CHAPTER I Introduction, Conceptual Analysis, Methodologies and Chapterisation. Part I 1., INTRODUCTION
Democratic Governments,' in modern times, do not restrict their activities to their sovereign duties alone. Complex functions such as Social Welfare, industrial devel opment and regulation, licensing and taxing, scientific and technological developments, education, transport and commu nication, urban and rural development and local self Govern mental necessitate employment of an army of public servants, delegate great discretionary powers to them and expect to discharge their duties effectively and with remarkable speed .
Very rarely do people get routine responses from public servants without extra consideration for the favour. Governmental regulations whether they are for issuing li censes, supply of essential commodities, housing loans, and tax concessions and the like bring people closer to bureauc racy, and bureaucracy in turn 'oblige' those who can afford to procure such 'obligations'. Such behaviours of the public servants may be prompted by corrupt practices or through maladriii nistration . Maladministration and corruption exist in all forms of Governments -- Capitalist, Socialist and Communist.
The volumes may vary from country to country, depending on the Constitutional or Legislative control over the Govern mental functionaries. In almost all the countries of the world regulatory institutions or authorities are setup.
Institutions and authorities to curb, prevent and
combat maladministration which includes bribery and corrup
tion in different countries are known by different names.
Thus in Sweden Ombudsman was created in 1809. This office
was adopted in Finland in 1919 and in Denmark in 1955. It
was set up in New Zealand, a common wealth country with
Parliamentary form of Government in 1962. In England, on the
recommendation of "Justice", a British wing of the Interna
tional Commission of Jurist, the office of the Parliamentary
Commissioner was setup under the Parliamentary Commissioner
Act 1967. In India the Administrative Reforms Commission
appointed by the President on January 5, 1966 unanimously
recommended^ '^ that the Ombudsman type of machinery be setup
in India. The Commission recommended two categories of
Ombudsman for India - a Lokpal to investigate the actions of
Ministers and Secretaries and one or more Lok Ayuktas to
investigate the actions of the officials below the rank of
Secretaries. The recommendations of the Commission was accepted by the Government of India and a bill providing for Ombudsman was introduced in the Lok Sabha in May 1968. It was passed by the Lok Sabha in August 1969. However when the Lok Sabha was dissolved in 1971, the above bill lapsed. Another bill with the same contents was introduced in 1971. Again a bill in 1977. The excerise of introducing the Lok Pal bill was repeated in 1985, 1989 and 1995. But so far there is no Ombudsman (Lok Pal) at the Indian Government level. However some of the Indian States have Lok Ayuktas appointed under the State Acts. In India there are other institutions like the Special Police Establishments, the Vigilance Commissions, the Commissions of Inquiry and have also laws such as the preventation of Corruption Act 1988 and the Indian Penal Code. In Thailand the office of the counter corruption is set up under the Counter Corruption Act 1975.
Thailand has the questionable political history replete with military coups, political somersaults, bureau cratic bunglings demonstrating maladministration, bribery and corruption. The law to prevent corruption at the offi cial level is totally inadequate and ineffective to curb corruption, check maladministration and eradicate bribery.
This study is aimed at tracing the basic and fundamental cause of corruption in Thailand and to examine the Law in force for counter corruption. The study is fur ther directed to understand the institutions of Ombudsman and other systems and Laws in different political Govern ment. The study will examine briefly the Ombudsman in Scan dinavian countries, the Parliamentary Commissioner
(Ombudsman) in England, the Lok Pal/ Lok Ayuktas, and other mechanism under the Laws, Central and States in India and equip this researcher to suggest a better mechanism for Thailand which will prevent corruption by and bribery to the public servants and maladministration by the Ministers and the bureaucracy.
The study will mainly resort to the use of second ary sources of literature and will stick to historical and analytical research methods.
