Concord Review

THE CONCORD REVIEW

I am simply one who loves the past and is diligent in investigating it. K’ung-fu-tzu (551-479 BC) The Analects

George Ripley Elizabeth Twomey Isidore Newman School, New Orleans, Louisiana The Italian State Antonia Woodford Horace Mann School, Bronx, New York Theodore Roosevelt Lucia A. Randall Montclair Kimberley Academy, Montclair, New Jersey Kim Dae Jung Youngkwon “Noah” Yu Perkiomen School, Pennsburg, Pennsylvania Sinn Féin Simeon R. Burke Lincoln Park High School, Chicago, Illinois Battle of Gettysburg Robert D. Hogan Glastonbury High School, Glastonbury, Connecticut Sakhalin Koreans Yeon Woo Lee Daewon Foreign Language High School, Seoul, Korea May Fourth Movement Caroline W. Tan Lynbrook High School, San Jose, California The Land Ironclads Cody E. Nager North Salem High School, North Salem, New York Lodges vs. Kennedys Matthew C. Weinstein Belmont Hill School, Belmont, Massachusetts Louis vs. Schmeling Kevin Liu Appleby College, Oakville, Ontario, Canada

A Quarterly Review of Essays by Students of History

Volume 21, Number Two $15.00 Winter 2010 Editor and Publisher Will Fitzhugh e-mail: [email protected] website: http://www.tcr.org/blog

The Winter 2010 issue of The Concord Review is Volume Twenty-One, Number Two.

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Volume Twenty-One, Number Two Winter 2010

1 Elizabeth Twomey George Ripley and Transcendentalism

23 Antonia Woodford The Italian State

49 Lucia A. Randall Theodore Roosevelt as NYC Police Commissioner

83 Youngkwon Yu Kim Dae Jung

129 Simeon R. Burke The Factions of Sinn Féin

151 Robert D. Hogan Battle of Gettysburg

167 Yeon Woo Lee Sakhalin Koreans

195 Caroline W. Tan Woodrow Wilson and the May Fourth Movement

227 Cody E. Nager The Land Ironclads

245 Matthew C. Weinstein Lodges vs. Kennedys in 1952

285 Kevin Liu Joe Louis vs. Max Schmeling

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Elizabeth Twomey (George Ripley) is a Senior at the Isidore Newman School in New Orleans, Louisiana, where she received the Yale Book Award and was named a Warren G. Moses Scholar. She is co-editor of the school literary magazine, The Pioneer, and plans a biology major in college. Antonia Woodford (Italian State) is in her first year at Yale. At the Horace Mann School in Riverdale, New York, she was captain of the cross-country and indoor track teams, and a board member of the Model UN Team. Her earlier paper on Italian Fascism was published in The Concord Review. Lucia A. Randall (Theodore Roosevelt) is a Senior at the Montclair Kimberley Academy in Montclair, New Jersey, where she was honored as a Faculty Scholar and won High Research Distinction for this paper. Before her Junior year she was homeschooled and she swims year-round. She plays the clarinet and works as an aquatics instructor and lifeguard. Youngkwon Yu (Kim Dae Jung) is a Senior at the Perkiomen School in Pennsburg, Pennsylvania, where is captain of the Model UN Team, and has been class president. He plays on the varsity soccer team and is a member of the swim team. He plays the saxophone in the school orchestra and is a member of the Math and Economics Clubs. Simeon R. Burke (Sinn Féin) is in his first year at St. Andrews University in Scotland. He was born in Wales, spent most of his childhood in Ireland, and two years in Fiji, and then graduated from Lincoln Park High School in Chicago, Illinois, where he earned the IB Diploma. At school he played drums in the band and was on the soccer team. Robert D. Hogan (Battle of Gettysburg) is a Senior at Glastonbury High School in Glastonbury, Connecticut, where he was on the ski racing team. He has been class tresurer for four years and is a peer educator. He is in the top 1% of his class of 510, and he was recognized by the College Board as an AP Scholar. THE CONCORD REVIEW

Yeon Woo Lee (Sakhalin Koreans) is a senior at the Daewon Foreign Language High School in Seoul, Korea, where he has an English major and a Chinese minor. He is the editor of Harbinger, the school newspaper and has worked in the Associated Press Seoul bureau. Caroline W. Tan (May Fourth Movement) is at Yale. She graduated from Lynbrook High School in San Jose, California, where she was president of the Speech and Debate Team (ranked 3rd nationally) and was an AP Scholar with Distinction. In the Ivy Scholars Progam she won the Dr. Ted Broman Award for the best written Marshall Policy Brief. Cody E. Nager (Land Ironclads) is a Junior at North Salem High School in North Salem, New York, where he won first place in the George S. & Stella McKnight essay contest. He is a research assistant at the John Jay Homestead Historic Site, and is active in 4-H at local, state and national levels. Matthew C. Weinstein (Lodges vs. Kennedys) is a Senior at the Belmont Hill School in Belmont, Massachusetts, where he is editor of The Panel, the school newspaper, and won the Monaco American History Prize. He has placed maxima or summa cum laude on the National Latin Exam each year, and he is a member of the varsity crew, cross-country, and squash teams. Kevin Liu (Louis vs. Schmeling) is a Senior at Appleby College in Toronto, Ontario, where he volunteers as a tour guide at the Thomas House Museum, and has been a history buff for as long as he can remember. He plans a history major at university.

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l For information on joining the Consortium, please contact Will Fitzhugh at [email protected] Annual Membership is $5,000, payable to The Concord Review 10 Elizabeth Twomey Copyright 2010, by The Concord Review, Inc., all rights reserved

GEORGE RIPLEY: A TRANSCENDENT LIFE IN THOUGHT, WORDS AND DEEDS

Elizabeth Twomey

George Ripley was an American philosopher known for his leadership in the Transcendentalist movement and Brook Farm—the experimental Utopian community he established. Along with important historical figures such as his cousin Ralph Waldo Emerson, Bronson Alcott, Theodore Parker, Henry David Thoreau, and Margaret Fuller, Ripley was at the center of the New England intellectual community during the 1830s and 1840s. The conversations among these individuals were the foundation for the American Transcendentalist movement, which was influenced by German philosophers such as Immanuel Kant, and focused on the importance of self-reliance and a critical evaluation of society. While often linked to Emerson and his July 15, 1838 address to the senior class of the Harvard Divinity School (in which he issued an “inspirational call to arms” by criticizing various accepted church doctrines and encouraging the students to find the true teachings of God in nature),1 Ripley’s views and career show that the Tran- scendental movement was more complex and even contradictory. Ripley was insightful, deeply religious, and as complex as the Transcendental movement itself. He was a man who felt it was his responsibility to find a perfect lifestyle for mankind and preserve

Elizabeth Twomey is a Senior at the Isidore Newman School in New Orleans, Louisiana, where she wrote this paper for Dr. Sheets’ AP United States History course in the 2009/2010 academic year. THE CONCORD REVIEW 11 it. He was a natural leader and very outspoken. Everything he approached, he approached with the notion that he could make it succeed. He pushed his fellow Transcendentalists to take risks and turn their words into actions. To him, it was not sufficient to sit around a room and discuss how the world could be better; people had to take initiative and act on their beliefs. Beginning around 1840, Ripley moved beyond general Transcendentalist concepts and created Brook Farm to do just that. Brook Farm was a community that emphasized an individual’s physical and intellectual contributions to society and the equality of men (and women). The experiment at Brook Farm was short-lived and its failure left Ripley in debt. Despite his failure, however, for the rest of his life Ripley remained committed to the principles on which Brook Farm was based.

Thoughts

George Ripley’s early years did not foreshadow his eventual conversion to radical ideology. He was born October 3, 1802, in Greenfield, Massachusetts, one of ten children.2 He attended Har- vard College and, during his years there, became involved with the Unitarian movement.3 Unitarians were Christians who believed, among other things, (1) that, to be Christian, people should seek to understand the Bible rather than wait for an “emotional conversion experience” and (2) that Jesus Christ represented a “unitary God” (that is, the Bible should not be interpreted as describing a “Trinitarian deity—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit”).4 While at Harvard, Ripley studied under Andrews Norton, chairman of the Divinity School and an enthusiastic Unitarian who frequently engaged in public arguments with Trinitarians and others with whom he disagreed (including, eventually, Ripley).5 After Ripley graduated from the Harvard Divinity School, he became a minister of the Unitarian Purchase Street Church in Boston, Massachusetts.6 Ripley served at the Purchase Street Church from 1826 to 1841. During his time at Purchase Street, he became disillusioned 12 Elizabeth Twomey

by the country’s focus on wealth and his congregation’s apparent indifference to those who were less fortunate.7 Through his sermons, Ripley encouraged his congregation to become more engaged in social reforms, but they failed to do so. Frustrated by his inability to motivate his church, Ripley eventually decided to resign. In his final sermon at Purchase Street, Ripley described himself as a “‘peace man, a temperance man, an abolitionist, a transcendentalist, [and] a friend of radical reform’ in social institutions, but [noted that] his flock was not following him down these paths as far as he wished.”8 By the time he left Purchase Street in 1841, Ripley had turned his back on the Unitarians and embraced the teachings of the Transcendentalists, a movement which had begun around 1830 in the town of Concord, Massachusetts.9 Ripley’s involvement with the Transcendentalists began in 1836, after Ripley and a few other men attended Harvard’s bicentennial celebration. Following the celebration, they began a discussion of philosophy and literature. After that initial discussion, Ripley proposed having regular, scheduled meetings to discuss what he considered “serious” topics at his house.10 On September 19, 1836, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Frederic Henry Hedge, Bronson Alcott, James Freeman Clarke, and Convers Francis met at Rip- ley’s home for the first meeting of the Transcendentalist Club.11 The group discussed a wide range of topics, including “Wonder and Worship, Innocence and Guilt, Emerson’s Journals, Property, Harvard College, Law, Truth, Individuality, Personality, God, Revelation, Inspiration, and many more.”12 As Ripley immersed himself in Transcendentalism, he drifted away from Unitarianism. Ripley’s discontent with Unitarianism played out in the most public manner. Between 1836 and 1840, he engaged in a series of debates with Unitarian theologians through the medium of the Boston newspapers. According to Charles Crowe, a historian and university professor, the split between the Unitarians and Tran- scendentalists was in part due to the dissatisfaction with “a wide range of subjects from church ceremonies to educational practices and literary loyalties.”13 One of the more important differences between the groups was the so-called “miracles controversy.” In THE CONCORD REVIEW 13 his article on the subject, Harvard professor Irving J. Rein sum- marizes the Transcendentalist position: “The central point of the transcendentalist thesis was that Christianity rested not upon scholarship, but on universal moral truths…[whose] demonstration did not depend upon miracles or mundane evidences…Men came to believe in religious truths because they were immanent. The existence of God, the assurance of immortality, were given in human nature…[It] confirmed spontaneity, emotion, instinct, ecstasy, imagination.”14 One of the main theological points of Transcendentalism, according to Irving, is the idea that everyone can interpret Scripture and that miracles are not the sole basis for the Christian faith.15 In analyzing an essay by Unitarian James Martineau in 1836, Ripley rejected the idea that miracles were “the essential foundation of the Christian faith, or the ultimate test of Chris- tian character.”16 According to Ripley, “it was the truth which Jesus Christ announced rather than the wonderful works that he wrought, that called forth the faith of his disciples.”17 He also went further, stating, “The power of the soul, by which it gains the intuitive perception of spiritual truth, is the original inspiration that forms the common endowment of human nature,” and suggesting, according to Stone, “that Reason, or intuition, allows each human, regardless of education, gender, class, or religious training, to perceive ‘Divine Truths.’”18 Ripley strongly believed human beings were made in God’s image and, therefore, had the power to distinguish right from wrong and true from false. To him, humans were created to be examples of perfection that held a responsibility.19 Ripley also asserted that humans were made in God’s image because they are capable of caring about others without being romantically interested. They did good deeds for others because they cared about them, not because they wanted to be recognized. Finally, Ripley stated humans were constantly seeking perfection because they fully wanted to emulate God. Ripley believed his critical review of Unitarianism were an appropriate exercise of his duties as a man of faith and reason. Prominent members of Unitarianism, 14 Elizabeth Twomey

however, saw his discussions and ideas concerning the religion as dangerous, and some even went so far as to call him a heretic— including Norton, his former mentor at Harvard.20 In November 1836, Norton publicly launched a personal attack on Ripley in the Boston Daily Advertiser.21 In the article, Norton wrote, “[George Ripley’s views are] vitally injurious to the cause of religion.”22 The schism between Norton and the “radicals” as Ripley and his colleagues were referred to, centered on the question of whether a person could interpret the word of God himself without the aid of a clergyman; Norton believed a lay person needed guidance, while Ripley and his colleagues believed a person did not.23 The attack and insult maddened Ripley, and he immediately began writing a reply. Four days later, his response was published in the Advertiser.24 Ripley described Norton’s argument as “superficial, irreligious and false in its primary elements.”25 He also went further, stating, “The power of the soul, by which it gains the intuitive perception of spiritual truth, is the original inspiration that forms the common endowment of human nature,” and suggesting, according to Stone, “that Reason, or intuition, allows each human, regardless of education, gender, class, or religious training, to perceive ‘Divine Truths.’”26 What angered Ripley most was not so much the insult as the fact that Norton had advised Ripley, from then on, to submit his work “to more mature individuals, such as Norton, before publishing them,” because many of his ideas and beliefs were heretical and he was corrupting the young and innocent with them.27 Ripley, of course, felt he had the right to share his ideas with the public and that his writings were causing harm to no one. Nine days after his response to Norton, Ripley compiled six essays together into a book which he titled Discourses on the Philosophy of Religion.28 In it, Ripley laid out “the case for Transcendentalism.”29 He argued that the key to perceiving God was to be connected with nature. He explained in his discourse: “To one, perhaps, whose heart is tuned to the praises of his Maker, everything suggests the presence of Divine Wisdom and Love. The voice of God is heard THE CONCORD REVIEW 15 in the rushings of the wind and the whisperings of the breeze, in the roar of the thunder and the fall of the rain; His hand is visible in the glories of the midnight sky and the splendor of the opening morn, in the fierce majesty and might of winter, and in the greenness and beauty of the returning spring; every object is an image of the goodness and beauty of God; every sound, a call for His adoration; every spot a hallowed temple for His praise.”30 To Ripley, every little sound or movement was a sign from God. In his discourse, Ripley also discussed human nature and the idea that we were created in God’s image. He wrote, “Consider then, my friends, these four principles of human nature, the power of perceiving Truth–of recognizing moral distinctions–of exercising disinterested love–and of aspiring after illimitable perfection, and tell me, if were not made to become partakers of the Divine Nature?”31 Ripley’s differences with the Unitarian’s theology were profound. Within four years of the publication of his Discourses, Ripley had decided to leave Purchase Street, and did so the following year. This chapter in Ripley’s life demonstrated his willingness to defend his beliefs in any forum, against any foe. As for Norton, he criticized not only the Transcendentalists, but also those of his Unitarian peers whom Norton viewed as too tolerant: “By the end of his participation in the transcendental controversy, Norton had identified two ‘parties’ threatening the religious and social stability of New England: the transcendental ‘mystagogues’ like Ripley, [Orestes] Brownson, and Elizabeth Peabody and the ‘new party’ of Unitarian ministers like Dr. [William] Channing and [Dr. James] Walker who countenanced the Transcendental views.”32

Words

In September 1839, the Transcendentalist Club members decided to publish a new magazine, which they would call The Dial (a title Alcott suggested because it was what he called his personal journal).33 One of the primary reasons the group supported a 16 Elizabeth Twomey new magazine was the refusal of other established publications to print articles on Transcendentalist topics.34 The group agreed that the general subject matter of the new magazine would be Transcendentalist philosophy. According to Emerson, “[The Dial should] contain the best advice on the topics of Government, Temperance, Abolition, Trade, and Domestic Life, [not] a mere literary journal.”35 Those involved with the preliminary work for the magazine were Ripley, Emerson, and Margaret Fuller. Marga- ret Fuller served as first editor of the magazine, and Ripley was in charge of the business arrangements.36 In April of 1840, the first issue ofThe Dial was published.37 Unfortunately, the issue was not particularly successful. The main complaint about the magazine concerned its content. Many readers believed the magazine focused too much on religious and moral issues “at the expense of belles letters.”38 Ripley himself was not satisfied with the periodical as he believed it failed to address adequately the important issues of the Transcendentalist movement. While some of its readers, including moderates in the Unitarian ministry, enjoyed it, The Dial was not as widely read as Ripley, Fuller, and others had hoped it would be.39 According to Emerson, The Dial “enjoyed its obscurity for four years.”40 Ripley left The Dial in 1841 and the magazine published its last edition in 1844.41

Deeds

While Ripley was involved with The Dial, he discovered the ideas of Charles Fourier. Fourier was a French socialist who believed “that work necessary to support a community could be distributed in such a way as to match people’s tasks with their individual desires and ability to do them.”42 Based on Fourier’s The Social Destiny of Man, Ripley wanted to create a community in which there would be a combination of “intellectual, manual, and managerial labor in a harmonious social system.”43 Dur- ing a Transcendentalist Club meeting in October 1840, Ripley introduced his plans for a community he called Brook Farm.44 THE CONCORD REVIEW 17 The members of the Club were genuinely interested, but no one would commit to joining this experimental community.45 Ripley’s biggest recruiting disappointment was Emerson’s decision not to join because Emerson was a prominent figure in the movement and many looked to him for guidance.46 If Emerson had joined Brook Farm, then many other Transcendentalists also might have done so. In early spring of 1841, Ripley resigned as the minister of the Purchase Street Church and in April, he and his wife arrived at Brook Farm in West Roxbury, Massachusetts.47 Ripley intended for Brook Farm to be a place where there was a balance between physical work and intellectual endeavors. It attracted a diverse group, from intellectuals, as Frothingham refers to them, to “un- intellectuals.”48 By the spring of 1842, the community consisted of a school with thirty pupils and about one hundred adults who “constituted the working contingent, those who actually lived and worked at Brook Farm for more than one season.”49 On any given day, Ripley could be seen milking cows, teaching classes, gardening, or engaging in any other task that needed to be accomplished. At the end of the first summer, the community seemed to be doing well financially and Ripley was able to turn his attention from his daily tasks to begin to focus on marketing activities. Although the community was stable, it desperately needed new members.50 Up to that point, Ripley had relied on magazines to send Brook Farm’s message. For example, The Dial and The Democratic Review (another magazine being printed at the time) usually printed favorable reviews about Ripley’s community. In September 1841, Ripley began working on various marketing activities such as writing a new constitution and creating an “economic conditions” report with the hope that more people would come live at Brook Farm.51 Members of the Brook Farm community did not have a single, unified vision of what the community really was. According to Crowe, “The community was many things to many people: an enterprise of communitarians vaguely connected to a Christian socialist past, a society of nineteenth-century ‘Utopian’ socialists 18 Elizabeth Twomey

who drew inspiration from Charles Fourier and other European writers; a Transcendentalist venture; and, finally, a community of sentimental memoirs about a life both serious and charming.”52 Some authors conclude that Ripley and others believed John Winthrop’s “A City upon a Hill,” reference53 applied to Brook Farm. For example, Charles Crowe argues that many people perceived Brook Farm as “a beacon to the world.”54 In a letter to a prospective member, Ripley described the community, writing: “[W]e are seekers of universal truth…We are striving to establish a mode of life which shall combine the enchantments of poetry with the facts of daily experience…We are not in the interest of any sect, party, or coterie; we have faith in the soul of man, in the universal soul of things.”55 He believed that what he and his colleagues were doing at Brook Farm was unique and being done for spiritual reasons. He wanted the people to feel a spiritual and harmonious connection between nature, intellect, and labor while living at the community. Philip McFarland, an historian who has written extensively about New England historical figures (including the author Nathaniel Hawthorne) writes that one of the goals of the community was “to help save the world by setting a good example.”56 Not everyone viewed Brook Farm as serving a higher purpose. To Nathaniel Hawthorne, Brook Farm was merely a place where he could live cheaply and write frequently.57 One critic of the community wrote in The Dial that the community consisted of “[a] few individuals who, unknown to each other, under different disciplines of life, reacting from different social evils, but aiming at the same object—of being wholly true to their natures as men and women—have been made acquainted with one another, and have determined to become the faculty of the embryo university.”58 This critic suggested that the community was made up of people who wanted to achieve different goals. These people, in his opinion, were not held together by anything other than the desire to have a different life at Brook Farm. According to Emerson, Brook Farm was “a noble and generous movement in the projectors, to try an experiment of THE CONCORD REVIEW 19 better living. They had the feeling that our ways of living were too conventional and expensive, not allowing each to do what he had a talent for, and not permitting men to combine cultivation of mind and heart with a reasonable amount of daily labor. At the same time, it was an attempt to lift others with themselves, and to share the advantages they should attain, with others now deprived of them.”59 Emerson believed Ripley’s experimental community was created with good intentions but was a radically different community which expressed its ideas. Emerson also did not believe there was order in the society because it lacked someone who directed and was in charge of the entire community. To him, it appeared everyone was responsible only for his own actions. In what may have been the most cutting criticism, Emerson described the members of Brook Farm as, “happy, hapless anarchists.”60 They enjoyed what they did and how they lived, including the opportunity to express new and radical ideas. According to Henry Golemba, Brook Farm was a community in which “many gathered, the young and the old, the zealous and the confused, ‘[and, according to Emerson, Brook Farmers were] madmen, madwomen, men with beards, Dunkers, Muggletonians, Come-outers, Groaners, Agrarians…Abolitionists, Calvinists, Unitarians,’ whose commonality was that they ‘were in search of something better and more satisfying than a vote or a definition.’”61 During his time at Brook Farm, Ripley struggled with obtaining a balance between collective living and individualism. He wrote in a letter, “The evils arising from trade and money, it appears to me, grow out of the defects of our social organization, not from an intrinsic vice in the things themselves; and the abolition of private property, I fear, would so far destroy the independence of the individual as to interfere with the greatest object of all social reforms; namely, the development of humanity, the substitution of a race of free, noble, holy men and women instead of the dwarfish and mutilated specimens which now cover the earth. The great problem is to guarantee individualism against the masses on the one hand, and the masses against the individual on the other.”62 20 Elizabeth Twomey

Ripley believed in order to create a perfect independent society, it had to be self-sufficient. Therefore, he believed, the evils of the outside world (such as materialism) would be eliminated and a perfect, sustainable society would arise. However, though the economy was centralized, Ripley still believed private property was essential to foster independence. While trying to balance the needs of individuals with the needs of the community, Ripley leaned toward the community, which led him away from Tran- scendentalism and further towards the ideals of Charles Fourier and Fourierism.63 Fourierism may have appealed to Ripley because of the similarity between Fourier’s character and his own. Both men could be described as possessing at an early age certain traits that defined them later on in life. For Ripley, these traits were “group effort, criticism of society’s ills, and faith in a better life.”64 For Fourier, they were “firmness of will…integrity and freedom of thought… independence of traditional errors and social prejudice.”65 In the years between 1844 and 1847, Ripley wrote a lecture on Fourier, which was never published. He described Fourier, writing, “In boldness, acuteness, and depth of thought … in the almost fearful power of intellect, with which he [Fourier] penetrated into the mysteries of nature, he stands, unrivalled and unapproached on the records of scientific investigation. The results of his thought …apply directly to the most important institutions of mankind, to the practical organization of the social state, and to the fulfill- ment of human destiny on earth.”66 Ripley believed Fourier was an intellectual genius who knew how to organize a community and make it efficient. This shift in emphasis became clear with the adoption of a new constitution. In January of 1844, he replaced the original constitution of the Brook Farm community with one which was mainly based on Fourierite ideals.67 Once the constitution was written and accepted, Ripley decided to implement as many of Fourier’s ideals into his community as possible. One of his key ideas was to provide “a wide choice of employment” for individuals with different skills.68 This structure, Ripley believed, would help THE CONCORD REVIEW 21 the community become more efficient. In March 1845, Ripley decided to reorganize the community under a third new constitution.69 He concluded that, under the first Fourierite constitution, the community lacked order and structure because there was little attempt to ensure that the needs of the community matched the work each member chose to perform. Through the reorganization, Ripley sought “to create a greater ‘unity of design’ throughout the phalanx” by providing some centralized guidance to the work efforts.70 With the adoption of the third constitution, the name of the community changed to the Brook Farm Phalanx71 (previously the official name of the community was the Brook Farm Association), and, as Ripley focused more intently on Fourier’s teachings, the community’s visitors also gradually changed. After Brook Farm adopted Fourierite programs and ideals, Transcendentalist visitors were less frequent because they felt the community was becoming more socialist, which conflicted with their views of independence and self-reliance. They believed the spiritual experience was being overshadowed by a need to become systematic and create a truly equal society. However, people who supported socialist ideals approved of the direction in which Ripley was guiding the community, and it was these individuals who began to flock to Brook Farm.72 Within the community, the new ideals were accepted and the morale increased. Members took it upon themselves to use their leisure time to raise money for the construction of the Pha- lanx.73 For the first time, Ripley “instituted regular study hours and fairly detailed rules” in the school.74 Instead of discussing Kant in his Saturday afternoon lectures, Ripley began to speak about Fourier and his ideals.75 Kant had been a regular subject of lectures because his ideas were influential to the Transcendental- ist movement. However, once the community adopted Fourierite ideals, Ripley found it more useful to discuss the relevant points of Fourierism rather than those ideals which lay at the center of Transcendentalism. 22 Elizabeth Twomey

During December of 1845, “the first [full] year under Fourierism,” there was general optimism due to “diversification of industry, incorporation by state charter in March, 1845, an increase of invested capital by ten thousand dollars, and the laying of foundation for a great communal center, the Phalanstery,” such that Brook Farm actually ended the year with a cash surplus.76 This fact increased the optimism in the community and, for the first two months, it seemed as if nothing could go wrong. However, on March 1, 1846, a fire struck the Phalanstery and the newly completed building was destroyed.77 The fire left the community in financial troubles.78 The time between the fire and the end of Brook Farm was a trying one for everyone involved in the community, and in September of 1847, the Brook Farm experiment came to an end. The ending of the community was caused mainly by the fact there were no finances left to sustain the community. It went into debt and was unable to persuade people either to stay or join after the fire. The debts mounted to such an extent that Brook Farm was forced to disband. The end of Brook Farm had a profound effect on Ripley. According to Octavius Frothingham (a contemporary of Ripley and the author of a sympathetic biography), the end of Brook Farm left Ripley feeling bitter. Frothingham writes, “How bitter is evident from the fact that he [Ripley] never referred to Brook Farm except in intimate conversation with his old comrades, or with one to whom he could unbosom his soul. At times he spoke of it in terms of banter such as one may use to conceal deep feelings; at other times, though this was rare, he dwelt with solemnity on the aims which sent him thither and kept him there doing the work he did for so many years. His faith in the principles remained with him through his life.”79 It was after the failure of Brook Farm that Ripley wrote the poem entitled “The Angels of the Past,” in which he described his sorrow:

My buried days!—in bitter tears I sit beside your tomb, And ghostly forms of vanished years THE CONCORD REVIEW 23

Flit through my spirit’s gloom. In throngs around my soul they press, They fill my dreamy sight With visions of past loveliness And shapes of lost delight.

Like angles of the Lord they move Each on his mystic way,—

These blessed messengers of love, These heralds of the day.

And as they pass, the conscious air Is stirred to music round, And a murmur of harmonious prayer Is breathed along the ground.

And sorrow dies from out my heart In exhalations sweet, And the bands of life, which she did part, In blessed union meet.

The past and future o’er my head Their sacred grasp entwine, And the eyes of all the holy dead Around, before me, shine.

And I rise to life and duty, From nights of fear and death, With a deeper sense of beauty And fuller strength of faith.80 24 Elizabeth Twomey

In this poem, Ripley reminisced about his life before and during Brook Farm when all of his endeavors seemed to be succeeding. Once the community was dissolved, Ripley did not know what he was going to do to pay off the numerous debts accumulated from Brook Farm. In his mind, the events of the past and the events of the future were connected; therefore, he needed to learn from his mistakes and move on rather than dwell on the past. In his poem, he realized the next few months or years were going to be difficult, but this time would give him a greater understanding of life, faith, purpose, and commitment. After the closure of Brook Farm, Ripley decided to take a position with Horace Greeley’s New York Tribune.81 Ripley took this job in order to pay off the Brook Farm debts, and because he also was in personal financial trouble. Everything he had was put into sustaining Brook Farm, so when it collapsed, he was left with almost nothing. He also co-edited The Cyclopedia, a widely acclaimed reference book published in 1862.82 Ripley was seventy- seven when he died on July 4, 1880.

In Retrospect

George Ripley should be remembered as a thoughtful idealist who made sincere efforts to improve society, and many of his principles can be found in society today. He believed that all activities, whether physical or intellectual, should be approached with purpose. He put all of his energy into whatever he did, whether it was pushing a congregation to help their fellow men, defend- ing Transcendentalism from attacks by Unitarians, or creating an entirely new community. He was a true leader who spoke his mind and was critical of other people’s work as well as his own. Over the course of his life, Ripley searched for the right set of ideals and worked to implement them. Ripley was a man who was dedicated to making this world a better place. He started Brook Farm in an attempt to demonstrate how mankind should live. Although most of the prominent Tran- THE CONCORD REVIEW 25 scendentalist figures declined to join his experiment (Emerson, Fuller, etc), Ripley was never shaken in his beliefs. Moreover, Ripley was a hard worker who invested almost all of his life to helping others and trying to change mankind. Ripley was devoted to his work and beliefs for the rest of his life and the closure of Brook Farm, for him, was devastating. Clearly, he felt responsible for how well the experiment went and how it was perceived by others. When it ended, Ripley felt as if he had somehow failed. However, it seems to me that he succeeded. He wanted to teach the world what Transcendentalists believed through example, which is more efficient than any essay. Emerson argued in 1838 that the graduating class from Harvard’s Divinity School could not communicate with their future congregations without the benefit of personal experiences. Ripley certainly embodied Emerson’s ideals. Through his experimental community, he did what no other Transcendentalist had succeeded in doing before—he opened the minds of the people he was able to reach to Transcendentalist thoughts, ideals, and beliefs. 26 Elizabeth Twomey

Endnotes

1 Philip F. Gura, American Transcendentalism (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007) p. 105 2 Ibid., p. 79 3 David Robinson, “George Ripley,” Dictionary of Unitarian and Universalist Biographies, Unitarian Universalist Historical Society, http://www25.uua.org/uuhs/duub/articles/ georgeripley.html (accessed October 11, 2009) 4 Gura, p. 23 5 Ibid., pp. 33-34 6 Octavius Frothingham, Transcendentalism in New England (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1959) p. 323 7 Gura, pp. 141-142 8 Ibid., p. 144 (paraphrasing Ripley) 9 Richard G. Geldard, The Essential Transcendentalists (New York: Penguin Group, 2005) p. 6 10 Charles Crowe, George Ripley: Transcendentalist and Utopian Socialist (Doraville, GA: Foote & Davies, 1967) p. 82 11 Susan M. Stone, “George Ripley,” Dictionary of Literary Biography Vol. 235: The American Renaissance in New England, Third Series (Detroit: Gale Group, 2001) p. 360 12 Crowe, p. 84 13 Ibid., p. 62 14 Irving J. Rein, “The New England Transcendentalists: Philosophy and Rhetoric,” Philosophy & Rhetoric 1.2 (1968) p. 103 15 Ibid., p. 103 16 Robinson 17 Gura, p. 82 (quoting Ripley) 18 Stone, p. 360 (quoting Ripley) 19 George Ripley, “Discourses on the Philosophy of Religion,” The Transcendentalists–The Classic Anthology, ed. Perry Miller (New York: MJF Books, 1950) p. 140 20 Henry L. Golemba, George Ripley (Boston: G.K. Hall & Co, 1977) pp. 38-39 21 Ibid., p. 39 22 Robinson 23 Golemba, p. 40 24 Ibid., p. 39 25 Robinson 26 Stone, p. 360 (quoting Ripley) 27 Golemba, p. 39 THE CONCORD REVIEW 27

28 Ibid., p. 42 29 Ripley, p. 132 30 Ibid., p. 136 31 Ibid., p. 140 32 Robert D. Habich, “Emerson’s Reluctant Foe: Andrews Norton and the Transcendental Controversy” The New England Quarterly 65.2 (1992) p. 237 33 Crowe, p. 86 34 Golemba, p. 58 35 Lawrence C. Porter, “Transcendentalism: A Self-Portrait.” The New England Quarterly 35.1 (1962) pp. 42-43 (quoting Emerson) 36 Crowe, p. 87 37 Ibid., p. 89 38 Ibid., p. 90 39 Gura, p. 225 40 Ralph W. Emerson, “Historic Notes of Life and Letters in New England,” Lectures and Biographical Sketches, ed. J.E. Cabot (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1883) p. 343 41 Golemba, p. 60 42 Robinson 43 Crowe, p. 137 44 Golemba, p. 64 45 Stone, p. 362 46 Golemba, p. 66 47 Stone, p. 362 48 Frothingham, Transcendentalism p. 165 49 Golemba, p. 82 50 Crowe, p. 145 51 Ibid., p. 145 52 Ibid., p. 146 53 John Winthrop, in 1630, referred to the Massachusetts Bay Colony as “A City upon a Hill” because he believed God had a special mission for the settlers of the colony. 54 Crowe, p. 144 55 Octavius Frothingham, George Ripley (Boston: Houghton, 1882) p. 144 56 Philip McFarland, Hawthorne in Concord (New York: Grove, 2004) p. 82 57 Ibid., p. 84 58 Frothingham, Ripley p. 122 59 Emerson, p. 360 60 Ibid., p. 368 28 Elizabeth Twomey

61 Golemba, p. 65 (quoting Emerson) 62 Frothingham, Ripley p. 147 (quoting Ripley) 63 Crowe, p. 167 64 Golemba, p. 16 65 David A. Zonderman, “George Ripley’s Unpublished Lecture on Charles Fourier,” Studies in the American Renaissance (1982) p. 189 66 Ibid., p. 189 67 Gura, p. 165 68 Crowe, p. 176 69 Gura, p. 167 70 Crowe, p. 177 71 According to Fourier, “Each ‘phalanx,’ the group who lived in a phalanstery, was thus comprised of a variety of individuals in terms of backgrounds and skills, all of whose basic needs were supplied in common…because of the increased production incumbent on cooperative labor, even as different jobs yielded different dividends, depending on their difficulty and desirability.” Gura, p. 162 72 Crowe, p. 179 73 Ibid., p. 177 74 Ibid., p. 179 75 Ibid., pp. 179-180 76 Ibid., p. 184 77 Golemba, p. 95 78 Gura, p. 168 79 Frothingham, Ripley p. 356 80 Ibid., pp. 197-198 81 Golemba, p. 116 82 Ibid., p. 114 THE CONCORD REVIEW 29

Bibliography

Crowe, Charles, George Ripley: Transcendentalist and Utopian Socialist, Doraville, Georgia: Foote & Davies, 1967

Emerson, Ralph W., “Historic Notes of Life and Letters in New England,” Lectures and Biographical Sketches. Edited by J.E. Cabot, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1883

Frothingham, Octavius, George Ripley, Boston: Houghton, 1882 . Transcendentalism in New England, New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1959

Geldard, Richard G., The Essential Transcendentalists. New York: Penguin Group, 2005

Golemba, Henry L., George Ripley, Boston: G.K. Hall & Co., 1977

Gura, Philip F., American Transcendentalism, New York: Hill and Wang, 2007

Habich, Robert D., “Emerson’s Reluctant Foe: Andrews Norton and the Transcendental Controversy,” The New England Quarterly 65.2 (1992) pp. 208-237

McFarland, Philip, Hawthorne in Concord, New York: Grove, 2004

Porter, Lawrence C., “Transcendentalism: A Self-Portrait,” The New England Quarterly 35.1 (1962) pp. 27-47

Rein, Irving J., “The New England Transcendentalists: Philosophy and Rhetoric,” Philosophy & Rhetoric 1.2 (1968) pp. 103-117

Ripley, George, “Discourses on the Philosophy of Religion,” The Transcendentalists: the Classic Anthology, Ed. Perry Miller, New York: MJF Books, 1950, pp. 132-140 30 Elizabeth Twomey

Robinson, David, “George Ripley,” Dictionary of Unitarian and Universalist Biographies, Unitarian Universalist Historical Society. http://www25.uua.org/uuhs/duub/articles/ georgeripley.html (accessed October 11, 2009)

Stone, Susan M., “George Ripley,” Dictionary of Literary Biography, Vol. 235: The American Renaissance in New England, Third Series, Detroit: Gale Group, 2001

Zonderman, David A., “George Ripley’s Unpublished Lecture on Charles Fourier,” Studies in the American Renaissance (1982) pp. 185-208 THE CONCORD REVIEW 31 Thus for sixteen days I saw from my window a hundred men at work like busy husbandmen, with teams and horses and apparently all the implements of farming, such a picture as we see on the first page of the almanac; and as often as I looked out I was reminded of the fable of the lark and the reapers, or the parable of the sower, and the like; and now they are all gone, and in thirty days more, probably, I shall look from the same window on the pure sea-green Walden water there, reflecting the clouds and trees, and sending up its evaporations in solitude, and no traces will appear that a man has ever stood there. Perhaps I shall hear a solitary loon laugh as he dives and plumes himself, or shall see a lonely fisher in his boat, like a floating leaf, beholding his form reflected in the waves, where lately a hundred men securely labored.

Thus it appears that the sweltering inhabitants of Charleston and New Orleans, of Madras and Bombay and Calcutta, drink at my well. In the morning I bathe my intellect in the stupendous and cosmogonal philosophy of the Bhagavad-Gita, since whose composition years of the gods have elapsed, and in comparison with which our modern world and its literature seem puny and trivial; and I doubt if that philosophy is not to be referred to a previous state of existence, so remote is its sublimity from our conceptions. I lay down the book and go to my well for water, and lo! there I meet the servant of the Brahmin, priest of Brahma and Vishnu and Indra, who still sits in his temple on the Ganges reading the Vedas, or dwells at the root of a tree with his crust and water jug. I meet his servant come to draw water for his master, and our buckets as it were grate together in the same well. The pure Walden water is mingled with the sacred water of the Ganges. With favoring winds it is wafted past the site of the fabulous islands of Atlantis and the Hesperides, makes the periplus of Hanno, and, floating by Ternate and Tidore and the mouth of the Persian Gulf, melts in the tropic gales of the Indian seas, and is landed in ports of which Alexander only heard the names.

FASCISTS, TERRORISTS, AND MAFIOSI: CHALLENGES TO THE ITALIAN STATE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Antonia Woodford

The Christian Democratic politician Aldo Moro once described Italy as a “difficult democracy”: a state beset by unstable government coalitions and by a populace profoundly distrustful of those in power.1 Ever since Italian unification in 1861, a government perceived as inefficient, ineffective, or even hostile to its people has spawned a gap between citizen and state that invites challenges to the political establishment. In the twentieth century, Fascists, terrorists, and mafiosi each threatened political legitimacy. These groups, all violent, posed as remedies for certain government ills, yet they diverged in their relationships to the state. Mussolini maneuvered to take over the state, while terrorists in the Red Brigades plotted the state’s destruction. The Mafia chose to cohabit with the state, exploiting it from within without causing its dissolution. The nature of each group’s relationship with the state would ultimately determine that group’s fate: its demise or survival. The danger of these groups to the government lay most visibly in their use of violence. As Max Weber wrote, the ability to “monopolize the use of force” is “essential” to a functioning state.2

Antonia Woodford is at Yale. She wrote this paper at the Horace Mann School in Riverdale, New York, as an independent study for Dr. Elisa Milkes in the 2009/2010 academic year. 24 Antonia Woodford

As soon as other institutions claim the authority to use violence, the legitimacy of the state suffers. Through overt displays of violence, Fascists in the 1920s, terrorists in the 1970s, and Mafia members in the last half of the century demonstrated the state’s incapacity to monopolize force. Only in the case of terrorism were these violent acts directed against the state itself, but they all nevertheless undercut state power. In the early 1920s, Mussolini’s willingness to use violence against socialists catapulted him and his National Fascist Party into the national spotlight. Italy had experienced a biennio rosso from 1919 to 1920, a “red two years” of intense labor agitation. Widespread factory occupations and calls for socialist revolution inspired panic among conservatives, yet the liberal government preferred not to intervene. Mussolini decided to exercise force where the state would not, and in so doing he assumed the state’s role as the arbiter of violence. In Italy’s northeastern Po Valley, where socialist Labor Exchanges controlled the labor pool and forced concessions from landowners, Fascist gang members began mounting nightly attacks on socialist offices. In the first half of 1921 alone, these squadristi “destroyed 17 newspapers and printing works, 59 Peoples’ Houses (socialist headquarters), 119 Chambers of Labor (socialist employment offices), 107 coopera- tives, 83 Peasants’ Leagues, 151 socialist clubs, and 151 cultural organizations.”3 Such violence not only secured Mussolini the support of landowners, but also caught the attention of national politicians. His “de facto power” in the countryside, established through physical force, made him impossible to ignore.4 Further undermining the state was that Mussolini exercised violence with seeming impunity. Local law enforcement officials were complicit in the squadristi’s expeditions, lending trucks and weapons and conveniently neglecting to interfere with Fascist acts of violence. Magistrates looked more favorably upon Fascist violence than socialist violence, and some police officers even participated in the squadristi’s raids.5 In the 1921 parliamentary elections, politicians such as liberal Prime Minister Giovanni Gio- litti welcomed Mussolini into their antisocialist coalition; with 35 THE CONCORD REVIEW 25 representatives elected to parliament, the Fascist party of thugs suddenly appeared respectable.6 Fascist violence, however, was selective. Mussolini was careful to ensure that powerful elites—the people he would rely on to acquire power—never felt that Fascist violence would turn against them. Liberals like Giolitti supported Fascism with the assumption that the movement would eventually “normalize,” ceasing to be violent once it had achieved stability. They also reasoned that if Fascism was an unpleasant alternative, surely Communism would be worse. Cleverly, Mussolini stirred up additional disorder with his squadristi and then presented himself as the only person capable of restoring calm, of both quashing socialism and restraining his own Fascist aggressors.7 Mafia violence, too, tended not to attack the government directly. While Mafia bosses did order the murders of politicians and state employees such as magistrates, the killings were meant to eliminate specific individuals seen as threats to Mafia families; the Mafia never desired the overthrow of the state. Yet compared to the Fascists, mafiosi targeted a much broader range of victims and used their violence for a multiplicity of goals. Mafia violence functioned to regulate Mafia clan dynamics, to give the Mafia an edge in business deals, and to solidify clans’ “political dominion” in a given territory.8 In addition, sometimes the Mafia was violent simply because it could be without suffering any consequences. Roberto Saviano narrates how members of the Neapolitan Camorra, an organized crime group similar to the Sicilian Mafia, tested out new assault rifles by firing into shops’ bulletproof glass windows. And often, motives for violence were interrelated. Firing at the windows rather than the open countryside came with “a side benefit: the local glass companies with the best prices on replacement windows are all related to the clan; the more broken glass, the more money they make.”9 Within Mafia families, violence served to reinforce or uproot clan hierarchies and to enforce codes of secrecy. As described by mafiosi who collaborated with the police, each clan had a strict hierarchy. The capofamiglia, literally the “family head,” held the 26 Antonia Woodford

most authority, followed by a few counselors (consiglieri) and then lower-ranking members. Though theoretically elected by the rest of their clan, family heads frequently imposed their leadership by force. Since Mafia power rested on the “capacity to personally employ or command violence,” it was acceptable for a lower-level mafioso to shoot thecapofamiglia and assume his place.10 Regard- less of how they came to power, family heads subsequently used violence to monitor clan affairs. They ordained the killing of mafiosi who violated the traditional code of secrecy omertà( ) and of any members of rival clans who encroached on their territory.11 Unlike Mussolini’s attacks on socialists, the goal of Mafia violence was more commercial. It sprung from the will to acquire profits and power, and as such it did not discriminate by ideology. When pursuing business interests—in everything from construction and trash disposal to trafficking in arms, drugs, and cigarettes—mafiosi were “pleased to take whatever they can get by force and fraud,” Letizia Paoli writes.12 Whether they were dealing with fellow mafiosi, Mafia affiliates, or regular business owners, Mafia members applied force to further their own interests. Paoli recounts how in the 1980s, the heyday of Mafia drug trafficking, two mafiosi racked up a large debt to Turkish heroin suppliers and finally killed the Turks rather than paying them. Mafia groups also required all enterprises operating in their areas to pay the pizzo, an extortion tax. Mafia bosses intimidated business owners who refused to comply by progressively extreme measures, warning them with a phone call, perhaps strangling their pets or smashing their windows, and ultimately killing the most stubborn resisters.13 In essence, Mafia violence aimed to punish anyone seen as a threat to a Mafia clan. Mafia family heads often entered alliances with politicians, guaranteeing votes from districts their clans controlled in exchange for legal protection.14 When the state intensified its antimafia efforts in the mid-1980s and again in 1992, the Mafia lashed out against formerly friendly politicians who had “failed” to defend Mafia interests. After 342 people were convicted of mafia-type association or mafia-related crimes in the “maxi-trial” of 1986-1987, the Mafia retaliated swiftly and brutally THE CONCORD REVIEW 27 against those it deemed culpable. Mafiosi assassinated not only major judges and prosecutors involved in the case—men who were clearly never Mafia affiliates—but also politicians like Salvo Lima, a Sicilian reputed to have Mafia sympathies. The maxi-trial verdicts were challenged in Italy’s appeals courts, and mafiosi expected Lima to influence the Supreme Court to rule in the Mafia’s favor. But after the court affirmed the verdicts in 1992, “Lima was killed because he did not uphold, or couldn’t uphold, the commitments he had made,” former mafioso Gaspare Mutolo testified.15 The Mafia even went so far as to murder priests who dared to speak out against it.16 Its killings were calculated to protect the Mafia organization, regardless of moral scruples. The Red Brigades also struck a wide variety of targets, including factory managers, industrialists, politicians, policemen, lawyers, judges, and journalists. However, in contrast to the Mafia, the terrorist violence of the Red Brigades was just ideological. And unlike both Fascists and mafiosi, brigatisti sought nothing less than the complete overthrow of the state. If both Fascist and Mafia violence intended to enhance their practitioners’ own power, Red Brigade violence had the external goal of revolutionizing society. The brigatisti identified themselves with Marxist-Leninism and conceived of the state as the “absolute enemy.”17 From their founding in 1970 to their decline in the early 1980s, the Red Brigades ratcheted up the intensity and scope of their violence as they waged a “war” on the Italian government.18 According to Luigi Manconi, the spark for the Red Brigades’ militancy was lit in December 1969, when neo-fascist extremists planted a bomb in Milan’s Piazza Fontana that killed 17 people and wounded 88. The police arrested two left-wing anarchists for the crime, one of whom “fell out” of a police station window while under interrogation and died, and they continued to prosecute the surviving anarchist even as his innocence became apparent. Future brigatisti considered the Piazza Fontana incident a “state massacre,” and it permanently shook their faith in the state.19 They became convinced that the state was an enemy intent on repressing the people, and they took up arms initially as a defensive mechanism. 28 Antonia Woodford

From 1970 to 1974, the Red Brigades concentrated their activities in factories in Milan and Turin, seeking to mobilize the working masses. They strove to liberate workers from exploitation at the hands of factory owners, a struggle that encapsulated their fight against the state itself. In this period the Red Brigades avoided excessive violence so as not to alienate workers: until 1972, they directed their violence exclusively against property, often using arson. From 1972 to 1974 they raided factory headquarters and vandalized the cars of factory personnel managers. Always, they supplemented these acts with elaborate justifications, in manifes- tos and communiqués, for why the people they “punished” were guilty, whereas neither Fascists nor mafiosi felt a comparable need to validate their actions.20 But the Red Brigades’ relative restraint was short-lived. After 1974 they began attacking political figures, often from the Christian Democratic party that symbolized Italy’s political status quo. They progressed from using guns for intimidation to using them to maim and kill, from kidnapping and releasing victims to kidnappings that ended in murder. By this point, the brigatisti’s struggle had left the factories behind. No longer content to punish certain individuals or expose corruption in the political system, the Red Brigades aspired to bring the entire state to its knees. They transitioned from a more defensive strategy (claiming to defend themselves against state repression) to one of open attack. Their goals of unleashing a latent “civil war” and assailing “the heart of the state” required that they randomly attack executives at all levels in industrial firms, not bothering to justify each one’s supposed crimes.21 While the Fascists had been violent at the outset and then toned it down, the Red Brigades tried to attract attention through increased radicalization. The brigatisti’s actions degenerated from violence against symbolic targets—prominent politicians, such as Moro, and corporate executives—to indiscriminate violence simply meant to perpetuate disorder. But if Mafia violence was purely practical and Fascist violence was both practical and political or ideological, Red Brigade violence was political to the extreme and hopelessly impractical. The brigatisti presumed the masses would THE CONCORD REVIEW 29 share their vision of violent revolution when, in reality, the public was appalled.22 In varying ways, all three groups were inspired by, and sought to address, public dissatisfaction with the state. They either shared or recognized grievances people had with the government, and they drew support by succeeding where the state had not. The Red Brigades were the least successful because they failed to provide an attractive alternative to the state: even working-class Italians in the 1970s preferred to live under the current system than to embrace the Red Brigades’ anarchic vision. Yet the emergence of the Red Brigades still revealed a gap between citizen and state, because the brigatisti were responding to their own disillusionment with the Italian political and legal system. The Piazza Fontana bombing made them profoundly distrustful of a state that would deliberately prosecute the wrong victims and seemed to condone right-wing, neo-fascist action. Until their violence became too extreme, the Red Brigades did enjoy many leftists’ sympathies. The Fascists and the Mafia achieved success with a much broader segment of the population. Mussolini, despite being a former socialist, first capitalized on Italians’ fears in 1920 that the government could not halt the tide of socialism. His Fascist squads reined in socialist opposition at a time when the liberal state seemed on the verge of disaster. As Mark Robson writes, for conservative elites “a ‘Bolshevik’ seizure of power seemed imminent and, to their disgust, the government appeared to be doing nothing to meet the threat.”23 When 500,000 laborers seized control of their workplaces in Milan, Turin, and Genoa that fall, then-prime minister Francesco Nitti encouraged employers to grant workers concessions; industrialists in turn concluded that the state would no longer protect them.24 Landowners in the Po Valley, too, felt besieged, and with his anti-socialist violence Mussolini became their savior. Mussolini similarly took advantage of the disconnect between the state and Italian nationalists. After World War I, nationalists and war veterans decried Italy’s “mutilated victory” in the war, claiming that the Paris peace conference had denied Italy 30 Antonia Woodford

territory it deserved. As the war veteran and Fascist leader Italo Balbo wrote, “When I returned from the war, just like so many others, I hated politics and politicians who, in my opinion, had betrayed the hopes of soldiers, reducing Italy to a shameful peace and to a systematic humiliation.”25 Mussolini’s aggressive foreign policy and his promise to strengthen italianità, or “Italian-ness,” around the globe appealed to Italians frustrated by their state’s humiliating disappointments.26 Perhaps most importantly, Mussolini won over the Catholic establishment, which had been estranged from the state since Ital- ian unification. Since 1870 the Vatican had refused to surrender its temporal power over the Papal States or to acknowledge the Kingdom of Italy. The Church had practically removed itself from Italian political life and, as a result, devout Catholics had little allegiance to the government. Anticipating the political might of the untapped Catholic electorate, in 1922 Mussolini began making overtures to the Church. He reinstituted religious teaching in elementary schools, shut down anti-clerical journals, and allocated 3 million lire to repair churches, among other measures. In 1929, he finally settled the “Roman question” of papal sovereignty by signing the Lateran Pacts.27 With Pope Pius XI hailing him as “the man sent by Providence,” Mussolini gained a legitimacy and popularity among Catholics that the previous state had never possessed.28 In the case of the Mafia, citizens’ lack of trust in the state to provide employment options allowed the Mafia to attain legitimacy. Mafia groups established themselves in the southern Italian countryside in the mid-nineteenth century. Back then, the state had little to no official presence in rural areas, and the Mafia played a quasi-judicial and protective role. Mafiosi would settle village disputes and guard the lands of property owners.29 By the twentieth century, the Mafia was an accepted part of daily life in Sicily, even as it became more interested in extracting money from the community than in community improvement. However, an enduring gulf between Sicilians and the government hampered antimafia efforts. Sicily had long been poorer and less developed THE CONCORD REVIEW 31 than northern Italy, and after the state ended the Cassa per il Mez- zogiorno, or Development Fund for the South, in 1992, Sicilians felt even more neglected.30 When the state also took steps to cur- tail Mafia-infiltrated industries, many working-class citizens felt their livelihoods menaced. With unemployment at 35% in 1991, residents of Palermo feared that eradicating the Mafia would only worsen the economy.31 They did not trust the government to provide new economic opportunities, and so they supported the Mafia. The same way that conservatives tolerated Fascism as the “less bad” alternative to socialism, Palermitans tolerated Ma- fia extortion and violence because of the jobs the Mafia created. The Mafia-dominated construction industry encompassed 48% of the area’s firms in 1999, therefore supplying most of the jobs.32 Working-class families interviewed by Jane and Peter Schneider in the mid-1990’s attested that “the mafia gave us work” and “the mafia put food on the table.”33 In the words of Borsellino, one of the top antimafia magistrates at the maxi-trial, the Mafia in Italy was “not the price of poverty, but the cost of distrust.”34 Borsel- lino made an important distinction: Sicilians turned to the Mafia because they lacked faith in the state’s ability to help them get out of poverty, not because of poverty per se. Failures of the state also influenced the attitudes that Fascists, brigatisti, and mafiosi held towards the state, and the relationships they formed with it. After gaining the premiership in 1922, Mussolini steadily moved to replace the liberal state with a fascist one. It was one of his opponents who invented the adjective totalitaria to criticize Mussolini’s policy; Mussolini apparently liked the term and voiced his ambitions for totalitarismo, or totalitarian- ism.35 Mussolini envisioned a state where the private melted into the public, and where all citizens subordinated their wills and individual rights to him and the Fascist party.36 His goal reserved no place for the former state: the Fascist party would become the state and then transform it. In the process of consolidating control, Mussolini set up a number of “parallel structures,” such as the party police, to usurp the functions of government bodies.37 One can imagine Fascism beginning as a parallel state, with its own organizations that carried out tasks similar to those of official 32 Antonia Woodford

state agencies. Gradually, the Fascist “parallel structures” took on more power, and exercised greater control, than the official agencies that they had duplicated. Thus, from being a parallel state, Fascism became the state itself. The Red Brigades also sought a societal transformation, yet they aspired to annihilate the state altogether. In this sense they were an anti-state, the state’s antithesis. They pitted themselves squarely against the state, with their rhetoric about an “armed struggle,” “unleashing civil war,” and “dislocation of the apparatus.”38 They never captured the public’s imagination largely because they could not articulate what would follow the revolution; overthrowing the state was their be-all and end-all. Interestingly, the brigatisti did define an “alternative law” which they believed should supersede the official justice system.39 The Piazza Fontana bombing was one of many incidents that proved to them the state’s injustice, and so they tried to establish a “proletarian justice” to oppose it.40 The Red Brigades exercised their system of “justice” at the same time as they carried out their attacks—hence the justifications for their actions and their interrogation of kidnapped politicians in a “People’s Prison.” When they kidnapped Aldo Moro in 1978, their biggest claim to fame, they said they were putting him on trial for the Christian Democrats’ “crimes.”41 A justice system alone, however, does not make a state. Both the Fascists and the Red Brigades had fairly straight- forward relationships with the state. For members of Mafia families, the situation was more convoluted. If Fascism was an alternate state and the Red Brigades were an anti-state, the Mafia operated, in the words of Alison Jamieson, as a “state-within-a-state.”42 Mus- solini took over the state, brigatisti aimed to destroy the state, and mafiosi instead exploited it from within. As mentioned above, Mafia bosses long enjoyed a symbiotic relationship with many politicians. This relationship broke down somewhat after the murder of Lima in 1992 for the maxi-trial verdicts, which revealed the Mafia’s willingness to kill not only its “outspoken enemies” but also its former allies.43 But despite its coziness with politicians, the Mafia acted as a parasite to the state as a whole. It drew strength THE CONCORD REVIEW 33 from the state’s weaknesses—such as its inability to provide jobs or to monopolize force—and then exacerbated those problems. In certain ways it was also a “parallel state”; in some Sicilian neighborhoods, residents would report thefts to the local capofamiglia rather than the police. Even though mafiosi in his clan had likely stolen the goods, the capofamiglia might return them in exchange for a bribe, while police searches regularly turned up nothing.44 The Mafia’s infiltration of both licit and illicit sectors of society further complicated its relationship to the state. The Ma- fia eludes classification as a simple criminal enterprise, because it often took illegally-made profits and invested them in legal industries. It was also involved in businesses that seemed legal on the surface, such as construction and waste disposal, but which it then subverted. In what is known as “the sack of Palermo,” in the 1960s the Mafia illegally built hundreds of apartments and condominiums on expanses of land meant to be left untouched.45 At other times the Mafia funneled public relief funds into specula- tive investments that in turn channeled enormous profits its way.46 Saviano describes how the Camorra in Naples unsafely disposed of millions of tons of toxic waste from the whole Italian peninsula—thus implicating even the north in what was considered a “southern problem.”47 Many historians connect the Mafia’s relationship to the state to the imperfect process of state formation in Italy. Charles Tilly writes that the Mafia “grew up precisely because national systems of power expanded without obliterating local systems of power.”48 Paoli draws from Tilly’s description of “a continuum running from anarchy to banditry to mafia to routine government” to characterize Mafia families as “small proto-states” which exist within the Italian state but are not developed enough to supplant it.49 Neither the Mafia nor the state monopolized force completely, and so they continued to exist and progress side-by-side. Antima- fia reformers highlighted citizens’ distrust of the state to explain why the Mafia persisted. Giovanni Falcone, the major antimafia magistrate in the maxi-trial alongside Borsellino, called the Mafia “nothing more than a need for order and therefore for a state.”50 34 Antonia Woodford

Sicilians did not trust the state to protect their social and economic well-being, the same way that conservatives in 1920 did not trust the state to stop socialism. In both eras, what Falcone termed the “lack of a sense of State” allowed alternate powers to step in.51 These groups’ relationship to the Catholic Church also seemed to influence the extent to which the state could overcome their challenges. Mussolini depended first on the Church’s neutrality and after 1929 on its explicit support. Before the Lateran Pacts, Catholic support for Fascism occurred mostly on an individual, rather than an institutional, basis. Mussolini won over a group of Catholic conservative elites, known the Clerico-Fascists, whom he used to dismantle the one Catholic political party (the Italian Peo- ple’s Party, or PPI) and to campaign for the Fascist parliamentary ticket. Once the PPI disintegrated, Mussolini could court Catholic voters. The Clerico-Fascists also served as intermediaries between the Church and Fascist leaders when negotiations began for the Lateran agreements.52 But even though the Clerico-Fascists did not act on the Church’s behalf, the Vatican’s stance toward Mus- solini in mid-1920s was one of “benevolent neutrality.”53 In 1924, for example, men associated with Mussolini murdered Giacomo Matteotti, secretary of the Italian Socialist Party, after he had denounced Fascist corruption before Parliament. Though it was unclear if Mussolini had ordered the murder, the event rekindled doubts about his regime’s legitimacy. The Church’s response was to remind Catholics to obey the budding Fascist government, and not to voice any concerns.54 Since Italy was, and still remains, a predominantly Catholic country, a neutral attitude by the Church could easily amount to a condonation. The Mafia, too, benefited from the Church’s lack of an institutional stance against it. Individual priests’ relationships to the Mafia ranged from collusion to passive acceptance to moderate criticism to opposition. A small number were obviously corrupt, acting as cash handlers for mafiosi or participating in kidnapping schemes.55 More commonly, they were neutral, not actively aiding Mafia members but not denying them Church marriages, baptisms, or communions either. Those few who did venture to speak out THE CONCORD REVIEW 35 strongly against the Mafia were often murdered—a shocking fact, given that mafiosi considered themselves good Christians. In the words of Saviano, mafiosi reconciled their violent activities with their Christian faith thus: “Killing is a sin that Christ will understand and forgive in the name of necessity,” with “necessity” meaning the self-interest of their clan.56 Amazingly, mafiosi could commit murder with indifference and turn drug-dealing into a pursuit worthy of Christian praise. In Camorra drug labs in Scampia, “bricks of hashish are often cut thirty-three at a time—like Christ’s age,” Saviano relates. “Then they halt work for thirty-three minutes, make the sign of the cross, and start up again.”57 So when certain priests dared to contest the Christian dimension of Mafia conduct, Mafia bosses felt incredibly threatened. They realized that a religious, moral appeal against them could be more damn- ing in the eyes of the people than any antimafia state effort.58 Unfortunately for antimafia crusaders, for a long time the Church withheld institutional condemnations of the Mafia. The result was that the few brave, vocal priests were killed, their messages silenced, while the Church failed to exert its institutional power. In 1992, the Diocese of Agrigento reproached the Sicilian Church for “not us[ing] all the means at its disposal to oppose the consolidation of the Mafia phenomenon either at a cultural level…or at a political level…or at the pastoral level.”59 Pope John Paul II was the first pope to publicly pronounce the term “Mafia” in 1981; the next time he spoke about it was ten years later. The Church did not make an official doctrinal statement about the Mafia until late 1992, when it said that mafiosi should be refused the sacraments but not excommunicated.60 In a largely Catholic country, the dearth of Church intervention against Fascists and later the Mafia certainly contributed to those groups’ abilities to survive, thorns in the side of the Italian state. (In the case of the Red Brigades, who were atheists and sought no relation to the Church, the issue is irrelevant.) Discussion of the problems Fascists, brigatisti, and the Mafia all posed to the state begs the following question: what did the state do to combat them, and what methods succeeded? Once 36 Antonia Woodford

