Which Jobs for Which Boys? Party Financing, Patronage and State Capacity in African Democracies
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Syracuse University SURFACE Dissertations - ALL SURFACE January 2015 Which Jobs for Which Boys? Party Financing, Patronage and State Capacity in African Democracies Rachel Sigman Syracuse University Follow this and additional works at: https://surface.syr.edu/etd Part of the Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons Recommended Citation Sigman, Rachel, "Which Jobs for Which Boys? Party Financing, Patronage and State Capacity in African Democracies" (2015). Dissertations - ALL. 325. https://surface.syr.edu/etd/325 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the SURFACE at SURFACE. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations - ALL by an authorized administrator of SURFACE. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Abstract Both Benin and Ghana are amongst Africa’s most celebrated examples of democratic success, but there is growing divergence in the capacity of their state institutions to act as effective agents of development. Why? This dissertation argues that modes of party financing are integral to understanding patterns of patronage-based recruitment to public office, and that these patronage practices have consequences for the broader developmental capacities of the state. The first part of the dissertation shows that leaders use political patronage not only as a means of “buying” votes,” but more fundamentally as a means of exerting control over the state’s resources. How leaders choose to access and control these resources depends on the size of the private sector and the strength of party organizations, both of which vary considerably across African countries. Where party organizations are strong and the private sector large, patronage is likely to be concentrated primarily at the elite level to facilitate the exchange of contracts for financial support to the party. Conversely, where private capital is more scarce, leaders will concentrate patronage at the public service level, enabling political supporters to access state revenue and rents for their party. These varying patronage practices have consequences for the broader developmen- tal capacities of the state. Elite level patronage leads to more stability and cohesion in the executive which, among other things, strengthens commitment to development programs over time even in the face of serious implementation challenges. High levels of public service patronage, by contrast, heighten organizational problems including technical deficiencies amongst public personnel, the frequent disappearance of state resources for political use and excessive control over bureaucratic agencies. This lat- ter environment is particularly challenging for the implementation of development programs. The argument is developed by combining comparative case analysis of Benin and Ghana with medium-N cross national analysis on a broader set of African countries. The case analysis draws on three principal sources of data collected in both countries, including 1) a comprehensive database containing appointment and biographical in- formation on all cabinet ministers from the early 1990s through 2013, 2) an original survey of over 500 civil servants in each country and 3) interviews with approximately 60 political and state actors. Together, the data allow for a novel empirical strategy that considers patronage across both elite and public service levels of the executive ap- paratus, and lends considerable support to a party-financing based explanation of the relationship between multi-party politics, patronage and state institutional capacity. Although the neopatrimonial perspective in African politics often leads us to be- lieve that patronage is both ubiquitous and uniformly detrimental to African states, this project shows otherwise. Instead the dissertation’s findings suggest the need to consider not only how much patronage, but which jobs are distributed and to whom. In so doing, the project moves away from monotonic conceptions of the relationship between democracy and state capacity, asking instead how multi-party politics inter- act with neopatrimonial forms of authority to produce variation in state institutional capacity. Which Jobs for Which Boys? Party Financing, Patronage and State Capacity in African Democracies By Rachel Sigman B.A. Wesleyan University, 2001 M.A. Syracuse University, 2010 DISSERTATION Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science in the Graduate School of Syracuse University Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs Syracuse University August 2015 Copyright c Rachel Sigman 2015 All Rights Reserved Acknowledgements This project would not have been possible without the guidance, support and friendship I received from many wonderful people. Thanks first and foremost to the members of my dissertation committee. Hans Peter Schmitz stuck with me even as the project deviated further and further away from his own expertise. His astute guidance and responsiveness throughout the process