Polit Behav (2011) 33:291–311 DOI 10.1007/s11109-010-9111-3

ORIGINAL PAPER

Distrust in Government Leaders, Demand for Leadership Change, and Preference for Popular Elections in Rural China

Lianjiang Li

Published online: 12 June 2010 Ó Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2010

Abstract This paper examines the relationship between distrust in incumbent government leaders and demand for systemic changes in rural China. It finds that individuals who distrust government leaders’ commitment to the public interest have both stronger demand for leadership change and stronger preference for popular elections. It argues that distrust in government leaders may have enhanced the demand for leadership change, which in turn may have reinforced the preference for elections. It further argues that distrust in incumbent leaders has in effect induced a demand for systemic changes, as introducing popular election of gov- ernment leaders would require a major constitutional amendment. The paper sug- gests that two distinctive mechanisms may be at work in determining whether distrust in current government authorities induces preference for systemic changes. Whether citizens can engineer leadership change through existing channels influ- ences the generation of idealistic wishes for a better political system. Perceived availability of better and viable alternatives affects whether idealistic wishes become a practical preference.

Keywords Political trust Á Distrust in government leaders Á Leadership change Á Systemic changes

Introduction

Trust in incumbent government authorities enhances system support while distrust generates demand for leadership and policy changes (Abravanel and Busch 1975, p. 57; Muller and Jukam 1977; Chanley et al. 2000; Hetherington 2004). Scholars,

L. Li (&) Department of Government and Public Administration, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, N.T., Hong Kong, China e-mail: [email protected] 123 292 Polit Behav (2011) 33:291–311 however, disagree about whether distrust in incumbent government leaders induces preference for systemic changes. As regards the United States, one side argues that distrust in current authorities may ultimately weaken public acceptance of democratic principles and result in support for undemocratic alternatives (A. Miller 1974a, b; Caddell 1979). The other side argues that distrust in political authorities does not undermine support for the democratic system (Citrin 1974; Abravanel and Busch 1975, p. 80; W. Miller 1979). Further empirical studies on the US and other democracies have not settled this debate. Some researchers observe that distrust in current administration significantly weakens support for a democratic system (Miller and Listhaug 1990; Waldron-Moore 1999; Bratton and Mattes 2001; Seligson 2002a, p. 180; Sarsfield and Echegaray 2006; also see Avery 2006, 2007; Weitz-Shapiro 2008). Others find that distrust in incumbent government authorities has little impact on democratic support (Lipset and Schneider 1983; Citrin and Green 1986; Finkel et al. 1989; Rose and Shin 2001). These studies concentrate on democracies where free election of government leaders has been institutionalized. The debate has thus focused on whether distrust in freely elected government authorities weakens support for democracy. Only recently have scholars begun to address another dimension of the theoretical puzzle, which is whether distrust in political authorities who are not freely elected stimulates demand for systemic changes in authoritarian and transitional societies. Their findings, though, vary from place to place. On one hand, a study by Rose (2007) finds that distrust in government leaders in post-soviet Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, where elections fall short of being free and fair, does not generate preference for further democratization. On the other hand, Johnson (2005, pp. 79– 80) observes that distrust in political leaders in the quasi-authoritarian Ukraine enhances support for democracy, while a more recent study by Jamal (2007) finds that in the Arab world individuals who have less confidence in authoritarian government have stronger support for democracy. This study joins the discussion by examining the relationship between distrust in current government leaders and demand for systemic changes in China. The case of China is interesting for two reasons. First, the country has witnessed a growing number of popular protests in the last two decades (Walker 2006; Cai 2008; O’Brien 2008), which suggests that trust in government authorities may have declined (cf. Abravanel and Busch 1975; Muller and Jukam 1977). Second, public demand for systemic changes seems to be on the rise. Disillusioned protest leaders, for instance, have openly called for ending one-party rule (Li 2004, p. 239; Li and O’Brien 2008, p. 23). More importantly, a three-wave survey conducted in the Chinese capital city finds that ‘‘diffuse support for the regime had declined by more than 6 percent’’ from 1995 to 1999 (Chen 2004, p. 184). Is distrust in government leaders associated with demand for systemic changes in China? What can we learn from the China case about the relationship between distrust in government authorities and preference for systemic changes? Drawing on survey data collected in the Chinese countryside, this paper addresses these questions. It first examines how distrust in government leaders’ commitment to the public interest is associated with demand for leadership change and preference for popularly electing government leaders. It then explores how 123 Polit Behav (2011) 33:291–311 293 distrust in leaders may foster idealistic wishes for a better political system and why only certain idealistic wishes become practical demands for systemic changes. It concludes with a discussion about the theoretical and methodological implications of survey findings from rural China.

