Federalism and Local Politics in Russia
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Ethnic Competition, Radical Islam and Challenges to Stability in the Republic of Dagestan
Ethnic Competition, Radical Islam, and Challenges to Stability in the Republic of Dagestan Edward C. Holland Doctoral Candidate Institute of Behavioral Science and Department of Geography Campus Box 487 University of Colorado Boulder, CO. 80309-0487 USA Email: [email protected] Phone: 1-303-492-4347; fax 1-303-492-3609 John O’Loughlin College Professor of Distinction and Professor of Geography Institute of Behavioral Science Campus Box 487 University of Colorado Boulder, CO. 80309-0487 USA Email: [email protected] Phone: 1-303-492-1619; fax 1-303-492-3609 Forthcoming COMMUNIST AND POST-COmMUNIST STUDIES 2010 Acknowledgements: This research was supported by a grant from the Human and Social Dynamics Initiative of the U.S. National Science Foundation, grant number 0433927. Thanks to Vladimir Kolossov, and Gearoid Ó Tuathail for help with the survey and the fieldwork in Dagestan, to our Dagestani colleagues, Eldar Eldarov, Shakhmardan Muduyev, Sharafudin Aliyev, and Zagir Atayev for their overwhelming hospitality on two field expeditions and to Nancy Thorwardson of the Institute of Behavioral Science for preparing the map for publication. We also acknowledge Alexei Grazhdankin and his colleagues of the Levada Center, Moscow for their timely, professional and friendly cooperation that ensured the success of the complex survey in Dagestan. Abstract Previous academic work on stability in Dagestan has focused on two potential cleavages, the republic’s ethnic diversity and the challenge from radical Islamist groups. Using results from a December 2005 survey, and focusing on Dagestan’s six main ethnic groups, this paper investigates attitudes towards the dual topics of the politicization of ethnicity and the relationship between terrorism and Islamism. -
The Russia You Never Met
The Russia You Never Met MATT BIVENS AND JONAS BERNSTEIN fter staggering to reelection in summer 1996, President Boris Yeltsin A announced what had long been obvious: that he had a bad heart and needed surgery. Then he disappeared from view, leaving his prime minister, Viktor Cher- nomyrdin, and his chief of staff, Anatoly Chubais, to mind the Kremlin. For the next few months, Russians would tune in the morning news to learn if the presi- dent was still alive. Evenings they would tune in Chubais and Chernomyrdin to hear about a national emergency—no one was paying their taxes. Summer turned to autumn, but as Yeltsin’s by-pass operation approached, strange things began to happen. Chubais and Chernomyrdin suddenly announced the creation of a new body, the Cheka, to help the government collect taxes. In Lenin’s day, the Cheka was the secret police force—the forerunner of the KGB— that, among other things, forcibly wrested food and money from the peasantry and drove some of them into collective farms or concentration camps. Chubais made no apologies, saying that he had chosen such a historically weighted name to communicate the seriousness of the tax emergency.1 Western governments nod- ded their collective heads in solemn agreement. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank both confirmed that Russia was experiencing a tax collec- tion emergency and insisted that serious steps be taken.2 Never mind that the Russian government had been granting enormous tax breaks to the politically connected, including billions to Chernomyrdin’s favorite, Gazprom, the natural gas monopoly,3 and around $1 billion to Chubais’s favorite, Uneximbank,4 never mind the horrendous corruption that had been bleeding the treasury dry for years, or the nihilistic and pointless (and expensive) destruction of Chechnya. -
Australian Parliamentary Delegation
The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia Australian Parliamentary Delegation to the Russian Federation and the Italian Republic 17 April – 1 May 2005 REPORT June 2005 ii © Commonwealth of Australia 2005 ISBN 0 642 71532 7 This document was printed by the Senate Printing Unit, Department of the Senate, Parliament House, Canberra. iii MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION Leader Senator the Hon. Paul Calvert President of the Senate Senator for Tasmania Liberal Party of Australia Deputy Leader Ms Jill Hall, MP Member for Shortland (NSW) Australian Labor Party Members Senator Jacinta Collins Senator for Victoria Australian Labor Party Mrs Kay Elson, MP Member for Forde (QLD) Liberal Party of Australia Senator Jeannie Ferris Senator for South Australia Liberal Party of Australia The Hon. Jackie Kelly, MP Member for Lindsay (NSW) Liberal Party of Australia Senator Ross Lightfoot Senator for Western Australia Liberal Party of Australia Delegation secretary Mr John Vander Wyk Department of the Senate Private Secretary to the Mr Don Morris President of the Senate iv The delegation with the Archimandrite of the Holy Trinity-St Sergius Lavra monastery at Sergiev Posad, Father Savva. From left, the Deputy Head of Mission and Counsellor at the Australian Embassy, Mr Alex Brooking, Senator Jacinta Collins, Mrs Kay Elson, MP, Senator the Hon. Paul Calvert (Delegation Leader), Father Savva, Senator Ross Lightfoot, Senator Jeannie Ferris, the Hon. Jackie Kelly, MP, and Mrs Jill Hall (Deputy Leader). v TABLE OF CONTENTS MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION iii PREFACE -