The object of the study is to analyse different mechanism adopted in different countries and to identify the best experience and make a mould which would be most suit able for Thai political system. The following hypothesis will be tested throughout the study- 1. An Ombudsman in Thailand would be inconsistent with the doctrine of ministerial responsibility and that he would deprive members of Parliament of their traditional function of taking up their Constituent's grievances.
2. A family of Ombudsmen, each with distinct func tions, would seem greatly preferable to a single over burdened Commissioner who would be forced to work through a large bureaucracy.
3. Beyond the ail-too human desire to become rich and reward friends it is the clique. Structure of elite-based politics that promotes corruption and patterns it in certain ways.
4. The existing Commission for counter corruption under the Counter Corruption Act 1975 will not control corruption at high places. On the con trary by excluding ministers from the purview of the Act multiplies corrupt practices. The thesis consists of seven chapters.
Chapter I : Introduction, conceptual analysis, method ology hypothesis and chapter schemes. Chapter II : Ombudsman in Sweden and Denmark. Chapter III: Ombudsman (Parliamentary Commissioner in England, Ombudsmen in New Zealand and Australia )
Chapter IV : LokPal, Lok Ayukta, Vigilance Commission, and legal control through prevention of Corruption Act 1988, Commission of Inquiry Act 1952 and the Criminal Laws. Chapter V : Control of maladministration in Thailand : A study of the methods of Ombudsman) Commission for Counter Corruption.
Chapter VI : Evaluation of the various institutions and legal controls discussed in Chapter II to Chapter VI.
Chapter VII: Conclusion, Recommendations. Part II Maladministration, Corrupt ion, Bribery - Conceptual Analysis Maladministration is a new term in the law, though not in the language^ '^. The Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967 (U.K) does not explain or define it, as is perhaps natural since it requires only that the complainant should claim that maladministration has occurred. Parliament was told that the word would cover 'bias', neglect, inattention, delay, incompetence, ineptitude, arbitrariness and so on and that it would be a long and interesting list^ •^ . H.W.R Wade feels that 'in fact no legal definition seems to be required. Once duly seized of a complaint, the Commissioner may investigate and report. He can be relied upon to criticise any lapse from the high standards expected of the Public service^ •''. However one wonders whether this is a perfect statement. For example section 12(3) drafted, it is generally believed, 'by the formidable Pen of Lord Chancel lor himself (Sir E Compton [1968] JSPTL at 110), declares that he is not authorised to question the merits of a deci sion taken without maladministration by a Governmental department or other authority in the exercise of a discre tion vested in that department or authority. For the purpose of this provision he may need to know what maladministration legally means. Ulade has expressed his own views : "yet since the Act clearly implies that the Commissioners task is to concern himself with maladministration it would seem that he should in any case not be concerned with decisions taken without maladministration; so that the provision just quoted appears to be a tautology. It is in terms declaratory and is perhaps a saving inserted out of caution, so that the Com missioner is warned against interference where there is nothing substantially wrong.^''. From the analysis above one is apt to observe the maladministration is not precisely explained in the U.K. Act 1967 and hence each case of al leged maladministration has to be examined according to the facts. Several of the reports of the Parliamentary Commis sioner show that he treats the giving of misleading advice as maladministration.
Maladministration is not defined in any of the
laws which provided for Ombudsman in any country. According
to S.P.Sathe, the courts have tightened up their control
over administrative action. However there are situations
which demand a less formal but more penetrating inquiry so
as to be able to read between the lines or to see through
the facade of legality, the subtle abuse of power or non-
exercise of power or to set high acts of maladministration
or those which cause inconvenience or hardship due to calo-
lusness, indifference, delay, over-enthusiastic pursuit of
policy or OTaiafide exercise of power. This task of the
8 Ombudsman detailed by Sathe fits in with the "Grossman Catalogue"*^ ° ^ and the provisions of the Prevention of cor ruption Act 1988 and sections 161-165 of the Indian Penal Code 1860.
