lithuania and Russia arose because of different interpretations of historical facts. For Russia, the end of the Second World War is an event of victory and pride. This event is important for constructing Russia’s identity as that of a great power. Yet for the Baltic States it means the beginning of new occupation. Lithuania and Russia blamed each other for misinterpreting the historical events, thought that in one way or the other this poses a threat to the state idea. Russia sought to establish its viewpoint in the global information sphere. Lithuania sought that Russia’s viewpoint did not become the dominant one and by opposing Russia’s position it declared its own viewpoint about historical facts. From the perspective of information security, it is important to draw attention to the fact that Russia, by questioning historical facts, sought to raise doubts about the already universally acknowledged facts. Discussions about facts would mean that there is no agreement on them, or this agreement is not substantial. The evaluation of these facts that would be reached in new discussions and could be different from the one that was before the discussions had started. Actually this is what the initiators of these discussions would seek. But on the other hand if Lithuania stayed aside from the discussions this would let Russia escalate its viewpoint about these historical facts. Thus one of Lithuania’s victories in countering Russia’s information pressure can

14 Delfi, “V.Adamkus į Maskvą nevyks, teigia šaltiniai” [Sources tell, V.Adamkus will not go to Moscow]. 2005 m. kovo 7 d. http://www.delfi.lt/archive/article.php?id=6190753, 15 09 2005. 15 ELTA, “Visuomenė pasidalinusi dėl V.Adamkaus sprendimo nevykti į Maskvą” [Public opinion is divided because of V.Adamkus decision not to go to Moscow]. 2005 m. kovo 31 d. http://www.delfi.lt/archive/article. php?id=6369915, 15 09 2005. 267 be its decision not to become involved in discussions that were meaningless and useful for Russia. But Lithuania also denied the interpretation of historical facts presented by Russia and put a question about acknowledgement of Lithuania’s occupation.16 The fact that the occupation is not acknowledged by Russia is perceived by Lithuania as the main threat to the state idea. Raising this question is useful for creating an opposition against Russia’s viewpoint and how it interprets historical events. The other victory of Lithuania was its decision to securitize the participation in the May 9th celebration, because by not going to Moscow Lithuania received an exceptional amount of attention of the international media. This allowed Lithuania to present its viewpoint about the end of the Second World War and the events that followed, and not to let Russia’s viewpoint to be the dominant one in the global information sphere. Thus Lithuania’s decision not to participate in the celebration was more successful than Latvia’s decision to go to Moscow.17 Russia was not in appropriate place where it was possible to express an opinion that is crosscurrent to the opinion of Russian officials. Lithuania, by staying aside from the epicentre of the celebration, had more possibilities to voice its position. Therefore in Lithuania’s case the May 9th issue can be regarded as a solved security problem or problem that did not become a threat because the decision was made not to participate in the celebration. Pressure by Russian officials to participate in the celebration and the stiffening of their speech after Lithuania rejected the invitation shows that by organizing this event, Russia had particular aims to make use of the May 9th issue against the Baltic States. Russia was very active in proclaiming its viewpoint about May 9th in the international arena. Thus Russia raised doubts of the international community and its own society about historical facts and made pressure on Lithuania to participate in the celebration. Through these actions Russia sought to dominate the information sphere, and to embed its own viewpoint about historical events, along with making an influence on the opinion of Russian, Lithuanian, and the international society. According to the information security definition, all this can be evaluated as the premises of Lithuania’s information insecurity and information campaign against Lithua- nia’s information security. However it can be noted that Russia did not manage to bring into effect all the aims it wanted to when Lithuania and Estonia started to doubt and finally decided not to come to the May 9th celebration. This means that Lithuania by securitizing participation in the May 9th celebration behaved in the opposite way than Russia wanted it to behave. And to the contrary if it did not securitize participation it would become an object of Russia’s manipulations. But it

16 BNS, “JAV lietuviai raginami bylinėtis su Rusija dėl sovietų okupacijos žalos atlyginimo” [“Lithuanian’s of USA are encouraged to litigate with Russia about compensation for soviet occupation”]. 2005 m. gruodžio 28 d. http://www.delfi.lt/archive/article.php?id=8355193&categoryID=7&ndate=1135750895, 15 09 2005. (In Lithuanian). 17 ELTA, “V.Vykė-Freiberga gerbia Lietuvos ir Estijos sprendimą” [“V.Vykė-Freiberga honours decisions of Lithuania”]. 2005 m. kovo 7 d. http://www.delfi.lt/archive/article.php?id=6198325&categoryID=8&nda te=1110226458, 15 09 2005 09 15]. 268