Welfare Reforms in Post-Soviet States: a Comparison
WELFARE REFORMS IN POST-SOVIET STATES: A COMPARISON OF SOCIAL BENEFITS REFORM IN RUSSIA AND KAZAKHSTAN by ELENA MALTSEVA A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Graduate Department of Political Science University of Toronto © Copyright by Elena Maltseva (2012) Welfare Reforms in Post-Soviet States: A Comparison of Social Benefits Reform in Russia and Kazakhstan Elena Maltseva Doctor of Philosophy Political Science University of Toronto (2012) Abstract: Concerned with the question of why governments display varying degrees of success in implementing social reforms, (judged by their ability to arrive at coherent policy outcomes), my dissertation aims to identify the most important factors responsible for the stagnation of social benefits reform in Russia, as opposed to its successful implementation in Kazakhstan. Given their comparable Soviet political and economic characteristics in the immediate aftermath of Communism’s disintegration, why did the implementation of social benefits reform succeed in Kazakhstan, but largely fail in Russia? I argue that although several political and institutional factors did, to a certain degree, influence the course of social benefits reform in these two countries, their success or failure was ultimately determined by the capacity of key state actors to frame the problem and form an effective policy coalition that could further the reform agenda despite various political and institutional obstacles and socioeconomic challenges. In the case of Kazakhstan, the successful implementation of the social benefits reform was a result of a bold and skillful endeavour by Kazakhstani authorities, who used the existing conditions to justify the reform initiative and achieve the reform’s original objectives. -
The Siloviki in Russian Politics
The Siloviki in Russian Politics Andrei Soldatov and Michael Rochlitz Who holds power and makes political decisions in contemporary Russia? A brief survey of available literature in any well-stocked bookshop in the US or Europe will quickly lead one to the answer: Putin and the “siloviki” (see e.g. LeVine 2009; Soldatov and Borogan 2010; Harding 2011; Felshtinsky and Pribylovsky 2012; Lucas 2012, 2014 or Dawisha 2014). Sila in Russian means force, and the siloviki are the members of Russia’s so called “force ministries”—those state agencies that are authorized to use violence to respond to threats to national security. These armed agents are often portrayed—by journalists and scholars alike—as Russia’s true rulers. A conventional wisdom has emerged about their rise to dominance, which goes roughly as follows. After taking office in 2000, Putin reconsolidated the security services and then gradually placed his former associates from the KGB and FSB in key positions across the country (Petrov 2002; Kryshtanovskaya and White 2003, 2009). Over the years, this group managed to disable almost all competing sources of power and control. United by a common identity, a shared worldview, and a deep personal loyalty to Putin, the siloviki constitute a cohesive corporation, which has entrenched itself at the heart of Russian politics. Accountable to no one but the president himself, they are the driving force behind increasingly authoritarian policies at home (Illarionov 2009; Roxburgh 2013; Kasparov 2015), an aggressive foreign policy (Lucas 2014), and high levels of state predation and corruption (Dawisha 2014). While this interpretation contains elements of truth, we argue that it provides only a partial and sometimes misleading and exaggerated picture of the siloviki’s actual role. -
Unsuccessful Orthodoxy in Russian Heartlands
Religion, State & Society, Vol. 28, No. 1, 2000 Unsuccessful Orthodoxy in Russian Heartlands FELIX CORLEY The Russian Orthodox Church may be the dominant and most visible religious group in the Russian Federation, but its performance in different regions of the country has been patchy. Even in regions that share common features - geographic, ethnic, economic and social - the Church has made a big impact in some, but little headway in others. Here we look at how the Church has fared in the postsoviet era in four Russian heartland provinces - Astrakhan', Yekaterinburg, Saratov and Omsk. I In all these regions the Orthodox Church has failed to take advantage of the opportunities presented by the end of restrictions on religious activity a decade ago and it is now suffering because of what many perceive as the authoritarian and backward-looking leadership offered by the local bishops. The article looks at what common features the Orthodox Church in these regions has and examines the consequences of failure to present a dynamic witness. Saratov1 Saratov had a vibrant circle of Orthodox intellectuals by the end of the 1980s, thanks in part to the benign influence of the local hierarch, Archbishop Pimen (Khmel evsky). Consecrated bishop in 1965 and appointed to the diocese of Saratov and Volgograd (as it was then), Pimen had had a chequered career, joining the Zhirovitsy Monastery in Belorussia during the Nazi occupation. In the 1950s - in a sign of trust from the Soviet authorities - he served in the Russian Spiritual Mission in Jerusalem. On his return to Russia he served in the Trinity-St Sergius Monastery in Zagorsk, for some of the time as deputy head. -
