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2. Monetary Union: the Political Shortcomings 2. MONETARY UNION: THE POLITICAL SHORTCOMINGS Román Escolano State Trade Expert, former Minister for the Economy 2.1. AN INCOMPLETE TASK, THE WRONG DEBATE Ten years have gone by since the outbreak of the Lehman Brothers crisis, and nine years have passed since the government of George Papandreou publicly questioned his country’s budget deficit figures after the Greek elections of October 2009. Thus began the chain of events that would finally mutate the global “Great Recession”, which at first mainly affected the US economy, into a severe and far-reaching Eurozone crisis. Much has been done since then to strengthen Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), especially if we compare this turbulent second decade of the euro with the apparent calm and stability of the first, after the adoption of the euro in 1998. Especially after the Euro Council meeting of 29 June 2012, changes of the required depth and scope began to be considered from a political and institutional point of view. The later story is well known. Since then, and over the next six years, crucial measures have been adopted – at an unprecedented rate – to create the “Banking Union”: it is worth recalling that this term was barely in use before that date. This is not the occasion for an exhaustive review of all those measures. Thorough and rigorous analysis is available from other sources, including earlier editions of this “Euro Yearbook”. But, to better understand what follows, we should bring to mind some of the milestones on this path. First, after the stress tests targeting the leading credit institutions that took place in 2012, the first two “limbs” of the Banking Union were formally established: the Single Supervisory Mechanism in 2014, and in 2016 the Single Resolution Mechanism, which soon became fully operational. In addition, Member States implemented – and began to apply – the statutory provi- sions of the Single Rulebook. This has gradually shaped a more cohesive regulatory frame- work and more effective supervision across the European Union, through: 65 EURO YEARBOOK 2018 a) stricter prudential requirements for banks, introduced by the Regulation and the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV/CRR); b) a new resolution framework, set out in the Bank Recovery and Resolution Direc- tive (BRRD); c) improved functioning of national deposit guarantee schemes (DGSs), reinforced by the Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive (DGSD). These reforms clearly had the effect of supporting the unusual (or “unconvention- al”) measures adopted by the European Central Bank since 2011-2002. ECB leaders have on several occasions reiterated that they would not have been able to tackle the measures alone, without political backing from the European Council, and, in particular, without the strong message arising from the June 2012 Summit. Alongside structural reforms adopted at the national level, these changes brought highly positive results in terms of financial stability. Financial markets became less frag- mented, thus lowering moral hazard, warding off the threat of bailouts funded by the public purse, and driving the risk of “redenomination” out of public debate once and for all. The effects also boosted economic figures in a broad sense. To quote recent figures from the European Commission,1 the European economy has entered its sixth year of recovery, creating nearly six million jobs since 2013. The jobless rate has remained at its lowest level since 2013 and the activity rate, at 70%, is above historic highs. Investment has picked up. Public deficits have fallen from over 6% in 2010 to 1.4% in 2017, and public debt rates have begun to subside. That economic performance has been strong is indisputable. EMU is now incompa- rably stronger and better prepared to deal with any economic shock than it was in the summer of 2009. According to recent editions of the Eurobarometer,2 the single curren- cy is still popular and appreciated by citizens, and its contribution to economic stability is seen as positive by a very large majority. However, it is equally clear that we are faced with a historic task that remains unfin- ished. The Eurozone is yet to achieve the institutional maturity of a firmly established currency area. 1 COM(217) 291 final: “Reflection Paper: on the Deepening of the Economic and Monetary Union”, p.11. 