is important to notice that Russia might seek for Lithuania (and other Baltic States) to securitize the May 9th problem. In this case it would behave in an opposite way then the Western countries: it would look Russian-phobic, hostile to Russia, not only having with her unsolved problems, but also solving them not with the help of a dialog (this could be seen when Lithuania refused to come to the celebration that was very important for Russia). Different attitudes of Lithuania and other Western countries towards the May 9th issue could cause disagreements in NATO and European Union. The ability to provoke such disagreements would be useful for Russia, because this would reduce the ability of countries belonging to the Euro-Atlantic organizations make joint agreements, act together and create balance to Russia in international arena. The premise that Russia sought Lithuania to securitized the May 9th issue or the conclusion that this was useful for Russia is confirmed by the fact that when Lithuania rejected the invitation to Moscow, Russia started to show it as a Russian-phobic and pro-fascist country. Thus Russia created the image of Lithuania as a country which is different from other Western countries because of its political decisions. These actions by Russia can be evaluated as unsuccessful, because Lithuania’s decision not to participate in the celebration was understood and justified by Western partners. The support for Lithuania was very clearly expressed by the USA. The ambassador of USA in Lithuania, Stephen D. Mull, reassured that Lithuania will stay in good relations with America even if Lithuania’s president decided not to go to Moscow.18 US politician and diplomat Richard Holbrooke confirmed that the decision of President Adamkus will not change friendly relations between Lithuania and the USA that have lasted since 1940.19 The president of the USA, George W. Bush, af- firmed that he respects the decision of Lithuania’s president not to participate in the May 9th celebration and understands that for Western Europe, the end of the Second World War denoted liberation, yet for the Central and Eastern Europe this meant soviet occupation and communism.20 In evaluating this, Russia’s information campaign against Lithuania was not successful. It did not succeed to seize the dominant position in global information sphere. The image of Lithuania as a pro-fascist and Russian-phobic country was not established, likewise this was the same with the interpretation of historical facts voiced by Russia. But on the domestic level, the Russia information campaign was more successful. The negative opinion of Russian society about Lithuania was formed. Although this aspect is not very important in case of the securitization of the May 9th issue, it is important considering the consequences of Russia’s implemented misinformation campaigns against its society in the long-run perspective. Such manipulations of society have become

18 Kristina Aleknaitė, “Lietuva išlaikys JAV paramą ir atsisakius vykti į Maskvą” [“Lithuania will sustain support of USA even if it will refuse to go to Moscow”]. 2005 m. vasario 10 d. http://www.delfi.lt/archive/ article.php?id=6021511&categoryID=7&ndate=1108045665, 15 09 2005. (In Lithuanian). 19 Aleknaitė, (note 12). 20 BNS, “G.W.Bushas: Lietuva – JAV draugė” [“G. W. Bush: Lithuania is friend of USA”]. 2005 m. gegužės 5 d. http://www.delfi.lt/archive/article.php?id=6610500&categoryID=7&ndate=1115274015, 15 09 2005. (In Lithuanian). 269 common in Russia. The results of them can be seen in the polls: 60 percent of Russians think that foreign policy of the Baltic States is hostile towards Rus- sia.21 That is why in the eyes of Russian society aggressive politics by Russia towards the Baltic States looks legitimate. This politics of Russian officials creates external enemies that are needed in order to control their society. Thus according the way the May 9th problem was securitized, it is possible to evaluate if the decision about participation in the celebration could cause a threat to Lithuania’s information security. In evaluating the effectiveness of Russia’s information assault against Lithuania it should be noted that the crucial consequences on it had Lithuania’s decision not to participate in the May 9th celebration. Thus Lithuania treated participation as a threat to its security and prevented it from possible damage to security. The securitization of participation was Lithuania’s consistent objective in securing its state idea as a referential object of security and it also matched Lithuania’s interest to avoid potential threats to security. Considering Russia’s expectations, it can be concluded that Lithuania’s actions did not match Russia’s interests or the plan of information assault.

3. Perceptions of Russian Fighter’s “Su-27” Crash

3.1. The Main Stages of the Incident

In the second case study – the crash of the Russian fighter “Su-27” in Lithuania – by invoking the securitization perspective, Lithuania’s and Russia’s perceptions of the incident and how they securitized problems that were perceived as posed threat are analyzed. It should also be noted that the crash of the fighter was first understood as a threat of military nature. Therefore in analyzing the incident not only information threats will be taken notice of, but also threats to military security. This will allow the evaluation of the importance of information security compared to the military security during this incident. Three main stages of incident can be outlined: first, the accident (the crash of the fighter); second – an investigation of the incident; third – announcement of the investigation’s conclusions. The events that followed – the returning of the fragments of the crashed fighter to Russia and the investigation of accident in Russia – did not raise significant reaction in either country, hence they are not analyzed. From the point of view of information security, it is not important what the real reason of the incident was, for example an accident, or a provocation (an objectivist perspective would be interested in real reasons of the incident). The most important questions are - what reactions did the countries express and what problems actualized.