Mussolini cemented his regime, the Fascist party was the state, and it took the end of World War II to restore liberalism. Dur- ing Mussolini’s tenure, clearly the government could not attack itself. But state responses to the Red Brigades and the Mafia are much more interesting. The government transplanted several of its anti-terrorist measures to the antimafia struggle in the 1980s and 1990s, and debates arose both times about how firm the state should be in dealing with the people who challenged it. For most of the 1970s, the state’s anti-terrorist measures yielded mixed results. By 1976 almost all the original Red Brigades leaders were in jail, yet a “second wave” of militants soon took their place.61 Police investigations were disorganized and untimely; just hours after Moro’s kidnapping, security around the crime scene was so low that the Red Brigades returned the car they had trans- ported him in without being caught.62 A turning point came in 1980, with the ad hoc approval of a so-called pentiti (“penitents”) law that reduced prison sentences for brigatisti who turned state’s witness. The Red Brigades already suffered from factionalism, and encouraged by the law a steady stream of members defected. These pentiti provided key information about the location of Red Brigade hideouts, greatly increasing the number of police arrests and dampening morale within the organization.63 By 1983, the Red Brigades had self-destructed. A second innovation of the terrorist period was the anti-terrorism “pool,” a group of magistrates who pooled knowledge gleaned from anti-terrorist investigations. The idea was that if one of the judges in the pool was assassinated, the others would be able to continue his chain of investigation.64 Both pentiti and the judicial “pool” became useful in the antimafia fight. After the state granted similar concessions to mafiosi-turned-collaborators, Mafia members offered invaluable testimony about the structure and operations of Mafia families. Judges’ understanding about clan hierarchies, for example, stems directly from the statements of former mafiosi. The testimony of Tommaso Buscetta in 1984 certified that the Mafia truly was a criminal organization, not simply a Sicilian attitude or way of life as some had averred. The “Buscetta theorem,” his revelation THE CONCORD REVIEW 37 that a Mafia Commission directed the clans’ activities in Sicily, allowed judges to prosecute Mafia bosses for crimes they had not personally committed.65 After legislation on state’s witnesses was officially passed in 1991, the number of collaborators skyrocketed. Increased severity of the state’s prison regime further propelled cooperation. By 1997, pentiti accounted for an estimated 6.6% of the Mafia’s total membership.66 In fact, by the early 2000s the state encountered logistical problems as it labored to accommodate all the pentiti and their families in its witness protection system. Ac- cording to the Schneiders, by that point the pentiti had outlived their usefulness, yet they were critical in the earliest stages of antimafia investigation.67 As for the technique of judicial teamwork, magistrate Rocco Chinnici created an antimafia pool in Palermo in the 1980s. The pool included Falcone and Borsellino, both assassinated by the Mafia in 1992 for their work on the maxi-trial. Anti-terrorism and antimafia judges alike faced enormous risk during their inquiries, and being able to pass on information to their colleagues was essential. And even though the antimafia team had scant resources at its inception, it successfully promoted the use of pentiti.68 The state’s commitment to both anti-terrorist and antimafia actions fluctuated over time. Only after “emergency” situations did the state allocate significant resources, at least temporarily, to meeting these threats. When the police failed to recover the kidnapped Moro and the Red Brigades killed him after 54 days of captivity, public outcry led to new laws, such as the one on pentitismo, and a greater police presence. Antimafia efforts, occurring over a much longer period, underwent multiple upswings and downswings. The first parliamentary Antimafia Commission was established only in 1962, after a Mafia-planted car bomb, intended to eliminate a rival mafioso, detonated and killed seven policemen.69 Mafia violence declined after 1963, and in the 1970s the government focused mostly on the terrorist threat. But in 1982, the murders of Pio La Torre, who had proposed an antimafia law, and of Carlo Alberto Dalla Chiesa, a police chief sent to curb Mafia violence in Palermo, again galvanized legislators. The Rognoni-La Torre law of that year defined Mafia membership in itself as a crime, 38 Antonia Woodford enabling judges to convict people for “Mafia association” in addition to particular crimes. The law revolutionized investigators’ approach to Mafia cases, as they “no longer concentrated on ‘the crimes of the Mafia’ but on ‘the Mafia as a form of criminality,’” Jamieson writes.70 Antimafia political action peaked in the mid-1980s. The Rognoni-La Torre law, combined with the testimony of collaborators such as Buscetta, empowered Falcone and Borsellino to bring 475 Mafia members to trial in 1986. The maxi-trial resulted in 342 convictions, a verdict that invited criticism but which the Supreme Court upheld in 1992.71 The Mafia assassinated Falcone and Borsellino after the Supreme Court ruling, triggering another wave of public outrage and state antimafia action. Post-1992 laws increased investigators’ capacities for asset confiscation and wire- tapping, specified policies for pentiti and witness protection programs, eliminated benefits for imprisoned mafiosi, and disbanded Mafia-infiltrated municipal councils. Italy’s antimafia police force, the Direzione Inveistigativa Antimafia, and its antimafia prosecution service, the Direzione Nazionale Antimafia, acquired greater authority, and troops were sent to Sicily to relieve the duties of police involved in antimafia work.72 All this political and legislative action, however, spurred a popular backlash. The state enacted these measures when the public thought it was doing too little, yet some citizens feared it had gone too far. The maxi-trial, though a tremendous victory for the prosecution, unsettled people in how it sentenced mass numbers of suspects in one swoop. Critics questioned whether the trial violated civil liberties and called into doubt the pentiti’s testimony. Some Sicilians accused antimafia reformers from the north of trying to discredit their region.73 When Palermo elected a staunchly antimafia mayor, Leoluca Orlando, in 1985, a new debate arose. Orlando advocated spaccatura, or “breaking,” with the Mafia, a policy of no tolerance towards institutions or individuals affiliated with the Mafia. The approach proved controversial even among antimafia activists.74 Was it fair to condemn the entire “gray area” of people who had dealt with mafiosi, but were not THE CONCORD REVIEW 39 criminals themselves? How could one distinguish between businesses that paid the pizzo willingly and those that the Mafia muscled into consent? Might spaccatura not actually hurt the poorest, most vulnerable members of society? Pierluigi Cervellati, the architect whom Orlando hired to rebuild Palermo’s city center, represents spaccatura in action. Cervellati wanted northern Italian companies to implement his plan of urban renewal, thus avoiding the “disgusting old relations of money, power, and the mafia.”75 Since the Mafia had tainted Sicilian-based firms, Cervellati preferred to sidestep them altogether and hire northern firms instead. Working-class Sicilians naturally opposed his idea. In 1988, labor unions marched in protest of his proposal, bearing signs with slogans such as “With the mafia we work, without it, no!” A union member in the crowd proclaimed, “If struggling for the workers signifies being mafiosi, then viva la mafia!”76 As discussed previously, economic concerns were the most pressing reason for antimafia resistance. Reformers who opposed spaccatura favored a more conciliatory approach, one that would account for working-class needs.77 During Moro’s kidnapping, politicians engaged in a comparable debate about how unbending the state should be against terrorists. In letters written from the People’s Prison, Moro asked that his party negotiate with the Red Brigades for his release. Pro- ponents of trattativa, or “negotiation,” thought saving a human life necessitated such compromise. Then-prime minister Giulio Andreotti, by contrast, espoused a policy of “firmness,” orfermezza . Andreotti maintained that the state should not negotiate as a matter of principle. Despite Moro’s pleas, the Christian Democrats ultimately held firm; with no use left for their prisoner, thebrigatisti shot him to death.78 In both the fermezza-trattativa and the spaccatura debates, politicians and reformers had to weigh intellectual, rational arguments with empathetic, moral ones. The spaccatura debate still waits to be resolved, and historians continue to debate whether trattativa would have altered the outcome of the Moro affair. 40 Antonia Woodford

In addition to state-directed action, grassroots movements were important in the antimafia fight, perhaps because the Mafia was so interlaced with the state. There were no equivalent movements against the Red Brigades, but the brigatisti never garnered much public support to begin with. In the case of the Mafia, grassroots activism became especially significant in light of the controversies over the maxi-trial and new legislation. To borrow a metaphor of Orlando’s, the antimafia process was “a cart with two wheels” one wheel being social reform and the other being police and judicial reform.79 Social centers, for example, supplied recreational outlets and “cultural re-education” for children in poor neighborhoods. The goal was to wean younger generations away from the pervasive Mafia mentality. Children would be taught to avoid fights, to report crimes to the police, and so forth: to have faith in the law, as so many Italians did not. Various community groups also formed in response to jarring events like the murders of Falcone and Borsellino. Several women formed the Committee of the Sheets, named for their practice of hanging sheets with antimafia slogans from their balconies. The Committee, comprised of 20 women and 6 men, published a pamphlet of “Nine uncomfortable guidelines for the citizen who wants to fight the Mafia,” urging citizens to reclaim their rights by denouncing corruption, demanding transparency, avoiding Mafia business, and educating their children for legality.80 Such initiatives helped alleviate the Mafia problem, though, as Orlando’s metaphor states, grassroots work alone could not eradicate the Mafia. Compared with Fascists and brigatisti, the Mafia arguably posed the greatest challenge to the state. In the spectrum of relationships each of these groups had to the state, the Mafia was the most inextricable. Mussolini never achieved his totalitarian goal; under Fascism the army, businesses, and the Catholic Church maintained a degree of autonomy from Fascist influence.81 The Red Brigades did not achieve their goal either; Richard Drake writes that they discredited not only themselves but the entire Left in Italy.82 But the Mafia managed to infiltrate so many aspects of Sicilian life that it remains alive and well. Precisely because it is THE CONCORD REVIEW 41 so intertwined with the state, the Mafia cannot easily be removed. As some reformers in Palermo feared, complete spaccatura might be fatal. Even people in the north of Italy, with its smaller organized crime presence, accept Mafia control of businesses such as waste disposal. Borsellino once commented, “The solution to the problem of the Mafia is to make the State work.”83 Can the Italian state work, and can its citizens learn to trust it? The answer is a work in progress, a formidable task left to those idealistic enough to conceive of it. 42 Antonia Woodford

Endnotes

1 Frederic Spotts and Theodor Wieser, Italy: A Difficult Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986) p. ix 2 Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, trans. A. R. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (London: William Hodge and Company Limited, 1947) p. 143 3 Robert Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism (New York: Random House, 2004) p. 61 4 Ibid., p. 64 5 Ibid., p. 60; John Pollard, The Fascist Experience in Italy (New York: Routledge, 1998) pp. 40-41 6 Paxton, p. 64 7 Paxton; Mark Robson, Italy: Liberalism and Fascism, 1870- 1945 (London: Hoddern & Stoughton, 1992) pp. 50-51 8 Letizia Paoli, Mafia Brotherhoods: Organized Crime, Italian Style (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003) 9 Roberto Saviano, Gomorrah: A Personal Journey into the Violent International Empire of Naples’ Organized Crime System, trans. Virginia Jewiss (New York: Picador, 2007) p. 160 10 Paoli, p. 43 11 Ibid., pp. 40-46, 108-110 12 Ibid., p. 154 13 Ibid., p. 154 14 Ibid., p. 191 15 Alison Jamieson, The Antimafia: Italy’s Fight Against Organized Crime (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000) p. 56 16 Ibid., p. 141; Saviano, pp. 229-240 17 Luigi Manconi, “The political ideology of the Red Brigades,” in The Red Brigades and Left-wing Terrorism in Italy, ed. Raimondo Catanzaro (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991) p. 115 18 Ibid., p. 115 19 Ibid., p. 119 20 Gian Carlo Caselli and Donatella della Porta, “The history of the Red Brigades: organizational structures and strategies of action (1970-82),” in The Red Brigades and Left-wing Terrorism in Italy, ed. Raimondo Catanzaro (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991) pp. 75-78 21 Ibid., p. 90 22 Caselli; Robert C. Meade, Red Brigades: The Story of Italian Terrorism (London: Macmillan, 1990) 23 Robson, p. 45 THE CONCORD REVIEW 43

24 Ibid., p. 45 25 Ibid., p. 30 26 Paxton, p. 63; Alan Cassels, Fascist Italy, 2nd ed (Illinois: Harlan Davidson, 1985) p. 27 27 Adrian Lyttelton, The Seizure of Power: Fascism in Italy, 1919-1929, rev. ed. (New York: Routledge, 2004) p. 417; Philip Morgan, Italian Fascism, 1915-1945, 2nd ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 254; John Pollard, “Conservative Catholics and Italian fascism: the Clerico-Fascists,” in Fascists and Conservatives: the radical right and the establishment in twentieth-century Europe, ed. Martin Blinkhorn (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990), 41; Pollard, The Fascist Experience in Italy, p. 48 28 Martin Clark, Modern Italy, 1871-1995, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1996) p. 255 29 Paoli, pp. 178-188 30 Jane C. and Peter T. Schneider, Reversible Destiny: Mafia, Antimafia, and the Struggle for Palermo (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2003) p. 232 31 Ibid., p. 233 32 Ibid., p. 232 33 Ibid., pp. 281, 314 34 Jamieson, p. xxi 35 Paxton, p. 211 36 Ibid., pp. 142-144 37 Ibid., p. 85 38 Caselli, p. 90; Manconi, p. 118 39 Manconi, p. 127 40 Ibid., p. 127 41 Leonardo Sciascia, L’Affaire Moro (Milan: Adelphi, 1994) 42 Jamieson, p. xxi 43 Alexander Stille, Excellent Cadavers (New York: Pantheon, 1995) p. 351 44 Jamieson, p. xxi; Paoli, pp. 160-161 45 Schneider, 14-16, p. 253 46 Ibid., p. 236 47 Saviano, pp. 282-295 48 Jamieson, p. xxi 49 Paoli, p. 172 50 Jamieson, p. xvi 51 Ibid., p. xvi 52 Pollard, “Conservative Catholics and Italian fascism: the Clerico-Fascists,” pp. 35, 36, 39, 43; Lyttelton, p. 131 44 Antonia Woodford

53 Lyttelton, p. 417 54 Paxton, pp. 109-110; Lyttelton, p. 417 55 Jamieson, p. 135 56 Saviano, p. 226 57 Ibid., p. 227 58 Ibid., p. 222 59 Jamieson, p. 138 60 Ibid., p. 139 61 Caselli, p. 89 62 Sciascia, p. 174 63 Caselli, p. 99; Paul Ginsborg, A History of Contemporary Italy: Society and Politics, 1943-1988 (New York: Penguin, 1990) 385-386 64 Jamieson, p. 29 65 Schneider, p. 139 66 Jamieson, p. 104 67 Schneider, pp. 291-292 68 Jamieson, p. 29; Schneider, pp. 131-132 69 Ibid., p. 16 70 Ibid., pp. 18, 28-29 71 Ibid., p. 3 72 Ibid., pp. 42-70, 75, 102-125 73 Schneider, pp. 194-195 74 Ibid., pp. 204, 219-222, 234 75 Ibid., p. 242 76 Ibid., p. 188 77 Ibid., p. 187 78 Sciascia, p. 174 79 Schneider, p. 160 80 Jamieson, p. 131; Schneider, pp. 207-209 81 Paxton, p. 153 82 Richard Drake, The Aldo Moro Murder Case (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995) p. 253 83 Jamieson, p. xvi THE CONCORD REVIEW 45

Bibliography

Blinkhorn, Martin, ed. Fascists and Conservatives: The radical right and the establishment in twentieth-century Europe, Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990 Bosworth, R. J. B., Mussolini’s Italy: Life Under the Fascist Dictatorship, 1915-1945, New York: Penguin, 2006 Caselli, Gian Carlo and Donatella della Porta, “The history of the Red Brigades: organizational structures and strategies of action (1970-82),” In The Red Brigades and Left-wing Terrorism in Italy, edited by Raimondo Catanzaro. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991 Cassels, Alan, Fascist Italy, 2nd ed. Illinois: Harlan Davidson, 1985 Catanzaro, Raimondo, ed., The Red Brigades and Left-wing Terrorism in Italy, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991 Clark, Martin, Modern Italy, 1871-1995, 2nd ed. New York: Longman, 1996 De Grand, Alexander, Italian Fascism: Its Origins and Development, 2nd ed. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989 Drake, Richard, The Aldo Moro Murder Case, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995 Drake, Richard, “The Aldo Moro Murder Case as Politics.” In Playing Politics with Terrorism, edited by George Kassimeris, New York: Columbia University Press, 2008 Fijnaut, Cyrille and Letizia Paoli, eds., Organized Crime in Europe: Concepts, Patterns and Control Policies in the European Union and Beyond, Dordrecht: Springer, 2004 Fulvetti, Gianluca, “The Mafia and the ‘Problem of the Mafia’: Organized Crime in Italy, 1820-1970” In Organized Crime in Europe Concepts, Patterns and Control Policies in the European Union and Beyond, edited by Cyrille Fijnaut and Letizia Paoli Dordrecht: Springer, 2004 Ginsborg, Paul, A History of Contemporary Italy: Society and Politics, 1943-1988, New York: Penguin, 1990 Ginsborg, Paul, Italy and Its Discontents: Family, Civil Society, State: 1980-2001, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003 Hilwig, Stuart J., “‘Are You Calling Me a Fascist?’: A Contribution to the Oral History of the 1968 Student Rebellion,” Journal of Contemporary History 36, no. 4 (2001) pp. 581-597, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3180774 (accessed February 2, 2010) 46 Antonia Woodford

Hilwig, Stuart J., “The Revolt Against the Establishment: Students Versus the Press in West Germany and Italy,” In 1968: The World Transformed, edited by Carole Fink, Philipp Gassert, and Detlef Junker, Washington, D.C.: Cambridge University Press, 1998 Horn, Gerd-Rainer, The Spirit of ’68: Rebellion in Western Europe and North America, 1956-1976, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007 Jamieson, Alison, The Antimafia: Italy’s Fight Against Organized Crime, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000 Jamieson, Alison, “Mafiosi and Terrorists: Italian Women in Violent Organizations,” SAIS Review 20, no. 2 (2000) pp. 51-64 http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais_review/v020/20.2jamieson. html (accessed April 30, 2010) Klimke, Martin, and Joachim Scharloth, eds., 1968 in Europe: A History of Protest and Activism, 1956-1977, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008 La Spina, Antonio, “The Paradox of Effectiveness: Growth, Institutionalisation and Evaluation of Anti-Mafia Policies in Italy,” In Organized Crime in Europe Concepts, Patterns and Control Policies in the European Union and Beyond, edited by Cyrille Fijnaut and Letizia Paoli, Dordrecht: Springer, 2004 Lyttelton, Adrian, ed., Liberal and Fascist Italy, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002 Lyttelton, Adrian, The Seizure of Power: Fascism in Italy, 1919-1929, Rev. ed. New York: Routledge, 2004 Manconi, Luigi, “The political ideology of the Red Brigades,” In The Red Brigades and Left-wing Terrorism in Italy, edited by Raimondo Catanzaro, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991 Marwick, Arthur, The Sixties: Cultural Revolution in Britain, France, Italy, and the United States, c.1958-c.1974, New York: Oxford University Press, 1998 Meade, Robert C., Red Brigades: The Story of Italian Terrorism, London: Macmillan, 1990 Morgan, Philip, Italian Fascism, 1915-1945, 2nd ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004 Paoli, Letizia, Mafia Brotherhoods: Organized Crime, Italian Style, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003 Paoli, Letizia, “Organized Crime in Italy: Mafia and Illegal Markets—Exception and Normality,” In Organized Crime in Europe Concepts, Patterns and Control Policies in the European Union and Beyond, edited by Cyrille Fijnaut and Letizia Paoli Dordrecht: Springer, 2004 THE CONCORD REVIEW 47

Paxton, Robert O., The Anatomy of Fascism, New York: Random House, 2004 Paxton, Robert O., Interviewed by Antonia Woodford, New York, New York, November 20, 2009 Pollard, John, “Conservative Catholics and Italian fascism: the Clerico-Fascists,” In Fascists and Conservatives: The radical right and the establishment in twentieth-century Europe, edited by Martin Blinkhorn, Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990 Pollard, John, The Fascist Experience in Italy, New York: Routledge, 1998 Robson, Mark, Italy: Liberalism and Fascism, 1870-1945, London: Hoddern & Stoughton, 1992 Sarti, Roland, ed., The Ax Within: Italian Fascism in Action, New York: Franklin Watts, 1974 Sarti, Roland, “Italian fascism: radical politics and conservative goals,” In Fascists and Conservatives: The radical right and the establishment in twentieth-century Europe, edited by Martin Blinkhorn, Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990 Saviano, Roberto, Gomorrah: A Personal Journey into the Violent International Empire of Naples’ Organized Crime System, Translated by Virginia Jewiss, New York: Picador, 2007 Sbordone, Argia, Interviewed by Antonia Woodford, New York, New York, February 20, 2010 Schneider, Jane C. and Peter T. Schneider, Reversible Destiny: Mafia, Antimafia, and the Struggle for Palermo, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003 Sciascia, Leonardo, L’Affaire Moro Milan: Adelphi, 1994 Sciascia, Leonardo, Il giorno della civetta, Milan: Adelphi, 1993 Spotts, Frederic and Theodor Wieser, Italy: A Difficult Democracy, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986 Stille, Alexander, Excellent Cadavers, New York: Pantheon, 1995 Tarrow, Sidney, Democracy and Disorder: Protest and Politics in Italy, 1965-1975, New York: Oxford University Press, 1989 Tarrow, Sidney, “Violence and institutionalization after the Italian protest cycle,” In The Red Brigades and Left-wing Terrorism in Italy, edited by Raimondo Catanzaro, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991 Thompson, Doug, State control in Fascist Italy: Culture and conformity, 1925-1943, New York: Manchester University Press, 1991 48 Antonia Woodford

Weber, Max, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, Translated by A. R. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, London: William Hodge and Company Limited, 1947

Whittam, John, Fascist Italy, New York: Manchester University Press, 1995

Special thanks to Drs. Jane and Peter Schneider, who provided me with an updated version of the final chapter of their book, Reversible Destiny. The chapter was an English translation from the more recently published Italian edition. THE CONCORD REVIEW 49 Copyright 2010, by The Concord Review, Inc., all rights reserved

THE RISE OF PROGRESSIVISM: THEODORE ROOSEVELT AS NEW YORK CITY POLICE COMMISSIONER

Lucia A. Randall

New York City, 1895: A place of political turmoil where secret, corrupt operations were concealed behind the efficient, powerful veneer of the Machine Boss. Patronage, vice, and bribery gripped city politics, in both the Republican Machine and the Democratic Machine, which was known as Tammany Hall. Fraud and graft were particularly rampant in the New York City Police Department, where Tammany Democrats’ hand-picked men, acting as puppets to Tammany interests, held positions of authority. Corruption within the Police Department left New York City virtually unprotected, but many citizens were ignorant of the full extent of the extortion and patronage. In 1892, however, muckrakers, crusading journalists who revealed crime, disease, and injustice in modern American cities, began to make an impact in New York City, setting the scene for the Progressive Movement. Reverend Charles Parkhurst, part- nering with muckrakers to spread his cause, exposed corruption within the Police Department through thunderous, provocative speeches in the city. Horrified citizens demanded change and called on Theodore Roosevelt, the Civil Service Commissioner in Washington D.C., to lead the Police Board in overhauling the

Lucia A. Randall is a Senior at the Montclair Kimberley Academy in Montclair, New Jersey, where she wrote this paper for Dr. Louise Maxwell’s Modern United States History course in the 2009/2010 academic year. 50 Lucia A. Randall

NYPD. Roosevelt’s term marked the rise of Progressivism and attention to civil service in New York City. As Police Commissioner of New York City, Theodore Roosevelt harnessed his Progressive instincts to transform what was considered by many the most corrupt organization in the city in hopes of establishing a politically impartial and just legacy within the NYPD and improving the lives of citizens. Born into a wealthy family on New York’s Upper East Side in 1858, young Theodore was taught by his father’s example to contribute to the improvement of American life. Theodore Roosevelt Sr. was a prominent philanthropist who established the New York City’s Children Aid Society, the Metropolitan Museum of Art, the American Museum of Natural History, and the New York Children’s Orthopedic Hospital.1 Theodore Sr. instilled a capacity for helping others in his four children: Bamie, Theodore, Elliot, and Corrine. Young Theodore especially, who idolized his father, strove to follow this calling of serving others throughout his life in his various roles in reform and civil service. Theodore Sr., however, had also made a deeply personal impression on his son in his early years. Theodore Sr. was a loving, entertaining, and empathetic father; yet young Theodore realized his father’s wrath and power after Theodore Jr. bit his older sister at the tender age of four.2 Although the biting incident was the first and last time Theodore Sr. physically chastised his son, his father’s disappointment in his bad behavior made a far greater impact on young Theodore than the brief spanking. The shame and humiliation that young Theodore had experienced was a lasting sensation, and Theodore envisioned his father’s hypothetical reaction before making future decisions. In his autobiography fifty-one years later, in which he described the biting episode in detail, Theodore Jr. spoke of his father as “the best man I ever knew…but the only man of whom I was ever really afraid.”3 The lessons of his father combined with emerging initiatives of the Progressive Movement established Roosevelt as the most capable man to transform the Police Department. The sparks of the Progressive Movement began to fly during this time, and THE CONCORD REVIEW 51 Roosevelt had proven himself a qualified candidate for reform in his work as Civil Service Commissioner in Washington D.C. from 1889-1895.4 Though nationwide efforts were made to improve the standard of city life and decrease corruption, Roosevelt was successful and unique in that he had a genuine interest in the welfare of New York City citizens and strove to improve city life without being influenced solely by his own political agenda. From 1860 to 1890, America was reacting to a massive influx of immigrants in densely concentrated urban areas. As a result of the unsanitary living conditions that resulted from this flood of immigrants, and the nativist sentiment thus inspired in the hearts of “rooted” citizens, American cities all over the country experienced upheaval and political volatility during this period: St. Louis, Minneapolis, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, and Chicago, as well as New York.5 Poverty arose from employers’ exploitation of immigrants as a means of cheap unskilled labor, and many immigrant families relied on several incomes for survival. Consequently, most immigrants gratefully accepted the help of aspiring urban bosses, who ingratiated themselves with immigrants by assisting with rent or buying groceries.6 As election time approached, these immigrants happily cast their votes for the benevolent-seeming urban bosses, only to discover that the bosses, once in power, reneged on their promises and managed the city in a new era of the political machine. Out of the political and social turbulence of this era rose Progressivism. In the words of a historian, “the class and status conflicts of the late-nineteenth century formed the driving forces that made men become reformers.”7 The Progressive political agenda rested on the principle that society needed improvement, and that government could be a force for good. Progressives typically challenged the largely corrupt machines and bosses that resided at the top of urban politics. Progressives endeavored to replace these dishonest systems with honest officials that would presumably remain untainted by political corruption. The Progressive cause, however, was by no means utopian; like any other political initiative, Progressivism was sometimes driven by the personal agendas 52 Lucia A. Randall

of reform politicians seeking power in their own right. Roosevelt, however, strove to maintain a more altruistic outlook in his work, and risked his blossoming political career to preserve integrity during his term as Police Commissioner. One scholar said that “He became the animating symbol of urban reform during his lifetime and in the years that followed the reforming impulse in the older cities of America sprang from sources rooted firmly on his life and times.”8 His term as Police Commissioner propelled Roosevelt to the national political arena as an honest reform politician and characterized him as one of the earliest and most groundbreaking progressives. Long before Theodore Roosevelt made his debut on the New York City political scene, however, Tammany Hall, “the embodiment of corruption,” as muckraker Lincoln Steffens referred to it, had established itself as the dominant force in city politics.9 Tammany Hall had rapidly ascended to power in the 1860s under the leadership of William Magear “Boss” Tweed.10 Tweed was the recently elected boss of Tammany Hall in 1862, when the New York City draft riots broke out. The rioters, mostly immigrants (who made up three-fifths of the city’s population), protested the $300 fee that the wealthy could pay to avoid service in the Civil War.11 Hostility radiated from the general public towards the rioters; a New York Times article from 1863 described them as “the malignant originators of the disturbance.”12 Tweed, however, realized that the equal treatment of the rich and the poor was crucial in order to carry out the necessary draft. Relieving the pressure on President Lincoln to raise troops, Tweed concocted a plan to compensate poor workers who couldn’t afford the fee with government-sponsored gratuities, thus appeasing the rioters and lessening class tension nationwide.13 Additionally, Tweed aligned himself with the Union cause for the next two years; he became “a hero in New York City.”14 Once in power, however, Tweed instituted a policy of political patronage, voting fraud, and bribery, thus beginning the corrupt legacy of Tammany Hall. Tweed became a ubiquitous symbol for the graft and greed of machine politics in America. THE CONCORD REVIEW 53 Although Tweed was eventually arrested, Tammany Hall remained at the apex of New York City’s politics, prevailing in every election until 1894. Though Tammany’s grip on elections seemed secure, a Republican rival, Thomas Collier Platt, known as “The Easy Boss”15 to some and “The Devil” to others, was working behind the scenes in the New York State Legislature, rallying support for a future election.16 Despite Platt’s courteous and respectable veneer, his Republican Machine equaled Tammany Hall in dishonesty. Even Platt’s political friend Lemuel Ely Quigg admitted that “This man’s conceded power was built on the use of money and patronage…”17 Tammany boss Richard Croker recognized the threat Platt posed and tried to appease the Republican machine by handing out “political plums” to Platt’s henchmen in the early 1890s.18 Nowhere was the corruption of both the Republican and Democratic machines as prevalent as in the New York Police Depart- ment. In Tweed’s time, the head Police Commissioner was Hank Smith, a Republican who worked closely with Tweed in pilfering government funds, eliciting money from legitimate businesses through extortion, enforcing Tammany initiatives, and immunizing members of the Tammany ring from legal prosecution. Satirical cartoonist Thomas Nast captured Smith’s dishonesty in a cartoon, entitled “The Guardian Angel of the Poor People’s Money: Does it ‘Take a Thief to Catch a Thief?,’” of a rotund Smith standing in front of a bankrupt Bowling Green Savings Bank with specific descriptions of Smith’s fraud written in the windows.19 Though Smith’s use of patronage and graft exposed the Tweed ring to the public, the current Chief of Police, Thomas Byrnes, seemed the picture of efficiency. The police force was nominally controlled by a Bi-Partisan Board, which consisted of two commissioners from each party. The commissioners essentially acted as the puppets of Platt and Croker, introducing a system of political patronage and graft. The livelihood and job security of police officials was dependent upon the whims and desires of the machine. A former police commissioner of New York testified that, “As the policeman is in office for life, he very logically looked past both the Mayor and me and 54 Lucia A. Randall made his alliances and took his orders from the only permanent influence concerned—the politician.”20 The system of corruption was reinforced by Byrnes, who, as the Chief of Police, interacted with his officers on an everyday basis. Byrnes, who to many reporters seemed an “awe-inspiring figure…a master of men…a manhandler of criminals,” generated a perfectly efficient, almost overwhelming, public persona that matched his imposing figure and loud Irish brogue.21 Byrnes, however, instituted a policy of patronage within his force; a historian stated that “appointment to the New York police force was predicated only upon payment of $300 to Tammany Hall!”22 Ruled by what Roosevelt described as “an elaborate system of blackmail,” the police force selectively enforced laws; those with money or influence evaded the law while honest citizens were penalized financially.23 A longstanding illegal policy of “police protection” existed between the police force and business owners; greengrocers forked up a dollar or two daily for permission to sell fruit on the sidewalks.24 However, the police treated powerful business owners, proprietors of “gambling houses, saloons, and brothels,” with respect and almost awe.25 Many of these proprietors had substantial power and means; the police force condoned illegal violations of statutes in exchange for a fee. The Reverend Dr. Charles H. Parkhurst exposed the previously undetected corruption of Byrnes’ administration on February 14, 1892 in a sermon at the Gothic brownstone church.26 An outraged Parkhurst attacked Tammany Hall and the Police Department, calling it “a lying, perjured, rum-soaked and libidi- nous lot.”27 Parkhurst announced that the time had come to oust “the official and administrative criminality that is filthifying our entire municipal life, making New York a very hotbed of knavery, debauchery, and bestiality.”28 Croker, Byrnes, and other Tammany leaders dismissed Parkhurst as “plain crazy,” but Platt, angered by Tammany resistance to a bill that he had proposed, authorized a commission to investigate Parkhurst’s allegations.29 The Lexow Committee, led by Senator Clarence Lexow, commenced investigation on March 9, 1894.30 The committee questioned citizens and policemen about brutal treatment and THE CONCORD REVIEW 55 arrest of suspected criminals, illegal monitoring of voting booths, police intimidation towards voters, and police soliciting during elections.31 The evidence the committee found created what Platt described as “a popular revolt” in New York among citizens previously oblivious to the corruption rampant in the department. As Avery Andrews, Roosevelt’s fellow Police Commissioner said later, “The city, and indeed the entire country, was shocked, horrified, and nauseated by its disclosures of graft, corruption, inefficiency and crime, and the close relations between Tammany politicians, the police, and the underworld.”32 The nationwide disbelief and anger over the Lexow findings signified the beginning of attention to the central issue of political reform that would mark the Progressive Era. On September 6, 1894, the Council of Good Government Clubs, an early Progressive organization, met at Madison Square Garden to discuss the findings of the Lexow Committee.33 United by a desire to eradicate the long and corrupt reign of Tammany, the council selected a “Committee of Seventy” to organize a non- partisan reform ticket for the November mayoral election.34 William Strong, an ironically-named and irresolute but “honest” merchant with absolutely no political experience, was selected as the mayoral candidate and endorsed by Platt.35 Sworn in on January 1, 1895, Strong’s first objective was to remove the corrupt Police Board members, Commissioners Murray, Kerwin, and Stanton, and find suitable replacements.36 Platt, however, had not anticipated the loss of Republican Commissioners Murray and Kerwin, his connections to the inner workings of the Police Department. The Easy Boss had overlooked the newly passed (January 1895) Power of Removal Act, which authorized Mayor Strong to discharge city officials without the consent of the New York State Assembly or any other government administrator.37 Thus Platt viewed Roos- evelt, Strong’s preference for the leader of the Police Board, as a hindrance to his objectives and an unwelcome replacement of Murray and Kerwin. Platt loathed the new commissioner from the beginning, creating a long-lasting, cutthroat rivalry in the political sphere. 56 Lucia A. Randall

Theodore Roosevelt, known for his work in Washington D.C. as Civil Service Commissioner, was the first choice of many New Yorkers for President of the Board. As the headline of the New York Times rhetorically stated, “If Not Mr. Roosevelt, Who?”38 Jacob Riis, leader of the muckraking journalism movement and later a close friend of Roosevelt, declared “Theodore Roosevelt is the man for president of the police board…..I don’t care who the other commissioners are. T.R. is enough.”39 Although he was clearly wanted in New York, Roosevelt debated accepting the position for weeks. He immensely enjoyed his work as Civil Service Commissioner, but Roosevelt felt that he could make a bigger impact in his native city. The Parkhurst allegations had appeared in newspapers nationwide, portraying New York City as the ideal setting for groundbreaking reform. Roosevelt, who always enjoyed a challenge, was inspired by the prospect of revamping the most corrupt law-enforcing body in the United States. In addition to his more altruistic reasons for accepting the position, the appointment, if successful, could establish Roosevelt as one of the premier American reform politicians. After much consideration, Roosevelt, uncertain but excited, accepted the offer from Mayor Strong. Though he felt that accepting the job would be “taking chances,”40 he was eager to go “back to my own city, to stay among my own people.”41 The characteristically optimistic Roosevelt was dismayed upon arriving in New York City and finding the police department in shambles. He quickly regained his previous confidence, however, by planning out a specific set of goals. Roosevelt resolved to thoroughly inspect the current force, dismissing the corrupt officers and encouraging a broader applicant pool of men to fill the empty positions. He raised admissions standards on the force and implemented new technology to maximize efficiency.42 In addition, an inimitable aspect that Roosevelt unknowingly brought to New York, as he brought to every other position, was his ability to captivate both the press and the public with his eloquence and vitality. Unlike his counterparts, he determined to speak to the public honestly and deliver on his promises. Roosevelt’s central, THE CONCORD REVIEW 57 and perhaps most important, objective was to eliminate patronage and install a system based on merit and justice, applicable to both selecting new officers and consistently enforcing laws without being dissuaded by offers of wealth or power.43 With the usual Roosevelt gusto, he resolved to “smash corruption” and “keep politics absolutely out of the force.”44 And so “Mulberry Street’s Golden Age,” in the words of Jacob Riis, began.45 Also serving on the Board were Republican Frederick D. Grant, son of former president Ulysses S. Grant, and Democrats Avery Andrews, and Andrew Parker, a well-known at- torney.46 Though it was nominally a bi-partisan board, the other members, as well as the entire city, recognized Roosevelt as the real leader; “rumors of his incorruptibility, his daring courage, and his independence” spread throughout the city.47 Andrew Parker grumbled, “Thinks he’s the whole board,” but on the whole, the other commissioners seemed willing to follow Roosevelt’s lead.48 Roosevelt soon realized the difficulty of his task. In a letter to his sister, Anna “Bamie” Roosevelt Cowles, Roosevelt wrote, I have never worked harder than during the last two weeks; the actual work is hard; but far harder is the intense sham. I have the most important, and the most corrupt, department in New York on my hands; I shall speedily assail some of the ablest, shrewdest men in this city, who will be fighting for their lives, and I know well how hard the task ahead of me is.49 Roosevelt’s preliminary initiatives were briefly hampered. The Bi- Partisan Act, passed by Mayor Strong in May 1895, decreed that decisions must be unanimously agreed upon by all four commissioners, or three commissioners and the Chief of Police, therefore limiting the power Roosevelt possessed as President of the Board.50 For Roosevelt, who firmly believed that “the ‘division of powers’ theory works unmitigated mischief,” the Bi-Partisan Act would be a constant tribulation.52 Roosevelt faced another dilemma with Chief of Police Thomas Byrnes, who one historian described as “the personifica- tion of the police department.”53 Byrnes seemed an immovable obstacle to Roosevelt’s initiatives from their first meeting. Refer- 58 Lucia A. Randall

ring to the corrupt machine politics that ruled the police force, Byrnes greeted Roosevelt with, “It will break you. You will yield. You are but human.”53 In response, Roosevelt confided his strategy to Henry Cabot Lodge, writing, “I think I shall move against Byrnes at once. I thoroughly distrust him, and cannot do any thorough work while he remains.”54 He recognized that introducing new policies through the force would be unattainable with Byrnes hindering change from a position of authority. After asking him several times to leave, Roosevelt threatened Byrnes with a public investigation of fraudulent finances in the force. Despite reports that he “will not retire in the face of charges,” Byrnes handed in his resignation a few days later.55 Byrnes was replaced by Peter Conlin, a quiet, unassuming man. Byrnes’ resignation was coupled with the discharge of Inspector “Clubber Williams,” notorious for brutally beating victims into unconsciousness.56 These replacements marked a significant turning point in Roosevelt’s reform; without the constant, adverse presences of Byrnes and Williams, the main representatives of political patronage within the force, Roosevelt was free to install new policies without resistance. Roosevelt sought to uncover the corruption and negligence of duty in the force by nightly tramps through the streets of the city. One headline declared, “Police Caught Napping: President Roosevelt Makes an Early Morning Tour.”57 Newspapers warned policemen to “be prepared for trouble whenever teeth and spec- tacles come out of the darkness.”58 Though Roosevelt enjoyed the press coverage of his nightly treks and called them “great fun,” they also had a more serious aspect.59 Roosevelt wanted to see firsthand the actual activities of his force; negligent officers were summoned to Roosevelt’s office the following morning, subjected to an intense interrogation, and often discharged, thereby leaving an opening. Roosevelt’s treks were groundbreaking; never before in city politics had an authority figure been so directly involved in the work of his subordinates. An excerpt from the Recorder in 1895 stated that: No Police Commissioner has ever before tromped up and down the streets in the hours between midnight and sunrise in order to ascertain for himself who of the guardians of the peace were at their posts THE CONCORD REVIEW 59

and who were not. The result of his investigation can be summed up in a few words: He found policemen where they should not be, and did not find policemen where they should be.60 Roosevelt’s nightly missions additionally exposed him to the mis- erable living and working conditions of immigrants. His friendship with Jacob Riis, a Danish immigrant and the author of the muckraking exposé How the Other Half Lives, further opened his eyes. “Roosevelt wanted to know the city by night, and the true inwardness of some of the problems he was struggling with as Commissioner…He wanted to understand it all, the smallest with the greatest, and sometimes the information he brought out was unique, to put it mildly.”61 As a pioneer of the Progressive movement and the quintessential reformer, Roosevelt adopted the task of immigrant’s advocate. Outraged at the deplorable, filthy conditions of tenements, Roosevelt, who as a municipal officer also served on the Board of Health, fought in “the battle of the slum,” destroying the worst tenements and creating better living conditions for immigrants.62 He personally supervised the demoli- tion of several particularly contaminated tenements, and oversaw the construction of more sanitary living conditions. Jacob Riis, who, like many immigrants, struggled to find shelter when first coming to America, often found protection in lodging-houses. Riis described New York City’s lodging houses, tenement-like structures that offered nightly shelter to immigrants and vagrants, as “jammed with a foul and stewing crowd of tramps.”63 Together, Riis and Roosevelt “tore down unfit tenements, lighted dark halls, forced the opening of parks and playgrounds…”64 In his crusade for better living conditions, Roosevelt was committed to the usual Progressive issues, such as tenement and lodging-house remodel- ing, as well as reforming the NYPD. To fill the empty positions after nightly dismissals, Roos- evelt encouraged all men to apply for jobs on the police force. A variety of applicants came from all over New York to apply. In a statement that was radical during this time of nativist sentiment and political patronage, Roosevelt announced that not only was discrimination with regard to race, religion, or political prefer- ences prohibited in the force, stating a connection to an ethnic, 60 Lucia A. Randall religious, or political group could actually work against the applicant: “The endorsement of an applicant by political or religious body on the ground of membership will not be considered. Such endorsement will, however, prove detrimental to the applicant.”65 Before Roosevelt’s term, the overwhelming majority of the force had been of Irish and German descent to the exclusion of other ethnicities. Roosevelt’s statement was noteworthy in that it opened police positions to men of different nationalities, and allowed each man to escape ethnic stereotypes and attain a position based on his character and ability. Roosevelt, though refreshingly open-minded about diversity, upheld high standards in his “severe mental, physical, and moral” admissions exams.66 With so many jobs handed out to unqualified machine supporters, the police force had not ad- ministered entrance exams. Henry Pringle noted, albeit harshly, that “the patrolman of the day was usually abnormally fat and usually abnormally stupid. He could barely read and write. His convenient conscience made strict obedience to the commands of his political sponsor easy.”67 Avery D. Andrews, Roosevelt’s fellow commissioner, commented that the “great majority of the rank and file of the New York Police were honest and efficient. They had given and would give excellent service with the right kind of leadership. But with so many of the senior officers proven to have engaged in blackmail and acquisition of illicit wealth, the breakdown and demoralization of the force was complete.”68 Roosevelt personally thought that “there were a few honorable and high- minded Tammany officials…but the corruption had become so widespread as seriously to impair the work of administration and to bring us back within measurable distance of the days of Tweed.” He determined that entrance exams were necessary to uphold high standards in daily police work.69 These entirely merit-based exams included new height, weight, and age requirements; basic spelling, penmanship, writing, arithmetic, and United States history and government exams; strength and agility athletic tests; and thorough background checks.70 Less than a year after Roos- evelt became Commissioner, three thousand, one hundred and THE CONCORD REVIEW 61 seventy candidates for patrolmen had been examined; fifty-five percent were rejected from the physical exam and thirty percent were rejected from the mental exam, leaving only fifteen percent as eligible applicants.71 Roosevelt was well ahead of the times; admissions standards were not adopted within police departments nationwide until the 1940s.72 After Roosevelt had whittled down the applicant pool and welcomed new members to the force, he focused on improving efficiency, enforcement, and morale within the force. Roosevelt clearly outlined the goals for the force, as described by Avery Andrews: “Police officers were sternly reminded that they were the servants and not the masters of the public, and that while all necessary force must be used in dealing with criminals, peaceful citizens must be treated with courtesy, and aided whenever possible.”73 To prepare for criminal encounters, Roosevelt held mandatory training sessions for his force and opened the New York Police Department School of Pistol Practice in 1895, the only training school of its kind in the country with the exception of the Cincinnati Police Department’s School of Instruction at the time.74 The foundation of the police school was coupled with the distribution of a police manual, which included all the rules and regulations. The printing of this manual was notable in that the distribution of formal rules and regulations via manual did not become common practice in American law enforcement until the 1970s.75 Roosevelt recognized innovations produced during the Industrial Revolution as ways to generate efficiency and technological advance within the force. He installed the Bertillon system, invented by Alphonse Bertillon, the chief of the identification bureau of the Paris Prefecture of Police.76 The system was designed to identify criminals based on body measurements, creating a systematic way to uncover criminals based on recent (later discredited) scientific advancements. The police department made forays in transportation with the purchase of several horse-drawn wagons and new “lightweight naptha-powered launches” to replace the dingy rowboats that were used to navigate New York City’s 62 Lucia A. Randall

complex waterways.77 The most innovative and successful use of technology within the force, however, was the Bicycle Squad. The Bicycle Squad arose out of an urgent traffic problem that threatened the daily safety of industrial urban life: “Not only were there no traffic rules or traffic lights, but there was no traffic squad, no traffic court, nor even a traffic ‘cop’, now so generally seen at busy intersections.”78 When Avery Andrews proposed the idea of a bicycle unit to the Board, Roosevelt was the only member who took him seriously, and the two men collaborated to set up a temporary bicycle squad to regulate traffic. Though the Bicycle Squad originated as a provisional unit, the members of the squad soon became the darlings of New York; in the Police Parade of 1896, the Bicycle Squad was commended as “the Finest of the Fin- est, the corps d’elite of the Department.”79 The normally reserved Chief of Police Peter Conlin publicly hailed the Bicycle Squad’s performance: “…it has much increased the efficiency of police service on the thoroughfares…and has been instrumental in the accomplishment of police work that could not possibly be so well accomplished under the conditions of the police service existing along the bicycle posts prior to the organization of the bicycle squad.”80 The Bicycle Squad regulated traffic patterns, increased the safety of pedestrians, and provided comfort to citizens with regular appearances on the streets of New York. The new standards and methods that Roosevelt implemented within the force strengthened the policemen’s resolve. As Jacob Riis wrote, “Did the police hate Roosevelt for making them do their duty? No, they loved him.”81 Raising expectations increased the personal commitment that policemen brought to work. Roosevelt rewarded exceptional performance with life-saving medals and promotions, and each policeman felt that he had a fair chance to achieve recognition.82 Avery Andrews wrote that “I am myself convinced that the greatest work done by Roosevelt in the Police Department was that of building up its morale and re-establishing discipline.”83 For the honest policemen who had tried in vain to maintain integrity under Byrnes, the standards and THE CONCORD REVIEW 63 merit-based promotions of Roosevelt’s term were inspirational and invigorating. The story of Edward J. Bourke, a retired captain of the New York Police who served as a patrolman under Roosevelt, reflects the uplifting personal impact that Roosevelt made on the members of the force. Bourke recalled that under Byrnes, “I had brought down the wrath of some of my superiors by arresting a man who was supposed to enjoy complete immunity.”84 Byrnes had punished him and ordered him to allow those with political pull to evade the law. Under Roosevelt, a similar incident happened; Bourke had inadvertently arrested “King” Callahan, a saloonkeeper with strong ties to Tammany, and the arrest had climaxed in what Lin- coln Steffens described as a “boozy, bloody battle” between Bourke and Callahan.85 Roosevelt, rather than obsequiously exonerating Callahan, rewarded Bourke for admirable police work, telling him that “You performed your duty, and that’s what I want the men on the police force to do…Don’t worry about this. I’ll stand by you to the end.”86 Roosevelt’s support made a lasting and deeply personal impression on Bourke, who was promoted to a rounds- man and later became a captain: “It was my mournful duty to lead the mounted escort in Roosevelt’s funeral, and I was not the only man in this country who shed tears that day. He was a man, one of the biggest this country has ever produced.”87 In addition to winning the support and love of the force, Roosevelt captivated the press with his nightly escapades and vivacious personality. The advantageous use of the press to gain support was a technique that many Progressives would adapt, though few enthralled Americans as Roosevelt did. The aver- age readership of American newspapers doubled between 1880 and 1900; one historian remarked that “Roosevelt responded in just the right way to take advantage of an upheaval in American journalism.”88 Roosevelt succeeded in using the inclinations of contemporary journalism, which generally displayed Progressive tendencies, due to the exposés of muckrakers. In New York, he captured the attention of the press with his “extraordinary gusto and enthusiasm”; one critic begrudgingly wrote that Roosevelt 64 Lucia A. Randall

“has the knack of doing things, and doing them noisily, clamor- ously; while he is in the neighborhood the public can no more look the other way than the small boy can turn his head away from a circus parade followed by a steam calliope.”89 Newspaper headings portrayed Roosevelt as a swashbuckling hero fighting crime in the grimy, base streets of New York, as exemplified in the titles of the New York Times 1895 articles “A Montana Man on Theodore Roosevelt: He Admires Him Greatly as a Pacifier of Bad Men and Bears,”90 “Police Board’s Crusade,”91 and “Roosevelt in Action.”92 After the lack of progress under the Byrnes force which was exposed in the Lexow Investigation, the public was relieved to see such vigorous activity and happily embraced Roosevelt’s energetic, almost frenetic, image. Despite the good rapport Roosevelt developed with the press and the public, he encountered a series of difficulties in the second year of his term that tested his integrity and compromised his political career. The first was the Excise Law, a law prohibiting the sale of liquor on Sundays in “side-door saloons.”93 Tammany officers used the Excise Law as a bribing pawn in gaining money from saloonkeepers. Roosevelt, however, would not permit such selective enforcement of laws, and publicly stated his fundamental position as a law enforcer. As one reporter stated, “Neither Mr. Roosevelt himself nor Mayor Strong is a teetotaler. They do not approve of the Sunday closing law as it stands, and would welcome some relaxation of its provisions. But Mr. Roosevelt has determined that while the law is on the statute-book it shall be enforced, and enforced against all parties without fear or favor.”94 In June 1895, newspapers announced “the ‘dryest’ Sunday to-morrow New York has ever known,” much to the dismay of the city’s large and politically active German-American population, who collectively preferred the selective, if corrupt, interpretation of the Excise Law.95 Roosevelt countered, saying “When they criticize us and say our action is severe and unintelligent, they merely mean that our action is not corrupt.” As the November elections approached, Republican leaders, including Mayor Strong, urged Roosevelt to ease up on the enforcement of the Excise Law in an effort to THE CONCORD REVIEW 65 appease the German-American population, who usually voted Re- publican. Edward Lauterbach, chairman of the Republican party, publicly stated that he “was not in any way responsible for Roos- eveltism.”97 A determined Roosevelt wrote to Henry Cabot Lodge in October that “I shall not alter my course one handbreadth.”98 In the elections, Republicans triumphed elsewhere in New York, but Tammany overwhelmingly prevailed within New York City, prompting angry citizens to send letter bombs to Roosevelt,99 and an anonymous verbatim telegram saying, “You are the deadest duck that ever died in a political pond.”100 Boss Platt, after the Tammany victories, and infuriated with the lack of cooperation from Roosevelt, dispatched his carefully anticipated plan to combine Old New York (Manhattan and the Bronx) with Brooklyn, Queens, and Staten Island into the metropo- lis of Greater New York, which would eliminate the current Police Department and restore the “side-door saloons” on the account of the Republican Party.101 In reaction, Roosevelt revealed Platt’s plan during an address to the New York Methodist Ministers’ Association, a group that was sympathetic to the enforcement of the Excise Law. Convinced that Roosevelt was their champion in abolishing the evils of alcohol, the ministers condemned Platt’s gerrymandering plot from pulpits all over the city.102 Much like the Parkhurst allegations and the investigation that followed, the Platt exposure provoked much public outrage. The New York Times charged in Roosevelt’s defense that “political cowards and assas- sins would strike him down for his honesty and courage,”103 and denounced the “cowardly attempt to restore sneaking side-door selling.”104 As a result, Platt’s plan was thwarted. Humiliated by the incident, he resolved more than ever to ruin Roosevelt’s political career. Though Roosevelt’s future in New York was compromised by his honest enforcement of the Excise Law, it established Roos- evelt as a politician with integrity, a refreshing change for many American citizens during the era of the archetypal machine. While an encounter with Platt had seemed inevitable from the moment he entered New York, Roosevelt never suspected an enemy from within the Board. Soon after the gerrymandering plot 66 Lucia A. Randall

was revealed, however, Roosevelt’s fellow Commissioner, Andrew Parker, began to disappear from Board meetings and resist new reforms. Parker, “an utterly untrustworthy and lying schemer” in Roosevelt’s view, enlisted the help of both Commissioner Grant and Chief Conlin in his sudden effort against reform, thus bringing action of the Board to an utter standstill by the Bi-Partisan Act. The situation worsened when Platt, seizing a possible opportunity to shatter the career of his rival, joined in the campaign against reform in the department. The conflict grew to a head when a simmering Roosevelt exploded at a complacent Parker at a New York State Senate meeting in Albany.105 As the New York Sun summarized, “no love was lost between Messrs. Roosevelt and Parker.”106 Roosevelt, a man who had always believed in the “strenuous life,” was dejected to see the NYPD regress to inactivity after his painstaking efforts to reform.107 It was becoming quite apparent that Roosevelt’s continuing endeavors would be fruitless. Thus, when President McKinley offered the post of Assistant Secretary of the Navy to Roosevelt, he again felt the call to public service and accepted McKinley’s offer. Though he was reluctant to leave the NYPD, Roosevelt was equally eager to serve in a place where his goals could be fulfilled and appreciated. In his resignation letter to Mayor Strong on April 17, 1897, Roosevelt highlighted the positive side of his administration and accredited the force, as well as his own leadership: “You have in the police force a body of admirable men, brave, able and zealous; under proper leadership they can at any time be depended upon to do the best possible work.”108 Despite the impediments at the end, Roosevelt viewed his term as Police Commissioner, which had not lasted two years, as triumphant, in that he had taken “the police out of politics,” as he had resolved to do in September 1895.109 As Roosevelt’s political career rapidly soared, climaxing with the Presidency six years after his term as Police Commissioner, the NYPD was never far from his thoughts. The New York Post declared that “his spirit, Rooseveltism, will not die out.”110 Indeed, from his post as Assistant Secretary of the Navy in Washington, Roosevelt, through a profuse correspondence with Commissioner THE CONCORD REVIEW 67 Avery D. Andrews, maintained a keen interest in police happen- ings, coupled with a steady stream of advice: “Of course I don’t wish to seem to dictate or interfere in any way, but…”111 In addition, Roosevelt continued to advise other members of the NYPD. “Honest John” McCullagh, an officer under Roosevelt, replaced Peter Conlin as Chief of Police in August 1897. In a lengthy letter to McCullagh, Roosevelt remained a mentor figure: “The Chief of Police of Greater New York is the foremost police officer in the entire world…your place is assured. Now, on the other hand, it is a place of great temptation—political, and worse than political, temptation…I have the foremost confidence in you.”112 Roos- evelt is honored today in Police Departments nationwide with the Theodore Roosevelt Police Award, which honors Roosevelt’s valiant commitment to honest police work and public service.113 Roosevelt also left a permanent, tangible legacy in American police and detective work with the creation, during his presidency, of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), in 1908, to facilitate detective work, an aspect of policing that he had felt was lacking during his time in New York.114 Though the recalcitrance of Parker, Grant, and Platt stopped progressive reform in the NYPD, Roosevelt’s work improved the lives of American citizens, especially New Yorkers, in the long run. Roosevelt became a nationally recognized symbol of “reform in the best sense,” restoring the faith in the American political system that had been lost during the pre-Progressive era of political machines, patronage, and urban squalor.115 Within New York City, Roosevelt left an enduring mark; an acclaimed Roosevelt historian noted that: Few could deny that his record as Commissioner was impressive… He had proved that it was possible to enforce an unpopular law, and, by enforcing it, had taught the doctrine of respect for the law. He had given New York City its first honest election in living memory. In less than two years, Roosevelt had depoliticized and deethnicized the force, making it once more a neutral arm of government. He had broken its connections with the underworld, toughened the police- trial system, and largely eliminated corruption in the ranks…During the reform Board’s administration, he had personally brought about 68 Lucia A. Randall

the closure of a hundred of the worst tenement slums seen on his famous night patrols.116 Perhaps, however, Roosevelt’s greatest long-term accomplishment on the lives of Americans was his ability to encourage citizens to fight for social justice. With Roosevelt as their inspiration, New Yorkers crusaded to eliminate tenements and orphanages, fight corruption in city politics, and stand up for the rights of underrepresented citizens. Citing Roosevelt as the primary impetus behind the newfound change in the attitudes of New Yorkers, a New York Times article stated shortly before Roosevelt’s departure, “…there will be in the future a larger body of citizens united for action than anything we know of at present. We are becoming a vast body of men, and are beginning to understand that nothing can be done for good government except by a persistent attack on the present methods of government. There will be no compromise.”117 By motivating citizens to fight for reform, Roosevelt ensured that his advancements in the NYPD and within New York City would never be completely effaced. Roosevelt’s impact on the NYPD and the Progressive movement as a whole is undeniable; his work in New York City exposed corruption and brought a favorable public opinion of the Progressive values. Though action within the Police Department was eventually brought to a standstill, the positives of Roosevelt’s administration far overshadowed the negative. His largely successful attempts to keep the police out of politics propelled Roosevelt to the forefront of national politics; he became President only six years after leaving the Police Commissionership. Roosevelt’s vibrant, larger-than life personality captured the attention of both the press and the public, and his speeches, which appealed to both the wealthy and immigrants alike for their all-American values, were peppered with eloquent and persuasive language. Ultimately, though, it was Roosevelt’s actions that established him as the quintessential Progressive; he was a refreshingly honest politician who set ambitious goals and followed up on his word. Roosevelt resolved to develop a force based on merit rather than patronage, and in doing so, uplifted the morale of the force. THE CONCORD REVIEW 69 Roosevelt created the modern police force with modern scientific and technological innovations. Through his commitment to public service within the NYPD, Roosevelt rid the police of patronage and corruption, increased their confidence and efficiency, and pioneered the Progressive movement as a dynamic force for positive change. 70 Lucia A. Randall

1 David McCullough, Mornings on Horseback (Simon & Schuster, 1981; reprint, Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2003) pp. 28-30 2 Theodore Roosevelt, The Autobiography of Theodore Roosevelt (Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1913; reprint, Seven Treasures Publications, 2009) p. 11 3 Roosevelt, The Autobiography of Theodore Roosevelt, p. 11 4 http://theodoreroosevelt.org 5 Lincoln Steffens, The Shame of the Cities (New York: McClure, Phillips & Co., 1904; reprint: Mineola, New York: Dover Publications Inc., 2004) 6 Kenneth D. Ackerman, Boss Tweed: The Rise and Fall of the Corrupt Pol Who Conceived the Soul of Modern New York (New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2005) p. 21 7 David P. Thelen, “Social Tensions and the Origins of Progressivism” The Journal of American History (September, 1969) p. 323, http://www.jstor.org 8 Kenneth Conboy, “The Reforming Impulse: Theodore Roosevelt and the New York City Police” (Master’s Thesis, Columbia University), Found in The Theodore Roosevelt Collection, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 9 Steffens, The Shame of the Cities, p. 203 10 Ackerman, p. 17 11 Ibid., p. 39 12 “The Reign of the Rabble,” New York Times, 15 July 1863, http://hn.bigchalk.com 13 Ackerman, pp. 26-28 14 Ibid., p. 29 15 Edmund Morris, The Rise of Theodore Roosevelt 2d ed., (New York: The Modern Library, 1979) p. 534 16 Owen Wister, Roosevelt: The Story of a Friendship (New York: Macmillan Company, 1930) p. 70 17 Lemuel Ely Quigg, “Thomas Platt” The North American Review (May 1910) p. 670, http://www.jstor.org 18 Eric H. Monkkonen, History of Urban Police: Crime and Justice, (1992) p. 552, http://www.jstor.org 19 Thomas Nast, “The Guardian Angel of the Poor People’s Money” Harper’s Weekly 16 March 1872, http://www. harpweek.com 20 V.O. Key, Jr., “Police Graft” The University of Chicago Press (March 1935) p. 633 THE CONCORD REVIEW 71

21 Lincoln Steffens, The Autobiography of Lincoln Steffens (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1931) p. 201 22 Jay Stuart Berman, Police Administration and Progressive Reform: Theodore Roosevelt as Police Commissioner of New York (Greenwood Press, 1987) p. 71 23 Theodore Roosevelt, American Ideals: Administration- Civil Service (New York: P.F. Collier & Son, Publishers, 1897) p. 204 24 Morris, p. 409 25 Kathleen M. Dalton, Reviewed Works: “Police Administration and Progressive Reform: Theodore Roosevelt as Police Commissioner of New York by Jay Stuart Berman” The Journal of American History, (March 1989) p. 1348 26 H. Paul Jeffers, Commissioner Roosevelt: The Story of Theodore Roosevelt and the New York City Police, 1895-1897 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1994) p. 5 27 Selwyn Raab, “Taking on Tammany, 100 Years Ago” New York Times, 14 February 1992, Theodore Roosevelt Collection, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 28 Raab, “Taking on Tammany, 100 Years Ago” New York Times, 14 February 1992, Theodore Roosevelt Collection, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 29 Steffens, The Autobiography of Lincoln Steffens, p. 215 30 Berman, p. 27 31 Ibid., p. 27 32 Compiled and edited by Louis J. Lang, The Autobiography of Thomas Collier Platt (New York: B.W. Dodge & Company, 1910) p. 268, Found in the Theodore Roosevelt Collection, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 33 Avery Delano Andrews, Theodore Roosevelt: Police Commissioner (Unpublished), Theodore Roosevelt Collection, Houghton Library, Harvard University. Cambridge, Massachusetts, p. 10 34 Berman, p. 29 35 Ibid., 30 36 Jacob A. Riis, The Making of An American (New York: The Macmillan Company: 1901) p. 211 37 Jeffers, p. 56 38 Berman, pp. 35-36 72 Lucia A. Randall

39 “If Not Mr. Roosevelt, Who?” New York Times, 3 April 1895 40 Steffens, p. 257 41 Theodore Roosevelt, to Anna Roosevelt Cowles, 14 April 1895, transcript in the hand of Theodore Roosevelt, Theodore Roosevelt Collection, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 42 Theodore Roosevelt, to Anna Roosevelt Cowles, 21 April 1895, transcript in the hand of Theodore Roosevelt, Theodore Roosevelt Collection, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 43 Berman, p. 59 44 Roosevelt, The Autobiography of Theodore Roosevelt, p. 97 45 Roosevelt, pp. 96-97 46 Riis, The Making of an American, p. 210 47 Berman, p. 46 48 Henry F. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1931) p. 135 49 Steffens, p. 258 50 Theodore Roosevelt, to Anna Roosevelt Cowles, 19 May 1895, transcript in the hand of Theodore Roosevelt, Theodore Roosevelt Collection, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 51 Berman, pp. 35-36 52 Roosevelt, p. 96 53 Berman, p. 51 54 Jacob A. Riis, Theodore Roosevelt: The Citizen, (New York: The Outlook Company, 1903, reprint, New York: The Outlook Company, 1904) p. 130 55 Selected and edited by Elting E. Morison, The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt: The Years of Preparation: 1868-1898 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1951) p. 456 56 “Byrnes May Soon Retire” New York Times 26 May 1895, http://hn.bigchalk.com 57 Steffens, p. 208 58 “Police Caught Napping” New York Times 8 June 1895, http://hn.bigchalk.com 59 Berman, p. 57 60 Theodore Roosevelt, to Anna Roosevelt Cowles, 23 June 1895, transcript in the hand of Theodore Roosevelt, Theodore THE CONCORD REVIEW 73

Roosevelt Collection, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 61 Recorder (8 June 1895), found in Theodore Roosevelt: Police Commissioner (Unpublished) by Avery D. Andrews, Theodore Roosevelt Collection, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 62 Riis, Theodore Roosevelt: The Citizen, p. 144 63 Ibid., p. 151 64 Riis, The Making of An American, p. 44 65 Ibid., p. 223 66 Andrews, Theodore Roosevelt, p. 46 67 Ibid., p. 56 68 Pringle, p. 134 69 Andrews, p. 21 70 Theodore Roosevelt, American Ideals, pp. 203-204 71 Berman, pp. 69-74 72 Andrews, Theodore Roosevelt, p. 59 73 “Book Reviews: Theodore Roosevelt as Police Commissioner” Theodore Roosevelt Association Journal (Spring 1988) p. 17 74 Andrews, p. 47 75 “Book Reviews: Theodore Roosevelt as Police Commissioner,” p. 17 76 Berman, 80. 77 Berman, 84. 78 Berman, 88. 79 Andrews, Theodore Roosevelt, p. 99 80 Ibid., p. 101 81 “Bicycles a Great Help” New York Times 7 March 1896, http://hn.bigchalk.com 82 Riis, Theodore Roosevelt, p. 145 83Avery Delano Andrews, “Theodore Roosevelt as Police Commissioner,” The New-York Historical Society Quarterly (April 1958) p. 124, Found in the Theodore Roosevelt Collection, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 84 Avery Delano Andrews, Theodore Roosevelt as Police Commissioner, p. 124 85 Edward J. Bourke, “The Roosevelt the Police Knew,” New York Herald Tribune 12 October 1958, Article originally published on 12 November 1921, Found in the Subject Files, Theodore Roosevelt Collection, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Masschusetts 74 Lucia A. Randall

86 Jeffers, p. 120 87 Edward J. Bourke, “The Roosevelt the Police Knew”, New York Herald Tribune, 12 October 1958, Article originally published on 12 November 1921, Found in the Subject Files, Theodore Roosevelt Collection, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 88 Ibid. 89 George Juergens, “Theodore Roosevelt and the Press,” The MIT Press on behalf of American Academy of Arts & Sciences (Fall 1982) pp. 114-115, http://www.jstor.org 90 Juergens, “Theodore Roosevelt and the Press” pp. 120- 121, http://www.jstor.org 91 “A Montana Man on Theodore Roosevelt,” New York Times, 27 July 1895, http://hn.bigchalk.com 92 “Police Board’s Crusade” New York Times, 18 July 1895, http://hn.bigchalk.com 93 “Roosevelt in Action” New York Times, 21 July 1895, http://hn.bigchalk.com 94 Morris, p. 537 95 Unknown Article The New York Times, 10 August 1895 Clipping found in the Theodore Roosevelt Scrapbooks, Theodore Roosevelt Collection, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massacchusetts 96 “Look for a Dry Sunday” New York Times, 27 June 1895 97 “Roosevelt on Excise Law” New York Sun, 11 October 1895 98 Morris, p. 529 99 Morison, p. 490 100 “To Scare Roosevelt” Washington Post, 6 August 1895 101 Anonymous telegram, reprinted in Avery Delano Andrews’ Theodore Roosevelt: Police Commissioner (Unpublished) p. 93, Theodore Roosevelt Collection, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 102 Morris, p. 537 103 Ibid., p. 539 104 “The Republican Plot to Oust Roosevelt” New York Times 23 January 1896, http://hn.bigchalk.com 105 “Plot of Platt Men Widely Condemned,” New York Times 24 January 1896, Article found in the Theodore Roosevelt Collection, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts THE CONCORD REVIEW 75

106 Theodore Roosevelt to Anna Roosevelt Cowles, 19 April 1896, transcript in the hand of Theodore Roosevelt, Theodore Roosevelt Collection, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 107 Morris, p. 548 108 “An Unpleasant Police Board Incident” New York Sun, 27 May 1897, Article found in the Theodore Roosevelt Collection, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 109 Theodore Roosevelt, The Strenuous Life: Essays and Addresses, (New York: Review of Reviews Company, 1899, reprint, Mineola, New York: Dover Publications, 2009) p. 1 110 Morison, p. 595 111 “Duty Owned by Citizens” New York Times, 6 September 1895 112 Unknown Title New York Post 10 April 1897, Clipping found in Theodore Roosevelt scrapbook, Theodore Roosevelt Collection, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 113 Theodore Roosevelt to Avery Delano Andrews, 14 September 1899, transcript in the hand of Theodore Roosevelt. Theodore Roosevelt Collection, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 114 Letter reprinted in Avery D. Andrews’ Theodore Roosevelt: Police Commissioner (Unpublished) pp. 172, 188-189, Theodore Roosevelt Collection, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 115 http://theodoreroosevelt.org/association 116 Kathleen Dalton, Theodore Roosevelt: A Strenuous Life, (New York: Vintage Books, 2002) p. 342 117 New York Sun (New York: April 26, 1895), Clipping found in scrapbook in the Theodore Roosevelt Collection, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 118 Morris, pp. 584-585 119 “Municipal Reform Work” New York Times, 4 April 1897, http://hn.bigchalk.com 76 Lucia A. Randall

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Andrews, Avery D., Theodore Roosevelt: Police Commissioner, Unpublished, 1945, Theodore Roosevelt Collection, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts

Andrews, Avery D., “Witness to History: Theodore Roosevelt and the State Trust Company,” The Business History Review, Vol. 29, No. 4, (December, 1955) pp. 363-370, http://www. jstor.org

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Bourke, Edward J., “The Roosevelt the Police Knew,” New York Herald Tribune, 12 November 1921, Theodore Roosevelt Subject Files, Theodore Roosevelt Collection, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts

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Conboy, Kenneth, “The Reforming Impulse: Theodore Roosevelt and the New York Police,” Unpublished, Master’s Essay, Columbia University, Found in the Theodore Roosevelt Collection, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts

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Jeffers, H. Paul, Commissioner Roosevelt: The Story of Theodore Roosevelt and the New York City Police, 1895-1897, John Wiley & Sons, 1994

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Lodge, Henry Cabot, Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, 1884-1918, Scribner, 1925, Theodore Roosevelt Collection, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts

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Mandelbaum, Seymour J., Boss Tweed’s New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1965, Reprint: Chicago: Elephant Paperbacks, 1990

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Monkkonen, Eric H, “History of Urban Police,” Crime and Justice, Vol. 15, Modern Policing, (1992) pp. 547-580, http:// www.jstor.org

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80 Lucia A. Randall

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KIM DAE JUNG: AN EVALUATION OF HIS PRACTICES FOR DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE CONTEXT OF KOREAN POLITICAL HISTORY

Youngkwon “Noah” Yu

Kim Dae Jung was born in January 1924 in Haui-Do, a small island of Korea. He led a tumultuous political career: the politician of the opposition party, a condemned prisoner, the president of a republic, and a Nobel Peace Prize laureate. He ended his life at the age of 86 on August 18, 2009. After his death, critics, historians, and supporters have begun to evaluate Kim Dae Jung’s role in Korean political history. Some conservatives, like Gab Je Cho and Man Won Ji, labeled Kim as “a black shadow of Korean modern history,” “power of darkness,” and “incarnation of false demagogy and forceful unification.”1 Another critic even stated that “all he accomplished are lies and frauds.”2 On the other hand, others were much more generous. Young Sook Park described him as “a true democratic fighter, who did not compromise with injustice even when his life was at stake.”3 Who is the real Kim Dae Jung? Why is he a historical figure who receives such conflicting evaluations? How is he a ‘hero’ and a ‘demagogue’ at the same time? To evaluate Kim Dae Jung, one needs to understand his career in the context of modern Korean history and politics. The modern history of Korea, which starts in 1948 with the establish-

Youngkwon “Noah” Yu is a Senior at the Perkiomen School in Pennsburg, Pennsylvania, where he wrote this independent study for Dr. Lisa Smart in the 2009/2010 academic year. 84 Youngkwon “Noah” Yu ment of the Republic of Korea, was built upon the legacies of the Japanese colonial period as well as the U.S. military government. The interests, philosophies, principles, and desires of the various parties and politicians from 1948 need to be examined thoroughly in order for us to understand how Kim Dae Jung resisted, as well as shaped, the system. In this regard, a well-known Korean historian said, “Kim Dae Jung IS history.”4 Although many citizens and critics agree that he was at the forefront of the democratization movement in Korea, his ideas and practices have not been analyzed from a dispassionate perspective. Because Korean politics is so bound up with partisanship and regionalism, most views on Kim Dae Jung have been biased and emotional. For this reason, this work is aimed at performing an objective analysis of Kim Dae Jung’s role within Korean politics, especially regarding his struggle for the democratization of Korea. With this purpose in mind, this essay will narrate the key changes in Korean political history and Kim Dae Jung’s role within these changes, specifically focusing on his goal of democratization. This essay hopes to provide insight on the accomplishments and limitations of Kim’s career.