Maladministration according to Random House Dic tionary^''^ of English language is "to manage badly or inef ficiently." Webster's New World Dictionary gives the follow ing meaning : "to administer badly or corruptly.'^^
Of the several context considered in terms of maladministration 'corruption' is more common and exhaus tively studied by several thinkers and writers.
2. CORRUPTION Everybody knows what corruption is, but it is difficult to define it in exact or exhaustive terms. Oxford
Dictionary of Current English^^^.
According to Encyclopedia Britanica^ -', a corrupt practice "includes bribery, but has reference to the elec toral system". These definitions do not adequately bring out the concept of 'corruption'.
The word "corruption" is generally defined in the context of specific normative standards. Thus, according to Santhanam Committee^^^^ the term includes all "improper or selfish exercise of power and influence attached to a public office or to a special position one occupies in public life". This definition covers value-loaded terms like "improper" and "selfish". It is therefore not possible to work out on the basis of the definition a permanent criteri on for identifying corrupt practices in the dynamic world of ours where ethical values change over time and space.^ ^
Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code^^^^ aims at penalising simply the receipt of illegal gratification. Section 123 of the Representation of the People Act^ ^'^ ^ defines corruption as practiced in relation to elections. Prevention of corruption Act 1988 defines criminal miscon- duct of a public servant in the discharge of his duties.^ "^"^
Legal definitions of "corruption" are by far too narrow. According to Halayya^ ^^ the word corruption could be used in a much wider sense than either definition would permit. According to him, every individual has a position in the society in which he lives and there are some responsi bilities attached to it, determined either by convention or otherwise. According to Landan^ , it is the business of a society to transfer sheer behaviour to appropriate modes of conduct a process we usually refer to as Socialisation. In
10 case the acts of an individual violate the modes of conduct they can be called corrupt. The legal frame work of a socie ty attempts to ensure that each individual fulfills his social responsibility and to that extent violation of law could be branded as an Act of corruption. However it is clear that the criterion for determining the social useful ness of an activity need not always be identical with the one for identifying corruption, no matter which definition is accepted.^^^ ^
According to Gibbon^ °^ corruption is the most infalliable symptom of Constitutional liberty. This state ment is partially true. There is widespread corruption even in countries where individual liberty is nothing much to speak of.^^^^ According to Santhanam Committee^ , while it is true that securing some kind of pecuniary or other mate rial advantage directly or indirectly for oneself or one's family, relatives or friends constitutes the most common form of corruption, other forms of evil are coming into existence in the ever increasing complexities of modern society. A.G.Noorani,^^^^ says, "if the Soviet Union dis proves Gibbson'-^"^ ^, India seems to support his aphorism to the hilt, where liberty and corruption co-exist happily, except that the powers that be find it far easier to curtail liberty than to check corruption.^C 25"•")'
11 How much is true and how much is false about corruption in high places, nobody outside a small circle can ever know for certain. What is certain and can be said without circumlocution, is that to wander through the cor ridors of power in these countries is to wander through a whispering gallery of gossip, in which the fact of corrup tion at the higher levels is taken utterly for granted and the only interest lies in capping the latest story with one that is even more startling . "It is always unfair to speak of people in categories instead of as individuals. Ronal Wraith and Edgar Simpkins felt that the civil services in West Africa can as a corporate whole be proud of their general integrity; on the other hand there is little doubt that the degradations of some civil servants are consider able. Those who deal direct with the public and are in a position to bestow benefits on individuals or to influence their bestowal are of course most vulnerable than the rest, and the known fact that some such men have avoided or de clined promotion to higher salaried grades tells its own story^^ -'. The economic effects of all this on a country may not be very considerable. The sum total of illicit gains is no doubt small in relation to the revenue, and there is no evidence from more developed countries where large-scale corruption is common that corruption and inefficiency are necessarily correlated. The tax payer is of course being
12 robbed, either directly in cash or indirectly by unsuitable appointments being made on his behalf. But by far the more serious loss is the loss of self respect and the growth of frustration and cynicism. It is above all a moral problem, immeasurable and imponderable. And politicians and civil servants who are guilty are more guilty only in degree than the mass of people whom they represent and are supposed to serve. "(28)
Santhanam Committee report^ ^^ on previous page contains the following observation :
" In the nature of things it is not possible to give even a rough estimate of the number of corrupt Government servants or the amount of money or value or percentage of illegal gratification that may be involved. Statistics would help in giving a measure of the prevalence of the malady. The Sta tistical information should not be taken as indicating an increase in the quantum of corruption. Increase in com plaints, investigations, prosecutions, departmental proceed ings and punishment may mean more intensified fights against corruption than any increase in it. It should also be noted that all complaints and vigilance cases do not relate to charges of bribery and corruption. Quite a number of these are in respect of other types of disciplinary offences."