2 “Eurobarometer” Spring 2018, at europa.eu/rapid/press–release_IP–18–4118_es.pdf 66 MONETARY UNION: THE POLITICAL SHORTCOMINGS Source: European Commission. What remains to be done? The problem does not seem to be a matter of diagnosis. The outstanding issues have been fully identified. In the famous “Five Presidents’ Re- port” of 2015 and later papers,3 all the elements required to complete Economic and Monetary Union in definitive form are described in detail. If no further progress has been made, it cannot be said to be for lack of a thorough analysis of the situation. Among the outstanding issues, we could mention two that are especially well-known. One of the fundamental pillars of EMU, in particular the “third limb”, remains to be developed: the establishment of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS). If the key purpose of the reforms carried out since June 2012 was precisely to break the vicious circle of interaction between sovereign risk and banking risk, the absence of this decou- pling means that the European Banking Union still suffers from fundamental problems of stability, even though progress has been made on other fronts. Moreover, even in areas where tangible results have in fact been achieved, such as the first two limbs (the SSM and the resolution mechanism), the decision-making scheme is overly complex and takes the form of a dissatisfying blend of EU and intergovernmental procedures. Indeed, one of the side-effects of the Greek crisis was a serious decline of political trust among the European institutions, which compounded the financial difficulties. In particular, mistrust took root between the Commission and the Member States, most notably Merkel’s Germany. This crisis of confidence and trust, the fallout of which is still felt today, left its mark on the new institutional framework of EMU developed after 2012. 3 “Five Presidents’ Report”, 2015, at www.consilium.europa.eu/es/policies/emu–report–2015; “ECOFIN Roadmap” www.consilium.europa.eu/es/meetings/ecofin/2016/06/17/. 67 EURO YEARBOOK 2018 In November 2010, a few weeks after the controversial Franco-German summit in Deauville, in a speech on the occasion of the opening of the European College in Bru- ges,4 the German Chancellor went as far as to “theorise” on the need to adopt a new institutional approach in future, stating that the European Union should be ready to go beyond the traditional EU method and operate on a different basis: “As a representative of a member state I would like to say now that it sometimes seems to me that the representatives in the European Parliament and in the European Commission see themselves as the sole true champions of the community method … I have to tell you I am rather sceptical about this argument and whenever I hear it, I want to refute it ... Given this new division of competences, I believe we must put old rivalries behind us, we must set common goals and adopt common strategies. Perhaps we can agree on the following description of this approach: coordinated action in a spirit of solidarity – each of us in the area for which we are responsible but all working towards the same goal. That for me is the new “Union method”. This new “method” of intergovernmental agreements, carried out in parallel with, if not against, the EU institutions, was reflected in concrete initiatives such as theFiscal Compact 2012 (formally, Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Eco- nomic and Monetary Union) or the creation of the ESM in 2011 by means of a Treaty signed by the Eurozone Member States. Today, looking back, many think that this institutional scheme falls short. The reinte- gration of the new institutions into the EU framework has become another outstanding task. The situation today, as we have seen, is different from that addressed at Deauville. An environment of economic recovery has driven up confidence in the euro, but has also brought new challenges. Following the several major agreements reached in 2012-2014, with markets in a stressed financial situation, severe financial fragmentation and fears of a breakup of the single currency, the pace of progress in EMU seems to have slowed. Economic growth and, above all, the improvement in market tone have created a tougher political environment for further progress on the outstanding issues. It is not hard to understand why. In a more favourable macroeconomic situation – European growth even outstripped the United States for several years – the benefits of taking fur- ther steps towards integration seem more distant and less urgent; and what might be perceived as a sacrifice or a concession is harder to “sell” to public opinion. This would seem to prove Jean Monnet right, when he famously said, “Europe will be forged in crises, and will be the sum of the solutions adopted for those crises.” And although it is true that there is now a “canonical” view on the long-term design of EMU, revolving around the proposal made by in the “Five Presidents’ Report” – on which there is formally an agreement, at least in principle – this political environment means the discrepancies between Member States (the North versus the South, creditors versus debtors, the Franco-German pair itself) persist over time, and even fester and 4 “Speech by the Federal Chancellor at the Opening of the 61st year of the College of Europe in Bruges”, 2 November 2010.
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