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Anonymität Im Internet

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Anonymität Im Internet Privacy-Handbuch Spurenarm Surfen mit Mozilla Firefox, E-Mails verschlüsseln mit Thunderbird, Anonymisierungsdienste nutzen und Daten verschlüsseln für WINDOWS + Linux 20. Mai 2017 2 Wir sind die Vielen, wir könnten einen Beat stampfen, der jede Macht pulverisieren wird. Inhaltsverzeichnis 1 Scroogled8 2 Angriffe auf die Privatsphäre 21 2.1 Big Data - Kunde ist der, der bezahlt................ 22 2.1.1 Google............................. 22 2.1.2 Weitere Datenhändler.................... 30 2.2 Techniken der Datensammler.................... 32 2.3 Tendenzen auf dem Gebiet des Tracking.............. 38 2.4 Crypto War 3.0............................. 42 2.5 Fake News Debatte.......................... 44 2.6 Geotagging............................... 47 2.7 Kommunikationsanalyse....................... 50 2.8 Überwachungen im Internet..................... 53 2.9 Terrorismus und Ausbau der Überwachung............ 61 2.10 NSA & Co................................ 64 2.11 Rechtsstaatliche Grundlagen..................... 65 2.12 Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz auflösen............ 67 2.13 Ich habe doch nichts zu verbergen................. 73 3 Digitales Aikido 77 3.1 Nachdenken.............................. 77 3.2 Ein Beispiel.............................. 81 3.3 Schattenseiten der Anonymität................... 83 3.4 Wirkungsvoller Einsatz von Kryptografie............. 84 4 Spurenarm Surfen 87 4.1 Auswahl des Webbrowsers..................... 88 4.2 Datensparsame Suchmaschinen................... 90 4.3 Cookies................................. 96 4.4 EverCookies.............................. 100 4.5 JavaScript............................... 102 4.5.1 NoScript für Mozilla Firefox................ 103 4.6 iFrames................................. 107 4.7 Werbung, HTML-Wanzen und Social Media............ 108 4.7.1 Tracking-Filter für Firefox.................. 109 4.7.2 Tracking Protection in Firefox................ 110 4.7.3 uBlock Origin für Firefox.................. 111 4.7.4 Adblock Plus für Firefox................... 112 3 4 INHALTSVERZEICHNIS 4.7.5 Werbung auf der NewTab Page............... 114 4.8 History Sniffing............................ 115 4.9 Browsercache und Chronik..................... 116 4.10 Referer................................. 118 4.11 Risiko Plugins............................. 119 4.11.1 PDF Reader Plugins..................... 119 4.11.2 Java-Applets.......................... 120 4.11.3 Flash-Applets und Flash-Videos.............. 121 4.11.4 Weitere Anwendungen................... 124 4.11.5 H.264 Plug-in und Adobe Primetime deaktivieren.... 124 4.12 HTTPS-Verschlüsselung nutzen................... 125 4.13 Vertrauenswürdigkeit von HTTPS................. 127 4.13.1 Verbesserung der Vertrauenswürdigkeit von HTTPS.. 128 4.13.2 Firefox Add-ons........................ 129 4.13.3 SSL-Zertifikate via OCSP validieren............ 131 4.13.4 Tracking via SSL Session................... 133 4.13.5 Tracking via HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS)... 134 4.13.6 SSL/TLS Konfiguration................... 135 4.14 Starke Passwörter nutzen...................... 137 4.15 Zwei-Faktor-Authentifizierung................... 139 4.16 Installierte Schriftarten verstecken................. 142 4.17 HTML5 Canvas Elemente...................... 143 4.18 recource:// URIs blockieren..................... 145 4.19 User-Agent modifizieren für Firefox................ 146 4.20 Hardware Fingerprinting...................... 148 4.21 Sonstige Maßnahmen......................... 150 4.22 Snakeoil für Firefox (überflüssiges)................. 154 5 Bezahlen im Netz 157 5.1 Kreditkarten.............................. 158 5.2 Bezahlsysteme der Deutschen Bahn................ 159 5.3 SOFORT Überweisung........................ 159 5.4 Paysafecard, UKash, Pecunix.................... 160 5.5 Anonyme Online-Zahlungen vor dem Aus?............ 162 5.6 Bargeld................................. 164 5.7 Bitcoin................................. 167 5.7.1 Exchanger / Marktplätze.................. 168 5.7.2 Bitcoin Software....................... 169 5.7.3 Anonymität von Bitcoin................... 171 5.7.4 Bitcoin anonym nutzen................... 173 6 E-Mail Kommunikation 175 6.1 E-Mail Provider............................ 175 6.2 Mozilla Thunderbird......................... 179 6.2.1 Account erstellen....................... 179 6.2.2 Sichere Optionen für SSL/TLS-Verschlüsselung..... 182 6.2.3 Sichere Konfiguration des E-Mail Client.......... 187 6.2.4 Datenverluste vermeiden.................. 191 6.2.5 Wörterbücher installieren.................. 191 6.2.6 User-Agent Kennung modifizieren............. 192 INHALTSVERZEICHNIS 5 6.2.7 Spam-Filter aktivieren.................... 194 6.2.8 Spam vermeiden....................... 