13 According to Halayya^ -^ most of the complaints that are lodged with the Government are of the nature of minor irregularities. Major cases of corruption are on many a occasion simply hushed up. It is significant that the anti-corruption drive has come in for criticism in certain quarters, mostly in Government departments; it is said to be causing demoralisation in the services.
Causes and Sources of Corruption According to Ralph Braibanti^ ^^ "There are atleast a dozen platitudinous injunctions which are in circulation with regard to corruption and which, because of their persistent ubiquity and their autonarcotic effect, deserve mention. This is not to say that these injunctions are totally unimportant, on the contrary they are signifi cant even though not as single causes or cures. Their impor tance lies in the fact that they are but elements in a complicated matrix of causes, each of which were of varying importance depending on spatial, temporal and circumstantial evidence."
Causes may be classified according to their effects as follows :
Fundamental causes : i. In a society functioning on the basis of decentralised
14 decision making the problem of corruption arises whe
never there is divergence between accepted normative
standards or law and personal interests. According to
Landan (30) it is the business of society to transfer sheer behaviour into appropriate modes to conduct - a
process we usually refer to as socialisation. The
larger the difference between normative standards and
personal interests, the greater the rise because the
gap can be filled by doubtful means like influence,
social connections and bribery. With the emergence of
new industrial societies the social environment in
which community consideration had held a very high
place in the individual's decision making is continous-
ly decaying. And in the absence of appropriate monetary
incentives in the existing market-mechanism, corruption
seeks to incorporate a regularised reward system in the
administrative structure. Besides the legal and moral
standards generally prescribe a uniform behaviour
pattern for all individuals irrespective of their
economic or social status. In a society with marked
unevenness in the distribution of wealth and income,
the temptation for violating these norms is likely to
be relatively high among the less privileged classes. ii. There may exist more than one interest for the members
of a society much the same as the one termed as 'plural society'. For the individual this means fragmentation of loyalties .
According to Wertheim •.^•^•^•' "it is not gener ally understood that this phenomenon (corruption) is largely to be attributed to relics of feudal past lead ing at present, to conflicting loyalties between duties towards the Governmental and duties towards one's own family, but at the same time it is a modern phenmenon in so far as loyalty to political parties or Army friends takes sometimes the places of family ties."
Gunnar Myrad ^^^^ felt that the loyalty to less inclusive groups like the family, the caste etc affects adversely the social outlook to such an extent that certain behavourial reactions generally held to be outside the profit consideration in the West are com monly for sale in South Africa. iii. The failure of all Governmental agencies to work as a team to fulfill social commitments because of inertia vested interest etc are also causes creating situations where guidelines presented for an individual are not in harmony. In such cases, more than one objective func tion will exist side by side. The existing legal setup may represent one set of objectives whereas a group of
policy makers (may be an eclipsed Legislature) may define another objective function. This undoubtly
16 ( 33 •) increases the scope for corrupt practices.