Data and Methods

This study relies on a local survey conducted in 2007. The field sites were Dongshan county and Wuping county in Fujian province, Shangrao county in Jiangxi province, and Yongjia county in Zhejiang province. The four counties were selected by convenience. Sampling in each county was conducted in three stages. First, five townships were selected with probability proportionate to size (PPS). Second, four villages were selected from each township with PPS. Lastly, within each selected village around 20 randomly chosen individuals over the age of 18 were interviewed, regardless of village population size. Interviews were administered by advanced undergraduate students in the Department of Sociology from a leading university in South China under the supervision of their professor. Altogether 1,600 farmers were interviewed. Cases are weighted according to the rural population size of the county. To adjust for survey design effects, each selected township is treated as a stratum and each village a cluster. As with other survey studies (e.g., Zhu 1996; Berinsky 2004), this research faces the unavoidable problem of missing responses. Altogether 7.7% of 1,600 respondents did not answer one or more of the 45 questions analyzed in this study. Little’s Missing Completely at Random (MCAR) test (Little 1988) showed that the data were not MCAR (N = 1,600; v2 = 3,437; df = 3,063; p = .000). Assuming that the data were missing at random (MAR), missing values were multiply imputed to increase the efficiency of estimation and to make inferences valid by reflecting additional variability due to the missing values (Rubin 1987; Schafer and Olsen 1998; King et al. 2001). Five multiply imputed datasets were generated using the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method (Schafer 1997; SPSS Inc 2008, p. 25). The imputed datasets were analyzed with Mplus 5.0 (Muthe´n and Muthe´n 2006, p. 315). Estimates and standard errors of direct and indirect effects obtained from imputed datasets were then combined using the rules given by Rubin (Rubin 1987; Schafer and Olsen 1998, pp. 556–557). For the purposes of comparison, the analytic model was also fitted to the original data using listwise deletion and to a singly imputed dataset generated with the Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm (Little and Rubin 1987). Results obtained from the three alternative treatments of missing values are highly consistent. The data analysis proceeded in two steps. Confirmatory factor analysis was used to assure that multiple measures of latent theoretical constructs were reliable. A path model was then estimated to examine the relationships between the outcome, explanatory, mediator, control, and background variables. Ordinal and binary indicators of latent constructs were treated as crude measurements of latent continuous factors. The WLSMV (weighted least squares mean and variance adjusted) estimator was used to correct for the bias that might result from having 123 294 Polit Behav (2011) 33:291–311 ordinal endogenous variables in the model (Muthe´n and Muthe´n 2006, p. 424). Since it relies on a local probability sample, the research focuses on exploring relationships between variables (Manion 1994).

The Outcome Variable: Preference for Elections as an Indicator of Demand for Systemic Changes

The outcome variable is preference for popularly electing government leaders. Preference for elections is used as an indicator of demand for systemic changes in China for two reasons. First, an expressed preference for elections may signify a certain degree of disapproval of the current political system, under which ordinary citizens have little say in the selection of government leaders (Burns 1989; Chan 2004). Second, a preference for popular elections may indicate a demand for an institutional change that will require a major constitutional amendment. The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (adopted 1982, last amended 2004) stipulates that government leaders of all levels are elected by deputies to the corresponding levels of people’s congress rather than ordinary citizens (Arts. 79.1; 101.1) (see O’Brien 1990, pp. 61–64, 127–137; Manion 2000, 2008).1 Preference for elections was tapped by asking whether government leaders should be directly elected by the people through one-person one-vote. Three choices were provided to the respondents: (1) should not; (2) should but conditions are not ripe; (3) should and elections can be held now. The question was asked, respectively, about the state chairman (i.e., the Chinese president), provincial governor, city mayor, county head, and township head (see Appendix for variable descriptions). Individuals who found elections undesirable were expected to choose ‘‘should not,’’ those who wished to elect government leaders but found it impractical were expected to choose ‘‘should but conditions are not ripe,’’ and those who found elections both desirable and feasible were expected to choose ‘‘should and can be held now.’’ The measure was relevant and stimulating. Excepting for a few experimental elections of township heads in Sichuan province and Guangxi province (Li 2002; Dong 2006), no popular election of government leaders had been held at any level in China. Equally important, the measure made good sense to Chinese farmers, many

1 It is worth noting that preference for elections is not equivalent to support for democratization, not to mention demand for overall regime change. As important as it is, popular election of government leaders is only one of several major dimensions of a democratic system. Moreover, election without multiparty competition can hardly be considered a criterion for democracy. Even if government leaders at all levels are elected with one-person one-vote, China will at best become an ‘‘electoral authoritarian’’ country (e.g., Diamond 2002; Schedler 2006) rather than a democracy if such elections are limited to and run by a single ruling party and exclude all potential organized opposition. Recent survey studies of political support in urban China have used more direct measures to tap popular demand (or the lack of it) for regime change, e.g., to what extent an individual feels proud to live under the current political system and feels obliged to support the current political system, if an individual believes that the communist-led multi-party system should be changed, and whether an individual finds political stability more important than democratization (Chen 2004, p. 23; Tang 2005, pp. 70–76). 123 Polit Behav (2011) 33:291–311 295

Table 1 Do you think the following government leaders should be directly elected by the people through one-person one-vote? Should not Should but Should and can Non-response conditions not ripe be held now

The state chairman 28.8 53.7 16.4 1.1 Provincial governor 26.1 55.8 16.9 1.2 City mayor 24.2 56.1 18.7 1.1 County head 16.9 52.9 29.0 1.2 Township head 12.1 47.9 38.9 1.1

Note:N= 1,600. Row entries are percentages, which may not add up to 100 due to rounding errors of whom had directly elected villagers’ committees through one-person one-vote for nearly a decade by the time of the survey (Manion 1996, 2006).2 Preference for elections turned out to be fairly widespread (Table 1). Over two- thirds of the respondents agreed that leaders of all five levels of government should be directly elected through one-person one-vote, either immediately or when conditions are mature. A preference for elections was strongest in regard to township head, and decreased steadily regarding higher levels of government leaders. While 86% of the respondents agreed that township heads should in principle be popularly elected, 70% thought the same about the state chairman. Similarly, a practical preference for elections was much stronger for lower level government leaders than for higher levels. Nearly 39% of the respondents thought that township heads should and could be popularly elected right away, when only 16% thought the same about the state chairman.