Introduction

While the institution of democracy is a hotly contested issue in many parts of the world, this was not an issue since the establishment of the Republic of Korea in 1948—at least on paper. The Constitution, written and enacted in August 1948, clearly supports democracy. Article 1, Clause 1 of the Constitution states that “the Republic of Korea shall be a democratic republic.”5 The assumption of this clause is the acceptance of a republican and parliamentary form of government. The Constitution goes on to delineate other democratic forms of practice to be instituted in Korea. For example, Article 1, Clause 2 of the Constitution states that “the sovereignty of the Republic of Korea resides in the people, and all state authority emanates from the people.”6 THE CONCORD REVIEW 85 Korean history, unfortunately, unfolded in a way much different from such prescriptions of the Constitution. For decades after the institution of the Constitution, the people’s will was not consulted or accepted. Too often, it has been neglected and worse, crushed. Thus, in Korea, democratization meant that people would regain their sovereign power from the authorities who took power away through illegitimate means. From this perspective, what Kim Dae Jung did was not controversial, unConstitutional, partisan, radical, or illegitimate, as many have labeled his career. What Kim did has an absolute value, the legitimacy of which is fully supported by the Constitu- tion. I argue that an evaluation of Kim Dae Jung’s democratization work needs to start with the acknowledgement that his efforts were thoroughly legitimate. His vision of democratization pulled Korean history in the direction of the original Constitution.

Liberation, Syngman Rhee, and Kim Dae Jung

Born in 1924 in Haui Do, Kim Dae Jung began to build his political career when the Korean peninsula was developing into a physical and ideological battlefield of the Cold War. On August 15th, 1945, when Kim was 21, Korea was liberated from Japanese domination and was consumed by the forces of the Cold War even before the celebration of the liberation had ended. The liberation was one “given” and determined by the Allies, rather than one achieved through the independent power of the people.7 The military governments of the U.S. and the Soviet Union were established in the Korean peninsula with the “liberation,” the former mentoring the right-wing Korean groups and the latter taking the left-wing Korean groups under its tutelage. This way, the Cold War was beginning to connect with the domestic politics of Korea. When all parties refused to compromise in their efforts to build a unified Korean government, Syngman Rhee, the leader of the right-wing group, established the Republic of Korea with the endorsement of the U.S. military government stationed in South 86 Youngkwon “Noah” Yu

Korea. Kim Il Sung welcomed this “separate peace,” establishing a Communist state, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in the North. Syngman Rhee’s authoritarian government was problem- atic from its very beginning. Not only did his regime have a weak connection with the public, but it also observed several practices that offended the public.8 First of all, the Rhee government failed to deliver appropriate punishment for the groups that had collaborated with the Japanese imperial forces during the 35-year period of the Japanese occupation of Korea. These pro-Japanese groups facilitated the Japanese suppression of ordinary Koreans during the occupation period. Additionally, Rhee’s authoritarian government increasingly included the ultra right-wingers, excluding more moderate politicians from participating in the government. Furthermore, Rhee’s government arrested the members of the opposition party under all kinds of political accusations. The National Security Law was enacted to suppress the opposing voices.9 These characteristics made the South Korean government an unpopular government that was truly undemocratic in nature. There was nothing “democratic” about this regime, despite its formal designation. The most notably oppressive ideological tool of the Rhee regime, however, was anti-Communism. The fact that the South and the North were waging a violent Cold War battle made the South Korean public vulnerable to anti-Communist propaganda. The outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950 also served to fuel the apparent legitimacy of anti-Communism. The Com- munist propaganda of North Korea—the aggressor that began the war—also further justified Rhee’s anti-Communist language. In this backdrop, Rhee increasingly strengthened and relied on anti-Communist ideology as a weapon to eliminate progressive politicians and political opponents and to suppress fundamental human rights. The hot environment of the “Cold” War provided the opportunity for Rhee and his Liberal party to abuse national power and to fortify its dictatorial ruling.10 In these historical con- texts, Rhee’s regime destroyed the liberal and democratic form of legislative politics, which formed the foundation of democracy.11 THE CONCORD REVIEW 87 These political and social conditions provoked Kim Dae Jung to enter politics. Kim recounted: “The conflict between the left and right and the corruption of the state after the liberation were manifest in all kinds of ways. This influenced me to enter politics.”12 Kim Dae Jung’s initial efforts to participate in the legislative system, however, were crushed under Rhee’s anti-Communism. In 1954, Kim Dae Jung ran for the 3rd Lower House election in Mok Po, where he attended high school. At that time, the Labor Union, which controlled elections in Mok Po, endorsed Kim Dae Jung. However, Rhee’s Liberal party pressured the police to arrest all union leaders, creating an election environment favorable for the ruling party.13 As a result, Kim Dae Jung was defeated. A similar interruption by the Liberal party took place four years later, in 1958, when Kim decided to run for elections in Injae, Kang Won Do. As the ruling Liberal Party interfered with Kim’s registration for candidacy, Kim could not even run for the election. Kim sued the elected candidate of Liberal Party for violating the election law. In March 1959, Kim won the case, and the elected candidate was force to resign.14 Kim ran in the special election for the vacant seat, but a group of soldiers controlled by the Liberal Party accused him of being a “commie” and created a fearful election atmosphere. The soldiers themselves installed and conducted the ballot, and again, Kim Dae Jung was defeated.15 These severe political conditions, in addition to the general atmosphere of indifference to politics, served as an unequivocal limitation for Kim Dae Jung, who had no social influence. But they also posed a number of directions for Kim. First, Kim Dae Jung performed legal protests against the Liberal Party, focusing on his local constituencies. In this process, he educated the local citizens about the democratic process of representation and election. Also, Kim brought the citizens’ attention to political reforms by questioning the legitimacy of Rhee’s government. This way, Kim Dae Jung began his work for democratization, which would continue for the next 40 years. 88 Youngkwon “Noah” Yu

The public’s rebellion against Rhee’s government on April 19, 1960 changed the course of politics and seemed to open some doors for Kim Dae Jung. During this incident, also known as the “4.19 Revolution,” Rhee was pressured to step down. This event marked the first democratic accomplishment achieved by Koreans. As the historian Chung put it, this was “a process of moving away from the condition of exclusive political power and the domination of authoritarian rule that it engenders.”16

Kim Dae Jung as a critic of the Chung Hee Park regime

Thanks to the optimism set off by the 4.19 Revolution, Kim could secure a seat in the National Assembly at In Jae, Kang Won Do, where he had lost elections three times previously.17 However, this triumph did not last long because on May 16, two days after Kim was elected, General Chung Hee Park staged a military coup. Park justified his coup as an effective way of dealing with the “social disorder and unstable politics arising from an incompetent interim government.”18 The coup leaders, who had obtained power through military force, established the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction, constructed a military cabinet, and initiated a full-scale military government.19 They proclaimed that they would return to the “original and revolutionary” goals by strengthening the anti-Communism system, fortifying Korea’s ties with U.S., establishing an independent economy, and wiping out corruption, among other “revolutionary pledges.”20

Kim Dae Jung criticized the 5.16 military coup with the following statement: Unrealistic argument on Coup d’etat is the issue. [Park and his supporters] claimed that the reason for the rebellion is corruption and incompetence of [the Chang Myun Cabinet]. However, the conspiracy for the coup started only thirteen days after the beginning of the Chang Myun Cabinet. Park criticized the corrupt nature of the Chang Myun government and opened a court-martial only after thirteen days. Of course, they couldn’t convict any of Chang’s cabinet members. [Park] THE CONCORD REVIEW 89

also argued that because of the endless demonstrations by college students, this country would eventually be in the hands of commu- nists. This is a contrived statement. If you review the newspapers of that period, demonstrations no longer took place. The main motive for the coup was simple, blind pursuit of power.21 As Kim Dae Jung continued to point out during this period, the military government was established and operated by soldiers, not by the representatives of the people who are elected through the representative system. Park’s military government also denied parliamentary democracy by dispersing the National Assembly and persecuting the opposition politicians. Moreover, Park abolished another system of democracy—the local self-government system. This system, which is based on the fundamental principle that people handle their local matters themselves, was abolished in 1961 through the coup. The system would only be recovered through Kim Dae Jung in 1995, 34 years after its abolition. Kim Dae Jung was deprived of his seat in the National assembly as the military government announced the dissolution of the National Assembly. For the following six years, he was not allowed to engage in politics with the enactment of the Refinement of Political Activities Act and was continuously offered the invitation to become a member of the military party, the Democratic- Republican party. Although his continuous refusal put him on Park’s black list, in 1963, he was released from the constraints as Park loosened the restriction on political activities as a gesture of goodwill during the presidential election campaign of 1963.22 As soon as he was freed from the ban, Kim Dae Jung focused on the presidential campaign, siding with the Democratic Party—the opposition party to which Kim belonged before the coup. Kim emerged as the trusted spokesman of this party. For the presidential election of 1963, Chung Hee Park ran as the candidate from the Democratic-Republican Party, and Yoon Bo Sun, of the Democratic Party, competed with Park. As a spokesman of an opposition party, Kim Dae Jung gave the citizens the opportunity to evaluate Chung Hee Park. The main standard under which Kim criticized Park was democracy: 90 Youngkwon “Noah” Yu

Kim highlighted the undemocratic nature of Park’s military government. He pointed out that Park had come to power through a coup instead of a fair, democratic election and accused Park of failing to keep the promise that he would transform his military regime into civilian rule.23 In this regard, he encouraged the Ko- rean voters to take democracy as a yardstick, a role that no other politician played during this time. However, in the end, Chung Hee Park won the election over Bo Sun Yoon by a slight margin of 150,000 votes. Park assumed the presidency.24 Despite Kim’s criticism, Park did not abandon military power and continued to violate the democratic and Constitutional principle of the neutrality of the military. Although the presidential election showed clear limits to Kim and his party, the years immediately following the election were productive ones for Kim. First, Kim was elected to the 6th National Assembly from his homeland, Mok Po. This was an unlikely feat for Kim since the citizens of his province, Jeolla (one of the five provinces of South Korea), favored Park and his Democratic-Republican Party.25 Considering the nine years of hardship and the four defeated elections that Park endured, this election was a victory. Second, during the 6th Assembly years, Kim focused primarily on parliamentary government activities.26 He went to the National Assembly library every day to collect data on parliamentary government activities. His examination and study served to check the prime minister and cabinet members.27 Park did not take Kim lightly; Park considered the alternative policy plans that Kim Dae Jung proposed and submitted, accepting his influence. This way, Kim Dae Jung gradually gained a reputation in political circles and grew into an influential politician.

Kim Dae Jung’s resistance to the Constitutional amendment for the president’s third term

The 1966 election campaign set Young Sam Kim and Chung Hee Park as clear oppositional forces. The main issue THE CONCORD REVIEW 91 of contention was the Constitutional amendment to modify the maximum number of terms that a president can serve. Park and his party justified the change of presidential terms from two to three by emphasizing the economic development that he directed during his first and second terms as the president. Chung Hee Park argued that a prolonged rule would enable him to finalize his economic guidance of the nation.28 On the one hand, Park’s contribution to national economic growth in the first eight years of his rule was unambiguous. On the other hand, his desire to rule South Korea for four more years would involve the violation of one of the most fundamental principles of Constitution and democracy—the principle that the rules of the nation should not be modified by interpretation of an individual or a specific group. Regardless of Park’s economic achievement, modifying the Constitution for the reelection of a president was a sign of a prolonged dictatorship. For president Chung Hee Park to serve a third term, the existing Constitution had to be modified. This modification could occur only when the ruling Democratic-Republican party obtained more than two-thirds of the National Assembly seats in the next general election; only with this majority, the bill for Constitutional amendment could be passed. Thus, Park approached the general election of 1967 as a ‘war.’29 From 1963 to 1966, while Kim served a member of the 6th National Assembly, Park started to watch Kim closely. As the spokesman of the opposition party and chairman of the Policy Council of the Assembly, Kim criticized Park’s dictatorship and sometimes offered alternative policies to his administration. Be- cause Park preferred a military-style command and control, he increasingly resented Kim’s pointed criticism.30 In particular, Park monitored Kim’s campaign activities in Mok Po, where Kim was running for an election.31 Park ordered the Korean Central Intel- ligence Agency (KCIA) to prevent Kim from getting elected and stated that he would not mind whether this meant the sacrifice of ten or twenty members of the ruling party.32 Also, to support Kim’s opponent in Mok Po, Park went to Mok Po twice during 92 Youngkwon “Noah” Yu the election campaign and promised the residents that he would invigorate the economy of Mok Po.33 In addition, under Chung Hee Park’s command, the Republican Party worked on creating twenty thousand “bogus voters.”34 Observing Park’s obsessive monitoring, Kim realized how desperately Park wanted the Constitutional amendment. In one of his public campaigns, Kim asked whether the ruling party’s main interest in gaining seats in the Assembly is to modify the Constitu- tion.35 In response, Park accused Kim of forging a political plot and declared that he did not wish to modify the Constitution for the purpose of obtaining a third term.36 Kim’s pointed criticism of Park during his campaign showcases how he effectively checked Park from indulging in his dictatorship. In the end, despite Park’s active support of the ruling party’s candidate in Mok Po, Kim Dae Jung secured the support of the local citizens and was elected. Through this victory, Kim Dae Jung became a nationally-recognized politician, much more prominent than he had been during his term in the 6th National Assembly. Yet, the 7th general election was a controversial one. The ruling Republican party won 130 seats nationally, and the opposition parties only won 44 seats. Thus, in spite of Kim Dae Jung’s victory, the opposition could not control the number of seats that could prevent passage of the Constitutional amendment.37 Many members of the opposition party discovered symptoms of corruption during the ballot process; consequently, they announced the election invalid. They requested a re-election and refused to attend the National Assembly until this demand was met.38 Park and the Republicans, who knew too well that the former administration of Syngman Rhee collapsed on the account of a fraudulent election in 1960, apologized and promised to resign 20 seats.39 If the opposition party accepted this offer, the third-term amendment would not have passed, since the number of Republicans would not have been enough to pass the amendment.40 THE CONCORD REVIEW 93 Kim Dae Jung at that time was pleased by the Republicans’ attitude and stated the following: [The opposition party] cannot continue with the refusal to attend the Assembly. [The chairman of the opposition party] insists on a reelection of the members of the National Assembly, but realistically speaking, isn’t that impossible? The president’s concession alone would prevent the chance for a third-term presidency, which is the crucial issue. Thus this proposition has to be accepted. What we need to do is to accept Park’s proposition and demand a change in the local government system, which would straighten out corruption in the election processes. In other words, we need a compromise now.41 However, the members of the opposition party were uncompromising. They insisted on the reelection to the end. Eventually, they lost valid justification for delaying Assembly attendance. As a result, they came back to the Assembly in 169 days, only to listen to Park’s apology.42 On this self-defeating and futile development of the opposition party, Kim commented: We did not gain anything. We could not gain the assurance that Park would not modify the Constitution or that the local government would be strengthened. We retreated and simply refused to compromise. I think the opposition party is also partly responsible for corrupting the politics and engendering dictatorship.43 Not withstanding Park’s efforts, the Constitutional amendment justifying the presidential third term passed through a number of illegal procedures. Until 1968, Park openly announced that he had no interest in amending the Constitution for his third term. However, in July 1969, one year after his announcement, Park justified the importance of passing the amendment by arguing that he could not leave office when the opposition party was attacking him. To the shock of the opposition party, in the morning of September 14, 1968, Republican members entered the Assembly building, hiding from the members of opposition party who were participating in a sit-in demonstration on the platform of the chamber to stop the amendment. They rushed the bill through in 25 minutes in the third wing of the National Assembly.44 The Constitutional amendment was passed by a 65% of the vote. It is 94 Youngkwon “Noah” Yu estimated that the Park government spent about $1.5 million in buying votes.45 These incidents leading to the amendment of the Con- stitution were the ultimate undemocratic change that Park and the Republicans carried out. The democratic process of election became meaningless as one man’s pursuit of power changed the law unilaterally. Observing this development, Kim Dae Jung commented: History was surely progressing towards the direction that was truly painful enough in a way that I was anxious and concerned about.46

Face-off: Kim and Park in the 1971 election

The presidential election in 1971, which followed the third-term amendment, was not only important to the people in positions of power but also to up-and-coming politicians in the opposition party. In the New Democratic Party, the biggest opposition party, Young Sam Kim, a young politician in his forties, insisted that politicians in their forties should be appointed as the candidates of the upcoming presidential election. This argument gained much support from the members of the New Democratic Party at the time and both Young Sam Kim and Kim Dae Jung entered the presidential primary for the New Democratic Party. Although Kim Dae Jung was no match for Young Sam Kim in the beginning, Kim Dae Jung could mobilize considerable support within his party with his relentless election campaign.47 As a result, Kim Dae Jung was nominated by his party as the presidential candidate for the New Democratic Party at the age of 45. Fearing the potential that Kim had, Park charged the KCIA with a very important mission: to make himself the president for the third time. To meet this end, the KCIA instigated anticommunist feelings by seizing the press and leaking false information. For example, they identified several college students as “spies from the North” and punished them, creating an environment of fear. In line with this political method, they identified Kim Dae THE CONCORD REVIEW 95 Jung as a “commie.” Soldiers also created fear among people by threatening the voters that there would be tanks from the North in the streets of Seoul if Kim Dae Jung were elected. 48 The conflict between the KCIA and Kim was so intense that one figure described the presidential election of 1971 as a confrontation between Kim Dae Jung and KCIA, rather than competition between the ruling Republican pary and the New Democratic party.49 Another political tool that Park used to win the election was to instigate sectionalism. Based on the fact that Park was from Gyeongsang Province and Kim was from Jeolla Province, Park in- cited hostile feelings between the provinces. Inciting sectionalism worked in Park’s favor since Gyeongsang Province had a larger population. One of the catch phrases that the Republican Party and the KCIA used for this purpose was: “if a president is elected from Jeolla Province, all people of Kyungsang Province will drown and die in the ocean.”50 This political strategy proved to have lasting consequences for the South Korean politics as it continued into the custom of tying the candidates with the regions they come from. This served to taint the democratic electoral system as the candidates’ political platforms and causes became largely irrelevant. Despite the conspiracies of the KCIA, Kim Dae Jung’s election campaign created a huge sensation.51 Although Kim criticized the legitimacy of Park’s regime in his campaigns, he did not focus solely on such criticism. Rather, Kim presented his new domestic policies to his constituencies. The key point of his platform involved the policy of reunification between North and South Korea. Ironically, the support for the cultural affiliation between North and South gave the Park government motive to denounce Kim as a communist. Yet, Kim’s reunification policy gained strong support from the intellectuals of the time, both nationally and internationally.52 Furthermore, Kim insisted that voting for Park would perpetuate the likelihood of illegitimate seizure of power in the future.53 Thus, in several ways, the public opinion was swaying in favor of Kim Dae Jung. 96 Youngkwon “Noah” Yu

The presidential election of 1971 also gave Kim the chance to emerge as an international figure. Until the election, Kim was largely unknown in the international arena despite his victory in the 7th general election in Mok Po and the presidential primary of the New Democratic Party. As he prepared himself for the presidential election, Kim visited Japan and the U.S. Kim proposed solutions for building a cooperative system with these two powerful nations and asked these countries to play a role in preventing the Park government from conducting another fraudulent election.54 Kim Dae Jung was welcomed by a number of American politicians and scholars. He engaged in discussions with them and gave a speech titled “The Reality and Direction of the Korean Opposition Party” at the National Press Club in Washington D.C.55 This international campaign of 1971 served as a tipping point for Kim Dae Jung since he adopted international diplomacy as the means of restraining the undemocratic rule of Korea. He used the pressure of the international society as a method to fight against Chung Hee Park’s military government, a system too powerful to be overturned by the opposition party alone. It was not easy for American politicians to take part in the internal affairs of Korea because they supported the sovereignty of each nation; however, Kim used the opportunity to let the world know of his desire for democratization.56 In his attempt to create democracy, Kim was particularly interested in creating a positive relationship with the United States, a powerful ally that the Park government was most fearful of. Nevertheless, the result of the election was disappointing to Kim and his supporters. With the help of the press, the KCIA, and a campaign fund of 60 billion Won (10% of national budget),57 Park won 6.34 million votes (53.3%) and his third term. In contrast, Kim Dae Jung, who did not have even one-hundredth of Park’s campaign fund, won 5.38 million votes (45.3%).58 Despite his victory, Park only secured the province of his birth (Gyeongsang Province) while all other provinces voted for Kim. Many scholars charged that the election involved undue regional conflicts and fraud.59 THE CONCORD REVIEW 97 The victory of Chung Hee Park in 1971 had a number of truly adverse influences on the prospect of democracy in Ko- rea. It not only fortified the legitimacy of one-man rule, but also rooted anticommunist ideas deeply into the society. After having witnessed the election in 1971, Kim Dae Jung announced that he was more concerned about the hopeless future of democracy in Korea than about his defeat in the election.60 Although the defeat in the presidential election would have been enough to demoralize him, Kim had to embark on a new task right after the election: campaigning for his opposition party on a national level for the 8th general election. The tension was high during this election campaign as university students and the public protested the fraudulent election and endorsed a boycott of the general election.61 Yet, the opposition party once again failed to associate itself with the public effectively, and the boycott lost its drive as the opposition party was plagued with internal division. 62 In this context, Kim’s goal was to prevent another Con- stitutional amendment that would perpetuate Park’s power. For this purpose, he strengthened his campaign for the opposition party, visiting many regions within Korea. He insisted that the public should not turn a blind eye on Park’s political schemes to revise the Constitution for a permanent rule.63 As a result, the Republican Party won 113 seats and the New Democratic Party won 89 seats, which meant that the number of Republican seats was insufficient to pass a Constitutional amendment.64 The members of the opposition party who were newly elected to the 8th National Assembly were positioned to successfully check the power of the ruling party. With stronger leverage, the opposition party positioned itself at the frontline of the struggle for democratization. It also received great support from the public. Now, the Republicans could no longer dictate. Because of this pressure, Park promised he would not run for a fourth term during the presidential election campaign of 1971. He also promised that he would wipe out corruption if he was elected for the third term. This pledge gave hope to the citizens, who believed that the pledge would be kept.65 98 Youngkwon “Noah” Yu

Park’s Revitalizing Reforms and Kim’s international campaign

Once again, the public was disappointed with Park. They did not see reforms that Park promised, and the students staged a series of protests. The public and the students demanded the closure of the KCIA, which interfered with the press and the freedom to hold rallies.66 Park enforced the Garrison Act in October of 1971 to suppress the protests, which involved about a thousand students.67 Moreover, Park declared a State of National Emergency in December.68 Such harsh response was possible because the Park administration had the support of six hundred thousand soldiers.69 Park’s “October Revitalizing Reform,” pronounced on October 17, 1972, culminated in his quest for perpetual power. On this day, Park declared national martial law, dispersed the National Assembly, and prohibited political activities.70 Beginning on this day, Park arrested and tortured the opposition members who raised objections to the reform. The vital elements of democracy were denied as well: the Constitution of Republic of Korea, the political party system, and the parliamentary politics.71 In declaring this reform, Park used changing Cold War politics as a rubric.72 The administration argued that the Reform was crucial to overcoming the domestic and foreign disorder at the time and that western-style democracy did not fit Korea.73 Ten days into the reign of terror, other harsh news hit the country: the Park administration announced a Constitutional amendment for a lifetime presidency, which passed with 91.5% of the votes in favor of the amendment.74 Under the new Constitu- tion, the “Constitution for Revitalizing Reform,” the president was elected by indirect election by the members of the Reunification of National Convention. The representatives of the Reunification of National Convention comprised 73 members of the National Assembly who were appointed by the president.75 Moreover, according to this new Constitution, the president could disperse the National Assembly, but the National Assembly no longer had the THE CONCORD REVIEW 99 authority to impeach the president. Furthermore, the judiciary branch was subordinated to the executive branch since the president had absolute authority to appoint all the judges.76 With these developments, democracy was boldly crushed. Article 1, Clause 2 of the Constitution, which states that all power comes from the people, became an irrelevant and powerless phrase. Kim Dae Jung and the leaders of Korean democratization denounced the Revitalization Reform. Kim Dae Jung, who was in Japan for medical treatment when the Reform was announced, knew that he could not participate in politics even if he returned to Korea. Therefore, he decided to start a political asylum abroad to fight Park’s dictatorship.77 On October 18th, 1972, the day after the announcement of the Revitalizing Reform, Kim contacted the news media in Japan, held press conferences, and declared his opposition to the Revitalizing:78 I pledge that I will continue to struggle against President Park’s decisions. Park broke his promise with his people and crushed the democratic spirit of the nation and the Constitution. I am certain that the people of our country, who love freedom, will not lose the chance to cast judgment on Park.79 In response to the Constitutional amendment announced on October 27, Kim Dae Jung gave a statement criticizing the Re- form’s denial of the core principles of parliamentary democracy and separation of powers. He pointed out that the Reform was merely an expression of Park’s ambition for dictatorship. Kim then relocated to Washington D.C., where he could exert political influence. However, since American congressmen did not have much interest in Korea, Kim left the U.S. and returned to Japan in November 1973. He consolidated his activities in Japan where more people were interested in Park’s dictatorship and the Re- vitalizing Reform.80 Through these activities, Kim strengthened his relationship with foreign politicians and sought to pressure Chung Hee Park with his diplomatic influence. On July 6, 1973, Kim Dae Jung organized the U.S. branch of the Korean Congress for Democracy and Unification in Wash- ington, and on July 10, he returned to Japan to organize another 100 Youngkwon “Noah” Yu branch. The Korean Congress for Democracy and Unification sought to combat the dictatorship of Chung Hee Park from abroad and to move the direction of the country towards a democratic system.81 It proceeded with the view that a recovery of democracy in Korea would lead to the overthrow of the Park government. Koreans residing in America and Japan were some of the key members of this organization. Although the Park regime could oppress the opposition party within the nation to some degree, it regarded Kim’s anti- government movement in the United States and Japan, two of the strongest countries in the world, as a threat.82 Park made attempts to stop Kim’s international anti-government movement through force. An act of violation occurred while Kim was visiting Japan to establish the Japan branch of the Korean Congress for Democracy and Unification. On August 8, 1973, a group of five to six men kidnapped Kim; he was physically beaten and led to a car, which ran toward the seashore. From there, an airplane picked him up and moved him to the Korean coast. When he was moved to a building by a car, a young man questioned Kim why he struggled against his country in foreign countries. Kim answered that it is Park’s regime that he is against, not the country. Blindfolded, Kim was at last released in front of his house.83 No longer than an hour after Kim Dae Jung arrived at his house, many reporters and cameramen gathered in front of his house. On the day after this incident, the South Korean government released a statement that it had no relation to the incident. But the response of the international community was surprisingly accusatory and suspicious of Park’s regime. The American ambassador in Korea at that time, Philip Habib, presented a letter of objection to President Park.84 Japan proceeded with its own investigation, and a Japanese newspaper released a report alleging that the fingerprint of Dong Woon Kim, a member of the KCIA, was discovered at the scene of the abduction. One of the Korean newspapers in Japan also criticized the Korean government. In response, Park banned this newspaper, aggravating Korea’s conflict with the Japanese government. As a result, the Japanese THE CONCORD REVIEW 101 government indefinitely postponed the ministerial meeting, which was scheduled for October. In addition, the North Korean co-chairman of the South-North Coordinating Committee refused to continue his relationship with Hoo Rak Lee, the South Korean co-chairman of this committee. He argued that the communication between the South and the North could not continue since the abduction of Kim Dae Jung was an act of the KCIA. Kim’s abduction incident increased the pressure on the Park regime, as it publicized the undemocratic and violent character of Park’s regime internationally. With this change, Park had no choice but to change the Revitalization Reform.

Kim Dae Jung as the leader of the democratization movement and the collapse of the Revitalizing Reform

Even after Kim’s release, Park declared it illegal for Kim to pursue political activities opposed to the Revitalizing Reform. Yet, Kim’s abduction incident had spurred a series of grassroots activities opposing the Restoration. For example, in December 1973, university students developed the National Federation of Democratic Youth and planned national protests, although their demonstrations resulted in the arrest of a thousand members and the execution of eight. 85 This massive crackdown only served to amplify the grassroots democratization movement. Eventually, these grassroots groups announced the “March 1st Declaration of Democratic National Salvation,” which demanded the elimina- tion of emergency measures, the release of imprisoned citizens and students, the restoration of the parliamentary government, and the independence of the judicial branch. In sum, it was the direct challenge to the Park regime on a nation-wide level. This document was co-signed by Kim Dae Jung, the opposition party leader, a renowned priest, a university professor, a female lawyer, and other high-profile figures of the democratization movement.86 Kim Dae Jung, who wrote the first draft of this declaration, said he would not mind getting imprisoned if this would motivate citizens to support democratization. The number and the social 102 Youngkwon “Noah” Yu positions of the signatories were formidable, and the foreign press covered this incident as a significant development with regard to democratization in Korea. Park’s government announced that the March 1st Declara- tion of Democratic National Salvation was an illegal attempt to destroy the Constitutional order. With this argument, Park arrested the co-signers of the declaration. During his trial, Kim Dae Jung criticized the illegitimacy of Park regime. Consequently, Kim and other co-signers were sentenced to about five years in prison. In prison, Kim built close relationships with the prominent figures of the democratization movement. On Dec 27, 1978, two years and nine months into his imprisonment, Kim was pardoned by Chung Hee Park, shortly after he was elected as the 9th president through the National Convention for Reunification.87 Kim Dae Jung was ordered to be confined to his residence. The 10th General Election reflected the widespread support for democratization and forecast the collapse of the Revitalizing Reforms. In this election, the opposition party, the New Demo- cratic Party, received 32.8% of the vote, and the ruling party, the Republican Party, received 31.7%. For the first time under the Re- vitalizing Reforms system, the New Democratic Party had received more votes than the Republican Party. The results indicated that the people used the most accessible way to voice their dissatisfaction with Park’s regime.88 During the fall months of 1979, discontent with Park seemed to explode on all fronts. During September 1979, Young Sam Kim, the chairman of the New Democratic Party, announced a “pan-national struggle” to overthrow Park’s regime. The Park administration took Young Sam Kim’s name off the list of assemblymen on Oct 4. To express the opposition to such measure, every one of the 66 members of the New Democratic Party submitted a waiver for his or her seat.89 More than 50,000 residents of Pusan, Young Sam Kim’s hometown, joined the opposition party on Oct. 16, 1979. They went on a strike and chanted political goals, such as “the abolition of Revitalizing Reforms,” “freedom of speech,” and “release Young Sam Kim.” On the 18th, Park proclaimed emergency THE CONCORD REVIEW 103 martial law in Pusan, but protest in Pusan expanded to Masan, a neighboring city. The Pusan-Masan uprising was meaningful in that ordinary citizens formed the center of the protest, unlike prior movements, which were largely driven by intellectuals. Through the uprising, the people showed their will to change the reality through active resistance.90 A surprising incident that took place 10 days after the Pusan-Masan Uprising ended the Revitalizing Reforms. On Octo- ber 26, Jae Kyu Kim, the director of the KCIA, assassinated Park. Many critics and scholars point out that this assassination would not have happened without the explosion of the citizens’ objection to Park’s dictatorship.91 In this sense, the Park regime created the possibilities for its own collapse through political, social, and economical contradictions.92 The environment of resistance among the citizenry would not have been formed if it were not for Kim’s personal sacrifice, diplomatic tactics abroad, and delivery of the March 1st Declaration of Democratic National Salvation. These accomplishments strengthened the citizens’ consciousness of democracy and gave them the courage to join the voice of opposition.

Spring of Seoul and the lost opportunity for democratization

A wave of hopeful optimism swept over the population when the 18-year old Revitalization Reforms ended. The citizens expected that democratization would soon follow.93 After the assassination, the official government power was handed over to Kyu Ha Choi, the prime minister under Park. Watching this development, many citizens expected a direct presidential election immediately, but Kyu Ha Choi insisted on finishing his term and on continuing the use of the National Convention for Reunifica- tion for presidential election.94 Kim Dae Jung, who was confined to his home during this period, was far from happy when he heard about Park’s assassination. He watched people’s early optimism with concern as he knew 104 Youngkwon “Noah” Yu that democratization was not an easy process.95 Kim Dae Jung did not attend the rally put forth by the National Union for Democracy and Unification although he was its co-chair; rather, he argued quietly but strongly that there would be a state of anarchy if the prime minister Choi resigned before the December Presidential Election through the National Convention for Reunification. Thus, he argued that a Constitutional amendment should provide for a direct election under Choi’s strong guidance; otherwise, a new military regime would emerge.96 In line with Kim’s prediction, the shadow of dictatorship and violence was everywhere, making the citizens’ optimism appear naïve. Doo Hwan Chun, the Head Security Commander of the time, declared martial law throughout the nation. Chun arrested the members of the National Union for Democracy and Unification when they insisted on the establishment of aneu- tral cabinet and objected to electing the president through the National Convention for Reunification.97 Chun announced that they were an “illegal gathering of greedy people who were misus- ing the circumstances to seize power and play politics.” With the tough response of the Martial Law Enforcement Headquarters, the National Union for Democracy and Unification had no option but to modify their demand from “the establishment of a neutral cabinet” to “the removal of martial law.”98 Doo Hwan Chun began to seize power gradually despite the election of Choi as the 10th president by the National Conven- tion for Reunification on December 6, 1979. Only two days later, a significant event took place that determined the fate ofthe 1980s. The Security of Capital Headquarters and Doo Hwan Chun, who was in charge of investigating Park’s assassination, charged Seung Haw Chung, the army Chief of Staff and the Chief Martial Law administrator, with conspiring to assassinate the president. With this event, Doo Hwan Chun took away Seung Hwa Chung’s military power and seized complete power over the military.99 Regardless of this coup within the military on December 12, the proponents of democratization did not doubt that democracy was fast becoming a reality. Many members of the New THE CONCORD REVIEW 105 Democratic Party dismissed Kim Dae Jung’s concerns, arguing that his apprehension came from a lack of firm conviction; instead of worrying, they went on writing the Constitutional amendments.100 Young Sam Kim, the chairman of the New Democratic Party at the time, was convinced that there would be political opportunities for him in the upcoming era. Young Sam Kim argued that the promotion of the New Democratic Party was the law of history.101 These demonstrated that the forces of democratization were celebrating an early victory and becoming too interested in obtaining political power in the “democratic era,” which everyone believed was coming soon. On the other hand, Kim Dae Jung was much more reserved. Having been released from house arrest on February 29, 1980, he held meetings around the nation and expressed his concern about the new military authorities, especially Doo Hwan Chun. Kim questioned why Chun and his organization continued to police the press with the excuse of emergency martial law and why they delayed the complete release of democratization activists.102 Kim also warned the citizens that if they become caught up in the forces of chaos, “[they] will give a golden chance for those in power who use the chaos as an excuse to attain power.”103 Because Kim feared this aspect of chaos, he went around to many universities in May of 1980 to ask the students to restrain their anti-government demonstrations. To address the potential chaos and the potential return of dictatorship, Kim Dae Jung sought to strengthen the New Democratic Party. On April 4, 1980, Kim met the chairman of the party, Young Sam Kim, to attempt a negotiation for the purpose of consolidating the party. With this attempt, Kim sought to buttress the democratic force within the parliamentary system. However, on April 7, Kim Dae Jung and Young Sam Kim announced a “negotiation breakdown.” The problem with the breakdown between the two Kims was a deep-rooted rivalry. They had a history of rivalry, starting from the party primary for the 1971 presidential election. Also, regional antipathy ran high between the two. Kim Dae Jung was 106 Youngkwon “Noah” Yu from Jeolla Province and Young Sam Kim was from Kyungsang Province, so their support bases were different. More fundamen- tally, Young Sam Kim, who was the less persecuted of the two, tried to make a full use of institutional advantages, which Kim lacked. Kim Dae Jung disapproved Young Sam Kim’s move as unfair competition. In this context, the mistrust between them caused efforts for democratization to founder. The breakdown symbolized the failure of the two most powerful forces to create a democratic government through cooperation, which in turn facilitated the new military force to seize political power. In the middle of this breakdown, a tragedy befell South Korea. On May 15, 1980, when more than 100,000 students and citizens were returning home after protesting in front of the Seoul Train Station, the military authorities led by Chun proclaimed a national emergency and martial law. That evening, they started arresting 26 leaders of the democratization movement. Soldiers infiltrated Kim Dae Jung ‘s house and relocated him to the basement of the KCIA building at gunpoint.104 The next day, the military authority executed 150 people participating in the Kwangju democratization uprising. With these events, it became clear that the reintroduction of the military government ended the so-called “Spring of Seoul,” the transitional period following the collapse of the Revitalizing Reforms. Once again, the military power overthrew the lawful government of the nation, and the soldiers staged an unstoppable revolt. Kim Dae Jung’s activities during the Spring of Seoul were two-fold. First, he demonstrated clear political insight as he consistently warned the New Democratic Party that the removal of the martial law should be their priority. He also predicted that Chun’s military power would use protests and social chaos as justifications for their accession to power. It was unfortunate that the forces of democracy failed to listen to Kim’s accurate predictions. However, Kim’s activities during the Spring of Seoul were not entirely positive. Kim Dae Jung could not overcome personal desires and sense of rivalry for the democratization of the country. His failure to compromise with Young Sam Kim was his critical mis- THE CONCORD REVIEW 107 take since Young Sam Kim had more leverage within the National Assembly. Finally, had Kim Dae Jung engaged more directly with the National Assembly, he could have exerted more influence to prevent the emergence of the military government.

Do Hwan Chun’s persecution of Kim Dae Jung

After Chun grasped power, the KCIA accused Kim Dae Jung of conducting a range of illicit political activities. Initially, he was accused of creating a conspiracy for rebellion and leading an anti-state organization. To support this accusation, the KCIA arrested 37 people, under the accusation of conspiracy for rebellion. Then, Kim was accused of giving money to a returning student of Jeonnam University, Dong Nyun Jung, to start the Kwangju riot.105 On July 4, the Martial Law Enforcement Headquarters announced that “Kim Dae Jung and his followers tried to stir up university students, with returning students as their activists. They tried to rally the masses, cause people to revolt, and ultimately overthrow the government in order to form an interim government headed by Kim Dae Jung.”106 Additionally, the Martial Law Enforcement Headquarters claimed that “Kim Dae Jung was an active communist, who was involved in the left-wing activities immediately after Korea’s independence from Japan and that he established the Recovering Democracy and Promoting Unification Congress of Korea, an antinational group that conformed to the orders of North Korea”107 It was evident that Chun set his mind on eliminat- ing Kim, a symbolic figure of democratization who posed a dire threat to Chun. The KCIA also attempted a combination of a threat and an offer. A month after the KCIA interrogation, a man came to see Kim Dae Jung. He told Kim that he would grant Kim any position other than the presidency if he cooperated with the new military authorities; but if Kim did not cooperate, there would be no option but to kill him. He also let it be known that the upcoming trial was just an excuse to kill Kim Dae Jung. 108 Youngkwon “Noah” Yu

As Kim Dae Jung consistently refused to compromise with the military government, the authorities finalized two charges: conspiracy and anti-state organization. To support these two crimes, the new military authorities tortured 26 figures of democratization and reporters, extracting false confessions. Since the harshest penalty for conspiracy was life imprisonment, the military authorities prioritized the charge of leading an anti-state organization, punishable by death. This way, Kim was sentenced with the death penalty on September 17, 1980. Kim prepared his final will, in which he stated that democracy would be recovered in the 1980s, and that he did not wish for any political retaliation in the future.108 The death penalty on Kim aroused great interest abroad. The foreign minister of West Germany, Genscher, proposed that the European Union Member States jointly complain to the Korean government. Edward Muskie, the Secretary of State of the U.S., stated that “the U.S. government is greatly concerned about the extreme, far-fetched punishment on [Kim Dae Jung].” Also, the Japanese government, which was already frustrated with Kim’s abduction in Japan, declared that there would be constraints on various assistance.109 Moreover, President Reagan proposed that Doo Hwan Chun reduce Kim’s penalty as the condition of Chun’s visit to America. On January 23, 1981, in response to the diplomatic pressure from abroad, Doo Hwan Chun reduced Kim Dae Jung’s sentence from capital punishment to life imprisonment. Within days, the military government changed its decision and recom- mended that Kim Dae Jung leave for the U.S. On December 23, 1981, Kim Dae Jung was deported to America, with the reinstatement of political prisoners as the condition for his departure.110 Kim’s refusal to cooperate with the military government, coupled with the interest that his sentence provoked in the international community, further transformed him into a symbol of democratization. THE CONCORD REVIEW 109 Political exile, coalition with Young Sam Kim, and return to Korea

During his political exile in the U.S., Kim Dae Jung worked on collaborating with Young Sam Kim, a problem for which he was rightly criticized. While he led his own independent effort for the democratization of Korea—for example, opening the Korean Institute for Human Rights in Washington D.C.—he also joined Young Sam Kim’s demonstration efforts in Korea. On May 18, 1983, Young Sam Kim began a highly publicized fast, demanding the release of all political prisoners, the reinstatement of dismissed professors and laborers, and the freedom of speech. Kim Dae Jung created a “National Emergency Countermeasure Committee for the Hunger Strike of Young Sam Kim” in Washington D.C. After the establishment of this committee, Kim released various public statements in support of the hunger strike and agreed to con- struct a common front with Young Sam Kim. Kim and Kim made a joint declaration, named “Kim Dae Jung—Young Sam Kim 8.15 Declaration,” which held that the struggle for democratization is a struggle for the independence and liberation of Korea. In this declaration, they acknowledged that they were responsible for impeding the construction of a common front of democratization. They founded the “National Council of Democratization,” through which they promised cooperation and unity.111 The alliance between Kim Dae Jung and Young Sam Kim—the two pillars of South Korea’s struggle for democratization—was a turning point for the movement of democratization in Korea as well as for the decline of Chun’s military government. On February 8, 1985, Kim Dae Jung decided to go back to Korea, ending his two-year career as a tough expatriate critic of the Chun regime. The Korean government communicated to Kim Dae Jung that they could not guarantee his safety if he returned home. In response, the American government demanded that the Korean government guarantee his safety as a condition of Chun’s visit to the U.S.112 A coterie of internally renowned figures went aboard with Kim Dae Jung for his safe return: congressmen Ed- ward Feighan and Thomas Foglietta, the Carter administration’s 110 Youngkwon “Noah” Yu

Assistant Secretary of State, Patricia Derian, the former ambassador to Korea, Thomas White, Reverend Chris J. Harvey, a retired navy captain, the president of World Lawyers’ Association, and a popular singer.113 What awaited Kim Dae Jung’s return were 300,000 people at the airport and the election of the 12th National Assembly, scheduled to be held four days later. Before returning home, Kim Dae Jung formed the New Korean Democratic Party with Young Sam Kim. His timely return had a great impact on the outcome of the election. The New Korean Democratic Party became the leading opposition party among an array of opposition parties aiming to abolish the military government.114

The democratic movement and Kim Dae Jung’s position on the presidential election

The positive results of the 12th general election that followed Kim Dae Jung’s return unified the forces of democratization and renewed people’s interest in democratization. From February to March of 1985, two of the most powerful social movements—the Democratic Movement Council of People and the Democratic Unification Committee of People—integrated into the Democratic Unification Movement Council.115 Moreover, the Democratization Promotion Council, an organization established with Young Sam Kim’s hunger strike in 1983, successfully secured the endorsement of ten million people for direct election of the president in February 1986.116 Yet, Kim Dae Jung was once again forced to political isola- tion. He was under house arrest after he returned to Korea. He could not hold press conferences or attend key political events, including the founding event for the newly organized Democratic Reunification Party in 1987. Approximately 3,000 policemen guarded Kim Dae Jung’s residence, prohibiting his communication with Young Sam Kim and the members of the opposition party. THE CONCORD REVIEW 111 The Doo Hwan Chun regime also continued to confront the forces of democratization with an iron fist.117 This was especially evident during a rally of university students at Kon Kuk University on Oct 28, 1986. The policemen denounced the rally participants as “Pro-North Korean Communist Revolutionaries,” and by the third day of the rally, a police force comprised of 8,500 men arrested 1,290 students. This made the record for the number of arrests made in a single day.118 In the middle of this heated atmosphere, Cardinal Soo Hwan Kim, a leader of Korean democratization who had a close relationship with Kim Dae Jung, made an important announcement; he first reminded the citizens that the presidency of Chun was nearing its end: Chun, who took power in 1980, promised that he would finish his presidency after a seven-year term. The Cardinal warned that in order to avoid repeating the past mistake, Kim Dae Jung and Young Sam Kim must cooperate.119 On November 5, 1986, in response to Cardinal Soo Hwan Kim’s statement, Kim Dae Jung announced his noncandidacy for the upcoming presidential election: The confusion created by violent power struggle has made everyone anxious… I feel frustrated that I am not able to perform any specific role for the democratization of this country because of various limitations in my position. I, too, am watching the political situation with distress and anxiety…… My heart broke into thousands of pieces when I watched a massive number of our young men getting crushed during the KonKuk University incident and when I think that such a situation may happen again in the future. The way to handle this crisis is a direct presidential election, which the majority of people are asking for. Democratization is the only way for national salvation, security, and safety. The Chun regime should follow this road [of democratization] to stop the misfortune. If I am in the way of Chun regime following this road, I will gladly sacrifice myself. If the Chun regime accepts the Constitutional amendment for direct election, I declare my decision not to run for the presidential election, even after the reinstatement of my political career.120 The response of the other pillar of Korean democratization, Young Sam Kim, was equally inspirational and modest. When Young Sam Kim heard the news that Kim Dae Jung was not run- 112 Youngkwon “Noah” Yu

ning for the election on his way to West Germany, he first urged the government to accept the proposal. Then, he stated that if Kim Dae Jung is reinstated, he would support Kim Dae Jung as the candidate of the presidential election. He acknowledged that their rivalry played a role in ushering the new military government in the 1980s and assured everyone that he would not repeat the same mistake. He said that like Kim Dae Jung, he was willing to sacrifice anything for democratization.121 Kim Dae Jung’s speech also had an effect on President Doo Hwan Chun. Kim’s speech was given two days before Chun planned to enact the Contingency Response and martial law proclamation that he had drafted some time ago. Chun acknowledged that Kim’s speech played a role in his deciding against this drastic measure and considering the amendment for direct presidential election.122 Doo Hwan Chun’s harsh dictatorship began to wane following another series of events. Political demonstration during this period became much more widespread and intense. People protested in 22 cities across Korea on June 10, 1987, when Chun nominated Tae Woo Roh as the candidate of his Democratic Jus- tice Party for the presidential election. Media around the world distinguished protests during that time from other protests, calling them ‘the revolt of the middle class.’ Along with the students or labor workers, who normally participated in anti-government demonstrations, the general population including employers and office workers also joined these demonstrations. Simultaneously, the U.S. government, which actually helped Chun’s ascendance to power, made it clear this time that it opposed any military intervention to suppress the resistance movement.123 Consequently, as a way of dealing with the anti-government protests and the response from the American government, Tae Woo Roh, the presidential candidate of the Democratic Justice Party, proposed a series of compromises: an amendment for direct presidential election, rehabilitation of Kim Dae Jung, release of political criminals, freedom of speech, improvement of the fundamental rights of citizens, and enforcement of the local government system. On July 1, Doo Hwan Chun accepted Roh’s proposal which became known as 6.29 Proposition. THE CONCORD REVIEW 113 Collapse of the Kim-Kim coalition and the extended military regime

As Doo Hwan Chun accepted Roh’s 6.29 Proposition, the citizens were wild with excitement. Indeed, the revision of the Constitution for direct presidential election, passed on October 27, 1987, was no small feat. In an important way, it was Korea’s first step toward democratization. The absence of such a system allowed a series of dictators to seize and maintain power through illegitimate methods. For example, the indirect election of the president through the National Conference for Unification, which was instituted as part of Chung Hee Park’s Revitalizing Reforms, assured Park’s power for two decades. After the celebratory mood waned, the citizens focused on the issue of who would run as the presidential candidate for the Democratic Reunification Party. Initially, the two Kims stated that they would unify and sacrifice their personal political desire for the goal of democratization. However, the relationship between the two proved to be disastrous, to the disappointment of the citizens. After being reinstated, Kim Dae Jung explained that he would refrain from a run for the presidency only if President Chun voluntarily accepted the direct-presidential-election amendment, but since this amendment was attained by the citizens’ pressure, he was not tied to his previous pledge.124 After this announcement, Kim Dae Jung and Young Sam Kim deliberated on the issue of candidacy for the presidential election but did not reach an agreement. Kim Dae Jung’s visit to the city of Kwangju in Je- olla Province shortly after his talks with Young Sam Kim showed his desire to run as a presidential candidate. The supporters of Young Sam Kim argued that Kim Dae Jung’s presidency would be a disaster because the military authority would disapprove of it.125 This conflict soon gave way to intense regionalism. Citizens of Gyeongsang Province, Young Sam Kim’s hometown, supported Young Sam Kim avidly, and citizens of Jeolla Province, Kim Dae Jung’s hometown, supported Kim Dae Jung without compromise. The intensity of regionalism mirrored the feelings created dur- 114 Youngkwon “Noah” Yu ing the presidential election of 1971, when Gyeongsang Province endorsed Chung Hee Park and Jeolla Province promoted Kim. When the two Kims met again on October 22, further conflict arose: Young Sam Kim wanted to conduct a party primary, but Kim Dae Jung opposed this suggestion as he (Jung) lacked a history of parliamentary political activities due to his long-term house arrest. On October 30, Kim Dae Jung made the last move of separation: he withdrew from the Democratic Reunification party, formed the Peace Democratic party, and declared his candidacy for the presidential election. These events surrounding the 13th presidential election demonstrated Kim’s weakness: his failure to collaborate with Young Sam Kim. In favoring his own political interest over the goal of democratization, he showed that he was all too human. The division between Kim Dae Jung and Young Sam Kim proved to be catastrophic once again. The ballot gave power to Chun’s Democratic Justice party: Tae Woo Roh received 36.6% of the vote, with Young Sam Kim receiving 28.0%, and Kim Dae Jung 27.1%. In other words, by dividing the constituency that would have otherwise voted for a single candidate from the opposition party, Young Sam Kim and Kim Dae Jung paved the way for Roh’s ascendance. Although Roh’s ascendance to presidency was thoroughly democratic and legitimate, his political genealogy was problem- atic in several ways. Roh was a central figure in Chun’s military government, and as such, he had no background in democratic parliamentary politics. An army general, Roh played a key role in Chun’s coup and suppression of protests. Ironically, although Roh came to power through a direct election, his presidency meant an extension of the military regime. Kim Dae Jung’s speech on the presidential election of 1987 ten years later in 1997 expressed his deepest regrets regarding the 13th presidential election. Kim stated that he was the cause of the problem; he was not being cool-headed because he was over- whelmed by the support of his constituency. He acknowledged that he should have made concessions for the people.126 However, THE CONCORD REVIEW 115 this was a belated regret as his failure to unify with Young Sam Kim delayed the election of a president with a background in democracy for five years.

The minority parliamentary situation, the merging of the three parties, and the activation of the local government system

The 13th general election, held in April 1988 after the presidential election of 1987, was meaningful in that it was the first time that the Korean national assembly had a minority parliament. In this election, Kim Dae Jung’s Democratic Peace Party gained 70 seats, Roh’s Democratic Justice Party gained 125, Young Sam Kim’s Democratic Party gained 59, and Jong Pil Kim’s Republican Party gained 35 seats. This minority parliament was a key issue in the Roh administration while serving as an ideal political environment for Kim Dae Jung. Exerting pressure within this environment, Kim Dae Jung, who became the chairman of the largest opposition party, declared that the public had the right to know how Chun’s former regime had abused its power during the Kwangju Uprising.127 As a result, the congress held a hearing for Doo Hwan Chun and his former military supporters. Through this act, Chun’s corruption and abuse of power was revealed, and the newly discovered facts about the Kwangju Uprising surprised citizens and the foreign media, many of whom were oblivious to this incident despite the violence experienced by the rioters.128 The assessment of and reflection on a shockingly undemocratic chapter of Korean history played a role in preventing a further collapse of democracy. Kim Dae Jung’s leading role in organizing the hearing was another of his achievements regarding democratization. Believing in the advantages of a minority parliament situation, Young Sam Kim had refused Roh’s previous proposal to unify the parties. This refusal was an obstacle for Roh until the leaders of other minority parties consented to the proposal: on January 22, 1990, Young Sam Kim, the leader of the Democratic 116 Youngkwon “Noah” Yu

Reunification Party, and Jong Pil Kim, the leader of the Republi- can Party, merged with President Roh’s Democratic Justice Party, marking the merger of three political parties. The public was not suspicious of Jong Pil Kim’s decision since he was related to the conservative/military families by marriage, specifically, Chung Hee Park’s family. However, Young Sam Kim’s decision was unexpected since Kim struggled for Korean democratization with Kim Dae Jung for nearly 30 years. It was difficult for the public to see Young Sam Kim working hand in hand with the military ruling power, which had delayed Korea’s democratization for decades. In comparison, Kim Dae Jung refused to compromise with the legacies of the military government, despite Roh’s plea that the merger was necessary to accelerate national reunification and the growth of the national economy. In response to Roh’s appeal, Kim Dae Jung argued that a minority parliament system better represents the citizens’ will.129 Above all, during the 13th National Assembly, Kim Dae Jung pressed for the activation of the local government system, one of the four basic democratic institutions that did not get ad- dressed by the parliament. Having a strong conviction that a true democracy cannot be completed without the sovereignty of the local government, Kim Dae Jung insisted on advocating the local government system to other opposition parties and the ruling party before they merged in January of 1990.130 When the ruling party refused to take this proposal seriously after its power grew through the merger, Kim Dae Jung decided to resort to a hunger strike.131 Young Sam Kim, who knew about the political effect of hunger strikes, promised Kim that the ruling party would execute the local government system. The strike ended on the 13th day, and with this accomplishment, the Republic of Korea came much closer to attaining democratization in four aspects: parliamentary system, party system, electoral system, and the local government system. This accomplishment was one of Kim’s most important legacies for democratization. THE CONCORD REVIEW 117 Political retirement, political comeback, and the presidential election of 1992

The presidential election of 1992 once again pitted Kim Dae Jung against Young Sam Kim. During this election, Kim Dae Jung had clear disadvantages. Although the two Kims had usually fought the ruling party on the same side of liberal democratization, during this election, Young Sam Kim ran as the ruling party’s candidate, representing the conservative democratic force. Young Sam Kim benefitted from Roh’s tight grip on the press and funding, two elements that Kim Dae Jung lacked.132 The ruling party also misrepresented Kim Dae Jung as a pro-communist by assert- ing that Il Sung Kim of North Korea supported Kim Dae Jung.133 Moreover, because Young Sam Kim refused to appear in a televised debate for presidential candidates, Kim Dae Jung did not have much opportunity to show promise as a future president. Another disadvantage was regionalism. The population of Kim Dae Jung’s hometown, Jeolla Province, was smaller than that of Young Sam Kim’s hometown, Gyeongsang Province, by two million people. The results of the election clearly matched this difference in the population.134 Kim Dae Jung announced his political retirement immediately after his defeat in the presidential election. He accepted his defeat, congratulated Young Sam Kim on his election, but said that he felt sad that the people did not choose him the third time he ran for the presidency.135 He retired stating that he would leave the evaluation of himself to history and that he would return to peaceful civil life. After retiring from politics, he continued his education at Cambridge University from January 1993 and lectured on democratization and reunification of Korea in numerous European countries.136 On July 4, 1994, he returned to Korea. Upon return, Kim Dae Jung established the Asia Pacific Peace Foundation, a research organization devoted to the goal of reunifying North and South Korea.137 However, to the surprise, and the disappointment, of political circles, Kim Dae Jung announced that he would come back 118 Youngkwon “Noah” Yu to the political scene immediately after the local election on June 27. On September 5, he established an opposition party, the New Political Congress of the People with 65 assemblymen, with himself as the chairman. Criticism on Kim Dae Jung’s re-entrance to Korean politics became vocal. Many called him a “liar sick with the desire for presidency” and accused him of dividing the progressive Democratic Party by establishing the New Political Congress Party of the People.138 Kim Dae Jung, of course, expected this criticism. He defended himself as follows: Some call me a liar because I returned to politics after I retired in 1992. However, they are defining the term ‘liar’ incorrectly. If people make a promise with the knowledge that they are not capable to keep the promise, then it is a lie. However, if people try to keep the promise but cannot because of unexpected circumstances, then that is not a lie. I actually made the promise to retire from politics because I actually thought that I could keep the promise. And I kept it for quite some time. To say my conclusion first, I came back because I concluded that I had to be there. Kim Dae Jung argued that the problems of the Young Sam Kim administration were making people’s lives difficult and that the Democratic Party that he himself established was not performing the role of the opposition party correctly. He asserted that the opposition party was not providing a vision to the people by suggesting alternatives to the ruling party’s policies.139 He said that he wanted to play a role in building a firm and healthy opposition party. Despite these claims, the reversal of his retirement announcement was an act of breaking promise with the people. Since the public connects politicians’ promises with faith and credibility, some of Kim’s constituencies lost faith in Kim.