194 6.2.9 RSS-Feeds........................... 199 6.2.10 Filelink............................. 201 6.3 Private Note.............................. 202 6.4 ProtonMail, Tutanota und andere.................. 203 7 E-Mails verschlüsseln 207 7.1 GnuPG und Thunderbird...................... 209 7.1.1 Installation von GnuPG................... 209 7.1.2 Verbesserte Konfiguration von GnuPG.......... 209 7.1.3 Installation der Enigmail-Erweiterung........... 210 7.1.4 Schlüsselverwaltung..................... 212 7.1.5 Signieren und Verschlüsseln erstellter E-Mails...... 214 7.1.6 Adele - der freundliche OpenPGP E-Mail-Roboter.... 215 7.1.7 Verschlüsselung in Webformularen............. 217 7.1.8 Browser Add-ons wie Mailevelop............. 218 7.1.9 GnuPG Smartcard nutzen.................. 218 7.1.10 OpenPGP Keyserver..................... 223 7.1.11 Mailvelope Browser Add-on................ 226 7.1.12 OpenPGP-Verschlüsselung für Kontaktformulare.... 228 7.1.13 Web des Vertrauens...................... 230 7.1.14 Schlüssel zurückrufen.................... 233 7.2 S/MIME mit Thunderbird...................... 234 7.2.1 Kostenfreie Certification Authorities............ 234 7.2.2 Erzeugen eines Zertifikates................. 235 7.2.3 S/MIME-Krypto-Funktionen aktivieren.......... 236 7.2.4 Zertifikate der Partner und der CA importieren..... 237 7.2.5 Nachrichten verschlüsseln und signieren......... 238 7.2.6 Root-Zertifikate importieren................ 239 7.2.7 Eine eigene Certification Authority............. 240 7.2.8 Ist S/MIME-Verschlüsselung unsicher?.......... 241 7.3 E-Mail als verschlüsseltes Dokument senden........... 245 7.4 Eine Bemerkung zum Abschluß................... 245 8 E-Mail jenseits der Überwachung 247 8.1 Anonyme E-Mail Accounts..................... 247 8.2 Private Messages in Foren nutzen.................. 248 8.3 alt.anonymous.messages....................... 248 8.4 Mixmaster Remailer......................... 248 9 Instant Messaging 256 9.1 Jabber (XMPP)............................. 256 9.2 Jabber/XMPP Client Gajim..................... 262 10 Verschlüsselt telefonieren 267 10.1 Open Secure Telephony Network (OSTN)............. 268 10.1.1 OSTN-Provider........................ 269 10.2 VoIP-Client Jitsi............................ 270 6 INHALTSVERZEICHNIS 11 Anonymisierungsdienste 273 11.1 Warum sollte man diese Dienste nutzen?............. 273 11.2 Tor Onion Router........................... 276 11.2.1 Security Notes......................... 280 11.2.2 Anonym Surfen mit dem TorBrowserBundle....... 281 11.2.3 Tor Hidden Services..................... 287 11.2.4 Anonyme E-Mails mit Thunderbird............ 294 11.2.5 Anonym Bloggen....................... 298 11.2.6 Anonymes Instant-Messaging................ 299 11.2.7 Anonymes Instant-Messaging mit TorMessenger..... 300 11.2.8 Pidgin für Linux und Tor Onion Router.......... 303 11.2.9 Gajim (Linux) und Tor Onion Router........... 305 11.2.10 Anonymes Instant-Messaging mit TorChat........ 308 11.2.11 Anonymes Instant-Messaging mit Ricochet........ 310 11.2.12 Dateien anonym tauschen via Tor............. 311 11.2.13 Tor Bad Exit Nodes...................... 313 11.2.14 Tor Good Exit Nodes..................... 317 11.3 Finger weg von unseriösen Angeboten............... 319 11.3.1 Tor-Boxen........................... 319 11.3.2 Web-Proxys.......................... 319 11.3.3 Free Hide IP.......................... 320 11.3.4 ZenMate............................ 320 11.3.5 5socks.net........................... 321 11.3.6 BlackBelt Privacy, Cloakfish und JanusVM........ 323 11.3.7 Proxy-Listen.......................... 324 12 Anonyme Peer-2-Peer Netzwerke 325 12.1 Invisible Internet Project (I2P).................... 327 12.1.1 Installation des I2P-Routers................. 327 12.1.2 Konfiguration des I2P-Router................ 329 12.1.3 Anonym Surfen mit I2P................... 331 12.1.4 I2P Mail 1 (Susimail)..................... 333 12.1.5 I2P Mail 2 (Bote)....................... 335 12.1.6 I2P IRC............................. 339 12.1.7 I2P BitTorrent......................... 341 12.2 DSL-Router und Computer vorbereiten.............. 342 13 Daten verschlüsseln 343 13.1 Konzepte der vorgestellten Tools.................. 344 13.2 Gedanken zum Passwort....................... 345 13.3 Dokumente verschlüsselt speicher................. 348 13.4 Quick and Dirty mit GnuPG..................... 349 13.4.1 GnuPG für WINDOWS................... 350 13.5 dm-crypt für Linux.......................... 351 13.5.1 Bis zu 8 Passwörter mit LUKS................ 352 13.5.2 Verschlüsselten Container erstellen............. 352 13.5.3 Passwörter verwalten.................... 353 13.5.4 Verschlüsselten Container öffnen/schließen....... 354 13.5.5 Debian GNU/Linux komplett verschlüsseln....... 357 13.5.6 Ubuntu komplett verschlüsseln............... 357 INHALTSVERZEICHNIS
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