The following are the broad heads namely, adminis trative, legislative, political, social and economics : Administrative causes :
(1) In a Parliamentary democracy, political considerations weigh heavily in preference to those who are qualified for the post. It has been the past experience that persons chosen for Ministerial posts were given prefer ence because of their past services to the Political Party and not for their administrative ability. Persons who were publicly indicted for their corrupt practices in the states are elevated as Ministers in the central Governmental.^ -^ They are generally ignorant of the
intricacies of administration. The fact that they are ignorant give ample scope to the officers in the de partment to become corrupt.
(2) A fertile source of corruption is the unholy contacts between businessmen houses and Ministers. The root cause of corruption is the close link between those who yield power and those who control the Nation's wealth. The alliance between the political leadership and big business has created a situation in which it has become possible for large scale corruption to invade the percints of politics. Historically this liaison can be
17 traced back to the National Movement of India.
(3) The fact that there are two set of standards, one for Ministers and another for Government officials has been responsible for the terrific increase in corrupt prac tices. A corrupt minister may atleast be asked to resign ( a remote possibility) but not so in case of a public servant. He may be even made to undergo impris onment in addition to the loss of his job.
(4) The desire to make speedy money is still another cause of corruption. Paper and files do not move from one table to another for weeks on ends. Those who deal with paper and files wantonly delay replying letters and disposing of files so that those who are concerned will approach them for movement of the files for a price.
(5) According to Santhanam Committee Report^ ^, only when there is someone willing to corrupt and capable of corrupting, there can be corruption. The number of
those who are willing and are able to corrupt has been growing day after day. According to the Committee "the tendency to subvert integrity in the public service instead of being isolated and aberrative is growing into an organised, well planned racket." It is no
exaggeration to say that corruption has become almost a way of life with these people.
(6) When controls and curbs are excessive the scope for
18 corruption widens. The tendency will be to bypass the
laws if need be by corrupt means. The Departments of
the Government issuing licenses, permits etc are the
one's most suspectible to corrupt practices. In this
regard persistent demands from responsible quarters for
the abolition of unwarranted control is justified.
Industrial licensing has been relaxed by the Congress
Government of India through the New Industrial Policy
declared in July 1991 in case of large number of indus
tries, but other controls remain. No wonder corruption
curves have been steadily rising during the past .
Social Causes (1) Attempts at regulating the morals of the Nation through laws have been a fad with some of the Indian leaders of consequence. Such regulation have proved to be fertile grounds for the growth of crime and corruption. Perhaps the best examples in this regard was the introduction of prohibition and gold control. In the former illicit distillation of liquor, bootlegging, selling of smug gled foreign liquor at exorbitant prices and in the latter smuggling of gold into India became the oder of the day. Those who engaged in antisocial activities could become wealthy enough to buy the men and officers entrusted with the task of enforcing law and order .
19 Corruption, especially of the police force became so rampant that the experiment proved to be a total fai lure and consequently, prohibition was lifted in many Indian states and gold control has been relaxed. (2) Personal virtues is essential for purity of public life and lack of it is an important cause of corruption. An honest Governmental officer who retires with his mere saving in the form of post retirement benefits like provident fund and gratuity is looked down upon as a fool, where as corrupt a officer who retires with a vast fortune is regarded as intelligent. The result is that individuals are goaded on to become corrupt. (3) In India castism and communalism constitute another aspect of corruption. There are any number of cases where jobs have been given by men at the helm to people who belong to the same community or caste. Caste and community consideration, according to knowledgeable have influenced the executive even in the appointment of Judges. (4) A fast rate of social change is generally accompanied by corruption. This is the price which has to be paid for social change and the price becomes higher as the process of change becomes faster. According to Santha- nam Committee^^^ \ modernisation and urbanisation have also contributed to the growth of corruption. They lead
20 to the weakening of the old system of values and norms without any replacement by a new system of sound val ues. It is said that the increase in corruption is due to lack of special training and education. It is not
so. It is seen that most of the officers who are cor rupt are generally well educated.^ -^ According to him "Literacy does not induce necessarily to purity. Highly educated men are no more or no less virtuous than the untutored, as Cicero wrote centuries ago. Moreover education in modern times has an imperfect function devoid of such moral content. The more secular a socie ty becomes the more this seems to be so. In any event, no modern Government can wait for allegedly magical result of education to take effect. Certainly education is one facet of a solution to the problem of corruption but no more than that." (5) Tolerance of corruption is a very important reason why corrupt practices tend to grow. Upto a certain level we take corruption for granted. It follows that eternal vigilance is an essential pre-condition for the elimi nation of corruption. If corrupt Ministers and offi cials are hounded out by turning the spotlight of
public opinion on them, surely that would prove to be an effective deterrent to corrupt practices by others. Haiayya^ •^^-^, cites the example of the resignation of a
21 former Vice President of the USA Mr.Spiro Agnew. He had to resign because of the mounting adverse public opin ion against his corrupt practices when he was Governor
of Maryland.