The presidential election of 1997 and the democratic transition of power

In the Presidential election of 1997, the ruling party peacefully transferred power to a democratically elected opposition victor for the first time in Korean history. In May 1997, Kim THE CONCORD REVIEW 119 Dae Jung, who was running for the presidential election for the fourth time, was nominated as the candidate by the New Political Congress of the People. His victory was facilitated by the merger of the New Political Congress of the People and the United Liberal Democrats. On December 18, 1997, Kim won 10,326,275 votes, 40.3% of the total vote. He defeated his rival Hoi Chang Lee of ruling party, who won 38.7% of the vote, 9,935,718 votes. This peaceful and horizontal transition of power in 1997 meant that procedural democracy was finally executed successfully in the Republic of Korea. Before the presidential election of 1997, the four elements of a democratic system, the parliamentary system, the electoral system, the party system, and the local government system, were already established in Korea. However, the peaceful transition of power to an opposition victor had never been accomplished since the establishment of the Republic of Korea in 1948. Usually, transition of power was conducted by military force, rigged elections, assassination, massacre, or propaganda. The election of 1997 showed that the power of citizens was the core source of power in Korea. Therefore, despite the criticisms coming from the reversal of his decision to retire, Kim was able to advance the political democratization of Korea to the next step, a goal that he held throughout his life. In retrospect, his ‘lie’ was more an ‘insight’ than ‘fraud.’ The peaceful transition of power in 1997 was symbolic in that it showed that democracy was becoming mature in Korea. Reflecting this, Kim Dae Jung was honored with the following statement when he received the Nobel Peace Prize: “Korea decisively joined the ranks in democratic countries of the world with Kim Dae Jung’s election in 1997.”

Conclusion

By the time Kim Dae Jung was elected as president in 1997, Korea had undergone a degree of democratization that satisfied his vision, a vision that he pursued throughout five death threats, 120 Youngkwon “Noah” Yu many trials, and persecutions, but also a vision that he himself delayed due to his own personal political interest. Kim Dae Jung’s effort for the political democratization of Korea started with his legal protest to the way the Rhee regime interfered with the opposition party candidacy laws. During Chung Hee Park’s military regime, Kim Dae Jung checked the dictatorship through the parliamentary system and later by leading the anti-Reform movement abroad. He led the movement of democratization under the Doo Hwan Chun regime, but at several points, he was responsible for delaying democratization by refus- ing to collaborate with the other opposition leaders. During the Roh era, he instituted the local government system by sacrificing himself. Finally, after his defeat in the 1992 election, his resignation, and his political return, he accomplished the first peaceful transition of power to an opponent victor in Korean history. The Kim Dae Jung administration after 1997 was characterized by several meaningful accomplishments. He safely led the country out of the International Monetary Fund financial crisis, and in 2000, he received the Nobel Peace Prize for initiating the first-ever Inter-Korean Summit, in addition to his past efforts in democratization. After retirement, he stepped down from political life and pursued ways to develop inter-Korean relations. On August 19, 2009, he ended his 86 years of turbulent life in YonSei Severance Hospital of Seoul. On August 23, 2009, Kim Dae Jung’s funeral was held in front of the National Assembly Building in Yeoui-Do, Seoul—the symbol of Korean democracy. The current president, Myung Bak Lee, praised Kim Dae Jung’s achievements in democratization and his efforts to reunify the North and the South, although Lee is known for holding very different perspectives from Kim. This state-sponsored funeral for a former president was a first in Ko- rean history. For President Lee, a leading conservative, to make this decision was a meaningful gesture to transcend the mistrust between the conservative and progressive forces. At this juncture in Korean history, Kim Dae Jung not only symbolizes democratization, but also the possibility for partisan interests to unite and cooperate towards a better future for all citizens. THE CONCORD REVIEW 121

Endnotes

1 Gab Je Cho, The True Character of Kim Dae Jung: the Dark Shadow of Korean Modern History (Seoul: Chogabjedotcom, 2006) pp. 5, 330 2 Ibid., pp. 5, 330 3 Young Sook Park, “Kim Dae Jung: Left behind Reconciliation and Integration,” Hangyerae Daily (23 August 2009) p. 1 4 Wook Kim, The Unfinished Story of Kim Dae Jung (Seoul: People and Thought, 2005) p. 56 5 Jong Sub Jung, Let’s Read the Constitution of the Republic of Korea (Seoul: Ilbit Publishing, 2002) p. 17 6 Ibid., p. 17 7 Institute of Historical Studies, Contemporary Korean History (Seoul: Seohae Munjib, 2004) p. 253 8 Ibid., p. 301 9 Ibid., pp. 302-303 10 Ibid., p. 314 11 Joo Shin Chung, Korea’s Democratization and the Resignation of the Military Regime (Daejun: Primabooks, 2009) p. 90 12 Kim Dae Jung, My Life, My Way (Seoul: Sanha, 1997) p. 66 13 Ibid., p. 83 14 Ibid., p. 84 15 Ibid., p. 84 16 Chung, p. 91 17 Kim Dae Jung, My Life, My Way p. 90 18 Institute of Historical Studies, p. 344 19 Ibid., p. 345 20 Joon Man Kang, Korean Modern History Promenade, 1960’s: from 4.19 Revolution to the Third Amendment of the Constitution Vol. I (Seoul: People and Thought, 2004), pp. 266- 267 21 Kim Dae Jung, My Life, My Way pp. 93-94 22 Ibid., p. 106 23 Ibid., p. 106 24 Joon Man Kang, Korean Modern History Promenade, 1960s: from 4.19 Revolution to the Third Amendment of the Constitution Vol. II (Seoul: People and Thought, 2004) p. 234 25 Kim Dae Jung, My Life, My Way p. 108 26 Ibid., p. 109 122 Youngkwon “Noah” Yu

27 Ibid, p. 110 28 Moon Kim, General’s Memorandum: the Story of the Generals who Led a Turbulent Modern History (Seoul: Byulbang, 1998) p. 63 29 Kang, 1960s, Vol. III, p. 150 30 Kim Dae Jung, The Complete Collection of Hukwang Kim Dae Jung: Dictatorship and My Struggle (Seoul: Jungsimseowon, 1993) p. 88 31 Kang, 1960s, Vol. III, p. 151 32 Choog Shik Kim, “Directors of Headquarters for Political Maneuver at Nam Mountain,” Dong-a Daily (15 September 1992) pp. 137-138 33 Kim Dae Jung, With History and Time: the Autobiography of Kim Dae Jung (Seoul: Indong, 1999 pp. 200-201 34 Kang, 1960s, Vol. III, p. 151 35 Kim Dae Jung, The Complete Collection of Hukwang Kim Dae Jung p. 94 36 Kim Dae Jung, With History and Time: the Autobiography of Kim Dae Jung pp. 201-202 37 Kang, 1960s, Vol. III, p. 153 38 Ibid., p. 153 39 Kim Dae Jung, The Complete Collection of Hukwang Kim Dae Jung p. 95 40 Ibid., p. 95 41 Kim Dae Jung, With History and Time: the autobiography of Kim Dae Jung, pp. 213-214 42 Kang, 1960s, Vol. III, p. 155 43 Kim Dae Jung, With History and Time: the Autobiography of Kim Dae Jung, p. 215 44 Kang, 1960s, Vol. III, p. 329 45 Jung Won Kim, Military Government and the Third Republic: 1961-1971 (Seoul: Georum, 1984) p. 199 46 Kim Dae Jung, My Life, My Way p. 138 47 Hui Ho Lee, Accompany (Seoul: Woongjin Wisdom House, 2008) pp. 98-101 48 Joon Man Kang, Korean Modern History Promenade, 1970’s: from 8.15 Pyungwha Market to the Goonjung Dong Vol. I (Seoul: People and Thought, 2004) p. 132 49 Choog Shik Kim, p. 249 50 Ibid., p. 142 51 Ibid., p. 134 THE CONCORD REVIEW 123

52 Kim Dae Jung, The Complete Collection of Hukwang Kim Dae Jung p. 107 53 Lee, p. 107 54 Kim Dae Jung, My Life, My Way p. 150 55 Lee, p. 103 56 Kim Dae Jung, The Complete Collection of Hukwang Kim Dae Jung p. 118 57 Choog Shik Kim, p. 296 58 Kang, Korean Modern History Promenade, 1970s Vol. I p. 135 59 Ibid., pp. 138-141 60 Lee, p. 110 61 Kang, 1970s, Vol. I, p. 145 62 Kim Dae Jung, The Complete Collection of Hukwang Kim Dae Jung p. 219 63 Kim Dae Jung, My Life, My Way p. 162 64 Kang, 1970s, Vol. I, p. 147 65 Kim Dae Jung, The Complete Collection of Hukwang Kim Dae Jung p. 137 66 Kang, 1970s, Vol. I, p. 189 67 Ibid., p. 190 68 Ibid., p. 191 69 Kim Dae Jung, The Complete Collection of Hukwang Kim Dae Jung p. 142 70 Ibid., p. 224 71 Chung, p. 125 72 Kang, 1970s, Vol. I, p. 211 73 Institute of Historical Studies, p. 374 74 Kang, 1970s, Vol. II, p. 230 75 Chung, p. 126 76 Ibid., p. 231 77 Kim Dae Jung, My Life, My Way p. 171 78 Kang, 1970s, Vol. II, p. 78 79 Kim Dae Jung, The Complete Collection of Hukwang Kim Dae Jung p. 53 80 Kim Dae Jung, My Life, My Way p. 177 81 Ibid., p. 194 82 Ibid., p. 195 83 Ibid., p. 198 84 Lee, p. 140 85 Kang, 1970s, Vol. III, p. 25 86 Ibid., p. 26

124 Youngkwon “Noah” Yu

87 Kim Dae Jung, My Life, My Way p. 222 88 Institute of Historical Studies, p. 407 88 Kang, 1970s, Vol. III, p. 239 90 Institute of Historical Studies, p. 410 91 Chung, p. 147 92 Ibid., p. 149 93 Ibid., p. 150 94 Institute of Historical Studies, p. 415 95 Kim Dae Jung, My Life, My Way p. 222 96 Kang, 1970s, Vol. III, pp. 297-298 97 Ibid., p. 293 98 Ibid., p. 297 99 Ibid., p. 300 100 Kim Dae Jung, My Life, My Way p. 228 101 Joon Man Kang, Korean Modern History Promenade, 1980s: From Kwangju Massacre to Seoul Olympic Vol. I (Seoul: People and Thought, 2004), p. 62 102 Kim Dae Jung, My Life, My Way p. 230 103 Kim Dae Jung, The Complete Collection of Hukwang Kim Dae Jung p. 88 104 Kim Dae Jung, My Life, My Way p. 237 105 Ibid., p. 241 106 Lee, p. 203 107 Kang, 1980s, Vol. I, p. 115 108 Ibid., p. 19 109 Kim Dae Jung, My Life, My Way p. 22 110 Ibid., p. 249 111 Kang, 1980s, Vol. II, pp. 147-148 112 Kim Dae Jung, My Life, My Way p. 263 113 Lee, p. 252 114 Kang, 1980s, Vol. II, p. 224 115 Ibid., p. 225 116 Kang, 1980s, Vol. III, p. 26 117 Ibid., p. 18 118 Ibid., p. 91 119 Ibid., p. 101 120 Ibid., p. 103 121 Ibid., p. 104 122 Ibid., p. 106 123 Ibid., p. 167 124 Ibid., p. 209 125 Kim Dae Jung, My Life, My Way p. 268 126 Ibid., p. 270 THE CONCORD REVIEW 125

127 Ibid., p. 273 128 Lee, p. 289 129 Kim Dae Jung, My Life, My Way p. 279 130 Lee, p. 294 131 Kim Dae Jung, My Life, My Way p. 304 132 Joon Man Kang, Korean Modern History Promenade, 1990’s: From Three Parties’ Merge to Starbucks Vol. I (Seoul: People and Thought, 2004) p. 163 133 Ibid., p. 168 134 Kim Dae Jung, My Life, My Way p. 172 135 Ibid., p. 288 136 Lee, p. 304 137 Kim Dae Jung, My Life, My Way p. 307 138 Lee, p. 310 139 Kim Dae Jung, My Life, My Way p. 125 126 Youngkwon “Noah” Yu

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Jung, Jong Sub, Let’s Read the Constitution of the Republic of Korea Seoul: Ilbit Publishing, 2002

Kang, Joon Man, Korean Modern History Promenade, 1960’s: from 4.19 Revolution to the Third Amendment of the Constitution Seoul: People and Thought, 2004 (Vol. I, II, III)

Kang, Joon Man, Korean Modern History Promenade, 1970’s: from 8.15 Pyungwha Market to the Goonjung Dong Seoul: People and Thought, 2004 (Vol. I, II, III)

Kang, Joon Man, Korean Modern History Promenade, 1980s: from Kwangju Massacre to Seoul Olympic Seoul: People and Thought, 2004 (Vol. I, II, III)

Kang, Joon Man, Korean Modern History Promenade, 1990’s: from Three Parties’ Merge to Starbucks Seoul: People and Thought, 2004 (Vol. I, II, III)

Kim, Choog Shik, “Directors of Headquarters for Political Maneuver at Nam Mountain,” Dong-a Daily 15 September 1992, pp. 137-138

Kim, Dae Jung, My Life, My Way Seoul: Sanha, 1997

Kim, Dae Jung, The Complete Collection of Hukwang Kim Dae Jung: Dictatorship and My Struggle Seoul: Jungsimseowon, 1993 THE CONCORD REVIEW 127

Kim, Dae Jung With History and Time: the Autobiography of Kim Dae Jung Seoul: Indong, 1999

Kim, Jung Won, Military Government and the Third Republic: 1961-1971 Seoul: Georum, 1984

Kim, Moon, General’s Memorandum: the Story of the Generals who Led a Turbulent Modern History Seoul: Byulbang, 1998

Kim, Wook, The Unfinished Story of Kim Dae Jung Seoul: People and Thought, 2005

Lee, Hui Ho Lee, Accompany Seoul: Woongjin Wisdom House, 2008

Park, Young Sook, “Kim Dae Jung, Left behind Reconciliation and Integration,” Hangyerae Daily 23 August 2009, p. 1 128 Youngkwon “Noah” Yu Edward Gibbon The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire New York: Everyman’s Library, 1993, Volume III, pp. 77-78 [383A.D.]

The fame of Gratian, before he had accomplished the twentieth year of his age, was equal to that of the most celebrated princes. His gentle and amiable disposition endeared him to his private friends, the graceful affability of his manners engaged the affection of the people; the men of letters, who enjoyed the liberality, acknowledged the taste and eloquence, of their sovereign; his valour and dexterity in arms were equally applauded by the soldiers; and the clergy considered the humble piety of Gratian as the first and more useful of his virtues. The victory of Colmar had delivered the West from a formidable invasion, and the grateful provinces of the East ascribed the merits of Theodosius to the author of his greatness and of the public safety. Gratian survived those memorable events only four or five years, but he survived his reputation, and, before he fell victim to rebellion, he had lost, in a great measure, the respect and confidence of the Roman world.

The remarkable alteration of his character or conduct may not be imputed to the arts of flattery, which had besieged the son of Valentinian from his infancy, nor to the headstrong passion which that gentle youth appears to have escaped. A more attentive view of the life of Gratian may perhaps suggest the true cause of the disappointment of the public hopes. His apparent virtues, instead of being the hardy productions of experience and adversity, were the premature and artificial fruits of a royal education. The anxious tenderness of his father was continually employed to bestow on him those advantages which he might perhaps esteem the more highly as he himself had been deprived of them, and the most skilful masters of every science and of every art had laboured to form the mind and body of the young prince. The knowledge which they painfully communicated was displayed with ostentation and celebrated with lavish praise. His soft and tractable disposition received the fair impression of their judicious precepts, and the absence of passion might easily be mistaken for the strength of reason. His preceptors gradually rose to the rank and consequence of ministers of state, and, as they wisely dissembled their secret authority, he seemed to act with firmness, with propriety, and with judgment on the most important occasions of his life and reign. But the influence of this elaborate instruction did not penetrate beyond the surface, and the skilful preceptors, who so accurately guided the steps of their royal pupil, could not infuse into his feeble and indolent character the vigorous and independent principle of action which renders the laborious pursuit of glory essentially necessary to the happiness and almost the existence of the hero... THE CONCORD REVIEW 129

SINN FÉIN SEVERED: ANALYSING THE CAUSES OF THE 1922 DIVISION OF THE IRISH REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT

Simeon R. Burke

Introduction

Posing the Question

In 1921, representatives of the Irish parliament met with a British delegation to negotiate the terms of a treaty that would dictate the future relationship between Ireland and Britain. On 6th December 1921 the Anglo-Irish Treaty was signed. To a man, the Irish negotiators were members of the Sinn Féin party, which at the time was the embodiment of Irish nationalism and had dominated the political scene since the Easter Rebellion of 1916. Moreover, the Irish parliament that the delegation sought to represent was also made up exclusively of Sinn Féin members. Remarkably just six years later, in the wake of the treaty debates of 1922, this unity was shattered, leaving Sinn Féin a shadow of what it once was. This investigation, therefore, seeks to analyse the extent to which the Anglo-Irish Treaty was responsible for the division of the Sinn Féin party.

Simeon R. Burke is at the University of St. Andrews in Scotland. He wrote this IB Extended Essay at Lincoln Park High School in Chicago, Illinois, for Mr. Richard Sauer in the 2009/2010 academic year. 130 Simeon R. Burke

Historical Context and Significance

The Irish nationalist movement at the turn of the 20th century was a chaotic, discordant conglomerate. The leading party at the time was the Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP), whose raison d’être was securing Home Rule for Ireland. Doing so would provide Ireland with its own parliament, and a measure of self government. On the other side of the political spectrum was the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB), a party committed to the goal of an independent republic, and rigidly opposed to Home Rule. In this atmosphere of contention emerged the Sinn Féin party, an umbrella organisation composed of figures from the two aforementioned parties. Its founder, Arthur Griffith, epitomized this conglomeration of ideas and implemented an intentionally loose agenda. Initially an avid parliamentarian, Griffith became a member of the IRB.1 Despite steering Sinn Féin away from the IRB’s infiltration, his party was “on the rocks” by 1908, due to the success of Home Rule.2 It was not until the 1916 Easter Rebellion that Sinn Féin finally came of age, a result of being wrongly blamed for the Rising.3 Exploding on to the national scene, Sinn Féin unified nationalist Ireland behind the banner of an Irish Republic. The party was the manifestation of a united movement; irresistible in victory, unparalleled in opposition, it was quite simply the “nation organized.”4 How was it then that in 1922, just six years later, this unity dissolved? What made a movement, albeit mismatched, split into two warring factions and fight a bloody civil conflict? In answering these questions the impact of the division on Irish and Northern Irish politics and the Republican movement will be examined. THE CONCORD REVIEW 131 Method of Investigation

In order to trace the division of Sinn Féin, this essay will explore three avenues of investigation. From its conception in 1905, the conflict between the moderates and republicans over the status of a future Irish state created explosive division. This essay will firstly examine the ideology of Sinn Féin’s founder, Arthur Griffith, and the irreconcilable principles upon which the party was established. Secondly, the transformation the party underwent as a result of the Easter Rebellion of 1916 will be examined. Despite catapulting the party to new peaks of popularity, the Rebellion also led to Sinn Féin assuming a more republican leadership. While the moderates now formed a minority, their continued presence within the party sustained the dispute over the nature of an Irish state. Finally, the role of the Anglo Irish Treaty of 1921 in dividing Sinn Féin will be investigated. The Treaty played some part in the division of Sinn Féin and will be examined in terms of its nature and the ways in which it divided the party. While historians argue that the debates over the Anglo Irish Treaty ultimately divided the Sinn Féin party, it will be argued that the nature of the Treaty was not primarily at fault. Rather the party’s disparate front and its incompatible, opposing objectives concerning the status of a future Irish state precipitated the split in 1922, resulting in a contentious Irish Republican movement. As a Protestant citizen of Northern Ireland living in the United States of America, this topic is one of personal significance. The irrational hatred and immoderate rigidity that was showcased during the treaty debates of 1922, continue to be practiced in Northern Ireland and, sadly, international politics to this day. The resulting Irish Civil War reminds us that the result of such strin- gency can often be bloodshed. The wounds of that embroiling conflict are still visible today; perhaps their scars will warn future generations. 132 Simeon R. Burke

Sinn Féin’s Early Goals

Sinn Féin, or “Ourselves Alone” as it is translated from Gaelic, was previously a way of thinking that encapsulated the desire of the Irish people to be independent from all things British.5 It was only in 1905 that the phrase “Sinn Féin” took on political overtones, when Arthur Griffith created the Sinn Féin Party. The very nature of the party from its conception foreshadowed the future separation of the party. A study of Arthur Griffith’s ideology and the principles upon which he founded the party foretell this imminent division. Arthur Griffith’s ideology was subject to constant change. He was initially an admirer of Charles Stuart Parnell’s Irish Par- liamentary Party (IPP) whose main objective was Home Rule. Parliamentarians like Parnell were known to be more moderate6 in their views, favouring a limited self-government for Ireland subordinated to the British Crown.7 Following Parnell’s death in 1891, and the failure of several Home Rule Bills, Griffith grew disillusioned and reverted to a more hard-line stance. As a result, Griffith’s connections with radical Republican groups such as the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) began to grow. The IRB was composed of separatists, or republicans, committed to ending British rule in Ireland by any means possible.8 While Griffith did rub shoulders with republicans, he distinguished himself by holding staunchly to non-violence, preferring passive resistance to the British Crown.9 At this point it is clear to see that Griffith held a variety of views. He was clearly an Irish nationalist, meaning he believed in an Ireland that was in all ways distinct from Britain. Moderates and radicals alike would have found common footing with this view. The danger lay in the murky coexistence of Griffith’s objectives. For example, while he possessed radical sympathies concerning separatism, he was equally adamant that Ireland should remain a distinct entity under the jurisdiction of a British monarch. Moderates shared this latter belief, while Republicans held fast to an Ireland severed from all British ties. Simply put, Griffith sought to combine elements of separatism THE CONCORD REVIEW 133 with the objectives of Parnell. This diversity within Griffith’s own ideology would soon reflect itself in the diverse composition of Sinn Féin and its objectives. In 1902 Griffith began mapping out an “alternative strategy” for Ireland, drawing heavily on the Austro-Hungarian model of a dual monarchy.10 His solution was to have the same monarch for both islands, but separate parliaments for both Britain and Ireland.11 In this way Griffith believed Ireland would be “self governing equal players” with Britain.12 In his publication The Resurrection of Hungary: a Parallel for Ireland, Griffith alternately discussed the policy of abstention. This called for an Irish parliament that ran independent of Britain, controlling the affairs of the state and allowing smooth and swift passage of law. This was to be accomplished by symbolically “abstaining” from taking seats in the British parliament. The importance of highlighting the objectives of abstention and dual monarchy is not only to reveal the stark difference between the two, but the division Griffith created between republicans and moderates, or parliamentarians. His doctrine of Dual Monarchy was well received by parliamentarians who welcomed it as a step up from Home Rule. Republicans, however, felt alienated and saw Dual Monarchy as an objective that served to “perpetuate the English connection” instead of sever it.13 Separatists therefore preferred to focus on abstention.14 It was clear that the newly formed Sinn Féin party was in danger of collapsing before it had even begun, as there was no general consensus on what the party line was to be. Ultimately, the decision was made to keep the movement as “broad a church as possible,” meaning moderates and separatists were both welcome.15 Griffith wrote that Sinn Féin would welcome all those who believed in “Irish independence” regardless of whether they were Republicans [separatists] or moderates [Dual Monarchists]; “it is the thing [an Irish government] itself, regardless of its form, Ireland wants.”16 Little did Griffith know that such a “disparate front” would have important repercussions for Sinn Féin in later years.17 Griffith must be credited with uniting diverse elements under one party. His recruitment of members who held these con- 134 Simeon R. Burke

trasting views, however, proved to be a precarious ploy. He must bear responsibility for conveniently side-stepping a solid stance for Sinn Féin. Feeney argues that his decision to do so “carried the seeds of many future battles.”18 Historian Laffan agrees, writing, “here in miniature, can be seen the divisions which were to tear nationalist Ireland apart sixteen years later.”

Platform of a Republic: Easter Rising Diversification (1916)

The Easter Rising of 1916 marked the start of the period most historians refer to as the Irish Revolution. On Easter Mon- day 1916, IRB leaders, Patrick Pearse and James Connolly20 led insurgents as they claimed public buildings across Dublin, declaring the establishment of a republic.21 Despite their bravery and resourcefulness, the insurgents were defeated, with more than 400 casualties. An error in British intelligence meant that Sinn Féin was wrongly blamed for leading the Rebellion.22 Initially the Irish people condemned the violent uprising, but with the execution of fifteen insurgent leaders the public rallied behind the new movement.23 While the transformation and diversification Sinn Féin experienced as a result of Easter 1916 catapulted the party to a new peak of popularity, it also exacerbated the divisions that had been building since 1905.24 Historians, such as Feeney and Laf- fan, contend that Sinn Féin and its objectives were consolidated. However, it will be argued that the persistent presence of moderate and Republican groups caused the re-emergence of old debates.25 Sinn Féin was both transformed and diversified by the events of the Easter Rising of 1916. Firstly, the party became much more acquainted with groups that had participated in the use of force against Britain during the week of the rebellion. Conse- quently a new, even more radical separatist wing emerged out of the returning heroes of 1916.26 Secondly, Sinn Féin elected a new leader, Eamon de Valera, the senior surviving commander of the 1916 Rebels.27 Like Griffith, de Valera provided Sinn Féin with THE CONCORD REVIEW 135 an increasingly broad and unified nationalist front made up of moderates and republicans.28 Thirdly, and most importantly, the party outlined a new programme that committed itself to the goal of establishing a Republic.29 In 1918, the party declared; “Sinn Féin aims at securing the establishment of that Republic” by pursuing abstention, and creating a parliamentary body.30 Historian Thomas Hennessy argues that this transformation resulted once more in the “diversification” of Sinn Féin. 31 Despite its initial diversity, Sinn Féin had fallen into moderate hands in 1910 after witnessing a mass exodus of its former IRB members.32 Consequently, the party that emerged after the Rebellion restored this multiplicity, creating a “blend of… politicians and…soldiers.”33 Outwardly Sinn Féin appeared a unified party in 1916. Historians Brian Feeney and Michael Laffan both point to the 1917 annual meeting as evidence of Sinn Féin’s consolidation of power. Despite the opposing viewpoints of the moderate minority and republicans, the two sides were able to formulate a compromise: Sinn Féin would continue to pursue a republic and only once freedom was attained would the people vote for either a republic or a dual monarchy.34 Both historians argue that accepting the compromise was a testament to Sinn Féin’s unity. As a result, the new Sinn Féin objective became the establishment of a sovereign republic.35 United behind one goal, Sinn Féin utilized its diversity to win the 1918 election, gaining an unprecedented 73 out of 105 seats.36 IPP leader John Dillon praised his opponents for their “most perfect organization,” a compliment that portrayed Sinn Féin’s outward cohesiveness.37 Michael Laffan adds that throughout its history, Sinn Féin’s primary achievement was “combining so effectively its different (and at times still mutually suspicious) component parts.”38 Sinn Féin became so successful, Laffan argues, because it relied on the “soldiers” (Republicans) to provide the “energy” for a Republic, and the “politicians” (moderates) to supply the practicality and pragmatism.39 While it must be acknowledged, as is stated by the historians above, that Sinn Féin’s diversification aided its swift success, it was equally important in rekindling old disputes and hastening 136 Simeon R. Burke its fragmentation. The unity that existed in 1916 was tenuous and superficial. Underneath the façade of a banner of a republic, debate was still brewing over the future status of an Irish State. Despite controlling the party, the republican element had to contend with a moderate minority whose agenda differed greatly from their own.40 Republicans continued to hold uncompromisingly to the goal of a Republic, while the old moderate remnant, led by Griffith, asserted that the decision to fight for a republic would fail, resulting in a harsher British stance. 41 It was their belief that Sinn Féin should commit itself to self-government rather than end up with no government.42 To hold unswervingly to a republic would make an “agreement with Britain more difficult—if not impossible.”43 The British, they rightly assumed, would only accept an Irish republic after they were beaten on the battlefield.44 The compromise that was devised therefore was a farce because, as Laffan highlights, the moderates had no objections to the idea of a republic; they merely “doubted the wisdom of demanding it or the possibility of achieving it.”45 Laffan argues that the debate in 1917 represented the “final clash” between “rival elements in the Sinn Féin movement.” Instead, the compromise arrived at merely suppressed the arguments and provided a tenuous solution to a problem calling for a lasting response. Furthermore, the election of Arthur Griffith to vice president consolidated the moderate remnant within Sinn Féin, prolonging the debates over the status of an Irish state. Sinn Féin soared to the heights of political popularity in Ireland, but only as a result of suppressing the debates over the status of an Irish state. The debates of 1917 were quickly forgotten, but they would continue to lurk under the surface and ultimately explode in the treaty debates of 1922, fracturing the Sinn Féin party. THE CONCORD REVIEW 137

The Treaty

Introduction to the Treaty

Between the rise of Sinn Féin in 1917 and the ratification of the Anglo Irish Treaty in 1922 the party continued its ascent as the 26 southern counties46 seemed unified behind the banner of a republic. As historian David Fitzpatrick writes, there was a “wonderful sense of oneness which pervaded Irish politics.”47 Fol- lowing victory in the 1918 election, Sinn Féin held true to their word, abstained from Westminster and formed the Dail Eireann or Irish Parliament.48 Britain stood in fierce opposition to Sinn Féin’s goal of a republic.49 In this contentious atmosphere, conflict was inevitable and in January 1919 the War of Independence officially began.50 After two inconclusive years of fighting, a truce was signed in 1921 and it was decided that a delegation of Irish plenipotentiaries would visit London to discuss various issues, chief among them the relationship Ireland would hold to the British Crown.51 The Irish committee was made up exclusively of Sinn Féin members, among them its founder Arthur Griffith and IRB leader Michael Collins. British Prime Minister David Lloyd George led the British panel. After much discussion and debate the Anglo Irish Treaty52 was signed by both delegations on December 6th 1921. The treaty created a new nation, called the Irish Free State, out of the 26 Southern counties. Before the Treaty could be ratified however, it had to be approved by the Dail Eireann. It was following the course of these debates that Sinn Féin physically split into two factions, the pro-treaty and anti-treaty sides. 138 Simeon R. Burke

The Treaty Analysed

While the Anglo-Irish Treaty did ultimately divide the party, it raised the contentious debates between moderates and Republicans that had been threatening to spill over for decades. These arguments centered on Ireland’s connection to Britain, and the form of government an Irish State should take. The Anglo-Irish Treaty was met with overwhelming approval by the Dail and the people. The Irish Free State had achieved a significant, unprecedented measure of independence and secured a full, working, legal parliament. Many, therefore, viewed Sinn Féin’s work as complete, in the sense that its role as the “unchal- lenged mouthpiece” of Ireland had come to an end.53 There was, however, a minority led by President de Valera which believed the Irish Free State fell short of a sovereign, Irish Republic. The ‘treaty debates’ began, focusing on the following two questions: Did the treaty really make Ireland free from Britain? Secondly, was the oath of allegiance a betrayal of the idea of a republic?54 In respect of the former, de Valera firmly believed that Ireland should never have expressed even “fidelity” to the British Crown.55 In respect of the latter, anti-treatyites believed that the Independent Ireland Sinn Féin had fought for and declared in 1916 had been “sold.”56 Pro-treatyites responded that for the meantime the treaty was the “best that could be done” for Ireland.57 While Ireland was not completely free from Britain, Michael Collins insisted that the treaty nevertheless gave Ireland “freedom—not ultimate freedom…but freedom to achieve it.”58Arthur Griffith added that the oath was one that could be taken with “honour,” because “after 700 years” the Irish Free State now stood as “free and equal partners with England.”59 Earlier historians such as J.C Beckett have recognized the Treaty as the main cause for the split of Sinn Féin. He writes that in 1922 “Sinn Féin was breaking into the pro-treaty and anti-treaty sections.”60 As an example of earlier 20th century historians, Beckett fails to mention the make-up of Sinn Féin. Modern scholarship, however, offers a more reasoned approach, demonstrating that THE CONCORD REVIEW 139 the issue is far more complex. While the treaty, and, in particular, the oath clause, were extremely contentious, and did ultimately split the party, they merely caused the resurfacing of decade-old debates. The divisions that were so apparent within Sinn Féin in 1922 were present at the party’s inception. Brian Feeney recog- nises the dissension the treaty created, but argues that from the beginning a popular front ensured a discordant Sinn Féin party in the future. Arthur Griffith’s “broad church” kept the party afloat, but meant that the republicans and moderates within it were sure to clash heads at some point in time. Dual monarchy and republicanism were such incompatible views that conflict seemed imminent. There was deep-seated suspicion between the two groups. Moderates were concerned that the party’s IRB contingent would convert the party to abstention, which would all but ensure its demise. Republicans on the other hand saw dual monarchy as the “lowering of an ideal,” and feared that Griffith was attempting to transform a republican party into one that would accept a monarch.61 The fact that the party stayed together for so long is a miracle, owing much to the aptitude of Arthur Griffith. And yet the merging of republicans and moderates became a powder keg waiting to explode.62 The Anglo-Irish Treaty was merely the spark that ignited this powder keg, and split Sinn Féin over an issue it had been contending with, perhaps even suppressing, ever since 1905. The answer to this question aids historians in understanding the Irish Republican movement today. As Brian Feeney writes: “The manner in which the various components split within themselves is vitally important for understanding the ‘theology’ for want of a better word, of the republican movement for the rest of its existence.”63 The Sinn Féin party, while still in existence in both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland today, has never quite recovered from the split of 1922. There have been attempts to unify the movement, but members of the party have come to realize that there is no magic formula for a unified movement.64 Later reincarnations have tried but failed, while others have refused to learn the lessons of history, fracturing Sinn Féin, and the Republican movement further.65 Fianna Fail, once the 140 Simeon R. Burke

anti-treaty party and Fine Gael, at a time made up of pro-treaty members, are at present the two leading parties in the Republic of Ireland. It is in Northern Ireland, however, that the Sinn Féin Party has experienced a complete transformation.66 In 2007, leaders of Sinn Féin and the Democratic Unionist Party67 brokered a deal that now sees a power-sharing government assume control in Northern Ireland. The causes of the breakup of Sinn Féin also aid in our understanding of the resulting Civil War and thus the present political landscape of Ireland. Historian David Fitzgerald writes that the acrimony and divisions within Irish politics ensured the disfigurement of Irish politics for years to come.68

Conclusion

The split of the Sinn Féin Party in 1922 still has profound repercussions on Irish politics to this day. While historians such as Beckett have placed the brunt of the responsibility on the treaty itself, recent scholarship maintains that the reasons for the separation are not monocausal. Most historians now recognize that the treaty did play a role in dividing the party, but the diverse make-up of the Sinn Féin Party itself ensured its demise. It has been proposed that from its inception the party was a powder keg, composed of competing and opposing political objectives. Because of Griffith’s integration of both moderate Dual Monarchists as well as Republicans into the party’s ranks, conflict and division were to some extent inevitable. While Griffith ensured Sinn Féin’s survival, he set off a ticking time bomb that exploded in the wake of the treaty debates. Despite the integration of a more radical contingent following the Easter Rising of 1916, the moderates continued as a minority. While historians have argued that this reemerging diversity, and the so called, ‘consolidation’ Sinn Féin experienced, aided in its sudden success, it has been argued that this diversity laid the foundation for future conflict. In both 1905 and 1917 Sinn Féin threatened to split, but compromise kept the party together, at the same time allowing incompatible viewpoints to coexist. Thus, it was Sinn Féin’s role as an umbrella for a con- THE CONCORD REVIEW 141 glomerate of incompatible ideology that brought its ultimate downfall. When it came time for the treaty debates, the divisions were already discernible—it was a simple case of the spark, or the treaty, igniting a tinder box of political debate that Sinn Féin’s leaders had been purposefully suppressing. As Michael Collins said during the treaty debates, “it was not today or yesterday” the arguments had begun.69 The divisions that had “lain dormant” could no longer be held back, but instead exploded leaving the party in fragments.70 Due to the focus of this essay, other factors which contributed to the split of Sinn Féin were not analysed to the extent desired. However these factors, such as the loyalty of the IRB members of Sinn Féin to the IRB itself, are inherently part of the argument that has been proposed. The IRB men, like later republicans, never accepted Sinn Féin’s objective of a Dual Monarchy, but merely viewed the party as an instrument to gain a Republic.71 The limitations on this essay meant that it was not possible to analyse fully the surprising reversal of roles between Collins and de Valera, and the profound role individual decision-making played in the break-up.72 Collins, although prominent among radicals, was above all else a pragmatist, demonstrated by his decision to accept a treaty that was perhaps an imperfect agreement.73 De Valera, by all accounts considered a moderate, surprised many historians and colleagues alike by his new rigidity. His shift from a compromising politician, to one who stringently and indeed rather stubbornly refused the treaty, highlights the importance that individual political decisions and philosophy played in the Treaty Debates and the ensuing carnage of the Irish Civil War.74 It was possible, nonetheless, to examine both Griffith and de Valera’s decision to create a popular front and compromise. For both men, this decision ensured short-term stability, but tragically resulted in the violent division of the Sinn Féin Party and the Republican Movement. Therefore, the most salient details were explored, and support the conclusion that it was the makeup itself of Sinn Féin that ultimately divided the party. 142 Simeon R. Burke

Endnotes

1 Brian Feeney, Sinn Féin A Hundred Turbulent Years (History of Ireland & the Irish Diaspora). (New York: University of Wisconsin, 2003) p. 23. While this source proves indispensable in the study of Sinn Féin’s history, the reader should keep in mind that this historian was once a member of the Social Democrat and Labour Party of Northern Ireland, the Sinn Féin’s main opposition. The SDLP is traditionally the more moderate of the nationalist parties (those favouring a United Ireland) in Northern Ireland and differs from Sinn Féin in its uncompromising condemnation of violence. Feeney’s analysis may contain a bias, as he was a member of Sinn Féin’s political opponents, and was directly involved in Northern Irish politics. Conversely, it could be argued that Feeney’s involvement in Irish politics also aids him in his writing, since he knows the nuances of Irish Republicanism. It is certain that Feeney does possess the advantage of hindsight, and has far more sources to rely on than an historian had earlier in the twentieth century. 2 Michael Laffan, The Resurrection of Ireland: The Sinn Féin Party, 1916-1923 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) p. 70. Michael Laffan, a professor at University College Dublin, is an academic historian who writes primarily on the Irish Revolution (1916-1923). Laffan’s account is more objective than Feeney’s, because he is not involved in the affairs or politics of Northern Ireland. Because Laffan is also gifted with hindsight, writing after the events of the early 20th century, his account is more reasoned and valid, again due to the wider availability of sources. 3 Laffan, p. 69 4 Feeney, p. 126 5 Laffan, p. 20. Laffan also provides additional instances of the earlier use of the term Sinn Féin. The phrase was in use as far back as 1882 when Tom Cleary entitled his play concerning Irish Nationalism, Shin Fain, starring ‘The Spirit of Self-Reliance’ as one of its main characters. Tim Healy also used ‘Sinn Féin’ as a slogan in 1892, at a time when the Home Rule Bill was being bitterly discussed at Westminster. Again its use was to promote both self reliance and also separation from the Liberal Party who at the time were supporters of the Home Rule bill. THE CONCORD REVIEW 143

6 The terms Parliamentarians, Dual Monarchists and moderates are used interchangeably in this essay, as are Republicans, radicals and separatists. 7 Feeney, p. 25 8 Ibid., p. 23 9 “BBC History: 1916 Easter Rising Profile of Arthur Griffith,” British Broadcasting Company: History, http://www. bbc.co.uk/history/british/easterrising/profiles/po07.shtml. 10 Ibid. 11 Feeney, p. 31, Feeney writes that although Griffith described himself as a separatist, he recognized that republicans were in the minority, and therefore dual monarchy was a fair compromise for the “majority.” 12 “BBC History: 1916” 13 Feeney, p. 37 14 Ibid., p. 33 15 Ibid., p. 41, The reason for this tactic, Feeney states, was an innate fear on Griffith’s part that the IRB would define Sinn Féin’s policy exclusively, allowing only radicals to join and thus turning Sinn Féin into another fringe organization. 16 Ibid., p. 43 17 Ibid., p. 42 18 Ibid., p. 42 19 Laffan, p. 24 20 A total of seven men signed the document known as ‘The Proclamation of the Irish Republic.’ Within the document the revolutionaries emphasized their independence, highlighting their desire for an Irish State that was to “be sovereign and indefeasible.” 21 Tim Pat Coogan, Eamon de Valera: The Man Who Was Ireland (New York: Perennial, 1996) p. 65 22 British Prime Minister Lloyd George went on to call the Easter Rebellion the “Sinn Féin Rising.” 23 Coogan, de Valera, 15 and Beckett, J.C., The Making of Modern Ireland: 1603-1923 (London: Faber, 1969) p. 441. The late J.C Beckett was a former lecturer at Queens University Belfast, during the years 1945-1975. During these years, Queens University was predominantly Protestant in its student body and faculty. As a Protestant, he may be biased in that he views Sinn Féin as a Catholic extremist organization. Beckett also writes forty years after the treaty and the Sinn Féin split and so does not possess the same breadth of sources as modern-day historians. Beckett does however provide a 144 Simeon R. Burke

necessary and opposing viewpoint to Feeney and Laffan, who are both Catholic writers. 24 Feeney, p. 45 25 Laffan, p. 118 and Feeney, p. 69 26 Feeney, p. 61 27 John Coakley and Michael Gallagher, ed., Politics in the Republic of Ireland (New York: Routledge, 2004) p. 16 28 Laffan, p. 120 29 “BBC History: 1916 Easter Rising Aftermath and the rise of Sinn Féin.” British Broadcasting Corporation: History, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/easterrising/aftermath/ af03.shtml. 30 Murphy, Audrey, “The 1918 Manifesto of Sinn Féin as prepared for circulation for the General Election of December, 1918.” Corpus of Electronic Texts (CELT) UCC, http://www. ucc.ie/celt/published/E900009/index.html 31 Thomas Hennessey, Dividing Ireland: World War One and Partition (New York: Routledge, 1998) p. 167 32 Feeney, p. 54 33 Laffan, p. 33 34 Ibid., p. 118 35 Feeney, p. 69 36 Laffan, p. 164 37 Ibid., p. 168 38 Ibid., p. 168 39 Ibid., p. 33 40 It is important to note that both the moderates and republicans believed in an Irish republic. The moderates differed from the republicans in that they believed in its gradual establishment. In other words, they were prepared to come under British rule for a time, if that was the means to procure absolute sovereignty. The Republicans believed in the immediate establishment of a republic, denouncing the moderates’ “stepping-stone” method as a betrayal of the Republican doctrine that soldiers so bravely fought and died for in the Easter Rebellion of 1916. 41 Mike Cronin, A History of Ireland (London: Palgrave, 2004) p. 203 42 Ibid., p. 203, Cronin explains that what the moderate leaders, such as Collins and Griffith, meant by this was that since the likelihood of defeating the British in battle was slim, diplomatic attempts should be made in order to secure self- government for Ireland. Cronin writes that this choice was THE CONCORD REVIEW 145 informed by Collins’ (President of the Irish Republican Army and later the IRB) belief that the IRA could not sustain any struggle against the British for much longer. 43 Laffan, p. 117 44 Ibid., p. 117 45 Ibid., p. 118 46 In 1920, a year before the Anglo-Irish Treaty was signed, there were efforts made to create peace. The Better Government of Ireland Act (1920) extended Home Rule to the 6 Unionist (loyal to the crown) counties in the North and the 26 Southern counties (this Act is thus known as the Fourth Home Rule Act). Belfast, in the North accepted, and Northern Ireland was created, but the Dail vehemently rejected the Act due to the limited government it offered as well as the sustained ties with Britain. The Better Government of Ireland Act shattered the dreams of many Republicans who clung to the hope of a 32-county Irish Republic. 47 David Fitzpatrick, Politics and Irish life, 1913-1921 provincial experience of war and revolution (Cork: Cork University Press, 1998) p. 119 48 Cronin, p. 199 49 Among many reasons, the British had to contend with their loyal subjects in Northern Ireland and their overseas colonies; concessions made to Ireland would surely weaken Britain in the eyes of their satellites. 50 Cronin, p. 199. Fighting was vicious, and although Britain lost more men, Ireland suffered tremendous damage to its infrastructure. It was no surprise, then, that both sides were looking for a way to end the conflict. 51 Phil Chapple, “‘Dev’: The Career of Eamon De Valera,” History Review 53 (2005) pp. 28-33 52 Otherwise known as the “Articles of Agreement for a Treaty Between Great Britain and Ireland,” the Anglo- Irish Treaty created the Irish Free State, which was to be a Dominion of the British Empire, much like Canada. Among other things, it was given a parliament and a limited army. The British established that they would control ‘treaty ports’, and maintained that each member of the Dail was to take an oath swearing to be “faithful to H.M King George V.” A Governor General was to be appointed in the interests of the Crown, and the British Imperial Forces would retain control of coastal defense. British troops were evacuated, something the new Irish Free State had not witnessed in decades. 146 Simeon R. Burke

53 Feeney, p. 125 54 Cronin, p. 205 55 R.F Foster, ed., The Oxford History of Ireland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989) p. 209 56 Donnchadh Ó Corráin, “Debate on the Treaty between Great Britain and Ireland signed in London on the 6th December 1921: Sessions 14 December 1921 to 10 January 1922.” Corpus of Electronic Texts (CELT) UCC, http://www. ucc.ie/celt/published/E900003-001/index.html. Sean O’Kelly, an anti-treatyite, sums up both these views, stating that “I am opposed to this declaration of fidelity to an alien King because it is an outrage on the memory of our martyred comrades.” 57 Ibid. 58 Michael Collins, The Path to Freedom (Boulder, Colo: Roberts Rinehart, 1996) p. 29 59 Ó Corráin, “The Treaty Debates” illustrate that the arguments went back and forth, both sides declaring that they held the interests of the people of Ireland at the forefront of their minds and hearts. Griffith and his cohorts were not prepared to let young Irishmen continue to die over what they saw as a “quibble.” One deputy stated that it was the “love of my country that made me fight” and now that the treaty brought “freedom worth dying for” Ireland was truly free. De Valera’s argument was equally persuasive, when he argued that the treaty made liars out of Sinn Féin, alluding to the party’s unfulfilled promises to secure a republic. 60 Beckett, p. 456 61 Laffan, p. 24 62 Feeney, p. 42 63 Ibid., p. 127 64 Ibid., p. 9 65 In 1970 for example, Sinn Féin split over the issue of abstention, resulting in a small minority group known as Provisional Sinn Féin. 66 Feeney, p. 13 67 Just as Sinn Féin are referred to as extreme republicans, as opposed to the Social Democrat and Labour Party (SDLP), the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) are extreme loyalists (loyal to the British Crown) and profess a deep desire to keep Northern Ireland separate from the Republic of Ireland. It is amazing then, that two parties on the complete opposite ends of the political spectrum should have compromised—this attests to the transformation that both the DUP and Sinn Féin THE CONCORD REVIEW 147 have made, and represents a true shift in the political paradigm of Northern Ireland. 68 Foster, p. 205. A study of recent politics in Northern Ireland, particularly the Troubles (1969-1998), provides evidence of this “disfigurement.” The republican movement itself experienced severe division, prior to its rise to national prominence in Northern Ireland. Despite the division and fractioning that threatened the legitimacy of the Irish Republican movement, Sinn Féin has fashioned a unified movement which now plays a key role in governing Northern Ireland. 69 Ó Corráin 70 Laffan, p. 361 71 Feeney, p. 43 72 Jason Knirck, Imagining Ireland’s Independence: the Debate over the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006) p. 120. This provides an excellent assessment of the role of personal conflict and the power struggle between Collins and de Valera. Knirck provides an analysis of the “personality types” (namely Collins, Griffith and de Valera) and how these “elite actors” contributed to the split. This adds another layer of complexity to the reasons for the disintegration of Sinn Féin. 73 Cronin, p. 203 74 Laffan, p. 361 148 Simeon R. Burke

Bibliography:

“BBC History: 1916 Easter Rising Aftermath and the rise of Sinn Féin,” British Broadcasting Corporation: History, http:// www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/easterrising/aftermath/af03. shtml (accessed August 24, 2009)

“BBC History: 1916 Easter Rising Profile of Arthur Griffith.” British Broadcasting Company: History, http://www.bbc.co.uk/ history/british/easterrising/profiles/po07.shtml (accessed August 24th, 2009)

Beckett, J.C., The Making of Modern Ireland: 1603-1923 London: Faber, 1969

Chapple, Phil, “‘Dev’: The Career of Eamon de Valera” History Review 53 (2005) pp. 28-33

Coakley, John and Michael Gallagher, ed., Politics in the Republic of Ireland, New York: Routledge, 2004

Collins, Michael, The Path to Freedom, Boulder, Colorado: Roberts Rinehart, 1996

Coogan, Tim Pat, Eamon De Valera: The Man Who Was Ireland, New York: Perennial, 1996

Cronin, Mike, A History of Ireland, London: Palgrave, 2004

Feeney, Brian, Sinn Féin A Hundred Turbulent Years (History of Ireland & the Irish Diaspora) New York: University of Wisconsin, 2003

Fitzpatrick, David, Politics and Irish life 1913-1921 Provincial Experience of War and Revolution, Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1977

Foster, R.F., ed., The Oxford History of Ireland, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989 THE CONCORD REVIEW 149

Hennessey, Thomas, Dividing Ireland: World War One and Partition, 1st ed. New York: Routledge, 1998

Knirck, Jason, Imagining Ireland’s Independence: the Debates over the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., Lanham, Maryland, 2006

Laffan, Michael, The Resurrection of Ireland: The Sinn Féin Party, 1916-1923, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999

Murphy, Audrey, “The Manifesto of Sinn Féin as prepared for circulation for the General Election of December, 1918” Corpus of Electronic Texts (CELT) UCC, http://www.ucc.ie/ celt/published/E900009/index.html (accessed October 16, 2009)

Ó Corráin, Donnchadh, “Debate on the Treaty between Great Britain and Ireland signed in London on the 6th December 1921: Sessions 14 December 1921 to 10 January 1922,” Corpus of Electronic Texts (CELT) UCC, http://www. ucc.ie/celt/published/E900003-001/index.html (accessed September 6, 2009)

O’Day, Alan and John Stevenson, eds., Irish Historical Documents since 1800, Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1992 150 Simeon R. Burke Edmund Burke Reflections on the Revolution in France 1790 Oxford World Classics, 1999, pp. 124-125

When all the frauds, impostures, violences, rapines, burnings, murders, confiscations, compulsory paper currencies, and every description of tyranny and cruelty employed to bring about and to uphold this revolution, have their natural effect, that is, to shock the moral sentiments of all virtuous and sober minds, the abettors of this philosophic system immediately strain their throats in a declamation against the old, monarchical government of France. When they have rendered that deposed power sufficiently black, they then proceed in argument, as if all those who disapprove of their new abuses, must of course be partizans of the old; that those who reprobate their crude and violent schemes of liberty ought to be treated as advocates for servitude. I admit that their necessities do compel them to this base and contemptible fraud. Nothing can reconcile men to their proceedings and projects but the supposition that there is no third option between them, and some tyranny as odious as can be furnished by the records of history, or by the invention of poets. This prattling of theirs hardly deserves the name of sophistry. It is nothing but plain impudence. Have these gentlemen never heard, in the whole circle of the worlds of theory and practice, of any thing between the despotism of the monarch and the despotism of the multitude? Have they never heard of a monarchy directed by laws, controlled and balanced by the great hereditary wealth and hereditary dignity of a nation; and both again controlled by a judicious check from the reason and feeling of the people at large acting by a suitable and permanent organ? Is it then impossible that a man may be found who, without criminal ill intention, or pitiable absurdity, shall prefer such a mixed and tempered government to either of the extremes; and who may repute that nation to be destitute of all wisdom and of all virtue, which, having in its choice to obtain such a government with ease, or rather to confirm it when actually possessed, thought proper to commit a thousand crimes, and to subject their country to a thousand evils, in order to avoid it? Is it then a truth so universally acknowledged, that a pure democracy is the only tolerable form into which human society can be thrown, that a man is not permitted to hesitate about its merits, without the suspicion of being a friend to tyranny, that is, of being a foe to mankind? THE CONCORD REVIEW 151

A TRAGEDY OF ERRORS: WHY THE SOUTH LOST THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG

Robert D. Hogan

Given the success of the Confederacy in the eastern theater of operations for the first two years of the Civil War, there was little reason to believe that the South would not continue that success when it engaged the Union forces at Gettysburg in early July 1863. The rebels had not lost a major battle to that point under General Robert E. Lee, and the Union Army was in the middle of yet another command change, this time with Major General George G. Meade replacing Major General Joseph Hooker after the Army of the Potomac’s crushing defeat at Chancellorsville a little more than a month earlier. So why, then, did the South lose the Battle of Gettysburg? This epic battle has been dissected by military historians for over a century and many conflicting opinions have been documented. However, evidence points to several key failures by the Confederate commanders, especially Lee, as critical causes of the South’s defeat at Gettysburg. Robert E. Lee took command of the Confederate Army in the spring of 1862 when General Joseph Johnston was seriously wounded at the battle of Seven Pines outside of Richmond, Virginia.1 Lee immediately renamed his forces “the Army of

Robert D. Hogan is a Senior at Glastonbury High School in Glastonbury, Connecticut, where he wrote this paper for Mr. John Cooper’s AP United States History course in the 2009/2010 academic year. 152 Robert D. Hogan

Northern Virginia.” From the spring of 1862 through May 1863, this army won a series of improbable “victories against seemingly insurmountable odds.”2 It was “always outnumbered, out-gunned, and often in a poor position to attack or defend,” yet Lee racked up victory after victory.3 After the victory at Chancellorsville in May 1863, the prowess of the Army of Northern Virginia had become a great source of national pride in the Confederacy among both the military and the civilian populace.4 Entering the Battle of Gettysburg, the Army of Northern Virginia had never known defeat under Lee’s command. Because of its decisive victories up to and including Chancellorsville, “a sense of invincibility had grown throughout the Confederate army.”5 British observer Arthur Freemantle wrote that “the universal feeling in the [Confederate] army was one of profound contempt for an enemy whom they had beaten so constantly, and under so many disadvantages.”6 Lee shared in this belief that his army could not be beaten, and this overconfidence was a key reason that the South lost at Gettysburg. Lee was brimming with confidence after Chancellorsville, where he won a brilliant victory after finding himself caught between two enemy forces.7 In that battle, the Confederate Army had captured a large number of Union rifles so that at Gettysburg, more than 90% of Lee’s infantry now had rifles.8 Since the Army of Northern Virginia had been winning battles using a preponderance of less accurate smoothbore rifles to this point in the war, acquiring and equipping his infantry with such a large preponderance of rifled musketry added to Lee’s overconfidence in his army.9 Despite the fact that his supply lines were thin and his men tired and often shoeless, Lee decided to invade the North in late June 1863. Lee’s ultimate purpose in marching into Pennsylvania was to attack Harrisburg and possibly Philadelphia, according to Lee’s personal papers.10 According to an 1869 New York Times article entitled “Lee at Gettysburg,” this was “a stretch of audac- ity far beyond what was supposed to have been entertained by the Confederate commander.”11 Yet Lee pressed on, crossing the Potomac into Pennsylvania. THE CONCORD REVIEW 153 Once in Pennsylvania, Lee looked for an opportunity to engage the North in battle. When he found out on June 28 that the Union Army was near, Lee was not panicked, in large part because of the confidence he had in his soldiers.12 After Chancel- lorsville, Lee wrote in a private letter: “There never were such men in any Army before and there never can be better in any Army again. If properly led, they will go anywhere and never falter at the work before them.”13 Despite the fact that the South had won many of its battles to this point using defensive tactics, Lee was predisposed to carry the battle to the Union Army. When General James Longstreet, Lee’s trusted confidant and corps commander, suggested that Lee take up a defensive position between the Union Army and Washington, then turn and march on Washington after defeating the North using defensive tactics, Lee replied, “No, the enemy is there [Gettysburg] and I am going to attack him there.”14 This apparent bravado was rooted in Lee’s overconfidence, and would lead to disaster. Having decided to attack the Union at Gettysburg, Lee’s overconfidence cost him dearly during the battle. Specifically, Lee’s daring was exacerbated by the isolated successes the South had on the first two days of the Battle of Gettysburg, which em- boldened him to order Pickett’s Charge on Day 3.15 Lee assumed that the center of the Union position had been weakened during the fighting on Day 2; Phil Andrade describes the successes of the Army of Northern Virginia on Day 2 of the Battle of Gettysburg in his article “The Mistake of All Mistakes” as follows: On Day 2 on the Confederate right, eleven brigades had attacked in echelon style and practically demolished Sickle’s corps, and inflicted great damage on Sykes’s and Hancock’s corps. A Georgia brigade from Anderson’s division actually advanced up Cemetery Ridge and pierced the Union centre, and was only ejected by a suicidal counter attack in which a Federal regiment from Minnesota was almost literally annihilated. The North lost 8,738 men on Day 2 of the battle while the South lost just 6,679, a highly unusual result that the attacker lost fewer men than the defender.16 Lee knew that he had only a 2-to-1 manpower advantage when ordering Pickett’s Charge on Day 3 of the Battle of Gettysburg when 154 Robert D. Hogan

the conventional wisdom of the day held that a 3-to-1 advantage was needed for a frontal assault against dug-in troops.17 But the overconfident Lee believed that his men had overcome greater odds at the Battles of Gaines Mill, Sharpsburg, and Chancellors- ville, and the previous two days of combat had convinced him that his troops were still unconquerable.18 Lee therefore gambled one more time against the odds, attempting to end the war with an audacious offensive in Pennsylvania. His gamble, stoked by his unwavering faith in his beloved Army of Northern Virginia, did not pay off, and because of this, Lee ended up turning the tide of the war to the Union.19 Not only did Lee’s overconfidence contribute to the South’s defeat at Gettysburg, but Lee’s failure to adapt his leadership style to meet the needs of his subordinate commanders also played a role. Lee was “notoriously secretive” with his battle plans and tended to be vague in giving orders.20 This leadership style was effective in dealing with Longstreet and Stonewall Jackson, Lee’s two corps commanders through the battle of Chancellorsville, for Longstreet and Jackson had both shown themselves quite capable of carrying out Lee’s will without a lot of guidance or clarification from him.21 However, with Jackson’s untimely death at Chancellorsville, Lee had put in place new, inexperienced corps commanders who required much more detailed instruction and tighter management than Longstreet and Jackson, and Lee’s failure to recognize this need proved costly at Gettysburg.22 After Chancellorsville, Lee decided to break his two corps into three, and appointed two of Jackson’s division commanders, Richard Ewell and A.P. Hill, to command these two new corps alongside Longstreet.23 Unfortunately for the Confederates, neither of these new corps commanders was of the same caliber as Jackson. Ewell was known to be “a bit cautious and a big worrier,” and Hill, while a superior general to Ewell, was “impulsive and hotheaded.”24 But more importantly, neither man was capable of translating Lee’s intent into proper action at Gettysburg. General Ewell was not an audacious commander who seized the initiative on the battlefield, but rather, he required very THE CONCORD REVIEW 155 specific instructions from his superiors prior to taking action.25 Lee was apparently well aware of this, as upon appointing Ewell to corps command, Lee spoke “long and earnestly” with Ewell about his “want of decision.”26 Despite his apparent awareness of Ewell’s indecisiveness, Lee nevertheless sent Ewell one of his typically ambiguous orders on the afternoon of Day 1 of the battle, requesting that Ewell take the high ground on Cemetery Hill “if practicable,” orders “that left open the widest possible range of interpretation.”27 Lee could have gotten away with such ambiguity with Jackson, whose aggressive nature and ability to translate Lee’s imprecise orders into decisive action would have driven him to take the high ground.28 But Ewell was no Jackson, and given the loophole Lee provided, he decided not to attack because he felt that his troops were exhausted, his artillery could not be positioned effectively to support an attack, and also because he was missing one of his divisions.29 Whether Ewell would have been able take both Cemetery Hill and Culp’s Hill after receiving Lee’s orders on the afternoon of Day 1 is a point of contention for historians; one of the most credible accounts is given by Colonel Edward Porter Alexander, who was chief of artillery for Longstreet’s corps at Gettysburg. Alexander believed that the Federal position on Cemetery Hill was well fortified by late afternoon and would have been difficult to win.30 However, Alexander continues, Culp’s Hill was lightly defended, and had Ewell attacked, he likely would have been able to take that hill and secure at least some key terrain for the Confederacy at the end of Day 1.31 Unfortunately, because Lee was not more directive with his new corps commander, Ewell failed to seize any advantage for the South after the initial fighting on Day 1, which allowed the North to secure the high ground around Gettysburg.32 This turned out to be a key reason that the Union won the battle, because that evening and all night long, Union forces streamed into the Gettysburg area, fortifying Cemetery Hill and Culp’s Hill and extending along the entire ridgeline into a fishhook-shaped defensive position that the South tried in vain to penetrate over the next two days.33 156 Robert D. Hogan