21 Česlovas Iškauskas, “Jokių diskusijų apie sovietinę okupaciją!” [“No discussions about soviet occupation!”]. 2005 m. balandžio 18 d. http://www.delfi.lt/archive/article.php?id=6495387&categoryID=2997120&ndate =1113803841, 15 09 2005. (In Lithuanian). 270 3.2. Lithuania‘s Reaction to the Incident

Reacting to the fighter’s crash, Lithuania’s officials mentioned various reasons for the incident, often contradicting what they said and did not present a clear attitude towards the incident. Right after the fighter’s crash, Lithuania’s National defence minister, Gediminas Kirkilas, claimed that Russia participates in espionage in Lithuania all the time and the crash of the fighter “Su-27” was another provocation by Russia. This statement was confirmed by the information in Lithuania’s media that the pilot of the Russian fighter took part in training where he performed the role of an air space boarder’s violator.22 Yet later, the National defence minister asserted that the “widely discussed possibility that Lithuania’s air space was violated deliberately can be pretty much denied.”23 The fact that Lithuania’s officials did not formulate a clear attitude which could be presented to the audience as an official position, allowed the appearing of various interpretations of the incident in the media. It was thought that the incident could be both an accident, and a well, a planned Russian provocation in order to test NATO’s defence capabilities for example: to check how does the air space monitoring and the defence system work; how well are NATO’s fighters that take care of the air space of Baltic Sates prepared; and how they react in a crisis situation. The fact that without clear evidence the idea that the flight of the fighter was a deliberate provocation gains lots of support in Lithuania, it shows that Russia is perceived as a source of threat and similar actions are expected from it.24 A similar flight of a Western fighter in Lithuania’s air space would not be so dramatized and securitized, i.e. it would be perceived as a problem, but not as a threat (according to securitization model and classification of problems into non-politicised, politicised and securitized as mentioned before). Thus the confrontation between Lithuania and Russia in information sphere started when each country tried to present its viewpoint about crash of the fighter. Russia asserted that this was an accident, and Lithuania – that this was provocation or an accident. Whereas Lithuania’s position was not clear and unambiguous, Russia by pursuing one firm conviction gained advantage in the information sphere. Russia’s version about the incident could be more easily understood by the audience and spread by the media. When the investigation of the incident started, Lithuania’s side claimed that Russia had made pressure and obstructed the investigation executed by Lithuania. It blamed Russia for suppressing information about fighter’s munitions, not submitting information to the investigation commission. Thus the opinion that Russia was a hostile country towards Lithuania and as a potential threat to its security was reinforced. Meanwhile, as Russia from the very beginning

22 ELTA, “V. Trojanovas imituodavo oro erdvės pažeidėją” [V. Trojanov was an imitator of air space violations]. 2005 m. rugsėjo 20 d. http://www.delfi.lt/archive/article.php?id=7521492&categoryID=5995&ndat e=1127200854, 27 09 2005. (In Lithuanian). 23 Krašto apsaugos ministerija, “Krašto apsaugos ministras pateikė savo preliminarias išvadas” [“Minister of defence presented his tentative findings”]. Pranešimas žiniasklaidai, 2005 09 23.http://monitoring.press. lt/docs/4130.doc, 15 10 2005. (In Lithuanian). 24 Russia can be seen as a factor that makes securitization process easier, a factor that has been related with threat for a long time – Waever, (note 5) 14-15. Thus the historical past of Lithuanian – Russian relations makes that Russia is easily understood as a threat. 271 claimed that the incident was an accident, later it could reasonably demand that the wreckage of the crashed fighter and the arrested pilot would be returned to her. These Russian claims sounded reasonably, as Russia always asserted that the crash of the fighter was an accident and that no investigation was needed. Lithuania also at one moment claimed that this was an accident and then it had to agree on Russia’s demands and return wreckage of fighter and the pilot. Yet Lithuania also claimed that the incident was a provocation and by referring to this it could not return what Russia asked and had to start an investigation of the incident. In this case, an unsubstantial position of Lithuania was saved by legal acts, that Lithuania backed its position on Lithuania’s constitution. According to it, Lithuania uses its sovereignty and implements justice in Lithuania’s territory. Also, in the case against the pilot of the crashed fighter, a national criminal code was employed and not the international convention to which Russia referred.25 After Lithuania rejected to return to Russia the wreckages of fighter and the pilot, Russia started active information pressure on Lithuania. Thus Lithua- nia began to securitize a hostile position of Russia. Lithuania’s foreign affairs ministry, reacting to the pretences of Moscow to hand over the fighter “Su-27” and its pilot, declared a protest against Russia because of their propaganda campaign and also attempts to discredit Lithuania as a member of NATO. The Speaker of the Parliament, Artūras Paulauskas, asserted that with propagan- dist statements and demands Russia is trying to hide the essence of incident.26 Information presented by Russian officials and in the media was perceived as a threat to Lithuania’s information security. It was noticed that Russia’s statements become more and more hostile and they attempted to dominate in the information sphere by presenting their viewpoint about the incident. In the conclusions made by the commission investigating the crash of fighter a bad situation in Russia’s air military capabilities was emphasized and this was perceived as a threat to Lithuania.27 Lithuania’s military vulnerabilities and Russia’s military threat, because of the problems in its military sector, was seen as problems to Lithuania’s security. It was argued that a serious and strong response must be given to Russia’s actions that Russia has to explain its actions to NATO. The NATO air policy mission in Baltic States must be strengthened and become permanent and the Kaliningrad region must be demilitarized.28