The Meltdown of the Russian Federation in the Early 1990S Nationalist Myth-Building and the Urals Republic Project Alexander Kuznetsov
The Meltdown of the Russian Federation in the Early 1990s Nationalist Myth-Building and the Urals Republic Project Alexander Kuznetsov Abstract: In the early 1990s after the collapse of the USSR, the new Russian state faced strong nationalist claims for sovereignty and increased autonomy from the side of regional elites. These nationalist challenges at the sub-national level were seriously considered by many experts to be a potential cause for the further breakup of Russia into a number of new independent states. The nationalist movements in ethnic republics like Chechnya, Tatarstan and Sakha-Yakutia, and their contribution to possible scenario of the disintegration of the Russian Federation, have been researched frequently in post- Soviet-studies literature. However, the examination of the impact of nationalistic ideas in ethnically Russian regions (oblasts) at the beginning of the 1990s has not received the same level of attention from political scientists. The Sverdlovsk oblast is a case study for this research. In the early 1990s, the creation of the Urals republic began in this region. This paper argues that the Sverdlovsk oblast’s claims for increased autonomy included elements of myth-construction within a sub-state nationalist ideology. The first section of this paper briefly contextualizes the events that occurred during the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s that led to the growth of strong sub-nationalist movements in post-Communist Russia. The second section gives details of the Urals republic project, launched in the Sverdlovsk oblast in 1993, and defines the presence of nationalist myth- making elements in this regional movement. -
Tymoshenko Cancels Visit to Moscow, Demands Russian Respect For
INSIDE:• Ruslana to perform benefit concert for CCRF — page 3. • Reflections on Yushchenko’s trip to the U.S. — page 8. • Maria Burmaka: from the “maidan” to Manhattan — page 12. Published by the Ukrainian National Association Inc., a fraternal non-profit association Vol. LXXIII HE KRAINIANNo. 17 THE UKRAINIAN WEEKLY SUNDAY, APRIL 24, 2005 EEKLY$1/$2 in Ukraine TymoshenkoT cancelsU visit to Moscow, Ukraine’s ministerW of justice demands Russian respect for Ukraine assailed over academic credentials by Zenon Zawada note sent to the Russian Federation’s by Zenon Zawada formal legal education, he also has no Kyiv Press Bureau Ministry of Foreign Affairs and made pub- Kyiv Press Bureau graduate or post-graduate college degree, lic by Vsevolod Shmatkov, an advisor- despite his insistence to the contrary to KYIV – In a demand for respect from envoy of the Russian Embassy in Ukraine. KYIV – For the last eight years, Ukrainian reporters in recent weeks. the Russian Federation, Ukrainian Prime “Due to spring field work and the neces- Roman Zvarych, today Ukraine’s minis- “I received the diploma of a master in Minister Yulia Tymoshenko abruptly can- sity of resolving tasks in order to eliminate ter of justice, has been claiming that he philosophy,” Mr. Zvarych told the popu- celed her first visit to Moscow the day complications arising at their implementa- earned a graduate degree in philosophy lar Russian-language newspaper Fakty i after Russia’s top prosecutor said crimi- tion, the Ukrainian side is forced to post- from Columbia University. Kommentarii in an interview published nal charges were still pending against her. -
Russia Intelligence
N°70 - January 31 2008 Published every two weeks / International Edition CONTENTS SPOTLIGHT P. 1-3 Politics & Government c Medvedev’s Last Battle Before Kremlin Debut SPOTLIGHT c Medvedev’s Last Battle The arrest of Semyon Mogilevich in Moscow on Jan. 23 is a considerable development on Russia’s cur- Before Kremlin Debut rent political landscape. His profile is altogether singular: linked to a crime gang known as “solntsevo” and PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS sought in the United States for money-laundering and fraud, Mogilevich lived an apparently peaceful exis- c Final Stretch for tence in Moscow in the renowned Rublyovka road residential neighborhood in which government figures « Operation Succession » and businessmen rub shoulders. In truth, however, he was involved in at least two types of business. One c Kirillov, Shestakov, was the sale of perfume and cosmetic goods through the firm Arbat Prestige, whose manager and leading Potekhin: the New St. “official” shareholder is Vladimir Nekrasov who was arrested at the same time as Mogilevich as the two left Petersburg Crew in Moscow a restaurant at which they had lunched. The charge that led to their incarceration was evading taxes worth DIPLOMACY around 1.5 million euros and involving companies linked to Arbat Prestige. c Balkans : Putin’s Gets His Revenge The other business to which Mogilevich’s name has been linked since at least 2003 concerns trading in P. 4-7 Business & Networks gas. As Russia Intelligence regularly reported in previous issues, Mogilevich was reportedly the driving force behind the creation of two commercial entities that played a leading role in gas relations between Russia, BEHIND THE SCENE Turkmenistan and Ukraine: EuralTransGaz first and then RosUkrEnergo later. -
