1 Psychological Warfare Theory 1

Notes 1 Psychological Warfare Theory 1. In the war against the Midianites, the Israelite prophet Gideon employed noise and deception to demoralize the enemy’s superior forces (Judges 7: 17–22). See also the speech by the Assyrian commander, Ravshakeh, to the besieged inhabitants of Jerusalem in 701 BC, urging them to surrender (2 Kings 18: 17–37; Isaiah 36). 2. Philip M. Taylor, World Encyclopedia of Propaganda, New York: Sharpe, 1998, pp. xv–xix. 3. Charles Roetter, Psychological Warfare, London: B. T. Batsford, 1974, pp. 35–37. 4. See the US Army manual on psychological warfare, accessible on the Internet: FM 3-1-1, Psychological Operations Techniques and Procedures. http://www.enlisted. info/field-manuals/fm-33-1-1-psychological-operations-techniques-and-procedures.shtml 5. JP 3-13.2 Military Information Support Operation, http://info.publicintelli- gence.net/JCS-MISO.pdf, January 7, 2010. Incorporating Change 1, December 20, 2011. 6. Socialism played an important part in shaping the worldview of the state’s founders. Israeli leaders were fully aware of propaganda’s tremendous potential in the hands of those appointed to wield it. 7. Hasbara comes from the Hebrew word “to explain.” The term originated with Nahum Sokolow, an early Zionist leader. 8. Moshe Yegar, Toldot Hahasbara Hayisraelit (The History of Israel’s Foreign Hasbara System), Tel Aviv: Lahav Publishers, 1986, p. 38. 9. These publications can be found in the Truman Research Institute Library, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Mt. Scopus Campus. 10. The USIA is now part of the State Department. 11. FM 3-1-1, Psychological Operations Techniques and Procedures. 12. Deliberate action is being taken to prevent a repeat of the unwanted develop- ments of the Vietnam War (1961–1973) and the wars in Afghanistan (2001–) and in Iraq (2003–2011) after the American occupation. 188 ● Notes 2 Principles of Psychological Warfare Management 1. Nazi Germany’s propaganda system, prior to the invasion of the Soviet Union (June 1941), depicted Bolshevism as a menace to humankind. In recent years the Palestine Authority and the Egyptians have broadcast anti-Semitic diatribes that included the demonization of Israel. 2. For example, the orders “Encounter!” or “Forward, charge!” force every soldier to respond immediately. 3. The First Gulf War (1991) is the classic case of the US army utilizing the media to convey messages that served the military’s aims. 4. The source for tracking the bogus leaflets is Dr. Saleh Abd al-Jawad from Bir Zeit. See, Saleh Abd al-Jawad, “Les Faux tracts,” Revue d’études palestiniennes, 48, été, 1993; see also the B’Tselem report—Collaborators in the Occupied Territories during the Intifada: Violations and Infringements on Human Rights, 1994 [Hebrew]. 5. Israeli Foreign Ministry representatives distributed a tape of the lynching to the participants at the Sharm el-Sheikh Conference (the PLO and United States) that was held one week after the event (October 16–17). 4 Psychological Warfare in the Arab-Israeli Wars (1948–1982) 1. Be this as it may, many people in the Yishuv joined the British army in World War II, and actually experienced psychological warfare first-hand by both sides in the conflict, such as radio broadcasts and air-dropped leaflets. 2. The American psywar unit in World War II encountered the same problem when air commanders refused to risk their crewmen in dispersing “pieces of paper.” To counter this, psywar officers launched a “marketing” campaign, the gist of which was semantic—replacing the term “pieces of paper” with “paper bullets.” 3. Captain Katz’s letter to Lieutenant Colonel Herzog, chief of intelligence services, December 1, 1948; Herzog’s reply was that he was very interested in Katz’s work and would help him find a room and transportation, but his hands were tied (March 2, 1949, IDF Archives 2169/50/72). 4. In the 1950s Nawi retired from politics and was elected mayor of Beer Sheva, an office he held for many years. He published books on Arab folklore, the most important of which for understanding psychological warfare is: Stories from the Old Middle East: Wisdom, Lechery and Lessons to be Learned [sipurei hamizrach hatichon hayashan: chochma, zima vimusar heskel ] (Tel Aviv: Tamuz, 2000). 5. Rafi Buchnik, “Voice of Israel Broadcasts Fail to Reach Most of the Gaza Strip—A Mess-up in Arabic Broadcasts,” Ha’aretz, September 18, 2003. 6. The main sources of information on Mossad activity: Yossi Melman (ed.), CIA Report on Israel’s Intelligence and Security Services (Tel Aviv: Erez Press, 1982)—an anthology of documents, removed by the Khomeini regime removed from the Notes ● 189 United States Embassy in Tehran and later published; Meir Amit, Head to Head: A Personal Look at Great Events and World Affairs (Or Yehuda: Hed Artzi Publishers, 1999)—memoirs of the former chief of the Mossad; Victor Ostrovsky, By Way of Deception: The Making and Unmaking of a Mossad Officer (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990)—a sensational book. 7. Paul Linebarger & Myron Anthony, Psychological Warfare (Washington DC: Combat Forces Press, 1954). 