25 ELTA, “G. Jasaitis: Rusijos naikintuvo pilotui galioja Lietuvos baudžiamasis procesas” [“G. Jasaitis: Against pilot of Russian fighter national criminal code can be employed”]. 2005 m. rugsėjo 23 d. http://www.delfi. lt/archive/article.php?id=7550038&categoryID=7&ndate=1127458028, 05 10 2005. (In Lithuanian). 26 ELTA, “Propagandiniais pareiškimais apie naikintuvo Su-27 sudužimo tyrimą Rusija stengiasi paslėpti šio incidento esmę, spėja A. Paulauskas” [“A.Paulauskas guesses that with propaganda statements about crash of fighter “Su-27” Russia attempts to hide the essence of the incident”]. 2005 m. rugsėjo 21 d.http://www. paulauskas.lt/index_2005.asp?DL=L&TopicID=60&ArticleID=1163&Page=4&SearchTXT=&iDay=&iM onth=&iYear=, 15 10 2005. (In Lithuanian). 27 Justinas Vanagas, “Naikintuvo avarijos priežastys: organizacinių, techninių ir žmogiškų veiksmų visuma” [“The reasons of the crash: the sum of organizational, technical and human acts”]. 2005 m. spalio 4 d. http://www.delfi. lt/archive/article.php?id=7631465&categoryID=7&ndate=1128430828, 08 10 2005. (In Lithuanian). 28 Lietuvos Respublikos Seimas, “Rezoliucija dėl incidento su Rusijos kariniu orlaiviu Su-27” [“Resolution on the incident with Russian fighter “Su-27””]. 2005 m. spalio 13 d.http://www3.lrs.lt/cgi-bin/preps2?Con dition1=263491&Condition2=, 19 10 2005. (In Lithuanian). 272 3.3. Russia‘s Reaction to the Incident

Russia’s officials consistently and united proclaimed one reason for the incident - that it was an accident. In the Russian media the viewpoint proclaimed by the government dominated. Hence at the beginning Russia did not perceive the incident as a threat and did not seek to securitize it. Russia could do this by claiming that Lithuania shot-up the Russian fighter. In this case, Lithuania’s abilities to do this would not be important because such a claim by Russia would be designed for foreign or domestic audience. The audience is unable to evaluate Lithuania’s military capabilities and it could be convinced by the fact that the fighter was shot-up (in this case the logic would be similar to this: the incident happened in Lithuania, most Russians perceive Lithuania as hostile towards Russia, thus idea that Lithuania shot-up fighter, which lost course, would sound for them convincing). Russia’s campaign of propaganda and diplomatic pressure against Lithuania began with Russia’s dissatisfaction about the investigation of the incident. It began to grow when they started to treat some problems as security threats. Russian diplomats in Vilnius delivered a note to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) offered compensation for any damages caused by crash of the fighter and also urged Lithuania to return the wreckages of fighter “Su-27” and the pilot. They asserted that the pilot and the fighter, which is the property of Russia’s military forces, according to the international law are legally immune from Lithuania’s jurisdiction and must be returned to Russia.29 As bilateral relations worsened because of the incident, Russia unilaterally cancelled a one and a half year ago planned session of an intergovernmental commission, which had to take place on 22nd-24th of September, 2005. The Russian MFA motivated this decision by indicating circumstances which appeared during solving problems caused by the crashed fighter and Lithuania’s actions towards the pilot. Lithuania’s Min- ister Counsellor from the embassy in Moscow was called to the Russian MFA where there were concerns about delaying the return of the fighters wreckages and the pilot, and also dissatisfaction about Lithuania’s doubts that the incident could not be an accident, were expressed for him.30 In informational competition, states seek to make their viewpoints dominant. Lithuania’s declaration, about Russia’s planed provocation, was different from the way Russia saw the incident. Thus the domination of Lithuania’s viewpoint was seen by Russia as a threat to its information security. Lithuania’s viewpoint about the incident was perceived by Russia as a problem, posing threat to its information security. Thus after Lithuania refused to return the fighter and pilot, Russia started its information attacks against Lithuania. The