Similarly, Lee’s lack of ability to control Hill and prevent him from escalating the battle on Day 1 had dire consequences. Lee had told his corps commanders on June 30, the day before the battle began, that they were to avoid direct contact with the enemy until the Army was concentrated and ready to deploy for battle.34 Lee took it for granted that his generals understood that his orders of June 30 not to take on a general battle extended to July 1 as well, for Lee wanted his entire army, including Longstreet’s Corps, together before engaging the Union.35 Unfortunately, Lee did not emphasize this sufficiently to Hill, nor did he respond to Hill’s dispatch on the evening of June 30 announcing his “intention to advance the next morning and discover what was in my (Hill’s) front.”36 Upon receiving this message, Lee should have recognized that the hotheaded Hill might be spoiling for a fight and reinforced his “no engagement” directive to his new corps commander. At a minimum, Lee should have asked Hill for clarification of his announced intent for his planned advance on July 1. However, Hill’s emotional nature made it so that he was not the kind of general with whom Lee could consult for guidance, as he could with Longstreet (and with Jackson before his death), and Lee was clearly not yet comfortable in dealing with Hill directly.37 Hill, it turns out, was anxious to engage the North, despite Lee’s “no engagement” order. He had resolved in his mind on the evening of June 30 that his corps’ expedition to Gettysburg on July 1 “was not going to be a halfhearted affair.”38 He sent two divisions, 15,000 men strong, into Gettysburg on a “reconnaissance mission.”39 Although Hill did tell his lead division commander, Henry Heth, not to bring on a full-blown engagement, the large size of this force and the nature of the troops he assigned (infantry and artillery instead of the usual cavalry used for scouting missions) made it almost impossible to imagine that general fighting would not break out if they encountered Union troops, which they did upon entering Gettysburg the morning of July 1.40 Lee had afforded Hill the same free reign he afforded Longstreet and Jackson, rather than amending his style to take tighter control of the actions of his inexperienced subordinate. As a result, Hill’s corps “blundered into a firefight” with Buford’s THE CONCORD REVIEW 157 cavalry and engaged the North before Lee could properly array his three divisions for battle.41 To his dismay, Lee arrived in the vicinity of Gettysburg in midafternoon of the first day to find his units fully engaged, and was not able to organize his army well enough to launch a coordinated attack before nightfall.42 While Lee’s mistakes were critical contributors in the South’s defeat at Gettysburg, he was certainly not solely responsible. There was plenty of blame to go around resulting from the actions (or inactions) of his subordinate commanders. The aforementioned indecisiveness of Ewell not taking the high ground late on Day 1 and the premature escalation of the battle by Hill were certainly factors in the South’s failure. Other notable miscues by Lee’s subordinates were Longstreet’s hesitation to engage on Day 2, which kept his troops on the sidelines through most of the day while the battle raged, and cavalry commander J.E.B. Stuart’s absence for several days leading up to the battle until the middle of Day 2, which blinded Lee as to the Union army’s disposition, location, and strength. Longstreet’s contribution to the South’s failure at Gettys- burg has been hotly contested by historians. This is because much of the history of the Civil War, especially from the South’s point of view, has been influenced by the “Lost Cause of the Confed- eracy” authors. The “Lost Cause” authors portrayed the South’s struggle as noble, its military leaders as chivalrous and superior to their Northern counterparts, and its ultimate defeat as being due to overwhelming numbers of Northern troops, not the Union’s leadership.43 One of the largest beneficiaries of the Lost Cause viewpoint’s influence on history was Lee, who emerged as the greatest hero of the Confederacy.44 On the other hand, these same writers made Longstreet the evil villain of the Confederate Army, largely because of his friendship with Union Army commander and later United States President Ulysses S. Grant and his pro- Reconstruction stance after the war (the Lost Cause authors were anti-Reconstruction, as they wanted to preserve the antebellum Southern way of life).45 In response to the Lost Cause authors, a number of pro-Longstreet writers emerged to defend “Old Pete,” 158 Robert D. Hogan as Longstreet was called. Longstreet’s delay in entering the Day 2 battle until 4PM has been called by Lost Cause historians an “act of insubordination” and by pro-Longstreet historians as “justified caution.”46 In the final analysis, however, while Longstreet’s actions were not the sole cause of the South’s defeat at Gettysburg as the Lost Cause authors have implied, his delay in joining the battle until late in the afternoon of Day 2 did hinder the Confederate Army’s ability to achieve a breakthrough of the Union defenses, and thus was a contributing factor. Lee wanted the attack on Day 2 to begin as early as possible; at 11 that morning, Lee ordered two of Longstreet’s divisions to attack the Federal left flank.47 However, Longstreet did not begin his assault until 4PM, by which time Meade’s army had dug into fortified positions. Longstreet “wasted much of the day countermarching in the hot summer sun to avoid detection,” which not only kept him from supporting Lee’s other two corps on the battlefield, but also greatly fatigued his soldiers.48 Therefore, by the time he launched the attack, it was too late to be effective, both from a tactical and a soldiers’ capability standpoint.49 Jubal Early, one of Ewell’s division commanders at Gettysburg and a leading member of the Lost Cause school of interpretation, wrote that “the position attacked by Longstreet was not occupied by the enemy until late in the afternoon, and Round Top Hill, which commanded the enemy’s position, could have been taken in the morning without a struggle.”50 Whether this is a valid tactical analysis or Lost Cause Longstreet-bashing is not clear, but what is clear is that Longstreet delayed his attack for five hours, which gave Meade time to fortify his defenses. Many historians believe that Longstreet’s disagreement with Lee on how to conduct the battle on the second day affected his conduct. Civil War historian G. Moxley Sorrel, who was an officer in Longstreet’s corps (and is not considered a “Lost Cause” author), recalled that at Gettysburg, “there was apparent apathy in his (Longstreet’s) movements…they lacked the fire and point of his usual bearing on the battlefield.”51 Lost Cause authors have accused Longstreet of “sulking” after his disagreement with Lee about battle tactics.52 Whatever his frame of mind, the fact remains THE CONCORD REVIEW 159 that Longstreet delayed his engagement; even Longstreet admitted as much in his memoirs, writing that on the afternoon of Day 2, “under the conduct of the reconnoitering officer, our march seemed slow—there were some halts and countermarches.”53 Another of Lee’s subordinates’ blunders was J.E.B. Stuart’s absence from the battlefield until the middle of Day 2. Stuart was vain and a bit of a showman who loved to take his cavalry and go on individual raiding sorties.54 Up through the Battle of Chancel- lorsville, Stuart had enjoyed great success. However just weeks after that battle, on June 9, 1863, Federal cavalry caught Stuart by surprise at Brandy Station, Virginia; as the “eyes and ears” of an army, cavalry is supposed to employ surprise, not be caught unawares.55 This was an embarrassment for Stuart’s troops, shattered the Confederate cavalry’s belief that it was unbeatable, and gave the Union cavalry a huge confidence boost.56 Vilified in the Southern press for being caught off guard at Brandy Station, Stuart was determined to regain his prominent reputation.57 So when Lee gave him orders on June 24 saying that “if General Hooker’s army remains inactive” Stuart could withdraw three cavalry brigades and “pass around their army… doing all the damage [he] can” as long as he did not encounter any “hindrance” from the enemy forces, Stuart saw this as a golden opportunity.58 Despite that this set of orders was somewhat vague, as was Lee’s norm, and in some cases contradicted earlier orders that Lee had given Stuart, Stuart chose to interpret Lee’s latest set of unclear orders as a green light for a glorious cavalry raid behind Union lines rather than seek clarification from Lee.59 When Stuart discovered the very next day that the Union Army was not inactive and was in fact moving northward, and despite one of his scouting parties running into a roadblock which led to a limited engagement with Northern troops, which could be considered a “hindrance,” Stuart nevertheless pressed on with his plan to ride around the Union army rather than directly report back to Lee that the North was on the move.60 As a result, on the way north into Pennsylvania, Lee was placed under great stress by his apprehension over Stuart’s absence.61 160 Robert D. Hogan

To make matters worse, Stuart decided to take his three best brigade commanders (Hampton, Fitzhugh Lee, and Chambliss) on his raid to the Union rear, leaving his two most incompetent commanders, Robertson and Jones, with Lee to provide intelligence about the Union maneuvers.62 The officers Stuart left behind in charge of his cavalry while Lee began his dangerous invasion of the North were not up to the task; for some reason, neither Jones nor Robertson notified Lee that the Union army had broken camp although Stuart had informed them of this after the meeting engagement on June 25.63 Lee’s firsthand account of the battle makes it clear that he thought up until June 28 that the Union Army was far away, for he was relying on Stuart’s cavalry to keep him up to date on the Union locations.64 Without Stuart’s cavalry, Lee struggled to ascertain the location of the Union Army during the march into Pennsylvania. Lee’s ignorance of the location of the Union Army prior to Gettysburg was a result of Stuart’s hubris in deciding to raid behind Northern lines, even after the conditions of Lee’s orders were not met, and Stuart’s poor decision-making regarding who he left in charge of his cavalry co-located with Lee’s forces.65 Lee relied heavily on Stuart for intelligence on the enemy, and prior to Gettysburg, Stuart’s absence left Lee blind. In an account of the events leading up to battle, Lee wrote that “in the absence of the cavalry, it was impossible to determine Hooker’s intentions,” so he decided to stay and fight near Gettysburg, with fateful results.66 As it turned out, Hooker had maneuvered his entire army between Stuart’s cavalry and Lee’s army, which delayed Stuart’s return to Lee’s side once the battle began. This delay proved costly for the South; on July 2, Stuart’s three brigades could have provided invaluable reconnaissance of the Union left flank and opened up more opportunities for Lee to attack.67 Stuart’s failings at Gettysburg, along with those of many of Lee’s other subordinate commanders, were more significant reasons for the South’s defeat. Of course, some credit must be given to Union commander General George Meade and his subordinate commanders, who THE CONCORD REVIEW 161 skillfully executed superior command and control during the battle, expertly shifting their forces as needed to thwart repeated rebel attacks. Meade had reluctantly taken command of the Army of the Potomac just a few days before the battle and was really no better than any of the generals who had preceded him.68 However, under his command, the Union turned the tide of the war in the eastern theater in its favor at Gettysburg. The Union Army enjoyed significant advantages at the Battle of Gettysburg which were key factors in its success: control of the high ground, superior interior lines of communication, more troops, and more artillery (140 guns to 69).69 However, the North had enjoyed battlefield advantages before, most recently at Chancellorsville, and had come up short against Lee. Reflecting on Meade’s performance after Day 2 of the fighting, Confederate Colonel Edward Porter Alexander wrote that it was “...perhaps the best example which the war produced of active supervision and efficient handling of a large force on the defensive...”70 Alexander went on to praise the fighting skills of the Union soldiers when he said, “...whether from discipline or from the inspiration of home, the fighting done by the Federal brigades was of the best type...”71 And giving credit where credit is due, General George Pickett, whose fabled charge against the Union center on Day 3 turned into a suicide mission, when asked years after the battle why the South lost at Gettysburg, remarked, “I think the Yankees had something to do with it.”72 While Pickett’s remark has merit, the preponderance of the historical record points to the blunders by Southern commanders, most notably Lee, as the root cause of the South’s defeat at Gettysburg. Ewell, Hill, Longstreet, and Stuart all made contribu- tory mistakes, but Lee, as overall commander of the Army of the Potomac, bears ultimate responsibility for the defeat, especially since his own mistakes were so egregious. Lee was clearly not at his best at Gettysburg. His overconfidence and failure to properly instruct and lead his subordinates, especially his new, inexperienced corps commanders, were fatal to the South’s chances. Had Lee recognized the limitations of his tired, often shoeless army and of his subordinate commanders, and adapted his leadership style and strategies accordingly, he might have met with more success at 162 Robert D. Hogan

Gettysburg. But he did not, and his failure at Gettysburg turned the tide of the war. The Union army gained confidence that it could defeat the legendary Lee, and the once-indefatigable morale of the Confederate army and its confidence in its commander were badly damaged. The Rebels lost their feeling of invincibility and for the first time saw losing the war as a real possibility, which they did, surrendering at Appomattox twenty-one months later.73 THE CONCORD REVIEW 163

1 John Heiser, “Biography of General Robert E. Lee,” National Park Service (September 1998), accessed January 28, 2010, http://www.nps.gov/archive/gett/getttour/sidebar/ leebio.htm. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 Joseph T. Glatthaar, General Lee’s Army (New York: Free Press, A Division of Simon & Schuster, Inc., 2008) p. 257 5 Gary H. Gallagher, ed., The Second Day at Gettysburg (Kent, Ohio: The Kent State University Press, 1992) p. 30 6 Ibid., p. 31 7 Tom Carhart, Lost Triumph: Lee’s Real Plan at Gettysburg and Why it Failed (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 2005) p. 105 8 Phil Andrade, “The Mistake of All Mistakes,” Military History Online (November, 2003), accessed January 15, 2010, http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/gettysburg/articles/ mistakeofallmistakes.aspx. 9 Ibid. 10 “Lee at Gettysburg,” New York Times (February 26, 1869); Proquest Historical Newspapers, accessed January 27, 2010, http://hn.bigchalk.com 11 Ibid. 12 William Garrett Piston, Lee’s Tarnished Lieutenant: James Longstreet and His Place in Southern History (Athens, Georgia: The University of Georgia Press, 1987) p. 47 13 Ibid., p. 47 14 Arthur C. Danto, “Gettysburg,” Grand Street 6, no. 3 (Spring, 1986) JSTOR: p. 107, accessed January 27, 2010, http://www.jstor.org/logon. 15 Andrade 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid. 20 Carhart, p. 246 21 Ibid., p. 246 22 Ibid., p. 246 23 Glatthaar, p. 256 24 Ibid., p. 257 25 Stewart Sifakis, “Richard Stoddert Ewell,” Civil War Biographies (March, 2010), accessed March 29, 2010, http:// www.civilwarhome.com/ewellbio.htm 164 Robert D. Hogan

26 Stephen W. Sears, Gettysburg (New York: Houghton- Mifflin Company, 2003) p. 503 27 David J. Eicher, The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001) p. 517 28 Ibid., p. 517 29 Ibid., p. 517 30 Sears, p. 233 31 Ibid., p. 233 32 Piston, p. 48 33 Ibid., p. 48 34 James M. McPherson, Hallowed Ground (New York: Crown Publishers, 2003) p. 36 35 Sears, p. 160 36 Ibid., p. 161 37 Clifford Dowdey, Lee (Toronto: Little, Brown & Company, 1965) p. 495 38 Noah Andre Trudeau, Gettysburg: A Testing of Courage (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, Inc., 2002) p. 153 39 Ibid., p. 153 40 Ibid., p. 153 41 Sears, p. 161; McPherson, p. 36 42 Glatthaar, p. 275 43 Gary H. Gallagher, Jubal A. Early, the Lost Cause, and Civil War History: A Persistent Legacy (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1995) p. 5 44 Gary H. Gallagher and Alan T. Nolan, eds., The Myth of the Lost Cause and Civil War History (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000) p. 2 45 Ibid., p. 6 46 Dowdey, p. 383 47 Glatthaar, p. 277 48 Ibid., p. 277 49 Ibid., p. 277 50 Gallagher, Second Day, p. 6 51 Gallagher and Nolan, p. 134 52 Ibid., p. 134 53 James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox: Memoirs of the Civil War in America (Philadelphia: Da Capo Press, 1896) p. 366 54 Daniel Zimmerman, “J.E.B. Stuart: Gettysburg Scapegoat?” Historynet.com (September, 1998), accessed February 1, 2010, http://www.historynet.com/jeb-stuart- gettysburg-scapegoat-may-98-americas-civil-war-feature.htm THE CONCORD REVIEW 165

55 Glatthaar, p. 268 56 Ibid., p. 268 57 Zimmerman 58 Ibid. 59 Ibid. 60 Ibid. 61 Dowdey, p. 381 62 Zimmerman 63 Ibid. 64 “Lee at Gettysburg” 65 Zimmerman 66 “Lee at Gettysburg” 67 Glatthaar, p. 279 68 Carhart, p. 3 69 Andrade 70 Ibid. 71 Ibid. 72 Ibid. 73 Glatthaar, p. 285

Bibliography

Andrade, Phil, “The Mistake of All Mistakes,” Military History Online, November, 2003. Accessed January 15, 2010, http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/gettysburg/ articles/ mistakeofallmistakes.aspx Carhart, Tom, Lost Triumph: Lee’s Real Plan at Gettysburg and Why it Failed, New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 2005

Danto, Arthur C., “Gettysburg,” Grand Street 6, no. 3 (Spring, 1986) pp. 98-116, JSTOR, Accessed January 27, 2010. http://www.jstor.org/logon

Dowdey, Clifford, Lee, Toronto: Little, Brown & Company, 1965

Eicher, David J., The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001

Gallagher, Gary H., Jubal A. Early, the Lost Cause, and Civil War History: A Persistent Legacy, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1995 166 Robert D. Hogan

Gallagher, Gary H., ed. The Second Day at Gettysburg, Kent, Ohio: The Kent State University Press, 1992

Gallagher, Gary H. and Nolan, Alan T., editors The Myth of the Lost Cause and Civil War History, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000

Glatthaar, Joseph T., General Lee’s Army, New York: Free Press, A Division of Simon & Schuster, Inc., 2008

Heiser, John. “Biography of General Robert E. Lee,” National Park Service (September, 1998), Accessed January 28, 2010. http://www.nps.gov/archive/gett/getttour/sidebar/ leebio.htm

“Lee at Gettysburg” New York Times, February 26, 1869 Proquest Historical Newspapers, Accessed January 27, 2010, http://hn.bigchalk.com

Longstreet, James, From Manassas to Appomattox: Memoirs of the Civil War in America, Philadelphia: Da Capo Press, 1896

McPherson, James M., Hallowed Ground, New York: Crown Publishers, 2003

Piston, William Garrett, Lee’s Tarnished Lieutenant: James Longstreet and His Place in Southern History, Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1987

Sears, Stephen W., Gettysburg, New York: Houghton-Mifflin Company, 2003

Sifakis, Stewart, “Richard Stoddert Ewell” Civil War Biographies (March, 2010) Accessed March 29, 2010, http:// www.civilwarhome.com/ewellbio.htm

Trudeau, Noah Andre, Gettysburg: A Testing of Courage, New York: HarperCollins Publishers, Inc., 2002

Zimmerman, Daniel. “J.E.B. Stuart: Gettysburg Scapegoat?” Historynet.com (September, 1998) Accessed February 1, 2010, http://www.historynet.com/jeb-stuart-gettysburg-scapegoat- may-98-americas-civil-war-feature.htm THE CONCORD REVIEW 167

THE FORGOTTEN PEOPLE: WHY SAKHALIN KOREANS COULDN’T RETURN TO KOREA

Yeon Woo Lee

Abstract

This paper will analyze why Sakhalin Koreans, the Korean descendants living in the Russian territory of Sakhalin, couldn’t return to Korea after they were either willingly moved or unwillingly drafted as forced laborers to Sakhalin mainly during the 1930s and 1940s. The scope of this paper is generally from 1945 to 1975, and the nations in concern are the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics/the Russian Federation, Japan, North Korea, and South Korea. International treaties, statements from government officials, and law codes are analyzed to support the thesis. The thesis proposed here is that Sakhalin Koreans couldn’t return to Korea because of the four countries’ neglect of the Sakhalin Koreans that resulted from sovereignty disputes, the undeclared official policy on the refugees, and the Cold War tension.

Yeon Woo Lee is a Senior at the Daewon Foreign Language High School in Seoul, Korea, where he wrote this paper as an independent study during the 2009/2010 academic year. 168 Yeon Woo Lee

Brief History of the Sakhalin Koreans The Sakhalin Koreans are Korean descendents living in Sakhalin, the far east island of Russia, who moved from Korea to Sakhalin, predominantly as coal miners, loggers, and war industry workers for the Japanese colonial government near the end of World War II. Although a large percentage of the Sakhalin Koreans were forced to move by the Japanese colonial government before 1945, the history of Sakhalin Koreans actually started in 1861 when farmers suffering from years of famine and poor harvest emigrated to Sakhalin, at that time the territory of the Russian Empire. Although Emperor Gojong of the Choson Dynasty, the Korean dynasty that lasted until 1910, requested Russia to stop accepting Korean migrants, more and more Koreans moved to Russia, including Sakhalin, because of higher wage rates in Rus- sia.1 After the Japanese Empire won the Russo-Japanese War and took a part of Sakhalin (below 50° North) by the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905, Sakhalin was governed by the Karafuto Pre- fecture of Japan.2 Under the Japanese rule, more Koreans crossed the East Sea to Sakhalin, most of whom were poor farmers hoping to get higher wages in Sakhalin. Most of these immigrants willingly moved, largely from agricultural towns of Jeolla-do and Gyeongsang-do, the southern provinces of Korea, with their whole families.3 The forced conscription by the Japanese colonial government started from September 1939, under the name of the National Service Draft Ordinance, a law that gave the Japanese colonial government the power to recruit civil workers as laborers for war industries. The central government assigned a quota for conscription workers to each town, and regional governors either accepted volunteers or forcefully recruited men.4 Interviews with Sakhalin Koreans confirmed that some degrees of coercion and deception were involved in the conscription, although to different extents in different provinces. The following interview with Jang Yang-ok, 76, describes the systematic mechanism of the forced conscription. THE CONCORD REVIEW 169

When Japan became weaker and weaker, Japanese people sent lots of young men to Karafuto (Japanese name of Sakhalin). When the Japanese people ordered conscription, regional governors—usually local Koreans—made the roster. If your name was written, you had to go [to Sakhalin]. As for my town, we had to send 10 people, so the governor went around asking for volunteers. At first, if you didn’t want to go, the governor didn’t force you. But because our town was short of the quota, the governor started to write down names randomly.5 Conscription became more prevalent and forceful as the Greater East Asia War broke out in 1941. In 1942, the Japanese government founded the Choson Labor Association and conscripted Korean men systemically as Sakhalin laborers.6 The forceful nature of the conscription is illustrated in the Japanese newspaper The Asahi Simbun’s article of 1982. The article described the forced labor law enforced in 1944 in Korea. Special teams of ten to fifteen policemen were dispatched to Korea from Japan. Armed with billies, the police besieged towns and recruited Korean men. The police chose sturdy men in their twenties to forties, pushed them into cargos, and shipped them from Korea.7 The Japanese colonial government in Korea estimated that 16,113 Koreans were conscripted and sent to Sakhalin from 1939 to 1943.8 However, the Soviet census shows that there were 43,000 Koreans in Sakhalin in 1947.9 Other unofficial statistics on the number of the Sakhalin Koreans show gaps in numbers.10 The exact number of the conscripted Sakhalin Koreans is not known. Once arrived in Sakhalin, most South Koreans worked in coal mines or at war industries. According to the interviews with the surviving Sakhalin Koreans, Japanese factory owners didn’t pay Koreans as promised, often deducting expenses for foods, gloves, shoes, and other necessary tools from their wages. Yeo Jeong- ryeol, a Sakhalin Korean who worked on the Horouchiho airfield in Sakhalin, testified that from the promised 2.50 won of wages, 0.80 won and other miscellaneous expenses were automatically deducted every month.11 At the work place, unmarried workers slept in dormitories called harmonica houses, and married workers with children lived in separate houses.12 Another example that reflects the Sakhalin Koreans’ life is the 630 Koreans who were 170 Yeon Woo Lee

sent to Naibuti mine near Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk on April 25, 1943.13 They built roads in heavy snow, working in teams of six people. 78 out of 630 Koreans died two weeks after they arrived.14 The forced labor continued until August 1945, when the Japanese Empire surrendered to the Allies, effectively ending the World War II. The USSR estimated that 43,000 Koreans were in Sakhalin after the end of war in 1947.15 The fate of the Koreans in Sakhalin remained unclear. The Japanese government withdrew its people quickly after the surrender: 292,590 Japanese returned to Japan according to the US-USSR Provisional Agreement on November 27, 1946, and all the remaining Japanese were returned by the Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration of 1956, according to the statistics from the Japanese Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare.16 However, because of the political situations in the Soviet Union, Japan, North Korea, and South Korea, most Sakhalin Koreans couldn’t return to Korea.

Where does Sakhalin belong? This paper first analyzes the legal standing of Sakhalin. Whether Sakhalin belongs to the Russian Federation, as commonly acepted, or belongs to nobody, is a crucial problem, since the answer to this question is contingent on the legal standing of the Sakhalin Koreans. Although Sakhalin Island was integrated as a part of the Russian Federation on January 2, 1947, the owner of southern Sakhalin is not clear. When the Russian Empire lost the Russo-Japanese War on September 5, 1905, it ceded to Japan “in perpetuity and full sovereignty the southern portion of the Island of Sakhalin and all the islands adjacent thereto and the public works and proper- ties thereon,” the northernmost boundary of the ceded territory being 50° North, according to the Treaty of Portsmouth’s Article IX.17 Thus, the Japanese Empire governed southern Sakhalin from 1905. THE CONCORD REVIEW 171 However, Japan lost its control over Sakhalin when it lost WWII. The Treaty of San Francisco of September 8, 1951, between Japan and the Allies of WWII, eliminated the Japanese Empire’s imperial power over its colonies, including Sakhalin Island. Accord- ing to the treaty’s article 2(c), “Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Kurile Islands, and to that portion of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty as a consequence of the Treaty of Portsmouth of 5 September 1905.”18 That is, Japan gave up its sovereignty over southern Sakhalin, but the recipient of the islands was not stated. The Soviet Union refused to sign the Treaty of San Francisco. One of the reasons for the refusal was related to the territorial problems. It can be seen that the Soviet Union was discontented with the San Francisco Treaty from the telegram that the Soviet Foreign Ministry sent to N. B. Roshchin, the Soviet ambassador in Beijing. “. . . the Soviet government has decided to send its delegation to the September 4 San Francisco conference on a peace treaty with Japan. The Soviet Union considers that it would be difficult for the Soviet Union to refuse to participate in the indicated conference since such a refusal could be assessed by public opinion as the unwillingness of the Soviet Union to have normal relations with Japan. The Soviet representatives will take part in the San Francisco conference and will strive for the proposals of the Soviet Union to be adopted.”19 Here, we can see that the Soviet Union was unhappy with the San Francisco Treaty and wrote its own version of the treaty. The Soviet Union did propose a revised version of the treaty during the conference. The article that reflected Soviet discontent over the territorial problems was Article 7: “Japan recognizes the full sovereignty of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the southern part of Sakhalin with all islands belonging to it and to the Kurile Islands and renounces all rights, legal foundations, and pretensions to these territories.”20 The Soviets wanted the San Francisco Treaty to explicitly recognize that Japan ceded southern Sakhalin to the Soviet Union. However, by the end of the peace conference, the participants decided not to adopt the 172 Yeon Woo Lee

Soviet draft. Consequently, the Soviet Union refused to sign the final version of the San Francisco Peace Treaty.21 Two points can be concluded in a legal sense: A. that from April 28, 1952, southern Sakhalin was no longer the territory of Japan and, B. the San Francisco Peace Treaty didn’t indicate who would receive southern Sakhalin. After the San Francisco Treaty went into effect, many nations did not acknowledge that southern Sakhalin was legally Soviet territory. The U.S. State Department published a report in June 1954 saying that the San Francisco Treaty did not yield southern Sakhalin or the Kuril Islands to the Soviets and that the Soviet Union cannot incorporate those territories, according to the Potsdam Declaration.22 The U.S. Senate Resolution of Ratification of March 20, 1952, also supports that southern Sakhalin doesn’t legally belong to the Soviet Union. The resolution states that nothing the San Francisco Treaty contains “is deemed to diminish or prejudice, in favor of the Soviet Union, the right, title, and interest of Japan, or the Allied Powers as denied in said treaty, in and to South Sakhalin and its adjacent islands, the Kurile Islands . . . or any other territory, rights, or interests possessed by Japan on December 7, 1941, or to confer any right, title, or benefit therein or thereto on the Soviet Union.”23 However, Sakhalin is actually under Russian military control. On August 8, 1945, seven days before the Japanese Empire surrendered to the Allies, the Soviet Union declared war against the Japanese Empire, advanced its military to the south, and occupied southern Sakhalin within days.24 The Russian Federation incorporated Sakhalin on January 2, 1947.25 But the Soviet military occupation of southern Sakhalin, rather than a legal occupation, continues a state of war, which doesn’t automatically grant Russia legitimate possession of the island. Thus, Russia’s occupation of Sakhalin isn’t legal, but is basically military rule. THE CONCORD REVIEW 173

The Soviet Union/the Russian Federation The Soviet Union’s policy on Sakhalin Koreans hasn’t been consistent, probably because Sakhalin Koreans were relatively few compared to other ethnic minorities and lacked massive ethnic movements, such as protests or lany arge-scale demand for returning sovereignty to Korea. The main policy of the Soviet government over the Sakhalin Koreans seems to have been “Let well enough alone.” Right after the end of WWII, the Soviet Union focused more on using Sakhalin Koreans to restore post-war Sakhalin. Because Sakhalin was one of the few industrially-developed regions that had a military infrastructure built during the Japanese occupation, the Soviet Union used Sakhalin Koreans to operate factories and mines. In fact, Igarashi Gozo, a member of the Japanese House of Representatives, pointed out during 1991’s budget committee meeting that after Japan retreated, the Soviets must have needed Sakhalin Koreans to operate paper factories or coal mines, because of a severe labor supply shortage.26 But the Soviet Union didn’t handle the problem of Sakhalin Koreans’ citizenship with great attention. After the end of WWII, the Soviet government took a census and assigned Japanese people in Sakhalin as Japanese, but assigned Koreans as stateless.27 In the Soviet point of view, Koreans were no longer Japanese citizens, because of the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945, the declaration that was issued by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Republic of China and approved by the Soviet Union. This Declaration summarized the terms of surrender of Japan. The most relevant part of the declaration is, “The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.”28 Here, the declaration limited the sovereignty of Japan to its four main islands, stripping Japan of its colonial territories including the Korean peninsula. The Cairo Declaration mentioned above in the Potsdam Decla- ration argued that Korea “in due course shall become free and 174 Yeon Woo Lee

independent.”29 Since Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration in 1945 when it surrendered to the Allies, it gave up its sovereignty over the Korean peninsula. From the Soviet point of view, the Sakhalin Koreans were no longer under Japanese control, hence were not Japanese citizens. Also, according to the 1938 Soviet citizenship law, those who lived in the Soviet Union but did not have a document that proved their relationship with a foreign country were considered as stateless.30 Although the Soviets initially described Koreans as stateless, it changed the policy on September 9, 1948, when North Korea was founded. The Russian government started to recommend Sakhalin Koreans getting citizenships—either Soviet or North Korean.31 According to the interview of Lee Chang-hee with the DongA Ilbo, the Soviet government allowed North Korean ambassadors to try to persuade Sakhalin Koreans into acquiring North Korean citizenships. Although most of the Sakhalin Koreans were from Jeolla-do and Gyeongsang-do, the southern provinces of Ko- rea, “many people became North Korean citizens in the hope that they could even walk back to home when the two Koreas reunify.” This fact that North Korean ambassadors persuaded Sakhalin Koreans to get North Korean citizenships was also confirmed by researcher Jung Nam Cho, who collected extensive information about North Korea’s political activity in Sakhalin.32 According to the Soviet census, by 1957, 6,891 were North Korean citizens, which amounts to 22.8% among 30,183 Sakhalin Koreans. Also by 1959, 12,352 were North Korean citizens, which was 22% among 42,337 Sakhalin Koreas.33 Over the two years, Sakhalin Koreans with North Korean citizenship almost doubled. The unusual aspect of this citizenship policy was that Sakhalin Koreans were allowed to get North Korean citizenship in the Soviet Union. The Russian government not only opened up its citizenship to the Sakhalin Koreans but also another regime’s. It allowed North Korea to persuade Sakhalin Koreans into acquiring another citizenship, when most of them weren’t even from North Korean regions. THE CONCORD REVIEW 175 Perhaps this policy aimed at wiping out potential troubles related to Sakhalin Koreans by making them either Soviet or North Korean citizens. North Korea and the Soviet Union were close in the 1940s. The Soviets looked after newly-founded North Korea as a fellow Communist nation. North Korea, in turn, aided the Soviet Union in various ways. A good example that shows North Korea and the Soviet Union’s close relationship is when North Korea dispatched more than 20,000 laborers to Sakhalin from 1946 to 1947. The Soviet Union needed a large number of laborers to restore the economy in Sakhalin and requested the North Korean Supreme People’s Assembly to send aid workers. Kim Il-sung, the North Korean ruler of the time, recruited young workers and sent them with family to Sakhalin, even though North Korea was also short of labor supply.34 Considering the fact that North Korea and the Soviet Union maintained this favorable relationship and that the Soviets and South Korea established diplomatic relationships much later on June 4, 1990 during the détente, the Soviet Union’s policy on Sakhalin Korean citizenship seems to have been aimed at quell- ing any potential problem with the Sakhalin Koreans. By making them either the citizens of the Soviet Union or of North Korea, the Soviet government exerted its power over the Sakhalin Koreans. George Ginsburg, a Soviet law expert, also supports this analysis. He interpreted that the Soviet Union recorded Sakhalin Koreans as North Korean nationals to “internalize” the problem by reducing it to a private matter between the Soviet Union and North Korea.35 In short, the Soviets made the problem domestic by making Sakhalin Koreans their citizens or those of North Korea. While trying to “internalize” the problem of the Sakhalin Koreans, the Soviet government was quick to quell any events that seemed potentially harmful to stability in Sakhalin. One illustrative example would be the Choson Communist Party movement (Choson refers to Korea). Founded secretly in 1950 by Choson People’s Academy’s educators Shin Jung-woo, Kim Young-gab, and Shin Bo-gyun, the Choson Communist Party set up its manifesto saying, “Sakhalin Koreans were slaves under the 176 Yeon Woo Lee

Japanese Empire and are beggars under the Soviet Communist system. The only way to escape this abject poverty is by returning to our home country.” The party’s existence was reported to the Ministry of State Security (MGB), which regarded the party as illegal and potentially disruptive. MGB arrested Shin Jung-woo at the Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk train station in August 1950 and other founding members subsequently. December 1950’s court convicted all of the arrested members for violating the Article 58 of the Criminal Law and imprisoned them in a gulag for six years. The inference from this incident is that Soviet policy for the Sakhalin Koreans aimed at suppressing any potential cause of trouble. The goal of the Choson Communist Party was returning to their the home country: “Sakhalin Koreans should return to Korea; the Soviets should acknowledge Koreans’ free will; and the specific course of action of return should be decided by the Sakhalin Koreans,” its declaration said. The Soviet government interpreted this declaration as implying more than a desire to return to Korea. The fact that the party was established by educated Koreans as well as that it wasn’t an authorized party might also have contributed to the Soviet government’s suspicion and antagonism to this party. In fact, during the 1950s, Sakhalin Ko- reans were often arrested for attempting to cross the Soviet-North Korea borders to visit their hometowns. The idea of a group of Koreans aspiring for returning to home must have been deemed “radical” by the Soviet government.36 In short, the Soviet government seemed to have focused most on preventing potential problems with the Sakhalin Koreans by persuading them to be either Soviet or North Korean citizens and by nipping collective movements in the bud.

Japan Although Japan caused most of the Sakhalin Koreans to end up in Sakhalin, the Japanese government played a passive role in returning Sakhalin Koreans to their hometowns. The following analysis of the Japanese government’s policies shows that THE CONCORD REVIEW 177 Japan does not want to take the full responsibility for the Sakhalin Korean problem. The Japanese government quickly withdrew all Japanese people from Sakhalin after its surrender in 1945. By the US-USSR Provisional Agreement on November 27, 1946, 292,590 Japanese people returned to Japan from December 5 to July 22, 1949. Be- cause this agreement was applicable only to Japanese prisoners of war and civilians, Koreans in Sakhalin couldn’t return either to Japan or Korea.37 During this time, Japan did not have diplomatic rights and were under the military administration of the Allies, so taking care of the Sakhalin Koreans wasn’t under Japan’s direct control. However, the Japanese government strongly demanded the return of Japanese people to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) while it didn’t argue on behalf of the Sakhalin Koreans. All the remaining Sakhalin Japanese returned home by the Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration of October 19, 1956. At this time, 1,541 Koreans who were married to Japanese people also moved to Japan. The return of these few Koreans was allowed under the new Japanese law that stated, “Koreans who are accompanied by Japanese spouses and who have lived in Sakhalin before the end of the war are applicable to the civil law code 126-2-6 and are allowed to land on Japan.”38 766 Japanese people returned to Japan, and 1,541 Korean husbands and their children also moved to Japan through this law. Only a few Japanese people who the Soviet government deemed to possess valuable skills were detained in Sakhalin by the end of 1957, whereas most of the Koreans were left on the island.39 What has been the Japanese government’s stance on the Sakhalin Koreans after most of its people returned to Japan? The Japanese government’s attitude can be viewed from the Japanese court’s 1976 statement. Eom Su-gab, a Korean living in the Sakha- lin port city of Korsakov, and four other Sakhalin Koreans sued the Japanese government in December 1975 at the High Court in Tokyo. The plaintiffs argued that the Japanese government had the 178 Yeon Woo Lee

responsibility of returning the four accusers to their hometowns. Starting in January 1976, the trial continued for 30 sessions.40 The case was eventually dismissed, however. The Tokyo High Court ruled that: A. because Japan gave up its dominion over its colonies by the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the Sakhalin Koreans had lost Japanese citizenship, hence weren’t allowed to appeal to the Japanese judiciary, and B. because the problem was a matter for the administration, not the judiciary, it was thus not appropriate for the Japanese court to handle.41 The Japanese court’s final statement shows that the government’s stance relies on the San Francisco Peace Treaty that deprived Imperial Japan of all its colonies. The court decided that a loss of sovereignty over a region means the loss of the sovereignty over the regional people. Since Japan gave up southern Sakhalin, Sakhalin Koreans automatically lost their Japanese citizenship. Japan actually decided the problem of its colonial people’s citizenship within its law. Nine days before the San Francisco treaty went into effect, the Japanese Ministry of Justice distributed Civil Case number 438 to the ministers of the central and local courts. The civil case stated, “Koreans, Taiwanese, and Japanese who were excluded from the Japanese family register by marrying or being adopted by Koreans or Taiwanese lose Japanese citizenship.”42 Fur- thermore, the Japanese Supreme Court ruled this administrative policy constitutional in 1961.43 With the San Francisco Treaty and Civil Case 438 as shields, the Japanese government has argued that it does not have complete responsibility for the Sakhalin Korans. The fact that Japanese government was unwilling to take full responsibility for the Sakhalin Koreans can also be seen from the late 1980s’ Japan-South Korea-USSR negotiation. In 1965, Sojee Heo, a Sakhalin Korean from Korsakov, negotiated with the Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk police and argued that the Soviets should send him to Japan. He finally received a reply from the Russian government that: “If Japan permits entrance, the Soviet Union permits departure. Contact Japanese Embassy in USSR to get Japan’s official stance,” on January 4. The reply was THE CONCORD REVIEW 179 announced to be applicable to every Sakhalin Korean, and many applied for departure to Tokyo. Until June 1996, 1,576 applied for permanent residence in Japan, and 5,348 for permanent residence in Korea—a total of 6,924 people. The Soviet government submitted the roster to Japan in August 1969.44 The Japanese government answered, “If the Korean government is willing to pay all the expense of sending Sakhalin Koreans who wish permanent residence in Korea, the Japanese government is willing to negotiate with the Soviet government” and notified this policy to the Korean government. This policy was confirmed in Japan when Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei answered the question of House of Representatives member Funa Tanaka about the Sakhalin Koreans on July 12, 1972.45 In the above policy, Japan focused mainly on the issue of money—that the Korean government should pay for the Sakhalin Koreans who want to live in Korea and that Japanese government pays for the Sakhalin Koreans who want to live in Japan. The issue is more of who holds the responsibility of the Sakhalin Korean problem than of the money. The interpretation of Japan’s stance is that although Japan holds some responsibility for returning Sakhalin Koreans to their home towns, it was unwilling to take the full responsibility, probably because Sakhalin Koreans were no longer Japanese citizens and/or because the Japanese government was negotiating with the USSR in South Korea’s stead. (South Korea didn’t establish diplomatic relation with the Soviet Union until June 4, 1990.) The Korean government refused to pay the expense, on the grounds that Japan had the full responsibility for the Sakhalin Koreans.46 After the negotiation with South Korea ended up in nothing, the Japanese government changed its stance in August 1975. It issued 2,000 voyage certificates that allowed Sakhalin Koreans to land in Japan. Also, the Japanese Embassy in the USSR issued voyage applications to Sakhalin Koreans who brought necessary documents, including a statement of purpose, three identification pictures, and an invitation letter from a guardian. As a result, 35 people received voyage certificates and entry permits to Japan 180 Yeon Woo Lee and 376 people received entry permits to South Korea. But only 2 people—Kim Hwa-chun from Chekhovo and Jang Jeon-du from Dolinsk—left to Japan, and one person, Choi Jung-sik, could return to South Korea, while rest of the certificate recipient weren’t allowed to leave by the Soviet Union.47 Based on Japan’s treatment of its people and the 1960s’ negotiation process, the Japanese government’s stance on the Sakhalin Korean problem can be summarized as “we take some responsibility for the Sakhalin Korean problem, but only partially.”

North Korea North Korea maintained a favorable relationship with the Soviet Union from its foundation. According to the General Headquarters (GHQ) report on November 7, 1947, the Soviet Union transferred some North Koreans to fill the labor vacancy when Japanese people left Sakhalin. Also, as mentioned above, Kim Il-sung, the North Korean president of the time, agreed to the Soviets’ request for back-up laborers and sent North Koreans to Sakhalin from 1946 to 1947, even though North Korea was also suffering from short labor supply.48 The North Korean government’s policy toward the Sakhalin Koreans has been consistent. It tried to make Sakhalin Koreans acquire North Korean citizenships or hinder Sakhalin Koreans from being sent back to Japan or South Korea. The basic stance was that Sakhalin Koreans were all potential North Korean citizens. North Korea’s project to have Sakhalin Koreans obtain North Korean citizenship started from 1958, when the chief ambassador of Choson Embassy in Nakhodka, USSR, started to engage in Sakhalin Koreans’ daily life. According to many interviews with Sakhalin Koreans who permanently settled in South Korea, many of them didn’t acquire Soviet or North Korean citizenship at first in the hope that returning to their home town might one day come true. But when some Koreans with Japanese spouses returned to Japan from 1957 to 1959, many Sakhalin Koreans started to hope again that this time, they might be allowed to return home.49 Under THE CONCORD REVIEW 181 these circumstances, the ambassador started to contact Sakhalin Koreans—both the people who were forcefully sent to Sakhalin during the Japanese colonization and the people who were sent by the North Korean government as aid workers. It can be inferred from the campaigns that the goal of the North Korean ambassadors was first to encourage Sakhalin Koreans to acquire North Korean citizenship and then to send them to North Korea. First, based on North Korea’s Communist philosophy, the ambassador persuaded Sakhalin Koreans that becoming North Korean eventually meant returning to South Korea: My friends, your mother nation is Choson (Choson is what North Korean people call their country). The division of Korean peninsula is temporary, and it will soon be reunified. According to our constitution, the capital of the republic is Seoul. Reunification is only a matter of time, and the burden of constructing a Communist nation in the southern part of Korea lies on you, because you, my friends, came from South Korea. My fellow friends, you are living in the prosper- ous nation of the Soviet Union, so you should learn everything from your Soviet fellows and should work as pioneers in every field. I can understand that you are worried about your families in South Korea. You will definitely meet them when the countries reunify. Remember that you are the proud citizens of Choson, and I would like to help you do the remarkable works.50 Considering the fact that most of the Sakhalin Koreans were from Jeolla-do and Gyeongsang-do, the southern provinces of Korea, this speech might have persuaded them effectively. They might have believed that although their home town was in South Korea, becoming North Korean might help them returning to their home towns if the peninsula would reunify soon, as the ambassador contended. Also, because North Korea was a fellow Communist country of the Soviet Union, while South Korea was an enemy nation, Sakhalin Koreans might have thought that North Korean citizens would be given priority in returning to their home town.51 According to the Soviet census, by 1959, 12,352 acquired North Korean citizenships, which was 22% among 42,337 Sakhalin Koreans.52 The second goal of the North Korean ambassadors seemed to have been sending Sakhalin Koreans with North Korean citizen- 182 Yeon Woo Lee ships to North Korea. Under the Nakhodka ambassador’s guidance, Sakhalin Koreans with North Korean citizenships studied about North Korea for 2 to 3 hours a week. In conjunction with the Choson People’s Academy, they studied about North Korean government, the Workers’ Party of Korea, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and current issues in North Korea. This comprehensive study seemed to have ben planned as a preliminary project for inculcating North Korean ideology into Sakhalin Koreans to fit the ideological taste of the North Korean government. After this comprehensive study, some Sakhalin Koreans moved/were sent to North Korea between 1959 and 1961, including graduates of the Choson People’s Academy who matriculated to North Korean universities.53 Besides persuading Sakhalin Koreans, North Korea also implemented indirect policies to send Sakhalin Koreans to North Korea. The indirect policies focused on making Sakhalin Koreans discontented by segregating them from mainstream Soviet society and make them want to move from Sakhalin to North Korea. In 1970, the ambassador visited Leonid Brezhnev, the General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, and requested that the Soviets “gather North Korean citizens in Sakhalin into one place for communal living and exclude North Korean citizens from receiving the advanced labor-technician recognition.” The advanced labor-technician recognition referred to the honors given during November 7’s Great October Socialist Revolution Day and May 1’s International Labor Day, when factories recognized workers of superior skills with certificates and prize money.54 This policy aimed at segregating Sakhalin Koreans with North Korean citizenship from the rest of Soviet society. The advanced labor-technician recognition was not a simple paper of certificate. The recognitions boosted the chance of becoming first or secondary managers in factories. They also helped recipients’ children get into the Communist Youth League and be employed.55 In response to the ambassador’s request, Brezhnev strongly objected to gathering Sakhalin Koreans with North Korean citizenship into one place, but agreed to excluding Sakhalin Koreans THE CONCORD REVIEW 183 from receiving the advanced labor-technician recognitions. From then on, Sakhalin Koreans with North Korean citizenships actually were discriminated against in work places. Sakhalin Koreans who permanently returned to South Korea said that the pictures of Sakhalin Korean advanced labor-technicians disappeared on the boards in factories and that no Sakhalin Koreans received the recognition.56 Why did North Korea want Sakhalin Koreans? The reason seems to lie in the acute labor shortage in North Korea. Accord- ing to the Sakhalin National Library, there were 23,498 Sakhalin Koreans by July of 1946 and 42,337 Sakhalin Koreas by 1959.57 This large number of Koreans in Sakhalin would have been a welcomed labor supply for North Korea, although sufficient ideological education would have been required. A further analysis of the North Korean citizenship law also supports the above inference that the North Korean government deemed Sakhalin Koreans a potential labor supply. On October 9, 1963, the North Korean regime enacted the legislation of citizenship law. It declared that the citizens of North Korea were: 1) those who had Korean citizenship before the establishment of North Korea and had retained it up to the day of publication of the 1963 statute, and their children; and, 2) foreigners who acquired the citizenship of North Korea in accordance with legal procedure.58 The line between “who had Korean citizenship before the establishment of North Korea” and who had not is fuzzy. Until August 15, 1945, when the Korean peninsula was liberated from the Japanese Empire, all Koreans were considered subjects of the Emperor of Japan. After the liberation, Japan gave up all rights on its colonies. Therefore, people who lived at the northern part of Korea became North Koreans when the DPRK was established in September, 1948 and those who lived at the southern part of Korea became South Koreans when the Republic of Korea was established in August, 1948. Thus any Koreans—whether North Koreans or South Koreans—are “those who had Korean citizenship before the establishment of North Korea.” In addition, the Koreans who remained in foreign countries, including Sakhalin, 184 Yeon Woo Lee

could also be seen as having had Korean citizenship before the establishment of North Korea. DPRK’s citizenship law demonstrates that North Korea included all Koreans in and out of the Korean peninsula as potential citizens of North Korea. However, it should be remembered that although this citizenship law allows some room for the inference that North Korea deemed Sakhalin Koreans as potential citizens, the official stance of the North Ko- rean government on this issue is not announced. The active effort of the North Korean ambassador seemed effective—some of the Sakhalin Koreans moved to North Korea as university students or workers. However, in the mid 1970s, the Japanese government started to engage in the problem of Sakhalin Koreans. Tanaka Kakuei, the prime minister of Japan, requested Leonid Brezhnev, the leader of the USSR, to facilitate the process of returning Sakhalin Koreans to their hometowns, during the Japan-USSR summit meeting on October 7, 1973.59 North Korea expressed strong opposition to sending Sakhalin Koreans to South Korea from the Japan-USSR the summit meeting, as shown in Rodong Sinmun, the national newspaper of North Korea: The problem of Sakhalin Koreans should be handled by the DPRK. Japan does not have any right or qualification to engage in the problem of Sakhalin Koreans. The machination of the Japanese government to send Sakhalin Koreans to South Choson reflects Japan’s antagonism toward DPRK. This kind of political conspiracy is not more than a wild delusion.60 (South Choson is the North Korean way of referring to South Korea.) The strong opposition of North Korea put the Soviet Union in an awkward position. For the Soviets, North Korea was an ally nation and the Soviet Union didn’t even have a diplomatic relationship with South Korea. Therefore, when the Japanese Ministry of For- eign Affairs requested a conference on specific policies regarding the Sakhalin Koreans in December 1973, the Soviets stepped back and answered, “This is not a problem to be discussed between Japan and the Soviet Union.” Also in foreign minister discussions in 1975 and 1976 between Japan’s Kichi Miyazawa and the Soviet Union’s Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet stance on the Sakhalin Ko- rean problem didn’t change.61 THE CONCORD REVIEW 185 However, North Korea soon found that it was losing its superiority over the Sakhalin Korean problem in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The Soviet Union itself started to change dramatically, during the détente. Some Sakhalin Koreans also started to visit South Korea—in 1988, 15 Sakhalin Koreans visited South Korea via Japan, and in October 1988, Japan legislated a policy that allowed Sakhalin Koreans to stay in Japan up to one year. Since Sakhalin Koreans could renew their license for residence continuously, they technically could stay permanently in Japan.62 With these breakthroughs, North Korea soon became indifferent and less responsive to the Sakhalin Koran problem. Although North Korea tried hard to either move Sakha- lin Koreans to North Korea or stop them from moving to South Korea, North Korea remains indifferent to the Sakhalin Korean problem now.

South Korea After the end of WWII and the liberation of the Korean peninsula in 1945, the Korean peninsula underwent dramatic political and social change. Busy taking care of the problems inside the Korean peninsula, the South Korean government didn’t give enough attention to the Sakhalin Koreans. The first time the South Korean government was officially informed of the Sakhalin Korean problem was in October 1947—it wasn’t the Korean Provisional government officials but the General Headquarters (GHQ) that thoroughly inspected the Sakhalin Korean problem. The GHQ discussed the problem of Koreans who were left in Sakhalin and asked for the official stance of the South Korean government. During that time, the Korean peninsula was divided by the 38° North, the northern part under the rule of the Soviet Civil Authority and the southern part under the United States. Because most of the Sakhalin Korean were from the southern provinces, the U.S. government of South Korea or the Provisional government should have accepted them if they returned to their home towns. However, South Korea had already accepted approximately 1,500,000 people who returned 186 Yeon Woo Lee

from Japan. To compound the situation, food and housing supplies were extremely short, even with the help from international relief organizations.63 The South Korean government didn’t do much to help the Sakhalin Koreans. The South Korean government didn’t have direct contact with either the Soviet Union or Japan—the only way to discuss the Sakhalin Korean problem was through the GHQ. Although bringing Sakhalin Koreans back to Korea was an understandably difficult quest, South Korea neglected the thousands of Sakhalin Koreans after the end of war as shown above. The process to help Sakhalin Koreans return to their home towns started a few years after the diplomatic relationship between South Korea and Japan was established in June 1965. The South Korean government demanded that the Japanese government take responsibility for returning Sakhalin Koreans to their home towns. In response, the Japanese government said that it was willing to negotiate with the Soviet government on the Sakhalin Korean issue if the Korean government funded some of the expense for the return of the people. This stance is similar to Japan’s response in 1969, which stated that “If the Korean government is willing to pay all the expense of sending Sakhalin Koreans who wish permanent residence in Korea, the Japanese government is willing to negotiate with the Soviet government.”64 However, the Korean government refused to pay the money, stating that Japan had the full responsibility to take care of the Sakhalin Koreans for three reasons: first, the Sakhalin Koreans were Japanese citizens during the forced conscription and were detained even after the war that Japan started; second, according to the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea of 1965, Sakhalin Ko- reans who wish to live in Japan should be given equal rights with the Koreans living in Japan; third, the Korean government will accept the Sakhalin Koreans wishing to return to Korea.65 The breakthrough on solving the Sakhalin Korean problem took place in late 1980s, when Japan invited Sakhalin Koreans and their families to Japan for family reunions. In June of 1989, the South Korean legislature’s reunification diplomats officially THE CONCORD REVIEW 187 visited Sakhalin for the first time, making the state of the Sakhalin Koreans exactly known to the South Korean government.66 South Korea allowed 65 Sakhalin Koreans to permanently reside in South Korea if their family members with financial means applied for the Sakhalin Koreans from 1988 to 1991, which re- stricted the homecoming for lots of Sakhalin Koreans. But on July 1, 1992, the South Korean government announced that Sakhalin Koreans with no family in South Korea would be able to return to South Korea. Thus in September 9, 1992, 77 Sakhalin Koreans settled in Chuncheon Sarang House. Also 119 people settled in Gwanglim Senior Nursing Home in March 20, 1993.67 In 1998, the Red Cross of Japan donated 3,200 million yen, which was used to build Sakhalin Korean institutions in Incheon and Ansan and to bring Sakhalin Koreans back to South Korea. Currently, there are apartment complexes built to accommodate Sakhalin Koreans in Gyeongsangnma-do Yangsam, Chungcheongbuk-do Eumseung, Gyeonggi-do Osan, Gyeonggi- do Paju, Chungcheongnam-do Jochiwon, Incheon Community Social Welfare Center, and Ansan Gohyang Village. 3,785 Sakhalin Koreans have returned to South Korea.68

Conclusion During the chaotic aftermath of WWII, the Soviet Union, Japan, North Korea, and South Korea avoided taking responsibility for the Sakhalin Korean problem. Left on an island that legally belonged to no nation, the Sakhalin Koreans lived as stateless people, until North Korea came to include them as North Korean citizens. Sakhalin Koreans who didn’t give up the hope of returning to their home towns negotiated with the Soviet and Japanese governments several times, but their efforts were in vain when the South Korean government refused to cooperate until Japan acknowledged its full responsibility for the problem. Their hope for homecoming finally came true on 1992 with the help of the Japanese and the Korean Red Cross. 188 Yeon Woo Lee

Sakhalin Koreans could return to South Korea 47 years after the end of the war. Based on the analysis provided above, the reason for this delayed return seems to have stemmed from the neglect and lack of willingness of the four nations to take responsibility for the problems they made during the war. The Soviet Union focused most on concealing the Sakhalin Korean problem; Japan, using international treaties and law codes, argued that it didn’t bear the full responsibility; North Korea tried to draw Sakhalin Koreans to its country; and South Korea refused to take care of its citizens until Japan took the initiative. Could all Sakhalin Koreans return to their home towns someday? This question remains to be solved since Red Cross Korea and the South Korean legislature started to budget money to accommodate more Sakhalin Koreans. But the homecoming project should be finished soon—those who moved/were sent to Sakhalin in the 1940s are already in their eighties. The second generation Sakhalin Koreans are much more accustomed to a Rus- sian lifestyle and lead satisfactory lives in Sakhalin. “My children and grandchildren were born in Russia,” said Han Moon-hyeong, a 76-year-old Sakhalin Korean who resides in Seoul now, “They use Russian everyday at workplace and school, and they are treated equally as Russian citizens there. They have no reason to come here to Korea.” Sakhalin Koreans’ homecoming will soon be an anachronism. THE CONCORD REVIEW 189

1 Yeonsoo Kim, “The History of Sakhalin Koreans,” Prospect (1990) p. 42 2 Sun Hyung Lee, Sakhalin Returnees (Seoul: Seoul University Publications, 2002) p. 44 3 Jonghuk Choi, Studies on Quality Evaluation (Seoul: Cheongmok Publishing, 2002) p. 379 4 Lee, p. 22 5 Ibid., p. 44 6 Ibid., p. 3 7 Kim, p. 43 8 Korea University Asian Studies Department, Sakhalin Korean Questions and Japanese Politics (Seoul: Korean University Publication, 1994) pp. 45-46 9 Jung Nam Cho, “North Korea’s Policy on Sakhalin Koreans,” Korean Studies 8 ((2001) p. 187 10 Tokyo University professor Onuma Yasuyaki estimated that about 32,000 Koreans were drafted to Sakhalin. Onuma Yasuyaki, Abandoned Sakhalin Koreans (Tokyo: Chokoron- Shimsha, 1992) 11 Mita Hideyaki, Forty Years of Nostalgia (Seoul: Sungjeong Publishing, 1983) p. 51 12 Ibid., p. 51 13 Kim, p. 42 14 Ibid, p. 45 15 Hyang-ju Park, Report from Sakhalin—The History and Thoughts of the Choson People (Tokyo: Ochanomizu Shobo, 1998) p. 72 16 Japanese Lawyer Association, “Japanese Government Has the Responsibility: A Report,” Prospect 4 (1990) p. 139 17 Seokwoo Lee, Towards a Framework for the Resolution of the Territorial Dispute over the Kurile Islands (Durham: International Boundaries Research Unit, 2001) p. 4 18 Kimie Hara, Cold War Frontiers in the Asia-Pacific Region: Divided Territories in the San Francisco System (London: Taylor & Francis, 2007) p. 13 19 Gilbert Rozman, Japan and Russia, the Tortuous Path to Normalization, 1949-1999 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000) p. 43 20 Ibid., p. 43 21 Ibid., p. 43 22 James E. Goodby et al. “Northern Territories' and Beyond: Russian, Japanese, and American Prespectives (Santa Barbara, Calfiornia: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1995) pp. xxii-xxiii 190 Yeon Woo Lee

23 American Society of International Law, The American Journal of International Law XLVI (Washington, DC: American Society of International Law, 1952) p. 96 24 Jae-sik Bae, “Ways to Protect Human Rights: Questions on Sakhalin Koreans,” Prospect 4 (1990) pp. 115-120 25 Kim, p. 43 26 Taesik Jeon, “Japan Should Take Legal and Political Responsibility,” North Korea Shinmun (Sakhalin, Russia) August 21, 2009, first edition 27 Japanese Lawyer Association, “Japanese Government Has the Responsibility,” p. 141 28 Hara, p. 76 29 Dorothy Perkins, Japan Goes to War: A Chronology of Japanese Military Expansion from the Meiji Era to the Attack on Pearl Harbor, 1868-1941, (Pennsylvania: Diane Publishing, 1997) p. 184 30 Jeon, “Legal and Political Responsibility” 31 Japanese Lawyer Association, pp. 137-141 32 Cho, p. 194 33 Jeon 34 Cho, p. 186 35 Ginsburg, The Citizenship Law of the USSR (Boston: Brill, 1983) p. 319 36 Cho, pp. 187-197 37 Japanese Lawyer Association, p. 139 38 Ibid., p. 139 39 Ibid., p. 139 40 Hisaya Shirai, “State of Sakhalin Koreans,” Prospect 4, 1990, p. 129 41 Shirai, p. 129 42 Japanese Lawyer Association, p. 142 43 Jeong Hwa Oh, Korean Culture Seen From Immigrants’ Culture (Seoul: Ewha Women’s University Publication, 2007) p. 121 44 Japanese Lawyer Association, p. 140 45 Japanese Lawyer Association, p. 140 46 Bae, p. 117 47 Japanese Lawyer Association, p. 140 48 Cho, p. 186 49 Ingeun Hong, “Soviet Sailor Says Sakhalin Koreans Took North Korean Citizenship,” DongA Ilbo (Seoul) May 14, 1979 50 Park, p. 58 51 Cho, p. 186 THE CONCORD REVIEW 191

52 Jeon 53 Park, p. 62 54 Ibid., p. 190 55 Ibid., p. 178 56 Ibid., p. 190 57 Jeon 58 Ginsburg, p. 319 59 Korea University Asian Studies Department, pp. 45-46 60 Tsunoda Husako, The Island of Grief (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 1994) pp. 53-54 61 Ibid., p. 84 62 Jonghuk Choi, Studies on Quality Evaluation (Seoul: Cheongmok Publishing, 2002) p. 389 63 Bae, p. 120 64 Japanese Lawyer Association, p. 140 65 Bae, p. 120 66 Choi, p. 389 67 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Press Release: Sakhalin Korean Aid Project” October 29, 2008 68 Choi, p. 389 69 Interview with Han Moon-hyeong at his house in Gangseo-gu, Seoul, South Korea

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Husaka, Tsunoda, The Island of Grief Tokyo: Shinchosha, 1994

Japanese Lawyer Association, “Japanese Government Has the Responsibility: A Report,” Prospect 4, 1990

Jeon, Taesik, “Japan Should Take Legal and Political Responsibility” New Korean Shinmun Sakhalin, Russia: August 21, 2009, first edition

Kang, Jung-ha, “Korea-USSR-Japan Negotiations on Sakhalin Koreans” PhD thesis, Chuncheon University, Chucheon, 2001

Kim, Yeonsoo, “The History of Sakhalin Koreans,” Prospect 4, 1990

Korea University Asian Studies Department, Sakhalin Korean Questions and Japanese Policies Seoul: Korean University Publications, 1994

Lee, Seokwoo, Shelagh Furness, Clive H. Schofield, and Internatinal Boundaries Research Unit, Towards a Framework for the Resolution of the Territorial Dispute over the Kurile Islands Durham: International Boundaries Research Unit, 2001 THE CONCORD REVIEW 193

Lee, Sun Hyung, Sakhalin Returnees Seoul: Seoul University Publication, 2004

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Press Release: Sakhalin Korean Aid Project,” October 29, 2008

Oh, Jeong Hwa, Korean Culture Seen From Immigrants’ Culture, Seoul: Ewha Women’s University Publication, 2007

Park, Hyang-ju, Report from Sakhalin—The History and Thoughts of the Choson People Tokyo: Ochanomizu Shobo, 1998

Perkins, Dorothy, Japan Goes to War: A Chronology of Japanese Military Expansion from the Meiji Era to the Attack on Pearl Harbor, 1868-1941, Pennsylvania: Diane Publishing, 1997

Rosman, Gilbert, Japan and Russia: the Tortuous Path to Normalization, 1949-1999 New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000

Shirai, Hisaya, “State of Sakhalin Koreans,” Prospect 4, 1990

Yasuyaki, Onuma, Abandoned Sakhalin Koreans Tokyo: Chuokoron-Shinsha, 1992

194 Yeon Woo Lee

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FROM FOURTEEN TO FOUR: EVALUATING THE INFLUENCE OF WOODROW WILSON’S FOURTEEN POINTS ON THE 1919 MAY FOURTH MOVEMENT IN CHINA

“The May Fourth Movement of 1919 was an epochal event in modern Chinese history. It marked the beginning of China’s modern revolutionary era, and a new stage after the Republican Revolution of 1911. It was both anti-imperialist and anti-warlord, and represented the reaction of the Chinese people to the turbulent new forces un- leashed by the First World War.”1 Joseph T. Chen, 1970

Caroline W. Tan Introduction

In the early 1900s, China was on its back. A series of military defeats and unequal treaties at the hands of Western nations and Japan left the once militarily powerful “Middle Kingdom” with the status of a minority nation. Not technically a colony or a protectorate, it could exercise no control over international trade coming through its ports or any of its territories that imperial powers such as Japan, Germany, and France wanted to seize. However, once heavily exposed to the intoxicating rhetoric of “self-determination” and “autonomy” of U.S. President Woodrow Wilson during World War I and its aftermath, China was determined to free itself from the shackles of imperial influence. At the Paris Peace Conference, when it became clear that the terms of the Versailles Treaty (a document that left few satisfied) would

Caroline W. Tan is at Yale. She is a graduate of Lynbrook High School in San Jose, California, where she wrote this paper for Mr. Kyle Howden’s AP United States History course in the 2009/2010 academic year. 196 Caroline W. Tan allow for no such thing, China’s disappointment led to action. If the nation could not wait for the Big Three to grant it back its independence, it would seize it for itself, a determination that would culminate in the May Fourth Movement. The 1919 May Fourth Movement was a cultural phenomenon that culminated in a mass, student-led demonstration held at Tiananmen Square in Beijing, China, soon after the ratification of the Versailles Peace Treaty. Thousands of university students and a sizable portion of the intellectual population denounced the incumbent Chinese government and the terms of the Versailles Treaty, calling instead for the establishment of self-determination in the region and for increased political power for the people. Leaders of the Movement hoped that Western ideals of democracy and individual freedom would eventually supersede traditional Confucian principles of hierarchy and familial order, achieving a change in political, social, and intellectual thought. The May Fourth Movement gradually westernized the Chinese political system, encompassing not only the historic student demonstration that took place on May 4, 1919, but also the literary revolution, merchants’ and workers’ strikes, the boycott against Japan, and a series of political and social activities headed by Chinese intellectuals.2 It spearheaded a revolutionary fervor for cultural change and an autonomous Chinese nation that transformed the nature of the Chinese government.3 Despite its age, the May Fourth Movement continues to hold both historical and political significance, as it was one of the most influential mass demonstrations of the 20th century and helped the concept of self-determination to reverberate around the world. Through a detailed analysis of the historical context surrounding the May Fourth Movement as well as its relationship to President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, a proposal that advocated for the principle of self-determination, this paper seeks to evaluate the influence that Wilson’s Fourteen Points had on the historic Movement, keeping in consideration the diplomatic exchanges between China, the United States, Europe, and Japan. Such diplomatic exchanges helped establish important precedents THE CONCORD REVIEW 197 for China’s political and economic relationship to the world and its reaction to Woodrow Wilson’s historic proposal. This paper will argue that foreign competition over access to Chinese markets, European and Japanese imperialism, and staunch American propaganda inextricably attached the Chinese populace to Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points. When the self-determination proposal codified within the Fourteen Points would, despite heavy enthusiasm, fail to materialize, the Chinese population’s disappointment would eventually manifest itself in the historic demonstration known as the May Fourth Movement.