Economic Causes
(1) Inadequate income for meeting the growing needs is frequently mentioned as a cause of corruption. With inflation eating into the income of the fixed income earners like Government servants, and with no other alternative sources to supplement their income and at the same time the standard of living rises they are forced, it is said to resort to corruption. There is a widespread belief among the Governmental servants that they are forced to become corrupt because the periodic increase in dearness allowance (D.A.) doled out to them was not enough to cover the ever rising prices of essential goods and services. According to Halayya^ ^, in many instances the need to keep above want has been, no doubt, an important factor in corruption. However a distinction has to be made between the want that is of an individuals own making, the result of his extrava
gance or misguided spending and want that arises be cause of factors beyond his control . For the common run of people in our country want was not known, but it has
22 been made acute by the prevailing economic situations. The persistent shortage of essential consumer goods, coupled with soaring prices all around, drives people to the brink of despair. They begin to feel that by means, fair or foul they must keep their heads above the water . "
(2) It is argued that a vexatious tax system and oppressive taxation constitute another cause of corruption. Taxa tion must not lead men to temptation by requiring trivial oaths by making if profitable to lie, to swear falsely, to bribe or to take bribe.^ -^
(3) The desire to have sufficient savings at the time of retirement from the service is said to constitute a very strong motive for Government servants to resort to corruption. The income while at active service is hardly sufficient to meet both ends and the terminal benefits and the post retiral payments provided by the
Government are mearge and there is no old age care being provided as in the case of advanced countries. Therefore the temptation to take to corruption is strong .
(4) A new trend noticed in many senior Government offi cials, aftei" retire m ent take employment in private firms in different capacities. Even Judges of the High Court and Supreme Courts are known to be engaged by
23 private firms as arbitrators in disputes with Govern
ment mechanineries . On this the Santhanam Committee^ ^ made the following remarks "It is generally believed
that such employment is secured on a guid pxc),_ quOi basis for favours shown by Government servants while in
service. It is also feared that highly place Government
servants who accept such employment after retirement
may be in a position, by virtue of their past standing,
to exercise undue influence on those in service who
might have been their colleagues or subordinates. The
fact that some of these retired Government servants who
have accepted employment with private firms in Delhi
and perhaps operate as 'contact men' has further
heightened these suspicions."
(5) Another source of corruption stems from the influence
with which wives of Government officials exercise over
their husbands. Uives aspire to join high society
ladies and live lives beyond the means of their hus
bands. Monteiro^ -^ made the following observations :
"There are known cases where the ladies traveled far
and wide in search of these curious pieces of ancient
history and brought all sorts of fabricated antiques at
fabulous prices. These are expensive habits for which a
lot of money is required and the official requires a
little backdoor business rather than be nagged at home. The general attitude with these officers is that those who pay them for these extra considerations have pots of money of their own and if we get an opportunity of taking some of it why should'nt we ?"
A term whici'i fits in with the two social evils 'maladministration' and 'corruption' is bribery.