The Explanatory Variable: Distrust in Government Leaders’ Commitment to the Public Interest as an Indicator of Distrust in Government Authorities

The explanatory variable is distrust in incumbent government leaders, which is multi-dimensional as its objects include leaders’ commitment, competence, character, equity, honesty, and responsiveness (Abramson 1972, p. 1245; Weatherford 1984, pp. 188–189; Citrin and Muste 1999). This study focuses on distrust in government leaders’ commitment to rule in the interests of the governed (Levi and Stoker 2000, p. 476), because popular elections can improve the incentive compatibility or ideological congruence between elected elites and their constit- uents (Achen 1978; Dalton 1985; Huber and Powell 1994; Manion 1996). Individuals who distrust the current leaders’ commitment to the public interest are expected to prefer popular elections, because it will enable them to remove untrustworthy leaders imposed from above and to choose trustworthier ones on their own. Distrust in government leaders’ commitment to the public interest was tapped with three indicators. Respondents were asked whether they believed that

2 Villagers’ committees are not a level of government but ‘‘mass organizations of self-government.’’ 123 296 Polit Behav (2011) 33:291–311 government leaders: (1) put their own interests before those of farmers; (2) do not care whether farmers will agree when they make policies; and (3) care primarily about the powerful and rich and neglect the interests of ordinary people. Provided choices were: (1) fully disbelieve; (2) disbelieve; (3) half believe and half doubt; (4) believe; and (5) fully believe. The question was asked about all five levels of government leaders: central, provincial, city, county, and township. Measured by these three indicators, popular distrust was highest for township leaders and decreased for higher levels. Over 22% of the respondents had no confidence in township leaders in all three aspects, while 15% had no trust in central leaders. Conversely, over 35% of the respondents were confident about central leaders in all three aspects, while less than 20% had full confidence in township leaders. The observation corroborates a previous finding that the Chinese people have less trust in lower levels of government than in higher levels (Shi 2001;Li 2004). Confirmatory factor analysis showed that for each level of government leaders the responses to the three questions constituted a single latent construct (standard- ized factor loadings ranged from .712 to .898). Five latent continuous variables were then constructed to measure distrust in central, provincial, city, county, and township leaders (see Appendix).

Mediator Variable: Demand for Leadership Change

Demand for leadership change is assumed to be the mediator through which distrust in leaders affects preference for elections. First, distrust in the incumbent leaders does not always induce demand for leadership change. Some Chinese farmers, for instance, do not want to see corrupt officials replaced on grounds that ‘‘when a full tiger leaves, he will inevitably be replaced by a hungry wolf’’ (Li and O’Brien 1996, p. 34). Second, distrust in incumbent leaders may induce demand for leadership change without generating demand for any systemic changes. An individual who wants leadership change may remain confident in the existing system of top-down appointment and may look to higher levels for the desired change. Only those individuals who both want leadership change and no longer have confidence in top- down appointment are likely to favor popular election as an alternative means of choosing government leaders. To tap their demand for leadership change, respondents were asked whether they would vote for the incumbent government leader if, hypothetically, a democratic election was held. Provided choices were: (1) yes; (2) unsure; and (3) no. The question was repeated about the state chairman, provincial governor, city mayor, county head, and township head. Reservations about voting for the incumbent were interpreted as an indication of demand for leadership change. Demand for leadership change turned out to be remarkably widespread (Table 2). Over 40% of the respondents showed reservations about voting for the incumbent state chairman. Demand for leadership change was stronger for provincial governor, city mayor, county head, and township head, as over 60% of the respondents were either unsure or determined not to vote for the incumbent. 123 Polit Behav (2011) 33:291–311 297

Table 2 Would you vote for the incumbent leader if a democratic election was held? Yes Unsure No Non-response

The state chairman 58.1 37.7 3.8 .4 Provincial governor 37.8 57.0 4.8 .5 City mayor 32.9 61.0 5.7 .4 County head 30.8 59.0 10.0 .2 Township head 29.1 57.7 13.0 .2

Note:N= 1,600. Row entries are percentages, which may not add up to 100 due to rounding errors

Three hypotheses were formulated. First, distrust in government leaders should lead to a stronger demand for leadership change. Second, demand for leadership change should lead to a stronger preference for elections. Lastly, distrust in leaders should have a positive indirect effect on preference for elections by inducing a stronger demand for leadership change.

Control Variables

Since it included a mediator variable, the analysis had two sets of control variables. Life satisfaction and perception of corruption were controlled to determine if distrust in current leaders’ commitment to the public interest had an independent effect on demand for leadership change. Individuals who were satisfied with their lives might give credit to incumbent government leaders (cf. Catterberg and Moreno 2006, p. 43) and prefer they stay in office, while those who were unsatisfied might blame current leaders (cf. Kinder 1981) and want leadership change. In the meantime, individuals who were more acutely aware of political corruption were expected to have a stronger demand for leadership change. Life satisfaction was tapped with three measures: (1) self-assessment of change in family income in the last 2 years; (2) expectation of change in family income in the coming 2 years; and (3) satisfaction with one’s life in general (see Appendix). The three indicators constituted a single latent construct (standardized factor loadings ranged from .650 to .796). Perception of corruption was also tapped with three indicators. Respondents were asked if township officials, county officials, and provincial and city government officials had in the last decade engaged in corruption. Provided choices were: (1) no; (2) do not know; (3) it is said so; and (4) yes. The three indicators constituted a single latent construct (standardized factor loadings ranged from .728 to .970).3 Both life satisfaction and perception of corruption were expected to have a direct impact on demand for leadership change. They were also expected to indirectly affect demand for leadership change by influencing distrust in government leaders.