The Fourteen Points “What we seek is the reign of law, based upon the consent of the governed and sustained by the organized opinion of mankind.”4 President Woodrow Wilson, 1918

On January 8, 1918, United States President Woodrow Wilson entered the Capitol Building in Washington DC, where he would deliver his historic “Fourteen Points” speech to a joint ses- sion of Congress and thus outline his vision for the postwar world,5 one with an established set of principles that would foster international peace and guide future global interactions.6 Addressing the 65th Congress, Wilson opened by saying that “we entered this war because violations of right had occurred which touched us to the quick and made the life of our own people impossible unless they were corrected and the world secured once for all against their recurrence.”7 Wilson then continued to enumerate the fourteen principles which he believed would deliver such an outcome, advocating for, among other things, open diplomacy, freedom of the seas, reduction of armaments, removal of economic barriers, and territorial sovereignty in various European nations.8 His Four- teen Points went further, as Wilson also proposed establishing an international organization “for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike,”9 which would manifest itself as the League of Nations. Yet regardless of the many significant and 198 Caroline W. Tan

historic suggestions offered in Wilson’s Fourteen Points, the most influential principle outlined in the speech was undoubtedly the principle of self-determination, a concept that would allow the population of various nations to determine the political future of their state without external coercion or pressure and thus was heavily supported in various platforms based on his proposal. What made the self-determination principle so notable was that it was introduced in an age of foreign imperialism and economic competition, where the world’s most hegemonic nations continuously exploited the developing ones for economic gains and increased access to lucrative markets,10—a radical viewpoint on the nature of international relations for its time. Point V of Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points stated that: a free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.11 Point V made it clear that the government and people of former colonies should have an equal say in determining the sovereignty of the colony in question, laying down the foundation for self- determination by valuing the opinion and input of the people. President Wilson further elaborates on the idea of self-determination through Points X, XII, and XIII of his Fourteen Points plan. Point X states that, The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity to autonomous development.12 The tenth clause argues that the people of Austria-Hungary should be permitted to take part in the development of their autonomous nation, further contributing to the idea of self-determination by empowering the populace and allowing them to determine the political fate of their own nation. Wilson’s influence in the international sphere was undeniable; his dogged determination to expand self-determination and make the world “safe for democracy”13 became a pivotal platform THE CONCORD REVIEW 199 of the Allied cause during World War I, reinforcing the moral justification for American intervention in the war. Continuously upholding such a policy became a necessity for the Allied powers, whose support from moderates and liberals for the war depended on the moral justifications for the Allied powers’ initial entry.14 When British Prime Minister Lloyd George feared that the “Allied position [was] in danger of fraying both at home and abroad… [he] decided to make a declaration of war aims that would regain the diplomatic initiative for the Allies…to rally labor and liberals.”15 George’s declaration declared that the “postwar territorial settlement…must respect ‘the right of self-determination or the consent of the governed,’” using Wilson’s own rhetoric of self- determination and indicating the global support from world leaders for his proposal. The Caxton Hall speech was a fundamental moment in the establishment of self-determination as one of the most distinguished principles of the postwar settlement, reinvigo- rating Wilson’s enthusiasm for the principle. Yet although the enthusiasm Wilson displayed for the concept of self-determination was at first mirrored in a number of colonial territories, that enthusiasm would soon wear away upon evidence that Wilson had never intended for self-determination to apply to non-European nations. Lloyd George himself would later claim in his memoirs that he and Wilson’s “statements supporting the right to self-determination had pertained only to Europe and the non-Turkish portions of the Ottoman Empire.”16 Moreover, Wilson, during his address to Congress where he initially introduced the Fourteen Points, was predominantly referring to the issue in Europe, with little thought of colonized nations elsewhere in the world. Self-determination was, to him, a privilege; if certain groups weren’t sufficiently “modern” or “enlightened,” they could be excluded from the concept for the time being.17 In fact, Woodrow Wilson’s own Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, later wrote that “the principle of self-determination clearly did not apply to “races, peoples, or communities whose state of barbarism or ignorance deprive[s] them of the capacity to choose intelligently their political affiliations.”18 200 Caroline W. Tan

In Wilson’s mind, then, nations he considered not developed enough weren’t entitled to the principle of self-determination that he otherwise so vehemently supported. Among the nations Wilson placed under that category was China, a “barbarous and ignorant”19 nation whose poor image in Wilson’s eyes stemmed from his disparaging attitude towards non-Europeans in general, an attitude born out of his childhood environment. As a Caucasian male born in antebellum Virginia in 1856, Wilson grew up in an environment where Caucasians were seen as superior to other ethnic groups.20 As a result, he tended to harbor a white-supremacist attitude typical of the time period21 and shared assumptions on racial discrimination that he never appeared to have seriously challenged.22 His racially-prejudiced opinion on Chinese development, then, can be understood as a result of his childhood; regardless, it influenced his belief that China, as a “backwards” nation, was incapable of self-government and instead still needed the protection of the United States and other foreign powers. Wilson’s real intentions regarding self-determination, however, weren’t known during his powerful Fourteen Points address. Thus, he still generated enthusiastic support from European and non-European nations alike and stimulated heavy interest in the Paris Peace Conference as delegates from all over the world arrived, anticipating global self-determination. Nations such as China would eagerly attend the conference, expecting to be treated as equals and anticipating the implementation of self-determination, only to be disappointed when Wilson’s prejudice would allow him to compromise the principle in favor of other goals. 23 Yet all of this would occur later; for the time being, Wilson was revered as a crusader for democracy and the global moral authority, enjoying immense popularity around the world. THE CONCORD REVIEW 201

Foreign Affairs “The earth is too small, the portion of it they occupy is too big and rich, and the intercourse of nations is now too intimate, to permit the Chinese keeping China to themselves.”24 British Colonel Francis Younghusband Before going into detail regarding the Fourteen Points and its direct relationship with the May Fourth Movement, it is essential to understand the background history in the international sphere during the 20th Century, as such history eventually set the stage for many of the events which would later transpire and lead to the May Fourth Revolution. Although China was, in theory, an autonomous kingdom, its military vulnerability forced itself to abdicate much. It was no protectorate like the British Empire’s India, but it was just as much as a crown jewel to be divided and quartered, more subtly, by imperial powers. We will examine this loss of autonomy and China’s status as a pawn in an international game for control over Asian economic markets through three spheres: diplomatic relations between China and the United States, between China and Europe, and between China and Japan.

A. China-US Relations Diplomatic relations between China and the United States were characterized primarily by the US desire to access Chinese and other international markets, a goal that served as the driving force behind most U.S. foreign policy initiatives at the time. In 1899, U.S. Secretary of State John Hayes dispatched a note, known as the Open Door Note, to the major powers at the time (France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Japan, and Russia), asking all nations to recognize equal trading rights and to uphold Chinese territorial integrity. He wrote that: First…[interested powers] will in no way interfere with any treaty port or any vested interest within any so-called ‘spheres of interest’ or leased territory it may have in China. Second. That the Chinese treaty tariff of the time being shall apply to all merchandise landed or shipped to all such ports… 202 Caroline W. Tan

[and] Third. That it will levy no higher harbor dues on vessels of another nationality…than shall be levied on vessels of its own nationality, and no higher railroad charges over lines built ..than shall be levied on similar merchandise belong to its own nationals…25 The note established an “open door” policy in China, essentially giving all countries involved an equal claim to economic advantages in China and mitigating the power of nations that had already established spheres of influence in the area. The United States’ motive for proposing the Open Door Policy was clear: it wanted to prevent losing lucrative trading relationships with the Chinese populace.26 At the time of the Open Door Note, although extensively involved in trade with China, the U.S. failed to hold any spheres of influences there. Therefore, if other countries decided to partition China, the U.S. would likely have little trading influence and risk losing its economic advantage in the region.27 Establishing equal trading rights in the area would continue to ensure U.S. trade and its ability to access Asian markets for economic gain, protecting both American businessmen and investors from economic liabilities. This policy, however, subjugated China for the benefit of imperial nations, a treatment that would later explain the strength of the Chinese people’s resolve for independence and freedom from imperialist control after the disappointment suffered from the Paris Peace Conference. Another aspect of the relationship between China and the United States had further political implications, namely the American propaganda that widely pervaded Chinese media. Dur- ing the final months of World War I, President Woodrow Wilson established the Committee on Public Information (CPI), an organization whose purpose was to increase support for American involvement the war through various propaganda tactics.28 The committee initially concentrated its efforts in the United States; however, after the U.S. minister to Beijing, Paul S. Reinsch, complained to Washington that “all the news about the United States was coming to China through the British agency Reuters … [whose] reporting…did not sufficiently highlight the President’s vision for the postwar world,” the American government established a CPI branch in China as well, appointing former muckraking journalist THE CONCORD REVIEW 203 Carl Crow to lead the effort as the Committee’s Chairperson.29 Rather than setting up a Chinese-language paper to publicize American war news, Crow decided to “translate American news dispatches and offer them to the Chinese press. [By] charging a nominal fee for the service…[he] would help present [the transla- tions] as ‘real’ news rather than propaganda.” 30 The results were immediate. Crow boasted, American news…now predominates in the Chinese papers … [and] is now supplying the bulk of foreign news and comment published in the Chinese press.31 With the help of Carl Crow and the CPI, 700 new periodicals were created between 1915 and 1923, indicating the widespread and far-reaching control that the CPI had on the Chinese press.32 By dominating the major trusted news agencies in China, such as the Zhong-Mei News Agency, Crow could incorporate American ideals of self-determination and autonomy into Chinese war news and thus successfully disseminate the ideals stated in Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points. However, these ideals were not meant to inspire the Chinese to yearn for their own self-determined independence from Western empires. Wilson and Crow were simply employing the propaganda to muster support for the Allied cause. Nonetheless, their convincing, widely-proliferated “news stories” had unintended consequences and helped set the stage for the later mass demonstration. Moreover, new inventions that vastly facilitated global communication systems helped deliver Wilson’s increasingly powerful rhetoric to audiences around the world in record time. The telegraph, first popularly used in Europe and North America in the 1840s, began to spread to other areas around the world. In China during the 1860s, following European influence in the area as the Qing dynasty began to collapse, telegraph lines flourished,33 enormously decreasing the amount of time it took for information to travel across continents and oceans. News that previously would have taken weeks, even months, to travel from one continent to another could now arrive in a matter of hours.34 Easier dissemination of news made Crow’s propaganda efforts 204 Caroline W. Tan

more fruitful, as publicizing excerpts from Wilson’s speeches or distributing ideas from his vision for the postwar world occurred more quickly and reached far more people. Crow’s efforts with newspaper agencies were clearly seen as the Chinese press often published President Wilson’s most important speeches, often verbatim, and a dominant Shanghai daily newspaper reproduced a translated, full-text version of Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points,35 exciting Chinese intellectuals who made up the bulk of the literate population and were particularly pleased with the prospect of self-determination. Hollington K. Tong, a venerated Chinese journalist, extolled Wilson as, a wonderful man, [with] a firm grasp of the world situation and [the knowledge on] exactly how to deal with it. That is why he is to-day heading the movement to make the world safe for democracy…he is spiritual, fair-minded, and firm in his determination.36 Crow’s efforts were not, however, limited to control of newspaper agencies and telegraph operations. With the help of the CPI, Crow also requested approximately twenty thousand large photographs of Wilson to display in various institutions, and distributed a variety of buttons and engravings with Wilson’s image.37 Furthermore, Crow assembled hundreds of volunteers, many of whom helped him circulate CPI news summaries, newsreels, posters, pamphlets, maps, and other materials. They plastered wall posters onto the windows and walls of American companies, churches, and schools.38 Crow himself also sent articles and pamphlets extolling Wilson and the progress of American society to some twenty-five thousand prominent Chinese citizens, further depicting the United States in a positive light within the Chinese environment.39 Such extensive propaganda supporting Wilson’s peace efforts and American involvement in the war attempted to gather Chinese support of American goals; undoubtedly, the endeavor was successful. By placing Woodrow Wilson in such high esteem, a natural result of the constant exposure to Wilson’s wartime speeches, the Chinese populace had become accustomed to the idea of the “consent of the governed,” making them even more upset when the Versailles Treaty would fail to uphold that standard for them. THE CONCORD REVIEW 205

The excitement of Chinese intellectuals for the prospect of self-determination, as well as the end of the economic exploitation they faced through the Open Door Policy, characterized China-US relations, and set the scene for the future May Fourth Movement by providing the Chinese population with a determination to gain the right to self-determination and to free themselves from the economic exploitation of the Western powers.

B. China-Europe Relations Chinese-European relations were dominated by European imperialistic motives. A number of European nations held spheres of influence within China and even claimed direct control of various Chinese cities themselves. Early in the 19th century, China faced a series of internal struggles propelled by the sale of foreign opium into the country.40 Growing opium in India, the British-held East India Company began to ship tons of opium into the Chinese Guandong41 port, trading the drug for Chinese manufactured goods and tea.42 Although the Manchu regime banned the substance in 1836, English traders would generously bribe port officials in order to keep the opium traffic flowing.43 The effects of such a trade were devastating to Chinese society; the enormous nation was, quite literally, filled with drug addicts, many of whom were no longer able to work due to the harmful effects of opium addiction. Such behavior dramatically reduced the efficiency of the Chinese labor force and greatly alarmed the government, who appointed Lin Zixu as the Imperial Commissioner at Guandong in order to try to block further importation of opium.44 Lin Zixu took over the Guandong port in March of 1839, and began quickly to eradicate opium traffic into the nation as well as all existing stores of opium.45 He proactively attempted to cut off the opium trade at its root by weeding out corrupt officials and heavily policing British trade of the drug.46 His most notable effort in fighting the drug trade, however, came from a 1839 letter he wrote to Queen Victoria of England, requesting that the 206 Caroline W. Tan

British cease all efforts to continue the opium trade in China. His letter implored that, …there are barbarian ships that strive to come here for trade for the purpose of making a great profit. The wealth of China is used to profit the barbarians…by what right do they then in return use the poisonous drug to injure the Chinese people?…Let us ask, where is your conscience? I have heard that the smoking of opium is very strictly forbidden by your country, that is because the harm caused by opium is clearly understood…how can you bear to go further, selling products injurious to others in order to fulfill your insatiable desire?47 In his eloquent letter to Queen Victoria, Lin Zixu argued that trade should be beneficial to all nations and that England couldn’t justify its exportation of opium into China when it itself had banned the drug in its country. Nonetheless, England refused to accede to Lin’s requests, primarily as a result of the disagreement between the British and the Chinese over the proper way to handle foreigners accused of crimes in China.48 While the British refused to hand over British citizens who had violated Chinese laws, Chinese officials demanded the sole right to deal with lawbreakers in their nation, regardless of the lawbreakers’ nationality or crime committed.49 This dispute, coupled with the extraordinarily lucrative nature of the opium trade, served as the primary reason for the British refusal to discontinue the drug trade in China and their decision to resume importing the addicting drug into the nation.50 In response to Britain’s continued importation, Lin threatened to cut off all trade with England and expel the British from access to Chinese markets and China itself. When Chinese junks51 attempted to counter English merchant vessels in November of 1839, England responded by sending warships to the area in June of 1840, initiating a conflict between the two nations that would become known as the First Opium War.52 China was no match for the British, who had superior military technology and gun- ships; in 1842, the Chinese were coerced into signing the Treaty of Nanjing, the first “unequal treaty”53 with the British. Article II of the Treaty of Nanjing stipulated that, THE CONCORD REVIEW 207

His Majesty the Emperor of China agrees that British Subjects, with their families and establishments, shall be allowed to reside, for the purpose of carrying on their Mercantile pursuits, without molestation or restraint at the Cities and Towns of Canton, Amoy, Foochow-fu, Ningpo, and Shanghai, and Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain, etc., will appoint Superintendents or Consular Officers, to reside at each of the above-named Cities or Towns, to be the medium of communication between the Chinese Authorities and the said Merchants …54 This segment of the Treaty forced China to open five ports, those of Canton, Shanghai, Foochow, Ningpo, and Amoy, to British trade. Moreover, the Treaty of Nanjing granted British subjects living in China “extraterritoriality” status (meaning they did not have to obey Chinese laws and could not be tried for crimes committed in China), coerced China to cede control of the Island of Hong Kong, and made Great Britain a “most favored nation,” a move that forced China to indiscriminately offer Great Britain any trading benefits that it offered to other nations.55 Unsurprisingly, the Treaty of Nanjing was enormously unpopular among the Chinese people, as the Treaty allowed England to gain economic dominance by bringing opium into China.56 Because no restrictions were placed on British trade, opium circulation in China more than doubled in the next three decades, further weakening the already crumbling empire.57 As China’s weakness became more pronounced, Chinese officials were made to sign a second set of treaties that provided for the complete legalization of opium and the unrestricted proliferation of Christianity in all areas of China.58 That the majority of the terms dictated in the Treaty of Nanjing were focused primarily on securing trade with the Chi- nese only shows the extent to which the British were motivated by economics. It could have demanded that China make Chris- tianity its national religion, as Great Britain had been interested in proselytizing other nations at the time, yet it focused its initial relationship with China as a purely market-based one with primarily economic, albeit some political, gains. By subjecting China to a series of unequal guarantees that would strengthen British influence in the area, Great Britain made China a pawn in its 208 Caroline W. Tan

international game for access to East Asian markets, and, given that such imperialism lasted up until World War I, only fueled China’s desire to emancipate itself from Great Britain. Chinese response to British imperialism was predictably outraged; in fact, the Treaty of Nanjing helped instigate the violent, anti-foreign, anti-Christian Boxer Uprising, a conflict organized by the Society of Righteous and Harmonious Fists, “Boxers”59 that sought to drive out the British from China. Although the effort ended in failure as the Chinese Emperor fled while French and British troops marched to Beijing, burning the Summer Palace to the ground, the Boxer Uprising was a manifestation of Chinese sentiment towards British imperialism, indicating the lengths that the Chinese populace would go to for autonomy and providing a precedent for future acts of civil disobedience.60

C. China-Japan Relations During the 1868 Meiji Restoration, a modernization campaign led by then-Emperor Meiji, Japan rapidly began to adopt Western science and engineering techniques, allowing the nation to begin to match its Western rivals in military and scientific achievements.61 In only a few years, Japan had transformed itself from a feudal society into a modernized, industrial state. This was due in part to its practice of sending Japanese students to Europe in order to learn from Western arts and sciences, helping the nation to elude foreign domination as well as to compete on an equal playing field with Western powers.62 While Japan enjoyed its technological advancements and newfound influence, China suffered from the stipulations proposed in the Treaty of Nanjing. Great Britain took control of Burma63 in 1852 while the French secured a protectorate over both Tonkin and Annan64 in 1885. Moreover, China slowly lost control over its satellite nations, further weakening the already debilitated state.65 The Japanese, however, would soon be one of the more formidable threats against the Qing Dynasty in China; by 1878, Japan had prevented the king of the Loochoo Islands from THE CONCORD REVIEW 209 paying tribute to the Middle Kingdom and was already looking eagerly to taking over China’s control of Korea.66 Naturally, then, when Korea faced difficulties in suppressing an internal rebellion, both China and Japan sent troops into the nation to defeat the rebels; however, by the time both nations arrived in Korea, the rebel troops had already been suppressed, giving both China and Japan a pretext to turn onto each other as Japan wanted Chinese territories and China wanted to prevent further Japanese interference.67 The conflict between the two nations became known as the Sino-Japanese War, a dispute that lasted from 1894 to 1895 and pitted Japan against the Middle Kingdom. The Japanese had the upper hand; not only did it command a navy modeled after the British Royal Navy, but it led an army modeled after the German army, the most formidable army at the time. China, on the other hand, suffered from widespread corruption and low morale, a result of the prevalence of opium in the Chinese society.68 Its army was unpaid, poorly fed, poorly trained, and poorly armed: only three-fifths of the Chinese soldiers had rifles while the other forty percent had to fight with pikes, swords, and spears, all of which were by then outdated technology.69 Moreover, China had already been facing internal disunity as a result of British imperialism and control over its foreign trade, further weakening the Chinese as they prepared for war against Japan.70 Unsurprisingly, the Sino-Japanese War ended in Japan’s favor with the Treaty of Shimonoseki [1895]. The terms of the Treaty dictated that China cede the Liaodong Peninsula, For- mosa,71 and the Penghu Islands to Japan, as well as pay a massive war indemnity. Article 1 of the Treaty required China to: “recognize definitively the full and complete independence and autonomy of Korea, and, in consequence, the payment of tribute and the performance of ceremonies and formalities by Korea to China, in derogation of such independence and autonomy, shall wholly cease for the future.”72 China, then, was forced to cede influence in Korea to the Japa- nese, who also required that four further river ports to be opened 210 Caroline W. Tan

up to foreign trade.73 China’s defeat by the Japanese led to what Lord Salisbury, British Prime Minister, described as the “Battle of Concessions,” when France won concessions in Kwangchouwan, Germany and Britain obtained Weihaiwei.74 It seemed, therefore, that the partition of China was imminent, with both European and Asian nations now vying for various economic opportunities in the region.75 China’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese War had further repercussions, leading to the die Gelbe Gefahr—“the Yellow Peril,” a German-coined term that reflected the westward fear of the “Land of the Rising Sun” and other Asian nations.76 European nations began to fear an armed, ambitious Asia rising up to occupy West- ern territories, a fear that translated to widespread hatred of not only the Japanese population, but also the Chinese.77 In 1898, London publisher M. P. Shiel published The Yellow Danger, a book that depicted the Chinese and other Asian races as conspirators attempting to break Britain’s power in the Far East. The book uses terms such as “fiendish love of cruelty” and “devilish cunning,”78 many of which were reproduced in letters of foreigners in Beijing as well as articles of the international press to describe the Oriental population. One character in the book is even quoted as saying, “what appalling fate would be that of Europe if the yellow races [referring to the Asian peoples] in their hundreds of millions organized a westward march is beyond the imagination of man to conceive.”79 Hatred of the Chinese wasn’t limited to Europe; in 1882, the United States banned Chinese immigration into the country, passing the Chinese Exclusion Act to protect American labor and keep out the Chinese.80 Antagonistic attitudes towards the Chinese as well as the gradual decline of Chinese power stemmed from a number of economic and territorial concessions China had to make to the United States, Great Britain, and Japan. Although China’s wars with Western nations did greatly weaken its empire, it was the Sino-Japanese war that solidified China’s waning power, as it demonstrated China’s military inferiority in the face of not only Western nations, which was expected, but also Eastern ones, which THE CONCORD REVIEW 211 was devastating. China, a once-powerful kingdom and empire in its own right, was humiliated by outsiders, surrendering its ability to regulate trade at home and defend itself. Eventually, this decline in China’s power at the hands of foreign influences would translate to an increased and unmatched desire for national autonomy, which, when not attained at the Paris Peace Conference, would spark a disappointment in the Chinese population that would manifest itself in the May Fourth Movement demonstration.

Paris Peace Conference When I was received at the White House, President Wilson in reply to my question confirmed the sympathetic attitude of the U.S. towards China’s desiderata. He was delighted that I was going to Paris and he hoped that I would keep in touch with the U.S. delegation … he talked at length about his hopes in the Conference and he reiterated what he had already stated in his famous Fourteen Points; if the world was to have permanent peace, he said there must be a new order.81 Chinese Diplomat Wellington Koo, 1918

When the Allied leaders met for the Paris Peace Confer- ence on January 18, 1919, to determine the peace settlements that would end the First Great War, they each came with a different goal in mind; Italian Premier Vittorio Orlando wanted to increase Italy’s territorial possessions, British Prime Minister David Lloyd George hoped to reaffirm Britain’s naval dominance, French Premier Georges Clemeneceau aimed to cripple Germany permanently and regain the highly-coveted Alsace-Lorraine region, and American President Woodrow Wilson focused on securing the passage of his “Fourteen Points,” a proposition that was intended not only to resolve the major conflicts that spurred the First Great War but also to establish a lasting peace and lay down the rules for future global interactions.82 Although delegates of the “Big Four” powers—the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy—wielded the most influence and power at the Conference, they were only a minority of the delegate population.83 Representatives from countries such as Japan, China, Brazil, Cuba, Belgium, Greece, Haiti, and Peru 212 Caroline W. Tan

attended the Paris Peace Conference with the hopes of securing greater rights and freedom for their nation. Beyond the members of the official delegations were journalists, representatives of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and long retinues of advisers, experts, and secretarial staff, all of whom were counted among the thousands of people who streamed into Paris in 1918 for the Paris Peace Conference.84 Attendance, however, wasn’t always guaranteed. Fearing that China would be excluded from the general peace conference, Chinese diplomats initially considered proposing a separate conference that would deal specifically with the Far Eastern questions; however, when it became clear that President Wilson would attend and dominate the peace conference, Chinese hopes for successful negotiations increased considerably, and talks of a separate conference evaporated.85 Instead, in preparation for the global conference, Chinese diplomats drafted far-reaching goals that referenced Wilson’s ideals of self-determination and its application to China, including a proposal for the nullification of all unequal treaties that reduced Chinese sovereignty, phasing out the system of extraterritorial jurisdiction, and asking for a return of foreign concessions (namely Chinese railroads, mines, and communication systems).86 These delegates brought such high-minded goals and enthusiastic determination to see them implemented to the Conference, hoping and expecting that with Wilson’s support, they would be enacted, making the Chinese nation a more equal participant in international society.87 Notable among the Conference attendees was the Chi- nese delegation in Paris, a large commission composed of five plenipotentiary representatives and several dozen support staff, all of whom enthusiastically arrived in Paris with the hopes of gaining the right to self-determination. Leading the delegation was Beijing’s foreign minister, M. Lou Tsengtsiang, a veteran diplomat who was fluent in French and fervently believed in China’s need to modernize in order to join the family of nations.88 Other delegates included V. K. Wellington Koo (the Chinese minister to Washington), Chengting Thomas Wang (a close ally of the THE CONCORD REVIEW 213 Kuomintang government), Sao-Ke Alfred Sze (the Chinese minister to London), and Suntchou Wei (the minister in Brussels), all of whom had extensive experience in foreign diplomacy and were well-versed in Western traditions and languages.89 They came to the Paris Peace Conference confident in Wilson’s ability to represent the interest of the Chinese people and of subjugated territories around the world; Koo and Wang, who coauthored a pamphlet entitled China and the League of Nations, described the faith that the Chinese people had in Wilson’s ability to enact positive change in China, saying that “[Wilson’s] ideals and principles have survived him from generation to generation, and had been deeply inculcated on the minds of the Chinese people.”90 Chinese support and enthusiasm for the Conference was enormous. Delegates at the international conference faced constant external pressures from Chinese civic groups to recognize Chinese independence and its influence in the global arena, often citing Wilson’s principles and advocating for their implementation in China. Chinese activist groups produced a series of petitions and pamphlets that explained China’s position and championed the application of self-determination to it.91 At one point, delegates produced and circulated a pamphlet that compiled hundreds of notices and messages from Chinese organizations all over the world, indicating the enormous amounts of attention that Chinese citizens were paying to the Paris Peace Conference. Activist groups, such as the Students of China and the League of Nations Society, argued that “it is now axiomatic that the final peace treaty shall be framed so as to give the world, as far as is humanly possible, a just settlement.”92 Chinese aspirations, however, were bitterly disappointed as the Paris Peace Conference progressed. From the outset, the great powers decided that China would have a status as a minority power, being allowed to seat only two representatives at the conference plenary and participating only in sessions that dealt specifically with its nation.93 Although the issue was pragmatically insignificant, as the big four powers would be making all of the decisions anyway, it held symbolic importance as it indicated that 214 Caroline W. Tan

China would remain inferior at a forum that they hoped would recognize their equality on an international stage.94 Before any substantive decision had been reached, China’s aspirations for the Paris Peace Conference were already impeded, fueling discontent among the Chinese populace who still held hopes of being treated as an equal in the international arena. Thus, Chinese hopes of a readjustment of China’s international status were put on hold for the time being. Instead, the delegates focused on whether or not to reaffirm Chinese control over the Shandong Province,95 a previously German-controlled territory that was seized by Japan. In January 1915, Japan then issued an ultimatum requiring China to recognize Japan as the rightful heir of German rights in the area; due to coercive forces, Chinese President Yuan Shikai accepted the terms.96 Nevertheless, the Chinese populace still believed that the Shandong Province rightfully belonged to China, as it held economic, strategic, and symbolic significance. Wellington Koo, one of the Chinese delegates, spoke on behalf of China regarding the Shandong Province territorial issue. In fluent English, he argued that although China was grateful for the services of the Japanese and Allied militaries in freeing the Province from German control, it did not believe that “selling the birthright of [its] countrymen”97 was the proper way to express thanks. Koo’s logical presentation, in contrast with Japanese delegate Makino Nobukai’s less eloquent one, symbolized to the Chinese that China would no longer submit to the will of the great powers but would instead stand up for its own demands.98 Believing that Great Britain would follow the United States in adhering to the Fourteen Points and blocking Japanese ambitions in China, the Chinese delegates as well as the populace were convinced that China would eventually win acceptance into the international forum as an equal member of the global community and the rightful owner of the Shandong Province.99 Their hopes weren’t unfounded, since the U.S. delegation often helped Chinese representatives draft their memoranda and petitions to the peace conference.100 Secretary of State Lansing and East THE CONCORD REVIEW 215 Asian Affairs expert Williams, for instance, reassured the Chinese delegates of U.S. support, understanding the strategic importance of maintaining friendly relations with China and stifling Japanese imperialism. Paul S. Reinsch, the American minister in Beijing, warned Wilson of this necessity, writing, The eager attention which has been paid to your words, the trust and confidence which the Chinese feel in your policies and aims, are evidence of a spontaneous desire to follow along the path of American action and aspiration which you have made so clear to the world. If China should be disappointed in her confidence at the present time, the consequences of such disillusionment on her moral and political development would be disastrous, and we, instead of looking across the Pacific towards a Chinese Nation sympathetic to our ideals would be confronted with a vast materialistic military organization under ruthless control.101 Williams, one of Wilson’s major experts on Far Eastern relations, warned that the United States was bound both morally and legally to support China in its struggle against Japan; Japan’s claim for the Shandong concessions, he said, held no merit as they were based upon coercion and conquest. China had been “encouraged by [U.S.] attitude”102 to expect the United States’ support in this issue, and “to disappoint her [would] mean irreparable injury to our good name in the Far East and [would instill] in the hearts of the Chinese a burning sense of wrong endured which will make impossible any lasting peace.”103 In principle, Wilson agreed with Williams and the Chinese delegates’ arguments, believing that Shandong rightfully belonged to the Chinese nation. However, after rejecting the equality clause that Japan had proposed in the League of Nations charter, Wilson feared that a further clash with Japan over the Shandong question would cause unnecessary tension with Japan and influence it to withdraw from the Conference.104 Moreover, the Beijing government had already signed secret wartime agreements with Japan recognizing Japanese claims to the Province, making Chinese calls for independence in that area more difficult to grant.105 Neverthe- less, the Chinese delegates argued that concessions made under coercion were illegitimate, especially if such concessions under- 216 Caroline W. Tan

mined Chinese culture and sovereignty.106 Colonel Edward House, one of Wilson’s advisers, advised Wilson to relent on the Shandong issue and cede to Japanese demands, knowing that China was the weaker power in the diplomatic struggle and therefore harbored interests that were more easily ignored by the major powers.107 After discussing the question for the last time on April 30, the Big Three (by this time, Italy had left the Conference) agreed to accept the Japanese claim for the former German concessions in Shandong in return for a verbal agreement that Japan would restore these territories to China at some point in the future.108 This announcement came as a stunning blow to the Chinese, who had long expected Wilson and his principles to come to their side on the Shandong issue and were so confident in the power of the Fourteen Points to back up their hopes that they hadn’t expected international politics to get in the way. Ameri- can diplomats were also stunned. Williams wrote that “the worst possible has happened.”109 He said that the decision violated the fundamental principles that the United States had come to Paris to stand for, including those of antimilitarism, self-determination, and no annexations.110 Williams feared that as a consequence of Wilson’s failure to uphold such principles, U.S. prestige in Paris, which had been at an all-time high, would have fallen to an all- time low.111 Reinsch wrote that people and officials in China were “deeply depressed” and felt “utterly helpless”112 by the rejection of Chinese claim towards the Shandong Province, especially given their complete faith in Woodrow Wilson and his Fourteen Points, whose advocacy for self-determination, they believed, would grant Chinese full autonomy over all national territory.113 Chinese disappointment continued for the next few days. Reinsch further described the discontent in China, writing that the decision caused “a revulsion of feeling against America” not because it was more to blame than the other nations, but because “the Chinese had entertained a deeper belief in [U.S.] power, influence, and loyalty to principle, than in those of any of the other major powers at the Conference.”114 THE CONCORD REVIEW 217 Students in Beijing who had idolized Wilson only six months previously now wrote that, When the news of the Paris Peace Conference finally reached us we were greatly shocked. We at once awoke to the fact that foreign nations were still selfish and militaristic and that they were all great liars. I remember that in the evening of May 2nd [only two days before the mass student demonstration] very few of us slept. We came to the conclusion that…we could no longer depend upon the principles of any so-called great leader like Woodrow Wilson…we couldn’t help feel that we must struggle!115 Chinese students felt that the failure of Woodrow Wilson to grant China its right to the Shandong Province violated the self- determination principles that Wilson himself had embodied in his Fourteen Points. Previously, China had been treated primarily as an imperial cash cow; events such as the Open Door Note, the Boxer Rebellion, and the Sino-Japanese War only showed the extent to which this was true. Therefore, to the Chinese people, who had resented this treatment as a violation of sovereignty, looked upon the Paris Peace Conference and Wilson’s presence there as a beacon of light that would free their nation from the control of imperialistic influences. When such a beacon would be extinguished, however, despite Wilson’s continuous advocacy for the self-determination principle, the Chinese people’s disappointment would be catastrophic. Historian Erez Manela of Harvard University summarized the Chinese sentiment well, writing that “[The Chinese in 1919] had envisioned the coming of a new era of self-determination and equality in international relations, and though their faith in Wilson crumbled when he failed to apply his principles to China, the experience left its mark.”116 In fact, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, a leader of Chinese nationalism, helped define that “mark,” writing that, Wilson’s proposals … stirred [the smaller nations] with a great, new consciousness; [when] they saw how completely they had been de- ceived by the Great Powers’ advocacy of self determination, … [they] began independently and separately to carry out the principle of the ‘self determination of peoples.’117 When the Chinese populace saw that they could no longer rely on the major powers and Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points to 218 Caroline W. Tan

grant them the autonomy and independence that they desired, they chose to carry out the essence of self-determination on their own. By staging the May Fourth protest, therefore, the Chinese students demonstrated their intent on achieving self-determination, continuing forth with the way they perceived would be the most effective to independently carry out such a concept.

Conclusion “When President Wilson … voiced the sentiment of all mankind in his address to Congress, embodying the famous fourteen principles … power politics was adjourned, for justice, justice that knew not the weak nor the strong was to be the guiding principle in international relations …People hitherto submerged under the domination and oppression of an alien power were promised the right to self-determination. [People] were inspired … to believe that, at least – The New Order Cometh. The New Order does not come to China, however. The principles enunciated are admittedly sound, but up to the present all that China has received is the vibration of the sound but not the application of the principles.”118

Chinese Patriotic Committee, 1919

The May Fourth demonstration, the pinnacle event in the overarching May Fourth Movement, can thus be traced back to the Wilson’s Fourteen Points. The goals in the Fourteen Points set Chinese goals undeniably high in terms of achieving self- determination; when such goals would fail to be achieved, the agonizing disappointment that followed would eventually influence Chinese students and intellectuals to organize a mass movement in order to publicize their disappointment and anger to the world. China’s anger was only fueled by its status as a colonized nation and treatment as a minority country. While the link between the Shandong decision and the May Fourth Movement has often been examined, few historians have analyzed the influence of Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points on the historic event, something that, given the foreign policy surrounding China prior to 1919 as well as the events that occurred THE CONCORD REVIEW 219 at the Paris Peace Conference, undoubtedly played an important role in prompting the eventual May Fourth student demonstration. The effects of such a movement were momentous; the event in Tiananmen Square on May 4th, 1919, initiated a widespread cultural movement that spread to other cities, garnering support from both the working class as well as the intellectual population and culminating in a general strike in Shanghai that devastated the Chinese economy.119 Not only did the May Fourth Movement hold significant cultural importance during its time, but it also set an important precedent that, 80 years later, would be repeated in the historic Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989, when students and intellectuals would again converge in Tiananmen Square to protest the Communist regime in China. Although the particular circumstances of the protest may have differed from those in 1919, the concept of mass demonstration set by the May Fourth Move- ment demonstrates its influence not only in international relations, but also in the spirit of democracy and individual autonomy that Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points aimed to uphold. 220 Caroline W. Tan

1 Joseph T. Chen, “The May Fourth Movement Redefined,” Modern Asian Studies, 4 no. 1 (1970) pp. 63-81 2 Pao Tsun-p’eng, chung-kuo ch’ing-nien yun-tung shih, Taipei, 1954, p.119 3 Jeffrey S. Wasserstrom, “Chinese Students and Anti- Japanese Protests, Past and Present,” World Policy Journal, 22 no. 2 4 Address at Mount Vernon, 4 July 1918, PWW, 48: pp. 516- 517 5 Thomas A. Bailey, Lizabeth Cohen, and David M. Kennedy, The American Pageant: A History of the Republic, 1 no. 12 (Lexington: Heath and Company, 1971) p. 690 6 Woodrow Wilson, Fourteen Points, Yale University Avalon Project, http://www.avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/ wilson14.asp (February 27, 2009) [Original Source: President Woodrow Wilson, U.S. Congress, 1918] 7 Wilson, Fourteen Points 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid. 13 Woodrow Wilson, Wilson’s War Message to Congress, BYU Library, http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Wilson%27s_War_ Message_to_Congress (February 29, 2009). [Original Source: President Woodrow Wilson, U.S. Congress, 1917] 14 Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007) p. 39 15 Ibid., p. 24 16 Ibid., p. 24 17 Ibid., p. 24 18 Ibid., p. 24 19 Ibid., p. 24 20 John A. Garraty, Woodrow Wilson (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966) p. 3 21 Manela, p. 26 22 Ibid., p. 26 23 Ibid., p. 99 24 Quoted in Diana Preston, The Boxer Rebellion, (New York: Walker Publishing Inc., 2000) 25 John Hay, “The First ‘Open Door Note,’” Brigham Young University Library, http://www.lib.byu.edu/index.php/the_ First_‘Open_Door_Note’ (March 3, 2009) [Original Source: THE CONCORD REVIEW 221

John Hay to Andrew D. White, Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 2899, pp. 129-130] 26 Ssuyu Teng and John Fairbank, China’s response to the West (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1954) repr. in Mark A. Kishlansky, ed., Sources of World History, Volume II, (New York: HarperCollins CollegePublishers, 1995) pp. 266-69 27 Ibid., p. 267 28 Manela, p. 100 29 Ibid., p. 100 30 George Creel, as quoted in Manela, p. 51 31 Chow Tse-tung, Research Guide to the May Fourth Movement (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963) p. 16 32 Manela, p. 25 33 Zhang Yongjin, China in the International System, 1918- 1920: The Middle Kingdom at the Periphery (Oxford: St. Anthony’s/Macmillan, 1911) pp. 15-38 34 Manela, p. 101 35 Ibid., p. 101 36 Ibid., p. 101 37 Ibid., p. 102 38 Ibid., p. 102 39 Ibid., p. 99 40 Hollington K. Tong, “What Can President Wilson do for China?” Millard’s Review (November 1918) p. 431 41 Guandong is also known as Canton. 42 R. Hooker, (1999, July 14), Retrieved January 9, 2010 43 Ibid., (1999, July 14) 44 Ibid., (1999, July 14) 45 Ibid., (1999, July 14) 46 Ibid., (1999, July 14) 47 Letter, Tang and Fairbank 48 R. Hooker, (1999, July 14) 49 Ibid., (1999, July 14) 50 Ibid., (1999, July 14) 51 A junk is a Chinese sailboat design developed during the Han Dynasty that is still in use today. 52 R. Hooker, (1999, July 14) 53 Treaty of Nanjing, http://www.international.ucla/edu/ asia/article.asp?parentid=18421 54 Treaties between China and Foreign State, Second Edition (Shanghai: by order of the Inspector General of Customs, 1917) vol. 2: pp. 590-596 55 Columbia University Asia for Educators. http://afe.easia. columbia.edu/special/china_1750_mayfourth.htm 222 Caroline W. Tan

56 R. Hooker, (1999, July 14) 57 Ibid., (1999, July 14) 58 Ibid., (1999, July 14) 59 Preston, p. 13 60 Ibid., p. 13 61 Ibid., p. xix 62 Marius B. Jansen, the Making of Modern Japan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), p. 335 63 Burma is now known as Myanmar. 64 Annan is now known as Vietnam. 65 Preston, p. 13 66 Ibid., p. 15 67 Ibid., p. 13 68 Ibid., p. 13 69 Ibid., p. 13 70 Ibid., p. 13 71 Formosa is now known as Taiwan. 72 Treaties between China and Foreign States, Second Edition (Shanghai: by order of the Inspector General of Customs, 1917) vol. 2: pp. 590-596 73 Preston, p. 13 74 Ibid., p. 15 75 Ibid., p. 13 76 Ibid., p. 13 77 Bailey, p. 690 78 M.P. Shiel, The Yellow Danger (London: Grant Richards, 1898) p. 29 79 Shiel, p. 29 80 Bailey, p. 690 81 Wellington Koo, as quoted in Manela, p. 177 82 Bailey, p. 691 83 U.S. Department of State http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/ time/wwi/89875.htm 84 Manela, p. 59 85 Ibid., p. 59 86 Ibid., p. 112 87 Ibid., p. 112 88 Ibid., p. 113 89 Ibid., p. 113 90 V.K. Wellington Koo and Cheng-ting T. Wang, China and the League of Nations (London: Allen & Unwin, 1919) 91 Manela, p. 105 92 Enclosed in Jordan to Curzon, 7 May 1919, NAUK, FO 608/210, fol. pp. 443-444 THE CONCORD REVIEW 223

93 Manela, p. 115 94 Ibid., p. 115 95 The Shandong Province is also known as the Shantung Province. 96 F. Gilbert Chan, “The American Revolution and the Rise of Afro-Asian Nationalism, with Special Reference to Sun Yat-Sen and the Chinese Experience,” Asian Profile 10:3 (1982) pp. 209-219; Michael H. Hunt, The Making of a Special Relationship: the United States and China to 1914 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983) pp. 258-266 97 Manela, p. 179 98 Ibid., p. 179 99 Ibid. p. 180 100 Ibid., p. 179 101 Ibid., pp. 111-112 102 Hans Schmidt, “Democracy for China: American Propaganda and the May Fourth Movement,” Diplomatic History 22 (Winter 1998) pp. 11-12 103 Ibid., p. 11 104 Manela, p. 181 105 Ibid., p. 182 106 Ibid., p. 182 107 House to Wilson, 29 April 1919, PWW, 58: pp. 228-229. 108 Jonathan D. Spence, The Gate of Heavenly Peace: The Chinese and Their Revolution 1895-1890 (New York: Viking) p. 198 109 Manela, p. 183 110 Ibid., p. 183 111 Chan, p. 209 112 Manela, p. 186 113 Ibid., p. 186 114 Schmidt, p. 11 115 Zhenchang Tang, Cai Yuanpei Zhuan [The Biography of Cai Yuanpei] (Shangha renmin chubanshe, 1985) p. 159 116 Manela, p. 216 117 Shibao, January 11, 1918 118 Chinese Patriotic Committee in New York City, Might or Right? The Fourteen Points and the Disposition of Kiao-Chau (May 1919) 119 Wasserstrom, par. 22 Joseph T. Chen, “The May Fourth Movement Redefined,” Modern Asian Studies, 4 no. 1 (1970) pp. 63-81, Pao Tsun-p’eng, chung-kuo ch’ing-nien yun-tung shih, Taipei, 1954, p.119 Wasserstrom, Jeffrey S, “Chinese 224 Caroline W. Tan

Students and Anti-Japanese Protests, Past and Present,” World Policy Journal, 22 no.

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Pao Tsun-p’eng, Chung-kuo ch’ing-nien yun-tung shih, Taipei, 1954, p. 119 Preston, Diana, The Boxer Rebellion, New York: Walker Publishing, Inc., 2000 Schmidt, Hans, “Democracy for China: American Propaganda and the May Fourth Movement,” Diplomatic History 22, Winter 1998: pp. 11-12 Shibao, January 11, 1918 Shiel, M. P., The Yellow Danger, London: Grant Richards, 1898. Spence, Jonathan D., The Gate of Heavenly Peace: The Chinese and Their Revolution, 1895-1890 (New York: Viking, p. 198) Teng Ssuyu and John Fairbank, China’s response to the West, (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1954) repr. In Mark A. Kishlansky, ed., Sources of World History, Volume II, New York: HarperCollins CollegePublishers, 1995, pp. 266-669 Tang Zhenchang, Cai Yuanpei Zhuan [The Biography of Cai Yuanpei] Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1985, p. 159 Tong, Hollington K., “What Can President Wilson do for China?” Millard’s Review, November 16, 1918, pp. 431-434 Treaties between China and Foreign States, Second Edition Shanghai: by order of the Inspector General of Customs, 1917, vol. 2: pp. 590-596 Treaty of Nanjing, http://www.international.ucla.edu/asia/ article.asp?parentid=18421 Tse-tung, Chow, Research Guide to the May Fourth Movement, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1963 U.S. Department of State, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/ time/wwi/89875.htm Wasserstrom, Jeffrey S., “Chinese Students and Anti- Japanese Protests, Past and Present,” World Policy Journal 22.2: 21 pars. 27 February 2009 Woodrow Wilson, Fourteen Points, Yale University Avalon Project, http://www.avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/ wilson14.asp (February 27, 2009) [Original Source: President Woodrow Wilson, U.S. Congress, 1918] Zhang Yongjin, China in the International System, 1918- 1920: The Middle Kingdom at the Periphery Oxford: St. Anthony’s/Macmillan, 1911, pp. 15-38 226 CarolineCopernicus W. Tan William Manchester, A World Lit Only By Fire New York: Little, Brown, 1993, pp. 89-90

Among the masses, for example, it continued to be an article of faith that the world was an immovable disk around which the sun revolved, and that the rest of the cosmos comprised heaven, which lay dreamily above the skies, inhabited by cherubs, and hell, flaming deep beneath the European soil. Everyone believed, indeed knew, that. Everyone, that is, except Mikolj Kopernik, a Polish physician and astronomer, whose name had been Latinized, as was the custom, to Nicolas Copernicus. After years of observing the skies and consulting mathematical tables which he had copied at the University of Kraków, Copernicus reached the conclusion—which at first seemed absurd, even to him—that the earth was actually moving. In 1514 he showed friends a short manuscript, De hypothesibus motuum coelestium a se constitutis commentariolus (Little Commentary), challenging the ancient Ptolemaic assumptions, and this was followed by the fuller De revolutionibus orbium coelestium (On the Revolutions of the Celestial Orbs), in which he concluded that the earth, far from being at the center of the universe, merely rotated on its own axis and orbited around a stationary sun once a year...the astronomer’s work was not widely circulated until after his death, and his peers were divided into those who laughed at him and those who denounced him. The offended included some of the brightest and most independent men on the Continent. Martin Luther wrote: “People give ear to an upstart astrologer who strove to show that the earth revolves, not the heavens or the firmament, the sun and the moon...This fool wishes to reverse the entire scheme of astrology; but sacred Scripture tells us that Joshua commanded the sun to stand still, not the earth.” John Calvin quoted the Ninety-third Psalm, “The world also is stabilized, that it cannot be moved,” and asked, “Who will venture to place the authority of Copernicus above that of the Holy Spirit?” When Copernicus’s chief protégé tried to get his mentor’s paper printed in Nuremberg, Luther used his influence to suppress it. According to (Will) Durant, even Andreas Osiander of Nuremberg, who finally agreed to assist with its publication, insisted on an introduction explaining that the concept of a solar system was being presented solely as a hypothesis, useful for the computation of the movements of heavenly bodies. As long as it was so represented, Rome remained mute, but when the philosopher Giordano Bruno published his Italian dialogues, declaring a rotat- ing, orbiting earth to be an unassailable fact—carrying his astronomical speculations for beyond those of Copernicus—the Roman Inquisition brought him to trial. He was convicted of being the worst kind of heretic, a pantheist who held that God was immanent in creation, rather than the external creator. Then they burned him at the stake. Catholics were forbidden to read Copernicus’s De revolutionibus until the deletion of the nine sentences, which had asserted it to be more than a theory. The ban was not lifted until 1828. THE CONCORD REVIEW 227

BREAKING THE STALEMATE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TANK

Cody E. Nager

The year was 1915 and the situation was critical. World War One was at a stalemate, a useless back and forth over just a few hundred yards of terrain. Barbed wire, artillery-pockmarked wastelands, machine guns and trenches caused the war to devolve into a useless bloodbath. The development of the tank broke the deadlock and restored movement to the battlefield. The tank, which was a long time in development, represented the peak of mobility, firepower, and armor. Through this combination, the tank was able to dominate the battlefield and change the course of the war. “It is impossible to say that this or that man invented the tank.”1 These were the words of Winston Churchill, later the Brit- ish Prime Minister, but at the time the First Lord of the Admiralty. He was speaking to the Royal Commission on Awards to Inventors which was established in 1919 to determine the legal inventor of the tank. Churchill’s observation captures the whole history of armored warfare which stretches back to the legions of Rome. The tank represented the application of the industrial age technology to the race for increased range of movement, weapons capabilities

Cody E. Nager is a Junior at North Salem High School, in North Salem, New York, where he wrote this paper for Mr. Christopher Regan’s Military History course in the 2009/2010 academic year. 228 Cody E. Nager

and durability. The horse cavalry, introduced as early as 1400 BC by the Mesopotamians, was rendered obsolete. At their roots, there are two approaches to armor. One is based in defense. This consisted of a metal or wood sheet used to deflect incoming attacks. The prime example is the Roman legion and the “Testudo” or tortoise formation which involved each soldier on the outside holding his shield to one of the sides and the inner legionaries holding their shields above their head to form a shell. 2 Speed was the second approach to armor, which consisted of dodging incoming attacks or moving too fast to be targeted. This method was exemplified in early decades of the 13th century by the Mongol horse archers whose fast movement with light armor allowed them to survive.3 As early as 1400 BC, the peoples of Mesopotamia had used cavalry in battle.4 Cavalry had the mobility to outmaneuver any opposing forces on the battlefield. They also had the firepower necessary to break enemy lines. By the 19th century, warfare advances had caused a reduction in the cavalry’s value. The introduction of the machine gun, barbed wire and trenches confirmed how useless cavalry had become. The approach towards cavalry had not changed much since its introduction, while infantrymen adapted and were able to kill a cavalryman more easily. The tank’s beginnings sprang from soldiers’ needs for different methods from the old ways of the horsemen. The first recognized use of a tank-like vehicle in combat was during the Hussite Rebellion of 1419. Rebel leader Jan Ziska took wagons with cannons in them and hooked them together to form a movable fighting fort. Jan and his men would wait in the fort until the enemy was tired and then sally forth and destroy them.5 The only problem with the wagons was, “Offensive tactics were inconceivable with the heavy horse-drawn wagons and by its very nature the wagon-laager was compelled to adhere to defensive tactics.”6 The first drawing of a tank is attributed to Italian genius Leonardo da Vinci in 1487. According to da Vinci, “I am build- THE CONCORD REVIEW 229 ing secure and covered chariots which are invulnerable, and when they advance with their guns into the midst of the foe even the largest of enemy masses must retreat, and behind them the infantry can follow in safety and without opposition.”7 Da Vinci’s tank was a conical wooden top placed on a set of four wheels. Leonardo’s tank had a flip-up wooden shield to cover the gun port. It was supposed to carry one cannon. Unfortunately, like many of Leonardo’s ideas, it was never built. 8 These early attempts at mobile armor all had one aspect in common that caused them to fail. The armor used horses as their power sources and these animals were unable to push the machines from behind a protective barrier. Instead, the horses were forced to pull in the full line of fire of the enemy.9 The Industrial Revolution, with its creation of mobile mechanical engines, and powerful mounted weapons, sparked the development of a useful tank. In 1899, a Polish banker named I.S. Bloch stated that any future war between European powers would be a stalemate. He published a book entitled The Future of War in which he claimed that the incredible power of two industrial age inventions, barbed wire and the machine gun, rendered the offensive ineffective. He predicted that any war would last far longer than it was expected to and lead to thousands of casualties.10 A New York Times article published in 1916, was subtitled, “Ivan S. Bloch, who wrote 17 years ago, foresaw ‘stalemate’ like that on the Western Front today, and made many more excellent guesses.” 11 Bloch’s book was not widely known until the British science fiction writer, H. G. Wells, read it and incorporated it into his own work. Bloch’s book led H.G. Wells to publish a short story in 1903 in Strand magazine entitled, “The Land Ironclads.” In this story, two young British soldiers were sitting in a trench across from the enemy until a “land ironclad” attacks. Wells describes the ironclad as, “It might have been from eighty to a hundred feet long—it was about two hundred and fifty yards away—its vertical side was about ten feet high or so, smooth for that height, and then with a complex patterning under the eaves of its turtle cover. 230 Cody E. Nager

This patterning was a close interlacing of portholes, rifle barrels, and telescope tubes.” 12 Wells’ story offers a prophetic glimpse of World War One. Just 11 years later, both trench warfare and Brit- ish tanks would be a reality. In 1905, the Russians and Japanese fought the Russo- Japanese War, which was arguably the first fully modern war and featured many similarities to the upcoming World War One. Trench warfare, the use of machine guns and use of barbed wire were commonplace. One Russian General complained that the lack of barbed wire would doom Port Arthur.13 Indeed, the Japa- nese ended up victorious. The war was of minor interest to many European powers who were too embroiled in their own problems closer to home. One of the more dedicated followers of this conflict was a Colonel Ernest Swinton, who the British Inventors Commission would later identify as one of the main creators of the tank. Swinton was tasked with preparing the official history of the Russo-Japanese War for the War Office in London. He found this assignment rewarding, “That campaign furnished two outstanding lessons in the tactical and technical side of warfare. The first was the possibility of employing very heavy ordinance in both siege and field operations…The second was the immense power in defense of the machine gun.”14 From his study, Swinton clearly placed himself in the camp that said that the cavalry was obsolete. His close friend, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, more widely known as the creator of Sherlock Holmes, stated the position quite well, “In the opinion of many, the tendency of the future will be to convert the whole force [cavalry] into mounted infantry…a little training…would give us a formidable force of twenty thousand men who would do all that our cavalry does and more beside.”15 However, convincing the higher level military officials of this was going to be a difficult task. In 1904, the army council debated whether to designate the rifle as the cavalry’s primary weapon. They decided to keep the sword as the primary weapon because, “All spirit and élan would go with this new departure, and if engaged in a European war such an organization might be fatal.”16 THE CONCORD REVIEW 231 Swinton had served during 1900 in South Africa during the Second Anglo-Boer War. While there, he had the opportunity to familiarize himself with the machine gun by watching its use during a Boer assault on June 13, 1900 against British forces holding a railway bridge.17 Indeed, in 1908, he was asked to edit a book, by a Captain Applin of the 14th Hussars, entitled Machine Gun Tactics, “Owing to the pressure of other work I was unable to do this, but I had the privilege of reading what an expert with practical experience and vision had to say on the subject and it confirmed my own non-expert views.”18 Swinton had also read H. G. Wells story “The Ironclads.” 19 In 1912, Lancelot de Mole, an Australian army Colonel, submitted designs for a tracked armored vehicle with mounted machine guns to the War Office in London. De Mole had gotten the idea when he was working on mining projects in the outback of Western Australia.20 The War Office took his designs and filed them away with all the other inventions that they had received. Later in 1912, the only company in Europe that had any experience building tracked machines, Richard Hornsby & Sons of Grantham, Lincolnshire, sold out their patents and trademarks to the Holt Tractor Company, then based in Stockton, California. The Holt Company eventually became the world leader in tracked equipment. It moved its headquarters to Peoria, Illinois, and later changed its name to the Caterpillar Tractor Company.21 In 1913, the War Office sent a rejection note to de Mole saying that his ideas were not practical.22 Indeed, the War Office did such a good job losing Mr. de Mole’s proposal that Swinton said in his memoir, “I make no mention of Mr. L.E. de Mole…I knew nothing [of de Mole’s proposal] at the time I am describing nor, indeed, till the facts were revealed before the Royal Commis- sion on Awards to Inventors, which sat in November, 1919.”23 In 1914, Swinton received a letter from a Mr. Hugh Marriott, a South African mining engineer. Mr. Marriott needed a machine to haul supplies to remote mining camps. After a long search, Mr. Marriott chose a Holt Caterpillar Tractor which he described in his letter. A Holt Caterpillar Tractor was a tracked vehicle of about 232 Cody E. Nager

two tons and 70 horsepower. Mr. Marriott thought that the Holt Caterpillar Tractor could be of some use to the military. Swinton brought the Holt Caterpillar Tractor idea to the Committee on Imperial Defense, the War Office, and the government representative on the board of the Anglo-Persian oil company.24 Mr. Marriott’s letter was also forgotten. As Mr. de Mole was proposing his tank design in Britain, a German man named Herr Goebel was trying to do the same in Germany. He attempted to give a demonstration of his war machine in 1914, after 3 years of work. Unfortunately, at a demonstration in Berlin, his tank stalled on the first obstacle and did not restart. He then disappeared from Germany in shame.25 On June 28, 1914, Archduke Franz-Ferdinand of the Austro-Hungarian Empire was shot in the streets of Sarajevo. This assassination pulled a complex web of alliances into effect and propelled all of Europe into World War One. The British and French managed to stop the German advance. The German army dug in along what became known as the Western Front. Thus began the stalemate predicted by Bloch and the root of the problem that precipitated the creation of modern armored warfare. Most of the fighting on the Western Front took place in between the two opposing trenches. This area was referred to as “No Man’s Land,” a term coined by Colonel Swinton. This wasteland was ripped up from artillery bombardments and strung with a barbed wire hedge. This hedge slowed the infantrymen’s movement near the trench allowing more time for the machine guns to kill them. Massive artillery barrages did nothing against the barbed wire because the shells simply caused the wire to sway. The battlefield had become impassable to most wheeled vehicles and horses.26 The combatants needed something to drive across the broken ground and crush the barbed wire. This problem led to many creative and improbable solutions. Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty and a former cavalryman from the 1898 Sudan Battle of Omdurman, was a proponent of bullet-proof shields on wheels pushed by the troops hiding behind it.27 One patriotic British citizen suggested THE CONCORD REVIEW 233 that the British army use high powered water jets to smash the enemies’ trench. The idea was put into a trial run in Scotland and Prime Minster Henry Asquith received a full report the next morning. The idea was rejected in a report written by Colonel Swinton because the long lengths of pipe that were required were vulnerable to artillery fire and the 3,000 horsepower engines were too heavy.28 Since Swinton had written a short story called The Defense of Duffer’s Drift, he was sent in 1914 over to France to serve as official war correspondent or “Eyewitness.” While Swinton was in France, he saw the uselessness of the current tactics. Machine guns combined with barbed wire made an almost unstoppable pair. “Our efforts to advance were in most cases frustrated by machine guns, frequently in combination with an obstacle hastily made from rabbit wire or fencing.”29 On October 19, 1914, the idea came to him of armoring a caterpillar tractor to crush the barbed wire and drive over the trenches. Or as he put it in his memoir, “…my vague idea of an armored vehicle had definitely crystallized in the form of a power-driven, bullet-proof, armed engine capable of destroying machine guns, of crossing country and trenches.”30 On October 20th, Swinton met with Captain Maurice Hankey, the Assistant Secretary for the Committee on Imperial Defense. Swinton described his idea for a machine gun destroyer and received instructions to talk to British General Headquarters (GHQ) in France. In November of 1914, wing commander Boothby of the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS) wrote a letter concerning tracked vehicles to London. The letter described the inherent benefits of tracks for crossing broken ground and pulling heavy loads. Although Boothby was writing in the context of using tracked vehicles as artillery haulers, the letter bore much influence and prompted the War office to order four Holt Tractors.31 On Christmas day, 1914 Captain Hankey wrote a memorandum that summarized conditions on the Western Front and the necessary action needed to overcome them. He then sent copies to British Prime Minister Herbert Asquith and Lord Kitchener, Secretary of State for War.32 234 Cody E. Nager