helped to propel me past each successive hurdle. Jon Hanson has always showed confidence in my abilities and encouraged me to build up my methodological skills in ways that have made me a more proficient and confident researcher. Three classes with Matt Cleary early in the graduate program cemented my ability to anticipate any possible challenge to my research, making me a stronger thinker, writer and presenter. I am grateful to Brian Taylor for his honesty and attention to detail in reviewing my work and for always ensuring that I have the relevant literature covered. I am delighted that Dominika Koter was able to join the committee. Her insights into party mobilization and financing in Benin have been especially useful in the recent development of the project. Thanks also to Gladys McCormick for her professionalism in chairing the oral defense. From my initial recruitment trip to Syracuse, I have always felt very well supported by the Political Science community at the Maxwell School. Thanks to Candy Brooks, Jacquie Meyer and Sally Greenfield for making the department an efficient and wel- coming place to pursue a PhD. I am especially grateful to Tom Keck and Kristi Andersen for the interest they took in my progress, and their willingness to offer support and guidance throughout. Many faculty members in the department have read and of- fered useful comments on my work, among them Seth Jolly, Dimitar Gueorguiev, Chris Faricy, and Spencer Piston. My ability to conduct field research was made possible by financial support from the v Smith Richardson Foundation, the Syracuse University Graduate School and Depart- ment of Political Science, the Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs, the Maxwell African Scholars Union, and the Maxwell School’s Roscoe Martin program. I am grateful to these institutions for supporting this project, many of them in the early stages when it was woefully unclear how it might turn out. It was only with the support of wonderful colleagues and friends that I was able to overcome the many challenges I encountered in the field. Professor E.K. Sakyi wel- comed me into his Department at the University of Ghana Business School, provided resources, office space and guidance to facilitate the initial collection of survey data. He also connected me with the many talented faculty in his Department, among them Dr. Daniel Appiah, who was particularly generous in the time and energy he spent discussing and partaking in the research. In Dr. George Bob-Milliar, I found a wonder- ful colleague and friend whose knowledge of Ghanaian political parties exerts much influence on the dissertation. The silver lining of Air Cote d’Ivoire’s terrible service was meeting Paul Opoku-Mensah, who shared wonderful insights about Ghanaian politics and connected me with his many accomplished colleagues and friends. I am grateful to Kassim Assouma for helping me to get my research started in Benin, and to Mme. Hyacinthe Koudhorot who not only welcomed me into the meticulously-kept archives at La Nation, but provided wonderful guidance for much of my research in Benin. I benefitted from the excellent research assistance provided by Anita Daniels, Innocent Fiagbe, Akosua Kuranchie, Ernest Opoku, Monel Sakponou, Portia Twerefoo and Charif Zime. Portia and Charif, in particular, always managed to stay a couple of steps ahead of me and kept things moving along even when I was being pulled in many directions. Last but not least, I thank the Otu family, Bertha Asabiya and Stephanie Rochatte for always providing a roof over my head when I needed one. Friends and family near and far have kept me grounded throughout this process. Sean and Keneshia were particularly apt at helping to make light of the peculiar sit- vi uations one encounters in graduate school. In the home stretch, Dave and Debbie K, Tony and Belinda and Mike and Katie always seemed to be there with a bed, a hot meal, a ride from the airport or whatever I needed at any particular moment. Thanks to Debra-Ellen for her many words of encouragement. Shawn not only held down the fort, but was always prepared with something fun in the works when I needed a break. Most importantly, I thank my parents, David and Diane, and my sister Laura for their unwavering support over the years, even when it was not at all clear to them (or me) where exactly this path would lead. vii Contents Abstract i Acknowledgments v List of Figures ix List of Tables x 1 Introduction 1 2 Modes of Party Financing 39 3 Which Jobs for Which Boys? 72 4 Elite Patronage and State Executive Capacity 96 5 Public Service Patronage and State Bureaucratic Capacity 128 6 Conclusion: State Capacity for Development in African Democracies 156 Appendix A: Survey Questionnaire 177 Appendix B: Survey Demographics 183 Appendix C: Descriptive Data for Regression Results in Table 6.2 187 References 188 Biographical Information 204 viii List of Figures 1.1 Ibrahim Human Development Scores 2000-2013 . .2 1.2 State Capacity in African Democracies 1984-2008 . 12 1.3 Government Effectiveness 1996-2010 (WGI) . 29 1.4 State Capacity 1986-2009 (Hanson and Sigman) .