3 The answer ‘‘do not know’’ was treated as a valid response rather than a missing value because it was read out as an alternative answer during the interview and it indicates a level of perception of corruption which is stronger than answering ‘‘no’’ but weaker than answering ‘‘it is said so.’’ 123 298 Polit Behav (2011) 33:291–311

Five variables were controlled to determine if demand for leadership change had an independent effect on one’s preference for elections. First, life satisfaction was controlled, as it has been observed to affect diffuse support for the political system in China (Chen 2004, p. 111). Individuals who were unsatisfied with their lives were expected to have a stronger preference for elections. Second, perception of corruption was controlled, as individuals who were more acutely aware of corruption were expected to have a stronger preference for popularly electing government leaders. The third control variable was internal political efficacy, i.e., the sense of competence in understanding public affairs and participating in politics (Abramson 1972; Balch 1974; Craig and Maggiotto 1982; Craig et al. 1990). To tap their sense of efficaciousness, respondents were asked, hypothetically, if they would be able to: (1) judge whether a county head has done a good job after listening to his/her work report; (2) judge which one is better if two candidates for county head debated each other; and (3) judge whether decisions by a county head benefit or harm their interests (see Appendix). The three indicators constituted a single latent construct (standardized factor loadings ranged from .855 to .960). More efficacious individuals were expected to have a stronger preference for elections in that they might be more confident of their abilities to work the new system. The fourth control variable was assessment of elected village leaders. In rural China, elections of villagers’ committees were designed to serve as a democratic training class (see O’Brien and Li 2000, pp. 469–470). It has been argued that as farmers realize that they can use their ballots to oust unpopular village leaders, they will wish to do the same to government officials (Shi 1999, pp. 394–395). To see if a preference for popularly electing government leaders might derive from the appreciation of the instrumental value of village elections, respondents were asked to compare elected village cadres with appointed ones in four regards: (1) honest and clean; (2) eager to serve farmers; (3) dare to speak for farmers and resist wrong decisions of the township government; and (4) handle affairs impartially. The four indicators constituted a single construct (standardized factor loadings ranged from .861 to .911). Individuals who found elected village leaders more honest, responsive, and impartial than appointed ones were expected to have a stronger preference for popular election of government leaders. Lastly, social trust was controlled as it might increase confidence in universal suffrage and ease worries about ‘‘tyranny of the majority’’ (Dahl 1971; Putnam 1993; Reisinger et al. 1994, p. 206). In rural China, social trust may be particularly important in cultivating a preference for elections, as village politics often involves long-standing lineage rivalries (Manion 2006, pp. 312–313; Tsai 2007, p. 360). To measure their trust in other people, respondents were asked whether they would in general believe what the following people told them, including: (1) fellow villagers; (2) people introduced by relatives and good friends; and (3) most people in society (see Appendix). The three indicators tapped the same latent factor (standardized factor loadings ranged from .691 to .931). Four demographic features, i.e., gender, age, education, and membership in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), were assumed to affect all attitudinal variables described above. Three regional dummy variables, i.e., Wuping county in Fujian province, Shangrao county in Jiangxi province, and Yongjia county in Zhejiang 123 Polit Behav (2011) 33:291–311 299 province were included to control for the effect of unobserved differences between the four selected counties. Dongshan county in Fujian was used as the reference. The county dummies were assumed to affect all endogenous variables.

Model and Results

A path model was constructed based on the theoretical considerations discussed above. Exogenous variables listed in the rectangular box on the left-hand side of Fig. 1 were allowed to influence all endogenous variables on the right-hand side of the bracket. Distrust in government leaders’ commitment to the public interest was assumed to affect demand for leadership change, which in turn was assumed to affect preference for elections. Distrust in leaders was assumed to have no direct impact on attitudes toward election. Life satisfaction, perception of corruption, internal political efficacy, assessment of elected village leaders, and social trust were allowed to directly influence preference for elections. As was explained above, life satisfaction and perception of corruption were also allowed to influence preference for elections indirectly by affecting distrust in leaders and demand for leadership change. The model has five versions, which are identical except that they estimate, respectively, the relationships between distrust in leaders, demand for leadership change, and preference for elections regarding five different levels of government leaders in China.