At GHQ in France, Swinton learned that the War Office had taken delivery of four caterpillar tractors for transport purposes. On January 2, 1915, Swinton returned to England only to find out that Lord Kitchener, Secretary of State for War, had rejected his machine gun destroyer proposal. So Swinton went to the head of the Royal Engineers, General Scott-Moncrieff and described his idea to him. General Scott-Moncrieff liked the idea and promised to consider it. 33 On January 9, 1915 Swinton left for France again. In January of 1915, Winston Churchill received a copy of Captain Hankey’s memo to Prime Minister Asquith. Churchill found the idea interesting and decided to act on it. On January 5th, Churchill wrote a letter to the Prime Minster Asquith stating, “It would be quite easy in a short time to fit up a number of steam tractors with small armored shelters, in which men and machine guns could be placed, which would be bullet proof.”34 In February of 1915, Churchill, under the auspices of the Royal Navy, started the political maneuvers necessary to get the tank project up and running. On February 16th, he inspected a track design for the machine. On February 20th, Churchill set up the Landships Com- mittee to study the usefulness of the proposed plan of the tank. 35 The Landships Committee was set up to study and design vehicles to crush barbed wire and assault enemy trenches. Their leader was Mr. Eustace Tennyson d’Eyncourt, director of naval construction. The engineering know-how was provided by Colonel Rookes Evelyn Bell Crompton and Lieutenant Walter Wilson. The rest of the committee were Royal Naval Air Service officers who had some sort of special experience with armored cars, engines, or tracks. The committee set to work on modifying the American Killen-Strait tractor with a naval net cutter on its front and a demonstration was given on June 30, 1915. The point of the demonstration was to justify the money being spent by the Landships Committee. Churchill had given the committee £70,000 worth of financing without informing the Board of the Admiralty, the War Office, the Department of the Master General of Ordinance, or the Treasury.36 Lord Kitchener, David Lloyd George (later a THE CONCORD REVIEW 235 British Prime Minister but at the time Director of the Ministry of Munitions), Winston Churchill and other officials were all invited. The tractor sheared through the barbed wire but was not effective at crossing trenches. David Lloyd George who attended the demonstration, was impressed with the tractor but was, “… surprised to find that these experiments were being conducted by naval men, mostly temporary officers and ratings of the armoured car division of the Royal Naval Air Force.”37 The time and money put into changing the American tractor was a disappointment because although it disabled the barbed wire, it was not able to cross trenches. So, the committee fired Col. Crompton and replaced him with a civilian engineer from William Fosters & Co named Wil- liam Tritton. Mr. Tritton ordered two specially extended tracks to be built by the American firm of Bullock Co. which was based in Chicago. When the tracks arrived in early August, the committee designed and built a hasty prototype named Number One Lin- coln Machine. When the vehicle was tested at Cross-o-Cliffe Hill in Lincoln, the tracks hung off the rims when passing over the trench. So Tritton and Wilson checked into the White Hart Hotel in London and designed a new track system.38 The new system included tracks that hooked into grooves on the wheels so that they would stay on when crossing over a trench. Many considered this new system to be the defining development of the tank’s creation. Without the new tracks, the tank would have been next to useless.39 The Number One Lincoln Machine equipped with the modified tracks was ready to be tested again on November 30th. Nicknamed “Little Willie,” this design worked. The word “Landship” was thought to be too descriptive of the purpose of the committee, so they cast about for a new name. One member of the committee suggested “water carrier” because of the proposed vehicle’s similarity to one. Even better, this implied that the invention had to deal with the Mesopotamian theater of the war and was therefore of little consequence to the Germans. “Water carrier” was rejected because the committee didn’t want to be known as the “Water Carrier Committee.” The committee 236 Cody E. Nager

finally decided on the non-descript word “tank,” after finding all possible synonyms for water carrier.40 The first official report using the new name was written on December 24, 1915. The War Office had known of the existence of the Land- ships Committee since May, 1915, but had considered it peripheral to the war effort. However, the success of “Little Willie” prompted the War Office to become involved in the tank project. The War Office took control of the project in December of 1915 on the pretense that since tanks were meant to be used on land the War Office should at least have a say in the their development. The War Office demanded that the vehicle be able to climb a 4ft 6 inch parapet and cross an 8ft wide trench. These demands sent Tritton back to the drawing board. Lt. Wilson, one of the original designers, finally came up with the idea of a rhombus with tracks running around the edges. They had to eliminate the turret that was supposed to go on the original design because it raised the center of gravity too far up.41 Two six-pounder guns of the type first used by the Royal Navy in 1885 were hung off of either side. These guns were chosen because the Royal Navy had a large surplus of them available.42 When the new tank was completed, it was named “Mother.” On January 29, 1916, “Mother” was taken to Hatfield Park, the estate of Lord Salisbury. The Lord had donated his golf course to be turned into a battlefield complete with shell holes and 9 foot wide trenches.43 On February 2nd, a demonstration was held for the military and government officials. “Mother” succeeded in impressing everyone except Lord Kitchener and former designer Crompton. David Lloyd George wrote this in his memoir, “And I can recall the feeling of delighted amazement with which I saw for the first time the ungainly monster, bearing the inscription “H.M.S. Centipede” on its breast, plough through thick entangle- ments, wallow through deep mud, and heave its huge bulk over parapets and across trenches. At last, I thought, we have the answer to the German machine-guns and wire.”44 Lloyd George also remembered Lord Kitchener’s reaction as, “[he] scoffed as the huge, clumsy creature lumbered and tumbled about, though THE CONCORD REVIEW 237 always moving forward, and expressed the opinion that it would be very quickly knocked out by artillery.”45 This insight was the exact way that the Germans would later combat the tanks. Winston Churchill also realized that the methods of warfare were profoundly changed. Writing after the war, Churchill said of the High Com- mand’s lack of faith: “There is a melancholy comfort in reflecting that if the British and French commands were short-sighted, the ablest soldier in Germany was blind. In truth these high military experts all belong to the same school. [Field Marshal Douglas] Haig at least moved faster and farther along the new path, and in consequence, doubtingly and tardily, he reaped in the end a generous reward.”46 After the Hatfield demonstration, an order for 100 tanks was placed with the Metropolitan Carriage, Wagon, and Finance Company of Birmingham. Foster’s of Lincoln was to build 25. However, during the building process, the Royal Navy ran out of six-pounder guns to give the companies. This led to the development of the “female” tank, which mounted Vickers water-cooled machine guns in the sponsons.47 A training area was secured near the town of Elveden and recruits began arriving to learn how to fight with the new tanks. At first, the Machine Gun Corps Heavy Branch had a hard time recruiting, “The development of this new arm of the service was so secret that the words Heavy Branch were omitted from the official announcements in the London gazette…”48 Most of the recruits came from the Royal Army Service Corps, the supply arm of the army. Many of the most promising recruits, those from the Royal Naval Air Service, did not join because the pay in the new Machine Gun Corps Heavy Branch was three times less than what the Royal Navy was paying them.49 Many soldiers with technical or engineering skill joined the service. One member of the Machine Gun Corps Heavy Branch was D.E. Hickey. Hickey said in his memoir that he joined the Machine Gun Corps Heavy Branch because, “Machinery had always fascinated me. The tanks fired my imagination, and I was eager to transfer into them.”50 The first tank that most recruits ever saw was “Mother,” the demonstration tank from Hatfield Park. A new British tank 238 Cody E. Nager

was, “... weighing 30 tons, and having a maximum speed of only three or four miles an hour. When closed a tank was pitch black inside…everything was so fitted that nothing was dislodged when the tank was in motion.”51 The tank’s design also greatly limited the visibility of the driver. In action, the driver had to rely on tiny O-shaped peepholes to guide the tank.52 Swinton was appointed to command the newly formed Tank Corps and immediately set out to develop a comprehensive attack strategy. When his plan was competed, Swinton’s troops were sent over to France with their newly built tanks named the “Mark One.” The tanks participated in the assault on the German lines during the Somme offensive on September 15, 1916. The assault was intended to breach the German lines near the town of Flers in the Somme. This battle had the distinction of being the first engagement ever to use a tank. There were 32 Mark One tanks involved in the assault. The understood tank tactic was, “…that they should be employed in subsections of two or three machines against strongpoints.”53 The tanks advanced out of a bombardment and began to assault the German line. One of the British tank fighters, Lt. A.E. Arnold, described the enemy reaction as, “A row of German heads appeared above the Parapet and looked—no doubt some in amazement—at what was approaching out of the murk of the bombardment.”54 The battle was a minor victory, with the British gaining just under 5 kilometers. However, it revealed the weaknesses in the Mark One model. The most notable was the large amount of exertion required to turn one of the tanks. According to one commander, “It was a hard job to turn one of these early tanks. It needed four of the crew to work the levers, and they took their orders by signal…Zig-zagging was, therefore, a slow and complicated business.”55 This battle caused a redesign of the tanks which eliminated the rear wheel assembly meant to help with steering. The largest and most important tank battle during World War One was the British surprise attack on Cambrai on Novem- ber 20, 1917. The Tank Corps (renamed from the Machine Gun Corps Heavy Branch) committed three-hundred-seventy-eight THE CONCORD REVIEW 239 recently built “Mark IV” tanks to this assault. The Germans had realized how to neutralize a tank. They “concealed tank traps on the model of elephant-pits, formidable double-traversed trenches, a branch of special anti-tank artillery, heavily reinforced concrete stockades, and an elaborate system of land mines.”56 However, the only practical way to destroy a tank was a direct hit with an artillery shell. Hence the worry of the British section commander of Company H, “There was another ridge to be crossed before we reached Fontaine, and since we’d already seen the mess that one enemy gun had made of tanks as they topped a ridge we didn’t feel too comfortable about it—especially as the enemy was now prepared for tanks.”57 The Cambrai battle ended with a British victory. “The attack was a stupendous success…the whole German trench system had been penetrated on a front of six miles, 10,000 prisoners and 200 guns captured without the loss of more than 1,500 British soldiers.”58 The Tank Corps still celebrates this victory as one of their greatest. The Armistice and the end of the First World War did not spell the end for the tanks. The British Mark series tanks were handed out as prizes to the towns that raised the most money during the war bonds campaign. Other Mark series were used as target practice for the newer generations of tanks. The British light tanks, the medium series, nicknamed the “Whippet” series, were used for policing purposes, especially in Scotland. Some others with historical significance were dragged to a lot in Bovington, where they sat and eventually formed the nucleus of the collection of the Tank Museum in Bovington.59 The end of the war did raise the issue for the British of who had actually invented this machine. Since the tank had many claimants, the British Government set up a Royal Commission in 1919 to investigate the matter. On October 6, 1919, the Commis- sion met at Lincoln Inn.60 The main claimants were Col. Ernest Swinton, Commodore Sueter on the behalf of the Royal Naval Air Service, Col. Crompton, and the engineer Tritton. Australian army Colonel de Mole also arrived to give testimony. The chief 240 Cody E. Nager

witness was Winston Churchill. The Commission interviewed all concerned and on November 27, 1919 issued its verdict. Swinton received £1,000, Tritton £7,500, and Sueter, de Mole and Crompton all collected nothing.61 The Commission’s findings didn’t end the quarrel however. In 1941, H.G. Wells was claiming that he invented the tank and that Swinton was a buffoon. Wells cited his 1903 story “The Land Ironclads,” as the basis for his claim. Swinton sued Wells for libel. They eventually settled out of court.62 No matter who gets credit for inventing the tank, its importance in revolutionizing warfare cannot be overstated. As David Lloyd George wrote in his memoir, “British in conception, design and manufacture, the Tank was the one outstanding and dramatic innovation brought forth by the War in the sphere of mechanical aids to warfare. It was the ultimate British reply to the machine-guns and heavily fortified trench systems of the German army, and there is no doubt whatever that it played a very important part in helping the Allies to victory.” 63 The development of the tank made cavalry obsolete. The horse, after nearly 3,400 years of battlefield use, was relegated to ceremonial purposes. The tank became the tip of the spear, used in many military situations to lead the attack. It was used most effectively by the German World War Two Panzer divisions in the deadly and effective blitzkriegs, their “lightning-strike” attacks. The tank was technology of the industrial age being applied to warfare, which made manpower advantages negligible, called for new tactics and restored movement to the battlefield. In 1920, Major J.F.C. Fuller, the renowned military strategist, won the Gold Prize from the Royal United Services Institute for his paper on the effects of tanks on the future of war. Fuller stated that “The change in the art of war effected by the introduction of the petrol engine to the battlefield…has opened a new era in the history of war to which we can find no parallel in land fighting.”64 Warfare had changed forever. THE CONCORD REVIEW 241

Endnotes

1 “Tank Evolved from 18 Machines,” New York Times (9 October 1919) p. 1 2 A. J. Smithers, A New Excalibur (London: Leo Cooper, 1986) p. 3 3 Ibid., p. 3 4 Robert Cowley and Parker Geoffrey, eds., The Readers’s Companion to Military History (New York: Houghton, 1996) p. 74 5 John H. Batchelor, Tank: A History of the Armoured Fighting Vehicle (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1970) p. 6 6 Richard M. Ogorkiewicz, Armor (London: Steven & Sons, 1960) p. 454 7 Arch Whitehouse, Tank: The Story of Their Battles and the Men Who Drove Them from Their First Use in World War One to Korea (Garden City: Doubleday, 1960) p. 35 8 Patrick Wright, Tank: The Life and Times of a ‘Wonder Weapon (BBC-History, BBC Online, 5 November 2009) 9 Smithers, p. 4 10 Ivan Stanislavovich Bloch, The Future of War in its Technical, Economic, and Political Relations; Is War Now Impossible? (New York: Doubleday & McClure, 1899) p. 345 11 “Prophet of Trench Deadlock Vindicated,” New York Times, (23 January 1916) p. 1 12 H. G. Wells, The Land Ironclads, (Strand, December 1903) p. 506 13 Smithers, p. 6 14 Ernest Swinton, Eyewitness: Being Personal Reminiscences of Certain Phases of the Great War, Including the Genesis of the Tank (Garden City: Doubleday, Doran, 1933) p. 8 15 Smithers, p. 7 16 John Glanfield, The Devil’s Chariots (Phoenix Mill: Sutton, 2006) p. 17 17 Swinton, p. 5 18 Ibid., p. 8 19 Ibid., p. 152 20 Ken Wright, The Design Was Not Passed On, (Brigham Young University World War One Document Archive Online, 242 Cody E. Nager

2006), 21 Glanfield, p. 14 22 Wright, 23 Swinton, p. 152 24 Ibid., p. 12 25 Smithers, p. 11 26 Ibid., p. 42 27 Winston Churchill, The World Crisis (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1931) p. 314 28 Glanfield, p. 3 29 Swinton, p. 43 30 Ibid., p. 57 31 David Fletcher, The British Tanks 1915-1919 (Wiltshire: Crowood, 2001) p. 23 32 Swinton, p. 77 33 Ibid., p. 77 34 Churchill, p. 313 35 Ibid., p. 316 36 Ibid., p. 316 37 David Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George (Boston: Little, Brown, 1933) p. 381 38 David Fletcher, Landships (London: Crown, 1984) p. 11 39 David Fletcher, British Mark One Tank 1916 (Oxford: Osprey, 2004) p. 5 40 David Fletcher, Landships, p. 46 41 Fletcher, British Mark One Tank 1916, p. 6 42 Ibid., p. 8 43 David Fletcher, Landships, p. 13 44 George, p. 382 45 Ibid., p. 383 46 Churchill, p. 321 47 Fletcher, British Mark One Tank 1916, p. 12 48 D. E. Hickey, Rolling into Action (London: Hutchinson, 1932) p. 26 49 Whitehouse, p. 35 50 Hickey, p. 26 51 Ibid., p. 48 52 Clough Williams-Ellis and A. Williams-Ellis, The Tank Corps (London: Country Life, 1919) p. 3 53 David Fletcher, ed., Tanks and Trenches (London: Sutton, 1996) p. 3 THE CONCORD REVIEW 243

54 Ibid., p.11 55 Fletcher, The British Tanks 1915-19, p. 87 56 Williams-Ellis, p. 3 57 Fletcher, Tanks and Trenches, p. 83 58 Churchill, p. 743 59 Fletcher, The British Tanks, p. 190 60 Christy Campbell, Band of Brigands (London: Harper Perennial, 2008) p. 400 61 Fletcher, The British Tanks, p. 187 62 Campbell, p. xxvii 63 George, p. 381 64 J. P. Harris, Men, Ideas, and Tanks: British Military Thought and Armoured Forces,1903-1939 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995) p. 204

Bibliography

Primary Sources Bloch, Ivan Stanislavovich, The Future of War in its Technical, Economic, and Political Relations; Is War Now Impossible?, New York: Doubleday & McClure, 1899 Churchill, Winston, The World Crisis, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1931 “Eleven Inventors Claim Tanks,” New York Times, 7 October 1919 George, David Lloyd, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, Boston: Little, Brown, 1933 Hickey, D. E., Rolling into Action, London: Hutchinson, 1932 “Prophet of Trench Deadlock Vindicated,” New York Times, 23 January 1916 Swinton, Ernest, Eyewitness: Being Personal Reminiscences of Certain Phases of the Great War, Including the Genesis of the Tank, Garden City: Doubleday, Doran, 1933 “Tank Evolved from 18 Machines,” New York Times, 8 October 1919 Wells, H. G., The Land Ironclads, Strand, December 1903 Williams-Ellis, Clough, and A. Williams-Ellis, The Tank Corps, London: Country Life, 1919 244 Cody E. Nager

Secondary Sources

Batchelor, John H., Tank: A History of the Armoured Fighting Vehicle, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1970 Caddick-Adams, Peter, Ninety Years of the Tank, BBC- News, BBC Online, < http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/ magazine/5339280.stm> 13 September 2006 Campbell, Christy, Band of Brigands, London: Harper Perennial, 2008 Cowley, Robert, and Geoffrey Parker, eds., The Readers’s Companion to Military History, New York: Houghton, 1996 Fletcher, David, Landships, London: Crown, 1984 Fletcher, David, ed., Tanks and Trenches, London: Sutton, 1996 Fletcher, David, The British Tanks 1915-19, Wiltshire: Crowood, 2001 Fletcher, David. British Mark One Tank 1916, Oxford: Osprey, 2004 Ford, Roger, The World’s Greatest Tanks: From 1916 until Present Day, London: Barnes & Noble, 1997 Glanfield, John, The Devil’s Chariots, Phoenix Mill: Sutton, 2006 Harris, J. P., Men, Ideas, and Tanks: British Military Thought and Armoured Forces, 1903-1939, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995 Ogorkiewicz, Richard M., Armor, London: Steven & Sons, 1960 Smithers, A. J., A New Excalibur, London: Leo Cooper, 1986 Whitehouse, Arch, Tank: The Story of Their Battles and the Men Who Drove Them from Their First Use in World War One to Korea, Garden City: Doubleday, 1960 Wright, Ken, The Design Was Not Passed On, Brigham Young University World War One Document Archive, Online, , 2006 Wright, Patrick, Tank: The Life and Times of a Wonder Weapon, BBC-History BBC, Online, < http://www.bbc.co.uk/ history/worldwars/wwone/gallery_tank_01.shtml> 5 November 2009 THE CONCORD REVIEW 245 Copyright 2010, by The Concord Review, Inc., all rights reserved

THE POLITICAL TIPPING POINT: HOW THE KENNEDY FAMILY DEFEATED THE LODGES IN THE 1952 UNITED STATES SENATE ELECTION IN MASSACHUSETTS

Matthew C. Weinstein

The 1952 United States Senate campaign was unlike any political race Massachusetts had seen before. The election pitted the state’s longstanding political and social aristocracy against the rising class of assimilated immigrants.1 Beyond the race between two highly qualified individual candidates, incumbent Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. (sometimes called, “Lodge”) and 11th District Congressman, John Fitzgerald Kennedy (sometimes called, “JFK”), voters witnessed a broader battle between the two prominent Massachusetts political dynasties of the twentieth century.2 When JFK defeated Lodge on November 4, 1952 by a mere seventy thousand votes, or three percent of votes cast, he ended the more than 150-year “Lodge dynasty” in Massachusetts politics and began the “Kennedy dynasty,” which would continue into the twenty-first century with the late Senator Edward M. Kennedy.3 JFK’s Senate victory, only the third by a Massachusetts Democrat since the initial election of the United States Senate in 1789, marked the end of Massachusetts as a Republican-dominated state.4 Since 1952, only two non-incumbent Republican United

Matthew C. Weinstein is a Senior at the Belmont Hill School in Belmont, Massachusetts, where he wrote this paper for Mr. Christos Kolovos’ AP United States History course in the 2009/2010 academic year. 246 Matthew C. Weinstein

States Senators have been elected in Massachusetts.5 Lodge, a three-term Republican Senator, represented traditional Protes- tant Yankee beliefs. Meanwhile, JFK, the great-grandson of Irish American immigrants, personified the Irish Catholic ascent in post World War II American culture.6 JFK, only thirty-five years old on Election Day, also represented a new breed of Massachusetts politicians.7 Using new technologies, such as television, and innovative campaign strategies, including personal gatherings with voters, the Kennedy campaign infused an extraordinary level of energy into the Senate race.8 This epic battle between old and new, fueled by Kennedy’s novel campaign strategies, drove an unprecedented 90.94 percent of eligible voters to the polls to vote for either tradition or change, an increase of more than seventeen percent from Lodge’s 1946 election.9 The 1952 campaign marked a crossroads of political careers for two politicians and their respective families. While Lodge was a well-established politician in his own right by 1952, he also represented the long lineage of Lodge family politicians.10 Prior to his 1952 defeat, Lodge was the prominent national leader of moderate Senate Republicans and served as Dwight D. Eisenhower’s campaign manager during the future President’s successful 1952 campaign.11 However, following his 1952 Senate defeat, neither Lodge, nor any of his relatives, ever held elected office again.12 In contrast, JFK was the first of several family members elected to federal office.13 JFK’s 1952 election elevated the young politician to national prominence and served as a launching pad for his 1960 Presidential campaign.14 Many strategies which Kennedy developed and perfected in his 1952 campaign were redeployed with success during his 1960 Presidential run.15 However, the future President did not defeat Lodge singlehandedly. Only by concentrating all of the Kennedy family’s resources and influence toward the campaign was JFK able to win over Massachusetts voters with his charm, energy, and fresh ideas.16 Without the zealous contributions of JFK’s parents, siblings, and cousins to his campaign, JFK, young and relatively unknown prior to 1952, might have lost to Lodge in a landslide.17 The mobiliza- tion of substantial Kennedy family resources to support John F. THE CONCORD REVIEW 247 Kennedy’s Senate campaign enabled the young congressman to defeat the incumbent, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.

The Cabot Lodges The Cabot Lodge family has been intertwined in Ameri- can political history almost since the federal government began. Lodge’s great-great-great grandfather, George Cabot, served one term as United States Senator from Massachusetts, from 1791 to 1796.18 Cabot’s seat was the same Senate seat which Lodge and JFK battled over in 1952, more than 150 years later.19 George Cabot, a member of the Federalist Party, also served as President of the Hartford Convention, a conference of New England states which met from December 15, 1814 to January 5, 1815 to discuss regional grievances with the federal government during the War of 1812.20 Two great-great grandfathers of Lodge also served in the United States Senate.21 Elijah H. Mills served for one term, from 1820 to 1827, and John Davis served two non-consecutive terms, from 1835 to 1841 and from 1845 to 1853.22 Henry Cabot Lodge, Sr. (sometimes called, “Lodge Sr.”) picked up the family’s political tradition in 1892.23 Lodge Sr. was elected six times to the United States Senate by Massachusetts voters, serving from 1893 until his death in 1924 in the same seat as both his great-grandfather and grandson.24 Lodge Sr. was one of the most powerful Republican Senators of his time. During his tenure, Lodge Sr. served as President Pro Tempore of the Senate from 1911 to 1913.25 However, Lodge Sr. is most widely known for his role as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.26 As chairman, Lodge Sr. led a group of isolationist Republican Senators who amassed enough Senate supporters to block ratification of President Wilson’s Treaty of Versailles.27 The son of Lodge Sr., George Cabot Lodge, was a poet who married Mathilda Elizabeth Frelinghuysen Davis.28 The couple gave birth to Lodge on July 5, 1902.29 Tragically, George Cabot Lodge died from a heart attack when his son was only seven years old.30 As a result, Lodge Sr. served as Lodge’s father and mentor throughout most of the younger Lodge’s childhood.31 248 Matthew C. Weinstein

From an early age, Lodge Sr. inspired his grandson to maintain the family’s tradition of public service. Looking back on his grandfather’s mentorship years later, Lodge remarked, The discussion of political topics was one of the first things I can remember. A haze of cigar smoke and the emphatic utterance of such words as ‘caucus’ ‘committee’ or ‘campaign’—words which were then incomprehensible to me—are vividly impressed on my mind…..It was his hope that I might carry on in this field.32 Lodge continued the Cabot Lodge political dynasty. Beginning his political career in 1932, Lodge was elected to the Massachusetts House of Representatives from the conservative and wealthy town of Beverly.33 Four years later, in 1936, Lodge, then only thirty- four years old, ran for and won the open United States Senate seat, soundly defeating his Democratic opponent, Massachusetts Governor James Michael Curley, by 135,409 votes, or seven and a half percent of the votes cast.34 Lodge served in the Senate until 1944, when, feeling he was not making adequate contributions to the country’s World War II efforts, he enlisted in the United States Army, becoming the first active United States Senator to relinquish his seat to join the military since the Civil War.35 After the war, Lodge’s yearning for public service led him, in 1946, to challenge and defeat five-term incumbent Democrat Senator, David Walsh, to regain a United States Senate seat from Massachusetts.36 By 1952, Lodge, then the second most senior Republican in the Senate, was an extremely powerful legislator, holding seats on the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services committees.37 These committees were especially influential given the predominance of military issues following World War II and the beginning of the Cold War.

The Fitzgerald Kennedys Following their immigration to the United States, the Fitzgerald Kennedy family quickly climbed the necessary economic and social ladders to gain affluence and power. All four of JFK’s great-grandparents were Irish immigrants, who came to America in the 1840s to escape Ireland’s devastating potato famine38 The family was introduced to politics when JFK’s maternal grandfather, THE CONCORD REVIEW 249 John “Honey Fitz” Fitzgerald, a Democrat, served as mayor of Bos- ton from 1896 to 1914.39 The first of four elections between the Lodge and Kennedy families occurred in November, 1916, when “Honey Fitz” Fitzgerald challenged incumbent Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Sr. for the United States Senate.40 In this opening contest between the two families, Lodge Sr. defeated Fitzgerald by approximately six percent of votes cast.41 The Fitzgerald and Kennedy families merged when “Honey Fitz’s” daughter, Rose Fitzgerald, married Joseph P. Kennedy in 1914.42 Approximately three years later, on May 29, 1917, Rose gave birth to John Fitzger- ald Kennedy, her second of nine children. The political history on the paternal side of the Kennedy family begins with JFK’s father, Joseph P. Kennedy, Sr., an influential self-made multi-millionaire.43 Joseph Kennedy earned his fortune with successful stock investments in the largely unregulated markets of the early 1920s.44 In 1926, Kennedy Sr. traveled to Hol- lywood and increased his fortune by producing low-budget movies featuring prominent stars, such as Gloria Swanson, promoted by frequent public print advertising.45 Through movie production and promotion, Kennedy came to understand fundamental marketing concepts and developed contacts in the advertising and video industries that he would later use to aid his sons’ campaigns.46 In 1932, Joseph Kennedy supported then New York Gov- ernor Franklin D. Roosevelt’s first campaign for President, raising 200,000 dollars for Roosevelt.47 In 1935, Roosevelt appointed Joseph Kennedy as the first chairman of the newly created Securities and Exchange Commission, designed to regulate the securities markets Kennedy had mastered.48 Always ambitious, in 1938 a national poll ranked Joseph Kennedy as the fifth most likely person to succeed Roosevelt as President.49 In his autobiography, Senator Ted Kennedy recalled his father’s ambition to become the first Irish Catholic President saying, “As I learned much later, my father’s name was among those being prominently considered as Roosevelt’s succes- sor.”50 In 1938, President Roosevelt appointed Joseph Kennedy the Ambassador to England.51 Kennedy was an isolationist, reluctant to see the United States enter the war against Germany.52 In a Boston 250 Matthew C. Weinstein

Globe article on November 10, 1940, Ambassador Kennedy shared his opinion that, “Democracy is finished in England. It may be here.”53 His controversial views made national news and alienated him from President Roosevelt and the Democratic Party.54 The Globe interview and resulting public outrage ended Joseph Kennedy’s aspirations for elected political office.55 Like a Hollywood actor, no longer able to stand in front of the camera, Joseph Kennedy was pushed to the background, where he worked tirelessly as the producer, director, banker, and marketer for the political careers of his sons.56 The senior Kennedy transferred his ambition to be the first Irish Catholic President of the United States to his sons, one of whom he imagined would someday become that President.57 After Kennedy’s eldest son, Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr. died during a World War II air force mission over the English Channel in 1944, that goal was passed onto the shoulders of JFK.58 Following his father’s desires, JFK began his political career soon after his brother’s death. Initially, JFK set sights on the 1946 race for the United States House of Representatives from the 11th District of Massachusetts.59 Foreshadowing the 1952 Sen- ate campaign, Joseph Kennedy’s influence and wealth facilitated JFK’s victory. Joseph Kennedy was so determined to improve his son’s chances to win, he paid Democrat incumbent James Michael Curley 100,000 dollars in return for Curley’s promise not to seek reelection.60 In addition, the Kennedy campaign, heavily funded by Joseph Kennedy, spent 300,000 dollars on the election, an unprecedented amount of money for a congressional race at that time.61 With his father’s aid, JFK won the open House seat, where he served three terms, from 1947 to 1953.62 This district, which included many of Boston’s nearby suburbs, such as Cambridge, Charlestown, and Somerville, was largely comprised of working class Irish and Italian voters.63 By one key measure, attendance, JFK was not particularly effective as their Representative, missing nearly half of the House’s floor votes.64 Early in his career, JFK suffered from Ad- dison’s disease, an illness of the adrenal glands, which drew him away from Capitol Hill for treatment and rest.65 In later years as a THE CONCORD REVIEW 251 Representative, JFK often skipped votes to campaign for the 1952 Senate election.66 However, despite these absences, JFK remained popular due to the Irish Catholic demographics of his district.67 Approaching the 1952 campaign, JFK enjoyed the support of the growing number of Catholics and Irish in Massachusetts.68 How- ever, he lacked the name recognition that Lodge and his family had built over several generations.69 JFK was forced to rely upon creative and tireless campaigning to challenge the long-standing incumbent successfully.70 With the determined, coordinated assistance of his large family, JFK defeated Lodge. Many Kennedy family members played vital roles in the campaign, but none contributed more broadly and influentially than JFK’s father. The wealthy Joseph Kennedy, Sr. provided financial backing for the Senate contest. In addition, his experience with public communications and connections with the nascent television and more established movie industries were arguably his most helpful contributions.

Joseph P. Kennedy, Sr.: Media, Money, and Influence

Joseph P. Kennedy, Sr. maintained close contacts with television producers he met in the 1930s, when he produced movies in Hollywood.71 During the 1952 race, the Kennedy campaign marshaled these resources to their advantage. For example, the elder Kennedy hired Hollywood newsreel cameramen to film JFK campaigning on the streets of Boston.72 This footage was later used in an advertisement that portrayed JFK’s personable style and showed his interest in meeting face-to-face with voters and answering their questions.73 Joseph Kennedy also used his influence in the television industry when, at JFK’s request, he convinced the NBC network to send to Boston from New York technologically advanced television broadcast equipment for use by the Kennedy campaign.74 Prior to Joseph Kennedy’s overtures, NBC network executives had declined the campaign’s requests to borrow such equipment.75 252 Matthew C. Weinstein

The most important media contact which Joseph Kennedy provided to the campaign was Batten, Barton, Durstine & Osborn (BBD&O), a nationally recognized television advertising agency.76 In a February 1952 letter to Joseph Kennedy, Mark J. Dalton, a close aide of JFK, suggested that Joseph Kennedy intervene to secure a series of television advertisement segments from BBD&O.77 Joseph Kennedy quickly acted upon Dalton’s request, and, within ten days, connected his son with agents from BBD&O who helped the candidate advertise on television.78 During his meeting with two BBD&O employees, Wicklifpe Crider and John Elliott, JFK learned how to communicate messages effectively on television with personal, intimate facial expressions and by looking directly into the cameras.79 John Galvin, another JFK aide, also present at the meeting, commented that, “the successful commercial TV programs are the ones marked by informality and action.”80 JFK’s ability to appear both engaging and informal on this powerful, new communication medium was one of his biggest campaign assets.81 With help from Joseph Kennedy’s connections at BBD&O and NBC, JFK campaigned much more effectively and frequently on television than Lodge. In the campaign’s final month, JFK appeared on CBS and ABC Boston affiliates a combined thirty-three times, appearing fifteen times on CBS and eighteen times on ABC.82 In contrast, Lodge made only eighteen television appearances on two affiliates, six times on CBS and twelve times on ABC.83 JFK’s 480 minutes on air during the last month of the race trumped Lodge’s 260 minutes of television coverage.84 Outside the greater Boston television market, Kennedy made a dozen five-minute television spots at notable sites across Massachusetts.85 Each spot focused on a specific campaign issue. For example, JFK filmed and aired one advertisement at a local fish pier where he discussed the New England fishing industry, and another advertisement at a local shoe factory, where he discussed the importance of the traditional shoe industry.86 Also, JFK appeared on the national political talk-show, Meet the Press, two separate times, once during the Senate campaign and another immediately following the election.87 In his first appearance, in December 1951, JFK attempted to increase both his THE CONCORD REVIEW 253 local and national name recognition by discussing national and foreign affairs.88 His second appearance on the show, November 9, 1952, featured his recent victory over Lodge.89 The sharp difference in how the two candidates made use of television was due to their different levels of competence and comfort with exploiting this new medium to market their personalities, styles, and ideas. JFK, groomed by his father and the BBD&O professionals, had, in the opinion of Camman Newberry, a close Kennedy aide, “a marvelous quality of making you feel that you were his special friend.”90 Lodge, in contrast, struggled to portray himself in an appealing light on television. According to Gene Wyckoff, a television producer who worked with Lodge, When [Lodge Jr.] opened his mouth and when he interacted with people on television, there was something not so attractive—something in his demeanor, a touch of hauteur, arrogance, aloofness, or condescension perhaps. His characterization did not ring true.91 Lodge seemed to understand his disadvantage when it came to television marketing and, as a result, he refused JFK’s request to debate on the political discussion show, The American Forum of the Air.92 When the candidates finally debated live on television on September 17th, most analysts concluded that JFK connected with the television audience more effectively than Lodge.93 In a review of the debate, the Lynn Telegraph News reported that Kennedy’s “manner was unrestrained, and his poise never left him.”94 In contrast, Lodge failed to connect with his audience, frequently coming across as uptight and often failing to look directly into the camera when speaking.95 JFK’s most successful television programs were two thirty- minute segments, entitled “Coffee with the Kennedys.” Airing on October 15th and November 1st 1952, these programs were broadcast on ABC and CBS, respectively, in the greater Boston area.96 How- ever, JFK reached voters throughout Massachusetts because these programs were simulcast on radio across the state.97 During these televised family gatherings, JFK’s mother and two sisters, Patricia and Eunice, accompanied the candidate on screen. The campaign sought to motivate female voters and arranged for women to call 254 Matthew C. Weinstein into the program to ask JFK and his family questions.98 In a highly coordinated and organized effort, the campaign also encouraged women across Massachusetts to host tea parties during the show for their neighbors. As a result of Kennedy’s intense promotion of the program, more than five thousand women across Massa- chusetts hosted their neighbors for the first show.99 These women served coffee and tea to their predominately female guests as they watched JFK on television.100 The second program, which aired two weeks later, was conducted in the same format.101 For this November program, JFK was joined by his youngest sister, Jean, in addition to Eunice, Patricia, and Rose.102 The November program was more popular than the first, as nearly ten thousand women throughout Massachusetts served as hosts.103 Ed Wagner, Kennedy’s campaign press aide, promoted the second program more broadly than the first, assuring the press that teas would take place in every city and town across Massachusetts.104 In addition to the television marketing campaign, Joseph Kennedy helped JFK’s print advertising campaign. With experience gained from marketing Hollywood movies, Kennedy developed novel media strategies. For example, he envisioned a cartoon book to emphasize JFK’s historical Massachusetts ties.105 Throughout the cartoon, some of which featured images of JFK’s father and maternal grandfather, the campaign illustrated the long history of Kennedy Fitzgerald families in Massachusetts politics.106 More important than cartoons, the elder Kennedy helped to secure traditional print newspaper support with the Boston Post’s endorsement of JFK over Lodge.107 This endorsement was crucial for JFK and a blow to Lodge, who was disadvantaged among Bos- ton voters due to his Anglo Protestant background, and sought the Post’s endorsement to salvage a respectable performance within Boston.108 In 1952, the Post boasted more than 300,000 daily readers, the majority of whom were located within Boston’s Irish Catholic neighborhoods.109 According to Lodge campaign estimates, the Post’s endorsement would have yielded 40,000 additional votes within Boston.110 The Post’s editor at the time, John Fox, was unsure whom he would endorse, waiting until October THE CONCORD REVIEW 255 25th, a mere ten days before Election Day, to endorse JFK.111 How- ever, Fox may have not supported JFK solely for the candidate’s political attributes. Just prior to the Post’s formal endorsement, Joseph Kennedy, echoing tactics from his son’s 1946 congressional race, loaned 500,000 dollars to Fox to pay off deficits of the newspaper.112 While Fox eventually repaid the loan, Joseph Kennedy’s financial influence over Fox may have given JFK an advantage at a key point in the campaign.113 The 1952 election results for Boston gave JFK a two-to-one margin over Lodge, winning by 119,393 votes.114 By comparison, Lodge beat Walsh in their 1946 Senate race by six percent.115 In 1952, among all Massachusetts voters located outside of Boston, Lodge beat JFK by 48,656 votes, or 2.4 percent.116 However, JFK’s large Boston lead overcame Lodge’s advantage elsewhere and tipped the race to JFK.117 Joseph’s Kennedy’s financial support of the Boston Post, similar to his third-party contributions during JFK’s 1946 campaign, demonstrate that, as one of the world’s most wealthy men, he was in a position to use his money to influence the 1952 election. Joseph Kennedy raised and spent hundreds of thousands of dollars on JFK’s Senate race.118 For example, according to Abraham Glovsky, a Beverly lawyer and close friend of Lodge, Joseph Ken- nedy would, during the 1952 campaign, “Go into a community that wanted to build a church…or some other communal thing, and they would put up X thousands of dollars….”119 Since this money came directly from Joseph Kennedy and was dedicated to public or charitable purposes, it was not, technically, a political campaign expenditure, but nonetheless garnered political support for JFK.120 The entire Kennedy family, including in-laws, officially donated more than 70,000 dollars to JFK’s campaign.121 Lodge’s entire campaign raised 58,266 dollars.122 By contrast, the Ken- nedy campaign reported official spending of 349,646 dollars.123 Kennedy’s ability to raise this substantial amount of money was helped by Joseph Kennedy’s circle of wealthy acquaintances.124 Finally, Joseph Kennedy used his national political influence to aid JFK’s campaign by convincing powerful Wisconsin Republican Senator, Joe McCarthy, the now infamous but then the 256 Matthew C. Weinstein extremely popular Communist-hunter, to remain neutral and not campaign for his fellow Republican, Lodge.125 If Senator McCar- thy, an Irish Catholic, had campaigned for Lodge, he would have diminished JFK’s core voting bloc and might have swayed enough voters to tip the election towards Lodge.126 In fact, McCarthy was certain that, had he campaigned for Lodge, the Republican would have defeated JFK.127 However, while McCarthy belonged to the same party as Lodge, he enjoyed a longtime friendship with the Kennedy family.128 His relationship with the Kennedys began during World War II, when McCarthy and JFK were both stationed on the Solomon Islands in the South Pacific.129 Following the war, McCarthy befriended Eunice and Patricia Kennedy, even dating Patricia for a short time.130 McCarthy and Joseph Kennedy were also close friends. The elder Kennedy frequently invited McCar- thy to his summer house in Hyannis Port, Massachusetts.131 As a result of such close ties to the Kennedys, together with a recent contribution of 5,000 dollars by Joseph Kennedy to McCarthy’s campaign fund, the influential Republican Senator did not openly campaign for Lodge, helping JFK to dominate the populous Irish and Catholic precincts around Boston on Election Day.132

The Kennedy Women: The French Connection and Tea Parties

As Joseph Kennedy, Sr. worked behind the scenes, the Kennedy women played successful public roles in promoting JFK’s election. Each of the Kennedy women, Rose, Eunice, Patricia, Jean, and Rose’s cousin, Polly, found her own niche in the campaign. Kennedy’s mother, Rose Fitzgerald Kennedy, sixty-two years old at the time, was the most active.133 Rose was especially valuable in cultivating French American voters. In the early 1900s, French- Canadians immigrated to work in textile factories of Massachu- setts mill towns.134 As early as 1900, Worcester’s 15,300 French- Canadians comprised 13 percent of its population.135 From 1915 to 1940, French-Canadians were the largest ethnic group in the Blackstone River Valley region.136 In 1950, three of the six most populous Massachusetts cities were located in this region.137 This French-speaking population read news from dedicated Franco- American newspapers.138 THE CONCORD REVIEW 257 Since Rose was fluent in French, the Kennedy campaign planned several short speeches for her in French across Massa- chusetts.139 Speaking to groups which sometimes exceeded 800 people, Rose’s remarks were specifically aimed to attract the votes of French women.140 All of her speeches followed a similar pattern.141 Rose emphasized her connections to France and the importance of French culture to Rose and her family.142 For example, speaking to a French women’s group in Boston, she said, “France means a great deal to me because I am a wife and a mother and a woman, who above all desires to make her home comfortable and beauti- ful for her husband and children.”143 In fact, Rose had never lived in France, but learned the language during annual vacations to Paris.144 Her appeals to French women frequently included jokes about the latest French clothing designs, but never a discussion of serious issues.145 Rose concluded her speeches by assuring her audience that her son shared the same fond feelings for France as she.146 Rose campaigned energetically in French venues. For example, on Bastille Day, July 14th, 1952, Rose attended a Memorial Service for French soldiers in Boston, then met diplomats at the French Consulate, and ended her day with dinner at the French Society.147 For her tireless efforts with the French community, Rose was honored on October 24th, 1952 by the French Women’s Com- mittee of Springfield for “her work in promoting French values” during the campaign.148 The Kennedy campaign identified French women as an important demographic constituency for Rose to court because many French women neither watched television nor attend the tea gatherings which the Kennedys sponsored.149 Accordingly, Rose’s speeches filled the communication gap. The campaign used her fluency with the French language to create the false impression among French voters that the entire family, especially JFK, could speak French.150 Rose’s efforts helped JFK carry French-Canadian strongholds in the Blackstone River Valley, including the city of Worcester and all Worcester County, which Lodge easily won in his 1946 Senate race, as well as convincing victories in the mill cities of Fall River and New Bedford.151 258 Matthew C. Weinstein

While Rose focused her energy on winning the French vote, her daughters, Eunice, Patricia, and Jean, actively campaigned across Massachusetts, from the western cities of Lenox and Holy- oke to the Cape Cod town of Barnstable.152 Rose’s daughters spent many days during the late summer and early fall of 1952 travel- ing door-to-door, handing out campaign paraphernalia, such as bumper stickers and pins, and generally encouraging voters to elect JFK.153 All three of JFK’s sisters concentrated on generating support for JFK among their peer group, women voters. In one memorable day in early September, Eunice and Patricia traveled the streets of Salem, meeting more than 1,000 women.154 Patricia also served as chair of Kennedy’s women’s committee.155 In this role, she promoted several mid-morning radio and television programs featuring JFK which aired in October.156 Similar to midday television shows popular among twenty-first-century women, Ken- nedy’s programs were directed away from thorny foreign policy issues and towards women and their interests, such as Kennedy’s family values.157 In addition, all three sisters promoted the two highly successful “Coffee with the Kennedys” television shows, encouraging other women to watch and host teas.158 The campaign’s most effective strategy to cultivate the women’s vote was a series of tea parties, separate from teas associated with the “Coffee with the Kennedys” programs. During the months leading up Election Day, the Kennedy women organized thirty-three informal tea gatherings in towns across Massachusetts, from North Adams to South Attleboro.159 The teas were marketed by the campaign’s press aide, Ed Wagner, as “an opportunity for the women to meet the Kennedy family socially and talk with Ken- nedy, the individual, rather than Kennedy, the candidate.”160 The teas were held in local homes or local hotels.161 First, the Kennedy women charmed their mostly female audience with light conversation.162 Then, JFK appeared towards the end of the gathering.163 The women flocked to JFK, a highly attractive bachelor.164 After meeting attendees, JFK usually made a short speech, focusing on lighter domestic matters, judged more appealing to female voters than foreign policy.165 Finally, as each woman left, she received several pieces of campaign literature.166 JFK often wrote thank THE CONCORD REVIEW 259 you letters to women who hosted the gatherings.167 Rose’s first cousin, Polly Fitzgerald, was the leading organizer of the teas.168 However, despite Polly’s broad leadership, the teas somewhat resembled a grassroots movement, whereby local women took charge of planning the logistics and spreading news of the event by word of mouth.169 While the campaign sent out invitations to prominent community members, the Kennedys were very inclusive, allowing anyone, specifically invited or not, to attend the teas.170 By working at these local levels, the Kennedy campaign motivated an estimated 75,000 women to attend one of the teas.171 Through these informal tea parties, JFK engaged women from a variety of social and ethnic backgrounds. Several teas were designed to appeal to specific ethnic groups. For example, the Kennedys hosted a tea reception at the Somerset Hotel in Boston in honor of Rose Kennedy on October 30th, targeted to attract Canadian Bostonians.172 These teas afforded JFK a forum to display his appealing and outgoing personality, charm and charisma. Through these teas, some in conjunction with the television programs, Kennedy energized the women’s voting bloc.173 On Election Day, the Boston American reported, Everywhere there was evidence that women for the first time were taking complete advantage of their political emancipation more than [thirty] years ago. They were turning out en masse, with babes in arms, in many cases.174 Kennedy’s unprecedented ability to motivate the previously untapped potential of women, who comprised approximately half of the state’s voters, helped drive a record 90.94 percent of eligible voters to the polls in November, 1952, a 17.2 percent increase from Lodge’s 1946 Senate campaign against incumbent Demo- crat, David Walsh.175 The 1952 turnout was also 4.2 percent higher than the 86.7 percent Massachusetts voter turnout for the 1948 Presidential-cycle election.176 The increased turnout of women voters was especially pronounced in large cities where the Ken- nedys held teas, such as Brockton, up 17.9 percent, and Lowell, up 13.1 percent.177 After conceding the election, Lodge was quick to blame “those dammed tea parties.”178 Indeed, Lodge was fighting 260 Matthew C. Weinstein a new type of highly organized, closely-knit political machine, one comprised almost entirely of family members and which appealed to voters who had previously been neglected.

Robert F. Kennedy: The Organizer

While JFK’s sisters were visible at tea parties and on the campaign trail, his brother Robert F. Kennedy served as the overall campaign manager. Robert’s organizational skill and tireless work behind the scenes was critical to JFK’s victory. Robert became campaign manager late in the spring of 1952.179 Seeking to distance themselves from the customary leadership of the Massachusetts Democratic Party, the Kennedys sought a campaign manager whom the family could completely trust.180 Joseph Kennedy urged JFK to entrust the organization to his younger brother, Robert.181 Throughout the campaign, John’s youngest brother, Edward “Ted” Kennedy, was serving in the United States Army in France and Germany.182 Robert was available, but only twenty-six years old at the time and had never worked on a political campaign before.183 Initially, Robert was timid when dealing with older, more powerful politicians, but he matured over the course of the campaign.184 Robert often performed the less glamorous, nitty-gritty campaign tasks of organizing workers and negotiating with opponents.185 For example, one day during the campaign, Robert had to be restrained from physically assaulting a state representative who slandered JFK.186 This near scuffle demonstrated that Robert ran the campaign according to his belief that, “They don’t have to like me, I only want them to like [John].”187 Unlike his sisters, Robert did not generally participate in door-to-door campaigning. Instead, he was the campaign’s chief coordinator and served as the buffer between JFK and campaign staff.188 As the organizational leader, all campaign workers, except JFK’s personal secretary, reported to him.189 Robert created Kennedy support organizations in each precinct across Massachusetts.190 Although Robert did not often appear in the public spotlight that his sisters and mother occupied, his organizational skills enabled the Kennedy family to THE CONCORD REVIEW 261 reach voters through a carefully coordinated strategy that targeted specific voting groups.

The Strategic Focus: Ethnic and Religious Voting Groups

JFK’s ethnic background and his family’s Catholic faith were as important as his charm and charisma. By 1952, more than sixty percent of Massachusetts residents, and seventy-five percent of Bostonians, were Catholic.191 This Catholic majority represented a sharp increase from historical Massachusetts demographics.192 During the early twentieth century, many Irish, Italian, and French immigrants settled in Massachusetts and, by 1952, assimilated into American culture, climbing social ladders and earning positions of power. As a result, ethnic groups developed resources to organize political blocs to further their ethnic interests.193 While French and Italian immigrants represented significant voter groups, by the 1950’s, forty-two percent of Massachusetts’ residents were Irish Americans, a large plurality among ethnic groups.194 The demographic trends indicated that most of these new immigrants were Catholic.195 Many immigrants supported the Democratic Party policies of social welfare, which President Franklin Roosevelt championed following the 1929 stock market crash.196 For these reasons, Irish Catholic and many other immigrant voters were drawn to JFK, an Irish Catholic and third-generation American immigrant. While JFK’s family background attracted ethnic and religious based voters, Lodge’s traditional Episcopalian and Anglo- Saxon lineage hindered his appeal to the changing pool of voters. By 1952, Anglo-Saxons had declined to 35 percent of Massachusetts voters and only about twenty-five percent of registered voters were Protestant.197 Therefore, Lodge found himself in the minority, with changing religious and ethnic trends, while JFK personified the aspirations of rising classes of Massachusetts immigrants. In addition to carrying his own ethnic and religious groups, JFK used his family’s high social standing to win support among other minority groups. JFK worked hard to cultivate the 262 Matthew C. Weinstein

Jewish vote. Prior to the campaign, many Jews perceived JFK as anti-Semitic, primarily due to anti-Semitic comments JFK’s father made as Ambassador to the United Kingdom.198 While Joseph Kennedy generally played a positive role in JFK’s campaign, these comments created an obstacle for his son.199 Phil David Fine, a Kennedy campaign worker, observed, “Many of the sins of the father were visited on the son; and if you talked to some of the [Jewish] leaders, they would generally talk to you in negative terms.”200 At the beginning of the campaign, JFK was also hurt by an historical distrust between two of Massachusetts’ largest immigrant communities, the Irish and the Jews.201 Nevertheless, JFK overcame these obstacles and won the Massachusetts Jew- ish community’s support. JFK launched a concerted advertising campaign to garner support among Jews, publishing five different advertisements in countless local papers across Massachusetts, including many Jewish newspapers such as the Jewish Civil Leader and Jewish Advocate.202 All five of these advertisements praised JFK as a “Champion of Human Rights!”203 In addition, repeating the previously discussed tactic of influential charitable contributions by JFK’s father, the Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr. Foundation, of which JFK was president, made a significant charitable donation of 50,000 dollars to Associated Jewish Philanthropies shortly before the start of Kennedy’s campaign.204 Finally, in the fall of 1952, on the Jewish New Year, Kennedy bought full page advertisements in several Jewish newspapers to wish the Jewish community a happy, healthy, and sweet New Year.205 JFK won support from other historically underrepresented minorities. For example, the Albanian American Citizens Com- mittee, in a letter to its members, proclaimed support for JFK, saying, We urge you to vote and elect Congressman John F. Kennedy to the United States Senate….Kennedy’s record shows that he has great sympathy and understanding of the problems of smaller nations and has a deep hatred for atheistic Communism.206 JFK also gained significant support from the Armenian, Greek, Syrian, and Polish communities by expressing his opposition to THE CONCORD REVIEW 263 the McCarran bill, which lowered immigration quotas for many small countries.207 In the words of M.S. Abourjaily, leader of the Armenian, Syrian, Greek Committee for Kennedy, these communities saw Kennedy as “champion of the racial groups.”208 Kennedy effectively used his Irish immigrant roots to appeal more broadly to the growing number of other, primarily European, immigrant voting sectors.

Responses of the Lodge Campaign

Confronted with Kennedy’s effective strategies of using his large family to cultivate ethnic, religious and women voters and using teas and television to communicate his engaging personality, the Lodge campaign attempted to respond by adopting similar methods. For example, as Lodge realized the positive impact of Kennedy’s tea parties, he organized his own social gatherings, some serving coffee.209 However, unlike the personable JFK, Lodge was uncomfortable at informal social meetings with potential voters.210 According to Lodge’s campaign aide, James Sullivan, He [Lodge] wasn’t the type of person you approached too easily. He had a gracious manner, a certain remoteness….He wouldn’t put his arm around you and say, ‘Let’s go out for a beer,’ or something like that. No way.211 Further hampering Lodge’s ability to counteract the Kennedy machine was that, unlike the Kennedys, Lodge lacked an extensive network of current family members to meaningfully assist his campaign. His famous grandfather had passed away twenty eight years earlier.212 In addition, Lodge’s wife, Emily Sears, was an extremely reserved woman, unwilling to campaign publicly for her husband.213 Nevertheless, Lodge received assistance from his brother, John Lodge, Governor of Connecticut at the time.214 The Governor spoke in Massachusetts on behalf of his brother twice in the weeks leading up to Election Day, in Boston on October 26th, and in Everett on November 1st.215 Governor Lodge’s wife, Francesca Braggiotti Lodge, also made several speeches on behalf of her brother-in-law.216 Mrs. Lodge, an attractive and moderately successful actress, was born in Florence, Italy.217 Emphasizing her 264 Matthew C. Weinstein

Italian roots, many of her speeches were directed towards the Ital- ian voting bloc, and she delivered several speeches in Italian.218 Beyond family support, other notable Republicans campaigned for Lodge in Massachusetts. In response to appearances in support of Kennedy by Democratic Vice President Alben W. Barkley, John A. Roosevelt, the Republican youngest son of popular former President Franklin D. Roosevelt, delivered several speeches on Lodge’s behalf during the final weeks of October. In Spring- field, a pro-Lodge group named “Volunteers for Lodge” tried to counter Kennedy’s tea parties by organizing eight “coffee hour” receptions to support Lodge.219 These informal receptions, held on consecutive days during the waning days of the race, attempted to inform voters of the “true facts” that compelled Lodge’s reelection.220 At these receptions, distinguished speakers, such as Stuart G. Waite, chairman of Springfield’s Republican City Committee, discussed where Lodge and JFK stood on particular election issues.221 However, Lodge did not attend these meetings and the turnout was much lower than at the Kennedy teas.222 Unfortunately for Lodge, these last-minute efforts by family and close supporters were far too little and much too late to stop the wide-reaching, strategically-focused, media-savvy, and extremely well-financed and well-organized political machine of the Kennedy family.