8. Based on the report of Nichols Van Damme of the Dutch Foreign Ministry. Van Damme stated that he exposed the case because he felt that remaining silent would have caused long-term damage to Druze-Israeli relations. 9. The Egyptians, wittingly or unwittingly, employed the system that the Germans had used in World War I—letting out bits of information on French war prisoners in order to get the French people to read their propaganda sheet. 10. Palestinian sources reported 700–800 killed, while official Lebanese reports put the number at 460. 11. Foreign journalists arriving in Lebanon for brief stays found accommodations in Beirut’s Commodore Hotel. The hotel bar was, in effect, the nerve center for information on Lebanon. The Syrians, PLO, and other Palestinian groups did their best to get the journalists to publish their positions by employing the “stick and carrot method.” The carrot was providing information, granting dramatic interviews with the underground, and allowing exclusive pictures. The stick came in the form of threats, kidnappings, and, on occasion, murder. Journalists—especially those who remained in Lebanon for extended periods— had to walk a very thin line when reporting the events. 5 The War between Israel and Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon (1985–2000) 1. Twenty thousand people were killed in the Lebanese Civil War, over half of them Shiites. 2. These include the break-away “Islamic Amal,” a Shiite organization that split from “Amal” and carried out innumerable strikes against the IDF. 3. The Hezbollah was not the only one to threaten and blackmail SLA troops. When manpower in the Christian militia declined following widespread demoralization caused by Hezbollah’s threats and attacks, the SLA high command began pressur- ing the local population, Christians as well as Shiites, to join its ranks. Dissenters and their families were sent to the SLA-controlled el-Hiam prison to ensure the troops’ loyalty. 4. Jewish history is rife with cases of Jews being kidnapped and held for ransom. This became a major topic of discussion in Talmudic literature and the Responsa (rab- binical questions and answers). 190 ● Notes 5. After protracted negotiations, the bodies of the three soldiers were returned to Israel in late 2004 along with the very much alive Elhanan Tenenbaum, a senior reservist officer who had been kidnapped by Hezbollah and held in custody for three years. In exchange Israel had to release four hundred Palestinian prisoners and dozens of others from Arab countries, including Mustafa Dirani and Abd al-Karim Obeid whom Israel had abducted as bartering chips for information on the missing airman Ron Arad. 6. The Hezbollah leader Sheikh Fadlallah gave many interviews to the foreign press, such as Der Spiegel and Le Figaro, but his real attitude toward Western countries can be gleaned from the organization’s Arabic-language publications and interviews in the Arab press. See M. Kramer, “Hezbollah’s Vision on the West,” Policy Papers, No. 16, (1989), The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Ch. IV. 7. The sources for this chapter are Israeli newspapers and “Hatzav”—the military intelligence’s unit that tracked the public media in the Arab world. 8. The messages are sorted according to target audiences, based on the theory of Maurice Tugwell who studied the connection between terror and propaganda in underground organizations, such as the IRA, the FLN in Algeria, and Etzel (Menachem Begin’s paramilitary organization during the British Mandate). 9. Demonization is a highly effective psychological tool since it circumvents rational considerations and convinces people to obey orders automatically for the sake of a national idea or higher goal. Conversations with IDF troops who served in Lebanon reveal that they felt no overriding hatred toward Hezbollah. On the other hand, the Shiite organization employed religious and psychological motifs to instill an ideological and psychological hatred of Israel in its members. 10. The Hezbollah leader Subhi Tufayli described the sacrifice made by the organization’s fighters: “The Islamic Revolution will continue regardless of obstacles. Islam is a way of life that views the world as a platform for action and struggle. Its prize is the Afterlife, and it is of no importance whether we achieve victory and hegemony in this world, only that we act in accordance with the will of God. If God’s will is realized by self-sacrifice or monetary payment, then Islam commands the Muslims to suffer and strive for victory.” The document was translated by Hatzav (17.4.90/843/007), taken from an interview published in the Lebanese newspaper Al Ahad on February 16, 1990. 11.

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