Social trust

Internal efficacy Gender Age Life Education satisfaction CCP membership

Distrust in Demand for Preference leadership leaders for elections Wuping change county Shangrao Perception of county corruption Yongjia county Assessing elected cadres

Fig. 1 The relationship between distrust in government leaders, demand for leadership change, and preference for elections. Note: Exogenous variables listed in the rectangular box are allowed to affect all endogenous ones on the right side of the bracket. Indicators of latent constructs and error/residual terms of endogenous variables are suppressed for the sake of clarity 123 300 Polit Behav (2011) 33:291–311

The model is not an exact fit. Analyses of individual datasets showed that the chi- square statistic (v2) ranged from 35 to 50 with 19 or 20 degrees of freedom (DF), which indicated an imperfect fit (p \ .01) (not shown). However, three widely- accepted close fit indexes reported in Table 3, i.e., Comparative Fit Index (CFI), Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI, also called Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI)), and Root Mean Squared Error of Approximation (RMSEA) met conventional cut-off criteria, which are, respectively, CFI [ .950, TLI [ 950, and RMSEA \ .060 (see Hu and Bentler 1999; also see Marsh et al. 2004). The goodness-of-fit test results assure us that estimated coefficients are acceptable descriptions of the data and can be used to test hypotheses. The results appearing in Table 3 can be grouped into three general findings. First, distrust in current government leaders’ commitment to the public interest was positively associated with demand for leadership change. All else being equal, individuals who had stronger distrust in government leaders were more likely to have stronger reservations about voting for the incumbent government leaders if democratic elections were held. The positive correlation between the two variables was highly significant regarding all five levels of government leaders (p B .001, one-sided test). Second, demand for leadership change was positively associated with a preference for elections, and the correlation was significant regarding the state chairman, provincial governor, city mayor, and township head (p B .05, one-sided test). All else being equal, individuals who had a stronger demand for leadership change were more likely to agree that government leaders should be popularly elected. Furthermore, individuals who were more eager to see leadership change were more likely to agree that elections could be held right away. The effect of demand for leadership change on preference for elections was statistically insignificant regarding county head, probably because individuals who had similar attitudes toward replacing the incumbent county head shared similar ideas about the desirability and feasibility of popularly electing the county head. Lastly, distrust in government leaders’ commitment to the public interest had a positive indirect impact on a person’s preference for elections by positively affecting demand for leadership change. All else being equal, the more distrustful one felt about government leaders’ commitment to the public interest, the stronger one’s demand for leadership change, and the stronger one’s preference for popular elections. The indirect effect was statistically significant regarding the state chairman, provincial governor, and township head (p B .05, one-sided test). The result offered additional support to the hypothesis that distrust in government leaders might reinforce a preference for elections by enhancing demands for leadership change. Due to the lack of longitudinal data, this research cannot establish causal relationships between distrust in government leaders, demand for leadership change, and preference for elections. In fact, alternative models that posit different relations between the key variables would fit the data equally well (see Stelzl 1986). Based on empirical and ‘‘theoretical grounds’’ (Warwick 1998, p. 597), however, it is reasonable to believe that distrust in government leaders may have enhanced demand for leadership change rather than the other way around, and it is also 123 oi ea 21)3:9–1 301 33:291–311 (2011) Behav Polit Table 3 Determinants of preference for elections and demand for leadership change

Outcome variable The state chairman Provincial governor City mayor County Head Township Head Preference for electionsa

Independent variables Demand for leadership change (weak to strong) .235*** (.059) .131** (.047) .073 (.043) .040 (.039) .100* (.042) Life satisfaction (low to high) .017 (.056) -.018 (.061) -.007 (.056) -.002 (.057) -.037 (.067) Perception of corruption (weak to strong) -.001 (.049) .062 (.043) .071 (.042) .056 (.045) .027 (.049) Assessment of elected village leaders (low to high) .058 (.050) .064 (.056) .065 (.057) .096 (.059) .030 (.051) Internal efficacy (low to high) .038 (.051) .044 (.055) .043 (.055) .136* (.062) .115* (.055) Social trust (low to high) -.083 (.076) -.099 (.078) -.081 (.075) -.129 (.070) -.125 (.069) Gender (0 = female; 1 = male) .118 (.094) .173 (.089) .147 (.078) .055 (.053) .042 (.068) Age (18–88 years) .000 (.003) -.002 (.003) -.002 (.003) -.002 (.003) -.001 (.003) Education (0–21 years) -.012 (.013) -.011 (.014) -.011 (.014) -.005 (.015) .005 (.014) CCP membership (0 = non-member, 1 = member) -.034 (.107) -.082 (.109) -.031 (.104) -.003 (.115) .000 (.099) Wuping county in Fujian province (0 = no; 1 = yes) .218** (.084) .142 (.092) .078 (.106) .166 (.090) .179 (.094) Shangrao county in Jiangxi province (0 = no; 1 = yes) .196 (.105) .212* (.104) .135 (.120) .007 (.126) .076 (.109) Yongjia county in Zhejiang province (0 = no; 1 = yes) .326** (.111) .406*** (.111) .404*** (.118) .479*** (.095) .337** (.103) Indirect effects of interest Distrust in leaders via demand for leadership change .063** (.021) .023 (.013) .018 (.012) .009 (.011) .019 (.010) Perception of corruption via demand for leadership change .012 (.016) .030* (.012) .019 (.011) .010 (.012) .041* (.017) Pseudo R2 .086 .060 .046 .065 .057

Mediator variable The state chairman Provincial governor City mayor County Head Township Head Demand for leadership changeb 123 Independent variables Distrust in leaders (weak to strong) .269*** (.050) .184*** (.056) .256*** (.062) .253*** (.047) .187*** (.053) 0 oi ea 21)33:291–311 (2011) Behav Polit 302 123 Table 3 continued Mediator variable The state chairman Provincial governor City mayor County Head Township Head Demand for leadership changeb