The Tipping Point

JFK’s victory over Lodge in the 1952 United States Senate race in Massachusetts resulted from coordinated efforts by the closely-knit Kennedy family, driving to win, with effective organization, new strategies and old fashioned influence. In hindsight, this election represented a major tipping point in Massachusetts politics. Until 1952, Republicans dominated Massachusetts politics. Since 1952, only two non-incumbent Republicans, Edward Brooke in 1966 and Scott Brown in 2010, have won Senate races in Massachusetts.223 In the 1952 election, Massachusetts Republi- cans won the Governorship, the majority of United States House of Representatives seats, and the majority of the popular vote for future President Eisenhower.224 Eisenhower carried Massachusetts THE CONCORD REVIEW 265 by an 8.8 percent margin over Democrat Adlai Stevenson.225 How- ever, despite this strong Republican performance, the underdog Democrat, JFK, narrowly defeated incumbent Republican Lodge by the narrow margin of 70,737 votes, or three percent.226 The 1952 Senate race was more than a battle between two individual candidates. Lodge, with support and name recognition built on his family’s longstanding political successes, campaigned against the entire Kennedy family. Robert Kennedy worked hard to organize each committee and precinct organization affiliated with the Kennedy campaign. Meanwhile, Joseph Kennedy bank- rolled a large portion of JFK’s campaign, and influenced support for JFK with contributions to ethnic-based charities and a timely loan to the Boston Post, which subsequently endorsed his son.227 Joseph Kennedy helped JFK effectively promote his candidacy with the new medium of television, including coaching techniques to project his telegenic personality to the masses. In contrast, Lodge struggled to connect with voters through television, often coming across as uptight and cold.228 While the Kennedy men worked behind the scenes, the Kennedy women stood in the public eye. Through creative events, including teas, “Coffee with the Kennedys,” and door-to-door campaigning, Rose and her daughters expanded the market of interested voters and helped drive turnout to unprecedented high levels.229 The Kennedys effectively appealed to women, French- Canadian immigrants, and other groups historically neglected by Massachusetts politicians.230 By incorporating these minority blocs into his strong Irish Catholic base, JFK captured enough votes, with a particularly strong showing in Boston, to defeat Lodge’s diminished Anglo-Saxon and Protestant blocs. JFK’s image and background touched the emotional roots of many immigrants. His brother, Robert, later reflected, “There was a great spirit in the campaign that I don’t think existed to that time in the state of Massachusetts.”231 JFK was a grandchild of immigrants and his wealth, high social standing and education personified the American Dream for many immigrant voters. 266 Matthew C. Weinstein

JFK’s election tipped the course of Massachusetts politics in another way, as the 1952 election ushered into office another Massachusetts Democrat who went on to influence the state and the country. On the same day JFK beat Lodge, Tip O’Neill won JFK’s former congressional seat.232 O’Neill held this seat for thirty- four years, until his death, serving as Speaker of the United States House for the final ten years of his life.233 Eight years after he defeated Lodge, JFK defeated the Republican ticket of Senator Richard M. Nixon and his Vice Presidential candidate, Lodge, to win the 1960 Presidential election.234 During this national campaign, JFK won with many of the same strategies he developed in the 1952 Massachusetts contest. For example, JFK’s success with television was repeated during the famous September 22, 1960 televised debate against Nixon, when JFK’s easygoing charm contrasted with Nixon’s stiff and gruff demeanor.235 Similar to 1952, JFK’s Presidential campaign held several tea and coffee gatherings in local houses in the swing states of Wisconsin and West Virginia.236 The final election between the Kennedy and Lodge families occurred two years after JFK’s Presidential victory, when John’s youngest brother, Ted, defeated Lodge’s son, George Cabot Lodge II, by over an eight percent margin, to win the same Senate seat which the two families contested both in 1916 and 1952.237 While these other Lodge-Kennedy elections cannot be overlooked, the 1952 campaign was extraordinary for how effectively the Kennedy family mobilized their wealth, experiences, resources, and influence to support JFK’s run. In the words of biographer Doris Kearns Goodwin, the Kennedys “were like a warrior force, combining in all their persons, one person’s goals.”238 When Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. conceded the 1952 Senate race, it was not just JFK, but the entire Kennedy family that had won. THE CONCORD REVIEW 267

1 “The Biographical Directory of the United States Congress,” The Congressional Biographical Directory, http:// bioguide.congress.gov/biosearch/ biosearch.asp (accessed April 10, 2010) 2 Thomas J. Whalen, Kennedy versus Lodge (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 2000) p. 7 3 John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, “The Election of 1952,” John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/ Archives/Reference+Desk/ The+Election+of+1952.htm (accessed December 29, 2009) 4 The Congressional Biographical Directory, “The Biographical Directory of the United States Congress” 5 Ibid. 6 Thomas J. Whalen, interview by author, Boston University, March 24, 2010 7 The Congressional Biographical Directory, “The Biographical Directory of the United States Congress” 8 Whalen, Interview 9 Whalen, p. 159 10 Alden Hatch, The Lodges of Massachusetts (New York: Hawthorn Books, Inc., 1973) p. 258 11 Whalen, p. 74 12 Ibid., p. 5 13 Ibid., pp. 7-11 14 Ibid., p. 4 15 Polly Fitzgerald, Oral History of the Life of Polly Fitzgerald, 1967, The Oral History Project, The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston 16 Whalen, Interview 17 Ibid. 18 The Congressional Biographical Directory, “The Biographical Directory of the United States Congress” 19 Ibid. 20 Albert E Van Dusen, “The Hartford Convention,” Connecticut’s Heritage Gateway, http://www.ctheritage.org/ encyclopedia/ct1763_1818/hartconv.htm (accessed May 15, 2010) 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. 24 Whalen, p. 35 268 Matthew C. Weinstein

25 The Congressional Biographical Directory, “The Biographical Directory of the United States Congress” 26 Ibid. 27 David M. Kennedy, Lizabeth Cohen, and Thomas A. Bailey, The American Pageant, 14th ed. (United States: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2010) p. 766 28 Article II Section II Paragraph II of the US Constitution requires the Senate to approve any treaty by a two-thirds majority. In two separate votes, of 55 nays to 39 yeas and 35 nays to 49 yeas, the Senate failed to amass the required supermajority. 29 Whalen, p. 34 30 Ibid., p. 34 31 Ibid., p. 34 32 Ibid, pp. 34-35 33 Ibid, p. 35 34 Ibid, p. 38 35 Ibid, p. 42 36 Ibid, p. 49 37 Ibid, p. 52 38 The Congressional Biographical Directory, “The Biographical Directory of the United States Congress” 39 Whalen, p. 7 40 The Kennedys, “The Senator,” PBS, December 29, 2009 (originally aired May 14, 2009), WGBH American Experience Series, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/ kennedys/ (accessed December 29, 2009) 41 Whalen, p. 11 42 “MA US Senate,” Our Campaigns, http://www. ourcampaigns.com/RaceDetail.html?RaceID=267998 (accessed April 10, 2010) 43 Whalen, p. 11 44 Ibid, p. 12 45 The Kennedys, PBS, December 29, 2009 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid. 48 Ibid. 49 “SEC Historical Summary of Chairman and Commissioners,” The Securities and Exchange Commission, http://www.sec.gov/about/sechistoricalsummary.htm (accessed April 10, 2010) 50 The Kennedys, PBS, December 29, 2009 THE CONCORD REVIEW 269

51 Edward M. Kennedy, True Compass (New York: Twelve, 2009) p. 55 52 The Kennedys, PBS, December 29, 2009 53 Ibid. 54 Ibid. 55 Whalen, p. 10 56 Ibid., p. 10 57 Whalen, Boston University. 58 Ibid. 59 Ibid. 60 Whalen, p. 21 61 Ibid, p. 22 62 Ibid, p. 24 63 Ibid, pp. 24-29 64 Ibid, p. 21 65 Whalen, Interview 66 Whalen, p. 26 67 Ibid., p. 26 68 During their September 16, 1952 debate, Lodge attacked JFK for missing House votes, saying, “[The Senate] is a full time job, and one third of a Senator is no good.” 69 The Kennedys, PBS, December 29, 2009 70 Whalen, Interview 71 Ibid. 72 The Kennedys, PBS, December 29, 2009 73 Mark J. Dalton to Joseph P. Kennedy, February 20, 1952, Series 4.2, Box 103, Folder “Correspondences 1/52-6/52 “ The Pre-Presidential Papers, The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston 74 The Kennedys, PBS, December 29, 2009 75 Ibid. 76 John Galvin to John F. Kennedy, July 29, 1952, Series 4.2, Box 106, Folder “Television,” The Pre-Presidential Papers, The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston 77 Ibid. 78 Mark J. Dalton to Joseph P. Kennedy, March 3, 1952, Series 4.2, Box 103, Folder “Correspondences 1/52-6/52” The Pre-Presidential Papers, The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston 79 Gloria Negri, “Mark Dalton, 89; Kennedy Aide, Noted Lawyer Had Key Role in D-Day Landing,” The Boston Globe, May 4, 2004, http://www.boston.com/news/globe/obituaries/ articles/2004/05/04/mark_dalton_89_kennedy_aide_noted_ lawyer_had_key_role_in_d_day_landing/(accessed February 28, 2010) 270 Matthew C. Weinstein

80 Dalton to Kennedy, March 3, 1952 81 Galvin to Kennedy, July 29, 1952 82 Ibid. 83 Whalen, p. 146 84 Kennedy and Lodge Television Schedules, chart (Boston, 1952) 85 Ibid. 86 Ibid. 87 The Kennedy Headquarters, “TV: 5 Minute Spots,” 1952, Series 4.2, Box 106, Folder “Television-Radio” The Pre- Presidential Papers, The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston 88 Ibid. 89 Transcripts from John F. Kennedy’s two appearances on Meet the Press, 1952, Series 4.2, Box 105, Folder “Meet the Press” The Pre-Presidential Papers, The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston 90 Ibid. 91 Ibid. 92 Whalen, p. 7 93 Ibid, p. 150 94 The Boston Herald, “Lodge Declines N.Y. Video Role with Kennedy, Asks Debates Here,” September 11, 1952 95 The Boston Herald, “Kennedy Distinguishes Self in Debating Lodge,” September 17, 1952 96 The Lynn Telegram-News, October 8, 1952 97 Whalen, p. 151 98 Kennedy and Lodge Television Schedules, chart (Boston, 1952) 99 Ibid. 100 Ed Wagner, Press release from Kennedy headquarters describing “Coffee with the Kennedys” October 16, 1952, Series 4.2, Box 105, Folder “Press Releases: 10/2/1952 – 10/19/1952” The Pre-Presidential Papers, The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston 101 Ibid. 102 Ed Wagner, Press release from Kennedy headquarters advertising upcoming “Coffee with the Kennedys” October 12, 1952, Series 4.2, Box 105, Folder “Press Releases: 10/2/1952– 10/19/1952” The Pre-Presidential Paper, The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston 103 Wagner, Press release from Kennedy headquarters, October 16, 1952 104 Ibid. THE CONCORD REVIEW 271

105 Ed Wagner, Press release from Kennedy headquarters advertising upcoming “Coffee with the Kennedys” October 31, 1952, Series 4.2, Box 105, Folder “Press Releases: 10/20/1952 – 10/31/1952, The Pre-Presidential Papers, The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston 106 Ibid. 107 Dalton to Kennedy, March 3, 1952 108 Ibid. 109 Whalen, p. 130 110 Ibid, p. 127 111 Ibid., p. 127 112 Ibid., p. 127 113 Ibid., p. 130 114 Ibid., p. 130 115 Ibid., p. 131 116 Commission on Administration and Finance, Election Statistics : The Commonwealth of Massachusetts (1952), by Edward J. Cronin, Public Document 43 (Boston: Office of Secretary of the Commonwealth, 1952) p. 356, http://archives. lib.state.ma.us/handle/2452/43444?show=full (accessed May 15, 2010) 117 Commission on Administration and Finance, Election Statistics : The Commonwealth of Massachusetts (1946), by Frederic W. Cook, Public Document 43 (Boston: Office of Secretary of the Commonwealth, 1946) p. 258, http://archives. lib.state.ma.us/handle/2452/43438?show=full (accessed May 15, 2010) 118 Commission on Administration and Finance, Election Statistics : The Commonwealth of Massachusetts (1952), by Edward J. Cronin, Public Document 43 (Boston: Office of Secretary of the Commonwealth, 1952) pp. 38, 356–357, http://archives.lib.state.ma.us/handle/2452/43444?show=full (accessed May 15, 2010) 119 Ibid. 120 Whalen, Interview 121 Hatch, The Lodges of Massachusetts, p. 258 122 Ibid., p. 258 123 Whalen, p. 163 124 Hatch, p. 258 125 Ibid., p. 258 126 Ibid., p. 258 127 Michael O’Brien, Rethinking Kennedy: An Interpretive Biography (Chicago: Ivan R. Dree, 2009) p. 72 272 Matthew C. Weinstein

128 The Kennedys, PBS, December 29, 2009 129 Ibid. 130 O’Brien, pp. 72-73 131 Whalen, p. 140 132 O’Brien, p. 73 133 Whalen, p. 141 134 The Kennedys, PBS, December 29, 2009 135 “Rose Fitzgerald Kennedy,” The John F. Kennedy Library, http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/ Biographies+ and+Profiles/Biographies/Rose+Fitzgerald+ Kennedy.htm (accessed April 11, 2010) 136 Assumption College, “History and Mission,” Assumption College–French Institute, http://www1.assumption.edu/dept/ Institutes/Frinstitute.html (accessed May 15, 2010) 137 Ibid. 138 Massachusetts Department of Conservation and Recreation, Regional Historic Context: Quinebaug-Shetucket and John H. Chafee Blackstone River Valley National Heritage Corridors, 32-33, http://www.mass.gov/dcr/stewardship/ histland/Regional%20Historic%20Context.pdf (accessed May 15, 2010) 139 Commonwealth of Massachusetts Office of the Secretary, Annual Report on the Vital Statistics of Massachusetts : Births, Marriages, Divorces and Deaths (Year Ending December 31, 1952), by Edward J Cronin, Public Document 1 (Boston: Secretary of the Commonwealth, Division of Vital Statistics, 1952) p. 321, http://archives.lib. state.ma.us/handle/2452/43813?show=full (accessed May 15, 2010) 140 These three cities, totaling over nine percent of the state’s population were: Worcester, population 203,486; Fall River, population 111,963; and New Bedford, population 109,189. 141 Gerard J. Brault, The French-Canadian Heritage in New England (Hanover, New Hampshire: University Press of New England, 1986) p. 104 142 Textile mill towns that supported Franco-American newspapers included: Lowell, L’Etoile; Fall River, L’Indépendant; Holyoke, La Justice; Fitchburg, La Liberte; and Worcester, La Travailleur. 143 B. Pauline to Robert Francis Kennedy, memorandum, September 8, 1852, Series 4.2, Box 108, Folder “Relations with French” The Pre-Presidential Papers, The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston THE CONCORD REVIEW 273

144 The Springfield Daily News, September 25, 1952 145 Rose Fitzgerald Kennedy (speech by Mrs. Kennedy in French to French voters (translated) 146 Ibid. 147 Ibid. 148 Ibid. 149 Ibid. 150 Ibid. 151 Maurice R. Cartier, “Report of Maurice R. Cartier for Week of July 14,1952,” July 21, 1952, Series 4.2, Box 109, Folder French (POF), The Pre-Presidential Papers, The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston 152 Ed Wagner, Press release from Kennedy headquarters advertising an upcoming gathering of the French Women’s Committee for Rose Fitzgerald Kennedy, October 23, 1952, Series 4.2, Box 105, Folder “Press Releases: 10/20/1952–10/ 31/1952” The Pre-Presidential Papers, The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston 153 Pauline to Kennedy, September 8, 1952 154 Ibid. 155 Commission on Administration and Finance, Election Statistics: The Commonwealth of Massachusetts (1946), by Frederic W. Cook, Public Document 43 (Boston: Office of Secretary of the Commonwealth, 1946) p. 258, http://archives. lib.state.ma.us/handle/2452/43438?show=full (accessed May 15, 2010) 156 Reception Schedule, chart (Boston, 1952) 157 Kennedy Headquarters, “Campaign Talk,” August 18, 1952, Series 4.2, Box 106, Folder “Promotion Pieces” The Pre- Presidential Papers, The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston 158 Kennedy Headquarters, “Campaign Talk,” September 2, 1952, Series 4.2, Box 106, Folder “Promotion Pieces” The Pre- Presidential Papers, The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston 159 John F. Kennedy to Sally King, June 17, 1952, Series 4.2, Box 106, Folder “Receptions (POF)” The Pre-Presidential Papers, The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston 160 Kennedy Headquarters, “Campaign Talk,” September 2, 1952 161 Ibid. 162 Ibid. 163 Reception Schedule, chart (Boston, 1952) 164 Ed Wagner, The Belmont-Watertown Herald, October 27, 1952 274 Matthew C. Weinstein

165 Polly Fitzgerald, The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston 166 Time magazine, “THE STATES: Big Battles,” August 18, 1952, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/ article/0,9171,816677,00.html (accessed December 27, 2009) 167 Polly Fitzgerald, The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston 168 Ibid. 169 Ibid. 170 Ibid. 171 John F. Kennedy to Mrs. Anthony Perreira, June 16, 1952, Series 4.2, Box 106, Folder “Receptions (POF)” The Pre- Presidential Papers, The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston 172 Polly Fitzgerald, The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston 173 Wagner, The Belmont-Watertown Herald, October 27, 1952 174 Polly Fitzgerald, The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston 175 Whalen, Kennedy versus Lodge, p. 158 176 Ed Wagner, Press release from Kennedy headquarters advertising a tea gathering of Boston-Canadians for Rose Fitzgerald Kennedy, October 27, 1952, Series 4.2, Box 105, Folder “Press Releases: 10/20/1952—10/31/1952, The Pre-Presidential Papers, The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston 177 Polly Fitzgerald, The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston 178 The Boston American, November 4, 1952 179 Whalen, p. 159 180 Commission on Administration and Finance, Election Statistics: The Commonwealth of Massachusetts (1948), by Frederic W Cook, Public Document 43 (Boston: Office of Secretary of the Commonwealth, 1948), 35, http://archives.lib. state.ma.us/handle/2452/43440?show=full (accessed May 15, 2010) 181 Whalen, p. 183 182 Ibid, p. 158 183 Whalen, Kennedy versus Lodge, pp. 61-62 184 Mark Dalton, JFK’s original campaign manager, abandoned that position following multiple verbal confrontations with Joseph Kennedy. 185 Whalen, Interview 186 Ibid. 187 Whalen, p. 82 188 The Kennedys, PBS, December 29, 2009 189 Whalen, pp. 63-64 190 Whalen, Interview 191 Whalen, p. 65 THE CONCORD REVIEW 275

192 Ibid. 193 Joseph Corish, “General Observations of Campaign Organization,” 1952, Series 4.2, Box 103, Folder “Joseph R. Corish Report on Campaign Organization” The Pre- Presidential Papers, The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston 194 Ibid. 195 Whalen, p. 68 196 The Kennedy Headquarters, “Massachusetts Is Democratic,” September 1952, Series 4.2, Box 105, Folder “Press Releases: 9/4/1952—9/30/1952,” The Pre-Presidential Papers, The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston 197 Ibid. 198 Ibid. 199 Ibid. 200 Ibid. 201 Whalen, p. 165 202 The Kennedy Headquarters, “Massachusetts Is Democratic,” September 1952 203 Whalen, pp. 93-94 204 Ambassador Kennedy, commenting on Germany’s aggression leading up to World War II, said, “[The Jews] only have themselves to blame, they brought it on themselves.” 205 Ibid. 207 Ibid. 208 Ibid. 209 The Kennedy Headquarters, “Nationality Groups– Jewish,” 1952, Series 4.2, Box 109, Folder “Jewish: Undated & Articles” The Pre-Presidential Papers, The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston 210 Ibid. 211 Whalen, p. 95 212 Whalen, Interview 213 Michell Kolsti to Members of the Massachusetts Albanian Community, Fall 1952, Series 4.2, Box 103, Folder “Campaign Letters to Special Groups,” The Pre-Presidential Papers, The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston 214 Ibid. 215 M.S. Abourjaily to Members of the Massachusetts Armenian, Syrian, Greek Communities, October 29, 1952, Series 4.2, Box 103, Folder “Campaign Letters to Special Groups,” The Pre-Presidential Papers, The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston 276 Matthew C. Weinstein

216 The Springfield Republican, “Volunteers for Lodge to Hold Reception Here,” October 26, 1952 217 Whalen, p. 146 218 Ibid., p. 7 219 Hatch, p. 153 220 Whalen, Interview 221 The Associated Press, “Gov. Lodge Plans to Aid Brother in Senate Fight,” The Holyoke Transcript-Telegram, October 16, 1952 222 Ibid. 223 The Leominister Daily Enterprise, “Mrs. John Lodge to Speak Here Sunday Night,” October 24, 1952 224 Ibid. 225 Ibid. 226 The Springfield Republican, October 26, 1952 227 Ibid. 228 Ibid. 229 Ibid. 230 The Congressional Biographical Directory, “The Biographical Directory of the United States Congress” 231 John H. Fenton, “Lodge a ‘Casualty’ in Massachusetts,” New York Times, November 6, 1952 232 Commission on Administration and Finance, Election Statistics: The Commonwealth of Massachusetts (1952), by Edward J. Cronin, Public Document 43 (Boston: Office of Secretary of the Commonwealth, 1952) p. 317, http://archives. lib.state.ma.us/handle/2452/43444?show=full (accessed May 15, 2010) 233 John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, “The Election of 1952” 234 Whalen, p. 130 235 Ibid,, 150 236 Whalen, p. 159 237 Ibid., p. 165 238 Ibid., p. 68 239 The Congressional Biographical Directory, “The Biographical Directory of the United States Congress” 240 Ibid. 241 Kennedy, Cohen, and Bailey, p. 965 242 Ibid., p. 964 243 Polly Fitzgerald, The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston THE CONCORD REVIEW 277

244 “MA US Senate–Special Election,” Our Campaigns, http://www.ourcampaigns.com/RaceDetail/html? Race ID=21231 (accessed April 10, 2010) 245 The Kennedys, PBS, December 29, 2009

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———. “Ten Reasons Why You Should Vote for John F. Kennedy for U.S. Senator,” 1952, Series 4.2, Box 106, Folder “Promotion Pieces,” The Pre-Presidential Papers, The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston ———. “TV: 5 Minute Spots,” 1952, Series 4.2, Box 106, Folder “Television-Radio,” The Pre-Presidential Papers, The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston Kolsti, Michell, Michell Kolsti to Members of the Massachusetts Albanian Community, Fall 1952 Series 4.2, Box 103, Folder “Campaign Letters to Special Groups,” The Pre- Presidential Papers, The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston The Leominister Daily Enterprise, “Mrs. John Lodge to Speak Here Sunday Night,” October 24, 1952 Lodge, Henry Cabot, Junior, 1952, Series 1-18, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. Papers, The Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston The Lynn Telegram-News, October 8, 1952 Michelson, Edward J., “Lodge Dislodged?” The Nation, October 4, 1952, pp. 297-298 Mullins, W.E., “This Is How I See It: Lodge-Kennedy Campaign Strategies a Problem; No Wide Difference between Them in Major Issues,” The Boston Herald, April 11, 1952 Murchison, Carl, Carl Murchison to Henry Cabot Lodge Junior, July 29, 1952 Series 4.2, Box 106, Folder “Promotion Pieces.” The Pre-Presidential Papers, The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston Nelson, George A., “A Vote for Kennedy Means Strength for Honest Government!” 1952, Series 4.2, Box 103, Folder “Biography-Kennedy,” The Pre-Presidential Papers, The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston O’Donnell, John, “Ike Sure of Only 3 States,” The New York Daily News, September 2, 1952 Pauline, B., “Radio Flashes in French,” B. Pauline to Robert Francis Kennedy, memorandum, September 8, 1952, Series 4.2, Box 108, Folder “Relations with French,” The Pre-Presidential Papers, The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston The Springfield Daily News, September 25, 1952 The Springfield Republican, “Volunteers for Lodge to Hold Reception Here,” October 26, 1952 Time magazine, “Harnessing a Wave,” December 17, 1951, http://www.time.com////,9171,859435-1,00.html (accessed December 27, 2009) Time magazine, “National Affairs: KEY STATE-- MASSACHUSETTS,” September 29, 1952, http://www.time. THE CONCORD REVIEW 281 com////,9171,935732-2,00.html (accessed December 27, 2009) Time magazine, “THE STATES: Big Battles,” August 18, 1952, http://www.time.com////,9171,816677,00.html (accessed December 27, 2009) Transcripts from John F. Kennedy’s two appearances on Meet the Press, 1952, Series 4.2, Box 105, Folder “Meet the Press,” The Pre-Presidential Papers, The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston Wagner, Ed, The Belmont-Watertown Herald, October 27, 1952 ———. John F. Kennedy’s daily schedule for the week of October 20, 1952. October 1952. Series 4.2, Box 105, Folder “Press Releases,” The Pre-Presidential Papers, The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston ———. The Lowell Sun, September 27, 1952 ———. Press release from Kennedy headquarters advertising an upcoming gathering of the French Women’s Committee for Rose Fitzgerald Kennedy. October 23, 1952. Series 4.2, Box 105, Folder “Press Releases,” The Pre- Presidential Papers, The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston ———. Press release from Kennedy headquarters advertising a tea gathering of Boston-Canadians for Rose Fitzgerald Kennedy, October 27, 1952, Series 4.2, Box 105, Folder “Press Releases,” The Pre-Presidential Papers, The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston ———. Press release from Kennedy headquarters advertising upcoming “Coffee with the Kennedys,” October 12, 1952, Series 4.2, Box 105, Folder “Press Releases: 10//– 10//”. The Pre-Presidential Paper. The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston ———. Press release from Kennedy headquarters advertising upcoming “Coffee with the Kennedys,” October 31, 1952, Series 4.2, Box 105, Folder “Press Releases: 10//– 10//. The Pre-Presidential Papers, The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston ———. Press release from Kennedy headquarters describing “Coffee with the Kennedys,” October 16, 1952, Series 4.2, Box 105, Folder “Press Releases,” The Pre-Presidential Papers, The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston ———. Press release from Kennedy headquarters promoting the Massachusetts political history of the Kennedy family. September 23, 1952, Series 4.2, Box 105, Folder “Press 282 Matthew C. Weinstein

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Assumption College, “History and Mission.” Assumption College–French Institute, http://www1.assumption.edu///. html (accessed May 15, 2010) “The Biographical Directory of the United States Congress,” The Congressional Biographical Directory. http://bioguide. congress.gov//.asp (accessed April 10, 2010) Brault, Gerard J., The French-Canadian Heritage in New England. Hanover New Hampshire: University Press of New England, 1986 Hatch, Alden, The Lodges of Massachusetts, New York: Hawthorn Books, Inc., 1973 John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum. “The Election of 1952,” John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum. http://www.jfklibrary.org/+Resources//+Desk/+Elec tion+of+1952.htm (accessed December 29, 2009) Kennedy, David M., Lizabeth Cohen, and Thomas A. Bailey, The American Pageant, 14th ed. United States: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2010 Kennedy, Edward M., True Compass New York: Twelve, 2009 Massachusetts Department of Conservation and Recreation, Regional Historic Context: Quinebaug-Shetucket and John H. Chafee Blackstone River Valley National Heritage Corridors. http://www.mass.gov////%20Historic%20Context.pdf (accessed May 15, 2010) “MA US Senate,” Our Campaigns. http://www. ourcampaigns.com/RaceDetail.html?RaceID=267998 (accessed April 10, 2010)“MA US Senate–Special Election” Our Campaigns, http://www.ourcampaigns.com/.html? RaceID=21231 (accessed April 10, 2010) Negri, Gloria, “Mark Dalton, 89; Kennedy Aide, Noted Lawyer Had Key Role in D-Day Landing,” The Boston Globe, May 4, 2004. http://www.boston.com////////_dalton_89_ kennedy_aide_noted_lawyer_had_key_role_in_d_day_landing/ (accessed February 28, 2010) THE CONCORD REVIEW 283

O’Brien, Michael, Rethinking Kennedy: An Interpretive Biography. Chicago: Ivan R. Dree, 2009 “Rose Fitzgerald Kennedy,” The John F. Kennedy Library. http://www.jfklibrary.org/+Resources/+and+Profiles//+Fitzger ald+Kennedy.htm (accessed April 11, 2010) “SEC Historical Summary of Chairman and Commissioners,” The Securities and Exchange Commission, http://www.sec.gov//.htm (accessed April 10, 2010) Van Dusen, Albert E., “The Hartford Convention,” Connecticut’s Heritage Gateway. http://www.ctheritage. org//_1818/.htm (accessed May 15, 2010) Whalen, Thomas J., Interview by author, Boston University, March 24, 2010 ———. Kennedy versus Lodge, Boston: Northeastern University Press, 2000 284 Matthew C. Weinstein In a June 3, 1990 column in The New York Times, Albert Shanker, President of the American Federation of Teachers, wrote:

“...It is also worth thinking about as we consider how to reform our education system. As we’ve known for a long time, factory workers who never saw the completed product and worked on only a small part of it soon became bored and demoralized, But when they were allowed to see the whole process—or better yet become involved in it—productivity and morale improved. Students are no different. When we chop up the work they do into little bits—history facts and vocabulary and grammar rules to be learned— it’s no wonder that they are bored and disengaged. The achievement of The Concord Review’s authors offers a different model of learning. Maybe it’s time for us to take it seriously.”

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In a June 1993 letter to the MacArthur Foundation, Albert Shanker, President of the American Federation of Teachers, wrote:

“...Equally important, the published essays can let youngsters see what other students their own age are capable of and what they themselves can aspire to. The Review also has a vital message for teachers. American education suffers from an impoverishment of standards at all levels. We see that when we look at what is expected of students in other industrialized nations and at what they achieve. Could American students achieve at that level? Of course, but our teachers often have a hard time knowing exactly what they can expect of their students or even what a first-rate essay looks like. The Concord Review sets a high but realistic standard; and it could be invaluable for teachers trying to recalibrate their own standards of excellence.”

...Let me say that I think The Concord Review could be especially useful to poor and disadvantaged children and their teachers. Last year, I was privileged to hear John Jacob, the president of the National Urban League, talk about how poor black children, in particular, need to be held up to higher academic standards. Jacob believes that, instead of lowering our sights, we must raise them and demand high academic performance. Among the specific standards he suggested was that every African-American child—and in fact every American child—write a 25-page paper in order to graduate from high school. I think Jacob is right. I also think The Concord Review could be a vehicle for raising the sights of disadvantaged children and their teachers. And I plan to work with leaders in one or more of the American Federation of Teachers’ urban locals to help set up special issues of The Concord Review for their cities similar to the special International Baccalaureate issue the Review recently published.” THE CONCORD REVIEW 285

LOUIS VS. SCHMELING: POLITICS AND RACE IN THE RING

Kevin Liu

Introduction

On July 22, 1938, New York City was buzzing with excitement as more than 70,000 people made their way to Yankee Stadium. All were present to witness what some observers described as “the most important sporting event in history.” When boxers Joe Louis and Max Schmeling stepped into the stadium that night, there was much more at stake than merely the world heavyweight boxing championship. The world was on the brink of war and both fighters were held up as symbols of the opposing countries. Joe Louis of Alabama, U.S.A, represented democracy and moral ideals while Germany’s Max Schmeling was seen as an emblem of Aryan dominance and even Adolf Hitler himself. A combination of the popularity of boxing, each fighter’s astounding skill set, and the differences of their backgrounds made Louis and Schmeling heroes of their generation. The Joe Louis versus Max Schmeling rivalry is a historic relationship that was freighted with incredible symbolic significance to the important social and political issues of the 1930s.

Kevin Liu is a Senior at Appleby College in Oakville, Ontario, where he wrote this paper for Dr. Patrick Carter’s United States History course in the 2009/2010 academic year. 286 Kevin Liu

Boxing was a unique sport that crystallized the racial and political tensions that most other sports attempted to steer clear from. Time magazine’s coverage of the fight referred to the challenger as “German Max Schmeling” and the champion as “Negro Joe Louis.” Thus even to the most experienced boxing enthusiast the fight held a vitality that was utterly unprecedented. This bout was between a twenty-four-year-old black American and a German nine years his senior. It was between the world heavyweight champion and the only man who had ever beaten him. This fight was not merely between black and white—which would have been furious enough—but also between youth and age, talent and experience, freedom and fascism, and even the minority population against Adolf Hitler. Everyone held a belief and a hope, and despite the popularity, no one could make any confident assumption on what was about to happen. In one of the greatest upsets in sports history two years earlier, Max Schmeling had knocked out the previously undefeated and seemingly invincible Joe Louis. Since that moment, a potential rematch had ben scrutinized from every possible angle. So popular was the 1938 rematch that it became known simply as “The Fight.” By the time the rematch was announced, both fighters showed confidence, and the public was clamoring wildly for a showdown. In a society still affected by the Great Depression, about one million dollars was spent in tickets. Such sales were a rarity at the time in professional boxing. “Judges and lawyers, Representatives and Senators, Governors and Mayors, bankers and brokers, merchant princes and industrial giants, doctors, artists, writers, figures of prominence in various fields of sports, champions of the past and present in the ring, stars of the stage and screen—everybody, it seems,” would be close to or at ringside that evening, the New York Times predicted. The publicity, political influence, and social significance of this fight demonstrated to everyone that there had never been a sporting event like this one, and there might never be anything like it again. Under the bright lights of a looming war and the hopes and dreams of millions, two men would battle for much THE CONCORD REVIEW 287 more than a typical prizefight. What made this sport and these men so special? What are the circumstances that gave a single sporting event so much social and political clout?

Boxing and Society Only boxers could have acquired the status and significance of Max Schmeling or Joe Louis. Boxing was America’s most popular sport, and boxers were the most celebrated athletes of their day. Joe Louis Jr., the son of Joe Louis, was able to recall how “the most powerful individual in the world was also the heavyweight boxing champion of the world.” Young children analyzed photos from The Ring and fathers spent what little money they had to see boxing matches at local arenas and enormous outdoor stadiums. Some spent 25 cents to view bouts they could not see in person at the movie house. Movie houses also played many melodramas that showcased boxing in which the leading man played a boxer, such as The Prizefighter and the Lady, The Champ, and The Golden Boy. In 1935, the year before Max Schmeling fought Joe Louis for the first time, the New York Yankees averaged 8,886 fans, playing practically in an empty stadium. That fall though, more than 100,000 people packed into Yankee Stadium to see Joe Louis fight Max Baer in a non-title bout. For Joe Louis and Max Schmeling, two of the top ranked boxers in the world, the limits of popularity were boundless. As Jeremy Schaap, author of Cinderella Man, eloquently stated “Baseball was America’s pastime but boxing was America’s passion.”

Background: Joe Louis To understand the upbringing of one of the most celebrated athletes in history, one must rewind about two decades prior to “The Fight.” The onset of the Great War meant that millions of Americans and European immigrants were called off to war. Many of these soldiers had previously been the foundation of American labor by manning the country’s foundries, factories, and mills. Underprivileged southerners and blacks were attracted by labor 288 Kevin Liu

agents who described Henry Ford’s five-dollar-day and even more were influenced by postcards and stories illustrating the wonders of electricity and moving pictures. Consequently, thousands of African-Americans abandoned the South and ventured northward in search of prosperity. Detroit’s population grew by six hundred percent during the First World War. It was in this mass movement that Joe Louis entered the training grounds that made him one of the greatest boxers in the world. His origins are vital as they provided a means by which people could later portray him as an athlete who embodied American democracy. Sometime at the beginning of the twentieth century, Munroe Barrow and Lillie Reese came together to begin a life in Chambers County in eastern Alabama, at the foot of the Buck- alew Mountains. Both Munroe and Lillie Barrow were imposing physical specimens. Munroe Barrow stood at about six feet tall and weighed two hundred pounds while Lillie Reese Marrow was about five-foot-six and 170 pounds. They dedicated their lives to sharecropping, an economic system of racism and inequality that was not far removed from the slave-and-master system of their parents’ era. Lillie Barrow was a dedicated mother who raised her children to respect their elders, to have faith, and always to embrace morals. Lillie Barrow was known for declaring “I’m not whipping you for what you did, I’m whipping you for lying about it.” All of her eight children, Susie, Emmarell, Alvanious, Ponce deLeon, Alonzo, Eulalia, Joe, and Vunies, were born in about a twelve-year period ending in 1916. A mixture of white, black, and Native-American blood was in the family. Joseph Louis Barrow was number seven and he first tipped the scales on May 13th, 1914, at eleven pounds. Life was arduous for the Barrows. Sharecropping meant that Munroe had to share his crop with the landowner, as well as pay for the rent of a horse, plow, and other essentials. Munroe was also prone to spells of mental instability and often required intermittent stays at the Searcy Hospital for the Negro Insane in Mount Vernon. By the time Joe was two, his father was permanently institutionalized in an asylum and the man who filled the role of THE CONCORD REVIEW 289 father was Pat Brooks, a widower with nine children of his own. The two families eventually merged and moved to a large house near Camp Hill, in the Buckalew Mountains. Joe’s schooling was irregular and he was known to use any excuse to miss lessons. He did not talk properly until he was six years old and even then he spoke with a speech impediment. This was the major cause for his distinctive shy personality. He was a big and healthy boy, but was also lazy and enjoyed nothing more than a sound sleep. This was another habit that would stay with him for the rest of his life. Despite the blatant racism of the era, Louis’s childhood was often known as a “racially benign existence” in the settled way of the segregated South. Pat Brooks was soon visited by his relatives from Detroit, who told grand stories of the industrial boom in the Motor City. Inspired by the news, Louis’s family joined the historic northward migration of blacks into Detroit when Joe was twelve years old. There, the Barrows saw their first flushing toilets, electric lights, and the hustle and bustle of a large and growing city. Louis was still finding traditional schoolwork too onerous, and joined a vo- cational school by the age of fourteen. He earned spare change by delivering ice, hauling sixty-pound blocks up several flights of stairs every day after school, building upon his already impressive physique. After sampling activities such as the violin and baseball, Louis finally discovered boxing. He had his first amateur match in the spring of 1932 at age eighteen against Johnny Miller. Miller was getting ready to fight for the United States Olympic team later that year and knocked Louis down seven times en route to an easy victory. Louis became discouraged and avoided the gym for a time. But he soon returned to the ring at the local Brewster Cen- ter. With newfound experience and training Louis knocked out thirteen straight amateur opponents.While he became considered a top prospect, it should be noted that he was no more so than the other fighters he trained with. After all, “he used to struggle to win our club championship,” recalled Eddie Futch, a former boxer in the lightweight class at Brewster Center. However, what 290 Kevin Liu

made Louis stand out from the crowd was his constant persistence and passion. Futch remembered how he “never knew anybody so persistent. If you had an apple, [Louis] would beg and beg for a bite until you gave him a bite. So he always got me into the ring to spar with him.” When word began to spread of how he dented a punching bag, Joe had his first experience of notoriety. Local boxing fans began to take notice of him on the streets and in the club. After his first year as an amateur, Louis found himself in the local light-heavyweight championships in the novice class. He began his Golden Gloves debut on January 11, 1933. Before long, Joe had six straight knockouts as a Golden Glover which earned him the light-heavyweight title. Despite his crowd-pleasing knockouts and toughness, Joe was not considered invincible yet. Joe steadily progressed through the amateur ranks, and he became an increasingly popular choice for various fight cards. His ferocity in the ring and gym always belied a remarkably even personality. Many local fans loved him for his shy sweetness and remarkable diffidence. Louis began his professional career on the night of Sep- tember 11th, 1934, in front of a large group of friends and family. The fight was nothing more than a local fight in Windsor, Ontario. However, Louis’s poise and aggressiveness in the ring that night would foreshadow the rest of his career. After merely five months, Louis’s professional record was 11 wins and 0 losses. Within another year, Louis was considered one of the top heavyweights, and his popularity was growing by the fight.

Background: Max Schmeling In the same period that the Barrows were contemplating a new life in Detroit, a dark-haired fifteen-year-old stood outside a newspaper office in Cologne listening to the radio. He was hunched with a group of men, all of whom possessed furrowed brows and looks of intense absorption. The boy was named Max Siegfried Adolph Otto Schmeling and he was completely engrossed in an THE CONCORD REVIEW 291 account of Jack Dempsey’s famed fight with Frenchman Georges Carpentier. After the fight, Schmeling spent his meager earnings watching the same fight in a local theatre. He then convinced his father to pay for some boxing lessons. Soon, young Max saved enough to buy old boxing gloves and hung them over his bed. A burning passion had been ignited. Max Schmeling was born on September 28th, 1905 in Klein Luckow, a small town eighty miles north of Berlin. Schmeling grew up in Hamburg; he left school early and worked at various odd jobs. He was always physically fit, and although he flirted with soccer at a young age, he was soon drawn to boxing. The pugilistic world was previously underground and illegal in Germany before World War I. However, interest in the sport had recently exploded. German soldiers had learned it as prisoners of war in Britain and America, and brought it back to Germany. In Weimar Germany, the sport evolved to become a great passion of the working class, artists, and intellectuals alike. First in Dusseldorf, then in Cologne, Schmeling spent most of his spare time in boxing clubs. In Cologne, he honed his distinctive skills and fighting style. Schmeling was known to be methodical, scientific, and patient. He was a fighter well-versed in the basics of footwork, body movement, and defense. He would become famous for his distinctive calculating style. In addition to his physical development, Schmeling’s personal life had always been extremely regimented. He was on a careful diet with no alcohol, no tobacco, and regular training hours. Schmeling’s training soon propelled him to the professional fight scene in 1924. Schmeling won nine of his first ten fights and became the German heavyweight boxing champion in 1928. With his success, Schmeling gained entry into elite German intellectual circles amongst novelists, filmmakers, and artists. His physical appeal and charming personality also allowed him to connect with the German public. German magazines called him “our greatest hope” and extolled his “cold, sure eye, technique, brain and general ability.” Sports columnists soon encouraged Schmeling to venture across the Atlantic. A notable example was 292 Kevin Liu

Paul Gallico, a prominent sports columnist for the New York Daily News, who spoke German and read German newspapers. Gallico and other journalists began urging Schmeling to test the waters of pugilism in the United States. Once in New York, Schmeling met Joe Jacobs, a notable Jewish fight manager. Their relationship was one of sport’s most incongruous partnerships. Jacobs was a short, fast-talking Jewish New Yorker while Schmeling was a muscular German who would be used to embody Nazi ideals. According to Time magazine, Jacobs, the manger, was physically “puny” but in character he was “generous, gregarious, and made good copy.” With Jacobs managing his career, Schmeling won two difficult fights in a row in February 1929, and many people were already beginning to predict he would become the world heavyweight champion. In fact, Boxing Sport declared that American public opinion toward Germany had warmed up for the first time since the armistice. This demonstrates the significance of boxing and its prizefighters to public opinion and political strife. After more victories against top contenders, Schmeling’s rise and publicity were unmatched. Jacobs wrote a seventeen-part series on Schmel- ing for the New York American. The New York Times declared that “all of Berlin was frantic with joy.” In barely a year since he arrived in America, Schmeling’s purses topped 95,000 dollars, the fastest start for a boxer ever. Schmeling was connecting with American fight fans but his newfound publicity and success made him one of Germany’s most precious exports. When Schmeling stepped in the ring to fight Jack Sharkey for the heavyweight crown on June 12, 1930, the fight received widespread media attention from all national and local papers. The front page of the Olean Times bore the headline “Expect 70,000 Fans to Witness World Title Contest” and dedicated its front page spreads to pictures of Sharkey and Schmeling. Schmeling would never back down from his image as Germany’s prodigal child; his trunks bore the German national colors and he was introduced as “the fighting son of the Father- land.” THE CONCORD REVIEW 293 Schmeling started the bout slowly, and lost the first two rounds. By the third round, Sharkey felt like he would be able to knock out Schmeling at will. In the fourth round, Sharkey saw an opening to Schmeling’s body positioned himself for an attack with full power. Precisely where the punch landed will forever be unknown. However, Schmeling doubled over in pain, and Joe Jacobs began to berate the referee for what he thought was an obvious below-the-belt foul. The entire ring erupted in pandemonium. The befuddled referee declared Schmeling the winner, and he became the first and only heavyweight champion to win on a foul. The manner in which he won the championship stained Schmeling’s accomplishment to the extent that even his extremely loyal German fan base criticized his victory. American newspapers were even more unforgiving in their accounts. The Baltimore Post declared that Sharkey had “had out-classed Schmeling in every way” and “no one among that vast throng which packed every nook and cranny of the towering Yankee Stadium last night left with any doubt that Jack Sharkey was the better man.” The negative publicity clouded Schmeling’s reign as heavyweight champion. In late January 1931, he began a forty-city exhibition tour, designed to cash in on his championship status. The tour was poorly attended, and Schmeling was often rudely received. In January of 1932, he finally agreed to a rematch with Sharkey that following June. Schmeling met Sharkey again on June 21st at the Madison Square Garden Bowl in Long Island City in front of 70,000 fans. Schmeling appeared to have dominated the somewhat dull fight from beginning to end. Astonishingly, the result was a split decision, and Sharkey was declared the winner. Joe Jacobs earned sport’s immortality by famously seizing the microphone to scream, “We wuz robbed!” Paul Gallico of the New York Daily News declared that “The great Schmeling-Sharkey controversy now stands at one steal apiece.” Despite Schmeling’s loss, he was a much bigger star than he had ever been as the heavyweight champion. 294 Kevin Liu

The Risen and the Redeemed After losing the title in 1932, Schmeling lost again to Max Baer in 1933 and to Steve Hamas in 1934. Ike Gellis of the New York Evening Post described Schmeling as “pathetic” and even Paul Gallico conceded that he thought Schmeling’s career was over. While Joe Louis began making headlines with his knockout prowess in the United States, the former champion’s only hope was to quietly rehabilitate his image in Europe. Beginning in Ger- many in a thrilling fight against Walter Neusel in August of 1934, Schmeling began his comeback. Schmeling went on to beat two more top contenders, Steve Hamas and Paulino Uzcudan. With the victories his handlers announced that Schmeling was ready to be considered for the championship. However, Schmeling’s redemption run coincided with Joe Louis’s meteoritic rise to stardom. Joe Louis had won his first twenty-three professional fights, with all but four being knockouts. His victories against top contenders and former champions gave him an unprecedented reputation for invincibility. Louis was already being proclaimed as one of the greatest fighters of all time. Destiny was moving Louis and Schmeling closer to a showdown when they both closed out 1935 with victories against the same opponent, Paolino Uzcudun. When Schmeling was scheduled to fight Louis for the first time in 1936, Louis held an unnerving aura of invincibility. Schmeling, on the other hand, was looking forward to his thirty-first birth- day, and attempting to rebound off of several stark losses. He was considered over the hill by journalists and fans alike. Joe Louis was beginning to connect with the American public, including people of all races. In an era long before political correctness or racial equality came into light, many writers exaggerated Louis’s unsophisticated speech. Sportswriters of the day were even blatantly racist in their drawings and columns. Coverage of a Max Schmeling fight against Max Baer, who is of Jewish origin, in Time magazine featured the headline, “Sport: Jew vs. German.” Despite racism, there was also a growing acceptance of Louis’s popularity with the general public. Most THE CONCORD REVIEW 295 writers agreed that his spectacular skill was combined with great modesty, behavior, and sportsmanship. Nat Fleischer wrote, “The Ring welcomes Louis among America’s fighting men. Regardless of color, boxing needs good talent and in the Detroiter it has the type of gladiator for whom the sport has been looking.” Louis’s popularity marks a largely unprecedented social achievement for an African-American athlete and would set the foundation for Louis’s reputation as “white America’s first black hero.” Although not on the same scale, Max Schmeling was also receiving admiring praise from American sportswriters for his determination and fearlessness. Schmeling is quoted as stating decisively that “I have been hit before and I did not like it, I admit. But I was not scared then and I will not be scared when Louis hits me.” Coincidentally, it was the German politicians and sportswriters who were criticizing him most. The Nazis thought his defeat would be inevitable at the hands of Louis and believed Schmeling would reflect badly on the dogma of Aryan superiority. The party’s officialReich Sport Journal observed that there was “not much enthusiasm” for the fight. Only one low-ranked Nazi correspondent travelled with Schmeling to cover the fight. It was as though his own nation had officially written him off after his previous losses. The unofficial betting odds showed that Schmeling was an 8 to 1 underdog at the start of the fight. Nonetheless, as he promised, Schmeling maintained his unperturbed demeanor. Most were ready for a quick and exciting knockout for the undefeated and virtually unassailable Louis. However, most were also unaware of Schmeling’s meticulous planning and fight strategy. He had spent countless hours studying films of Louis’s previous fights, probing for any sign of a weakness. Schmeling himself described his research as the “thorough, systematic observation of a scientist.” It did not take long for Schmeling to notice that Joe tended to drop his left hand after delivering a punch, thus leaving himself open to a right-hand counterpunch. It was also the case that a short, straight right hand attack was the best weapon in Schmeling’s arsenal. Most of the knockouts in his career came from his powerful and deadly-accurate right hand. 296 Kevin Liu

The fight opened quietly, and Louis easily won the first few rounds. It seemed that he was indeed on his way to an easy win. However, Schmeling never deserted his fight strategy and patiently waited for Louis to drop his left hand and completely open himself to a Schmeling counterpunch. Schmeling had long ago decided to sacrifice a few rounds and absorb some hard Louis punches to get his chance at landing his right-hand attack. Of the first few rounds, he declared “I could have avoided those punches, but that would have meant moving out of the range from which I could land my right.” Schmeling then found that opportunity for which he had been preparing for. He unloaded the perfect punch which he had honed for his entire career. According to Schmeling, he had “thrown [his] entire body weight behind it, and it was hard and sharp.” All of a sudden, Louis went from cool and collected to staggered and foggy. His knees became unsteady and Schmeling sent him tumbling to the canvas for the first time in his career. Nat Fleischer of The Ring described how Louis “seemed not only to be wobbly, but in a daze.” Fleischer went on to declare how “the idol who replaced Jack Dempsey as the magnet was nearing the end of his reign.” Schmeling kept finding openings for his right and when he knocked out Louis in the twelfth round, journalists called it the “upset of the century.” Merely hours before Schmeling sat in his locker room, exhausted but victorious, Germany had wanted to forget him. Suddenly, Schmeling became the new darling of the Third Reich. Joseph Goebbels cabled immediately after hearing the result, declaring “I know you won it for Germany. We are proud of you.” Adolf Hitler soon followed with his own message, and even sent Schmeling’s wife flowers. A week after the fight, Schmeling was invited to fly home on theHindenburg zeppelin. After Schmeling arrived in Germany, he was whisked off to Berlin for a private reception with Adolf Hitler. The two viewed footage of Schmeling’s victory and Hitler demanded that footage of the fight be expanded into a full-length feature called Max Schmeling’s Victory, A German Victory. THE CONCORD REVIEW 297 In Louis’s locker room, Joe could be seen weeping long and hard. His face had been bludgeoned blue, purple, and yellow. Given Louis’s lofty status amongst American blacks, his mauling was perceived as a symbolic defeat for the entire race. There were even scattered reports of black-on-white violence. The American press, found completely off the mark in its prediction of an easy knockout for Louis, searched frantically for excuses. The final conclusion was practically unanimous in the belief that Louis had gone into the fight unprepared, both mentally and physically. Louis had entered boxing as a teenager largely influenced by his family, his religion, and the poverty of his upbringing. The fact was Joe Louis had grown up. By the time of the Schmeling fight, he had become a confident young man swayed by fame and fortune. He had his own opinions and influences and was not influenced by the well-meaning advice of friends and family. His trainers lamented about Louis’s preparation for the Schmeling fight; when he was not spending time chasing women, he was playing golf. While many in America debated Louis’s astounding fall, he responded with a stout heart and yearned to resume training as soon as possible. In an interview he said that “I had been humiliated, and I had to prove to everybody that I was the best heavyweight around.” Prior to the bout, Louis symbolized racial progress in black America. More than just a top prospect, he was considered untouchable. According to journalists, Schmeling’s victory was tantamount to realigning the stars in the universe. Walter Wendall of the Boston Chronicle wrote about the streets of Harlem just after the fight and how “not even the worst days of the Depression could achieve such blanket sadness.” Even for the citizens who were not boxing fans, who were few and far between, Louis’s defeat had an astounding impact. Although originally disconsolate after the defeat, Louis returned to his winning ways just eight weeks after his loss to Schmeling. He knocked out Joe Sharkey just three rounds in. Then, in September of that year, he knocked out Al Ettore. Neither Schmeling nor Louis held the world heavyweight championship at this point. The current champion was James 298 Kevin Liu

J. Braddock, a man journalist Damon Runyon anointed as “the Cinderella Man” for his surprising rise. Both Louis and Schmeling were considered better prospects than Braddock and a race began to see who would come to hold the title. It was a significant social and political fear for many Americans that Schmeling would beat Braddock and consequently take the title back to Germany and keep it there. Thus, even though Louis had lost his bout against Max Schmeling, promoters had cleverly argued a championship fight against Braddock in his favor. On the evening of June 22, 1937, the champion and the challenger made their ways to the ring pitched outside in Comiskey Park. Joe was considered a much superior fighter, and a 2-to-1 favourite. When Joe knocked Brad- dock down in the eighth round he knew he was the first black heavyweight champion in an entire generation and the youngest titleholder ever. Louis had managed to climb his way back to the top of the world after his damaging loss to Schmeling. The response was both exuberant and immediate. The New York Sun featured a headline that said “Harlem Holds Maddest Revel.” Within a half-hour of the fight’s conclusion, newsboys were hawking fight extras. Once again the stars in the universe had seemed to realign and praise for Louis resumed. However, in the emotional dressing room he sat exhausted and quiet. When he finally spoke, he declared that “I don’t want nobody to call me champ until I beat that Schmeling.” Up until that point, both Schmeling and Louis were larger than life. After those words, their rivalry and forthcoming rematch were too.

“The Fight” It was September 3rd, 1937, and Mike Jacobs, boxing promoter at Madison Square Garden, was practically prancing around his office with delight. This was of little surprise as Jacobs had just received word that Max Schmeling agreed to fight Joe Louis for the World’s Heavyweight Boxing Championship. “I can see all those senators, governors, and mayors chasing me for a crack at the bout,” Jacobs anticipated. “They’ll be in a line from here to San Francisco.” The so-called “Fight of the Century” was now THE CONCORD REVIEW 299 scheduled, and fans would have to wait just 10 months for the most famous boxing showdown in history. During this long interval, press and world events would help create the most politicized and publicized fight build-up in sports history. Both fighters attempted to concentrate on the task ahead without becoming distracted with the ever-present political spin. However, neither could fail to recognize the significance of their fight. Over the winter and spring of 1937-1938, Adolf Hitler had increased the pace of German rearmament and territorial expansion, eventually setting his voracious gaze upon Czechoslovakia. Political tensions were high, and the war became a real fear for the general public. Consequently, the enormous wave of pre-fight publicity in 1938 saw both men exploited by their respective countries in an effort to try to shape a patriotic consciousness. President Franklin D. Roosevelt was worried about how America would respond to growing fascist power in Europe. In 1937, Roosevelt was voicing his concerns that “the epidemic of world lawlessness is spreading.” Further, by the start of Roosevelt’s re-election campaign for the presidency in 1940, America was only beginning to recover from the after-effects of the Great Depression and was in desperate need of a hero. Joe Louis seemed to be a prime candidate. Prior to Louis’s fight against Max Schmeling, Roosevelt invited Louis to the White House for dinner. After touching Louis’s arm, Roosevelt declared “Joe, we need muscles like yours to beat Germany.” Herr Hitler looked upon Max Schmeling as a perfect propaganda tool. Blessed with an able body, broad shoulders, and a stiff right jab, Germans saw Max Schmeling as a “superman.” The Nazis became incredibly fond of Schmeling as a charismatic symbol to whom they could attach their political ideology. Chris Mead, author of Champion Joe Louis described how “World events made it increasingly difficult for Americans to disassociate Max Schmeling from his fascist homeland. The swastika hugged Schmeling like flypaper.”

300 Kevin Liu

Schmeling himself explained the political importance of the fight and how 1938 saw Hitler at the height of his popularity. But as great as was the celebration, so was the rest of the world put ill at east. I felt the shift in public opinion when I arrived in New York in early spring to start training for the Louis fight. Even as theBremen pulled into New York harbor, there were people yelling and carrying signs, apparently waiting for none other than myself. The posters that they held over their heads called me an ‘Aryan Show Horse’ and a representative of the ‘master race,’ while they shook their fists at me. Schmeling was not the only competitor affected by the fight’s political ambience. Just before stepping into the ring, the American nation heard Louis’s views on the event: “Tonight I not only fight the battle of my life to revenge the lone blot on my record, but I fight for America against the challenge of a foreign invader, Max Schmeling. This isn’t just one man against another or Joe Louis boxing Max Schmeling—it’s the good old U.S.A. versus Germany.” As June 22, fight night, drew nearer, fight talk and war talk were virtually interchangeable. Groups like the Anti-Nazi League and American Jewish Committee picketed Mike Jacobs’s office in an effort to slow ticket sales. Further, it was rumored that Hitler had offered Schmeling the minister of sport position for the Third Reich if he won. Another rumor spread that Schmeling’s trainer, Max Machon, had a full Nazi uniform hanging in his closet. “The Fight” also had important social consequences. Most notable was Joe Louis’s great impact on racial equality for African- Americans. Louis became the first African-American to achieve lasting popularity and universal fame in the 20th century. In an age when African Americans were subject to lynching, segregation, and oppression, Louis inspired hope. Malcolm X recalled that “every Negro boy old enough to walk wanted to be the next “Brown Bomber” (Louis’s nickname).” Louis was the first African-American to receive a hero’s worship that had previously been reserved for white men only. According to Joe Louis, Jr. “What my father did was enable white America to think of him as an American, not as a black. By winning, he became white America’s first black hero.” Louis was black America’s most significant source of pride and THE CONCORD REVIEW 301 a win against Schmeling would mean triumph against the most brutal racism directed at people. The Joe Louis and Max Schmeling rivalry also had a significant impact on society that superseded individual races. Both national governments were grooming their fighter to appear as the invincible champion. A win would boost morale, promote public confidence, and reflect positively on the government. As Louis stated, “I knew I had to get Schmeling good. I had my own personal reasons and the whole damned country was depending on me.” In a time of war and foreign policy struggle, public confidence is considered vital. Given the importance of boxing, no single event could have more of an effect on public confidence than a Max Schmeling versus Joe Louis championship bout. A loss for Schmeling would mean inferiority of the Nazi race, while a loss for Louis would mean a nod in favor of Hitler’s racist beliefs. As the second fight drew nearer everyone from former champions to fans alike voiced their predictions. The experts almost unanimously favored Louis. Many past champions, including Braddock, Sharkey, Willard, and Jefferies agreed. However, the official betting odds were only 2:1 in favor of Louis, whereas the 1936 fight had at times come close to 20:1. Despite his apparent advantages, Louis astonished fans with his own prediction of a knockout in the second round. Schmeling could recall the excitement leading up to the fight and how “the whole world eagerly awaited the fight. People were arriving from all over. All of Hollywood came.” At 8:25 pm the ring lights in Yankee Stadium turned on. Twelve minutes later, the first preliminary fights began. A hundred Western Union wires had been installed for the fight but were still ineffective in managing traffic on international phone lines. At precisely 10:08pm, the bell rang, signaling the start of the first round. A reporter for the Philadelphia Tribune described how “a silence, like the calm of Heaven, prevailed over Harlem.” Those who could not afford to come to the fight listened to the radio at home. Those too poor to own a radio visited public facilities to hear the fight. 302 Kevin Liu At the sound of the bell, Louis quickly bounded out of his corner, meeting Schmeling three-quarters of the way across the ring. The two fighters parried for only seven seconds before Louis began to land combinations of lefts and rights. Schmeling was soon bewildered, trying desperately to maintain his defense. He managed to throw just two punches the entire fight. Before the round reached two minutes, Schmeling was down on the canvas, trying to maintain mental clarity. Then, two minutes and four seconds after the opening bell, the referee stopped the fight. Louis had knocked Schmeling unconscious. Bedlam broke out instantly. Jews, blacks, Americans, whites, and Nazis alike were all shouting, celebrating, or crying. Schmeling soon recovered enough to make his way across the ring and throw his arm around Louis’s shoulders. Then, he slowly returned to his corner and began to cry. The Daily News reported that “he wept slowly at first, then his whole body shook.” In the weeks following the fight, Schmeling lay resting in the hospital. In his autobiography he reported that Joseph Goebels was spreading the story that Louis had wrapped lead in his gloves and threw illegal punches. Schmeling also lamented that there “was something that I already knew—after this defeat, I no longer existed for Hitler and Goebbels. The time for receptions in the Reich Chancellery and Daggers of Honor was over.” The fight immediately became a cultural touchstone. Ev- eryone could remember where they were the night Joe Louis beat Max Schmeling. Sportswriters and journalists in America focused on Louis’s victory and its expected social and political outcomes. Firstly, Americans were confronted with the acceptance of a hero who was not of white skin. According to Bud Shaver of the Detroit Times, “there is no place for prejudice or politics in sports here, and to me Joe Louis is an American kid who has fought honestly and fairly to a high place. I know he has white, Indian, and Ne- gro blood in him, and to me that is all good American blood.” Further, America’s communities erupted with celebration and revival. Detroiters even asked police to cordon off an entire city section to celebrate. People in every American city reveled in the THE CONCORD REVIEW 303 radiance of Louis’s win. “Had you been in Harlem Wednesday night,” the Courier reported afterward, “you might have thought another World War had just ended. Joy was simply unconfined.” Many other stories centered on the fight’s symbolism, which served to strengthen America’s resolve. In many cities, banners flew that declared “Joe Louis Knocked Out Hitler.” The celebrations soon died down as both countries prepared for war. Schmeling and Louis would both fight in World War II. Further, both America and Germany would again depend on the fighters for propaganda purposes and public appeal. The Angriff declared that “as an athlete, Schmeling is a role model for ambitious youth, even more so today than earlier, because now he wears the gray coat of the Wehrmacht.” In 1940, Louis registered for army service as well. It was reported that he would often lace up boxing gloves and fight with eager soldiers, working hard to boost morale. Even as the war drew to a close and both fighters aged, their rivalry and consequent appeal would serve as an inspiration to an entire generation. Joe Louis and Max Schmeling rose to prominence through the grit of their own determination and the public’s need for heroes. As a result both were transformed into living symbols of their respective races and countries. The most basic and simple duel, a fistfight, had somehow turned into an international incident between two opposite parts of a world destined for war. Every punch was thrown from across the Atlantic Ocean. Thus, the Max Schmeling and Joe Louis rivalry had a great impact on society in the mid-late 1930s. The fight was used for political propaganda, the promotion of racial equality, and to bolster public morale. But it must be understood that despite all of the fame and tension, at the heart of this rivalry were merely two men working hard at something they loved. The authenticity of their passion, sweat, and years of labour was both irresistible and unforgettable. “The Fight” affected the world past the realms of sports and entertain- ment; it helped shape a society and its influence continues to live on in the annals of sports history. 304 Kevin Liu

1 National Public Radio, “The Fight of the Century: Louis vs. Schmeling,” November 26, 2006, http://www.npr.org/ templates/story/story.php?storyId=6515548 2 Time magazine, Sport: “Fireworks: Joe Louis Beats Max Schmeling,” October 5, 1938, http://www.time.com/time/ magazine/article/0,9171,952148,00.html (accessed July 21, 2010) 3 David Margolick, Beyond Glory, Toronto: Random House of Canada Limited, 2005 4 National Public Radio, (accessed April 25, 2010) 5 Jeremy Schaap, “Cinderella Man,” In Cinderella Man, by Jeremy Schaap, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2005 6 Schaap, p. 3 7 Ibid., p. 3 8 Ibid., p. 4 9 Ibid., p. 6 10 Richard Bak, Joe Louis : The Great Black Hope, Dallas: First Da Capo Press, 1998, pp. 2-3 11 Patrick Carter, Fiorella Finelli, Derek Grant, and David Nagy, American History, Toronto : Edmond Montgomery Publications Limited, 2008, p. 313 12 Bak, p. 4 13 Ibid., p. 4 14 Ibid., p. 5 15 Ibid., p. 6 16 Patrick Myler, Ring of Hate, New York: Arcard Publishing, Inc., 2005, p. 6 17 Ibid., p. 6 18 Ibid., p. 6 19 Ibid., p. 6 20 Ibid., p. 6 21 Ibid., p. 6 22 Ibid., p. 6 23 Margolick, p. 60 24 Ibid., p. 60 25 Ibid., p. 60 26 Ibid., p. 60 27 Ibid., p. 60 28 Bak, p. 33 29 Ibid., p. 34 30 Ibid., p. 35 31 Ibid., p. 36 32 Ibid., p. 36 THE CONCORD REVIEW 305

33 Ibid., p. 79 34 Ibid., p. 90 35 Margolick, p. 18 36 Ibid., p. 18 37 Schmeling, p. 75 38 Ibid., p. 18 39 Kasia Boddy, Boxing: A Cultural History, Reaktion Books, 2009 40 Ibid. 41 Margolick, p. 18 42 Ibid., p. 18 43 Ibid., p. 19 44 Ibid., p. 19 45 Time magazine, Sport: “We Wuz Robbed,” May 6, 1940, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/ article/0,9171,763952,00.html (accessed May 6, 2010) 46 Margolick, p. 22 47 Ibid., p. 22 48 Ibid., p. 23 49 Ibid., p. 25 50 Ibid., p. 23 51 Olean Evening Times, “Expect 70,000 Fans to Witness World Title Bout,” June 11, 1930, http://www. newspaperarchive.com/PdfViewerTags.aspx?img=38743457&fir stvisit=true&src=search¤tResult=3¤tPage=0&fpo= False (accessed August 17, 2010) 52 Margolick, p. 23 53 Bak, p. 83 54 Baltimore Post, “Schmeling, Beaten, Wins on Foul,” June 13, 1930, http://www.boxinggyms.com/news/schmeling1930/ schmeling-sharkey1930.htm (accessed August 17, 2010) 55 Margolick, p. 26 56 Ibid., p. 27 57 Ibid., p. 27 58 Ibid., p. 27 59 Ibid., p. 27 60 Ibid., p. 44 61 Bak, p. 114 62 Myler, p. 74 63 Ibid., p. 70 64 Time Magazine, Sport: “Jew vs. German,” June 19, 1933, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/ article/0,9171,789370,00.html (accessed July 8 , 2010) 306 Kevin Liu

65 Margolick, p. 67 66 Larry Schwartz, ‘“Brown Bomber’ was a hero to all,” Uknown, http://espn.go.com/sportscentury/ features/00157501.html (accessed April 24, 2010) 67 Myler, p. 78 68 Ibid., p. 78 69 Margolick, p. 70 70 Max Schmeling, Max Schmeling: An Autobiography, Chicago: Bonus Books, 1977, pp. 144-145 71 Myler, p. 75 72 Schmeling, p. 120 73 Ibid., p. 122 74 Nat Fleischer, The Ring, 1936, pp. 12-14 75 Bak, p. 120 76 Myler, p. 86 77 Bak, p. 121 78 Ibid., p. 120 79 Myler, p. 89 80 Ibid., p. 89 81 Ibid., p. 91 82 Margolick, p. 170 83 Bak, p. 124 84 Myler, p. 97 85 Bak, p. 132 87 New York Sun, “Harlem Holds Maddest Revel,” June 1938 88 Bak, p. 150 89 Myler, p. 117 90 Ibid., p. 117 91 Myler, p. 118 92 Patrick Carter, Fiorella Finelli, Derek Grant, and David Nagy, American History, Toronto: Edmond Montgomery Publications Limited, 2008 93 Schwartz, p. 1 94 Schmeling, p. 152 95 Myler, p. 138 96 Bak, p. 160 97 Ibid., p. 160 98 Ibid., p. 160 99 Schwartz, p. 5 100 Ibid., p. 3 THE CONCORD REVIEW 307

101 PBS Home Programs, More about the Film: The Fight, September 22, 2004, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/fight/ filmmore/index.html (accessed April 24 , 2010) 102 Schmeling, p. 152 103 Margolick, p. 265 104 Schmeling, p. 152 105 Margolick, p. 288 106 Ibid., p. 288 107 Ibid., p. 289 108 Damon Runyon, Evening Standard: “Louis Was Truly Great,” June 23, 1938, http://www.boxinggyms.com/news/ louis_schmeling1938/standard_cover.htm (accessed May 6, 2010) 109 Ibid. 110 Margolick, p. 301 111 Ibid., p. 305 112 Schmeling, p. 156 113 Bak, p. 166 114 Ibid., p. 167 115 Margolick, p. 314 116 Bak, p. 167 117 Margolick, p. 338 118 Myler, p. 172 308 Kevin Liu

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Schmeling, Max, Max Schmeling: An Autobiography, Chicago: Bonus Books, 1977 Schwartz, Larry, “‘Brown Bomber’ was a hero to all.” Uknown, http://espn.go.com/sportscentury/ features/00157501.html (accessed April 24, 2010) The History Place, Prelude to War, Uknown 1999, http:// www.historyplace.com/worldwar2/hitleryouth/hj-prelude.htm (accessed April 24, 2010) Time magazine, Sport: “Fireworks: Joe Louis Beats Max Schmeling,” October 5, 1938, http://www.time.com/time/ magazine/article/0,9171,952148,00.html (accessed July 21, 2010) —. Sport: “Jew vs. German,” June 19, 1933, http://www. time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,789370,00.html (accessed July 8, 2010) —. Sport: “We Wuz Robbed,” May 06, 1940, http://www. time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,763952,00.html (accessed May 6, 2010) “We have been glad to have reprints of essays published in The Concord Review, submitted by our applicants over the years, to add to the information we consider in making admissions decisions...All of us here in the Admissions Office are big fans of The Concord Review.”

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