29 BNS, ELTA, Lietuvos radijas, “Rusija paragino Lietuvą grąžinti lakūną ir lėktuvą” [“Russia urged Lithuania to return the pilot and plane”]. 2005 m. rugsėjo 19 d. http://www.delfi.lt/archive/article.php?id=7515121& categoryID=5995&ndate=1127121827, 05 10 2005. (In Lithuanian). 30 DELFI, ELTA, BNS “Maskva plečia diplomatinio puolimo prieš Lietuvą frontą” [“Moscow escalates diplomatic attacks against Lithuania”]. 2005 m. rugsėjo 21 d. http://www.delfi.lt/archive/article.php?id=75 32582&categoryID=7&ndate=1127298207, 24 09 2005. (In Lithuanian). 273

Russian media, subordinate to the Russian government, strained the information about the fighter and pilot, and actively criticized Lithuania. The headlines of Russian newspapers announced: “As it could be expected, Lithuania’s government provoke and international scandal,” and “Lithuania’s national defence minister claims, that crash of the fighter is planed provocation by Russia,” and also that “Lithuanians became defiant,” etc..31 Konstantin Kosachov, president of the foreign affairs committee in Russia‘s Duma, speaking about Lithuania’s and Russia’s relations asserted that Lithuania did not want Russia to participate in the investigation and did not let objectively and properly investigate the incident, which was only an accident: “in analysing information coming from Lithuania I notice that there are a lot of attempts to show these relations as hostile which might not be the truth.”32 Lithuania was perceived as a country hostile towards Russia.33 It was thought that by starting the investigation of the accident, Lithuania took revenge on Russia for its agreement with Germany on the Northern European gas pipe. In the Russian media the pilot of fighter, Trojanov, was depicted as a hero who directed the falling fighter from a village or a martyr caught in to enemy’s prison.34 It is interesting that Russia embraced the incident for desecuritizing the threat of NATO. General Vladimir Mikhailov, Russian Air Force and Air Defence Commander-in-Chief, criticised NATO’s mission in the Baltic States, which controls their air space, he asserted that Russia did not plan to test the abilities of the NATO defence, but the incident showed shortcomings of air-defence.35 Additionally in the Russian media it was asserted that the Commander of the Lithuanian Air Force, Colonel Jonas Marcinkus, was dismissed because of the gaps in Lithuania’s air defence system, which were revealed by the accident (in Lithuania dismissal of Marcinkus was explained by his unlicensed contacts with representatives of the Russian Air Forces). Thus the violation of air space was made a convenience by deemphasizing Lithuania’s entrance to NATO and NATO’s power, which caused great worries for Russia during the NATO enlargement.

31 Birutė Vyšniauskaitė, Aleksandras Procenka, “Iš Rusijos sostinės - įniršio ir melo purslai” [“Rage and lies from capital of Russia”]. Lietuvos rytas, 2005 m. rugsėjo 21 d. (In Lithuanian). 32 ELTA, “K. Kosačiovas: nuo naikintuvo avarijos tyrimo priklausys, ar Lietuva ir Rusija liks draugiškos valstybės” [“K. Kosachov: wheteher Lithuania and Russia will remain friendly states will depend from the investigation of the crash”]. 2005 m. rugsėjo 23 d. http://www.delfi.lt/archive/article.php?id=7550004&cat egoryID=7&ndate=1127422800, 02 10 2005. (In Lithuanian). 33 Павел Аксенов, “Необъяснимая авиакатастрофа” [“Unexplainable plain crash”]. 19.09.2005. http://lenta. ru/articles/2005/09/19/su/, 05 10 2005. (In Russian). 34 “Пилот российского Су-27 спасал литовскую деревню Йотишкиу?” [“Pilot of Russian Su-27 was saving Lithuanian village Iotyshki”]. 19.09.2005. http://news.pravda.ru/abroad/2005/09/19/81490.html, 05 10 2005; Владимир Ворсобин, “Супруга пленного летчика получила персональный Ту-134” [“Wife of pilot in confinement got personal Tu-134”]. 18 сентября 2005. http://www.kp.ru/daily/23580.5/44588/, 05 10 2005. (In Russian). 35 ELTA, “Rusijos KOP vadas: skrydžio iš Sankt Peterburgo į Kaliningradą organizavimas – gėdingas” [“Rus- sian general: the organization of flight from Sant Petersberg to Kaliningrad region is shameful”]. 2005 m. rugsėjo 26 d. http://www.delfi.lt/archive/article.php?id=7572085&categoryID=7&ndate=1127682000, 05 10 2005. (In Lithuanian). 274 4. The Consequences of the (de)securitization . of Problems caused by the Incident