Life satisfaction (low to high) .095 (.058) .014 (.062) -.055 (.067) -.062 (.053) -.093 (.050) Perception of corruption (weak to strong) .057 (.070) .240*** (.062) .268*** (.058) .302*** (.042) .398*** (.048) Gender (0 = female; 1 = male) -.003 (.095) .010 (.096) -.032 (.089) -.014 (.082) .038 (.088) Age (18–88 years) -.005 (.004) -.004 (.004) -.001 (.004) -.001 (.003) .003 (.003) Education (0–21 years) -.013 (.014) .005 (.010) .014 (.011) .015 (.011) .012 (.013) CCP membership (0 = non-member, 1 = member) -.182 (.114) -.102 (.105) -.137 (.100) -.137 (.086) -.229** (.077) Indirect effects of interest Perception of corruption via distrust in leaders .007 (.012) .030* (.012) .044*** (.013) .066*** (.016) .053*** (.016) Life satisfaction via distrust in leaders .000 (.010) -.007 (.008) -.013 (.010) -.023* (.011) -.016 (.009) Pseudo R2 .121 .106 .130 .147 .186 Model fit indexes CFI .991 .991 .989 .989 .987 TLI .988 .988 .985 .985 .984 RMSEA .026 .026 .028 .029 .030

Notes: Cell entries are unstandardized ordered probit coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses beneath them. Coefficients of county dummies on the mediator variable are not shown. N = 1,600. Missing data are multiply imputed. Data are weighted p B .05 one-sided; * p B .05 two-sided; ** p B .01 two-sided; *** p B .001 two sided a Preference for elections is measured by ‘‘Do you think the following government leaders should be directly elected by the people through one-person one-vote?’’ 1 = should not; 2 = should but conditions are not ripe; 3 = should and elections can be held now b Demand for leadership change is measured by ‘‘Would you vote for the incumbent leader if a democratic election was held?’’ 1 = yes; 2 = unsure; 3 = no Polit Behav (2011) 33:291–311 303 reasonable that demand for leadership change may have reinforced preference for elections rather than the other way around. First, it is more plausible to assume that distrust in government leaders occurs prior to the formation of demand for leadership change. It is true that an individual who has a pre-formed demand for leadership change may be inclined to view incumbent leaders with skepticism such that one’s demand for leadership change enhances one’s distrust in government leaders. In China, however, this is not a very likely scenario. For one, it is hard to see how individuals would develop an interest in leadership change without having doubts about incumbent leaders. Second, most people are socialized into having faith in political authorities, particularly in national leaders. Political education in Chinese schools is designed to cultivate faith in the ruling party and the regime. Cultural myths about ‘‘benign emperors’’ and ‘‘parent-like mandarins’’ may also help inculcate trust in political authorities. Lastly, the observation of corrupt behavior such as using power for private gain and practicing favoritism may induce distrust in government leaders (Chanley et al. 2000; Seligson 2002b; Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Bowler and Karp 2004), but it does not necessarily create demand for leadership change. In light of these considerations, it is more likely that an individual finds government leaders untrustworthy and then develops an interest in leadership change. It is also more plausible to assume that demand for leadership change occurs prior to the formation of a preference for elections in China than otherwise. It is true that pro-election individuals may be more likely to view unelected government leaders with distrust and want leadership change because the leaders have not been chosen through procedures that they believe are appropriate. But this is not very likely in the Chinese countryside. The surveyed rural residents had no prior experience with democratic election of government leaders, and Chinese farmers have relatively little knowledge of democratic political systems and philosophies. They are unlikely to have been socialized into pro-election views prior to interaction with government officials. It is more likely that Chinese farmers’ interactions with government authorities affect their trust in government leaders and their demand for leadership change, which in turn condition their preference for elections. The two arguments are supported by two other empirical findings. First, all else being equal, individuals who were more acutely aware of corruption had stronger distrust in government leaders at provincial, city, county, and township levels (p B .001, one-sided test) (not shown in Table 3) as well as stronger demand for leadership change at the provincial, city, county, and township levels (p B .001, one-sided test). Moreover, perception of corruption had a significant indirect impact on preference for popularly electing the provincial governor, city mayor, and county head by affecting distrust in these three levels of leaders (p B .05, one-sided test). Although it is possible that one’s preference for elections leads to a demand for leadership change, which in turn induces a stronger perception of corruption, it is more likely that perception of corruption occurs prior to distrust in government leaders, demand for leadership change, and preference for elections. Second, individuals who were less satisfied with their lives were generally more distrustful of government leaders’ commitment to the public interest and thereby had stronger demands for leadership change. The direct impact of life satisfaction 123 304 Polit Behav (2011) 33:291–311 on distrust was significant regarding county and township leaders (p B .01, one- sided test), and its indirect effect on demand for leadership change by increasing distrust was also significant regarding county and township leaders (p B .01, one-sided test), probably because these two levels of government are most directly responsible for the local economy and governance. This finding supports the argument that distrust in leaders occurs prior to demand for leadership change. It is possible that individuals who are more eager to see county and township heads replaced are more likely to develop distrust in county and township leaders, which in turn makes them more unsatisfied with their lives. It is, however, much more plausible that life satisfaction affects confidence in township and county leaders, which in turn affects demand for leadership change at these two levels. In sum, it seems that Chinese farmers became doubtful about government leaders’ commitment to the public interest if they knew or heard that sub-national authorities were corrupt and/or if they were unsatisfied with their lives. And then as a consequence of this, they wanted to see untrustworthy leaders replaced and preferred to effect the leadership change through popular elections.4 This line of interpretation is supported by the finding that individuals who were more confident of their abilities to assess and choose county government head tended to have a stronger preference for elections. The effect of internal efficacy was significant on preference for popularly electing county and township government heads (p B .01, one-sided test). This finding suggests that Chinese farmers base their choice of leadership selection systems on assessment of their own political competence. They favor popular elections if they feel more confident about working the new system. Three minor findings of this research are worth mentioning. First, individuals who found elected village community leaders more honest, impartial, and responsive than appointed ones were more likely to favor popular election of government leaders. This effect, though, was statistically insignificant after controlling for the effects of other variables. The finding thus offers limited support to the ‘‘spill-over’’ argument that village elections may enhance demand for popular election of government leaders (Shi 1999). Second, contrary to what has been observed in industrialized democracies, social trust in rural China had a negative effect on preference for elections, and the effect was significant in regard to electing county and township heads (p B .05, one-sided test). It is possible that interpersonal trust and political trust are positively correlated in rural China, as social capital theory suggests. The finding offers some support to the argument that social trust in undemocratic societies is associated with support for authoritarian patterns of rule (Jamal 2007). Lastly, preference for elections varied considerably from one location to another. Farmers from Yongjia county, Zhejiang province had a significantly stronger preference for popular elections than those from the other three counties, probably because Yongjia had the highest level of economic development. It will be