J.R.B. Jeejeebhoy^ •' quotes Webster, as follows : "A bribe is described by the great Lexicographer, Webster as a prize, reward, gift or a favour bestowed or promised with a view to prevent a Judgement or corrupt the conduct of a Judge, witness, voter or other person in a position to trust: and corruption signifies the inducing a violation of duty by means of pecuniary considerations^ .
25 Chapter I References, Notes
1. Administrative Reforms Commission, Government of India - Interim Report on Problems of C,i.tiz.e,n.'.s Gri..ev,a_nc.es... 1966.
2. It has been used at least since 1644 O.E.D. cf. H W.R.
Wade, A .d..mi....n..i..s t r..a .t..i.,y..e,_. .L..a.,w_, sixth ed. E.L.B.S. Oxford
University press, (1988) p.87.
3. 734 House of Commons debate, col.51.18th October 1966. In Ombudsman circles this became known as the 'Crossman Catalogue'. But it is clearly open-ended, as stated by
Lord Denning .M.R in R, v L.o.cal C.omoiis.si.o,n§_r.....f.or. Adm.i.Dl.s..-
.tra.t.i.o.n,.,..e,.x...... £,„, B.red fo.rd };±.C,.C. 1979 .a .b .287 . For a full commentary see, H.W.R Wade, op.p.,_ c.i..t...P 87
4 . I b..i..d
5. I..bid P.88
6. S.P.Sathe, Admi...nisLL.a.Li.v.e Law. 5th ed. N. M. Tripathi Private Limited, Bombay P. 491 7. College Edition, 1977
8. Webster's N.e.w W.o.r. 1,d D.i..c..t.i.p..n.a.r,,y., 1972
8a. The Swedish, Danish, New Zealand, Australian and the
U.K. Legislation which provide for the appointment of Ombudsmen/Commission do not define "maladministration". The Parliamentary Commissioner's Act 1967 which was pri-
26 marily to prevent maladministration does not define the term. The Justice Report, which in most part has been adapted by the Parliament describes what the Parliamen tary Commissioner (Ombudsman) would investigate and said: "they would involve an accusation against some part of the administration, of efficiency, delay, negli gence, bias, unfair preference or dishonesty. On the second reading of the Bill Mr .Grossman said that the
Government had deliberately refrained from trying to define 'maladministration' which according to him "might
include such things as bias, neglect, inattention,
delay, in competence, ineptitude. Perversity, furpitude,
arbitrariness and so on. This is known as the "Cross- man's catalogue". The New Zealand and the Australian Act which provide for appointment of Ombudsman lay down a catalogue of circumstances in which the Ombudsmen may consider an administrative action to be defective
(maladministration). The Indian Lokpal Bill 1971 stated
maladministration as "an action taken in exercise of
administrative procedure or practice governing such
action which was unreasonable, unjust, oppressive or
improperly discriminatory or where there had been negli
gence or undue delay in taking such action, or the
administrative procedure or practice governing such
action involved undue delay'. There are illustrative
27 statements and there has been no definition in any of
the Laws
9. Oxford Dictionary of Correct English Clarion Press,
Oxford 1964. 10. Encz.Q.1.02edla Br.ltan.nica (1929) London P. 472
11. Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Report of t h_e Co.nirn_i ..t.t .e..e _ o_n P.Le y .e .n t i.o n .o..f _ _C o .r ..r...y. E>..t .i_o..n., New Delhi
(1964) P. 5 12. M.Halayya, C.g.r.Ly.£t..i.o..n .i.n .I,.Dd.i...a , Affiliated East Uest
Press Private Limited, Madras P. 1 13. Indian Penal Code 1860, Section 161 14. Representation of Peoples Act 1952.
15. Prevention of Corruption Act. 1988
16.