4.1. Evaluation of Lithuania’s Performed (de)securitization

Membership in NATO was one of the main aims of Lithuania’s foreign policy and security policy. After the entrance in to the Alliance new aims were raised this being: to entrench in NATO and secure a full-fledged and active participation of Lithuania in the Alliance.36 Lithuania’s attempts after the incident to securitize the military aspects created the image of Lithuania as a militarily weak country. Also this strengthened perception (which had been weakened after Lithuania entered NATO), that Lithuania is not military safe. This emboldened radical assertions, that investments in national defence are too big and do not stand up. After the crash of the fighter “Su-27” the Russian media and officials presented a lot of negative information about NATO, thus strengthening the doubts of Lithuania’s society about the security guaranties promised by NATO and provoking some of Lithuania’s officials to express concerns about NATO’s position after the incident. In Lithuania, NATO was criticised for three reasons. First, because NATO allowed the Russian fighter to invade Lithuania’s air space. Second, because NATO did not contribute to the investigation of the incident. Third, NATO did not present the political evaluation of the incident and did not provide Lithuania with any support against Russia’s information pressure. Thus the mistrust of NATO was created and the feeling of insecurity strengthened. By securitizing the incident in the military and information sectors (asserting that a reaction to the incident is needed and problems that arose must be solved by extraordinary means) Lithuania partly discredited NATO, because NATO did not regard this problem as a very important security issue. By criticising the alliance that it did not accomplish the functions it had to, and by evaluating its positions after the incident as dormancy, Lithuania securitized the alliance. Lithuania started to perceive NATO’s attitude as a threat to its security, because the alliance did not secure the air space and did not offer much support when Russia put pressure on Lithuania. Appealing to this incident, Lithuania started to solve air defence problems. From the point of view of information security, the propelling and securitization of Lithuania’s military problems brought more benefit for Russia then Lithuania. The incident revealed that membership in NATO does not per se guarantee security. The escalation of military security problems minimized the psychological security feeling of society, which appeared when Lithuania became a NATO member. Also this downgraded NATO’s image and reliance

36 Only those aims are mentions which are related with Lthuania’s membership in NATO. URM, “Lietuvos Respublikos politinių partijų susitarimas dėl pagrindinių valstybės užsienio politikos tikslų ir uždavinių 2004-2008 metais” [“Agreement of Lithuania’s political parties on primary foreign policy aims and goals in 2004-2008”]. http://www1.urm.lt/data/2/LF914183242_partijususitarimas.htm, 15 10 2005. (In Lithuanian). 275 upon NATO’s provided security guaranties: 60 percent of respondents said that they trust less in NATO then they did before the incident.37 Although Lithuania’s military officials did not perceive the incident as a military threat, in public discussions, attention was drawn at the urgency to improve air space security, ask for a permanent NATO mission, and demilitarize the Kaliningrad region. From the viewpoint of military security securitization of military threat, it was useful for Lithuania’s security. However because of the before mentioned negative influence on information security the assumption can be made that problems of military security would be solved more effectively by not securitizing them (by solving them in the ordinary political agenda, just the way NATO did). It should be noted, that Lithuania has seen the incident as a threat to the whole NATO: national defence minister Kirkilas declared that “what happens and what had happened is an obvious threat to our, NATO’s, and the EU’s security.”38 It can be noted that a major part of Russia’s disseminated information about the incident was not favourable to NATO. But neither in a single country, nor at the NATO level, was this information not called to be a threat, even if unofficially it was held to be a problem. This means it remained desecuritized. Thus NATO did not securitize problems caused by the incident as military or information threats. In its official position towards Russia, NATO emphasized that Russia is a NATO partner and cooperation with it is very important. Lithuania, by securitizing the incident as a threat and strengthening Russia’s image as a hostile country, strengthened its own image as a country which quite sensitively reacts to Russia and thus might undermine good relations between NATO and Russia. Thus Lithuania’s reaction contradicted the official position of NATO. By commenting on the incident the Secretary General of NATO, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, emphasized that Russia is NATO’s partner. Meanwhile Lithuania’s officials spoke about the hostile disposition of Russia. With reasonable reaction, NATO sought to keep pragmatic relations with Russia. By evaluating the position of the West, on one hand, it can be said that NATO’s reaction was too weak and inadequate in order to solve problems emanating in the relations with Russia and especially to prevent them. The fact that the incident did not boost Western reaction could possibly encourage Russia to voice more aggressive reaction towards Lithuania and to seek to dominate the information sphere. On the other hand it might be that the desecuritization of problems in relations with Russia (and especially from the point of view of information security) could be a better solution for them. Russia bases its relations with the Baltic States on confrontation. It needs “outside enemies” in order to mobilize domestic resources, to draw attention from domestic problems, or to blame for them. Thus involvement into Russia’s organized provocations brings more benefit for Russia. Also the West always looks sceptically to the fact that there