4 It ought to be noted that many unobserved factors might have affected distrust in government leaders, demand for leadership change, and preference for elections. Failed attempts to defend one’s lawful rights and interests through non-electoral channels such as petitioning and administrative litigation, for example, may result in stronger distrust in government leaders, stronger demand for leadership change, as well as stronger preference for elections. 123 Polit Behav (2011) 33:291–311 305 interesting to see how the local economy, political history, and government performance in different Chinese counties affect political attitudes and values of the local populace. For this study, the fact that correlations between distrust in current government leaders, demand for leadership change, and preference for elections remain highly significant after controlling for the effects of county dummies suggests that the key findings reported above may be generalizable to other parts of rural China.

Conclusions

This research finds that distrust in incumbent government leaders’ commitment to the public interest is associated with stronger demand for leadership change, which is in turn associated with stronger preference for popular elections of government leaders in rural China. It argues that distrust in government leaders’ commitment to the public interest may have enhanced demands for leadership change, which in turn may have reinforced a preference for popular election as an alternative mechanism of leadership selection. It further argues that distrust in current government leaders may have in effect induced a demand for systemic changes. The belief that government leaders should be popularly elected may indicate disapproval of the existing leadership selection system, which is characterized by top-down appoint- ment and limited popular participation. The belief that government leaders should and can be popularly elected right away may indicate a demand for immediately changing the existing system of leadership selection. Yet introducing popular election of government leaders, as noted above, will require a major constitutional amendment. As regards the theoretical debate about whether distrust in government authorities induces demand for systemic changes, the China case suggests that two mechanisms may be at work. First, whether ordinary people can engineer leadership changes through existing channels affects the generation of idealistic wishes for a better alternative system. Second, perceived availability of better and viable alternatives affects whether an idealistic wish becomes a practical demand. The distinction of the two mechanisms helps explain why authoritarianism may be more vulnerable to the corrosive effect of distrust in incumbent government leaders than democracy is. Under authoritarian rule ordinary people have little institution- alized recourse to get rid of untrustworthy government leaders, so they are more likely to feel frustrated with the existing system and develop idealistic wishes for a better one (cf. Anderson and LoTempio 2002, p. 349). In the meantime, their idealistic wishes can readily develop into a practical preference for elections, which have proven elsewhere to be a better and more viable system of leadership selection. Democracy, by contrast, has somewhat stronger immunity to the corrosive effect of distrust in incumbent government authorities (see Sztompka 2000, pp. 140–150). It enables the people to engineer leadership changes through regular elections, thereby generating less frustration with the overall system and weaker wishes for a better one. Equally important, it is harder for idealistic wishes for a system better than democracy to become a practical demand for systemic changes, because better and 123 306 Polit Behav (2011) 33:291–311 viable alternatives may not be in sight (Rose 2007, p. 112; Rose and Shin 2001, p. 340). Viewed from this perspective, both sides of the theoretical debate may be correct on whether distrust of freely elected leaders induces a preference for undemocratic alternatives. Distrust in freely elected government leaders may foster idealistic wishes for an even better system. Such wishes, however, may never materialize into practical demands due to the lack of ‘‘real’’ choices (Fraser 1970, p. 415). Methodologically, the research reaffirms the importance of specifying the object of political trust in survey research (e.g., Citrin and Muste 1999; Levi and Stoker 2000). If the dependence on global measures has led to the overestimation of distrust in the United States (Hill 1981), then it may have the opposite effect in the study of political trust in China. As is shown in this research, measures of trust need to be administered at all five levels of government. Asking only about trust in central leaders would have missed distrust in local government authorities; asking broadly about local government leaders would have missed the fact that public trust decreases significantly for every lower level of the government hierarchy. Since popular trust in Chinese central leaders may remain robust even when trust in local authorities is declining, focusing exclusively on the central government would unveil the tip of an iceberg of public distrust in government leaders but fail to expose its growing body.