17. Halayya, o|?,p..., c,i...t P.3
18. M.Landan, D.e_y_el_gp.m..e...n.,t Administration and Dec.i.s_.i..o...n _..-.
I..b.§..QI.Z in D.ev.e.log.me..n,t. .A..d..m...i.n..i.s.t..r.a.ti,on .i..n...... A.s_.i..a...... ( Ed ) by
E.W.Weidover . Duke University Press, North Carolina.
1970.
19. Halayya Q££^.__cit.. P.3 20. Gibbson, D..e.c.,l...i,.ne .a.nd. f.a..l.l o..f th.§. .ElQiI!..a.D. iJI!E..i.r..§_. Chapter
21 .
21. Stevens.J.Staats, P,.r.0.b.1 e.iT!..s .o..f C.om..m..u,.n.i...s.,m.,, in Jan-Feb
issue Vol XXI, No. 1 Published by USIA Washington D.C.
The national, regional and local press of the erstwhile
28 USSR contain myriad accounts of bribery, falsification of reports, party-state complicity in concealing corrup tion, misuse of public office and State funds and patro nage and nepotism in personnel appointments. 22. Santhanam Committee Report opp. cit. P.11 23. A.G.Noorani, M.i..nister....'s. M..iscgn_du.c.t Vikas publishing
House Private Limited Delhi (1973) P.2
24. See Note 12, Supra. 25. What Noorani expressed in 1973 with conviction has proved by the recent developments in India. Media in India reports several items like the Jain Diary endorse ments involving Ministers, Governors and Politicians, the Stock Scams, Fodder Scandal, Bank Frauds and the like. Even the former Prime Minister's name is involved in a fraud case.
26. Ronald Wraith & Edgar Simpkins, Corruption ,ip Peveloping
Countries • George Allen and Unwin Ltd, PP 15, 16
27. Ibid P-16 28. Ibid PP 16, 17
28a.Santhanam Committee Report Opp. Cit P. 14
28b.M. Halayya, Opp...... Cit P. 15
29. Ralph Braribanti , R.ef.l.ections on Bu.r.e.a,ucr..at.l.c, Co,rj_up,,t,,ion
in .Pu.b.1 ic Adm.!nistrat,ion , Writer London 1962 P. 357
30 . M .Landon , D.eye_lgpnient Adm.inis.tr,atig..n .and.....Q.ec.is.ig..n Ihegry
in E. W. Weidner (Ed), Development Ad mini strati on. i..D.
29 Asia. Duke University Press, North Carolina (1970) P.86 31. F.W.Wertheim, Indon e s i an Socije. .tx.....l...n.....I..I..a.n.s_.i..t ^ , Van House Ltd, The Hagye (1956) P. 942. 32. Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama Vol ii Pelican Books, 'Mas sachusetts (1968) P.942. 33 . A .K .Sen , Inter.... .r...e.l.atign. B.e..t.w.e..e..n .P.r.o.i.ec.t Planning _an.d Ag.9..r..e.g..ate..„P.lanni.n^^^^ a paper presented at the seminar an Economic Problems at Dishame, USSR, September 1970,
34. In India and in Thailand such cases are aplenty.
35. Santhanam Committee Report Qp.2...... ,...c.it, PP. 11, 12 36. Ibid. 36a.Ibid P.8 37. Ralph Braibanti Q.pp_,..,...... C..it. P 359
38. Halayya, Qp.p....,._.C...i..t P . 101
39. In Thailand and in India a full time Government employee is not permitted to work outside his office-hours for another employer.
40. Halayya Op.p...., c..i.t P. 101
41. India is one of the few countries where taxation is highest and the tax procedure cumbersome.
42. Santhanam Committee, Opp... .c..i..t P. 199
43. J .8 .Monteiro, C..or.r.u.p.t..i.o.n, P.C. Manaktala and Sons Bombay 1966 P. 62
44. J.R.B.JeeJeebhoy, Br ibery a..nd. C.o,r r up.t.i..o.n. ..i.n. .Bombay
(1952) P.I.
30