37 “Sumenko pasitikėjimas ir šalies kariuomene, ir NATO” [“Trust in national military and NATO has de- clined”]. “Lietuvos rytas,” 2005 m. lapkričio 2 d. (In Lithuanian). 38 Krašto apsaugos ministerija, (note 18). 276

will be a country, confronting with Russia, in Western organizations. It can be considered that the praise told by the USA ambassador Mull to Lithuania’s officials “for their professionalism and quiet reaction”39 in investigating the incident was also an indirect reference to what kind of reaction from Lithuania that the Western partners request. By securitizing Russia’s informational attacks Lithuania pointed to Russia’s pressure on Lithuania and reacted to this by using diplomatic means. Lithuania’s decision not to become involved in Russia’s provocations can be assessed positively. Yet Lithuania’s offensive capabilities in information confrontation should be evaluated negatively - substantially Lithuania only defended itself, that is it reacted to interpretations presented by Russia instead of clearly stating its position on concrete questions.

4.2. Consequences of Russia’s Performed (de)securitization

Russia’s hostility towards Lithuania (and other Baltic States) is often transferred into the information sphere. For example, Russia’s officials assert that Russia’s image abroad is spoiled by the Baltic States and Poland: “their entrance to the EU and NATO did not raise living standards of their people. Thus with the current anti-Russian campaign they seek to draw attention of the population from their social, economic and political problems.”40 By treating the Baltic States as its zone of influence and interests, Russia regards their independence and orientation to West as contradicting its national interests. Also as it was mentioned that Russia needs “external enemies” in order to mobilize domestic resources, and direct the attention of society from domestic problems or even to blame for them. It is critical, that this information is disseminated not only to domestic, but also to an international audience. Thus, first by using the incident, Russia’s officials formed an image of Lithuania as country which is hostile to Russia and strengthened anti-Lithua- nian opinion of the Russian population. They sought to present the incident as if Lithuania was guilty for the incident, to depict it as a conflicting country. Constantly presented accusations to the Baltic States for being not friendly makes an influence on Russian society. Polls show that the Russian population holds Latvia and Lithuania as two out of three most hostile countries towards Russia.41

39 BNS, “S. Mullas: Lietuva ne viena katastrofos akivaizdoje” [“S. Mull: Lithuania is not alone in the event of the catastrophe”]. 2005 m. rugsėjo 23 d. http://www.delfi.lt/archive/article.php?id=7555153&categoryI D=7&ndate=1127422800, 24 09 2005. (In Lithuanian). 40 Arūnas Spraunius, “Šizofreniški Baltijos šalių ir Rusijos santykiai” [“Schizophrenic relations of Baltic States and Russia”]. Savaitraštis Laikas. 2005 m. rugpjūčio 8 d. http://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/comments/article. php?id=7244902, 12 08 2005. (In Lithuanian). 41 The poll was organized on 13-18 of May, 2005. ELTA, “Apklausos duomenimis, rusai priešiškiausiai nusiteikusiomis šalimis laiko Baltijos valstybes” [“According to polls, Russians hold Baltic States as mostly hostile”]. 2005 m. birželio 9 d. http://politika.lt/index.php?cid=695&new_id=4301, 12 08 2005. (In Lithuanian). 277