Acknowledgements This project was funded by the Research Grants Council of the Hong Kong Government (Grant No. CUHK2440/06H). I thank my collaborators for administering the survey. For insightful comments and suggestions, I thank the editors, two anonymous reviewers, Pierre Landry, Xiaobo Lu, Jeremy Wallace, and especially Kevin O’Brien and Melanie Manion.

Appendix

See Table 4.

Table 4 Description of variables Mean SD Std. factor loading

Outcome variables Observed preference for elections Do you think the following government leaders should be directly elected by the people through one- person one-vote? 1 = should not; 2 = should but conditions are not ripe; 3 = should and elections can be held now The state chairman 1.879 .668 Provincial governor 1.911 .657 City mayor 1.946 .659 County head 2.119 .674 Township head 2.264 .670

123 Polit Behav (2011) 33:291–311 307

Table 4 Description of variables Mean SD Std. factor loading

Explanatory variables Do you believe the following statements? 1 = fully disbelieve; 2 = disbelieve; 3 = half believe and half doubt; 4 = believe; 5 = fully believe Latent distrust in central leaders’ commitment to the public interest They put their own interests before those of farmers 2.703 1.240 .765 They do not care if farmers agree when they make policies 2.745 1.220 .823 They care primarily about the powerful and rich and neglect the 2.598 1.236 .898 interests of ordinary people Latent distrust in provincial leaders’ commitment to the public interest They put their own interests before those of farmers 2.901 1.065 .751 They do not care if farmers agree when they make policies 2.860 1.068 .792 They care primarily about the powerful and rich and neglect the 2.746 1.073 .863 interests of ordinary people Latent distrust in city leaders’ commitment to the public interest They put their own interests before those of farmers 3.025 1.020 .712 They do not care if farmers agree when they make policies 2.929 1.009 .768 They care primarily about the powerful and rich and neglect the 2.838 1.017 .871 interests of ordinary people Latent distrust in county leaders’ commitment to the public interest They put their own interests before those of farmers 3.175 1.069 .741 They do not care if farmers agree when they make policies 3.046 1.049 .791 They care primarily about the powerful and rich and neglect the 2.980 1.069 .863 interests of ordinary people Latent distrust in township leaders’ commitment to the public interest They put their own interests before those of farmers 3.223 1.116 .762 They do not care if farmers agree when they make policies 3.103 1.096 .775 They care primarily about the powerful and rich and neglect the 3.001 1.121 .848 interests of ordinary people Mediator variables Observed demand for leadership change Would you vote for the incumbent leader if a democratic election was held? 1 = yes; 2 = unsure; 3 = no The state chairman 1.459 .574 Provincial governor 1.672 .566 City mayor 1.730 .561 County head 1.792 .605 Township head 1.838 .630 Control variables Latent life satisfaction How do you compare your family’s economic situation with 2 years ago? 1 = a lot worse; 2 = somewhat worse; 3 = same; 4 = somewhat better; 5 = a lot better

123 308 Polit Behav (2011) 33:291–311

Table 4 Description of variables Mean SD Std. factor loading

How do you predict your family’s economic situation in the coming 2 years? 1 = worse; 2 = uncertain; 3 = no change; 4 = better All in all, are you satisfied with your life? 1 = very unsatisfied; 2 = unsatisfied; 3 = so-so; 4 = satisfied; 5 = very satisfied Family economic situation compared to 2 years ago 3.969 .865 .796 Family economic situation in the coming 2 years 3.407 .894 .715 Overall level of satisfaction with life 3.611 .784 .650 Latent perception of corruption In the last decade did the following government officials engage in corruption? 1 = no; 2 = do not know; 3 = it is said so; 4 = yes Township government officials 2.701 1.075 .728 County government officials 2.550 1.046 .970 Provincial and city government officials 2.427 .984 .759 Latent political efficacy Do you think you can do the following? 1 = definitely can’t; 2 = can’t; 3 = unsure; 4 = can; 5 = definitely can Judge a county head’s performance after listening to his/her work 3.173 .927 .855 report Judge which one is better if two county head candidates debate 3.182 .944 .960 each other Judge if a county head’s decisions benefit or harm self-interests 3.288 .963 .862 Latent assessment of elected village leaders How do you compare elected village cadres with appointed ones in the following aspects? 1 = appointed ones are better; 2 = same; 3 = elected ones are better Honest and clean 2.471 .591 .870 Eager to serve farmers 2.500 .584 .911 Dare to speak for farmers and resist wrong township decisions 2.527 .590 .901 Handle affairs impartially 2.472 .603 .861 Latent social trust In general, do you believe what the following people tell you? 1 = fully disbelieve; 2 = disbelieve; 3 = half believe and half doubt; 4 = believe; 5 = fully believe Fellow villagers 3.343 .679 .691 People introduced by relatives and good friends 3.146 .682 .931 Most people in the society 2.995 .735 .727 Demographic variables Gender (0 = female; 1 = male) .516 .500 Age (range 18–88) 41.30 13.59 Education (0–21 years) 8.02 3.47 CCP membership (0 = non-member; 1 = member) .17 .38

Notes:N= 1,600; missing data are multiply imputed. Row entries are means, standard deviations, and standardized factor loadings

123 Polit Behav (2011) 33:291–311 309

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