TO POPE BENEDICT XVI and HIS FELLOW BISHOPS on the Occasion of the Pope’S April 2008 Visit to the United States
TO POPE BENEDICT XVI AND HIS FELLOW BISHOPS On the occasion of the Pope’s April 2008 visit to the United States Please join Voice of the Faithful (VOTF) in calling all Catholics to transform our Church. Join your voice with thousands of others who must raise our voices through petition because the Pope has scheduled no discussions or listening sessions with ordinary laity. Will he hear the concerns of the faithful without such conversations? We Catholics are still addressing the clergy sex abuse scandal, one of the worst crises in the history of our Church. One-third of those raised Catholic in the U.S. no longer call themselves Catholics, accord- ing to a recent survey. Numbers of priests are declining; many parishes and schools are closing; we face massive financial crises. Voice of the Faithful, with more than 35,000 members, proposes concrete solutions to address this crisis: 1. Treat survivors of sexual abuse with the justice and compassion our faith demands. 2. Hold bishops accountable to the people they serve. 3. Embrace full participation of Catholic men and women in Church decision-making. 4. Require full financial transparency and accountability in all governance matters. We believe these steps will produce: ▪ An open, transparent and accountable Church ▪ A participative Church embracing the gifts and talents of the baptized ▪ A Church governed by compassion, informed by justice, empowered by equality, and animated to act collegially We urge all clergy to listen to the voices of the faithful as we join together to inspire our Church to become a community of believers worthy of our founder, Jesus Christ. -
Russia Macro-Politics: Political Pragmatism Or, Economic Necessity
The National Projects December 2019 Population and GDP (2020E data) The long and winding road Population 146.8 GDP, Nominal, US$ bln $1,781 Plans are worthless. Planning is essential” GDP/Capita, US$ $12,132 Dwight D. Eisenhower GDP/Capita, PPP, US$ $27,147 Source: World Bank, World-o-Meters, MA The National Projects (NP) are at the core of the Russian government’s efforts to pull the economy out of the current slump, National Projects - Spending* to create sustainable diversified long-term growth and to improve Rub, Bln US$ Bln lifestyle conditions in Russia. It is the key element of President Putin’s Human Capital 5,729 $88 effort to establish his legacy. Health 1,726 $27 Education 785 $12 We are now initiating coverage of the National Projects strategy. We Demographics 3,105 $48 will provide regular detailed updates about the progress in each of Culture 114 $2 the major project sectors, focusing especially on the opportunities Quality of Life 9,887 $152 Safer Roads 4,780 $74 for foreign investors and on the mechanisms for them to take part. Housing 1,066 $16 ▪ What is it? A US$390 billion program of public spending, designed Ecology 4,041 $62 to stimulate investment, build infrastructure and improve health Economic Growth 10,109 $156 and well-being by 2024, i.e. the end of the current presidential Science 636 $10 Small Business Development 482 $7 term. Digital Economy 1,635 $25 ▪ Is this a return to Soviet-style planning? For some of the NPs, Labour productivity 52 $1 Export Support 957 $15 especially those involving infrastructure, it certainly looks like it. -
THE POLITICAL SYSTEM – CHANGES DURING the ELECTION CAMPAIGNS the Search for a New Political Model
Part 1. THE POLITICAL SYSTEM – CHANGES DURING THE ELECTION CAMPAIGNS The search for a new political model. Putin as the national leader – a change in status and a possible change in the configuration of the political system. A change in the weight of different political institutions All of 2007 was characterized by the competition between two projects that can conditionally be called “successor” and “third term”. At that, supporters and opponents of the latter scheme belonged to different groups among the elites, which added a distinctive sharpness to the situation and this manifested itself not only in an ideological but also an administrative confrontation. The search for a place for Vladimir Putin in the “post-Putin” system of checks and balances started after the 1st of October when he agreed to head the United Russia party list. Before this, in spite of many statements by the head of state himself about his unwillingness to go against the Constitution and run for president for a third term, projects that entailed changing the Constitution predominated. The main lobbyists for the “third term” project were the so called “siloviki” or the security wing of the presidential administration that were headed by deputy head of the presidential administration, Igor Sechin. In the media, the main voice on this topic was the head of the Federation Council and leader of the party Fair Russia Sergey Mironov. This politician is considered to be in the orbit of this group of elites. Nevertheless, his wavering to meet the “party line” was evident. In particular, at the end of March in 2007, he increased his activity in this direction1.