Second, by securitizing information which was unfavourable, Russia behaved according to its Information security doctrine, in which an objective to secure Rus- sia’s “national interest in the information sphere” is stated.42 This means that official position of Russia’s government must be effectively presented to the international society seeking to secure national patriotism, values, etc. Third, the desecuritization of the NATO threat had to make an influence on Russia’s population. The image of NATO as an enemy was sustained by presenting the NATO member Lithuania, as a hostile country towards the Russian country. But on the same time it was depicted that this enemy is weak because NATO did not prevent it from an incident, and did not express clear support to Lithuania. Paradoxically, the unsuccessful flight of the Russian fighter was successful because it showed that the NATO enlargement closer to Russia does not pose such a big threat in as it was thought at the beginning. When Russia desecuritized NATO, relations with the alliance were transferred from the security agenda to the political agenda. This can show Russia’s aspirations to strengthened cooperation with NATO and lessen possible confrontations with it. The fact that Russia seeks to cooperate with NATO could be seen when Russia stopped opposing the NATO enlargement. For a long time Russia did not consider NATO as an actor of international arena, with whom it could cooperate. But later this viewpoint began to change, Russia deepened contacts with NATO, and strengthened the political dialogue through NATO- Russia Council. Russia’s behaviour in the case of the incident with the fighter, confirms that it seeks to gain more regard from NATO countries and deepen their relations with the Alliance.

Conclusions

Both the May 9th issue and crash of the fighter revealed that in analysing information security it is more important how information (in this case about the May 9th, occupation of the Baltic States, reasons of the fighters crash, etc.) was perceived and not if it represented real facts. Thus according to the securitization model and by evaluating how states perceived the May 9th issue and what they securitized and then by comparing their actions with their declared national security and foreign policy interests, such conclusions can be made. First, the decision about the May 9th event could pose a threat to Lithuania’s information security and its referent security object state idea. But by securitizing participation in the celebration, Lithuania avoided indirect acceptance of Russia’s viewpoint about historical facts and possible manipulations that Lithuania agrees on them. Second, although Lithuania’s decision not to participate in the May 9th celebration did not match the decision of Western countries, Lithuania got confirmation from them that they

42 Coвет Безопасности Российской Федерации, “Доктрина информационной безопасности Российской Федерации.” [“Doctrine of Information Security in Russian Federation”] № Пр-1895, 9 сентября 2000. http://www.scrf.gov.ru/Documents/Decree/2000/09-09.html, 05 10 2005. (In Russian). 278

understand and support Lithuania’s decision. Third, by securitizing information about historical facts voiced by Russia, Lithuania did not allow Russia to establish its viewpoint in the global information sphere. Lithuania’s resistance to Russia’s information pressure was strengthened also by not involving itself in discussions about historical facts initiated by Russia and by regarding the occupation as an obvious fact and thus demanding compensation of the damage made by occupation. All this shows that Lithuania’s behaviour and the decisions made had matched its security interests. In Russia’s case it can be asserted that its information attack against Lithuania on the May 9th issue was not effective. Russia did not achieve its aims to raise doubts of the international community about the occupational facts and to discredit Lithuania. Russia sought all this in order to strengthen its influence on the country, which it regards as its zone of influence. But it should be noted that the Russian disinformation campaign was successful against the Russian population in creating an image of Lithuania as of an external enemy. In the case of the fighter “Su-27” crash the following aspects should be emphasized. First, viewing from the Russian point of view, the way it perceived the incident, what problems were securitized, and then by comparing its actions with national interests, it can be concluded that by (de)securitizing problems it behaved according to the previously declared interests, how it defined its national security, and the threats to it. Second, by viewing how Lithuania perceived the incident and what problems were securitized, it can be concluded that this did not match its national interests. Lithuania’s behaviour (quite opposite from the position of NATO towards Russia and the criticism of NATO, which strengthened insecurity feeling) was more useful for Russia, then for Lithuania. Third, this allows the making of a conclusion that the information security analysis based on an objectivist method, which would investigate national interests of countries (without investigation of their perceptions), would only explain Russia’s behaviour. In the case of the Lithuanian analysis of national interests, it would not be suitable because Lithuania did not follow them and consequently its actions contradicted previously declared foreign and security policy aims. Finally, according to this it can be assumed that the securitization actions – when the decision is made to treat certain problems as a threat – can be regarded as an information threat. A country which organizes information attacks could seek that its opponent securitized a concrete problem and thus it destabilized the situation in the country which is attacked. In this case the mistrust about Lithuania’s membership in NATO was created and problems to which the population reacts very sensitively were actualized (being NATO, and its provided defence was discredited in Lithuania). Also the prominence of Lithuania’s insecurity and criticism of NATO contributed to creating a negative viewpoint of Western countries about Lithuania. This means that the crash of the fighter was more important from the viewpoint of information security, then military security, because the most important consequences were created not by the incident, but how it was perceive and what information about it was escalated.

Vilnius, May 22, 2006. STRATEGIC RESEARCH CENTER of the Lithuanian Military Academy and Institute of International Relations and Political Science of the University of Vilnius

LITHUANIAN . ANNUAL STRATEGIC . REVIEW 2006

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